2.5. Daghestan, August 1999
On August 6, Vadim Ilyin published an article called "No Replay of 'Chechen Scenario' in Daghestan" in Nezavisimaya Gazeta. He recalled that three years earlier to the date, on August 6, 1996, Chechen units seized Grozny and after a few days of fierce fighting forced the federal authorities to enter into negotiations. Later in August 1996, the Khassav-Yurt Accords were signed.
Some mass media recently predicted that a new war in the Caucasus would break out precisely on August 6, and so far these predictions have held an inevitable promise of coming true, something evidenced by clashes between the militia force and Islamic extremists in Daghestan's Tsumadin district. The situation in the mountainous areas of Daghestan sharply aggravated during the first week of August 1999, Ilyin indicated.
On August 5, units of 102nd Brigade of the Russian Interior Ministry moved from Makhachkala to the Tsumadin district. Their mission was to provide security along the administrative border with Chechnya. According to official reports, the brigade as a whole would move to the mountains to form the backbone of a federal force on the border between the two republics - the mountainous part of Daghestan and the Chechen Republic, the article said. In addition there were plans to move a battalion of the Defence Ministry's 136th Motor-rifle brigade from Buinaksk to the Botlikh district bordering on the Tsumadin district. The Defence Ministry units were assigned the mission of "eliminating bandits with all means available if they infiltrate into Daghestan".
Shortly before that, two militants were killed in the Botlikh district. They were members of a criminal grouping and exchanged fire with the militia. On the night of August 5, the interior troops on the Chechen - Daghestan border repeatedly opened fire on Chechen militants who were officially reported to have infiltrated into the Daghestan territory. Therefore, on the whole, the situation in Daghestan remained regularly troubled and did not threaten to escalate into large-scale hostilities, Ilyin writes. Akhmednabi Makhtigadzhiyev, secretary of Daghestan's Security Council, announced that there were no groups of armed bandits in the territory of the Tsumadin district. That was confirmed by other sources of Nezavisimaya Gazeta which indicated that the militants who provoked armed clashes on August 1-2 and tried to seize Agvali, the administrative centre of the Tsumadin district, clearly had not expected resolute resistance from the militia.
The relocation of troops to the mountainous areas was a rare occasion when the federal leaders paid heed to the requests of the Daghestan authorities. The very presence of the Russian military on the border with Chechnya could naturally serve as a pretext for stepped up provocations against and shelling of checkpoints and outposts, but in this case the troops were really deployed in the mountains at the request of official Makhachkala and the local authorities, and, therefore could count on support and assistance from the law-enforcement bodies and the population, Ilyin indicated.
Nevertheless, according to Akhmednabi Makhtigadzhiyev, Islamic extremists are planning to launch large-scale operations in August - September to topple the existing government and establish the rule of Shari'ah laws in Daghestan. He also confirmed the reports about the concentration of illegal armed units in the neighbouring territory. Asked by Interfax when preventive strikes were not delivered on those concentrations pursuant to the July order issued by Vladimir Rushailo, Akhmednabi Makhtigadzhiyev said the following: "We cannot and do not want to deliver strikes just like that on concentrations of armed people in the territory of the neighbouring republic. A strike will be delivered only if an attempt is made to illegally infiltrate into the territory of Daghestan".
In the meantime, Ilyin writes, a situation which took place during those days was related precisely to strikes on the militants. According to reports from Grozny, two Russian attack planes delivered dropped rockets and bombs in the vicinity of the Kenkhi village located high up in the mountains in the evening of August 3. Kenkhi is not a Chechen village, and its residents are Tsumadins, an ethnic group within the Avarian people. (Please, take a special note of this report, since the events that followed suggest that it was from that village that the infiltration of the Daghestan territory by the Chechen militants started. - RIC).
Lieutenant General Stanislav Kavun, deputy commander-in-chief of Russia's Interior troops made the following comment on the situation: "The situation in the Republic of Daghestan is very tense, and to much regret, it currently tends to deteriorate. The blame for the aggravation of the situation is fully attributable to the extremists units, which are not controlled by official Grozny and are trained by the notorious Khattab in his so-called field camps. The events in the Tsumadin district of August 2-3 graphically illustrate this judgment. Faced with this situation, the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation, and the Supreme Command of the Interior Troops are taking the appropriate measures, one of them being the relocation of a unit of the 102nd Interior Troops Brigade from Daghestan's capital to the Tsumadin distric".
