25.11.1999 12:00 Aggressive extremism under cover of Islam: adventure in Dagestan, its consequences and lessons.
Morozov Y., Lutovinov V.
Geopolitical significance of the Caucasus for Russia.
The majority of European politicians came to a conclusion that the Caucasus is an "Achilles' heel" for Russia as early as 150 years ago. They asserted it was there that the aimed blow should be delivered in order to throw off "Russian bear". However, there were some people who didn't advise to do so. It was not for the sake of Russia, but for the reasons of safety for Europe itself, as it would inevitably have found itself under the debris of the dying empire.
Indeed, Northern Caucasus is still Russia's most intricate region nowadays due to unsettled problems of public administration, federal structure, as well as aggravation of socio-political, economical, religious and some other contradictions, which threaten national security of the whole country. It is one of the most vulnerable segments of Russian geopolitical area. It is no coincidence that it was precisely this region that became the arena of the cruellest armed conflicts between the Russian Empire on the one side and Turkey and Iran on the other. Western Europe actively supported the activities of the latter.
From the geopolitical point of view Caucasian region of Russia is extremely important strategical center. The Caucasus is a kind of connecting-link between Europe and Central Asia, it secures outlet to the system of 3 seas - the Caspian, the Black and the Sea of Azov, and through the Azov- Black Sea basin to the Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar and to the Suez Canal. Transcaucasian states have here their major economical transport and transit communications with Russia, which practically can't be duplicated. The Caucasus has a common border with Turkey - one of the members of NATO. Fertile lands of Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories, sturgeon resources of the Caspian Coast, oil and gas resources - all this is in the Caucasian region.
In short, it can be asserted without too much of a stretch that the one who has influence upon this region, to a certain extent dominates over considerable part of our planet. That's why there are enough forces all over the world interested in shattering stability and in weakening Russia's positions in this region.
Military- strategical intentions.
Experts of any trade now have practically no doubts that destabilization in the Caucasus is the result of the western planned policy aimed at the weakening of Russia's position in this region as well as in the Balkans, while simultaneously securing their own presence in the area and exerting considerable influence upon the development of socio-economical, ethno-religious and military-political process. One can clearly see many of the elements of the "Yugoslavian scenario" in its early stages in the Caucasian current events. There is direct evidence of constantly stirred up separatism, nationalism, religious fanaticism, centres of tension kept up for a long time (Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnia), mutual territorial claims etc.
While our country is in the current disorganized state, one should expect that the western policy will remain unchanged - gradual contribution to the crisis in the Russian Federation with moving it from economical and political spheres to the military one. In this situation domestic conflicts within "the Caucasian bulge" from Chechnya to Dagestan through Kabardino-Balkaria into Adygeia, as well as in other regions stricken by economical and socio-political crisis, constitute the major menace to Russia. The model of destroying Russia at that will comply on the whole with that of dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Legitimate expansion of the western military presence in the Caucasus through peacemaking (Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, Chechnya) is possible at certain stages of the crisis. At the same time ethno-national and religious conflicts, half-extinguished, will be stirred up by all possible means, the new ones will be unleashed directly or through the third countries, thus attaining dispersal of Russia's efforts and its economical wearing out.
Judging from the experience based on the analysis of the reasons for dissolution of the USSR and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the crisis in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, exposure and searching for the ways of preventing tendencies towards growing separatism and nationalism on the part of subjects of Federation takes on special significance for Russia.
In the struggle for ousting the Caucasus from the sphere of Russia's national interests ethno-religious factor with the use of military force, which can be clearly viewed in Chechnya and Dagestan as well as in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, has been exploited most actively lately.
Many regional leaders, for example those in Chechnya, are using weakening of the administrative influence of the federal centre for consolidation of their personal authority with the help from outside. This support manifests itself through financial flows both from the West (USA, Turkey) and from the East (Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia). According to the intelligence service some of the high-ranking Russian oligarchs were taking part in financing separatists from Chechnya in order to destabilize the political situation in Moscow, distract attention of the Russians and law enforcement agencies from the scandals connected with currency frauds and other abuses.
The Chechen leaders realized that Ichkerya, within its present borders, was lacking vitality of an independent state. Its leadership counted on the separation of the whole Northern Caucasus and first of all of Dagestan, whose significance is determined by its geographical location (its proximity to the major countries of Islamic world, its outlet to the Caspian Sea and to the oil shelf, its international transport communications). The events were supposed to move according to the following scenario.
