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23 October 1998

TRANSCRIPT: ALBRIGHT, BERGER, ROSS BRIEFING ON WYE OCT. 23

(Will permit start of permanent-status negotiations) (6140)
Washington -- Secretary of State Albright told reporters at the White
House Occtober 23 that the Wye River accord on Middle East peace "will
permit the launching of permanent-status negotiations .... and create
an environment in which the parties can ensure, by refraining from
unhelpful unilateral acts, that those negotiations succeed."
Albright said the Wye River Memorandum "recognizes the urgency posed
by the looming expiration of the interim period on the 4th of May next
year.
"The United States," she said, "hopes that the implementation of this
agreement will spur forward movement on the other tracks of the peace
process and lead to improved relations between Israel and all her Arab
neighbors.
"Today's ceremony," Albright said, "culminates almost a year and a
half of efforts to restore confidence and forward movement to the
peace process. It ends a dangerous impasse that has eroded trust and
stalled progress towards a broader peace."
The Secretary of State said the accord reached at Wye River "is based
on the principle of reciprocity and meets the essential requirements
of both the parties, including the further redeployment of Israeli
troops and unprecedented measures on security. To terrorists, it sends
an unmistakable signal that negotiations, not violence, produce
results.
"This agreement," she said, "will help make tangible the benefits of
peace for the Palestinian people through greater economic cooperation,
opening of the Gaza Airport, safe passage between the West Bank and
Gaza, and other commitments. The United States will lead a major donor
effort to help develop the Palestinian economy and in consultation
with Congress, will seek to increase our own economic assistance. We
will also help Israel defray the security-related costs of
implementing this agreement."
Following is the White House transcript:
(begin transcript)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
October 23, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, AND SPECIAL MIDDLE EAST COORDINATOR
DENNIS ROSS
The Briefing Room
6:25 P.M. EDT
BERGER: I would like to introduce the Secretary, who will conduct this
briefing on the events of the past several days. Let me say just a few
things. You've heard from the leaders in the signing ceremony
descriptions of President Clinton's activities and contributions over
the last nine days. I won't add to that except to say that having --
that watching it over this period, I can only describe it as dazzling.
But I think it is important to remember that the person who launched
this initiative, this American initiative, for breaking the logjam was
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 18 months ago. She has been the
engine that has kept this process going forward, not just in the ups
and downs over the last nine days, but the up and downs of the last 18
months. And she has brought to this a steel backbone, a steel-trap
mind, and a absolute determination that this will go forward. This is
a very tough person to say no to.
And I'm very pleased to introduce Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright.
ALBRIGHT: Thank you, Sandy. And having you as a partner in this has
been really terrific. I think that we've been able to accomplish a
lot, and there's a lot more to go. Thank you a lot.
Today's ceremony culminates almost a year and a half of efforts to
restore confidence and forward movement to the peace process. It ends
a dangerous impasse that has eroded trust and stalled progress towards
a broader peace. It is based on the principle of reciprocity and meets
the essential requirements of both the parties, including the further
redeployment of Israeli troops and unprecedented measures on security.
To terrorists, it sends an unmistakable signal that negotiations, not
violence, produce results.
This agreement will help make tangible the benefits of peace for the
Palestinian people through greater economic cooperation, opening of
the Gaza airport, safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and
other commitments.
The United States will lead a major donor effort to help develop the
Palestinian economy, and in consultation with Congress will seek to
increase our own economic assistance. We will also help Israel defray
the security-related costs of implementing this agreement.
The agreement will permit the launching of permanent status
negotiations, which President Clinton just made clear, and create an
environment in which the parties can ensure, by refraining from
unhelpful unilateral acts, that those negotiations succeed. And
it recognizes the urgency posed by the looming expiration of the
interim period on the 4th of May next year.
The United States hopes that the implementation of this agreement will
spur forward movement on the other tracks of the peace process and
lead to improved relations between Israel and all her Arab neighbors.
