21 September 1999
Text: State Dept.'s Rand Beers Testifies on Colombia
(Underlines U.S. support for "Plan Colombia") (3510)
A top State Department official is alerting members of Congress to the
"critical" situation in Colombia, where the government of President
Andres Pastrana faces a battle against guerrilla groups and the
narcotraffickers to whom they are closely linked.
Guerrilla income from illicit activities "clearly exceeds $100 million
a year, and could be far greater. Of this, some 30-40% comes directly
from the drug trade," Assistant Secretary of State Rand Beers told the
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control during a September 21
hearing.
Beers underlined the U.S. determination to support Colombia in its
struggle, and described the Pastrana administration as "a full and
trustworthy partner." He also hailed Colombia's military leaders for
taking "dramatic steps" to deal with the legacy of human rights abuses
within the country's armed forces.
Beers described the Colombian government's recently-developed strategy
for dealing with the current crisis -- the "Plan Colombia" -- as a
unified and comprehensive plan that covers four fundamental tenets:
social development, economic development, integrated counternarcotics
strategy, and resolution of the insurgency.
"All four elements are essential to the success of the plan and all
four deserve our support," he said.
The majority of the resources for the plan will probably come from
Colombia and other donors, Beers said, adding that U.S. officials are
"ready to work with the Colombians to assess the resource implications
of their strategy and the optimum ways in which the United States can
assist."
Following is the text of his congressional testimony as prepared for
delivery:
(begin text)
Statement of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control
September 21, 1999
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus:
I want to thank you or this opportunity to speak to you today about
the situation in Colombia, and about our ongoing policy review.
Colombia stands at a critical crossroads now, and there are
considerable threats to U.S. national security interests in Colombia.
What the United States does or does not do in Colombia over the next
few years, and perhaps even over the next several months, will have a
great impact on the future of that country.
The Current Situation
It is difficult to describe the current situation in Colombia without
sounding alarmist. Colombia's national sovereignty is increasingly
threatened -- not from antidemocratic elements in the military or the
political sphere, but from well-armed and ruthless guerrillas,
paramilitaries and the narcotrafficking interests to whom they are
inextricably linked. Although the central government in Bogota is not
directly at risk, these threats are slowly eroding the authority of
the central government and depriving it of the ability to govern in
outlying areas. And it is in these very areas, where the guerrilla
groups, paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers flourish, that the
narcotics industry is finding refuge.
The links between narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla and
paramilitary movements are well documented. We estimate that
two-thirds of the FARC fronts and one half of the ELN fronts are
involved in narcotics trafficking to one degree or another. By
involvement, we mean not just that the guerrilla groups collect
"taxes" as they do with all legitimate businesses in areas they
control, but that they actively participate in other ways. Reporting
indicates that guerrilla groups protect illicit fields and labs,
transport drugs and precursor chemicals within Colombia, run labs,
encourage or intimidate peasants to grow coca, accept drugs as payment
from narcotics traffickers and resell those drugs for profit, trade
drugs for weapons, and have even begun to ship drugs out of the
country -- to Brazil and Venezuela. Estimates of guerrilla income from
narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities, such as kidnapping
and extortion, are undependable, but it clearly exceeds $100 million a
year, and could be far greater. Of this, some 30-40% comes directly
from the drug trade. Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to
important narcotics traffickers, and obtain much of their funding from
traffickers. Carlos Castano, the paramilitary leader, has been
previously identified as a significant narcotics trafficker in his own
right.
Profits from illegal activities, combined with a weakening economy and
high unemployment, have enabled the FARC, in particular, to grow
rapidly in terms of manpower. This growth has occurred despite an
apparent loss of ideological support in the cities, where polls show
extremely low approval ratings for the FARC. Much of their recruiting
success occurs in marginalized rural areas where the groups can offer
salaries much higher than those paid by legitimate employers. This is
an example of an area where counternarcotic efforts will have a
spillover effect on Colombia's counterinsurgency successes by reducing
funds available to the insurgent groups.
