19.01.2000 14:00 NORTH CAUCASUS AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS OF RUSSIA IN EURASIAN CONTEXT
Participants:
LEONID G.IONIN - Doctor of Philosophy, professor
KONSTANTIN M. TRUEVTZEV - deputy dean of applied politics department Higher Economics School state university
ALEKSANDR P. MINEEV, RIA Novosti political analyst
MINEEV: Our round-table discussions mostly aim to suggest a veritable long-term political-settlement model for the Chechen Republic.
TRUYEVTSEV: It's crystal clear even today that any military solution to the North Caucasian problem does have its own limitations in terms of time and space. What will happen in the future? What does the West want? What are the Islamic world's aspirations? And what importance will the North Caucasian factor eventually have for Russia? Besides, how can all this be linked with the Russian Federation's geo-political interests?
One would like to heed the Russian public's concern to the effect that Western countries would like Chechnya to turn into some kind of a Russian Ulster. What harm will this entail within the framework of Russian-Western relations? Some questions in the context of Russia's traditionally profound relations with the Arab world also have to be asked. I get a chance to contact Arab journalists and politicians rather often; and it seems that they mostly want to engage in wishful thinking with regard to Chechnya, as they talk about Islamic revolutionaries' struggle against the Russian regime.
The end of the Chechen conflict is already in sight. First, Chechnya doesn't amount to another Ulster in the demographic context. The same is true of the geo-political aspect. The Chechen factor is, in essence, some kind of an enclave. Nonetheless, Russia views Talib Afghanistan's attempts to recognise Chechen independence as something really unpleasant. The Chechen issue also seems to be quite limited in the general Islamic context. This can be explained by the fact that intra-Islamic contradictions have become aggravated in the wake of Chechnya's Daghestani incursion.
IONIN: Chechnya constitutes a local factor, which will, sooner or later, recede into the background. Chechnya was perceived as an apparently insoluble problem some time ago, with some people thinking that it heralded the Russian state's incipient disintegration. However, there has now appeared some weighty evidence to the effect that Russia, which is ready to settle this problem, boasts the required potential for doing this.
One would like to learn more about the structure of present-day geo-political conflicts. Who is fighting whom? What goals do the belligerents want attain? Can Chechnya be viewed as a manifestation of that struggle between the poor South and the rich North? Given the tentative nature of all these concepts, one can say that Western civilisation, which preaches liberal values, as well as a science-and-technical ideology, is currently spreading all over the world. This process is called globalisation.
What place does Chechnya occupy within the framework of the globalisation process? Medieval Chechen customs and traditions have nothing in common with liberal values and human rights. At the same time, we are witnessing active Western support for Chechnya.
We are witnessing a clash between Russia and the West under the pretext of spreading liberal and humanitarian values all over the world. In that case, Chechnya merely constitutes the scene of a struggle between the Western civilisation, which pretends to be something global, and a sufficiently local Russian civilisation, rather than a result of that struggle between Islamic and Slavic civilisations.
The situation used to be different in the past. There used to be two global concepts, e.g. Marxism's global aspirations, as well as those of the West. One of them has now crumbled to dust. Consequently, only one global concept now claims the right to dominate the world. At the same time, quite a few local values are trying to counter that concept.
MINEEV: If Chechnya constitutes a mere instrument of a struggle between a global civilisation and a local Russian civilisation, in that case the people of Russia would like to know about the possible outcome of such a confrontation. Supposing that Russia manages to preserve itself as some kind of a local-civilisation island as a result of such confrontation, in that case what can you say about that political system's lifestyle? Besides, what can you say about the relevant territorial division?
IONIN: Speaking of short-term prospects, I get the impression that Chechnya is highly unlikely to present a significant military and geo-political problem in the territorial context. Technically speaking, Chechnya is part and parcel of the Russian Federation; it will also become a Russian territory de facto. Nevertheless, certain conflicts will constantly flare up along the entire line dividing Russia and the Islamic world. It is to be hoped that such conflicts won't prove fatal.
