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2.2.  Islamic Radicals' Plans for Daghestan and Chechnya

The people of Daghestan took part in republican parliamentary elections March 7, 1999 (Sunday) and in a

republican referendum dealing with the possibility of introducing the post of Daghestan's president. However, local voters opposed the introduction of presidential rule in their republic for the third time.

While assessing that event, some analysts also considered the Daghestani vector of the Chechen opposition's policy, e.g. the policy of those specific Chechen forces that advocated the reunification of Chechnya and Daghestan, as well as the establishment of an integral Islamic state.

In its March 9, 1999 issue, Kommersant-Vlast magazine wrote that the afore-said referendum amounted to yet another attempt on the part of the Chechen opposition to conquer Daghestan. (By the way, Gen. Shpigun, who used to serve as the Russian Interior Ministry's envoy to Chechnya, was also kidnapped in Grozny March 7, 1999 - RIC). Shamsuddin Mamayev, who authored that article headlined "An Imamate In Three Moves", substantiates this idea.

Chechen warlords are guided by simple logic, he notes. By uniting with Daghestan, Chechnya would be able to breach the "Orthodox Christian blockade" (that was imposed on that rebellious republic by Russia and Georgia), subsequently joining hands with other Islamic countries (via Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea). He also writes that Grozny's eastward aspirations can be explained by purely mercenary considerations. You see, Daghestan accounts for about 66 percent of Russia's entire Caspian shelf. By gaining access to that Caspian shelf, the Chechen oil industry would become sufficiently independent, thereby making it possible to separate Chechnya from the entire Russian economic system. Besides, it would be seen as sufficiently attractive by Western investors, ultimately enabling Chechnya to breach the current diplomatic blockade.

The author recalls that the first attempt to reunite with Daghestan was made during the 1994-1996 Russian-Chechen war. At the time, the city of Kizlyar was raided by Salman Raduyev's unit, which didn't intend to merely destroy a Russian military base. Raduyev's thugs were expected to involve Daghestan in

Chechnya's war against Russia. However, the Chechens had failed back then.

In the spring of 1998 the then Chechen Prime Minister Shamil Basayev submitted his bid for the Rosneft company (that is, while preparations for the Rosneft auction were in full swing), subsequently making the following proposition to Moscow. He suggested that Russia part with this oil company, which, in turn, would amount to reparations on its part. One had the impression that the men in Grozny were ready to content themselves with just a part of that company, which controls the Caspian shelf's Daghestani sector. However, Moscow ignored that bid; this is hardly surprising because Chechnya's No. 1 terrorist should not have expected anything else.

Consequently, Basayev changed his tactics, after becoming appointed to the post of chairman of the congress of Ichkeria-Daghestan nations. He decided to wrest concessions from Moscow (that the latter refused to make) by force. Congressional regulations state expressly that the congress aims to unite both republics into one single state. Yet another influential Chechen field commander, namely Khattab, also became a member of that congress.

The Daghestan-Chechnya reunification concept was supported by Daghestan's Akintsy Chechens and local Wahhabis, who cherish the idea of a Shari'ah republic. Small wonder, but congressional members chose an Islamic revolution as the main reunification instrument, Mamayev pointed out.

A subsequent Daghestani coup was attempted pretty soon. In May 1998 local Islamists, as well as the supporters of Nadir Khachilayev, chairman of the Russian Moslem League, and his brother Magomed Khachilayev, seized the building of Daghestan's State Council in Makhachkala. A green flag was then hoisted over that building, with the rebels demanding that the republican leadership be changed. The rebels were supported by several armed Wahhabi communities.

Militia officers and Wahhabis clashed in Karamakhi village the very next day after the afore-said take-over. The Wahhabis seized a local militia station, expelling the militiamen from that village. One village dweller and one militia officer were killed as a result. That village then refused to obey federal authorities, what with some other territories following suit later on. Karamakhi's Wahhabis first established fortified outposts along village outskirts, subsequently setting up similar road-blocks along a republican highway connecting Buinaksk and Daghestan's mountainous areas (where about 20 republican districts are located).

The pro-Basayev congress declared right away that it was ready to render military support to its Daghestani brothers in case of Russian military involvement. However, the Khachilayev brothers failed to enlist the support of other Daghestani-clan chiefs. Moreover, another extremely influential Daghestani leader, namely, mayor Said Amirov of Makhachkala, as well as his armed supporters, entrenched themselves inside a building just opposite of the republican State Council, calling on city residents to unite against the "bandits".

