09 June 1999
TEXT: RICE BRIEFS SENATE AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONGO WAR
(Cites possible need for peacekeeping force) (3030) WASHINGTON -- Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice June 8 told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs that the current conflict in the Congo is "the widest interstate war in Africa in modern history." However, after months of tortuous negotiations, she told the lawmakers, a "shift in thinking" has pervaded the talks, and now there is more of a reliance on diplomacy to end the conflict rather than a "reliance on military force." The United States has been a player in recent peace negotiations, she told the lawmakers, and "SADC [Southern African Development Community] has become the accepted vehicle for ending the conflict, with Zambian President Chiluba assuming the leading role. Mozambican President Chissano and Tanzanian President Mkapa are assisting President Chiluba, and the United Nations has recently appointed a special envoy, former Senegalese Foreign Minister Niasse, to determine how the U.N. might support regional efforts to broker a peace settlement." However, the official added that "Congo's potential can only be realized in the context of a negotiated cease-fire and comprehensive political settlement that takes account both of the legitimate concerns of Congo's neighbors and the internal political conditions that helped precipitate the crisis. For a resolution to be durable, any solution must also address the issue of ex-FAR, Interahamwe, UNITA, and other non-state actors." When a settlement does come, she noted, it "may require the insertion of an international peacekeeping presence to monitor the cease-fire." Following is the text of Rice's statement, as prepared for delivery: (BEGIN TEXT) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs Tuesday, June 8, 1999 Central African Conflict and Its Implications for Africa and for the Future of U.S. Policy Goals and Strategies Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to testify before this Subcommittee this afternoon. Let me congratulate you, Senator, for your new role as Chairman of this Subcommittee, and welcome new member Senator Brownback. I also am pleased to see Senator Feingold returning as ranking Member of the Subcommittee. I look forward to working together to meet the many challenges and opportunities facing the United States in its partnership with Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is home to roughly 50 million people and borders nine other countries. It is an integral member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). With its vast mineral, agricultural and water resources, the country has the potential to serve as an economic powerhouse -- to improve the lives not only of its own citizens but of many of its neighbors. Its political course and economic prospects will directly influence the stability of much of the rest of Africa. The opportunity costs of Congo becoming a failed or fragmented state are huge. The direct costs in terms of lives and destruction, I presume, would be self-evident. The Conflict in the Congo The current conflict in the Congo is the widest interstate war in Africa in modern history, and potentially one of the most dangerous conflicts in the world today. It is unique in its complexity and in the multiplicity of actors. There have been at least eight foreign countries directly involved in the fighting in Congo. There is also a plethora of non-state actors engaged in the conflict, including UNITA, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, numerous Sudanese-backed Ugandan rebel organizations, and others. The Congo crisis is bleeding over into other regional conflicts. The result is a swath of interlocking wars involving Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola, extending from the Horn to the Atlantic. It puts at risk the futures not only of the people of the Congo, but the peoples of all nine countries on its periphery. It is no exaggeration to suggest that if the conflict persists, much of Southern, Eastern and Central Africa could be adversely affected. It has set back economic development and retarded efforts to strengthen regional cooperation. The ultimate path out, outlined further in this presentation, lies in achieving a comprehensive settlement. That is the end goal which guides President Chiluba and our accompanying efforts. Over the past ten months, we have not shied away from that goal, but we recognize the complexity and difficulty of achieving quick progress. Therefore, we have focused our thinking as well on realistic intermediate targets of opportunity that can create new facts on the ground. We've pushed for the beginning of an internal Congolese dialogue, without serious preconditions. We have suggested to Congo and its neighbors [to] think in earnest how they might reach regional compacts that put in place a new security architecture to address the vacuum in eastern Congo. When broken down into its component parts, this conflict can become less hopeless and more soluble. The Congo crisis is the result of the intersection of two developments: (1) the political and institutional vacuum that was the legacy of thirty years of Mobutu's corrupt and tyrannical rule; and (2) the use of Congo by various insurgent groups to destabilize neighboring states. A number of the countries surrounding the Congo have been plagued by insurgencies and armed conflict. Of these, none has been more intractable and more destabilizing than the bloody conflicts between Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi and in Rwanda. In 1972, an estimated 150,000 Burundian Hutus were the victims of genocide; then, in 1994, at least 800,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsi) were slaughtered in a genocide organized by the Hutu government then in power. It is difficult to overstate the continuing traumatic impact of that event for Rwanda and for the region. Then, in 1996, violent inter-ethnic conflict came directly to Congolese soil, in the form of the expulsion of Congolese Tutsis in the Masisi region. This event was the backdrop to the Banyamulenge-led and externally supported rebellion that led to Mobutu's ouster. Today, there are two broad coalitions facing each other in the Congo conflict that erupted last August: President Kabila's government and his principal allies of Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola and Namibia