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2.4. On the Situation in Chechnya and Daghestan and the Reaction of Russian Leadership

This course of events made some analysts turn to the theme of federal forces' readiness for the force scenario of the solution of the Chechen problem.

An article by Vadim Solovyov, Sergei Sokut and Nikolai Ivanov titled: "A Shadow of the Second Chechen War Falls on the North Caucasus" was published in the "Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye" (March 12, 1999) soon after Stepashin's tough statement (due to the capture of Shpigun).

It said, in particular, that having exhausted all the thinkable and unthinkable reserves of patience for the process of Chechnya's criminalisation, Moscow had said that it would switch over to decisive actions. The force scenario of the settlement of the crisis situation was not ruled out either. In this connection, they were assessing those forces and means, which were located in the area of the probable conflict.

According to official data, as of March 1999, the temporary grouping in the North Caucasus included over 10,000 servicemen. Interior troops and militia formations constituted its basis. In the case of necessity, it can be reinforced not only with the units and large units of interior troops brought from other regions of Russia but also with the most combat efficient army large units and units, in the first place, special task forces and paratroopers.

In experts' opinion, strike aviation of the Russian Air Force and Interior troops armed with Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters will most likely constitute the basis of the aviation grouping. It is not ruled out either, wrote the authors of the article, that the Russian military space forces may be employed.

The bandit formations not controlled by official Grozny number about 300 militants' detachments, according to data given in the article. The most combat efficient of them are the detachments led by Salman Raduyev (the so-called army of general Dudayev), Shamil Basayev and Jordanian Khattab.

The strength of the Dudayev army is about a thousand armed militants. However, only about 200 men are constantly under arms. The main base is located in the village of Noviye Gordali (south-east of Chechnya). The Basayev detachment has approximately the same strength and combat might. Its main domain is the Vedeno district. Khattab's grouping is the third largest detachment. Its headquarters is located in the village of Serzhen-Yurt, 35 kilometres to the south-east of Grozny. A training centre, where foreign instructors work, is also located there.

It should be expected, the article goes on to say, that most likely, taking into account the experience of the 1994-1996 Chechen war, the federal forces will focus on pin-point missile and bomb strikes and special operations. In experts' opinion, the use of modern high-accuracy weapons also envisages a qualitatively new level of interaction between intelligence (technical, agent intelligence and army reconnaissance), anti-terrorist formations, army units and aviation. To achieve this purpose, it is necessary to create modern tactical automatised control systems and ensure an efficient combat teamwork of the formations of all armed services and other power departments.

They also drew attention to the fact that the tactic of "surgical strikes' really makes it possible to inflict upon the enemy serious damage but does not guarantee at the same time the attainment of the political goals of the war.

While agreeing with the arguments of the authors of the article, let's note that the emphasis on special operations for the destruction of illegal armed formations in Chechnya could be made upon the consent of official Grozny to interact with federal secret services. The entire course of the development of relations between Grozny and Moscow did not provide any substantial grounds to expect that Maskhadov would choose such a way of de-militarisation and de-criminalisation of his republic.

The authors of the article noted that in any case classical methods of the conduct of combat operations were absolutely unacceptable in the situation which had developed in Chechnya. In their opinion, only special task troops with their tactics, techniques and methods of counter-guerilla and counter-rebel struggle could achieve considerable successes in the fight against bandit formations. In this case, great importance is attached not to the number of soldiers but to the combatants of the special task forces of the Interior Ministry, anti-terrorist formations of the Federal Security Service or, at a pinch, the army special units who are firm, courageous, inventive and highly professional. Taking into account the mistakes of the past years, it is extremely important to do everything so that if not to secure the support of local residents, then at least to convince them to be neutral.

The use of military force is an extreme measure. It should be employed only after all the possibilities have been exhausted and, what is the main thing, after a thorough preparation of means and forces has been carried out - such is the conclusion of the military experts as regards the situation which had emerged by the beginning of March 1999.

It seems that the President is seriously worried about the criminal danger coming from Chechnya, wrote Vremya MN (April 15, 1999).

