21 September 1999
Text: Southcom's Wilhelm Testifies on Colombia
(Says key to peace is stopping guerrillas) (4870)
The key to peace in Colombia is to deprive that country's guerrilla
forces of the "illegal revenues they receive from narco-traffickers,"
which "in turn will pave the way" for a negotiated settlement to
Colombia's four-decades-old insurgency, says Charles Wilhelm,
commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command.
Testifying September 21 before the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, Wilhelm said that he has been encouraged by recent
defeats inflicted on Colombia's guerrillas by government forces. But
to improve the Colombian government's position in peace negotiations
with the guerrillas, the country's armed forces "must continue to
upgrade their combat capabilities and sustain recently-observed trends
of improved performance on the battlefield."
In that regard, Wilhelm said, the United States "must now increase the
capabilities" of Colombia's armed forces without "degrading" the
capabilities of that country's national police.
By bringing the capabilities of its armed forces into balance with
those of the national police, Wilhelm said, Colombia can achieve a
"one-two punch" with the armed forces "preceding the police into
narcotics cultivation and production areas and setting the security
conditions that are mandatory for safe and productive execution of
eradication and other counter-drug operations by the national police."
Following is the text of Wilhelm's congressional testimony as prepared
for delivery:
(begin text)
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES E. WILHELM, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
BEFORE THE SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
21 SEPTEMBER 1999
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Caucus, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you to discuss U.S. Southern
Command's role in stemming the cultivation, production, and movement
of illicit drugs in our Area of Responsibility (AOR) with special
emphasis on our counterdrug (CD) efforts in Colombia. In my last
appearance before this Caucus, I stated that we have made continued
progress in multinational CD efforts.
I also emphasized that we must sustain our collective successes and
continue to squeeze the narcotraffickers on all fronts. Since then, we
have achieved some significant successes and some additional
challenges have emerged. Today, I will provide an update on the drug
threat to U.S. interests in the region, my assessment of the situation
in Colombia, a summary of U.S. military support to CD efforts in
Colombia, a brief discussion of CD resource requirements, the status
of our regional approach, and an overview of our post Panama Theater
Architecture.
THE DRUG THREAT
The entrenched and increasingly diverse illegal drug business
continues to demonstrate an ability to meet the world demand, and
poses increasingly complex challenges to CD efforts throughout our
AOR. Cocaine and heroin continue to be a formidable industry in the
Source Zone. Coca is grown almost exclusively in the three Andean
countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. It is refined into finished
Cocaine Hydrochloride (HC1), primarily in Colombia, then transported
to world markets, primarily the United States. In 1998, an estimated
541 metric tons left the Source Zone destined for the U.S. via air,
maritime and overland routes. Multinational interdiction efforts
seized approximately 147 metric tons. Despite these strong efforts, as
much as 394 metric tons arrived at distribution sites in the U.S.,
largely through our Southwest Border, and Florida.
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)
The nature and modus operandi of DTOs are well known. Their primary
strength is their ability to operate with significant financial
backing and freedom of action in the Source and Transit Zones.
Nurtured by a constant U.S. demand for their products, these
transnational criminal organizations are resilient, dynamic, and
agile. They have adapted and prospered despite the dissolution of
traditional cartels. They have proven over time that they can rapidly
adjust transit routes and modes in response to U.S. and participating
nations interdiction efforts.
Motivated by profit, DTOs are adversely impacting Colombia's
infrastructure, economy, and security apparatus. In some areas, DTOs
operate with near impunity, controlling ports and many of the rural
areas east of the Andean Ridge. Cooperation with insurgents is an
integral part of DTO "security arrangements". These insurgent groups,
in turn, have become increasingly dependent on drug profits to arm and
sustain themselves.
DTOs possess extensive resources, which are heavily invested in
legitimate businesses. Their disregard for national sovereignty allows
them to cross national frontiers without fear of retribution and to
gain unfair advantages over legitimate business enterprises, which
further undermines the civil government. Nevertheless, DTOs are
vulnerable. An effective CD effort can drive up the price of illegal
drugs causing demand to wane with a concomitant reduction in profit to
a point where drug trafficking is no longer a lucrative business.
We know DTOs make every effort to maximize profits. They are
continuing to expand cocaine production and export to the U.S.,
Europe, Asia, and new secondary markets in South America. DTOs are
planting a higher yield variety of coca in the Putumayo and Caqueta
growing areas in Colombia and are expanding cocaine HC1 production
within Peru and Bolivia.
