[Senate Hearing 113-196]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-196
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2014
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 4
Kerry, Hon. John F., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the
following Senators:
Robert Menendez.......................................... 43
Bob Corker............................................... 70
Robert P. Casey, Jr...................................... 102
Jeanne Shaheen........................................... 107
James Risch.............................................. 110
Jeff Flake............................................... 111
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
(iii)
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2014
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Coons, Murphy,
Kaine, Corker, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, and Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
Welcome back, Mr. Secretary. And first let me say that I
know how important the tragic incidents in Boston is to all of
us, but certainly to you, how much the Boston Marathon has
meant to you and everyone in Massachusetts and New England. But
Bostonians are resilient, and I know next year on Patriot's
Day, the marathon will be bigger and better than ever before.
And our thoughts are with everyone in Boston today. And I know
that you would have loved to have been there after so many
years, and I appreciate, as do all the committee members, your
appearance here today.
In the 2\1/2\ months since you were sworn in, you have
spent 31 days traveling to 17 countries, logged in over 55,000
miles, and done a lot of good work along the way.
There was one headline in that time that affected all of us
deeply as I know it affected you. Anne Smedinghoff, an upbeat
25-year-old diplomat whom you met, was tragically killed in
service in Afghanistan. Her life was a tribute to all of those
dedicated to something bigger than themselves, and it
underscores the importance of service to this Nation and to
people around the world who look to us for leadership. Her
death is a stark reminder that part of our duty is to provide
those who serve abroad with everything they need to do their
jobs and to keep them as safe and secure as possible in
carrying out America's priorities.
Today, Mr. Secretary, we have an opportunity to look
forward, as always, to hearing the State Department's
priorities as well as of that of the administration's, and, of
course, letting you know some of ours. Our policy focus is not
only on budgetary items, but also on taking action to
demonstrate U.S. leadership and improve lives through
cooperation with other states.
An example, from my view, is the Disabilities Treaty, which
would, without cost, improve the lives of thousands of people
overseas, but as well for millions of Americans with
disabilities who travel abroad.
We are all committed to strong American leadership, and the
need has never been greater. Mexico, Central America,
Venezuela, Cuba, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea,
climate change, nuclear proliferation, the Arab Spring, all
require our full attention. Some require greater attention,
some require specific action, and some require changes in
approach as we look around the world.
As we heard in testimony here last week, violence in Syria
has already displaced 4 million people, resulted in more than a
million refugees, and threatens to further destabilize the
Middle East, which brings up another issue, and that is whether
or not we need to do something more to help that Syrian
opposition that we, in fact, have vetted as being in line with
our values. And I would like to hear your views on whether or
not you believe we should be moving forward to change the
tipping point in that regard.
Syria is not the only humanitarian crisis. In the Sahel,
severe drought has displaced more than 300,000 people, affected
9 million more. Thirteen million people have been affected by
drought in
the Horn of Africa. These humanitarian disasters demand active
and engaged U.S. diplomacy and assistance, which depend on
robust funding of the International Affairs Account. And at the
same time, we understand the budget realities we face and the
need to make smart decisions in choosing the most effective and
efficient programs that will yield the greatest security return
on our investment.
We may live in a constrained budget environment, but the
world goes on. National security needs are not bounded by any
constraints, budgetary or otherwise. They continue, and meeting
them requires clear thinking and difficult choices. We will
have to rebalance and scale down operations in certain areas as
we scale up in others, so I look forward to your views on how
we strike the balance in making those tradeoffs.
In that process, I fully support efforts to increase
funding for the Asia-Pacific rebalance. We applaud the
administration for a budget proposal that includes an increase
for East Africa--East Asia, I should say, and the Pacific. But
as important as East Asia and the Pacific area, I hope it does
not come at the expense of other priorities, such as Latin
America. I am concerned with sharp cuts to the Western
Hemisphere and what this may say about our strategy within our
own front yard. And I look forward to being able to pursue
those.
Finally, I look at the humanitarian needs in Syria, and our
increasing interests, national interests, national security
interests. I look at the question of embassy security and we
look forward to hearing from you about progress on the
Accountability Review Board's efforts. And last, I am
interested in your views on how this budget reflects the
priorities of diplomatic statecraft as economic statecraft, and
how the budgetary choices we make could help the State
Department create jobs and economic opportunities at home.
I will have my full statement entered into the record
without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Menendez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Robert Menendez
Welcome back, Mr. Secretary. First, let me say, I know how
important the Boston Marathon is to you and everyone in Massachusetts
and New England. But New Englanders are resilient and I know--next
year--Patriot's Day and the Boston Marathon will be bigger and better
than ever. Our thoughts are with everyone in Boston today.
Again, welcome back. In the 2\1/2\ months since you were sworn in,
you've spent 31 days traveling to 17 countries, logged in over 55,000
miles, and made many headlines along the way.
There was one headline in that time that affected all of us
deeply--as I know it affected you. Anne Smedinghoff, an upbeat 25-year-
old diplomat whom you met, was tragically killed in service in
Afghanistan. Her life was a tribute to all those dedicated to something
bigger than themselves. It underscores the importance of service to
this nation and to people around the world who look to us for
leadership. Her death is a stark reminder that part of our duty is to
provide those who serve abroad with everything they need to do their
jobs--and to keep them safe and secure in carrying out America's
priorities.
Today, Mr. Secretary, we look forward, as always, to hearing the
State Department's priorities, as well as the administration's--and, of
course, letting you know ours. Our policy focus is not only on
budgetary items, but also on taking action to demonstrate U.S.
leadership and improve lives through cooperation with other states, an
example being the Disabilities Treaty which would--without cost--
improve the lives of thousands of people overseas, as well as Americans
with disabilities who travel abroad.
We are all committed to strong American leadership, and the need
has never been greater. Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, Cuba,
Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, climate change,
nuclear proliferation, the Arab Spring--all require our full attention.
Some require greater attention. Some require specific action; and some
may require changes in approach as we look around the world.
As we heard in testimony here last week, violence in Syria has
already displaced 4 million people, resulted in more than 1 million
refugees, and threatens to further destabilize the Middle East--which
brings up another issue and that is arming the Syrian opposition--and
I'd like to hear your views on whether or not you believe we should be
providing military aid to vetted opposition forces we identify,
stopping short of providing weapons that could threaten our own
security if they fall into the wrong hands. And Syria isn't the only
humanitarian crisis. In the Sahel, severe drought has displaced more
than 300,000 people and affected 9 million more, and 13 million people
have been affected by drought in the Horn of Africa. These humanitarian
disasters demand active and engaged U.S. diplomacy and assistance--
which depend on robust funding of the international affairs account.
At the same time, we understand the budget realities we face and
the need to make smart decisions in choosing the most effective and
efficient programs that will yield the greatest security return on our
investment. We may live in a constrained budget environment, but the
world goes on. National security needs are not bound by any
constraints, budgetary or otherwise. They continue and meeting them
requires clear thinking and difficult choices. We will have to
rebalance and scale down operations in certain areas, as we scale up in
others. I look forward to your views on how we strike the balance in
making these trade-offs.
An example is funding for Western Hemisphere programs. I fully
support efforts to increase funding for the Asia-Pacific rebalance and
applaud the administration for a budget proposal that included an
increase for East Asia and the Pacific . . . but as important as East
Asia and the Pacific are, I hope it does not come at the expense of
other priorities--like Latin America. I'm concerned with sharp cuts to
Western Hemisphere, and what this may say about a lack of a coherent
U.S. strategy. The FY14 budget proposes a 14-percent, $253 million cut
in aid to the region. Some of that decrease is because we are engaging
with increasingly capable partners and our activities are less resource
intensive.
In Mexico, we are transitioning the Merida Initiative on security
cooperation from a focus on equipment to technical assistance on the
rule of law and local capacity-building. But, again, I hope we are
circumspect in how we go about striking the proper balance and that we
don't overlook the very severe security crisis in Central America. I
hope you will address what we gain and what we potentially give up as
we make these decisions.
To address the humanitarian needs in Syria I mentioned, we are
already providing $385 million in humanitarian support, but, even in
this difficult fiscal climate--we could dramatically increase that
number to help end one of the region's most devastating humanitarian
tragedies unfolding as we speak. Making that choice would, in my view,
be a positive step not only for the Syrian people, but it would signal
to other donors that this is not business as usual. I'm anxious to hear
your views on the prospect of increasing aid, as well as an answer to
the question I raised at our hearing on Syria that no one seemed to
address--and that is: What, in your view, does a realistic political
solution in Syria look like? And have we already moved beyond that
point?
I'm also interested in a fuller understanding of the Department's
approach to implementation of the Accountability Review Board's
recommendations to meet embassy security goals balanced against the
need for our diplomats to freely operate and do their jobs.
Lastly, Mr. Secretary, I'm interested in your views on how this
budget reflects the priorities of diplomatic statecraft as economic
statecraft, and how the budgetary choices we make could help the State
Department create jobs and economic opportunities at home.
With that, Mr. Secretary, it's good to welcome you back. I look
forward to your comments.
The Chairman. And with that, let me turn to the ranking
member, Senator Corker, for his remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Secretary, thank you for being here today. And I appreciate
your continued updates on what is happening. I have to say I am
very encouraged with the beginning of your tenure and the
efforts that you have underway. And I look forward to you
having a very successful tenure at the State Department. So
thank you.
I also want to apologize. There is a hearing going on
upstairs regarding housing finance, and I may step in and out.
I hope you understand. It is not due to lack of respect.
Today the committee is convening its annual budget hearing
with the Secretary, an opportunity to talk about the budget
request and the issues that should inform what I hope will be a
near-term effort by the committee to produce a State Department
authorization bill. Unfortunately, the challenges to our
interests around the globe have not become easier since the
Secretary last appeared before us as our colleague and nominee.
I want to note that I welcome the food assistance reform
proposal in the budget request. Thank you for that, the top-to-
bottom look at significant foreign assistance programs. And I
underscore that I look forward to discussing the details of
this proposal and the way forward with Administrator Shaw
during next week's hearing.
The budget reflects a sense of uncertainty in key areas,
and I know that you are working to change that. But, for
example, in this budget we see a lack of structured funding for
Syria. I fear this reflects the lack of a coherent strategy and
a failure to plan ahead to invest in specific priorities,
whether supporting the opposition inside Syria or better
preparing the neighboring states to weather the coming storm.
Once again, the administration has submitted a request for
a contingency fund for the Middle East and North Africa, but I
am concerned that we are getting a vague request for an open-
ended authority rather than a request for funds tied to clear
priorities.
We also see uncertainty for U.S. personnel serving abroad.
The budget request, including a substantial amount of funding
for security-related programs, reminds us that there are still
critical, unanswered questions that must be addressed going
forward about the failures of process and leadership in
Benghazi. And as far as I am aware, no one has yet lost their
State Department employment over the Benghazi failures, and I
do hope at some point, Mr. Secretary, you will address that.
Given that the budget has now arrived with substantial
funding requests for embassy construction and security
programs, I hope we will shortly have responses to the
questions we have been asking about the process by which the
Department is sorting and prioritizing the competing
construction and security list. This will assure the committee
that funding is spent on the highest priority construction and
renovation projects.
At the same time, we see built into the budget request
plans for continued development in places like Afghanistan and
Iraq, where security issues present a significant challenge for
U.S. personnel. In many of these programs, it is evident that
targets are not being set, performance data is not being
collected, and monitoring of our partners is not being done to
know if our objectives are being met. This issue, as I said, is
worth a larger conversation, and I am sure we will have that
soon.
Today's hearing is also our first opportunity for the
committee to hear from you about your recent Asia trip, and to
get your assessment of China's willingness to support a larger
strategy to address the uncertain situation in North Korea.
And finally, the administration has sent a $52 billion
request to Congress for funding, and we owe it to the taxpayer
to ensure that every penny of their hard-earned money is well
spent. It is long past time, and I hope again you will address
this, for the administration to name a permanent, qualified
inspector general for the Department of State and the U.S.
Agency for AID to help ensure that that happens. In fact, it is
my hope that the next nominees you send to this committee will
be individuals with proven careers and aggressive oversight for
these two mission critical positions.
Mr. Chairman or Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your
comments.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
With that, Mr. Secretary, we will welcome your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, and
members of the committee, thank you very much. It is a
privilege to be back here, though still a little surreal to be
on this side of the dais. But I am honored to be back here, and
I thank all of you for your generous comments, and particularly
for the cooperation on any number of issues along the way.
Thank you for your mentioning of Boston. Obviously I
appreciate that enormously. It is no secret that my heart and
my head are in Boston today with the President, with the
families, with a lot of friends. There is a memorial service
there, and I am grateful to the President for going up there. I
wish I could be there with him, but I need to be here, and I
understand that. And I respect the need to continue.
You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, how resilient Bostonians are,
and it is absolutely true. I echo the admiration that I saw
watching the news clips. You know, you watched people running
toward the chaos to help. You saw runners continue running from
the marathon to the hospital to give blood. You saw people
opening their homes to give comfort to complete strangers. It
was just a remarkable outpouring.
And I think, you know, last night I saw that at the Boston
Bruins game, everybody just broke out into singing the
``National Anthem.'' I do not think it ever sounded better, and
there was this sign that flashed up saying, ``We are Boston
strong.'' And so my thoughts are with those folks today, and I
am confident we are going to get to the bottom of this.
I also want to thank--you know, this is unusual, but a
couple of days ago at Yankee Stadium, the Yankees posted the
Boston Red Sox logo, and they sang ``Sweet Adeline'' during--
after the third inning, I think. But it was a great tribute to
the way America comes together, and we are grateful for all of
people's prayers and thoughts, and we thank everybody for their
solidarity. Express my condolences, deep condolences, to the
families, those who were lost, and we lost a citizen of another
country, a young Chinese girl studying in Boston, a graduate
student who went there with her friends to watch the marathon
and take part in this fabulous Patriot's Day rite that, if
nobody has ever experienced it, you are right, Mr. Chairman,
they will be back, and there will be a bigger and better one
next year. And we will celebrate that spirit.
So thank you for your comments.
Turning to the business of the budget, I will try to move
rapidly because I do remember the lesson of let us get to the
questions as fast as we can. Senator Lindsey Graham said, I
think, very eloquently, that America's investment in foreign
policy is a national security insurance, and I think he is
right. If you make the small, smart investments up front, we
can avoid much costlier conflicts and burdens down the road.
And in the past few months, we have seen a number of
developments that just lend credence to that.
American engagement was essential to our rapprochement
between Turkey and Israel, a positive step toward stability in
a volatile region of the world, and helpful in terms of perhaps
ultimately being able to get to negotiations in the Mideast
peace process. The committee, needless to say, is deeply
immersed. You had a hearing the other day on Syria. We have
contributed nearly $385 million to the humanitarian crisis to
provide essential resources to the Syrian people. We have
actually delivered flour to bakers in Aleppo and provided food
and sanitation in the Atmeh refugee camp, which is not
inconsequential in terms of stability.
The fourth-largest city in Jordan today is a tense city. It
is a refugee city. I believe Senator McCain has been there, and
he understands the passions of the people who are there. Having
just returned from Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo, where obviously
the North Korea nuclear issue took center stage, I really was
reminded again of the fact that America is the guardian of
global security. People all through the region look to us for
that leadership, the indispensable nation. And we will not turn
our back on the prospect of peace, but I will tell you, neither
will we hesitate to do what is needed to defend our allies and
our interests. And that was the message that I went to deliver
and that we have delivered in other ways over the course of the
last weeks.
So all of these things, and a lot more, speak to why the
budget is not just a collection of numbers. It is an
illustration of our values. It is an illustration of our
priorities, particularly with respect to the security and long-
term interests of our country. I know that budget deficits and
debt are all weighty decisions, and we have to toe the line,
but--and I know you are all grappling with that. We are
grappling with them at the State Department, too, and I think
our proposed budget is responsive to, and reflective of, the
national economic reality.
In fact, I think it is more restrictive than I would
personally like it to be in the context of our national
reality. And we can talk about that a bit today. But it is
responsible investing in areas that attract economic growth,
create good jobs in America, and secure our national interests.
And as you know, when I testified before you for my
confirmation hearing, I said then that I think much of foreign
policy today is, and ought to be, economic policy. I stand by
that even more so after the meetings that I have had both in
Europe and the Middle East and Asia. It is just more clear than
ever where the economic action is, where the United States
needs to be, and how we can lead in the future if we are.
I believe we have implemented reforms that reduce costs
without jeopardizing vital contributions. The budget delivers,
I think, maximum bang for the buck, but that is not to say we
cannot do more and do better. And I will share with you
thoughts about some of the places where I think as I get into
this and we get people sort of at the table and invested, we
are going to be able to deliver more for the dollar and even
reduce some costs and do a more effective job.
Let me give you a couple of examples of some high-impact,
low-cost things that we are doing right now that we get as a
return on the investment. For just over $3.5 million, the State
Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization made really
key investments leading up to the elections in Kenya.
And I am absolutely convinced, and I think the record will
show, that what we did in Kenya, what Assistant Secretary of
State Johnny Carson and his shop did, and what the folks over
there in the Embassy and others working, AID and others, over
the last year, helped prevent a repeat of the violence that
tore that place apart 5 years ago. Our antiterrorism assistance
funding has helped save hundreds of lives of people in places
like Pakistan, India, and Lebanon, by training local law
enforcement to detect and neutralize explosive devices.
Our 2014 budget request maintains these commitments to
advancing peace and stability in places where it is hard to
find them. I have already traveled three times as Secretary to
the Middle East and north Africa, and all of you know how north
Africa is struggling to meet the growing expectations of
populations in this moment of uncertainty.
To that end, this budget includes a request for $580
million for the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund for
the very purpose of allowing us to be able to give reformers
the tools and resources they need to make the right decisions
and to avoid a decline into either failed statism or near
failed statism.
When we look at the threats that emanate from failed and
potentially failing states, nobody knows more than the members
of this committee the costs of making the wrong choice. Quite
simply, the U.S. homeland is not going to be secure if violent
extremists are bent on attacking us, and they can find a safe
haven in a place like the Sahel or the Maghreb. As Senator
McCain just returned from Mali, I know he is familiar with the
threats that we are dealing with there from al-Qaeda to
narcorebels and so forth.
This budgets sets aside $8.6 billion for our security,
counterterrorism, law enforcement assistance. Now, I ask you to
just compare $8.6 billion and what we have gotten as a return
on that investment versus the more than $1 trillion we have
spent fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think there is a
clear penny-wise, pound-wise investment that we are engaged in.
And I emphasize to all my former colleagues the United States
simply cannot be strong in today's world if we are not strong
in the world. And I think this is particularly true when it
comes to our domestic economic renewal.
We need to be more engaged and more out there, which is the
purpose of the TTIP, which Europe is very excited about.
Turkey expressed to me their desire to do parallel
negotiations. They do not want to be left out in Europe. And in
Asia, I just saw the enthusiasm of Prime Minister Abe and the
Japanese to be part of the TPP. They have taken significant
steps to reform and alter their approach in order to qualify,
and the United States is pleased to support their desire to be
part of this.
This is the way we are going to raise the standards and
deal with the issues of cyber security and intellectual
property and the other financial transactional rules of the
road that we all think are so important.
I would say also to everybody, I just want to emphasize
that development is not charity. It is an investment. Eleven of
our top fifteen trading partners today, 11 of the top 15, were
beneficiaries of U.S. foreign assistance only a few years ago.
I was just in Korea. Korea, 15 and 20 years ago, was a
recipient of aid. Today Korea is donating aid around the world
and partnering with us in charitable initiatives, efforts for
Syria, humanitarian and other kinds of efforts. So this is
important.
I also just want to highlight, quickly, reforms we are
making in this budget. The most visible one perhaps is in the
area of food aid, U.S. food aid. By giving ourselves the
flexibility to choose the most appropriate and efficient type
of food assistance, we are going to reach an estimated 2-to-4
million more people, and we are going to do it with the exact
same discretionary funding. At the same time, we are going to
save approximately $500 million in mandatory funding over the
next decade, which we will use to reduce the deficit.
American growers and producers will still play the majority
role in the donation of food assistance. Over half the funding
we are requesting will be used for the purchase and shipping of
U.S. commodities overseas. But by giving us the ability to
modernize, including the flexibility to procure food in an area
closer to the crisis, we actually address the crisis. We can
get food to malnourished people 11-to-14 weeks faster, and 11-
to-14 weeks faster for malnourished people can mean the
difference between life and death.
And here is the bottom line. This change allows us to do
more to help people lift themselves out of hunger and poverty
without spending more money. I think that is a great deal for
the American taxpayer.
The final thing I want to mention and then open to
questions obviously is just our most valuable resources--and,
Mr. Chairman, thank you for talking about Anne Smedinghoff. I
met Anne in Afghanistan in Kabul a few weeks ago. She was in my
control team. And I met with her family in Chicago the other
day on the way back, just this unbelievably good family,
committed, and vibrant, and very proud of their daughter. And
we have requested--you know, we cannot protect everybody. We
just say it. We cannot have 100 percent assurance in this
world. We have to make judgments.
So we have requested $4.4 billion to fortify our worldwide
security protection and to improve our overseas structure; $2.2
billion is set aside for constructing secure diplomatic
facilities. And this is part of our commitment to implement the
full recommendations of the ARB so we can mitigate the
potential of the risks. And I say to my former colleagues, you
know, we cannot guarantee the elimination of that risk. So as
Secretary, I will sit here and I will say to you, you know, we
lost people in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and in the first
decade, and it is a risk of being on the front lines of
diplomacy in dangerous places. But we cannot retreat, and we
will not retreat.
Anne and Ambassador Chris Stevens were cut from the same
cloth, and that is what made them such outstanding members of
the State Department family. And as Secretary, obviously my job
is to work with you so that together we protect the men and
women, and they can carry out our national mission.
I will just summarize by saying to everybody here, nothing
has hit me more in the last 2 months, 2\1/2\, months of my
travel and engagement in this job than the reality that so many
nations are looking to us for leadership. So many nations see
us as that indispensable country. We stand for optimism. We
stand for opportunity, for equality, for freedom, for dignity,
for people's ability to have a job and an education and do
better in life. And we stand in opposition to all those who
want to replace hope with hate, who just want to blow
themselves up and take people with them, or who want to, you
know, conduct a jihad without any viable program, purpose, or
alternative view that makes people's lives better.
So those are the things we believe. Those are the values
that the State Department and AID will defend every day. And I
look forward to continuing to work with this committee to take
those values and interests and protect them to the best of our
ability, and see America's flag fly proudly.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State John F. Kerry
Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker. It is always a
privilege--and still a bit surreal--to be in this hearing room on the
other side of the dais.
Before I begin, I couldn't possibly come home to the Senate without
addressing the terrorist attack in my home city of Boston, an attack
that hit home for me--literally. I've talked with friends and family
still wrestling with what happened to children and loved ones, and I am
very sorry that I am unable to join President Obama at the memorial
service today because my duties demanded I be here with you this
morning. But I know just how resilient Bostonians are, and I want to
echo all the admiration we hold for the people, both first responders
and ordinary citizens, who didn't hesitate when the bombs went off--the
people who ran into the chaos to help the victims, the marathoners who
continued running to the hospital to donate blood, the citizens who
opened their homes to offer comfort to strangers. Their actions are
proof positive that the American people, and especially Boston, cannot
be intimidated by cowardly acts of terrorism and destruction. My
thoughts and prayers are with the families of the three victims who
lost their lives--American victims and citizens of other countries, one
just 8 years old--and with all those who were wounded. We will not rest
until we have gotten to the bottom of these bombings and the
perpetrators have been brought to justice.
Turning to the business of the budget--I promise to remember the
most important lessons I learned during my time on this committee.
First, keep your remarks short so we can get to the questions.
And second, a lesson we talked about at my confirmation hearing but
which has hit home particularly during my travels as Secretary: there
really is no longer anything foreign about foreign policy.
As Senator Lindsey Graham has said very eloquently, America's
investment in foreign policy is ``national security insurance.'' He's
right. If we can make the small, smart investments up front, we can
avoid much more costly conflicts and burdens down the road.
In the past few months, we have seen several developments that
underscore the stakes for having a strong American presence in every
part of the world. American engagement was essential to the
rapprochement between two of our close partners, Israel and Turkey--a
positive step toward stability in a volatile region of the world.
This committee is well aware of the ongoing crisis in Syria--you
held a hearing on it just last week. We have contributed nearly $385
million in humanitarian relief to provide essential resources to the
Syrian people, including sending flour to bakeries in Aleppo and
providing food and sanitation in Atmeh refugee camp. I expect we will
have the chance to discuss Syria at length today.
Having just returned from Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo where the North
Korea nuclear issue took center stage, we are reminded once again that
America is the guardian of global security. We will not turn our back
on the prospect of peace, but neither will we hesitate to do what is
needed to defend our allies and interests.
All this speaks to why this budget isn't just a collection of
numbers; it's an illustration of our values and priorities. Budgets,
deficits, debt--these are weighty decisions, and I know each of you is
grappling with them carefully.
We are grappling with them at the State Department, too, and I
think our proposed budget is responsive to, and reflective of, our
national economic reality. As part of the President's budget, it will
help cut our deficit responsibly while investing in areas that attract
economic growth, create good jobs for American workers, and secure our
national interests.
Our 2014 budget request represents a 6-percent reduction from 2012
funding levels. We have examined our request with a steely eyed
determination to improve efficiency and economize wherever possible. We
have implemented reforms that reduce costs without jeopardizing vital
contributions. This budget delivers maximum bang for the minimal
possible taxpayer buck--actually, for about one single penny out of the
taxpayer dollar.
Let me give you a few examples of the kind of high-impact, low-cost
work we do every day to make the world safer. With just over $3.5
million, the State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations made key investments leading up to the recent elections in
Kenya that helped prevent a repeat of the violence we saw 5 years ago.
Our antiterrorism assistance funding has helped save the lives of
hundreds of people in places like Pakistan, India, and Lebanon by
training local law enforcement to detect and neutralize explosive
devices.
Our 2014 budget request maintains our commitments to advancing
peace, security, and stability in places where all three can be scarce
commodities. I've already traveled three times as Secretary to the
Middle East and North Africa--a region struggling to respond to its
citizens' growing expectations for dignity and opportunity. Leaders
there are making difficult decisions, and the United States cannot make
those decisions for them, but we can do more to be a partner for all
those on the side of freedom and democracy.
To that end, this budget includes a request for $580 million for
the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund so that we can help
give reformers the tools and resources they need to make the right
decisions on behalf of their citizens. This fund allows us to say to
people in the region: ``If you're willing to take on the deep-rooted
challenges and make the tough choices, we are here for you.''
When we look at the threats that emanate from failed and
potentially failing states, we must heed the lessons of our past. The
U.S. homeland will not be secure if violent extremists bent on
attacking us find a safe haven in places like the Sahel or the Maghreb.
Senator McCain, you've just returned from Mali, so you are familiar
with the range of threats we're dealing with in that part of the world,
from
al-Qaeda rebels to narcotraffickers. This budget sets aside $8.6
billion for our security, counterterrorism, and law-enforcement
assistance. Compare that $8.6 billion to the more than $1 trillion we
have spent fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and I think you'll agree
this is both a penny and pound-wise investment.
The simple fact is, the United States cannot be strong at home if
we're not strong in the world. This is particularly true when it comes
to our domestic economic renewal.
We need to do more to get out there and stoke our economic engines
with the trade and business opportunities available in other countries.
That's why the President is committed to successfully completing the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership. We want to tap the growing markets of the Asia-Pacific,
which are vital to American economic recovery.
When it comes to shoring up our economic health and protecting our
national security, our development work is one of our strongest assets.
Let me be clear: development is not charity. It's an investment in a
strong America and a free world. Eleven of our top 15 trading partners
were once beneficiaries of U.S. foreign assistance. We can't afford to
pull back. But that doesn't mean we won't work in better, smarter ways.
Let me highlight the reforms we are making with this budget to one
of our most visible forms of assistance: U.S. Food Aid. By giving
ourselves the flexibility to choose the most appropriate and efficient
type of food assistance, the U.S. Government will reach an estimated 2-
4 million more people every year with the same discretionary funding.
At the same time, we will save approximately $500 million in mandatory
funding over the next decade, which we will use to reduce the deficit.
American growers and producers will still play a major role in our
food assistance. Over half the funding we are requesting for emergency
food aid must be used for the purchase and shipping of U.S. commodities
overseas. But by giving us the ability to modernize, including the
flexibility to also procure food aid in developing countries closer to
crisis areas, not only can we feed more people, we can get food to
malnourished people 11-14 weeks faster. Here's the bottom line: this
change allows us to do more to help more people lift themselves out of
hunger and poverty without spending any more money. That's a great deal
for the American taxpayer.
The final area I want to mention is how this budget cares for our
most valuable resource: the brave men and women of the State Department
and USAID. We have requested $4.4 billion to fortify our worldwide
security protection and improve our overseas infrastructure; $2.2
billion of this is set aside for constructing secure diplomatic
facilities. This is part of our commitment to implement in full the
recommendations of the independent Accountability Review Board so that
we can mitigate the risk of future tragedies like the one we suffered
last year in Benghazi.
This has been a hard year for our State Department family--a family
that knows how risky the work we signed up for can be in a very
dangerous world. Just 2 weeks ago in Afghanistan we lost a bright,
committed Foreign Service officer--Anne Smedinghoff. I met her on my
last visit, and earlier this week, I sat with her parents. She was just
25 years old. She wanted to make a difference in the lives of people
she had never met, and she was willing to take risks to do it.
Anne and Ambassador Chris Stevens really were cut from the same
cloth. That's what made them such outstanding members of the State
Department family, and such outstanding Americans.
As Secretary, my most important job is to protect the men and women
under my watch so they can carry out their national security mission.
But we cannot do it by retreating from the world. We stand for optimism
and opportunity and equality. And we stand in opposition to all those
who would replace hope with hate. That's what we believe--and those are
the values the State Department and USAID defend every day.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Well, we will start a round of questions of 6 minutes.
Secretary, there is a lot to talk about here, and part of
the budget is also understanding some of our policy choices so
we can make decisions as to what that budget should look at. So
let me review some of those most significant policy choices
that I think we have some challenges moving ahead.
Iran. I am very concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions. I
was discouraged to see the last round of the P5+1 talks where I
saw there was no real intention by the Iranians really to have
any commitment to moving forward in that regard.
The problem here is that we saw a report that they have
more sophisticated centrifuges, that they have progressed far
more than many expected at this time according to reports that
came out of the IAEA. The centrifuges are spinning, the clock
is ticking, and they seem to be managing the sanctions that we
have levied so far. And if they think that the status quo
continues to move forward, they will continue to manage it in a
way that they will move forward.
My question is, What do we do going from here? Is there,
for example, additional support in the Security Council to take
additional action? And what is your view--there is talk within
the Senate, someone who has led on this issue. I know Senator
Kirk and others. What is your view of sanctions that would
require the acceleration of significant reductions in petroleum
purchases by foreign nations or that would limit Iran's access
to its foreign currency reserves as additional items that might
create a tipping point in their attitude?
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I share your concern. The
President shares your concern. There is no question but that
the last round of talks was less than the United States hoped
for. However, our policy is clear, and there is no variation in
it. The clock is ticking. And the Iranians I believe know that.
The one thing I would say to the members is that they are
2 months away from an election. The election is on June 14. And
every bit of evidence we have, this very week or next week,
they declare who their candidates are. And there is an enormous
amount of jockeying going on with the obvious normal struggle
or tension between hardliners and people who might want to make
an agreement, et cetera.
We all know what life is like here in the Senate 6 months
from a Presidential election, so you can imagine what it is
like there
2 months from theirs. And so I think this is a moment for us to
be a little patient. We are watching. Every bit of intelligence
is being compared on a daily basis within our interagency
process. We are deeply engaged with our Israeli allies,
friends, comparing on a regular basis. I think we are on the
same page, and we understand sort of what the schedule is here.
But I am personally not expecting something dramatic to
happen over the course of the next 2 months, unless of course
they take steps to not just install additional centrifuges in
Natanz, but start to spin up and do things which we are capable
of tracking very effectively.
So the President has made the policy crystal clear: Iran
will not get a nuclear weapon. The international community has
spoken to this effect, and we have, as everybody on the
committee knows, the United Nations resolution, and the
Chinese, Russians, everybody supporting it. We still want a
diplomatic resolution of this as our first choice, but if the
Iranians, who know what they have to do, are not willing to
come to the table, the clock will ultimately run out.
We are not there yet. We do not need to spin this up at
this point in time. I think the President will be very clear
with you when and if we need to do that. But for the moment, I
think you need to leave us the window to try to work the
diplomatic channel.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that. It is just that I
see that diplomatic window increasingly closing, and I am
concerned that if they believe they can manage the present set
of circumstances over the next 5 months or so, then we have a
real challenge. So we hope you will be open to some of the
initiatives that we may be considering. We will confer with you
in that regard.
Secretary Kerry. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, we are open
obviously. I would really like to work with you on the timing,
and the reason is I would like to actually talk about some of
this in a classified session. And I would be happy to do that
with you at near term. But I do think timing and the choice of
when we might do something is critical. We need to cooperate
together on that, and you need to be aware of some things that
I need to talk to you about in a classified session.
The Chairman. All right. Syria. We had a hearing here last
week, and we heard from Ambassador Ford and the Acting
Assistant Secretary that our current policies and political
solution, which of course we would love to see. But I got no
sense of what is the pathway toward a political solution.
And I am concerned that if Assad continues to believe, as I
believe he thinks in his mind at this point, that given the
present dynamics where he has a monopoly on air power and on
artillery, that he will continue to be able to move forward.
And unless we change the tipping point here, and from my own
personal view I have evolved to the point of thinking about how
do those who are in opposition, which we have vetted and
believe share our values, get the type of assistance that can
change that tipping point, we will continue to see lives lost.
We will continue to see the challenges to other countries in
the region and to their own security, like Jordan and others,
move forward.
So can you give me a better roadmap than we got last week
and a sense of whether or not you believe we need to change the
tipping point? And if so, how? And if not, what is the
political solution road work?
Secretary Kerry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I have said for
months that I think--and President Obama has said and directed
me to go out and try to find the ways to implement this, to
change--we need to change President Assad's calculation. That
is clear. Right now he is sitting there with support from Iran,
with support from Hezbollah, with support from Russia, with
artillery and an army, and believing that he can continue to
fight it out using his air power, his Scuds, his artillery, and
his tanks. So that equation somehow has to change, and we all
understand that.
We have a meeting scheduled--well, the President directed
me first to go to Rome where we did pick up what we were doing.
We increased it and created a synergy, I think, between the
core group of supporters and Syrian opposition, which was
important, has been important. And Syrian opposition is making
progress on the ground. If you look at a map and see where they
are versus where they were a few months ago, they are making
progress. But that is not the measurement of this. The violence
is enormous. The numbers of refugees coming out is intolerable.
The killing, the wanton destruction is unacceptable. And so
time is not on our side. We do not want to leave this in the
status quo if we can help it.
To that end, I have reached out to the Russians trying to
find if there is a way for us to find a common ground with
respect to the possibility of implementing the Geneva
principles. Now, the Geneva principles are as follows, and
Russia signed on to them, that President Assad and the Syrian
opposition both nominate and choose individuals who will be
the, by mutual consent--both sides have to agree, so obviously
the Syrian opposition is not going to agree to Assad. It has to
be someone else. And they create a transitional government with
full executive authority that then goes to an election where
all of the Syrian people will choose their future.
Now, that is the ideal that has been set forth and, in
fact, codified in international terms by this agreement that
was reached in Geneva with the Russians signed onto it. They
are now arguing that Assad does not necessarily have to leave
immediately or up front, and they believe that the Syrian
opposition is pushing away from the negotiations.
So we are meeting in Istanbul this Saturday at the
invitation of both Foreign Minister Davutoglu and myself with
the core group, to get everybody on the same page with respect
to what post-Assad might look like: commitment to diversity,
pluralism, democracy, inclusivity, protection of minority
rights; that they would be open to the negotiating process, to
a political settlement; that they will abide by rules with
respect to conduct in warfare and so forth, so that everybody--
Qataris, Saudis, Emirates, Turks, Europeans--who are involved
will all be on the same page.
And the hope is that that will then create a confidence
level about who is getting what kind of aid from whom.
Everybody has now accepted a concern about extremist elements
who have forced their way into this picture, and there is a
desire by all parties to move those extremist elements to the
side, and to give support, I believe, to the Syrian opposition.
That is a big step forward.
And so if we can come out of that, then there are some
other considerations that are clearly being talked through.
None have been approved yet. But the President has authorized
additional assistance, nonlethal, and others are giving lethal.
So different countries are making their choices about what they
are doing, but we are coordinating as closely as we can in that
effort, and that is what the meeting in Istanbul would be
about.
I think that is the best road we can at least work on at
this moment in time. My hope is still that the Russians can be
constructive in this process, and we can find room to
negotiate. The bottom line is that time is not on the side of a
political solution. It is on the side of more violence, more
extremism, an enclave breakup of Syria, a very dangerous
sectarian confrontation over the long term, and the potential
of really bad people getting a hold of chemical weapons. So
there are enormous strategic interests for us here.
I will be seeing Foreign Minister Lavrov next week in
Brussels at the Minister's meeting there when I come back from
Turkey. And hopefully we can find some progress, and that is
where we are.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
welcome back. Thanks for being here.
Let me pick up on Syria. Over the course of a couple of
hearings, we have heard some conflicting testimony in terms of
the Pakistanis--or, I mean, the Syrian citizens, their
viewpoint of America, whether they are appreciative of what we
are trying to do versus growing resentment that we are not
doing enough. What is your assessment of the general feeling of
the citizens of Syria?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I think it is a mix. I think there
are some that are angry and feel we should be doing more, and
there are some that think we are doing things and helping them.
There is no question that the vast majority would like to see
us do more.
Senator Johnson. OK, thank you. As a fiscal conservative, I
am not opposed to foreign aid. I think if it is spent well, it
is money well spent. I am proud of the fact that we, you know,
portray American values around the world, and I think if it is
done effectively, I think it would be an important component of
both our foreign and military defense policy.
But at the same time, we have, to put it delicately, some
unreliable allies. And there have been attempts in the Senate
to move amendments that could strip foreign aid from some of
these allies. What is your assessment of the best way of
holding some of these allies accountable without--you know,
again, to also understand the real politics of the situation,
whether we are talking about Egypt. I mean, let us talk about
Pakistan with Dr. Afridi.
How can we handle those situations effectively?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator Johnson, it is a really good
question. And what I have learned through the years at least,
you know, from my practice is that there is no generic
prophylactic rule that applies to everybody. Just there is not.
There is a delicacy and an individuality to each situation that
you have to kind of respond to.
Some places you can do conditionality, and it lends itself
to that, and it is effective. Some places it is
counterproductive, and it does not work, and it actually can be
even, you know, destructive. And it depends on who you are
dealing with and what the circumstances are.
And Pakistan, for instance, as everybody knows, certain
things that have been taking place over the years have really
created anger within the country, and the body politic is
tense, and the politicians respond to that. But then they have
been trying to be helpful in other ways, and they have been.
And we have a route for transiting our aid to--all of our
supplies to our troops in Afghanistan last year and now
bringing things out. We have had cooperation on intel. We have
had cooperation on nuclear weapons. We have cooperation on
efforts to ferret out, you know, bad actors in the Fatah in the
western part of the country. They have lost--I think they have
150,000 troops out there fighting the same fight we are now.
So it is a mixed bag is the bottom line. And it does not
lend itself to sort of just come in and say, well, Dr. Afridi
is in jail, he should not be, et cetera. We have said that. We
will fight that. And it is wrong, and it angers all of us. But
I do not think you can chuck the whole relationship over one,
or two, or three things here and there because of the overall
interest that we have.
Egypt similarly. The army in Egypt has been, frankly, an
incredibly responsible player in this drama. You know, but for
the army, you could have had--you would have had a civil war I
think in Egypt. You would have had massive bloodshed. And the
army not only kept the peace, but did what it said it would do:
created the capacity to have an election, had the election, and
gave up power, turned it over to the people who won the
election. Now, we do not--you know, we have questions about
where the people who won the election are taking the country,
but they won the election.
And so I think, frankly, our investment over the years in
the relationships we have in the junior officer level and on
the way up within the army is terrific. We have people on the
telephone to their military during Tahrir Square saying, you
got to be restrained, you got to do this. Many of these people
have trained over here at our training facilities, and so there
were relationships built up and standards put in place.
That is the virtue of what we do in these kinds of long-
term investments and relationships. And they are never perfect,
but on balance, I believe, you know, we are getting a return on
that investment that is not inconsequential. The army also is
helping us enforce security in the Sinai. The army is also
helping us enforce the Gaza peace, and the Gaza peace has held.
And the relationship--our friends in Israel will tell you today
that the day-to-day relationship and workings they have for
security--mill to mill and intel to intel--is army to army
intel to intel with Egypt. So I think it is very important, and
we have got to be thoughtful about how we approach those
things.
Senator Johnson. And I agree, and I guess I would just
suggest the administration work very closely with the Senate
and the Congress in terms of getting the information out,
because let us face it, foreign aid is very unpopular, and we
need to at least provide the American people the rationale for
why we are doing it.
A quick other question here. I agree with you that foreign
policy is but economic policy. I also believe that the reason
America is getting away with these enormous deficits, all this
debt, is because we are still the world's reserve currency. We
are still the world's safe haven.
I am concerned about the point in time when America is no
longer the world's reserve currency, and we are seeing China
begin, you know, developing relationships with other countries
and doing currency swaps and trading in other currencies. Can
you just speak to your concern about that and how far has that
progressed where America is no longer going to be the world's
reserve currency?
Secretary Kerry. I do not see it happening any time soon,
to be honest with you, Senator. I think our economy is the
strongest economy in the world still. We are going to be the
first or second strongest economy through the first half of
this century to a certainty. And I think we can get stronger,
much stronger than we are if we make some of the right moves
now and the right investments.
So, you know, my sense is that we are on a pretty good
track. With the TTIP we will bring Europe, which is the largest
market in the world, together with the United States, which is
the largest economy in the world. We will set the standards
through that. With the TTPP and Japan joining in, we will have
40 percent of GDP in that alone. So these are very significant
economic alliances that we are building. And others will have
to come up to our standard, and I think that is one of the
reasons why the dollar will remain strong.
If I can just say one thing quickly on foreign aid, you
mentioned that foreign aid is unpopular. That is the reason I
went to the University of Virginia to give my first speech as
Secretary of State to talk about what we do get for what we
invest. What we are talking about in this budget is one penny
on every dollar we spend, folks, in everything that we do in
the world: our embassies, our consulates, our visa programs,
our economic programs, our aid, I mean, everything. One penny.
Now, if you look at the relationships we get out of that,
and the role we play in the world, and our ability to have an
impact, we are saving 5 million lives in Africa through PEPFAR
in what we are doing. I saw 10 extraordinary women the other
day in Afghanistan, each of them going against years of habit
and culture and history in their country to start businesses.
One woman had 10 businesses. Another had three or four. They
are entrepreneurs. They are unbelievable, and they are
courageous because it is not easy to do. So that is what we get
for our help and investment.
So I would say that, you know, what we need are more
elected officials who do not go home and beat up foreign aid
and say, you know, I would rather have that money come to
wherever it is in their particular hometown. It is a guaranteed
applause line, but it does build up that prejudice against the
program.
And I would just close by reminding everybody here, when
George Marshall and Harry Truman put the Marshall Plan in
place, the country was overwhelmingly against it. Japan and
Germany today are two of the strongest allies we have. Europe
as a whole, whose economy was flat and broken and destroyed by
the war, came back, and Europe and NATO have been indispensable
to us. And to remind you of what I said in my opening, 11 of 15
countries we gave aid to now give aid around the world, one
penny on the dollar. I will argue that anywhere in this Nation.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Johnson. Again, I would like to help you make that
argument. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Well, I want to thank Senator Johnson for
that line of questioning because I think it was very important.
