Transcript: September 8 Worldnet on U.S.-Indonesian Relations
(Masters/Wolfowitz see relations surviving Timor crisis)The United States and Indonesia have to approach the East Timor crisis "as partners," said one-time U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Edward Masters to a Worldnet audience September 8.
Masters, speaking on a program that had been planned to discuss U.S.-Indonesian relations since that island nation's independence, stressed that the best approach for the United States, the world's third most populous country, in dealing with Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous country, was to treat Indonesia as an equal.
"It is not," Masters stressed, "a situation in which one side can dictate to the other, and I think that has got to be the solution to the East Timor problem."
Masters, currently the president of the United States Indonesia Society, said he favored a quiet, private approach for dealing with human rights issues with the Indonesian government.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Wolfowitz pointed to the "remarkable" referendum in East Timor and tied it to Indonesia's own remarkable election earlier this year which was an important step in the democratic transformation taking place there.
While a reign of terror may hold sway in East Timor, Wolfowitz noted, "it's even more remarkable ... what is taking place in the rest of Indonesia in that democratic transformation is going on."
Too many Americans, Wolfowitz said, "don't understand this second very important aspect of things."
Most Americans, he advised his Indonesian audience, "would be astonished to know that most of the Indonesian people who voted in favor of democracy in their own country are not at all happy about the idea of independence for East Timor."
"So squaring democratic opinion in Indonesia with democratic opinion in East Timor is a huge challenge," said Wolfowitz.
Now the Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Wolfowitz echoed his ambassadorial colleague in saying that the way to deal with issues was "diplomatically and privately." But, added Wolfowitz, "I certainly don't think I faced anything like that in my time when I was in Indonesia."
Following is a transcript of the program:
(begin transcript)
WORLDNET "DIALOGUE"
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
Television and Film Service of Washington, D.C.GUESTS: Ambassador Edward Masters, President,
United States Indonesia Society, Former U.S. Ambassador to IndonesiaAmbassador Paul Wolfowitz, Dean,
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Former U.S. Ambassador to IndonesiaAmbassador Arifin Siregar, Former Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S.
Ambassador Hasnan Habib, Former Indonesian Ambassador to the U.S.
TOPIC: U.S.-Indonesian Relations
POST: Jakarta
HOST: Doris McMillon
DATE: September 8, 1999
TIME: 21:00 - 22:00 EDT
MS. MCMILLON: Hello, I'm Doris McMillon, and welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue." Today we join our friends gathered in Jakarta, Indonesia, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Indonesian bilateral relation. Indonesian Ambassadors Siregar and Habibie are joining us, and in Washington I'm joined by two former ambassadors to Indonesia to help with the discussion of this important topic.
First we are joined by Ambassador Edward Masters, President of the United States Indonesia Society. Also joining us is Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Gentlemen, welcome, and it's a pleasure to have you with us today on "Dialogue."
Before we begin our discussion with Jakarta, I understand you both would like to make some opening remarks. So, Ambassador Wolfowitz, we'll begin with you, and then we'll move to Ambassador Masters.
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: I suppose when this program was planned no one thought we would be facing the kind of crisis we are facing in East Timor today, and it seems to overshadow everything. But I think in spite of that it is worth remembering, number one, the reason we got together here is to celebrate 50 years of U.S.-Indonesian relations. I think we can be very proud as Americans of the role that the United States played in helping Indonesia achieve its independence, and I think we managed our relations between the two countries extremely well over the long period of time. We have had problems, we've dealt with them. I hope our ability to deal with them in the past can be a good omen for what we have to deal with now.
But much more important than the past is the future. And it is important that the future of 700,000 people in East Timor is even more important, if anything, the 200 million in Indonesia are trying to construct for the first time in the country's history a fully functioning democracy. And I think it's very important to help both processes move forward.
MS. MCMILLON: Thank you, sir.
Ambassador Masters?
AMB. MASTERS: Thank you. Well, I was privileged to serve in Indonesia two times. I was there, as many of my Indonesian friends know, as political counselor from 1964 to '68; then I was back as Ambassador from the end of '77 to the end of '81. And I have since kind of kept my hand in on Indonesia, and most recently of course in running the U.S. Indonesian Society here in Washington.
I've seen the relationship over a number of years -- certainly not the whole 50. I've seen it with some down periods; I've seen it with a lot of up periods. But I am convinced, as Paul is, of the fundamental strength and the fundamental soundness of that relationship. I think although we do have differences -- we come from different perspectives, we look at things sometimes from a different standpoint. But I think there is a fundamental strain that unites us, and I think the Indonesian people and the American people in many respects are quite similar, and I certainly look forward to the strengthening of that relationship in the future.
Right now we are focused on East Timor, and I am sure we will want to talk about that tonight. We'll get over this. Our Indonesian friends will resolve it. Let's hope that we can help them and get back to the fundamentals in this relationship.