COLOMBIA
Narcotrafficking and Insurgency
The threat to Colombia is real and immediate. It is a malignant cancer
eating away at the underpinnings of Colombia's economy and governance.
Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine HC1. Lack of
effective government control over more than 50 percent of the
countryside has allowed coca cultivation in Colombia to increase by 28
percent in 1998 alone and projections indicate additional increases in
1999. Colombia's situation is especially complex because the
sophisticated DTOs cooperate with mature insurgencies and illegal
paramilitary groups. Colombia's internal armed conflicts persist after
nearly 40 years and the loss of more than 35,000 lives on both sides.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN) have become increasingly aggressive in recent
months, conducting highly publicized kidnappings and initiating
clashes with Colombian Security Forces. There were over 220 such
incidents during the six-month period from February to July of this
year, highlighted by the Avianca airliner hijacking and the abduction
of churchgoers in Cali.
Strong links exist between DTOs and the insurgents in Colombia.
Thirty-six of sixty-one FARC fronts and thirteen of fifty-two ELN
fronts are known or suspected to receive support from and protect
DTOs. The ELN and FARC both profit from their association with DTOs,
particularly the FARC which is heavily dependent on DTOs for revenues
to finance their insurgent activities. Drug money makes up a major
portion of the FARC's war chest and is a primary financial source
sustaining force levels, combat operations and weapons purchases.
Today, Colombian Security Forces confront a triangle of violence with
themselves on one point, two insurgent groups on another, and
paramilitary organizations on the third. Collectively, the FARC, ELN,
and paramilitary groups threaten the democratic and economic security
of Colombia, while providing sanctuaries for thriving DTOs. Insurgents
also continue to find safe havens in Panama's Darien Province, as well
as in Venezuela, Ecuador, and to a lesser extent Peru and Brazil.
We have long recognized that Colombia's problems are international in
dimension. The events of the past year have crystallized this point
with neighboring countries.
Spillover to Neighboring Countries
In one way or another and to varying degrees, the problems plaguing
Colombia impact each of her five neighbors -- Venezuela, Peru,
Ecuador, Brazil and Panama. In the absence of coordinated action, I
believe the external effects of Colombia's problems will continue to
increase in severity. We are aggressively working with all six
countries to encourage a collective approach against a threat they are
individually incapable of defeating.
Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru have deployed forces along their borders
with Colombia to prevent or limit intrusions by insurgents,
narcotraffickers, and paramilitaries. On any given day, Venezuela has
approximately 10,000 troops routinely deployed along the Colombian
frontier. The resolution of the border dispute between Peru and
Ecuador and implementation of the peace accords have allowed both
governments to turn their attention away from fighting each other to
focusing on regional issues, such as narcotrafficking. In the case of
Ecuador, the economic crisis and civil unrest have limited President
Mahuad's options for countering the violence and corruption associated
with the drug trade. But despite economic constraints, Ecuador has
increased the number of troops and active patrols along the border
with Colombia.
Brazil now openly acknowledges that narcotraffickers and insurgents
are violating its borders and that drug use is damaging Brazilian
society. Incursions by traffickers and the FARC into the Amazon region
have caused Brazil to reassess its vulnerabilities. During the past
year, the Brazilian Army has reinforced military garrisons along the
Colombian border, and the government continues to develop SIVAM, the
$1.4 billion-dollar surveillance system for the Amazon. Brazil has
also restructured its national counterdrug organization and system and
has intensified military area denial operations in the vast Amazonas
State.
Panama's position is more complicated. The abolishment of their
military forces following Operation JUST CAUSE left the country with
only police forces -- the Panamanian Public Forces (PPF). The PPF are
neither manned, trained, nor equipped to confront the heavily armed
insurgent and paramilitary units that make repeated incursions into
the southern portion of the Darien Province. The FARC enter Panamanian
territory to rest and rearm. The paramilitary organizations violate
the same territory in order to seek out and destroy FARC elements.
U.S. support and mentorship provide the catalyst to help these
countries help themselves.
