Chapter 6
Shortly after the meeting with Russian Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov went abroad, staying in Turkey for a few days while on his way to the United States. Observers noted that Maskhadov's major goal in his voyage was to woo foreign investors in an attempt to make the Chechen Republic a free economic zone in the near future as had been announced in Nazran.
The day before Maskhadov left Grozny, ITAR-TASS reported that, when in Washington, he would announce a project to attract as many as USD 30 billion for Chechnya using his republic's oil exports as a security. Apparently, the Chechen president had discussed the approximate share of Chechnya in the joint production and refining of oil, which he discussed with the Russian Prime Minister.
Most probably, Aslan Maskhadov was looking hard for investment in Turkey too, even though no clear evidence supported this assumption. At any rate, Husamettin Cindoruk, the leader of the Democratic Turkey Party, which is part of the coalition government, spoke in favour of a closer study of the Chechen potential by Turkish investors and contractors. Up to this point, however, the parties limited themselves to warm compliments.
In her comment on Maskhadov's visit to the United States, political analyst Lilya Shevtsova noted that the US establishment remained remarkably indifferent to the Chechen canvassers. This time, Maskhadov scored much less attention than during his first US tour of autumn 1997 (Moscow News, August 11, 1998).
The Chechen delegation came to Washington under the formal pretext of attending a conference on Islamic unity organised by the previously unknown groups invisibly backed by the official circles normally supporting moderate Islamic movements, Shevtsova asserted. The purpose of Maskhadov's visit was to attract the attention of the US business and political community to Chechnya. He also played a somewhat different tune in Washington than he had in the UK in March 1998. In London, the Chechen president had attempted to prove his republic's right to independence incessantly claiming that "Chechnya has never been part of Russia". In Washington, he toned down his anti-Russian rhetoric. He even went as far as to claim that an opportunity of "rapprochement" between Grozny and Moscow was available for the first time in 400 years of confrontation. Maskhadov acted as an exceptionally well-balanced and careful politician, apparently realising that anti-Russian vociferation would get him nowhere in the West. He was now implying that he had a carte blanche from the Kremlin.
Maskhadov clearly stated that he had agreed with premier Kiriyenko that "Russia should not hamper Western investments in Chechnya". Whatever Kiriyenko had actually said at the meeting, he gave the Chechens enough leeway to interpret his words as a signal to seek Western aid. The Chechen delegation proposed that Washington invest USD 30 billion in Chechnya promising potential investors "attractive terms". Maskhadov was looking for the right words to convince his audience that Chechnya could ensure the safety of pipelines and refineries needed for the Russian market above all others. In his few meetings with the political establishment, he was insistent that Chechnya would be stabilised and that there would be "no Afghan or Tajik scenarios" there. His US counterparts maintained an impervious look and nodded occasionally, having heard grim stories of recurring hostage- taking and the recent attempt on Maskhadov himself.
The official line chosen by Washington allowed no second interpretation: it let Maskhadov know politely but firmly that he was regarded only as the leader of one of Russia's constituent members, even if it were a member looking daggers at Moscow. It appeared that Maskhadov's remark "Russia's not against..." caused a certain reaction in Washington, Shevtsova observes. More likely than not, it would provoke the US to play with possible new configurations of the North Caucasus.
As for Maskhadov in Washington, he couldn't help but appear as a deeply dramatic figure, Shevtsova remarks. He did his best to show confidence, but his face and his stance betrayed bitterness and doom. Maskhadov had to admit that everything depended on Russia, but Russia was unable to help Chechnya. A man of reason, Maskhadov realised that Western investment in a devastated region with uncertain status flooded by bellicose guerrilla troops was an impossible combination. Still he was doomed to make his hopeless trips creating an illusion of looking for a way out of a nearly hopeless situation.
After his visit to the United States, Aslan Maskhadov visited Indonesia and Malaysia in early September 1998. Chechnya attempted to present them as "official state visits" which was a far cry from reality. The truth was that Maskhadov attempted to tie a few links with business communities in a bid to attract investors to Chechnya.
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
