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2.1. Wahhabism and its Role in the Caucasus

The following are excerpts from the magazine Kommersant-Vlast (April 20, 1999):

"Originally called Muwahiddun, or Unitarians, the term Wahhabism was introduced by opponents of Muwahidduns and has since been used by European scholars and the majority of Arabs. Wahhabism was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an 18^th century exponent of Islam, who taught that all the accretions to Islam after the death of Prophet Muhammad were spurious. Al-Wahhab urged Arabs to return to Fundamental Islam, which, in his opinion, was the closest to the original holy scripts. He was against the worship of the saints and the tradition to beg the Prophet to protect the prayer during communion with God.

Wahhabis are famous for their austerity lifestyle. In 1912 they began to create farming colonies in which members of different tribes lived together. They called each other 'brother'. Each colony numbered from 1,000 to 10,000 people. Each colony sprang up near a spring of water and was protected by armed men.

T.E. Lawrence, a British spy and international adventurer, known as Lawrence of Arabia, became the God Father of the 'second edition' of Wahhabism. During World War I, he used the Wahhabi Islamic sect in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire. By rallying disunited Bedouin tribal groups, he brought to power the Saud dynasty in Arabia.

To this day Wahhabism is the religion of the ruling family of Saudi Arabia. The status of Saudi Arabia's ruling house is very high in the Islamic world, because the holiest Moslem places - the shielded city of Mecca and the radian city of Medina - are situated in the territory under its control".

Mikhail Vagabov, professor of the chair of fundamentals of religious studies, Daghestan State University, and head of the North Caucasus Centre for Islamic Studies, on June 23, 1999, published an article in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta titled "Manifesto of Jihad Is Proclaimed". He analyses the history of infiltration of Islam into the Caucasus, including the appearance of Wahhabism in Chechnya and Daghestan lately.

There are two Sufi tarikats in the North Caucasus today - Nakshbandaya and Kadiriya, Vagabov writes. Each is a ramified network of vird fraternities, which, in turn, are divided into numerous murid communities. Virds are rather stable entities professing and advocating many-year religious traditions. A specific feature of modern Islam in the North Caucasus, in particular, Chechnya, is the growing influence of the religious factor on public life. The tarikats have had a tangible role to play in the history of the North Caucasus. In Chechnya, their influence was used to handle tasks of a socio-political character. Recent events showed, however, that the positions assumed by the tarikats can also become a serious factor in the military-political sphere. During the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya the ideology of the Kadiriya tarikat was regarded as a mobilising factor.

Before Islam spread to the region, Vainakhs and the peoples of Daghestan, Kabarda and Adygeya had their own developed system of political faiths. The character of local syncretism stands to show that it was a combination of Islamic, pagan and biblical traditions. The pagan and Moslem traditions of Chechens were so mixed up that it was difficult to distinguish one from the other. Traditional social and spiritual institutions in their entirety proved to be a fertile soil for the spread of the activities of religious fraternities in the North Caucasus.

Muridism Caucasus style is usually defined as a variant of Sufism, "aggressive tarikatism", born on the ground of local cults. Vagabov cites scholar Nikolai Dyakov as saying that "with the exception of a purely outward and practical semblance, any concrete specificities of relations between Muridism and Sufism are rather hard to be traced". Thus, the majority of members of Shamil's movement had no connection whatsoever with Sufism, whereas characteristic of the majority of Muridism followers was the clearly manifested cult of the Prophet and closeness to Islamic Fundamentalism.

When analysing the situation in Daghestan, Vagabov points to the growing trend towards politicising Islam and aggravation of internal confessional differences (between Sunnis and Shiites, between Fundamentalists and Modernists, and between Wahhabis and Tarikatists) in the past few years. According to some respected people in Daghestan, under Russian conditions, Wahhabism was oriented to provoking inner-religious and inter-ethnic differences and igniting a civil war. Wahhabis particularly emphasised in their propaganda efforts that it will be a holy war which will eventually lead to the victory of the Islamic State of Daghestan and Chechnya, which will be independent from Russia.

According to Wahhabis, the Islamic regime was to be established in Daghestan after the completion of three main periods. The first period is the period of a large-scale spread of Islam; the second is the unification of all Moslems; and the third is jihad as a result of which Islamic rule is introduced and consolidated in the state.

In the drive to implement that plan, Wahhabis started setting up military formations for possible hostilities in Daghestan against the "usurpers who prevent Islamic propaganda". In their propaganda materials, including the so-called Manifesto of the Jamaat of Daghestan to the Moslem World issued in 1997, they accused Daghestan's leaders of illegitimate activities aimed to infringe the interests of the believers, claiming that "the leaders of Daghestan and those who cooperate with them have launched a full-scale struggle against genuine Moslems".

