[Senate Hearing 113-180]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-180
EXAMINING PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN
ZIMBABWE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
86-777 PDF WASHINGTON : 2014
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico RAND PAUL, Kentucky
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona, opening statement... 3
Gast, Hon. Earl, Assistant Administrator for Africa, Bureau for
Africa, United States Agency for International Development,
Washington, DC................................................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Mahvinga, Dewa, senior researcher, Human Rights Watch,
Washington, DC................................................. 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Moss, Todd, Ph.D., vice president for programs and senior fellow,
Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.................. 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Articles submitted as attachments to prepared statement:
Appendix A--Article from the Robert F. Kennedy Center for
Justice and Human Rights............................... 44
Appendix B--Article from the Washington Post, July 5,
2008................................................... 46
Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis
Group, Washington, DC.......................................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Yamamoto, Hon. Donald, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
(iii)
EXAMINING PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN
ZIMBABWE
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
A. Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Coons, and Flake.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. Good morning. I would like to call this
hearing of the African Affairs Subcommittee to order. Today we
will focus our attention on Zimbabwe, a country with abundant
natural resources, human resources, fertile land, and a capable
and enterprising population. Zimbabwe should be driving growth
and prosperity in southern Africa, but today instead, in the 33
years since independence, Zimbabweans' prospects have become
increasingly bleak, having reached a low point in 2008 when the
economy nearly collapsed and having slowly made modest progress
since.
It is no coincidence the economic collapse came at the same
time as a significant decrease in respect for democratic
principles and the rule of law and harsh crackdowns on free
expression, civil society, and the news media.
Zimbabweans will go to the polls at some point later this
year for the first elections under their newly ratified
constitution, and the preparation for and conduct of these
elections will be an important indicator of whether Zimbabwe
can and will realize its great economic and democratic
potential.
I would like to welcome my partner on the subcommittee,
Ranking Member Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona, who brings with
him considerable personal insight on Zimbabwe from his time
spent in that country, and I look forward to continuing to work
with him to advance our shared interests in good governance,
economic growth, and security throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses today:
Don Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa;
Earl Gast, the Assistant Administrator for Africa at USAID, on
our first panel, as well as our second panel to follow them:
Dewa Mahvinga, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch; Mark
Schneider, senior VP at International Crisis Group; and Todd
Moss, the vice president for programs and senior fellow at the
Center for Global Development. I look forward to hearing your
insights and thank you for being here.
Relations between the United States and Zimbabwe are guided
by our shared aspiration for democratic and humanitarian
values. The United States, though, has in recent years had to
impose targeted travel and financial sanctions against
individuals and businesses in Zimbabwe who have been engaged in
persistently undermining democratic institutions. But we have
in other ways remained a steadfast partner to the people of
Zimbabwe. We have provided, over the dozen years since 2001,
nearly $1.5 billion in support, much of which has helped
address ongoing health and humanitarian needs of millions of
regular Zimbabweans. The fiscal year 2014 request, if I am not
mistaken, is for $135 million.
Although providing this aid has been in the broadest sense
the right thing to do, better governance and respect for rule
of law in Zimbabwe would open the door to a stronger and
different kind of partnership with the United States, one that
leverages our resources and expertise more strategically to
expand trade and investment and cooperatively approach vital
regional challenges. Zimbabweans need not be destined for
prolonged dependence on foreign aid.
The upcoming elections offer Zimbabweans a critical chance
to show their commitment to their new constitution, which
limits Executive power and protects civil rights, and to build
on the stabilization of the economy ushered in under the
coalition government.
SADC members have a critical and challenging role to play
in supporting the elections and in holding Zimbabwe accountable
to the standards it set in its new constitution. I am concerned
from recent reports that the Zimbabwean Government is not
working in good faith with SADC and other international
partners to ensure these elections will be free and fair,
especially considering the lengths to which President Mugabe
and his ZANU-PF loyalists went to preserve power in the 2008
elections. I am alarmed by the uptick in targeted harassment
and intimidation of civil society leaders and human rights
defenders who are seeking to ensure a free, fair, and open
election. Activists such as human rights lawyer Beatrice Mtetwa
have been harassed and arrested and leaders of security forces
have in some recent instances been openly partisan and acting
to suppress democratic expression.
Today's hearing will look at the tools the United States
could effectively deploy to support the upcoming elections and
post-electoral reforms, to support increased respect for human
rights and rule of law and mutually beneficial relations
between our countries. I look forward to continuing my own
engagement with SADC members and the administration following
on this hearing and to make recommendations based on the advice
we hear from our five witnesses today.
With that, I turn it over to Senator Flake for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Flake. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for
arranging this hearing, and thank you to the witnesses. I look
forward to the testimony.
As you mentioned, I have a personal interest here. I spent
a good deal of time in Zimbabwe in 1982-1983, back when there
was great hope that things would turn out better than they
have. As the chairman said, the purpose of this hearing is to
see what we can do, what constructive role can the United
States play to ensure a better future than it looks like we are
in for right now. We will see if these election dates will hold
and, if they do, if the outcome will be respected and will be
credible.
So look forward to the testimony and thank you again for
coming.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
I would now like to turn to our first panel, starting with
Ambassador Yamamoto and then followed by Assistant
Administrator Gast.
Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD YAMAMOTO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Senator Coons and
Senator Flake. And thank you very much for having this hearing
on Zimbabwe, and also for your deep concern and also great work
on this important issue. For the sake of time, I would like to
submit a longer version for the record.
I would like to start off by noting that in the past year
we have made engagements to move the Zimbabwe Government toward
a much more open, free, fair, and transparent electoral
process. In that regards, former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young
delivered a letter to President Mugabe from Secretary Kerry
outlining the opportunities for normalized relations.
Let me just say that Zimbabwe now is at the crossroads.
Either it is going to go back to 1999 when it refused to pay
for loans and concede to debt relief, or is it going to go
forward in the progress that has been made in the last few
years? We can see the progress. HIV-AIDS infection rates have
fallen to below 15 percent. That is about half of what it was
in 1999. The United States has helped them to meet the issues
of cholera and tuberculosis and also further the issues on HIV-
AIDS issues.
The other issue, too, is that the MDC-managed finances have
helped to bring down inflation rates to almost zero, but also
to have economic growth in the last 4 years which is about 5
percent. We are also looking at independent newspapers
increasing, commercial radios. Outflows of economic migrants
into South Africa and to other areas has decreased. Trade is up
with the United States from about $100 million to $160 million.
But these all stand to be sacrificed if these upcoming
elections are not free, fair, open, and transparent. We share
your deep concerns about the trendlines that we are seeing. But
the recent statements by SADC to have Zimbabwe go back to the
constitutional process, the African Union sending observers, I
think we are going to continue to work with all the
stakeholders to ensure that this happens.
But if it does not, if we do have a problem of regression
on the part of Zimbabwe, then I think we can look at other
issues and other areas in which we can make a difference for
the people of Zimbabwe. Again, this is at a crossroads for
Zimbabwe, the future progress for the people of Zimbabwe or to
the past.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Yamamoto follows:]
Prepared Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary Donald Yamamoto
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for holding this hearing on Zimbabwe. Thank
you also for affording me the privilege of testifying before you about
this very important country at this critical juncture. It is my honor
to have this opportunity to speak with you and our other assembled
guests here today about the Department of State's work in Zimbabwe. We
appreciate the deep interest of this committee in Zimbabwe over the
years, and we are pleased to work closely with Members of Congress in
support of our national interests in Zimbabwe and the region.
After nearly 5 years under Zimbabwe's unity government, 2013 began
as a year of promise and opportunity for Zimbabwe. In February,
President Mugabe's ZANU-PF party and the MDC parties led by Morgan
Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube agreed on a draft constitution. In March,
Zimbabwe held a peaceful referendum in which the Zimbabwean people
overwhelmingly approved the draft constitution and, on May 22,
President Mugabe signed Zimbabwe's new constitution into law.
The June 15 communique issued by the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) called for the parties in Zimbabwe's unity government
to seek more time to complete important reforms and create a conducive
environment for peaceful, credible elections. Too short a timeline
would risk undermining the careful work of SADC to build a framework
for peaceful, credible, transparent elections and to ensure necessary
reforms are in place.
These elections present an important opportunity for Zimbabwe to
improve its relationship with the United States by holding elections
that are regarded as peaceful, credible, and transparent by a broad
range of international observers. Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
and civil rights leader, Andrew Young, recently delivered a letter to
President Mugabe from Secretary Kerry outlining this opportunity. As
elections approach, however, reports indicate that elements within
Zimbabwean political parties and government security agencies have
already begun efforts to intimidate voters and illicitly shape the
outcome of the elections.
This includes a troubling trend of arrests, detentions, and
harassment of organizations and individuals working on human rights,
electoral assistance, and related issues. The chilly reception offered
to a partial U.N. Electoral Needs Assessment Mission (after all but one
member of the delegation was denied entry into Zimbabwe), Zimbabwean
hardliners' persistence in brushing off calls for a broad range of
international election observers, and ZANU-PF's insistence on the
removal of all sanctions rather than recognizing good faith efforts to
ease some restrictions constitute obstacles to the conditions that we
feel are necessary for warming relations between the United States and
Zimbabwe. Influential officials within the Zimbabwean Government and
the Zimbabwean defense and security sectors who benefit from the
perpetuation of the status quo remain the most vocal critics of further
engagement with the ``West.''
The Government of Zimbabwe now faces a key decision point. Zimbabwe
must decide whether it will support a credible electoral process, or
continue to repress its people and isolate itself from the
international community. The 2011 Southern African Development
Community's (SADC) Roadmap and Zimbabwe's new constitution outline key
reforms focused on voter education and registration, inspection of
voters' rolls, media reform, security sector reform, freedom of
assembly and association. We are concerned that holding elections
without providing adequate time for voter registration, inspection of
voters' rolls, other needed electoral and democratic reforms--
particularly reforms of the Public Order and Security Act, media
reforms, and security sector reforms--will put the credibility of the
outcome at risk.
The United States shares the same fundamental interest as the
people of Zimbabwe: a stable, peaceful, democratic Zimbabwe that
reflects the will of her people and provides for their needs. U.S.
support for human rights and democracy groups contributed to the
success of the long and difficult development of Zimbabwe's new
constitution. The U.S. also supported Zimbabwe's progress in attaining
universal coverage for antiretroviral treatment, reducing the HIV/AIDS
prevalence to just under 15 percent and extending the quality and reach
of Zimbabwe's health care system. U.S. development assistance in
smallholder farming has improved the lives of tens of thousands of
everyday Zimbabweans, and U.S. support to the quasi-governmental
statistics and economic research institutions, as well as
nongovernmental organizations, has fostered a more disciplined approach
to evidence-based fiscal and agriculture policy development in
Zimbabwe.
In May, following the peaceful and credible constitutional
referendum, and as a means of demonstrating the sincerity of our intent
to work toward normalizing relations should Zimbabwe make progress
consolidating its democratic institutions, the administration eased
restrictions on two Zimbabwean banks--the Agricultural Development Bank
of Zimbabwe and the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe. Both
remain on the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) list of
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN List), despite the issuance of a
General License by OFAC allowing Americans to conduct transactions with
those banks. As part of our regular review of U.S. targeted sanctions,
we also removed eight individuals and one entity designated under the
Zimbabwe sanctions program from the SDN list. Some of the individuals
are recently deceased, but others have left their positions in the
Zimbabwean Government or are now using positions of influence to effect
positive change; 113 individuals and 70 entities remain sanctioned
under the Zimbabwe program today.