Now, the last days have been described as long and definitely
sometimes difficult. I am pleased to report to you that the peace
process is back on track, and we're here, but slightly diminished in
mental capacity, and will do my best here and then, of course, Dennis,
who is never diminished in mental capacity, indefatigable, will be
able to do more Q's and A's with you.
Q: Madam Secretary, this last day appeared to be the longest and most
difficult of them all. Why was that, from the U.S. standpoint? What
happened?
ALBRIGHT: Well, I think as a student and professor of negotiations, I
can tell you that it's kind of normal procedure that if you have
negotiations about a very complex and passionate subject and you're
trying to achieve something, there usually are, especially towards the
end, certain kinds of issues that come up, and I think it's kind of
normal, actually.
Q: Well, let me be more explicit, then. Was the Jonathan Pollard
matter on the table prior to early this morning, and if it was, what
happened? And if it wasn't, why did the Israelis claim that it was?
ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think for those of you that have
followed this is that previous prime ministers, Prime Minister Rabin,
for instance, had asked President Clinton about the Pollard case.
Prime Minister Netanyahu had asked before. He came and he, again, said
that this was an issue of some importance, and he asked the President
to look at it, and the President said that he would review it. It had
come up earlier, and it was -- that is the basis of what happened. And
as to why it particularly -- you know, I think it kind of was, as I
said towards the end, there were a bunch of issues.
Q: Well, apparently, it took up the last five or six hours of
negotiating, when everything else was already done.
ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that, again, as I said, it was an issue that
had come up. The President had said that he would, as he said here,
that he was committed to review it, and I think it was an issue that
came up and it has been dealt with.
Q: But what did that have to do with all these days of negotiations?
ALBRIGHT: Well, I think what happens, again, in negotiations is that
there are a variety of issues that come up, that become a part of the
discussion. And truly, in terms of somebody who was there for the
eight days, there were a number of times, there were lots of kind of
ups and downs in negotiations, bumps in the road, and frankly, very
much -- you expect a certain amount of things to be delayed or to have
some discussion about them.
Q: Madam Secretary, can you give us an idea of the size of the
economic package that you're talking about for the Israelis and
Palestinians? And as a second question, when do final status talks
begin?
ALBRIGHT: Well, let me say this, is that on the economic package, what
we are going to do is obviously consult with the parties -- the
Israelis and the Palestinians. As I said, the Israelis are concerned
about defraying some of the costs involved with the redeployment, and
the Palestinians need help in terms of their economy.
I was interested in hearing Chairman Arafat's remarks where he talked
about the various needs that they have -- in schools and clinics and
businesses. And so it's that kind of thing that we're going to be
looking at. And obviously, we're going to be consulting with Congress.
I can't give you a dollar figure at this point.
Q: Camp David was $5 billion a year forever. Can you indicate how much
less this is going to be?
ALBRIGHT: I don't have those figures. I'm not prepared to give those
at this stage. I'm just telling you kind of where they are.
In terms of final status, the President said that we would begin them,
and they will begin when this agreement comes into force, which is 10
days from signing.
Q: Did President Clinton promise to free Jonathan Pollard and then
renege on that promise in the face of domestic outrage?
ALBRIGHT: Absolutely not. I said what happened, and I'll repeat it,
which is that Prime Minister Netanyahu, as in previous -- previous
Prime Ministers have asked -- this is a case of some importance --
asked the President to look at it. The President said he would review
it. And that's --
Q: The President didn't change his tune even in degree, he didn't say,
I'll look at it, and then pull back in any degree at all?
ALBRIGHT:  No.  No.
Q:  In 10 days from now, was this the signing, or is there a --
ALBRIGHT:  That's the beginning -- yes.
Q:  Or is there another signing.  Ten days from now?
