Chapter 5
On August 1, Russian Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko met with President Aslan Maskhadov of Chechnya in Nazran to conduct talks.
The results of the meeting were commented on in the article by Mikhail Vinogradov "Chechnya to Become a Free Zone" published in the French newspaper Russkaya Mysl (August 6, 1998). The article said that by and large the meeting boiled down to assuring Maskhadov of Moscow's readiness to provide him with support. According to Vinogradov, Kiriyenko's proposal to create a free economic zone in the territory of Chechnya can hardly be viewed as a serious breakthrough, given the republic's actual exemption from the Russian customs and border-guard regime.
According to the journalist, it is unclear what instructions were given by Yeltsin to the head of the government for the talks with Maskhadov. Probably, he just asked to "gauge" the other party's steadiness and evaluate his position following a long pause in the Russian-Chechen dialogue. The initiative to hold the meeting came from President Yeltsin and was caused by the extremely difficult situation Maskhadov recently found himself in. For the centre, he was still the most loyal and acceptable Chechen leader, but the signs of his growing weakness were recently becoming ever more obvious, as was the increasing independence of the numerous armed units and aggravation of internal differences within the ruling coalition headed by Maskhadov.
The seriousness of the situation was demonstrated by the abortive attempt on Maskhadov on July 23, 1998. Apparently, it was that event revealing the shakiness of Maskhadov's position that prodded Yeltsin to declare his unequivocal support for the President of Chechnya and send Sergei Kiriyenko to meet him. After a pause in the dialogue between Moscow and Grozny which lasted for a few months, negotiations between Kiriyenko and Maskhadov could open a new chapter in relations between Russia and Chechnya, however, that would happen only if the parties had something to offer each other. In the meantime, the model of their behaviour differed little from the previous dialogue, the author writes. Moscow continued to follow the letter of the Khasavyurt agreements under which the issue about Chechnya's status was postponed until 2001, while Grozny was demonstrating Chechnya's independence even at this stage. As a result, the essence of the meeting was that the centre confirmed something that everybody had known a long time ago: Maskhadov's continued tenure of office would best suit the centre.
According to the article, the centre did not have the financial resources to provide assistance to Chechnya for restoring its destroyed economy. Even if the funds had been available, the saga of the multi-trillion programme of recovery adopted by the government in 1996, demonstrated the unwillingness of the State Duma and the Federation Council to endorse the programme, the government's reluctance to implement it, and the aversion of the Chechen recipients of the assistance to the idea of using it for the good purposes outlined in the programme.
As for armed support the centre could have provided for Maskhadov, the idea, according to Vinogradov, would be misunderstood in Russia and would not be accepted by the Chechen leader. Fully aware of that, the Interior Ministry of Russia coordinating the efforts of power structures in the North Caucasus was emphasising its preparations for repelling future Chechen "raids" against populated localities and locations of military units in Daghestan and other republics bordering on Chechnya.
The meeting between Maskhadov and Kiriyenko could have looked effective, if the Chechen president had broken off ties with the more radical of his partners in the government coalition, Shamil Basayev and Movladi Udugov, but he was not prepared to do so. At this point, Maskhadov again asserted that the attempt on his life was ordered by "foreign secret services" (which actually means Russian power agencies) and indicated that the main issue for him were compensation payments and Russian financing of the republic's restoration. The relevant outlays were defined in the peace treaty signed in May 1997.
Lurking behind the internal Chechen strife, the armed clashes in Gudermes, the attempt on Maskhadov, and the anti-Wahhabi declarations by the president himself were something more significant than just power struggle. The question remained what kind of a state Chechnya is building. This was how the extensive article by Maksim Shevchenko is called (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 12, 1998).
Analysing processes unfolding in post-war Chechen society, he turned to historical analogies of last century, the fight by imam Shamil against Chechen and Daghestani kingpins of the time.
Russia's war in the Caucasus of the 19th century began as imperial interference in the Caucasus' internal affairs. The local tribal aristocracy had been incorporated into the Russian structures from the late 18th-early 19th century and existed as semi-European and semi-Asian bureaucratic-feudal corporations, the journalist writes. Thus, shamkhals of Tarki (who owned lands in Daghestan) had the title of generals of the Russian Army by birth since Peter the Great campaign against Persia. For the then inhabitants of the North Caucasus, Islam was no more than just the traditional religion. The influence of Islam was weaker in the more remote locations situated higher up in the mountains (particularly in Chechnya where tribal relations and traditions were absolutely predominant).