MS. MCMILLON: Thank you both. And without further delay we will go directly to Ambassadors Siregar and Habib standing by in Jakarta. Welcome, and please go ahead, Ambassador Siregar, with your opening remarks.
AMB. SIREGAR: Thank you, Doris. Good evening, Doris, Paul and Ed. This is indeed a pleasure for us to be with you this evening. As you know, I was posted in the United States from 1993 to 1997, and before that I had also the opportunity of being posted in the United States when I was working with the International Monetary Fund in the mid '60s, the late '60s and before that with the U.N. in New York in the early '60s. I could say that I had the opportunity of knowing the American people, the American government. And when I was in Washington as the Ambassador, well I had of course to face a number of problems; i.e., the problems of the violation of human rights, in particular in the case of East Timor. Apparently not many things have changed since then. That's why I would like to say that the more things change the more they become the same. But we have to be mindful of the fact that the relations between the United States and Indonesia have been characterized by an excellent beginning when the United States supported our struggle for independence. And of course afterwards the relations have been subjected to a number of frustrations. But on the whole I must say that the relations have been good and have been expanded -- have taken up a number of dimensions, that the relationship is not only characterized by one aspect, but different aspects. And as two important countries of the world, I think we have to continue making efforts to improve the relations, despite some problems now and then.
AMB. HABIB: Good morning, Doris.
MS. MCMILLON: Good morning.
AMB. HABIB: It is a pleasure to see both my friends there, Paul and Ed. I am happy you both are in good shape.
I was the Ambassador to the United States from 1982 just before the state visit of President Suharto to that country, and until late 1985. As it is always the case everywhere else, the relationship between nations are defined in respect of national interests. And in our case of course between our two countries we cannot escape the -- (inaudible). National interests defining everything -- (inaudible) -- national relationships between our two countries. And on this score I must say that we have seen a fluctuating relationship between our two countries since the first beginning of Indonesia, just before the official relationship between our nations in 50 years, just before --I'd say from the very first day of the proclamation of our independence.
Now, although we have seen fluctuating relations between our two countries, but nevertheless on the whole I must say that our relationship has been a very good one, and I hope a very lasting one also, beneficial to both of our countries. But nowadays it seems that again we have some problems in our relationship. But as said just now, I am also concerned that we can better discuss this and continue strengthening our relationship in the future. Thank you.
MS. MCMILLON: And thank you, Ambassador Habibie. And now without further delay we are going to start with our discussion. And we will start in Jakarta. We are talking more of a roundtable discussion, although half of our table is there and the other half is here. So what I would like to do is I would like to start off with a question, and we can go back and forth.
Looking at the current tense situation in East Timor now, it has got the potential to become even more tense in the days to come. So I would ask you gentlemen that drawing on your experiences during past crisis periods, what general advice would you give to those currently attempting to defuse the situation? Ambassador Masters, let's start with you.
AMB. MASTERS: All right, let me plunge in on this one. I was Ambassador during much of the Carter administration. As we all know, human rights was very high on Jimmy Carter's agenda -- it still is, for that matter. So I spent a lot of time working on human rights issues. And I became convinced at that time, and since, that our best role is one behind the scenes working with and supporting our Indonesian friends.
Now, I have a specific example of that. When I arrived in Jakarta in late 1977 there were still thousands of detainees on Bulu Island out in the Banda Sea, and it had become a real embarrassment to Indonesia. So we -- that is, a number of ambassadors -- Indonesians who shared our concern about this problem, worked together, and eventually got a process underway under which virtually all those detainees were processed and most were released.
But the important thing was that the system worked and the processing continued, when we were working with rather than confronting our Indonesian colleagues. Every time someone in Washington got up on the Senate floor or elsewhere, made a strong statement that this problem must be resolved by next Tuesday or else -- and the "or else" usually involved threats to put conditions on aid or something -- then the process would stop. And we in Jakarta would have to work with our Indonesian friends over time to get the process back on track again.
So I think that points out what to me is a very fundamental part of this relationship, and that is really that we have to approach it as partners, we have to approach it as equals. It is not a situation in which one side can dictate to the other, and I think that has got to be the solution to the East Timor problem.
MS. MCMILLON: Ambassador Wolfowitz?
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: Yeah, I am not sure that we have had a crisis of this magnitude, and certainly nothing like this before. It's remarkable both in what is taking place in East Timor and the referendum, and it's sadly remarkable in what's taking place in East Timor with the violence there. But it's even more remarkable as anything in what is taking place in the rest of Indonesia in that democratic transformation is going on. And I think far too many Americans don't understand this second very important aspect of things. In fact, most Americans would be astonished to know that most of the Indonesian people who voted in favor of democracy in their own country are not at all happy about the idea of independence for East Timor. So squaring democratic opinion in Indonesia with democratic opinion in East Timor is a huge challenge. I certainly don't think I faced anything like that in my time when I was in Indonesia.