In an effort to leverage SADC's consistent position that elections
in Zimbabwe should be conducted properly rather than expediently, we in
Washington and our Ambassadors in the field have been working to
highlight and reinforce key U.S. policies on Zimbabwe, including strong
support for SADC as the guarantor of the Global Political Agreement
(GPA) and creator of the roadmap charting the reforms to which the
unity government has committed. The people of Zimbabwe deserve the full
and complete enactment of the reforms called for in the GPA, the SADC
Roadmap, and the new constitution prior to elections. An environment
free of political intimidation and violence, and the inclusion of a
broad range of international observers, are essential for credible
elections. Led by SADC, a robust contingent of election observers would
play a central role in verifying that the credibility of the upcoming
election and Zimbabwe's ability to live up to international electoral
standards. The absence of local and international observers would
detract from the credibility of the electoral process.
We are also profoundly troubled by the lack of transparency within
the diamond sector and the possibilities for illicit diamond sales in
Zimbabwe. We are concerned about ongoing reports that diamond mining
entities in Zimbabwe are being exploited by people in senior government
and military positions for personal gain, that revenues from those
enterprises are being diverted for partisan activities that undermine
democracy, and that proceeds from diamond sales are enriching a few
individuals and not the Treasury and people of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean
people deserve to benefit from Zimbabwe's diamond fields and the many
millions of carats (and dollars) that they likely hold.
Giving all Zimbabweans the opportunity to choose their government
this year, in peaceful, credible, and transparent elections, will help
ensure a democratic, prosperous future for Zimbabwe. The United States
Government has made it clear that we deeply respect the sovereign will
of the Zimbabwean people, and that we will work with any government
chosen in such elections.
We are prepared to consider steps to further roll back sanctions
and expand trade and investment between our countries. However, as a
necessary first step, Zimbabwe must first hold elections that are
peaceful, credible, transparent, and truly reflective of the will of
the Zimbabwean people, and which are verified as such by a broad range
of international observers. Thank you for providing me the opportunity
to speak with your committee today. I welcome any questions you may
have at this time.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ambassador.
Assistant Administrator Gast.
STATEMENT OF HON. EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AFRICA, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gast. Good morning, Chairman Coons and Ranking Member
Flake. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I
appreciate your continued interest in how United States
policies and assistance programs can help build a peaceful and
stable democracy in which prosperity is available to all in
Zimbabwe. I would also like to thank Acting Assistant Secretary
Yamamoto for his leadership on this issue.
The negotiated resolution to Zimbabwe's violent electoral
dispute in 2008 brought with it an opportunity for the
consolidation of democratic institutions and improved systems
of governance in Zimbabwe. A government of national unity
agreed on a roadmap to achieve sustained political stability
through stronger democratic processes. Broadly, the General
Political Agreement, or the GPA, required the unity government
to draft a new constitution, enhance basic reforms and
freedoms, and reform Zimbabwe's security sector before the next
elections, because the steps taken before and after election
day are just as important as the election day itself.
However, recently, on the 13th of June, President Mugabe
issued a proclamation fixing July 31 as the day for harmonized
Presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections.
Though he claims his action was compulsory due to a
constitutional court ruling, the ruling itself is highly
questionable as it does not take into account the GPA's
requirements, which are necessary for credible elections.
The absence of transparent and accountable preelectoral
processes will cast doubt regarding the legitimacy of the
election results. At the same time, civil society leaders are
facing increasing incidences of intimidation and harassment.
Restrictions on media freedoms and public meetings,
particularly in rural areas, are common. Furthermore, whether
as a result of insufficient resources or political will,
government attempts to provide even basic information on the
voter registration process have been inadequate. This is as we
are entering the second week of voter registration.
As preparations progress, USAID continues to provide
support where possible in an effort to address or at least
mitigate these challenges. This support has three core pillars.
One is empowering citizen participation in the elections. The
second is supporting observation in the electoral process. Then
the third is supporting credible elections administration.
The first pillar emphasizes access to information as key to
catalyzing participation of citizens, particularly women and
youth, both groups of which have been underrepresented in
elections previously. At USAID-supported youth clubs, young men
and women have consistently expressed concern about the unmet
need for basic information, particularly outside of urban
areas. In response, a dynamic group of young partners has
designed a groundbreaking voter response and a mobilization
campaign that is broadcast on weekly radio programs and through
social media outlets. So it is for the first time that we are
seeing Zimbabwean youth very much engaged in debating issues
that are related to the elections.
Given the history of violence associated with Zimbabwe's
past elections, peace-building and reconciliation are critical,
and we are seeing faith-based organizations stepping up and
playing a critical role. We are seeing large-scale peace
rallies and in those rallies representatives from across the
political spectrum are very much involved in this.
The second pillar of USAID programs focuses on observation
of the electoral process in accordance with the principles of
SADC, which is the regional organization that has been
monitoring the implementation of the GPA. USAID and other
donors are funding domestic observation efforts, but avenues to
support international observation are limited at this point.
Despite calls from the international community and
Zimbabwean civil society for long-term international or
regional observers to document the preelection environment, the
electoral law does not provide a mechanism for accrediting
long-term observers. We feel having long-term observers in
place would absolutely be essential to help ensure that we have
credible elections.
The third pillar of our work is supporting elections
administration. We are engaged with civil society and others to
provide evidence-based research and information on best
practices in the region. The goal is to provide this
information to key stakeholders, including parliamentarians and
members of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, to ensure that
legal and regulatory frameworks provide a foundation for
transparent and credible elections.
Our overall assistance, be it in health or be it in
economic growth, support--our assistance supports these three
pillars. We feel by providing basic services for Zimbabwe's
citizens we not only meet immediate needs, but also demonstrate
that better governance can lead to better lives. We have
provided substantial support to combat the spread of HIV-AIDS,
while other efforts are increasing food security, which is now
a critical issue for Zimbabwe, and we are working to improve
Zimbabwe's business environment to help attract private
investment.
We will continue to prioritize human rights and conflict
mitigation and management activities as we move to the
elections and beyond the elections.
Thank you for your support.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Administrator Earl Gast
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and members of the
subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak
with you today. I appreciate your continued interest in how U.S.
policies and assistance programs can help Zimbabweans build a peaceful
and stable democracy in which prosperity is available to all. I would
also like to thank the Acting Assistant Secretary for Africa at the
Department of State for his leadership on this issue.
The negotiated resolution to Zimbabwe's violent electoral dispute
in 2008 brought with it an opportunity for the consolidation of
democratic institutions and improved systems of governance in Zimbabwe.
A Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed, composed of Zimbabwe's
then-ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF), and the two factions of the former opposition party,
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)-MDC-T (Tsvangirai) and MDC-N
(Ncube). Together, the parties of the unity government agreed on a
roadmap to achieve sustained political stability through stronger
democratic processes. Broadly, the General Political Agreement (GPA)
required that the GNU would draft a new constitution, enhance basic
freedoms (including media), and reform Zimbabwe's security sector
before the next elections were held.
USAID has strongly supported the unity government's efforts to
implement the GPA, including the development of a new constitution,
which was adopted in May 2013. The U.S. Government worked with the
Zimbabwean Parliament and civil society to ensure that the new
constitution would expand protections under the bill of rights and
enhance gender equity provisions. USAID support for civil society
activities culminated in an awareness-raising program highlighting the
need for youth to peacefully participate in the March 16 referendum
through which a record voter turnout overwhelmingly endorsed the new
constitution.
Yet challenges remain. On May 31, the Constitutional Court ruled
that elections must be held by the end of July, and on June 13
President Mugabe issued a Presidential decree declaring July 31 the
date of elections. However, little progress has been made on the other
key reforms identified in the GPA--most notably, media and security
sector reforms--and it is unlikely that full implementation of the
agreement could occur by July 31. The constitution includes strict
requirements that must be fulfilled during the preelection period,
including voter registration and inspection of the voter role, and
candidate primaries. It also requires that the Electoral Law be updated
by the Parliament to reflect changes in the constitution before an
election date can be set--procedures that were not respected in
President Mugabe's decree. The absence of clear, governing law may give
rise to challenges in the post-election period and underscores the need
to follow an agreed upon, detailed election roadmap.
The requirements included in the GPA are important because progress
made in reforming these sectors is necessary for a credible election.
The absence of transparent and accountable preelectoral processes will
cast doubt regarding the legitimacy of the election results. Civil
society leaders are facing increasing incidences of intimidation and
harassment. Restrictions on media freedoms and public meetings--
particularly in rural areas--are common. Furthermore, whether as a
result of insufficient resources or political will, government attempts
to provide basic information on the voter registration process have
been inadequate. The steps taken before and after election day are just
as, if not more, important than the election day itself.
The new chair of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) has
demonstrated commitment to addressing many of these shortcomings and is
reaching out to key stakeholders, including political party leaders and
civil society, to improve the process. Previously, it cost $30,000 to
obtain a comprehensive copy of the country's voter rolls--a sum out of
reach of political parties and civil society. As a result of her direct
efforts, the cost has dropped to $5,000. These efforts could produce
legitimate reforms to begin to address the question of the Zimbabwean
Government's ability and will to conduct free and fair registration and
electoral processes.
As preparations progress, USAID continues to provide support where
possible in an effort to address these challenges. This support has
three core pillars: empowering citizen participation in the elections,
observing the election process, and supporting credible election
administration.
The first pillar emphasizes access to information as key to
catalyzing the participation of citizens--particularly women and youth.
At USAID-supported youth clubs, young men and women have consistently
expressed concern about the unmet need for basic information,
particularly outside of urban areas. In response, a dynamic group of
young partners designed a groundbreaking voter mobilization campaign
that is broadcast on weekly radio programs and through social media
outlets. For the first time, Zimbabwean youth are discussing and
debating issues related to their participation in elections. The
campaign's popularity continues to expand, and the ZEC has been
critical to its success. ZEC staff members regularly participate in the
radio program and field live questions from listeners on the challenges
they face in attempting to register. Similar programs use engaging
events such as theater and music concerts as an opportunity to have
well-known Zimbabweans disseminate information on elections and the
importance of voting. Other voter outreach activities have been
conducted through townhall style meetings, community dialogue, and
community newsletters.
Given the history of violence associated with Zimbabwean elections,
peace-building and reconciliation are critical, and faith-based
organizations play a central role. As a complement to voter
mobilization activities, the United States supports faith-based
organizations' efforts to conduct large-scale peace rallies that
feature gospel music and other performances. Messages calling for
peaceful elections are delivered by representatives from across the
political spectrum as well as religious leaders, and thousands of
Zimbabweans turn out for each event.
The second pillar of USAID support focuses on observation of the
election process in accordance with the principles of the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC)--the regional organization that has
been monitoring implementation of the GPA. USAID and other donors are
supporting domestic observation efforts. However, avenues to support
international observation are more limited. Despite calls from the
international community and Zimbabwean civil society for long-term
international or regional observers to document the preelection
environment, the current Electoral Law does not provide a mechanism for
accrediting long-term observers--a critical gap. At this point in time,
the USG is not funding regional or international observation
delegations and it remains unclear whether the Government of Zimbabwe
will accredit such observers in a timeframe allowing them to make an
informed assessment of the overall electoral process. It is important
to note even before elections take place that trust in the credibility
of the election is not possible if long-term observers are not allowed.
The third pillar of our support is in the critical area of election
administration. Efforts are underway to secure approval of a memorandum
of understanding between the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES) and the Government of Zimbabwe, which would enable USAID
to provide support for the ZEC's priority actions. In the interim,
USAID supports election administration strengthening and civil society
efforts to provide evidence-based research and information on election-
related best practices in the region. The goal is to provide this
information to key stakeholders, including Parliamentarians and members
of the ZEC, to ensure that Zimbabwe's legal and regulatory frameworks
provide a foundation for transparent and credible electoral processes
consistent with international norms and guidelines.
