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USIS Washington 
File

09 September 1999 
Transcript: White House Briefing on Clinton APEC Trip 
(U.S. has three APEC goals, Berger discusses East Timor) (7120)
The United States has three critical goals for the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum this year, according to National
Economic Advisor Gene Sperling.
During a special briefing September 8 on the President's upcoming trip
to the APEC meetings in Auckland, New Zealand, Sperling said the first
goal is for the 21 APEC leaders to send a strong message of support
for the launching of a new World Trade Organization (WTO) round in
Seattle.
Sperling noted that the region managed to come through a major
financial crisis without resorting in any significant way to
protectionism. "This is an accomplishment that cannot be
under-appreciated," he said. "It is crucial that we take this
opportunity to reaffirm the importance of open markets and open trade
going forward."
APEC economies, Sperling said, constitute a "critical mass" for
potential support for the launch of a new trade round in Seattle. "And
so a primary goal is to get support for a broad-based yet manageable
round that would focus on market access, expanding trade in
agriculture, services, high technology sectors, reduction of
industrial tariffs, and that will deliver concrete benefits within
three years."
A second major goal for APEC, he said, is to continue the global
pressure and support for economic reforms over complacency. "There is
no question that those countries, such as Korea and Thailand, who took
the tough steps for reforms, for fiscal reforms, the steps that have
led them to stabilize their currency, have benefited the most,"
Sperling said. "And the lesson should be the importance of further
progress, not complacency."
Finally, he said, APEC can use its unique interaction with business
leaders to forward its initiatives in such areas as natural gas
infrastructure, liberalization in aviation, a more open and efficient
food system, and transparency in government procurement.
Sperling said that during his trip to APEC the President would also
deal with critical bilateral economic issues such as China's entry
into the WTO. "Ambassador Barshefsky is on her way to New Zealand now
for the APEC trade ministers meetings where she certainly hopes to
have discussions with her counterpart from China. While it's too early
to predict any outcomes, it is certainly our hope that the bilateral
between President Clinton and President Jiang will lead to a
resumption of momentum for a commercially viable WTO agreement with
China," he said.
Prior to Sperling, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger addressed a
regional issue not formally on the APEC agenda, but which will
undoubtedly be discussed by participants: the situation in East Timor.
"The people of East Timor have voted overwhelmingly and bravely for
independence. The Indonesian government deserves credit for holding
the vote. It has said it would respect the outcome, and now it must be
respected. Meanwhile, Indonesia has the responsibility to protect the
people of East Timor from violence. Indonesia cannot assert
sovereignty in East Timor during this period while abdicating
responsibility," Berger said.
The United States, he said, remains deeply disturbed by continuing
reports of forced expulsions and attacks on innocent people. "The
Indonesian government has said that it intends to address this
situation on its own, but today we have seen little evidence of this.
And if this continues to be the case, then it should invite the
international community to assist in restoring order and security," he
said.
The resolution of this crisis, Berger said, matters not just for East
Timor but for Indonesia as a whole. "It is a test of whether Indonesia
is genuinely moving towards democratic rule and political stability,"
he said. "How the Indonesian government deals with the challenges in
East Timor will have implications for the capacity of the
international community to support Indonesia's economic program."
Following is the official White House transcript of the briefing:
(begin transcript)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release September 8, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER 
AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR GENE SPERLING
The Briefing Room
MR. HAMMER: Good afternoon, everyone. Today we have the National
Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, and the National Economic Advisor,
Gene Sperling, to brief you on the upcoming APEC trip.
MR. BERGER: We're back, it's time to leave town again. (Laughter.)
Let me give you an overview of the President's trip to New Zealand for
the APEC summit. And Gene will then focus specifically on the APEC
portion of the meetings.
This is the annual meeting, as you know, which is of Asian and Pacific
leaders, which was started by President Clinton in 1993, in Seattle.
It consists of leaders of over half the world's people and half its
economic activity.
APEC met last year in the shadow of Asia's financial crisis. It will
meet next week in the wake of a surprisingly strong recovery. The
reasons are many, and each holds lessons. The U.S. economy remained
open and vibrant, bolstering Asia and the world. Asian countries
benefitted from timely interventions by the international community.