Ilyia Maksakov wrote in the same issue of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (August 6, 1999) that an armed incursion by the militants from among Islamic extremists in Daghestan's Tsumadin district on August 1 indeed came as a serious shock to the republic. It was particularly emphasised in Makhachkala that what happened in the Tsumadin district was an armed attempt by the so-called Wahhabis to seize power and change the constitutional system. That was why the response by the republic's leaders to the events in the mountainous Tsumadin district was so painful, although shoot-offs on the border with Chechnya had already become a daily occurrence. Apparently, the alarming statements by the Makhachkala authorities, the most serious of which referred to the intention to form a self-defence unit, were heard in Moscow, and considerable contingents of the federal forces are now being moved to the mountainous area of Daghestan to provide security along the administrative border with Chechnya.
The recent events reanimated the discussions about the prospect that Russia might lose Daghestan and the "Chechen scenario" might be replayed in the republic, the article runs. According to some predictions, the advocates of "pure Islam" in Daghestan supported by the Chechen militants may attempt to topple the incumbent authorities in Daghestan to proclaim a united Islamic state. A major role in fuelling tensions is assigned to the disgraced deputy of Russia's State Duma Nadirshah Khachilayev who allegedly knocked together numerous squads in the Chechen territory, and to the leader of some of the Daghestan Wahhabis Bagautdin Magomedov. Magomed Tagayev, author of two much touted subversive books, who also has numerous armed units under his command has also been named among potential participants in an attempt to seize power in Daghestan.
Maksakov writes in his article that Nezavisimaya Gazeta has repeatedly pointed out that events in Daghestan could not possibly develop according to the Chechen scenario. He believes that the pre-war situation in Grozny was different at least because the Dzhokhar Dudayev government did not recognize Russian leadership and did not enjoy Moscow's support, while the Makhachkala authorities incessantly reiterate their adherence to the policy of preserving Russia's integrity. But this is not the point. Those who predict that the events will develop following the scenario whereby Daghestan would be turned into a an independent Islamic state are trying to present the situation as if it would be enough for the militants to make a decision, and they would be able to seize power in Makhachkala without any major effort. But that is far from being true, which is evidenced by the events of the past few years.
If one gets absorbed to the extent where one considers the possibility of active hostilities in Daghestan, one should not fail to take into account the fact that the two most powerful political and financial groupings wielding power in the republic, headed by the republic's leader Magomedali Magomedov and Makhachkala Mayor Said Amirov, respectively, will become a major obstacle in the way of anyone trying to change the constitutional system in Daghestan, Maksakov writes. In other words, why should Magomedov and Amirov share something that they rightfully own with some Wahhabis? In this case, the author continues, we even disregard the multithousand-strong power structures deployed in Daghestan, including militia units, Interior, frontier guard and Defence Ministry troops which do not make a welcome committee greeting the rebels with flowers of hospitality.
Besides, the powers and possibilities of the disgraced Nadir Khachilayev are notably exaggerated by many analysts, Maksakov concludes. It appears that if he had been "forgiven" and received an opportunity to come back to Makhachkala, he would have become nearly the most sincere ally of the authorities. That Nadir Khachalayev is not going to burn his boats is also evidenced by the fact that even in his contributions to Chechnya-based extremist newspapers he identified himself as a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. As for another maverick, Magomed Tagayev, the rumours that he commands numerous armed units are not treated seriously.
The extremists opposed to the leaders of the republic do have problems, the main one being the absence of a single leader and dissociation. Before he died a few months ago, the leading ideologist of Wahhabism was Akhadkadi Akhtayev hailing from the Gunib district. He maintained close ties with the Chechen military-political groupings, but completely rejected a violent armed approach and did not have his own units. Incidentally, Bagautdin Magomedov and his brother were among Akhtayev's disciples, and the battles in the Tsumadin District suggest that they were not his best pupils. Bagautdin Magomedov and to a lesser extent Nadir Khachilayev are trying to fill in the void that emerged with Akhtayev's death. The fact that the Wahhabis do not have a universally recognized leader makes the threat that they pose less serious, Ilya Maksakov believes.