Supporting each of these three pillars is USAID's overarching
assistance to Zimbabwe. By providing basic services for Zimbabwe's
citizens, we not only meet immediate needs of citizens but also
demonstrate that better governance can lead to better lives. The United
States provides substantial support to combat the spread of HIV through
the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Other efforts
are increasing food security--now a critical issue for Zimbabwe--and
working to improve Zimbabwe's business enabling environment to attract
private sector investment, particularly in the once-thriving
agricultural sector. USAID is also working with the Ministries of
Finance and Economic Planning to strengthen human and institutional
capacity for economic policy analysis, and to rebuild Zimbabwe's
statistical foundations for economic analysis. These activities
encourage the use of evidence-based economic policy research as a
counterpoint to politically driven debate around economic policies.
They also seek to broadly disseminate policy research and analysis to
encourage public- private dialogue to improve Zimbabwe's economic
policies and strengthen the policymaking process. In the short term,
given the targeted harassment and intimidation of human rights
defenders and democracy advocates in the lead up to the elections, the
United States will continue to prioritize human rights and conflict
mitigation and management activities.
We continue to believe that the Government of Zimbabwe can promote
conditions for a credible electoral process in the preelection period,
on election day, and in the tabulation of results, and USAID will
continue to support its efforts. At the same time, we need to maintain
our vigilance to ensure that barriers to participation--whether it is
through intimidation, media restrictions, or denial of public assembly
in the period running up to the election--do not undermine the
credibility of those results.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Flake, and members of the
subcommittee for the continued commitment you have shown to the
Zimbabwean people and your support for real reform within the
government. I welcome any questions you might have.
Senator Coons. Thank you to both our witnesses. We will now
begin a round of questions, 7 minutes at a time, if we might.
First, if I might, Ambassador Yamamoto, you mentioned a
recent development regarding the AU and observers. Just fill us
in with a little more detail about what role the African Union
is playing, or could play, and how essential SADC has been, and
could be, to ensuring a free, fair, and effective election.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you, Senator. Right now SADC has
taken the lead in the recent meeting this past weekend in
response to, I think, some of the comments made by Prime
Minister Tsvangirai that the electoral process needs to be much
more broad-based, the ability for the electoral commissions to
register people properly and for it to hold elections in a very
free and not rushed environment.
So the July 31 timeframe, the SADC has gone back and said
this has to be done according to the electoral process. The
issue is that the African Union, which is a very positive
development, is going to be sending or has sent election
observers into Zimbabwe.
What we are trying to do is--and we encourage not only the
leadership that SADC has taken, South Africa, which we commend,
but also the African Union under its new leadership, the
Chairman Madam Zuma. But also we look to the United Nations
also to take a leadership role. I think these groups and
international groups together can make a difference in moving
Zimbabwe toward making the right decisions and having free,
fair, and open elections.
Senator Coons. Assistant Administrator Gast, you mentioned
these three pillars: empowering participants, election
observers, and election administration. Talk, if you would, in
a little more detail about what the Zimbabwean Electoral
Commission, the ZEC, needs to be able to effectively administer
an election and what these regional best practices are that you
are trying to help present information about and support ZEC in
implementing?
Mr. Gast. Senator Coons, there has been a recent change in
the leadership at the ZEC, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.
Joyce Kazembe, who is coming from the Supreme Court, was
recently placed in charge of the commission back in March, and
I think by and large, talking with our Embassy, our Ambassador,
our USAID mission, and our international observers. There has
been a sincere outreach on her part and some of the other
commissioners to engage with international partners in a
dialogue.
So we are seeing that they are reaching out to us to talk
about issues related to the electoral process. We also
understand that, in spite of earlier efforts of the Ministry of
Justice to prevent the UNDP from coming in and conducting an
assessment mission and in the future providing support, she has
approached both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Justice in trying to get other international groups, some of
which we work with, to come in and help establish the
milestones and help come up with budget figures on how much it
would cost to run the elections.
Another, I think, important twist is that she is actually
effectively engaging with civil society groups, and she is
beginning a process now, although it is not complete, but she
is beginning a process by which she would be able to register
and accredit local civil society organizations to observe the
elections.
Senator Coons. Does the Zimbabwean Government have the
resources to conduct--let us assume just for the moment that
the constitutional court issues a later deadline--does the
Zimbabwean Government have the resources and the technical
expertise to conduct a free, fair, and open election?
Mr. Gast. We think not on both questions. But we are not
certain that--well, one, no one has seen a specific budget on
what it would cost to administer the elections. I think that is
one of the reasons why the commissioner is reaching out for
international support.
Second, the Minister of Finance, his observation, his
assessment, is roughly it would cost $78 million to run the
elections. That may be a bit low, just looking at other
elections where you are running multiple levels of elections,
parliamentarians, Presidential election, local elections. So we
think that is a bit low.
The third thing related to that is that he has only made
available $20 million of the so-called $78 million that is
needed to conduct elections. Part of it is that the government
runs on a cash-based basis, meaning what is in the coffers is
what is allocated. So he has initially allocated $20 million to
get the elections under way, but more money is needed,
obviously, very soon if the elections are to take place at the
end of July.
Senator Coons. Is it possible for there to be credible
elections on this short of a timeline with that modest of a
budget, with the restrictions on observers, and with the
limitations on engagement?
Mr. Gast. International observers do not believe that it is
likely that we will have credible elections if we were to
proceed with the July 31date, looking at all the milestones
necessary, to include a credible voter registration process as
well as an opportunity to audit the voter registry.
Senator Coons. Ambassador Yamamoto, you state in your
prepared testimony--you imply that the administration may be
prepared to reconsider some of the sanctions structure or at
the very least to expand trade and investment with Zimbabwe if
they, in fact, have peaceful, credible, transparent elections.
On the other hand, I will just assert that it is possible that
there are alternative actions we might take if these elections
fall significantly short of the SADC criteria. Speak to that a
little bit more, if you would.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Sure. Nothing is off the table. We
will look at every issue and every option that is before us.
But right now we are so focused just on what SADC has done to
try to move these elections to a much more free, fairer
opportunities for all sides, but also to kind of continue the
good things that are happening.
Just one point is, you know, Tendai Biti, the Finance
Minister, has signed this IMF staff monitoring program, which
is going to help the finance become much more open and
transparent on the finances part. But what we do not want to
see is where we have progress in one area, but not progress in
the main area, which is going to be the electoral process,
because that ultimately is going to define where Zimbabwe goes
to the future. That I think, Senator--and we agree with you--
nothing is off the table.
Senator Coons. Are you concerned that even if there are
relatively peaceful elections, there may not be a smooth
transition to an appropriately elected future government?
Ambassador Yamamoto. That is correct.
Senator Coons. With that, I will hand it over to Senator
Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ambassador Yamamoto, you mentioned that we ought to seek
for more U.N. intervention or involvement. What organ of the
United Nations? Is the Security Council likely to move on this
or is this General Assembly resolutions or what exactly are we
looking for there? What would be useful?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I think right now that is an issue to
be answered by the organizations that are dealing with Zimbabwe
itself. Right now SADC has taken the lead, not only through the
roadmap for the elections, but also the global political
agreement that became really the hallmark, the framework, of
where we are headed toward in Zimbabwe.
The input by the African Union recently with the electoral
observers, that is important. But I think, in consultations
between SADC, the African Union, and the United Nations to look
at where each institution, organization, can play a role in
moving Zimbabwe forward, I think it has to be a discussion with
them.
Senator Flake. Mr. Gast, what has been the impact of the
sanctions that we have imposed, the travel and other targeted
sanctions on leaders? And what leverage do we have going
forward in terms of their reaction? Do you see any movement
based on these sanctions or not?
Mr. Gast. I will let my colleague talk specifically about
the sanctions, but certainly because there are sanctions we are
very careful about whom we work with in the country. So some of
our economic programs, which really are a way of supporting
small farmholders who did not have access to credit, and
looking at linking them to buyers, we go through a very
specific vetting process to make sure that anyone who is on any
of the sanctions lists does not benefit from our assistance.
Senator Flake. Before we go back to answer that question,
the new constitution, how does it address the land reform
issue?
Mr. Gast. It does not address the land reform issue, and
that is one of the problems, is that there is no secure land
tenure in the country. As we were discussing in the back room,
we see that there are two major--certainly one that is on the
books now, the absence of land tenure, which means that no one
can use the land as collateral for getting lending, and so
there is no financing or no lending in the ag sector.
The second issue is indigenization, and they are looking at
putting forward a more aggressive bill to support
indigenization, which would require all international companies
to divest themselves of ownership so that there is a minimum of
51 percent Zimbabwean ownership. So we feel that those are
going to be two major--those are major impediments to
investment going into Zimbabwe.
Senator Flake. With regard to sanctions, what has been the
impact and what leverage do we have moving forward?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I think on the sanctions, of course,
it is on 113 individuals and entities. They remain really the
framework which we are using to work with the Zimbabwe
Government to do the right things. I think the sanctions as
they stand now is on assets and of course travel.
We are constantly reviewing and looking at how we can beef
up, strengthen those sanctions. But I think for the time being
the sanctions we have in place seem to be our policy for the
time being, and it is always under constant review.
One thing on the land reform is, we are also looking at
that very, very carefully, because on the land reform, if we
cannot have the Zimbabwean Government move forward on a
rationalization of land, but more important is the transference
of land with titles, that I think is going to be bad for not
only the economy, but I think on the overall stability of the
country.
Senator Flake. With regard to the electoral process, Mr.
Gast, you mentioned that the preelection requirements have
not--there is insufficient time to get those in place. What
amount of time is needed in your estimation to have these in
place?
Mr. Gast. There are a number of laws and the constitution
have very strict timelines. So there is some conflict among
them. Parliament goes out of session at the end of June and
there is a
4-month gap by which elections have to be held. So if you
extend that out, elections have to be held no later than some
time in October.
The other requirements are the fact that there has to be a
30-day voter registration process and then another 30 days to
review and audit the rolls, as well as time for the political
parties to nominate candidates. Again, we are dealing with
multiple levels of elections, so parliamentary as well as local
elections. And then for those candidates to be announced, as
well as the campaigning period.
So, using that as a timeline, others in the MDC and other
observers have said that potentially one could meet--they could
meet the milestones if elections were pushed back about 30 days
toward the end of August.
Senator Flake. With regard to the economy, you mentioned 5
percent growth or some estimates as high as 7. Is this
artificial? Can this be maintained, assuming we have some
version of the status quo after the election? Do you believe
that the economic growth that has occurred over the past year
or so will continue, Ambassador?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I think those will be held in jeopardy
if the elections are not free, fair, open, because it would
send a message to investors that the government has reneged on
its commitment toward those electoral processes. The end result
is if you do not have confidence in that government the
investments will start to dry up. So that is why we said that
the government and the people of Zimbabwe are really at a
crossroads with these elections.
Senator Flake. In recent years the government has
collateralized a lot of the industry and minerals there. To
what extent have they gone? I think the airport near Victoria
Falls, commercial activity has been mortgaged, if you will.
Some of the mineral rights. What else has the government done
in order to meet short-term cash flow needs?
Ambassador Yamamoto. We would have to get back to you on
the specificity. Just on some of its intake and revenues, we
are seeing that they have not capitalized on a lot of the
resources that they have exported and that they have not taken
full advantage. Of course, that becomes mainly due because of
lack of transparency.
One of the issues that we support with the IMF on the staff
monitoring program is that it gives greater transparency to
financial resources and intake.
But we will get back to you on more information.
[Editor's note.--A response to the above question was not
supplied by the time this hearing went to press.]