And they began a process of restructuring and reform, helped by
political changes in the key countries -- things that might have
turned out a lot worse if Thais, Koreans and, ultimately, Indonesians
had not had a peaceful outlet for the expression of their hopes and
frustrations.
The good news makes it all the more important, yet also harder to
avoid complacency. This will be an important part of the President's
message at APEC. The work begun in crisis must be completed or Asia's
bounce-back may yet be the prelude to another breakdown. Above all, we
need to accelerate progress towards global economic liberalization and
Gene will speak more about our goals there.
Lasting economic recovery in Asia depends on more than open markets.
It will also require continued stability in the region, which can
never be taken for granted. This is where the United States play an
especially vital role. And it will be an important part of our agenda
at APEC, as the President's schedule will make clear. The President
will arrive -- we leave here Thursday evening. We arrive in Auckland
on Saturday morning, losing a day to the International Date Line. That
afternoon, he will meet with President Jiang, of China, the first
meeting since we were in China last year. We will seek in that meeting
to restore momentum to our relationship, to urge an easing of tensions
between China and Taiwan and to resume discussion of China's accession
to the WTO.
On Sunday morning, the President will lay out our goals for the APEC
summit in a speech to the APEC Business Advisory Council, which
consists of CEOs from APEC members. Later that day, the President will
hold a trilateral meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung,
Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi to discuss security on the Korean
Peninsula and other issues. We've worked particularly hard to maintain
a concerted approach with the South Koreans and the Japanese seeking
to deter and, if necessary, respond to another missile test by North
Korea.
The President will also meet with Russian Prime Minister Putin,
following up on the topics he covered with President Yeltsin in
Cologne -- arms control, non-proliferation, economic reform -- which
he just discussed with President Yeltsin on the phone earlier this
morning, and stressing the importance of a concerted push against
crime and corruption.
Monday is all APEC, a leaders retreat in the morning. Gene will
amplify on this. On Tuesday, the President will travel to a resort in
Queenstown, in the mountains on New Zealand's south island for a day
in which we can all seek to reset our body clocks.
On Wednesday, we will be in Christchurch. This southern city is a
starting point for most American expeditions to the Antarctic. I
hasten to say we are not, no plans, current plans to go to the
Antarctic, no current intention. (Laughter.) And the President will
deliver a speech there at Christchurch on the global environment
strategy at what's called the Antarctic Center, which is a museum and
a center of interactive research.
Prime Minister Shipley of New Zealand has invited the President to
make a state visit to New Zealand. So on this day in Christchurch the
President will meet with her, as well as with New Zealand's opposition
leader, Helen Clarke. He will attend a state dinner before a daunting
flight home.
Before I turn to -- daunting only because of length, the plane has
been fully checked out. (Laughter.)
Before I turn matters over to Gene, let me say something about another
important regional issue that was not formally on the APEC agenda, but
is very much on mine, as I'm certain it will be discussed at APEC, and
that is the situation in East Timor.
The people of East Timor have voted overwhelmingly and bravely for
independence. The Indonesian government deserves credit for holding
the vote. It has said it would respect the outcome and now it must be
respected. Meanwhile, Indonesia has a responsibility to protect the
people of East Timor from violence. Indonesia cannot assert
sovereignty in East Timor during this period while abdicating
responsibility. We remain deeply disturbed by continuing reports of
forced expulsions and attacks on innocent people.
The Indonesian government and, in light of martial law, the Indonesian
military, is responsible for the safety of the East Timorese and the
UN staff. We are working closely with Secretary General Annan, our
regional partners -- including Australia -- and that's Annan calling
right there on the phone -- (laughter) -- to press Indonesia to bring
an end to the violence.
We will be looking to the report of the UN Security Council team that
is now in Jakarta. The Indonesian government has said that intends to
address the situation on its own. But, to date, we have seen little
evidence of this. And if this continues to be the case then it should
invite the international community to assist in restoring order and
security. Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world. It is
undergoing a fragile, but tremendously important political and
economic transformation, which the United States strongly supports.