On April 14, 1999 the session of the Security Council of the Russian Federation discussed the situation, which had taken shape in Chechnya and the regions bordering on it. The session was held on the instruction of the Russian President by director of the Federal Security Service and Secretary of the Security Council Vladimir Putin. Governor of the Stavropol Territory Aleksandr Chernogorov who had long demanded from federal authorities to ensure security in the territory had been invited to the session.

As Vremya MN wrote (April 15, 1999), the speech of the Stavropol governor did not leave any doubts for the head of the Federal Security Service that "the social and crime situation on the administrative border of the Chechen Republic with other regions of the Russian Federation remained complex and showed a trend towards further aggravation". Since the bandit formations which hide in Chechnya and "have made robbery and the abduction of people their constant business" are the main evil, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Security Council, while the republic's leadership does not take "proper measures", the

Security Council must ensure the security of the border districts.

Commander of the Interior troops, Colonel General Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov told about some security measures. According to him, says Vremya MN, everything is ready for the introduction of a special regime on the administrative border with Chechnya. In the Kursky district of the Stavropol Territory a special motorised regiment has been formed. Along the perimeter of the border "a powerful grouping of forces" is now located - 6,000-strong militia and 10,000 servicemen of the interior troops. Interior troops posts "which are ready to come to help those who directly protect the border", are situated at some distance from the frontiers, said General Ovchinnikov. In the case of the border breakthrough, the operative units of the interior troops are ready to go into combat.

On May 5, 1999 Aleksandr Veklich wrote in Krasnaya Zvezda on the command and staff exercises, which were carried out in the North Caucasus under the guidance of the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, Colonel General Viktor Kazantsev.

The first stage of the exercises envisaged the thrashing out of the preparation and training of the personnel of control agencies. The tasks of interaction to ensure security and stability in the south of Russia were practised jointly with the operational headquarters of the Interior Ministry in the republics of North Ossetia-Alania, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the interior department of the Stavropol Territory, with the participation of the operative control group of the North Caucasian District of the Interior Ministry's troops. The second stage of the exercises practised the tasks of headquarters control together with practical actions for the fulfilment of training and combat assignments. General control over the exercises was carried out by First Vice Premier of the Russian government, Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin.

On May 28, 1999, for the first time after the end of the Chechen war, the Russian troops conducted combat operations on the territory of Chechnya, Kommersant-Daily reported (May 29, 1999). Several helicopters delivered missile strikes on the positions of the militants of Khattab on the Terek River. The action of retribution was carried out after the militants had made an attempt to seize an interior troops' post on the Daghestani-Chechen border.

The militants's raid was timed to coincide with Border Guard's Day, which was celebrated on May 28. On 2:10 a.m. they opened massed fire on the Russian positions from mortars and grenade launchers. After the artillery shelling, the militants went across the Grebensky bridge over the Terek River and launched an attack in an attempt to seize the frontier post from three sides. Despite the fact that the mines hit an officer's tent (platoon leader, senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Misyura was killed and three other officers were wounded), the soldiers quickly assessed the situation and put up resistance to the militants. Under the fire of armoured carriers and grenade launchers the militants retreated. But at four hours in the morning they launched a new attack which was also repelled. There were killed and wounded men among the attackers judging from the interception of their radio talks. The militants changed the tactic: at 7:38 a.m. they drove to the border the residents of near-by villages and, using people as a shield, continued to shell the post from grenade launchers. The soldiers could not fire in response.

Then, by decision of commanders, combat helicopters took off. When they began to descend right above the crowd, people ran away in panic. The militants retreated back into Chechnya. Russian forces did not pursue them. However, about 2 hours in the afternoon the helicopters delivered a missile strike on one of the bases of Khattab near the Terek River. There were trenches and dugouts at that place and, as the reconnaissance presumed, the militants were to gather there after the attack.

Several days after Kommersant-Daily (June 3, 1999) reported about a new attack of Chechen militants on the post of Russia's interior troops, which protected the Grebensky bridge across the Terek River. There was also an attack on the militia unit in the Kazbek district of Daghestan. In both cases the bandits were thwarted.

The Grebensky bridge is one of the strategic facilities on the Chechen-Daghestani border which goes across the Terek River. During the war, the Chechens blew it up to impede the federal troops to deliver personnel and materiel. After the completion of the combat operations the bridge was restored. It was placed under the control of federal troops. This does not suit Chechens since the route for the delivery of contraband gasoline to Russia lies across the bridge.