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
Ambassador, your written testimony raises concern about the
diversion of diamond revenues to the security sector that is
directly or indirectly being used in suppressing civil
liberties. What is the United States doing to address those
concerns and have concerns like this been addressed effectively
through the Kimberley Process or is the Kimberley Process not
either relevant or effective, moving forward, to ensuring that
natural resources revenues are taken care of responsibly and
appropriately in Zimbabwe?
Ambassador Yamamoto. As you know, Senator--thank you,
Senator. For 1 year we were the chair for the Kimberley Process
and we made a great effort to look at rationalizing how the
Marange mines are operated, how free and fair and open it is in
its operations, and that money from the diamonds are not
diverted.
As you know, from the resources and the amount of diamonds
that Zimbabwe has they can earn probably as much as $600
million a year or more. Right now the estimate is about $47
million. So the question comes in is what happened? Where is
that? Where is the money? Are they not efficient in how they
sell those diamonds, or is it being diverted toward other means
that are illicit or not in keeping with support of the general
public? Those are questions that we constantly ask.
We do not have the complete answers, but we only have
concerns that those moneys are not being used for the support
of the people of Zimbabwe.
Senator Coons. So do you think the Kimberley Process
continues to be relevant to this conversation?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes.
Senator Coons. And what more can we or should we do moving
forward?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I think the Kimberley Process, what we
try to do is make it a much more rational and decisive
institution and organization. I think its establishment has
been effective in trying to control the flow of diamonds and it
remains relevant in how we manage the diamond markets. I think
it also holds Zimbabwe and other countries in many ways
accountable to what they need to be doing on the diamonds.
But let me just also add on the sanctions, on the 113
individuals and 7 entities. What it does do, too, is that it
limits the ability of the mining sector to distribute diamonds
or conflict minerals to the United States and to other
countries.
Senator Coons. The Vice Premier of China visited Zimbabwe
last month and I have raised in previous hearings concerns
about ways in which China's expanding economic role in the
continent may provide a counterweight to our values agenda
around democracy, human rights, open media, and so forth. Do
expanding Chinese interests in Zimbabwe lessen incentives for
the government to improve respect for human rights, or is China
simply positioning itself to play a stronger role in the
economy in a way that does not influence the elections or the
outcome? Any input for me, Assistant Administrator Gast or
Ambassador Yamamoto, on the role China is playing?
Mr. Gast. China, obviously, has a noninterference approach,
which means that they do not engage the government on reforms.
As we have always said, U.S. business is great for the
continent in so many ways because it also brings good
governance principles. We do not see that when we see Chinese
investment.
The deals generally are shrouded in secrecy. There is no
transparency and it actually helps to further, if you will,
corruption or corrupt practices.
Ambassador Yamamoto. If I can add one point to that.
Senator Coons. Please, Ambassador.
Ambassador Yamamoto. We are headed into our seventh
bilateral discussions with the Chinese that we started several
years ago. These are some of the issues that we have raised
with the Chinese directly, that if they are going to use the
resources--and right now they are at $150 billion and that is
mainly raw materials and resources from Africa--if they are
going to be focused on that, then they have to look at what is
good for, or will help benefit, the people in Africa and make
sure that all these resources are accountable and accounted
for.
So those are some of the things that we are looking at.
Yes, there are a lot of areas that we have deep concerns, but I
think through these negotiations and meetings annually that we
are addressing these, and it is going to be very tough
negotiations and talks.
Senator Coons. Well, if Zimbabwe were to change and if we
were to see a changed timeline, with free and fair and open
elections, an orderly election, and a peaceful transition to a
new government, what might we be able to do in response? What
sort of expanded programs or activities might USAID take that
would significantly increase economic opportunity and improve
the lot of the average Zimbabwean?
Mr. Gast. Obviously, we have been consulting with like-
minded donors and also some of the major financial
institutions--African Development Bank and World Bank.
Obviously, institution-building would be needed, putting in
good systems of accountable governance, to include economic
governance.
But one area that could make a big difference in Zimbabwe
is in the agricultural sector, doing more in supporting small
landholders, getting people employed in the ag sector, and
starting with that. The industries that have languished over
the years will take years and years of investment before they
come back in line, but to make an immediate impact we feel that
on the economic side the focus should be on agriculture and
linking small farmholders, landholders, to larger markets and
also buyers in the region.
Senator Coons. These are areas where USAID and other
elements of the U.S. Government have successfully led
significant initiatives and investment and have made real
progress in other countries in the region?
Mr. Gast. In other countries, and we are also doing very
similar things with some of the small landholders in Zimbabwe.
So we are working with approximately 90,000 landholders,
families that own land, and helping provide them with technical
assistance in good farming techniques, access to inputs, and
also, more importantly, access to credit.
Senator Coons. Last question, if I might, for both of you.
What are the specific benchmarks or the conditions that would
have to be met to justify increasing engagement with, or
support for, the Zimbabwean Government going forward?
Mr. Gast. Our Ambassador has publicly stated in Zimbabwe
that credible, peaceful elections is absolutely a must before
we can talk about further engagement and deepening engagement
with the Government of Zimbabwe.
Ambassador Yamamoto. And based on that framework, we can
work on the other areas, such as media freedoms, the
agriculture, the economy, and the finance.
Then just to add to what my colleague has said, in striking
terms Zimbabwe should be the breadbasket for southern Africa.
It should be. It is importing food. We are providing
humanitarian assistance for--in the nineties--7 million people.
It is now down to 1.6 million. But that should not be the case.
This is a rich, very rich country. It should be the leading
light for southern Africa. As the regional leaders have said,
this is as much a problem for these countries as it is for
Zimbabwe and the people of Zimbabwe.
Senator Coons. So to summarize, let me just make sure I
hear you right. Credible, free, fair elections are the
beginning, beyond which there are other critical benchmarks,
including a transition to a new government and progress on
human rights, media freedoms, and so forth.
Thank you very much.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Well, that was my question, Is what would
constitute progress enough--sufficient for us to normalize
relations, to remove the sanctions?
Let me just say, I met with MDC officials a couple years
ago. They were calling for relaxing some of these sanctions.
Obviously, Andrew Young and others who have gone there have
called for that as well. To what extent is the opposition, the
MDC and others, publicly still calling for normalization or at
least some kind of lessening or weakening of these sanctions?
And is that their true feeling or is that a public posture that
they feel differently otherwise? What is your assessment there?
Ambassador Yamamoto. That is a very difficult question to
answer in a public forum. The issue for the sanctions is, yes,
regional leaders have approached us and said that if sanctions
were lifted Zimbabwe could have a freer access toward
developing their economy and reaching out to its people. Our
position has been that the sanctions are there because the
government has not reached out to its people, because it has
not done the right things in various areas. So those sanctions
remain.
As we told the MDC people and the others, the MDC, that
these sanctions are in their interests as well, and they
understand that. And ZANU-PF also understands why those
sanctions are in place and they are going to remain so until
there is changes.
Senator Flake. What motivated our recent decision to waive
the sanctions with regard to the African Development Bank?
Ambassador Yamamoto. You mean the Agriculture and the
Infrastructure Development Banks? Those were our normal review
of sanctions. So the eight individuals, eight individuals and
entity that we looked at, we looked at whether or not they were
making progress toward being much more open and transparent in
their processes and their restrictions.
Anyway, so in that regards we had determined through the
sanctions review process that they were meeting some of those
trendlines and so therefore we lifted just part of the
sanctions.
Senator Flake. Mr. Gast, do you think that State and the
impact at AID--do we have the flexibility that we need, the
administration, with regard to these sanctions to help try to
prompt change or the kind of behavior that we want?
Mr. Gast. At this point we do, and we have also built in
flexibility into our existing program and our strategy to allow
us to move into areas where there are openings, provided that
there is good progress with regard to the elections and human
rights.
Senator Flake. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. I would like to thank our first panel. Thank
you very much, Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you, Assistant
Administrator Gast, both for your leadership, for your
insights, and for your important testimony today.
I would now like to turn to our second panel, and we will
wait for a moment for the transition from the first to the
second panel. Thank you so much for your testimony.
[Pause.]
Senator Coons. I would now like to turn to our second
panel, starting with Mr. Mahvinga, followed by Mr. Schneider
and finally Mr. Moss. Gentlemen, thank you so much for being
with us today. I have given a brief overview of your current
positions and responsibilities in my introduction and I would
now like to invite Mr. Mahvinga to offer your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF DEWA MAHVINGA, SENIOR RESEARCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Mahvinga. Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member
Flake, and other members of the committee, for providing Human
Rights Watch with the opportunity to testify on this hearing on
Zimbabwe. I would like to request that my statement be
submitted for the record.
Senator Coons. Without objection.
Mr. Mahvinga. My name is Dewa Mahvinga. I am a senior
researcher with the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch,
where I lead our work on Zimbabwe. I frequently travel to
Zimbabwe and last month I met the leaders of the main political
parties, media, key civil society groups, church leaders, and
business people to assess the human rights conditions ahead of
the coming elections. I also maintain daily contact with local
activists, who keep me informed of the situation in Zimbabwe.
Mr. Chairman, my testimony will first lay out the human
rights trends in Zimbabwe and then highlight key
recommendations for the U.S. Government for action to promote a
rights-respecting environment leading to credible, transparent,
peaceful elections and political stability thereafter.
Many people in Zimbabwe have expectations that the
elections will usher in a democratically elected government
with interest in addressing the country's long-standing and
serious human rights issues. But as things stand, there is a
slim chance that Zimbabwe will have free, fair, and credible
elections, particularly given the shortcomings of security
sector reforms and reforms in other sectors.
On June 13, President Robert Mugabe used a Presidential
decree to set July 31 as the election date for harmonized
elections. It is critically important that these elections
should be held under conditions where Zimbabweans can freely
vote for leadership of their choice. As you may know, on June
15 the leaders of the Southern African Development Community,
SADC, urged President Mugabe to approach Zimbabwe's
constitutional court to seek extension or delays to elections
to allow for much-needed electoral reforms before elections.
The Government of Zimbabwe has said it does not have funds for
elections.
Mr. Chairman, during my visit to Zimbabwe last month people
told me of their great fear of the coming elections, that they
might just be another cycle of violence because little has
changed on the ground. They told me of their despair when they
see people responsible for the 2008 violence working free
because the so-called unity government has failed to hold them
accountable. Instead of focusing on pulling themselves out of
this poverty and rebuilding their lives, they are bracing
themselves for further violence and chaos.
I had the opportunity to interview the home affairs
minister, Theresa Mekone of the MDC, who is responsible for the
voters roll, about the ongoing process of updating the voters
roll. She told me that when she checked her own name was
missing from the roll. After complaining about it in Cabinet,
she later checked again and found that her name had been
removed from the roll. When then she checked for the second
time, it had been placed there, but spelled incorrectly. The
voter registration process and the voters roll updating process
is marred with errors, to what extent deliberate unclear.
A key benchmark for the U.S. Government here as it
reconsiders its policy toward Zimbabwe should be the assessment
of whether or not the country is prepared and has held
peaceful, transparent, fair, and free elections, and also that
the government-elect has been able to assume power. Simply
basing the U.S. policy on the holding of a peaceful referendum
on the constitution, which took place in March, is not enough.
On the human rights landscape, Mr. Chairman, there have
been some reforms. We now have a new constitution that has been
agreed to last month. It is a significant reform, but alone it
is not sufficient because of challenges relating to the
security sector.
A number of new national commissions have been established,
including the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the Zimbabwe Media
Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Zimbabwe
Human Rights Commission. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission
is not functional because of lack of resources, so it has no
capacity the influence positively the human rights environment
as we go into elections.
The Zimbabwe Media Commission has licensed new newspapers,
but there is limited opening of the free air waves in terms of
electronic media in terms of the radio and television.