The resolution of this crisis matters not just for East Timor, but for
Indonesia as a whole. It is a test as to whether Indonesia is
genuinely moving towards democratic rule and political stability. How
the Indonesian government deals with the challenges in East Timor will
have implications for the capacity of the international community to
support Indonesia's economic program. We will be working on this
situation today, tomorrow and the coming hours and days. And it
certainly will be a subject of discussion, I'm sure, at APEC, as well.
Now let me ask -- let's do this in an orderly fashion here. Let me
have Mr. Sperling talk a little bit about the APEC part of this and
then we can do questions on anything you want.
MR. SPERLING: As Sandy mentioned, we meet for APEC this year in a far
stronger economic situation than a year ago or two years ago. Let me
mention three critical goals that we see for APEC.
First is the need for the APEC leaders -- the 21 APEC leaders -- to
send a strong message of support for the launching of a new WTO round
in Seattle. It is worth noting that we have come through what
certainly we hope is the worst of the major financial crisis without
the resort in any significant way to protectionism by any significant
degree for dealing with a financial crisis.
This is an accomplishment that cannot be under-appreciated. And it is
crucial that we take this opportunity to reaffirm the importance of
open markets and open trade going forward. The chances to, at this
point, come together and have a significant launch of a new round in
Seattle would be one of the most significant things that could be done
worldwide for keeping up the benefits that come with open markets in
terms of growth, innovation, competition and the free flow of ideas
and freedoms. The countries at APEC make up 45 percent, nearly half of
the trade in the globe. The countries at APEC, therefore, constitute a
critical mass for potential support for the launch of a new trade
round in Seattle. And so a primary goal is to get support for a
broad-based, yet manageable round that would focus on market access,
expanding trade in agricultural services, high technology sectors,
reduction of industrial tariffs, and that will deliver concrete
benefits within three years. We also hope to make progress in other
areas, from the extension of the moratorium in e-commerce and
government procurement transparency.
A second major goal at APEC is to continue the global pressure and
support for reforms over complacency. It is a striking issue that
there is now concern in some parts of the world that recovery, having
come faster than expected, may deter the progress for structural
reforms in these countries. This would be a serious mistake. There is
no question that those countries such as Korea and Thailand, who took
the tough steps for reforms -- for fiscal reforms, steps that have led
them to stabilize their currency -- have benefited the most. And the
lesson should be the importance of further progress, not complacency.
If you look at Korea, you look at one of the most remarkable
turnarounds one can imagine -- from 5.5 percent negative growth last
year, to the IMF now projecting 6.5 percent growth one year later.
That's a remarkable turnaround and it's due in no small part to the
hard-headed economic leadership of President Kim. And the important
part there as in other places is to continue the reforms in the
conglomerates, the cables to no longer give way to the political
pressures of propping up inefficient government-related activities.
The same story can be told in other countries, maybe not to the same
degree. In Thailand, who had nearly 10 percent negative growth last
year, now has projections by some experts of 2 to 3 percent growth
this year. They also have taken substantial measures, but have
substantial challenges, particularly in their banking institution.
And so I think this will be a primary subject and I think a major goal
is to reaffirm the momentum for reform and to, in every way possible,
use this international forum to empower those at the domestic level to
go forward.
Finally, APEC is unique in its interaction with business leaders and
there will be efforts made in several business, private sector
government activities, from an initiative on natural gas
infrastructure to further liberalization in aviation, to more open and
efficient food system and to transparency in government procurement.
As Sandy touched on, there obviously will be critical economic issues
in the bilaterals with, obviously, Russia, and trilateral with Korea
and Japan. Certainly, with China, as Sandy said, we have long
advocated that China's entry into the WTO on strong commercial terms
is in the long-term interest of China, the United States and the
global community. It has been our hope to resume negotiations as soon
as possible. As some of you know, there have been some expert
discussions in Beijing the last couple of days. Ambassador Barshefsky
is on her way to New Zealand now for the APEC Trade Ministers
meetings, where she certainly hopes to have discussions with her
counterpart from China.