But I do think if I think about something in fact related to East Timor, I remember when Secretary Shultz visited Indonesia in 1986, and he was asked predictable questions from the press about human rights in East Timor, and he began his answer by saying if we are going to talk about human rights in Indonesia, let's understand there are some real human rights achievements in this country. He was in Bali -- he said on the island of Bali -- this is 20 years ago -- tens of thousands of people starved to death, but now starvation has been eliminated in Indonesia and they're self-sufficient in rice. This is the largest Muslim population of any country in the world and it is a model for religious tolerance. That's a triumph for human rights. So he tried -- and then he said, Of course there are human rights differences, and we try to discuss them between our governments as much as possible diplomatically and privately, because we think that's the way to make progress.
And I was struck later on how many Indonesian officials said since you do understand us, since you do realize that we have got a lot to be proud of, we are also willing to listen -- though we prefer in private -- to your criticisms. It's the people who don't acknowledge at all that these important things are taking place that are not likely to get a hearing.
But I would say, having said that, I think that the Indonesian people shouldn't underestimate the damage that is being done to the whole reputation of the country by the spectacle of what's taking place in East Timor. It is truly horrifying, even to someone like me, who I think does understand how complex the East Timor problem is, and does understand how ambivalent the Indonesian people feel about it.
I'd just say one last thing. I think Ambassador Habib was absolutely right in talking about the countries have different interests and common interests. I would really emphasize in trying to deal with this crisis that I think the United States and Indonesia have fundamentally common interests, and two in particular. Unlike some deplorable periods in our past history when admittedly the United States was not assisting Indonesia, I don't know of any serious American official who wouldn't view the further breakup of Indonesia, beyond what may happen in East Timor, as being anything of danger to American interests in that region. We want, as the Indonesian people want even more, to help that country preserve its remarkable unity. And, secondly, I don't know of any serious American official in the administration, in the Congress, or former officials like myself, who don't truly hope that Indonesia can be a democratic example to the rest of Asia and for the rest of the world.
So I think our interests are now fortunately very closely aligned, and I will try to work from that basis.
MS. MCMILLON: Okay. Thank you. We'll go to Jakarta now, and we are waiting for your questions or comments. Please go ahead.
AMB. SIREGAR: As you know, the issue of East Timor has always had a negative on the relationship between the United States and Indonesia. It started a couple of years ago and it continues until today. But I would like just to stress the point that the environment in which this issue is being handled is quite different. Until about one and a half years ago of course we had a different regime. Now we have the beginning of more democratic government. And it is very important to bear in mind I think, because if you look at how the Indonesian people consider the problem, consider the possibility of solving the problem, it is quite different from, say, two years ago. There are a lot of differences of opinion between the government on the one hand and the public at large. And now people agree that we should approach the whole problem from a new perspective, a new aspect; that is, a democratic aspect. Before, until about one and a half years ago, it was the government which determined all this. But now I think the public opinion plays a very important role here.
And I am cautiously optimistic that despite the problems we are facing and despite the fact that the international community has been treating Indonesia very harshly -- probably rightly -- I think that we could solve the problems now much better, in a much better environment than before. And I sincerely hope that this issue, because it is one of the many issues in the relationship between the United States and Indonesia -- should not endanger -- should not put too much strain on the relations between the United States and Indonesia. And I hope that we could learn from the positive experience that we had in our relations in order to look to the future.
AMB. HABIB: While the East Timor problem has stayed with us since the very first day we went into East Timor. When we went into East Timor -- but many of us were aware that East Timor actually was not a colony anymore of the Portuguese. Not many of us were aware that the status of East Timor when we went there, the status actually as a non-self-governing territory, which was actually the first step toward de-colonization of a colonized people, and that Portugal was there not as a colonial master but Portugal was the administrator with responsibilities -- (inaudible) -- for the continuation of the colonization process.
Now, one day, because they were asked by the people there, that was our conviction, many people there, it was already in civil war, and that civil war started by the coup attempt, a -- (inaudible) -- party coup d'etat, in August 1975. And Fretilin came then, Fretilin -- fall back -- and within two weeks occupied the whole territory. And on the 28th of November 1975, Fretilin declared independence and declared the existence of the East Timor people's democratic country.
But the next day the other parties, the other three parties, issued a statement, a valuable statement, declaration, that that one-sided proclamation of Fretilin was not valid and that all of the people of East Timor would wish to integrate themselves into the Republic of Indonesia. And they asked our help. So it was the question -- we went there to de-colonize, to free the people from their colonial life. But only after that we went -- we knew that in the first place we should not have invaded East Timor, because East Timor had never been territory of Indonesia; it was not claimed also by us in a proclamation of independence.
