[Senate Hearing 113-421]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-421
THE TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 10, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Corker, Hon, Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 2
Dobbins, Ambassador James, Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC......... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 41
Letter and GAO Report Submitted to Supplement Answers to
Questions No. 4 and No. 5.................................. 46
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Sampler, Donald L., Jr., Acting Assistant to the Administrator,
Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 50
Graphs Submitted to Supplement Answer to Question No. 5...... 60
(iii)
THE TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Shaheen, Kaine, Markey, Corker,
Rubio, Johnson, Flake, and McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
We thank our witnesses, Ambassador Dobbins and Acting
Assistant Administrator Donald Sampler, for being here.
In July, this committee met to assess the transition in
Afghanistan. At the time, Mr. Ambassador, you had been on the
job only 2 months. And, in looking over the transcript from
that hearing, I was struck by how the issues remain virtually
the same, 5 months later. I will look forward to hearing what
both of you believe we should expect in the coming months, as
well as your perspective on some broader issues I have with
respect to the State Department and USAID's planning for a
post-2014 presence.
Clearly, this is a critical time in the transition process.
President Karzai has, in my view, unwisely decided to gamble
with the lives of millions of his citizens with a delay in
signing the Bilateral Security Agreement, testing our patience
and threatening the progress made by so many Afghans, in
partnership with the international community, since 2001. And I
believe this brinksmanship is unwarranted and, frankly,
insulting to the sacrifices made by the United States military
and taxpayers, and it is not in Afghanistan's best interests.
But, I do not think anyone should take my word for it. Ask
the thousands of Afghans who participated in the Loya Jirga
last month and overwhelmingly called for Afghanistan to sign
the BSA. Ask leaders in the region who have called upon
Afghanistan to sign. Ask Afghan civil society leaders, who,
without a smooth and stable transition, stand to lose ground
gained over the past decade. And ask the women of Afghanistan,
who stand to lose the most if Afghanistan falls victim to the
kind of violence we saw in the 1990s.
Any further delay will have real implications on the
ground. First, every day that passes makes it more difficult to
plan militarily. Second, the longer the delay, the more players
in Afghanistan and across the region will hedge their bets,
leading good people to leave Afghanistan and taking needed
capital with them.
Simply put, at some point the United States has to ask if
we should let our long-term interests and our substantial
investments in Afghanistan be determined by a lame-duck
President.
If we are not able to finalize the Bilateral Security
Agreement, the results are clear: all United States troops
would have to leave the country, support in Congress for
appropriations for the Afghan military and development efforts
will diminish, and we will not be able to support the Afghan
military in any significant way, or be able to provide
development assistance at the same levels.
Afghans seem to understand this. It is unfortunate that
President Karzai does not, though, I note with interest a
recent article that says that President Karzai agreed on a
cooperation pact with Iran on Sunday, while continuing to
resist signing a long-term security agreement with the United
States. It is pretty amazing to me. He has enough time and
effort to strike an agreement with Iran, but not with the
country that has shed blood and national treasure to bring it
to the point in which it is today.
Let me reiterate, finally, that the United States has no
intention in interfering in the election process. The choice of
President and provincial officials will rest with the Afghan
people. But, the future of international assistance will depend
upon the integrity of the process. We have seen some progress
with respect to the election preparations, but I am still
concerned about the security situation. We know that hundreds
of polling places will not be able to open. Many are in areas
too dangerous for domestic and international observation.
I am also deeply concerned about the disenfranchisement of
women, especially in rural areas, where it has been difficult
to recruit Afghan women to serve in security roles at polling
stations.
It is also clear that President Karzai's behavior makes it
difficult to plan our diplomatic and development efforts. I
look forward to our witnesses providing the committee with a
better understanding of the administration's planning for the
State Department and USAID's footprint, post-2014.
Having laid out those broad parameters, let me thank you
both for being here. I look forward to our discussion.
And, with that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Corker, for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I do not know
the outcome of today's meeting exactly, in light of what is
happening in Afghanistan, but I would like to make three brief
points, and certainly look forward to hearing your testimony.
I think that you know where we are today in this bilateral
agreement, we certainly have a President of a country that is
really not speaking for its citizens. And I think everyone
understands that. And all of us have had encounters with Karzai
and understand the irrationality that comes with most dealings
with him. So, I think, as I talk to troops in Tennessee, that
are getting ready to be there in February, and they are sort of
asking, ``Why would we go to a country that has a President who
is dealing with us this way? Why would we do that?'' And, of
course, my explanation is, again, ``He is not speaking for
Afghanistan, and we have got to look to the longer view and the
Afghan people, and not to one individual that is somehow trying
to find his place in history.''
Secondly, I would love to hear--I know that, when
Ambassador Dobbins was in a most recent classified setting, we
thought we were maybe a couple of days away from something
happening, and I know that everyone shared that view, and that
is not where we are--but, I would love to hear your assessment
as to how this uncertainty is affecting things inside the
country, economically, how it is affecting business decisions,
how it is affecting the ingress and egress of citizens there,
and how it is going to affect the political circumstances
between now and the proposed election in April.
And then, lastly, I know that a number of us who were at
the Munich Security Conference last year--it was almost 11
months ago--our NATO allies were wanting to know, How are they
going to provision troops? How many folks? There are some
things that I know the administration can and should be
communicating to our NATO allies. And I do not know if you want
to--especially Ambassador Dobbins--shed any light on the
conversations that are occurring, relative to if we get this
bilateral agreement in place, you know, how those
communications are going, and are we still going to be in a
position to be appropriately ready when that time comes.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our
witnesses, and thank them for being here.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Let us turn to Ambassador Dobbins, who is the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Department
of State, and Mr. Sampler, who is the Acting Assistant to the
Administrator for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan
Affairs for USAID.
Your full statements will be included in the record. I
would urge you to summarize your statements in about 5 minutes
or so, so we can have a dialogue with you.
And, Ambassador Dobbins, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Dobbins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Corker, Senator Kaine.
My longer statement does cover a range of issues, but I do
want to concentrate on the one that both of you have raised,
which is the fate of the BSA and the consequences for our and
the international community's relations with Afghanistan.
As you noted, the Loya Jirga, which was assembled by
President Karzai, had 2,500 Afghan leaders from across the
country, it strongly endorsed this agreement, and it urged
President Karzai to conclude it by the end of the year. One
member of the Loya Jirga actually told me that, of the 2,500
people, only 25 spoke out against the agreement, which would be
a pretty startling majority.
The United States certainly agrees with the Afghan people.
Concluding the BSA will send an important signal to the people
of Afghanistan, to the Taliban, to our allies and partners, and
to the region. For the Afghan people, it will reduce anxiety
and uncertainty about the future. A signed BSA will tell the
Taliban, who may think that the end of 2014 means the end of
international support, that their only path to peace is ending
violence, breaking ties with al-Qaeda, and accepting the Afghan
Constitution. A signed BSA will ensure the region that the
United States will remain engaged, as will its allies, and that
we are not going to abandon Afghanistan, as we did once before,
to our regret, in 1989.
To our NATO allies and other international partners, a BSA
will open the door to concluding a NATO agreement of comparable
status of forces and allow them to begin planning for their
2015 presence.
For all these reasons, the administration is committed to
expeditious signature of this agreement. Delaying signature is
in no one's interest, as both of you have stressed. Delay would
add another element of uncertainty as the Afghans prepare for
their elections. For the United States and our NATO allies, it
would mean the lack of clarity about our own presence in 2015.
That, in turn, would jeopardize the fulfillment of pledges of
assistance that NATO and other countries have made in Chicago
and Tokyo.
As Ambassador Rice made clear during her recent visit to
Kabul, although it is not our preference, without a prompt
signature of this agreement, we will have no choice but to
initiate planning for a 2014--post-2014 future in which there
would be no United States or NATO troops in Afghanistan.
Let me make clear, however, that plans are not decisions,
and assure you that we are not about to decide to abandon all
that we and the Afghan people have achieved over the last 12
years. Based on the results of the Loya Jirga, expressions of
public opinion throughout the country, and discussions
throughout my own visit to Kabul last week, I do not believe
that there can be any serious doubt that the Afghan people want
the United States and NATO forces to stay, and recognize that
the Bilateral Security Agreement is a necessary prerequisite.
The BSA is also the keystone of a much wider international
commitment involving over 70 countries ready to provide
economic and security assistance to Afghanistan beyond 2015.
Afghanistan's regional neighbors, with the exception of Iran,
also understand the importance of the BSA. I understand that
President Putin of Russia, President Xi of China, Prime
Minister Singh of India, and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan
have also personally urged President Karzai to conclude this
agreement. Now, as you know, several of these leaders are no
fans of an American military presence in Central Asia, but they
all seem to recognize that, without continued international
military and economic support, Afghanistan risks falling back
into civil war, with the attendant rise in extremist groups,
outflow of refugees, and disruptions in commerce that would
threaten the region as a whole. Given this coincidence of
Afghan public and regional governmental opinion, I see little
chance that the BSA will not be eventually concluded.
Awaiting the arrival of the next Afghan President to do so,
however, will impose large and unnecessary costs on the Afghan
people. Already, the anxiety caused by President Karzai's
refusal to heed the advice of the Loya Jirga is having such an
effect. While in Kabul last week, I learned, from the World
Bank and other sources, that the Afghan currency is slipping in
value, inflation is increasing, capital fleeing, property
values dropping. Probably for the first time since 2001, the
outflow of Afghan population exceeds the return of refugees.
The longer this uncertainty about the future international
commitment to Afghanistan continues, the more anxiety will
increase, potentially dominating the upcoming Presidential
elections, threatening to turn these into a polarizing, rather
than a unifying, experience in the country.
Prolonged uncertainty over the BSA will also erode larger
international support for Afghanistan. At Tokyo in July 2012,
and in Chicago in May of that year, the international community
pledged billions in support of the Afghan security forces and
the Afghan economy beyond 2014. As in the United States, the
fulfillment of these pledges is dependent on public support and
parliamentary approval. Prolonged delay in concluding the BSA,
and the also required NATO equivalent agreement, can only
diminish the prospect that these pledges will be fully met.
So, just to conclude, there, really, I have no doubt that
the BSA ultimately will be concluded. I am concerned about the
damage and the costs which a prolonged delay will create. I
cannot predict with any certainty when it is going to be
signed. I think there is some prospect that it could still be
signed this year. But, you know, given my own discussions with
the President last week, I am simply not in a position to
provide you any assurances on that. It certainly continues to
be our objective, and we are nowhere near a decision that would
involve our departing Afghanistan altogether.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador James F. Dobbins
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
transition in Afghanistan.
As all of you know, the U.S. role in the latest chapter of
Afghanistan's history began on September 11, 2001. Within a month, U.S.
forces were in Afghanistan in pursuit of the al-Qaeda terrorists who
planned the attacks and the regime that had given them sanctuary. That
military involvement has now lasted more than a decade and has expanded
to a NATO-led international coalition of 49 nations. The military
campaign has been accompanied by a truly extraordinary international
civilian campaign to help heal the scars of decades of war and years of
life under a system of government that made the cruel commonplace and
to ensure that such a government can never again return, to provide
shelter to those who would threaten American citizens, interests, or
allies.
From the beginning, we have made clear that our role in Afghanistan
and our presence there cannot be open ended. It has always been the aim
of U.S. policy to strengthen Afghan institutions so that the Afghan
Government and people can provide for their own security, grow their
own economy, and manage their own internal and external affairs. The
President has spoken of these three transitions: security, economic,
and political. The underlying element of all three has been a gradual
and responsible effort to help Afghans recover from decades of conflict
and Taliban rule that damaged or destroyed nearly every institution in
the country.
A stable, democratic, and secure Afghanistan is a U.S. national
interest; it will be a bulwark against al-Qaeda and other dangerous
extremist groups and a partner in the effort to prevent those groups
from using Afghanistan to plan and launch attacks against our people
and our allies. And while Afghanistan still faces significant
challenges, I can say with the perspective of having first led U.S.
diplomatic efforts on Afghanistan 12 years ago, that we are closer than
ever to achieving this goal. I'd like to spend a few minutes reviewing
our efforts and the progress Afghanistan is making.
security transition and partnership
The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), signed by
President Obama and President Karzai in May 2012, codified the terms of
our partnership after 2014. It looked ahead to a Transformation Decade
of cooperation, as the Afghans continued to strengthen their
institutions, improve governance, and stabilize their economy. While
making clear that the United States does not seek permanent bases in
Afghanistan or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan's neighbors,
the SPA included a provision to negotiate a Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) between the two countries which would govern future
security cooperation.
After a year of negotiations to conclude the text, that agreement
was submitted 2 weeks ago to a Loya Jirga, a traditional gathering of
2,500 Afghan leaders from all parts of the country. After 3 days of
debate, the Loya Jirga overwhelmingly endorsed the BSA as written and
urged President Karzai to sign it before the end of the year. This
decision underscores the clear and strong desire of the Afghan people
to continue their partnership with the United States and the
international community and their determination to move forward, away
from the Taliban past.
The United States agrees with the Afghan people. Signing the BSA
promptly is the path to a partnership in support of Afghan efforts to
achieve lasting peace, security, and development. It will send an
important signal to the people of Afghanistan, to the Taliban, to our
allies and partners, and to the region. For the Afghan people, it will
reduce anxiety and uncertainty about the future, allowing them to
concentrate on the upcoming elections and to invest with confidence in
their own economy. A signed BSA will tell the Taliban, who may think
that the end of 2014 means the end of international support for
Afghanistan, that their only path to peace is by ending violence,
breaking ties with al-Qaeda and accepting the Afghan Constitution,
including its protections for women and minorities. A signed BSA will
assure the region that the United States will remain engaged there and
not abandon Afghanistan as we did in 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal.
To our NATO allies and other international partners, a signed BSA will
open the door for NATO to begin negotiations on the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) with Afghanistan that will cover its forces
participating in the train, advise, and assist mission.
For all of these reasons, the administration is committed to
expeditious signature of the BSA. Delaying signature is in no one's
interest. Delay would add another element of uncertainty as Afghans
prepare for the April, 2014 election to choose President Karzai's
successor. For the United States and our NATO allies, delay means a
lack of clarity needed to plan for a post-2014 military presence. That,
in turn, would jeopardize fulfillment of the pledges of assistance that
NATO and other countries made at the Chicago and Tokyo conferences in
2012. As Ambassador Rice made clear in her recent visit to Kabul,
although it is not our preference, without a prompt signature we will
have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 future in which
there would be no U.S. or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan.
Let me make clear, however, that plans are not decisions, and
assure you that we are not about to decide to abandon all we and the
Afghan people have achieved over the past 12 years. Based on the
results of the Loya Jirga, expressions of public opinion throughout the
country and discussions throughout my own visit to Kabul last week, I
don't believe that there can be any serious doubt that the Afghan
people want American and NATO forces to stay and recognize that the BSA
is a necessary prerequisite. The BSA is also the keystone of a much
wider international commitment, involving over 70 countries ready to
provide economic and security assistance to Afghanistan beyond 2015.
Afghanistan's regional neighbors, with the exception of Iran, also
understand the importance of the BSA. President Putin of Russia,
President Xi of China, Prime Minister Singh of India, and Prime
Minister Sharif of Pakistan have all personally urged President Karzai
to conclude the BSA in recent weeks. Several of these leaders are no
fans of an American military presence in Central Asia, but all
recognize that without continued international military and economic
support, Afghanistan risks falling back into civil war, with the
attendant rise in extremist groups, outflow of refugees and disruptions
in commerce that would threaten the region as a whole.
Given this coincidence of Afghan public and regional governmental
opinion, I see little chance that the BSA will not be eventually
concluded. Awaiting the arrival of the next Afghan President to do so,
however, will impose large and unnecessary costs on the Afghan people.
Already the anxiety caused by President Karzai's refusal to heed the
advice of the Loya Jirga is having that effect. While in Kabul last
week I learned from the World Bank and other sources that the Afghan
currency is slipping in value, inflation increasing, capital fleeing,
and property values dropping. Probably for the first time since 2001
the outflow of population exceeds the return of refugees. The longer
this uncertainty about the future international commitment to
Afghanistan continues, the more anxiety will increase, potentially
dominating the upcoming Presidential elections, threatening to turn
these into a polarizing rather than unifying experience for the
country.
Prolonged uncertainty over the BSA will also erode larger
international support for Afghanistan. At Tokyo in July 2012 and at
Chicago in May 2012, the international community pledged billions to
the support of the Afghan security forces and the Afghan economy beyond
2014. As in the United States, the fulfillment of the pledges is
dependent on public support and parliamentary approval. Prolonged delay
in concluding the BSA, and the also-required NATO equivalent agreement
can only diminish the prospect that these pledges will be fully met.
As the President has said, the U.S. combat mission will end in
Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The BSA does not prescribe the number
of U.S. forces that may be present in Afghanistan after 2014, but it
will give us the invitation to remain that President Obama will need as
he makes that force-level decision. By next February, there will be
34,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, down from roughly 100,000 at the
height of the surge, and any post-2014 military presence will be much
smaller. Those who remain will concentrate on two specific, narrow
missions: counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, and training, advising, and assisting Afghan
security forces.
It is important to note that, while the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) are still a work in progress, there is reason to be
encouraged, thanks to capabilities that have been fostered and
developed by the U.S. military and our allies. Our efforts are making a
critical difference and can continue to do so. I should note that the
Afghan people themselves share this assessment. According to a recent
Asia Foundation survey, 88 percent of Afghans have confidence in the
Afghan National Army and 72 percent in the Afghan National Police.
economic and social development
I know that Assistant Administrator Sampler will talk about USAID's
efforts to deliver and monitor civilian assistance in Afghanistan, how
that assistance has improved the lives of ordinary Afghans, and the
challenges his agency faces working in that country. I am happy to talk
about the specifics of what we are doing, but I first want to offer
some encouraging news about how we are doing overall. For the past 9
years, the Asia Foundation has conducted a nationwide survey of Afghan
attitudes and opinions, tracking long-term trends among the population.
The latest annual Asia Foundation of more than 9,000 Afghans drawn from
every province was released last week, and it confirmed, through the
eyes of ordinary Afghans, the depth and durability of the progress
Afghanistan has made, with our support.
A few numbers stand out. Today, 57 percent of all Afghans believe
their country is moving in the right direction. This number has
increased steadily since 2008, when it stood at 38 percent. Not
surprisingly, the majority--76 percent--said they were better off
economically than they were under the Taliban. Three quarters gave
their national government a positive assessment although they remained
critical of subnational government and Parliament and concerned about
corruption at all levels. Five in six Afghans--men and women--believe
that women should have an education. Seventy-five percent believe it is
acceptable to criticize the government in public--a sign of an active
democracy with an independent media, which is the civilian institution
in which Afghans have the most confidence. Sympathy for armed
opposition groups is far lower than in 2009 and yet, nevertheless, a
majority of Afghans understand the need for peace and support Afghan-
led reconciliation efforts. The overall picture is one of an aspiring
nation that has witnessed and welcomed the progress that the
international effort has helped bring about. These are the people whose
representatives at the Loya Jirga overwhelmingly approved the BSA.