ALBRIGHT: Ten days from now, we are going to begin. Now, obviously,
what I think we need to also focus on, this agreement has a number of
very important aspects to it, but implementation of this agreement is
important. So we are going to be moving on final status and focusing
on implementing this agreement.
Q: Could you give your interpretation of the timeout? What
specifically are you expecting the parties not to do?
ALBRIGHT: We have a section in this on unilateral actions. And we
basically -- and I'll read you the language, but then explain it to
you -- "recognizing the necessity to create a positive environment for
the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any steps that
will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in
accordance with the interim agreement."
So what the whole purpose of unilateral action -- the section on
unilateral action is that we hope very much that the momentum from
this agreement and the launching of the permanent status talks will
create a positive environment, and we hope that various actions,
either actions or statements, would not undermine or detract from this
positive environment.
Q: But it sounds like the definition is a little bit elastic. I just
wondered if you --
ALBRIGHT: No, I think I'd like to leave it with the fact that we hope
very much that -- I mean, basically, the permanent status talks are
the ones that are dealing with some of the most difficult issues,
those that have to do with boundaries and settlements and refugees and
Jerusalem. And I think that it's very -- what we're saying is that
actions or statements that undermine what I think is really a new
spirit are not taken, so that we can move on to really do the serious
business of implementing this agreement and moving along parallel with
the --
Q:  Does this cover next May 4th?
ALBRIGHT: Well, we have -- Dennis, you might want to answer how this
-- let me let Dennis answer some of the more specific questions on
that. Let me just take one more here.
Q: Do you see any enemy of this peace accord in the area? Do you have
support from the rest of the Arabic world?
ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that what I have found is that peace often
brings out those who don't have a stake in peace. And what we're
trying to do is to broaden the circle of those that have a stake in
the peace process and understand that they can do much better if they
are a part of a developing economy and in relations between Israel and
the Palestinian people. What we're trying to do is to make sure that
those who do not want peace don't have oxygen, which will kind of
initiate problems.
Q: How much is the U.S. involved in this agreement? Unless there is
something wrong -- how are you going to intervene?
ALBRIGHT: Well, there are a series of committees that have been
established, some bilateral, some trilateral. The security aspects of
this are going to be handled by professionals who have already been
cooperating and are going to be cooperating more. I hope you'll
understand that I'm -- pardon?
Q: What happens about changing the facts of land? Do you mean that
Israel has agreed to stop building --
ALBRIGHT: I have said that basically we have said that we think that
unilateral actions or statements are not helpful to this environment.
Q: Just in general terms, could you give us a sense of the
relationship among the three principal participants?
ALBRIGHT: Actually, I'm glad I stayed for that question, because what
I think was interesting is, one of the things that has troubled me
during the last 18 months was that the interim accord was based on a
premise that the parties would work together and get to know each
other, and then be able to work with what clearly are the most
complicated issues that have been left for permanent status talks.
And what happened, instead, was that while they were looking at issues
like the airport and safe passage and various things, they, in fact,
got so that they were working with each other less and less, and in
fact, were not working with each other. What I think has changed --
and I think that it began to change, frankly, in September when we
were in New York at the General Assembly session, was again, when I
brought the leaders together for their first trilateral in over a
year, that they began to work together again.
What I think really was quite remarkable at Wye -- and again, it's one
of those things that happens in negotiations -- while there is very
tough talk during the negotiating sessions, in the down time, or when
people are in different committees, people ate together and did a lot
of talking together. When there would be meetings of one group, then
the others would get together. So it is my hope -- and I think you saw
some of that feeling up on the stage today -- that those bonds are
being rebuilt, because they are essential.
These people have to work together to try to get the permanent status
and they have to work together to do the implementation of this. The
implementation of this agreement is going to require working together,
so I'm pleased with that.
I hope you will excuse me.
Q: Wouldn't it be liberating to admit that the Israelis sandbagged you
with the Pollard question?