A key challenge for Zimbabwe as we go into elections which
is really crucial to be addressed is the role that Zimbabwe
state security forces would play, particularly the defense
forces, the police, and the Central Intelligence Organization.
I turn now to recommendations for the U.S. Government that
we request: Close collaboration with the Southern African
Development Community, SADC, for the United States in terms of
pushing for free and fair elections. We urge the U.S.
Government to ensure that before there is consideration for a
shift in policy or a review of sanctions this should be based
on whether or not the country has had peaceful elections and
whether the government-elect has assumed power.
We also urge the Obama administration to work closely with
SADC to ensure strict political neutrality on the part of the
security forces and to ensure that they refrain from partisan
statements supporting one political party over the other.
We also urge for urgent reforms to the highly partisan
state-controlled print and electronic media.
We also urge that there be immediate deployment of domestic
and SADC-led international election observers in sufficient
numbers to allow for effective monitoring of the situation and
to promote credible, free, and fair elections in line with the
SADC standards.
We also urge that the Zimbabwe Government should
immediately repeal all repressive legislation, including the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the Public
Order and Security Act, the Criminal Procedures and Evidence
Act, which are hindering freedom of expression for the people
of Zimbabwe as they go into elections.
We urge the U.S. Government to provide financial and
technical support for a government that comes into power
through credible, free, and fair elections in a manner that
would strengthen democratic state institutions in the areas of
promoting the rule of law, democracy, good governance, and
human rights.
Mr. Chairman, my sincere thanks again for this opportunity
to address this committee. I am happy to respond to questions
from you or from your colleagues. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahvinga follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dewa Mavhinga
introduction
Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and other members
of the committee for providing Human Rights Watch the opportunity to
testify at this hearing on Zimbabwe. I would like to request that my
statement in its entirety be submitted for the record.
My name is Dewa Mavhinga. I am a senior researcher with the Africa
Division of Human Rights Watch where I lead our work on Zimbabwe. I
frequently travel to Zimbabwe and last month met with leaders of the
main political parties, private media, and key civil society groups to
assess human rights conditions ahead of the coming elections. I
maintain daily contact with local activists, civil society and church
leaders, and business people from Zimbabwe who keep me up to date
regarding the situation there.
Mr. Chairman, my testimony will first lay out the human rights
situation in Zimbabwe and then highlight key recommendations to the
U.S. Government for action to promote a rights-respecting environment
leading to credible, transparent, and peaceful elections and political
stability thereafter. Many people in Zimbabwe have expectations that
the elections will usher in a democratically elected government with
interest in addressing the country's longstanding and serious human
rights issues. But as things stand currently, the chances of having
free, fair, and credible elections are slim, particularly given the
shortcomings of security sector reforms and reforms in other sectors.
On June 13, President Robert Mugabe used a Presidential decree to
set July 31, 2013, as the date for national ``harmonized'' elections,
that is, parliamentary, Presidential and local government elections.
These are critically important elections that should be held under
conditions in which Zimbabweans are able to freely vote for leadership
of their choice. As you may know, on June 15, leaders of the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) urged Mugabe to approach
Zimbabwe's Constitutional Court to seek a 2-week delay to elections to
allow for much-needed electoral reforms before elections. The
Government of Zimbabwe has said it does not have funds for elections.
Mr. Chairman, during my visit to Zimbabwe last month, people told
me of their great fear that the coming elections might just be another
cycle of political violence because little had changed on the ground to
build their confidence that they can vote freely. They told me of their
despair when they see the people responsible for the 2008 violence,
whom the unity government failed to hold accountable, walking free.
Instead of focusing on pulling themselves out of poverty and on
rebuilding lives shattered by the 2008 political violence, they were
bracing themselves for further violence and chaos.
I had opportunity to interview Zimbabwe's home affairs minister,
Theresa Makone of MDC, responsible for the voters roll, about the
ongoing process of updating the voters roll. Despite having voted in
2008, when she checked on the voters roll she found her own name was
missing. After complaining about it in the Cabinet, she later checked
again and found her name on the roll, but spelled incorrectly. The
voter registration and voters roll updating process is marred with
errors--to what extent deliberate is unclear.
A key benchmark for the U.S. Government here, as it reconsiders its
policy toward Zimbabwe should be the assessment of whether the country
has not only managed to have peaceful, transparent, free and fair
elections, but also that the government-elect has been able to assume
power. Simply basing the U.S. policy on the March 16 constitutional
referendum is insufficient all three main political parties campaigned
for the adoption of the new constitution--and it is only one successful
stop along a long road of change.
Instead, positive engagements with Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party should be conditioned on
tangible progress in improving respect for human rights and the rule of
law in Zimbabwe. Mugabe's recent calls for peace are not enough; there
is need for matching action to demonstrate a commitment to nonviolence
and to peaceful elections.
i. the human rights landscape
The human rights landscape in Zimbabwe is characterized by a
mixture of modest reforms in the context of a number of necessary
reforms that remain outstanding if genuine change is to occur.
A. ``Unity Government'' Reforms
In September 2008 President Mugabe's ZANU-PF and the two factions
of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party, led by Morgan
Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, agreed to a Global Political Agreement
(GPA) to form a power-sharing government, formed officially in February
2009. The main purpose of the so-called unity government was to
establish institutional and legal reforms to create a conducive
environment for the holding of free and fair elections.
The unity government, however, left Mugabe and ZANU-PF--because of
their control of key government ministries including defense, state
security, and justice--with significantly greater power than the MDC,
which has been used to frustrate or stop crucial reforms. Over 4 years
since the GPA was signed, the unity government has made some progress
only in implementing those parts of the agreement that do not address
political violence or create conditions for credible elections.
Establishment of a New Constitution
Perhaps the most significant reform is the establishment of the new
constitution, signed into law by President Mugabe on May 22, 2013,
following a March 16 referendum and approval by the Zimbabwe
Parliament. The new constitution, which replaces the 1979 Lancaster
House Constitution, may prove beneficial to the electoral process as it
prohibits any changes to the electoral law once elections have been
called. It has a more expansive bill of rights, and it restores
citizenship and voting rights to those born in Zimbabwe to a parent or
parents with citizenship of another SADC country but resident in
Zimbabwe.
While very important, the new constitution is only one of the
reforms required for an environment conducive for credible elections. A
number of laws, including the electoral laws, require amendment to be
brought in line with the provisions of the new constitution. For the
new constitution to benefit all Zimbabweans government leaders and
state institutions must respect the constitution and fulfill its
provisions. Failure to act in accordance with constitutional provisions
has been a major challenge contributing to a poor human rights
environment in the country.
Establishment of National Commissions
The unity government established four new national commissions--the
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the reconstituted Zimbabwe Media
Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Zimbabwe Human
Rights Commission (ZHRC).
The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's Secretariat staff is dominated
by partisan state intelligence and military officials. Electoral
reforms are essential if the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is to be
independent and professional. Further, the voters roll needs to be
updated and to be placed under ZEC's exclusive control.
The potential impact of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission on the
human rights environment, particularly curtailing impunity for serious
abuses, is undermined by the commission's limited mandate and
jurisdiction--it is insufficiently retroactive as it can only
investigate and address human rights abuses committed since February
13, 2009, when the unity government was formed. Notably, it is not
empowered to address the widespread electoral violence of 2008. Also
problematic is that the ZHRC is not fully operational to address human
rights complaints or carry out its core mandate because of lack of
resources to recruit technical staff and procure essential office
equipment.
The Zimbabwe Media Commission has licensed new newspapers,
including the once banned Daily News, that are now operating in the
country, but the media remain under the shadow of repressive
legislation that severely restricts rights to freedom of expression and
association. This includes broad sections of the Criminal Law
(Codification and Reform) Act on criminal defamation or publicly making
statements that may cause feelings of hostility toward or cause hatred,
ridicule, or contempt of the President--whether in person or in respect
of the Office of President.
The ZANU-PF minister for media, information, and publicity
unilaterally and controversially constituted the Broadcasting Authority
of Zimbabwe (BAZ), which has since issued two private commercial radio
licenses as part of the commitment to free up the airwaves. The first
commercial radio station, Star FM, is owned by Zimpapers--a state-owned
company that publishes all state-owned newspapers, including the ZANU-
PF-aligned Herald daily newspaper. The only other private commercial
radio license was awarded to AB Communications to run ZiFM Radio.
There is concern that the two radio stations will be highly
partisan reflecting their close links to Mugabe and ZANU-PF. For
instance, Supa Mandiwanzira, the founder and chief executive officer at
ZiFM Radio, is the ZANU-PF treasurer for Manicaland province.
Despite the provision in the roadmap to elections that new,
independent boards for the Mass Media Trust and the Zimbabwe
Broadcasting Corporation should be appointed to make state-owned
broadcasting and print media politically neutral, this has not
happened. There have been limited media reforms to ensure that the
highly partisan state-controlled print and electronic media become
genuinely public, to guarantee equal and fair coverage to all political
parties.
B. No Meaningful Security Sector, Legal & Institutional Reforms
The Zimbabwe unity government's failure to introduce and implement
far-reaching reforms in the security sector and in other sectors has a
huge bearing on the human rights situation in the country especially
around elections.
Highly Partisan and Politicized Security Forces
Crucial for the elections--and the government that comes to power--
will be the role played by Zimbabwe's state security forces,
particularly the Defense Forces, the police, and the Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO). The security forces have a long
history of partisanship on behalf of President Mugabe and ZANU-PF.
Since independence in 1980, the army, police, and CIO have operated
within a system that has allowed elements within their ranks to
arbitrarily arrest, torture, and kill perceived opponents with
impunity.
Zimbabwe's security forces, notably the military, have for several
years interfered in the nation's political and electoral affairs in
ways that have adversely affected the ability of citizens to vote
freely. This was particularly evident during the 2008 elections, in
which the army played a major role in the widespread and systematic
abuses that led to the killing of at least to 200 people, the beating
and torture of 5,000 more, and the displacement of about 36,000 others.
Since then the leadership of the military, police and CIO, all
appointed by Mugabe, remain unchanged, as have their clear, public and
vocal support for Mugabe and ZANU-PF.
The partisanship of the security forces' leadership has translated
into abuses by these forces against MDC members and supporters, and
civil society organizations. Beyond the open endorsement of ZANU-PF,
the security forces have been deployed across the country where they
have intimidated, beaten, and committed other abuses against
Zimbabweans perceived to be supporting the MDC or critical of the ZANU-
PF officials in government.
Although Zimbabwe's various laws, as well as the new constitution,
require neutrality and impartiality from the security forces, no effort
has been made to enforce them. No members of the security forces are
known to have been disciplined or prosecuted for acting in a partisan
manner in support of ZANU-PF or committing criminal offenses against
the MDC and its supporters. Concerns about the role of the security
forces extend not only to situation prior to election day and the
voting itself, but to the critical post-election period.
There is an urgent need, ahead of the elections, to ensure that the
new constitutional provisions prohibiting members of the security
services from acting in a partisan manner and from being active members
or office-bearers of any political party or organization are enforced
to ensure strict political neutrality. Should the security forces fail
to adopt a professional, independent and nonpartisan role during
elections, other recent reforms may be insufficient to deliver the
elections needed to put Zimbabwe on a democratic and rights-respecting
track.
Restrictions on Rights to Freedom of Expression,
Association, and Assembly
The unity government has failed to make any changes to repressive
laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Criminal Law
(Codification and Reform) Act. These laws have been used to severely
curtail basic rights through vague defamation clauses and draconian
penalties. Provisions dealing with criminal defamation and undermining
the authority of or insulting the president have been routinely used
against journalists and political activists.