As I see it, a long-term forecast, e.g. a possible clash between a global civilisation and local civilisations, seems to be much more interesting. There don't seem to be any reasons for optimism here. The human rights ideology is gradually turning into an instrumental ideology. In real life, though, we can see that human rights are being exchanged for political influence.
In my opinion, Russia has no other alternative but to gradually join the Western commonwealth. Participation in the northern hemisphere's democratic reconstruction constitutes the only option for Russia. The northern hemisphere's countries will strive to ensure their own interests. However, all of them are going to simultaneously ensure common interests, as they use the human rights ideology as an instrumental weapon for attaining world domination.
A third model, e.g. a liberal-and-socialist scenario, also emerges at this stage. Russia keeps noting all the time that it will opt for this third model. I think that this amounts to a common Russian-Western model, i.e. the instrumentalisation of human rights and the creation of a human-rights ideology that would be supported by the entire military, technical and economic might. A sufficiently authoritarian society would be created on this basis. The Kosovo conflict is seen as convincing proof of the fact that the West now conducts brain-washing campaigns, just like the Soviet Union had done in its day.
TRUYEVTSEV: I get the impression that the latest visit by the Council of Europe delegation amounts to a landmark event, of sorts. The Europeans would like to know, to what extent they can pressure Russia.
China has stated its support for Russia's Chechen campaign. The Chinese side motivates its position by the fact that it faces a similar Tibetan problem. All this is taking place against the background of expanded Russian-Chinese cooperation.
The same can be said about India. The Indo-Pakistani conflict can eventually escalate into a nuclear war. India, too, tends to expand its cooperation with Russia. On the one hand, we can see an emergent anti-Western Russian-Indian-Chinese triangle; and, on the other hand, that triangle confronts the Islamic world. Consequently, the West would have no alternative but to team up with the Islamic world against the above-mentioned triangle. The West considers this to be a rather uncomfortable dilemma. In fact, Western circles began to experience such geo-political discomforts in the context of the situation around the Caucasus.
FEDERAL NEWS AGENCY: PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) Chairman Lord David Russel-Johnston has visited the North Caucasus not so long ago. Will the results of his trip alter Russia's positions inside the European Community, just as he had predicted?
TRUYEVTSEV: Lord Russel used to make some really bellicose statements, before visiting Russia. However, he has assumed a much more moderate stand after his Daghestani trip. I think that Russian-Western relations are hanging on a very thin thread. Will this thread be torn; or will it become strengthened? This constitutes a significant aspect of this visit's results.
IONIN: Regardless of what results this particular visit will produce, certain decisions enabling the West to distance itself from Chechnya will be made. This can be explained by the fact that public opinion had been brain-washed rather intensively for quite a while. Western and Russian positions will be merged in the future. Both sides will display mutual understanding, also voicing mutual consent with respect to each other's humanitarian operations. This would constitute a step toward a more close-knit Russian-Western alliance within the framework of a common human rights ideology. The West would recognise Russia's right to re-establish a modern liberal humanitarian order, rather than a mere constitutional order, on Chechen territory. For its own part, Russia has recognised the West's right to implement its own humanitarian ideology in Kosovo, albeit with reservations and in the course of difficult discussions.
MINEEV: We consider the West to be a homogeneous entity. Does the West have any noticeable political initiative, which would have a different opinion of this problem, and which would facilitate Western-Russian consolidation?
IONIN: I don't see any full-fledged political initiative. There exist groups of intellectuals, who reject any brain-washing campaigns whatsoever, and who are ready to disagree with any semi-official viewpoint. Still I doubt, whether they have acquired any full-fledged political-expression means.
There has now appeared evidence to the effect that Western political quarters, which are unable to change its position by 180 degrees, are, nonetheless, becoming increasingly able to accept Russian arguments.
MINEEV: Mr. Truyevtsev, as an Orientalist, can you say a few words about the Arab world's position on this issue?