on the one hand, and the rebel/Uganda/Rwanda coalition on the other. Each side has internal divisions of its own, based on their quite different interests and perspectives. On the Congolese side, Chad and Angola have effectively withdrawn from active participation in the conflict. On the opposing side, schisms between Rwanda and Uganda as well as among the rebels have led to the emergence of several competing factions. After months of diplomatic and military stagnation, several recent developments suggest there has been a shift in thinking within the region -- in favor of political and diplomatic action, versus overwhelming reliance on armed force. On April 18 in Sirte, Libya, Congo, Uganda and Chad signed an agreement calling for a cessation of hostilities, the deployment of an African peacekeeping force and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Chad subsequently began withdrawing its troops, and Uganda has since generally avoided fighting. Perhaps most importantly, on May 28, Rwanda declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities, a move which triggered a flurry of diplomatic activity and could help re-energize regional peace efforts. The United States subsequently pressed other parties to the conflict to welcome the Rwandan announcement and reciprocate by refraining from further offensive operations as well as to redouble their efforts to reach an agreement on a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign troops. A SADC summit is scheduled for late June in Lusaka to try yet again to reach a cease-fire agreement. Still, reports of Congolese bombing of Uvira and Bukavu, as well as unconfirmed reports that rebels shot down Zimbabwean aircraft May 29 or 30, and unconfirmed allegations of Rwandan shelling of allied positions since the cease-fire announcement, leave the true situation on the ground murky. While the warring parties may be more inclined to negotiate now than at any time since the war began, there are still numerous obstacles to a comprehensive and sustainable peace. Among them is the fact that the main rebel group -- the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) -- recently split over the question of whether to negotiate or seek a military victory. RCD hard-liners have associated themselves with neither the Sirte agreement nor the Rwandan declaration, although their ability to conduct major military operations without external support is uncertain. Implications The costs of the continuation of this conflict are potentially huge. It threatens to roll back recent economic and political gains across much of Africa. It constitutes a massive drain on resources urgently needed for development. Continued instability is scaring away foreign investment and could spark secondary economic and/or political crises from Zimbabwe to Uganda. Ethnic violence has been a perennial feature of recent conflicts in Central Africa, and this most recent Congo crisis is no exception. Thousands of innocent civilians have been killed in Congo. The Congo Government has actively armed and trained 10,000-15,000 Interahamwe militia, many of whom participated in the 1994 genocide. Historically, Congo has been at the heart of successive scrambles for Africa. Today, those with economic and political designs on the Congo come not from Europe but from within the African continent itself. A political vacuum in the heart of Africa is a perfect setting not only for various state and non-state actors to replenish themselves and rebuild strength, but an attractive venue for other groups with aims that directly threaten U.S. interests. Growing Libyan involvement in DROC may only be the forerunner of much more. Sudan's involvement is yet another example of that government's attempt to destabilize its neighbors, by using the cover of its support for the Congo to provide additional aid to insurgent groups in Uganda. The Congo war also contributes both to the intensity and possibly the duration of the Angolan civil war -- UNITA has found new allies and is gaining from divisions among states within the region. The conflict also has the potential to adversely affect Burundi's peace process. Finally, rearmed and retrained ex-FAR and Interahamwe are a tremendously destabilizing factor for the entire Great Lakes region. The threat of renewed genocide, therefore, remains real. U.S. and International Response Efforts to end the war began almost immediately after the conflict began in August. There have been dozens of meetings of regional leaders in various cities under different auspices. However, seldom did all necessary players participate. The rebels were excluded from all but one meeting. SADC has become the accepted vehicle for ending the conflict, with Zambian President Chiluba assuming the leading role. Mozambican President Chissano and Tanzanian President Mkapa are assisting President Chiluba, and the United Nations has recently appointed a special envoy, former Senegalese Foreign Minister Niasse, to determine how the U.N. might support regional efforts to broker a peace settlement. From the start of the Congo crisis, the U.S. has pursued an active diplomatic strategy in support of our objectives. Beginning last August, we have provided full support for the regional initiative taken by SADC and the OAU. Last fall, I traveled to seven of the nations involved in the conflict. Shortly thereafter, Rwanda acknowledged its presence in the Congo -- which eliminated one of the major obstacles to the peace process. Under Secretary of State Tom Pickering met with several leaders of countries involved in the conflict last September during the U.N. General Assembly, and visited Harare in February to underscore the important role Zimbabwe must play to end the conflict. During the U.S.