I appreciate it.
And I want to thank you, Secretary Kerry. We really miss
you in the Senate, but I cannot imagine a better job for you
than this. And already in the shortest time, it felt like in 2
minutes you have been to every hot spot in the world. And here
you are today before your colleagues. I am just very happy
myself.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you. Thank you, thank you.
Senator Boxer. I also want to express my support for the
extraordinary people of your home State as they face the
aftermath of a cowardly and vicious attack, and associate
myself with the remarks you made yesterday in front of the
House, and everything you said.
I do have the luxury of having the microphone on, so I want
to say two more things that do not have anything to do with
your appearance here.
I send my deepest sympathies to those in West, TX, who are
dealing with a horrific explosion, and to the parents of Sandy
Hook Elementary School, I want to say how sorry I am for a do-
nothing Senate. And in that I speak for myself alone.
Mr. Secretary, in your job, you are dealing and responding
to devastating violence and humanitarian suffering all over the
world. And I was very pleased in your response to Chairman
Menendez to hear about this meeting that is going to happen in
Turkey, and that you are trying to bring everybody together.
About a year ago, I met with the Russian Ambassador, and it
was one of the--about this issue in Syria and a post-Assad. It
was a very depressing meeting for those of us there. I was
called by Senator Durbin in his office in the Capitol. And
Russia's attitude was that there is not going to be any post-
Assad. Assad is going to be there.
Now, I certainly hope in light of what has happened since
then that they have softened on that. And if anybody can push
them in our direction, I think it would be you given your
amazing sense of history and your ability to communicate.
I want to focus on the issue of refugees for a minute and
get your opinion. There is a worsening situation there.
According to the United Nations, the number of Syrians fleeing
to the neighboring countries has more than doubled just since
January from 400,000 to 1.3 million refugees. And these
refugees are in dire need of assistance, especially the women
and the children, many of whom have suffered rape or sexual
violence. A UNICEF spokeswoman warned, ``The needs are rising
exponentially, and we are broke.''
Now, I am so proud that the United States is the largest
single donor, and I think as Senator Johnson indicates, this is
hard for us. We have these deficits. I am happy to say they
have gone way down from the top when the President inherited
them from President Bush, $1.2 trillion. They are now down to
about $700 billion or so, but still too high. But we are still
the largest single donor of humanitarian aid to the Syrian
people. But the United States cannot do this ourselves.
So in your opinion, Secretary Kerry, are you confident that
the Gulf States will follow through in a constructive way on
their pledges to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance to
Syria? And what can we do here to encourage the international
community, including the Gulf States, to do more?
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you, Senator Boxer. You are
absolutely correct. This is a growing humanitarian catastrophe,
and Lebanon is very destabilized. You do not have camps in
Lebanon. They are just pouring into Lebanon and spread out
among the population. And they are obviously in Turkey, and
everybody is very concerned about it. As I said earlier, the
fourth-largest city in Jordan now, which is already under
economic stress and some financial constraints, they are
feeling the impact of this.
So that is one of the reasons there is an urgency to this.
I mean, your refugee situation, if this just continues to slide
downward, is going to get worse, and I also fear for the lives
of minorities if this slides downward and gets worse. It is why
a political solution--
I know some people say you are crazy, how can you work out
something with Assad. Maybe you cannot, but you ought to keep
trying even as you keep the pressure on.
The important thing is that you try to get a transition one
way or the other as rapidly as you can. And that is why
accelerants to Assad's departure are being thought through and
are being considered at this point. And that is why the
President decided to raise the amount of nonlethal aid that he
is currently providing.
So I hope they will follow through on the pledges. We are
talking to each of them. I actually met with His Highness
Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed yesterday. This is very much on their
minds. They are deeply concerned about Syria as is every member
of the Gulf State community. So hopefully they will be
forthcoming, and we are going to need to help Jordan in this
struggle.
Senator Boxer. Secretary, you recently returned from a trip
to Asia amid intensifying threats from North Korea, and coming
from California, I am sure you understand everyone has deep
concerns, our State and the west coast particularly. I
understand North Korea still faces significant challenges in
developing a reliable missile capable of reaching the United
States, but I know you can appreciate our angst.
You said that the United States is willing to engage
directly with North Korea as long as it takes steps to end its
nuclear weapons program. What leverage does the United States
have to pressure North Korea to sit back down at the
negotiating table?
Secretary Kerry. Well, that is precisely why I went at the
request of the President. The President's policy is to try to
change this dynamic, which has been just a round robin of
disaster for the last 20 years. The framework agreement, you
reach agreement, they go back on it. You reach agreement again,
you give them some food aid, there is some sort of bait,
nothing happens. It just has not been serious. And the problem
with that is that now they are further down the road in terms
of nuclearization, and it is more dangerous.
So my conversation with all of the parties in the region
was really very direct, and particularly honest and candid with
the Chinese, and I am grateful. I want to thank the Chinese
for, first of all, their reception for me, which was open and
at the highest level, and very engaged, very serious
conversations. And it is clear to me they are wrestling with
their best approach. They are really thinking about this for a
number of reasons. I think they view this as different now
because it does involve the security of the United States, and
the United States, through the President's decisions, has
appropriately responded by deploying different assets to
respond to a potential missile threat.
So China sees a growing level of instability in the region,
and the last thing they would want, I am convinced, is a war on
their doorstep or a completely destabilized Korean Peninsula.
The best way to avoid that, needless to say, is to move to
change the dynamic. No country has as much leverage with North
Korea as China. China provides most of their fuel supplies.
China provides a huge amount of food aid. China supplies a lot
of their banking facilitation. China supplies a lot of their
trade. China has a huge ability here to have the major impact.
Now, I do notice that since the visit yesterday, the Korean
foreign office put out their terms of what would be required
with respect to a negotiation. That is the first word of
negotiation or thought of that we have heard from them since
all of this has begun. So I am prepared to look at that as, you
know, at least a beginning gambit, not acceptable obviously,
and we have to go further.
One thing we are not going to do is get into the, you know,
here is a little food aid, here is a little of this, and then
we will talk kind of, you know. We have got to make some
fundamental determinations here, and we have made that crystal
clear in our discussions with the Chinese. And I hope--I know
that the Chinese are thinking about this very, very seriously
as they always do, and now I think their interests are perhaps
different than they were before.
One of the calculations I know that has been in Kim Jong-
un's mind is that he can kind of do this and get away with it
because he does not believe China will crack down on him. So
that is a key consideration here, and hopefully that, in fact,
will be proven to be not true.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr.
Secretary, again thank you for being here and for your
presentation.
Secretary Kerry. Oh, I am just being corrected here. I said
something. It was not the Republic of Korea that put it out. It
was the DPRK. I thought I was saying DPRK, but I just wanted
the record to reflect correctly who put out what.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Senator Corker. Mr. Secretary, you know, when the conflict
in Syria began, the administration put out a statement that
Assad must go, but then not much has happened since from the
standpoint of a coordinated strategy. And it would appear to me
that the reason for that was that there was not really a
national interest that was perceived there. There was a desire
to be kind of involved and to act as if, you know, we were
doing some things on the humanitarian front. But there really
was not a clear national interest per the administration. I
know this is all before your time.
It seems like that the events have shaped into a very
different kind of situation where the national interest that we
have or might have thought we would have discussed in the very
beginning is very different now. And what I mean by that is, it
seems to me that the national interests that we have in Syria
are that we do not want al-Qaeda or other extremists to control
the country, and to be able to infect, if you will, countries
nearby. And it seems to me that that now makes it a national
interest.
And I wonder if you might shed some light on your thoughts
as it relates to this being very different. Obviously I do not
think anybody here wants to see Assad stay, but at the same
time, our national interest now is very different. I think our
national interest now is not so much to focus on that, although
we want that to change, but our national interest is to ensure
that al-Qaeda does not end up with a foothold in this country
with chemical weapons and have the ability to destabilize
countries in the neighboring areas.
Would you agree with that assessment?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I certainly agree with the part that
says that we do not want, you know, any extremist elements to
be able to control the country. I think everybody accepts that.
But I do not agree that we did not have a national interest at
the beginning, which is why the administration said that Assad
has to go. But our interest was different.
You know, you can have a national interest. You can have a
vital national interest. You can have a--I mean, there are
gradations.
Senator Corker. The gradation has increased.
Secretary Kerry. Yes; they have.
Senator Corker. OK.
Secretary Kerry. You bet. They absolutely have. They have
changed, and you are absolutely correct that they morphed
during the process.
But we had an interest in supporting the Syrian opposition
and did. In fact, it was President Obama's leadership through
Secretary Clinton that brought the original--you know, the
Syrian opposition----
Senator Corker. And I do not really care about all that. I
mean, I just asked----
Secretary Kerry. No, but I am just trying to----
Senator Corker. What I would like to focus on if we could--
I mean, I will take your comments. That is fine. I do not want
to spend 5 minutes talking about the past. What I would like to
do is talk about the future.
Secretary Kerry. OK.
Senator Corker. And I would like to talk about the threat
that al-Qaeda poses and whether there is any thought of trying
to figure out a way that the more secular moderate opposition
could team over time with the Alawite population and do
something very different than what we see now taking place.
Secretary Kerry. Senator Corker, you are hitting the nail
on the head, and that is exactly what we are going to talk
about in Istanbul, among other things. In fact, we are actively
reaching out now to see if that base of the opposition could be
broadened, and whether or not everybody can come together and
agree on sort of the rules of the road, if you will, going
forward. So my hope is that the dynamic could conceivably shift
through that.
You still have the difficulty of, you know, trying to
change President Assad's calculation himself because he has got
to be--he has got to get to a place where he is making the
decision, whoops, this is not so good for me. If I hang around,
it is curtains for the government or curtains for me
personally, and I got to make--I have got to find an
alternative. He is not there. Obviously he is not there.
Senator Corker. How do you deal, though, with the fact that
the more moderate secular groups that we would like to support
in some way, and I know you are having discussions about the
best way to make that happen, and I appreciate that. How do you
deal with that knowing that the Alawites on the other end are
worried about extermination, and at the same time, the more
secular opposition groups that we want to support realize that
if they are successful, their very next conflict is going to be
with al-Qaeda. So how do you deal with that all simultaneously?
Secretary Kerry. That is exactly what this meeting is
about. The core group parties have come to the conclusion--I
think now all of them with perhaps one exception, and we have
to figure that out--that they are concerned about the growth of
the extremist element, particularly when it aligned itself
voluntarily the other day with
al-Qaeda. That was a break point for a lot of them.
And now they are determined to try to take steps, I
believe, based on the conversations we have had, to try to
isolate them and, in fact, make sure support is going through
the Syrian opposition. So this is a potential moment of
coalescence that we have been looking for, and people have
wanted a clarity to how the aid is being delivered and to whom
and so forth. Our hope is to be able to achieve that, and that
is one of the purposes of the meeting.
Senator Corker. And do you think there is a realistic way
to cause the more secular groups to actually reach out and try
to accommodate some kind of political reconciliation with the
Alawite population, not Assad----
Secretary Kerry. I know this----
Senator Corker [continuing]. But the Alawite population
that supports him?
Secretary Kerry. I know this. I know that they will sign on
to a document that will offer protective language, and
inclusivity, and other things to the Alawite and to the others,
to the Druze, to the Christians, to the Ismali, and others.
Can I tell you to a certainty that--I think we have got to
find a way to make sure that policy is implemented and adhered
to. We need to. Everybody needs to reach out to Alawi to change
the calculation, because you are right. They do believe they
are fighting against extermination. And sectarian components of
this, the sectarian overhang on this conflict, is very
dangerous in that context, not just for the Alawi, but for
other minorities in Syria. And that is why getting everybody to
be very public and very clear and ready to adhere to the
standards with respect to the rules of the road is going to be
critical.
Now, all I can do is tell you that we have got to have that
meeting and see where people are really at, and what the
enforcement mechanisms can be, and how strong an agreement it
can be. And I cannot give you any guarantees until I am seeing
sort of the flavor of that.
Senator Corker. Mr. Secretary, I do appreciate what you
have been doing since you have been in your position. And I,
too, have visited the camps in both Turkey and Jordan, and I do
believe that the folks that influence the secular groups on the
ground are the ones that are going to determine the future. And
I know you are looking at how that best can be done.
I have also traveled through North Africa, Mali and Tunisia
and Algeria, and I just do not think we have a very coordinated
effort there. The budget request lays out a big sum of money,
but not a real strategy. And I know that is of lesser import,
if you will, with all the other urgent things that you have
going on or of slightly lesser focus. But I do hope we will
deal with that.
And I want to thank you for your efforts with North Korea.
I think that there is a real chance of nuclear proliferation if
we do not deal with this issue, and I know you sense that as I
did on the ground, both in South Korea and Japan. So anyway,
thank you for your efforts.
Secretary Kerry. No, thank you very much, Senator. And I
need to work with you guys, with all of you, very, very much on
what you just mentioned about the Maghreb and the Sahel. The
President has directed me actually--it is on the menu, and we
are putting together--what he wants is to analyze what the
options are. And we are going to be putting those options. The
President will need your input ahead of time, and then we will
need your support hopefully when the President makes decisions
about what we try to do.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kerry, let me join in thanking you for your continued
service. A very impressive start giving us all hope that we can
make progress in areas that are extremely important to
America's security.
You mentioned several times that the international
community looks to the United States as the best chance to
resolve international conflicts. I just want to concur with
Senator Corker's observations of the problems we have in the
Syrian opposition. I have been to that region also. I have been
to the camps. I have talked to the Syrian opposition. And it is
young. It is yet to be fully tested. It is a very difficult
area in which they are operating. The Assad regime still
controls a great deal of military might, and it is still a very
difficult circumstance.
But we do know that the extremist groups that want to
identify with al-Qaeda are strong. And I just would encourage
you to be very aggressive, and as you said, not just the
conversations, but how do we have accountability to make sure
that the opposition groups that we are supporting in Syria
isolate themselves from those extremists.
You also mentioned as one of the ways the international
community looks to America is for dignity, and I could not
agree with you more, so I want to talk a little bit about the
rebalancing to Asia. And I do want to point out, originally I
was listening to our chairman talk about the additional funds.
If I did the calculations correct, East Asia and the Pacific is
one of the smaller parts of the pie of international diplomacy,
and, yes, they did receive an increase, but that increase is
smaller than Africa. And if you take Iraq out, I think the
increase is smaller than the Near East. I would just point that
out, but I do believe we have to put the resources up for East
Asia and the Pacific.
And we made some changes in military deployments in that
region. We have joined the East Asia summit. Secretary Kerry,
you mentioned the trade initiative, CPP. All that speaks to the
economic and military side. I want to talk about the human
dimension for one moment. I know you are not going to be
surprised to hear me bring that subject up.
In Europe, we focused on all of the areas important to the
United States in 1975 when we established the Helsinki Accords.
We did that recognizing that security in a region depends not
only on military, but also on economic growth, as you pointed
out, but also human rights and respect for human rights.
We do not have any similar mechanism within the Asian
community. ASEAN represents an opportunity. They are looking at
human rights issues, but it is at the beginning stages, and it
is not quite yet clear what the commitment is among the member
countries, let alone the U.S. involvement here.
So could you comment as to the priority you are placing on
the development of basic rights, particularly in Asia as we
rebalanced Asia, and whether there are some mechanisms that we
can help you with in order to advance these causes?
Secretary Kerry. Absolutely, Senator Cardin. And I would
begin by thanking you for your unbelievable tenacity and
continued focus on these issues. You are the Senate's champion
on it, and I appreciate that.
I gave a speech while I was in Japan in which I talked
about sort of the Pacific dream, if you will, in response to
the notion that we have an American dream and that the new
President of China is now talking about a China dream, a
Chinese dream.
And so I wanted to hold out to them on behalf of the
administration. You know, the President did the rebalance, and
the President is super focused on Asia. And the reason is that
he has a vision about what it can be and what our relationship
with it can be. And so we talked about strong growth which
relates to our security components, and we talked about smart
growth, which relates to our, you know, technology and other
things that we can do, and energy, and so forth, green growth.
And also just growth. And just in the growth, I talked about
rule of law and human rights, and how critical human rights
are, talking about specific challenges and instances in the
region. In all of my conversations with everybody, I raised, as
I always have as a Senator and now as Secretary, the specific
human rights concerns relative to the country. We talked about
Tibet in China, and we also talked about individual cases of
rights.
And so ASEAN will continue to be, as it was in the last 4
years--Secretary Clinton did this also. We are going to
continue. It is a part of American foreign policy. It is one of
the signature components of our policy, and it will continue to
be.
Senator Cardin. Well, I thank you for that. It seems to me
we have to be very clear that for U.S. participation, as you
point out, it so critically important to development of that
region that there is an expectation that the countries will
commit themselves to basic internationally recognized human
rights, and the legitimacy of other countries to challenge
their adherence to those standards, not by direct action, but
by the conciliatory process patterned after the Helsinki
process, which, as you know, is not a treaty. It is a consensus
organization, and it has been very effective in putting a
spotlight where countries need to make further progress. I
would just urge you to do that.
And last, let me say I strongly support the statements that
you have made on development assistance. I could not agree with
you more. I just want to underscore the point of Senator Boxer,
and it has been very strong from other members of our
committee, on gender issues, and to continue the incredible
work that Secretary Clinton did in making it clear that gender
equity issues must be--progress must be made for our continued
cooperation and participation in development assistance in
countries that have not made as much progress as they should.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, and thank you for your testimony.
Let me talk about the budget for a minute. You know, prior
to the Iraq and Afghanistan war, DOD had a small account,
overseas contingent operations, or OCO account. As you know,
since Iraq and Afghanistan, that has been plussed out
significantly, and it has been taken offline or off budget.
Now it looks as the State Department is going in this
direction as well, and for the first time in fiscal year 2012,
it is requesting OCO funding outside of the base budget. So
when we hear figures about budget decreasing 6 percent or
whatever, it is not always accurate because of the existence of
these OCO funds outside.
And it is a bit troubling if we want to see in all areas of
government honest accounting. And I am not blaming you or
anything else. We are seeing this in other areas of government.
But how are we, who have to authorize funding or appropriate,
how are we to do our job when we do not know, you know, what we
are dealing with really in terms of where this funding is going
to be spent?
The concept of OCO is, you know, for contingency operations
that we do not plan for. And initially, I think that was--it
was true to that, but it is not anymore if we are still using
OCO funding in defense in Iraq and Afghanistan. You know, this
is 11 years in. And with regard to the State Department, I
understand that some of these funds are being spent in Syria
and Mali. That might apply for a year, but certainly not beyond
that.
What can you tell me about your efforts to try to make sure
that we have accounting that we can actually rely on here as
those who have to authorize and appropriate?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, that is an excellent
question, and I think we are actually helping to improve the
situation in this budget in the following ways.
I mean, first of all, I agree with you. I mean, OCO became
the Overseas Contingency Operation Fund because we had all
these surprise numbers coming at us, and I guess it sort of
became semisupplementary, if you will, in that respect.
We recognize, needless to say, that that is changing now.
Our OCO is down 65 percent. We are going in the right direction
here. And overall, our budget represents a 6-percent decrease
compared to fiscal year 2012, and the reason we compare it to
2012 is we had a CR in 2013.
But I will give you both comparisons. Our overall Function
150 request for all of our agencies is $52.1 billion, including
OCO. That is $2.4 billion, 4 percent less than 2012, and it is
$3.2 billion, 6 percent less than the 2013 CR. So we are going
down, and we have had to make a lot of different adjustments,
different tradeoffs.
We have had targeted reductions on a number of programs. We
have taken advantage of cost efficiencies in some programs. We,
you know, made some changes in reforms and the food aid program
and so forth to create savings. We have deferred maintenance.
We have deferred purchases. We have deferred hiring. We are now
doing a one-for-two hiring. For each two slots, we only fill
one. And we are living with sequester on top of that.
So I assure you at an age where I am saying I could, you
know, give you 10 reasons why we ought to be doing more in 50
places, we are going down.
Senator Flake. Right.
Secretary Kerry. I might also add, the Congress decided 3
years ago in response to what had been a long period of
downward trend within the foreign assistance budget and a shift
to the Defense Department, and you remember Bob Gates' speech.
Bob Gates said we have got to stop this. Too much coming over
here to the Defense Department. We have got to get it back to
the State Department.
And so there was a conscious decision in the Congress, and
we plussed up. We had a target of increasing the State
Department budget by 25 percent under Secretary Clinton and
President Obama in the first term. That got up to a 17-percent
level, folks, then it stopped. Now we are going down. So we
will never reach, at least on the current track, the 25 percent
that we committed to in the Congress a few years ago.
I am sad to see that, and I am going to come to you maybe
later, depending on the decisions the President makes, and see
if we cannot reverse that.
Senator Flake. If I might ask just specifically with regard
to Syria and Mali, will these in the future years--right now
some of that is coming out of OCO. Is that going to come out of
the base budget or OCO?
Secretary Kerry. Well, if the base budget can handle it. I
am not going to come to you--I will tell you right up front, I
am not going to gut the State Department and come up here
because we have some new emergency contingency that has arisen
in terms of national security. And I think it is critical for
this committee and the Approps Committee to fight for, you
know, a reasonableness with respect to American security
policy.
Senator Flake. I agree. I am just talking about in future
years.
Secretary Kerry. But the short answer is, it is most likely
going to be in the form of something like an OCO or
supplementary because we do not yet know the full measure of
what it is going to be. We have got to put together what is the
most rational approach. What will our allies do? We just do not
know what kind of number to give you at this point. The
President has not yet made a decision about exactly what
strategy he will implement. He wants the options for putting
them together.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, before I
begin, this is the first chance I have had to be with you
publicly, and Senator Rubio, and Senator Flake, at least a
working crew of the Group of Eight just to congratulate you on
the work that you have done on immigration reform. This is an
important part of the face that we turn to the world, and it
bears on foreign relations matters. And I just wanted to
congratulate all of you for your work and tell you how excited
I am to have a chance to work on it with you as we get down the
road.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. You honored me by having me
introduce you at the University of Virginia, and I love that
your first speech was there. And if Americans would read the
comments you made that day about international development; you
put the case about as well as it can be made. The value of that
one cent on the dollar and how it produces actual tangible
dollar value as well as good will. You did such a good job, and
I know you will continue to carry that message.
One other comment before questions. I just associate myself
with comments that Senator Corker has made and that you have
made as well on Syria. I just really believe that the more work
that can be done diplomatically to have the opposition be more
inclusive of the Alawite minority, a powerful minority, the
quicker we will hasten Assad's exit, the harder we will make it
for Assad to paint this as a United States-Russia proxy war.
The right thing we will do by human rights, and Alawite
involvement in the opposition will also dilute jihadist
elements. So there is a lot of things that rest on that
particular diplomatic effort, and I am going to say prayers for
you in those meetings.
I asked you at your confirmation hearing about Mideast
peace and the relationship between Israel and Palestine. We
want a safe Jewish state of Israel, and we want it living side
by side with a Palestine that will respect its sovereignty, and
that has been United States policy. My concern has been we have
stated it as a policy without really trying to do what we need
to make it, in fact, happen. And it is difficult. And you gave
me a diplomatic answer, which was appropriate, but also one
that made me feel good about the fact that you recognize that
as a huge priority. And I know that you have been doing work on
that.
So without, you know, going into things you should not,
could you talk a little bit about that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you, Senator Kaine. Thanks for
your comments also, and I appreciate your support and
friendship.
To me, one of the greatest--obviously I think to
everybody--one of the greatest foreign policy challenges there
is is this Middle East peace process, and we have had how many
Presidents, and how many Secretaries of State, and how many
Congresses have tried
to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East, and tried to,
you know, work through various negotiations--Oslo, Madrid, Wye
Plantation, Annapolis. You know, you can run the list of them--
Camp David.
And we are now at a point where in my judgment, because of
demographics, because of settlements, because of perceptions,
because of the Middle East, because of a whole bunch of things,
a lot of people are questioning, you know, because of Hamas
rockets, I mean, you can run the list. I am not pointing
fingers in any direction. I am just saying there is a
complicated mosaic that presents an enormous challenge.
But time is running out on two states because of those
things. And I am convinced that is the only way to have peace,
the only way. So we have an urgent need to try to meet here,
and the greatest challenge obviously, and they are both
legitimate concerns, is how do you provide security for Israel?
How do you work with Israel so Israel has its own security is a
better way to phrase it. Israel needs to know that is not
turning the West Bank into Gaza, that it is secure. That is a
very legitimate concern. I accept that.
At the same time, the Palestinians need to know that they
will have a legitimate state that is contiguous, viable, and
based on, in their judgment, the 67 lines plus swaps, which is
also our judgment and the judgment of the international
community. So we have to try to find a way to get everybody
over years of mistrust that is built up by failure, by
problems, by actions, and that is the goal.
I do not want to say much more than that, except to say
that Prime Minister Netanyahu has really been terrific, and up
front, and very open, and engaged in trying to figure out how
we might be able to get to real talks. And likewise President
Abbas has accepted responsibility for a period of time
certainly not to go to the United Nations, not to try to see if
we can find this mutual way forward. And we all have some
homework to do. We are doing our homework, and that is about as
much as I would sort of want to lay out, except to say to you
that we are going to need everybody's support and help in this
to try to create the conditions.
I do not think it is going to happen in some grand, you
know, public negotiating scene, but I think it is going to have
to be steady, quiet, patient, but nevertheless fairly rapid
work because of the timeframes that are hanging over all of us.
Senator Kaine. One last issue. The fiscal year 2014 budget
proposal reduces the Western Hemisphere by about 14 percent
overall. There are some pluses and minuses. So it looks like
Mexico and Colombia are taking cuts, and the CARSI, Central
America Regional Security Initiative, is plussed up 20 percent
because of the security concerns there. I would just like you
to comment for a second about the budget and the Americas.
Secretary Kerry. There are some plusses and minuses, you
are absolutely correct. And it is really readjustments I think
more than anything to some success stories. We have worked very
closely with President Pena Nieto, and he and the President
have sort of agreed that the redirection of the Marita
Initiative to greater training emphasis over purchasing of
equipment. We have been purchasing equipment. There is a lot of
equipment there. What we need now are trained police officers
and trained law enforcement officers, and judges, and so forth.
So there is a reemphasis, and it is really a reflection of
that. It is not a diminution of effort or focus on the region,
but a kind of how do you adjust and, you know, perhaps save,
but do some things better, more efficiently.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Secretary.
Thank you for being here with us.
As you know, I have been a supporter of foreign aid just as
a way to further the national interests of the United States
throughout the world. I read with interest your comments in
front of the House committee yesterday, regarding your
frustration over the billion dollars in debt relief to Egypt
that has been held up by congressional action. And I wanted to
probe that a little bit.
Let me pose to you the dilemma. I think people read about
things that are happening in Egypt, and in particular things
that are happening with the Egyptian Government, and are
wondering why the United States continues to send aid.
There is an article from I think a month ago where an
Egyptian cleric says that American aid is basically a mandatory
tax. ``The taxpayer aid consists of a poll tax that Americans
must pay to placate the Muslim Brotherhood,'' according to
Khalid Saad, a cleric who serves as the official spokesperson
for the country's Salafi front. ``They pay that so we will let
them,'' he said in an interview.
Now, I know he does not speak officially for the
government, but I think a lot of people have come to suspect
that that sort of sentiment is widespread in the country among
the Islamist leadership.
So here is the question that I have. First of all, I would
like you to kind of delve into the difference between the
Egyptian military and the Egyptian Government because that is
two different types of aid and two different types of
institutions we are dealing with. And second, exactly what is
our strategic plan with regards to aid to Egypt? And in that
light, I would just say what I am most concerned about is that
we are not repeating errors of the past where we have valued
stability or strategic interests at the expense of some of the
democratic principles in the region.
So if you could help me explain to my constituents what is
our plan and how we intend to use foreign aid to not just bring
Egypt along toward a more democratic process, but one, for
example, that respects religious minorities. We are outraged at
what we are seeing happening with the Christians in particular
in Egypt and a government that quite frankly that has not
responded. In fact, there has been reports that the government
has actually participated, or at least the military has
participated, or the police, in some of these attacks.
So what is our strategic goal with regards to foreign aid
in terms of moving Egypt in the direction we think is in our
national interest as well as in the interest of democracy? And
second to that, if you could explain the distinction between
aid to the military and aid to the government, which I believe
there is a distinction. It might be helpful if you outline
that.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator Rubio, thank you. I
appreciate the question, and it is an appropriate one. And I
will not only answer you, but I will answer that fellow who
thinks that we are placating the Brotherhood.
We have been very clear with the Brotherhood, and had very
direct conversations with President Morsi and others about the
need for inclusivity, the need for recognition of the
opposition. We have urged them, in fact, to try to reach out to
the opposition and bring them into a greater degree to the
governance.
I would express here today concerns about the direction
that they appear to be leaning, which is not, in fact, to be
that inclusive, and rather to consolidate and to leave people
out. That is of great concern to us, which is why on the $1
billion of aid that the President promised, we have only, in
fact, delivered $190, which I released when I was there in
those conversations with them as a sign of good faith based on
the need to try to proceed forward.
But any further aid we said very clearly is going to be
conditioned on progress on a number of things. One, on the IMF.
If economic reforms are not put in place, if they do not
restore credibility to the political process, if they do not
pacify the streets to some degree so that they can begin to
attract tourists and get businesses working again, if they do
not give confidence to the diaspora that they can, in fact,
return and invest in Egypt without witch hunts, or trials, or
confiscation, or other kinds of problems, I do not know how
Egypt is going to, you know, rebound. And I think the politics
could be very, very difficult absent a shift here that becomes
more inclusive, more democratic, more respectful of the
opposition and so forth.
Now, the army--the military has been quite separate from
that. I think the military has been the best investment that
America has made in years in that region for a lot of reasons,
keeping the peace with Israel. It is enforcing security in the
Sinai. It helped to negotiate, broker, and, in fact, enforce
the Gaza peace now. If you ask Israel, they will tell you, our
Israeli friends, that the day-to-day intel mill partnership
that is so essential to security and to enforcement of the
Sinai and other things, is being carried out on a day-to-day
basis not in government to government, but in military to mill
and intel to intel. And that is very important to us. So there
is a clear distinction here.
The military I believe, you know, in a significant way was
responsible for holding Egypt together at a critical moment,
and many of those officers who were on those tanks or
commanding those battalions that were out trying to keep the
country calm responded thoughtfully because they had trained
here in the United States, had relationships with people here.
They were in touch--we were in touch with them at the lower
officer level. There was a great deal of communication. And
they had a different ethic. They had a different standard. They
knew they needed to try to be responsible.
I met with Field Marshal Tantawi at least three, four, five
times in the interval between the SCAF taking responsibility
for governing the country and then running the election, and
they did exactly what they promised. They set up the machinery
for an election. They enforced that process for the country.
The country had an election, and the Brotherhood won--a
Brotherhood that had organized for 80 years and was waiting,
you know, in the wings that did not have much to do with the
bringing of the revolution. The revolution was young kids
looking for a different world and a different future. It was a
generational revolution, not an Islamic one. But when you had
the election, the results brought what we have.
So now we are in a different stage where we are trying to
move the government in one direction and keep our relationship
with the military, which is meeting other interests in another
direction. And that is pretty much how I describe the
differential.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. Welcome,
Secretary Kerry. It is tremendous to have you back. I have been
impressed in the brief time you have been serving as Secretary
with your vigorous and engaged diplomacy. Not at all surprised.
The time that we served together in this committee, I had the
pleasure of working with you on a whole range of demanding and
pressing issues from Syria, to Egypt, to Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and, of course, a whole range of issues across the
continent of Africa.
I just want to associate myself with remarks made by
Senators of both parties about the level of my concern about
Syria as well as Iran, and my compliments to your early work on
trying to achieve some progress and peace in the Middle East
while respecting the vitality and centrality of our
relationship with Israel.
If I might as the Africa Subcommittee chair, I just wanted
to briefly mention a wide range of issues on the continent that
I would love to work with you and where generally I am quite
pleased with the budget status of a variety of different
investments we are making. I am pleased with your advocacy for
an ongoing effort by the Obama administration to invest in the
three pillars of diplomacy, development, and defense, and to
make sure that we have a balanced and responsible engagement.
I recently released a report on the promises of United
States-Africa trade. I would love to work with you more
closely. Senators Durbin and Boozman and I have introduced a
bill to try and significantly improve United States-Africa
trade cooperation. After peaceful elections in Kenya, we face
real challenges in balancing accountability to the ICC with a
critical, strategic partnership. I just held a hearing on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and I look forward to working
with you on the appointment of a special envoy, which I think
is absolutely essential.
I was pleased with your opening comments about both Kenya
and Mali and the recognition we have to have a balanced
approach in Mali, and look forward to continuing to work with
you on conservation issues and trying to fight poaching in the
same way that I think terrorism in Mali was, in part, financed
by kidnapping terrorism, and instability in other parts of the
continent are financed, in part, by poaching.
Let me focus on three areas I wanted to ask questions on. I
was very pleased with proposals to streamline aid and to find
efficiencies first in food aid on PL 480. These are some bold,
challenging changes that have long been urged by aid
professionals. I respect the fact that it continues to have a
floor of 55 percent for U.S. commodity producers and
transporters, and look forward to working with you on trying to
ensure progress on food aid reform.
In the area of PEPFAR, which is a very significant portion
of United States budget toward Africa, how will we work
together to ensure that the stove piping of PEPFAR funds that
dominated some of the early years of the program is reduced and
to make real progress in terms of streamlining and improving
our partnership? I recently visited South Africa, was very
encouraged with the transition being made there, and look
forward to working with you. But I would be interested in
hearing your vision for how with PEPFAR going forward, we will
achieve greater impact at lower cost through reducing overlap.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, first of all, let me begin
by honestly thanking you for your unbelievable focus on Africa,
and the contributions that you have made to a lot of those
discussions going forward.
With respect to PEPFAR, you know, it is really our greatest
success story in that we are--one of our greatest success
stories. What we have been able to accomplish, we are really
looking now at the potential of an AIDS-free generation. And we
are looking at, you know, 60 percent of the carriers are women,
as you know, I think. And so if we can prevent children from
starting with it, we are saving enormous amounts of money.
So that is really I think the principle focus is on this,
you know, mother to child pass down, and we have become far
more efficient in the way in which we are able to reach people,
get out. And that means we are not just talking about a round
robin where the costs are going to keep going up or you just
have a population that keeps going up. You are actually moving
toward elimination for the next generation.
The President originally, you know, there was a lot of--
this was hard fought for, and, I mean, we really pushed hard,
and I am grateful to President Obama for listening carefully to
the arguments about this moment and why it was so important to
keep the funding at a full funding level. I do not know if that
is entirely answering your question. If there is another----
Senator Coons. I look forward to continuing to work with
you to advocate for robust funding for PEPFAR, let me not be
misunderstood. But I think there are ways to achieve
efficiency. And in the same way that I look forward to
continuing to advocate for food aid, I think we can make that
case as long as we are also continuing to find ways to deliver
that aid.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I would be----
Senator Coons. Let me move to one other question if I
could.
Secretary Kerry. Yes, sure.
Senator Coons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is visiting
three west African countries, I think, Benin, Ghana, and Niger,
just this week. I am very concerned about the sort of charm
offensive the Iranians are leading in Africa. I am very
concerned about the Chinese dominance of the continent. Senior
Chinese leaders have made many visits to the continent.
I would welcome your personal engagement in leading our
engagement with Africa and wonder what, if any, plans you have
to work with us to blunt or press back on Iran's seeking access
to natural resources, to diplomatic support, and to potential
allies on the continent, which I view as a very negative
development.
Secretary Kerry. Well, I think that is a negative
development, Senator. You are absolutely correct. And you are
correct also--
I mean, on China. China is now out-investing the United States
significantly in Africa. Now, China is principally focused on
resources--minerals, so forth--and that does not necessarily
compete with us. But I will say that between Iran, China, other
countries, they are having an impact on the business practices
and on the choices that, you know, some of the leaders and some
of the governments there are facing. And it has not been a
positive one in some regards.
In addition, a lot of different folks in the region--I am
not going to name the names here and now--are engaged in bad
business practices, in bribery, in, you know, support for the
wrong people. And that is having a negative impact on the
stability of some governments. So we are going to have to be
more engaged in Africa. We will have a special envoy for the
DRC. We will have a special envoy for the Sudan. Princeton
Lyman just retired about 5 weeks ago now. We are racing to try
to get people in these places, and we will have them. But you
are absolutely correct to be focused on this.
I think that something like--I think it is 6 of the 12 to
15 fastest-growing or 10 of the fastest 15 growing countries in
the world----
Senator Coons. Seven to 10, yes.
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Are in Africa.
Senator Coons. Correct.
Secretary Kerry. And we need to be cognizant of the long-
term implications of that with respect to resources, trade,
governance, and other issues. So I look forward to working with
you on that.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I need to mention something.
Also I am going to be at the 50th anniversary in Ethiopia in
May.
The Chairman. Wonderful.
Secretary Kerry. And there are some other engagements that
we are looking at with respect to sort of trying to be front
and present.
Mr. President--Mr. Chairman, I--you know, maybe it is the
confusion--not the confusion, but it is the emotion of actually
getting to the point where I praise the New York Yankees in a
tribute to Boston. And I am not used to giving the evil empire
credit for something. [Laughter.]
Secretary Kerry. But with my head and heart in Boston----
The Chairman. Which evil empire are you referring to?
[Laughter.]
Secretary Kerry. With my head and heart in Boston, I think
I said ``Sweet Adeline,'' which is Ted Kennedy's grandfather,
Honey Fitz's favorite song, and I meant ``Sweet Caroline.'' And
I want to make sure everybody knows that I can sing ``Sweet
Caroline,'' but I ain't singing it here for you now, but----
[Laughter.]
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Just my head was whatever,
jumbled up.
The Chairman. That we will leave for some benefit
fundraiser.
Secretary Kerry. I will spare you a rendition, but it is
pretty good. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you.
Senator Murphy. And our hearts are with you and your
friends in Boston this week.
We are about 3 or 4 years since the administration's reset
on our policy toward Russia, and so it is probably a good time
to have a conversation about where we are and whether that
reset has gotten us what we wanted to get. Senator Johnson and
I have the new responsibility of overseeing the subcommittee
here, which has jurisdiction over Russia. And so I wanted to
just spend my few minutes getting your thoughts on a couple of
issues related to recent developments in Russia.
First, developments regarding the state of Russian civil
society. We clearly were very upset to see our USAID workers
leave that country. They are not alone. Many of the NGO workers
have been either subtly or not so subtly moved out of that
country in recent months. And of course, that corresponds with
a much larger degradation of civil society.
And so I wanted to get your thoughts on two issues. One,
what is the administration's role in trying to promote civil
society in Russia? And two, what is Congress' role, because
historically during the cold war when the administration here
in the United States had to have an ongoing dialogue with the
Soviets. It was Congress that often provided the link to
Russian civil society, a link that maybe has atrophied over the
years as we did not necessarily think that it was as important
given the reforms happening there.
So I guess my question is, one, the role of the
administration, your role in trying to promote civil society.
And then, you know, some advice as to what Congress' role can
be in complement or in contrast to the administration's role on
trying to provide linkages with civil society there.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, thank you. Very thoughtful
question, and I will try to answer it as directly as I can.
We have a role, obviously, and so do you, and it varies at
different points in time. I mean, whether it was Jackson-Vanik
or whether it was, you know, Jewish immigration, you know,
Soviet jury issue. There have been constant efforts by the
Congress and by administrations to have an impact on civil
society not just in Russia, but everywhere. That is American
DNA. I mean, that is who we are. That is part of our foreign
policy is to try to fight for human rights, freedom, democracy,
the ability of people to choose for themselves, not just, you
know, because it works. It is in our interest, and we think
that those people do better, feel better, live better lives,
have better choices. And those societies are less prone to
engage in war and conflict and oppression.
And so there are any number of reasons why we have a
responsibility to always press for the growth of civil society.
We try to work it as effectively as we can in ways that, you
know, are as respectful as you can be under difficult
circumstances of the sovereignty of a country that you are
dealing with. I mean, it depends on which country it is and
what issues there are as to how responsive people are going to
be or what kind of gradations of opposition you have to those
kinds of efforts.
So we do it. Lech Walesa jumps over a fence and becomes the
leader of a labor movement and ultimately the President of a
country because he used to listen, among other things, not the
only reason, but he was inspired by, you know, Voice of
America, listening to us, and freedom, as were many other
people who found their hope in that. We encourage things
through that.
It sometimes costs us, and right now we are going through a
period of time in our relationship with Russia where it has
unfortunately been less productive than we would like it to be.
I would like to see us get back on track, and obviously our
NGOs are going through a tough period with the law that is
there. But they would say to us, well, we are going through a
tough period with the law that you passed, and you are
interfering with us, and so forth. So you get into this back
and forth.
Frankly, to the credit of the reset that President Obama
engaged in and to the credit of Russia and the choices they
have made, on the big ticket items, we have continued to make
progress, and Russia has actually been a partner with us. A lot
of people have lost sight of that in the fight over adoption
and the fight over the Magnitsky and so forth. But the fact is,
on Afghanistan, Russia has been enormously helpful with respect
to the northern supply route and helping us. With respect to
WTO, Russia has been helpful, and came on board, and met the
standards with respect to the START Agreement. Russia did its
part and has kept that agreement, and we are working with them
now on the dialogue to go to the next step with that.
On Iran and North Korea, two issues of vital national
security interest to the United States, Russia has been
supportive. Russia is there on the resolution and supportive of
the sanctions, and Russia has been supportive on the DPRK.
So we have to put this in perspective, even as we continue
to keep faith with our values and our beliefs about, you know,
how we want to reach out to citizens in other countries.
Senator Murphy. Mr. Secretary, my simple hope is that--I
just hope as a tradeoff for this cooperation that we are
getting in places that we may not have gotten before that we do
not take the foot off the pedal in terms of trying to promote
civil society there. I think we have a role as well, a role
that sometimes can go further than the administration's role.
But given that cooperation, I hope ultimately it does not
present any disincentive for us to do the things we have
historically done to stand up for the Russian people who need a
friend now more than ever.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you, Secretary Kerry, for coming today.
You mentioned in your remarks that we do not need
politicians to go home and say we need to end foreign aid and
we need to spend some of that money at home. Well, this might
come as news to one of the most prominent politicians in our
country who said in his reelection campaign that we need to
less nation-building abroad and more nation-building at home.
And that would be your current boss, the President of the
United States.
So I do not think this is unique to Republicans or
Democrats. In fact, it crosses all party lines. It is not me
going home and creating an atmosphere where people are doubtful
of foreign aid. It is that 80 to 90 percent of the people are
doubtful. We have two bridges in my State that are over 50
years old. The President came and I flew down with him to talk
about rebuilding them. I am in favor of replacing bridges and
rebuilding our infrastructure.
But at the same time, we seem to not have enough money to
keep the doors open around here, not enough money to keep the
touring of the White House open. This administration sent an
extra $250 million to Egypt. Many of us find that offensive. We
cannot even run the basic functions of government, and yet we
send an extra $250 million in addition to the $2 billion we
already send over there. So many of us are offended by this.
The question I have for you is, the Mubarak family is said
to be worth more than $10 billion. Most people say that a lot
of that money came from our foreign aid. Mobutu ruled for many,
many years in Central Africa. He was said to be worth millions
upon millions, if not billions, of dollars. His wife was called
Gucci Mobutu. She was famous for going to Paris and shopping
for shoes with a Louis Vuitton bag full of $500,000 in cash to
a million dollars in cash. That money was looted from the
American treasury.