Colombia's Commitment to Fighting Narcotraffickers
Colombia remains our focus of effort for CD operations. As I stated
previously, Colombia's problems are becoming problems for the entire
region. In my opinion, the focus for addressing Colombia's internal
problems must be on depriving the FARC and ELN of the illegal revenues
they receive from narcotraffickers; this in turn will pave the way for
a negotiated settlement to the four-decades old insurgency. Tactical
defeats suffered by government security forces at the hands of the
FARC in recent years have emboldened the FARC and provided little
incentive for them to engage in meaningful or substantive peace
negotiations with the Government of Colombia (GOC). However, I have
been encouraged by the performance of Colombian Security Forces during
the FARC's countrywide July offensive and in subsequent engagements.
In a number of instances, government forces inflicted substantial
losses on the FARC, and we saw encouraging levels of cooperation and
coordination among the Colombian Armed Forces (COLAF) and Colombian
National Police (CNP). To improve the GOC's position at the
negotiating table, the armed forces must continue to upgrade their
combat capabilities and sustain recently observed trends of improved
performance on the battlefield.
During the Samper Administration we provided substantial assistance to
the CNP, but provided little in the way of meaningful help to the
COLAF. As a result, Colombian national capabilities are out of
balance. We must now increase the capabilities of the armed forces
without degrading the capabilities of the CNP. Though professional and
well led, the CNP are precisely what their name implies -- they are a
police force. They lack the strength in numbers and combined arms
capabilities that are required to engage FARC fronts and mobile
columns that possess army-like capabilities. This is a mission that
the armed forces and only the armed forces can and should undertake.
By bringing the capabilities of its armed forces into balance with
those of the national police, Colombia can achieve a "one-two punch"
with the armed forces preceding the police into narcotics cultivation
and production areas and setting the security conditions that are
mandatory for safe and productive execution of eradication and other
counterdrug operations by the CNP.
Despite the current high level of violence and the increasingly
complex problems associated with the insurgents, narcotraffickers, and
paramilitary groups, I remain cautiously optimistic that Colombia,
with increased U.S. support, can advance the peace process initiated
by the Pastrana administration. To succeed at the peace table, the GOC
must bargain from a position of strength, buttressed by consistent
success on the battlefield. To this end, Colombia's leaders have
undertaken initiatives to make the armed forces equal to the task that
lies before them.
Colombia continues to shoot down and force down narcotrafficking
aircraft. The Colombian Air Force reports that during the past 18
months it interdicted at least 47 aircraft. The Colombians destroyed
22 on the ground, shot down 4, and captured 21. To increase its
capabilities and enhance coordination with and support to the CNP, we
are working closely with the Colombian Army to create a Counter Drug
(CD) Battalion. This battalion, which is one- third again the strength
of a traditional Colombian Army Battalion, is being trained primarily
by members of our Seventh Special Forces Group at the Tolemida
garrison in southern Colombia. With organic intelligence,
reconnaissance, indirect fire, medical and other capabilities, the CD
Battalion will become fully operational during December of this year.
This unit has been specifically designed to be interoperable with the
CNP and to provide the complementary capabilities that are needed to
achieve the synergy in CD operations that I have previously described.
As the CD Battalion demonstrates its effectiveness, and I am confident
it will, I will encourage Colombia's military leaders to expand the
concept and create a CD Brigade.
The success and effectiveness of the CD Battalion and the CNP forces
it supports will be largely contingent upon the timely availability of
accurate, fused, multi-source intelligence. To ensure that quality
intelligence support is available, we have embarked on a concurrent
initiative to create a Colombian Joint Intelligence Center (COJIC)
that will be co-located with the CD Battalion and Joint Task Force
(JTF) South at Tres Esquinas. By reprioritizing tasks, we have
identified sufficient Fiscal Year 1999 funds to train, equip, and
provide facilities for the COJIC. Training has already commenced and
the target date for attainment of initial operational capability is 15
December of this year.
We anticipate that these two initiatives, in combination with a
parallel training program designed to expand and refine the
operational planning capabilities of JTF South, will bring significant
improvements in the performance of Colombian Security Forces against
the crucial cocaine cultivation and production areas in Putumayo and
Caqueta Departments. As these new organizations demonstrate their
effectiveness, I anticipate they will become models for further
restructuring and refinement of Colombia's Armed Forces.
