1.6. Growing Tensions on the Administrative Border of Chechnya. Reaction of the Federal Authorities
The events in Chechnya, especially those which took place in the spring of 1999 after the kidnapping of General Shpigun, the armed raids of Chechen militants to the neighbouring regions and explosions in Vladikavkaz, postponed the Maskhadov - Yeltsin meeting, while the advocates of harsher measures with regard to the bandits who entrenched themselves in Chechnya gradually took the upper hand in Moscow.
On July 3, 1999, the Federation Council heard a report of Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo and suggested that the President should take "effective measures" to ensure safety on the territory adjacent to Chechnya and to disarm the Chechen bandit groups.
Kommersant-Daily (July 6, 1999) wrote that Rushailo made his report in the presence of the Chief of the presidential staff Aleksandr Voloshin, Vladimir Putin, then Secretary of the Security Council and FSB director, and government members. Premier Sergei Stepashin arrived when the report was nearly over.
Here is how Rushailo described the situation in Chechnya: "Kidnapping has turned into a well-organised international business, with the brains in Chechnya. Information about the sale of hostages can be seen in the central market of Grozny. Many Chechen building houses include in the blueprints cells for keeping hostages. Chechnya is more and more becoming the focal point of international drug dealers, as proved by the development of industrial-scale production of heroin on its territory".
The Interior Minister hinted at that session that there was the requisite legal basis for cutting short the operation of bandit groups in Chechnya. He meant above all the May 19, 1999 presidential decree "On Additional Measures to Combat Terrorism in the North Caucasian Region of the Russian Federation". As for the means and resources for this, Rushailo said that a temporary operational group of over 17,000 had been established in the region. Of these, some 10,000 were deployed on the Chechen border. In case of deterioration of the situation, the group could be reinforced with over 7,000 troops of the Defence Ministry and the Federal Frontier Service. Rushailo said he had issued an order "on making pre-emptive aviation and artillery strikes at the reconnoitered concentrations of bandits and their hardware".
So, the ultimatum demands made in Stepashin's March statement after the kidnapping of General Shpigun were repeated by Vladimir Rushailo in his July report in the Federation Council.
But this time the words were followed by deeds. Kommersant-Daily wrote (July 6) that after Rushailo met with Yeltsin on July 5, he announced that a pre-emptive strike was delivered by helicopters, artillery and mine-throwers at a group of 150-200 militants outside Kizlyar at around 6 in the morning. "The militants sustained losses, and, as far as we know from radio intercepts, some of them were killed", the Minister said.
On July 3 and 4, mine-throwers were used against Chechens who tried to attack the Interior Troops roadblocks at the Kopayevsky hydro station outside Kizlyar.
Replying to journalists questions about the Chechen threat to stage a series of terrorist acts in Russia, Vladimir Rushailo said that there had always been enough threats, and hence "we should be extremely vigilant and ready for anything. But our reaction should be adequate, we must reply to strikes with strikes, and often make pre-emptive strikes".
After that news agencies circulated the statement of Mairbek Vagachayev, press secretary of Aslan Maskhadov, to the effect that Chechens will reply to each such strike with ten explosions in Russia. Kommersant-Daily suggested that Vachagayev expressed not only his personal opinion. Anyway, it coincided with the statements made by field commanders at the congress of Chechen people, held in Grozny on July 3.
Maskhadov said at that time that "the Russian troops are fighting ghosts on the border, shooting at some non-existent concentrations of fighters and ordering pin-point strikes". He also harshly criticised the regions adjacent to Chechnya. "They are lucky to have Chechnya nearby, on which everything can be blamed". (St. Petersburg Vedomosti, July 8, 1999)
Ingush President Ruslan Aushev also criticised the delivery of pre-emptive strikes at the bases of Chechen militants. He said at a press conference in Moscow that such strikes would not affect "the criminals' plans" but would "embitter the Chechen people". The North Caucasian problems can be resolved only "by establishing constant and full-scale dialogue with the Chechen Republic", he said. (St. Petersburg Vedomosti, July 8, 1999)
Moscow did not rule out talks with the Grozny authorities, including on questions of coordinating efforts to combat crime. On July 7, representatives of the Chechen Interior Ministry came to Moscow for meeting Vladimir Rushailo. The delegation was led by First Deputy Interior Minister Kh. Khatsiyev. The mass media reported that the Chechen delegation planned to talk with Rushailo about the events that took place on Chechen borders, especially the border with Daghestan, in the past few days, and to discuss the fulfilment of tasks designed to combat crime, including kidnapping.