The strength of Colombia's armed insurgent groups has, in turn,
limited the effectiveness of joint U.S./Colombian counternarcotics
efforts. While aggressive eradication has largely controlled the coca
crop in the Guaviare region, and is beginning to make inroads in
Caqueta, any gains made in Guaviare have been more than offset by
explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo, an area which, until
recently, has been off-limits for spray operations because the
Colombian National Police have been unable to establish a secure base
there due to heavy guerrilla presence. Only in recent weeks have
eradication operations ventured into Putumayo. Even then, operations
have moved no more than 10 miles into the area. Interdiction
operations in Putumayo are similarly limited. We are unable to carry
out any meaningful alternative development programs in most of the
coca-growing region because the Colombian government lacks the ability
to conduct the monitoring and enforcement necessary for the success of
such programs. In order for our counternarcotics programs to be
ultimately successful, we cannot allow certain areas of the country
like Putumayo to be off-limits for counternarcotics operations.
Fortunately, there are reasons for optimism. In the Pastrana
administration, the U.S. finally has a full and trustworthy partner
that shares our counternarcotics goals in Colombia and is committed to
full cooperation on the full range of counternarcotics efforts. The
Colombian National Police, under the direction of General Serrano, has
continued its superb record of counternarcotics activity, reinforcing
its image as one of the premier counternarcotics forces in the world.
Now, for the first time, the CNP's commitment to counternarcotics has
been adopted by the Colombian armed forces.
Historically, Colombia's security forces have not fared well in
confrontations with the guerrillas, who, over the last few years, have
scored a string of tactical successes. Recently, however, the
Colombian military and police have been able to inflict significant
defeats on the guerrillas. While these recent engagements give us
reason for optimism and are a sign of increasing commitment and
aggressiveness by the Colombian armed forces, the Colombian military
must still address severe deficiencies in training, doctrine,
organization and equipment to be able to deal effectively with the
guerrilla and paramilitary threat.
Under its current leadership, the Colombian military is also
undergoing a cultural transformation which, if sustained, bodes well
for Colombia. Defense Minister Ramirez and Armed Forces Commander
Tapias have taken dramatic steps to deal with the legacy of human
rights abuses and impunity that have clouded our bilateral relations
in the past. Our human rights report has also documented a steadily
declining number of reported human rights violations by the Colombian
military. Clearly much work remains to be done to address the problem
of human rights in the Colombian military, but we now believe that the
will exists to do so.
Concurrent with this effort to clean up the military, is a renewed
Colombian military commitment to counternarcotics. The new leadership
realizes that one of the best ways to attack the guerrillas is to
attack their financing, in the form of narcotics profits. The
Colombian Army has greatly expanded cooperation with and support for
the Colombian National Police, and is forming a brand new
counternarcotics battalion, specifically designed to work directly
with the CNP on counternarcotics missions. The Colombian Air Force has
undertaken an aggressive program to regain control of their airspace,
and deny its use to traffickers. They have registered some significant
successes and demonstrated considerable competence and will, but are
still limited by outdated equipment, limited operating funds and
inadequate training. The Colombian Navy is working closely with U.S.
forces on maritime interdiction, and has participated in many
significant seizures, despite limits on equipment and operating funds.
Overall, cooperation with the Colombian military on counternarcotics
operations has never been better.
Joint Counternarcotics Programs
The USG in general, and INL in particular, is involved with the
government of Colombia on a wide range of programs in support of our
Colombia counternarcotics strategy, which is, in turn, an integral
part of the President's Source Zone Strategy. Our strategy for
Colombia calls for an integrated program of support for interdiction
and eradication efforts, justice sector reform, alternative
development, and institutional strengthening. Colombia is the largest
single recipient of U.S. counternarcotics assistance, over $200
million in FY99 alone. Much of this is from the emergency supplemental
passed by Congress last year.
In 1998, the joint CNP/INL eradication campaign sprayed record amounts
of coca, over 65,000 hectares. In the Guaviare region, where much of
the spray effort has been concentrated and which was the center of the
Colombian cocaine industry, the crop has decreased more than 30% over
the last two years, and very little new cultivation is reported.
Similar inroads are being made in the Caqueta region now.
Unfortunately, this success has been undermined by the inability of
spray aircraft to make meaningful penetration into the Putumayo
region, where coca cultivation has increased an astounding 330% over
the last two years. The center of gravity of the coca industry in
Colombia has clearly shifted.
On the opium poppy front, spray activity has prevented the expansion
of the opium poppy crop, which has remained essentially stable for
several years. During this time, however, Colombian-origin heroin
dramatically increased its market share in the United States, and now
increasingly dominates that market, particularly in the eastern U.S.
For that reason, in conjunction with the CNP, we began an intensive
opium poppy eradication campaign in December 1998. Already this year,
the CNP has sprayed over 7600 hectares of opium poppy, a record total.