In the long run, State-Council chairman Magomedali Magomedov managed to convince the Khachilayev brothers to leave that building (in exchange for a pardon pledge and the resignation of the republican interior minister). Khattab's "peace-keeping brigade" didn't dare interfere, fearing a possible Daghestani rebuff.

According to Mamayev, the pro-Basayev congress preferred to assume a wait-and-see attitude, obviously expecting Moscow to pacify Daghestan by force. Chechen warlords also hoped to join the game at that stage.

On July 4, 1998, Shamil Basayev organised "show-case" war games involving the so-called peace-keeping brigade of the Chechnya-Daghestan congress. For his own part, Chechen field commander Khattab reviewed troops at the Chechen republican armed forces' training centre the day before. The war games apparently involved more than 1,000 soldiers.

Reporters were invited to attend those war games, with their hosts allowing them to photograph the brigade's personnel, combat hardware and the camp proper (without any restrictions whatsoever). In its July 4, 1999 issue, the Russky Telegraph newspaper reported that the brigade comprised Chechens, Mid-eastern Arabs and even African militants. Basayev, who attended the troop review, spoke to reporters, telling them that this exercise aimed to "warn Russia's military clique, which is trying to unleash a war in Daghestan". "We are warning Russia that nothing will go unpunished", Basayev went on to say, adding that Caucasian Moslems had the required strength, resources and will-power in order to thwart Russia's plans to unleash a war. After receiving a sword from Khattab, Basayev assured those present that, instead of hanging on the wall, it will serve the good cause of Caucasian liberation. Movladi Udugov, who also arrived at the scene, made a statement, informing his audience that the above-mentioned peace-keeping brigade aims to show who really controls the Caucasus.

Chechen militants didn't receive a chance to fight in Daghestan in the summer of 1998 because the federal centre didn't intend to re-establish law and order in that republic by force. Moreover, the then Russian Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin supported a document on pardoning all culprits. In spite of pressure on the part of Daghestan's leadership, Stepashin also refused to crack down on the Wahhabis, who had proclaimed several of their villages to be a liberated Islamic territory.

On August 17, 1998 the population of the so-called Wahhabi villages, i.e. Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi and Kadar (in Daghestan's Buinaksk district), proclaimed the creation of a separate Islamic territory. In its August 18, 1998 issue, Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote that all attempts on the part of the local clergy, republican officials and local self-government bodies to strike a deal with the Wahhabis in order to restore the normal operation of the afore-said village militia station and to remove all fortified outposts in that area were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, Daghestani and federal authorities alike continued to attach priority to negotiations with local dwellers.

In his article, which was printed March 9, 1999 by the Kommersant-Vlast magazine, Mamayev wrote that Stepashin didn't deal a retaliatory blow in Daghestan before September 1998 (that is, after all those bloody terrorist acts against Daghestan's mufti and the mayor of Makhachkala). According to Mamayev, that retaliatory blow was really skilful. Stepashin, who managed to shy away from politics and Islam, organised an anti-corruption campaign in Daghestan. Moscow acted swiftly, with the Prosecutor-General's Office arresting Magomed Khachilayev and compelling the State Duma to strip Nadir Khachilayev of his parliamentary immunity.

Moscow's successes entailed some far-reaching consequences, what with one of the Chechen military opposition's leaders Salman Raduyev issuing an ultimatum and demanding that Magomed Khachilayev be released within three days. Shamil Basayev also promised to aid the population of Wahhabi villages, who had supported the Khachilayev brothers (in case of military force were used against them). In response, President Aslan Maskhadov of Chechnya addressed the people, informing them that the Khachilayev brothers were acting in line with their own clan interests, and that their arrest constituted an internal Russian affair.

In its August 25, 1998 issue, Nezavisimaya Gazeta noted that first deputy prime minister Turpal Atgeriyev of the Chechen government, who attended the funeral of mufti Abubakarov in Makhachkala, accused deputy Chechen commander-in-chief and chairman of the so-called congress of Chechen and Daghestani nations Shamil Basayev of inciting tensions in Chechen-Daghestani relations by his ill-conceived statements on behalf of the Chechen people. According to Turpal Atgeriyev, Shamil Basayev had no right to speak on behalf of the Chechen republic's people and state-power bodies. He also noted that the actions of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi residents, who enjoyed the support of some political forces in Grozny, were spearheaded against the legitimate government and the entire Daghestani nation.

Maskhadov referred to his field commanders' Daghestani plans as an adventure. In response, Chechen warlords demanded the president's resignation, thus triggering off an intra-Chechen confrontation, which has never abated since then.

In his article, Mamayev writes that Daghestani unrest began to calm down at the end of the 1998 summer season. Incidentally, not a single terrorist act against Russian forces was registered there until February 1999.

