November 18, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL "SANDY" BERGER
7:00 P.M. (L)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Istanbul, Turkey)
For Immediate Release November 18, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SAMUEL "SANDY" BERGER
The Conrad Hotel
Istanbul, Turkey
7:00 P.M. (L)
MR. BERGER: Now, I get so little respect from Leavy that he doesn't
even introduce me. (Laughter.)
Let me give you a readout on the meeting between President Yeltsin and
President Clinton. It was a vigorous meeting, the two Presidents
expressing strong convictions. They expressed their views on Chechnya, not
too dissimilar from what you heard in the plenary session.
The hallmark of this relationship, however, has been the willingness
of President Yeltsin and President Clinton to work through difficult
issues. And I don't know that we convinced President Yeltsin on Chechnya
-- he certainly didn't convince us that the course that they're on is not
-- is likely to succeed. But I do think it was useful for President
Yeltsin to be here today to hear the voices of the international -- his
colleagues, which were quite uniform in expressing their concerns, not
hostilely toward Russia, but out of concern for the impact that this could
have on Russia.
The meeting, however, was, I think, cordial in its tone. It ended --
it actually both began and ended by President Yeltsin telling President
Clinton that he owed him a visit to Moscow. At the end, saying that he
hoped he would get him a date soon for coming to Moscow to continue the
dialogue sometime next year. We will look at our schedule.
Now, on Chechnya, as I said it was quite consistent in essence with
the exchange you heard this morning. President Yeltsin said that Russia is
under the threat of what he described as "merciless terrorists;" that they
were in favor of peace, but that that was only possible by eliminating the
terrorists. He said that their intent is not to harm civilians, but that
this -- that the rebels in Chechnya not only were indigenous, but also were
increasingly being supported by radical fundamentalists from the region.
The President said to him that we don't disagree on the need to combat
terrorism, but said that -- and that we would be prepared to work with
Russia on cutting off resources to terrorist organizations, particularly
international terrorist organizations -- but that we feel that the
situation on the ground here is such that the civilians and rebels are
intermingled, and makes it very difficult to avoid civilian casualties.
Therefore, the President said, the means that you're using will undermine
your ends, and lead to a cycle of violence. And that's why we're urging a
political dialogue to achieve a political settlement. Again, this was, I
would say, at least half the meeting, discussing Chechnya.
................
Q Sandy, in the end, did President Yeltsin yield any ground? We
had a German diplomat saying that he's agreed to allow the OSCE head into
Chechnya, and has agreed to work for a political solution. Are you aware
of any concessions that he made or any ground --
MR. BERGER: He left Foreign Minister Ivanov behind. He said, Mr.
Ivanov will negotiate with your ministers. The foreign ministers have been
meeting this afternoon and I believe Secretary Albright may be by in a bit
to bring you up to date on where those discussions go.
Let me simply frame that -- tomorrow, there are three possible
documents that will be signed. One is, as I've said before, the CFE
agreement. Two is the OSCE Charter, which we talked about before. And
three is a declaration.
In the declaration, we have proposed some language relating to OSCE
engagement in Chechnya. That is what's being discussed. It's obviously a
consensus document; therefore, the Russians would have to agree to it. And
I think I'll leave to Secretary Albright -- and I think she'll be by
shortly -- to describe where that is.
Q The President said, in talking about an OSCE negotiations, that
there were people other than terrorists that --
MR. BERGER: I'm sorry, I can't hear you.
Q The President said, with respect to the OSCE negotiations, that
if the Russians would agree to it, there were people other than terrorists
in Chechnya that could be negotiated with. President Yeltsin's remarks
seemed to say that his argument was not with people who want to talk peace,
but with the people -- with the terrorists themselves. Was there any
movement inside the meeting? Any discussion? Any attempt to identify a
group of people that the two could sit down and talk with?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think that's an important -- that, in general
terms, was discussed. I mean, President Yeltsin said, I will not negotiate
with terrorists, with bandits. And he described, in some detail, the
activities of some of these groups in Chechnya, and the support they
receive from outside interests, outside terrorist groups, et cetera.