Partisan policing and prosecution has worsened the impact of the
repressive provisions in POSA and AIPPA laws. Often the police have
deliberately misinterpreted provisions of POSA to ban lawful public
meetings and gatherings, including religious meetings that are exempt
from police permission where the requirement is only for police to be
notified. Failure to repeal or significantly revise these laws and to
develop mechanisms to address the partisan conduct of the police leaves
little chance of a full enjoyment of the rights to freedom of
association and assembly in the runup to and during the coming
elections.
The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act in section 121 effectively
permits prosecutors to overturn judicial rulings granting bail and
extend detention time by 7 days. It has frequently been used by
prosecutors targeting political and civil society activists who work
with local human rights organizations.
Police Crackdown on Civil Society
Since December 2012, the ZANU-PF-controlled police have carried out
a campaign of politically motivated abuses against civil society
activists and organizations, including the harassment and 8-day
detention of human rights lawyer, Beatrice Mtetwa, despite a High Court
order for her release. The judge who issued the court order for her
release was later charged with misconduct by the Supreme Court's Chief
Justice. At time of writing the judge's misconduct case was pending
consideration by President Mugabe.
On March 8, 2013, in Harare, police charged Jestina Mukoko,
director of the Zimbabwe Peace Project, with leading an unregistered
organization under the Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Act, and
with smuggling radios and mobile phones into the country in violation
of the Broadcasting Services Act and the Customs and Excise Act. The
charges under the PVO Act violate the right to freedom of association,
while the other charges appear to be a politically motivated attempt to
curtail the group's human rights work.
On February 13 and 14, police in Harare and Bulawayo forcibly
disrupted the annual Valentine's Day ``love'' protests by about 190
members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA). The police arbitrarily
arrested, detained and in some cases beat with batons protesters,
including the WOZA national coordinator, Jenni Williams. The protesters
were released without charge following the intervention of lawyers.
On February 11, in what appears to have been coordinated action,
police raided the offices of the National Association of NGOs (NANGO)
and Community Tolerance Reconciliation and Development (COTRAD) in
Masvingo and the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) offices in Harare.
On March 8, the ZANU-PF-controlled Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
announced that any civil society organization under police
investigation would be barred from monitoring the constitutional
referendum and elections. This directive directly affected the main
civil society organizations operating in the country, including ZPP,
Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), Zimbabwe Election
Support Network, and Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition.
The recent police actions against civil society groups appear to
have had the approval of the highest levels of the police. At the
Senior Police Officers' Conference in November 2012, attended by
country's top police officers, an official statement was approved
noting ``with concern the negative influence and subversive
activities'' of nongovernmental and civil society organizations in the
coming referendum and elections.
A similar resolution was approved at the December 2012 ZANU-PF
annual conference, which was attended by all security chiefs. ZANU-PF
resolved to ``instruct the party to ensure that government enforces the
de-registration of errant [organizations] deviating from their
mandate.''
Soon after these statements were approved, the police began a
sustained and systematic campaign of harassment and intimidation of
civil society organizations. On December 13, police raided the offices
of ZimRights and arrested four people, including one of the
organization's staff. A month later, on January 14, police arrested the
ZimRights national director, Okay Machisa, ostensibly in his capacity
as director of the organization, on charges relating to a voter
registration campaign. Machisa spent over 2 weeks in detention before
being released on bail.
On January 18, the ZANU-PF minister for youth and indigenization,
Saviour Kasukuwere, formally approved regulations requiring all youth
organizations to be registered with the Zimbabwe Youth Council or to be
banned. Under these regulations, no youth organization may receive
funding without authorization from the youth council and all members or
affiliates of registered youth organizations are required to pay
exorbitant annual levies to the youth council. These regulations may
cripple the operations of youth organizations throughout the country.
The systematic police campaign against civil society organizations
may be a deliberate attempt to disrupt the operations of civil society
organizations and stop them from monitoring the human rights
environment ahead of the elections.
ii. key recommendations to the us government
The U.S. Government has a strong interest in promoting respect for
the rule of law, good governance, and human rights. In southern Africa,
the United States can safeguard and promote these interests by
supporting the people of Zimbabwe at this time by helping to minimize
the risk of the country sliding back to political chaos and widespread
rights violations.
As the United States considers the best way to assist the
Zimbabwean people to resolve their human rights and governance crisis,
we urge Congress to consider the following measures.
(1) Ensure that any shift in U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe, including
a review of sanctions, is based on an assessment of whether the country
has managed to have peaceful, transparent, free and fair elections and
whether the government-elect can assume power.
(2) Call on the Obama administration to work closely with the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) to press Zimbabwe's
political leaders to urgently take steps to:
Ensure the political neutrality of the security forces,
namely by investigating and prosecuting alleged abuses by
security force personnel, publicly directing the leadership of
the security forces to carry out their responsibilities in a
professional and impartial manner, and appropriately punishing
or prosecuting those who fail to do so;
Press for urgent reforms to the highly partisan state-
controlled print and electronic media to ensure that they
become genuinely public, to guarantee equal and fair coverage
to all political parties;
Provide for the immediate deployment, and in sufficient
numbers, of both domestic and SADC-led international election
observers to Zimbabwe and maintain such monitors for a
sufficient period after elections to deter violence and
intimidation and to promote credible, free and fair elections
that comply with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections;
Ensure implementation of all electoral reforms envisaged in
the new constitution including the updating and cleaning up the
country's outdated voters' roll, which has a significant number
of ``ghost'' voters; and
Ensure that the Zimbabwe Government repeals or amends all
repressive legislation such as the repressive sections of the
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, the Public Order
and Security Act, the Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act and section 121 of the Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Act.
(3) Provide financial and technical support for a government that
comes to power through credible, free, and fair elections in a manner
that would strengthen democratic state institutions and promote the
rule of law, democracy, good governance, and human rights.
Mr. Chairman, my sincere thanks once again for the opportunity to
address this committee. I am happy to respond to any questions you or
your colleagues may have.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Mahvinga.
Mr. Schneider.
STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Chairman, let me express my appreciation
to you and to Senator Flake and members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Africa for the opportunity to testify
this morning and for focusing attention on what we do see as a
looming electoral crisis in Zimbabwe.
Crisis Group, as you know, is independent, nonpartisan, and
nongovernmental. We try and provide field-based analysis of the
drivers of conflict and offer some policy prescriptions to try
and prevent deadly violence or to bring it to an end where it
exists.
We have reported on Zimbabwe's dismal state of governance,
deterioration of human rights, and worsening economic
conditions for more than a decade. In March 2008 our
preelectoral report was entitled ``Prospects from a Flawed
Election.'' Unless urgent actions are taken over the next
several weeks, we fear Zimbabwe is facing deja vu and
essentially return to the same potential chaos that we saw in
2008.
Our May report, which I believe the committee has, cited
the absence of a level playing field. Recent actions have
tilted the playing surface even more sharply. Last Thursday,
for the first time since the coalition government of ZANU-PF
and the two MDC factions was formed, President Robert Mugabe
issued his first Presidential decree under emergency power,
setting the election date for 31 July. He issued a second
decree which short-circuited the democratic process, overrode
constitutional electoral timelines. It shortened voter
registration. It shortened candidate registration, and it
shortened periods for the campaign itself, and in so doing
immediately drew challenges from the MDC and civil society as
unfair and unconstitutional.
This weekend, the SADC heads of state met as the oversight
and monitoring authority on compliance with the Global
Political Agreement and received South African President Jacob
Zuma's report on Zimbabwe. He essentially cited some of those
same concerns. He noted, in words that we would echo, that the
GPA commitment was that, ``elections shall be held under
conditions where all parties shall participate freely, on equal
footing, in an environment free of intimidation and violence,
and that this is necessary to bring into being the next
government, which shall enjoy undisputed credibility.''
Essentially, without those reforms and without that kind of
credible election, Zimbabwe is going to find itself again
essentially as an outcast. It should be noted that his report,
which I assume the committee has, the recommendations were
endorsed by the SADC heads of state in that communique, and
thus far they noted that the failure--they have seen the
failure to see the adoption of reforms on media, political
participation, security, electoral procedures, and they noted
that the 31 July date, ``is fraught with legal contestation,
political dispute, and heightened tensions.''
They specifically urged all of the parties in Zimbabwe to
seek more time. Some have interpreted that as 2 weeks. That is
not what the communique said. That is not what President Zuma's
report said. It said seek more time, essentially to ensure that
the opportunity for a fair and free election is there.
The reason why is that 6 weeks prior now to July 31, there
is no agreed and final registration rolls, there is no
electoral law approved by the Parliament, no candidates
formally nominated or approved by the nomination court, not
only for President, but for 358 parliamentary seats and local
and urban and rural councils as well. There is little time for
ballots to be printed, less time for them to be distributed to
basically 9,500 polling stations, and no time for the 30-day
campaign set out in the constitution after the candidates are
approved. There is no testing of electronic tabulation
processes, no agreement yet for who the domestic electoral
monitors can be, nor authorization for international electoral
monitoring, and no transparent indication of how the election
will be funded, which the committee has already raised in the
previous testimony.
Our single greatest worry, however, is the conduct of
Zimbabwe's security forces leading up to elections, the day of
elections, and the post-election period. We have urged,
obviously, an end to state-sponsored violence, for security
reform, protection of civil society and political party
activists as necessary to end the politics of fear in Zimbabwe.
Unfortunately, what we have seen is we have seen continued
partisan statements from leaders of the security forces that
obviously raise additional concerns.
It should be noted that the report from President Zuma
cited the same concerns and called for a public code of conduct
for the security forces because of those partisan statements by
the military leadership. We have seen and we reported in May
that the Zimbabwe Armed Forces have expanded their deployment
nationwide, particularly into swing provinces, Manicaland and
Masvingo, for legitimate, on the face of it, purposes: food
distribution, disaster preparedness, and carrying out research
on the army's history during independence. There is some
concern that the message is intimidation.
I would just simply say, given the time, that what we have
argued is that what needs to be done at this point is the
United States--the United States Government--needs to clearly
support SADC on insisting that the reforms that they have laid
out are put into place in order to allow Zimbabwe to step back
from a political abyss, which we see is threatening internal
violence, regional instability, and a needless return to
international isolation.
That is why our answer to your question of what the United
States should do is support SADC in all possible ways, to
insist on the minimal redlines a credible electoral process,
urge SADC to deploy as early as possible a nationwide
monitoring and observation network that covers electoral
infrastructure, electoral security, ideally embedding SADC
police with Zimbabwe police, and electoral participation. If
SADC needs additional resources to complete its mission, we
would hope that the United States would respond appropriately.
And finally, the United States should publicly indicate
that it is willing, once credible and peaceful elections are
held, to cooperate with the new government that comes into
being through an election that's judged by all sides to be
credible, transparent, and peaceful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark L. Schneider
I would like to express my appreciation to the chairman, Senator
Christopher Coons, ranking member, Senator Jeff Flake, and members of
the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for
the opportunity to testify this morning and for focusing attention on a
looming electoral crisis in Zimbabwe.
Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental
organization that provides field-based analysis, policy advice, and
recommendations to governments, the United Nations, the European Union
and other multilateral organizations on the prevention and resolution
of deadly conflict. Crisis Group was founded in 1995 by distinguished
diplomats, statesmen, and opinion leaders including Career Ambassador
Mort Abramowitz, Nobel Prize winner and former Finnish President,
Martti Ahtisaari, late Congressman Stephen Solarz, and former U.N. and
British diplomat, Mark Malloch-Brown.
Ambassador Thomas Pickering is our current chairman. Louise Arbour,
former chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia, and former U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights, is our current president. In 2011, Crisis Group was
awarded the Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service.