But nevertheless we were also in the perception that our friends, American friends and Australian friends would wish us to come into East Timor and to pacify the country from a holocaust -- for the bloodshed in the country. So we went in there with -- (inaudible). But, as you know, when we were in there we did not expect that kind of stubborn resistance for the Fretilin. And until today we have never been able to settle the issue completely. Until today we have not been able to crush the so-called Fretilin communist fighters there in East Timor.
But nevertheless, right from the very first beginning, when the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly came out on the 20th of December, just five days after we invaded East Timor, deploring us and asking also Portugal to continue to settle the problem and continue the decolonization process. And then came the resolution of course of the U.N. Security Council, ordering us to get out of East Timor. But we did not pay heed to all these resolutions, the UNGA resolution and the U.N. Security Council resolutions.
But, nevertheless, it was only when you see in the tabulation of the voting in the UNGA meetings, we saw that only on the first resolution in '75 that the United States was pro the resolution, which means that the United States was pro Indonesia to get out of East Timor.
But after that, '77 to -- (inaudible) -- until as it concluded in 1982, the United States was against the resolution, which meant -- it means that the United States saw as the best solution of the East Timor issue is integration with Indonesia. The only problem was the way -- how we went about integrating East Timor into Indonesia. And, moreover, the abuses that during the occupation of Indonesia of East Timor that we did that, that we had done that in East Timor -- that's now the human rights issue.
But in 1982 they decided to settle the issue bilaterally, that is, on the negotiating table between Indonesia and Portugal under the jurisdiction of the secretary general of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights every time again and again in Geneva condemned us because of our human rights, our poor record there -- not only in East Timor but in other parts of Indonesia. That was actually the real issue, which was hindering, which was jeopardizing our bilateral relationships between Indonesia and the United States.
But now Habibie has made a very broad decision -- in fact, actually leaving it to the people themselves -- I mean the East Timor people themselves -- to decide on their own future. But according to me Habibie made a terrible mistake by offering a second option. He made the second option after the first option. The first option was a special autonomous state for East Timor. I think the majority of Indonesia agreed with that. You know, this was a breakthrough. It was also applauded by the international community.
When I talk to someone -- I spoke with Xanana. He said that he could accept the autonomous offer, but actually give us time, some time -- 10 years after which then a referendum will be held and only after that the decision will be left to the East Timor people themselves, whether to continue within Indonesia, with the state's autonomy, or whether they still want to be an independent nation.
But at the same time where Habibie said this is -- what is it? -- the final offer -- take it or leave it. And immediately afterwards he followed up with the option of independence, and then forced the people there in East Timor to look at the other as, you know, bitter enemies. I want freedom, I want integration and autonomy. Then immediately there was still more. That is the (paramount ?) mistake.
So it's too quickly you know, too hasty, between autonomy and freedom, between autonomy -- I belong to the so-called constructive opposition -- not party -- moral force -- the National Front. You know, at the first beginning I said autonomy -- okay, we applaud this, Habibie -- you really made a breakthrough. But then following up with a referendum, I said five years. Within the five years Indonesia would then try to repair the damage done and to correct all our mistakes in the past and really work towards a genuine autonomy, and after that leave it to the people -- a referendum -- leave it to the people to make the final choice. When they still opt for independence, it means that we have not succeeded in repairing the damage done during the 24 years, 25 years -- almost 25 years -- in East Timor.
But no problem has ever -- Habibie has a very crucial problem, a domestic problem. You know, he was being attacked from left and right from up till now, you know especially when he did not counsel anybody. He did not counsel the assembly -- I mean the parliament. He did not counsel the FBR (ph), while the PPR (ph) and the Peoples Consultative Assembly have very much been part and parcel during the so-called integration process constitutionally of East Timor into Indonesia.
Now, we hope the best. We are really in a mess right now, and we do not -- we cannot afford another -- what is it -- approaches of statements from our friends, which could make the situation much worse in the country. That's my opinion on East Timor.
MS. MCMILLON: Thank you so much, Ambassador.
Now we will be glad to take questions. And because our time is slipping away, we would like to get as many questions in as possible. So please go ahead.
AMB. SIREGAR: (Off mike) -- to what my colleague -- (inaudible) -- Ambassador Habib said. In this connection I would like to appeal to our friends in the United States that they should make a clear distinction between the attitude of the Indonesian government and the Indonesian people. I think as far as the Indonesian people are concerned, the majority would like to accept the results of the poll. And I realize that there is a lot of criticism against the way in which the post-referendum developments are being handled by the government. But please don't generalize as if it is the mistake of the whole population of Indonesia. If we can talk about a mistake or shortcoming, it is the shortcoming of the government, not of the people.
MS. MCMILLON: Do you care to comment?