This growing optimism among Afghans is due in part to the
increasing capability of some of their institutions, none of which
existed in 2001. According to the poll, the Afghan media is one of the
country's most trusted institution. The growth of a free media is one
of the great achievements of reconstruction in Afghanistan. When the
Taliban ruled, people had few modern means to communicate with one
another (there were fewer than 40,000 phones in the country) or to get
information (there was one state-run TV station). Now, more than 18
million Afghans have phones and the telecommunications network covers
90 million of the population. Afghans are also eager for news, which
they see on one of the 75 TV stations or hear on the 175 radio stations
available. This is not, I should add, a triumph of quantity over
quality. In the most recent worldwide assessment of press freedom by
Reporters Without Borders, Afghanistan outranked Pakistan and India and
every other country but one in its region. The Loya Jirga that
considered the BSA was televised nationally and Afghans watched as
their representatives debated their future. This would have been
technically impossible and politically unimaginable 15 years ago.
There is a body of research that demonstrates the effectiveness of
the international effort in Afghanistan. Of the 20 major post-cold-war
interventions conducted by the United States, United Nations, and
others, Afghanistan had the greatest improvements in the U.N.'s Human
Development Index, was third among 20 improvements in government
effectiveness as measured by the World Bank, government, and was second
out of these 20 in growth of per capita income. Afghanistan's progress
should be compared with that of other countries that have faced similar
levels of conflict. Even postwar stabilization in European countries
over these same decades, where conditions for stabilization have been
much more favorable, has taken many years.
Afghan institutions are performing better, in part, because they
are increasingly integrated within the regional economy of Central and
South Asia. With considerable financial and technical assistance from
the United States and American supported international agencies,
millions of Afghans can now access electricity from power lines
stretching across their northern border into Central Asia. In the last
5 years, trade between Afghanistan with its South and Central Asian
neighbors has far outpaced trade with the outside world. Building
strong state, civil society, and private sector institutions by
economically integrating Afghanistan within its neighborhood remains at
the heart of our New Silk Road vision.
political transition
Despite all of the focus on the BSA in recent days, the political
transition is next year's critical event. A timely Presidential
election in April can be a unifying moment for the country,
consolidating the gains of the past decade and demonstrating that the
Afghan people would rather use politics than violence to solve their
differences. If successful, this will be the first peaceful transfer of
power from one elected leader to another in Afghanistan's history.
The Afghans have committed to holding credible, inclusive, and
transparent elections, and they are on track to meet this commitment.
Larry Sampler will talk about what we are doing to support this effort,
so let me talk about what the Afghans have done and are doing. As with
elections anywhere, many things can go wrong between now and election
day in April, but Afghanistan is far ahead, in terms of technical
preparations, of where it was in previous electoral cycles.
Afghanistan's last elections were conducted under rules established by
Presidential decree because the political system had been unable to
reach consensus on necessary legislation. Compare that to today. This
past summer, Afghan legislators passed the laws establishing the
structures that will shape the vote and procedures to evaluate
complaints. In July, President Karzai signed that legislation into law.
Now, the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) is implementing those
laws, working with the Ministry of Interior on the security plans that
will be critical to the success of the election. The IEC is also
engaged in a nationwide voter registration ``top up'' program, which,
thus far, has enrolled 3.1 million new voters of which 1 million are
women. Although women's participation in the process still needs to
improve, 3 of the prospective Vice Presidents are women, as are over
300 (11 percent) of the provincial council candidates. Presidential
candidates have registered and last month the IEC approved a final
official list of 11 candidates. Official campaigning gets underway in
February, when rallies, ads, and televised debates will take place.
We have made clear that, in the upcoming election, the United
States will support the process, not any individual party or candidate.
We will continue to assist Afghan electoral authorities, the Afghan
Government, Parliament and civil society in their efforts to strengthen
the electoral system and to minimize electoral fraud. While the Afghan
Government has taken encouraging steps to ensure security for poll
workers, the Independent Election Commission and other elections-
related workers, we will continue to monitor security trends as the
elections near. Our military experts are also helping the Afghans with
security planning. That said, ISAF planners have been surprised by the
extremely limited number of requests from the Afghan security forces as
they support IEC voter registration efforts in insecure areas of the
country--what is, in effect, a dry run for the challenges they will
need to handle during next April's vote.
Enduring stability will require reconciliation and we remain
committed to supporting an Afghan peace process. Our objective has
been, and continues to be, to promote and support a political process
by which Afghans sit down with other Afghans to determine the future of
their country. The outcomes of peace and reconciliation must be the
Taliban and other insurgent groups breaking ties with
al-Qaeda, ending violence, and accepting Afghanistan's constitution,
including its protections for women and minorities. Even as we remain
committed to supporting a peace process, we do not plan to let up our
fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan or our support to
Afghan forces. Our military and diplomatic efforts continue to be
mutually reinforcing.
I do not mean to present an overly rosy picture of Afghanistan's
present or future. Many challenges remain. The Taliban continue to
fight. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world
and the drawdown of international military forces will reduce economic
growth. Afghans still need to put in place the physical infrastructure
and legal framework to encourage long-term sustainable development and
attract private investment. Corruption is a major problem--one the
Afghan public is aware of and one the Afghan Government promised to
reduce as part of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. The
narcotics trade is far from under control, as the recent announcement
of a record poppy harvest showed. All of these require sustained
commitment from the Afghans and the further development of their
institutions to remedy. But most Afghans want to fix them, as the
survey shows, and international support is vital to helping them do so.
As we focus on the pivotal year 2014, which will mark the end of
the U.S. combat mission and what we hope and expect will be the
successful transfer of power to a new, democratically elected Afghan
President, we should also keep an eye on the future of this region.
Afghanistan has a young population; more than 65 percent of Afghans are
under 25 and the average age is 18. Over the last decade many of these
young Afghans have gone to school, learned to use e-mail, set up
Facebook pages, become connected to other Afghans outside their
provinces and ethnic groups, reclaimed their artistic heritage, become
familiar with other countries and ways of life, even learned English.
(There are 1.5 -2 million Internet users.) They participate in civil
society and establish think tanks. They are moving from the rural areas
to the cities for jobs and education. Sustaining our relationship with
Afghanistan means maintaining our connection with those young Afghans.
Their future is crucial to the stability of the region and ultimately
the security of the United States. Right now these young men and women
want democracy, access to free media, economic opportunities,
transparency, and education. A partnership with the United States will
help them consolidate the institutions that did not exist 12 years ago,
but which have grown in their lifetimes and which will help ensure that
these youth rebuff the recruitment of extremists and help to build a
peaceful democratic partner for the United States and our allies.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that despite the many challenges,
we have much to build on as we look to the future of America's
partnership with Afghanistan. Thanks in large part to the generosity of
the American people, the courage of its men and women in uniform and
the bipartisan support of Congress, Afghanistan is a fundamentally
different country than it was 12 years ago. It remains a hopeful
country, although uncertainty over conclusion of the BSA is
unnecessarily increasing anxiety at just the point in Afghanistan's
growing self-reliance where reassurance is most necessary. This
administration looks forward to continuing its work with Congress to
help ensure that as these hopes are realized our own vital national
security interests are secured.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Sampler.
STATEMENT OF DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT TO THE
ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Sampler. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today.
I have been working on and in Afghanistan in both civilian
and military capacities since 2002. In addition to having
worked with the Afghan emergency Loya Jirga and the Afghanistan
constitutional Loya Jirga, I have served as a representative of
an international NGO, a senior advisor to two ISAF commanders,
and as chief of staff to the U.N. Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan.
After the fall of the Taliban regime, I saw, firsthand, an
Afghanistan that had been devastated by decades of conflict.
The unprecedented investment by United States taxpayers and the
international community, in partnership with the Afghans
themselves, has created transformational changes in Afghanistan
that are reflected in the United Nations 2013 Human Development
Index. Afghanistan improved its score in that index more than
any other country in the index of that year, an improvement of
about 60 percent. Changes of this magnitude are not made
overnight, especially in such a deeply traditional society and
in such a challenging operational environment. The results of
international civilian assistance are significant, but fragile.
Just a few examples: In 2002, there were only 900,000
Afghan children in school, and virtually no girls. Today,
nearly 8 million children are in school, and 30 percent of them
are girls. Life expectancy in Afghanistan has increased from 42
years to over 62 years. The maternal mortality rate has
declined by 80 percent, and child mortality has decreased by
just under 50 percent.
In 2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to
electricity. Today, that number is 18 percent. And the Afghan
electric utility is well on its way to financial stability.
In 2002, there were very few fixed telephone lines, and a
call outside of Afghanistan required a satellite phone. Today,
the combined phone networks in Afghanistan cover 90 percent of
the Afghan population, and 85 percent of women have access to a
cell phone. Today, there are over 3,000 women-owned businesses
and associations, almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in
higher education are women, and women are active participants
in the Afghan political process.
As we enter the transition period of 2014, USAID's strategy
is threefold: to maintain and make durable the gains that have
been made in health, education, and the empowerment of women;
to mitigate the economic consequences of the military drawdown;
and to foster improved stability by supporting legitimate and
effective Afghan governance, to include the 2014 elections.
USAID places a high priority on ensuring that American
taxpayer dollars are used wisely. While many of the issues in
Afghanistan are unique to that country, monitoring projects in
challenging environments is something that USAID does around
the world, and does very well. In designing the Afghanistan
monitoring strategy, USAID incorporated lessons learned from
our monitoring programs around the world, to include Colombia,
Iraq, Pakistan, and South Sudan. I will note that these
programs that form the basis of our Afghanistan monitoring
program have been reviewed in six separate USAID Office of the
Inspector General reports as well as three reports by the
General Accountability Office.
Finally, external audits provide useful oversight and
discipline, and they complement and reinforce USAID's own
efforts to ensure U.S. tax dollars are used effectively and
efficiently. There are currently over 100 audits ongoing of
USAID programs in Afghanistan.
The bottom line is that USAID will terminate programs if
the agency determines that adequate oversight is not possible
or that adequate development progress is not being made.
With respect to the elections, a credible, transparent, and
inclusive electoral process is central to the U.S. Government's
transition strategy and critical to Afghan stability and
democratic development. USAID remains focused on supporting an
inclusive and democratic process by supporting Afghan electoral
authorities and by building the capacity of democratic
stakeholders in Afghanistan so that they can participate in the
elections in a robust and informed way. USAID supports
independent domestic observers, civil society, media, and
political parties, helping them appropriately engage in the
democratic process.
USAID is supporting the participation of women in all
aspects of the electoral process, promoting the hiring and
training of female polling staff, promoting public outreach to
women voters by civil society and by public officials, and
enhancing the ability of women candidates to campaign
effectively.
In conclusion, I have worked in Afghanistan as a member of
the Department of State, USAID, and the U.S. military. I have
attended ramp ceremonies for the fallen heroes of all three
organizations. I am personally, and USAID is institutionally,
keenly aware of the enormous sacrifices made by Americans to
build a secure and a stable Afghanistan. And we fully
understand the need for constant vigilance, particularly during
this delicate transition period. We are making tough decisions,
we are prioritizing our investments, and we are looking for
things that have the greatest potential for long-term success.
As USAID navigates the 2014 transition period, we continue
to be committed to safeguarding taxpayer resources and to
ensuring that the remarkable levels of development progress
made in Afghanistan are maintained and made durable.
It is an honor to be here today and to be able to share
with you a small glimpse of what USAID is doing in that regard.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald L. Sampler
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before
you today to discuss the role of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) in advancing U.S. Government policy through USAID's
civilian assistance program during the transition in Afghanistan. It is
an honor to appear before you today with Ambassador Dobbins.
USAID has been fully engaged in Afghanistan for 12 years, and
during that time Afghanistan has made remarkable development gains in
many sectors. This transition period is a pivotal moment for
Afghanistan, in anticipation of which USAID has been planning and
adjusting its programming to maximize sustainability and
accountability.
I have been working on and in Afghanistan in both civilian and
military capacities since 2002. In addition to having worked with the
Afghan Constitutional Loya Jirga and the Afghan Emergency Loya Jirga, I
have served as a representative of an international nongovernmental
organization, and as chief of staff of the U.N. Assistance Mission to
Afghanistan. I bring these perspectives to USAID's work today.
Continued U.S. engagement is critical to Afghanistan's stability
and to protecting the vital interests of our own country. Improving
governance, creating economic opportunity, and supporting civil society
are critical to solidifying our military gains and advancing our
political and diplomatic goals for Afghanistan and the region. In order
to achieve these goals, USAID has reoriented its assistance program to
lessen its stabilization work and place an even greater emphasis on
long-term, sustainable development programming.
usaid and results
After the fall of the Taliban regime, I saw firsthand an
Afghanistan devastated by decades of conflict. The unprecedented
investment by U.S. taxpayers and the international community, in
partnership with the Afghans, has created transformational changes in
Afghanistan that are reflected in the United Nation's 2013 Human
Development Index. Afghanistan improved its score more than any other
country in the index since 2000 on a percentage basis: a nearly 60
percent increase. Although Afghanistan had a very low starting point,
the upward trends show powerful aggregation over a decade and strongly
reflect areas of USAID investment.
Changes of this magnitude are not made overnight, especially in
such a deeply traditional society and challenging operational
environment. The results of international civilian assistance, led by
USAID in concert with the broader U.S. Government, are significant,
though fragile:
Education: In 2002, there were only 900,000 Afghan children
in school, and virtually none of them were girls. Today, nearly
8 million children are registered to attend school and more
than one-third of them are girls.
Health: Life expectancy has increased from 42 years to over
62 since 2001; the maternal mortality rate has declined by 80
percent from 1,600 deaths to 327 per 100,000 births; and child
mortality decreased from 172 to 97 deaths per 1,000 live
births.
Energy: In 2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to
reliable electricity. Today 18 percent do. In addition, USAID
assistance has helped put the Afghan national power company
(DABS) on a path to become fully self-sustaining. DABS
collected $220 million from the sale of electricity in 2012, an
increase of 67 percent from 2010.
Mobile Technology: In 2002, there were few fixed telephone
lines and making calls outside of Afghanistan required a
satellite phone. Today, the combined phone network covers 90
percent of the Afghan population; 85 percent of women have
access to a mobile phone. The telecommunications sector is
Afghanistan's greatest source of foreign direct investment,
largest remitter of taxes to the government, and biggest licit
employer, providing jobs for 100,000 Afghans.
Women: Today, there are over 3,000 women-owned business and
associations; almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in higher
education are women; and women are active participants in the
Afghan political process, with three female Cabinet members of
the Afghan Cabinet, 68 Members of Parliament (of the 249
seats), and three women Vice Presidential candidates.
usaid transition strategy
Over the last 2 years USAID has regularly reviewed and adjusted its
programs to ensure that they advance the administration's strategic
objectives and are necessary, achievable, and sustainable. USAID's
transition strategy is threefold:
Maintain and make durable the gains made in health,
education, and the empowerment of women;
Mitigate the economic impact of the drawdown through a
robust focus on the agriculture sector, private sector
development, the operations and maintenance of infrastructure
investments, and the future potential of the extractives
industry; and,
Foster improved stability by supporting legitimate and
effective Afghan governance, including the 2014 Presidential
election.
Operationally, USAID has adjusted its implementation model to
improve sustainability and meet the challenges presented by the
transition through:
Focusing assistance in Regional Economic Zones (REZs) that
cover major population centers and promote regional trade and
economic opportunities;
Developing a multitiered oversight strategy that, along with
other monitoring and evaluation efforts, will continue to
ensure adequate oversight over projects in the field, as field
staff decrease;
Transforming USAID's approach in Afghanistan to one of
mutual accountability, ensuring alignment with Afghan
priorities and promoting Afghan reforms; and
Implementing USAID's 2011 Afghanistan Sustainability
Guidance, which emphasizes the principles of (1) increasing
Afghan ownership and capacity; (2) contributing to stability
and confidence, and (3) effective and cost-efficient
programming.
With these parameters in mind, USAID works in coordination with the
U.S. Government interagency and the Afghan Government to review and
revise USAID's Afghanistan portfolio. For example, in consultation with
the Government of Afghanistan in 2012, USAID substantially downscaled a
5-year, $32 million agricultural faculties program found to be
duplicative of efforts by another donor.
Sustaining the development gains made over the past decade will
require continued reforms by the Afghan Government. USAID is active in
promoting these necessary reforms in coordination with our
international partners through the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework (TMAF). As part of TMAF, USAID has established a bilateral
incentive fund to encourage action on key reforms. Funds will be
released as the Afghan Government meets certain thresholds of progress
on the key TMAF indicators.
For instance, as a result of the Afghan Government's progress in
meeting commitments related to the upcoming elections, USAID is
preparing to release $15 million (out of the $75 million in incentive
funds for this year) through the World Bank's Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The Afghanistan Ministry of Finance
is now working with other Ministries to undertake agreed reforms to
ensure that the remaining $60 million of U.S. incentive funds for this
year are focused on Afghan priorities. In addition, the United States
coordinates closely with the Afghan Government and other donors to
prioritize reform objectives and coordinate other incentive programs,
including those that are part of the ARTF.
Throughout this transition, USAID continues to closely coordinate
with the Departments of Defense and State and other relevant agencies.
For example, USAID has placed Liaison Officers with both the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command and the
Special Operations Joint Task Force to advise these commands on the
design and implementation of development projects. USAID has two
representatives on the Department of Defense's Commanders Emergency
Response Program Board, and these positions ensure the Agency's
visibility on proposed military development projects and synergies of
such projects with USAID's programming. USAID also participated in the
Department of State-led ``Transfer of Tasks'' exercise, which helped to
inform the U.S. Embassy and USAID mission on how to responsibly
transfer development-related activities undertaken by ISAF to other
U.S. Government entities or to the Afghan Government. Throughout this
process, USAID has drawn on lessons learned from the Iraq experience to
help navigate the transition period.
oversight and accountability
USAID places the highest priority on ensuring that American
taxpayer funds are used wisely, effectively, and for their intended
purpose. While many of the issues in Afghanistan are unique to that
country, monitoring projects in very challenging environments is
something the Agency has been doing for years in many places around the
world.
In addition to the usual oversight USAID undertakes in every
country where it works, USAID's Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan
initiative (known as A3) focuses on four areas:
1. Award Mechanisms--We rely less on large agreements and have
increased the number of smaller and more flexible agreements. We are
also utilizing assistance awards that provide the most visibility on
project costs, such as cost-reimbursable contracts and limiting layers
of subcontracts to two.
2. Partner Vetting--The USAID mission established a Vetting Support
Unit in February 2011. The unit conducts checks on non-U.S. companies
and non-U.S. key individuals for prime contractors, subcontractors,
grant recipients and subgrantees to determine whether or not they are
associated with known malign entities or individuals. We have kept
$41.5 million from being awarded as a result of our vetting process.
3. Financial Controls--We are enhancing controls on project funds,
such as using electronic funds transfers in lieu of cash payments,
using independent financial monitors to verify appropriate usage of
funds, ensuring close review of recipients/contractor's claims prior to
payment, and performing audits of locally incurred cost.
4. Project Oversight--USAID uses a multitiered monitoring approach
that includes, as appropriate, independent monitoring contractors;
observation by U.S. Government staff; reporting by implementing
partners, local nongovernmental organizations and civil society; and
use of technological tools, such as time- and date-stamped photos. By
using multiple sources of monitoring data, USAID can compare
information received from separate sources to ensure the greatest
degree of oversight possible.
USAID will terminate projects, or specific activity sites within
projects, if the Agency determines that adequate oversight is not
possible or adequate development progress is not being made. In
designing the Afghanistan monitoring strategy, USAID incorporated
lessons learned from its use of third-party independent monitoring in
challenging environments across the world, including Colombia, Iraq,
Pakistan, and South Sudan, as well as from the USAID Office of
Inspector General (OIG) and U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
audits, as well as public feedback.