There are all kinds of examples of theft and kleptocracy.
There are examples of our foreign aid being used to buy tear
gas in Egypt to spray on the Egyptian people. So I do not think
it even buys the good will of the people because often it is
stolen by their leaders who are unpopular in their country. So
I think it is often counterproductive.
But I think we are missing the boat here if you think that
we are stoking the fires and that the people do not already
believe this. This is something that is already in the psyche
of the people. People are upset about it, would rather spend
money at home. But I would like your comments on the
President's position, but also on the idea that a lot of
foreign aid has been stolen by these leaders.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, I think there is a
difference between, you know, some of the nation-building that
we have seen sometimes engaged in and good foreign aid programs
that do not rise to the level necessarily of nation-building.
But that is a quibbling probably, and we will wind up arguing
about the smaller issue rather than the larger one here. So let
me try to frame it this way.
Has some money been stolen? Absolutely. But by the largest
measure possible today because of reforms that have been put in
place because of new accountability systems, because of the way
aid is given now, because of something like the Millennium
Challenge Corporation's standards that are applied to
investment and other kinds of things, the money, a lot of it
does not go to governments anymore directly. It goes into
either the investment or into the project, and it is quite
controlled. And that is one of the reforms that has been put
into place.
And we often have a fight about that with some countries.
For instance, Pakistan pushed very, very hard to say, no, we
want it directly to the government, and we said, no, we are
going to do it this way to the project and so forth in order to
have the kind of accountability that you are talking about that
we need.
So historically, yes. But, you know, some of the riches of
people who have ripped off their own governments have not
necessarily come from our aid. They have come from stealing
from the revenues of their oil, or selling the diamonds and the
rubies that they have in their resource rich, you know, mines.
And there are plenty of ways that people have enriched
themselves in some countries to the adversity of their people.
That is something we fight. I mean, that is also part of
what our foreign policy and investments try to change is
installing rule of law, is trying to help with the justice
system, create accountability for those things.
Senator Paul. But nevertheless, we kept sending money to
Mobutu for years and Mubarak for years despite evidence that
they were stealing it.
Secretary Kerry. I did not make that decision, and I will
certainly review any program that we are engaged in now. And if
you have any information on something we are doing now that
somebody is stealing, let me know immediately.
But let me just come back to one thing about this. You
know, all of this that we do, Senator Paul, is one penny on the
dollar. And if you look--I mean, I can go through a long list
of things that we invest that provide a return on our
investment. I will give you an example. We have stopped
countless plots against our country, which had the FBI not
cooperated and had the CIA and other entities not been creating
some of the programs we had, and had we not worked with the
justice systems, and had Interpol and the other things that we
worked with, we never would have done. Americans would have
died, and they would have been blown up. And but for the
discovery of the Christmas bomber or the other people, which
came through these kinds of efforts, we made our country safer.
So I have to tell you, for the penny on the dollar, I will
still make this argument anywhere, even though, yes,
occasionally something gets abused, just as it gets abused in
some parts of almost every government.
Senator Paul. One quick question. Yesterday the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey, stated that he
was no longer sure that the United States could clearly
identify the right people in Syria. I am quite concerned with
this and quite concerned about arming elements of radical jihad
that ultimately will come back to be our enemies or enemies of
Israel.
My question is, is that--you know, there is a million
Christians in Syria. I do not think they have quite decided
which side they are on. Two hundred and fifty thousand of those
Christians came from Iraq because they were not too happy with
the government that has been installed in Iraq after we win the
war.
So the question is, you know, you win the war and radical
Islam takes over in Syria, or you give weapons to these groups.
You have your own Joint Chiefs of Staff saying he is not sure
he knows who the right guys are and who to arm. I really think
we ought to be careful about getting involved in this civil
war.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, your warning is a
legitimate one, and we are being careful, which is why the
President has not yet decided whether or not--which is why the
President has not given lethal aid. He has given nonlethal aid.
But the President is correct, I believe, in his determination
that President Assad can no longer represent the people of that
country, and that Syrian opposition is the broad-based
international entity that is representative of the real
aspirations of the Syrian people.
Now, that is a different determination from actually
deciding you can protect who is getting what. I have had
conversations with General Dempsey obviously, and I read his
quote, and I saw what he said. I think he really said we are
not certain we can do that yet, but we have to make certain or
we have to be sure. And that is exactly what we do have to do,
and that is exactly what we are engaged in. That is why I have
this meeting that I am going to be in Istanbul on the weekend.
And a lot of discussion is taking place to be certain of that
determination.
I think what he is really saying is be sure before you make
the decision, and he is right, and that is what we are trying
to do.
The Chairman. Thank you. We have a little time left with
the Secretary, and so we are not going to get through a full
round of questions. But to the extent that the Secretary has
been gracious with his time, maybe there will be a couple of
opportunities here.
Let me focus a bit for the moment on a place that does not
get a lot of attention, but that certainly is in the national
interests and security of the United States. Senator Kaine
raised it as the chairman of the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee, something that I had the privilege of chairing
before I had the privilege of chairing the full committee, and
I still have a great passion for.
And this decrease in the Western Hemisphere levels, this
has now been a historic reality. And I understand that we have
in the case of Mexico, your response, Mr. Secretary, and even
in Colombia a different dynamic. But we have underfunded a
whole host of other initiatives in the Western Hemisphere in
our interests.
And many of the things that we debate in the Congress stem
from issues within the hemisphere. If you in part want to stem
the tide of undocumented immigration, you want to make sure
that people have stability and economic opportunity in their
native country. They will not flee.
And so the reality is our lack of moving toward economic
development creates a push factor. And in addition to that, if
we have significant narcotics issues throughout the hemisphere
that still are challenging, particularly growing in the Central
America and Caribbean region. Our lack, to some degree, of
investment and engagement in the hemisphere. You talk about
Iran and Africa. Iran has spent a lot of time in the Western
Hemisphere. China is spending a lot of time and resources in
the Western Hemisphere.
And you find yourselves that in the lack of creating--in
the process of not having being pushed to Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, the Middle East, that we create a
vacuum in our own hemisphere, and that vacuum is filled by
people like Past President Chavez of Venezuela, Edward Morales,
and a whole host of individuals within the hemisphere who have
a much different set of values and priorities than we do. You
have biodiversity issues that are enormous, carbon sink issues
that are enormous, a thing I know that you have been passionate
about.
So while we are facing these challenges, when you have
instability in the hemisphere, the markets, we have the
greatest--American products and services are deeply loved
within the hemisphere. But by the same token, instability and
lack of economic development creates challenges there.
So I hope in the midst of all of these global challenges
that we will look at the Western Hemisphere much more intently
than we have in the past. And specifically, there is a pressing
issue which is Venezuela. I applaud the Venezuelan people for
coming out in significant numbers. I would like to see
Americans vote at 79 percent of those eligible to vote to come
out. But that election is so close that for the people of
Venezuela to have faith in its outcome. I personally believe
there needs to be an audit.
So I would like to hear it from you--I think, if I am not
mistaken, I heard a statement from you that might coincide with
that. What is our pathway forward in terms of promoting an
opportunity to ensure that the people of Venezuela's rights are
preserved? And, of course, working with our OAS partners in
that regard.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank
you for making an eloquent argument about the need for a plus-
up in the investment in the Western Hemisphere. And I do not
disagree with you. I said we have to make tough choices about
tradeoffs in this budget, and obviously ours is a first cut.
You get the second, and third, and final cut frankly. And I
would like to work with you to figure out sort of, you know, if
there are adjustments or ways that we can do this more
effectively; we are open to thinking about that.
I do not disagree with you about the need to change the
dynamic in the Western Hemisphere. It has too often been viewed
as a second thought. It should not be. It is our backyard
neighborhood, as you say. I think there are relationships that
we could improve frankly in the region that do not have to
necessarily go down a track where they have been.
I would leave the hopeful door open that maybe something
can turn with respect to Venezuela, but right now it is
obviously not in a great place. I do support the notion that
there should be--the administration supports accountability for
this election, and believes that it would be better to have
that audit and to have the recount so that the people of
Venezuela are in a such closely divided election, which is so
important, have confidence that they enough legitimacy that is
necessary in the government going forward.
Now, as you know, we have to work with what we have to work
with. My hope is that doors will not get shut in automatic by
anybody to start off this next government, whatever happens in
the days ahead. But our position is that that audit would be an
important first ingredient to providing confidence to the
entire community of nations that care about this outcome, that
it has been fairly arrived at.
The Chairman. And then very briefly, more a comment than a
question. I believe that we hopefully can work with you to
develop the support for bringing the disabilities treaty both
to hearings and ultimately to a vote. I think that is about
protecting American citizens abroad, Americans with
disabilities who travel all over the world and do not have the
same rights they have here in the United States.
We already have the highest standards probably in the world
as it relates to the rights of those who are disabled, and
creating that right globally for our citizens is an important
step. So we look forward to working with you on that.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I really hope, and I hope,
Ranking Member Corker, I hope we could do that. I will work
with you and the whole Department will work with you to make
adjustments if they are needed to address the questions that
arose about sovereignty or a couple of other questions. I think
they can be addressed, and if that is what it takes to bring
some people over to be able to vote for it.
But it is hard for me to imagine that we cannot find a way
to provide those rights to our people. This is one of the most
undemanding of America treaties I think I have ever seen.
Almost all of the demand is on other countries to come up to
America's standard without any recourse whatsoever that
prejudices any American right or citizen.
So I truly hope we can revisit it, and the Department, the
administration will work with you in every way possible to
assist the committee and the Senate in trying to pass this.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr.
Secretary, thank you for the first round of questioning that we
had and our discussions about North Korea and Syria, northern
Africa, and other places. And again, I really do believe you
are off to a very good start, and I have high hopes for the
major policy issues that you are dealing with coming to
resolution. I really do.
The other part of the job, I guess, is running the
Department, and sometimes that is a lot less fun and glamorous,
and you do not get a lot of questions about that. But I do
think it is my responsibility to ask a couple about the more
mundane, the caring and feeding of the troops, and the running
of the Department.
We have an acting inspector general in place and my sense
is that you do not get a lot of respect when you are an acting
inspector general, that when you subpoena, you get push back,
those kinds of things. I just wonder if you would commit to----
Secretary Kerry. Can I save you time?
Senator Corker. What is that?
Secretary Kerry. I will save you time.
Senator Corker. Good.
Secretary Kerry. We have a terrific candidate who is being
sent over to the White House today.
Senator Corker. Very good. And I know we choreographed this
in advance. I am just kidding, we did not. [Laughter.]
Second, you know, we have Americans throughout our country
who are losing their jobs. It has been a tough environment. We
all know that. It is the No. 1 issue that all of us really care
about is making sure that hardworking Americans have
opportunities for good paying jobs.
And within the Department, we still have these four
employees, and I know this happened before you, and I know that
you have nothing to do with what happened prior to January. But
we have four employees that are on paid leave. I mean, they are
sitting at home getting a full paycheck despite some of the
activities that took place in Libya. And I know there were
discussions earlier with another Senator about foreign aid and
accountability and all of that. But this is a place where
Americans look at this and know that some of these folks
anyway, had to have some degree of culpability in four
Americans dying, and yet they are sitting at home getting a
full paycheck.
And I just wondered if you might address this. Again, I am
not one of those folks that goes on a witch hunt, but this does
seem at this point in time a little bit beyond American values.
And I just wondered if you might respond.
Secretary Kerry. Senator Corker, honestly I understand the
concern. I have asked about that internally, and I expect a
report that is done in due course of business according to the
law with respect to the rights of employees and the standards
that are applied to these kinds of issues administratively.
That report will be coming to me. I do not know what is in it
yet. I do not know what recommendations are being made. But I
will then have to make a decision about options with respect to
recommendations that are based on that, and I will do that at
that time.
Senator Corker. Good. It seemed that when Secretary Clinton
was up here, there was a standard by which things like this
were judged, and you had to go way beyond the normal
circumstances for somebody to actually be held accountable. And
regardless of what happens, I know you will look at this in a
judicious way. But it seems to me that we might want to
establish some different standards as it relates to people who,
candidly, do not live up to their responsibilities on the job,
and we end up losing lives. And so I would hope you would also
look at that. I know she mentioned actually possibly sending up
some legislation to deal with that.
And then last, the third question, and again I know this
was before your time. You were sitting up here when we were
dealing with this. But in Libya, I know I had met with numbers
of officials there to try to get them to help us and to help
find the people that certainly did know what happened in
Benghazi. And it was very frustrating. I mean, it is almost an
ungoverned country. I know that you know that.
But I just wondered if you have had any success, or any of
the folks who work with you have had any success, pushing the
Libyan Government who we are helping tremendously and certainly
play a big role in determining where they are. Have we had any
success in getting them to cooperate with us on trying to find
the folks who were involved? And now, some of them have left
the country, but some of them probably are still there, and I
just wondered what your activities had been in that regard.
Secretary Kerry. We have, I believe, had some success. I
inquired directly of FBI Director Mueller regarding this
because I was interested personally obviously, and I think the
State Department has a high level of interest in making sure
those people are brought to justice. So we are tracking it.
The discussion I did have with him, he was actually leaving
to go over to Libya and personally meet with those officials,
and he felt that we were making a level of progress. Now, it
has been what, about, I guess, 11 months, something like that.
It takes time. It is difficult.
They do have people ID'd, however. They have made some
progress. They have a number of suspects who are persons of
interest that they are pursuing in this and building cases on.
And I am quite confident. I know that, first of all, this is a
high priority for the FBI. It is high priority for the
Department, people working in Libya, and I think we are making
some progress.
A lot of these people are out in very difficult areas, and
that is part of the problem in terms of building the case. But
they are working under those difficult circumstances. And what
I will do is get the sort of latest update for you and report
back to you.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Kaine, you are going to
get the last opportunity here.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And sticking with
response and aftermath of the tragic attack in Libya, Secretary
Kerry, the areas in the ARB report that I sort of focused most
on were both the findings of concern and also the
recommendations with respect to embassy security. So, you know,
who is providing security, how is it provided, levels of
training, et cetera. I visited Quantico where the Marine
security guards are trained, and that is being expanded. Very
significant. Looked good.
But one of the ARB recommendations was in addition a
foreign affairs security training center that would coordinate
all efforts of training foreign affairs security. That was an
ARB recommendation. It was reported to Congress in February
that that was being fast tracked forward, that there was an EIS
being prepared to locate that facility in Virginia at Fort
Picket, which was a BRAC'd army base. It is now a National
Guard facility in Southside, VA.
Just recently, Congress was informed that that EIS is now
on hold for sort of unspecified reasons, and this is something
we can talk about here or offline if you need to pull more
information. But when I----
Secretary Kerry. Who informed you of that?
Senator Kaine. This has been--State and GSA has informed
Congress just recently that the earlier statement that we were
going to do this and that there was going to be the EIS out in
April is on hold in kind of an unspecified--for unspecified
reasons for an unspecified time. That causes significant
concern obviously. I am parochial about it because of the
Virginia tie, but it does seem to fly in the face of the ARB
recommendation. And as of 2 months ago, we were full speed
ahead on the recommendation, and now it seems like we are
equivocal about it, and I would like to, you know, find out as
much as I can about it, because I do think the security
challenges at these embassies are the things that have to be
solved so that we will all feel comfortable that our folks are
safe as they are doing their jobs.
Secretary Kerry. I am getting apparently some input on
this. I am not aware of it, so I just want to find out.
Senator Kaine. I am comfortable following up offline on it,
but I just wanted to raise it as an issue of concern, Mr.
Chair, and we will follow up offline.
Secretary Kerry. I am being told that folks are prepared to
give you a briefing on that. I was not aware of that, but
obviously we have got to follow up with you and let you know
what has happened.
Senator Kaine. Great. I appreciate that. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you for the
breadth and scope of not only your answers, but your depth of
knowledge just confirms once again the tremendous choice the
President made.
There are a lot of other things we will hopefully discuss
in the future continuing in our dialogue of course. We did not
touch upon Afghanistan and Pakistan which are critical. But
even issues that do not rise to those levels, issues like child
care abduction cases and how we get other countries to respond.
I saw your response to the House committee on Camp Ashraf.
I actually have different information that I would really like
to share with the Department. I think there is a different set
of views about the willingness of people if there is certain
security. So some are big ticket items. Some maybe do not rise
to that level, but they are very important to the people who
are involved.
I appreciate the willingness and the constant flow of
information with the Department. It has been excellent. And we
look forward to continuing to work with you to ensure America's
interest abroad.
With that, the record will stay open until close of
business on Monday.
The Chairman. And this hearing is adjourned.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question #1. Foreign Assistance Reform.--The need to update and
reform the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) is widely recognized. In a 2009
speech at the Brookings Institution, you highlighted the importance of
this to our broader foreign policy objectives: ``we need to streamline
outdated laws . . . The last time the United States Senate authorized
the FAA was the year I arrived in the Senate in 1985. That bill runs
over 400 pages long and is full of confusing directives, reporting
requirements, and procedural roadblocks. We need to ease those burdens
so that the missions, and those on those missions, can get the job
done.'' Your proposed Foreign Assistance Revitalization and
Accountability Act of 2009 as well as your draft Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for 2010 and 2011 also included a number of elements
to reform the FAA.
Is it still your opinion that reforming the FAA should be a
major administration priority, and are you ready to work with
Congress to get this done in the 113th Congress?
Answer. We welcome efforts to modernize the Foreign Assistance Act
in a manner that will better enable the U.S. Government to use all its
tools and capabilities to provide assistance that furthers our foreign
policy objectives, advances U.S. national security, promotes peace,
maximizes sustainable development results, and ensures America's
leadership in the world. The Department of State and USAID stand ready
to work with Congress on this important endeavor.
Question #2. Arming the Opposition.--During our hearing last week
on Syria, we heard from Ambassador Ford that our current policy for
Syria is to see a political solution. However, we were not able to get
a clear explanation of what that political solution might be, and I
remain concerned that there may be no political solution for this
crisis and that extremists elements, with the help of Iran and al-
Nusra--are filling in the political vacuum.
Can you describe the political solution you are aiming for?
Do you believe it is still realistic? Or has the time come
to start looking at more military oriented options such as
vetted arming and training the opposition?
What confidence do we have that the assistance we are
providing, including the more recently announced nonlethal aid
to the armed opposition, is having a material impact on the
ground?
Is there specific support that we could be providing that
would turn the tide?
Answer. We believe that the best way to end the Syrian crisis is
through a negotiated political solution. The regime and its supporters
will fight to the last person standing. To get to a sustainable peace,
Syrians need a political solution that assures all citizens of their
rights.
The opposition and members of the regime without blood on their
hands must come together to negotiate a deal like the framework laid
out in the Geneva communique. This framework--agreed last June by the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Turkey, and
Arab League states--calls for a transitional governing body formed on
the basis of mutual consent of the opposition and the Syrian regime to
be given full executive powers and guide the country to elections.
This means that Assad, who has long lost his legitimacy and whom
the opposition will never accept, will not play any role in that
transitional governing body. If he is unwilling to decide that he
should transfer executive authority, we will continue to find ways to
pressure him to think differently about what lies in the future.
While this administration continues to take a hard look at every
available, practical, and responsible means to end the suffering of the
Syrian people, we do not believe at this time that it is in the United
States or the Syrian people's best interest to provide lethal support
to the Syrian opposition. The judgments we make must pass the test of
making the situation better for the Syrian people and must also take
into account the long-term human, financial, and political costs for
us, Syria, and the region. We continue to believe that a political
solution to the crisis is the best way to save the Syrian people
further suffering and to avert further destruction of the country, for
which the regime bears overwhelming responsibility.
As President Obama told the Syrian people in a recent message,
``More Syrians are standing up for their dignity. The Assad regime will
come to an end. The Syrian people will have their chance to forge their
own future. And they will continue to find a partner in the United
States of America.''
We look forward to working with Congress throughout this process as
we seek to protect the interests of the United States in the region and
support the needs of the Syrian people in their struggle to create a
free, stable, and democratic Syria.
Question #3. No-Fly Zone.--Last week, the committee held a hearing
on U.S. policy toward Syria. One proposal for more forward-leaning
engagement was the implementation of a no-fly zone ``light,'' in which
Patriot missiles would be deployed along the Turkey-Syria border with
signals to the Assad regime that any Syrian military plane within 50
miles would be considered a threat and dealt with accordingly.
What are your thoughts on such a plan of action?
Answer. While this administration continues to take a hard look at
every available, practical, and responsible means to end the suffering
of the Syrian people, we do not believe at this time that it is in the
United States best interest to provide a no-fly zone. The President has
not ruled out other options, which may be contemplated if the situation
worsens and the policies we are pursuing now prove insufficient. We are
conscious, however, of the significant risks and costs that could be
involved in any military intervention.
These include: risks to U.S. military personnel; high risk of
civilian Syrian casualties; U.S. intervention could undermine the unity
of the opposition and the international community, both of which are
deeply divided on the question of foreign military intervention;
limited military actions may not have a decisive impact and could lead
us down a slippery slope of escalating involvement and greater
responsibility for the conflict and its aftermath; U.S. military action
could undermine our efforts toward a negotiated transition and provoke
a negative response by Russia; U.S. military strikes could invite
reprisal attacks against U.S. interests or allies in the region.
Contrary to some assertions made in the press, from a technical
standpoint, Patriot batteries in Turkey could only provide very limited
protection to very small areas inside Syria, which would not make a
significant difference in nonregime controlled areas. Furthermore, the
NATO deployment of U.S., German, and Dutch Patriot batteries in Turkey
is for point defense against the threat posed by ballistic missiles;
the batteries were provided and are configured accordingly. The express
and sole purpose of this deployment is defensive, to protect Turkey and
the Turkish people from missile threats.
Question #4. I remain very concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions
and was discouraged to see that Iran came to the most recent round of
P5+1 talks with no more interest in reaching a real resolution than it
has previously. The negotiations seem stuck, but Iran's nuclear program
is moving forward.
What steps is the U.S. Government planning to take to
increase the pressure on Iran in response to the failure of the
talks?
What is your view of sanctions that would require the
acceleration of significant reductions in petroleum purchases
by foreign nations or that would limit Iran's access to its
foreign currency reserves?
Answer. The United States will continue to increase the pressure on
Iran as we seek a diplomatic solution to international concerns over
Iran's nuclear program. We have built an international coalition to
increase the economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran, and we will
continue to use all existing authorities and pursue new measures to
further isolate Iran.
We are committed to aggressively enforcing our existing
authorities, and are considering additional measures that will support
our ultimate goal of finding a peaceful solution to our concerns about
Iran's nuclear program.
We robustly implement all sanctions legislation, and we are taking
the necessary steps to implement the sanctions under the ``Iran Freedom
and Counter Proliferation Act'' subtitle of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) 2013. These sanctions, which come into effect
in July, will send a further message to Iran that sanctions will
intensify without progress at the negotiating table.
On February 6, 2013, amendments to section 1245 of NDAA 2012 went
into effect. One aspect of these amendments requires the few remaining
countries that import Iranian crude oil to keep the payments for those
imports in bank accounts in the importing country. These countries all
have significant trade imbalances with Iran, meaning that Iran does not
have access to a significant amount of hard currency derived from its
energy sector. Iran's mismanagement of its economy, combined with
sanctions' impact, has sparked severe inflation in Iran and continues
to drain its foreign currency reserves. We continue to work with our
partners around the world to target Iran's access to foreign currency
and continue to pursue reductions in Iran's crude oil exports.
Question #5. The budget for assistance to the Western Hemisphere
decreased by approximately 15 percent from FY12 levels. There are
countless reasons that we should be investing more in the relationships
with our neighbors. Some of the nations in the region have among the
highest homicide rates in the world and the trends of crime,
insecurity, and narcotics trafficking are shifting and are increasing
dramatically in Central American and the Caribbean. Insecurity disrupts
markets in the region with a negative impact on markets in the United
States.
With these proposed sharp budget reductions, how do you plan
to demonstrate that the Western Hemisphere is a priority in our
foreign policy?
Answer. While the foreign assistance budget environment is
difficult and constrained overall, the FY 2014 budget request aligns
with our foreign assistance priorities, especially on citizen security,
which accounts for half the total WHA request.
Our growing partnerships with increasingly capable regional
leaders, combined with the hemisphere's economic success over the last
decade, means that U.S. foreign assistance is not as needed in as many
places as before.
In areas where our partners are increasingly capable, including
Mexico and Colombia, we have been able to reduce our assistance. Most
of the decrease is due to: nationalization of key programs in Colombia;
a continued focus on training and other capacity-building assistance in
Mexico, which tends to be less expensive and have broader impact than
the donations of aircraft and equipment that characterized the initial
phases of our programming; and the increased capability of the
Colombian and Mexican security forces and rule of law institutions.
At the same time, we have increased assistance for the Central
America Regional Security Initiative by 20 percent from FY 2012 to
strengthen Central American capacity to address rule of law challenges.
Central America is where we see the greatest threats to U.S. and
regional interests.
President Obama and I recognize that we share common values and
global markets with the Western Hemisphere, which includes some of our
largest trading partners, and we view the region as critical to our
economic success and prosperity.
Question #6. Are the U.S. counternarcotics strategies in the
Western Hemisphere conceptualized in a strategic way--is there an
administration-wide counternarcotics strategy for the hemisphere?
Answer. The National Drug Control Strategy \1\, coordinated by the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, is the United States
Government's multiyear interagency strategy to address narcotics. Our
vision for implementing the strategy, as well as the National Strategy
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime \2\, is to enhance citizen
security throughout the hemisphere in a coordinated effort to address
all forms of crime and public insecurity. President Obama has
recommitted the United States to practical partnerships in the Western
Hemisphere that advance shared interests and protect U.S. citizens.
This cooperative approach is based on a growing understanding of both
emerging and traditional threats to the safety of our citizens. It is
grounded in the recognition of a shared responsibility for addressing
such challenges; the critical importance of political will, the rule of
law, and effective institutions of governance; and common aspirations
for secure, and prosperous societies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/2013-national-drug-control-
strategy.
\2\ http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-
crime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transnational threats, which often blur the lines among crime,
narcotics trafficking, and terrorism, shape the way security is viewed.
This creates a broader, more integrated view of security, which
advances citizen safety while simultaneously countering emerging
transnational threats and narcotics trafficking. This approach
emphasizes greater reliance on the will, capacity, and cooperation of
regional partners such as Mexico and Colombia. It also recognizes that
transnational, local, and white-collar (e.g., corruption) crime are
interconnected, requiring an integrated approach to combat them.
Our principal mechanisms for implementing this strategic vision for
enhancing citizen security, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime are our citizen
security initiatives: the Merida Initiative, Central American Regional
Security Initiative, Colombian Strategic Development Initiative, and
the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. These initiatives are
developed with our partners and are aimed at protecting citizens and
strengthening the institutions responsible for ensuring citizen safety.
One mechanism to help ensure that these initiatives are effectively
coordinated is the Executive Committee for citizen security in the
Western Hemisphere. This interagency group is chaired by the WHA
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and includes key interagency
stakeholders in each of the initiatives, bringing them together
periodically to discuss lessons learned, opportunities for enhanced
implementation, and opportunities for coordination across the
initiatives.
Question #7. What is the path forward in Venezuela following the
contested elections? What will the U.S. Government do to ensure that
democratic process prevails?
Answer. The close results of the April 14 Presidential elections in
Venezuela demonstrated an evenly divided electorate and a highly
polarized society. Given the tightness of the result--just over 1
percent of votes cast separate the candidates--the opposition
candidate, Henrique Capriles, and one member of the electoral council
called for a 100-percent recount of the results and a full
investigation into alleged electoral irregularities.
The Venezuelan National Electoral Council (CNE) has the
responsibility under the Venezuelan Constitution to make declarations
certifying the results, but the CNE's decision to declare Maduro the
victor before completing a full audit remains difficult to understand.
The CNE did not explain its haste to take this decision.
Acting President Nicolas Maduro previously expressed his support on
election night for an audit of 100 percent of the paper ballots. Our
position, shared by the European Union, continues to be that a full
recount and review of alleged irregularities would be important,
prudent, and necessary in ensuring that the election met the democratic
aspirations of the Venezuelan people.
We have noted the Venezuelan Government's obligation to respect the
rights of Venezuelan citizens to peaceful assembly and free speech. We
join others in urging all parties to refrain from violence and other
measures--including threatened arrests of political leaders and
journalists--that could raise tensions at this difficult moment.
We continue to believe that resolving alleged voting irregularities
and appropriately responding to the several calls for a recount would
do much to ensure that the Venezuelan people feel included in this
process and can be confident that their democratic aspirations are
being met.
We have consulted and will continue to work with regional partners,
the EU and multilateral fora, such as the Organization of American
States, and partners in the Union of South American Nations, to call
for calm and a rapid and transparent institutional response to the
current political impasse.
Question #8. The FY14 budget requests $15 million for democracy
promotion in Cuba. I note that this is a reduction from historical
levels of $20 million. Given the significant increase in detentions and
arrests on the island in the past year, what is the justification for
decreasing assistance to civil society in Cuba?
Answer. The U.S. commitment to human rights and democracy in Cuba
is strong. We will continue our robust program providing humanitarian
support to political prisoners and their families, building civil
society and expanding democratic space, and facilitating the
information flow in, out, and within the island.
For FY 2014, we are requesting $15 million, the same level of
assistance we have deemed appropriate for the last three fiscal cycles.
The request is based on our assessment of needs on the ground, and on-
island and off-island capacity to carry out programs. In addition, the
combined pipeline (FY09 to FY12) for Department of State and USAID
implementers is about $44 million, sufficient funding to carry out the
purposes of the program over the next 3 years.
Question #9. One of the primary challenges in the Western
Hemisphere is the erosion of democratic norms in select countries. Does
the administration have a strategy through which they aim to strengthen
democratic institutions and uphold rule of law in the Western
Hemisphere?
Answer. The administration believes engagement is a vital tool for
advancing U.S. objectives throughout the world, including in support of
our efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and uphold the rule
of law.
Our commitment to democratic ideals is rooted in the recognition
that sustainable democracies must do more than just hold elections--now
the norm throughout the hemisphere. Sustainable democracies demonstrate
ongoing commitment to democratic institutions, freedoms, meaningful
public participation in government, and the separation of powers. Some
countries throughout this region have held open, democratic elections,
but have subsequently taken steps to undermine the democratic process
and restrict basic democratic freedoms, such as the freedom of speech
and judicial independence. We view the situations in each country as
distinct and separate, and we pursue our relationships with these
countries on a bilateral basis.
We employ the full range of diplomatic and U.S. assistance tools
available to support the rule of law and human rights in the
hemisphere. We are working with governments to support people-to-people
efforts to build vibrant civil societies, and promote accountability,
the rule of law, independent and capable judicial systems, and respect
for human rights. Our U.S. assistance investments strengthen citizen
security and bolster democratic institutions in partnership with host
nations. Our diplomats engage constantly with governments, addressing
issues of democracy and rule of law both publicly and privately. In
bilateral and regional meetings, we press all governments to fulfill
their commitments under the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other
international conventions and treaties to which they are signatories.
For example, we have spoken out strongly, both in international fora
and directly to governments, against corruption, lack of justice, and
election irregularities in Nicaragua; against severe restrictions on
civil society and freedom of expression in Venezuela; and in defense of
press freedom in Ecuador and elsewhere. All of our human rights
reporting, including certification in Colombia, documentation on human
rights criteria in Mexico, and our annual country reports, promote the
rule of law and accountable democratic institutions.
Weak rule of law institutions will continue to be at the center of
the citizen security challenges. The inability of governments to uphold
the rule of law and provide basic services to citizens will slow their
efforts to improve citizen security, reduce inequality, and foster
development. We will continue to work with governments as they
strengthen their institutions and secure their cities, waters, remote
regions, and vulnerable populations.
Question #10. The Accountability Review Board made several
recommendations to help prevent future attacks against our diplomats.
Secretary Kerry, you committed to full implementation of the ARB's
recommendations. This budget is a good step toward adequately
resourcing embassy and diplomatic security in the future. It is
incumbent upon Congress to provide the necessary resources and
authorities to support those efforts. Anything less would be a breach
of faith with our brave and dedicated diplomats and aid workers
stationed abroad.
Does this budget request funding necessary to fulfill
overseas infrastructure needs as identified by the
Accountability Review Board?
Answer. The Department's Capital Security Construction Program
addresses overseas infrastructure deficiencies by constructing new
embassy and consulate buildings, and implementing security upgrades.
The Department has made progress by completing the construction of
approximately 100 new diplomatic facilities, but the construction
program is a multiyear effort. There are more posts that will need to
be addressed.
The Accountability and Review Board (ARB) recommended a $2.2
billion level for the Capital Security Construction Program. The FY
2014 funding request of $2.2 billion addresses needs that can be
executed during FY 2014. The Department will plan for and include
future needs in subsequent budget requests.
The $2.2 billion level recommended by the ARB will ensure the
Department can continue to construct facilities at a pace equivalent to
the pace when the program first began. New security enhancements will
be incorporated into the security upgrade program and executed as
either stand-alone projects or incorporated into larger projects.
Question #11. Can you give us an update on the implementation of
the recommendations of the ARB?
Answer. The independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB)
made 29 recommendations in key areas such as training, fire safety,
staffing, and threat analysis. To hold ourselves accountable for
implementation, we divided the recommendations into discrete tasks, and
then assigned bureaus with these tasks and deadlines.
To date, the Department has taken action to substantially address
all of the ARB's recommendations, insofar as resources and staff
training cycles permit. Some of this work--such as enhancing language
and security training or constructing facilities--requires a multiyear
commitment. Others--such as expanding the presence of Marine Security
Guard--require ongoing interagency cooperation and continued funding.
In support of these efforts:
The Department reviewed our presence and staffing
footprint at high-threat posts; and established a High
Threat Board to review our presence at high-threat, high-
risk posts every 6 months.
We are improving training for our employees headed to
high-threat posts, and have expanded the number of posts
where such additional security training is required.
We surveyed fire and life safety equipment, and have
procured needed equipment for posts.
All posts performed a review of tripwires to determine if
any had been breached in the past year. The Department
developed and issued revised guidance on responding to
tripwires, and established a Washington-based ``Tripwires
Committee'' to review tripwires upon breach.
With congressional support, we are creating 151 new DS
positions; 113 are expected to be hired this fiscal year.
The remainder will be hired in FY14.
The Department is working with the Department of Defense,
and the Congress, on increasing the number of Marine
Security Guard Detachments deployed to U.S. diplomatic
posts overseas.
We developed a concept for ``Support Cells'' for opened/
reopened posts; the process is being incorporated into the
Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH).
The Department established a six-person panel to
thoroughly review DS's organization and management
structure; the panel has developed draft findings.
The Department will never be ``done'' when it comes to security.
The stark fact is that we can never truly eliminate the risks that our
diplomats and development experts face as they advance America's
national interests abroad. But we must always be working to find ways
to minimize that risk.
Following through on our progress will, of course, require
continued support from the Congress. Your support for our FY 2013
funding request to enhance embassy security--as recommended by the
ARB--has been invaluable. To truly address the findings of the ARB, we
hope Congress will continue to be a partner, in terms of providing
resources and oversight. The FY 2014 budget requests the resources
necessary to carry on this important work.
Question #12. Mr. Secretary, you and the President have traveled to
Israel and the Palestinian Territories in a renewed effort to build
momentum toward rekindling the Peace Process. We learned a few days ago
that Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a moderate Palestinian politician who
the United States and Israel consider a valuable partner, submitted his
resignation after some infighting within the Palestinian Authority.
In your assessment, where are we in terms of prospects for
bringing the two parties together in direct bilateral talks?
How concerned are you that the Palestinians might go back to
the United
Nations or the ICC in the coming months?
Has the message been delivered to them that such a move
could have serious consequences?
Answer. The United States is committed to the goal of two states
living side by side in peace and security. We remain clear that only
through direct negotiations without preconditions between the parties
can the Israelis and Palestinians address all permanent status issues
and achieve peace that both deserve: two states for two peoples, with a
sovereign, viable, and independent Palestinian state living side by
side in peace and security with a Jewish and democratic Israel. That
remains our goal.
We will continue to build on the commitment President Obama
reaffirmed in Jerusalem in March. At President Obama's request, I am
engaged in personal diplomacy with the leaders on both sides to find an
opening for renewed direct negotiations. We will not necessarily
provide the details of every meeting every step of the way, but we are
still listening--and we will continue to listen--to the issues of
concern to Israelis and Palestinians.
I am not aware of any currently pending efforts by the Palestinians
to seek membership as a state in additional international
organizations. I am concerned that pursuit of Palestinian membership as
a state in international organizations will drive the parties further
apart and risk hard-won progress in building Palestinian institutions.
There is simply no substitute for direct negotiations.
The United States will continue to oppose unilateral actions in
international bodies or treaties that circumvent or prejudge the very
outcomes that can only be negotiated between the parties. And, we will
continue to stand up to every effort that seeks to delegitimize Israel
or undermine its security.
We will continue to consult closely with our international partners
to make clear our firm opposition to one-sided actions against Israel
in international fora. Further, we will continue to urge all parties to
avoid any provocative actions that circumvent or prejudge outcomes that
can only be negotiated, including Palestinian statehood.
The administration is seeking a waiver to allow the discretion
necessary to continue to provide contributions that enable us to
maintain our vote and influence within the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, if the President determines that doing so is
important to our national interests, and to remove from the
Palestinians or their allies any ability to force a contribution cutoff
and diminish our influence within these agencies.
Without a national interest waiver our ability to conduct
multilateral diplomacy and pursue U.S. objectives will be eroded, and
our standing and position in critical U.N. agencies will be harmed. As
a result, our ability to defend Israel from unfair and biased attacks
in the United Nations will also be greatly damaged.
Question #13. The transition to democracy in Egypt is marked by
significant obstacles, a floundering economy, ongoing political
protests, and parliamentary elections that keep getting postponed.
What is the current focus of our bilateral engagement with
Egypt? Do we need to reevaluate the balance of military and
economic assistance to Egypt in an effort to reform it to
reflect new realities?
Answer. Our bilateral engagement with Egypt is focused on serving
the U.S. national interests of promoting regional peace and security,
ensuring regional stability, and encouraging economic, democratic, and
security sector reforms to help shape and advance Egypt's democratic
transition. It is in our interests to have an economically and
politically stable and democratic Egypt.
We have consistently made clear to the Egyptian Government that the
United States supports the establishment of an inclusive and lasting
democracy in Egypt that protects the universal rights of all Egyptians,
including women and religious minorities. We are concerned by the
ongoing political impasse and we are pressing President Morsy to build
greater consensus and protect universal human rights, while also
encouraging the opposition to participate in dialogue and political
processes. It is also vital that Egypt have a stable economic
foundation in order to help build democratic institutions and meet the
economic needs of its growing population. We continue to urge the
Egyptian Government to implement economic reforms and come to an
agreement with the IMF.
The budget request reflects our current military and economic
assistance needs. Our security assistance has been critical in
maintaining Egypt's partnership with the United States in advancing the
cause of Middle East peace, meeting its treaty obligations with Israel,
implementing critical counterterrorism and nonproliferation
initiatives, and supporting our regional operations. Our economic
assistance is a key component of U.S. engagement in support of the
democratic transition and providing economic opportunities for all
Egyptians, as demonstrated by the administration's $1 billion
commitment announced in May 2011. Our robust economic assistance
programs are already helping to promote democratic principles and civic
participation, educate Egyptian youth, improve the business climate,
promote advances in science and agriculture, and achieve key health
outcomes.
Question #14. I took my first trip as chairman to Afghanistan and
Pakistan because I believe this region remains critical to our national
security interests. The region is in transition with historic elections
just weeks away in Pakistan and planning for 2014 elections underway in
Afghanistan. Like you, I believe the political transition in
Afghanistan is the most important milestone for the region. The results
of the election will either consolidate the gains we have made the past
decade or undermine them and threaten future international support.
Please describe the administration's thinking with regard to
the elections in both countries and how the United States can
best support a successful transition.
Our relationship with Pakistan has been rocky these past couple of
years, despite efforts to build a strategic partnership based on mutual
interests and trust. Efforts such as the historic Kerry-Lugar-Berman
aid legislation, which you authored, have faced an array of political
and implementation problems.
What is your vision for improving this relationship, and how
can Congress best support this effort given all the challenges
we face?
Please describe proposed civilian staffing levels in
Afghanistan (both in Kabul and in the field) for FY 2014. How
do these levels compare to previous years?
What steps is the Department taking to bolster Embassy
security in Afghanistan? How much will be spent on embassy
security in FY 2014, and for what purposes?
Answer. The 2014 Presidential election in Afghanistan will be a
defining moment in the overall transition process and will set the
trajectory for Afghanistan's stability and that of the region beyond
2014. A peaceful transfer of authority will send a strong and
reassuring signal to Afghans and the region that Afghanistan's
democratic system and institutions are an enduring reality.
Ultimately this election belongs to the Afghans. Our role is to
support a fair and inclusive electoral process and encourage Afghans to
reach a unifying, widely accepted outcome. The United States will not
support any particular candidate.
We are providing significant financial and program assistance to
help Afghans build credible and independent electoral institutions. We
emphasize expanded voter participation, particularly for women, and
ensuring the independence of the election commission, an independent
complaints commission, and consultative procedures for commissioners.
We engage intensively with Afghan officials, civil society, and
political leaders to support their efforts. We coordinate closely with
the United Nations and other donors on training, public information
campaigns, fraud mitigation, domestic observation efforts, and improved
ways to identify eligible voters.
Afghan Government and election officials, political players, and
civil society understand that an inclusive electoral process is
critical to Afghan stability, as well as to sustaining international
commitments to Afghanistan. Key political leaders from major factions
have been meeting to seek consensus on how elections should be
conducted, who should run and on what platform, and how to ensure that
influential political factions respect the result. We support efforts
to coalesce around common interests through a political process, to
preclude conflict that could threaten the viability of Afghanistan's
young democracy.
An urgent priority is enacting legislation to lay a lasting
foundation for a credible electoral process. We are encouraging
consultations between all stakeholders regarding draft laws currently
under consideration. We are urging Parliament and President Karzai to
move quickly on enacting legislation and making key appointments to
maintain momentum in election preparations.
Pakistan's national elections in May 2013 were a historic occasion:
This is the first time since Pakistan's founding in 1947 that a
civilian government has completed its term and transferred power
democratically to another civilian government. The National Democratic
Institute's Election Observation Mission called the election a
``victory for democracy'' in spite of extremist attempts to disrupt the
polls. Following the May 11 vote, the Secretary stated that ``these
national and provincial assembly elections mark a historic step in
Pakistan's democratic journey. The Pakistani people stood up
resiliently to threats by violent extremists. We'll be working with the
new government to advance shared interests including a peaceful, more
prosperous and stable future for Pakistan and the region.''
The State Department and USAID provided targeted assistance to
support an improved election process in Pakistan. The U.S. Government
funded the National Democratic Institute's observer mission, which
includes 28 short-term observers and 10 long-term observers. We also
supported the Free and Fair Election Network, a Pakistani NGO, to train
up to 40,000 local election observers. Additionally, we supported an
innovative program on election information management, which included a
web-based system that allows election monitors to text and track
polling station results, and to document election irregularities.
We have made our position clear throughout the election period: The
United States supports a credible democratic process, and not any
particular candidate or party. Months of concerted effort has
effectively repaired our working relations with the Pakistani
Government, which had sunk to a low point during 2011-2012. Very
serious challenges immediately confront Pakistan's newly elected
leadership, and we stand ready to work with the new government to
continue building our relationship and advance our mutual interests.
