Chapter 7
In the meantime, vice president Vakha Arsanov used Maskhadov's absence from home to shoot a critical salvo at him in the parliament claiming that "the nation is losing confidence in the leaders of Ichkeria" (Kommersant-Daily, September 12, 1998). Arsanov offered his stabilisation package for Chechnya, which included convening Chechnya's national congress, a radical turn in the foreign and domestic policy, and giving all law enforcement and military authority to the vice president, i.e. himself. Although the parliament made no decision at that meeting, it generally upheld what the vice president said.
Several days later, some influential field commanders declared their open opposition to Maskhadov. On September 24, 1998 Kommersant-Daily reported that the former Chechen premier, Shamil Basayev, joined the radical opposition by teaming up with another notorious terrorist, Salman Raduyev. Supported by the chief of the Chechen Anti-Terrorist Centre, Hunkar Israpilov, Basayev and Raduyev accused Aslan Maskhadov of usurping power and violating the constitution, and demanded that he resigned. Although the Chechen parliament deemed these claims invalid, having debated the field commanders' letter on September 23, the situation in Chechnya became sharply aggravated again.
The newspaper reported that the field commanders had accused Maskhadov of "usurping power and pre-empting the judicial system" by depriving the parliament of the right to appoint judges. The field commanders further insisted that cronyism and nepotism were the president's guiding principles in selecting candidates for office. They asserted that the current system of the Shariah ran counter to the republic's constitution and provoked several armed conflicts in Chechnya. Maskhadov was also accused of knowingly obstructing the process of setting up a Constitutional Court in the republic.
One other serious charge was that the president was consistently and repeatedly breaking the law on the protection of state sovereignty and independence. For instance, when discussing the status of Ichkeria with the Russian party, Maskhadov was violating the provision of that law by which the "state sovereignty and independence of Chechnya may not be a subject of negotiation with other nations, including Russia".
Basayev, Raduyev and Israpilov also claimed that Maskhadov had received arms from Russia after his envoys had held secret talks with Russian Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin. Maskhadov was also charged with holding raucous celebrations and building a sumptuous residence at a time when thousands of people in Chechnya were homeless.
Deeming actions of the president "a gravest crime" the authors of the letter demanded he be brought to book in an effort to save Chechnya from a "total crisis and civil confrontation".
The parliament took the letter calmly. The press secretary of the parliament, Lomali Misirbiyev, stated that the letter "did not point at any substantive facts requiring serious action". Besides, members of the parliament knew that relations between Maskhadov and the authors of the letter had been tense, he added. Several criminal proceedings had been initiated against Raduyev, while Israpilov's Anti-Terrorist Centre was marked for early dissolution.
Nonetheless, the Chechen parliament considered the field commanders' letter at its extraordinary closed meeting on September 23. Maskhadov and his administration were invited to join the meeting. According to Misirbiyev, "the discussion between the president and MPs bolstered Aslan Maskhadov's position and improved mutual understanding between the president and parliament", whereas the arguments of the opposition were discarded as unconvincing.
In its commentary, Kommersant-Daily emphasises that despite official Grozny's appeasing statements, the situation was truly extraordinary. The alliance of Salman Raduyev and Shamil Basayev, who openly joined the radical opposition and were backed by the well-trained armed units operating under the auspices of the Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Daghestan promised little good to Maskhadov in any case.
Kommersant-Daily further reported on September 30, 1998, that the field commanders in opposition had demanded Maskhadov's resignation at a congress of the resistance movement in Grozny on September 29. They had accused Maskhadov of breaking the laws of the Shariah and constitution. The congress intended to replace Maskhadov with Raduyev and threatened to instigate civil unrest. Maskhadov, for his part, said that people "like Raduyev should be put before a firing squad".
The congress of the resistance movement was held at a stadium in Grozny and attracted about 5,000 people. The presidium of the congress, which included vice president Vakha Arsanov, former acting premier and chairman of the congress of the people of Chechnya and Daghestan Shamil Basayev, field commanders Salman Raduyev, Ruslan Gelayev and Hunkar Israpilov, was closely circled by security guards. Speaking to the congress, Raduyev said that Maskhadov "had departed from the idea of independence making one concession to Russia after another". "Maskhadov is trying to make the Chechen population a crowd of slaves and rules the republic indivisibly finding strength in dictatorship," Basayev said. The congress passed a vote of no-confidence in the president due to his "inability to manage the country" and demanded that he resign.
Maskhadov retaliated by organising a military parade on the other side of the stadium at the same time. In his address, the president denounced all accusations categorically.
After this reconnaissance, it seemed that the Chechen leaders would not make a deal with the opposition, the Krasnaya Zvezda daily reported on October 3, 1998. However, the previously flaccid parliament suddenly felt it could make use of the heavily armed opposition and threatened Maskhadov with impeachment.
To keep power, the Chechen president had to make a deal. On October 1, Maskhadov issued an edict discharging the cabinet of ministers. His press service announced that the government would be reshuffled by 90 percent. However, unlike the parliament, the resignation of the cabinet of ministers was not enough for Raduyev, Basayev, Israpilov and their supporters. They started an ongoing rally in Grozny that would last until the parliament debated the impeachment of Maskhadov, as they claimed. Armed fighters need either appeasement or a stronger fist. The latter was something that Maskhadov could clearly not afford, Krasnaya Zvezda believed.
An article by Victoria Sokolova in the Paris-based Russkaya Mysl (October 15, 1998) pondered on the yet another round in Maskhadov's fracas with field commanders. The article asserted that the convocation of the national Chechen Congress on October 8 by Maskhadov was an appeal to the vox populi to match the recently held congress of the "Russian-Chechen war veterans".