USAID has also developed a new unit at the mission, the
Implementation Support Team, which is responsible for providing an
additional layer of critical review and analysis for the many streams
of monitoring information and for providing USAID leadership with
alternative courses of action for addressing challenges with project
implementation. In addition, USAID is continuing its close coordination
with other donors to share best practices and expertise on monitoring.
USAID also has a rigorous system of oversight for its ``on-budget''
programming with the Afghan Government. This means that USAID conducts
assessments to ensure that each Afghan ministry or entity has systems
in place to manage on-budget assistance. To date, USAID has assessed 13
ministries, but has limited its on-budget assistance to 6 ministries,
subject to stringent safeguards.
For ``on-budget'' assistance, USAID utilizes multiple levels of
protection to mitigate risks before disbursing any funds. These
measures may include, but are not limited to, requiring the Afghan
Ministry of Finance to establish noncommingled, separate bank accounts
for each project with USAID; disbursement of funds only after USAID has
verified that the ministry has achieved a performance milestone or
USAID has verified accrued costs; an annual audit by a USAID OIG-
approved firm; substantial involvement and oversight by USAID staff in
procurement processes; independent management, monitoring and
evaluation of services; and technical assistance to increase the
capacity of ministries while addressing any vulnerabilities or
weaknesses identified in the assessments. All ``on-budget'' assistance
requires compliance with USAID accountability and oversight procedures,
including site visits to ministries by USAID staff or independent
contractors, as well as regular reporting. Ministries are required to
fully comply with the mitigation measures prior to and throughout the
disbursement process. If Afghan ministries fail to adhere to these
measures, the agreements are subject to immediate suspension or
termination.
For example, USAID has worked closely with the Ministry of
Education to assess its financial management systems, implement
extensive mitigation measures for the risks these assessments
identified, and audit their progress and monitor results. USAID
negotiated a stringent series of preconditions and financial controls
pursuant to the launch of a $27 million textbook printing program, part
of the Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical Vocational Education
and Training Project. The specific steps USAID required to mitigate
these risks included use of a noncommingled separate bank account from
which all project disbursements are to be accounted for; an annual
audit including quarterly audit testing of all project disbursements
under the agreement by an OIG-approved certified public accounting
firm; and USAID involvement and mandatory clearance of the textbook
procurement cycle for each separate procurement undertaken under the
agreement. USAID subsequently obligated a total of $20 million toward
the agreement, and to date $11.7 million has been disbursed.
Finally, audits provide useful oversight and discipline, and
complement and reinforce USAID's own efforts to ensure U.S. tax dollars
are used effectively and efficiently. There are currently over 100
ongoing audits of USAID programs in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2013,
the GAO, USAID OIG, and Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) completed over 65 financial and program audits
in Afghanistan.
Oversight is a process that requires continual reexamination and
the ability to adjust to new circumstances as they arise. Although
there are inherent risks in doing business in a country like
Afghanistan, we work hard to ensure taxpayer dollars are adequately
protected while carrying out a vital component of the U.S. Government's
national security policy.
afghanistan 2014 elections: usaid's role
A credible, transparent, and inclusive electoral process is central
to the U.S. Government's transition strategy and critical to Afghan
stability and democratic development. Afghanistan has made significant
progress, with support from USAID, toward holding elections in April
2014: two key election laws were passed over the summer, marking the
first time the Parliament directly approved the electoral process.
Commissioners to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the
Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) have been appointed
through a consultative process, and have proceeded to implement
responsible plans for conducting polls for the April 5 vote. Candidates
registered for the Presidential and Provincial Council elections in an
orderly fashion, and the final candidate lists were prepared after
complaints were addressed by the appropriate Afghan institutions. In
short, there has been significant progress on multiple elements of the
necessary electoral machinery, pointing toward a timely and credible
election this spring.
USAID, in coordination with partners in the U.S. Government and the
international community, remains focused on supporting an inclusive and
democratic process by supporting Afghan electoral authorities and by
building the capacity of democratic stakeholders in Afghanistan to
participate in a robust and informed way. USAID is the lead donor to
the IEC and IECC through the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) ELECT II basket fund, which provides expert advice and mentoring
to the IEC and funds key election procurement, training, and logistics.
USAID is also funding IECC activities through the UNDP ELECT II basket
fund. In addition to the electoral authorities, USAID supports
independent domestic observers, civil society, media, and political
parties, helping them appropriately engage in the democratic process.
USAID is supporting the participation of women in all aspects of
the electoral process: promoting the hiring and training of female
polling staff; promoting public outreach to women voters by civil
society and public officials; and enhancing the ability of women
candidates to campaign effectively.
Despite many existing and potential challenges, Afghans have
demonstrated through every stage of the election planning process that
they see a successful election as the only acceptable option to decide
the leadership of their next government. The U.S. Government, through
USAID and other departments, is providing across-the-board support to
help ensure this happens.
conclusion
USAID always keeps in mind the enormous sacrifices made by
Americans to build a secure and stable Afghanistan, and we fully
understand the need for constant vigilance, particularly during this
delicate transition period.
Throughout our efforts, we are applying important lessons from the
past 12 years in Afghanistan, as well as from other high-risk
environments in which USAID has worked. Weaning Afghanistan from
unsustainable levels of assistance is necessary for us, and essential
for them, and we are making tough decisions and prioritizing
investments that have the greatest potential for long-term
sustainability. As USAID navigates through the 2014 transition period,
we are committed to expending every effort to safeguard taxpayer funds
and ensure that the remarkable development progress in Afghanistan is
maintained and made durable.
Denying al-Qaeda a chance to rebuild in Afghanistan remains
America's primary mission in that country, and the programs implemented
by USAID are essential elements to the success of that goal,
particularly through the transition period.
It is an honor to be able to share with you today a small glimpse
of what USAID is doing in that regard. I look forward to answering any
questions that you may have.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both.
Let me start off with Ambassador Dobbins. What is Karzai's
purpose? It seems to me that he is putting his country, his
legacy, maybe even his personal security at risk. What is his
purpose?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, I think----
The Chairman. You need to put your microphone on.
Ambassador Dobbins. Sorry.
I can tell you what--you know, the kinds of conditions he
is laying down. I would have to speculate about what further
purposes may be beyond it. But, although he has spoken
generally about a number of different desiderata, they
basically come down to two, as far as we can determine. You
know, one is a peace process, and the second is no entry into
Afghan homes, sanctity of Afghan homes.
On the first, we, of course, have supported reconciliation.
We have tried to advance reconciliation. His position, at the
moment, seems to be that we actually have to succeed in
initiating a formal, overt, public Afghan Government/Taliban
peace negotiation before he will sign the BSA. Now, I have
noted to him that the Taliban have no real incentive to
facilitate his signing a BSA, and that this conditionality
actually probably works against what he would like to see. Not
that we are opposed to a peace process; on the contrary, we
are----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Dobbins [continuing]. All for it. So, that is
one of his desiderata.
And the second is--in the context of the BSA and in the
context of the--on the text of the BSA and then an assurance he
got from the President alongside it, you know, we have
committed to respect the sanctity of Afghan homes and to
operate in ways that recognize the importance of privacy and
safety within the home. He seems to be interpreting this as:
Under no circumstances, in any case, even if accompanied by
Afghan troops, and even if Afghan troops are actually leading
the operation, should the United States forces participate in
entering and searching a home in search of a terrorist.
So, we think both of these are a bit of an overstretch.
Now, it could be that, in the end, formulas will be determined
that are mutually acceptable. Clearly, what he is asking is
beyond where we are likely to be able to accommodate him. But,
he may see this as the beginning of another negotiation.
The Chairman. I know that your testimony said you feel that
we definitely will get there. But, is there a breaking point
here? Is there a point in which the consequences of not having
a signed agreement are going to have--you refer to some of the
consequences. Certainly, when I was there earlier this year,
there was a real concern, both among Afghanistan's neighbors
and internally in Afghanistan, about people hedging their bets,
about having that sense of confidence for the future,
especially as the 2014 elections are pursued. Are there not
real consequences?
And, as part of that answer, can you talk a little bit
about the regional implications of this agreement and political
transition--can you describe what diplomatic efforts and
planning to address the concerns expressed by some of our
partners in the region, and perhaps, through that process,
mitigate potential second- and third-order effects of the
transition?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, I agree with you entirely.
Senator, on the consequences of delay. I think your opening
statement and mine were almost, you know, at perfect parallel
on those consequences, and they----
The Chairman. Please have the State Department note-taker
put that down in their report back to the State. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Dobbins. And the longer the delay is, the
greater those consequences are.
Is there a point at which walking away from Afghanistan
would be better than continuing to live with uncertainty?
Personally, I do not think so. Because I think the consequences
of leaving entirely would be even more catastrophic. But,
clearly, the sooner the better.
We are engaged with the neighboring countries. You
mentioned President Karzai has just visited Iran, but he is
also in--I think, 3 days from now, going to be visiting India,
where he will meet with the Prime Minister and other leaders in
India. He is visiting Turkey shortly thereafter. We have
already mentioned what Russia, what China, what Pakistan have
said. So, I think that, with the exception of Iran, there is
quite a remarkable, actually, international consensus that,
while the United States should not stay forever, it should stay
for a while longer.
I do think that, to the extent we----
The Chairman. Well, he knows that, too, right? Part of his
willingness to delay is because he believes that, at the end of
the day, it is not in our interests not to stay. So, in doing
so, he thinks he has leverage, in that regard.
Ambassador Dobbins. I think that is probably accurate. What
I think--the most viable sort of leverage, I think, is probably
domestic; that is, his supporters, his political opponents, the
media, the public. I mean, this is on every talk show, every
night, and they have got 76 channels of television there. This
is a big topic. It is the main topic of public debate. And
there is, as we have both noted, overwhelming support within
the population. And I am hopeful that, over time, that will
begin to have an effect, along with whatever advice he gets
from friendly neighbors, of whom, for instance, his upcoming
visit to India could, I think, be quite influential, because he
highly respects and has good relations with the Indian
Government.
The Chairman. Finally, part of Afghanistan's future is
going to be in its regional integration in trade opportunities.
And I think a lot of that is embodied in the administration's
new Silk Road Initiative. I think that the FY14 Foreign
Operations bill, which passed out of the Appropriations
Committee this year, wisely calls for a plan to integrate the
functions of your office back into the Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs. Can you shed some light on the State
Department's plans to integrate SRAP and SCA, and what
challenges are there in conducting that integration?
Ambassador Dobbins. I--you know, I think--I would not say
we have a plan. I think there is a sort of a general working
assumption that the transition, in end of 2014, where we move
from a large combat presence to a small train-advise-and-assist
presence, would be a logical breakpoint, where you might make
some changes in the way the State Department is organized.
On the other hand, even under those circumstances,
Afghanistan is still going to be one of our largest, if not the
largest--certainly, it will be the country in which we are most
heavily engaged in a country that is still undergoing conflict.
And whether you would want to just turn this over to the Afghan
desk officer, I am not sure. So, I think reintegration into the
Bureau, in some circumstances, in some manner, might well make
sense.
I mean, when I was the Special Envoy for Afghanistan, back
in 2001, I was administratively attached to the South Asian
Bureau. When I was the Special Advisor to the President and
Secretary of the State for the Balkans, I got my administrative
support from the European Bureau, as opposed to from the
Secretary's office directly. Although, in both cases, I had
direct access to the Secretary of State.
The Chairman. Well, I am certainly not suggesting, nor do I
think the subcommittee suggests, that it be the Afghan desk
officer that deals with the major account that we have in this
part of the world. But, I think there is some benefit in
integration, because it is not just Afghanistan that we are
focused on there; it obviously has regional consequences, as
well. And I would love to see the continuing development and
thought of the State Department in that regard.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and, again, to both
of you, for your testimony.
You know, for a long time, there has been a push by many to
try to get the administration to commit to what the troop
levels were going to be if there was a bilateral agreement that
was agreed to. And I know there have been specific ranges that
we have talked about, in combination with NATO, and then a
contingent of Special Ops, aside from that operation, that we
would have, unilaterally. Has the--do you think, to any degree,
the lack of our willingness, if you will--the administration's
willingness--to actually commit to firm troop levels--or, firm
commitment to troop levels--has that entered into Karzai's
flakiness on this issue?
Ambassador Dobbins. Probably not. Karzai has shown
complete, total disinterest in troop levels or even assistance
levels, and is focused on some of these other issues that
clearly are hot buttons with him. I think his working
assumption is, we will do what is necessary, as Senator
Menendez indicated, and that, therefore, he can take that for
granted. We try to tell him that American opinion is not
exactly where he thinks it is, and there--that he is--you know,
that he is playing with fire.
And it was instructive that the Foreign Minister of Iraq
visited, 10 days ago, met with President Karzai and said, ``Do
not make the same mistake we did. You know, we kissed the
Americans good-bye, and we need them today.''
Senator Corker. So, let me ask you--obviously, you assess,
you know, the need for troops, or the levels of those troops,
based on conditions on the ground. And you just mentioned that
things obviously are deteriorating. I mean, part of having
security in the country is having appropriate economic growth
and all of those kinds of things. And these actions on his part
are causing that to deteriorate. Is this situation in
Afghanistan, is it affecting how you are discussing troop
levels right now? And is that moving up or down based on the
changes that are happening there internally?
Ambassador Dobbins. I do not think the negative trends that
I have suggested have yet manifest themselves in a degree that
would impact the battlefield. I mean, it is only been, what, 2
weeks, 3 weeks that we have faced this problem that Karzai gets
endorsement for it but says he does not want to sign it during
his term of office. As I have said, there are already some
manifestations, in terms of the economy, but they are limited--
--
Senator Corker. Will it, over time, affect things in that
way, if it goes out to the end of the election and----
Ambassador Dobbins. Possibly, yes. I think, if the
uncertainty persisted through the summer, we would have less
allies when we finally do confirm this, we would have less
public support in this country when we finally get an
agreement. We might even have less support here in the
Congress, although I would hope not. But, these are real
dangers. And would it affect morale on the battlefield? So far,
that has not been a problem. So far, the Afghan Army has been
performing well, taking high casualties, replacing them,
fighting hard. But, frankly, if this uncertainty persisted and
was exacerbated by regional interference of the sort that we
have seen in other decades, you could draw a lot of very
unpleasant scenarios.
I think we need to try to ensure that it does not unravel
in that regard over the next several months. But, I agree that
these are dangers.
Senator Corker. And I know, with Iraq, you alluded to that,
but a big part of that, I think, was what we were leaving
behind was so insignificant that I think Iraqi political
leadership decided it was not worth the internal grief, if you
will, to enter into an agreement. I do not sense anything like
that is at play here, and I do sense there is a sincere effort,
on behalf of our country, to end up with a bilateral agreement
that leaves a substantial number of folks there to see this
through. And, to that end, in talking about our internal
situation, other than preserving our gains, how would you, as
our special envoy--how would you describe what our national
interests are in Afghanistan as people watch a President there,
if you will, turn his back on all the things that have happened
there over the last 10 to 12 years?
Ambassador Dobbins. We obviously have an interest in
preventing al-Qaeda from repositioning itself in Afghanistan,
from being able to operate with the active collaboration of a
government that supports it, which was the case before 2001 and
which would be the case again if the Taliban were to come to
power in part or all of Afghanistan. They remain the link to
al-Qaeda. We have no reason to believe that they would not
continue to allow al-Qaeda to use the territory and to actually
facilitate their use. So, that is one.
We have an interest in preventing even a largely dismantled
al-Qaeda from rebuilding itself within an Afghan sanctuary,
which, again, would be a real possibility if the Taliban were
to come back to power.
We also have an interest in preventing Afghanistan from
simply falling into a wider civil war, which would become
exactly like Syria, a magnet for extremists, militants of all
stripes, including
al-Qaeda, but not just al-Qaeda, some with global agendas and
some with desires to attack the United States at home and
abroad. We do not need another ungoverned space, another
country like Somalia, like Yemen, like Syria, that has no
capacity to control its own territory and which is in an
ongoing and everlasting conflict which attracts every extremist
in the world to plant their flag, to recruit, to fundraise, and
to use that conflict as a basis for wider action.
Senator Corker. Well, I thank you for that answer.
In regards to Karzai, in his irrational activities--I mean,
we have got to act responsibly, and sometimes when you are in a
negotiation and you have an irrational and irresponsible
partner, it ends up changing the dynamic in a way that is not
to your advantage. Is there any part of this that has to do
with manipulating the election, in your opinion, and
potentially causing favor to move toward his brother in the
election?
Ambassador Dobbins. He has been pretty consistent in
everything he has said to everybody he has talked to, that we
know of, in opposing his brother's candidacy, frankly.
Senator Corker. Well, is he trying to affect it, in any
direction?
Ambassador Dobbins. So, there is obviously those kinds of
suspicions, particularly on the part of his political
opponents. He has done nothing to substantiate that, so far,
that we know of. He seems to be committed to holding the
election on time. He has encouraged a number of candidates to
run, not just one. He clearly does not, at this stage, have an
identified favorite. And he, otherwise, has largely avoided the
kind of interference that one could legitimately take exception
to. He expresses a concern, based on his experiences in 2009,
about our interfering in the election, and, of course, we have
reassured him on that stage. At one point, after National
Security Advisor Rice gave him some assurances in that regard,
he declared himself satisfied and that he would no longer raise
the issue. But, he does come back to it, as clearly there--you
know, 2009, from his standpoint, was fairly traumatic, and he
is not willing to let it go. But, to be fair, at this stage we
have not seen anything which suggests that this is a ploy to
either postpone the elections or manipulate their outcome.
Senator Corker. You know, if you look at our foreign policy
over the last few years, American foreign policy has really--I
mean, we have been Iran's best friend, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, over the last several years. And, you know,
obviously, the President of Afghanistan entered into this
agreement with Iran, which really was not much of an agreement.
I think it is an agreement to agree down the road.
Ambassador Dobbins. Yes.
Senator Corker. It was not very specific. But, from his
manipulative standpoint, what was Karzai attempting to do with
this agreement he just announced with Iran?
Ambassador Dobbins. As we understand it, he simply agreed
to negotiate an agreement. And he has negotiated these kinds of
agreements with other states in the region. I do not know that
this--I cannot tell you whether this meeting was set up before
we had the Loya Jirga and all, his trip to Iran. He has gone
there once or twice a year since he became President, back in
2001-2002.
So, at this point, I would not attach a lot of importance
to it. Iran is the only country that is encouraging him in his
current stance. Of course, they are not encouraging him to sign
it late, they are encouraging him not to sign it at all.
Senator Corker. Not at all; yes.
Ambassador Dobbins. You know, their position would be,
``You do not need the Americans. You know, there are lots of
other countries of the region that will help you.'' In fact,
there are no other countries of the region that are offering
the kinds of assistance that the United States and its NATO
allies are prepared to commit to, and the other countries of
the region have made that clear.
So, is this a gesture designed to demonstrate that he has
other options? Maybe. But, it is so in keeping with his
relations with Iran over the last decade that at this point, I
am not getting too excited about it.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
And, Ambassador Dobbins, appreciate your service in a
challenging environment; both of you, actually.
You mentioned President Karzai's interest in reconciliation
agreement with the Taliban. And can you talk a little bit more
about that? What kind of prospects do we think are realistic?
Why should the Taliban--or, why do we think the Taliban might
be interested in reaching some sort of an agreement with the
current Government of Afghanistan or the government of any new
President, once we begin to draw down our forces and there is
less of an obstacle to their regaining power?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, first, to be fair to President
Karzai, he is not asking for, or expecting, a peace agreement
with the Taliban. He simply wants a process to be begun under
his administration, which is a natural enough desire, and one
we would be happy to support, if it was realistic. And, in
fact, we have been trying to promote it for several years,
since, essentially, 2011, when----
Senator Shaheen. So, can you also talk about why what he is
proposing is not realistic.