Still, the events that took place in the North Caucasus on August 7, 1999 were viewed by many observers as the beginning of efforts to implement the plan to topple the legitimate government of Daghestan in order to create an Islamic state in the territory of Daghestan and Chechnya.
Pyotr Polkovnikov wrote the following in Independent Military Review (August 13, 1999): "the reconnaissance in force was followed by an incursion: on August 7, up to 1,500 militants crossed the border between Chechnya and Daghestan in the southern mountainous section and seized a few villages in the Tsumadin and Botlikh districts. There were no federal troops in the villages, and the local militia did not offer resistance to the numerically superior extremist force. Commanded by Shamil Basayev, militants' units are formed from Daghestanis who received military training in Chechnya and Chechens who according to official Grozny do not obey government orders. Some of the local residents who support the Wahhabi movement welcomed the seizure but many of those who opposed extremism had to leave their homes.
The article suggests that the power structures of Russia quite promptly responded to the attack. Units of the 136th army brigade ad the 102nd interior troops brigade, as well as local and federal militia forces moved into the conflict area. Mi-24 and Mi-8 gunships were moved to the Botlikh airfield to immediately launch strikes on the intruders. The operation to end the militants' incursion into Daghestan and to eliminate the intruding force began.
Independent Military Review notes that the efforts to thwart the political design of the forces striving to seize power in Daghestan failed in the initial phase of the conflict. The extremists succeeded in holding in the occupied territory the so-called shura where they proclaimed an independent Islamic state of Daghestan. According to Review, this fact will hardly have any serious consequences, but it is of note that the events followed the algorithms developed by the West and the USSR during the Cold War: aggression is launched from without to seize part of the territory where a puppet political structure is created, and the all military and propaganda efforts are concentrated on its legitimisation.
Aleksandr Veklich wrote in Krasnaya Zvezda (August 10, 1999) that the bandits sought to bring physical and psychological pressure to bear on the entire population of Daghestan in an attempt to win them over to their side. But their expectations never materialized.
The Daghestanis viewed the incursion by the militants from the neighbouring republic as an act of perfidy and offered fierce resistance to the intruders. During the very first days of hostilities, volunteers from various districts of Daghestan took part in fighting the unwelcome guests. The State Council of the republic decided at its emergency session to form volunteer units.
The federal authorities and the leaders of Daghestan took a recalcitrant stance on the gangs of Basayev and Khattab. Vladimir Rushailo, Russia's Interior Minister, arrived in Makhachkala to announce that the Centre's firm view is that the bandits should be destroyed.
As to official Grozny, it hastily refused to have anything to do with the incursion. (Trud, August 10, 1999). Comments by the Chechen authorities essentially boiled down to statements that no group had crossed the border with Daghestan, while the villages were allegedly seized by Daghestan Islamists, and therefore, the developments were an internal affair of Daghestan.
Magomed Tolboyev, until recently secretary of the Security Council of Daghestan, told Trud the following: "All that is going on is the implementation of the plan by the Chechen military leadership to annex Daghestan to Chechnya ad create a single Islamic state. I know that in addition to Chechens there are quite a few young Daghestanis among members of the gang that came to our villages, they had been trained in militants' camps in the neighbouring republic. But the stake is not on them, the expectation was that the Islamists would be supported by the local population. But this is where the criminals made a mistake. The overwhelming majority of Daghestanis are prepared to give them a firm rebuff".
The situation, existing in the republic, was commented on by Akhmad Hadzhi Abdullayev, Mufti of Daghestan, in a Trud interview. "Before anything else I would like to recall that during the war in Chechnya, we, the Daghestanis, did whatever we could to help refugees from the neighbouring republic. What we see now are armed people who also came from there to invade our land. Thus our neighbours repaid our kindness with base ingratitude. It is very sad to realise that.
"Religious leaders of the republic have for years warned the government of Daghestan against the threat of Wahhabism, but the authorities did little if anything to counter that radical religious movement. Now, it all has come to the point where obscure impostors like Adallo Aliyev who incidentally doe not have a religious rank or any official authority are speaking on behalf of all Moslems of Daghestan."