Preliminary training of military groups and preparation of the districts of the forthcoming combat activities, secret infiltration into Dagestan's districts difficult of access, inspiration of the conflicts at the border and on the territory of the whole republic, military intervention in the conflict zone. Later, after escalation of the conflict, "voluntary" joining to Chechnya on basis of decision taken by religious leaders (Moslem "shura"), creation of a state with "shariat" form of government and provision of outlet to the Caspian sea for Chechnya.
In future they counted on creation, according to a similar scenario, of a unified Caucasian state consisting of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kalmykia, on basis of which the foundation of the so-called "Caucasian confederation" with participation of other North-Caucasian republics and Transcaucasian states would become possible.
The following facts serve as confirmation of reality of these plans.
As far back as during the Chechen conflict Botlikhsky and Tsumadinski districts as well as vicinities of the villages of Karamakhy and Chabanmakhi on the territory of Dagestan were made by illegal gangs the base stations for the early stage of the conflict.
Radical Islamic forces have prepared overthrowing of the constitutional order in Dagestan for the past 1 year and a half. Within this period of time several thousands of mercenaries of various nationalities have been trained, depots of arms, ammunition, provisions and other materials have been created.
The mercenaries were well trained and equipped for armed fights in mountain conditions. Bandits' efforts were supported by propaganda and information wars, including those on the part of mass media.
"Fifth Column" was created on the territory of Dagestan to assist guerrillas.
Illegal infiltration of militant groups into Botlikhsky and Tsumadinsky districts of Dagestan started in midsummer 1999 in order to gain the confidence of the residential population and to bring discontent with existing situation in the republic to its "boiling point"; Chechen guerrillas showed off their piety and respect for local morals and manners.
August intervention in Dagestan was preceded by numerous militant sallies, which took place practically on a daily basis all along administrative border between Chechnya and Ingushetia, Stavropol Territory and particularly Dagestan. 14682 characters; 22November, 1999 e-mailed to RIA Vesti
Analysis of almost 100 recent attacks on the police blocks and Interior troops' outposts, of the tactics of bandit groups' operations, of the acts of terrorism and diversions allow to conclude that not only the scenario of the escalation of the given armed conflict was carefully planned, but it was also inevitable due to pathological bellicosity of the forces, which consciously and irrevocably followed the path of violation and aggression. Because of this, the South of Russia, which became hostage of terrorists owing to their ever-growing activity, started to turn into a war zone long before the August events in Dagestan. It is significant that peaceful citizens, whose lives in all the areas bordering upon Chechnya became almost unbearable, prevail among the victims of outrageous anarchy and bandit operations that were made a practice. Measures undertaken by local executive authorities to insure safety of the Russian citizens were obviously insufficient due to poor support and limited help from the federal centre.
The main slogan of the inspirers of this operation, namely powerful interests in some countries in the Near East and the Middle East, was "deliverance from Russian colonialism" of separated and moved nations, their national and religious "liberation" as well as creating on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan a unified Islamic state with the subsequent extension of its frontiers at the expense of other subjects of the North-Caucasian region. Wahhabism was chosen an ideological platform for these geostrategical aspirations.
The early stage of realization of so far-reaching designs, whose immediate performers became militants headed by S. Basayev, was generously sponsored from abroad, i.e. by "western countries" , by one of the most notorious terrorists and leaders of "Taliban" movement, ben Laden as well as by some others. According to the Russian intelligence, the budget of the operation total 25 mln dollars.
The extremist formations, which were out of control of the official powers in Grozny, consisted of the Chechens as well as of the natives of Dagestan, Afghanistan, Tadjikistan and the Near East, there also were quite a few adventurers who were always ready to fight for the ideas of Wahhabism arms in hand. Many of them manage to reconcile their "faith" with drug trafficking, distillery business, kidnapping and slave trafficking, robberies and other criminal offences.