After finding out that Chechnya and Daghestan can't be reunited by a war or a revolution, those in favour of the reunification concept decided to attain their goals with the help of elections, Mamayev noted. The third referendum (dealing with the introduction of the post of president in Daghestan) was suggested by local Islamists. In May 1998 this was demanded by Nadir Khachilayev. In August 1998 (that is, after the mufti of Daghestan was assassinated), the referendum idea was supported by an extraordinary Moslem congress. Therefore yet another referendum was appointed. Those advocating a Chechen-Daghestani imamate believed that an Islamic candidate would win in the course of Daghestani presidential elections. But their hopes were dashed in the course of the March 1999 referendum.

Nonetheless, the so-called independent Islamic territory continued to exist in Daghestan's Buinaksk district, virtually turning into a bridge-head for Islamic extremists, who were supported by Chechen field commanders.

Magomed Gadzhiyev wrote about a threat emanating from Chechen militants in the January 29, 1999 issue of Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (Independent Military Review). According to Gadzhiyev, the confrontation between President Maskhadov and opposing warlords could also affect other North Caucasian territories neighbouring on Chechnya (Daghestan and Stavropol territory, in the first place). Numerous facts proving that radical forces, which are not controlled by Grozny, are preparing for this, were registered. By the way, all kinds of groups pursuing political goals, e.g. seizing power in Chechnya and Daghestan, as well as ordinary gangs, tended to pool their efforts.

This unrest is being fuelled by the Congress of Ichkeria-Daghestan nations and the supreme council of Islamic jamaats (societies), Gadzhiyev pointed out. According to some sources, the latter comprised former members of Arbi Barayev's SWAT (Special Weapons And Tactics) regiment, which was disbanded in 1998 by President Maskhadov, and people from some other groups, which used to support official Grozny only a short while ago. Their list apparently included units serving under the command of Jordanian citizen Khattab. State Duma deputy Nadir Khachilayev, who was hiding on Chechen territory, also joined the jamaat council.

Such forces are also supported by some foreign extremist organisations. Foreign aid boils down to weapons purchases and deliveries; apart from that, Chechnya gets communications systems and mercenaries from abroad. Foreign organisations also provide information to their Chechen clients. Dozens of foreign missionaries are quite active in Daghestan, Chechnya and some other North Caucasian members of the Russian Federation. They preach extremist Islam among the local population. Gadzhiyev quotes Russia's Nationalities Minister Ramazan Abdulatipov, who believes that such ideas have nothing in common with the high-landers' traditional way of life, mentality and customs. According to Abdulatipov, the list of such organisations includes Taibat Al Heiriya, which has its headquarters in the United States, as well as Al Igasa of Saudi Arabia. Hamas and Brother Moslems have also stepped up their activities in the North Caucasian region.

In its December 16, 1998 issue, Kommersant-Daily carried an article by Georgy Dvali entitled "Chechnya Training International Terrorists". According to Dvali, who quoted Georgian law-enforcement agencies, Chechnya boasted at least two camps, which train international terrorists, who subsequently join Hezbollah, Hamas or the bin Laden organisation. They were forced to search for territories, which can't be reached by the United States (after the latter bombed camps in Sudan and Afghanistan), Dvali stressed. Chechnya is seen as an ideal place in this connection, because, technically speaking, it still remains under Russian jurisdiction. Consequently, the United States will hardly dare to bomb Chechnya. Arab terrorists illegally reach into Chechnya via Georgia, Azerbaijan and even Russia (entering the latter under the guise of tourists). Georgian intelligence operatives are inclined to think that those particular militants, who had tried to assassinate Shevardnadze February 9, 1998, were trained at camps in Chechnya's southern and south-eastern districts.

According to this article, it was the Mid-eastern Chechen diaspora, which suggested using Chechnya's camps for training the so-called Islamic warriors. As is known, hundreds of thousands of Chechen Mohajeers (settlers), whose ancestors had left the Caucasus as a result of the 1817-1864 Caucasian war, now live in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Egypt and Persian-Gulf countries. Barring Turkey, local Mohajeer organisations closely cooperate with well-known Islamic terrorist organisations; and this is particularly true of Lebanon.

It's highly unlikely that this terrorist-training programme was coordinated with official Grozny, which finds it unprofitable to spoil its relations with the Western world. However, paramilitary units serving under Salman Raduyev and Shamil Basayev, who have repeatedly voiced anti-American statements, might have tried to earn some money by training Islamic warriors, Georgy Dvali said in conclusion.