-Africa Ministerial in March, I and others met with dozens of senior government officials from Angola, Zambia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, the Congo, Uganda and Chad to press specific proposals for achieving a negotiated settlement. Secretary Albright has personally and repeatedly underscored U.S. concerns in conversations and correspondence with President Kabila, President Museveni, United Nations Secretary-General Annan, OAU Secretary-General Salim Salim and other African leaders. And the President's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Howard Wolpe, has spent almost two weeks of every month since last summer shuttling between capitals to try to advance a cease-fire agreement that is acceptable to all sides. Most recently, ten days ago in Abuja, on the margins of the inauguration of the new civilian government in Nigeria, the U.S. delegation met with the presidents of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to urge progress in the wake of the Rwandan cease-fire declaration. U.S. Interests and Objectives Throughout, U.S. policy objectives in the Congo have been consistent and clear. We seek peace, prosperity, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights. We have affirmed our support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo. We have repeatedly condemned any violation of this fundamental principle of both the United Nations Charter and the Organization of African Unity. We have worked to counter those who would perpetuate genocide in the region. We have encouraged the establishment of an inclusive political transition that would end the cycle of violence and impunity; build respect for the rule of law and human rights; and create the conditions for lasting development and reconstruction. As a consequence, we have been committed to a policy of engagement in support of the Congolese people who suffered so much under Mobutu Sese Seko's tyranny. Our immediate objectives include: -- A peaceful, negotiated end of the war; -- Preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; -- The resolution of border security issues affecting the Congo and its neighboring states; -- Curbing ethnic strife and preventing the resurgence of genocide in the region; -- The institutionalization of democratic processes, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental human rights in the Congo, and indeed, across the region; -- The economic reconstruction and development of the country. While a comprehensive settlement comprising these elements is our ultimate objective, our immediate challenge is to set -- and achieve -- realistic intermediate targets that change the facts on the ground. Rwanda's acknowledgement of its presence in Congo, and its subsequent cessation of hostilities announcement, are two examples of such targets that have been met. We -- along with our African partners and other friends of Congo in the international community -- must work together to identify and bring about other steps to move the belligerents toward a comprehensive solution. We cannot lose sight of the continued need for a meaningful constructive role by the United Nations. In the medium to long term, it will be dangerous for Africa and for the world at large if the U.N. becomes marginalized from the management of crises. For this reason, we have been encouraged by the U.N. Secretary-General's appointment of Special Envoy Niasse, and have encouraged a very active engagement by the UNSYG [U.N. Secretary-General]. In the longer term, our objectives are equally clear. We seek to strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and democratization within all of the states of the region, so as to reduce the tensions and conflicts that fuel insurgent movements. In short, we seek stable, economically self-reliant and democratic nations with which we can work to address our mutual economic and security interests on the continent. A stable and democratic Congo can contribute powerfully to regional stability. Its economic promise is even greater, with enormous benefits for U.S. economic interests as well as for the African continent in general. However, Congo's potential can only be realized in the context of a negotiated cease-fire and comprehensive political settlement that takes account both of the legitimate concerns of Congo's neighbors and the internal political conditions that helped precipitate the crisis. For a resolution to be durable, any solution must also address the issue of ex-FAR, Interahamwe, UNITA and other non-state actors. We are encouraging the states in the region to implement a security compact to contain and halt the non-state [actors] immediately following a cease-fire. The formidable nature of the challenge these non-state actors pose will make the erection of the required security architecture a difficult undertaking. We stand ready to support the region in its efforts to develop such an agreement. Next Steps To summarize, any sustainable resolution of the DROC conflict will require successful implementation of these distinct, but related, processes: -- A cease-fire among the external parties, the Congo Government and the rebels. -- An open and inclusive internal political process that will credibly engage the government, rebels, the unarmed political opposition, and civil society. This process must lead to a transition to a democratic state respecting fundamental citizenship rights of all Congolese. -- The organization of a security compact among regional states to address the problem of the ex-Far/Interahamwe, UNITA and other non-state actors. In addition, a settlement may require the insertion of an international peacekeeping presence to monitor the cease-fire, eventual withdrawal of foreign troops and the exchange of prisoners, as well as lend confidence to the Congolese during the transition. Conclusion Let me conclude by underscoring our recognition of the fact that Africans themselves will plot their own destiny -- their own paths toward peace and stability. Neither the United States nor any external actor can wave a magic wand and resolve this conflict for the people of the Congo or for the region. The people and leaders in the region must do so for themselves. For our part, we will continue to do all we can to help. Mr. Chairman, all the African countries and the leaders of the Congo who have contributed to the current crisis stand at a perilous crossroads. They themselves must determine whether to continue on the present violent path to the detriment of their people or step away from military action and work in concert to find a viable diplomatic solution. We will continue to lend strong U.S. support to ongoing diplomatic initiatives to bring all sides to a peaceful settlement. These efforts are the only viable way to resolve the current crisis in Central Africa. I look forward to working with Members of this Subcommittee, as always, to do our utmost to help the countries and parties in the region to address the challenges before the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, more broadly, before Central and Southern Africa. Thank you. (END TEXT)
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