While it's too early to predict any outcomes, it is certainly our hope
that the bilateral between President Clinton and President Jiang will
lead to a resumption of momentum for a commercially viable WTO
agreement with China.
With that, Sandy are I are both available for questions.
Q: Sandy, why do you believe the Indonesian military is not stopping
the violence in East Timor?
MR. BERGER: Whether it is a question of will or a question of
capacity, or some combination of both, I think one can have different
views on. I think what is important here is the fact, which is that
there has not been, in an aggressive way, an effort on the part of the
Indonesian military to stop the rampaging violence of these militia.
And that has to happen very quickly in our judgment, or the Indonesian
government should turn to the international community and seek its
assistance.
I would say that we've had a number of contacts with Indonesian
authorities over the past several days, at various levels -- including
General Shelton to General Wiranto, Ambassador Roy to senior officials
in the government and in the opposition. There are a number of
different statements being made by Indonesian authorities about their
intent. I hope that they will quickly assert control. That obviously
would be the quickest and most effective way of stopping the violence.
But we need to see some evidence of that in the relatively near
future.
Q: Sandy, would the United States participate in an international
force if one is needed, and in which way would it --
MR. BERGER: Well, if it were an international peacekeeping force it
obviously would be at the request of the Indonesians and it would be
led by the Asians. The Australians have indicated that they're
prepared to take the lead with respect to such force. The President
has indicated he's supportive of that. We have not made any decisions
about the nature of our participation. If we could provide some
material support in some fashion, that is something that we would
consider. But this would not be essentially -- let me put it
positively, this would be I think overwhelmingly Asian in character,
as is appropriate.
Q: What if the Indonesians simply do neither? What if neither takes
steps to stop these rampaging militias? Or ask for international --
MR. BERGER: I'm not going to speculate on that. We've made it very
clear what we think has to happen. Either they need to assert control
or to ask the international community for assistance.
As I said to you before, there are a range of voices and views being
expressed now in Indonesia about their intent. And I don't think it's
useful for me to speculate on what might happen if neither of those
scenarios comes to pass.
Q: Would the U.S. consider economic sanctions to force Indonesia to
make one of those choices?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think I said in my remarks earlier that, as a
practical matter, the ability of the international community to
continue to be of economic assistance to Indonesia will be affected by
the stability in the country. And that, in turn, is in part a function
of their ability to get control of the situation of East Timor.
So it's not a question of making threats; it's a question of
articulating, stating what is simply a practical fact of life, which
is it would be very hard for the international community to continue
to be of economic assistance if there is a chaotic situation in Timor.
Q: Have we told that to Jakarta, that we would cut off aid and ask the
international -- I mean, World Bank and so forth, IMF, to cut off aid?
MR. BERGER: Well, that's not exactly what I said. But we have made it
very clear to -- listen, we care very much about not only the future
of Timor and the people there, the roughly million Timorese, we care
very much about the future of Indonesia. Indonesia is undergoing one
of the most extraordinary transformations in the world, moving towards
democracy, hopefully -- moving towards a more democratic form of
democracy than has been used to. And we want Indonesia to succeed and
we want this transition to succeed.
Now, for this transition to succeed, these things become
inter-related, obviously. It's important that the authorities take
charge of the situation in Timor and the authorities include the
military, as well as the civilian authorities.
Q: Secretary Cohen said that U.S. troops would not be involved in any
international presence, that it's not our role to be the world's
policeman. Yet, it's a role we only seemed too willing to accept in
Kosovo. Why then and not now?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think that's a little bit of a -- as I read what
Secretary Cohen said -- a little sharper reading of what he said. It
is, as I said earlier, if there is going to be a security force that
is invited in by the Indonesians, it should be led by the Asians, but
we will -- the President has indicated that we would support it. And
we are looking at ways in which we could provide material and support
to such a force if that becomes necessary.
Q: Sandy, why do you see Indonesia's consent as a necessary? Do you
see it as a necessary condition for an international force being
there? And, secondly, in what venues at APEC do you expect this to be
discussed? Will President Clinton raise it directly with President
Habibie?