Our civilian staffing levels in Afghanistan are decreasing. Our
military and civilian field presences are drawing down as our military
platforms are being closed. Our plan is to consolidate our civilian
presence at our enduring presence locations; we are awaiting White
House guidance on what the shape and scale of our civilian mission will
be.
The decrease of civilian staffing levels in Afghanistan will reduce
the challenge of securing our people and facilities, although the
corresponding decrease in International Security Assistance Forces will
limit possible U.S. military responses to threats outside the scope of
the Department's internal security capabilities. The Department uses a
wide array of security personnel, technical and physical security
countermeasures, and threat analysis to ensure staff located at
Department facilities in Afghanistan are well protected. Department
security measures are continually reviewed at post and in Washington
based on the threat situation and are upgraded as appropriate.
The President's FY 2014 budget request includes $643.8 million
within the Worldwide Security Operations account for security
operations in Afghanistan. This funding will support local guards,
movement security teams, physical and technical security operations,
and support costs for regional security officers serving in
Afghanistan.
It should be noted that while this funding will support security
operations, it is separate from funding appropriated under the
``Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance'' (ESCM) account,
which is responsible for providing U.S. diplomatic and consular
missions overseas with secure, safe, and functional facilities to
assist them in achieving the foreign policy objectives of the United
States.
Question #15. I am concerned about the proposed $151 million
increase in the INCLE account for FY 2014, given the lack of robust
metrics or assessment tools to measure the success of our justice
sector programs and problems supporting rule of law in Afghanistan.
Please describe how FY 2014 INCLE funds will be spent and
what steps the Department will take to improve evaluation,
accountability, and ensure funds are well spent.
Answer. The FY 2014 request reflects needs across all International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) programs in Afghanistan. In FY
2014, we will continue our range of counternarcotics and corrections
programs--as well as our engagement with the Afghan justice sector--
including government institutions, civil society,
and legal education. Our programming will remain focused on
transforming donor assistance projects into sustainable initiatives led
by Afghan institutions and organizations.
The Department recognizes that, in order to effectively manage INL
programs and evaluate their broader value, we must develop and maintain
standardized and flexible tools to collect program performance data and
track how each of these projects contributes to broader INL,
Department, and U.S. strategic objectives. Even in an extremely complex
and insecure environment like Afghanistan, we find creative solutions
for project monitoring that lead to better program performance, such as
joint project oversight between INL and international organizations.
Our basic oversight framework requires regular and consistent
reporting from INL implementing partners, complemented by additional
monitoring and evaluation tools--such as Performance Management Plans
(PMPs). Under each PMP, all data requested by INL about a program is
aligned with broader strategic goals to help program managers regularly
evaluate if, how, and to what degree our initiatives help achieve core
U.S. objectives. These PMPs gather a wide range of quantifiable data
supplemented by qualitative reporting, and will be compared to
independently gathered impact data. These tools allow us to change our
programs for the better and ensure their strategic value.
INL does not implement a ``one size fits all'' approach to program
management. Instead, the monitoring and evaluation framework varies by
program. Data collection tools and reporting requirements are tailored
to the implementing partner's strengths and weaknesses, INL's
particular information needs, and our desired outcomes. For example,
for complex initiatives with the societal depth and breadth of the
Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and the Corrections System
Support Program (CSSP), larger scale research is conducted to craft an
accurate picture of change. In programs more centered on increasing the
capacity of individual leaders, such as our LLM and Ph.D. initiative
for Afghan law faculty, we gather basic data on participation, but we
rely more heavily on qualitative narrative reporting and interaction
with Afghan alumni to understand the long-term impact of our support
and to make nuanced changes to the program design. In our work with
civil society, we focus not only on the organization's fulfillment of
project goals, but also on its ability as an organization to function
effectively now and into the future.
While it is often challenging in Afghanistan to link program
activities to broader institutional and societal change, INL
systematically collects and uses project-specific and impact-level
trend data through a variety of commissioned and free sources in order
to achieve this goal. When projects demonstrate sustained and positive
change, we apply any relevant lessons to other projects. When the data
indicate that operational problems exist, we modify our programs
accordingly and intensify our oversight relationship. For example, we
de-scoped regional legal training work from a contractor-supported
program when security risks and Afghan laws regarding private security
companies inhibited our movement. We then entered into an agreement
with an international organization with a more nimble and province-
based profile to carry on the work and eventually turn it over to the
Afghan Government. If program performance data indicate that INL is on
the wrong track, we de-scope the work and either find better
alternatives for implementation or terminate unsuccessful projects. For
example, when regular narrative reporting in 2009-2010 by INL's
implementing partner for the Counter Narcotics Advisory Teams (CNAT)
demonstrated that the program, as designed, was not effectively
transferring public outreach and drug supply reduction skills to the
Afghan Government, INL terminated the contract. All INL programs have
rigorous reporting requirements.
Question #16. What is the status of the Mutual Accountability
Framework that was signed last July in Tokyo? Please describe the
reforms the Afghan Government has taken since the Tokyo conference to
meet its commitments and steps that remain.
Answer. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), as agreed
at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, remains the basis for
a coordinated effort by the international community to promote
necessary reforms by the Afghan Government.
To provide a roadmap for what is expected of the Afghan Government,
the TMAF is also more explicit than previous documents in specifying
the goals and indicative Afghan reforms that the government and the
donors agree should be achieved. These cover five areas: (1)
Representational Democracy & Elections; (2) Governance, Rule of Law &
Human Rights; (3) Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking;
(4) Government Revenues, Budget Execution and Subnational Governance;
and (5) Inclusive & Sustained Growth and Development.
In these areas, the TMAF seeks to establish a narrow, prioritized
set of actions that the Afghan Government agreed to undertake. This set
of actions draws from the IMF's own ongoing engagement and the many
Afghan commitments, many of which are still unfulfilled, that were
included in previous Afghan-donor communiques, such as London and Kabul
(2010).
Donors, including the United States, have emphasized the importance
of implementation of all TMAF goals. However, in the context of the
ongoing political, security, and economic transitions, we have focused
in particular on reforms required to support the 2014 elections, combat
corruption, strengthen domestic revenue collection, and protect the
rights of women and girls.
As called for in the TMAF, donors will meet on July 3 in Kabul at
the level of senior officials to assess progress to date and plan for
continued constructive cooperation. We expect the Afghan Government to
produce a progress report for that meeting, which will detail its
progress thus far on critical reforms. In addition, international
donors will outline steps to increase the percentage of assistance
provided through the government's financial systems, as part of the
mutual accountability framework. We will make this report and other
outcome documents from the July meeting available to the committee.
Since last July, Embassy Kabul, in coordination with other key
donors, has organized a series of engagements with the Afghan
Government to promote the steps called for in the five areas outlined
in the TMAF. There has been noticeable progress in some areas, though
significant work remains.
To date, we note important progress in some areas, including the
publication of an elections timeline, as well as the presentation of an
operations plan by the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) for
Presidential and Provincial Council elections, released to donors 1
year prior to the scheduled elections. The IEC has also sent the
proposed list of polling centers to the securities ministries,
providing time for security coordination. In addition, the Cabinet has
approved for submission to Parliament a number of critical draft laws,
including the Value Added Tax (VAT), the Minerals Law, and the Banking
Supervision Law.
The indicators enumerated in the TMAF were not intended to be
completed in a single year, and were structured to provide evidence of
Afghan progress toward the larger, agreed goals in each area. After the
July 3 meeting to assess progress, the TMAF calls for a meeting at the
ministerial-level following elections in 2014. This post-elections
meeting will reassess resource requirements moving forward.
Question #17. There are more than 2.7 million Afghan refugees that
have fled their war-torn country. When Afghan refugees return to their
country, 78 percent of returnees do not have access to sustainable
self-reliance and livelihood activities. The U.N. Consolidated Appeal
for Afghanistan has received less than half the resources necessary to
respond to the humanitarian crises.
What is the administration's strategy for dealing with the
significant humanitarian needs in Afghanistan?
With the significant decrease in the Migration and Refugee
Account in the FY 2014 request, how will you support the needs
of the millions of Afghan refugees living in neighboring
countries?
Answer. The United States is the leading donor for humanitarian
assistance to victims of the Afghan conflict. In FY 2012, this
assistance included over $89 million from the State Department's Bureau
of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to support
Afghan refugees, returnees, and IDPs. State/PRM's obligations to date
in FY 2013 include over $24 million in assistance to Afghan refugees
regionally.
The majority of this assistance is provided through UNHCR, in
support of the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), which
seeks to protect existing asylum space in Pakistan and Iran while
creating the conditions in Afghanistan for successful, sustainable
returns. PRM provided $47.6 million to UNHCR in FY 2012 in response to
its regional appeal for Afghan refugees; in FY 2013, PRM's initial
contribution to UNHCR for its regional appeal for Afghans was $11.92
million.
In FY 2012, State/PRM also provided over $16 million to NGOs in
Afghanistan and Pakistan for programming in areas such as vocational
training and the creation of sustainable livelihoods, water and
sanitation, the prevention of gender-based violence, primary education,
and health care. PRM is concluding the competitive process for FY 2013
NGO programming, and anticipates continuing to significant support to
Afghan refugees through our NGO partners this fiscal year.
As a matter of policy, State/PRM believes that the ability to
protect and provide services to women and girls among the populations
we serve is a definitive measure of our effectiveness. PRM is committed
to strengthening practices and policies that will prevent and respond
to gender-based violence, both in crises and in protracted situations
such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We will continue to collaborate
with our international and nongovernmental organization partners in
that effort.
In addition to supporting assistance programming, the State
Department has sought to build the capacity of the Afghan Government to
effectively deal with humanitarian issues and thus reduce reliance on
the international community. As such, State/PRM funded the first year
of a multiyear capacity-building program for the Ministry of Refugees
and Repatriation (MoRR), implemented through the International
Organization for Migration (IOM).
Beyond Afghanistan, we will continue to engage with the Government
of Pakistan on continued protection and the preservation of asylum
space for Afghan refugees. In particular, the issue of Proof of
Registration (POR) cards, which allow Afghan refugees to reside legally
in Pakistan, will remain a focus of our humanitarian diplomacy efforts
once Pakistan completes its May 2013 election and a new Pakistani
Government has been established.
Question #18. Please provide the committee with an update on the
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), including sustainability plans
for all programs.
Answer. The Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense continue close
coordination to ensure the effective and sustainable use of Afghanistan
Infrastructure Funds. To date Congress has appropriated $1.125 billion
for the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (FY 2011: $400 million, FY
2012: $400 million, FY 2013: $325 million) to support 10 initiatives,
comprising 13 individual projects, including efforts to rehabilitate
and expand the Northeast and Southeast Power Systems (NEPS and SEPS).
In the coming weeks the Department of Defense, in coordination with the
Department of State, will request AIF resources for FY 2014 to further
support the overarching objectives of the AIF, which are to support the
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, the Civ-Mil Strategic Framework, and
the infrastructure priorities outlined in Afghanistan's National
Priority Programs. The goal of AIF is to lock in the economic and
stability gains of the last 10 years and provide Afghanistan with a
foundation for internal economic growth that is less reliant on
external aid. To date, more than $717 million of the available $800
million in FY 2011 and FY 2012 AIF funding has been obligated. All FY
2011 projects are under contract and the two remaining FY 2012
contracts are expected to be awarded within the next month. Over the
last year, adjustments were made in response to unforeseen cost
increases--funds were realigned within the program and several projects
were split into phases. All changes have been notified to Congress and
briefed to the appropriate committees.
We are making every effort to ensure projects supported by the AIF
are sustainable in the long term. It is worth noting, however, that the
Kandahar Bridging Solution--which provides short-term stabilization and
has fueled economic growth in the Kandahar region--was not intended to
be sustained. It is a temporary counterinsurgency initiative designed
to improve security and jump-start economic activity until long-term
sustainable power projects, including the NEPS-SEPS connection and the
rehabilitation of Kajaki Dam, are complete. Sustainability plans
include extensive work by USAID to improve the commercial viability of
the Afghan National Electricity Utility, Da Afghan Breshna Sherkat
(DABS). USAID recently signed an agreement with DABS for the Power
Transmission Expansion Connectivity Project, which includes
commercialization activities and the AIF-funded Kabul to Ghazni
transmission line. DABS has since issued tenders for these two
activities; awards expected in late summer. In addition, USAID is
working with the International Finance Corporation on a design for an
on-budget management contract under PTEC to improve the revenue
collection and service delivery of DABS Kandahar. This project is
funded by ESF but complementary to the AIF-funded projects in Kandahar.
Question #19. Please explain why the Department and USAID decided
to turn over the installation of Unit 2 at Kajaki Dam and the Power
Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Program to the Afghan
Government as on-budget assistance, given the many difficulties the
United States has had in completing this project over the past years.
Are we handing over programs to the Afghans such as this that are
likely to fail?
Answer. We made the decision to shift the management of the Kajaki
turbine installation project to the Afghan Government because we
believe the relevant Afghan institutions are capable of completing the
project in a cost effective, sustainable, and timely manner.
Furthermore, Afghan management of the project will leverage the
increased capacity of the Afghan Government to take on responsibility
for its own economic and social development, a critical component to
the sustainment of the country's development progress. We have not
changed our plans with regard to the Power Transmission Expansion and
Connectivity Project since our plan was always to conduct this project
on-budget. Afghan management of these two projects is a positive
reflection of Afghan leadership and its increased capacity. Our initial
assessment is that it will be more effective and efficient to have
DABS, the Afghan national electric utility, manage this project with
continued technical and managerial support as needed. We made the
decision to shift the implementation mechanism of the Kajaki project to
on-budget assistance through the Afghan Government after it
successfully completed a number of increasingly complex projects
including other rehabilitation work on the turbines at the Kajaki dam.
In addition, DABS has shown impressive progress in both operational and
managerial capacity: doubling its year-on-year revenues while
increasing overall power distribution.
Question #20. Please describe the Department's strategy to address
rising opium poppy cultivation levels for the third consecutive year.
Please explain why our counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan are not
having strategic impact in breaking the links between narcotics and the
insurgency and significantly reducing the support the insurgency
receives from the narcotics industry.
Answer. The Department's counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan
are focused on achieving long-term, lasting results through a blend of
sustainable alternative development, demand reduction, eradication,
public awareness and engagement, and interdiction programs. These
efforts--along with complementary efforts by other U.S. agencies, the
Afghan Government, and coalition partners--have contributed to a net
reduction in opium poppy cultivation of 20 percent since its peak in
2007. Seventeen of thirty-four Afghan provinces are poppy-free and tens
of millions of dollars in revenue have been denied to the insurgency.
Ninety-five percent of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan remains
concentrated in a small number of provinces where governance, security,
and development remain broader challenges. Over the past 2 years,
economic insecurity, high opium prices, credits by traffickers, and low
yields from previous years have encouraged some farmers to plant more
poppy. Success in countering poppy cultivation requires a continued
effort throughout the country. Sustainable reductions in poppy
cultivation are possible over time with comprehensive efforts to lift
rural incomes, provide licit alternatives and access to markets,
increase security, and enforce the law.
Recognizing the need for a comprehensive evaluation of current
counternarcotics efforts, the U.S. interagency developed a new U.S.
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, which the National Security
Staff Deputies Committee approved in January 2013. The strategy has two
overarching goals--(1) strengthening the Afghan Government's capacity
to combat the drug trade as a critical element of securing and
sustaining transition in broader stability and security matters, and
(2) countering the link between narcotics and the insurgency and
disrupting drug-related funding to the insurgency through and beyond
the security transition.
This strategy focuses on building the capacity of the Ministry of
Counter Narcotics (MCN), Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Public
Health (MOPH), the Attorney General's Office, and other relevant Afghan
entities to carry out counternarcotics programs. Equally important, the
U.S. Embassy will continue to raise counternarcotics issues at the
highest levels with Afghan Government officials and encourage the
political will to take action at both the national and provincial
levels, with a concrete objective of integrating counternarcotics
planning and priorities into all relevant aspects of the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIROA) National Priority
Programs.
The drug trade's negative impact on GIROA's ability to govern
effectively is a strategic threat to U.S. Government policy and goals
in Afghanistan. Enabling GIROA to independently combat the narcotics
trade, with gradually increasing degrees of responsibility and
ownership, will help foster an enduring United States-Afghan
partnership for the long term and reinforce broader U.S. security goals
in the region. This holistic approach is necessary to ensure hard-
fought gains are not reversed and to achieve long-term, sustainable
results in combating the Afghan narcotics trade.
Question #21. Given the approximately 14-percent reduction to
civilian assistance in the FY 2014 request for Pakistan, please provide
the committee with detailed descriptions of which programs will be cut
and how the cuts will affect programs?
Answer. Our FY 2014 request reflects our recognition of budgetary
and implementation constraints, while maintaining substantial levels
during a critical period--as we transition out of Afghanistan. Our
civilian assistance to Pakistan remains focused on five priority
sectors: energy; economic growth, including agriculture; stabilization;
education; and health. The 14-percent reduction in civilian assistance
from FY 2012 factors in reductions to the education, health, economic
growth, and stabilization sectors.
The largest reductions are in the education and health sectors,
resulting in 58 percent and 30 percent decreases from FY 2012,
respectively. While our assistance in these sectors is important to
Pakistan's economic growth, health outcomes, and service provision--we
front-loaded our investments in education and health and narrowed our
portfolio of programs within each sector to maximize impact. Our
reductions to the economic growth and stabilization sectors--20 percent
and 13 percent respectively--reflect efforts to streamline the program,
while enabling the continuation of critical investments in border
security, infrastructure, law enforcement, and programs that support
entrepreneurship and alternative livelihoods.
Question #22. Please describe proposed civilian staffing levels in
Pakistan (both in Islamabad and in the field) for FY 2014. How do these
levels compare to previous years?
Answer. In 2009 and 2010, Mission Pakistan experienced over 30
percent growth in authorized positions from the previous year,
primarily due to growth by the Department of Defense and the U.S.
Agency for International Development. In 2011 the rate of growth
declined and by 2012 staffing growth had leveled off.
There are currently just over 700 authorized positions in Pakistan.
The Embassy and the Washington interagency are in the process of
conducting a rightsizing study; initial work on the study seems to
indicate that we are likely to maintain a substantial presence in the
coming years, but our rate of growth will be modest.
Question #23. What steps is the Department taking to bolster
Embassy security in Pakistan? How much will be spent on embassy
security in FY 2014, and for what purposes?
Answer. The Department is bolstering Embassy security in Pakistan
by augmenting the Regional Security Office with DS Special Protective
Security personnel who provide protection for personnel under Chief of
Mission (COM) authority. The Department is also deploying additional
low-profile armored vehicles for use within the country.
The President's FY 2014 budget request includes $49.8 million
within the Worldwide Security Program account for security operations
in Pakistan. This funding will support local guards, movement security
teams, physical and technical security operations, and support costs
for regional security officers serving in Pakistan.
It should be noted that while this funding will support security
operations, it is separate from funding appropriated under the
``Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance'' (ESCM) account,
which is responsible for providing U.S. diplomatic and consular
missions overseas with secure, safe, and functional facilities to
assist them in achieving the foreign policy objectives of the United
States. Physical security upgrades are being constructed in Karachi,
Lahore, and Peshawar.
Question #24. How much money will be spent on cross-border programs
between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the FY 2014 request? Please
describe the programs.
Answer. The United States continues to use diplomatic and foreign
assistance resources to promote a range of constructive cooperation
between Afghanistan and Pakistan to support the stability and economic
growth of both countries. Given the importance of regional integration,
we anticipate substantial civilian assistance resources for cross-
border programs between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including standalone
projects to promote cooperation and subactivities within broader
programs such as market access support within agricultural development
projects. For example, a significant portion of USAID's Trade program
in Pakistan supported cross-border activities with Afghanistan; this
program was funded at $6.5 million in FY 2012, and we anticipate
similar funding in FY 2014. This program and a similar project in
Afghanistan work to enhance economic integration and trade flows
between the two countries, including improved implementation of the
Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) and potential
expansion of the current agreement to include other countries in the
region. Funding will also help to finalize customs notifications
procedures and capitalize on recent progress on issues that were until
recently the greatest bottlenecks to APTTA implementation: bank
guarantees for trucks, tracking devices, and customs-to-customs
information-sharing.
Funds will be used to improve trade logistics by reducing barriers
to trade such as informal checkpoints and will provide technical
support for meetings of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The United States
will also help Afghanistan advocate for the expansion of the number of
items eligible for special rates under these agreements. For FY 2014,
the United States will also likely continue to assist the Afghan
Government in processing the ratification of the SAFTA South Asian
Agreement on Trade in Services and finalizing the service market access
agreement offers.
In Pakistan, the United States is funding the construction and
rehabilitation of roads on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which
contribute substantially to the economic integration of the region;
these roads also enhance stabilization by facilitating access to border
areas by Pakistani security forces and civilian law enforcement. To
date, between USAID and the State Department, U.S. assistance has
funded 650 km in roads throughout the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Our assistance is
currently undertaking reconstruction of the Peshawar-Torkham highway,
and we hope to fund similar rehabilitation of the Kalat-Quetta-Chaman
road; the roads are two of the major transit routes between Afghanistan
and Pakistan. In FY 2012 the United States dedicated $100 million to
border road construction and we estimate similar funding in the FY 2014
request.
In addition, we are exploring the possibility of sponsoring cross-
border financial investigation training to improve Afghan and Pakistani
capacity to detect and deter illicit financial transaction across their
borders and improve bilateral coordination.
Question #25. How much money remains in the pipeline for Pakistan
for FY 2009 through FY 2013?
Answer. We acknowledge the large pipeline and are addressing it, as
reflected in our FY 2014 request, which is a 36-percent reduction from
FY 2012. We maintain that robust levels of assistance are important for
our long-term interests in Pakistan and the region, particularly during
this critical transition period.
From FY 2009 to FY 2012 we allocated approximately $4.8 billion in
civilian assistance and $2.6 billion in military assistance to
Pakistan. As we are currently working on the 653a report for FY 2013,
we do not yet have country allocations for that fiscal year.
Approximately 88 percent of civilian assistance allocated has been
obligated, and of that amount $1.8 billion remains to be expended.
USAID also recently completed an extensive analysis of its
implementation mechanisms; total expenditures in the first half of FY
2013 increased by 40 percent over the prior two quarters in FY 2012,
and program implementation is expected to accelerate further in FY
2014. For military assistance, approximately 73 percent has been
obligated, and of that amount $719 million remains to be expended.
Question. During your Asia trip last week you mentioned that the
United States should consider diplomatic engagement with North Korea at
the ``appropriate moment'' and under appropriate circumstances.
Could you share with us your sense of what might constitute
an appropriate moment and the appropriate circumstances?
Answer. We have made clear our openness to authentic and credible
negotiations with North Korea, but North Korea must take meaningful
steps to abide by its commitments and obligations related to the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We will not reward North
Korea simply for the absence of bad behavior nor will we accept North
Korea as a nuclear state. If North Korea wants to join the
international community as a responsible member, it needs to refrain
from actions that threaten the peace and stability of the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia and comply with its commitments in the
September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its
obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.
North Korea's choice is clear. Concrete steps toward
denuclearization can lead to a path of peace, prosperity, and improved
relations with the international community, including the United
States. As he has said many times, President Obama came to office
willing to offer his hand to those who would unclench their fists. The
United States is prepared to sit down with North Korea to negotiate
terms to implement the commitments that North Korea has made. But if
Pyongyang instead continues to choose to defy its commitment to
denuclearization and continues to engage in destabilizing provocations,
it will face further international isolation.
Question #27. PEPFAR and our other global health programs have been
among our most successful foreign policy initiatives in years. They
have saved and are saving millions of lives. Congress last formally
reauthorized PEFAR in 2008. The Institute of Medicine recently released
a report that highlighted the many successes of PEPFAR and, unlike a
similar assessment in 2007, did not point out the need for statutory
reforms.
In your opinion, are statutory changes needed to sustain or
improve our AIDS, TB, and malaria programs? If so, what are
they?
Are there elements that will expire without specific
reauthorization that should be continued through some
legislative vehicle?
Answer. The authorities to conduct assistance programs to combat
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria under the Tom Lantos and Henry J.
Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (the Leadership Act), and
pursuant to the amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act made by the
Leadership Act, will not lapse in 2013. These authorities remain in
effect as permanent law, and as long as the annual appropriations act
appropriates needed funds for assistance, program activities will be
able to continue unaltered. While a limited number of provisions in the
Leadership Act will sunset after 2013, this should not affect the
ability of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, housed at
the Department of State, and its implementing agencies to carry out
assistance related to HIV/AIDS. USAID will also not be affected in its
ability to carry out assistance to combat tuberculosis and malaria.
Question #28. In December 2011, the United Nations and the
Government of Iraq (GOI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to
facilitate the safe and orderly transfer of Camp Ashraf residents to
Camp Liberty. The relocation of the residents has successfully taken
place, but concerns about their safety remain, especially in light of
the fatal rocket attacks on Camp Liberty in early February 2013.
How is the U.S. Government engaging the GOI to ensure that
it provides a safe and secure environment for the residents at
Camp Liberty while they are processed by the U.N. refugee
agency and await possible resettlement?
Answer. Following the February 9 rocket attack targeting Camp
Hurriya, the Government of Iraq has taken steps to enhance security in
and around the camp. We continue to urge the government to take all
possible measures to ensure the safety of Camp Hurriya residents. The
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the GOI are
trying to work with the MEK camp leadership on security enhancements
and we continue to firmly support the many efforts of the GOI and UNAMI
in this endeavor. Since the attack, UNAMI reports that over 250 bunkers
and nearly 600 small T-walls have been delivered to the camp and other
security measures have been put into place. As we have seen from other
terrorist incidents, no amount of physical structures can guarantee the
safety and security of Camp Hurriya or Camp Ashraf, which clearly
underscores the urgency of resettlement of residents outside of Iraq.
We join UNAMI and other nations in urging the permanent
resettlement of former Ashraf residents outside Iraq. Resettlement is
the only sustainable solution to ensure the safety of the residents. We
remain firmly committed to supporting and assisting UNAMI, UNHCR and
the Government of Iraq in their efforts to facilitate resettlement. The
resettlement of Camp Hurriya residents outside Iraq requires immediate
and urgent attention. We have made known to the MEK leadership and Camp
Hurriya residents that Camp Hurriya remains a target and further delays
in resettlement jeopardize the safety and security of residents.
Question #29. What steps is the Department taking to appropriately
balance demands for security cooperation and upholding respect for
basic human rights in its relations with Central Asian countries?
Answer. Our dual-track policy of engaging Central Asian governments
on security issues while encouraging political liberalization has
succeeded in advancing our regional security objectives as we maintain
our strong support for human rights in the region. We have strengthened
the Northern Distribution Network and bolstered our broader
relationships with Central Asian militaries and security services. At
the same time, we use our expanded relationships to continue to
encourage Central Asian governments at every level to respect
fundamental human rights, and to allow greater space for civil society,
peaceful religious practice, and full freedom of expression, including
media freedom and other fundamental rights. During our comprehensive
Annual Bilateral Consultations with each of the five Central Asian
states, human rights are always one of the core issues, and we have
consistently stressed that human rights are an integral part of our
broader bilateral relationships. We urge these governments to hold free
and fair elections and to undertake necessary judicial, law
enforcement, and media legislation reform to expand rights protections
and the rule of law. We support a range of civil society organizations,
many of which operate in extremely difficult environments as they
advocate for human rights and democracy reforms. We also partner with
Central Asian states and international organizations to combat
trafficking in persons and forced labor by facilitating cooperation
with international monitoring entities, civil society, and law
enforcement organizations.
For FY 2012 we provided $26.6 million (not including centrally
managed accounts such as the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) to support democratic
reforms and human rights in Central Asia; our FY 2014 request would
increase this support to $28.6 million.
Question #30. How much money will be spent on cross-border programs
between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries in the FY 2014 request?
Please describe the programs.
Answer. We appreciate the committee's support for cross-border
programming between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. This type
of programming is critical to supporting the development of a ``New
Silk Road'' linking a stable Afghanistan with a prosperous and peaceful
region. For the past 2 years, we have aggressively worked to facilitate
Afghanistan's economic transition by integrating it with the broader
South and Central Asian region. The foundations for self-sustaining
growth are taking root through the reduction of regional barriers to
trade and transit, increased private investment, and the development of
regional road, rail, energy, and communications linkages.
Although our assistance to Afghanistan and the Central Asian
countries is largely delivered bilaterally, we also support regional
economic integration and security through cross-border programs. For
the FY 2014 budget, a few examples include:
With Afghan bilateral funds, USAID's Trade and Accession
Facilitation for Afghanistan Project (soon to be renamed
CARAVAN) estimates spending between USD $7.5 and $8.5
million annually for FY 2014 and subsequent years, and for
the duration of the project on cross-border programming
between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. The
project has identified important trade opportunities
between Afghanistan and its three immediate northern
neighbors of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
In addition, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL)'s Central Asia Counternarcotics
Initiative ($7 million request in FY 2014) fosters cross-
border counternarcotics intelligence-sharing and
strengthens our international partners' ability to monitor
goods and people crossing borders. The initiative also
provides support to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime's (UNODC) programs to promote counternarcotics
cooperation in the region, including the Central Asian
Regional Information and Coordination Center.
The President's FY 2014 budget requests additional
resources to promote regional economic integration in South
and Central Asia ($18.5 million in FY 2014). These funds
will be used to increase trade and investment; improve
transit; advance cooperation on energy trade; promote
effective management of natural resources across the
region; and develop sustainable people-to-people
constituencies for regional engagement.
Afghanistan is central to all of these efforts. Our infrastructure
investments in Afghanistan are helping provide the linkages to promote
commerce between Afghanistan and Central Asia. Our capacity-building
efforts in key Afghan ministries are providing Afghans with the tools
and skills to negotiate successful transit-trade agreements (or
implement existing ones) with their regional partners. We have also
invested heavily in rehabilitating the Afghan electrical grid,
facilitating the purchase and effective distribution of Central Asian
electricity throughout Afghanistan. Our cross-border training programs
in Tajikistan will empower border guards from both Afghanistan and
Tajikistan to cooperate for the security of both countries.
Our cross-border programs have made real progress. Our targeted
assistance has advanced technical understanding of large-scale energy
projects such as CASA-1000, which would enable Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan to sell their hydropower to Pakistan, via Afghanistan. We
have facilitated energy trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, and
between Tajikistan and Afghanistan's northern border region. For
example, in partnership with the Aga Khan Development Program's Pamir
Energy project, we have supported the installation of new transmission
lines which are powering two villages, businesses, and government
buildings in Afghan Badakhshan. Power links to a third Afghan village
will be completed this summer. Associated training of engineers to
maintain the new lines is also taking place. U.S. assistance to small
and medium-sized enterprise development, agricultural production water
management, and vocational training are also beginning to expand
Afghanistan's economic ties with Central and South Asia, which we plan
to build on with our FY 2014 request.
Women's economic empowerment, in particular, has been a cross-
cutting priority, and in 2011 we hosted over a hundred dynamic women
business leaders from across Central Asia at the Women's Economic
Symposium (WES) in Bishkek, including then Kyrgyz Republic President
Roza Otunbayeva. The participants developed a roadmap to increase
women's entrepreneurship and regional trade, and we are now supporting
a range of follow-on activities, including a Central Asia-Afghanistan
Women's Business Association, proposed by WES participants. Through
this diplomatic and programmatic initiative thus far, women have
started an impressive 141 businesses and expanded 57 existing
businesses thus far. SCA is currently funding an independent evaluation
of the WES and will use the results to inform the design of future
programs, including increasing participation by women in trade and
building stronger links between women leaders in Central and South
Asia.
We understand that our ``New Silk Road'' vision and regional
integration efforts will only succeed if the countries of the region
and international development banks take a leading role. Between fiscal
years 2010 and 2014, estimated outlays from other donors, such as the
Asia Development Bank and the World Bank, in support of energy
transmission lines, hydropower plants, and reforms have totaled more
than $2 billion.
Question #31. Congress approves money for seven programs that
benefit the Tibet people, both inside Tibet and in exile. Among these
are Tibetan language broadcasts by Voice of American and Radio Free
Asia, which are one of the only sources of information to Tibetans
living under a smothering Chinese censorship regime.
Do you agree that the relatively small amount spent on Tibet
programs reaps a large dividend for Tibetan communities trying
to preserve their culture, religion, and identity?
Answer. U.S. funding for the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free
Asia (RFA) programs supports the mission to inform, engage, and connect
people around the world. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a
U.S. independent federal agency, oversees the operations of VOA and
RFA. BBG promotes the broadcasting of accurate, objective, balanced
news and information about the United States and the world. VOA and RFA
English and Tibetan language broadcasts reap a large dividend for
Tibetan communities trying to preserve their culture, religion and
identity. These broadcasts clearly advance U.S. policy and interests.
In accordance with the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, the Department
of State is continuously working in other ways as well to promote the
policy of seeking to protect the distinct religious, cultural, and
linguistic identity of Tibetans. Our various Tibet programs,
implemented by the bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA),
Population Refugees and Migration (PRM), Democracy Human Rights and
Labor (DRL), and by USAID, promote activities that preserve cultural
traditions, enhance sustainable development, expand economic
opportunities and support environmental conservation, health care and
education within Tibetan communities inside Tibet and for Tibetans in
India, Nepal, and Bhutan. We continue to increase our people-to-people
exchanges with China, and actively seek to include Tibetans in a
variety of these exchanges, including the International Visitors
Leadership Program. The Tibet Scholarship Program supports eligible
Tibetan refugees residing in India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Our programs
benefit the Tibetan people, both inside Tibet and in exile, and promote
the protection of Tibetans' distinct cultural, religious and linguistic
identity in accordance with U.S. policy.
Question #32. The FY14 budget for core global climate change
funding is roughly 2 percent lower than FY12 enacted.
Can you please explain the drop in funding requested for the
sustainable landscapes pillar?
Can you also discuss what types of programs the increase in
clean energy funding will support?
Please also discuss how the State Department plans to engage
and/or leverage the private sector in the programs and efforts
undertaken to address global climate change.
Answer. Sustainable Landscapes (SL) remain a priority for the
Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI). The potential for sustainable
land use to mitigate climate change is enormous: Nearly one-third of
global greenhouse gas emissions come from the land sector, especially
from deforestation and agriculture. Just as important, sustainable
landscapes provide other benefits, including biodiversity conservation,
regulation of water and nutrient cycles, and livelihoods for billions
of people.
The overall portion of funding for each GCC pillar varies from year
to year for a number of reasons. The FY 2014 request is $123.5 million
for State and USAID SL programming, compared with the $136.5 million
figure that was enacted in FY 2012, but this should not be taken as a
predictor of future requests. Since many SL programs are multiyear, the
decline in FY 2014 should not affect the ambitious level of work on the
ground, supporting partners around the world in improving their land
use, and protecting their forests and other natural resources.
The FY 2014 request for State and USAID Clean Energy (CE) programs
is $171.5 million, compared with the $160.5 million figure enacted in
FY 2012. FY 2014 CE funding will build on, replicate, and extend the
types of CE activities developed through the GCCI over the past few
years. These projects are designed with the intention of transforming
energy markets in order to increase the diffusion of commercially
driven clean energy technologies and practices. GCCI CE funding serves
to construct the institutional scaffolding and organizational
capabilities at the bilateral and plurilateral levels, working in
collaboration with key public and private sector participants.
Specific projects seek to introduce policy and regulatory
structures that have been proven to catalyze private sector financing
and project development within the United States and other developed
countries. On the energy demand side, focal areas range from industrial
energy efficiency and appliance efficiency standards and labels to
building code design and utility demand-side management. With respect
to CE supply efforts, State and USAID work on the entire suite of
renewable energy technologies and the necessary finance, policy and
regulatory models that will facilitate their diffusion and adoption.
State and USAID's GCCI FY14 budget request will support programs
that leverage and mobilize private investment to address climate
change. The funding will support programs in developing countries that
aim to build reliable national climate change policies that attract
private investment in low-carbon, climate-resilient infrastructure;
support efforts that close the financing gap for renewable energy
projects in sub-Saharan Africa (helping to get such projects to a
commercially bankable stage); and support partnerships that foster
collective innovation and piloting of market-based instruments for GHG
emissions reduction, that encourage private sector involvement and
financing.
Question #33. This past year saw a significant growth in countries
joining the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, a partnership aimed at
reducing emissions from pollutants that have significant harmful
effects on public health and climate change.
Please discuss what steps will be taken this coming year to
continue this momentum and how this initiative interacts with
related efforts, specifically the U.S. efforts under the
Montreal Protocol negotiations and within the Arctic Council.
Answer. In just over 1 year, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition
(CCAC) has grown from 6 to 31 countries (with over 60 total partners)
and raised pledges for funding from 9 countries, totaling over $40
million. The CCAC is translating this commitment of human capital,
political will, and financial resources into emissions mitigation
actions for short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) at the national,
regional, and global level, including through nine sectoral
initiatives. These initiatives, in areas such as municipal solid waste
management, heavy-duty diesel engines, oil and gas production, and
brick kilns, are implementing workplans funded by the CCAC's trust
fund, staffed by CCAC partners, and designed to achieve the engagement
and buy-in of key stakeholders in the public and private sectors and
provide the technical and other resources necessary to effect large-
scale change. The CCAC is also working with countries such as Mexico,
Ghana, Bangladesh, and Colombia to develop government-endorsed SLCP
action plans; with the World Bank and other development institutions to
pursue private sector financing arrangements for SLCP mitigation; and
to build regional communities of practice in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America to address SLCPs in ways that integrate their treatment with
other development priorities.
The CCAC will continue recruiting additional strategic partners and
coordinating with important forums such as the Arctic Council and
Montreal Protocol. In the Arctic context, seven of eight Arctic Council
countries are CCAC partners, and new efforts in the Council to address
black carbon and methane are modeled after and consonant with the work
of the CCAC. As these efforts unfold, the CCAC and the Arctic Council
will seek to be mutually reinforcing. With relation to the Montreal
Protocol, the CCAC has a hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) initiative that is
working on enabling climate-friendly technology in HFC-intensive
sectors such as refrigeration and air conditioning, areas covered by
the Montreal Protocol and the proposed HFC phasedown amendment. The
CCAC HFC initiative is a complementary, voluntary approach that
supports the Montreal Protocol amendment efforts. The CCAC is also
seeking to partner with on-the-ground implementers and financiers such
as the World Bank and regional multilateral development banks to
broadly target SLCP reduction opportunities in their lending
portfolios.
Question #34. The United States and China are the two largest
emitters of greenhouse gases. Their collaboration and leadership are
critical for progress in addressing global climate change. As you know,
the Climate Change Working Group with China is a means to advance
cooperation between the two countries on technology, research,
conservation and alternative and renewable energy. In addition, the two
countries have established an effective relationship through a variety
of organizations, including the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Major Economies Forum, Clean Energy Ministerial, among others.
How will the Climate Change Working Group build on previous
collaborative commitments between the two countries on climate
change?
How do you plan to work with private sector, nongovernmental
groups, and other key stakeholders in these efforts?
Answer. The United States-China Joint Statement on Climate Change
acknowledges the ``significant and mutual benefits of intensified
action and cooperation on climate change.'' Our existing collaboration
provides a strong foundation upon which to base new and expanded
climate action. The Climate Change Working Group therefore has begun
its task by taking stock of the work already underway between our two
countries, in order to identify areas where those efforts might be
effectively scaled up or improved upon. The Group is also working to
identify potential new areas for cooperation. The recommendations of
the Working Group will be presented to the fifth U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue in July.
In developing its recommendations, the Working Group is consulting
with a variety of stakeholders--from both the private sector and from
nongovernmental organizations.
Question #35. In 2012, the United States joined Colombia and other
Western Hemisphere countries in ``Connect 2022,'' an initiative to
collaborate on energy access by achieving universal access to
electricity through enhanced electrical interconnections, power sector
investment, renewable energy development and cooperation by 2022.
Connect 2022 aims to provide reliable, clean, and affordable
electricity to the hemisphere's 30 million people currently without it.
What progress has been made in the 2 years since this
initiative's start to
increase energy access to this region? What are the challenges
to fulfilling this goal?
Answer. The Connecting the Americas 2022 Initiative (Connect 2022)
was launched during the Sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012 by
Colombia, with support from the United States. Prior to the Initiative
being launched, the Western Hemisphere had made significant progress to
integrate power sectors and promote cross-border trade in electricity
with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), World
Bank, Organization of American States (OAS), other donors, and private
companies. While interconnection efforts have advanced in other regions
of the Western Hemisphere (detailed below), U.S. Government efforts in
the first year of Connect 2022 are focused on the Mesoamerican region
that includes Mexico, Central America, and Colombia.
Due to the efforts of the Central American Electrical
Interconnection System (SIEPAC) project, a power line from Guatemala to
Panama is nearly complete, regional institutions to govern the regional
electricity market have been established, and political will is growing
in support of regional electricity trade. However, achieving the full
benefits of Mesoamerican power sector integration is hindered by the
lack of a functioning regional electricity market. Electricity demand
in the region is growing between 5-8 percent annually, which will
require an estimated $25 billion USD in power sector investment by
2030, according to the World Bank. Success here benefits both the
United States and our partners in the region through greater private
sector investment, economic competition, and renewable energy
integration. When the region adopts the regulations needed to encourage
more private investment, U.S. clean energy exporters, power companies,
and service providers will be ready to play a leading role, and U.S.
finance agencies are able to support these investments.
In addition to the Mesoamerican region, high-level policy
discussions occurred at the subregional level for North America, the
Andes with Chile, the Southern Cone, and the Caribbean. In North
America, Canada, Mexico, and the United States already trade power
through existing electrical interconnections. Colombia leads the
regional power integration efforts in the Andean region with Chile, an
effort we and the IDB strongly support. Finally, while the Caribbean
faces geographic challenges to interconnection, they recognize the
value of integrating a greater proportion of locally sourced renewable
energy into their matrix. The Department of State and World Bank
supported feasibility studies to help inform ongoing dialogues in the
Caribbean.
These discussions are essential to identify and address the policy,
market, and regulatory challenges that currently prevent productive
interconnection and limit power trade, which if overcome, would help
attract the more than $1.4 trillion needed (according to the
International Energy Agency) in private investment by 2035 in the power
sectors of the Western Hemisphere (excluding the United States) and
create significant commercial opportunities for U.S. private companies.
Question #36. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
(CSO) played significant roles in U.S. support for South Sudan's
referendum and Kenya's elections. What do you see as the role and
primary added value of CSO? The Budget Request foresees some half dozen
high-impact engagements, 10-15 medium-sized technically focused
engagements, and additional deployments to embassies as resources
permit.
What factors will guide decisionmaking on the tension
between high-impact engagement and being able to contribute in
a large number of situations?
Answer. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
executes the State Department's core mission of conflict prevention and
crisis response. Through an agile approach, collaboration with local
and international partners, and a focus on impact, CSO brings coherence
and effectiveness to U.S. engagement in priority countries. CSO is an
example of high-impact, low-cost work we do every day to make the world
safer.
To focus impact where it is needed most, CSO evaluates potential
country or regional engagements in light of specific criteria: U.S.
national security interests, urgency for action, and opportunities for
impact within 12 to 18 months. We aim to (1) select places that matter
to the United States; (2) make sure the time is right; and (3)
determine that CSO can make a difference on one of the two or three
major challenges in that place.