They have essentially sprayed the entire poppy crop in the Huila
growing area and have now shifted operations to Cauca.
We have just begun to provide support for a nascent alternative
development program in Colombia -- $5 million in FY99. We are limiting
our support to areas in which the government can exercise reasonable
control. Experience has taught us that without this control,
alternative development cannot succeed because compliance among drug
cultivating farmers cannot be monitored and enforced. As a practical
matter, this has limited our assistance to programs in the opium poppy
region, where the government has a better presence, and where the
necessary infrastructure already exists. The alternative development
program is being integrated with the aggressive opium poppy
eradication program; and combined, the programs aim to eliminate the
majority of Colombia's opium poppy crop within three years.
We continue to provide support for the interdiction operations of the
Colombian National Police, which have continued at a high rate
throughout this year. We are also working closely with the Colombian
Air Force to improve the effectiveness of its aerial interdiction
program, and its expansion into southern Colombia. To this end, the
Department of State is funding facility improvements to the air base
at Tres Esquinas, including a runway extension. We are also funding
life-extension and night capability upgrades of A-37 interceptor
aircraft and, with DOD, are examining the addition of OV-10s to the
intercept fleet. Additionally, we are working with the interagency
community to provide better detection and monitoring support, not just
in Colombia, but throughout the source zone.
We support an administration of justice program in Colombia, working
with AID, OPDAT and ICITAP to provide technical assistance and
training to the beleaguered Colombian justice system, which continues
to be the weakest link in the Colombian counternarcotics effort. We
are pressing actively for continued reforms, including improved asset
forfeiture procedures, tighter money-laundering enforcement, and
stiffer penalties for narcotics trafficking offenses. We are also
working with Colombian authorities on improved prison security to
ensure that inmates cannot escape or continue to operate their illicit
enterprises from behind bars.
We are working directly with the Colombian military in two important
areas. First, we are coordinating with SOUTHCOM and DoD to provide
training and equipment for the Colombian Army's new counternarcotics
battalion. This battalion is a 950-man unit, comprised entirely of
personnel who have been vetted by both the Embassy and the State
Department to ensure that none of them have been involved in alleged
human rights violations. In addition to training and equipment, the
USG is providing mobility to the unit in the form of 18 UH-1N
helicopters. I understand that the first two phases of training are
complete and that the Colombian government believes the full battalion
will be operational by January 2000. The mission of this unit is to
conduct counternarcotics operations and to provide force protection
support to the CNP. This is an important illustration of the growing
ability of the military and the CNP to work cooperatively.
Additionally, the clear definition of areas of responsibility for the
military vis-a-vis the police strengthen them both as democratic
institutions.
We are also working to improve the Colombian security forces' ability
to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence on counternarcotics
activity and on insurgent activity which could threaten
counternarcotics forces. A key element in this is helping the CNP and
the military to share the information they do have, so that all
relevant forces have access to the best available information on
activity in their area. Intelligence is a force protection issue as
well as an operational concern. We are taking steps to ensure that we
have all of the information necessary to protect U.S. personnel in the
region, including State Dept. contractors helping with the eradication
effort and DoD personnel conducting training in non-operational areas.
Peace Process
One of the top priorities of the Pastrana government and of Plan
Colombia is implementing a peace process to bring an end to the
violent conflict that has drained that nation for four decades. The
USG believes in and supports the peace process not just because it is
the right thing to do, but because it would be of great benefit to
U.S. interests in Colombia. It would stabilize the nation, help
Colombia's economy to recover and allow for further improvement in the
protection of human rights. More importantly, in the context of this
hearing, a successful peace process would restore Colombian government
authority in the coca-growing region. The demobilization and
reintegration of former insurgents into civil society will remove the
umbrella of insurgent and paramilitary protection that the narcotics
traffickers currently enjoy.
However, we have made it very clear to the Pastrana government that
"peace at any price" is not an acceptable policy. We have consistently
asked the Colombian government to press the guerrillas to cease their
practices of kidnapping and forced recruitment of children, and to
provide a full accounting for the three New Tribes mission members who
were kidnapped by the FARC on January 31, 1993. We have also demanded
that the FARC turn over to the proper authorities those responsible
for the March 4 murder of three U.S. citizen indigenous rights
activists. We have made clear to all parties that the peace pro
process must not interfere with counternarcotics cooperation, and that
any agreement must permit continued expansion of all aspects of this
cooperation, including aerial eradication. The Pastrana government
understands our priorities and fully agrees with and supports them.