As far as the repulse of the aggression goes, especially if compared to the military operations of the federal troops during the 1994-1996 Chechen war, there weren't any evident weak spots this time. The informational background of the military operations was rather active and purposeful, it being the case not only at the federal level but also with the Dagestan mass media, which made the most of their resources and acted quite efficiently. The attitude of the Command towards subordinate personnel has changed considerably when speaking of maximum reduction in casualties. The tendency to spare soldiers' lives, however, neither practically affected the results of the military operations nor their offensive character. At the same time insufficient material support didn't allow to cause still more damage to the manpower and firing facilities of the enemy, limited the tactical offensive abilities of the federal troops. As a result considerable part of extremists managed to abandon the war zone even using transport vehicles, in spite of the fact that it was blocked.
Later these half-beaten militants, having recovered from the mass firing, having licked their wounds and having received the necessary reinforcement took up arms once again. By drawing off considerable forces of the federal troops they thus enable the militants' main power (up to 2000 people), deployed cleared for action at several points along the Dagestan-Chechen border to unleash yet another aggression in one or several districts at any opportunity.
It's quite possible that the recent outbreak (in the Bouinaksk district) can recur again and again in order to disperse efforts of the federal main force, to stretch it out along the border and to involve it in a lengthy fights with numerous small groups of militants, using guerrillas' tactics in the ideal conditions of the highlands and woodlands.
Probability of such a scenario of future developments has risen after A. Maskhadov had declared the state of emergency in Ichkerya and after the anti-Russian moods have dramatically spread among the majority of its population. Under these circumstances one can hardly reckon that after liberation of the Dagestan mountainous villages the unleashed armed conflict will quickly come to an end. The positive results achieved in the course of suppressing the aggression in August are most likely to be considered only the first step, being one of the stages of fierce and stubborn struggle to entirely smash the militants. There are few who doubt that further escalation of aggression at the Chechen border, being lesser evil, and even acts of terrorism in Russian cities, mentioned by Basayev, being the worst scenario, are quite real. Militants won't settle down, they will just alter their tactics.
As far as the strategy and geopolitical designs of the radical Islam go, the failure of their adventure in Dagestan has in no way affected the expansion aspirations of the aggressive wing of fundamentalists. Confirmation of this is manifest in just another burst of militants' aggressiveness in Dagestan, further spreading provocations and acts of terrorism to the territory of Central Asia (Kirgizia and Uzbekistan) alongside with uninterrupted activity of the extremists' main force, which stroke its roots in the regions of the North Caucasus.
So what lessons are to be learnt from the analysis of the August aggression in Dagestan?
Firstly, the operations in this republic were aimed at intensifying destabilization in one of the regions of the Russian Federation known for their intricate, highly unfavourable environment, being manifestation of the system crisis, which has been going on for a long time now. Absence of the prospect to meet such a crisis and presence of numerous undecided contradictions in the main aspects of everyday life pave the way for various adventures, provocations, incidents etc. as part of the civilians, being desperate, can resort to any unexpected and destructive actions.
Secondly, domestic aggressive forces, based in the South of our country are becoming more insolent and decisive, are getting increasing support from abroad, are developing methods and means of destabilization and aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus and even in other regions of our country.
Thirdly, the majority in the political leadership of Russia doesn't have a clear idea of the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Interior Ministry, Federal Frontier Service, other forces, military formations and bodies in insuring national security in the face of internal threats. Until there is deep understanding of this problem, the events will be developing according to the least desirable scenario.
Fourthly, the failure of the aggressive designs in the Botlikh district of Dagestan contributed to cementing of unity of the Dagestan peoples, strengthening their negative attitude towards the ideas of Wahhabism, and, particularly to its promoters, in the person of bandit formations, to strengthening the authority of the government of the RF among local citizens and to increasing the number of supporters of pro-Russian orientation.
Fifthly, a crushing defeat of S. Basayev, being one of the Chechen leaders, death of many hundreds of militants lead by him aggravated the situation in the republic immensely. Great number of the undecided problems tormenting Chechnya, among which those connected with criminality and poverty being the most evident, is supplemented with aggravation of the relations with neighbouring Dagestan. Considerable part of the Chechens express readiness to set out arms in hand against criminal groups, willing to put an end to anarchy.
Sixthly, in this connection and in the light of the positive changes in the situation in the North Caucasus, it's extremely important to use current political and psychological environment to considerably strengthen Russian authority in the given region. Factors of such strengthening should be not only building up military presence, but also growing political activity and adjustment interests of the federal centre to those of the local elite by every possible means. It's time to reject wait-and-see-policy and to start putting forward initiatives, contributing to solving the most acute problems and contradictions.