On August 10, 1999, the so-called "Islamic shura" which gathered in the Botlikh District, proclaimed Daghestan's secession from Russia and the beginning of a holy war against the "occupants". (Business&Baltia, Riga, August 11, 1999). The "Shura" also adopted an appeal to the "Islamic Chechen state and people" calling for support for the Moslems of Daghestan.
The statements drew an extremely negative response from the authorities of the republic and the Spiritual Board of Moslems of Daghestan. The Spiritual Board said: "let those aggressors create the so-called shura and announce their laws in the territory of the Chechen Republic. Resolutions of the so-called shura have no legal effect for Moslems of Daghestan".
A similar response came from official Makhachkala. According to a high-ranking official in Daghestan's prosecutor's office, "the statement by an "Islamic shura" unknown in Daghestan warrants sanctions under a whole series of articles of the Russian Federation Penal Code, and naturally the law-enforcement bodies of Daghestan will not let it pass unnoticed. The entire strength of the law will be used against those who call for toppling the constitutional system in the republic".
Since the time when the militants from Chechnya invaded Daghestan, the attention of the press has been riveted to the conflict zone. The situation there was difficult during the first few days, but the troops and interior bodies managed to put it under control. Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote (August 13, 1999) that the mistakes that were made in the beginning were corrected after General of the Army Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the General Staff, and Colonel General Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, commander-in-chief of the Interior troops, arrived in Botlikh.
Propaganda efforts launched by Shamil Basayev and Movladi Udugov misfired. It became apparent that the Islamic extremists overestimated their possibilities and clearly underestimated their opponent. First, as the intercepted reports from the militants' agents suggest, they did not think much of the fighting potential of the interior troops, Army units and borderguards based in Daghestan. They disregarded local law-enforcement officers altogether in the belief that they would be the first to join Khattab's units. Second, they expected that as soon as the militants crossed the border and moved into the Daghestan villages, the local residents would join the militants and stab the military force in the back.
However, it became clear by the end of the very first day that such forecasts did not hold water. Virtually all political forces and ethnic movements of Daghestan rallied round in the face of a common threat.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that Magomedali Magomedov, chairman of Daghestan's State Council, addressed a note of protest to President Aslan Maskhadov of Chechnya accusing the neighbouring republic of launching an open aggression against the peoples of Daghestan.
The entire leadership of the Spiritual Board of Moslems of Daghestan, alims (theologists) much respected by the people, met with residents of mountainous villages to explain the danger posed by the so-called Wahhabis. In some areas considered the patrimonial estate of the advocates of "pure Islam" hundreds of men and youngsters volunteered to fight the intruders.
Free Georgia, a Tbilisi-based newspaper (August 28, 1999), reported that official Grozny was doing whatever it could during those days to distance itself from what was going on in Daghestan. Mairbek Vachagayev, general representative of Chechnya in Moscow, said that the whole situation was personal business of Shamil Basayev and Khattab. He admitted that the two were citizens of Chechnya, but said that Grozny was not their keeper.
In the meantime, Shamil Basayev officially took command of the "armed forces of the Islamic shura", Tenghiz Gamkrelidze wrote in his article. He was assigned the responsibilities of a "military amir (commander) of the united forces of Daghestan mojaheds until all of the kaffirs (infidels) are driven out of the sacred land of Daghestan". The same publication indicated that in Chechnya itself Basayev pandered to Wahhabis in defiance of President Maskhadov.
Gamkrelidze writes that Basayev and his supporters put under their control not only the Vedeno district, but also a large part of Chechnya which until recently remained inaccessible to them. Importantly, the role of the Wahhabis and Basayev who incidentally espouses the traditional Tarikatist Islam has grown to the extent where they managed to fully put under their control even the Oktyabrsky district in Grozny. The squad commanded by Arbi Barayev, murderer of the British, "controls" the Caucasus federal highway between the border with Ingushetia and Grozny, including his own checkpoint on the key entrance into the capital. The role of Aslan Maskhadov and his entourage has been recently reduced to ornamental declarations seeking to appease Moscow's anger. Maskhadov every day makes statements, which essentially suggest that all what is going on is Daghestan's internal affair.