Q:  Madam Secretary, what other countries can learn from --
Q: Couldn't have done it without you. Give you the credit. You don't
have white hair. What does he mean, white hair?
Q:  You look as good as you always have.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Thank you. Not bad for someone who hasn't slept in 48
hours.
Q: The Secretary, in the warm afterglow of this moment, seemed
reticent to talk about this Pollard example. But I mean, you did have
-- you had the President's spokesman coming out and saying that the
Israelis were being false and inaccurate about what they were saying
about what the American President had agreed to. So are we supposed to
say now that we trust their pronouncements? I mean, how do you read
this?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, I think I would echo what the Secretary said
before: In every negotiation, you're going to have ups and downs. And
especially when you come to the end game of the negotiation and
decisions are required. It's not surprising for the parties to begin
to evaluate everything that they're about to decide, and they sort of
weigh it in the context of what's required, and it's not surprising
sometimes other issues get introduced.
Q:  So that's when they try to roll you, is that it?
Q: It sounds like it was a form of blackmail, though. You know, you're
negotiating these delicate things, and then all of a sudden, Pollard
gets thrown in.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, that was an issue that was raised, and in the
end, we responded and you heard what the President's going to do. The
President said there's going to be a review.
Q: Are people supposed to be surprised if Mr. Pollard is, in fact,
released in the next two or three, four months? People will say, "My
goodness." What about that?
AMBASSADOR ROSS:  Well, all I know is that there is a review.
Q:  Right.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: There will be a review. I don't know how long it will
take, but there will be a review.
Q:  And he'll be released.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I would not say that because I would be prejudging
their review.
Q:  What are these extra prisoners being held in Israel for, then?
AMBASSADOR ROSS:  I'm not aware of extra prisoners being withheld.
Q: And you maintain that they're not trying to roll you, they weren't
trying to roll you when they did that?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I don't evaluate anybody's particular motives at a
given time when we're negotiating, I'm focused on how we solve
problems.
Q: Dennis, can you talk a bit about the unilateral actions? Does this
prohibit all settlement building? Does it prohibit new settlements?
What does it do about next May 4th, that sort of thing?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: If you look at the language, you'll see the language
on this section is really rather general, because we made a basic
judgment that the best thing that we could do is focus on how to work
with both sides in a vigilant way to try to prevent or at least avoid
the kinds of steps that would undercut the climate and make
negotiation permanent status far more difficult.
We are dealing, or about to deal with the most difficult issues in the
process -- the issues that were reserved for the end of the process,
but in fact, reserved for a three-year period, not for a period that
we're now facing. So if you're going to have any chance of really
breaking through, you've got to change the way business is done,
you've got to change the climate in which it is done, there's got to
be a transformation psychologically, and a whole lot more trust than
we've seen. The kinds of steps that put one side or the other in the
corner are exactly the kind of things you need to avoid. And that's
what we're going to do.
Q: I understand the rationale for it, but I was wondering what is it
that it prohibits.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I wouldn't say that if you look at it, we're focused
on being able to prohibit actions. We didn't try to adopt a position
that would prohibit actions, but we are trying to adopt the position
creates a certain greater leverage against the kinds of actions that,
in fact, would be detrimental to the kind of climate we need to build.
Q: -- the text of the full agreement? Can we have the text of the full
agreement soon?
AMBASSADOR ROSS:  Yes, it will be issued.
Q: What you said, does it mean that if there is any more building now,
it could be a violation for the agreement signed today?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: I think that, again, what I've just said is that we
are focused on actions that are going to undercut or spoil the kind of
climate that one needs.
Q: Given what you've just said, Dennis, about the rushed timetable you
face, wouldn't you anticipate President Clinton traveling to the
Middle East as he said he would do? And when do you anticipate this
next summit taking place, which he alluded to as well?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, there will be at least two periods in which he
will go. One is related to what's in the text, and that relates to the
whole sequence of moves on the Palestinian side with regard to
ratifying the letter that was sent by the Chairman to the President in
January.
