DATE=9/15/1999
TYPE=BACKGROUND REPORT
TITLE=INDONESIAN ARMY - FOLLOWING ORDERS
NUMBER=5-44257
BYLINE=STEPHANIE MANN
DATELINE=WASHINGTON
CONTENT=
VOICED AT:
INTRO: When armed militias rampaged in East Timor
after the referendum results showed overwhelming
support for independence, Indonesian army units
stationed in the territory seemed either unable or
unwilling to stop the carnage. Were those soldiers
and officers rogue army elements who ignored the
orders of their superiors? Or were they perhaps
acting according to instructions from, or with the
blessing of, military authorities in Jakarta? V-O-A's
Stephanie Mann examines those questions in this
report.
TEXT: In the weeks before the August 30th referendum,
East Timorese in exile as well as foreign observers
inside East Timor repeatedly called for an
international peacekeeping force to be sent to the
territory. They were afraid pro-Jakarta militia
groups would carry out their threats to kill anyone
who voted for independence.
The Indonesian government repeatedly said its 15-
thousand troops stationed in East Timor would be
adequate to keep the peace. But that did not
happen.
After the referendum results were announced on
September 4th, gangs of pro-Jakarta militiamen rampaged
through East Timor, searching out anyone suspected of
supporting independence. People were massacred,
houses were set on fire, and hundreds of thousands of
East Timorese have become refugees. Foreign reporters
and other witnesses in the East Timorese capital,
Dili, say Indonesian army troops often did not try
to stop the militia attacks and sometimes were seen
joining in the violence.
Indonesia specialist Karl Jackson says there are two
possible theories to explain the discrepancy between
the actions of the soldiers in East Timor and the
message coming from the chief of the army, General
Wiranto, who continued to insist his troops could
control the situation.
// JACKSON ACT ONE //
One possible interpretation is that they have no
control over the militias and they have no
control over many of their subordinate officers
in East Timor. Another possible interpretation
is a conspiracy theory, which says that Wiranto,
himself, and the highest levels of the
Indonesian Army, wanted all of this to happen.
// END ACT //
Mr. Jackson, chairman of the Asian Studies Program at
the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University, says he does not believe General
Wiranto wanted his troops to engage in killing and
destruction. // OPT // He says the general would have
known such a policy would have brought international
condemnation and disgrace. // END OPT //
Instead, Karl Jackson says the Indonesian army is
plagued by disunity. And he suspects army commanders
in East Timor sympathized with the militia's desire
for the territory to remain part of Indonesia, and
they acted on that commitment.
// OPT // JACKSON ACT TWO //
What Wiranto appears to have tried to do was to
negotiate with the rebellious officers, to bring
them back in line. And his policy of
negotiating with them, which is a very
Indonesian thing to do, simply did not meet
the timeline demanded by the international
community and therefore was judged a failure.
And rightly so, because lots of people were
dying and getting killed at the time.
// END ACT // END OPT //
Another Indonesia specialist, Bill Liddle, says there
is not yet enough clear evidence to explain the
army's inability or reluctance to stop the bloodshed.
Mr. Liddle, a political science professor at Ohio
State University, says the army allowed the militias
to operate freely before the referendum, probably
because it expected a different outcome.
// LIDDLE ACT ONE //
I suspect that one of the factors that has been
operating here is a very widespread belief
within the Indonesian army, including its top
leaders, that the referendum would be won by the
pro-Indonesia forces. It's a little hard for
outsiders to believe, but I know from talking to
Indonesian military officers and others close to
them, including intelligence officers, that
that's in fact what they believed.
// END ACT //
After the referendum results were announced, Mr.
Liddle says, the militias and the troops went wild,
and General Wiranto had no real control over them.
A U-S Defense Department official rejects that excuse,
and says the military failed in its responsibilities.
The Pentagon official, who asked that his name not be
used, says the Indonesian army had the resources - the
personnel and the training - to control the situation
and restore order quickly in East Timor. But he says
that was not done.
The Pentagon official says it is not known if
General Wiranto made a conscious decision not to act
or if he and others in Jakarta were paralyzed by the
situation. He says top authorities were likely trying
to decide how to deal with East Timor in light of
Indonesia's other areas of rebellion, such as Aceh,
Ambon and Irian Jaya.
// REST OPTIONAL //
There has been speculation in the West and in Jakarta
that the army may have allowed the bloodshed in East
Timor because it wanted to send a message to those
other rebels. Professor Liddle says that does not
make sense.
// LIDDLE ACT TWO //
It seems quite the opposite. I mean you
certainly frighten people in those regions, but
you also anger them, and you say to them, "This
is the kind of life that you can hope for if you
stay in Indonesia, so the best thing to do is to
get out of Indonesia."
// END ACT //
Karl Jackson of Johns Hopkins University agrees. He
says encouraging lawlessness by soldiers would not
be a plausible way to convince rebels they should stay
part of Indonesia. (Signed)
NEB/SMN/KL
15-Sep-1999 14:02 PM EDT (15-Sep-1999 1802 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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