OTHER U.S. SUPPORT TO THE CD EFFORT
While the CD Battalion and COJIC are important initiatives that will
substantially increase Colombian Security Force capabilities to
contend with the growing threat posed by the union of narcotraffickers
with insurgents and paramilitaries, they are by no means all
inclusive. We are providing assistance in other areas as well. We are
enhancing Colombian Air Force interdiction capabilities by expanding
training for pilots at the strategically significant Barranquilla Main
Operating Base. Principal focus is on improving Colombian Air Force
night interdiction posture through the provision of night vision
goggles (NVG), aircraft cockpit NVG compatibility upgrades, and
aircrew NVG training. In partnership with Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Department of State, we are attempting to accelerate
A-37 service life extension and upgrade initiatives. These initiatives
include airframe structural repairs, avionics upgrades, integration of
podded radar systems, and creation of a two-year spare parts pipeline.
Concurrently, we are striving to help the COLAF achieve sorely needed
improvements in battlefield tactical mobility. Important breakthroughs
are at hand. Using an existing foreign military sales case, we have
assisted the GOC in its efforts to purchase five UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopters that are available from Sikorsky for immediate delivery.
Concurrently, we are working with the Department of State
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to effect a no-cost lease
for 18 UH-1N helicopters recently repurchased from Canada. These
aircraft are crucial, as they will provide tactical lift for the new
CD Battalion. In response to an urgent request from the Commander of
the Colombian Air Force, we have provided and expedited delivery of
ordnance items required to replenish inventories depleted during the
July FARC offensive.
We have stressed to our Colombian and Peruvian colleagues the need to
retain the strategic initiative. Past and present airbridge
interdiction operations have caused traffickers to seek alternate
routes for movement of precursor chemicals and other materials
associated with the production process. Thanks to previous strong
support from the Congress, we are aggressively implementing a
five-year program designed to create or enhance the capabilities of
Peru and Colombia to interdict traffickers on the extensive river
networks that traverse primary drug cultivation and production areas.
Peru has fielded two of 12 planned Riverine Interdiction Units, and
the program is now expanding to Colombia where our goal is to roughly
double the capabilities of its already formidable riverine force. A
major milestone was achieved last month when President Pastrana
personally activated the new Riverine Brigade and its five battalions.
Earlier, the Colombian Navy launched its first indigenous support or
"mothership."
U.S. Southern Command continues to assist the Colombian Security
Forces by providing essential CD training. During this fiscal year,
over 30 CD training teams have deployed to Colombia providing training
assistance to more than 1,500 members of the security forces in such
diverse subjects as light infantry training for CD field operations,
helicopter familiarization, and riverine craft handling and safety.
The command has also provided communications support and facilitated
information sharing by completing the first phase of a theater-wide
communications system that links participating nations, through our
country teams, to the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) at Key West
that now oversees CD operations in both the Source and Transit Zones.
As I stated in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, earlier this year,
I strongly commend the performance of Colombia's military and national
police leadership teams and applaud their aggressive ongoing
initiatives to restructure their forces. Additional U.S. assistance to
Colombia in the areas of increased detection and monitoring,
information sharing, equipment and training are necessary and should
be pursued. Increased U.S. support for Colombia's Armed Forces will
improve their performance on the battlefield, provide increased GOC
leverage at the negotiating table and significantly increase the
chances for success of the peace process.
These measures are additive to the attempts to improve and better
capitalize on the capabilities of our regional partners in the Source
Zone as previously discussed in this statement. However, all of these
measures taken singly or in combination are insufficient to address
what I consider to be a classic strategy to resources mismatch. There
are no villains here. Despite the best efforts of everyone involved,
the frequency, pace and tempo of higher priority global military
operations have taken a heavy toll on scarce and crucial assets such
as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.
CD REQUIREMENTS
U.S. Southern Command lacks the resources to fully accomplish the
goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy. While the
U.S. military services are tasked to support detection and monitoring
requirements with dedicated CD aircraft and ships, out of theater
contingencies, higher priority missions, and limited availability of
high demand/low density assets result in inconsistent and inadequate
support for our requirements.
Our most significant deficiency is in the area of ISR. Lacking
adequate ISR, we cannot react quickly and effectively to changes in
drug traffickers' operational patterns. U.S. Southern Command's ISR
capabilities have been seriously degraded due to the non-availability
of required assets. This has significantly reduced the effectiveness
of our CD operations. For example, during July of this year, the FARC
were able to coordinate a nearly nationwide offensive in the second
most populace nation of South America without U.S. intelligence
detecting a single concrete indicator of FARC intentions.