Seventhly, the most important factor of containment is insuring effective protection of the Chechen borders. Unfortunately, during the August events in Dagestan it turned out that the Dagestan-Chechen border was at some points practically unprotected. It was the Botlikh district from which landing parties were withdrawn several months ago, which, naturally, considerably lightened the task of practically unhampered infiltration of the militants in the territory of the independent state.
Eighthly, legal regulations for guarding the administrative borders between Chechnya, with its special status, and other subjects of the Russian Federation haven't been worked out up to now, which, undoubtedly, causes problems in securing their territorial integrity and protecting them from encroachments of the militants. Besides, during the combat activities, insufficiency of legal rules for the combined activities of the Joint Alignment of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and Russian agencies which carry out strategical and strategical tactical tasks, was brought to light again.
Ninthly, aggravation of the situation at the Dagestan-Chechen border was taking place for quite a long period of time. Reports about preparations for the armed assault on the part of Chechnya were permanently submitted to the corresponding authorities both in Dagestan and the federal center. However, no preventive measures, first of all, on the part of the Interior Ministry were taken. What is the most important is inertia of the corresponding law enforcement agencies and the fact that rather strong fortifications built in the mountains by the militants as well as the concentration of the latter at the border in threshold of the aggression dropped out of sight of these agencies. Absence or insufficiency of the necessary information about the war zone adversely affected the terms of deployment of the Joint Alignment and its readiness to start the operation. That's why collection and analysis of the necessary military intelligence on the situation in Chechnya and its borders should be, undoubtedly, far more proficient.
Tenthly, in the light of the growing aggravation at the Dagestan-Chechen border and in connection with the fact that provocations, acts of terrorism etc, aimed first of all against the Interior Ministry, became more and more undisguised and aggressive, a system of effective measures to actively resist the wild outburst of gangsterism should have been carried out. It should have been done all the more as the number of victims, including officers of law enforcement agencies, in days and weeks prior to the armed aggression had risen sharply. However, the Interior Ministry and its Interior Troops chose the tactics of selective response and that of wait-and-see. Initiative was take up by the bandits, who skilfully took advantage of the inactivity, half-measures and poor proficiency of the law enforcement agencies and managed to aggravate the situation sharply before the beginning of the armed conflict. One of the measures to improve the situation is creating operational force of the Interior Troops in Dagestan, which, relying on the support of the local citizens, would be able to keep due order in the republic.
It should be pointed out that tactics of the military operations, chosen by the Federal Troops, which fully used the most appropriate for this area weapons and military equipment and conducted constant reconnaissance as well as other background activities in the course of extermination of the enemy, turned out to be far more efficient.. The degree of coordination between the Armed Forces, Interior Troops, other groups, military formations and agencies while carrying out the set tasks not only of strategical but also of tactical character, has risen immensely. It's a sign of hard work done by the leadership and headquarters of the military authorities after the armed conflict in Chechnya.
However, combat activities have brought to light quite a few problems in technical supply of the Armed Forces with weapons and military equipment. Existing traditional means of reconnaissance and communication are no longer able to promptly supply the commandment with information. Facilities of the deployed space-based observing systems, which conduct reconnaissance, provide communication and topographical fix, are exploited not to their full capacity due to poor performance of the ground-based infrastructure which receives data from space. There are some other unsettled matters, which can be and must be resolved by launching into serial production samples of the newest weapons and military equipment, which have been developed by our scientists and designers in recent years.
Finally, another lesson, learnt from the events in Dagestan, is the necessity of manifestation of political will and decisiveness in applying force, without which suppression of an aggression is impossible. These qualities should be manifested firmly, unhesitatingly, taking into consideration the given situation at the highest level in order to exclude doubts, inactivity, inconsistency, indecisiveness and other such negative manifestations while deciding military-political and strategical-tactical matters. Small and big wars have one thing in common: the victory in both of them can be achieved only owing to mutual aspirations and combined efforts not only of a soldier and a general, but also of a journalist, Finance Minister and, undoubtedly, President of the Russian Federation himself. It is particularly important to understand it now, at the time of hardships for our country, when Russia alone, without any help from the outside, has to solve the most complicated problems and tasks, upon which future of our citizens as well as fate of many peoples and countries, closely related to our country, depends.
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