As the newspaper Segodnya wrote (June 4, 1999), head of the Russian Interior Ministry Vladimir Rushailo said on those days that all the attacks on the posts of interior troops and Daghestani militia were inter-related. He believed that those were not the last incidents.

The article by Dmitry Nikolayev under the headline: "Reconnaissance in Force in Daghestan" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 4, 1999) notes that the attack by the Chechen rebels on the post of the Russian interior troops located near the village Grebenskaya on the administrative border of Daghestan with Chechnya and the combat in the Kazbek district are the links of one chain. As the military say, reconnaissance in force is underway. The militants try to learn about the security system, reveal fire destruction plans of interior troops and Daghestani militia upon the attacks by militants on posts, the procedure of summoning aviation for help, and study the ways of manoeuvres by reserves. In a word, they look for weak points in the defence, which Daghestan was forced to organise on the border with its restless neighbour. Reconnaissance in force always precedes large-scale combat operations, notes the author of the article.

Simultaneously, the militants of Chechen and Daghestani opposition formations are actively infiltrating into the territory of Daghestan. Those who plan an armed provocation count on the fact that these people will form the so-called fifth column at a necessary hour. Their concentration is observed both in the capital of Daghestan, Makhachkala, and also in large populated settlements, mainly in eastern and northern districts of the republic. All of them either have a combat experience or have been trained in subversion activity centres of war lord Khattab.

The militants do not waste their time, says the article. They are recruiting jobless young men to join their ranks. They are conducting active propaganda work among the local population. Judging from the fact how they act, it is felt that experienced people are preparing an armed operation. A whole range of forms and methods of information and propaganda impact on the population is being used in the propaganda work. In particular, television is being used very actively. Television broadcasting is being carried out both from the territory of Chechnya and directly from the areas of Daghestan which border with Chechnya. For example, a TV re-transmitter installed near the village of Chabanmakhi is being used for the propaganda of the ideas of radical Islam, calls for jihad and the transfer of specific instructions to militants. The leaders of illegal armed formations clearly understand that if they are not supported by the broad masses of the population, their military adventure may fail.

An important element of the propaganda campaign is a targeted mass moral and psychological pressure on the employees of the law-enforcement agencies, representatives of local administrations and clergymen. The latter have come under threats because as distinct from the ideologists of Islamic extremists they do not urge people to resort to violence and confrontation with temporal power. They are trying to convince the true believers in the pernicious nature of the path, which the Islamic extremists want to impose upon them by force.

There are more than enough facts of the preparation of Islamic extremists for the seizure of power in Daghestan by an anti-constitutional way, by the use of force", says the newspaper's article.

The residents of Daghestan are extremely preoccupied over the negative development of the situation on the border with Chechnya. In some populated settlements gatherings of local residents were held. They made a decision to send to Chechnya elders and clergymen to conduct talks with their neighbours on the inadmissibility of unleashing a fratricidal war. Federal and local authorities, in the opinion of ordinary citizens, do not act decisively enough in cutting short violence.

The article by Dmitry Nikolayev says that the state must assume a firm position on de-legitimatising those public and political movements of the North Caucasian region, and also their leaders, who are oriented towards violent, anti-constitutional actions. There are also needed persistent efforts for the seizure of arms illegally held by civilians, the disarmament and dissolution of illegal armed formations. Only the state has the monopoly right to violence and the use of weapons. Those who are entrusted with the task of governing the country must never forget that if the state refuses from this burdensome constitutional duty, the right to violence and the use of weapons are seized by bandits.

In the subsequent weeks armed incidents on he Daghestani-Chechen border occurred many times. Thus, Krasnaya Zvezda (July 30, 1999) wrote that on the night of July 28-July 29 a fierce combat took place, already not for the first time, in the area of the Kopayevsky hydraulic power system. About 4 hours in the morning a group of militants with a strength of up to 20 men fired at the post of the interior troops using automatic small arms. By the fire of on-duty means, the fire pockets of the attackers were suppressed. The bandits who had planned under the cover of the night to destroy the post were dispersed and retreated far into the Chechen territory.