To compensate for inadequate resources, we have implemented innovative
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) such as pulse operations in
the Caribbean to disrupt the flow of illegal drugs. We have also
deployed air assets to support surge CD operations in Central America
and in the Eastern and Western Caribbean. Simultaneously, we have
aggressively pursued closer cooperation, more complete coordination,
and expanded information exchange with Dutch, British and French
forces resident in our AOR. These efforts have paid off in the form of
several significant seizures.
A REGIONAL APPROACH TO CD OPERATIONS
U.S. Southern Command's Theater CD priorities are consistent with the
National Drug Control Strategy and with interagency guidance. Our
number one priority is to support the Government of Colombia in its
efforts to destroy the cocaine and heroin industries in that country.
Accordingly, Colombia remains our focus of effort but not at the
expense of forging regional and inter-regional approaches to the
narcotics trafficking threat. While continuing our support to
Colombia, we must sustain support for Peru and Bolivia to ensure they
maintain momentum in reducing coca cultivation and drug trafficking.
We cannot mortgage the successes we have achieved in these countries
or alienate neighboring countries like Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and
Venezuela with a "Colombia Only" policy.
While I subscribe to the theory that there is no "silver bullet" for
the drug problem, the effectiveness and impact of eradication efforts
in Peru and Bolivia must not be underestimated. For the second
consecutive year, we have observed significant reductions in coca
cultivation, leaf production, and base production in both countries.
As a result of forced and voluntary eradication, cultivation is down
26 percent in Peru and 17 percent in Bolivia, while leaf and cocaine
production potential has been reduced by roughly 25 percent in both
countries.
Though these gains have been partially offset by increases in all
categories in Colombia, eradication efforts in Peru and Bolivia
convince me that they are making steady and significant inroads into
cocaine production at the source. At U.S. Southern Command, we are
evaluating other options (equipment and infrastructure development)
that will allow us to sustain and even further enhance the progress
Peru and Bolivia are making.
The regional riverine training center at Iquitos, Peru, has trained
more than 300 personnel from the Peruvian National Police and Coast
Guard. Graduates have been assigned to the first of 12 Riverine
Interdiction Units (RIUs) or to locally constructed motherships that
will support sustained operations by the RIUs. Heretofore, Peru has
lacked the capability to interdict narcotraffickers using the
extensive network of inland waterways. This initiative will
significantly expand Peruvian organic counterdrug capabilities and
will provide them urgently needed capabilities to assert control over
rivers that have provided traffickers an alternative to the Air
Bridge. We have been monitoring Peru closely and view with concern the
steady rise of coca prices since August of last year. The
profitability threshold has been crossed, creating the incentive for
farmers to turn away from alternative crops and return to illicit coca
cultivation. Though preliminary figures indicate that eradication is
ahead of last year's pace, we must ensure that Peru continues to
receive the U.S. support and assistance it requires to preserve the
landmark progress that has been made over the past two years in
reducing coca cultivation.
Like Peru, Bolivia has made impressive strides in its counterdrug
efforts. Despite periodic resistance, President Banzer has resolutely
pursued his "Dignity Plan" and remains steadfast in his commitment to
eliminate illegal coca cultivation by the year 2002. Progress to date
has been impressive. The forced eradication program undertaken
primarily by the armed forces has met or surpassed all established
goals. To assist Bolivia in maintaining the momentum that has been
established, we must continue to provide adequate support to each of
the four pillars of the "Dignity Plan" -- prevention, eradication,
interdiction and alternative development.
THEATER ARCHITECTURE
To meet current and future CD responsibilities, U.S. Southern Command
must compensate for the loss of U.S. bases in Panama by creating an
alternative theater architecture that will support efficient,
effective and flexible CD operations into the 21st century.
Puerto Rico has replaced Panama as the focal point of our theater
architecture. U.S. Army South recently completed its relocation from
Fort Clayton in Panama to Fort Buchanan; Special Operations Command
has displaced from its garrison locations in Panama to its new home at
Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads; our restructured Navy Component
Command, U.S. Navy Forces South, will stand up at Roosevelt Roads
later this year, and our intratheater airlift assets and other forward
deployed elements of SOUTHAF have migrated from Howard Air Force Base
to new locations in Puerto Rico and in Key West. JTF Bravo, augmented
with additional helicopter assets from the 228th Aviation Battalion
remains at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and continues to serve as
our primary operating location in Central America.