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, particularly saying, ``I won't
sign the BSA until I have formal talks with the Taliban''----
Senator Shaheen. OK.
Ambassador Dobbins [continuing]. Does not exactly give the
Taliban an incentive to talk to him. The Taliban might be
willing to talk to him if he never signs the BSA, but he is not
providing them an incentive, with that particular formula. The
Taliban have been quite consistent, for several years, that
they are willing to talk to us, they are not willing to talk to
the Government of Afghanistan. We brought them over that line,
almost, in June, and then it faltered, not, in fact, as a
result of the Taliban's bad faith, but for other extraneous
reasons, and we did not get to that goal line. And I guess I
would have to say that it is unlikely that they will cross that
in the next--you know, between now and April. They would not
seem to have an interest in enhancing the legitimacy of the
current regime, or, in particular, of the elections that are
going to produce the next regime. That would seem the logic
that is consistent with everything they have said, and it is
consistent with what we know about what they say to themselves
and what they say to others, privately.
But, over the longer term, you know, it is our view that if
we have a BSA, if we have a continuing presence, if the
international community remains committed, if the international
financial support for the ANSF and to the Afghan Government as
a whole is sustained, that the Afghan forces will continue to
dominate and hold the major population centers, that the
Taliban will eventually realize that the American departure, if
you will, has not brought them a breakthrough, that the war
will continue indefinitely until they reach a settlement. There
are elements within the Taliban, we think, who are interested
in talking. I would not say, at this point, they are interested
in a settlement that we would regard as acceptable, but they
are interested in talking, and that is a first step.
So, I think we will continue to support this, in principle;
we will continue to try to support it, in practice. But, our
expectations are that something is more likely to take fruit
once a new government has been elected, which clearly has broad
support within the country, and the international continued
support into the coming decade is manifest and obviously going
to materialize.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that argument. It sounds
optimistic. However, given our failure, in past years, to have
any progress----
Ambassador Dobbins. I am a diplomat; I am optimistic.
[Laughter.]
That is what we do.
Senator Shaheen. Well, and we politicians are usually
optimistic, too, but----
Ambassador Dobbins. Right.
Senator Shaheen. Let me--one piece of that concern about
what might happen with the Taliban, I think also has to do with
what happens with the rights of women. And there was an
article, yesterday in the New York Times, talking about some
backsliding with respect to women's rights in Afghanistan. And
notwithstanding all of your positive statistics, Mr. Sampler, I
think there is real concern that, if we leave, that one of the
things that will get sacrificed is Afghan women and what their
future might look like. And so, what assurances might there be
in BSA that would address that issue?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, if we leave entirely, you are
absolutely right. I mean, I think the country, as a whole, will
suffer, but probably women will suffer the most. I will let
Larry talk a bit about, you know, what our programs are, going
forward, and the degree to which, assuming we have a BSA and a
continued presence, we are going to be able to administer and
continue to support the programs in the area of women's rights
and women's empowerment.
I think that, you know, the statistics that Larry has
indicated do have to be contrasted with significant serious
problems that women still face there. On the other hand--you
know, so the--Afghanistan has not gone from the 14th century to
the 21st, but it may have gone from the 14th century to the
18th or something, in terms of number of women in universities,
number of women--well, in number of women in Parliament, they
are in the 21st century, essentially, as--and in some of the
others--number of women in the workplace, including number of
women of entrepreneurs--there has been some rather striking
gains.
But, perhaps most important is the change in public
attitudes. If you look at survey results, going back to 2001--
Asia Foundation does one every year, and they have got a new
one--you know, the number of men who think that women should be
educated--you know, I think it is now 60-some percent, maybe
even higher, and I think much higher among people who have girl
children. The number of men who think that women should be in
the marketplace, in--you know, in jobs. These trends--although,
in the last year, they have come down slightly, I think--they
have been--there has been very significant gains. And it is
those kinds of changes in attitudes which, over time, will
sustain the progress that we have made.
But, Larry, you may want to add something on this.
Mr. Sampler. Sure. I will second the notion that the
statistics cited in the New York Times article are grounds for
concern, but there has been so much progress made that we
cannot allow it to dissipate.
The things that strike me as most compelling are the 20
percent of women--or, the 20 percent of higher education
students who are now women. We could not have seen that
statistic when our forces first went into Afghanistan, because
there were no women who had primary and secondary educations.
So, the fact that women are entering into the advanced
education field is promising, not just because it means there
are women capable of taking senior jobs, but because it means
they have reached a level where they will not allow themselves
to be rolled back.
Another statistic that I think is more relevant than
perhaps first recognized is that 85 percent of women in
Afghanistan have access to a cell phone. So, no longer are they
relegated to a small backroom in a compound, they now are able
to reach out, they are able to receive news, they are able to
communicate with each other. On my last visit to Kabul, I
visited with a group of women who are using SMS technology to
build their ability to cohesively and coherently campaign, not
for office, themselves, but for issues among the candidates who
are running for office. So, they are demonstrating a level of
sophistication that just has not been there in previous years.
And I will also mention, and be happy to discuss further if
you like, we have a program that we plan to implement, if the
situation allows us to continue engaging, called PROMOTE, which
is intended to focus primarily on the roughly 200,000 women
between the ages of 18 and 30 who do have secondary education
degrees. It also does things for other women who are
disadvantaged and do not have that level of education, but we
have made a deliberate policy decision that, in the
transitional period, we wanted to be able to build on the work
that has been done and help these 200,000 women find ways to
gainfully engage themselves in the future of Afghanistan and
then serve as role models so that the pool of such women will
continue to grow.
But, I do think you are right to be concerned about
rollbacks. Afghanistan is a big country, there are women in all
kinds of different situations. But, I am also cautiously
optimistic that, if we are allowed to stay, we will continue to
see improvements in their status.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And, to the witnesses, thank you. We always thank witnesses
for their service and for appearing, but I want to just kind of
underline and exclamation-point it today, because we hear these
statistics, but I think it is really important to step back and
just talk about how meaningful they are. I mean, just take the
life-expectancy increase from 42 to 62 in 10 years. There is
just no precedent for that. There is just--I mean, I do not
think the United States has ever been involved in anything that
would have had that kind of impact, a 50-percent expansion of
the life of a regular person because of the work that we and
our partners have done, in tandem with the Afghans, on public
health issues. It is unprecedented. It took 100 years for the
life expectancy to--in the world--to increase by 30 years, from
30 to 60, essentially, in the 21st--in the 20th century. But,
to do 20 years in 10 years, in one decade, is amazing. And that
has largely been driven by public health for women and
children. If you drop maternal deaths by 80 percent, if you
drop infant mortality by 50 percent, that is what drives up
life expectancy in what we have seen. And then the increases in
children in school, you know, by, essentially 10 times, so it
is almost an infinite increase in the number of women in
school. You have to feel a sense of satisfaction about it. I
mean, I know it is--and that probably makes it incredibly
frustration, what you are dealing with now, but those of you
who have done this--I do not know how this polls with the
American public, to know that we have helped expand life
expectancy from 42 to 62 years in Afghanistan with the work
that we have done, but, in terms of feeling good about what you
have done, and feeling like you have played an important role
in a very challenging circumstance, you ought to feel a sense
of pride. And I think we can feel a sense of pride, you know,
that we have been willing to stick with it. That does make it
frustrating.
You alluded, Ambassador Dobbins, to Iraqi Foreign Minister
Zabari, and I was him this weekend, and--just to expand on this
a little bit--I was at a security dialogue in Bahrain, this
weekend, and--the Iraqi Foreign Minister Zabari was publicly
saying, ``I have told President Karzai, `Do not bluff the
Americans. The Americans were willing to stay in Iraq. We told
them we did not want them. And we wish we had not told them
that now, 2 years later. We wish the Americans had stayed in
Iraq.' '' And he has met directly, as you indicated, with
President Karzai, and he said, ``Do not think you can bluff
them, and do not be foolish enough to think that, if they
depart, your life is going to be better. Your life is going to
be worse.'' And so, that is what makes this moment a
frustrating one.
I am kind of curious about your--each of your sense about
this--the election campaign coming up, and how this issue of
the BSA could play into it. Assume that Karzai does not change
his position and he keeps taking the position that, ``I am not
going to do anything; it is for the next person.'' My initial
thought was, I would be very worried that the role of the
United States, or the role of the international partners in the
BSA, and the economic aid, being part of an election campaign
would not be a good thing. It would seem like it would be
preferable to get that resolved and have the election campaign
proceed with the candidates making their cases with that as
sort of an issue that has already been resolved. But, I guess I
kind of have now--I am questioning my own sense about whether
that would be a good thing or a bad thing.
If Karzai does not--if he continues in his current
position, this BSA issue would have to be a major issue that
the Presidential candidates would be addressing. They are
addressing it in talk shows in 78 TV channels. How would that
play out over the course of an election campaign, based on your
experience? And would that likely be a positive, or would it
be, as I initially thought, a negative?
Ambassador Dobbins. I think it would cut two ways. I think,
first of all, most of the candidates would endorse the BSA and
promise to sign it. Several have already done so. It is
possible that all of them would. So, the future of the BSA
might not, in fact, be an issue in the campaign in the sense
that all the candidates, or at least all the serious
candidates, might well converge on a single position.
I think that the uncertainty attached to the future of the
international commitment, on the other hand, would tend to,
as--you know, in threatening environments, people tend to
converge on their ethnic identities, on strongmen who can
protect them. It polarizes already divided societies. And so--
and, you know, in the current environment, they have had--this
is the third Presidential election, and they have had two
parliamentary elections. And, you know, if you lose the
election, you just go into comfortable opposition. You still
have a seat in the Parliament, you still get paid, you are
still in the patronage world, you are not excluded.
You know, if Afghanistan's going back to the 1990s, you
lose an election, you go into exile or get killed. I mean, it
is a different ball game. It is the winner-takes-all-and-never-
gives-it-up, and the losers, you know, are losers for life,
unless they spark a revolution. But, you do not want that kind
of thinking. You want it something in which the losers accept
the results and say, ``It is okay, we will try again next time,
and, in the meantime, please make sure that I get my share of
the patronage, by the way,'' you know, which is what a lot of
this is all about.
So, high levels of anxiety, indecision about the future, I
think could have a very divisive effect, even if the BSA itself
is not a point of contention. That is what I would be concerned
with.
Larry.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Sampler.
Mr. Sampler. The only thing I would add is, I think
President Karzai is demonstrating, in his resistance to sign
the BSA, the distance between his opinions and public opinion,
and the other candidates. And it might threaten his role as
kingmaker. He sees himself very much as the father of the state
and as a kingmaker in Afghanistan, and I think it would weaken,
in some ways, the persona of President Karzai as the spokesman
of the Afghan people.
But, the thing that concerns me more is the hedging that
Ambassador Dobbins mentioned earlier. Any uncertainty--and in
the elections, the uncertainty may be demonstrated by hedging,
particularly on the provincial elections. Remember, we are
having two elections in April, both the Presidential and
provincial. And the provincial elections are where the local
contesting warlords or powerbrokers go kind of head-to-head to
represent their communities.
And I think Ambassador Dobbins is exactly right when he
says that the population in this area, if there is this
continued uncertainty, will be inclined to go back to what they
have always known. And that is not necessarily what we see as
best for the future of Afghanistan. We want them looking at
progressive new ways to achieve representation.
Senator Kaine. And again, I was not sure I completely
understood this, until your testimony, but it is important for
us to grapple with it, make sure I get this right.
The progress of the Bilateral Security Agreement has a
direct impact also on the promises of economic aid by the--you
know, the 70-plus nations that have been part of it. It may not
be the same document, but the absence of a Bilateral Security
Agreement is going to cause serious concern by any party that
is thinking, on the international level, about putting economic
aid into Afghanistan.
Ambassador Dobbins. I think there is a couple of impacts.
And, again, I will ask Larry to elaborate. But, you know, one
is that if we do not have troops, we will not have diplomatic
representation. It is conceivable, under the worse of
circumstances, that we could not even have an embassy if the
country really does, you know, descend into serious civil
conflict. I mean, we left in 1989. We might face a situation,
particularly post-Benghazi, when the risk tolerance is so low,
where you would face a very difficult dilemma. But, let us not
go there, for the moment.
Even if you had an embassy, the embassy would largely be
Kabul-centric. You would not be able to get out into the
provinces. And so, your ability to oversee and assure that
Congress and other Parliaments that the money was being
properly spent would be somewhat circumscribed in a no-BSA
world.
But, secondly, you know, you can make an intellectual case
that, even with no troops, you should still have the same
amount of nonmilitary assistance, maybe even more.
Senator Kaine. Right.
Ambassador Dobbins. But, you tell me. My judgment is: no
troops, no aid, or almost no aid, that the political support
for the aid comes from the military presence. The people see,
``This is important.'' We have got, you know, 5-10,000 troops,
whatever it is. ``This must still be an important place, and
that is why we have a big aid program.'' If we do not have any
troops, I think it is going to be much more difficult, also,
for you to justify and secure the number of votes that will be
needed for the civilian aid program. But, you know this more
than I do.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Sampler.
Mr. Sampler. Yes, I have the benefit of executing, within a
policy envelope dictated by Ambassador Dobbins and Ambassador
Cunningham and, of course, the Congress and the President,
within that envelope, if there were no BSA and there were a
decision to continue the program, it would be incredibly
challenging. USAID staff around the world are devoted to doing
the best they can for people in desperate situations, but it
requires some measure of access, and it requires some measure
of, not just physical access, but political freedom to
maneuver. And I think not having a BSA--and I am just
speculating, but--we would lose that freedom to maneuver, so it
would be incredibly challenging to try to implement programs in
that environment.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chair--but, one last thing I would just like to
put on the table. This is really out of an Armed Services
perspective, than Foreign Relations, but it ties, that we are
dealing, right now, with whether we will be able to pass an
NDAA, National Defense Authorizing Act, by the end of 2013. And
one of the reasons we need to is, there are some expiring
authorities in that act, that expire on December 31, that, if
we do not act before the end of the year--two, in particular,
touch on Afghanistan; there are some others that touch on it
more generally--but, there is currently programmed into the
Defense appropriation spending for reintegration activities in
Afghanistan to reintegrate former Taliban and other members
back into civil society. That is funded, but that funding
expires on December 31 unless we pass an NDAA. And, similarly,
any military member that is engaged in hostile fire is entitled
to hazardous pay, under the current appropriations bill. That
authority expires on December 31 if we do not pass an NDAA, and
that could affect us, as well.
So, these are important issues, just in the FRC status, but
there is also another item on the table right now in the Senate
that has a significant bearing upon the kind of stability
activities that we want, going forward. And so, it is my hope
that the body will act with dispatch on that NDAA, as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Let me ask you two final questions. We have touched, here,
in various iterations, on the election process, which is, I
think, very important for the future of Afghanistan. And
everyone who I speak to tells me that security is their major
concern, or the highest concern with reference to the
elections. What can be done to address the issue of ghost
polling stations in insecure areas? And what about the issue of
security for women's polling stations, which could hinder the
ability of Afghan women to vote? Could insufficient security at
polling stations impact the legitimacy of this election for the
Afghan people?
Ambassador Dobbins. I had a briefing on election
preparations, from ISAF when I was there last Thursday, and
they were pretty positive about the degree to which the Afghans
are taking responsibility for this, are coordinating
effectively. They are engaged--the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Interior are engaged, at quite high levels, with
the president of the Election Commission. The president of the
Election Commission is clearly in charge and not hesitant about
exercising that authority. ISAF will, of course, be prepared,
within its limited capabilities. I think we will have about
34,000 troops there--ISAF troops there. I guess that is--the
figure is American troops in--when the election takes place, in
April--to provide some of the assets that will be needed--
helicopter lift and a few other things.
They have plans to secure all the polling stations,
different levels of commitment, in terms of police and soldiers
for each polling station, depending on the level of threat. I
think there are three or four districts where they have decided
they are simply not going to be able to have polling stations.
These tend to be quite unpopulated areas, lightly populated
areas. They seem to be pretty confident that they are going to
be able to conduct the election in the vast majority of the
country.
Larry.
Mr. Sampler. Yes, Senator, the important metric to keep in
mind, too, is Afghan expectations. I mean, the Afghans
understand the problems with women polling stations much better
than we do. And I think, basing on the 2004 and then the 2009
elections, we are on track to meet the Afghan expectations.
That is not to say that we are taking this problem for
granted. While I cannot assure you that it will be resolved
completely, I can assure you that the U.S. Government and the
international community are devoting significant resources
specifically to empowering women in these elections--as I
mentioned in my remarks, focusing on ways for women to network
and campaign together, focusing on training women searchers,
women polling-station observers, and women polling-station
workers. Those are things that, through the United Nations
Development Programme Election Assistance Team and through the
Independent Election Commission, we actually think we will be
better off this year than we have been in previous elections.
The Chairman. Well, I am glad to hear that last statement,
because I appreciate the nature and understanding of the Afghan
expectation, but I would hope that our expectation would be, to
the extent feasible, as high as possible, and that we would be
working toward that.
Mr. Sampler. No, Senator, it certainly is. When I mentioned
resources we have devoted to this, what I meant was that the
bar that we would accept and that the international community
would accept is probably not going to be reached, but that
gives us something to strive for so that the resources and the
efforts we are putting into it will show some sign of success.
The Chairman. Let me ask two final questions, then,
concerning women, a topic on which we have had a fair amount of
discussion here. We have cited all of the great forward
movement, which we should all be thankful for and supportive
of, but it seems to me that we have seen some backsliding in
this regard, particularly when I see the lower House of the
Afghan Parliament trying to weaken the landmark Elimination of
Violence Against Women law, and the U.N. releasing a report
which indicated that only 7 percent of registered incidents of
violent crimes against women went through a judicial process
using that law. So, what steps does the Department intend to
make to relay to the Afghan Government that we are looking for
a vigorous implementation of the law, post-2014?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, we, of course, work directly with
the Parliament on legislation of this matter, and bring our
concerns directly to the attention of individual
parliamentarians. I believe that they have not succeeded in
weakening the law you talked about, at this point, although the
threat to do so is there, and it is still, as I recall,
enforced by decree rather than by legislation.
The Chairman. Well, even without passing the weakened
legislation, the fact is that only 7 percent of violent crime
goes through a process envisioned by the law. I am just
wondering--you know, laws are great but not unless we actually
enforce them. So I hope that, with all the resources and
efforts we are putting in here, that we are making it clear, as
part of our continuing relationship, that the enforcement of
the law is critically important.
Ambassador Dobbins. Right, absolutely. And clearly we have
programs designed to support both the effectiveness of the
police and judiciary, in general, as well as in this specific
area. I do not know what proportion of violent crimes, in
general, end up going through the judiciary in Afghanistan. It
may not be any higher than the figure you cited for----
The Chairman. Well, we would be interested in getting
feedback from you on that.
Finally, for Mr. Sampler, I understand that AID uses third-
party monitoring techniques in many countries in the world, and
sometimes they are the primary means of evaluating a program.
But, given the environment in Afghanistan, there is a lot of
skepticism about relying on third-party monitoring. Can you
discuss, to what extent you are using that type of monitoring
and evaluation in Afghanistan, how they are being implemented,
and--I think this is an area that the SIGAR suggested there
will be an audit of. So, I would like to get a preview of that
before I see the SIGAR's report.