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: I think what Ambassador Siregar said is absolutely right. In fact, I think what both ambassadors said is right. I would just add I think it would be very helpful in getting the American people to understand that difference if as many Indonesians as possible, and particularly those that are representative of the newly strengthened political parties, can make it clear. One can question whether the referendum was too hasty, one can question whether President Habibie should have consulted with more people, one could question whether it should have allowed an option for autonomy followed by a vote later on. But all of that, as we say in American slang, is water under the bridge. And the fact is, as Ambassador Siregar just said, 80 percent of the population of East Timor has now voted clearly for independence. And I think as hard as it may be for the Indonesian people to accept that, I think the sooner it is accepted, the more openly it's accepted, the sooner Indonesia can move on and be done with the problems of East Timor and focus on the much more important problems of Indonesia.
MS. MCMILLON: Ambassador Masters?
AMB. MASTERS: I certainly agree with that. I think that's a very important point, and one that we should perhaps talk about a little bit.
The election in East Timor went remarkably well. It was peaceful, it seemed to be effective, it seemed to be a true reflection as far as we can tell sitting here halfway around the world, of the wishes of the people. And I think that's highly commendable. But the tragedy is what's happened since the election.
But it's important, as Paul said, that Indonesia get this behind it, to end the damage that is happening to Indonesia's relationship. Our two colleagues who served as ambassador here will understand that everyday in the Washington Post, the New York Times, every evening on our televisions, we see scenes of tragedy, of killing, of violence, and that is having a tremendously adverse effect on the whole attitude toward Indonesia. But it needs to be handled just as quickly as it can be, in order not only to remove this erosion of Indonesia's image, but also to permit Indonesia to get on with its very important tasks of economic reform, consolidating the democratic system, decentralization and so forth. There are a broad range of issues that Indonesia needs to be concentrating on. So there are a large number of reasons for resolving East Timor and getting that issue off the table.
MS. MCMILLON: Gentlemen, let me ask you this, speaking about the economy: What are the economic stumbling blocks in the relationship between the two countries?
AMB. MASTERS: Well, there are some problems now on the commercial side, and these actually are very troubling. Some contracts of American companies seem to be in question now, and it's uncertain whether those contracts are going to be honored. Obviously if they aren't, it's going to have an extremely adverse impact on future investment, and also as you know we have a democratic system -- you now are moving into a similar system -- this will lead to strong pressures on the U.S. government, through the Congress, individually with the executive branch, for the government to intervene. So these business problems can very easily become serious government-to-government problems, and I think those need to be handled as quickly as possible.
MS. MCMILLON: What would you say are the important elements to Indonesia's -- (inaudible) -- economic programs that could probably enhance the relationship? Are we are talking bank reform, privatization, judicial reform?
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: One of the very good things that is happening in Indonesia I think is this whole very outspoken and strong attack on corruption or the KKN they call it, the Indonesian letters for "corruption, collusion and nepotism." I think there is a very strong demand among the Indonesian people for cleaner government, for ending all kinds of dirty back-room deals that influence commercial practices in the past, for a strengthened legal system. And already there is an extraordinary strengthening of the press. The press is as free as one could ask for, and able to expose a great many examples of wrongdoing.
So I think, though its first effect is to real scandals and problems, but those are problems that people have been generally aware of and haven't talked about. I think the fact that they are talking about it, doing something about it, is very promising.
I would say the single biggest obstacle perhaps is the need to get the Indonesian banking system back on its feet, because that's I think a turnkey to reviving the Indonesian economy. And I think you can't separate, and the recent scandal (over Bank Bali ?) shows you can't separate that for the need for transparent legal procedures of government.
MS. MCMILLON: Thank you. Jakarta, we will go back to you for more questions and comments. Please go ahead.
AMB. SIREGAR: As you know, we started this economic recovery program a couple of years ago. There are indications that the program started having results, but unfortunately a further development of the program depends to a very high extent on the political development. As you know, we are going to have presidential elections, and we are not quite sure who will be the president. And as far as the business community is concerned, they would like to have some certainty. I have the feeling that the majority of businessmen be there -- Indonesian and foreign. I would like to see more stability, more efficiency of the government agencies. And I hope that if we have a new government that the situation will change for the better.
Thus now many people are waiting until we have a new government and until there is more certainty about what the attitude of the new government will be.
But as far as the opposition parties are concerned, as you know the leaders of the most important opposition parties have agreed with the international community, and in particular with the IMF, World Bank and ADB, that they would like to continue the program, even if they come to power after the presidential elections. And the whole thing is very important indeed for economic recovery, and also of course for the relations between the United States and Indonesia. And as such on the problem of contracts which should be honored by the Indonesian government, it is also of course one important aspect of the recovery program. And I am quite sure that if we have a new government that the new government will pay due attention to this problem.