The loss of Howard Air Force Base has also caused us to revisit our
in-theater CD command and control architecture. Panama-based JIATF
South which previously functioned as our principal planning and
execution oversight activity for CD operations in the Source Zone has
been merged with JIATF East in Key West creating a single operational
headquarters for the planning and execution of CD operations in both
the Source and Transit zones. A similar merger has unified the
Southern Regional Operations Center (SOUTHROC) with the Caribbean
Regional Operations Center (CARIBROC). Through creative use of
information technology, this consolidated organization now gives us
the capability to "'see" from the Florida Straits deep into the Source
Zone.
The final and, from a counterdrug perspective, most critical element
of the new theater architecture are the Forward Operating Locations,
or FOLs, that will fill the void created by the loss of Howard Air
Force Base. Constrained counterdrug detection, monitoring and tracking
missions are currently being conducted from FOLs at Curacao and Aruba
in the Netherlands Antilles and Manta, Ecuador. To provide adequate
coverage of the expansive Source and Transit Zones, some level of
military construction is required at each of these locations to expand
their capacities and improve operating and safety conditions. We will
also need one additional FOL in Central America to provide increased
coverage of heavily used Eastern Pacific transit routes. FOLs are a
cost-effective alternative to overseas U.S. bases. They enable us to
exploit existing host nation infrastructure to achieve levels of
coverage that will equal or exceed that which we enjoyed from Howard
Air Force Base at a fraction of the cost when measured over a 10-year
period. The Manta FOL is particularly critical as it will give us the
operational reach that we need to effectively cover Colombia, Peru and
the remainder of the critical southern source zone. A total of $122.5
million in Air Force military construction (MILCON) funding is needed
($42.8 million in Fiscal Year 2000 and $79.7 million in Fiscal Year
2001) to achieve the upgrades and expanded capacities that our CD
mission demands.
CONCLUSION
I have now served at U.S. Southern Command for almost 24 months.
Shortly after assuming command and making my initial assessment of
security conditions in my area of responsibility, I asserted that
Colombia was the most threatened nation in the 32 country AOR. Today,
even though I continue to stand behind that assessment, I am
cautiously optimistic about Colombia's future. My optimism stems from
several convictions, two of which I would like to share with the
Caucus. First, I have been in and out of Colombia for more than a
decade. The leadership team which now guides the country and its
security forces is the best I have seen. In Generals Tapias, Mora,
Velasco, Serrano and Admiral Garcia the armed forces and the national
police are in the hands of top flight professionals. These are senior
officers who are both competent and ethical. Their total and undivided
allegiance is to Colombia. They know what needs to be done to enable
Colombia's security forces to prevail against the narcotraffickers,
insurgents and other agents of violence who have wreaked havoc on
Colombia's society and its economic wellbeing. Second, they have set
the wheels of military reform in motion and the changes they have
implemented have already borne fruit on the battlefield. The outcomes
of the country-wide offensive undertaken by the FARC during July merit
close examination. I am convinced that Colombia's security forces
emerged with the upper hand. Recent successes can be attributed to
improved intelligence preparation of the battlefield; better
cooperation between the armed forces and national police; improved
air-ground coordination; more effective command and control and
competent, aggressive leadership at both tactical and operational
levels. As the new Counterdrug Battalion achieves initial operational
capability, the Colombian Joint Intelligence Center comes on line,
additional helicopters bring about urgently needed improvements in
tactical mobility, riverine forces are expanded, and anomalies in the
ratio of support to combat forces are corrected, I predict these
favorable trends will continue. While I share the widely held opinion
that the ultimate solution to Colombia's internal problems lies in
negotiations, I am convinced that success on the battlefield and the
leverage that it will provide is a precondition for meaningful and
productive negotiations. We at U.S. Southern Command are genuinely
grateful to the members of the Caucus for your support and interest in
our region. We are turning the corner in Colombia. With your continued
support and assistance we can and will resolve the two most stressing
challenges to the security, stability and prosperity of a region that
is rapidly growing in importance to the U.S. -- the national crisis in
Colombia and the hemispheric crisis generated by illegal drugs and
their corrosive effects on our society and those of our neighbors to
the South.
(end text)
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