Yelena Loria, who wrote in Noviye Izvestia (July 13, 1999) about Rushailo's report in the Federation Council and subsequent statements and actions by politicians, pointed out that the new Interior Minister was dead set to control the situation in the turbulent North Caucasian region. She inferred that Rushailo had an action plan for the North Caucasus, and that his visit to Stavropol on July 12 was a proof of this.
Vladimir Rushailo was accompanied on his trip to the Caucasus by Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, Commander of the Interior Troops, and Vyacheslav Mikhailov, Minister for the Federation and Nationalities. A closed session of the Stavropol department of the Interior Ministry was held in Stavropol in the morning, followed by a conference with governor Aleksandr Chernogorov. After that, the delegation went to Mozdok, from which they expected to go to Makhachkala.
It is clear that it was no an inspection trip, Loria writes, as Vladimir Rushailo, who had released many hostages from Chechen cells, and Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, who spent many months in Chechnya during the first war, were well aware of the operational situation in the region. Rather, they went there to issue direct orders and instructions. Moscow will hardly step on the same rake twice and again dispatch troops to Chechnya, the author implied. But it is clear that the Interior Ministry would act much harsher now. It is no by chance that the Interior Troops deployed on the administrative border with Chechnya have been receiving armoured vehicles, including combat ones, in the past few weeks. Vladimir Rushailo said in Stavropol that "the residents of regions bordering on Chechnya, including Cossacks, can have weapons for self-defence, on conditions stipulated in the Russian legislation". The Minister also pointed out once more that "the administrative border must be protected by both technical methods and human resources". In fact, it should be equipped as well as the state border, but this will cost at least 10 billion roubles, which is not stipulated in the budget.
Igor Porshnev wrote in his article "Russia - Chechnya: What Will the Presidents Do? (Interfax-Vremya, July 16, 1999) that preparations for the Yeltsin - Maskhadov meeting proceeded against the background of more provocations on the Chechen administrative border with neighbouring regions. But Moscow hopes to hold the meeting in summer, he added.
Porshnev pointed out that each time when the meeting of the two presidents was put on the agenda, Chechen field commanders sought to prevent it by staging border provocations. Their logic is understandable: the "mountain generals" do not want Maskhadov's contacts with Moscow to succeed, as this would strengthen the positions of the Chechen leader. Analysts believe that the field commanders need to maintain the status quo under which Maskhadov controls no more than 20% of the republican territory and armed formations. Each field commander wants to be the king of his province - Arbi Barayev in Urus-Martan, Shamil Basayev in Vedeno, etc... If field commanders pooled forces, they would have easily got rid of Maskhadov, but they have no such plans so far.
Judging by everything, Moscow wants to speak with Maskhadov, because his dismissal would inevitably result in a head-on fight between field commanders and the federal centre.
Experts forecast the growth of the fighters' actions in July-August, but nothing more than this. As far as we can see, Igor Porshnev writes, the terrorist acts in Vladikavkaz and the attacks on the Russian roadblocks in Daghestan will not prevent the Yeltsin - Maskhadov meeting.
It is indicative that Moscow and Grozny try to coordinate their efforts in the struggle against kidnapping, drug trafficking, and the like. These issues were discussed a week before at the meeting of Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo with the leaders of the Ministry of Shari'ah Security of Chechnya. It took place barely a few days after the Russian Minister made his harsh statement about the delivery of pre-emptive strikes at Chechen bandit groups.
"The task is to prevent the bandit groups from moving beyond the borders of Chechnya", Interfax-Vremya wrote citing a source in the law-enforcement structures. "If this happens after all, and the bandits attack, say, our roadblocks, they should not just return fire, but pursue the bandits and liquidate them in their camps on the Chechen territory". Rushailo reaffirmed this task, indirectly. He stated during his trip to Stavropol that "we are not fighting Chechnya or Chechen people, but we have taken, and will continue to take, resolute measures to cut short the bandits and punish them for their attacks".