Now, the Executive Committee will act within two weeks after entering
into force. The Palestinian Central Council will act within four
weeks. And then at six weeks, there will be a gathering that will
involve an invitation to all the members of the PNC and other groups
as well, such as the PCC and the Legislative Council. And President
Clinton will go, and he will address that group. That's at six weeks.
We start in 10 days. Go 10 days from today, and that's when you enter
into force. That, in effect, is day one.
Q:  Got it.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: So six weeks from then, the President would make such
a trip.
Q:  And what about the summit?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: That will come at an appropriate time. And what the
President said is that, in fact, he would seek, in fact, to try to
have such a summit to try to bring the permanent status negotiations
to a close.
Q: And when you said that he would travel twice, I take that to mean
that the next summit would not be here, but rather would be someplace
in the Middle East.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, I may have misspoken by saying traveling twice.
What I meant is that there will be -- he will travel once. I mean the
fact that I haven't slept in 48 hours means that there's a chance that
I might not have everything precisely right.
Q: I'm confused. In 10 days, and then do two weeks go after that, and
then do six weeks go after that?
Q:  No, 10 days plus six weeks.
AMBASSADOR ROSS:  In 10 days, you start counting.
Q:  It would be December 14th --
Q: December 14th, my birthday -- no, it's not my birthday. But is he
actually going in December? I just said early next year
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, try back -- go back to December 14th, and
you'll be on the mark. I guess. I mean, you can't --
Q: Dennis, I still don't fully understand the Pollard case. Could you
more fully characterize when it came up? Did it come up this morning
as a last-minute sweetener to seal the deal, and is that what delayed
this by four hours today? Or was it on the table earlier in the
negotiations? Give us a better sense of how it all played out.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: As the Secretary said earlier, this Prime Minister
and his predecessors have raised the Pollard case, and the Pollard
case was raised by Prime Minister Netanyahu while we were at Wye, and
it became, obviously, a snag today. In the end, the President agreed
that -- in response to the Prime Minister's request -- to review the
case, but that's all he did. He agreed only to review the case.
Q:  Was that before this morning?
AMBASSADOR ROSS:  Yes, it had been raised before this morning.
Q: Dennis, did Chairman Arafat commit himself not to declare a state
by next May?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: He did not make such a commitment; and in fact, that
wasn't our focus. Our focus was first to try to resolve all the
interim committee issues and the other issues that were left over from
the interim agreement, which, in fact, we did. We did better in this
regard than we thought.
In addition to resolving the further redeployment and the first and
second phase and setting up a committee on the third phase, we settled
the airport, we are very close to an agreement on safe passage. In
fact, in the agreement itself, it is expected that the agreement on
safe passage will be achieved within a week of the entry into force.
There is a timetable for the port, which includes a committee starting
next week; and within 60 days, achieving a protocol on the port which
would allow construction to begin once that protocol had been
achieved.
There are a whole series of other economic issues and civil affairs
issues that are part of an ongoing process of committees. But in
truth, what we really did is try to wrap up the interim period -- not
so much the interim period, but the interim issues so that we could
really get into permanent status in a way that would not be diverted
to other issues.
Q: Could you tell us, other than the Pollard case, what the turning
point of these negotiations were? They dragged on a lot longer than
they were supposed to. When did you know, when did you think, what was
the thing that -- the catalyst that brought it together, other than
the last-minute snag you were describing?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, I think that when you get involved in a
negotiation like this -- especially when you've had 18 months of
stalemate -- and we've had countless trips to the region --in fact,
this is not going to be a briefing that ends with announcing that I'm
going to the area; this is going to be a briefing that ends with my
announcing I'm going home to bed.