The President said, I'm not talking about negotiating with terrorists.
I'm talking about negotiating with those people in Chechnya who seek to
have a peaceful resolution, and isolating the terrorists. And, again,
President Yeltsin didn't say -- there was no agreement on that, but I think
to the extent that President Yeltsin was here today and heard what
President Clinton said, heard what Chancellor Schroeder said, heard what
Mr. Ahtisaari said and others that were after us, hopefully that will push
him down the road toward seeking a political solution.
Q Sandy, is there an analogy here? Maybe it's a poor one, but
Yeltsin would negotiate -- let's take the Northern Ireland example -- he
would negotiate with somebody like Sinn Fein but not with the IRA, is that
the idea?
MR. BERGER: I think -- I've learned never to use metaphors --
(laughter) -- so I can't even use analogies. But I think the concept here
I agree with, which is we're not suggesting that he should sit down with
those forces in Chechnya who are, in fact, killing innocent people, have
attacked Dagestan, who have been engaged in terrorist activities. I don't
think anybody disputes the fact that Chechnya is a haven for terrorists and
secessionists. But there are certainly other forces in Chechnya -- it's
not for me to describe them or designate them who want this over, who want
peace.
One of the reasons we would like to see some greater OSCE role --
again, I don't think it's the be-all and the end-all, but an intermediary
here may be able to help create that dialogue.
Q Can you please enlighten us on the circumstances -- could you
please explain the circumstances of Yeltsin's departure? There have been
conflicting reports about this. Did he leave when he planned to leave?
Did he leave early because he was angry about the Chechnya part of the
declaration?
MR. BERGER: I spoke to my opposite number and President Chirac before
coming over here to make sure that I understood the dynamic. President
Yeltsin had always planned to arrive last night and leave today. That had
always been his intention. The meeting with President Chirac and
Chancellor Schroeder, according to French government officials who were in
the meeting, was very cordial, brief.
President Yeltsin said, I want to focus on a time when we can meet --
I think he said in Paris -- for a whole day and talk about European
security issues and these issues. And they reached an agreement to a
meeting, I think, sometime in December, and had a brief discussion and left
not at all on an angry note. Whether that was by virtue of pressing
business in Moscow or stamina or what, I can't speculate. But it was not
stomping out of the room.
...........
Q Sandy, I know Secretary Albright's coming, but could you describe
the flavor of the Chechnya language in the charter?
MR. BERGER: No, I really -- she's been in these negotiations
representing the President, and both is more familiar with the language and
I think it's more appropriate for her to -- I'm not trying to duck
anything, I just think it's more appropriate -- she'll be better able to
answer your questions, I think.
Q You said the President spoke about the impact of the Chechnya
crisis continuing and the status quo would have on Russia. What did he say
about what that --
MR. BERGER: I'm sorry, for some reason I'm having a hard time tonight
hearing you.
Q You said that the President spoke with Yeltsin about the impact
that a continuation of the Chechnya crisis at its current stage would have
on Russia. What impact did he describe, and how is it that it will have
some serious impact on Russia if, in all the bilateral relationships with
other countries, it doesn't seem to have had a serious impact?
MR. BERGER: First of all, internally, there's an awful lot of
resources that Russia is now expending on this conflict in Chechnya --
resources that obviously are needed for its domestic economy. So, number
one, it's a diversion of resources, it's a diversion of the focus and
attention of Russian government officials, and the greater degree of
instability that is created in the Northern Caucasus -- this is a problem
that could spread rather than be contained by continuing conflict.
So I think the President is referring in particular, and more
importantly to Russia, to the effect on Russia -- in Russia.