But the Wahhabis receive their supplies from Chechnya, the author of the article in Free Georgia indicates. True, the Kenkhi village in Chechnya's Cheberloi district from where most Wahhabis invaded Daghestan is populated not by Chechens but by Chamalals who live on the two sides of the Snow Ridge, both in Chechnya and Daghestan. But that does not relieve Chechnya of responsibility for an attack on Daghestan being launched from its territory. And who are those militants? Chechens, Arabs, Pakistanis, Tajiks and even Russians.
Whatever one's attitude to these people, one thing is clear: the war in Daghestan is not just an impromptu raid by the bandits. The action could have been predicted well in advance by the very same analysts of the Federal Security Service, the journalist believes. It was timed to coincide with at least two "memorable" dates. August 7 is Khattab's birthday and his followers promised him the Botlikh district as a gift. And on August 26 140 years ago, surrounded by the Russian troops in the Gunib village, Imam Shamil surrendered. He had created an imamate, a military-theocratic state of Chechen and Daghestan highlanders, which exited for two decades. If another ideologist of Wahhabism, this time a Daghestani, Magomed Tagayev is to be believed (a criminal file was opened on him in connection with the Ghazawat brochure that he authored), the militants who invaded three Daghestan districts were not bandits but the Rebel Army of Imam and their objective is to restore the state of Basayev's famous namesake, no more, no less.
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It was not until a third week of hostilities that all five Daghestan villages captured by the militants were freed. The grandiose plans of the extremists acting under the Islam's green banners were thwarted.
Without going into much detail in describing the events of those dramatic days (this should be a topic for a separate narrative), let us turn to more general comments. Indeed, many political observers and experts tried to identify substantive points and find a linkage between the facts, which seem to be very much apart in time and space. And that, in its turn, helps one realise that the current campaign in Chechnya is not "revenge by the military" or "an episode from Putin's election campaign", but rather a response to the insolent and harsh challenge to the state, society, security and dignity of individual citizens. At first glance, the challenge may appear to have been issued by a not so numerous force, but this is only first impression.
"Nation's Destiny Is Decided in Daghestan Mountains" is the name of Dmitry Nikolayev's article published in Independent Military Review (August 20, 1999). He believes that after the events in Chechnya of 1994-1996, the extremists rallied under the slogan of "fighting the infidels" to launch a second phase of the implementation of the global geopolitical design to establish control over Caspian oil and its transportation routes. In that game, Basayev, Hattab, Udugov, let alone rank-and-file militants are a mere cover-up for those who are actually, even if from afar, orchestrating the events.
Hostilities in the mountainous areas of Daghestan are rather the first phase of a more large-scale operation by religious extremists. This is evidenced by the choice of the incursion area (difficult mountainous terrain) and the absence of troops in this sector. Those who stand behind Basayev and Khattab probably banked on the fact that these factors together with support of the local population would help seize part of Daghestan's territory, announce the self-proclaimed Islamic shura government of the republic, and on its behalf to launch a "holy war" across Daghestan.
In addition, it was planned to test the reaction of the federal centre and international community, as well as the combat capability of the Russian army and other power structures and special services. The results turned out to be unconsoling for the militants. The UN and the European Union were at one in condemning the actions of Basayev's and Khattab's militants, and in voicing full support for the measures taken by Russia to stabilize the situation. The Russian army also turned out to be alive and kicking despite the endless "reforms".
Nikolayev indicates that on the whole the federal group of forces managed to put the situation under control and deal telling blows on the units of bandits. The advantage of the bandits' guerrilla tactics on difficult mountainous terrain was largely whittled away by air strikes and artillery fire, as well as by laying mines in the way of manoeuvring militants or their advancing reserves. The military command relied on guaranteed neutralization of the enemy with firepower, which helps save manpower and minimize human losses in accomplishing missions.
Earlier reports mentioned the movement of special army and interior troops units to Daghestan. Although nothing was said about them afterwards, it is to be presumed that they also conducted active counter-guerrilla operations.
The stake placed by the militants on mass support of the local residents and ecclesiastics never materialized either. On the contrary, about 5,000 volunteers rose to defend their villages.