When you've had all that and you also have discussed all the issues --
and we had, in fact, gotten into a fair amount of drafting prior to
going to Wye -- frequently, when you get in with the leaders in this
kind of an environment, everybody wants to sort of see how everything
fits together. So issues are no longer looked at in isolation, which
is, in fact, one of the things we wanted; because we came to the
conclusion that if we did not bring the leaders together in a
concentrated way, we simply couldn't pull together the further
redeployment, all the aspects of security, all the various interim
issues.
There was simply no way to resolve everything because we were too
bogged down in individual issues. The process of bringing everything
together also began to produce rather different perspectives from the
two sides about what kinds of packages could produce outcomes.
I think that -- it's hard to remember because the days really merge. I
don't think I've been to bed since Wednesday. I think three days ago,
the President in one meeting sat with the leaders and he did an
inventory of all the issues and said, let's take a look and let's
summarize exactly where we are on each issue so that we have a very
good feel for what the nature of the gaps are; and instead of trying
to put everything together in one package, let's see if in that
summary we can see if there are groups of issues that we can settle
now and then reserve the harder issues for later. I think that was
probably a key point that really gave us a push.
I would also say two days ago, there was a three-on-three meeting
between the two sides, actually without us. I think that was one of
the better meetings that took place, principally because we had set up
the agenda for the meeting. We had isolated the issues we felt that
needed to be addressed. And they made a fair amount of headway in that
meeting.
It is interesting that in those kinds of meetings, especially after
having long periods of not having such intensive discussions, what you
begin to see is not so much the issue of trust suddenly emerging, but
the beginnings of relationships.
I think it's important to remember that many people tend to idealize
the relationship that existed between the last Israeli GOvernment and
the Palestinians; and they tend to forget that it took a while to
build that kind of relationship.
These kinds of relationships are forged through crucibles of pretty
hard times. When this government came in, it inherited a relationship;
it didn't really develop a relationship. What has happened, I think,
in the last month -- and especially now, with eight days of very
concentrated work together -- is that we begin to see a very different
kind of interaction.
I think the meeting two days ago after the President's meeting of
three days ago really got us on a track that tended to move us towards
a conclusion. I would say that 48 hours ago, I knew we would reach an
agreement. Prior to that time, I wasn't certain.
Q: Can you give us an example of what you just spoke about? I mean,
what do you see in the interactions between Arafat and NEtanyahu that
tells you that the general statement that you just made is true?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, I think the main thing is the quality of the
discussion and the depth of it. In the past when they would have
discussions, if they would go over an issue, sometimes they would
simply lay out positions that just bore no relationship to each other.
And rather than engaging in a way, they would begin to find points of
convergence or think about how you solve problems more effectively,
they'd just kind of go on to the next issue.
What was different this time, even though I have been in almost all
the previous meetings, and some of them had been good, what was
different this time is, they went into meetings where they had very
different positions, but they actually made efforts to respond to the
other. And in fact, they tried out ideas on the other. That really was
different, I think, than we'd seen before.
Q:  Does this include Foreign Minister Sharon in terms of --
AMBASSADOR ROSS:  Well, he was in meetings with Chairman Arafat.
Q:  He was sleeping in the ceremony.
AMBASSADOR ROSS:  Pardon me?
Q:  He was napping in the ceremony.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, I think -- we've been through a pretty intense
period.
Q: Is there any plans now after you rest to start the process on the
other two tracks -- the Syrian and the Lebanese?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, I think we have for some time made it very
clear that we want to be able to work on all the tracks. We did put a
special emphasis on this track because our feeling is that if this
track is moving, it creates a basis that affects a whole area. And
also, we understood that when this track breaks down, it has a flip
side, too, which we've also seen.
The consequences of stalemate between Israelis and Palestinians has
pretty negative consequences for the pursuit of peace in the region as
a whole.
So I think we will try to make a move on the others, even while at the
same time we will be involved, as the Secretary said, in the process
of implementing this agreement, as well as working with the parties on
permanent status. Although, I think we would truly achieve one of our
objectives, in terms of making it more likely that they will reach
agreement, if our role doesn't have to be so consistently one of
mediation.