Q Sandy, the Europeans and Mr. Ahtisaari used the word "condemn" in
referring to the events in Chechnya. It didn't seem to me that the
President's speech was anywhere near as strong, using language anywhere
near as strong as that. Would you accept that?
MR. BERGER: No. We can stack up adjectives, I suppose, and see who
has the larger, bigger pile. I don't think there was any question to
anybody that was listening; the President was very firm in what he is
saying. He was trying to persuade. He was trying to have an impact on
Yeltsin. And he did that, I think, in a forceful way. And I think he did
that in a clear way. And there was no mistaking his position.
And I think, in particular, when Yeltsin took a swipe at the United
States for aggression in Kosovo, I thought the President's rejoinder was
both powerful and quite telling. And almost everybody in that room -- that
room was electrified at that moment. And I think almost everybody came up
to the President afterwards and said they thought it was a very convincing
way of making the point to Yeltsin that what goes on within a country is no
longer simply a matter for that country; that the international community
-- after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, after the Helsinki
Final Act, after an OSCE Charter that we may sign tomorrow -- that the
international community does have a right and obligation to express its
concerns.
And by putting it in terms that I think Yeltsin could relate to --
what would happen if you, having stood on that tank, had been arrested?
Would you have wanted the international community to be silent, or to stand
up and condemn it? I thought that was an extraordinarily powerful way of
making that point.
Q Was he making some kind of analogy to democracy in Chechnya?
MR. BERGER: No. There are two different issues here. Put Chechnya
aside. Yeltsin was, and has, challenged -- and did in his intervention --
this is none of your business, he has said to the world. This is none of
your business, Chechnya. This is our business; stay out of our business.
And the President was saying, that's wrong; it's not just your
business, it's the international community's business, because violations
of human rights are matters that the international community has a right
and obligation to speak to. And particularly as friends of Russia, we have
an obligation to speak up when we think you're headed -- you're on a course
that is going to be damaging. So the point the President was addressing
was Yeltsin's point that the international community had no right to
condemn them for what was going on in Chechnya.
Q Sandy, do you have any reason to believe that Yeltsin will be
influenced by any of the things that were said today?
MR. BERGER: I don't know the answer to that, Mark. I think the fact
that he came, in and of itself, was, I think, an interesting fact, and
suggests that Russia does care about the international community and seeks
to maintain its relationships with the international community. I think he
was hearing this from people who have been -- Jacques Chirac, and the
Germans, and the President -- who have been supportive of Russia's
democracy, supportive of what Russia has been seeking to do in general; not
people who have been hostile.
So I hope it has some impact. I can't say whether it will or not.
But I think we have an obligation to try to express our concerns.
..........
Q Did President Yeltsin indicate any willingness to let relief
agencies into Chechnya?
MR. BERGER: I think that's something that's being discussed by the
ministers this afternoon.
Q -- conversation between President Yeltsin and President Clinton?
MR. BERGER: No. President Clinton expressed our view that it's
important, as he did again in his intervention in his statement at the
session, that what we want to see here is an end to the violence against
innocent civilians, the ability of people to return to their homes, access
of relief organizations. He made those points again to President Yeltsin
in the private meeting.
Q Did the President ever say, look, this could cost Russia money in
terms of loans in the future, loan guarantees?
MR. BERGER: Not in those terms. I think that -- quite honestly, I
don't think that would be the most effective way to get them to change
course at this point.
Q Did President Yeltsin mention anything about how the prosecution
of the war is affecting the popularity of the Prime Minister?
MR. BERGER: No.
Q Could you talk a little bit about who is helping the Chechen --
the rebels, the separatists? Because I know Mr. Yeltsin's referred to
them, and President Clinton appears to have referred to them. Who are
these --
MR. BERGER: He spoke particularly of Islamic fundamentalist groups --
I'm using his description -- groups that are being supported by countries
in the region. He didn't specifically indicate which countries. You know,
we have, for example, some information that Osama bin Laden is supporting
some of these people.
............
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