MR. BERGER: The Australians, for one, have said that they would
require -- that they would want Indonesian consent. Without Indonesian
consent, this is a non-permissive environment, as we like to say in
other contexts. And it's obviously a very different kettle of fish if
you're talking about going into East Timor in combat with the
Indonesian military.
I think our effort needs to be placed on -- for now, needs to be
focused on the two things that I emphasized. One is using all of the
influence that we have to convince the Indonesians -- and not only us,
but others in the region and elsewhere -- that it is in the
Indonesians' interests having been responsible for what is quite an
extraordinary process by which the Timorese people have expressed
their desire about the future to not squander the goodwill that that
has brought them in the international community by saying in the
aftermath of that a very bloody situation. In the absence of that, if
they're not able to do that, then, in our judgment, they need to agree
to an international peacekeeping force.
Q: Can you imagine a scenario under which the United States would find
it in its national security interest to intervene there?
MR. BERGER: Well, I don't want to -- again, I don't want to speculate
about future scenarios. I think we are very much focused on the two
objectives that I discussed. I think, as I said to you earlier, the
Australians have made clear that they and the UN, I assume, would
expect to see Indonesian support -- Indonesian agreement to an
international force. So we're going to do everything we can to try to
bring that about.
Q: Sandy, could you elaborate on the Yeltsin phone call? What was that
-- a little bit more detail? And, Gene, could you say, do you expect a
Vietnam trade agreement to be signed by Barshefsky or Albright or
somebody during this trip?
MR. BERGER: Let Gene go first while I drink a glass of water.
MR. SPERLING: The truth, Terry, is at this point I think we don't
know. As you know, we initialed the agreement. There were still
matters that were being worked out. Richard Fisher, from USTR, has
been very actively involved. We are still hopeful, overall. But as to
the timing and whether the timing will fit with APEC or not, I think
at this point we just really don't know.
MR. BERGER: In terms of Yeltsin, President Yeltsin called the
President, initiated the call. The call lasted about an hour, I guess.
And it really reviewed a range of issues in the U.S.-Russian
relationship. He noted that the President was going to see Prime
Minister Putin in APEC. I think he wanted to talk with the President
before that.
They talked about the cluster of issues involving START II, START III,
national missile defense, ABM and, as you know, Secretary Talbott is
in Moscow now discussing those issues. And there will be a Russian
team coming here in mid-September.
They talked about the money laundering corruption issues. The
President said it was very important, he thought, to deal with these
on the merits and to cooperate. The Russians are sending a law
enforcement team here next week to meet with our FBI and other law
enforcement officials. And then there will be, in October, a larger
meeting in Moscow, a G-8 meeting dealing with issues of rule of law
and law enforcement.
The President raised the question of the money laundering legislation,
in which he said he wished that President Yeltsin could sign.
President Yeltsin said that he had had some difficulties with a
particular legislation that the Duma passed with respect to their
consistency with the constitution, but that he was prepared to sign a
money laundering bill if an appropriate bill was passed by the Duma.
They talked about Dagestan and the difficulties that are presented
there by virtue of the efforts by separatists and other militants to
attack Russian forces. And President Yeltsin said that he expected and
hoped that they would be able to gain control of the situation, but it
was a very difficult one.
Q: On the issue of money laundering, if the NSC and the State
Department found out about the investigation into that, the Soviet
alleged money laundering, if they found out about it in March and the
Treasury Department found out about it in April, why were the
President and the Vice President not informed of this until last
month? If that is, indeed, when they were informed.
MR. BERGER: Well, as I understand the chronology here, the first
briefing that was received by the foreign policy community --
including senior NSC officials, State Department -- was soon after
August 26th, when I believe the Attorney General first was briefed on
this matter by the FBI -- which I think was soon after the New York
Times stories appeared.
Now, there were two prior contacts -- two prior pieces of information
with respect to the investigation. In March, a foreign government told
the State Department that it was its understanding that there was an
investigation of the Bank of New York involving Russian entities -- no
indication that those involved either Russian government officials or
foreign funds. We contacted the Justice Department at that time and
said if there were matters here that we thought were -- that were
pertinent to national security or foreign policy considerations, we
would like to be briefed about them. The Justice Department did not
feel that was either the case or appropriate at the time and did not
brief us until, as I say, after August 22.