For FY 2013, the Bureau is engaged in 1 major crisis (Syria), 3
large projects (Kenya, Honduras, and Burma) and at least 10 medium-
sized projects. CSO's efforts to help prevent election violence in
Kenya were concluded successfully on May 1, 2013, and all CSO personnel
have departed the country. CSO is now in the process of identifying and
selecting several new major projects for early FY 2014. To do our
current work in FY 2013 and prepare for additional efforts in outyears,
CSO leveraged a base operational budget of approximately $46 million
and roughly $35 million in foreign assistance assembled from
nonrenewable resources (such as the section 451 and section 1207
programs).
While the conflict landscape and CSO's engagement portfolio will
change, historical patterns leave little doubt that ongoing needs will
exist. Consequently, we have requested $45 million for a base
operational budget in FY 2014. If we can make the small, smart
investments up front, then I believe we avoid more costly conflicts,
and greater burdens down the road.
Question #37. Over the last several fiscal years, the
administration's request for basic education has plummeted.
Specifically, the administration's FY14 budget proposal was to cut the
international basic education account by $299 million from fiscal year
2013-enacted funding levels, a severe 37 percent decrease, and has
plummeted by nearly half since the enacted level in fiscal year 2010.
At your swearing in ceremony as Secretary of State, you recognized one
of the agency's roles to be helping provide quality basic education for
children in emergencies and for improving access to education for girls
around the world.
What assurances can you give that the administration will
reverse the recent decreases in funding and prioritize
resources toward basic education in order for the State
Department to fulfill its role?
Answer.
The FY 2014 request for education is $723.3 million, which
includes $501.4 million for basic education and $221.9
million for higher education.
Education is a foundation of human development and
critical to broad-based economic growth. Increasing access
to education in crisis and conflict environments is a key
component of achieving long-term stability.
As laid out in the USAID education strategy, issued
February 2011, we aim to improve reading skills for 100
million children in primary grades and to increase
equitable access to education in crisis and conflict
environments for 15 million learners by 2015.
The decrease in basic education funding in the FY 2014
request should not suggest a decrease in our commitment to
international education efforts. Rather, the key drivers
for the reduction are (1) efforts to concentrate activities
in the highest priority areas of USAID's Education Strategy
and in a more focused number of countries where we feel
U.S. assistance can have the most impact in the education
sector; and (2) general reductions in the frontline states.
In FY 2012, the Frontline States represented over 26%
of the basic education funding. As overall assistance
levels for Frontline States decreases in FY 2014, our large
requests for basic education funding in these countries
also go down.
We are firmly committed to using foreign assistance
resources in a manner that is strategic and impactful. In
today's fiscal environment, we have to make tough tradeoffs
to fund programs where we believe U.S. foreign assistance
can most contribute to a country's overall development and
stability.
Broadly speaking, investments in youth are broader than
basic education. In FY 2012, U.S. assistance includes an
estimated $149 million for youth programming, cutting
across areas in education, health, social services, and
assistance for especially vulnerable children.
Question #38. In July 2012, the Azerbaijani State Civil Aviation
Administration said in a statement that planned flights between
Stepanakert and Yerevan would represent an invasion of Azeri airspace
and ``taking corresponding measures in connection with that is
inevitable.''
What has the United States done to prevent Azerbaijan from
committing provocative acts against civil aviation? What
consequences would Azerbaijan face if they threatened a
civilian aircraft?
Answer. As a Cochair of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, along with Russia and France,
the United States remains committed to helping the sides find a
peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I have discussed
the issue of civil flights to Nagorno-Karabakh with the governments of
Armenia and Azerbaijan at the highest levels. The Minsk Group Cochairs
are working to help the sides find a means of resolving this issue
diplomatically, and have received assurances from the sides that they
will reject any threat or use of force against civil aircraft. We
remain concerned about any action that could fuel tension in the region
or threatens to damage the peace process.
Question #39. Members of the international community have
repeatedly called for the withdrawal of snipers from the Armenian-
Azerbaijani line of contact. What's the status of international efforts
to accomplish this? Is it true that the Azeri Government has refused?
Answer. The United States, Russian, and French Cochairs of the OSCE
Minsk Group are working to help the sides reduce tension in the region,
and over the years they have proposed a number of confidence-building
measures that would reduce violence and improve the climate for
negotiations. Their longstanding proposal to withdraw snipers is one
such measure; they noted with regret in March 2011 that it had not been
implemented, and they continue urging the sides to consider such ideas.
In their June 2012 statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the
Presidents of the United States, the Russian Federation, and France
reiterated the need for the sides to ``respect the 1994 cease-fire
agreement, and abstain from hostile rhetoric that increases tension.''
We remain committed to helping the sides find a peaceful resolution to
this conflict, and will continue to pursue measures that could bring
the sides closer to making this a reality.
Question #40. The religious freedom of the spiritual head of the
second-largest Christian Church in the world, Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomew, has been severely constrained by the Government of Turkey.
Secretary Hillary Clinton put particular effort into urging Turkey to
allow the Church's seminary at Halki to reopen. On a number of
occasions during her term as Secretary of State, she was led to believe
that the seminary was on the verge of being reopened. The Bush
administration was also led to believe this through public statements
made by Turkish Government officials.
Will you continue to press Turkish authorities to reopen
Halki?
Answer. The United States fully supports efforts to reopen Halki
Seminary, a vital institution of spiritual learning for Orthodox
Christians around the world. We will continue to urge the Government of
Turkey at the highest levels to reopen the seminary as a symbol of its
commitment to religious freedom. I raised this issue with Foreign
Minister Davutoglu during a visit to Istanbul April 21 and met
separately with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to underscore our
commitment to Halki's reopening and the rights and status of the
Patriarchate in Turkey. The Ambassador and officers from the U.S.
Embassy and Consulate General also engage on this issue on a regular
basis.
Though incremental, some progress has occurred. The Turkish
Government's return of property surrounding the Seminary to the Church
in January was a positive step, and the current constitutional
redrafting process is encouraging an unprecedented dialogue on
individual rights and religious freedom. We will continue to encourage
the Government of Turkey to work cooperatively with the Ecumenical
Patriarchate to pass legislation and overcome political roadblocks that
are hindering the reopening of this historic institution. We will also
encourage Turkey to take additional steps to promote religious freedom,
such as allowing more religious communities to own property, register
their places of worship, and train their clergy.
Question #41. Should American policy stay silent on Turkey's
transfer of what they claim are hundreds of thousands of Turks to
Cyprus in an apparent effort to alter the demography of that country?
Answer. Any comprehensive settlement plan will need to take into
account issues of citizenship and residency on the island. I believe
that a settlement plan dealing with these and other questions needs to
be worked out between the communities, with United Nations support, and
needs to be acceptable to majorities in both of the island's
communities. I strongly support the settlement process, which is the
only practical way to resolve the many critical issues between the
communities.
Question #42. The Turkish Foreign Minister recently sent you a
letter regarding the Cyprus question. During your recent meetings in
Turkey, Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the Cyprus question with Turkish
officials? Did you convey that U.S. policy still continues to support
the solution of a bizonal, bicommunal federation in Cyprus, based on
U.N. Security Council resolutions?
Answer. In my recent meetings with Turkish officials, I discussed a
range of pressing issues, including Cyprus. I expressed my support for
the reunification of Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal federation, which
has been the longstanding policy of the United States, consistent with
United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Question #43. Significant natural gas finds off the coast of the
Republic of Cyprus could contribute to the European Union's plans for
energy diversification and future energy security. Do you continue to
support the right of Cyprus to explore for natural gas in its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ)? Are you concerned about threats by other countries
to interfere in such exploration?
Answer. I support Cyprus' right to explore for energy in its
offshore areas. Disputes over energy exploration in Cyprus must
ultimately be resolved through the negotiation process, under U.N.
auspices, to reunify the island. Such a settlement will help to
strengthen regional stability as it would facilitate the normalization
of relations between Cyprus and Turkey. I believe that the island's oil
and gas resources, like all of its resources, should be equitably
shared between both communities in the context of an overall
settlement.
Question #44. U.S. policy has always supported a solution to the
Cyprus question that involves a bizonal, bicommunal, reunified Cyprus.
I am concerned that funds used for bicommunal programs on Cyprus have
been obligated without appropriate advanced notification to and
consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. How can we
work to address this issue and ensure that USAID funding is working in
concert with U.S. policy?
Answer. Every activity implemented with U.S. funding in Cyprus is
designed to help Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots chart a path to
peace and reunification in line with the congressional mandate.
The United States is committed to consultation and transparency
with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on our foreign assistance
program. We have and will continue to be transparent and sensitive to
issues raised by the Republic of Cyprus. Likewise, we will continue to
consult with and be sensitive to the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot
community.
That said, for the U.S. foreign assistance program to be effective,
neither side can be allowed to make funding decisions reserved for the
U.S. Government. Indeed, it would contravene current congressional
report language directing that the organizations implementing the U.S.
foreign assistance program, as well as the specific nature of that
assistance, not be subject to the prior approval of any foreign
government.
Question #45. During Secretary Hillary Clinton's final public
remarks she noted the importance of an effective and up-to-date
Broadcasting Board of Governors. While broadcast entities like Radio
Free Asia and Voice of America clearly do important and meaningful work
on a tight budget, it is also undeniable that the organizational
structure of the Broadcasting Board of Governors is in need of reform.
The FY 2014 budget request includes a legislative proposal to establish
a chief executive officer for all civilian U.S. international media, a
reform that was also encourage in the Office of Inspector General's
recent report.
Do you think there is more that should be done to modernize
the Broadcasting Board of Governors and enhance the ability of
its entities to inform and engage people around the world in
support of freedom and democracy?
Answer. The Department of State fully supports the creation of a
chief executive officer (CEO) position for United States International
Broadcasting, as presented in the administration's budget for fiscal
year 2014. This move to improve the management and efficiency of
Broadcasting Board of Governor (BBG) operations was unanimously
supported by the members of the BBG in January 2012, and the Department
of State's Office of the Inspector General underscored the importance
of such an action in a report issued this past January.
Under this plan, the CEO will be chosen by and report to a BBG
board that is appointed through the White House and confirmed by the
Senate, with the Secretary of State continuing as an ex-officio member.
The CEO will provide critically important day-to-day executive
leadership for U.S. international broadcasting, and will have
management authority over the Federal and non-Federal elements of U.S.
international broadcasting. The Broadcasting Board of Governors would
continue to set the strategic direction of U.S. international
broadcasting, as well as evaluating its journalistic quality and
maintaining its journalistic integrity.
The Broadcasting Board of Governors also needs to be at full
membership. It has been without a chair for more than a year. A nominee
for the BBG Board chairman and another Governor are now before the
Senate, and their confirmation without delay will provide an important
step in restoring the Board to full strength.
Our international media operations are an important part of U.S.
foreign policy. Their mission--to inform, engage, and connect people
around the world in support of freedom and democracy--remains a
critical element for achieving our foreign policy and national security
objectives. I remain committed, both as Secretary and as a member of
the Broadcasting Board of Governors, to ensuring that our international
media operations have the leadership, structure, and clear vision
needed to fulfill their vital mission on behalf of the American people.
Question #46. The FY 2014 budget request includes $104 million,
across a number of bureaus, to support State Department's efforts to
Counter Violent Extremism (CVE).
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that CVE efforts are
coordinated across the Department and is there a standardized
approach to evaluating and measuring the success of specific
programming initiatives?
Answer. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)
gave State's Counterterrorism (CT) Bureau the lead on countering
violent extremism (CVE) efforts. CT was instrumental in reviewing the
programmatic attributions that comprised the $104 million level in the
FY 2014 budget request. CT coordinates closely with other bureaus and
offices which implement projects with CVE effects. These include the
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication (CSCC), Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the Office of the Special
Representative to Muslim Communities (SRMC), and key regional bureaus,
primarily through their public diplomacy offices.
The CT Bureau helps to ensure CVE efforts are coordinated across
the Department by: (1) meeting frequently with these, and other,
bureaus and offices to coordinate and collaborate on CVE and CVE-
relevant programming in specific countries or on particular issues; and
(2) coordinating Department participation in quarterly data calls by
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which collects information
on interagency CT and CVE-relevant programming. CT has played a leading
coordination role for the Department when it comes to specific CVE
interagency efforts or guidance from the National Security Staff (NSS).
More broadly, the Department's new ``J Family''--of which the CT
Bureau is a part and which reports to the Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights--helps to align CVE-relevant
efforts when multiple J stakeholders are involved. Also, the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs leads a biweekly CVE
communications coordination meeting that includes senior CSCC and CT
Bureau staff.
The Department has also implemented a rigorous evaluation policy
requiring that all large programmatic efforts be evaluated.
Unclassified evaluation reports will be posted to a new Department Web
site (under construction) to assure transparency. We will continue to
prioritize transparency and accountability efforts to ensure U.S.
taxpayers can have easy access to information showing how U.S. foreign
assistance funds are spent.
Within the CT Bureau, the CVE Program has a results-based
monitoring and evaluation framework to account for projects meeting its
three objectives: (1) providing positive alternatives to populations
most at-risk of radicalization and recruitment; (2) countering violent-
extremist narratives and views; and (3) building partner-nation (both
government and civil-society) CVE capacities. The CVE Program draws on
broader types of CVE-relevant metrics and tailors them to its specific
projects. The CT Bureau participates actively in the work of the Global
Counterterrorism Forum CVE Working Group's work stream on measurement
and evaluation to define replicable international good practices in CVE
evaluation and assessment.
Within the Department, all bureaus and offices provide the Office
of the Director of Foreign Assistance Resources standardized reporting
on their programming objectives, progress and results. Last, the CT
Bureau reviews all CVE program attributions across State and USAID and
advises the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance whether these
programs are being accurately attributed to CVE goals.
Question #47. Prior to the coup in 2012, Mali was viewed by many as
a democratic success. Given the events of the past year, was that
assessment accurate and if not, did the international community miss
specific signs of impending instability?
Answer. Mali made substantial progress in democratizing over the
last 20 years, and power was successfully transferred through national
elections in 1992 and 2002, but it is still a relatively fragile state
in a region facing many challenges. Mali is one of the poorest
countries in the world, and has suffered from repeated humanitarian
crises. Adding to this vulnerability has been the longstanding conflict
with the Tuareg and other nonextremist groups in northern Mali with
legitimate political and socioeconomic grievances. More recently, Mali
has been affected by the serious instability that emerged from Libya's
revolution and regional terrorism. We will continue our focus on
strengthening and deepening democratic institutions, boosting broad-
based economic growth, advancing peace and security, and promoting
opportunity and development in Mali. It is important to note that
success in these objectives is critical to our counterterrorism goals
in the region.
Question #48. U.S. officials have urged Mali to organize a peace
process and hold elections as part of the transition to a more
legitimate government. What is the U.S. Government doing to support the
preparations for elections and what are the long-term plans for helping
the Malians build institutional capacity?
Answer. The transitional Malian Government has pledged its
commitment to hold inclusive, democratic elections in July. While much
work remains to ensure adequate preparation for the elections, the
United States is committed to supporting the Malian Government's
efforts to hold elections on schedule.
Working with our international partners, we continue to urge the
transitional Malian Government to press ahead with its efforts to
update its voter list, register voters in refugee camps and among
internally displaced populations, set up polling stations, and address
the other challenges that remain in organizing elections. Mali is still
subject to the post-coup legal restriction in section 7008 of the
Department of State, Foreign Appropriations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act for 2012, which restricts assistance to the
government. This restriction will remain in effect until the Secretary
determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that a
democratically elected government has taken office in Mali. In the
meantime, we have continued democratic elections support programming,
which is exempt from the legal restriction. We are providing technical
and other support to elections efforts in Mali, which includes more
than $6 million in electoral programming that we will provide to
support progress on key issues such as voter education, technical
assistance and training to the electoral management bodies, and
national reconciliation. We are also actively encouraging the
governments of neighboring countries hosting Malian refugees to
cooperate fully with the transitional Government of Mali officials as
they seek, with assistance from relevant international organizations,
to register voters and establish polling stations in refugee camps to
ensure that displaced Malians have the opportunity to vote in the
upcoming elections.
Question #49. The U.S. State Department's ability to respond to
urgent, unexpected TIP situations has been described as ``uneven.''
Beyond crises, the Department receives frequent requests for assistance
in drafting antitrafficking legislation, training law enforcement, and
establishing shelters, often from countries that want to respond to the
concerns identified in the annual TIP Report but that lack expertise or
resources to do so. The recent reauthorization of the TVPA includes a
provision that gives the U.S. State Department J/TIP Office the
authority to establish a program in order to respond in these urgent
situations.
How will funding from appropriations be focused on building
the ability to respond quickly with core expertise to urgent,
unexpected trafficking in persons situations?
Answer. J/TIP's current programming model includes funds dedicated
to providing targeted support to governments with identified needs to
combat trafficking in persons (TIP) but that lack the resources or
expertise to meet those needs. We currently provide funding to
organizations with core antitrafficking expertise. For example, we
support the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the
Warnath Group, as part of a program to provide short-term emergency
training and technical assistance (T/TA) focused on enhancing the
capacity of governments to combat TIP. The Department works closely
with U.S. Embassy counterparts and these organizations to ensure that
the T/TA provided is targeted, tailored, and responsive to actual
needs. Initial results from these interventions suggest that this type
of assistance may be an important precursor to more sustained
government support for longer term bilateral programs. Our T/TA is
narrowly targeted and usually provided in response to a direct
government request, and to date has produced the intended results.
In response to the very high demand for this type of assistance, we
intend to align our budget to focus more on global training and
technical assistance awards (particularly in FY 2013 and FY 2014), and
award fewer longer term bilateral awards. In the meantime, we are
working with our providers to enhance their ability to respond to
urgent needs and reduce the turnaround times for service delivery.
Presently, the demand for training and technical assistance creates
a particularly significant challenge within the current constrained
budget environment, and can impede our ability to respond nimbly in
crisis situations. The success of our work in Haiti, for example, was
possible through the urgent reprogramming of prior-year funds and the
receipt of funds from a supplemental appropriation. In creating a
program to respond to urgent, unexpected trafficking situations, we
will make every effort to keep funds available to provide swift
assistance that may save lives and create the conditions for a more
sustained response to the issue.
At the same time, the existing T/TA work we are doing is
establishing frameworks that will enable governments not currently
faced with crisis situations to better respond when unexpected
trafficking emergencies arise. This targeted assistance complements
another program that we operate through IOM to provide emergency direct
assistance for trafficking victims overseas.
Aside from enhancing our T/TA program, J/TIP is also working with
others in the Department to improve strategic planning for implementing
the 2013 TVPRA provision for meeting urgent human trafficking needs in
a coordinated and systematic way.
Question #50. The U.S. State Department is viewed as a global
leader to combat trafficking in persons, in large part due to the TIP
Report's ability to positively influence foreign governments to adopt
and implement antitrafficking initiatives.
Given its limited resources, how does the J/TIP Office plan
to utilize its funding to institutionalize antitrafficking
policies, procedures, and practices and to ensure that the
United States remains a leader on these issues?
Answer. J/TIP operates in conformity with the Department's goals by
funding programming that focuses on building institutional capacity and
sustainability beyond USG intervention. J/TIP leverages support from
non-USG resources to magnify the impact of our resources and to avoid
duplication of effort. For example, in Jordan, J/TIP contributed
funding toward victim care in a cost-sharing agreement that included
requiring the Government of Jordan to contribute a significant amount
of funding.
J/TIP also continues to build the capacity of antitrafficking NGOs
through monitoring and technical assistance (TA). J/TIP is currently
funding evaluation experts to provide targeted TA to grantees on data
collection. For example, in Nepal J/TIP funded the American Bar
Association to build a database system for the Attorney General's
office to track and share information on TIP cases.
In addition, J/TIP prioritizes activities that lead to creating
self-sustaining antitrafficking programs or that train local staff and
governments to themselves become trainers. Such efforts have led to
several programs being sustained beyond
J/TIP funding.
Our bilateral assistance strategy is developed in conjunction with
the Department's regional bureaus and according to funding priorities
that heavily weigh the tier ranking and assessment of political will of
a given country. We look for opportunities to use our limited funding
as leverage points that will spur greater government investment in
effort and resources to fight the crime and protect trafficking victims
and to reward bourgeoning government efforts. Most of the projects that
we fund include an element of direct engagement with governments,
whether by civil society or multilateral partners.
Additionally, we award funds to nongovernmental and public
international organizations for 2-to-3-year projects that include
measures designed to increase sustainability. We specifically encourage
the submission of proposals that include strong partnerships involving
NGOs and multilateral organizations and government agencies that
promote sustainable institutional development and ongoing structural
impact. We require that each applicant for funding submit a logical
framework that describes the relationship between its goals and
objectives, and establishes performance measurement indicators that
focus on outcomes over outputs. We take particular note of projects
that aim to develop and institutionalize training curricula, policies,
procedures, action plans, and legislation that will improve
government's response to the issue and result in lasting changes. Where
needed, J/TIP staff work with selected applicants to strengthen this
aspect of their project design prior to award to ensure that the
project goals include sustainability long past the project period.
Question #51. The U.S. State Department J/TIP Office receives
recommendations of tier rankings in the annual TIP Report by regional
bureaus or embassies that often prioritize issues other than the
eradication of trafficking in persons. Antitrafficking experts have
raised concerns about ``grade inflation'' in the tier ranking process.
What steps will your Office take to reduce the influence of
political concerns on the tier ranking system and to guarantee
the tier rankings reflect true antitrafficking efforts?
Answer. We are aware of the concerns expressed about the TIP
Report. J/TIP will continue to work collaboratively with other bureaus
and offices within the Department to ensure the findings of the TIP
Report are merit-based and in alignment with the requirements of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), as amended. When
governments do not produce results in holding those determined to be
trafficking offenders accountable and providing comprehensive services
to victims, these areas for improvement are documented in the report.
Many governments--including some critics of the report--use the
report's findings as a guide for addressing human trafficking more
effectively. The overall positive impact and results of this report
have been well documented.
Question #52. The administration's budget request includes a
request for legislation authorizing IMF reforms, including a doubling
of the U.S. quota and reorganizing the IMF voting structure, while
preserving the U.S. veto. My understanding is that the net financial
commitment to the United States is zero.
Please elaborate on this, and please explain the importance
of these reforms for ensuring the stability of the
international monetary and financial system.
Answer. The United States worked with its international partners in
2010 to secure an agreement on quota and governance reforms that would
expand core quota resources and enhance International Monetary Fund
(IMF) legitimacy, while requiring no new resources from the United
States and preserving our unique veto. The proposal will reduce U.S.
participation in the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) by Special
Drawing Rights 40,871,800,000 (approximately $63 billion) and
simultaneously increase the size of the U.S. quota in the IMF by an
equal amount. The President's budget request does not change the net
U.S. financial participation in the IMF.
Our investment in the IMF is safe and smart, and it is secured by
the IMF's rock-solid balance sheet in which total assets exceed total
credit outstanding. Our participation in the IMF is an exchange of
equivalent assets. The U.S. reserve position is an interest-bearing and
liquid asset, held as part of U.S. international reserves and available
to the United States on demand.
In order to maintain our veto power and strong leadership position
at the IMF, it is necessary that we implement the 2010 IMF governance
reforms and quota changes. The administration looks forward to working
with you and Congress generally to enact this important legislation.
Question #53. By responding to financial crises, stabilizing
monetary and financial markets, fighting global poverty and promoting
global growth, the IMF plays an important role in protecting U.S.
markets and preserving American jobs.
Can you expound on the positive impact the IMF and other
International
Financial Institutions have on our economy and the American
people, and further elaborate on the ways in which the IMF
supports U.S. global strategic interests?
Answer. U.S. leadership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
promotes American core interests in three ways: as the first responder
when financial crises abroad threaten jobs and growth at home,
strengthening our national security, and designing rules for an open
global trade and financial system.
Protecting American Jobs and Growth.--This recovery has shown the
close links that tie American jobs and growth to financial conditions
abroad. When financial conflagrations hit beyond our shore, the IMF
provides firebreaks to limit contagion while helping our trading
partners stabilize and heal their economies. By sheltering our economy
from headwinds abroad, the IMF helps us to cushion the impact on U.S.
jobs, business investment, and household savings for college and
retirement.
Strengthening our National Security.--The IMF is an important
partner in strengthening our national security--building the economic
foundations for peace. The Fund's work on the ground helps prevent and
mitigate the economic stresses and conditions that foster instability,
extremism, and violence.
Setting Standards for an Open, Resilient International Trade and
Financial System.--The IMF plays a central role in setting norms and
standards for the smooth functioning of the market-based system of
international trade and finance that is at the core of U.S. prosperity
and stability. When countries join the IMF, they sign up for important
obligations that help maintain open markets and avoid beggar-thy-
neighbor policies.
Honoring our commitments will preserve our active leadership
position and unique veto power and allow us to continue to promote U.S.
values and interests around the world without any new U.S. financial
commitment to the IMF.
Question #54. Is the administration concerned that further delay in
approving these reforms could lead to a proliferation of side financial
arrangements--such as the BRIC countries' recent attempt to establish a
development bank--occurring outside the established global monetary
system that we have great influence over?
Could this eventually increase global financial risk and
reduce the ability of the United States to respond to financial
crises?
Answer. G20 leaders committed to implement the quota and governance
reforms by October 2012. The vast majority of the IMF membership has
now acted, and only U.S. approval is necessary for these important
reforms to go into effect.
As the world's largest economy, we are the only country with a veto
to shape major IMF governance and resource decisions. We should
carefully steward this privilege to shape the rules of the global
economy, especially as emerging economies, like China, seek greater
influence in the coming years.
The 2010 quota and governance reforms involve shifting quota shares
from smaller countries to emerging market countries, while preserving
the U.S. veto. U.S. support for the reforms reinforces the central
position of the IMF at a time when emerging economies explore
establishing new and parallel financial institutions.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question #1. Is the leadership of the State Department and of USAID
OIGs required, formally or informally, to seek approval from anyone
outside of their respective OIG offices to fill vacancies (other than
politically appointed positions)? If the Department requires OIG
leadership to seek any sort of hiring approval, please provide
additional information about the origins of this policy, and the name
and position of all non-OIG personnel who are or ever have been
involved in OIG hiring decisions.
Answer. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is not required to
seek approval from the Department to fill its vacancies. With regard to
any sort of hiring approval by the Department:
All potential employees who have been offered a position by
the OIG must undergo a security background investigation
conducted by the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security.
Senior-level employees and other employees going into filing
positions who are hired by the OIG must complete legally
required Conflict of Interest and financial disclosure
paperwork with the Department's Legal Adviser, Office of
Ethics.
These procedures are carried out in accordance with Federal laws and
regulations.
Question #2. In February, Department officials indicated they were
consolidating numerous lists used by the agency to prioritize embassy
construction, and my staff asked for this information in order to match
that against, past, present, and planned construction projects. Please
provide the committee with (1) the consolidated overseas post threat
list with an adequate description explaining the nature of the threat
and (2) a list of all current and planned construction projects
including estimated (or actual) cost, location, dates of construction/
improvement initiation, current project status, and planned completion.
Answer. In March 2013, the Department developed a list of high-
threat, high-risk (HTHR) posts, and the Department is reviewing HTHR
posts for possible early execution of new building construction. The
construction of a new Embassy or consulate compound is a complex
process with long lead times between site acquisition, planning,
project development, and project execution.
We would be happy to provide you a briefing on the high-threat
high-risk list in the appropriate setting.
A list of current and planned new embassy/consulate construction
projects is attached. The following acronyms are used in the attached
list: NEC-New Embassy Compound; NCC-New Consulate Compound
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
embassy security, construction, and maintenance
Question #3. During the April 18, 2013, budget hearing before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you testified that an internal
report on Department staff culpability in the attack on the U.S.
mission in Benghazi was forthcoming to you. What is the expected date
of completion? Will this report be made available, in an unredacted
form, to committee?
Answer. I will be briefed on the results of the staff culpability
review. After that time, I will notify you of the results by letter.
Question #4. Secretary Kerry, will you commit to providing this
committee with all State Department Benghazi related materials provided
to other congressional committees? Specifically, will you commit to
providing this committee with all State Department materials, including
cables and e-mails, related to security risks in Libya and approval and
denial decisions with respect to security for USG facilities in Libya?
Answer. The Department has a strong record of cooperation with this
committee and others that are reviewing the facts and circumstances
surrounding the September 11-12 attacks in Benghazi. As you know, the
Department has provided access to over 25,000 pages of documents to
date, including documents relating
to security matters in Libya prior to the attacks. These documents
continue to be available for review by a number of congressional
committees, including this committee.
Question #5. Secretary Kerry, will you commit to providing this
committee with a copy of all interagency communications in the
possession of the State Department related to the Benghazi talking
points? Specifically, will you commit to providing this committee with
all communications to and from the State Department regarding those
talking points?
Answer. As you know, on May 15 the White House released 100 pages
of e-mails and other documents related to the preparation of the
talking points provided both to Congress and to Ambassador Susan E.
Rice in advance of her September 16, 2012, media appearances. This set
includes the e-mails and other documents created by State Department
personnel in connection with their participation in the interagency
process led by CIA to prepare the talking points in question. In
addition, on June 7 the Department produced to the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform 97 pages of documents responsive to the
committee's May 25 subpoena regarding the talking points. We are open
to also making this set of documents available to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, should the committee so request.
Question #6. What are the six new positions that would be funded
via the State Department's FY 2014 Embassy Security, Construction, and
Maintenance funding request? Please provide details about (a) the
breakdown between career and noncareer positions, (b) whether any of
these positions will be Senior Executive Services positions, (c) which
Bureau would receive these new positions, and (d) any proposed or known
grade or step information for these positions.
Answer. The six new positions are all overseas facility managers
who will provide professional operations and maintenance support at
Embassies in Seoul, Korea; Jakarta, Indonesia; Sanaa, Yemen; Paris,
France; Ottawa, Canada; and Dili, Timor-Leste. These are all career
Foreign Service positions in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations (OBO), to be hired at the grade of FP-04 (GS-11 equivalent).
None of the positions will be Senior Executive Service.
Question #7. Noting the budget request for embassy construction and
security resources, does the State Department consider the construction
of environmentally friendly, or ``green,'' embassies or consulates to
be of lesser, equal, or greater importance than the physical security
needs of embassies or consulates?
Answer. The Department's No.1 priority consideration for embassy
construction is the safety and security of personnel. The Department
does not consider environmental sensitivity and physical security
mutually exclusive; we strive to design and build facilities that meet
all security standards, incorporate industry best practices, provide
for sustainability, and reflect the best of American architecture,
engineering, technology and construction. The decision to use
sustainable technology includes life-cycle cost analysis which
considers the overall maintenance and operations cost of a building and
the return on investment for the American taxpayer over the long run.
Question #8. Does the State Department consider the construction of
environmentally friendly, or ``green,'' embassies or consulates to have
any strategic or security value?
Answer. The State Department's Greening Initiative is separate from
initiatives to address physical security overseas. Greening initiatives
may enhance security as some may reduce or eliminate dependence on
local utilities. No such initiatives will be undertaken which in any
way undermine the safety and security of our personnel and facilities
overseas.
Question #9. If embassies and consulates can be constructed or
improved for significantly less money by using resources other than
``green'' construction materials, technology, or designs, and save
substantial taxpayers' dollars in the process, will the State
Department commit to doing so? If not, why not?
Answer. OBO is committed to using designs, technologies,
construction methods, and materials that reduce the life cycle cost of
our buildings over its entire useful life. Sometimes this means
spending more initially in order to achieve better performance and
lower expenses long term.
Question #10. Is all $250 million of the FY 2014 Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funding request being dedicated to the construction of the New
Consulate Compound (NCC) in Erbil, Iraq?
Answer. Yes, all $250 million in OCO funding requested under the
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account is for the
Erbil NCC project.
Question #11. If all $250 million of the FY 2014 Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance OCO funding request is being dedicated to
the construction of the NCC in Erbil, Iraq, why isn't Erbil NCC funding
included within the Worldwide Security Upgrades funding amount?
Answer. The Department's FY 2014 Request for OCO funding reflects
the requirements necessary to achieve key national security goals,
which includes supporting a stable, unified Iraq. The Erbil NCC was
identified as a priority project that facilitates the transition
efforts and demonstrates the Department's commitment to the region. The
request to fund the Erbil NCC with OCO is consistent with previous
facility projects in Iraq.
The Department recognizes that this requirement needs to be
addressed outside of the Capital Security Cost Sharing program, which
is funded through ESCM's enduring appropriation for Worldwide Security
Upgrades. The Erbil NCC is analogous to projects previously funded
under Supplemental or OCO appropriations. The request falls within the
``Ongoing Operations'' component of the ESCM OCO appropriation to
clarify that it is not a cost-shared project, avoiding potential
confusion with other agencies and congressional committees. Operation
of the current facility in Erbil is funded through D&CP OCO.
The Department would be happy to discuss this project with you in
the future should you need any additional information or have further
questions on this matter.
Question #12. If all $250 million of the FY 2014 Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance OCO funding request is not being
dedicated to the construction of the NCC in Erbil, Iraq, what are the
plans for the balance of the funding?
Answer. All $250 million in OCO funding requested under the Embassy
Security, Construction, and Maintenance account is for the Erbil NCC
project.
Question #13. What appropriations categories in the FY 2014 budget,
other than the Diplomatic and Consular Programs category authorize use
of funds for the following: (1) additional State Department-employed
security personnel; (2) non-State Department security personnel, such
as nongovernmental security contractors or other temporary security
personnel; and (3) procurement of security vehicles and equipment?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) receives
appropriations noted below to fund State Department-employed security
personnel; non-State Department security personnel such as domestic and
post local guards, personal service contractors, and other third-party
contractor security support personnel; and the procurement of security
vehicles and equipment.
1. Diplomatic and Consular Programs:
a. Worldwide Security Protection (WSP): WSP no-year funding
supports 1,900 security-related positions across 14 bureaus and
at 285 locations. It supports the worldwide local guard
program, high-threat protection, security technology, armored
vehicles, cyber security, information security, facility
protection, and diplomatic couriers. WSP funding also supports
emergency preparedness programs; internal and interagency
collaborations and information-sharing; and medical emergencies
planning in the event of mass casualties from a biological/
chemical attack.
b. Diplomatic Security: Two-year funding supports American
salaries and covers a portion of DS ICASS payments.
c. Iraq Operations: Two-year enduring funding supports
armored vehicles, movement security, static guards, physical
and technical security, regional security operations, training,
and equipment in Baghdad.
d. Office of Foreign Missions (OFM): Funding supports
American salaries and other support costs associated with OFM.
e. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO):
i. Iraq: Two-year OCO funding supports armored
vehicles, movement
security, static guards, physical and technical
security, regional security operations, training, and
equipment in Iraq.
ii. Afghanistan: No-year OCO funding supports armored
vehicles, movement security, static guards, physical
and technical security, regional security operations,
training, and equipment throughout Afghanistan.
iii. Pakistan: No-year OCO funding supports armored
vehicles, movement security, static guards, physical
and technical security, regional security operations,
training, and equipment throughout Pakistan.
2. Border Security Program:
a. Machine Readable Visas (MRV): No-year funding supports
salaries for DS field agents investigating visa passport fraud
and all related support costs.
b. H1B Visas (H&L): No-year funding supports salaries for
Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigators overseas and
all related support costs.
3. Protection of Foreign Missions:
Funding supports reimbursement to New York and other States
that qualify for the extraordinary protection of international
organizations, foreign missions and officials, and foreign
dignitaries (under certain circumstances) throughout the United
States. Covers events such as U.N. General Assembly, G8, etc.
4. Working Capital Fund:
No-year funding provided to DS for the overseas Local Guard
Program as part of ICASS.
In addition to funding for DS, some of our foreign assistance accounts,
such as the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement account, fund
not only program costs but also life support costs for personnel in the
field, including direct hires and contractors. Life support costs
include security.
Question #14. Diplomatic and Consular Programs.--What amount (if
any) of Diplomatic and Consular Programs funding could be applied for
payment of the following: (1) domestic, non-security-related State
Department personnel salaries, (2) domestic, non-security-related State
Department facility construction, (3) domestic, non-security-related
State Department vehicles and equipment? Please express these amounts
in both dollars and a percentage of overall Diplomatic and Consular
Programs spending.
Answer. Approximately $1.1 billion is included in the Diplomatic
and Consular Programs (D&CP) appropriation that could be applied for
domestic, non-security-related salaries. This represents roughly 15
percent of the overall D&CP spending. This amount includes all bureaus
included in the D&CP appropriation except the amounts allocated to the
following: Bureau of Counterterrorism, Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Bureau of Arms
Control, Verification and Compliance, Bureau of Political Military
Affairs, Office of Foreign Missions, Iraq Operations, Afghanistan
Operations, Pakistan Diplomatic Surge, and the Worldwide Security
Protection program.
The Department does not have any funding included in the FY 2014
D&CP request for domestic, non-security-related State Department
facility construction. The Department has allocated D&CP funding in
prior years to the Bureau of Administration for domestic, non-security-
related State Department facility construction.
Approximately $3 million included in the D&CP allocation for the
Bureau of Administration may be applied to domestic, non-security-
related State Department vehicles. This represents roughly 0.4 percent
of the overall D&CP spending.
Approximately $55 million included in the D&CP allocation for all
bureaus using the supplies and material budget category, except amounts
allocated to the following: Bureau of Counterterrorism, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance,
Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Foreign Missions, Iraq
Operations, Afghanistan Operations, Pakistan Diplomatic Surge, and the
Worldwide Security Protection Program, may be applied to domestic, non-
security-related State Department equipment. This represents roughly
0.8 percent of the overall D&CP spending.
Question #15. How does the State Department's budget reflect the
administration's Asia-Pacific rebalancing initiative? Specifically,
where has the administration increased, decreased and/or shifted
resources to achieve its stated objectives to provide more geographic
balance to ``the projection and focus of U.S. power'' in the Asia-
Pacific?
Answer. President Obama made a strategic decision at the outset of
his administration to increase focus on the Asia-Pacific and rebalance
U.S. engagements, activities, and resources toward and within this
vital region. Even as we face budget constraints within the Department
of State and USAID, the fiscal year 2014 budget request reflects this
strategic priority, sustaining key investments made throughout the
President's first term and investing in new initiatives to expand and
deepen a government-wide commitment across the region.
The FY 2014 budget request for the State Department and USAID
provides $1.2 billion in funding for East Asia and the Pacific, which
reflects a 7.1-percent increase from FY 2012 in recognition of the
rebalance. This request directly supports our core regional objectives,
including strengthening ties with our allies, deepening our engagement
with new partners and emerging powers such as China, shaping a robust
regional architecture, expanding trade and investment, and promoting
democratic values.
The FY 2014 Foreign Assistance request expands funding to the East
Asia-Pacific region to $768.3 million, from $715 million in FY 2012,
reflecting a $53.3 million overall increase. This request focuses
assistance to the region in six key areas aligned with core objectives:
(1) regional security cooperation; (2) economic integration and trade;
(3) expanded development in the Lower Mekong region; (4) transnational
health and environmental challenges; (5) democratic development; and
(6) addressing war legacies.
For example, the FY 2014 Foreign Assistance request increases
Foreign Military Financing funding to the Philippines to $50 million,
reflecting an increase of $23 million, to support regional maritime
security. The budget request also provides $31 million to deepen our
support for Burma's political and economic transition, including
support for the key 2015 elections, $5 million for Vietnam in support
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and $13 million in new funds to
expand regional economic and development programs including in
cooperation with multilateral bodies such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), the Lower Mekong Initiative, and the Pacific Islands Forum.
The FY 2014 request also provides an additional $25.9 million in
State Operations to expand our diplomatic platform and PD programs in
the region, including funding to add 24 new domestic and overseas
positions to our existing 1,008 EAP positions in order to fill critical
positions at our embassies and in our regional bureau offices. Ten of
these positions will be Washington-based, while the remaining 14 will
be overseas. The overseas positions are for Burma (three positions),
Australia (three positions), Korea (two positions), Jakarta (ASEAN--two
positions), and one position each in Timor Leste, Vietnam, Brunei, and
New Zealand. In addition, Public Diplomacy will add a position in
Jakarta for the ASEAN Office.
An additional $10 million in public diplomacy funds for the Asia-
Pacific region will expand alumni engagement, English Language teaching
and training, academic advising, and journalist training and journalist
tours. Additional funding would also be used to strengthen digital
outreach with youth audiences in tech-savvy Asia.
Question #16. Does the State Department have the lead for
coordinating all the tools--military, diplomatic, security--of the
Asia-Pacific rebalance? If so, how has the State Department
reprioritized its resources to execute this responsibility?
Answer. Working closely with the White House, the Department of
State coordinates foreign policy for the Asia-Pacific region with
executive branch agencies involved in U.S. foreign affairs, including
the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, and others. In
the Asia-Pacific region, we also enjoy a close, cooperative
relationship with Pacific Command (PACOM), and the Bureau for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs participates in PACOM planning, exercises,
and other events. We closely coordinate our regional strategies with
agencies such as Homeland Security, the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, and the Treasury Department. The Department has taken a
number of actions to align resources with demands associated with its
coordinating function and the broader U.S. rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific region, including the creation of a new Deputy Assistant
Secretary position for Strategy and Multilateral Affairs in 2012. The
FY 2014 State Operations request provides additional resources that
support the Department's expanded coordination role, including new
domestic positions that will provide increased capacity in cyber
security, support for the region's multilateral institutions including
ASEAN, coordination on force posture initiatives, and evaluation of
diplomatic and assistance programs.
Question #17. Do you believe any new interagency structures are
necessary to ensure a strategic ``whole of government'' approach to
achieving U.S. goals and objectives in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. I do not see a need for new interagency structures to
achieve our goals in the Asia-Pacific region. There is currently a
strong interagency collaboration and ``whole of government'' effort in
Washington in support of the administration's Asia-Pacific policy. This
collaboration extends to our overseas missions, where our interagency
country teams, under Chief of Mission authority and leadership,
coordinate U.S. Government efforts. Our whole of government approach is
aligned with the U.S. commitment to the East Asia and Pacific region
and our multifaceted strategy that utilizes the major pillars of our
foreign policy: diplomacy, development, and defense.
Question #18. What new initiatives is the administration planning
to upgrade U.S. diplomatic visibility and presence in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. We are significantly increasing the United States
diplomatic engagement throughout the entire region. My predecessor
began this process and I plan to continue to increase our diplomatic
presence in Asia-Pacific through expanded strategic dialogues, public
diplomacy programs, and the establishment of new positions and offices
at our embassies in the region.
I want to reiterate that this reflects the Obama administration's
policy and is reinforced at the senior levels. In July, I will
participate in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum ministerial meetings in Brunei, demonstrating U.S.
support for strengthened regional institutions. At the fifth meeting of
the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Washington in
July, Treasury Secretary Lew and I will be joined by our Chinese
counterparts for a discussion of challenges and opportunities on a
range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. In August, I will host
the fourth meeting of the U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People
Exchange (CPE). In October, President Obama plans to attend the APEC
summit in Bali, his third East Asia summit in Brunei, and the Global
Entrepreneurship summit in Kuala Lumpur, all of which showcase our
commitment to comprehensive regional engagement.
We have increased our people-to-people engagement with the region
by expanding our educational and cultural exchanges. We have launched
the U.S.-China CPE, the TOMODACHI initiative with Japan, and the
Brunei-U.S. English Language Enrichment Project for ASEAN. With
increased FY 2014 public diplomacy funds we would expand alumni
engagement within the region, English-language teaching and training,
academic advising, and journalist training. Additional funding would
also be used to strengthen digital outreach with youth audiences in
tech-savvy Asia.
We are also increasing our physical presence in the Asia-Pacific
region. In June 2010, the United States became the first non-ASEAN
country to establish a dedicated mission to ASEAN in Jakarta. That
office has expanded to around a dozen U.S. direct hire employees and
locally engaged staff, led by U.S. Ambassador David Carden, whose
mission is to promote U.S. objectives in issues as broad as disaster
relief, maritime security, nonproliferation, and economic cooperation.