Mr. Sampler. Certainly, Senator. Would you mind if I added
something onto the Violence Against Women issue before I enter
into that?
The Chairman. Not at all.
Mr. Sampler. The Elimination of Violence Against Women law
is one of the key elements of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework. That is a multilateral international donor
commitment to the Government of Afghanistan that, as they
demonstrate progress on several hard deliverables, we would
reciprocate and recognize that. The passage of the law and the
reporting, by province, of violence against women, are two of
the hard deliverables that they have not yet met. The United
States, bilaterally, has attached incentive funding to those
two actions, and there is money in the pot that will not go to
the Government of Afghanistan unless and until they accomplish
those. And in my last meeting with Minister of Finance
Zakhilwal, he is very keen to see these funds released. And
Finance Minister Zakhilwal agreed that he would begin to use
his influence within the Government of Afghanistan to help
these things move forward. And what it does is, it gives the
ministers and the Government of Afghanistan some political
capital and an incentive to literally do things that are
politically hard to do. So, we are focused on that, and we are
making sure that the Afghans understand our insistence on
progress.
But, if I could note--I mean, again, having worked there
since 2002, I am thrilled that there is an elected Government
in Afghanistan that is debating laws. We may not like, right
now, where they are in the debate, but at least we now have
partners that we can engage with in a normal Westphalian-sort-
of-state way and to influence, because we did not have that for
the longest time.
With respect to your question about third-party monitoring,
the first point that I would make is, unfortunately, third-
party monitoring has entered the arena of public thought with a
very heavy negative connotation. Third-party monitoring is what
we do all over the world. I am an electrical engineer by
training in university, and studied physics. I would not be
able to go out to a health program in Afghanistan, for example,
as a U.S. Government direct hire and provide USAID meaningful
information on the successful implementation of that program.
So, what we do, whether it is Afghanistan or Honduras or other
hard places like Pakistan and South Sudan, is, we hire
competent professionals who go and do that work for us. So, in
every case around the world, I literally do not believe there
is a single mission in the world that would not use some form
of third-party monitoring.
Having said that, Afghanistan is different, both with
respect to scale of the problem, the complexity of the problem,
and the security situation and the restricted movements,
because what we do have in Honduras is the ability for a U.S.
Government direct hire to jump in a car and ride out and kick
the tires on a project.
The Chairman. Right. Well, I am not against all third-party
monitoring. That is not what I suggested in my question. My----
Mr. Sampler. I am sorry.
The Chairman [continuing]. Question concerns, specifically,
third-party monitoring as it relates to an environment such as
Afghanistan.
Mr. Sampler. Right.
The Chairman. To what degree are you doing it in
Afghanistan, and what are the challenges you face, or are you
doing more direct monitoring, without a third party, through
AID?
Mr. Sampler. No, what we have done is--our contract
officers, who hold the warrant to approve or disprove payments,
have to have a certain amount of information about the program.
And how we provide them that information is, in Afghanistan,
something of an adventure and something of a challenge. What we
have come up with is multiple layers that provide that
information. On the one hand, partners self-report; they have
quarterly and even, some case, weekly reporting requirements.
That information goes into USAID's Afghanistan Info database.
We hire third-party monitors, and we correlate the information
that third-party monitors provide against that which the
partners have provided. We have, in the past, used ISAF to go
out and validate that a particular project is ongoing, and even
to provide photographic evidence. We have used technology, such
as overflights with photographs, of large agricultural
projects. Flying a plane over and taking a photograph is the
best way, sometimes, to measure progress.
And then, for other programs, social programs, such as
making sure that schoolteachers get paid out in these remote
districts, we are using SMS technology, where we actually
interrogate the SMS network of schoolteachers and say, ``Did
you get your paycheck?'' And then we get feedback in that way
from the teachers, themselves, saying they did or did not get
paid.
So, the answer to your question is, really, we are being
innovative and creative in Afghanistan in ways we have not
necessarily been forced to innovate or create in other
countries, but we are devoted to making sure that that
contracting officer, who, to put you in his or her shoes, is
probably a 28- to 34-year-old young professional with USAID
with enormous responsibility to say, ``Pay the bill'' or ``Do
not pay the bill.'' We want them to have all the information
they need. And if ever a contract officer raises her hand or
his hand and says, ``Wait a minute, I am not confident that I
have got what I need,'' we stop that program.
The Chairman. Well, I am going to cease here, but my
concern is, for us to continue to be supportive of the type of
money that we are pumping into a country like Afghanistan, with
all the challenges we have already talked about, we are going
to need to have some sense of our ability to assess what we are
succeeding at, what our delivery system is doing, what the
effects are, exactly. Because when we have to respond to the
American taxpayer, they are going to want to know. And
inevitably, when we get into an area--although I think AID does
a pretty good job across the spectrum beyond Afghanistan--but,
inevitably, when we read a story from a report like the
SIGAR's, that suggests that we are just missing the ball--and I
am saying we will see that--it is a real consequence to the
policy opportunities here, so that is why I actually want to
pursue this different hearing in a broader context with AID, in
general. I am a big supporter of AID, but we also have to have
accountability to be able to continue to have that flow of
support, whether in Afghanistan or beyond.
Now, I have gotten my questions in that I wanted to ask,
and I have bought time for Senator Flake to get here. So, with
that--oh, and Senator McCain--and so, with that, Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. All right, thank you.
I appreciate the testimony. I am sorry I was not here to
hear it, but I have reviewed some of it.
Ambassador Dobbins, you have talked about, in your
testimony, that Russia and China, India, and Pakistan have all
personally urged Karzai to conclude the BSA, because they
recognize that instability is not to their benefit, either.
What assistance are those countries planning to provide over
the course of the agreement, over the next 10 years? Are we the
only ones on the hook for assistance, moving ahead, both
military and economic and otherwise?
Ambassador Dobbins. No, Senator. I mean, they vary. In
terms of assistance levels, India has a pretty substantial
assistance program, substantial for, itself, a developing
country. China has some significant investments in Afghanistan.
There are about 70 countries that are part of either the ISAF
coalition or--such as Japan, for instance--provide significant
economic assistance. And, as I said in--earlier--one of the
reasons that we believe that the Bilateral Security Agreement
needs to be concluded as soon as possible is so that that
coalition, a really substantial coalition of substantial
countries who are making substantial commitments, commitments
to pay the Afghan Armed Forces--I think we anticipate that
about 20 percent would come from other allies--it does not
begin to deteriorate, that countries do not begin dropping out,
that they do not use the excuse that, ``The Afghans do not seem
to want us, the Afghan President seems ambivalent about whether
we should stay,'' to not fulfill commitments that they have
made over the years, and not to continue to participate. But,
Larry can probably tell you what proportion of economic
assistance comes from non-American countries, but if you
include the international financial institutions, I think we
are well less than half.
Senator Flake. All right. Well, Mr. Sampler, let me kind of
go along that route. Ten years from now, why should we have any
more confidence that the economy will be able to sustain the
government any more than it is now? I realize you need
security, and we know those arguments, certainly. But, when you
look at Afghanistan right now, you are hard-pressed to look at
an area or a sector of the economy that will step up, in the
next 10 years, to actually replace some of the revenue that we
are providing now. Why should we feel any differently?
Mr. Sampler. Senator, I will give you two examples, a
specific and more general.
The specific example is the proliferation of small and
medium enterprises in Afghanistan. And I wish I could take full
credit for this, but I have to say, this is just ordinary
decent capitalistic activity. As the population in Afghanistan
becomes more educated, and as they move from the rural to the
urban centers, there are markets that were not there before.
And it has been our experience that small and medium
enterprises generate a lot of the economic activity that will
sustain GDP.
And there are sectors in Afghanistan, if we could take you
to Herat, where the mining industry is actually doing quite
well, and Herati marble now is being exported to Italy; up in
Mazar-e Sharif, there are value chains around some of the
agricultural sectors, that the north has a strength in, that
they are preparing and then shipping, to the Central Asian
states, some of their agricultural products.
The general answer I will give you is: we, just last month,
launched a new program, called the Afghanistan Trade and
Revenue Program, and it is focusing on generating trade by
working in the region, not just in Afghanistan--to your point,
Mr. Chairman, about regional integration--it works in the
region to lower real and perceived tariffs to regional trade.
So, we are trying to find ways for Afghans, not just to export
their apples to Pakistan, where they turn them into juice and
ship them back, but to help the Afghans build a value chain so
that they are packaging their own juice and then shipping it
across the region. It also has a component which is increasing
revenue, and that is to help the customs officials at the
borders and the Government of Afghanistan collect the revenues
and then put them into their coffers.
And one of the points that I focus on with Minister
Zakhilwal: If Afghanistan is able to achieve WTO accession in
the next couple of years--and this program will support that--
WTO accession has, historically, in the situation of countries
like Afghanistan, generated a 4- to 5-percent increase in GDP
for the first 5 years, so a net gain of GDP of 20 percent
before it flattens out. That will not completely make up for
the GDP that has been lost by the military drawdown, but it
will help to offset it, and it will put Afghanistan back on a
more stable glidepath of what we would consider a transitioning
or developing country.
Senator Flake. All due respect, that was--you are talking
about--and I have been there, and I recognize some of that is
going on--that is on the very margins, in terms of what is
going to be needed to sustain government. And it is a pretty
bleak picture, in my view.
We did a study, when I was in the House on one of the
committees, about the trucking contracts that are currently in
force, moving goods between military bases, and we contract
with local Afghans to do that. I think, at least count, that
was about 20 percent of the Afghan economy, just trucking
contracts that we are paying for to move goods around.
When that goes away, it just tells you how much--it is an
indication to me of how much the economy just relies so much by
our presence. And that is why it is still so startling that
Karzai is resisting this BSA. So, I do not pretend to
understand that, but I just think we have spent a lot of money
there, obviously--$683 billion, total, in Afghanistan, and in
military and economic aid, and that for a promise that some of
this might hold up after we withdraw. It is a tough pill to
swallow for those of us who are going to be asked to authorize
and appropriate additional funding over the next 10 years. And
so, I just want some sense of why we should think that, 10
years from now, we will be in a better position than we are
right now, and if--or we will be having this same argument, 10
years from now, and being asked to extend another agreement
that will provide a lot more funding. Can you give me any more
comfort than----
Mr. Sampler. Senator, I mean, 10 years is a good lens. I
mean, I think, 10 years from now, we will begin to see some
return on the investments in the mineral wealth of Afghanistan.
That is something that has a fairly long development period. As
Ambassador Dobbins was saying, one of the consequences of the
hedging that goes on in Afghanistan because of the lack of a
BSA and the lack of clarity, going forward, is the development
of the tenders, and the development of the ministerial capacity
to let tenders for the mineral wealth of Afghanistan, is
challenged. But, if we can get those tenders out, then 7 to 8
to 10 years after those tenders are let, Afghanistan should be
able to see a return on that investment.
Afghanistan is not, in 10 years, going to be a Sweden; we
are hoping for a Bangladesh. The focus is on the lines of
governance that will allow Afghanistan, in modest ways, to
incrementally improve. And 10 years is a good first step.
Development workers typically think it takes 10 years to get to
the next stage of development. So, I do not mean to be overly
optimistic, but, when I work with my staff, one of our founding
principles is that Afghanistan will survive; what it will look
like 10 years from now is largely up to the Afghans to
determine, and we want to make sure that we are giving them the
kinds of assistance and the kinds of technical support that
they need, that that is as positive a scenario as it can be in
10 years.
Ambassador Dobbins. Let me just add----
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ambassador Dobbins [continuing]. Briefly, Senator, that a
lot will depend on, you know, whether Afghanistan faces the
same security challenge 10 years from now that it faces today.
The largest driver of the Afghan budget is the security costs,
and the largest focus of American assistance is helping pay
some of those security costs.
We do have programs across the region to increase regional
integration. To the extent these countries become tied together
economically--and they are becoming tied together more
economically--their incentives to interfere, to allow their
territory to be used to destabilize Afghanistan, which has
always been the weakest country of the region, the one most
susceptible to outside interference--will diminish and
Afghanistan will face less of a security challenge.
Probably more than anything else, this will depend on
whether Pakistan, over the next decade, is able to gain control
of its own territory, particularly its border regions, and stop
allowing that territory to be used to destabilize Afghanistan.
If those things happen--and I think 10 years is a period
during which it is reasonable to hope they will happen, it is
reasonable to plan on them happening--then I think
Afghanistan's capacity to otherwise fund its own government
operations may be--you know, it may be--they may be capable,
within their own resources, at that point.
Senator Flake. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
the witnesses.
If I heard your last comment right, you think that they
will be able to fund their own government and functions of
government, Ambassador?
Ambassador Dobbins. Within a decade?
Senator McCain. Yes.
Ambassador Dobbins. Assuming that they are not facing an
insurgency; yes.
Senator McCain. Is not about 95 percent of their economy,
right now, USAID assistance funding?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well no, it is not that high. It is
certainly significant; and it is not just United States, of
course.
Senator McCain. Of course. But, it is foreign aid, it is
not their own economy. Where do they rank--where does
Afghanistan rank in the world estimate of corruption? I believe
it is at the bottom.
Ambassador Dobbins. It is. Well, I think there are two
other countries, but yes.
Senator McCain. Two other countries. I understand and have
paid close attention to the problem we have with President
Karzai on the signing of the BCA--excuse me--the strategic--the
BSA. Have we announced what size of the force we are going to
leave behind, yet?
Ambassador Dobbins. No. We had intended, assuming that the
BSA was concluded this year, to announce that early next year.
Senator McCain. Why would we not want to define, for the
Afghan people and maybe for the Congress, what those roles and
missions would be for 2014 and even beyond, so that they would
know, maybe Congress might want to know? And are we not seeing
a repeat of what happened in Iraq? And your and my version of
what happened in Iraq may differ. But, since I was there on the
ground, I will challenge any other interpretation than what
happened with Senator Graham and Senator Lieberman and I when
Maliki had agreed to have a U.S. troop presence, and we never,
ever gave them a decent number until, in the words of General
Dempsey, it cascaded down to 3,500, and then the Iraqis decided
it was not worth it, and now we are seeing everything unravel
in Iraq. Why in the world would we not tell the Afghans and the
American people what size of residual force we want there and
what their roles and missions would be?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, I think that is a good point,
Senator. I am not suggesting we should not. Frankly, President
Karzai's unwillingness to sign an agreement that he--the text
of which is fully agreed, and which he asked the Loya Jirga to
endorse, is a new problem. In other words, we did not
anticipate that he was going to ask the Loya Jirga to endorse
this and then, at the conclusion of that meeting, announce that
he was not going to sign it until the end of his term of
office. So, we are grappling with that. Our assumption had been
that this was, in fact, going to be signed by the end of the
year, at which point, within a few weeks, we could make the
announcement you have suggested. We are now grappling with the
uncertainty, the possibility that it may take a lot longer to
get this agreement concluded. As I said in my opening
testimony, I believe, based on my own visit there, that there
is no serious doubt that the Afghan people do want us and that
we will eventually get a BSA, but we may not get it within the
timeframe we anticipate, in which case, we will have to face
exactly the issue that you have raised, and make a decision.
Senator McCain. We should face the issue before, so that
the Afghan people know what our commitment is, Ambassador. And,
by not doing so, you are making a very, very serious mistake
and a repeat of the movie we saw in Iraq. And so, I understand
why, to some degree--not very much, but to some degree--why
President Karzai is waffling around. Because he does not know
what our commitment is. And why we will not announce what our
commitment would be is--defies imagination. And there are many
of us that know that if you get below a certain number, then
that force spends its time defending itself. And for months and
months and months, some of us have been arguing strenuously,
say, ``Tell them what our commitment is. Tell them what the
roles and missions are,'' and maybe Karzai will not be quite as
paranoid as he is today.
So, I blame Karzai for a lot of it, but I can also, from
his viewpoint, see that, since we have not even told him what
our commitment and roles and missions are, that he would be, at
least to some degree, uncertain of the degree of our
commitment.
Is it true that Karzai recently agreed to a long-term
friendship and cooperation plan with the Iranian Government?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, let me address the first part of
your question first, and then I will come to that.
I do not know that you and I have any disagreement on the
utility of announcing the size and scope of our presence. So, I
am not taking issue with you on----
Senator McCain. Then one would wonder why the
administration has not.
Ambassador Dobbins. What I would say is that President
Karzai has shown absolutely no interest in the size of the
forces, or indeed the scale of our aid budget. He----
Senator McCain. Well, he shows an interest, in my
conversations with him. He showed one that we wanted to know,
in my conversations with him. Maybe he has not with you, but he
certainly has with me. But, go ahead.
Ambassador Dobbins [continuing]. He certainly knows--I
mean, the Bilateral Security Agreement defines, in excruciating
detail, the functions that our forces would undertake. What he
does not know, but has not pressed us on, is the exact scale of
that commitment; that is, how many troops would be involved.
So, I can attribute a number of explanations to his behavior;
some are consistent with what he has said, some are just
speculation. I do not think that our failure to specify a
number actually is a factor in his decisionmaking, which is not
to say that I disagree with your more general point on that.
On the Iran--what--as I understand it--all he and the
Iranians have agreed is that they should negotiate such an
agreement, which has yet to be--there is not even a text of it,
in other words. I mean, it is just, ``Yes, let us negotiate
such an agreement.'' He has negotiated these with a number of
the neighbors. He visits Tehran once or twice a year, ever
since he came into office. He is going on to visit India, a
much more important relationship for him, in 3 days. He is
visiting Turkey shortly thereafter. So, as I said earlier in
the testimony, although I am not particularly happy about this,
I would not attach too much importance to it.
Senator McCain. Well, I thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me--you may have
already said it, responded--the status of negotiations with the
Taliban?
Ambassador Dobbins. There is nothing, really, new to
report. I said that President Karzai has articulated two
conditions for signing the BSA, both of which seem, to us, to
be somewhat unrealistic. One is that we somehow produce a
formal, open, publicly acknowledged Afghan Government/Taliban
peace process before the BSA has concluded, to which I have
responded that I do not see that the Taliban have much
incentive to facilitate signature of the BSA, and so I was not
sure that articulating that linkage advanced his desire; nor
was it, in my judgment, likely that we would be able to do that
in the few months that remain before the elections, although we
support, in principle and in practice, a reconciliation
process, and have spent several years trying to persuade the
Taliban to talk to the Afghan Government. And so, we are
perfectly prepared to continue.
He has also asked for a cessation of all U.S. and NATO
military operations involving the entry into Afghan homes, even
when accompanied by Afghan forces, and even when led by Afghan
forces, which, you know, almost amounts to a cease-fire, you
know, a one-sided cease-fire, in terms of the effort to deal
with this ongoing threat. Now, we have provided assurances, in
the BSA and in a separate assurance from President Obama, that
we will take seriously the sanctity of Afghan homes, as we do
homes in the United States, that we recognize the importance of
both privacy and safety in one's home. And we are prepared to
continue to do that, and to intensify it in the future. But, so
far, that has not satisfied him.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Thank you both for your service.
Pakistan. As we draw down in Afghanistan, what pressures
could that put on Pakistan, in terms of instability or breeding
grounds for insurgent groups?
Ambassador Dobbins. I think a lot will depend on how this
goes. I mean, if it goes as we hope it will go, with a
continued American and NATO military commitment, with continued
substantial assistance to Afghanistan, and--on the one hand--
and, on the other hand, continued improvement in the Pakistan/
Afghan relationship--and there has been a marked improvement
over the last 2 or 3 months--then I think it will become
somewhat easier for Pakistan to begin to stabilize its own
border regions.