AMB. HABIB: I agree with my colleague, as already has been said on the issue, that unfortunately the political situation has not supported -- has not been conducive to the continuation of the economic recovery program.
But at the same time also I would like to point out -- (inaudible) -- said about the opposition party support. As of today we don't know who will be the opposition , who will be in the government. This is the real problem. Until we now we don't even know what party will be in the government, who will be our president. It is still very confusing. And our political elite it seems to me they are making a very simple issue -- that is, leave it to the voting, and the People's Consultative Assembly, instead of leaving it -- a simple way. And that's creating every day again a (new complex formula ?). So it confuses the people a lot, so that now we don't know who will be the opposition party.
But still the Habibie government, which has not enjoyed enough credibility and legitimacy to entice the foreign investors to come into the country again. That's one thing.
And secondly, also, speaking about the economic recovery program, the most important thing has not been touched really -- has not -- (inaudible) -- at all. Now, take for instance the bank (reconstruction ?) program. It just even started only recently, but we don't know yet if we can continue or not. And recapitalization program -- it was wracked by scandal. Look at the Bali Bank scandal. This is a very serious obstacle to the recovery program.
And on top of that also, with this East Timor issue, the certainty of investment, it all creates impediments, and this is why it is very important for all of the Indonesians to have as soon as possible this government replaced by a more credible and a more legitimate government, by allowing the People's Consultative Assembly to elect a general session in November or late October, and then elect the president, who hopefully will be much more accepted by the wider circle of Indonesian society.
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: I think it's worth pointing out, especially for Americans who may be listening, but I would say also to Indonesians, there is an extraordinary situation, and I think not a healthy one, where you have an election on June 7th that fundamentally changes the whole political order, but you still have for almost six months afterwards the same old government in place. And we have a much shorter transition period in the United States from the election, which is always held in early November, to the inauguration of the president, which comes two months later in mid-January. And even in that system -- we call him the president-elect -- is beginning to form a government and to take charge. And I think some of the problems that we see in East Timor is a product of this vacuum of power at the center. And if there is anything the Indonesian people can do to shorten that time and to begin to put a government together more quickly, I think the process is so drawn out it would be difficult for any country. But for a country facing Indonesia's problems, it's an enormous handicap.
MS. MCMILLON: Ambassador Masters?
AMB. MASTERS: Yes, I agree with that. If the MPR could take up this issue with the new president shortly after it reconvenes in early October, just next month, I think this would be highly desirable. The problems that Indonesia faces, both domestically and internationally, require I think firm leadership, leadership that has a solid backing among the people and within the MPR. And I think we don't have that. President Habibie has done many good things, and I certainly give him full credit for that. I think he came in under very difficult circumstances. But Indonesia now needs a president who has gone through a new process of being elected and who can cope with these problems in perhaps a more forthright, more confident way.
MS. MCMILLON: Thank you. Let's return to Jakarta for more questions and comments. Please go ahead.
AMB. SIREGAR: Here again I would like just to ask our colleagues and friends in the United States to make a clear distinction between the attitude of the government or the actions of the government and also the attitude of the population in general.
If the government does something, it does not reflect really in some cases the will or the agreement of the whole population of Indonesia. We are now in a different situation compared with, say, even two or three years ago. It is true that to the international community the East Timor issue is very important indeed. It is also very important to us. But in fact you know until a couple of days ago the East Timor issue was not of the highest priority to the majority of the Indonesian population, because since that time and until now in fact we have been paying a lot of attention to the election of the president, because we think that the coming president would play a vital role indeed to determine the future of Indonesia. It is true that now the issue of East Timor has become very important -- not only to the international community, but to us as well. But please bear in mind that as far as the relations between the United States and Indonesia are concerned there are many other aspects to political, international, economic aspects, and that we should not just be dominated in our relations by one aspect -- i.e., East Timor.
AMB. HABIB: I agree with -- (inaudible) -- my colleague Ambassador Siregar. But I must add also at the same time that until recently the East Timor issue has not been high -- (inaudible) -- of Indonesia. Because why? Because the majority of the Indonesian people take it for granted that East Timor is part of Indonesia. And no one can really get away from it. But afterwards it seems that all this time not many of the Indonesian people really know what was going on on the issue of East Timor. And now they are angry -- many of them are angry -- even to the extent that some of the militia there in East Timor, they would not accept -- they would not accept the outcome of the referendum, and that they said they will continue to go to war there in East Timor. That's a real problem, a dilemma for Wiranto, who has taken upon himself to the -- (inaudible) -- that's possible for the return of peace, stability and security in the country.