In keeping with the classical theory of jihad, the leaders of the Islamic jamaat claim that Wahhabis and the pro-Russian leaders of Daghestan "are in a state of war with all the ensuing consequences". That is why they called upon their supporters "in full measure to stir the Islamic call to activity and wage jihad against unfaithfulness and all those who embody it". The leaders of Wahhabi organisations in Daghestan and all the members of this religious fraternity were advised to resettle to neighbouring Chechnya.

Professor Vagabov recalls that shortly before the jihad Manifesto was made public in the end of 1997, Chechen and Daghestan armed groupings signed a treaty of a military alliance. The signatories to that treaty took the pledge, first, to give each other military and other support in case of an aggression from a third party or its threat, and, second, to facilitate the strengthening of peace and stability in the Caucasus and the settlement of religion-related and inter-ethnic conflicts. They also agreed that this treaty can be fulfiled only in accordance with Sharia standards and exclusively on the basis of the provisions of the Koran and Sunna.

In their joint statement the parties to the treaty stressed that the "jamaat of the Daghestan people represents the interests of Daghestan people in their service to Allah in the same way as the command of General Dudayev's army is entitled to represent the interests of Chechens, the interests of the freedom and independence of the Caucasus as a whole". "We are proud that by signing this treaty we have started close cooperation between the peoples and jihad armed units of Daghestan and Ichkeria. There are many people in the Caucasus who want to unite, and we hope that other political forces will join our treaty", the statement read.

"Pulling our efforts together is the only way to our salvation. Today we have started by forming a military union, because the present situation is the Caucasus is very complicated. Our common enemy - the Russian empire - does its utmost to preserve its presence and influence in the Caucasus and prevent Shari'ah from striking deep roots in our region so that an integral Islamic state should not be formed". Having proclaimed the slogan "there are no limits to Islam", the signatories to the military alliance declared that they will lend every effort to create an integral Moslem state on the entire territory of the Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Ichkeria, Ingushetia, Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia, that is, all the Caucasian peoples.

Professor Vagabov shows the historically developed environment in which the proponents of "pure Islam" - Wahhabism - unfolded their activities.

Islam in the form of tarikats preserved the organisational structures of Sufi vird fraternities. That is why it was able to strengthen its positions among Chechens and Ingush. Sufi fraternities actually proved to be the guardians of not only the rites and traditions of the Chechen and Ingush peoples but their spiritual culture in general.

In the Soviet era, up to the early 80s, there were no officially acting mosques in the Chechen-Ingush republic. That is why Sufi fraternities acted in a semi-underground manner. This circumstance gave the ground to some Western scholars, including A. Bennigsen and C. Lemercier-Colkege, to call it "parallel Islam". All Soviet institutions conducted a purposeful and aggressive ideological struggle against "parallel Islam" (there was practically no official Islam at that time).

It was a course aimed "to eradicate religion and religious mysticism, which also meant the eradication of the science which studied them", writes A. Knysh, an expert in Sufism. Soviet ideological organisations posed the students of Sufism with the task of exposing the activities of fraternities and their social harm. Nonetheless, atheist propaganda failed to produce expected results, and the religious feelings of Chechens did not grow any weaker, Vagabov points out.

When Jokhar Dudayev came to power in 1991, Sufi fraternities tangibly intensified their activities in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Dudayev who needed political support, brought the Moslem clergy closer to himself with the help of national-religious slogans. One of his former comrades, Yusuf Soslambekov, could not but notice it. "Dudayev announced that he belongs to the Kunta-Khadji vird. This ensured him support from this influential fraternity", Soslambekov said. Dudayev's elder brother Bekmirza presumably belonged to the Vis-Khadji vird fraternity. That gave Dudayev the ground to count on the support of this fraternity, too. It is only natural that the support of "zikrists" and the Kunta-Khadji and Vis-Khadji virds was not quite unselfish. Many of them became fabulously rich in Dudayev's times, Vagabov continues.

Under Dudayev's rule, a religious movement, which had been practically unknown in Chechnya before, began to gradually take shape under the tentative name of Wahhabism as an antipode to traditional Sufism. Either in Chechnya or in Tajikistan, in which the appearance of Wahhabis was also registered, this Islamic sect - despite its name - has no direct relation to the religious-political movement, which was established on the basis of the Sunni sect in Saudi Arabia. The main idea of the home-made Tajik and Caucasian Wahhabis is purification of Islam from all kinds of pagan accretions and later innovations. As a matter of fact, practically each religion, including Christianity, has lived through such a stage.

So, Professor Vagabov draws the conclusion that the history of the North Caucasian tarikats, especially the Kadir tarikat, shows that the attitude of Sufis to the reality has largely changed. This is borne out, in particular, by their participation in gazavat ("holy war") and political activities, among other things. This happened, in his opinion, to a considerable degree, as a result of changed conditions and under the influence of the practice of other Islamic trends.