With respect to the Treasury Department, as I understand it, in April,
through bank supervisory channels, the Treasury Department learned
that there was an investigation of the Bank of New York involving
Russian entities but, again, no suggestion of Russian -- of
governmental involvement or Russian or the involvement of any kind of
either American money or IMF money.
And in terms -- just to anticipate your next question --
Q: Do you believe that that was a correct decision on the part of the
Justice Department not to have briefed you earlier?
MR. BERGER: Well, it depends on what the facts are. And I think we'll
have to -- we don't know yet what the -- what really are the facts of
this -- that will evolve from this investigation. I always like to
know things that affect national security as soon as those are in fact
known to others. But I don't assume that the Justice Department at
that point had reached the conclusion that there was a national
security interest here. The way this process works, since they have
the information, they generally make that judgment.
Q: Sandy, again, the phone call, did the President say to Boris
Yeltsin, look, what about these reports that Swiss authorities have
receipts implicating you and your family?
MR. BERGER: Yes, and Yeltsin denied those reports.
Q: Gene, you said you were hopeful that momentum toward a China WTO
deal could be achieved at the summit. Does that mean that it's
unlikely that a deal would be concluded at that summit and, if not
then, when would you do it? The ministerial is in November and
Congress still has to approve it. When is a better time?
MR. SPERLING: Well, our position has always been the same for quite
some time. We've always thought that earlier was better than later and
that we look forward to returning to the negotiating table and working
out a strong, commercially viable agreement that could allow China to
enter the WTO. At this point, I just can't try to predict what the
pace of this will be.
Obviously, this was slowed down by the unfortunate accident concerning
the bombing. And we've been looking forward to resumption. There
clearly has been resumption of at least people sitting at the table
together. Ambassador Barshefsky will be there. I think she's hopeful
to have discussions with Minister Shirk there.
But what I can say is that we hope that we would at least -- that the
bilateral between the two Presidents would at least lead to a
resumption of negotiations and momentum, but I can't try to make a
prediction. Our position is that we're -- we have been ready to engage
for some time. And we think a strong deal would be in everyone's
interest.
Q: Based on the technical discussions that have just gotten back
underway, is there signs for optimism there -- a pace in a way that's
encouraging to you?
MR. SPERLING: I can assure that over the next several day that no
plans to either negotiate in public or discuss docs or anything in
public. I think that those talks there were fairly designed to simply
take stock of where were had been and to have some discussion. So I
would not look for that one way or the other. But, again, we are
hopeful that there will be a resumption of momentum coming out of the
bilateral between the two Presidents.
Q: Sandy, did the National Security Council, was it involved in the
granting of clemency to the Puerto Ricans? Did the President discuss
with you and the National Security Council?
MR. BERGER: As far as I know, Puerto Rico is still part of the United
States.
Q: I realize that.
MR. BERGER: We're making some efforts to bring it within the
jurisdiction of the NAC, but -- (laughter.)
Q: So are they. (Laughter.)
Q: I thought national security -- is national security.
MR. BERGER: Let me say this, I'm aware of no such contacts. Mike?
MR. HAMMER: No.
MR. BERGER: Mr. Hammer -- that's the authoritative voice.
Q: On East Timor, is there a clock ticking? Is there any kind of
deadline approaching? How long can the United States and the rest of
the world stand by and watch while the chaos and the killing
continues?
MR. BERGER: Well, there is a UN mission that Secretary General Annan
has sent to Jakarta; they arrive today. They are meeting with
officials of the government -- I hope that they will meet with
opposition figures, I hope that they will be able to go to East Timor.
I believe they will report back to the Secretary General by Friday. So
I don't know -- I think that the clock is very much affected by the
situation on the ground. The situation on the ground is clearly not
improving.
But the fastest way for order to be restored is for the Indonesian
military to restore it. Even if you move to an international
peacekeeping force there will be some time necessary to organize it,
constitute it. So I don't think there is a deadline, but I think there
is a sense of urgency.