You can easily have a different analysis, in which we
withdraw more comprehensively, there is less or none of a NATO
military advise-and-assist presence, international assistance
begins to diminish, all of Afghanistan's neighbors, not just
Pakistan, begin the typical hedging behavior of all--looking
for factions to support, and the factions, the warlords, the
regional commanders, the powerbrokers, begin to maneuver, not
within a constitutional system of checks and balances and--you
go into opposition but you get a chance to come back 4 years
from now, but in a much more--you know, a much more brutal
arena. Under those situations, I think it is quite possible
that the border regions of Afghanistan would begin to be even
more of a safe haven for anti-Pakistani terrorists than they
already are. And, of course, the regions of Pakistan become an
even greater safe haven for terrorists and extremists that want
to----
Senator Markey. And so, are we taking steps to ensure that
there is security along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as we
begin to draw down? What are those steps--are there contingency
plans that we are putting together? And I would add that there
could be a refugee exodus out of Afghanistan into Pakistan that
could have a destabilizing impact, as well. Could you deal with
those issues relating to security along the border?
Ambassador Dobbins. The--I mean, our primary method of
dealing this, for the moment, is to try to conclude the
Bilateral Security Agreement, provide the Afghans an assurance
that the international commitment is going to be sustained
beyond 2014, and to be able to conduct an election campaign and
the selection of a new President within a security blanket, if
you will, that the future is not going to be turned to the
1990s, but is going to be continuity of the progress that they
have made over the last decade.
We do not want to see an outflow of refugees. Millions have
come back over the last decade, and we do not want to see that
flow reversed.
We have worked carefully with the new Pakistan Government
to try to promote better relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Part of what Pakistan is proposing is a much more
substantial cooperative border regime. The Afghans, of course,
do not accept it as a legitimate border, but essentially a
regime, along that line, which would better regulate the some-
60,000 people who go back and forth every day across that line.
The Pakistanis seem serious about moving toward a more
substantial regime, more checkpoints, more biometric data to
make sure you know who is moving back and forth, that kind of
thing. It is going to take time to put those kinds of things in
place, but they have at least agreed to begin talking about
that.
Clearly, our ability to directly impact security on the
border is going to be somewhat diminished as our own forces go
down, but part of the residual force we are talking about is a
small counterterrorism force which would operate almost
exclusively partnered with Afghan forces and would be directed
very much at the insecurity and militancy that grows up in the
border region.
Senator Markey. If I can move over to Iran--again, in this
meeting with Rouhani and Karzai, reportedly they talked about
an economic, security, and political strengthening of their
relationship. Especially as we pull back, it does create
opportunities for Iran to move in.
What is it that you are concerned about, if anything, in a
relationship between Iran and Afghanistan becoming closer?
Where might our interests actually coincide with Iran--and
where might they diverge with Iran, in terms of what their
objectives might be in the next several years?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, that is a good question. I mean,
Iran has always had a pretty substantial aid program for
Afghanistan. I remember, in the first Donor Conference, in
2002, the Iranian commitment was actually larger than the
American commitment. They have also had a positive relationship
with Karzai, even under the worst of the Iranian governments.
They, on the other hand, have also provided arms and money to
the Taliban--in small measure, nothing like what flows from the
Pakistan side. But, they have played both sides of the fence.
They collaborated with the United States, back in 2001,
after
9/11, because they did not like the Taliban. They almost went
to war with the Taliban. The Taliban were suppressing the Shia
minority in Afghanistan. They had something like 4 million
refugees that they wanted to go back into Afghanistan; I think
about 2 million of them have gone back, so far. And they have a
big drug problem flowing out of Afghanistan. So, the driver of
their continuing to flirt with the Taliban is that it is a way
of demonstrating to the United States that they would have
avenues to make our life miserable if we got into a military
conflict with them. If that becomes less difficult, their
interests in Afghanistan are likely to coincide more with ours.
Senator Markey. And has Iran in any way tried to undermine
this bilateral security agreement?
Ambassador Dobbins. Yes.
Senator Markey. They have.
Ambassador Dobbins. They have argued against it. And they
are the only country that argues----
Senator Markey. And they are arguing against it because--
what would be their response to it, if it is finalized? And how
do we expect them to respond to an agreement that they do not
agree with?
Ambassador Dobbins. They will live with it if it gets--if
and when; because I think it will be concluded--their argument
against it is, they are against foreign troops in the region.
They had the same position with respect to Iraq, of course. And
indeed, they wish U.S. troops would leave the Persian Gulf. So,
it is not exclusive to Afghanistan. And the obvious reason is,
they do not want to be susceptible to American pressures on any
of their borders. They probably exaggerate the degree to which
Afghan bases are important to us for that particular purpose.
So, on the other hand, you know, as I have said, they have
always had a positive relationship with Karzai, a significant
aid program. Karzai goes there once or twice a year. He has
bilateral agreements, of the sort he is probably talking about
with Iran, with a number of other countries of the region. So,
I do not know that this is a particular break from the pattern
of Karzai's relations with Iran. And, of course, we are not
leaving unless we are forced to. We intend to stay and have a
significant relationship, including a significant defense
relationship with Afghanistan for a number of years to come.
Senator Markey. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio will be the final member for
questions.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. And I will be brief. I know most
of these questions have been asked and answered.
Just as an aside, I get a lot of questions from
constituents. They read the news about Karzai's behavior, they
see the sacrifices that Americans have made to bring freedom
and stability to Afghanistan, and they ask, ``Why are we
involved? Why don't we just pick up and go?'' I think you have
probably answered this question, certainly in your opening
statement, but just to confirm it.
If the United States were to pursue the zero option,
completely withdraw, or even if we were to withdraw,
potentially, to a level below a certain number, would it be
safe to say that, between 18 and 24 months, we would see,
potentially, all-out civil war and perhaps even the return of
al-Qaeda and the Taliban to Afghanistan? Is that a fair
statement?
Ambassador Dobbins. I think that would be a real risk. I
think Afghanistan has come a long way. Its armed forces have
come a long way, but they continue to be dependent on the
United States and United States allies for training, advice,
assistance, some enabling capabilities, and, in particular, for
financing. And Afghanistan, as a whole, is a weak state
surrounded by more powerful states. If those states perceived
that the international community was eliminating or reducing
dramatically its commitment to Afghanistan, they would begin to
change their own behavior. At the moment--with the exception of
Iran--Russia, India, Pakistan, and China have all argued with
Karzai that he ought to sign the BSA.
So, at the moment, we have the international--the regional
consensus is reinforcing stability in Afghanistan. That could
change. Afghans would become more uncertain, more anxious. In
those kinds of situations, societies generally polarize around
powerful figures, around ethnic leaders, warlords, military
commanders, people who they think can protect them, and you
would begin to see the kind of fragmentation that are you are
seeing already in Iraq.
Senator Rubio. But, so far, it has not been signed. We have
given them--the administration's position is, if it is not
signed by the end of 2013, they will have to begin planning for
the zero option. If, in fact, Karzai does not sign, or decides
to leave it for the next President to sign, what are our
options, at that point, if, in fact, it is not signed or agreed
to by either Karzai or his successor?
Ambassador Dobbins. Well, you know, I think--and, I think,
in answering your constituents, you should argue that we cannot
let one man be the bellwether for Afghanistan's attitudes
toward the United States or desire to have us continue the
commitment. It is clear, after the Loya Jirga in which 2,500
influential Afghans from all over the country strongly and
overwhelmingly endorsed conclusion of the Bilateral Security
Agreement and asked to be concluded by the end of the year,
that there is no serious doubt that the Afghans want us to
stay. Having just come back from a visit there last week, I do
not think there is any serious doubt that a bilateral
securement will eventually be concluded. There are a lot of
costs for delaying it until next summer, for instance, and we
are not advocating that. We are, in fact, underlining the risks
and the costs of delay, in terms of diminished international
support and increased anxiety and fragmentation among the
Afghan people.
We have said that, in the absence of an agreement by the
end of the year, we will have to begin planning for not having
an agreement. But, as I said in my written testimony, plans are
not decisions, and we are not about to make a decision----
Senator Rubio. Well, Secretary Kerry has said that someone
other than Karzai could sign on behalf of the Afghans. Is this
the current position of the administration?
Ambassador Dobbins. Say that again, sir.
Senator Rubio. Secretary Kerry has said that someone other
than Karzai could, potentially, sign on behalf of the Afghans.
Is that him speculating or is that the official position of the
administration?
Ambassador Dobbins. Yes, I think that may have been
overinterpreted. Of course, Karzai can designate anybody he
wants to sign the agreement. We routinely have our Ambassadors
sign these agreements, or our Secretary of State. If Karzai did
not want to personally sign it, he could ask somebody else, but
it could only be signed under his authority and at his
direction, as long as he is President.
So, as I said, I think it will eventually be concluded, but
there will be a cost to delaying. And the cost will be a cost
to the Afghan people.
Senator Rubio. Well, my last question is--and this was
asked by Senator McCain, about the prospects of talks with the
Taliban. I know that is one of the conditions that Karzai has
now raised. Do we have an official list of assurances that we
are asking for before we would even consider resuming talks
with the Taliban?
Ambassador Dobbins. We have no preconditions for talks with
the Taliban. We do have a set of conditions for any agreement
that we would enter into or that we would endorse. And those
conditions are that they have to lay down their arms, accept
the Afghan Constitution. So, you know, we, in June of this
year, were about to open talks with the Taliban, and we would
be prepared to do so again, but only if they are paralleled by
a negotiation between the Taliban and the Afghan Government. I
mean, we are not going to try to negotiate peace in
Afghanistan. That is something the Afghans have to do. And the
Taliban have refused to engage the Afghan Government. And as
long as they continue that stance, it is hard to make much
progress.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony. I
think it is probably the judgment or views of, if not all, then
the majority of the members of the committee, that the sooner
that President Karzai executes this agreement, the better his
standing will be in the Senate, as well as the better our
ability to help Afghanistan enter its new chapter with success.
And I hope that, if those 70
or whatever number of stations in Afghanistan have been
reviewing or will report on this hearing, that they take away
that message. The administration seems to have an enormous
amount of patience. I am not quite sure that the Senate does as
well.
So, I look forward to the execution of the agreement as
quickly as possible, on behalf of the future Afghanistan, and
the sacrifices that have been made by Americans, both in lives
and national treasure.
With the thanks of the committee for your testimony, the
record will remain open until the close of business on
Thursday, and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Special Representative James Dobbins to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question #1. The November 2013 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) report shows that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has reached
a record high this year. Overall potential production of opium
increased by 49 percent and 19 of the country's 34 provinces are now
poppy growers, two more than last year.
The November 2013 ``Report on Progress Toward Security and
Stability in Afghanistan'' released by the Department of Defense was
very critical of U.S. efforts to eradicate poppy, particularly the
Governor Led Eradication (GLE) program, which provides development
grants based on successful eradication efforts.
Taken together, the DOD and UNODC reports reflect an apparent
growing lack of will on the part of the Afghan Government to seriously
address this issue, a paramount concern moving forward. There does not
appear to be a serious effort by the Afghan Government to pursue drug
traffickers, especially as we move into the transition year.
Please list the concrete results in counternarcotics
programming that we realistically expect to achieve in 2014 and
2015? Please focus on the anticipated results of this
programming, not program activities.
Answer. We are disappointed that UNODC has reported that
cultivation reached an all-time high in 2013. The U.S. Government has
recently published its poppy cultivation and opium production estimates
for 2013 and did not find that 2013 was a record year for cultivation.
Rather, our estimates reflect a 10-percent increase in cultivation--or
198,000 hectares under cultivation in 2013. This of course is serious
enough cause for concern.
However, cultivation is not the only indicator of progress and
commitment on counternarcotics. The Department of State, Department of
Defense, and Drug Enforcement Agency have partnered with the Afghan
Government in making strides in several key elements of the U.S. and
Afghan counternarcotics strategies. Afghanistan now has an effective
counternarcotics police force dedicated to interdicting drug networks
and arresting traffickers. The Afghan Government's central
counternarcotics court effectively processes hundreds of significant
counternarcotics cases each year. Within the last 12 months, the court
has convicted major narcotics criminals, including U.S.-designated drug
kingpin Haji Lal Jan and sentenced him to 15 years in prison. Through
programs managed by the Department's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and USAID, Afghan farmers now have
better access to resources for growing licit crops, rather than poppy.
These are the types of results that we expect to see in 2014 and
beyond, particularly with continued U.S. support for Afghan
counternarcotics institutions.
Our experience in other parts of the world has shown that
counternarcotics is a long-term effort that requires a multifaceted
approach, well integrated with broader efforts to support good
governance and sustainable economic growth. Our focus has been, and
will continue to be, to help the Afghan Government build institutions
and the political will to take on the drug trade on its own. However,
we cannot evaluate progress on the Afghan drug trade in a vacuum. There
are other factors at play. We are working to develop a strong, licit
economy that provides an alternative to the drug trade; to promote
stable government institutions; and to cultivate an Afghan security
force that can improve the security environment sufficiently to make
drug cultivation and trafficking more difficult. These areas, along
with dedicated counternarcotics efforts, will require continued U.S.
support to reduce the supply of opium in the long term.
Two points of clarification: the Governor-Led Eradication program
supported by INL reimburses the expenses of poppy eradication that have
been verified by the U.N.; it does not fund development projects. In
addition the Good Performers Initiative provides funding for
development projects in provinces that have achieved or maintained
poppy-free status, have significantly reduced poppy cultivation, or
have made significant counternarcotics efforts.
Question #2. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I am concerned
about Afghanistan's ability to raise revenue in the future. For years,
government revenue collection had steadily increased, but the World
Bank reports an 11 percent decrease in nominal terms during the first
half of 2013. In a recent report, the Bank blamed the shortfall on
``leakages and weakness in administration, particularly in customs.''
What concrete measures is the State Department taking to
improve the Afghan Government's ability to collect revenue?
Answer. We agree that Afghanistan's future depends in large part on
the ability of the Afghan Government to efficiently and transparently
collect revenues to become more self-reliant. We have been tracking
Afghan revenues very closely and using diplomacy along with assistance
to help build a sustainable revenue base and ensure the country meets
its revenue potential. Afghan revenue collection got off to a
disappointing start in 2013, due to a number of factors, including the
slowdown in economic growth, the collection of some 2013 taxes ``in
advance'' during the 2012 fiscal year, and corruption. Revenues
rebounded somewhat over the summer and early fall after the Ministry of
Finance introduced several reform measures, although the latest data
shows that revenues through the first 9 months of 2013 were still 7.4
percent below revenues from the prior year over the same period. These
results illustrate uncertainty surrounding the ongoing security and
upcoming political transitions, which has reduced investor confidence,
dampened economic growth, and reportedly led more officials to engage
in rent-seeking and corrupt behavior as they contemplate the possible
loss of their government positions post-election.
We and other donors anticipated the strain the transition would put
on the Afghan economy and have designed and implemented a number of
programs and initiatives to improve the prospects for Afghan revenue
collection by focusing on more immediate means of revenue generation as
well as longer term institutional changes that will promote sustainable
growth, at the same time closing the space for corruption. We have
focused on improving the performance of the current top revenue
generating areas--taxes and customs fees--and initiated efforts to
support the development of new sources of revenue including from
extractives and a planned value added tax. Programmatically, USAID has
begun implementing its new $78 million Afghan Trade and Revenue (ATAR)
project that will work directly with the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, and the Ministry of Finance to improve customs and border
procedures, use improved procedures and technology to reduce
corruption, complete Afghanistan's accession to the WTO, and build
fiscal capacity. The Department of State and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative have also worked closely with the Afghan
Government and are hopeful Afghanistan will be able to accede to the
WTO in 2014. Based on the experience of other countries, we expect WTO
accession will have a positive influence on GDP growth and translate
into increased revenue from business taxes and customs fees.
Additionally, USAID will continue its ongoing project supporting
electronic funds transfer that increases transparency and efficiency in
the collection of taxes and fees, as well as the distribution of
salaries and other uses of funds. USAID has been implementing a program
in the extractives sector that will help the Ministry of Mines and
Petroleum and the private sector to develop the professional skills and
transparent systems required to attract world-class investors to
exploit Afghan natural resources and generate royalties and additional
taxable economic activity. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul hosts the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection-managed Border Management Task Force,
which provides direct mentoring to Afghan border and customs officials
at three land border crossing points, inland customs depots,
international airports, both agencies' headquarters, and in the
National Customs Academy. The Embassy Borders Office helps to
coordinate various U.S. and international agencies working in
Afghanistan to improve border management.
The Department is also using a number of diplomatic initiatives to
help build a more sustainable revenue base. We and other donors are
using the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework to encourage key
economic reforms to support revenue, including compliance with the
existing IMF Extended Credit Facility (which includes a revenue
benchmark of 17 percent of GDP by 2025 and requires passage and
implementation of new value-added tax legislation that is currently
being considered by the Afghan Parliament), improved budget
transparency, recovering additional embezzled assets from Kabul Bank,
and other activities, which should encourage greater trade and
investment flows. Afghanistan also explicitly acknowledged at the Tokyo
Conference that the international community's ability to sustain
support for Afghanistan in the future depends on meaningful Afghan
efforts to combat corruption. In addition, the Department of State has
engaged with the Afghan Government and governments in neighboring
countries to strengthen regional trade, transport, and energy networks
that have the potential to add to Afghan revenues in the future. The
U.S. Embassy in Kabul has regular consultations with the Ministry of
Finance at all levels to advise on revenue matters, help in planning
for continuity through the transition, and resolve disputes in various
taxation cases.
Question #3. What is the organizational structure of SRAP? How many
personnel work in SRAP and what are their specific roles? How does SRAP
coordinate with the South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Bureau?
Answer. SRAP was created in 2009 by former Secretary Clinton to
lead diplomatic and development efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
SRAP reports directly to the Secretary and through him to the
President. It is comprised of 22 personnel who form the core of a
``whole of government'' approach to policymaking and implementation.
This core office includes direct hires from the State Department and
other USG agencies, a representative from the German Foreign Ministry,
and outside subject matter experts.
In addition, the country offices for Afghanistan and Pakistan
(about 20 personnel assigned to each office) and the Embassies in Kabul
and Islamabad report to the Special Representative. Reflecting the
broader regional context and intersection with U.S. relations with
India and Central Asia, the Principal Deputy SRAP is ``dual-hatted'' as
a Deputy Assistant Secretary in SCA. SRAP and SCA coordinate closely on
a range of regional issues including Afghanistan's and Pakistan's
relations with their neighbors.
Question #4. In report # GAO-12-750, GAO made the following
recommendation:
To ensure that current and future assisted interagency acquisitions
in support of State's missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are consistent
with regulatory requirements and guidance designed to improve the
management and use of such acquisitions, the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense should undertake a comprehensive review of all
existing and proposed assisted interagency acquisitions in support of
State's missions in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify and implement
corrective measures to bring the acquisitions into compliance and to
strengthen management.
Specifically, this should entail (1) the Department of State
assessing the cost effectiveness and full range of requirements, which
can be used to inform future best procurement approach determinations,
(2) the Departments of State and Defense preparing and signing
interagency acquisition agreements that address the elements
established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, such as roles and
responsibilities for contract management and oversight, and (3) the
Department of State planning for sufficient personnel to perform
contract oversight.
Please provide a status update on #1, #2, and #3.