This nascent presence allows us to affect and influence policies in
this region of 600 million people. We are committed to maintaining an
embedded presence within both APEC and ASEAN Secretariats to provide
technical assistance to their membership. Last year, we elevated our
diplomatic ties with Burma by exchanging ambassadors. We also
reestablished our USAID mission in Rangoon, reaffirming the United
States commitment to the people of Burma.
The State Department and USAID have expanded development assistance
in a number of areas, setting aside $21 million in FY 2014 as part of a
3-year, $50 million commitment to expand programs supporting the Lower
Mekong Initiative. In FY 2014, the United States also will provide $7
million as part of a 5-year, $32.4 million commitment to programs
focused on climate change adaptation, humanitarian demining, economic
growth, and education in the Pacific Islands. In the Philippines, we
are sponsoring the 5-year Partnership for Growth Program to support
sustained and broad-based economic growth.
In short, the State Department is committed to aligning actions and
resources with our strategic approach toward the Asia-Pacific. As such,
the FY 2014 budget request also provides an additional $25.9 million in
State Operations, which includes funding to add 24 new EAP domestic and
overseas positions to fill critical positions at our embassies and in
our regional bureau offices. The overseas positions are for Burma
(three positions), Australia (three positions), Korea (two positions),
Jakarta (ASEAN--two positions), and one position each in Timor-Leste,
Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and New Zealand. This increase will enhance
our diplomatic platform in the region to tackle key challenges such as
transnational crime and terrorism, North Korea, and supporting human
rights and good governance throughout Asia and the Pacific.
Question #19. Please provide specific details on resources for the
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) Bureau, including staffing at State
Department headquarters and diplomatic posts as well as funds allocated
for bilateral dialogues and multilateral meetings.
Answer. The FY 2014 budget request for the State Department and
USAID provides $1.1 billion in funding for EAP which reflects a 6-
percent increase for EAP from FY 2012.
Increased U.S. Government engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has
resulted in a sharp increase in workforce demands: dealing with the
nuclear threat from North Korea; engaging a rising China; supporting
the historic political and economic transition in Burma; participating
in the East Asia summit; advancing the reposturing of U.S. Forces in
Asia; and expanding U.S. economic and commercial interests. Beyond
these ongoing challenges, EAP has seen a dramatic expansion of visa
demand in China requiring sizable increases in visa operations and the
conversion of the American Presence Post in Wuhan to a full-service
consulate opening in 2014.
To provide the resources necessary to support the Department of
State's rebalance of diplomatic activity to the Asia-Pacific region,
the FY 2014 request for EAP provides an additional $15.7 million in
State Operations funds over FY 2012 to expand our diplomatic platform
and public diplomacy programs, including funding to add 24 new
positions to our existing 1,002 EAP positions. Ten of these positions
will be Washington-based, while the remaining 14 will be overseas. The
overseas positions are for Burma (three positions), Australia (three
positions), Jakarta (ASEAN--two positions), South Korea (two
positions), and one position each in Timor Leste, Vietnam, Brunei, and
New Zealand.
EAP's Washington-based staff levels must be augmented to support
expanding U.S. activity in Asia. With a new mission to the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta, an upgrade of U.S.
relations with Burma, and the rotational deployment of U.S. military
forces to Australia, EAP requires additional staff to manage and
coordinate State Department policies with embassies and other U.S.
Government agencies.
The requested increase in State Operations funds for Diplomatic and
Consular Affairs and Public Diplomacy programs includes an additional
$8.2 million for current operating cost increases. $1.3 million is
requested to support security-driven New Embassy Compound/Consulate/
Annex (NEC) projects and opening the new consulate in Wuhan, China.
These increases are offset, in part, by a $2.5 million reduction in
administrative costs.
EAP spends approximately $1.3 million annually to support
participation in bilateral dialogues and multilateral meetings in the
EAP region.
Question #20. The administration has undertaken efforts to upgrade
our alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. What new
initiatives does the administration envision in the security and
economic spheres in the coming years?
Answer. The United States is an Asia-Pacific nation, and our
presence has underpinned peace and security in the region for
centuries. As the region's importance grows, we must lock in our
investment--diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise--in both the
Asia-Pacific and our future. At the core of our approach is an
understanding that diplomatic, security, and economic relationships in
the Asia-Pacific region cannot be neatly compartmentalized--economic
statecraft, traditional diplomacy, and security engagement go hand in
hand.
Our five treaty alliances--with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK),
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand--are the cornerstone of our
presence and leadership in Asia. These alliances have safeguarded
regional peace and security for the past half century and support the
region's remarkable economic growth. In the case of Japan, we are
advancing our force realignment initiatives, including a reduced U.S.
Marine Corps presence in Okinawa and operational buildup in Guam, as
laid out in the June 2011 and April 2012 2+2 statements. As part of
this process, the Department of Defense recently released a plan for
the consolidation of our military facilities in Okinawa, and the
Japanese Government took important steps toward construction of the
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). By replacing the Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma, the FRF will ease the burden on local communities in
Okinawa. We are also expanding our missile defense cooperation with
Japan by working together to establish a second X-band radar site in
Japan to counter missile threats from the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK). Additionally, we continue to advance security alliance
coordination in the emerging areas of cyber security and space.
This year marks the 60th anniversary of our alliance with the
Republic of Korea. Our cooperation has evolved over the years into a
truly global partnership, and we are working together in places such as
Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off the coast of Somalia. The United
States is committed to the defense of the ROK, and both governments
fully support the modernization of our alliance. Over the next 12
months, we are continuing preparations under the U.S.-ROK Strategic
Alliance 2015 plan to advance efforts to transfer to the ROK wartime
operational control of our joint South Korean forces. Strengthening our
alliance includes both preparing for and deterring North Korean
aggression.
Over the course of the next year, we will also deepen the U.S.-
Australia alliance through continued implementation of our force
posture initiatives, including by gradually augmenting the U.S. Marine
rotational force in northern Australia and increasing U.S. aircraft
rotations and exercises. Additionally, we intend to enhance existing
trilateral engagement with partners such as Japan and expand
cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Building on our successful
counterterrorism partnership with the Philippines, we are expanding our
security engagement to focus on building the Philippines' military and
law enforcement agencies' indigenous capacity in order to address areas
of common interest in maritime security, disaster relief, and
nonproliferation.
As we renew our alliances to meet new demands, we are also working
to build new partnerships throughout the region that can help solve
shared challenges, including with emerging powers like China, India,
and Indonesia. Building a positive, comprehensive, and cooperative
partnership with China is a key component of our Asia-Pacific strategy.
We are advancing capacity-building activities over the next year that
aim to strengthen the United States ability to operate with armed
forces and civilian law enforcement in the Philippines, Thailand,
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and other key partner countries in the
region with a strategic focus on maritime security, disaster relief and
humanitarian response, countering the trafficking of people and illicit
goods, and combating terrorism and violent extremism. Over fiscal years
2012 and 2013, the U.S. Government will also provide $170 million to
support the political and economic transition in Burma.
The Asia-Pacific region is linked primarily by its maritime
environment, which has enabled the region's dynamic growth and
facilitated greater connectivity. We recognize that challenges
including territorial and maritime disputes, piracy, trafficking in
illicit materials and natural disasters can threaten regional peace,
stability, and prosperity. Supporting maritime security in the region
therefore represents an enduring interest for the United States. The
United States has consistently worked with its partners in the Asia-
Pacific region to build capacity and promote cooperation on maritime
security issues. In November last year, President Obama announced the
U.S. intention to accede to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (RECAAP), the
first government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance
cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. We also continue
to strongly support the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF),
established in 2012, to provide a platform for coordination among EAS
countries on a range of maritime issues including marine environment,
resource management, piracy, and capacity-building.
An important initiative that originated from the EAMF is the U.S.-
led Expanded ASEAN Seafarers' Training initiative (EAST), which was
announced by the President and endorsed by leaders at the November 2012
East Asia summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The State Department is
working closely with the Department of Transportion, the lead agency,
to implement this initiative, which will seek to enhance counterpiracy
training and education for seafarers in the region, specifically
focusing on topics that address seafarer safety and welfare, such as
surviving captivity, ransom negotiations, post-capture and release
issues, treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder, and awareness of
cultural and criminal aspects of piracy.
We are also taking steps to elevate our economic engagement in the
region. At the East Asia summit last November, President Obama
announced a new Expanded Economic Engagement initiative with ASEAN as a
complement to our existing Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement.
As a key element of this initiative, the State Department will host a
visit from ASEAN economic ministers to the United States this year to
build capacity around the key areas of focus for E3, which include
business ethics and anticorruption, trade facilitation, investment
principles, and information and communications technology.
The President also announced last November an initiative called the
U.S.-Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership, which cuts across
ASEAN, APEC, and other Asian regional fora to promote sustainable
energy policy and, working with the private sector, to facilitate the
deployment of clean energy technologies in the region. In the coming 12
months, the Partnership's focus will be on completing capacity-building
activities in the areas of markets and interconnectivity, emerging role
of natural gas, renewable and cleaner energy, and sustainable
development.
Question #21. What role do you envision for the State Department in
paving the way for Japanese entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership?
The administration has set a target date for conclusion of the
negotiations of October 2013. Will Japan's entry delay that target
date?
Answer. Japan's entry into this important negotiation will help to
deliver significant economic benefits for the United States, Japan, and
the Asia-Pacific region. With Japan's entry, Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) countries will account for nearly 40 percent of global GDP and
about one-third of all world trade, increasing the agreement's economic
significance and its promise as a pathway toward a Free Trade Area of
the Asia Pacific.
The United States and its TPP partners are determined to
expeditiously complete a comprehensive, next-generation agreement. Our
negotiating team worked hard in bilateral consultations with Japan,
which concluded on April 12, to confirm Japan's readiness to pursue the
high-standard, comprehensive objectives that the TPP countries are
seeking. The administration also focused in these consultations on
ensuring that Japan's participation would not slow down the
negotiations. In response, and in full recognition of the goal shared
among the current TPP countries to conclude the negotiations this year,
Japan has confirmed that it will participate positively and
constructively in the negotiations.
The State Department will continue to play an active role in the
TPP negotiations and in integrating Japan into the regional trade
talks. Officers from U.S. Embassies in member countries and from
Washington participate in formal negotiations, intersessional meetings,
a variety of bilateral side meetings, and the U.S. Trade Policy Staff
Committee to support and complement the work of USTR negotiators by
sharing their country, regional, and technical expertise.
The State Department has personnel with institutional experience on
trade issues and subject matter experts who have spent years working on
World Trade Organization (WTO) issues and other plurilateral and
bilateral negotiations. The Department can provide context on topics
that relate to the larger foreign policy agenda such as state
capitalism, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), labor, the environment, and
anticorruption. The Department's lawyers can also provide key guidance
on general international law issues.
Japan is preparing a large negotiating team to take part in TPP
negotiations. State Department officials, particularly those based at
U.S. Embassy Tokyo, will seek to build contacts with this team at the
working and senior levels in order to help U.S. decisionmakers
understand Japan's negotiating priorities and flexibilities, how Japan
incorporates TPP membership into its broader economic reform plans, and
Japan's efforts to address public concerns regarding sensitive sectors.
Question #22. As you know, China has engaged in aggressive maritime
behavior in the East and South China Seas. While the United States
takes no position on the issues of territorial sovereignty, the
administration has made clear in the past that the United States will
abide by its security commitments. In January, then-Secretary Clinton
made a clear statement on U.S. policy with regard to the Senkaku
Islands, stating ``we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to
undermine Japanese administration.''
Can you reaffirm for the record U.S. support for Japan's
administrative control of the Senkaku Islands?
Answer. The United States urges all parties to avoid actions that
could raise tensions or result in miscalculations that would undermine
peace, security, and economic growth in this vital part of the world.
Our position on this issue is longstanding--we do not take a position
on the question of ultimate sovereignty over the islands and call on
all parties to manage their differences through peaceful means.
The Senkaku Islands have been under Japanese administration since
the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. As I reiterated in Tokyo in April, we
oppose any unilateral or coercive actions that would seek to undermine
Japanese administration.
I would also state, as administration officials have said numerous
times, the Senkakus fall within the scope of article 5 of the 1960
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
Question #23. There is an unprecedented level of exchanges and
dialogues between the United States and China; however, there are
several irritants and challenges in strengthening our bilateral
relationship. Serious obstacles remain on the economic front, including
market access and intellectual property rights.
How can we more effectively harness the framework of the
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to make
progress on these issues?
Answer. The week of July 8-12, Treasury Secretary Lew and I will be
chairing the U.S. side of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED),
along with State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Vice Premier Wang Yang on
the Chinese side. The S&ED enables the United States and China to
expand our collaboration on important strategic and economic issues
while providing a key platform for raising our concerns, such as the
need for progress on economic issues, regional challenges, and human
rights, in a candid and direct manner with China's senior officials.
The United States utilizes bilateral engagement with China,
including through the S&ED, to enhance communication on areas of
concern in the bilateral relationship. For example, the Strategic
Security Dialogue (SSD) established at the 2011 S&ED, has for the first
time provided the United States and China a forum for civilian and
military representatives to discuss strategically sensitive issues in
the relationship, such as cyber security and maritime security.
Building on discussions of cyber policy at the 2012 SSD, the United
States and China have made progress in addressing that issue. When I
visited Beijing, we announced the opening of a new channel for
communication on cyber policy--the Cyber Working Group, under the SSD.
Through the S&ED's economic track, the United States is expanding
opportunities for American firms to export to China by increasing
market access, leveling the playing field, and pressing for greater
transparency. Through the S&ED, the United States is encouraging
China's shift toward consumption-led growth and is seeking economic and
regulatory reform in China aimed at a more open Chinese market for U.S.
goods and services. The S&ED provides an important platform for
strengthening U.S.-China economic and financial cooperation and
understanding so that we can tackle bilateral issues as well as improve
our coordination in addressing global challenges in international fora.
Question #24. The administration has devoted considerable resources
to supporting the political transition in Burma, with significant
congressional support for easing restrictions in response to positive
steps by the Burmese Government. However, there is growing concern here
in Congress that the administration has eased the pressure on the
Burmese Government to demonstrate continued progress on political
reforms, including engaging in a meaningful political dialogue with the
marginalized ethnic groups.
Is the administration still committed to implementing the
``action for action'' model with respect to further engagement
with the Burmese Government and continued easing of
restrictions?
Answer. The United States remains committed to a policy of
calibrated engagement with the Burmese Government with the aim of
ensuring further progress on political, economic, and social reforms.
While we assess that the Burmese Government's commitment to reform is
genuine and that the country has made remarkable progress over the past
2 years, we continue to have serious concerns about human rights, the
role of the military, progress toward national reconciliation, and rule
of law and accountability. We continue to emphasize to the Burmese
Government the need to reach a cease-fire in Kachin State, advance
political discussions with ethnic minority groups, and resolve tensions
and prevent violence in Rakhine State, and the importance of promoting
values of tolerance, diversity, and peaceful coexistence.
The United States engagement with Burma includes steps to match
action with action, recognizing the reforms Burma has undertaken to
date and incentivizing further progress. The guiding principles of the
action-for-action policy have been to support reforms and promote
national reconciliation; build government transparency, accountability;
empower local communities and civil society; and promote value-based
standards for international engagement.
The administration continues to promote these policies and
principles as the fundamentals of Burma's reform. The President's trip
in November 2012 demonstrated the United States resolve to support
Burma in its political and economic reform efforts. On the eve of his
visit, the Burmese Government articulated its commitment to 11 specific
issues covering human rights, political prisoners, ethnic
reconciliation, nonproliferation, good governance, and human
trafficking. These commitments include forming a committee to review
the remaining political prisoner cases; pursuing peace talks with
ethnic minorities; meeting humanitarian needs in Rakhine State and
other conflict affected areas; allowing the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights to open an office in Burma; and facilitating access for
the International Committee of the Red Cross to resume prisoner visits.
The Burmese Government has made notable progress on many of these
commitments. We will continue to press for further progress to ensure
that the Burmese Government upholds its commitments to protect and
promote human dignity and strengthen democratic governance.
Question #s 25-26. Strategic Nuclear Arsenal Reduction.--The
administration has indicated that it is interested in pursuing further
reductions in our strategic nuclear arsenal with Russia later this
year. Section 2573 of Title 22 of the U.S. Code states the following:
``(b) Prohibition: No action shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or
any other Act that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit
the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily
significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the
President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution or unless authorized by the enactment of further
affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.''
Can you assure us that you will honor the law and that any
agreement, formal or informal, with Russia in the field of arms
control based on ``reciprocal unilateral measures'' or
multilateral nontreaty agreements will be submitted to the
Senate? Can you further assure us that it remains
administration policy that the United States will not negotiate
any limitations to our missile defense? Can you assure us that
the Obama administration will not take unilateral action to
reduce the strategic arms or missile defenses of the United
States without consultation and approval from Congress?
What value does the administration place on treaty
compliance? Do you believe that violators should be held
accountable? Is the United States holding violators
accountable? Under what conditions should the United States
engage in ongoing negotiations with parties we know to be in
violation of more than one treaty?
Answer. Having served proudly in the U.S. Senate for 28 years, I
have the utmost respect for the Senate's role in the treaty process. I
am mindful of the language in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and
similar language in other legislation. As always, the administration
will follow the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
Department of State will continue its consultations with the Congress
on arms control and missile defense-related issues.
With respect to missile defense limitations, the President has
consistently made clear that the United States will not accept any
obligations that would limit U.S. missile defense capabilities. As
ballistic missile threats continue to evolve, we cannot place limits or
constraints on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our
partners.
The United States places a very high priority upon verifying
compliance with, and detecting violations of, arms control agreements.
We carefully monitor compliance with arms control agreements in order
to detect and respond to any such violations in an appropriate manner.
Treaty compliance is essential for creating the stability and
predictability that aids international security efforts.
Our national security interests have been and will continue to be
the primary consideration in any future arms control negotiations.
Given the large number of pressing international security issues on the
agenda, it is important to look at the current arms control regimes and
our national security interests comprehensively when considering future
negotiations.
reform to consolidate business and trade promotion
into a single department
Question #27. Please explain why the consolidation of business and
trade-promotion entities, as outlined in your budget request, is
necessary? Are these agencies underperforming in the administration's
view? Could a robust interagency decisionmaking and accountability
process akin to that of PEPFAR serve the same function? If not, why
not?
Answer. This matter is not within the purview of the Department of
State. The Department defers to the Department of Commerce.
Question #28. Do you have any concerns that lumping them all
together could have the unintended effect of undermining their
effectiveness? Can you provide data or assumptions that demonstrate a
gain in effectiveness by a combined department?
Answer. This matter is not within the purview of the Department of
State. The Department defers to the Department of Commerce.
Question #29. The Budget request assumes that ``these changes could
generate approximately $3 billion in savings over the next 10 years,
with roughly half of the savings coming from reducing overhead and
consolidating offices and support functions.'' How did you arrive at
this number? Given the challenges that have been confronted at the
Department of Homeland Security in doing something similar, do you have
any concerns that, given the different missions of these agencies, you
may in fact end up unnecessarily growing the bureaucracy by merging
them together?
Answer. The specific consolidation activities referenced in your
question are with regard to the President's proposal to consolidate all
Business and Trade Promotion into a single Federal Department solely
focused on domestic economic growth, which, as currently proposed, does
not directly involve shifting or consolidating Department of State
bureaus and offices.
However, in the spirit of this consolidation activity, the
Department of State is committed to identifying areas of overlap and
duplication and implementing programs and policies designed to save
American taxpayer dollars.
In accordance with Executive Order 13589, ``Promoting Efficient
Spending,'' in FY 2013 the Department is working toward targeted
spending reductions of $182 million less than that spent in FY 2010 on
travel, supplies, IT devices, printing and reproduction, executive
fleet, and promotional items. Leadership at all of our overseas posts
has been directed to comply with governmentwide mandates to reduce
cost, scrutinize travel, review service contract requests, and hasten
adoption of the top eight savings initiatives for the Department, which
include: Warehousing, Voucher Processing, Utilities, TDY ICASS Cost
Management, Regionalization of Support Services, Furniture Pool,
Expendable Supplies and Local Transportation.
Question #30. In its budget submission, MCC highlighted the
challenge that rising State Department International Cooperative
Administrative Support Services costs have on program support and
implementation in country.
Are increased ICASS costing negatively affecting MCC's
ability to accomplish its goals? Is a similar impact observed
by other agencies, and what processes does the Department have
in place to assess the affect its policies are having in this
area?
Answer. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) currently has a
presence in 18 countries, up from 4 in its first year of operation in
2006. The size of its staff at each MCC post has grown as well, from an
average of 3 staff per post in 2006 to about 5 staff per MCC office
today. MCC has 32 U.S. direct hire employees and about 50 Foreign
Service Nationals (FSNs) located in the 18 countries where they have a
presence.
The total International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
(ICASS) invoice for MCC in 2013 is projected at $3.9 million, up from
$374,000 the first year. As the GAO noted in its recent review of
ICASS, in order to determine if ICASS costs are reasonable, it would be
necessary to compare the actual known cost of ICASS support to the cost
of a hypothetical alternative support platform that a particular agency
would have to fund if the ICASS shared services platform did not exist.
Even where agencies asserted that they could provide services more
cheaply than they pay under ICASS, none of those agencies was able to
supply the GAO with data on the actual cost of such alternative
operations to support this claim.
The Department continues to work with other agency ICASS partners
to promote efficiency and focus on cost savings. Using ICASS governance
mechanisms at both the Executive and working levels, agencies are
invited to provide input on these concerns and are provided an active
role in identifying the size of ICASS operating budgets each year.
Beginning with the Forward Planning process that provides budget
projections to agencies 2 years in advance of each operating year to
enable them to include this information in their own budget
submissions, the Department provides a venue for two-way communications
on both the cost of operations and the impact of these costs on agency
missions. Continuing that engagement, before the start of each fiscal
year, agencies engage with the Department in a process that identifies
the actual ICASS operating funding levels for each mission overseas.
The Department's Bureau of Budget & Planning factors agency concerns
into funding determinations, and weighs their affordability along with
the Department's into recommended funding levels. Also factored into
funding levels are savings from initiatives the Department has launched
to control the growth of costs, initiatives that regionalize, right-
size and further consolidate the overseas management platform. The
final ICASS funding level for each overseas mission each year is
approved by the ICASS Interagency Working Group (IWG) in Washington.
While the cost of management support competes with program
operations for the same scarce dollars, all agencies want assurance
that support for the diplomatic mission is successful. So, in addition
to providing agencies with an active voice in determining ICASS funding
levels, an annual survey is conducted worldwide to assess the opinion
of ICASS customers overseas in its ability to support their missions.
That survey invites customers overseas to rate services on a 5-point
scale, with 5 being the highest rating. This year, more than 54,000
customers: Americans, dependents, and Foreign Service Nationals took
the survey and scored overall services at 4.09 out of 5. The Department
takes the governance aspect of ICASS very seriously, and will continue
to ensure that processes are in place to ensure agency input is
incorporated into the system.
Question #31. Please provide to the committee an explanation of how
ICASS costing is calculated.
Answer. International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
(ICASS) costs are calculated and shared through a Cost Distribution
system. In practice, the cost of ICASS operations is spread to all
customer agencies based on their share of consumption of services as
measured using cost distribution factors. These factors include
headcounts for American personnel, their dependents, and locally
engaged staff, space occupied in embassies and consulates, and unit
counts such as the number of kilometers driven in the motor pool, or
the number of procurement documents processed. Each agency's percentage
share of those factors, on an annual basis, drives the percentage share
of ICASS cost that they pay on their invoices. Using this system, the
share of costs agencies pay relates directly to their relative
consumption of services provided.
Question #32. Please explain how FY14 budget request tracks with
the recent PPD and explain the coherence of this budget request with
other elements of the overall strategy for sub-Saharan Africa. This
should include the interrelation of CIPA, MCA, and other economic and
governance programs as well as those of other U.S. agencies and
international organization budgets.
Answer. The FY 2014 request closely aligns with the Presidential
Policy Directive on sub-Saharan Africa (PPD), which identifies four
pillars of U.S. strategy toward the region: strengthening democratic
institutions; spurring economic growth, trade, and investment;
advancing peace and security; and promoting opportunity and
development. The request identifies the diplomatic and development
resources needed to make meaningful progress in these four key areas.
The PPD underscores the fact that strong, accountable, and democratic
institutions grounded in the rule of law meet with greater success in
generating prosperity and long-term stability, and the request includes
a 12-percent increase over FY 2012 levels in resources committed to
programs that promote and strengthen just and democratic governance.
The U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa reflects the importance
of fostering broad-based, sustainable economic growth through a variety
of measures, including trade and investment. Accordingly, substantial
resources ($884 million) are requested in FY 2014 to support economic
growth, including activities to spur greater agricultural productivity,
expand and revitalize key infrastructure, and boost trade and
investment, among other priorities.
American and African people alike are put at risk by instability
and violent conflict on the continent, as are our diplomatic and
development programs and investments. In line with the PPD's emphasis
on advancing peace and security, roughly 7 percent of the budget
request will support efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict, to
counter terrorism and violent extremism, and to build African security
capacity while promoting healthy civil-military relations and adherence
to democratic norms. In addition, our efforts to advance peace and
security are supported by the Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account, of which over $1.61 billion is
requested in FY 2014 to fund the U.S. share of assessed contributions
for U.N. peacekeeping operations working to address conflicts or post-
conflict situations in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Somalia, Darfur, Southern Sudan, and the Abyei region.
Since the FY 2014 budget request hearings, the U.N. Security Council
has approved a new U.N. peacekeeping operation for Mali, for which
there is no currently identified source of funding.
As in years past, the request also includes significant resources
to support the Global Health, Feed the Future, and Global Climate
Change Presidential Initiatives that seek to promote opportunity and
development by transforming Africa's public health systems,
strengthening its food and nutrition security, and facilitating
climate-resilient development and better management of natural
resources.
The FY 2014 request is a result of close collaboration within the
foreign affairs interagency community. Initial input for the request
comes from our missions in the field and reflects on-the-ground
coordination of all U.S. Government partners under Chief of Mission
authority, including Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) resident
country representatives. From the initiation of budget planning in the
field to the completion of the President's budget request, the Africa
bureaus at State and USAID work hand-in-hand and seek input from and
review by other U.S. Government partners, as appropriate.
The U.S. Government's efforts to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic are
a prime example of this degree of coordination. Through the President's
Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the cornerstone of the
Global Health Initiative, State's Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator
leads an interagency process--including USAID, the Department of Health
and Human Services, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Peace
Corps--in planning and implementing a comprehensive response to HIV/
AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.
Additionally, with respect specifically to the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC), the Secretary of State serves as the organization's
chairperson. The USAID Administrator, along with other principals from
the interagency community, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the
U.S. Trade Representative, and others, serve as MCC board members. This
kind of collaboration and participation ensures that interagency
partners' respective resources are brought to bear in order to advance
common objectives and broader U.S. national interests while increasing
the impact and optimizing the effective stewardship of funds.
Question #33. What is the driving interest of the United States in
its engagement with the continent? How is that strategy affected by the
prioritization of programs that constitute a significant percentage of
the aid to Africa, such as the Global Health Initiative, Feed the
Future, and Global Climate Change funding?
Answer. The driving interests of U.S. engagement in sub-Saharan
Africa are multifaceted and interrelated. They include a desire for
shared peace, prosperity, and development; the advancement of universal
values; and efforts to counter threats to the United States and the
international order. As described in the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-
Saharan Africa, the United States seeks to advance these interests by
prioritizing strong democratic institutions; broad-based economic
growth, including through increased trade and investment; peace and
security; and opportunity and development. The FY 2014 request
identifies the diplomatic and development resources, and associated
programs, needed to make meaningful progress toward all of the
Strategy's goals and the United States broader interests. A majority of
the overall request for sub-Saharan Africa supports Presidential
Initiatives: Global Health, Feed the Future, and Global Climate Change.
These initiatives address critical issues on the continent and are
inherently more resource intensive than programs that advance other
elements of U.S. strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa. Funding for
programs that advance peace and security and democratic governance
continue to be high priorities, as these are important pillars of the
U.S. Strategy. The requested 12-percent increase over FY 2012 levels
for programs that strengthen democratic institutions is indicative of
the importance placed on that priority in line with the U.S. Strategy.
Question #34. What are the central points of agreement regarding
economic growth across Africa and how has the United States adjusted
its economic development and trade policy to achieve improvements in
sub-Saharan Africa? How would you assess the impact of existing
programs such as AGOA, MCA, OPIC/EXIM in enabling greater U.S.
investment and trade with Africa?
Answer. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts sub-Saharan
Africa will experience growth rates over 5 percent in 2013 and that 7
of the world's 10 fastest-growing economies through 2015 will be in
Africa. Africa's growth and its rising middle class offer the U.S.
private sector a new market for its goods and services.
Existing U.S. programs to foster U.S. investment and trade with
Africa have achieved notable results, and we are exploring new
initiatives to further strengthen our trade and investment relationship
with the continent. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has
helped eligible countries grow and diversify their exports to the
United States, create jobs in the United States and Africa, and attract
investment with support from USAID's regional Trade Hubs. Last year,
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) supported a record
amount of private sector investments in Africa, more than $1.7 billion.
And in partnership with the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) and the U.S.
Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), OPIC recently opened an office in
South Africa to promote U.S. private sector investment in clean energy
projects across the continent. The Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) has also strengthened economic growth and opportunities for U.S.
businesses, notably through a focus on improving infrastructure and
regulatory environments, as well as opportunities for U.S. investors
and exporters.
MCC considers $3.2 billion, or 35 percent of its overall assistance
to partner countries, as ``aid for trade.'' While each country's grant
program is different, many MCC partner countries place a high priority
on increasing competiveness and facilitating domestic commerce as well
as regional and international trade. In Africa, MCC has partnered with
14 countries, totaling over $5 billion in compacts, to improve their
capacity for trade by removing internal barriers to trade; building
institutional capacity in areas such as customs and national standards;
developing business skills; and building the transportation, energy,
and other infrastructure needed to enable trade and business expansion
that can propel economic growth.
The 2012 Presidential Policy Directive for sub-Saharan Africa
spurred creation of a new ``Doing Business in Africa'' (DBIA) campaign
to provide support for U.S. companies interested in doing business in
Africa, and it highlights an emerging partnership with the East Africa
Community to support Africa's regional integration and increase U.S.
trade and investment with the region. The DBIA campaign will include
expanding targeted trade missions to Africa and efforts to bring more
African buyer delegations to the United States.
In 2012, State launched the Direct Line Program for U.S.
Ambassadors to provide on-the-ground information about a country's
business climate and opportunities to U.S. companies. U.S. embassies in
sub-Saharan Africa have hosted 13 Direct Line calls to-date. In the
coming months, State will roll out a new online database where U.S.
companies can find timely leads on foreign government procurement
opportunities, including large infrastructure projects.
State and USTR are also continuing efforts to expand the number of
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with sub-Saharan Africa, to
encourage U.S. investment by improving the investment climates,
promoting economic reforms, and strengthening the rule of law. The
United States currently has 6 BITs in force in sub-Saharan Africa out
of a total of 40 worldwide, including the U.S.-Rwanda BIT--the most
recent signed. Negotiations are underway with Mauritius, and
exploratory discussions are being held with Ghana and Gabon as well as
with the East African Community for a regional investment agreement as
noted above under the rubric of the U.S.-EAC Trade and Investment
Partnership.
Question #35. What are the specific metrics for the TSCTP and
PREACT programs and how have they been applied over the last 3-5 years?
What has changed since the most recent Mali experience?
Answer. While Africans in general have not been receptive to al-
Qaeda ideology or tactics, al-Qaeda and other violent extremist groups
actively seek to exploit
weak governance, inadequate service delivery, poor security capacity,
and large ungoverned spaces in West and East Africa. The U.S.
counterterrorism strategy
in Africa focuses on building and sustaining the long-term capacity of
regional partners through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
(PREACT). TSCTP and PREACT are the U.S. Government's multiyear,
multisector programs to help regional partners engage populations at-
risk of extremism, address drivers of radicalization, strengthen border
and customs systems, enhance financial controls, and build law
enforcement and security sector capacity.
Metrics for TSCTP and PREACT programs include output measures such
as the number of host-government officials trained in specific
counterterrorism capabilities and the number of countering violent
extremism programs implemented in a particular country by civil society
and partner governments. We also apply more outcome-oriented
evaluations such as the extent to which those officials demonstrably
operationalize those capabilities and the overall professionalism and
readiness of the host-nation security sector in response to terrorist
threats. U.S. embassies and other U.S. agencies carry out periodic
assessments and site visits to evaluate how effectively partner nations
are utilizing and institutionalizing U.S. counterterrorism training and
equipment. Our embassies and various U.S. agencies also carry out
periodic assessments and surveys to identify drivers of radicalization
and determine the effectiveness of U.S. programs to counter violent
extremism. These assessments help to identify vulnerabilities and best
practices that shape future programming decisions.
With regard to the recent Mali experience, we believe our TSCTP
programming generally has helped our African partners to confront the
threat presented by
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and to prevent AQIM from
establishing a permanent safe haven in northern Mali or the broader
Sahel region. France and select African countries, which received
training and equipment through TSCTP, have dealt significant blows to
AQIM and pushed it out of key strongholds in northern Mali. In order to
consolidate these positive trends, it is essential that Mali restore
democratic governance and address the core economic and political
grievances that AQIM seeks to exploit. We continue to look for ways to
enhance TSCTP programming to better address the evolving threat
environment and establish effective, accountable, democratic security
institutions.
Question #36. What funding sources and programming are TSCTP or
PREACT-specific? What other specific funding mechanisms and programs
are utilized to fund TSCTP and PREACT?
Answer. To ensure a comprehensive, multisector approach, the
Department and USAID use different funding streams to advance the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for
Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) strategic objectives.
The President's Fiscal Year 2014 budget request includes dedicated
funding for TSCTP and PREACT from the following foreign assistance
accounts: (1) Development Assistance; (2) Economic Support Funds (ESF);
(3) Foreign Military Financing (FMF); (4) International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); (5) Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR); and (6)
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In addition to these specific funding
allocations, TSCTP and PREACT may also benefit from other global
counterterrorism funding, for example NADR antiterrorism funds support
regional-focused counterterrorism projects developed by the Bureau of
Counterterrorism's
Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) program. Department of Defense
section 1206 funding may also be used to train and equip foreign
military forces.
Question #37. Why have GAO recommendations from a 2008 report on
TSCTP been accepted by State Department but no action taken to make
improvements? What if any U.S. or partner constraints are there to more
effective programs?
Answer. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
remains the U.S. Government's primary program to support the long-term
capabilities of the countries in West, Central, and North Africa to
address the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
other violent extremist groups. The challenges in this region are
great, and we believe it is critical that TSCTP employ a multifaceted
approach to build partner capacity, strengthen regional cooperation,
and counter violent extremism across the region. The 2008 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report recommended that the U.S. Government
develop a comprehensive strategy for TSCTP with clear goals,
objectives, and milestones, and seek to enhance interagency
coordination. We have made progress in implementing the GAO report's
recommendations. We continue to refine TSCTP's strategy based on
lessons learned and our analysis of the evolving threat environment.
There is strong coordination between interagency partners, program
managers, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and our embassies in the field
to better ensure an integrated approach. We have put in place multiple
coordination mechanisms for TSCTP, including an annual TSCTP
conference, periodic field visits, and regular video-teleconference
calls. The first line of coordination and oversight takes place at our
embassies. While various assessments and inputs from throughout the
interagency inform decisions regarding TSCTP programming, chiefs of
mission must concur with all proposed activities.
Individual TSCTP programs are closely monitored and assessed in the
field and in Washington. U.S. embassies and various U.S. agencies carry
out periodic assessments and site visits to evaluate how effectively
partner nations are utilizing and institutionalizing U.S.
counterterrorism training and equipment. As noted in the referenced GAO
report, establishing institutional metrics for success with our
counterterrorism programming is challenging. Nevertheless, the
interagency continues to explore ways to update our performance
indicators and identify best practices. Our embassies and various U.S.
agencies also carry out periodic assessments and surveys to identify
drivers of radicalization and determine the effectiveness of U.S.
programs to counter violent extremism.
There continue to be considerable challenges to designing and
implementing effective programming. Many members of TSCTP are counted
among the poorest countries in the world and currently lack basic
capabilities to secure their borders, respond to crisis situations, and
respond to aggrieved populations. However, these countries have
demonstrated the essential political will to take responsibility for
their own defense and have sought out long-term engagement with the
United States to build up their capabilities. To the extent possible,
we seek to ensure that TSCTP assistance packages are tailored to fit
the priorities and needs of individual countries. At the same time, we
support regional and subregional initiatives that can strengthen
cooperation and interoperability.
Despite the challenges, the TSCTP approach has proven successful in
Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso, where willing partners have
intensified their efforts to confront the AQIM threat. Due in part to
TSCTP engagements, these countries have increased their limited
capabilities to more effectively monitor, control, and defend their
territories against transnational threats, including terrorism. In
Mauritania, for example, U.S. assistance has enabled military and law
enforcement to deploy and sustain units on its eastern border, in the
extremely austere frontier. Utilizing U.S.-supplied aircraft and
equipment, these units have increased Mauritania's border security and
interdicted terrorists. Similarly, Niger has benefited from U.S.
training and equipment to bolster its efforts to protect its borders
and interdict terrorists attempting to transit through its territory.
In addition to initiatives to bolster the capacities of regional
military and law enforcement, several TSCTP programs aim to enhance
individual and community resilience to the risk of violent extremism.
For example, TSCTP supports educational and training courses in Algeria
and Morocco, and extensive youth employment and outreach programs,
community development and media activities in Mauritania, Senegal,
Niger, and Chad. These programs continue to demonstrate a measurable
effect on factors that correlate to the drivers of violent extremism
such as levels of civic engagement, individual sense of identity, and
perceptions of the use of violence. We continue to look for ways to
make these programs more effective and targeted.
Question #38. The Global Peace Operations Initiative was intended
to create an Africa peacekeeping capacity that would provide responsive
and effective African peacekeepers in 5 subregional formations.
What is the current commitment for FY14 to the GPOI ACOTA
program and what are the longer term goals of sustaining such
train and equip efforts? What is the status of each of the
intended subregional peacekeeping contingents? How have other
nations contributed to this train-and-equip program? To what
extent does this program fail to meet requirements on the
continent? Why?
Answer. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was
established in 2005 to strengthen international peacekeeping
capabilities, with a focus on Africa. Though we have trained African
peacekeepers across the continent, our training has not focused on the
African Union's subregional contingents, which comprise the AU's
Standby Force. The FY 2014 request for the GPOI program is $75M, which
is consistent with the FY 2013 request of $75M. Approximately 60-65
percent of GPOI's annual budget supports peacekeeping capacity-building
activities in African partner countries, with a significant portion of
the remaining funds supporting the deployment of peacekeepers from
other regions to peacekeeping missions on the African Continent.
The long-term goal of our training is African partner militaries
that can excel at critical peacekeeping tasks on the continent. Since
2005, we have established ACOTA partnerships with 25 African countries,
18 with which we are actively engaged in training for peacekeeping
missions and the deployment of the African-Led International Military
Force in Mali (AFISMA) point to the development of this capacity.
Like-minded international donors, including the European Union,
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark, Canada, and Japan provide
individual and unit training, equipment, and advisory assistance for
African military, police, and civilian peacekeepers, as well as support
enhancements to peacekeeping training facilities. The Government of the
Netherlands (GON) has provided the ACOTA program with over $35 million
since 2007.
Challenges to the effectiveness of our training in meeting the
needs of the continent include the increasing demand for peacekeepers
in light of shrinking budgets and the lack of developed institutional
capacity.
Question #39. The U.S. Africa Command is approaching 5 years of
full operational capability and its leadership has been tested in
coordinating for combat in North Africa. It has also expended a great
deal of effort in bilateral security cooperation across the continent.
Assess the degree of coordination and collaboration between
State Department and AFRICOM as it relates to the overall U.S.
bilateral relationships in Africa. What specific
institutionalized venues or policy vehicles exist for such
coordination and collaboration and at what levels? What is
lacking that would improve such coordination and collaboration?
Answer. To ensure a high degree of ongoing coordination and
collaboration between AFRICOM, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint
Staff, and the State Department, AFRICOM and subordinate command have
hosted annual security cooperation planning conferences in addition to
annual planning meetings which take place in the host-nation with host-
nation input. Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission, in coordination
with Senior Defense Officials stationed at the embassies and with
AFRICOM staff members, ensure that all military activity (e.g.,
military senior leader visits, military exercises) supports overarching
bilateral political objectives. Interagency working groups have
addressed specific topics (i.e, Mali, Global Security Contingency
Fund).
To improve upon the effectiveness of AFRICOM/State Department
coordination and collaboration, interagency planning needs to continue
to focus on establishing enduring, sustainable programs with long-term
effects that address areas of mutual interest and concern. Host-nations
and U.S. embassies have a finite capacity to absorb military activity;
thus, all the more reason to ensure the effectiveness of AFRICOM
programs.
Question #40. Who is responsible for AFRICOM activities in a given
mission? How is the Chief of Mission informed of AFRICOM activities and
plans?
Answer. The Ambassador, or chief of mission, is responsible for
approving all AFRICOM activities in his/her country of assignment. A
full-time senior defense official, posted to most embassies, keeps the
chief of mission informed of planned activities and the effects of past
activities. The senior defense is responsible for implementing
activities in close coordination with the interagency embassy country
team.
Question #41. What are the greatest concerns and what are
considered most valuable in relation to AFRICOM activities by the State
Department, USAID, Chief of Mission, and host country officials?
Answer. AFRICOM is an important partner in advancing our strategic
objectives and partnerships in Africa, including building the capacity
of our partner nation militaries, reinforcing norms like respect for
human rights and civilian control of the military, and reinforcing our
relationships and cooperative efforts with international and regional
institutions in Africa. Both the Department of State and USAID work
closely with AFRICOM as it plans and develops its new initiatives and
programs. In doing so, we seek to ensure that as we implement the
administration's Africa policy, we properly balance the use of
diplomatic, development, and security assistance tools to achieve our
national objectives and assist our African partners to increase and
maintain peace and stability in Africa.
AFRICOM's most valuable role on the continent is helping to build
more professional, effective defense institutions that respect human
rights and civilian control of the military. For instance, AFRICOM has
played a critical role in the efforts to build professional defense
institutions in post-conflict states like Liberia. AFRICOM participates
in the Department of State's Africa Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance program through the provision of military mentors and
trainers, and has provided specialized counterterrorism training and
equipment to peacekeepers deploying to Somalia under the section 1206
authority. AFRICOM has also provided a critical role in training troops
in the Sahel region to address the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb as part of the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership program. AFRICOM also has provided advice and assistance to
Ugandan and regional African forces pursuing the Lord's Resistance
Army. Finally, AFRICOM is also helping to build the capacity of African
states to secure their maritime domains through programs like Africa
Partnership Station, which furthers important U.S. strategic interests
like Freedom of Navigation, protecting free trade routes, and
inhibiting piracy and other crimes at sea.
Question #42. The United Kingdom recently conducted a study and
found that a number of U.N. organizations were providing poor value for
money. In light of this study, what are the top three U.N.
organizations the United States currently funds that provide the least
value for our investment? Is this funding a result of a congressional
earmark or does State provide the funding voluntarily?
Answer. The Department receives two appropriations for
International Organizations through two budget accounts: (1)
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) and (2)
International Organizations and Programs (IO&P). The CIO account
provides funds for U.S.-assessed contributions to 45 international
organizations. The IO&P account provides for voluntary contributions to
a limited number of international organizations to accomplish
transnational goals (e.g., safeguarding international air traffic) or
to multiply the effect of U.S. assistance through support for
international programs.