Q: Did Yeltsin deny any Russian government involvement in the money
laundering during this phone call, by any chance?
MR. BERGER: He indicated that the government of Russia would cooperate
with these investigations. I think he suggested that at least in part
there may be some political motivations in his own country that
affected these allegations. But he indicated that they would cooperate
and that they were sending a team to the United States, I think on the
15th of September.
Q: On Kosovo, I mean, I'm back to that Kosovo analogy. After Kosovo
ended there were people in the White House talking about a Clinton
doctrine about intervention in -- military intervention for
humanitarian purposes. Why does that doctrine not apply in East Timor?
MR. BERGER: That is the most sweeping formulation of -- my daughter
has a very messy apartment up in college, maybe I shouldn't intervene
to have that cleaned up.
I don't think anybody ever articulated a doctrine which said that we
ought to intervene wherever there's a humanitarian problem. That's not
a doctrine, that's just a kind of prescription for America to be all
over the world and ineffective.
I think that each of these situations is different. In Kosovo, you had
a situation in the middle of Europe, on the doorstep of NATO which
clearly posed not only a compelling humanitarian imperative, but also
had a strong security and strategic consequences.
I think the situation in Indonesia is a serious one and one that we
cannot ignore. But there's not one prescription that fits -- because
we bombed in Kosovo doesn't mean would should bomb Dili. I mean, I
think that we have to recognize that Indonesia is in Asia; that the
Indonesians will respond much better to a solution here that is
dominated by the Asians and not dominated by the United States; and
that in this situation our appropriate role is to be very active, but
in a supportive role.
Q: Sandy, the President continues to say that he wished he had acted
more quickly in the Rwanda situation. I mean, if proximity is not the
overarching determinate here -- which we would all hope it's not --
why would he say that about Rwanda? Why would we act in Kosovo and,
yet, we will not commit troops to East Timor?
MR. BERGER: First of all, I don't know that anybody has articulated
this doctrine that was expressed in the back of the room.
Q: I'm not alluding to any doctrine. I'm just saying that he has
expressed regret over Rwanda, which is one of the reasons why we acted
in Kosovo.
MR. BERGER: As you go back over Rwanda -- I think every situation is
different; and if they aren't different then you need not people with
judgment in these positions, you need robots.
In Rwanda, I think as we look back over that situation the one thing
the international community might have done differently, recognizing
that Rwanda happened very quickly, was to move in with others and
create some sort of a safe haven that would have been protective of
some of the Rwandans. There are real questions of whether that was
feasible.
I think each of these situations has to be taken on its own merits.
And in Indonesia -- I believe Indonesia is a serious problem. I
believe we want to do what is most effective in trying to prevent a
very, very bad situation from evolving there. But you have to do that
within the context of Indonesia and in the context of Timor and in the
context of Asia. And the United States has a role to play. But I think
that we have to also recognize that the regional players here have the
dominant role to play.
Q: Sandy, on the Yeltsin phone call -- can you -- you've talked about
all the things that they discussed during this phone call. Can you
sort out for us why Yeltsin made the phone call? Was it in preparation
for APEC? Or was it in response to all the publicity about money
laundering? Was he concerned? What prompted him to make the call?
MR. BERGER: I'm, to some degree, surmising. I think this was in
anticipation of APEC. I think the President -- obviously President
Yeltsin is not going. Prime Minister Putin is going. Under other
circumstances, President Yeltsin might be meeting with President
Clinton at APEC. And I think that he was saying to the President, I'm
very glad you're meeting with Prime Minister Putin. He had some very
nice things to say about former National Security Advisor and now
Prime Minister Putin.
Q: Natural order of progression.
Q: For how long? (Laughter.)
MR. BERGER: But I think it was more -- it was set in the context for
the APEC discussion. But obviously in doing that, all of these issues
came up.
Q: -- is beginning to question the value of its alliance with the
U.S., especially given the unwavering contributions Australia has made
to many U.S. military operations. Two questions, does the U.S. value
its relationship with Indonesia over the alliance --
MR. BERGER: Who is questioning?