So there are more and more people looking at the possibility of inviting even a U.N. peacekeeping force to maintain security there. Because if it is very hard for the Indonesian military to take really firm action against the militia, who are now actually the ones who disturb peace and security there. Because why? Because the militia was the creation of the military, and you cannot really think that the Indonesian military really can take firm action against a former brother in arms -- (inaudible) -- in arms who fought shoulder to shoulder together with them, to wipe out the resistance movement in East Timor. So this is a -- (inaudible) -- for Wiranto. And if he fails it means the whole reputation of the military of the TNI (ph) -- not only that, but the whole credibility and the reputation of Indonesia surely will suffer severely.
So this again is an issue which is not easy to solve, to solve Indonesia. Indeed Habibie has done some good things, you know, but sometimes the after effect of the decisions taken by him -- he was not aware of the real consequences of that -- (inaudible) -- of the positions he has taken.
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: If I could just say quickly, I agree with what Ambassador Habibie has said. I think it is very important to realize there are many other issues. The way to get Timor out of the way I believe at this point, recognizing what we have gotten to, is to accept the referendum as decisive, to say that the security problems of East Timor are no longer Indonesia's concern -- Indonesia has a lot of other things to worry about. Let the international community become responsible for the security of East Timor. And I think in turn the international community should make it clear to Indonesia that East Timor is a special case. It is not a precedent for Aceh or for any other part of what has been Indonesia since the very beginning.
MS. MCMILLON: Okay, thank you. We are going to kind of change the discussion a little bit, and then we'll go back to Jakarta. But how can cultural differences between the U.S. and Indonesia be bridged? And has educational exchange had an impact or had an important effect?
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: I think it's had a huge effect. I think there's been more of it in terms of Indonesians becoming educated about the United States, unfortunately than Americans becoming educated about Indonesia. Ambassador Masters has done remarkable work as president of the U.S. Indonesia Society in trying to correct that other side of the equation. We started a whole program on Southeast Asia at my school, Johns Hopkins University, to try to begin educating Americans about that whole important region. But I unfortunately would still say there is probably no country in the world as important as Indonesia about which Americans have so much to learn.
MS. MCMILLON: Ambassador Masters?
AMB. MASTERS: No, I fully agree. I would only underscore what Paul has said.
MS. MCMILLON: Okay. Let us go back to Jakarta. But one other question before we do. What can the U.S. do to support Indonesia?
AMB. MASTERS: You mean generally? Getting off of East Timor?
MS. MCMILLON: Right.
AMB. MASTERS: It can -- well, economic aid I think is important, both bilaterally and through the World Bank and the international institutions, the Asian Development Bank, the IMF and so forth. Foreign investment is very important. The business-to-business relationship I think is critical -- it creates jobs, it helps with Indonesia's development. Education is very important. I wish we had more government-sponsored educational programs in this country. I wish there were more opportunities to bring Indonesians here, and also to send Americans to Indonesia. Unfortunately those opportunities are increasingly limited now.
And I think of particular importance -- we can just get to know more about Indonesia and to understand and to appreciate the diversity of the country, the very deep culture, and to know how to work and how to interact with our Indonesian friends. To put it in a nutshell, I would say we need to learn to listen more perhaps and talk less, and let our Indonesian friends teach us a bit about not only their own country but the region.
MS. MCMILLON: We have two ears and one mouth -- we should listen more. Ambassador Wolfowitz?
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: I agree with everything Ambassador Masters said. I think it is important to stress that the key to helping Indonesia is what the Indonesians do themselves. And we have had a rather dramatic lesson unfortunately in Russia that if a country isn't willing to take the difficult policy decisions and measures needed to institute the rule of law, more foreign aid and more money may actually just corrupt the process even further. So I think the United States and the international community should absolutely help Indonesia in its democratic transition, but a lot of the prerequisites have to be created by the Indonesian people themselves. I think there are a lot of signs that they are moving in that direction, but I think one should never lose sight of that priority.
The other thing I would say, and I don't say this just because I'm the dean of a university division, but I do believe education is one place where any amount of aid is going to be a plus. That goes to individuals, it goes to improve their productivity over a lifetime. There is no way you can go wrong in investment in education in either direction.
MS. MCMILLON: Thank you, gentlemen. And now let's return to Jakarta. Thank you so much for waiting. Please go ahead.
Q Thank you. Yes, we do have a question from the audience in Jakarta, which again relates to East Timor -- perhaps not surprisingly. The question would be if the East Timor situation is not resolved quickly and positively, what are the possible ramifications in the international community for Indonesia? And what will be the long-term impact on bilateral relations with the United States?
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: I don't even want to try to describe it. I just think they will be very, very bad. And particularly -- of course it depends on what one means by unresolved, but if unresolved means the continuation of this kind of sort of "ethnic cleansing" -- and I use that word, although it may not be entirely appropriate -- that's what people are going to think of -- actions that seem to put Indonesia, as unfair as it is, and it is totally unfair, in the same category as Milosevic's Serbia. You can just imagine for yourself what the consequences would be. I think it's very, very important to try to deal with this issue quickly and cleanly. And I believe the way forward is reasonably clear.