Seeking to give a national dimension to his forum, the president could not do better than calling a rally of individuals devoted to him personally. Indicatively, Maskhadov had dismissed this idea in September, when it had been suggested by his disloyal second in command Vakha Arsanov. At that time, Maskhadov claimed that he had been elected by popular vote and did not need any reiteration of his legitimacy. A few weeks afterwards, Maskhadov had to call a congress. This allegedly indicated his poor evaluation of the situation and need of extra support. The congress upheld all Maskhadov's proposals, even calling for 'blood vengeance' on all kidnappers in Chechnya.
The opposition - Shamil Basayev, Salman Raduyev and Hunkar Israpilov - retaliated by denouncing the congress as "not national" by virtue of not being invited and setting up a Centre for Social and Political Parties and Movements. As many as 35 groups in opposition to Maskhadov joined the centre. The coalition's main demands were Maskhadov's early resignation and the rejection of any talks with Russia before it formally recognised Chechnya's full independence.
In an effort to avoid any accusations of staging an armed coup d'etat, Sokolova observes, Basayev made a public appearance stating that he would seek the resignation of the president only by constitutional means. Obviously, the author remarks, Basayev would soon realise his predicament: Maskhadov would not resign voluntarily, no forceful methods were available, and if they were, Raduyev would replace him. The president saw the situation as well and continued to invite Basayev to commence a dialogue. Thus, Maskhadov even said he was prepared to negotiate with all opposition forces.
No party to the conflict managed to tip the balance visibly in its favour by the middle of October, but Sokolova still maintains Maskhadov was in a somewhat better position, as indicated by the process of forming a new government. He used the resignation of the previous cabinet, which was perceived by the parliament and opposition as bowing to their demands, to purge the government of disloyal politicians and field commanders. The position of the first vice premier was eliminated (Maskhadov had been careful not to appoint a prime minister for a long time, preferring to act as one himself). He appointed Alkhazur Abdulkerimov to oversee the crucial oil industry instead of the Basayev brothers. Other vice premiers were to include Turpal-Ali Atgeriev (law enforcement), Kazbek Makhashev (foreign intelligence), Lom-Ali Alsultanov (agriculture), Khamzat Shidayev (social sector), Nuzhden Daayev (transport), Isa Bisayev (economy), Eli Sultanov and Akhmed Zakayev. Nearly all of them were the president's closest allies. The new cabinet did not include the "pro-Russian" Yusup Soslambekov, or "pro-Saudi" Movladi Udugov who had bickered for the right to pursue Chechen foreign policy and ideology in the previous government.
In this highly charged situation, Sokolova notes, Maskhadov kept to a cautious line in his relations with Russia by setting up links with the newly appointed Russian Premier Yevgeni Primakov but still using the obligatory anti-Moscow rhetoric. Thus, at the national congress the president promised to fight not only against the "reactionary forces" calling for toppling the government in the neighbouring Daghestan, Georgia and Azerbaijan, but also with the secret services of Moscow, the West, Middle East, the Wahhabi, etc. The Primakov government could understand this. Even the Interior Ministry known for its traditionally rough attitude to the Chechens realised Maskhadov was probably the most loyal to Moscow among all Chechen leaders.
The article further asserts that the long-standing Russian-Chechen entanglement showed weak signs of progress. The terms of reference of a negotiating commission on a fully fledged treaty were transferred to a state commission on the stabilisation and development of the economic situation in Chechnya, which was headed by the Nationalities Minister Ramazan Abdulatipov. Eventually, those responsible for the Chechen problem were identified in the new Primakov government.
The article also suggests that positive signs in the dialogue between Moscow and Grozny could possibly provoke new kidnappings in Chechnya. At least the official Chechen leaders and Russian law enforcement agencies strongly maintain that abductions were designed to discredit Maskhadov and disrupt the process of negotiations. The dead body of Akmal Saidov who was on the staff of the Russian government's representation office to Chechnya and abducted on September 29, was found on the Chechen-Ingush border on October 3. On the same day, October 3, UK Granger telecom engineers and UK nationals Peter Kennedy, Darren Hickey, Rudolf Petschi and New Zealander Stanley Shaw contracted by Chechentelecom were abducted. The fate of the Russian presidential envoy to Chechnya, Valentin Vlasov, also remained uncertain. In this situation, the federal authorities probably chose to keep negotiations on ice not to let Maskhadov down. This is probably why the meeting of Maskhadov and Primakov scheduled for October 10 was cancelled, Russkaya Mysl concludes.
It should be noted here that the abductions of highly placed Russian officials (Vlasov, Shpigun, and Saidov) and Westerners in Chechnya fit in the internal political context nicely. Maskhadov's opponents consistently presented the president as a person who did not keep his country under control. To boot, abductions are always associated with hefty ransom expected by slave-driver politicians. Maskhadov certainly knew who organised these outrageous abductions, but was also certainly unable to punish the culprits.
On October 25, the media reported the death of the chief of Chechnya's anti-abduction directorate, Shadid Bargishev. His car was blown up one day before a large hostage freeing operation.
President Maskhadov issued an edict to fight kidnappers. Maskhadov also demanded that field commanders dissolve all armed units other than the national armed forces reporting to the general staff.
The response came soon. One day after Shadid Bargishev was killed, an attempt was made on the Mufti of Chechnya, Akhmad Khadzhi Kadyrov, in Grozny on October 26. The Mufti survived having leapt out of his burning Mercedes. On the previous Sunday, September 25, the Mufti had called for the elimination of the gangs of kidnappers.
Even after this, Maskhadov stated that the fight against crime would continue.
In the late October he met with the Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeni Primakov, in Vladikavkaz despite the critics accusing him of making advances towards Moscow.
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