TRUYEVTSEV: We are now witnessing a global solitaire game, which has four dimensions, e.g. Russia; the Far Eastern dimension, e.g. India and China; the West; and the Islamic world. The Islamic world takes an active part in global developments, e.g. events around Iraq, Kosovo and Chechnya.
The Islamic and Arab worlds had rallied around events in Kosovo, what with Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi alone failing to solidarise with Kosovo's Albanians. Iran voices an evidently pro-Russian stand with regard to Chechnya and Russian interests as a whole.
Apart from Taliban and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is just about the only Arab country to assume a pro-Chechen position. Owing to different considerations, other countries, namely Iraq, Syria, Egypt and North Africa, voice a rather cautious position on the issue. The same can be said about the Palestine autonomy's leadership. The so-called "Arab street" mostly sympathizes with the Chechens. Owing to the authoritarian nature of Arab states, their political elite, which makes the appropriate decisions, assumes quite dissimilar positions. Not all of them side with Chechnya's "Islamic revolutionaries", as they are called by the Arab world. This split makes it possible to promote Russian interests to some extent and to build Russia's own relations with the Islamic world.
MINEEV: Many discourses concerning Chechnya are based on the fact that there exist Chechen national traditions, and that such traditions clash with Russian values. Subsequent post-war settlement models proceed from the fact that Chechnya must be populated by only one ethnic group.
Meanwhile the Chechen Republic, which is one of the Russian Federation's constituent members, comprises diverse territories replete with their own ethnic groups. Approximately 50 percent of the entire Chechen Republic were populated by the Slavs, as well as by the Terek Cossacks, the Grebenskiye Cossacks, etc., ever since the 16-th century. Barring WWII-vintage deportation, the Chechen-Ingush Republic had found itself under the auspices of the Russian civilisation. The entire local industry, urban culture and education were based on Russian civilisation's expansion, with Chechen traditions persisting inside various canyons alone.
Cossacks residing along the left bank of the Terek river attended one of our round-table discussions, noting that, if the Russian army withdraws, and if an attempt is made to cede all administrative powers to ethnic Chechens, in that case the Chechen republic would develop for another three consecutive years under Maskhadov. Chechen authorities were given an opportunity to build their own independent state, be it de facto, if not de jure, after the Khasavyurt peace process.
What do you think about a possible post-war political settlement for Chechnya?
IONIN: It's very hard to talk about the Chechen nation's ethnic homogeneity. It's well-nigh impossible to introduce local self-government and to hold local elections on the entire territory of the Chechen Republic. This would signify a return to a previous stage. Consequently, we would start preparing for a third Chechen war. That's why Moscow is going to appoint its own administrative structures for Chechnya in the near future. In fact, such structures will also encompass local self-governments. You see, it's next to impossible to stabilise the regional political, economic and social situation, without introducing a concise administrative system. The latter must guarantee complete observance of the Russian Constitution all over Chechnya, as well as the real-life equality of different ethnic groups.
TRUYEVTSEV: I had visited Armenia and Azerbaijan at the very beginning of the Karabakh conflict. By the way, orientalists had contributed greatly to that conflict. For example, it was said that the Armenian ethnic group had evolved outside present day Caucasian boundaries. This process had taken millennia to complete. The Cossacks are right when they say that the Vainakh ethnic group had evolved outside modern Chechnya, that is in the vicinity of Nakhichevan, subsequently clashing with the Arab caliphate and moving northward. Well, they are right here. Indeed, this had happened more than 1,000 years ago. However, not a single national problem can be solved in line with these positions.
We must establish certain temporal boundaries. As I see it, the 1991 period, e.g. the Russian state's formation, constitutes such a temporal boundary. We've got to admit our own mistakes. The law dealing with repressed nations' rights is really good in itself; but how can it be translated into life? Didn't its application upset the entire Caucasian balance of forces? In my opinion, the answer is "Yes" just because the Chechen Republic began to eject the entire non-Chechen diaspora ever since 1991.