The new radical approach based on Shariah and rooted in the main provisions of Khanbalite Mazkhab (unlike others it first emerged as a religious-political movement and only then transformed into a law school distinguished by its fanatical rigor in observing the rituals and legal norms of Shariah, but resolutely opposing any extremes both in religious dogmas and in the life of the community) was inspired by imams Gazi-Muhammed, Gamzat-bek, and was most consistently translated into life by imam Shamil.
It was the struggle of the forces of Islamic religious resurrection personified by an imamate state in whose territory Shariah was the only existing law that underlined the peculiar nature of war in Chechnya and Daghestan. Adats (local customs) were condemned by Shamil as "laws of the shaitan".
Imam Shamil lost to both the military power of the empire and the willingness of the mountaineers "to live not by the law of Allah, but the way their grandfathers and great-grandfathers lived", the author of the article emphasises. Initially Shamil's preaching was an enormous success and entire mountain areas came under the authority of the imamate. Even Soviet historiography pointed to the similarity of ideals espoused by the Muridis (the followers of Shamil) and socialism. German historian Tielman Nagel underlined that the purpose of Moslem statehood is "to unite all humankind in a single commune set up in accordance with the law of God". The principle of justice, which is fundamental to Islamic religious conscience, helped Shamil to achieve success in his fight against the local feudal lords.
But the economic blockade of the areas ruled by the imam and the impoverishment of the population suffering losses from the punitive expeditions antagonised most of the people who refused to fight for the implementation of "pure Shariah". His last bulwark on Mount Gunib was stormed by units of mountaineers fighting side by side with the Russians.
Turning to contemporary problems, Shevchenko writes that apparently the Kremlin assigned to Maskhadov the role of the very same aristocracy (in the modern bourgeois fashion) against which the advocates of Shariah fought (the "Wahhabis" of that time) in the 19th century. It is believed in Moscow that the demeanour of a smart officer could have given Maskhadov the opportunity to become the exponent of a new European state approach, even though the traditional "Islamic component" would have been preserved (in which case Ichkeria has the potential to become "another Turkey" where Islam is present at the level of formal cultural religiousness, whereas its real postulates mean nothing for the state).
But this is only partly true, the author of the article believes. Chechen society was facing the most serious choice in its history, that between a Shariah state and a national state.
It stands to reason that the only politician who really personifies the struggle for imam Shamil's heritage today is Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. Rumours that he had been elected imam of the North Caucasus were not confirmed. In a Nezavisimaya Gazeta interview Yandarbiyev underlined that he himself declined to take that position. One can clearly understand the reason why he did that. The real election of Yandarbiyev to that position would create and formalise in Chechnya powerful opposition to the legitimate Maskhadov structures. Maskhadov's claims to Yandarbiyev are largely due to the former's fear of the real authority of the latter. Yandarbiyev has not officially assumed the role of "an heir to Shamil". But Shevchenko believes that sooner or later the logic of events would force him to do so. The developments in Gudermes revealed not only the emergent lines of opposition in Chechen society but also confronted the leadership in Grozny with the fact that the fundamentalist opposition to the idea of a European state is military force.
How vast and how influential is it? Shevchenko names Khattab among its supporters but not leaders. According to the journalist, Khattab is a successful soldier but has no influence in Chechnya as a politician. Classed with the real spiritual leaders of the advocates of a pure Shariah state should be mullah Bagauddin Mukhammed who escaped to Chechnya from Kizil-Yurt (Daghestan) after the Wahhabis began to be persecuted. His audiences are growing with every new day, and his supporters have many opportunities for disseminating their ideas (for instance, an extremely radical newspaper, Al-Qaf, is published in Grozny with a circulation of 2,000 copies; a typical headline in that newspaper would be "Buinaksk Battle: Glorious Landmark of Caucasus Jihad"). The conflict between them and Maskhadov's supporters is more profound and serious, and it is by no means confined to the rift between the Shariah and National Guards. Mullah Bagauddin sits in Urus-Martan and none of Maskhadov's decrees against Wahhabism will force him to leave Chechnya.
The idea of Shariah rule is aimed at destroying the teip-based structure of society and purports to be a revolutionary anti-imperial force challenging not only Maskhadov but also the entire North Caucasus government recessed into the Russian establishment.
The only thing that should be added to these considerations is that given such ideological purposes, the raid on Daghestan had been pre-determined. And there was no way Maskhadov could have prevented it.
Even when Maskhadov and the forces opposing him are fighting for international recognition of the Chechen Republic, they pursue somewhat different objectives. Maskhadov advocates the building of an independent state within the geographical borders of the Chechen Republic, while his radical opponents see an independent Chechnya only as the first step towards the establishment of a broader state entity, a North Caucasus Confederation at least.
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