Answer. (#1) State continues to host biweekly Transition
(Contracting) Phase II Working Group teleconference calls between
Department multibureau participants and Department of Defense (DOD) to
address requirements and post-transition activity in Iraq.
Additionally, State cochairs both the Afghanistan Executive Steering
Groups (ESG) and the Afghanistan Transition Coordination Group (TCG)
with DOD to jointly assess the current and future acquisitions
activities for Afghanistan, and to ensure a ``whole of government''
approach. Through these groups, State and DOD are addressing the full
range of requirements, exploring the most cost effective means for
delivery, and working to deploy the appropriate interagency agreements
to ensure compliance with regulatory guidance. State is also working
with DOD to enhance the database at MAX.gov used to store information
on joint Interagency Agreements. With regard to existing interagency
acquisitions, State continues to work with DOD to identify where any
required justifications do not exist and generate the required
documentation in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation and DOD
FAR (DFAR) requirements. Future State/DOD collaborations would have the
same documentation requirements.
With regard to contract oversight, State has engaged DOD for more
clarity on their procedures identifying the number of personnel
required to manage DOD contracts in dangerous and constantly changing
environments. State is keenly aware of the importance of providing
contractor oversight and is currently considering a variety of methods
to formulate the right number of properly trained Contracting Officer's
Representatives (COR) numbers--including the size of contractor
staffing, location and/or function of the contract, a computation
related directly to the dollar value of the contract, or perhaps a
hybrid that takes into account each of these factors. In the case of
both Iraq and Afghanistan, their approach to contractor oversight and
staffing has been detailed in the Department of State Acquisition Human
Capital Plan submitted to the Office of Budget and Management on March
31, 2013.
(#2) State issued Procurement Information Bulletin (PIB) 2013-03
Acquisition Agreements on January 30, 2013, to fully align Department
policy with current FAR and OMB requirements regarding interagency
acquisition.
(#3) State transferred to DOD $1,972,240 via a Military
Interdepartmental Purchase Request for Rock Island Contracting Command
acquisition services on September 6, 2012.
[The above responses to GAO-12-750 were transmitted to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on October 3, 2013, via letter signed by
the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.]
Question #5. In report # GAO-12-750, GAO made the following
recommendation:
To better inform future decisions regarding the use of assisted
interagency acquisitions and to better manage and more consistently
implement their use, the Secretary of State should revise the State
First policy to fully align with current FAR and OMB requirements
regarding interagency acquisitions.
Please provide a status update on this recommendation.
Answer. The Department's revised policy was issued as Procurement
Information Bulletin (PIB) 2013-03 on January 30, 2013, to fully align
policy with current FAR and OMB requirements regarding interagency
acquisitions.
[The above response to GAO-12-750 was transmitted to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on October 3, 2013, via letter signed by
the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.]
Question #6. In report # GAO-12-614, GAO made the following
recommendation:
To improve State's ability to track progress of efforts in Pakistan
to counter IEDs, the Secretary of State should direct the U.S. mission
in Pakistan to enhance its counter-IED performance measures to cover
the full range of U.S. assisted efforts.
Has State produced a strategic document that contains
counter-IED performance measures in Pakistan? If so, could you
please share this document with the committee?
Answer. The Department is committed to countering the threat of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and
with DOD is leading a robust interagency effort aimed at disrupting the
illicit network of IEDs and IED precursors. We agree with you on the
importance of performance metrics as part of that effort and that,
ultimately, the only metric that matters is the reduction of lives lost
and affected by IEDs. We would be pleased to brief committee members or
staff on the different performance measures that have been incorporated
into our counter-IED efforts.
The Department is prioritizing efforts to counter the threat of
IEDs as part of the Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Working Group
of the Strategic Dialogue with Pakistan. Through its security
assistance programs, the Department is providing equipment and training
to Pakistan's security services to improve their capacity to combat
IEDs. The Department has also provided support for public information
programming aimed at increasing the Pakistani public's awareness and
activism on the IED threat. The Department continues to work with
Pakistan in close coordination with JIEDDO to implement its action plan
for countering IEDs. We look forward to continued discussions with
Congress on the progress and impact of these activities.
Question #7. How many personnel currently work at the U.S. Embassy
in Afghanistan? How many are full time State Department personnel and
how many are contractors? How many are Third Country Nationals?
How many personnel are assigned to U.S. diplomatic presences in
Jalalabad, Herat, and Kandahar? Does the State Department have staff
assigned elsewhere in the country?
When does the State Department anticipate completing construction
on new facilities at the Embassy compound in Kabul? How much will this
construction cost?
Answer. There are 785 U.S. direct hire civilian employees in
Afghanistan, 420 of which are State Department. There are 3,812
civilian contractors associated with the mission: 1,976 are U.S.
citizens; 495 are Afghans, and 1341 are Third Country Nationals.
Currently, there are five diplomatic staff members assigned to
Forward Operating Base Fenty at Jalalabad Airfield in Nangahar. The
diplomatic staff in our consulate in Herat has been drawn down
following the attack last spring; we have 13 diplomatic staff operating
out of a temporary location at the Italian base in Herat (Camp Arena)
while the consulate facility is being repaired. In Kandahar, we have 22
diplomatic staff colocated with the military on Regional Platform at
Kandahar airfield. There are 67 other chief of mission civilians
serving at 5 other locations outside of Kabul including our consulate
in Mazar-e-Sharif.
The multiyear Embassy construction project is expected to be
completed in early 2017. The cost of the project is estimated to be
approximately $860 million.
Question #8. As we discussed during the hearing, the U.N. recently
released a report which indicated that only 7 percent of incidents of
violent crimes against women went through a judicial process using the
Elimination of Violence Against Women law.
What proportion of overall incidents of violent crime is
prosecuted by the Afghan justice system?
Answer. The lack of reliable data on the incidence and prosecution
of crime throughout Afghanistan makes it difficult to compare
prosecutions for crimes against women with prosecutions for violent
crimes in general. The State Department is dedicated to supporting
Afghan justice institutions in increasing the number of prosecutions
for both violent crimes and crimes against women. The recently launched
Case Management System (CMS), developed through Department of State
funding and the only reliable data on nationwide prosecutions, has
registered a total of 2,418 arrests for violent crime in the three
provinces in which CMS is operational (Kabul, Herat, and Balkh). Of
these cases, recorded from October 2012 to September 2013, 1,443 led to
prosecution, or 60 percent of reported violent crimes in those three
provinces (nationwide rates are not available). In those same three
provinces 451 arrests were made pursuant to the Law on Elimination of
Violence Against Women (EVAW) from January-December 2013. Of those, 274
went to prosecution, handled by Elimination of Violence Against Women
(EVAW) Prosecution Units supported by the U.S. Government. This
represents a 61-percent prosecution rate, nearly identical to the rate
for all violent crimes. However, it should be noted that Kabul, Mazar,
and Herat are all urban areas and that rates are almost certainly lower
in rural areas.
The figure cited in the U.N. report also needs to be understood in
light of important differences between EVAW law cases and other violent
crime cases prosecuted by the Afghan justice system. Under the EVAW
law, a victim may withdraw her case at any stage of judicial
prosecution and police/prosecutors may not pursue a case after this has
occurred. Therefore, it is not that 7 percent of cases were prosecuted
and 93 percent were mediated. A high number of cases end up being
withdrawn by the victim. Although UNAMA notes this provision, it does
not identify it as a possible contributing factor to the gap between
registration and prosecution.
It is also important to keep in mind that women often seek justice
within their own communities through informal justice systems that have
been in place throughout Afghan history. That said, criminal cases are
supposed to be referred by the jirga/shura traditional dispute
resolution bodies to the district courts. Statistics could be low
because women drop the case or fear being accused of ``Zina,'' or moral
crimes themselves. It is likely that the majority of violent crimes
against women have not been adjudicated in the formal system; however,
we believe that the percentage has steadily increased over the past 10
years and continue to monitor the progress of EVAW prosecutions. The
United States has, and will continue to, advocate for full
implementation of the 2009 EVAW law. We will also remind Afghan leaders
of their commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
(TMAF) to implement EVAW.
letter and gao report submitted to supplement
answers to questions no. 4 and no. 5
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[The above letter and GAO report were also sent to: Bob Corker,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate; Edward R. Royce, chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives; Eliot L. Engel,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives; Barbara A.
Mikulski, chairwoman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate; Richard
C. Shelby, vice chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate;
Harold D. Rogers, chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives; Nita M. Lowey, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives; Darrell E. Issa, chairman, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives; Elijah E. Cummings,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives;
Thomas R. Carper, chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate; and, Tom Coburn, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.]
______
Responses of Donald L. Sampler, Jr., to Questions
Submitted by Senator Menendez
Question #1A. Security of Aid workers.--Do recent attacks on aid
workers indicate an emerging trend where these individuals, even for
Afghan-led initiatives, are targeted by insurgents?
Answer. The number of attacks against aid and humanitarian
organizations in the past year has increased. Aid and humanitarian
organizations operating in Afghanistan are funded from a broad range of
U.S. and non-U.S. affiliated sources, including other foreign
governments and private organizations, not all of whom report threats
and attacks to the Embassy. However, attacks that are reported are
recorded in the Aid Worker Security Database (https://
aidworkersecurity.org/). According to this data base, 56 attacks were
reported in 2012 and 79 reported in 2013.
Question #1B. Have threats to USAID staff and partners increased
over the past year? If yes, by how much?
Answer. The number of threats against USAID and USAID implementing
partners in the past year has increased by 23.4 percent. The Partner
Liaison Security Office, USAID Afghanistan, tracks these incidents
using the Afghanistan Infrastructure and Security Cartography System
(AISCS). According to AISCS, 47 threats were reported in 2012 and 58
reported in 2013.
Question #1C. If these threats have increased, does USAID have the
adequate budget resources to address this growing threat environment?
Is there a shortfall in funding?
Answer. USAID implementing partners are responsible for providing
security for their staff. There is no indication at present that the
average cost of security for USAID implementing partners is increasing,
but the security situation in Afghanistan is fluid; it can vary based
on threat and location, and can change suddenly and often without
warning. Security assessments (conducted by the Implementing Partner)
are an ongoing process. Security costs are factored into partner
proposals for USAID review. Historically, specific security costs for
USAID partners vary from location to location and the type of project.
Currently for partners utilizing the Afghanistan Public Protection
Force (APPF), security costs average 6.2 percent of the total estimated
cost of project awards. Additionally for USAID personnel, the USAID
Regional Security Office (RSO) assesses security conditions and makes
appropriate resource recommendations.
Question #2A. Duplicative efforts.--In your testimony you stated
that USAID, in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan,
substantially scaled down a $32 million agricultural faculties program
found to be duplicative of efforts by another donor.
Please describe USAID's consultation mechanism with the
Government of Afghanistan to identify duplicative development
efforts.
Answer. USAID conducts extensive consultation with the Government
of Afghanistan across its entire civilian assistance portfolio,
including sector- and project-specific coordination, and one of the
reasons for this consultation is to identify duplicative development
efforts. USAID consults on an almost daily basis with the Aid
Management Directorate (AMD) of the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF).
The AMD is responsible for coordinating all civilian assistance on
behalf of the Afghan Government. USAID also frequently takes the lead
in coordinating donor community collaboration with the government
through the AMD.
USAID conducts three annual consultation processes with the MOF.
Joint portfolio reviews allow USAID technical staff, Afghan Government
line ministries, and the AMD to conduct detailed reviews of USAID
projects. Donor Cooperation Dialogues conducted with each donor allow
for macrolevel evaluation of assistance flows and harmonization of the
donor community. Core Donor Consultations focus on on-budget assistance
and allow donors and the Afghan Government to plan together for the
coming year's expenditures on development projects. As a part of these
processes, donors submit development project data, including locations,
funding, and results, to the Afghan Government so that it can analyze
annual assistance across the donor community, across sectors, and
across geography. Furthermore, USAID and other donors provide
information on the alignment of USAID's portfolio of programs with
Afghanistan's National Priority Programs, allowing donors and the
government to work together in balancing assistance across priority
sectors.
In addition to the portfolio-wide processes mentioned above, USAID
consults regularly with Afghan Government line ministries on individual
project development and implementation. These ministries are essential
partners in planning, developing, and implementing USAID assistance
projects. Some coordination examples include:
Infrastructure--Interministerial Commission for Energy,
chaired by the Afghan Government, which includes the Ministry
of Energy and Water, Ministry of Public Works, and Da
Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS, the national utility), USAID
and other key donors, and the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF).
Agriculture--Provincial Level Technical Working Groups with
the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL)
and USAID staff.
Health--USAID holds a monthly meeting with the Deputy
Minister for Policy and Planning of the Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH). In addition, technical working groups composed
of MoPH and USAID and other donor staff provide an opportunity
to ensure that donors are effectively dividing their efforts
across distinct elements of technical strategies.
Question #2B. Are there consultation mechanisms in place with other
donors, or just with the Government of Afghanistan?
Answer. USAID participates in extensive coordination mechanisms
among other donors in addition to bilateral and multilateral
coordination consultations with the Afghan Government. In addition to
Afghan Government-led coordination bodies, donors often hold
consultations at the sector and project level to harmonize activities.
Some consultations are formalized by working through international
organizations, such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Others are
standing committees that coordinate activities in a given sector. Some
consultations arise as needed to support specific projects or
activities. Examples include:
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)--
Hosts policy-level and sector-specific committees to coordinate
donor activities, including the weekly Head of Agency meeting,
with every other meeting cochaired by the Afghan Ministry of
Finance.
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)--Managed by the
World Bank since 2002, ARTF is one of the most effective
standing mechanisms for donor consultation and cooperation.
Areas of collaboration include agriculture, health, education,
governance, and public financial management. USAID is the
largest annual contributor to ARTF and directly supports
programs in education, health, agriculture, and economic
growth.
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)--The AITF,
managed by the Asian Development Bank, allows for donor
coordination and joint funding of infrastructure projects.
Health Sector--USAID chairs the Health Development Partners
Forum. USAID also partners closely with the World Bank and the
European Union in supporting the Afghanistan basic health
package and essential hospital services. Future programming
will be coordinated through the World Bank's System Enhancement
for Health Action in Transition (SEHAT) program. While close
donor coordination has been an important factor in achieving
dramatic health gains over the last decade, the SEHAT program
is expected to streamline management of donor support and
further enhance coordination.
Elections--USAID works with other partners through an
elections working group to ensure that donor support to
elections is coordinated and that key policy concerns are
communicated jointly to the Afghan Government. USAID also
supports elections programming through the multidonor United
Nations Development Program ELECT project.
Agriculture--In addition to regular consultations with the
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL),
USAID is part of an Agriculture Donor Coordination Working
Group, composed of donors and MAIL that meets quarterly to
strengthen coordination among partners. Further, USAID
organizes a bimonthly Water Donor's Coordination meeting that
is cochaired by USAID's agriculture and infrastructure offices.
Infrastructure--In addition to regular consultations with
the Interministerial Commission for Energy, USAID is part of an
intra-U.S. Government working group on infrastructure cochaired
by USAID and the Department of Defense.
Gender--USAID participates in gender coordination and
working groups at several levels in Afghanistan. As the cochair
of the U.S. Government's Kabul Interagency Gender Working
Group, USAID engages in the coordinated effort to implement the
U.S. Government Gender Strategy in Afghanistan (2012).
Externally, USAID participates in the Interagency Gender Donor
Coordination group in Kabul. In Washington, the Office of
Afghanistan Pakistan Affairs works closely with the State and
Defense Departments through relevant task forces on: Women,
Peace and Security, Gender-Based Violence, and Trafficking in
Persons to ensure a coordinated effort.
Question #2C. Are there any other cases where duplicative efforts
have been found? What action was taken?
Answer. USAID takes significant steps to ensure projects in design
are not duplicative of existing efforts by the Afghan Government or
other donors. However, with the complexity of the environment in
Afghanistan, and the unusually large number of donors contributing high
levels of assistance, duplication has occurred. When duplicative
efforts are identified, USAID works with the relevant partners to
streamline efforts and ensure they are mutually supportive. This is
becoming increasingly important in the transition period, and the
expected decrease in donor funds over time means that greater
harmonization will maximize available funding.
Some examples of efforts to streamline donor support and eliminate
duplication are noted below:
Health: In the early stages of the international intervention in
Afghanistan, USAID, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank divided
responsibility for delivering basic health services and essential
hospital services across Afghanistan. This division of labor allowed
for swift improvements in health service delivery, and directly
contributed to the significant health impacts over the past decade,
including remarkable gains in access to health care, maternal
mortality, and infant and child mortality. However, in establishing the
systems necessary to swiftly deliver health services, each partner had
to create appropriate procurement mechanisms and financial management
processes through the Ministry of Public Health to ensure that funds
were managed and results achieved according to their respective
policies and regulations. As of 2014, USAID will be joining the EU in
delivering health services through the World Bank's SEHAT program. This
is a significant step that will eliminate separate management systems
and unify the Afghan health system. Ultimately, the goal is for this
single, donor-supported health system to transition to an Afghan-
managed health system.
Energy: USAID is coordinating with the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
and the World Bank on their regional energy proposals, the
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (TUTAP)
energy corridor project and the proposed Central Asia-South Asia
(CASA)-1000 project. In some cases, we have found small duplicative
efforts in this area. For instance, a power system study being funded
by USAID had some overlap with work being done by World Bank's
contractor regarding CASA-1000 transmission line routing. USAID's
implementing partner will directly coordinate further with the World
Bank's contractor to avoid duplicative work.
Democracy and Governance: USAID is currently designing a follow-on
to the Regional Afghanistan Municipal Program for Urban Populations
(RAMP UP) municipal support program. RAMP UP made significant gains in
major municipalities, and the follow-on program will work to sustain
those gains. As other donors are active in the large cities of these
municipalities, however, the follow-on program will place less emphasis
on major municipalities in favor of increased emphasis on small and
medium municipalities. This approach will decrease duplication of
effort in major municipalities, while sustaining previous gains and
broadening USAID's reach to those cities that will benefit most from
our assistance.
In consultation with other donors and the Government of
Afghanistan, USAID has become concerned that capacity-building efforts
in several ministries may be duplicative, as several donors may be
supporting the same ministry through different projects. USAID will
conduct an assessment of its off-budget ministry capacity-building
programs to identify duplicative efforts and other weaknesses, and when
appropriate seek to coordinate future capacity-building through
mechanisms such as ARTF's Capacity Building for Results and the Afghan
Government's Civilian Technical Assistance Program. USAID is currently
drafting the statement of work for an assessment team that should begin
its work in early 2014.
Question #3A. Bilateral Incentive Fund.--In your testimony you
stated that $60 million remains in the U.S. bilateral incentive fund,
to be released as the Afghan Government meets certain thresholds of
progress on the key TMAF indicators.
Which TMAF indicators is the remaining $60 million tied to
and what are the benchmarks the Government of Afghanistan must
reach for the funds to be released?
Answer. The $75 million in incentive funding from FY 2012 resources
is tied to progress on the five Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
(TMAF) Areas: (1) representational democracy and equitable elections;
(2) governance, rule of law, and human rights; (3) integrity of public
finance and commercial banking; (4) government revenues, budget
execution and subnational governance; and (5) inclusive and sustained
growth and development. Donors and the Afghan Government agreed upon 17
``hard deliverables'' in the first half of 2013 that would demonstrate
progress in the five TMAF reform areas.