Of note is the conclusion drawn by the author of the article written before Moscow and Volgodonsk were shaken by explosions. He wrote referring to historical experience that a rebel movement, which fails to receive support from the local population and defeated by the government forces resorts to terror, violence, looting and assassinations. Consequently, taking into account the "feats" earlier committed by Basayev, it is to be expected that his supporters may soon resort to actions similar to the operation in Budennovsk. It is not to be ruled out that there have been developed plans for seizing a hospital or a maternity home in the capital city of Daghestan or the Stavropol Territory. Importantly, the bandits may operate under any cover: they may be dressed as military servicemen or militia, they may pose as refugees or volunteers transporting killed and wounded persons, etc. In addition, the power structures need to be prepared for potential acts of subversion on transport, in crowded public places, at energy and water supply facilities, and not just in Daghestan itself, but also in other cities of Russia, including Moscow.
Foreign patrons of the extremists have invested heavily into the current armed stand-off in Daghestan. Therefore, it is very likely that the bandits might shortly strike on Kizlyar and Khassav-Yurt, or try to seize Buinaksks, or the supporters of the religious extremists in Makhachkala and the so-called Karamakhi zone might stage armed provocations.
The most important task at the moment is to vanquish the fire of the armed conflict and finally settle relations with Chechnya. Russia cannot afford to have this republic remain a concentration point for foreign mercenaries, a breeding ground for extremist religious movements and a hotbed of tension not only in the North Caucasus but also across the country.
One week later, the military operation in Daghestan was analysed by Vadim Solovyov in the very same Independent Military Review (August 28, 1999).
According to the author, the operation drawing to a close in the Botlikh district revealed new qualities in the planning of operations of the federal forces, and in the use of troops for addressing political tasks.
The latter consideration is largely related to the fact that the two most recent governments in Russia were headed by generals from the power services. Being more of a professional power officers as compared to their predecessors, they knew a thing or two about the criminal features of the North Caucasus, and were, therefore, more cohesive and consistent in preparing the use of military force for counteraction. In other words, the Defence Ministry was not rapped over the knuckles but was encouraged to focus on countering large-scale armed incursions by the separatists in that region. That's one thing.
Secondly, the actions of the federal forces revealed well-planned and targeted preparation of army and interior units. The analysis of events on the eve of August 9 when the two opposing parties entered into fire contact suggests that high command headquarters rather efficiently organized the advance of the forces and means, as well as their interaction. The frontier guard posts, which would not have been able to stop the avalanche of thousands of Chechen militants, were timely wound up in the threatened sector. Simultaneously, battalions of the 136th army brigade and the 102nd interior troops brigade began to be moved to the area. Other units and troops were put on red alert as well. Those who are arguing that the federal power structure proved out of depth or overlooked something, etc., are absolutely wrong.
The third feature, which is closely related to the previous ones, was manifest in a very firm resolve of the command and the troops to accomplish the military objectives. The armed forces were used they way they should be used, and it appeared that they have forever foregone some pseudo-democratic and pseudo-humane image which haunted them since they were created in 1992.
An important distinguishing feature of the operative use of forces was a radical change in the supreme military command's philosophy with respect to their subordinates, or the troops. The government, too, showed responsibility for the destiny of the military sent to Daghestan. The participants in combat operations were given a timely raise. The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation also ordered to take additional measures to provide a social safety net for members of those killed or missing in action in Daghestan, and additional benefits were introduced for injured officers and men, as well as their families.
And finally, the information warfare. Last time, in 1994-1996, it was completely lost to the Chechen side. This time, according to Solovyov, although one cannot say that it has been won, still information efforts made by the federal side did not look so pitiful, spontaneous or ill-coordinated as during those years.
Politically, it became clear that Daghestan and its population are not willing to secede from Russia, and consequently, it will not be all that easy to split the North Caucasus. Militarily, the federal troops are different from what they were three or five years ago, and can effectively protect the territorial integrity of the state.
In his article, "Wahhabi Crescent" (Kommersant-Vlast, August 24, 1999) Andrei Klochkov analyses the connections between Islamic extremists in Chechnya and Daghestan with their foreign patrons who have their own interests not only in Russia but also in other regions of the world.
The journalist notes the Foreign Ministry statement that tens of millions of dollars had been invested into the Islamists' operation in Daghestan. The notorious international terrorist Osama bin Laden and Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, were named among the sponsors. There are reasons to believe that the forces behind the Chechen and Daghestan extremists are well organised.