Crisis Group publishes some 80 reports and briefing papers
annually, as well as a monthly CrisisWatch bulletin. Our staff is
located on the ground in 10 regional offices, and 16 other locations,
covering between them over 60 countries and focused on conflict
prevention and post-conflict peace-building. We maintain advocacy and
research offices in Brussels (our global headquarters), Washington, and
New York. We have liaison offices in London, Beijing, and Moscow.
Crisis Group's Johannesburg-based southern Africa project has for
some time been focused on the dismal state of governance, deterioration
in human rights, and worsening economic and political conditions in
Zimbabwe. In March 2008, we published a preelectoral report entitled
``Prospects from a Flawed Election.'' Hopefully a similar unhappy
result will not reoccur.
Since the 2008 crisis, we have published nine reports on the post-
electoral process in Zimbabwe, analyzing the negotiations, the Global
Political Agreement (GPA) and the Southern Africa Development
Community's (SADC) role in helping the country chart a reform roadmap
to elections and a democratic transition. As the coalition government
and transition Parliament's terms come to an end under the GPA on 29
June, instead of consensus and compromise, we see confrontation and
conflict.
For the first time since that coalition government was formed,
President Robert Mugabe issued a Presidential decree last Thursday that
short-circuits the democratic process, by-passing the still functioning
Parliament, cutting short voter registration, overriding constitutional
provisions on time-lines for candidate nominations and posing obstacles
to critical reforms that are essential not only to achieve fair and
free elections but to achieve peaceful, credible, and transparent
elections. The playing field--as we concluded in our 6 May report
``Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios'' and our analysts reaffirmed recently
in Harare--is far from level.
Over the weekend, SADC heads of state met as the oversight and
monitoring authority of compliance with the GPA and received a report
from its current facilitator, South African President Jacob Zuma. The
report underscored the GPA commitment that ``elections shall be held
under conditions where all parties shall participate freely, on equal
footing, in an environment free of intimidation and violent; and that
this is necessary in order to bring into being the next government
which shall enjoy undisputed credibility.''
We strongly agree with those views.
President Zuma reported on actions related to the pending
harmonised elections with a clearly critical message that resulted in
SADC issuing warnings to Zimbabwe regarding compliance with the
previously negotiated GPA electoral roadmap. SADC essentially called
for important reforms to be in place before elections are held and also
urged the government to request the Constitutional Court to delay its
call for elections prior to 31 July to permit compliance with current
constitutional electoral provisions and enable key reforms to be
adopted. The 31 July date, the Zuma report stated ``is fraught with
legal contestation, political dispute and heightened tensions. . . . ''
Among the reforms discussed in President Zuma's report which were
endorsed in the SADC communique were the following, many of which touch
on concerns that we also have raised:
Media reforms;
The rule of law (which explicitly refers to security
concerns regarding military and intelligence interference in
the elections which would be in violation of Section 208 of the
new Constitution);
The role of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation
Committee (JOMIC);
Electoral date, Validity of Electoral Regulations; and
Deployment of SADC elections observers.
We remain hopeful that SADC will continue to insist on those
reforms and convince not only President Mugabe but all parties to step
back from a political abyss that threatens internal violence, regional
instability and a needless return to international isolation.
The shortest possible response to ``What should the United States
Government do at this critical moment?'' Mr. Chairman, is simply this:
Support SADC in all possible ways to insist that the minimal
``redlines'' be adhered to for a credible presidential, parliamentary
and local election.
SADC will hopefully quickly open an office in Harare and establish
a nationwide monitoring apparatus covering electoral infrastructure,
electoral security, and electoral participation. Where those basic
reforms are agreed, the U.S. can offer whatever technical, financial
and other assistance that might be needed. In addition, the U.S. should
reiterate its readiness to cooperate with a new government if chosen in
an election that is judged by all sides in Zimbabwe and SADC to be
transparent, peaceful, and credible.
Where we stand: The clock is running now on what may be 6 weeks
until a hastily called election in a country that suffered widespread,
brutal national violence during and following its last flawed and
discredited election in 2008.
In the wake of the 31 May court ruling that elections must be held
before 31 July, the focus inside and outside Zimbabwe is whether there
is any way to avoid a repeat of the undemocratic and violent 2008
elections. We believe that there still are options that include a
pragmatic political consensus on delaying for several months--but not
later than 29 October--the actual date, and getting court concurrence.
President Mugabe's disputed decree setting 31 July as the election date
also would have to be modified. However, additional time is clearly
needed to permit the implementation of basic reforms to avoid a repeat
of the 2008 disaster. His subsequent Executive order making a series of
amendments to electoral law that shorten registration, nomination, and
campaign periods also has drawn opposition charges of
unconstitutionality.
The new constitution provides that the current 30-day voter
registration period be completed, a process that would take to 9 July.
It also provides that the Nomination Court sit for 14 days thereafter
for candidates to register and be accepted and then allows for a
minimum of 30 days campaigning, which cannot feasibly occur by 31 July.
At this stage, there is:
No agreed and final registration roll;
No electoral law approved by Parliament;
No candidates formally nominated or approved for President
or for 358 seats in Parliament;
No time for a campaign after candidates are named;
Little time for ballots to be printed;
Less time for ballots to be distributed to 9,449 polling
stations;
No testing of electronic tabulation processes;
No agreement for domestic electoral monitoring;
No authorization for international electoral monitoring; and
No transparent indication of how the election will be
funded.
Behind the procedural and legal issues, there are critical
unresolved political issues that complicate the current election that
Crisis Group outlined in its last report: Within the Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), ``hardliner'' and
``reformist'' camps are fighting over who will succeed 89-year-old
President Robert Mugabe in the future. The opposition, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC-T) led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai is
struggling with infighting and limited capacity to mobilise its
supporters, let alone to find avenues for electoral cooperation with
the other MDC faction, which itself is divided. Some officers high in
the security and intelligence forces seem unwilling to contemplate a
possible opposition win and their rhetoric and increased deployment in
swing provinces constitute intimidation.
The way forward also requires a clear understanding of the
unfulfilled elements within the GPA that would help lay foundations for
normalizing political processes and, by extension, foster conditions
for free and fair elections. Unfortunately, the GPA was treated as a
``cease-fire'' document and as a framework for further negotiation,
rather than as a formal agreement to be implemented. Despite a new
constitution, this central drawback remains largely unchanged as
resistance to reform continues to characterise the country's uneven
power-sharing arrangement. The two uneasy party partners in that
coalition government are President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF; and the
wings of the Movement for Democratic Change, the
MDC-T of Prime Minister Tsvangirai and the remaining MDC faction. An
election roadmap was drawn up in July 2011, but key areas of
disagreement relating to elections, the media, security environment,
and institutional partisanship have not been adequately addressed.
There are also profound concerns that an election outcome that
results in ZANU-PF losing power will not be respected by powerful
elements in the security forces. Many military and intelligence
officers articulate partisan political preferences under the guise of
defending the gains of Zimbabwe's national democratic revolution. They
even have described the MDC partners in government, particularly MDC-T
and its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, as national (and regional) security
threats. Such dangerous rhetoric has yet to be countermanded by
President Mugabe, the commander in chief of the country's defense
force.
There have been some reforms put in place, highlighted by the
adoption of a new constitution endorsed by over 95 percent of
Zimbabweans who participated in the 16 March referendum. The
replacement of the much criticized independence/Lancaster House
constitution has both substantive and symbolic value. It was critical
in the GPA and pressed by the Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC), which monitors the GPA. However, its passage has had virtually
no immediate or direct impact yet on achieving ``free and fair''
conditions for the elections.
An overview of key reform concerns and what may be possible in a
restricted timeframe to help build toward a credible election process
and outcome remains pertinent.
Three major goals called for under the GPA have yet to be achieved:
(i) An end to state sponsored violence;
(ii) Security sector reform; and
(iii) Formation of adequately funded, credible, independent
electoral authorities.
With respect to these goals, key reforms promised in the draft
election roadmap that was signed in July 2011 by all GPA participants
have been blocked. With respect to the integrity of the electoral
process, the key reforms are aimed at:
(i) Access to information;
(ii) Freedom to participate; and
(iii) Safety and security.
All require urgent attention;
1. access to information
Media and the State Broadcaster: The media environment remains
distorted and partisan. The State broadcaster (TV and especially radio)
remains the primary source of information for most Zimbabweans. Largely
hostile to MDC formations (especially MDC-T), it is unashamedly
partisan to ZANU-PF. The new commercial FM radio stations Star FM and
Zi-FM have provided limited alternative voices but even here their
ownership underscores a ZANU-PF bias.
ZANU-PF continues to point to ``pirate radio stations'' and
``independent'' print media as evidence of ``balance'' and progress
toward a ``free media.'' External radio and local independent
newspapers, however, have a very limited footprint compared to the
state broadcaster. Consequently the media environment is severely
prejudiced against parties other than ZANU-PF.
The Minister of Information and Publicity should urgently instruct
state media (both electronic and print media) to: ensure balanced and
objective reporting; provide reasonably equal access; desist from
publishing and broadcasting hate speech; accept paid advertisements
from all political parties; and also provide priority access to the
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) for public service voter education
announcements. Instructions should be public to rebuild public
confidence in State media and foster citizen accountability for media
freedom.
Longer term concerns regarding regulation and partisan governance
of the media, including amending restrictive provisions of the Access
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order
and Security Act (POSA), were to be part of the reform agenda and at
least must be addressed in the post-election environment, and
commitment to address these concerns should be secured by all parties.
Extension of Voter Education: The ZEC must accredit more civil
society organisations to undertake voter education about new election
rules, regulations, and procedures, including how to access the voters
roll, how to check for accuracy and where to file complaints. The ZEC
should proactively enable civil society organisations, including faith-
based networks to disseminate information about the forthcoming
elections, processes, and institutions. The ZEC should also direct the
Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) to stop interfering with civil society
groups who disseminate information about elections and election
processes. Continued harassment of those involved in voter education
effectively criminalizes the exercise of basic democratic rights,
undermines public trust in election and consolidates concerns that the
ZRP is pursuing a partisan political agenda.
2. freedom to participate
Citizen Verification of Voter Registration and an Audit of Voters
Roll: No voters roll is perfect, but in Zimbabwe there have been
widespread and well-founded concerns that the roll has been used as a
tool to manipulate participation and exclusion. According to the ZEC in
April, the Registrar General had registered 60,000 new voters and
removed 345,000 deceased persons since December 2012. Yet there are
continuing concerns of over and under registration that only credible
auditing of the rolls can remedy. Since the April-May 21-day
registration process, another 200,000 voters were reported added
yielding an estimated but highly questionable total of 5.87 million.
Political parties sharply criticised the differing standards, hours,
resources available to register voters in different constituencies and
a seeming surfeit of opportunities in ZANU-PF areas and far fewer in
areas seen as favoring MDC. A new 30-day voter registration drive that
started on Monday 10 June must address the shortfalls and anomalies
identified in the May process. Anecdotal feedback during the first week
suggests, however, that many problems remain.
The current final registration process which should last for 30
days now is being cut short by Presidential order to 17 days. Assuring
that a final roll including all eligible voters is prepared and
available is not a simple task--and with voters able to vote in any
ward in their electoral district the potential for fraud rises
considerably.
The integrity of the voters roll would be vastly enhanced by a full
ZEC supervised audit of the existing roll. This could be done in a
short timeframe and resources with resources already available through
external EU funders. If SADC requested additional funding to support an
independent audit, we would urge the U.S. to support such an effort.
Beyond the parties, the public should be provided with a reasonable
time and opportunity to check the voter roll and effective methods to
correct all flaws, particularly those that exclude citizens from
voting.