The Afghan Government has made satisfactory progress on a number of
the hard deliverables, including the four associated with TMAF Area 1
(Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections), allowing the
release of the first $15 million from the Incentive Fund.
Disbursement of the remaining $60 million is dependent on progress
in the other four thematic TMAF areas. We are evaluating now whether
the Afghan Government has made sufficient progress on these remaining
deliverables.
Prior to January 29, 2014, when the Joint Coordinating and
Monitoring Board (JCMB) with the Government of Afghanistan and other
members of the international community is scheduled to be convened, the
U.S. Government will finalize its assessment of Afghan progress and
determine which, if any, of the remaining four TMAF areas show progress
sufficient to justify the release of additional FY12 incentive funds.
Question #3B. Is $75 million for the bilateral incentive fund an
appropriate limit, or should the fund be expanded to include larger
amounts of U.S. assistance to the Government of Afghanistan?
Answer. The $75 million in incentive money is only the first part
of a larger $175 million commitment the U.S. Government made at the
July 2013 Senior Officials Meeting in Kabul to incentivize progress
toward TMAF goals. As part of that commitment, the U.S. plans to
allocate an additional $100 million in incentive funds to incentivize
TMAF progress by the Afghan Government in 2014. The specific details of
what performance is needed will be made after the January 2014 JCMB
meeting referenced in the prior answer.
In addition to the bilateral TMAF incentive fund, the U.S. has
obligated approximately $318 million to the multilateral Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) in fiscal year 2013, part of which
will be used for incentive funding. The U.S. contribution is pooled
with that of other donors and allocated to a number of mechanisms
within the fund, including the ARTF Incentive Program. The ARTF
incentive fund focuses primarily on incentivizing improved Afghan
financial management and transparency.
Further, the U.S. and other donors announced their intentions in
the TMAF to incentivize 10 percent of their funding by the end of 2014,
with the goal of increasing that amount to 20 percent by the end of the
next decade (2024). The administration considers the United States-
Afghan bilateral TMAF incentive fund and ARTF Incentive Program to be
part of the overall incentive funding initiative. We believe the $175
million slated for the bilateral incentive fund and the additional
funding in the ARTF incentive program provide incentive for Afghan
reform without undermining development progress and stability during
this critical year of transition.
Question #4A. In your testimony you stated that the ``Transfer of
Tasks'' exercise helped inform USAID on how to transfer ISAF
development projects to other entities. In 2011 the Government
Accountability Office issued a recommendation which called on the
Department of Defense to enter information about its Afghanistan
development projects into a common database with the State Department
and USAID. However, this recommendation is yet to be implemented. I am
concerned that the lack of a common database of development projects
creates an unnecessary gap in the institutional knowledge base of our
development efforts.
Is there a plan to transfer information on projects
conducted by CERP, TFBSO and AIF into the Afghan Info database?
Answer. USAID recognizes the value of a more comprehensive database
of USG funded projects in Afghanistan and is working with the State
Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine the most
effective manner to achieve this goal. To date, Afghan Info has
received a limited, one-time transfer of Commander's Emergency Response
Program (CERP) data, but no data on the Task Force for Business
Stability Operations (TFBSO) or the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund.
However, close and continued engagement with DOD ensures that
programs are coordinated and guarded against duplication of effort.
Currently, USAID has not taken on any DOD projects identified from the
U.S. Government Transfer of Tasks exercise. Moving forward, if USAID
were to take on development assistance oriented tasks from DOD based on
the Transfer of Tasks exercise, the tasks would be added to Afghan
Info.
USAID has attempted over time to retrieve relevant DOD CERP data as
opportunities have arisen, although a formal mechanism does not
currently exist. To date, as mentioned above, USAID has received a
limited one-time transfer of DOD CERP records. More data transfers have
been difficult to coordinate because DOD project records are stored on
a classified system and in some cases project data itself is
classified. As a result, CERP data are only available in an
unclassified form at a significant delay due to challenges such as
ensuring the quality of data and preventing operational risks that
could flow from the release of data in unclassified form.
In addition, USAID and DOD databases collected different
information, which makes data transfer more difficult. Since Afghan
Info is a USAID system that was designed to fit USAID requirements and
processes, it is often difficult to accommodate other agencies'
workflows. Recently, Afghan Info modifications have focused on upgrades
that better meet USAID's internal performance management needs,
particularly to facilitate better use of partner reporting and better
ways to monitor projects from an increased number of sources, such as
the Afghan Government, other donors, and the beneficiaries themselves.
The next opportunity for transferring DOD information into Afghan
Info will likely occur once CERP has ended and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for Policy has finished reviewing and
declassifying CERP data. At that time, we anticipate that current
restrictions on the transfer of data to Afghan Info will be lessened.
Regarding AIF activities, USAID consults regularly with DOD on the
implementation of infrastructure programs to ensure all projects are
coordinated and provide the maximum benefit for Afghanistan's
development. As such, current coordination provides USAID better
visibility of AIF activities than would be possible through any attempt
to incorporate non-USAID administered activities into Afghan Info while
they are under implementation. Thus AIF has generally not been part of
this discussion.
To date, USAID has not sought to incorporate TFBSO into the Afghan
Info database. TFBSO programs are significantly more complicated to
incorporate due in part to the nature of its program portfolio and
overall organizational and bureaucratic differences in program data-
sharing. However, USAID has quarterly coordination meetings with TFBSO
to ensure full visibility and understanding of the USG programs in the
economic and infrastructure sectors. On a more frequent, but ad hoc,
basis the USAID team working with the Ministry of Mines meets with the
TFBSO staff working with the extractive sector to discuss and better
coordinate programs.
In addition, there are other coordination mechanisms in Kabul
currently in place like the Deputies-Level Executive Working Group,
regular field level coordination, and close cooperation between working
level projects teams at USAID, the Department of State and DOD.
Question #4B. Please share the ``transfer of tasks'' list with the
committee.
Answer. USAID has been an active participant in the Transfer of
Tasks exercise in coordination with U.S. Embassy Kabul, which led
civilian agency participation in the review process. The Department of
Defense (DOD), via CENTCOM and ISAF, compiled an initial list of
approximately 420 tasks for consideration during the Transfer of Tasks
exercise. USAID has not taken on any DOD projects identified during the
exercise. As the list of tasks is a DOD product, we respectfully
request that the committee coordinate with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense on this request for the list.
Question #5A. In your testimony you stated that USAID will
terminate projects or activities if adequate third-party oversight is
not possible or adequate progress is not being made.
Please list any past development projects or activities in
Afghanistan that were terminated because of lack of oversight
or progress.
Answer. To date, USAID has not terminated/cancelled any projects
for the reason of constraints on oversight. USAID has and will continue
to terminate/cancel and extensively de-scope projects when there are
problems with implementation and progress. Please find attached a list
of terminated/cancelled projects since 2008.
Issues with progress can take many forms including not having the
desired impact, delays in implementation, and corruption. Regardless of
the cause or form, USAID provides appropriate justification and
documentation to terminate programs.
Question #5B. How many USAID projects do you estimate will rely on
third-party monitoring in 2015?
Answer. USAID applies a multitiered monitoring approach to collect
and verify data using a variety of means to inform decisionmaking. This
approach recognizes the increasing importance of a variety of
monitoring sources to gather project monitoring data and that each
project requires its own, unique monitoring plan based on the type of
activities taking place. One example is the important use of satellite
imagery as a monitoring tool for crop production. Customized monitoring
plans position each USAID project manager to gather and analyze
monitoring data from various, appropriate monitoring sources, to
compare data to ensure confidence in the reporting, and to make
programmatic decisions based on the results. By using multiple and
overlapping sources of monitoring data, USAID can compare information
received from separate sources to verify project activities and ensure
the greatest degree of oversight possible. Tiered monitoring actors
are:
Tier 1: U.S. Government (USAID and other agencies);
Tier 2: Implementing Partners;
Tier 3: Afghan Government (internal monitoring and
evaluation systems, observation) and other donors;
Tier 4: Civil society, local organizations, and
beneficiaries; and
Tier 5: Independent Monitoring Contractors (Third Party
Monitors).
USAID has also developed a new unit at the mission, the
Implementation Support Team, which is responsible for providing an
additional layer of critical review and analysis for the many streams
of monitoring data. This unit will review performance at the project
and sector level, and provide USAID leadership with alternative courses
of action for addressing challenges with project implementation.
Currently, USAID already utilizes independent monitors as one method of
monitoring projects in the infrastructure, health, and stabilization
sectors in Afghanistan. We estimate in 2015 that much of the likely
portfolio, consisting of some 60 to 80 projects, will use the Tier 5
Independent Monitoring Contractors to one degree or another. USAID will
regularly review project activities to determine if adequate oversight
is possible, and make decisions about the viability of continued
implementation, including the potential termination of activities.
Question #5C. How much do you estimate third-party monitoring
programs will cost in FY14 and FY15?
Answer. Agency guidance recommends 5 to 10 percent of total program
resources should be allocated for both monitoring and evaluation. This
includes the required 3 percent of program funds for evaluations. USAID
anticipates spending up to 6 percent of its resources on monitoring
efforts, which includes third-party monitoring. The total cost of
USAID's portion of the monitoring contract is thus well within the 2 to
7 percent range outlined in Agency guidance.
A lesson learned from USAID/Iraq's use of independent monitors is
to provide adequate funding to monitoring contracts, which is a
principle behind the Agency's guidance. This is necessary so that USAID
can appropriately respond to a changing implementation environment. As
such, the Monitoring Support Project (MSP) has an estimated project
ceiling of up to $170 million, which includes a still-to-be-determined
potential buy-in option for other U.S. Government agencies. Thus, the
ceiling provides USAID operational flexibility that other contracts of
this type do not have.
Question #5D. Please describe in detail the specific tools that
will be used to conduct third-party monitoring in Afghanistan.
Answer. USAID clearly defines the role of Independent Monitoring
Contractors; they do not represent the U.S. Government, the Afghan
Government, or any other local organization, and they do not take the
place of USAID staff as project managers. Their function is to monitor
and verify--to USAID--whether USAID-funded activities have been
undertaken according to the terms and conditions of contracts, grants
and/or cooperative agreements with implementing partners. USAID then
uses this information to manage its projects to achieve maximum
development impact.
Within this role, Independent Monitoring Contractors may use a
variety of methods to verify project data. The precise nature of the
data collection efforts will vary on a project-by-project basis. USAID
is developing project specific monitoring plans. Potential monitoring
tools include those described below:
i. Site Visits: Individuals working under the Monitoring Support
Project (MSP) will visit USAID project sites and independently verify
activities implementing partners have completed and reported to USAID.
USAID requires that these individuals have the relevant technical
expertise for the sites they are visiting or the data they are
collecting. These reports, including corroborating data, will be
reviewed by USAID.
Every effort will be made to corroborate information reported by
monitoring partners. To do so, USAID compares information from site
visits with additional evidence from other monitoring techniques, such
as GPS tracking, photography, and crowd-sourcing, as described below,
to mitigate the risk of bias, error, or corruption.
Global Positioning System (GPS) Tracking: MSP monitors will
be equipped with GPS receivers so they can navigate to and
verify activity locations using the geographic coordinates
provided to USAID by technical projects' implementing partners.
Monitors will use GPS receivers to record the precise location
of all of their verification visits. This information can be
collected through photos taken with GPS-enabled cameras (see
below), so location data collected with stand-alone GPS
receivers can be used to validate the coordinates embedded in
the photos.
For security reasons, the MSP monitors may be required to devise
strategies for recording the precise locations of activities
using more discreet and inconspicuous GPS recording devices. In
the event that standard GPS receivers cannot be used for a
particular verification visit, the contractor will inform USAID
of the alternative method used to determine the coordinates for
a site visit before the monitoring is implemented.
Photography: GPS-, date- and time-stamp enabled digital
cameras are required for all site visits. These pictures
provide photographic evidence of project implementation and
also include the time and location of a particular verification
visit. Should security circumstances prevent monitors from
taking such pictures, the MSP monitor must inform USAID,
propose alternative measures for validating the authenticity of
the site visit report, and include information from the
alternate measures in the visit report. The photos will be
cross referenced by USAID to photos and locations provided by
the project implementer and the other locations provided by the
monitoring partner.
ii. Satellite/Aerial Imagery Analysis: The requirement for
satellite/aerial imagery data and analysis as a part of a verification
and monitoring plan for a given project will be determined by USAID, in
consultation with the MSP contractor. USAID will work with interagency
partners that already procure commercial satellite imagery to acquire
imagery of project sites where appropriate, so this cost will not be
covered by MSP. An example of this approach would be an agriculture
project required to measure changes in cultivated land, such as wheat
or orchard crops, over time. USAID already uses this technique in
Afghanistan and around the world through its Famine Early Warning
System Network (FEWS-NET).
iii. Surveys: USAID is requiring that MSP design and deploy two
types of public opinion surveys:
Rapidly-developed and rapidly-deployed surveys. While the
scope and general conclusions of these surveys is more limited
than larger national surveys, they provide a quick perspective
on project activities for USAID, including supplemental data,
or short-term trends that may need further qualitative
research. They may be deployed through a number of instruments
and mediums, including human enumerators and cell phones.
Larger, more rigorous surveys. These are thoroughly designed
and tested surveys meant to prevent bias. They will be
sufficiently large to draw statistically significant inferences
and deployed by trained enumerators with quality control
measures in place.
iv. Data collection with mobile devices: Verification and
monitoring activities using mobile devices, including cell phones may
also be used as monitoring tools. These include the following:
Conducting surveys of technical project beneficiaries via
short message service (SMS; i.e., text messages) or interactive
voice response systems. Surveys consisting of 1 to 20 questions
will be used where deemed appropriate by USAID. MSP will manage
the inflow of survey responses, compile them into a readable
format, and report findings back to USAID.
Assisting implementers of USAID technical projects in
incorporating cell phone-based data collection into their
project implementation. The purpose of this activity is to help
expedite monitoring efforts by assisting USAID and technical
project implementers to collect, manage, and utilize cellular
technology in implementation.
Managing data intake and databases for unsolicited
reporting. MSP will assist USAID in organizing and managing e-
mail addresses and phone numbers where project beneficiaries
and other Afghan citizens can send information on project
performance. USAID will direct MSP monitors to conduct followup
visits to locations that unsolicited reporting identifies as
particularly problematic or beneficial.
v. Crowdsourcing: MSP will assist USAID in defining the specific
and discreet monitoring tasks that can be performed by members of the
public and the most effective methods of soliciting and receiving this
information. This could include feedback on specific aspects of project
performance or a related indicator where it would be advantageous to
receive feedback from a broader population and not just direct
beneficiaries.
For example, a subnational governance project training municipal
employees on project planning and budgeting could be monitored by
soliciting information on municipal service delivery from local
citizens. Through radio, we can create a call-in service for the public
to respond via SMS on the length of time it takes for the delivery of a
particular service that USAID attempted to improve through its
assistance. MSP will work with USAID to develop and implement an
outreach campaign that drives the solicitation. This could include
informing communities about programs being implemented by USAID and/or
the municipal government in a given community and their expected
outcomes. Information collected from crowd sourcing will be reported
back to USAID and used to verify information reported through other
monitoring tiers.
Question #6A. Economic Impact of the Drawdown.--What specific
programmatic steps is USAID taking to mitigate the impact of the loss
of jobs in the Afghan economy due to the drawdown of the international
presence at the end of 2014?
Answer. Over the last 11 years the United States has helped
Afghanistan achieve significant economic growth, which has averaged
over 9 percent annually. However, the military drawdown poses a
challenge to sustaining this growth. World Bank projections depend on
differing sets of assumptions, but the more optimistic scenarios place
future annual growth at 4 to 6 percent. The World Bank also expects an
increase in unemployment, currently about 8 percent, but given the
large informal economy, expects the greater impact to be felt on
underemployment (low-paying, non-full-time jobs) which is at about 48
percent, and may increase alongside underemployment.
To mitigate the potential negative impact of the transition on
Afghanistan's economy and help it move to more sustainable sources of
growth, U.S. Government efforts have been focused on promoting the
development of Afghanistan's most productive sectors: agriculture,
small and medium enterprise (SME) development, trade, and mining, and
reinforcing of the key policies needed for growth; e.g., the business
enabling environment and human capacity. USAID is concentrating these
efforts in Regional Economic Zones in and around major municipalities
and economically productive corridors--the areas in Afghanistan that
have the greatest potential for sustainable growth due to concentration
of population, presence of economic infrastructure, and access to
domestic and international markets.
USAID will focus on the agriculture sector since it is highly
relevant to poverty reduction and job creation. Agriculture generates
more than 50 percent of employment and roughly 75 percent of Afghans
earn their income from the agricultural sector. Furthermore, employment
in agriculture is characterized by small family businesses, often
producing merely for subsistence and seldom providing enough resources
to sustain families throughout the year. Between 2013 and 2018, USAID
will implement four new regional agriculture development programs that
are designed to increase employment along a number of market-oriented
supply chains that will focus on value-added processing, linking
farmers and private sector actors to regional markets, and addressing
constraints in the business enabling environment. The USAID agriculture
portfolio also includes critical investments such as irrigation,
extension services and the provision of agriculture financing for
commercialization and expansion that are required for leveraging the
potential of agriculture to create jobs and reduce poverty. USAID will
continue to introduce low cost, productivity enhancing technologies
that are likely to yield jobs, higher outputs, and require lower water
amounts, delivering environmental benefits at the same time.
Other economic development activities will also help mitigate the
effects of the drawdown on the economy, and help create jobs. The
Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan
(FAIDA) project assists the Government of Afghanistan and the private
sector in developing the financial sector. FAIDA helps USAID's Afghan
partners in building capacity to deliver finance where it can be used
most effectively, and in developing a legal framework and market
infrastructure in which financial sector institutions and their
business partners can create employment opportunities for all Afghans.
The Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP) helps address the
twin problems of unemployment and the scarcity of technically skilled
Afghan labor and trained business managers by improving quality and
access to training in market-driven skills including construction,
information and communications technology, mining, business management,
and service industries to enable Afghans to fill jobs in these fields.
By improving the quality and access to training in market-driven
skills, AWDP complements the workforce development goals of the Afghan
Government while providing trained employees to growing businesses.
The Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises
(ABADE) program primarily works with the private sector to strengthen
the productivity of enterprises so that these enterprises can have
sustained growth and job creation. ABADE's objectives are to increase
domestic and foreign investment, stimulate employment, and improve
sales of Afghan products. ABADE's alliances with Small and Medium
Enterprises (SMEs) will accelerate productivity and job creation by
mitigating risk, and leveraging contributions from private companies
via alliances.
Question #6B. How many jobs do you anticipate will be created as a
result of USAID's efforts?
Answer. While many factors affect the creation of jobs, USAID is
aiming to create approximately 34,000 jobs through the direct influence
of USAID programs in the agriculture and economic growth sectors in
2014. These estimates are subject to change depending on the fluid
conditions during Afghanistan's transition period.
By the end of the Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP),
USAID anticipates a 20-percent increase in full time employment in the
targeted areas and value chains, which equates to approximately 10,000
new jobs, including a 10-15-percent target increase in women's full
time employment. The Financial Access for Investing in the Development
of Afghanistan (FAIDA) project has hired 19 district and regional
coordinators to assist in the creation of new private sector loans that
are anticipated as being able to generate more than 2,100 new full-time
equivalent jobs in 2014. The Assistance in Building Afghanistan by
Developing Enterprises (ABADE) program estimates its public private
alliances and technical assistance will help generate 12,000 new jobs
in 2014.
graphs submitted to supplement answer to question no. 5
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