Judging by press publications, the Chechen and Daghestan proponents of so-called Wahhabism did not conceal their political goals. After the end of hostilities in Chechnya in 1996, they began coordinating their actions. Though it cannot be said that Moscow, Grozny and Daghestan authorities actively opposed all this process, but they did not disregard it altogether. The "Chechen war" syndrome will fetter the initiative of federal and regional authorities for a long time to come, as they would be afraid that any of their actions would provoke the escalation of the situation in the North Caucasus. Chechens have come out from the 1994-1996 war with another syndrome - "the victor syndrome". Some of them who play the role of an opposition to President Aslan Maskhadov (Shamil Basayev, Movladi Udugov, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Vaha Arsanov and others) were convinced that Chechnya is destined the missionary role in the creation of a Caucasian Islamic state separated from Russia. So, they did not take into consideration any warnings.

In the end of 1998, Professor Kazbek Sultanov, a State Duma expert, published an article called "Daghestan Faces an Endurance Test" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 24). The author urged that the following circumstance should be fully realised: while tilting to strategic partnership with Daghestan within the framework of spiritual Moslem unity, the Chechen republic makes a mistake by taking this vector for the base of a real political union. The idea of such a union with the subsequent cessation from the Russian Federation is not the dominating one in Daghestan at this stage. It is a mistake to think that "Daghestan is turning into Chechnya's subsidiary (NTV News Program "Itogi", May 24, 1998). Daghestan increasingly feels that it can become small change in a big Chechnya-Moscow game and that it is just a springboard for Chechnya in its drive to get access to the sea and complete independence.

In Sultanov's opinion, many Chechen politicians do not conceal their positive attitude to a possible disintegration of Daghestan into warring enclaves. Daghestan regards such an attitude as an unfriendly challenge, the selfish character of which is not even concealed.

Sultanov also said that the uncertainty of Chechnya's status has a direct impact on destabilisation of the situation in Daghestan. It seems that certain forces in Chechnya and Moscow alike are interested in the persistence of a "neither war, nor peace" situation, which has actually been legalised by the pseudo-shuttle diplomacy of some Russian politicians. Meanwhile, from the standpoint of Daghestan's geopolitical stability and its role as Russia's strategic outpost in the trans-Caspian and North Caucasian regions, the deliberate uncertainty of relations with Chechnya and a painful lack of clarity with regard to its status undoubtedly exercise a negative and provocative influence.

We should not forget, either, that Daghestan remains the centre of Moslem education and the spiritual bulwark of Islam in the Caucasus, Sultanov goes on. However, the strength and influence of Islam are less self-sufficient than they are inversely proportional to the fall of trust in the actions of Russian authorities in the region and the crisis of the republic's regime. If sufficiently strong pro-Moscow sentiments fail to meet a natural and legitimate support from Moscow, they may organically transform into pro-Islamic sentiments. This is the stake of the proponents of "pure Islam".

However, Wahhabism, as an "alien ideology" which is not quite apprehensive of the local peculiarities, cannot triumph, Sultanov continues. In Daghestan, many people are ready to admit that under the present circumstances Wahhabism with its aggressive propaganda precepts and claims to the monopoly on holy truth is a way to chaos and decomposition under the attractive slogan of the purity of the faith. It is also necessary to bear in mind that Wahhabism as an oppositional movement can accumulate socially-oriented protest ideas. In the absence of a civilised political opposition in Daghestan many desperate people, especially, the young, can see Wahhabism as the possibility of a direct social protest.

"Dominating in public consciousness is the sentiment which Moslem educator I. Gasprinsky formulated in the beginning of the 20th century as follows: 'Russia must be sure that Moslems are its true and reliable allies, while Moslems, for their part, should be confident that Russia and Russians do not need and have no intention to encroach on their beliefs'," Sultanov writes in conclusion.

Sultanov also doubts various plans aiming to establish an Islamic state. In his opinion, Shamil's attempts to create a theocratic North Caucasian state in the 19th century, as well as similar attempts on the part of Uzun Khaji at the turn of the 20th century, lack any serious foundation at the end of the 20th century.

The elements of modernisation and Westernisation, as well as that aggressive present-day ideology of consumerism, seriously limit Islam's claims to set an example to others and to remain the sublime spiritual value. According to Sultanov, Daghestani intellectuals are increasingly becoming inclined to think that political self-determination in the form of an Islamic state doesn't guarantee prosperity to specific nations because it encourages a secession from Russia, also ensuring permanent regional instability (as a result of innermost differences, which inevitably flare up). It ought to be mentioned in this connection that, as distinct from Russia, which has traditionally steered toward an inter-ethnic coalition of nations, the Turkish model doesn't tolerate any ethnic diversity whatsoever.

We've now got carried away with the process of restoring the entire diversity of our national history, gaining a better insight into our origins, Sultanov noted. Meanwhile we have a less clear idea of the direction in which we are headed, as we make tortuous attempts to switch over from the survivalist ideology toward that promising right to development and positive self-assertion. We need intellectual honesty and a rational approach toward defining a system of priorities as never before. The absence of a well thought-out development concept turns North Caucasian peace into a mere temporary absence of war. Such peace amounts to lasting tensions, whose centre will methodically move along the entire North Caucasian perimeter.