MS. MCMILLON: Ambassador Masters?
AMB. MASTERS: I agree with that. I think the issue is escalating in this country. Our country has been on leave over Labor Day. They are now back in session, and already I saw on the evening news tonight some ringing speeches from several members of the Senate and the House. Some resolutions have been introduced which are very critical of Indonesia, which call for restraints -- perhaps even termination in some cases of U.S. economic assistance. Private groups, NGOs in this country are becoming increasingly active on the issue.
And again to reiterate what I think Paul and I have been saying, an American view, if this issue is not resolved quickly and with a minimum of further violence, I think there is danger -- not of permanent -- but of longer lasting damage to this very important bilateral relationship.
MS. MCMILLON: Jakarta, we'll take another question.
AMB. HABIB: Well, let me say in the first place that Indonesian proper -- I think almost all of them, the political parties, the newly-created political parties, the leaders of the political elite, more and more they accept the outcome of the referendum on East Timor, although some of them deplore and criticize severely Habibie's decision -- Habibie's way of proposing the option for independence.
Another thing is of course we also want to settle the issue as soon as possible, and allow us actually to proceed with what has been stipulated in the New York agreement, the May agreement, that after the referendum the Indonesian government, it's their responsibility to follow the constitutional ways, to return the status of East Timor to the status before 1976. It means actually that first of all the People's Consultative decision Number 6 of 1978, and the law 30, 1976, should be declared now unvoid.
But then we will have to wait -- to wait for the People's Consultative Assembly to complete -- and that will take place only in November. So there is still some two months left before.
And in the meantime we hope that the situation, that the international community will allow us to try to settle it in our way as peacefully and as quickly as possible, and refrain -- especially from our press -- refrain from making statements which would be perceived by the majority -- but some sections of the society here as an uptight Indonesian attitude. The majority of the people in Indonesia cannot distinguish that what comes out of America, whether from Congressmen or senators, or from ambassadors or from the White House -- you know, they cannot distinguish what is it. The other thing that comes from Indonesia is regarded as the official position of the American government. And they sometimes see that some of the statements have what is it -- a frightening tone. For instance, if you do not do this, you are not capable of settling -- of returning peace and security there in 48 hours, then this will be regarded as a threatening statement, and it does not promote well for the future of Indonesian relations. They do not know really what is happening basically there. They only know, the majority of them -- well, in the first place, 1975, America supported when we entered East Timor. But now America is engaged in the so-called international conspiracy to take it away from Indonesia, that the people -- that it is the people's sentiment. They do not know better. And then that is the real thing here we have to consider (this seriously ?).
MS. MCMILLON: Do you care to comment?
AMB. MASTERS: Well, we spend a lot of time on East Timor. Understandably it's an extremely important issue. And it will affect one way or another this very important bilateral relationship that we have been talking about. But there are many other aspects of that relationship. I think most of the other aspects are in good shape, and it's that fundamental soundness that we need to return to. And I think all of us on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, if I understand our Indonesian colleagues correctly, they're saying let's get this East Timor problem behind us, so Indonesia can get on with its work and we can get on with ours, and we can get back to the fundamentals.
MS. MCMILLON: Well, we have maybe about two minutes left, and I want to ask words of advice before we close. And what would you impart to a new ambassador to Indonesia and in the U.S.? In two minutes.
AMB. WOLFOWITZ: Let me take a new American Ambassador going to Indonesia, which is not totally a hypothetical issue at the moment. I think I made one of the points earlier, to put it crudely, and that is to learn to listen a lot and take advice. But maybe more importantly would be to find a good Indonesian interlocutor, a good Indonesian teacher. I was extremely lucky in my first tour in Jakarta in getting to know very well a very fine Indonesian man who unfortunately passed away, Koko Moko (ph), who later served as ambassador her. Koko (ph) introduced me to Indonesia and introduced me to the Indonesian culture, and that has been extremely beneficial for a number of years now.
MS. MCMILLON: Ambassador?
AMB. MASTERS: I think I would -- some of my -- I think it's very important to emphasize the good will and the friendship. I think Indonesians can take a lot from Americans, if it is put politely, if it put respectfully, if it is put in the spirit of friendship. If we sort of glower at them, as we think sometimes works with other kinds of people, and start to lecture at them -- I'm not sure it works with others, but it certainly doesn't work with Indonesia.
MS. MCMILLON: Well, I am going to politely say that those are our final comments. So we are going to end our program here. We'd like to thank our guests, Ambassador Edward Masters and Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, and Indonesian Ambassadors Siregar and Habib, as well as our participants in Jakarta. We wish you continued success. In Washington, for Worldnet's "Dialogue," I am Doris McMillon.
(end transcript)
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