One of the key limitations confronting the Pastrana administration
during the negotiations is the fact that the guerrillas currently feel
little pressure to negotiate. Their intransigence is fueled by the
perception that the Colombian armed forces do not pose a threat and by
profits from narcotics trafficking and other illegal activities that
will allow them to continue building their strength through recruiting
and arms purchases for the foreseeable future. Essentially, the
guerrillas have little reason to negotiate other than an opportunity
to rejoin a society they are fighting to destroy. For this reason, we
have encouraged the Colombian government to strengthen its military.
Although it may not be possible for Colombia to end the insurgency
militarily, we do believe that the Colombian armed forces must improve
their capacity to defend the civilian population against guerrilla and
paramilitary aggression and defend national sovereignty. Furthermore,
a stronger military will enhance the negotiating position of the
Colombian government by offering the FARC a much- needed incentive to
pursue peace.
Plan Colombia
Over the past several weeks, the government of Colombia has developed
a comprehensive strategy, the Plan Colombia, to address the economic,
security, and drug-related problems facing that country. By bringing
together the various entities already engaged in confronting issues,
the Colombians are producing a unified strategy of mutually supporting
actions that will address these interrelated crises. This strategy
integrates four fundamental tenets: social development, economic
development, integrated counternarcotic strategy, and resolution of
the insurgency. All four elements are essential to the success of the
plan and all four deserve our support.
Colombia invited the U.S. government to contribute to the development
of this plan. An interagency team, under the leadership of Under
Secretary Pickering and including representatives from ONDCP, USAID,
and the Departments of State, Justice, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce
are in an on-going discussion with the Colombian government to
determine how we can best support their efforts. Clearly, the Plan
Colombia will have resource implications. We expect the major part of
these resources to come from Colombia itself and other donors. We are
currently involved in discussions within the Administration regarding
how we can use existing authorities and funds to support
counternarcotics operations. We are ready to work with the Colombians
to assess the resource implications of their strategy and the optimum
ways in which the United States can assist.
Of primary importance to us with regard to the United States' interest
in counternarcotics is the commencement of operations in Putumayo. As
long as this region remains a sanctuary for traffickers, progress
elsewhere will be undermined. In order to operate effectively in this
area, which is heavily dominated by the FARC, the CNP will need the
support of the Colombian military. The CNP cannot operate there alone.
We must therefore begin working with the Colombian military to bring
their capabilities up to a level where they successfully operate
alongside the CNP and contribute to the counternarcotics effort. We
are currently examining the needs of the Colombian military forces
involved in counternarcotics and searching for ways to steer the
appropriate resources toward them. We have no intention of becoming
involved in Colombia's counterinsurgency, but we do recognize that
given the extensive links between Colombia's guerrilla groups and the
narcotics trade, that counternarcotics forces will come into contact
with the guerrillas, and must be provided with the means to defend
themselves and carry out their mission.
We also believe an active aerial interdiction program is absolutely
necessary. In Peru, we have seen the dramatic effect such a program
can have on the economics of the drug trade, and we would like to
recreate that effect in Colombia. The Colombian Air Force is willing,
but requires considerable assistance to carry out the mission. Monies
have already been appropriated to upgrade the capabilities of
Colombian intercept aircraft. With the Colombian government, we are
working to implement a system to better track air traffic in the skies
over rural Colombia. Additionally, our governments have established
improved means to share a wide range of trafficking-related
-intelligence.
We cannot forget the Colombian National Police, which maintains
primary responsibility for counternarcotics operations in Colombia.
While the list of CNP achievements is illustrious, they still have
outstanding equipment needs and an ongoing need for operational
support.
Finally, we need to continue working to reform the Colombian justice
system and provide licit alternatives for coca and opium producers so
that they do not replant illicit crops after eradication.
Conclusion
The problem of narcotics in Colombia is daunting and complex. While it
is convenient to think of it in criminal terms, it is linked at a
fundamental level to the equally complex issue of insurgency, and any
action directed at one will have spillover effects on the other.
Because of this, it is all the more important to maintain our focus on
the counternarcotics question at hand. In Colombia, we have a partner
who shares our counternarcotics concerns and a leadership that
regularly demonstrates the political will to execute the needed
reforms and operations. Our challenge, as a neighbor and a partner, is
to identify ways in which the U.S. Government can assist the Colombian
government and to assure that we are able to deliver that assistance
in a timely manner. I look forward to working closely with Congress as
we continue to address these critical issues.
(end text)
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