Igor Porshnev writes that it proceeds from the meeting of the Chechen delegation with Rushailo that Moscow's offensive attitude to the bandits did not provoke an allergic reaction of Maskhadov, who is objectively interested in weakening his rivals.
But Russia's tactics changed, too. The Grozny officials and field commanders made an attempt at consolidation, for the first time since the end of the Chechen war. A preliminary session of the National Security Council, attended by Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, Movladi Udugov, Ruslan Gelayev and other field commanders, who had not met each other for a long time, was held in Grozny in the night of July 12/13. Some sources reported that the agenda included the format of the council and its competence. A provisional agreement was reached that Maskhadov would head the council, which would be the supreme body of state authority in Chechnya, with the right to make decisions on all questions of domestic and foreign policy.
The Grozny rhetoric became considerably harsher by the end of July. Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov (Basayev's man) stated on July 30 that Chechnya has the right to delivery pre-emptive strikes at the Russian territory (Kommersant-Daily, July 31, 1999). That statement was provoked by the occupation of a Chechen customs post by the Russian troops. However, the Chechen "foreign ministry" forgot to say in its statement how Russia should regard the numerous sorties by Chechen militants. Are they "pre-emptive strikes" or reconnaissance in force?
On July 28 Kommersant wrote that the Chechen office of the prosecutor general, acting in the framework of the instituted case of genocide against the Chechen people, threatened to have a Shari'ah court trial, and subsequently execute 200 Russian politicians and military leaders, including Boris Yeltsin. Chechen officials explained that "there will be no manhunt for them. They will be punished strictly in accordance with law, when the situation changes". The latest statements made by terrorists Basayev and Khattab and by the Chechen Foreign Ministry show that the situation will change when Chechnya wins the war against Russia and impose Shari'ah laws on its territory, Kommersant writes. Chechens do not seem to doubt this possibility, and the numerous sorties by their militants, which remained unpunished, only convinced them of the impotence of their opponent.
But the Chechen authorities were alarmed when the Russian troops were ordered not just to fire to kill, but also to pursue the bandits in their territory. They launched an information warfare, a part of which is the notorious genocide case and the "plan of the Russian special services" to liquidate Chechen leader, allegedly exposed by Basayev and Khattab. The subsequent series of the border shoot-outs outside Kizlyar, which the bandits did not win, provoked a nervous reaction of the republic's top leaders.
Kommersant-Daily wrote (July 31, 1999) that this happened in the last few days of July. First the Chechen militants tried once again to stealthily approach the Interior Troops station at the Grebensky Bridge, but were detected by the guards and retreated without opening fire. An hour later they shot at the station at the village of Aksai, but, as the official statement reported, "were dispersed" by the reply strike from "the fire systems on combat duty". Next came the battle for the Chechen customs station located 800m outside Kizlyar and 30m away from the Russian checkpoint.
According to the Russian version, the Daghestani militia and Russian troops pursued the bandit groups when the latter were supported by hurricane fire from the Chechen customs station. The federal helicopters fired missiles and burned down the station. When the militia ran up to the burning trailers, two armed Chechens jumped at them, shouting "Allah Akbar!" One of them was killed, and the other was wounded and detained. The station, located on the Caucasus federal highway and regarded as disputed territory for two years, was occupied by the Russian troops.
That incident provoked harsh Chechen statements. According to the Chechen interpretation of the incident, as put forth in the "statement of the Foreign Ministry", a sniper from the Russian roadblock killed a Chechen customs officer and provoked the shoot-out. Next "followed the violation of the state border by the units of the Russian armed forces".
The statement, which Chechen «foreign minister» Ilyas Akhmadov sent to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, says that the "provocation" on the border amounted to "the actual prologue of a new armed aggression" of Russia against Chechnya. In this situation, "the leadership of the Republic of Ichkeria reserves the right to take pre-emptive measures with regard to the aggressor", the statement says.
Ivanov did not reply to it. Instead, the reply was provided by the military. "Let them make their strikes; we have things to meet them with", said Interior Troops Commander Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov.
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