But everything began even before the Wahhabi militants seized a few Daghestan villages close to the Chechen border, Klochkov believes. That event was preceded by other actions and events that really made a splash in regions located far away from the Caucasus.
Late in July 1999, the heads of almost thirty countries gathered for a Balkan summit in Sarajevo. At the time, Osama bin Laden, international terrorist No.1, announced that he was preparing an act of terror against the participants in the summit. The already unprecedented security measures in Sarajevo seemed insufficient to the Western leaders. The city was inundated with US, British, French and other special forces, which secured every block.
The meeting went undisturbed. There were no acts of terror. But bin Laden's strike achieved its objective.
Seated quietly for a while and therefore somewhat forgotten, bin Laden conducted a brilliant PR campaign. The whole of the world turned around to cast an alarmed glance at the East, where the terrorist has been recently hiding in the mountains of Afghanistan. It was at that time that his friends and patrons, the Afghan Wahhabis, or the Talibs, breached the truce and launched a powerful offensive on Punjsher. That is the last bulwark of the opposition in the mountains close to the border with Tajikistan, where Ahmad Shah Masud, the Talib's last undefeated opponent, is based.
Another disturbing piece of news came from the neighbouring Kyrghyz Republic, whose territory was infiltrated by a group of militants from the squad of Uzbek Wahhabis commanded by Juma Namangani who had fought with the Tajik opposition at some point in time. The Wahhabis took hostage a few Kyrghyz officials and demanded free passage to the Ferghana valley in neighbouring Uzbekistan where they intended to initiate armed struggle against Islam Karimov's regime.
It is not to be ruled out that Uzbek Wahhabis might make new attempts to break through to the Ferghana valley. The residents of that valley, which is one of the world's most densely populated areas, are believed to be the most religious group in Central Asia. The Wahhabis have strong positions in the region and this is where their clandestine organisations operate. It is also here that social tensions are at their highest, which may translate into a conflict. The first serious conflicts in Central Asia of the late 1980s and early 1990s took place in Ferghana: pogroms against Meskhetian Turks and Kyrghyz-Uzbek clashes in the Osh region (the Kyrghyz part of the valley).
If one looks at the geography of Wahhabi escapades, it leaps to the eye that they form a semi-circle enveloping the southern and predominantly Moslem part of the post-Soviet space, with the Caspian region rich in oil and gas in the middle, Klochkov writes.
The seemingly uncoordinated events are actually linked one with another. All of these sites are linked to the Middle East, or the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
Osama bin Laden is a Saudi billionaire who has high-placed patrons and sponsors in his ancestral land. He also has quite legitimate business in Arab countries, including in Jordan (the birthplace of notorious Khattab).
Incidentally, Khattab began his military campaign in what used to be the Soviet Union with Tajikistan. Early in the 1990s, a civil war broke out in that country, and the militant Jordanian joined the Tajik opposition then based in Afghanistan. At about the same time, Shamil Basayev turned up in those parts after he completed his first war campaign in Abkhazia.
The would-be comrades-in-arms met and found common ground. According to some reports, they met bin Laden at about the same time. When the war in Chechnya began, Khattab never hesitated to change the Tajik front for the campaign in the Caucasus.
Today, militants hailing from the Arab Middle East are fighting among the Taliban militia and the North Caucasus Wahhabis.
According to special services of the West and CIS countries, including Russia, it is from the Gulf countries that Wahhabis in the Caucasus and Central Asia receive powerful financial support and religious literature. The Wahhabi elite is trained in training centres in those countries. Small wonder, the first TV reporting from the militants' camp in Daghestan shown by all TV companies in the world was produced by the Qatar television. The Qatar TV also was the first to report about the dispatch of a US special unit to Pakistan to eliminate bin Laden.
The Gulf region, which accounts for a lion's share of all international supplies of energy, has held a special position throughout the entire Cold War. For the sake of friendship with those countries, both the USSR and the West turned a blind eye to all sins and small follies of their leaders. Reprisals against the communists unleashed by President Kamal Nasser of Egypt or Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein did not prevent Moscow from entering into agreements on "fraternal friendship and cooperation" with them. Similarly, the medieval executions and suppression of all freedoms in the monarchies of the Gulf did not force the West to give up strategic partnership with those countries.