Q: The Australians, the Australian government. Does the U.S. value its
relationship with Indonesia over its alliance with Australia? And do
you acknowledge that U.S. support for a peacekeeping mission would
give it much greater impetus and make a greater impact on the
Indonesian authorities?
MR. BERGER: Well, number one, I don't know that Australia is
reevaluating its relationship with that United States --
Q: The value of it.
MR. BERGER: Well, Prime Minister Howard spoke to the President 24
hours ago, and there was not a hint of that whatsoever. Number two, of
course we don't value our relationship with Indonesia over our
relationship with Australia. Australia is an ally of the United
States. We have deep and abiding ties to Australia. This is not a
question of choosing one over the other. Number three, I've said
several times that we -- if it comes to an international security
presence, international peacekeeping presence, we are prepared to be
supportive. So I think the premise is wrong.
Q: Sandy, do you have a clear sense of what the Indonesian military is
weighing in its decision as to whether to allow the Blue Helmets in?
And, second, has the President contacted President Habibie in all this
or are there plans for him to make a call over the next day or two?
MR. BERGER: The President has been in touch with President Habibie in
the last week in two letters, which in the judgment of our folks was
the best way to make the presentation.
What was the other part of your --
Q: What the Indonesian military is weighing in deciding whether to
allow the UN in?
MR. BERGER: I think that's a very confusing situation. I think that
it's unclear what the real chain of authority is in Indonesia at this
point. Indonesia itself is going through a political transition. There
are obviously some forces within the Indonesian military that are at
least sympathetic to the anti-independence forces. So I think it's a
combination of many things.
Q: So Habibie doesn't have control of the military?
MR. BERGER: Well, I don't want to speculate on who has control of
whom. What's important to us at this point is what actually happens.
And the Indonesian military -- either the Indonesian military taking
control or the government of Indonesia calling on the international
community to be of support.
Q: Sandy, you said earlier that Yeltsin denied those reports that he
or his family may have been involved in the money scandal. Did the
President initiate that exchange or did Yeltsin bring it up
spontaneously?
MR. BERGER: I don't remember, John, exactly how it came up. Yeltsin
made a general lengthy presentation at the beginning of the
conversation, which covered a lot of subjects, and dismissed those
allegations as not being --
Q: In the course of that lengthy -- because it's kind of an awkward
subject to bring up between two heads of state, isn't it?
MR. BERGER: It's hardly awkward to bring it up and it seems to me --
let me put it this way, John. We have been raising issues of
corruption with the Russians since 1993, since AID first instituted a
rule of law program in Russia to deal with judges and to deal with law
enforcement, all the way up through the President's last trips when --
some of you were with us -- the President spoke rather forcefully
about corruption and rule of law. So this has been an element of our
relationship, an element of our dialogue from the beginning.
Thank you.
Q: Gene, can we do a quick APEC question? Can you just talk in general
terms about how the administration responds to criticism that APEC has
lost its focus, its mission. The -- report is out saying it's pretty
much a glorified chat session.
MR. SPERLING: Well, I think that APEC has played a major role in the
past on trade issues, certainly, the initial ITA agreement. I think
even critics stress that that played a major role. It was the major
force for going forward. And I think we should remember that this was
a forum that provided discussions during the critical moments of the
Asian financial crisis.
And I think right now shows why it does matter if you're going into
what is the most important World Trade Agreement Round at least in
this part of the decade, you have the opportunity now to provide a
critical mass of 45 percent of -- of countries making up 45 percent of
the global trade able to come together and at least have the potential
to have an agreement going in.
So I think if you were to be able to forge this type of an agreement
when you consider all the domestic pressures each of these countries
faces against going forward in this type of trade liberalization
round, I think it shows quite clearly that opportunity. And then
again, even what we're seeing right now in East Timor does show that
as issues come up, this can provide a forum even for things that are
not on the agenda to be addressed in a serious way.
And I think if you look at discussions, bilateral with Russia, the
meeting between President Jiang and President Clinton -- potential for
that to be a source of discussion -- it shows that the forum itself
also facilitates critical bilateral discussions.
I'll let Mr. Lockhart come on. Thanks.
Q: Thank you.
(end transcript)




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