The CIO account funds U.S. obligations to international
organizations pursuant to a treaty, convention, or U.S. law. As part of
the preparation of our annual budget process, the Department reviews
how U.S. participation furthers one or more of the strategic goals
outlined in the ``Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review'' (see
FY 2014 Congressional Budget Justification at http://www.state.gov/s/d/
rm/c6112.htm). Comparing the relative value of each organization is
problematic, given the variety of evaluative criteria that would apply
across this diverse set of organizations. Further, U.S. participation
in each of these organizations has strong support from numerous U.S.
Federal agencies and private sector entities that rely on these
organizations to advance U.S. objectives abroad. The Department
addressed this challenge as part of its Report to Congress on the
``Review of U.S. Membership in International Organizations,'' submitted
in June 2012. We have attached the report for your review and
consideration (see attachment below).
The United States uses the provision of voluntary contributions,
via the IO&P account, to seize opportunities to take a leadership role
in areas of critical interest to the United States, such as gender
issues, environmental issues, and humanitarian aid. In this way, the
United States can multiply the influence and effectiveness of its
support in targeted areas.
Further, under the United Nations Transparency and Accountability
Initiative (UNTAI), the Department targets areas where member states
can increase oversight and accountability and ensure that contributions
are utilized efficiently and effectively. The United States has long
led the charge on U.N. management reform, and we will continue to
advocate for budget discipline, program prioritization and efficiency,
and oversight.
ATTACHMENT TO ABOVE RESPONSE
Report to Congress
review of u.s. membership in international organizations
This report was prepared and is being submitted in accordance with
the joint explanatory statement (H. Rept. 112-331) accompanying the
Department of State Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2012 (Div. I, P.L. 112-74), which requests that the
Department of State ``conduct a review of United States membership in
each international organization supported by [the Contributions to
International Organizations] account and prioritize the United States
participation in, and funding for, each organization in accordance with
United States policy goals. The review should also include any recent
reforms the organizations have taken to increase transparency and
accountability'' and provide the results of the review.
Funding for the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)
account currently enables U.S. participation in 44 international
organizations (IO) that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in every
region of the world. International organizations facilitate collective
action by the world community. By combining resources and expertise,
international organizations can undertake coordinated multilateral
efforts and be an effective alternative to acting unilaterally or
bilaterally, especially in the areas of providing humanitarian
assistance, eradicating disease, setting food and transportation safety
standards, addressing nuclear proliferation and reaching agreement to
impose sanctions on rogue states and actors.
The Administration's commitment to strengthening and working
through international organizations to jointly address shared
challenges is laid out in the National Security Strategy as a vital
instrument of diplomacy and foreign policy.
Prioritization
Participation in IOs has strong support from U.S. federal agencies,
Congress and private sector entities that rely on these IOs to advance
their objectives abroad. The justification for continued membership in
each IO is the product of a collaborative effort between the U.S.
Department of State and other agencies that send delegations to
represent the United States in these bodies and otherwise take
advantage of opportunities to promote U.S. interests at these
organizations. The agencies that participate in these IOs include the
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce,
Agriculture, Transportation, Labor, Education, Interior, and Health and
Human Services, among others.
Each IO advances one or more of the following strategic goals (SG)
outlined by the Secretary of State in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review:
SG 1--Counter threats to the United States and the
international order, and advance civilian security around the
world.
SG 2--Effectively manage transitions in the frontline
states.
SG 3--Expand and sustain the ranks of prosperous, stable and
democratic states by promoting effective, accountable,
democratic governance; respect for human rights; sustainable,
broad-based economic growth; and well-being.
SG 4--Provide humanitarian assistance and support disaster
mitigation.
SG 5--Support American prosperity through economic
diplomacy.
SG 6--Advance U.S. interests and universal values through
public diplomacy and programs that connect the United States
and Americans to the world.
As part of the preparation of our annual budget request for the CIO
account, the Department reviews how U.S. participation in each IO
furthers U.S. policy goals. Specifically, in our FY 2013 Congressional
Budget Justification (CBJ) (http:// www.
state.gov/documents/organization/156215.pdf), we describe how each IO
is linked to the Department's strategic goals. Continued participation
in each of these 44 IOs has been determined to be in the national
interest and contributes to U.S. strategic priorities.
U.S. membership and participation in, as well as contribution to,
any individual international organization varies by size, scope, and
mission. Because of these various factors, conducting a comparison of
the relative value of each organization is subjective. For example, the
U.S. assessed contribution to the World Health Organization (WHO),
which works to eradicate diseases and address health issues, is $109
million. ln contrast, the U.S. assessed contribution to the
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), which focuses on
sustainable development of tropical forests with a far-reaching impact
on sustaining the U.S. wood products industry, biological diversity,
and conservation of a dwindling resource, is about $300 thousand.
Although the U.S. contributions to these two international
organizations are markedly different, U.S. participation in them
remains a priority.
It should be noted that over the years, the United States has
withdrawn from membership in IOs for a variety of reasons and after
consultation with stakeholders and partners. As recently as last year,
the United States withdrew its membership in the International Rubber
Study Group (IRSG), in which the United States had been a member since
its inception in 1946. ln assessing impact of possible U.S. withdrawal
from the IRSG, in 2009 and 2010, the Departments of State and Commerce
sought views from agencies with potential interests in maintaining our
participation. None of the agency partners expressed concern over
withdrawal. The Department of Commerce also sought views from industry
and trade associations that participated in the IRSG and did not
receive broad expressions of support for maintaining U.S. membership in
the Group. Going back further, the U.S. withdrew our membership in the
International Office of the Vine and Wine in 2001 and in the Inter-
American Indian Institute in 2000. The United States withdrew from
these IOs either because of an unclear purpose and function or waning
ability to address U.S. concerns.
Reforms
The Department of State has spearheaded reforms to improve
efficiency and responsiveness at the U.N. and other IOs through the
U.S.-sponsored United Nations Transparency and Accountability
Initiative (UNTAI). Phase I of UNTAI was launched in 2007 for the
purpose of extending reforms already in place at the U.N. Secretariat
to the rest of the U.N. system. As a result, many U.N. organizations
have strengthened internal oversight and transparency, established
ethics offices, made more information publicly available online, and
updated financial systems.
In 2011, the Department of State worked with the U.N. to launch
UNTAI Phase II (UNTAI-II) to target further areas where member states
can increase oversight and accountability and ensure that contributions
are utilized efficiently and effectively. Specifically, UNTAI-II seeks
to make reforms in the following areas:
(1) effective oversight arrangements; (2) independent internal
evaluation function; (3) independent and effective ethics function; (4)
credible whistleblower protections; (5) conflicts of interest program;
(6) efficient and transparent procurement; (7) enterprise risk
management; and (8) transparent financial management.
The Department of State assesses IOs' progress annually. Initial
assessments under UNTAI-II took place in late 2011 and show that most
U.N. organizations continue to make progress on oversight and ethics
reforms. These assessments also indicate that reforms of internal
evaluation, procurement, and risk management, which are new goals under
Phase II, are still in their early stages, but work is ongoing.
Specific examples are as follows:
The U.N. is implementing the following management reforms to
promote accountability and transparency: (1) adoption of International
Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS); (2) strengthening of
internal controls related to the U.N's procurement systems; (3)
improvement in the training program for procurement officers; and (4)
establishment of an independent bid protest system.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is in the process of
implementing the recommendations of the Independent External Evaluation
(IEE), released in 2007 and approved by FAO's members in 2008. In terms
of management, the IEE recommended reform of human resources, ethics,
finance, reporting structures, and organizational cultural change.
In 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implemented
the first phase of a new Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system,
partly financed with extra budgetary contributions from the United
States. The organization's first IPSAS compliant financial statements
were issued in December 2011.
International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO is implementing key
budget and management reforms, including adopting an ethics framework
with whistleblower protections fully implementing International Public
Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS); and drafting risk registers related
to Enterprise Risk Management.
International Labor Organization (ILO) introduced a new pilot
procedure to rigorously track evaluation recommendations, a system of
follow-up audits to vetify management action to implement
recommendations, and new procurement rules and procedures to bring ILO
closer in line with other U.N. organizations. ILO is also establishing
the Independent Oversight Advisory Committee as a permanent advisory
committee to the ILO governing body and updating its terms of reference
in the process.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) Council recently
adopted an internal audit disclosure policy by which member states can
request access to internal audit reports from the Head of Internal
Oversight Services.
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) recently implemented
several management reforms, including establishing an independent audit
committee; adopting policies on financial disclosure and whistleblower
protections; and adopting results-based budgeting to link resources to
operational plans.
The U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
received approval from the General Conference to begin implementing the
first phase of the decentralization strategy, which aims to streamline
the field network and encourage greater collaboration among field
offices. UNESCO has also begun to implement a new human resources
management strategy for 2011-2016: which is comprised of three core
objectives: improve the delivery capacity of UNESCO, strengthen the
field presence, and human resources planning.
In 2011, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) Council of Administration
(CA) adopted proposals to outsource the functions of the UPU
Secretariat's ethics officer to another U.N. specialized agency and the
work of its internal auditor to a multinational accounting firm and
approved plans by the Secretariat to seek the services of an ombudsman
from an outside source. The Secretariat produced administrative
instructions on whistleblower protection and harassment prevention.
WHO convened a special session of the Executive Board to address
organization-wide reform, including streamlining of recruitment/
selection processes, improving performance management processes,
implementing a mobility and rotation framework and enhancing staff
development. WHO developed a comprehensive and integrated risk
management approach for its administrative functions.
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) implemented IPSAS,
adopted an independent audit committee, approved a risk management
policy, and developed a new integrated budget model. WMO is requiring
financial disclosure by all senior officials with fiduciary
reponsibilities; formalizing a process to select an External Auditor;
filling the role of ethics officer; and implementing a program
monitoring and evaluation plan.
Organization of American States (OAS) established a working group
on the review of OAS programs to assess its programs, general standards
budget, income sources, and mandates. OAS is continuing its work to
institute a results-based budget based on a thorough review of Member
States' priorities to demonstrate results; modify the indirect cost
recovery policy; address building repairs, fundraising and increasing
transparency in hiring/promoting staff; and strengthen the inspector
general functions.
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) focused on
strengthening its ethics office, which also acts as the coordinator for
PAHO's Integrity and Conflict Management System, oversees the ethics
help line, and serves on the Standing Committee on Asset Protection and
Loss Prevention. ln addition, the Director has initiated changes to the
criteria for selecting a chair for the Board of Appeal, which resulted
from a comprehensive review of PABO's Integrity and Conflict Management
System.
Also, in our FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification, the
Department included details about recent accomplishments, priorities
and reforms for each of the 44 IOs funded by the CIO account, along
with the principal partners and benefits of each organization.
Question #43. Over the past 10 years, the U.N.'s International
Civil Service Commission (ICSC) has recommended salary increases for
New York-based U.N. employees above the margin for which they are
calculated.
Considering member states, including the United States, have
had to freeze salaries for civil service employees, what action
has the administration taken to oppose increases in U.N.
employees' salaries? Additionally, what action has the
administration taken to urge the ICSC to clarify and publish
the assumptions regarding how salary adjustments are calculated
for the purposes of transparency and accountability?
Answer. The United States has led a vigorous effort to control
staff salaries at the United Nations. Due to lobbying by the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations (USUN), the Fifth Committee approved the
first-ever pay freeze for New York-based U.N. professional staff from
August 1, 2012-January 31, 2013, despite intense opposition by some
countries.
The United States has also led the charge to clarify the complex
methodology that the United Nations uses to set and adjust U.N.
salaries and benefits. Due to lobbying by USUN and other member states,
the Fifth Committee requested the International Civil Service
Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the U.N. compensation
package and the underlying methodology behind it. The intent of this
review is to recommend to the General Assembly what is needed to
attract and retain talent while taking into account that U.N.
organizations face financial constraints and will recommend ways to
streamline the methodology to make it more clear and accountable to
member state oversight.
Question #44. What is the total request for funding for global
climate change programs in the Function 150 Account? What is the
breakdown by agency?
Answer. The President's FY 2014 Budget requests $836.6 million for
the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI), of which $481 million
would be programmed through the Department of State and USAID and
$355.6 million would be programmed through the Department of Treasury.
Question #45. In what ways are the Department of State and USAID
conducting climate change programs or initiatives that are duplicated
by multilateral organization to which we contribute, including the
United Nations and its affiliated agencies? Please provide a
description of each multilateral program to which we contribute for
these purposes, the U.S. funding level, and the percentage of total
funding that the U.S. contribution comprised.
Answer. The United States provides support to multilateral
organizations to accomplish goals where solutions to problems can best
be addressed globally. Climate change is one of these areas. U.S.
support to multilateral organizations for climate change work advances
U.S. strategic goals by increasing coordination with and leveraging
resources from other countries. The Department of State, USAID, and the
Department of Treasury coordinate closely to ensure the coherence of
international climate programming. Working together through the Global
Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) enhances our ability to design
bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral programs that are
complementary to and nonduplicative of efforts underway through
multilateral channels. Both the Department of State and the Department
of Treasury fund climate work through multilateral organizations.
department of state
The Department of State provides funding to the following
multilateral programs in support of U.S. climate change objectives:
1. Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change
Fund (SCCF)
For FY 2014, the Department of State plans to use the $34 million
requested for Adaptation for the Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) to maintain support for
climate adaptation through the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)
and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). The Global Environment
Facility (GEF) operates the LDCF, with the World Bank as Trustee for
the fund. The GEF develops its projects through 10 implementing
agencies: the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), the U.N. Environment
Program (UNEP), the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization,
and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization. The LDCF supports the
49 least-developed countries, which are especially vulnerable to the
adverse impacts of climate change, in responding to urgent adaptation
needs in key development sectors. The SCCF also assists countries in
implementing adaptation measures that increase the resilience of key
development sectors to the adverse impacts of climate change; however,
the SCCF is accessible to all developing countries, including non-LDC
small island developing states and glacier-dependent countries.
Both funds have concentrated on sectors that are particularly
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as agriculture and
water. U.S. support for these funds helps increase the number of
projects funded and enables countries to integrate adaptation into
larger development programs that address multiple sectors and are
therefore anticipated to result in more substantial and long-lasting
resilience to severe climate risks. Depending upon the performance and
speed of disbursements by these two funds and other needs, some portion
of this request may support other adaptation programs.
Since FY 2010, the United States has contributed $55 million to the
LDCF or nearly 11 percent of the total and $30 million to the SCCF or
nearly 14 percent of the total.
2. Incentivizing Sustainable Landscapes
The Department of State also plans to provide a portion of the $10
million requested in FY 2014 for Sustainable Landscapes funding
implemented through the World Bank for OES to a multilateral fund to
support reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in
developing countries (REDD+). World Bank funds that may be considered
for U.S. assistance include the BioCarbon Fund, the Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPF), or the Forest Investment Program (FIP).
The BioCarbon Fund supports projects that sequester or conserve
carbon in sustainable forest and agroecosystems. The FCPF provides
incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions through forest
conservation and restoration as part of REDD+. The FIP supports
developing country efforts to reduce deforestation and forest
degradation and promote sustainable forest management as part of REDD+
implementation. All three funds focus on programs that generate
significant additional benefits, including water resource protection,
biodiversity conservation, and livelihood generation.
Multilateral sustainable landscapes programming complements
bilateral efforts and enables the United States to leverage significant
additional funding from other donors, facilitate larger programs,
generate access to additional expertise, and support critical fora for
capacity-building for policymakers, stakeholders, and practitioners
working to implement sustainable land use programs on the ground.
3. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
The FY 2014 request also includes $13 million for the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The IPCC reviews and assesses
the most recent scientific, technical, and socioeconomic information
relevant to the understanding of climate change. It does not conduct
any research nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters.
The U.S. contribution to the IPCC in 2012 amounted to approximately $2
million or 22 percent of the total. The UNFCCC Secretariat is charged
with supporting the operation of the international climate treaty
framework. U.S. support includes contributions to the work of the
Adaptation Committee. The United States contributed nearly $6.9 million
to the UNFCCC in 2012. This figure is 21 percent of the total.
Department of State funding also will support efforts to unlock low-
carbon energy investments in developing countries and to enhance
coordination and cooperation among countries and international programs
to advance low-carbon growth. Funding for the IPCC, the UNFCCC and
related bodies supports diplomatic and scientific efforts necessary for
international consensus and action.
4. Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund
The FY 2014 request includes $25.5 million for the Montreal
Protocol Multilateral Fund. The Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund is
an effective mechanism for large-scale reductions of the world's most
potent greenhouse gases. The main objective of the fund is to assist
certain developing country parties to the Montreal Protocol in
complying with the control measures of the Montreal Protocol, which
aims to reverse the deterioration of the ozone layer. As at November
30, 2012, U.S. contributions for 2011 to the Montreal Protocol
Multilateral Fund amounted to $29.3 million or nearly 22 percent of the
total.
department of treasury
The Department of Treasury provides funding to the following
multilateral programs in support of U.S. climate change objectives:
1. Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Department of State assistance is complemented by the Treasury
Department request for support of sustainable landscapes and clean
energy activities through the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The
GEF is the largest funder of projects to benefit the global
environment, providing grants to address issues of biodiversity, clean
energy, sustainable landscapes, oceans, land degradation, and
chemicals. The GEF supports innovative, cost-effective investments that
can be replicated and scaled up by the public and private sectors. The
FY 2014 request by the Department of Treasury includes approximately
$143.8 million for the GEF, of which 50 percent--or approximately $71.9
million--is attributable to the Global Climate Change Initiative.
Since 1991, the GEF has allocated $10.5 billion, supplemented by
more than $51 billion in cofinancing, to fund more than 2,900 projects
in 168 developing countries. The United States pledged $575 million
over 4 years for the Fifth Replenishment of the GEF. Our cumulative
unpaid commitments to the GEF totaled $229 million at the end of FY
2012, the largest of any donor.
2. Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)
Department of State support for multilateral organizations is also
complemented by the Department of Treasury's support for the CIFs. The
United States has pledged a total of $2 billion to the CIFs, which
include the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund
(SCF). The World Bank serves as trustee for the CTF and the SCF. The FY
2014 request by the Department of Treasury includes $215.7 million for
the CTF and $68 million for the SCF.
A. Clean Technology Fund (CTF)
The CTF targets 18 emerging market countries with rapidly growing
energy demand, including Mexico, Turkey, India, and South Africa. The
CTF supports U.S. economic, national security, and environmental
objectives by incentivizing countries to deploy renewable energy and
clean transport and to increase energy efficiency throughout the
economy by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, enhancing energy
security, and opening up new markets for green technologies. The CTF
trustee reports that, as of December 2012, nine donors had pledged a
total of $4.9 billion to the CTF. FY13 appropriations of $175.3 million
will shortly be transferred to the CTF, bringing cumulative U.S. CTF
payments to approximately $889 million (or 21 percent of the total
payments). The United States is the only donor that has not yet
contributed its full pledge amount.
B. Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)
The SCF is funded by donor pledges of $2.4 billion and is comprised
of three programs: The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)
works with 19 countries to increase their resilience to the
environmental drivers of instability; the Program for Scaling-Up
Renewable Energy in Low-Income Countries (SREP) helps eight countries
use renewable energy to expand energy access, stimulate economic
growth, and reduce vulnerability to energy shocks; and the Forest
Investment Program works with national governments, the private sector,
indigenous people, and local communities in eight countries to reduce
deforestation and forest degradation. SCF funds benefit the United
States by providing a single channel to promote diverse solutions to
myriad challenges faced by 33 countries that struggle to balance
economic growth and environmental pressures. The SCF trustee reports
that, as of December 2012, 13 donors had pledged approximately $2.3
billion to the SCF. FY 2013 appropriations of approximately $47.4
million will shortly be transferred to the SCF, bringing cumulative
U.S. SCF payments to approximately $247 million or 12 percent of total
payments. The United States is the only donor that has not yet
contributed its full pledge amount.
Question #46. What appropriations categories in the FY 2014 budget,
other than the Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs category,
authorize any use of funds for education programs or opportunities,
including (but not limited to) the following: (1) Programs that cover
the expenses of visiting foreign nationals or other cultural exchange
programs, and (2) U.S. citizen or foreign national scholarships? What
is the Department doing to reduce or eliminate the duplication of
effort for these activities in other Departments and consolidate this
activity to reduce cost and eliminate waste?
Answer. Educational programs for visiting foreign nationals, as
distinct from cultural exchange programs, can be funded with a number
of different appropriations categories in the FY 2014 budget, including
Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Fund (ESF), International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and Nonproliferation,
Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Activities (NADR). In all such
cases, the visiting foreign nationals would be participating in an
educational program designed to accomplish a specific foreign
assistance goal authorized by the appropriation used. Unlike programs
providing an educational benefit in support of a foreign assistance
program, cultural exchange programs are funded exclusively from the
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs account.
Scholarships for foreign nationals can be funded from an
appropriate foreign assistance account. ESF and DA funds can be used to
fund the education of foreign nationals at universities or community
colleges, either in their home countries, third-countries, or in the
United States. In addition, INCLE funds might be used to fund a study
tour for foreign prison officials to learn best practices in prison
management. In such cases, the educational advancement of the foreign
national supports the broader educational goals for the foreign
country. Scholarships for U.S. citizens to study in a foreign country
would be funded with Educational and Cultural Exchange funds, as
scholarships for U.S. citizens do not generally support a foreign
assistance goal. In limited circumstances, when it has been determined
that a U.S. citizen's activities would be directly contributing toward
a foreign assistance goal in the foreign country during his or her
tenure there, Economic Support Funds have been used to provide
fellowships or other funding to U.S. citizens who may receive some type
of academic credit for their overseas activities.
Bureaus and embassies interested in providing educational programs
in the United States for foreign nationals to further a foreign
assistance purpose frequently coordinate their efforts with the
Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau in order to capitalize on that
Bureau's expertise in exchanges.
Question #47. What percentage of Educational and Cultural Exchange
Programs funding is disbursed directly to foreign governments or
international nongovernmental organizations to distribute for
educational or cultural purposes? Please provide a list of each
disbursement for the past 5 years including recipient's name, total
funding, purpose of the funding, performance targets and baselines, and
whether or not the targets were met.
Answer. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) does
not disburse Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs funding
directly to foreign governments or international nongovernmental
organizations to distribute for educational and cultural purposes. ECA
awards grants and cooperative agreements only to U.S. public and
private nonprofit organizations meeting the provisions described in
Internal Revenue Code section 26 U.S.C. 501( c )(3) to support
educational and cultural exchanges.
Question #48. Can the State Department use any other
appropriations, other than those provided via the Educational and
Cultural Exchange Programs category, to fund any domestic or
international educational and cultural exchange programs? If the answer
is yes, please identify the source(s) and then provide the amount(s)
both in dollars and as a percentage.
Answer. Educational exchange programs for visiting foreign
nationals, as distinct from cultural exchange programs, can be funded
with a number of different appropriations categories in the FY 2014
budget in addition to the Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs
account, including Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Fund
(ESF), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Activities
(NADR). In all such cases, the visiting foreign nationals must be
participating in an educational program designed to accomplish a
specific foreign assistance goal authorized by the appropriation used.
ESF and DA funds can also be used to fund the education of foreign
nationals at universities or community colleges, either in their home
countries, third countries, or in the United States. Unlike programs
providing an educational benefit in support of a foreign assistance
program, cultural exchange programs are funded exclusively from the
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs account.
In FY 2014, we are requesting $221.9 million for higher education
activities via the DA, ESF and the Middle East and North Africa--
Incentive Fund (MENA-IF) accounts. These programs are essential to our
efforts to foster and improve the quality, contributions and
accessibility of higher education in developing countries. I am happy
to have my staff talk to your staff in more detail about what types of
programs that funding supports.
Question #49. Are any current Educational and Cultural Exchange
Programs funds being used to fund scholarships or provide other
financial benefits for individuals who are illegally present in the
United States? Does the Department vet participants according to their
legal status in the United States?
Answer. No Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs funds are
used to provide scholarships or other benefits to individuals who are
illegally present in the United States. U.S.-based participants are
required to obtain valid travel documents in advance of their exchange
programs, which individuals illegally present in the United States
cannot do.
Question #50. What appropriations categories in the FY 2014 budget,
other than the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
category, authorize use of funds for the following: International drug
enforcement efforts (including related training); non-drug-related
international law enforcement support (including related training); for
international judicial system support and development (including
related training); international anticrime efforts (including related
training); and international drug enforcement efforts (including
related training)?
Answer. The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) account is authorized to fund assistance for counternarcotics
and other anticrime programs. In addition, however, other foreign
assistance accounts may have broad mandates that would allow those
funds to be used for certain of these types of activities. Thus,
accounts such as Development Assistance (DA) funds and Economic Support
Funds (ESF) can also be used to provide assistance to develop foreign
government capacities, including in the area of rule of law, judicial
system support, and certain, limited law enforcement activities (such
as community policing programs). The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
program funded under the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR) account is authorized to provide assistance to
enhance the capacity of foreign law enforcement forces to combat
terrorism.
Question #51. What amount (if any) of International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement funding will be dedicated specifically to
the following: non-drug-related international law enforcement support
(including related training), international drug enforcement efforts
(including related training), international judicial system support and
development (including related training), and international anticrime
efforts (including related training)? Please express this amount in
both dollars
and a percentage of overall International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement spending.
Answer. The total FY 2014 International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) request is $1.47 billion. Of this amount, $582
million, or 40 percent of the request, is related to international
judicial system support and development (with Afghanistan accounting
for $337 million or 58 percent of this portion of the request,
specifically in the area of rule of law and human rights); $472
million, or 32 percent, is related to international drug enforcement
efforts; $331 million, or 23 percent, is related to non-drug-related
international law enforcement support; $67 million, or 5 percent, is
related to international anticrime efforts. All training related to
each category is included in these estimates.
Question #52. Are any of the nongovernmental organizations that
receive International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding
required to submit performance metrics or other performance data to the
State Department or any other Federal agency in order to continue to be
eligible for subsequent funding?
Answer. Yes, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funding are required
to submit performance metrics or other performance data. These
reporting requirements are outlined in the grant with an NGO or
indirectly through interagency agreements (IAAs). Under such an
agreement, the IAA partner may fund an NGO for services to implement
the interagency agreement. Submission of required reports and
performance metrics are key factors in the determination of whether or
not to continue the grant or agreement.
Question #53. What is the State Department's position with respect
to preserving more traditional forms of broadcasting, such as shortwave
radio transmissions, given that many of the poorest parts of the world
that are most in need of freedom broadcasting rely on shortwave
technology and may not have access to Internet technology or social
media resources?
Answer. We believe that the U.S. international media effort needs
to utilize a range of communication technologies in order to most
effectively inform and engage foreign audiences. Shortwave radio
transmission should be considered as one option where appropriate,
along with other radio broadcasting techniques, television broadcasts,
and digital engagement via the Internet and social media channels.
The FY 2014 budget proposal for the Broadcasting Board of Governors
(BBG) maintains shortwave service to high-priority target areas where
shortwave transmissions will continue to be important to satisfy BBG
mission requirements. Shortwave radio broadcasts would continue in many
regions that lack access to digital technologies, including North
Korea, Darfur, and Tibet. The BBG budget proposal also builds upon the
agency's efforts to evolve international broadcasts in places where
shortwave is no longer popular, by converting to digital tools
(satellite and Internet radio, mobile phone technologies, and Internet-
based social media) that are increasingly utilized by certain
audiences.
Question #54. Does the State Department agree or disagree with the
Broadcasting Board of Governors that there should be a chief executive
officer (CEO) position to run top-level functions, and that this CEO
should both be chosen by the Board and answerable only to the Board?
Answer. The Department of State fully supports the creation of a
chief executive officer (CEO) position for United State International
Broadcasting, as presented in the administration's budget for fiscal
year 2014. This move to improve the management and efficiency of
Broadcasting Board of Governor (BBG) operations was unanimously
supported by the members of the BBG in January 2012, and the Department
of State's Office of the Inspector General underscored the importance
of such an action in a report issued this past January.
Under this plan, the CEO will be chosen by, and report to, a BBG
board that is appointed through the White House and confirmed by the
Senate, with the Secretary of State continuing as an ex-officio member.
The CEO will provide critically important day-to-day executive
leadership for U.S. international broadcasting, and will have
management authority over the Federal and non-Federal elements of U.S.
international broadcasting. The Broadcasting Board of Governors would
continue to set the strategic direction of U.S. international
broadcasting, as well as evaluating its journalistic quality and
maintaining its journalistic integrity.
Question #55. On Thursday, April 18, 2013, in testimony before this
committee, you indicated that the State Department would evaluate
complaints that foreign governments or foreign officials were illegally
or inappropriately using foreign assistance funds. Does the Department
already possess any reports or assessments of foreign governments or
foreign officials illegally or inappropriately using foreign assistance
funds?
Answer. For all forms of assistance, including direct government
assistance, the Department and USAID rely on internal monitoring and
evaluation teams to identify any misuse of funds. When permitted by
security and geographic conditions, monitors are sent into the field to
ensure programs are being implemented for their intended purposes and
achieving results. We also rely on our inspector generals (IGs),
special IGs, and the Government Accountability Office to identify
illegal or inappropriate use of foreign assistance by foreign
governments.
Unfortunately, there have been instances where the illegal or
inappropriate use of foreign assistance funds has been identified. In
these cases, we have immediately taken the steps necessary to prevent
further fraudulent use of funds.
Question #56. If the State Department already possesses such
reports or assessments, has the Department used that information in any
way to adjust foreign assistance funds to violating countries?
Answer. The Department and USAID are committed to taking the steps
necessary to protect against illegal or inappropriate use of foreign
assistance funds. These include thorough reviews of any agency
receiving funds to ensure they are capable of tracking the funds,
establishment of separate dollar accounts for U.S. funds where
appropriate, and careful monitoring of the use of funds once
transferred.
In situations where official corruption has been identified, we
review our assistance mechanisms and take actions to prevent the
diversion of our assistance, including ceasing assistance through a
particular ministry or organization if necessary. A significant portion
of our assistance is implemented through contractors and grantees who
provide a variety of services, such as training, commodities, and
technical assistance, directly to the people of the benefiting country
rather than government officials.
There are several examples where we have become aware of the
inappropriate use of funds through investigations by USAID or State
Inspectors General, Special Inspectors General for Iraq Reconstruction,
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or the
Government Accountability Office. In each case, we have taken the steps
necessary to protect the funds from improper use.
Question #57. Would the State Department be willing to dramatically
reduce or eliminate altogether foreign assistance funds if it can be
clearly demonstrated, via legal judgment or some other fact-based
determination, that foreign governments or foreign officials are in
fact using foreign assistance funds illegally or inappropriately?
Answer. The Department and USAID take the necessary measures to
prevent officials from misusing U.S. funds. When providing assistance
directly to foreign governments, the Department and USAID work to
ensure funds are used for their intended purpose, and on the rare
occasion when funds are determined to have been used improperly, we
immediately take steps to address the problem.
As required by the FY 2012 Appropriations Act and carried forward
by the FY 2013 Continuing Resolution, the Department and USAID do not
provide assistance to countries that do not meet the minimal standards
of fiscal transparency unless the Secretary determines it is in the
national interest to do so. In those cases, the Department puts forward
recommendations on how the particular country can take steps to improve
its fiscal transparency and tracks a country's actions on the path to
improved fiscal transparency.
In addition, as required by the FY 2012 Appropriations Act, the
Department and USAID only provide direct government-to-government
assistance if each implementing agency or ministry to receive
assistance has been assessed and is considered capable to manage such
funds; has adopted competitive procurement policies; and has effective
monitoring and evaluation systems in place. State and USAID also enter
into agreements with the government of the recipient country on the
objectives of any such assistance.
The law also calls for the USAID Administrator or the Secretary of
State to suspend any such assistance if the Administrator or the
Secretary has credible information of material misuse of such
assistance.
Question #58. The administration's budget requests the Congress
pass legislation to implement the 2010 IMF governance reforms and quota
changes. The FY 2014 Budget Request Justification for Appropriations,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, International Programs, states that
``the net cost of the proposed IMF legislation is zero, both in terms
of budget authority and outlays.'' Please explain in more detail why
moving these funds from the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) to the
quota system will have no cost?
Answer. At the height of the global crisis in 2009, Congress
provided critical leadership by approving the administration's request
for a permanent increase in U.S. participation in the International
Monetary Fund's (IMF) New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB)--a standing
backstop to safeguard the stability of the international monetary
system. This strategy worked: it arrested a steep fall in trade and a
sharp reversal of capital flows in many emerging markets.
As global financial conditions eased, we worked with our
international partners in 2010 to secure an agreement on IMF quota and
governance reforms. We found a solution that would expand core quota
resources and enhance IMF legitimacy, while requiring no new resources
from the United States and preserving our unique veto.
The proposed legislation will reduce U.S. participation in the NAB
by Special Drawing Rights 40,871,800,000 (approximately $63 billion)
and simultaneously increase the size of the U.S. quota in the IMF by an
equal amount. Thus, the U.S. quota increase would be offset by a 1:1
reduction in U.S. participation in the NAB. The President's budget
request includes this commitment in a way that is fully offset and does
not change the net U.S. financial participation in the IMF.
I defer any further questions on the 2010 IMF Quota Reform to the
U.S. Treasury.
Question #59. In Egypt, has the Department of State officially
raised the matter of renationalization with the Morsy government? If
so, were any solutions proposed for stemming the outflow of foreign
capital caused by these local court cases?
Answer. I conveyed U.S. concern about renationalization directly to
President Morsy when we met in Cairo on March 3. I said that any
renationalization serves as a disincentive to international investment
in Egypt. I told President Morsy that fair and equitable reconciliation
arrangements with key Egyptian and foreign investors are necessary and
in his country's best interests. Ambassador Patterson had raised the
same issues previously at senior ministerial levels.
Question #60. E.U. member states' ambassadors to Egypt have
expressed concern about the deteriorating business environment in
Egypt, specifically due process violations in court cases that have
been brought against past privatizations of state-owned companies. Do
you share these concerns about the risks of renationalization of
companies currently owned by foreign investors? If so, what steps are
you taking to ensure a fair adjudication process for protecting the
rights of foreign investors?
Answer. I registered U.S. concern about the renationalizations with
top officials in both Europe and the Middle East. We view the
renationalizations as a disincentive to international investment in
Egypt. Ambassador Patterson and her team in Embassy Cairo have raised
cases of due process violations, and State Department officials have
met with U.S. companies who may be subject to such renationalizations.
The Embassy monitors civil suits filed by Egyptians alleging damages
due to privatizations and continues to make clear to the Egyptian
Government that fair and equitable reconciliations with key domestic
and foreign investors are essential and in Egypt's best interests.
Question #61. Noting your testimony that the President is committed
to completing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and
with the understanding that USTR will play the lead agency role in
these talks, please describe the role the State Department will be
playing in these negotiations. Specifically, how will your State
Department team be adding value in these negotiations?
Answer. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) will lead a
broad interagency team, on which the State Department will play a
prominent role. The Department will provide substantial contributions
to the talks, building on its extensive network of diplomatic,
business, consumer, academic, and other contacts in Brussels and
throughout the European Union, to advocate U.S. views and to engage
with the EU public. The Department also has technical expertise in the
areas covered by the negotiations, including trade, investment, and
related issues such as international environmental matters, labor
standards, state-owned enterprises, and other elements of the
ambitious, comprehensive, and high-standard agreement we are seeking to
conclude. Our subject matter experts have spent years working on these
issues at the World Trade Organization as well as in many other
multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
Question #62. In response to questions I submitted for the record
during your nomination hearing process regarding PEPFAR and PMI, you
responded that the administration would continue consult with Congress
as to whether to pursue reauthorization of the Tom Lantos and Henry J.
Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 this year. You also noted that
``If Congress chooses to pursue reauthorization of the Tom Lantos and
Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 . . . '' This
wording seems to indicate that the administration does not intend to
ask Congress to renew the law or otherwise reauthorize the programs.
Does the administration intend to pursue reauthorization of PEPFAR
and PMI, in part or in full? If not, why not? If so, would you please
give some indication of your plans and timing.
Answer. The State Department and USAID will continue the dialogue
within the administration and with the U.S. Congress regarding the
reauthorization of the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States
Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act. The
administration strongly supports the President's Emergency Plan For
AIDS Relief, President's Malaria Initiative, and Tuberculosis TB
programs and will work with Congress on our shared priorities for the
continued operation of our U.S. global health programs.
Question #63. If the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States
Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
Reauthorization Act of 2008 is not renewed, what specific authorities
would lapse or otherwise expire? How would expiration affect existing
programs, and what are the specific changes you are planning in the way
the administration implements HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis
programs?
Answer. The authorities to conduct assistance programs to combat
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria under the Tom Lantos and Henry J.
Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (the Leadership Act), and
pursuant to the amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act made by the
Leadership Act, will not lapse in 2013. These authorities remain in
effect as permanent law, and as long as the annual appropriations act
appropriates needed funds for assistance, program activities will be
able to continue unaltered. While a limited number of provisions in the
Leadership Act will sunset after 2013, this should not affect the
ability of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, housed at
the Department of State, and its implementing agencies to carry out
assistance related to HIV/AIDS. USAID will also not be affected in its
ability to carry out assistance to combat tuberculosis and malaria.
Question #64. Does the administration intend to observe the cap on
U.S. contributions to the Global Fund at one-third of the total
contributions for the Global Fund ``replenishment'' process for 2014-
2016, either on an annual basis or otherwise?
Answer. We will continue to ensure that the U.S. contribution to
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)
represents no more than one-third of the cumulative donations to the
Global Fund. The FY 2014 budget, with a request of $1.65 billion,
maintains our strong commitment to the Global Fund and recognizes the
crucial role that the Fund plays in the success of global health
strategy. U.S. funding requests for the Global Fund beyond FY 2014 will
depend in large part upon (1) other donors stepping up to match the
U.S. investment 2 to 1 that no more than one-third of the total
donations are from the United States, and (2) the Fund's continuing
implementation of its ambitious reform agenda.
U.S. Global Health programs and Global Fund financed programs are,
to an even greater extent than ever before, complementary and deeply
intertwined. Better program coordination, decreased costs, and greater
efficiencies between Global Fund and U.S. Global Health investments are
helping to increase coverage of essential services and save more lives.
We are pleased with the Fund's progress in undertaking a needed
reform process, which was spurred in part by the leadership of the
United States. We are excited by the potential of the new funding model
to maximize the impact of Global Fund dollars and look forward to
seeing the reforms as they start to positively impact programs on the
ground.
Question #65. What is the goal of the administration in coming
years in terms of the proportion of global HIV/AIDS funding that will
be programmed bilaterally versus that programmed multilaterally,
especially through the Global Fund? Does this shift from bilateral to
multilateral provide savings to the United States? If so, could you
please identify those savings and provide the analysis or assumptions
behind any projected savings?
Answer. The U.S. Government's bilateral and multilateral
investments are mutually supportive, increasingly integrated, and
programmatically interdependent. Together, these investments save lives
and build country ownership and capacity to lead and manage national
responses over the long term. The U.S. contribution to multilateral
programs, including the Global Fund, helps us achieve the objectives of
our bilateral programs, while reaching more people with quality
services, leveraging contributions from other donors, expanding the
geographic reach of bilateral U.S. investments, and leading the way to
promote a shared responsibility among donors and implementers. The
distribution of health funding between bilateral and multilateral
programs is reviewed annually. In order to maximize results and
coverage, decisions are made across the President's Malaria Initiative,
the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and
Tuberculosis programs based on country strategies for each of the three
diseases as well as contributions from both government and other
donors.
We're working more closely with the Global Fund to ensure that we
are providing complementary services and not duplicating efforts.
PEPFAR and other U.S. Government health agencies have entered a new era
of cooperation with the Global Fund, which institutionalizes joint
planning and implementation in countries where both organizations are
making investments. Increasing program coordination and creating
efficiencies between Global Fund and U.S. investments will help to
increase coverage and save more lives.
Question #66. Would the administration support legislation that
would seek to provide the necessary authorities and structures to
implement the President's Global Health Initiative, which was last year
effectively scrapped?
Answer. We appreciate the strong interest in and support for our
global health programs. No new authorities are needed to implement the
principles of the administration's Global Health Initiative.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. As we approach the political and security transition in
Afghanistan,
preserving the gains made by Afghan women and girls is paramount to
long-term stability and democracy in Afghanistan. I am pleased to see
that this budget request would create a new fund for women's
initiatives, but I do not want us to lose sight of integrating the
security of women and girls into our security assistance and training
to the Afghan National Security Forces.
What role does the State Department play in working to
ensure that women's rights are protected as part of ANSF
training?
Answer. With the tireless efforts of Afghan women and consistent
support from the international community, Afghanistan has made
significant progress toward realizing the potential of women and girls
in all aspects of society. Girls now make up more than a third of
enrolled students throughout the country, and women are represented in
Parliament and on provincial councils. Businesswomen and female
entrepreneurs are playing a key role in the economic development of
their country, and life expectancy for women has risen from 44 years in
2001 to 64 years today. Female activists are actively advocating for
social justice and seeking a peaceful resolution to the Afghan
conflict. However, the progress that has been made is fragile and
challenges still remain.
Given the importance of this issue, the United States has made
consistent and concerted efforts to integrate women's rights into its
overall policies and strategy in Afghanistan. Our concerns about Afghan
women's rights have not only been at the top of the agenda for our own
policies and programs, but we have consistently encouraged President
Karzai and Afghanistan's civilian and military leaders to promote
women's rights and to incorporate gender issues into all aspects of
their government's policies. U.S. Embassy Kabul recently adopted a new
``Gender Strategy'' that highlights the need to mainstream gender
issues into all of our policies and programs through transition and the
transformation decade. The gender strategy focuses missionwide
resources on five key areas: health, education, economic development,
leadership opportunities, and security and access to justice, all of
which are consistent with the five cross-cutting priorities of UNSCR
1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. In implementing the strategy, we
not only measure the effectiveness of U.S. Government programs in these
areas, but also track overall progress and/or backsliding in key
priority areas. Implementation of this strategy will also help to
ensure that women are not disproportionately affected by any decreases
in U.S. funding in Afghanistan.
While the Department of State and USAID administer the majority of
women's initiatives in Afghanistan, DOD has the lead for women's issues
related to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development. However,
the State Department is working closely with DOD to ensure that the
ANSF has adequate training on gender issues, the Elimination of
Violence Against Women (EVAW) law, and that security institutions are
equipped to ensure women's rights are protected. An immediate priority
is improving the recruitment of women into the ANSF, their status and
treatment within the ANSF, and the ANSF's treatment of female civilians
across Afghanistan. ISAF, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and
Ministry of Interior (MOI) have a large number of programs aimed at
protecting women's rights and promoting women in the ANSF. For example,
the MOD recently stood up the Human Rights and Gender Integration
Directorate, which will coordinate an enhanced Afghan National Army
(ANA) recruiting plan for women and will provide better oversight of
female integration issues within the MOD. Support from Afghan
leadership is essential, and we will continue to press forward with
high level and working level diplomacy to encourage the Afghan
Government to make progress in this critical area.
We are also working very closely with our Department of Defense
colleagues to provide you a detailed report on our efforts to promote
women's security as required by the Afghan Women and Girls Security
Promotion Act (AWGSPA). The United States will continue to prioritize
promoting Afghan women's rights to ensure that the positive gains made
since 2001 are not reversed.
Question. I am deeply concerned about the humanitarian crisis
resulting from the ongoing conflict in Syria and am pleased that the
administration has already provided $385 million to respond to the
crisis. My bill, the Syria Democratic Transition Act, would authorize
the administration to do more.