The situation has changed today, the journalist believes. It is not just that the Cold War is over and there is no camp left where the offended monarchs and dictators could defect to. Gradually digesting the Balkans, the West has come close to the Middle East. The "hot region" itself is gradually cooling off. The recent trouble-makers like Saddam Hussein, Muammar al-Qaddafi, Hafiz al-Assad, and the Iranian ayatollahs have become quieter. The Arab-Israeli agreement is entering its final phase. Many activists of radical Islamic organisations who tried to spark off an anti-West war in their own countries found themselves ousted to the periphery of the Islamic world, to Afghanistan, the Caucasus or the Balkans. It is only Hezbollah and Hamas that are still engaged in rear-guard battles. But they, too, are losing supporters, positions, bases and leaders.
In addition, the West now has an alternative to the Persian Gulf - the southern post-Soviet countries which have their own energy resources and their own delivery routes.
All of that enabled the West to take a tougher stance vis-a-vis Middle Eastern countries and give sufficiently obvious hints to the future leaders of the region that it is not going to forgive them for something their predecessors could get away with.
The response from the Gulf did not take long to follow. The war was moved to a new theatre - post-Soviet Asia which indeed boasts energy resources and supply routes. But these supply routes are much too extended. And it is on them that the strike is delivered.
Coordinated actions by the Wahhabis in Central Asia and the Caucasus look more like a demonstration of the main lines of attack. If they succeed, the Islamist may establish control over the main transportation routes.
The first result is impressive: the transportation of oil through the Baku - Novorossiisk pipelines has been discontinued, while the proposed construction of a pipeline through Afghanistan to the Arab Sea has been indefinitely postponed. The two remaining routes - from Kazakhstan to Novorossiisk and from Baku to Georgia's Black Sea coast - are threatened.
In this connection, the choice of central Daghestan as the main line of attack by the North Caucasus Wahhabis does not appear to be accidental at all. This area, with predominantly Avarian population, borders on Georgia and Azerbaijan. Also, Avarians live in close communities in the areas of these Transcaucasian republics bordering on Daghestan.
In order to bring pressure to bear on the southern neighbours, the Wahhabis do not have to necessarily occupy all of Daghestan. Once they gain a firm foothold high in the mountains of Daghestan, they will be able to begin their expansion in the direction of Georgia and Azerbaijan, from where the Baku - Poti pipeline is within a stone's throw.
True, it is not only about oil that the whole thing is all about. By cutting the supply lines, the Islamists would terminally undermine the already weak economies of post-Soviet Asia. This could further exacerbate social tensions, lead to the collapse of pro-Western regimes and radicalisation of the population. With this tidal wave, the Islamists could well establish control over a vast region rich in energy resources.
The success of the Wahhabis "Northern march" will undoubtedly give an impetus to the revitalisation of Islamist movements in the Middle East. The more so, since the cause of the Islamist radicals cannot be written off as a complete failure there. They still have serious positions, and given certain alignment of forces, they may well take revenge. Suffice it to recall the recent victory scored by the Islamists at the parliamentary elections in Turkey, which seemed to be the most secular and pro-Western Moslem state.
The objective of the Wahhabis' "Northern march" is not Moscow. In longer term, the Islamists are not interested in a war against Russia. After they establish control over the "historically Islamic lands" the Wahhabis intend to come to agreement with Russia and strike an alliance against the West, that 'common historical enemy". This is something that was repeatedly emphasized by the Wahhabi leaders themselves and the ideologists close to them.
It appears that the West does not view such scenario as science fiction. At any rate, this time the USA or Europe did not call on Moscow to resolve the conflict in Daghestan politically, as they did during the Chechen war. On the contrary, they firmly and clearly supported resolute actions by the Russian authorities against the Islamists in the North Caucasus.
The recent Istanbul summit rather confirms this premise than denies it. Despite the vociferous campaign in the Western mass media over the methods used in the anti-terrorists operation in Chechnya, most of the official leaders of the countries taking part in the summit had to recognize the need for liquidating the seat of international terrorism Chechnya has rapidly been turning into after 1996. It is Russia's duty to accomplish this task.
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