Speaking of human rights, the afore-said ethnic-cleansing campaign was not duly covered by the Russian press. For its own part, the West knows nothing about this aspect of the problem.
Let's face the facts. As of 1989, the Chechen Republic had a population of 1.2 million people, what with the non-Chechen population accounting for more than 50 percent of the grand total. (These statistics were provided during the 1989 census - Ed.) At present approximately 150,000 people live in Chechnya. Moscow's Chechen diaspora now stands at 300,000; therefore one apparently knows the Chechen population's whereabouts. And where did the non-Chechen diaspora go? A Cossack ataman (chief) was killed in 1991, thus sparking off a conflict with the Grebenskiye Cossacks, the Sunzha Cossacks and the Terek Cossacks. As a result, the entire Cossack population was completely deported from the Chechen Republic.
This is a subject for a very serious discussion because present day events can trigger off a war between high-lander and low-lander Chechens, who are bedevilled by numerous contradictions (just like the Chechens and the Cossacks were).
MINEEV: All of us agree that there exist entirely different and conflicting local self-government traditions, e.g. Vainakh and Cossack traditions. Events of the last few weeks (that is, when Chechen fighters appeared in traditionally Russian-controlled areas) show unequivocally that the relevant federal strategy aiming to peacefully seize various populated localities is rather short-sighted at a time when the local population turns into militants virtually overnight (the way werewolves do).
There exists an occupation regime, as well as a long-term strategic policy for building local communities. Does international practice know of any precedents when the population's bi-ethnic composition amounts to a highly explosive "mixture", but when both ethnic groups, nonetheless, manage to co-exist? Chechnya has both Slavic and Chechen populated localities, which can be found not far from one another.
IONIN: First of all, Russia has amassed ample experience in the Caucasus. Among other things, they used to elect local atamans in the past. Suffice it to recall classic works of fiction, Leo Tolstoy's novel "The Cossacks" included. Therefore it will become possible to gain an insight into the solution of specific disputes between the Sunzha Cossacks and the Chechens during the 19-th century Caucasian war. Old sages enabled the conflicting sides to settle all kinds of issues.
Mid-eastern countries did their best to deblock the Lebanese conflict, which was marked by a multi-religious, rather than multi-ethnic, situation. In the long run, the international community tried to cut off the conflict zone from specific lines of communications. As a result, that 20-year-long conflict began to abate, in spite of contradictions. The local population itself started looking for specific trouble-shooting options.
RADIO ROSSII: A 50-year-old Chechen driver gave me a lift from Grozny via Znamenskoye one day prior to the Russian invasion. We asked him whether a military contingent should be deployed in Chechnya. He replied in the affirmative, noting that the troops must be British. It turns out that many of that driver's acquaintances view the current situation (that was just arising at the time) as the implementation of certain British and US plans aiming to reinstate their Caucasian influence. I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that quite a few Chechens agreed with such plans. I was really surprised back then.
MINEEV: There exists a Chechen apocryph, which was quite popular with the Dudayev-controlled press. It was believed that the British nation was the Chechen nation's younger brother. The ancient Chechen nation had apparently allowed the British to settle down on juicier grazing lands, provided that they will come and help in case of trouble.
GUSEV: In 1992 a person holding a Candidate Science (History) degree even wrote an open letter to the British Parliament on this issue; that letter was published by a Grozny-based newspaper. This is both funny and terrible.
As you may remember, the Cossacks had stormed Sukhumi together with Dudayev's men. By the way, many Cossacks used to view Dudayev as their brother back then. At the time, quite a few Russian patriots sincerely believed that the Chechens would serve as a factor making it possible to promote Russian interests in Trans-Caucasia.
Rutskoi said in this connection that such opinions being voiced by statesmen amounted to a real disaster. However, far from everyone shared Rutskoi's opinion, despite the fact that he was, doubtless, right, here.
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