How will additional assistance, like the MENA Incentive
Fund, be used to support the Syrian opposition and increase
their ability to govern in liberated Syria?
Will you route a greater proportion of assistance to
organizations working across Syria's borders, instead of
through the United Nations, which is hampered by the lack of a
mandate to operate across Syrian borders?
Answer. Syria remains a tremendous challenge. We are strengthening
our nonlethal support to the opposition and making inroads with local
organizations responding to the needs of their communities and laying
the foundation for transition in areas from which the regime has
retreated in whole or in part. We must be ready in FY 2014 for the
transition in Syria to a post-Assad government deserving of our
support, but cannot now predict what support may be required. The
potential of an extremely challenging transition in Syria has informed
our Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF) request
level, particularly for contingency resources.
No bilateral foreign assistance is included in our FY 2014 request;
the request assumes other sources, including global contingency
resources such as the humanitarian assistance accounts and MENA IF,
will be tapped for future needs. The MENA IF will give the U.S.
Government critical tools to respond both to contingency and
stabilization needs, including support to interim governments and
emerging civil society; and short-term economic stabilization, support
for elections, humanitarian assistance, short-term security sector
support, weapons abatement, and deployment of additional staff. It also
makes resources available to support long-term political, economic, and
security sector reform efforts.
Question. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Guterres projected
that refugee flows into Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan could exceed 1
million in each country by the end of 2013. How are the State
Department and USAID planning to address this contingency, which could
have disastrous effects on the host nations?
Answer. We are closely following refugee outflows into the
neighboring countries and the repercussions for local host communities.
The pace at which numbers of Syrians have become refugees is alarming--
the numbers have risen from 66,000 a year ago to 1.4 million today. The
generosity of neighboring countries has been inspiring, but the
capacities of local governments, families, social services, and civic
organizations are severely strained as they seek to accommodate this
flood of new arrivals. The State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and USAID are working to provide
assistance to address needs in host communities in Jordan, Lebanon, and
Turkey where refugees are living. These cities and villages are
suffering from financial strain, reduced public services, and growing
tensions as a result of hosting large numbers of refugees.
The Department is concerned about the growing numbers of refugees,
and we continue to work closely with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to plan for future outflows based on
current conditions. Projecting refugee outflows is not an exact
science, however, and no one can predict with certainty events inside
Syria that will prompt refugees to flee. That said, in addition to the
widespread violence, the collapse of basic services inside Syria,
including the education and health systems, is likely to be a major
driver pushing more Syrians to flee to neighboring countries.
The United States has provided $409 million in humanitarian
assistance and continues to work with the U.N. to rally financial
support from other international donors. For example, the Government of
Kuwait, cohost of the Syria pledging conference on January 30, recently
fulfilled the entirety of its pledge of $300 million through
contributions to U.N. agencies, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
We must make smart, well-informed funding decisions. This puts a
premium on contingency planning, on all donors coordinating with the
U.N. and on providing assistance in a manner that meets international
standards.
Overall, we are pursuing a multipronged approach: First, we are
consulting with key aid agency partners. In our discussions with
organizations we fund, such as UNHCR, we ask them to identify how they
are targeting the most vulnerable, meeting the needs of the majority of
refugees who live outside of camps, and incorporating more robust
support for overburdened host. We discuss their respective contingency
plans, including topics related to: their humanitarian stockpiles in
the region; guarding against aid pipeline breaks; preparing for health-
related and weather-related challenges; and plans for responding to
major incidents that could result in large surges of refugees.
Second, PRM and USAID have also been working with the Department's
and President's budget offices to ensure that the U.S. Government is
able to continue to provide sufficient funds to humanitarian partners.
We are looking at ways to boost support for host countries beyond
emergency humanitarian assistance, so that host communities can
continue to support refugees fleeing violence in Syria. The
international community needs to increase support to host countries'
core community infrastructure, including health, education, energy, and
water to minimize the burden of hosting up to 4 million Syrian refugees
in the region by the end of the year.
Third, we engage in humanitarian diplomacy. For example, we
continue to urge all host countries to keep their borders open to all
vulnerable refugees fleeing Syria, including Iraqis and Palestinians.
We also regularly consult with officials from refugee-hosting
countries to understand the relative priority they place on particular
kinds of assistance, so we can synchronize our aid as much as possible
and encourage them to engage in best practices when applicable. For
example, camp construction has begun following a Government of Jordan
decision to open an additional refugee camp in Azraq to respond to new
arrivals and ease the burden on refugee-hosting communities in northern
Jordan. We intend to provide additional assistance to support this
goal.
In Turkey, the government has played a strong and commendable role,
providing ample support to nearly 200,000 refugees living in camps, and
limited support to over 100,000 in urban areas. We are working with the
Government of Turkey, UNHCR, and other partners to address basic needs
as the numbers swell.
Finally, we liaise with international organizations, NGOs, and the
Syrian Opposition Council's Assistance Coordination Unit to evaluate
how partners are performing and the extent to which there are gaps in
the international humanitarian response. This information is then
incorporated into our planning/programs.
The U.S. Government is committed to continuing to help Syria's
neighbors as they cope with refugee inflows. It is critical to regional
political stability and to keep borders open to all those fleeing the
violence in Syria that we demonstrate that they are not in this alone.
Question. Aside from the President's stated ``redline'' on the use
of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, are there any other redlines
the administration has that would trigger stronger intervention? What
kinds of intervention, military or otherwise, would the administration
use if Assad did definitively use chemical weapons?
Answer. At the President's direction, the United States Government
has been closely monitoring the potential use of chemical weapons
within Syria.
Our intelligence community does assess with varying degrees of
confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small
scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin. This assessment
is based in part on physiological samples. Our standard of evidence
must build on these intelligence assessments as we seek to establish
credible and corroborated facts. For example, the chain of custody is
not clear, so we cannot confirm how the exposure occurred and under
what conditions. We do believe that any use of chemical weapons in
Syria would very likely have originated with the Assad regime. Thus
far, we believe that the Assad regime maintains custody of these
weapons, and has demonstrated a willingness to escalate its horrific
use of violence against the Syrian people.
The President has made it clear that the use of chemical weapons--
or the transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist groups--is a redline
for the United States of America. We have communicated that message
publicly and privately to governments around the world, including the
Assad regime.
We have also provided information and equipment to the region to
help protect Syrians and support humanitarian workers in their life-
saving work. However, precisely because the President takes this issue
so seriously, we have an obligation to fully investigate any and all
evidence of chemical weapons use within Syria.
That is why we are pressing for a comprehensive United Nations
investigation that can credibly evaluate the evidence and establish
what took place. We have offered information, expertise, and resources
to the United Nations to support this investigation, and we are urging
others in the international community to do the same.
We are also working with our friends, allies, and the Syrian
opposition, to procure, share, and evaluate additional information
associated with reports of the use of chemical weapons so that we can
establish the facts. Given the stakes involved, and what we have
learned from our own recent experience, intelligence assessments alone
are not sufficient--only credible and corroborated facts that provide
us with some degree of certainty will guide our decisionmaking; the
intelligence assessment is only one part of a broader process.
Question. The State Department has now led two U.N. Human Rights
Council resolutions on Sri Lanka, and I continue to believe that an
independent, international investigation is needed for reconciliation.
Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Government reportedly continues to commit
human rights violations, especially against journalists and students.
How will the State Department leverage its IMET training
programs to bolster a new generation of Sri Lankan military
leaders, who respect human rights, and to press the Government
to allow for an independent investigation?
What is the State Department vision for the future of
security cooperation with Sri Lanka?
Answer. The Department continuously reviews its security
cooperation programs with Sri Lanka to make sure they are appropriately
calibrated to the rest of the bilateral relationship and broader U.S.
objectives in Sri Lanka. U.S. military engagement with Sri Lanka is
both limited and focused on our strategic goals. Currently, our efforts
are focused on positively influencing the next generation of military
leaders, strictly adhering to Leahy vetting requirements, and promoting
Sri Lanka's ability to maintain security in its maritime domain, an
area that is a key U.S. interest and has ramifications for the security
of the broader region.
IMET-funded courses expose defense establishment personnel to U.S.
military doctrine and values. The courses promote democratic values,
build capacity in key areas, increase the professionalization of the
forces, and build lasting military-to-military relationships. We review
IMET funding allocations carefully each year to ensure each program
supports U.S. efforts to positively influence the Sri Lankan military
in support of our strategic goals in the region. IMET funding in Sri
Lanka has decreased over the past 3 years, from $952,000 in 2011 to
$626,000 in FY 2013, in response to our concerns over the Sri Lankan
Government's lack of progress reconciliation and accountability.
Question. After 2 years of protests, dialogue between the
Government of Bahrain and the opposition remains stalled. Meanwhile,
reports of human rights violations against opposition protestors are
concerning. The FY14 budget requests $10 million in Foreign Military
Financing and an increase in the International Military Education and
Training account.
How will you use this assistance to encourage the Government
of Bahrain to pursue real dialogue and end its crackdown on
protestors?
What else is the administration doing to press the Bahraini
Government to fully implement the recommendations of the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry?
Answer. Making a strong case both publicly and privately for why
political dialogue, reform, and the protection of human rights are in
the long-term interests of Bahrain and the United States is a critical
component of our bilateral relationship, as is continued engagement in
support of a strong security partnership in the face of serious
regional threats. We see the dialogue as a positive step in a broader
process that needs to result in meaningful reform that meets the
aspirations of all of Bahrain's citizens. We are pressing the Bahraini
Government and opposition to explore confidence-building measures as
the dialogue continues. We continue to urge the Bahraini Government to
implement the full range of recommendations in the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry report.
We have seen some progress on these fronts, including the
establishment of an ombudsman's office within the Ministry of Interior
and the Police Code of Conduct, but more remains to be done. We
continue to withhold the export of lethal and crowd-control items that
could be used against peaceful protesters in Bahrain. We review all
credible information documenting human rights violations and continue
to press for investigations into, and accountability for, these
violations, including effectively utilizing the Leahy amendment to
ensure security assistance isn't provided to human rights violators in
Bahraini security forces. Maintaining Bahrain's Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) account and increasing support for International
Military Education and training (IMET) course--courses that include
human rights modules and whose participants are screened for potential
human rights abuses in accordance with Leahy vetting--will allow us to
maintain a strong partnership with the Bahraini Government as it
continues to move forward on reforms.
The United States and Bahrain have a long history of friendship,
and the Government of Bahrain has continued to be a critical partner in
maintaining regional security.
Question. While energy-rich and key to our operations in
Afghanistan, the Central Asian countries have in common pervasive
violations of human rights and poorly performing democratic
institutions. What is the administration's strategy to encourage these
regimes to treat their people with justice and strengthen the rule of
law?
Answer. We closely follow developments in human rights and
democracy in central Asia, and promotion of democratic reform and
greater respect for human rights is a top priority in this
administration's strategy for central Asia. We continue to encourage
central Asian governments at every level, including in every high-level
visit to the region, to respect fundamental human rights, and to allow
greater space for civil society, peaceful religious practice, and full
freedom of expression, including media freedom. We urge these
governments to hold free and fair elections and to engage in judicial,
law enforcement, and media legislation reform. We support civil society
organizations that use education and community development initiatives
to help mitigate interethnic tensions and reduce regional
vulnerabilities to violent extremism. We partner with central Asian
states and international organizations to combat trafficking in persons
and forced labor by facilitating contact with international monitoring
entities, civil society, and law enforcement organizations. We also
provide assistance to support democratic reforms and human rights. For
FY 2012 we provided $26.6 million (not including centrally managed
accounts such as the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) to support democratic reforms and
human rights in central Asia; our FY 2014 request would increase this
support to $28.6 million.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
afghanistan special immigrant visas
Secretary Kerry, on April 15, the New York Times reported on the
growing backlog of immigration visa applications for Afghans pending
with the State Department. These individuals have, at tremendous risk
to their own lives and to the lives of their family members, assisted
the United States and NATO as translators in Afghanistan. The Taliban,
as you know, puts a high price on their heads for helping Western
forces.
Given the clear threat these brave individuals face and the ongoing
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan that increases that threat, I believe
we owe it to them to address this backlog immediately and move these
applications along.
Question. How large is the current backlog of Special Immigrant
Visas for Afghan principal applicants and eligible family members under
section 1244 and section 1059 at the State Department?
Answer. Afghan Special Immigrant Visas are issued under Section
602(b) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 and Section 1059 of
the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006. As of April 29,
there are approximately 2,000 Afghan principal applicants and eligible
family members who have been interviewed and are in administrative
processing pending the completion of the interagency screening process.
There are 480 Afghan principal applicants and eligible family members
scheduled for SIV interviews in May with 1,934 waiting to be scheduled
for interviews as openings become available in upcoming months. There
are an additional 2,032 principal applicants and family members whose
cases have been assigned to a consular section and will be scheduled
for interviews once the applicants submit the required documents.
Question. What are the major obstacles to processing these
applications more quickly?
Answer. The two major obstacles to processing these applications
more quickly are the interagency screening process and preliminary
approval at post by the Chief of Mission due to setbacks in the
establishment of the recommendation committee in Kabul at the onset of
the program. The screening process takes the most time and the
Department of State is working constantly with our interagency
counterparts to streamline this comprehensive and essential process
while eliminating bottlenecks. We have added additional staff to
address the delays in the Chief of Mission approval process and quickly
process pending cases. A legislative extension of the program would
allow additional time to process the cases that remain in the pipeline.
Question. Will you make the reduction of this backlog a priority?
Answer. Yes. Finding ways to streamline the process, without
compromising national security, has been a Department priority since
the inception of the program. We are working with National Security
Council staff and the interagency to address the challenges. We
recognize that many who are employed by, or work on behalf of the U.S.
Government in Afghanistan and their families, face real threats as a
result of their U.S. Government affiliation. We take these threats, and
the concerns of those who work with us, very seriously and we are
committed to providing them with the benefits for which they legally
are eligible. At the same time, we must ensure that recipients of
SIVs--like all others who seek to enter the United States--do not pose
a threat to our security. Embassy Kabul has redirected and increased
resources to improve efficiency at all stages of the SIV process and
reduce processing backlogs without compromising security. The consular
section has increased staffing to meet the increased demand for visa
appointments and the Embassy has increased staffing to more
expeditiously process Chief of Mission reviews, which are required as
the first step of the application process.
Question. As you know, the SIV program currently is set to expire
at the end of this fiscal year. Do you support the program's extension
beyond September 30?
Answer. Our authority to issue SIVs to Iraqis under the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2008 expires at the end of this fiscal
year. Our authority to issue SIVs to Afghans under the Afghan Allies
Protection Act of 2009 expires at the end of fiscal year 2014. We have
been working with our interagency partners and interested Members of
Congress to extend our authority to allow for the continued issuance of
SIVs after those dates. We fully support each program's extension and
welcome any action by Congress to extend the programs. The FY 2014 NDAA
request includes provisions extending the program, as does S. 744--the
Senate Comprehensive Immigration Reform legislation.
cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation in mena
Secretary Kerry, at an April 16 Senate Armed Services hearing,
Secretary Hagel announced that the administration is utilizing the
Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction authorities to
work with Jordan to help them counter the threat from Syria's chemical
weapons.
I believe that the Middle East and North Africa region is our next
real proliferation challenge when it comes to WMD-related materials. I
believe we should be supporting more cooperative threat reduction and
nonproliferation resources to this region. DOD is obviously responsible
for the CTR program; however, State does have a number of important
nonproliferation programs that could be ramped up to meet the threat
posed in this region.
Question. Do you believe we are doing enough to work with our
partners on cooperative threat reduction in the region--particularly
with respect to Syria's chemical weapons stockpile?
Answer. Given the dynamic situation in the region, mitigating the
chemical weapons threat emanating from Syria requires a multifaceted
and tailored engagement strategy. The Department of State is working
closely with other U.S. Government agencies, including the Department
of Defense, and regional allies to address these threats by
strengthening the ability of our partners to prevent, detect, and
respond to a chemical event. The Department's Global Threat Reduction
(GTR) program is leveraging current partnerships to develop regional
and country-specific activities tailored to address the evolving Syrian
threat. GTR works closely with partners in Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and
elsewhere in the region to build capacity in the areas of chemical
security, detection, and forensics for technical and law enforcement
audiences.
Question. Could we be doing more to support assistance efforts like
upgrading border controls or increasing some of our allies' capacities
to prevent, detect, or interdict chemical weapons technology or
materials in this region?
Answer. The Department of State is actively working with allies in
the region on a broad range of efforts to address the threat of
chemical weapons and other border security challenges emanating from
the conflict in Syria. We have an extensive border security engagement
program and work closely with our Department of Defense and other U.S.
Government stakeholders to continually address and respond to the
evolving threat. Furthermore, we are in close coordination with our
international partners to coordinate assistance in the region to ensure
that activities are complementary and not duplicative. In particular,
through our Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program,
we are providing inspection and detection equipment and training for
border security units to enhance their capabilities to detect and
interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology and related
materials.
For example, the EXBS program is providing fixed imaging systems,
night vision binoculars, mobile x-ray vans, personal radiation pagers,
and basic inspection tool kits to our partners in the region. EXBS is
also providing training in WMD interdiction, targeting and risk
management, and other border interdiction related skills to Syria's
neighbors.
nonproliferation
More generally, I'm concerned about the decrease in funding for
nonproliferation reflected in the President's budget. I think we need
to be ramping up nonproliferation efforts around the globe--
particularly as the proliferation threat becomes more complex and
diffuse.
Question. Do you believe that the current budget for FY 2014
nonproliferation activities is adequate to meet the challenge of the
nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
materials around the globe?
Answer. As we reduced the overall State Department budget to help
meet our country's fiscal problems, it was necessary to also reduce the
budget for our nonproliferation foreign assistance programs. However,
we limited the reduction to less than 10 percent (compared to FY 2012
funding levels). While this reduction will force some of our programs
to make difficult decisions, we are confident that the budget will
ensure funding for our highest nonproliferation priorities, including
our contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards
program, and our program to improve strategic trade and export controls
in key partner states.
ndi's challenges and crackdown in azerbaijan
Secretary Kerry, it has come to my attention that the United States
funded National Democratic Institute and other pro-democracy
nongovernmental organizations are experiencing intense and increasing
harassment from the Government of Azerbaijan. The Azeri government has
submitted a formal request to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to downgrade its presence in the country. In
addition, last week, the Government of Azerbaijan closed the U.S.-
funded Free Thought University, which provides lectures and open
dialogue for Azerbaijani youth on economics, human rights, government
reforms, and culture.
I am deeply concerned by these troubling developments in Azerbaijan
and the implications of what appears to be a broader antidemocratic
push taking place.
Question. In light of the Azeri government's crackdown and
widespread harassment of civil society groups, how is the State
Department responding to Azerbaijan?
Answer. The State Department has raised concerns privately and
publicly about Azerbaijan's crackdown on and harassment of civil
society groups. For example, in a series of statements in recent weeks,
Ambassador Morningstar has made plain how troubling the United States
has found the closure of Free Thought University's facilities and the
government's reaction to peaceful protests in January and March. Both
the State Department spokesperson and the U.S. Mission to the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have made
similar statements. We regularly raise our concerns directly with
senior Azerbaijani Government officials in Baku and Washington. While
in Baku April 17-18, Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Deputy Assistant
Secretary Thomas Melia conveyed our concerns in meetings with President
Aliyev and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, while publicly demonstrating
support for civil society activists in several meetings and with the
press.
The Department will continue to encourage meaningful dialogue
between the Azerbaijani Government and its citizens to address
legitimate grievances and also encourage authorities to respect
citizens' freedom of assembly, expression, and association.
Question. What is the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Baku
doing to impress upon Azeri political leaders the need to improve their
human rights record and work to realize Azerbaijan's potential as a
responsible stakeholder in the international community?
Answer. We have repeatedly raised these concerns in public
statements and in meetings with high-level officials in Baku, including
President Aliyev.
For example, in December and again in April, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Thomas Melia
led interagency visits to Azerbaijan with the Department of Justice and
USAID. In meetings with the President, Foreign Minister, human rights
activists, and civil society, the team emphasized the need for
meaningful democratic reform, including increased respect for human
rights, fundamental freedoms, due process, and the rule of law.
Question. On April 16, President Aliyev stated publicly ``We are
building relations with all countries on the basis of mutual respect
and with no interference in each other's affairs . . . We do know how
to run our country. We do not need advice from the sidelines.'' Given
this recent statement, how do we work with President Aliyev to convince
him that democracy promotion organizations and other U.S.-funded civil
society efforts are good for Azerbaijan and in high demand by the Azeri
people?
Answer. We have expressed our concern at the highest levels about
actions taken by the Government of Azerbaijan, including harassment of
democracy promotion organizations such as the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) and the closure of Free Thought University's
facilities. As Ambassador Morningstar reiterated in his remarks in Baku
on April 11, ``Our closest relationships are with democratic states
that respect the full range of human rights of their citizens.'' We
will continue to make these points in our interactions with all of our
contacts inside and outside of the government in Azerbaijan.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to
Questions Submitted by Senator James Risch
Question. Your budget requests $133.2 million to realign Regional
Security Officer positions. Will this include rebalancing personnel to
ensure the RSOs with the greatest experience are placed in the
locations that need the most seasoned experts?
Answer. In an effort to create greater transparency on how DS
positions are funded, the Department is proposing to realign funding
for DS overseas positions from the Diplomatic and Consular Programs
(D&CP) 2-year account to the Worldwide Security Protection no-year
account. Currently overseas positions are funded out of both funding
sources. This realignment is consistent with how the Department handles
American salaries under other Bureaus such as Consular Affairs and
Overseas Buildings Operations.
The Department has looked at staffing issues for high threat posts,
and we believe that the overall availability of experienced staff will
remain a challenge given hiring shortfalls in previous years. We have
evaluated the use of temporary, experienced staff, but believe only
hiring, training, and assigning adequate permanent staff will provide a
long-term solution to the identified experience gap. However, we are
making progress on this front as the FY 2013 continuing resolution
provided funding to hire additional Diplomatic Security personnel,
including more RSOs.
Question. On 21 March 2013, six of my colleagues and I sent you a
letter on arms control compliance and verification issues. When can we
anticipate a response?
Answer. The Department will provide a response shortly.
Question. Could you provide more details on the U.S. economic
package to the Palestinians that you mentioned while you were in the
region? Will the resignation of Prime Minister Fayyad have an impact on
this?
Answer. We are still working on the economic initiative for the
Palestinians. The U.S. Government, through USAID, is already the
leading provider of bilateral economic assistance to the Palestinian
people. This initiative will complement the work that we have underway
across a variety of sectors. We want to consult with the many
interested parties prior to making any final decisions.
There will be a heavy emphasis on leveraging the private sector,
and we do not envision the need for any additional U.S. budgetary
resources for this initiative. As soon as decisions are reached, we
will of course brief Congress on the details.
At the same time, economic efforts are not a substitute for the
political track. We remain focused on creating the conditions needed to
reestablish productive negotiations between the parties with the goal
of two states for two peoples living side by side in peace and
security.
The Palestinian Authority has made tremendous strides in
revitalizing the Palestinian economy and reforming its institutions to
better serve the Palestinian people. We look to all Palestinian leaders
and the Palestinian people to continue these reform and revitalization
efforts, and we are committed to moving forward with economic and
institution-building efforts in the West Bank. The resignation of Prime
Minister Fayyad should not derail this economic initiative or our
efforts to promote peace and security.
Question. Please explain the efforts of the administration to
promote democracy, the rule of law, civil society, and human rights in
Russia, particularly in the wake of closing the USAID office and the
government's ongoing crackdown on independent civil society groups?
Answer. The United States is firmly committed to promoting
democracy, the rule of law, civil society, and human rights in Russia.
We have raised our concerns in public statements and private
discussions about the regrettable closure of USAID, disruptive
government inspections of hundreds of NGOs across Russia, an array of
new laws aimed at intimidating civil society, and the prosecution of
political and civil society leaders. We have frequently joined with the
international community in urging Russian officials to protect the
fundamental human rights of all citizens.
The decision by the Russian Government that USAID should close its
mission in Moscow marked the beginning of a transition for how we will
support civil society, human rights, and democracy in Russia, but it
has not altered our goals or our commitment. As in all countries in
which our civil society partners face severe impediments to carrying
out their work, the United States is putting in place a tailored
strategy that is sensitive to the specific context, needs,
opportunities, and challenges. I would be happy to have State
Department officials brief you on the specifics of our approach to
support for civil society.
Question. With the recent announcement of a merger between Al Qaeda
in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra, please identify what connections exist
between al-Nusra and Al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Answer. On April 10, al-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani
publicly pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, but
said he was not consulted on Al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) April 9 public
announcement of a merger between AQI and al-Nusra. Al-Nusra is part of
Zawahiri's al-Qaeda network, as is AQI.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. The Executive Budget Summary notes that the request for
State and USAID ``strikes the balance between fiscal discipline and
sustaining and advancing America's global leadership--and is 6 percent
less than in FY 2012.'' But, looking at the breakdown, it appears that
base budget funding in FY 2012 totaled $39.6 billion, while base budget
funding in the FY 2014 request totals $43.9 billion, roughly. It would
seem to me that any savings claimed here comes strictly from a
reduction in OCO funds, and in fact the Department is asking for
additional base budget funds this year. Is this the case?
Answer. The FY 2014 budget request for the Department of State and
USAID totals $47.8 billion, which is a decrease of $3.1 billion from FY
2012, or 6 percent. The reduction is largely a result of our efforts to
rightsize our presence and programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq,
yielding savings of $4.2 billion from FY 2012. The FY 2014 budget
prioritizes how we use our limited resources so they are effective
investments in solving the problems of today and shaping the world of
tomorrow, protecting the American people and bolstering the U.S.
economy.
Due to the breadth of the FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) appropriation, which shifted some base programs to OCO, the
overall topline is the most accurate comparison of programs from FY
2012 to FY 2014. In FY 2012, Congress provided $11.2 billion in OCO,
$2.5 billion (29 percent) more than the administration had requested,
and expanded the definition of OCO beyond the Frontline States of
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Consistent with the FY 2012 and FY
2013 requests, the FY 2014 request returns to the administration's
approach of using State/USAID OCO for the temporary and extraordinary
costs of operations and programs in the Frontline States.
Question. Before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department
of Defense maintained an account within its budget called the
``overseas contingency operations transfer fund,'' which was used to
pay for operations in places like the Balkans, and other places where
the United States ran operations on a temporary basis. DOD still
maintains this fund although it has not received any recent
appropriations from Congress, and it is a separate account from the OCO
title which is now funded with tens of billions of dollars, none of
which is subject to spending caps.
The State Department began requesting OCO funds outside of its
``base budget'' in FY 2012. It has been used to pay for State
Department operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and ``to a limited
extent in other fragile regions,'' according to a response I received
from your office. Certainly the State Department has operated in
``fragile regions'' long before the existence of this extra-budgetary
account, and I am sure that even after the war in Afghanistan winds
down, the Department will continue to operate in these regions.
Do you intend to continue requesting OCO funding outside of
the regular
budget to pay for these operations interminably?
Would the Department benefit from creating an on-budget OCO
account, similar to the one operated by the DOD?
Answer. We appreciate the flexibility that the Congress provided in
the FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations appropriation. Our FY 2014
request reflects the administration's intent that OCO for the
Department of State and USAID include only the temporary and
extraordinary costs related to the civilian responsibilities in the
Frontline States (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq). We do expect to
continue programs in these countries in the long term, but at more
reduced levels.
The size of the State/USAID OCO request will change, as reflected
in the FY 2014 President's budget, as circumstances on the ground
warrant, with the general goal of decreasing OCO funding over time.
Since FY 2012, OCO funding governmentwide has decreased by $34
billion. The administration has capped OCO spending through 2021 at
$450 billion to ensure that OCO funds are used judiciously, in a
fiscally responsible way, and only for the extraordinary needs for
which they were designed.
Question. In FY 2012, the Department requested $8.7 billion in OCO
funds but received more than $11 billion from appropriators. The FY
2013 CR continues those levels.
How has the Congress' decision to designate more of the
State Department's ``base budget'' as OCO funding affected the
Department's budgeting process?
Answer. The FY 2013 Continuing Resolution (CR) provides the
Department and USAID with $10.6 billion in Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding, $559 million less than the FY 2012 OCO
appropriation. The Department and USAID appreciate the flexibility
Congress has provided within the OCO title and has used that authority
judiciously to respond to emerging and unanticipated contingencies,
which are consistent with the intent of OCO funds, including responding
to the crises in Syria and Mali.
Question. OCO funds have been reprogrammed to pay for operations to
Syria and Mali, and perhaps even elsewhere.
Do you know approximately how much money has been
transferred within the OCO account to pay for these operations?
Can you tell me what else, apart from Mali and Syria, these
funds have been used for?
If not, can you please provide that to my office?
Answer. We are dealing with complex crises at a time when resources
are scarce. The Department of State/USAID budget prioritizes how we use
our limited resources so they are effective investments in solving the
problems of today and shaping the world of tomorrow, protecting the
American people and bolstering the U.S. economy.
The transfer authority provided in the OCO title has enabled the
Department and USAID to respond to emerging needs in Syria and Mali and
elsewhere. The transfer authority has also allowed us to meet
priorities of the Congress.
We will provide a list of programs we have used OCO authority to
fund to your staff. We look forward to working with the Congress to
determine how best to maintain flexible authorities and sufficient
resources to meet emergent needs in the out years.
Question. The FY 2013 request asks for $77.7 million in funding for
UNESCO, despite the decision of that entity in October of 2011 to award
the Palestinian Authority full member status in its organization.
UNESCO went through with this vote knowing full well that doing so
would result in a cessation of contributions to it from the United
States, pursuant to existing U.S. law. You have also said that, ``if
confirmed, I will continue the administration's policy of opposing
firmly any and all unilateral actions in international bodies or
treaties that circumvent or prejudge the very outcomes that can only be
negotiated, including Palestinian statehood.''
Why have you again requested both funding for UNESCO as well
as a waiver to allow the administration to ignore the current
laws that prohibit assistance to UNESCO?
Answer. The administration is seeking a waiver to allow the
discretion necessary to continue to provide contributions that enable
us to maintain our vote and influence within the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, if the President determines that doing so is
important to our national interests, and to deny the Palestinians or
their allies any ability to force a contribution cutoff and diminish
our influence within these agencies.
Without a national interest waiver our ability to conduct
multilateral diplomacy and pursue U.S. objectives will be eroded, and
our standing and position in critical U.N. agencies will be harmed. As
a result, our ability to defend Israel from unfair and biased attacks
in the United Nations will also be greatly damaged.
The most effective way to wield U.S. influence in international
organizations is from within. By withholding our contributions, not
only do we cut off support for important programs that advance U.S.
interests, we weaken our ability to promote our priorities, risk losing
altogether our voting rights, and effectively empower others to
determine how and when America engages.
Congress has passed legislation that provides the United States
with additional tools that are much better suited for the purposes of
deterrence than the contribution cutoff mechanism. Legislation passed
in the aftermath of the Palestinians' successful UNESCO bid, if
triggered, would place limits on U.S. economic support to the
Palestinian Authority and would require the closure of the
Palestinians' Washington, DC, office if they obtain membership as a
state in a U.N. specialized agency going forward. These requirements
are, appropriately, directed at the Palestinians in the event they
engage in conduct that we are seeking to discourage. By contrast, the
implications of the contribution cutoff will be most felt by the United
States and the partners whose interests we defend across the spectrum
of the U.N. system.
Ironically, current legislation penalizes U.N. institutions which
do not have a role in membership votes. The vote to admit the
Palestinians was taken by other member countries, not U.N. officials.
Question. In response to an inquiry from my office when your
confirmation was pending, you stated that, in fact, you would seek
these funds [for UNESCO] along with the waiver because, ``I believe
that our country cannot afford to be on the sidelines of organizations
that help advance American national interests.''
What national interests are served by UNESCO?
If the United States does not follow through on its word to
withhold these contributions, do you think this would encourage
other organizations to take actions similar to those taken by
UNESCO?
What kind of a message does it send to our allies when the
United States
reneges on its word?
Answer. UNESCO promotes U.S. national interests. At its core,
UNESCO is an antiextremism organization, and one that uses cooperation
to address shared challenges. The work that UNESCO carries out in order
to promote peace, intercultural dialogue, tolerance, and education for
all is essential to combating violent extremism. UNESCO's coordination
of the global tsunami warning system has already proven invaluable for
helping prevent massive casualties from deadly tsunamis, some of which
threaten large populations along the U.S. coastline.
UNESCO also serves U.S. free market goals. Many American
companies--including Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Procter and Gamble--
have partnered with UNESCO to advance core American values, such as
press freedom and access to education. At the same time, these
companies are expanding their global reach into new and untapped
markets.
In addition, UNESCO supports and furthers fundamental American
values, including promoting literacy for women and girls, promoting
tolerance and respect for all by creating curriculum programs for
global dissemination, and supporting Holocaust education as a means to
combat anti-Semitism and prevent future atrocities. UNESCO also plays a
critical leading role in promoting freedom of the press and safety for
journalists globally.
The United States remains a steadfast ally of Israel at UNESCO, and
has been able to successfully advocate for Israel within the
Organization. The most recent example is at the UNESCO Executive Board
meeting in April, where the United States played an instrumental role
in negotiating a compromise between the Israelis and Palestinians,
resulting in the deferred consideration of five contentious recurring
resolutions on cultural sites in the region.
This latest example of U.S. engagement on behalf of Israel in the
U.N. system underscores the critical importance of a continued strong
U.S. presence at UNESCO. However, without resuming payment of assessed
contributions due to UNESCO, the United States will lose its vote at
the 37th General Conference in November 2013--an unprecedented
consequence that will harm both U.S. interests and those of our allies.
At the same time, we continue our active engagement across the
spectrum of U.N. agencies and directly with the Palestinians to
underscore that similar efforts to pursue status as a member state will
only risk undermining a return to direct negotiations which remain the
only path forward to a just, lasting, and comprehensive regional
solution to end the conflict.
We believe that our actions must be determined by our own national
interest both in a just, lasting, and comprehensive regional solution
and in a responsible and capable U.N. system. We remain convinced that
the best way to advance these interests is to demonstrate our
commitment to Middle East peace and to maintain our investment in and
our leadership within the U.N. system.
Many of our allies have given us a clear message--including through
statements at the UNESCO Executive Board that just ended in Paris--that
they want the United States to remain an active player at UNESCO and in
the multilateral system more broadly. They see the United States as a
vital and powerful voice for freedom and democratic values.
As you will recall, it was under the leadership of President George
W. Bush that the United States rejoined UNESCO in 2003 following a
prolonged absence. In a bipartisan effort, President Bush and the late
Representative, Tom Lantos, led the charge in convincing members on
both sides of the aisle in Congress that the United States is far
better off being at the table at UNESCO. By withholding our
contributions, not only do we cut off support for important programs
that advance U.S. interests, we weaken our ability to promote our
priorities, risk losing altogether our voting rights, and effectively
empower others to determine how and when America engages. As a result,
our ability to defend Israel from unfair and biased attacks in the
United Nations will also be greatly damaged.
Question. A total of $836.6 million has been requested for the
Global Climate Change Initiative in FY 2013 [sic]. The Executive Budget
Summary says that the programs which receive these funds will work to
``improve the resilience of countries that are most vulnerable to
climate and weather-related disasters; support fast-growing economic
and regional leaders in their transition to clean energy; and limit
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.''
What countries will be receiving funds to combat climate
change?
Can you please provide my office with a complete list of
countries and programs which will receive these funds?
Answer. Funding for the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) is
requested for programs implemented by the Department of State, USAID,
and the Department of Treasury. The President's FY 2014 budget requests
$836.6 million for GCCI, of which $481.0 million would be programmed
through the Department of State and USAID.
The Department of State's programs focus on diplomatic initiatives
and are generally global in scope. USAID's programs focus on regional
and bilateral programs. GCCI funds do not provide cash transfers to
foreign governments; they provide technical assistance to public and
private stakeholders in partner countries. In the case of USAID
bilateral funding, the FY 2014 budget request seeks funding to support
the following countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Philippines, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Georgia, Ukraine,
Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nepal, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, and
Barbados. Additionally, funding is requested for State Western
Hemisphere Regional and the following USAID regional programs: Africa
Regional, Central Africa Regional, East Africa Regional, Southern
Africa Regional, West Africa Regional, Regional Development Mission--
Asia, Europe and Eurasia Regional, Central America Regional, Latin
America and Caribbean Regional, and South America Regional. Details on
the requested funding levels for each bilateral and regional program
will be provided in the Congressional Budget Justification.
Funding programmed through the Department of State is generally
either transferred to other USG agencies utilizing USG technical and
functional expertise and leadership, or provided to international
organizations including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, the U.N. Environment Program,
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the World
Bank.
In FY 2014, the Department of State plans to fund the following
programs through the GCCI in the areas of adaptation, clean energy, and
sustainable landscapes. Where possible, a list of countries that
benefit from these multilateral programs is provided.
adaptation
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)
The LDCF supports the 49 least developed countries, which are
especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, in
responding to urgent adaptation needs in key development sectors. The
Global Environment Facility (GEF) operates the LDCF, with the World
Bank as Trustee for the fund. The GEF develops its projects through 10
implementing agencies: the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), the U.N.
Environment Program (UNEP), the World Bank, the African Development
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International
Fund for Agricultural Development, the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization, and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization. The
current list of 49 least developed countries (LDCs) eligible for
funding under the LDCF are Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin,
Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Timor-
Leste, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan,
Sudan, Togo, Tanzania, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Zambia.
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)
The GEF operates the SCCF, with the World Bank as Trustee for the
fund. The GEF develops its projects through 10 implementing agencies:
the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), the U.N. Environment Program
(UNEP), the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Fund for
Agricultural Development, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization,
and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization. Unlike the LDCF,
which is specifically dedicated to the urgent and immediate needs of
the LDCs, the SCCF is open to all vulnerable developing countries
(defined as all non-Annex I parties to the UNFCCC). All developing
countries that are party to the Convention are eligible to receive
financial support for adaptation interventions to be integrated into
development activities.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change/U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assesses the
state of our understanding of the science, impacts, and possible
response strategies to address climate change. U.S. contributions to
the IPCC do not support country programs. The U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change Secretariat provides organizational and technical
support for negotiation and implementation processes under the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The nearly 200 Parties to the
Convention are divided into three main groups according to differing
commitments: Annex I Parties, which are the industrialized countries
that were members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the
EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and
several Central and Eastern European States; Annex II Parties, which
include the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties; and Non-
Annex I Parties, which are mostly developing countries. The 49 Parties
classified as least developed countries (LDCs) by the United Nations
are given special consideration under the Convention due to their
limited capacity to respond to climate change and adapt to its adverse
effects.
clean energy
The Global Methane Initiative (GMI)
The GMI is implemented through the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). EPA develops its GMI implementation plan on an annual basis,
based in part upon the interest and capacity of partner country
governments to support methane reduction activities. GMI activities
utilizing FY 2014 funds may include work with the following countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Philippines, Peru, Poland,
Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)
The CCAC is implemented through EPA and the United Nations
Environment Program. Country engagement primarily focuses on developing
countries that are formal partners of the CCAC, including Bangladesh,
Benin, Chile, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Jordan, Maldives, Mexico, Nigeria, and Peru, but could also
include select other countries that are not currently partners.
The Renewable Energy Deployment Initiative (Climate REDI), Clean Energy
Ministerial (CEM), and Major Economies Forum (MEF)
Climate REDI is implemented through the Department of Energy and is
the primary vehicle through which the United States sponsors activities
in support of the CEM and MEF. Primary recipients are developing and
emerging market countries that are members of the CEM, including India,
Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa. Other emerging market CEM members
include China and Russia, which have not received funding to date but
could benefit from funding in the future. Some Climate REDI programs,
such as the Clean Energy Solutions Center, benefit a much wider group
of developing countries that reach out to the Solution Center's ``Ask
an Expert'' staff for policy support. Additional countries that have
received assistance through such ad-hoc requests to the Solutions
Center include: Argentina, Chile, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Iraq,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Laos, Micronesia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Sierra
Leone, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Suriname, Uganda, and Vietnam.
Enhancing Capacity for Low Emission Development Strategies (EC-LEDS)
EC-LEDS, which is primarily funded through USAID, provides
technical assistance and support to developing countries for the
development and implementation of low emission development strategies.
These strategies assist countries to achieve their economic and social
development objectives while reducing greenhouse emissions over the
longer term. The EC-LEDS program works in the following countries:
Albania, Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa Rica, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala,
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Malawi, Mexico, Moldova, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Serbia,
Thailand, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zambia.
Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund
The purpose of the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund is to assist
what are referred to as Article 5 Parties to implement the Protocol's
obligations for those countries. Article 5 countries are developing
countries whose annual level of consumption of ozone depleting
substances (ODS) was less than 0.3 kilograms per capita at the time of
entry into force of the Protocol for them. A list of these countries
can be found in the following link: http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/
parties_under_article5_para1.php. The Department of State does not plan
to provide funds to all of these countries. For example, the Department
of State does not fund the Republic of Korea and the United Arab
Emirates, both Article 5 countries. In addition, Section 307(a) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the United States
to withhold its proportionate share of expenditures for programs funded
by the International Organizations and Programs account for Iran, Cuba,
Burma, North Korea, and the PLO or entities associated with the PLO.
Funding for the IPCC and UNFCCC falls under both the Adaptation and
Clean Energy pillars of the GCCI. These two programs are also funded
from the IO&P account and are subject to the same legislative
restriction cited above as the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund.
sustainable landscapes
FY 2014 Sustainable Landscapes funding implemented through the
World Bank will support work in developing countries seeking to reduce
net emissions by improving land use through sustainable landscapes,
REDD+, LEDS, or related strategies. The Department of State also plans
to provide a portion of its $10 million in Sustainable Landscapes
funding to a multilateral fund to support reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+)
with FY 2014 funds. Funds that may be considered for U.S. assistance
include the BioCarbon Fund, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
(FCPF), or the World Bank Forest Investment Program (FIP). Countries
that will benefit from this work will depend on the fund to which
assistance is provided.
Question. The MCC takes a different approach to foreign assistance
than many competing agencies in that it requires a recipient country to
meet certain indicators to qualify for varying levels of assistance. It
also requires that recipient countries have some stake in their
compacts, as well.
The budget request for the MCC has been consistently less robust
than it used to be for at least the last 4 fiscal years. I understand
better than most that budgets are constrained these days, but these
lower requests occurred before the current fiscal crisis had really set
it. And while the budget request for MCC has been less robust, budgets
for USAID have grown.
What is the reason that the budget requests for the MCC has
been decreased, while USAID's has been increased?
Answer. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a critical
component of the U.S. Government international programs. With its
selective approach and focus on broad-based economic growth and
democratic governance, MCC advances countries along the path to
reliance on domestic resources, foreign investment, and trade rather
than foreign aid. The entire U.S. Government development community is
learning and applying broader lessons from MCC about economic analysis,
growth, evaluation, the cost-effectiveness of development investments,
monitoring and evaluation, and data-driven approaches to decisions.
All development agencies currently face a very constrained budget
environment and, as a result, the overall FY 2014 foreign assistance
request is 6 percent below the FY 2012 enacted level. The request
addresses many foreign assistance priorities that are not within the
scope of MCC programs, including humanitarian assistance, aid to
support post-crisis transitions from armed conflict, and security
assistance. The level of USAID funding also reflects that Agency's role
in implementing the administration's key development programs: the
Global Health Initiative, Feed the Future, and the Global Climate
Change Initiative. The administration will continue to support MCC and
the unique skills and strengths it provides.
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