Facilitation is a whole lot more productive in terms of reaching
agreements where the parties themselves solve problems together. We've
had to do a lot of mediation because they weren't doing any of that on
their own. I think that's now changed, and one of the positive things
that comes out of the last eight days is just how intensive their own
discussions have been.
And I would even say one other thing. In the past there was a
brittleness to some of the discussions, in the sense that if there was
a disagreement, that was it, the talk really wouldn't go on much
longer. But here, there were disagreements, and at times, we had
--while I think there was a real constructive atmosphere in terms of
how people dealt with each other, there were points of some friction
in terms of disagreements. And, yet, that never became something that
was a show-stopper; on the contrary, it tended to be a catalyst for
efforts to continue discussions and try to find ways to solve
problems. And that, I think, was qualitatively different than what
I've seen before.
Q: My understanding is that there's various side letters of
understanding that supplement the written agreement. Are those going
to be released, and can you describe what they're about?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: There are, in -- we have, with both sides, there's
really only a very limited amount of that. And they're really geared
more towards explanation or amplification of a particular point. I
would downplay that, because there's not a lot of that. The thrust of
this agreement, when you get it, when you see the text, it's there in
the text.
Q: I may have missed this, but how much is the financial aid, the
additional financial aid to both parties?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: We have made no decisions on that. We have made it
clear to both sides that we're prepared to talk with them about what
would be -- packages of assistance that could be helpful to them. The
Israelis will incur costs of implementation; the Palestinians clearly
need help when it comes to economic development.
Q: That's what it's for. In other words, this is not additional aid in
any of the other areas in which we aid the groups -- it's for the
implementation of this agreement.
AMBASSADOR ROSS: In the case of the Israelis, it's designed, clearly,
to help meet the costs of implementation. In the case of the
Palestinians, it would be an effort to increase the level of
assistance; it goes to dealing with what are pretty profound needs of
economic development.
Q:  Do you have a range on that?
Q:  -- solve the issue about the third withdrawal --
AMBASSADOR ROSS: As you'll see in the text, there is a committee that
will deal with that issue.
Q: Is this agreement now between the Israelis and Palestinians
regarding changing the Palestinian government, is it the Central
Council or the National Council? And President Clinton said members of
the National Council, which means not all of them, right?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: There will be an invitation to all of them. There is
a sequence. In deference to you, Sam, if you go 10 days from today,
two weeks after that, the Executive Committee will ratify, the
Executive Committee of the PLO, will ratify the letter that was sent
to President Clinton that specified the provisions of the covenant
that had been cancelled.
At week four, the Palestinian Central Council will also ratify that.
At week six, there will be a gathering which President Clinton will
speak to in which all the members of the PNC will be invited.
Q:  December 14th?
Q:  -- accused by Israel of being terrorists?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: All the members of the PNC will be invited, and the
legislative council, the PCC, the Executive Committee and other
leading officials will also be invited to that.
Q: Have the Palestinians seen or offered any maps for the land that
the Israelis are pulling back from, and why do you call it a
memorandum instead of agreement or accord?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: Well, it is -- we were thinking about how we could
come up with what would be an appropriate title, and since it's an
American -- it was based on an American initiative, and it was pretty
much reflective of an American draft, we decided to make it a
memorandum that the parties would be agreeing to.
Q:  What role was the King helpful in?
AMBASSADOR ROSS: He was extremely helpful. There were two
interventions by him during the course of the last several days, and,
frankly, every time he came in, he really had a profound effect on
both sides -- not just the leaders, but the parties. I mean, he came
in one night around 10:00 p.m. when we were eating, and all I can tell
you is that in the aftermath of that meeting, there was not only a
kind of poignancy, there was also almost an inspiration. There was
kind of renewed sense of dedication that we really had to overcome
some of these problems.
Thank you very much.
(end transcript)