Utilisation of Social Media: The ZEC and Registrar General must
improve from their performances during the May registration drive when
neither advertised any details on their respective Web sites. They need
to take advantage of social media and the Internet to communicate the
location of mobile voter registration stations, their hours and days of
operation, registration procedures, required documentation, appeal
mechanisms and their right to be registered should they meet all
prerequisites.
The integrity of the voting process itself must include particular
attention to the early/special voting process for elections, estimated
to be some 100,000, to ensure concerns about multiple voting are
minimised and if possible totally eradicated.
Reporting Election Results: It seems unlikely that ZEC will have
the necessary technical infrastructure in place to ensure electronic
reconciliation of voters roll for early voters or even on election day.
In addition the ZEC does not have equipment for transmission of polling
station results which will mean a reliance on Zimbabwe Republic Police
communication equipment. At the very least, public details on the
processes that will be followed should be made available to avoid as
far as possible misapprehensions and distrust. The full tabulation and
reporting process should be monitored by SADC observers.
Political Campaigning: Conditions must be ensured for the promotion
of free political activity across the country. Each party must actively
promote political tolerance and be seen to be doing so. There should be
widespread dissemination of the political parties' code of conduct
(during elections) by the parties themselves, but also through civil
society and democracy supporting institutions. A remedial
infrastructure to address any violations must be functioning and
accessible.
Party Code of Conduct: Given the existing polarization, and taking
into account the 2008 election dispute, all parties, especially those
in the GPA, must consent and sign a code of conduct, with SADC as
witness. The code should be widely disseminated and commit parties to
promote political tolerance, reject any use of violence by their
members (with threat of expulsion from the party for any who engage in
those acts), and agree to settle any election outcome dispute through
the formal channels ultimately outlined in the Electoral Act. Its
compliance should be monitored by ZEC, the Zimbabwe Human Rights
Commission and if passed and functioning, the ``Special Investigation
Committee'' provided for in the draft Electoral Act, as well as by
SADC.
Developing early warning and rapid response capacities: Zimbabwean
parties should put in place early warning and rapid response mechanisms
to deal with issues of violence and intimidation as a matter of
urgency. A reconfiguration of the existing Joint Monitoring and
Implementation Committee (JOMIC) structure presents the most realistic
institutional option, but again requires political will and SADC
support.
Strengthening Monitoring and Observation: An early SADC observation
and monitoring mechanism must be put in place in compliance with the
recommendations of the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU)
of the African Union, which in 2012 noted the need for African
elections to transform toward long-term observation. Ideally, SADC
observers and monitors must be in place at least 60 days before
elections; now, they should be urgently deployed. Funding to underwrite
a meaningful monitoring and observer footprint should be assured, and
in addition to EU funding support to SADC, the U.S. should be prepared
to respond urgently to any requests.
In addition, observers should be drawn from a range of other
countries. ZANU-PF's control over the Foreign Ministry already has seen
rejection of proposals from countries which have current sanctions on
Zimbabwe, such as the U.S. Hopefully that will change. But there are
other countries with good democratic credentials who should be
encouraged to apply.
3. safety and security
Issues of political violence and allegations of partisanship within
Zimbabwe's security services have been effectively side-stepped during
the life of the GPA. Although wide-scale political violence has
remained at a low level, it is worth remembering that the situation in
February and March 2008 was also peaceful. Understanding how violence
manifests in Zimbabwe requires a more sophisticated analysis of its
characteristics and the infrastructure that services it. Despite
mitigating interventions to promote reconciliation and conflict
resolution in many communities across Zimbabwe, the infrastructure of
repression remains largely in place. The ``politics of fear'' continues
to harvest on the legacy of abuse, institutional bias, and systemic
impunity. Even over recent months, there have been serious instances of
harassment and intimidation against civil society activists and
opposition political leaders particularly in rural communities. The
absence of a visible deterrent or effective remedy to further abuse is
a significant factor in the current environment.
Equally worrisome has been a recent expansion of deployment of the
Zimbawe National Army, which we detailed in our May report, for what
appear to be worthy public purposes such as food distribution, disaster
response preparation and a
so-called army history of independence. The concentration of those
deployments in political swing provinces such as Manicaland and
Masvingo raises concerns.
Security sector reform has been deadlocked by ZANU-PF opposition,
despite calls for ``security sector realignment'' from SADC. There is
substantial fear that security forces could take actions to undermine
the campaigns and serious concern that they will not remain neutral as
election results are being tabulated. The continued push for a credible
and transparent election process by domestic and regional civil society
and political figures, requires a diplomatic strategy to address these
electoral and post-electoral security sector concerns.
The legacy of mistrust--the centrality of the Zimbabwe Republic
Police: Zimbabwe has a long history of election related violence and
intimidation. This history is compounded by systemic levels of
impunity. Consequently, many ZRP perpetrators continue to live within
the same communities where abuses occurred. While the police are only
identified as perpetrators in a minority of cases, there are widespread
allegations that they failed to protect citizens under attack or to
adequately investigate political violence. It should be noted that the
vast majority of people subject to politically related abuse between
2008 and 2012 have not reported these matters to the police. Details on
over 12,000 cases covering this period were submitted in September 2012
to JOMIC facilitation team. In over 90 percent of these cases, the
matter was not reported to the police by the victims. The police
hierarchy has compounded concerns by demonstrating clear political
partisanship in favour of ZANU-PF. Evidence in this regard is
incontrovertible.
As with other aspects of Security Sector Reform, concerns about the
police require a long-term strategy. There are, however, critical
actions in the short term that can be taken to enhance the election
environment and raise general levels of confidence.
Deployment of SADC police officers as an ``African solution
to an African problem'' to work with their ZRP counterparts
prior to, during, and after elections. Rules of engagement for
fellow SADC officers can ensure there is no untoward
interference, but they must be mandated to report to SADC
monitoring and observation structures.
Detail should also be provided of ZRP command structures,
including names and contact details of commanders and their
respective geographical responsibilities under the electoral
security plan.
A security sector code of conduct should be in place before
the elections, coupled with a public commitment made to this
code by the security force chiefs and all rank and file
members. This would be greatly enhanced if it was done in
response to an order from the President, as current Commander
in Chief. In addition, and in light of ongoing concerns about
the partisan role of the military, they, along with the Central
Intelligence Organisation (CIO) should be confined to barracks
during the campaigning period as a sign of good will and an
investment in building confidence amongst the general
population.
conclusion
The uncontested constitutional referendum in March enabled
Zimbabweans to participate in a voting process without fear of
retribution. The pending parliamentary and Presidential balloting is
another matter. SADC remains the point vehicle for pressing for
conditions on the ground to allow for credible elections and a process
with integrity, including adequate domestic and international
monitoring of all aspects of the process. The U.S. should support those
efforts.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Moss.
STATEMENT OF TODD MOSS, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR PROGRAMS AND
SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Moss. Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake.
Robert Mugabe, after 33 years in power, will soon be running
for yet another term. This hearing is a timely opportunity to
shape United States policy, not only because Zimbabwe is facing
a critical moment, but also because I am increasingly concerned
that our government may be sleepwalking down the wrong path.
We are at serious risk of sending the wrong signals and
damaging U.S. interests in the region. This danger is
especially high while the Assistant Secretary position remains
vacant.
Let me start with three analytical points. First, I believe
it is already far too late for a free and fair election in
2013. The ZANU-PF intimidation machine has been running full
steam for the past 5 years. Local party bosses know who the
opposition sympathizers are, in some cases even going door to
door and marking houses. The police have repeatedly raided
civic groups. Even radios, the principal way most Zimbabweans
get news, have been banned and confiscated in many rural areas.
Imagine the chilling effect of banning radios in a rural area.
As a result of the systematic campaign of fear already in
place, we should not be surprised if the actual election day
passes peaceably. We should thus severely discount the
relevance of observers that just fly in and declare voting calm
and orderly.
Second, even if Mr. Mugabe somehow loses, ZANU-PF will not
allow Morgan Tsvangirai to become President. We know this
because it has already happened. In 2008 Mr. Mugabe lost the
first round. While he was surprised at this defeat, he was
prepared to step down, but the military convinced him to stay
and promised him that they would ensure his victory in a second
round, and indeed they did.
Under the direction of senior army officers, party militias
attacked the MDC's supporters and the nation's civil society
networks. At least 80 people were killed, hundreds went
missing, thousands were injured, and hundreds of thousands of
Zimbabweans were driven from their homes.
There is no reason whatsoever for us to believe that in
2013 this will be any different. Mr. Mugabe will simply not
step down if he loses. So if the outcome is already decided,
then it cannot by definition be a competitive election.
In fact, the election itself is not an expression of
democratic will, nor a process for Zimbabwe to select a
political leader. It is in reality a form of political theater,
only grudgingly tolerated by Mr. Mugabe. If we focus on the
minor details, the deep weeds of the electoral process, like
the current wrestling over the election date or the length of
the registration process, I fear we will miss this bigger
picture.
Third, Zimbabwe's economic collapse has been halted, but
reports of a broad recovery are premature. The end of
hyperinflation and the modest bounceback are welcome, but these
are also the predictable result of dropping a worthless local
currency and moving to the U.S. dollar. The Finance Minister,
Tendai Biti, has done a very impressive job under grim
conditions, but the foundation for full economic turnaround is
still missing.
Also missing are hundreds of millions of dollars in diamond
revenues controlled by ZANU-PF and the military. Instead of
paying for Zimbabwe's reconstruction, the country's diamonds
are funding the repression machine.
So what does this all mean for U.S. policy? I will quickly
offer three suggestions. First, the United States should become
more active and creative on Zimbabwe policy. Zimbabwe does not
want to remain a pariah state, a fact that we should be able to
leverage. This need not cost blood or treasure. It does mean
working in a nuanced and resourceful manner with like-minded
allies to find opportunities to increase political and economic
freedom. When necessary, we should deploy the full capabilities
of the U.S. Government, including and beyond the State
Department.
Second, we absolutely should not endorse an election whose
outcome is already known, nor should we prematurely normalize
relations. Engagement and flexibility does not mean
appeasement. The absence of wide-scale violence is not the same
as a credible election. Until the signs of true political
reform are clear, we should keep in place our current travel
and financial sanctions against those responsible for violence
and political repression.
Similarly, the United States should resist any premature
efforts to clear Zimbabwe's arrears at the international
financial institutions. Recall, if you will, that the Zimbabwe
Democratic and Economic Recovery Act became U.S. law in 2001
and was cosponsored by Senators Bill Frist, Jesse Helms, Joe
Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Russ Feingold. The act's conditions
for reengagement are still appropriate today. These include
restoration of the rule of law, freedom of speech and
association, and an end to violence and intimidation. I am
worried that our government may be sending premature signals
that these have been restored when they most certainly have
not.
Finally, the United States should prepare for real change
in Zimbabwe. Despite my short-term pessimism, I am optimistic
about Zimbabwe's long-term future and for building a fruitful
partnership with the United States. We should be actively
seeking dialogue with potential future leaders, planning for
quick-reacting forms of recovery assistance, and finding ways
of aiding democratic forces.
To conclude, Zimbabwe has fallen off the U.S. foreign
policy agenda just at the time that the rest of Africa is
booming and becoming an important partner for the United
States. If we are seen as accepting a sham election, it will
damage America's reputation at just the time we should be
standing on principle. We may have limited policy tools to
influence events in Zimbabwe, but it is in our long-term
interests to help encourage the country to turn away from the
hatred and fear of the past and toward a new Zimbabwe based on
openness, prosperity, and freedom.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moss follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Todd J. Moss
Thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and other members
of the subcommittee. I appreciate that the subcommittee is holding a
hearing on the economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe. I proudly
served in the State Department of the previous administration, but did
not work directly on Zimbabwe policy. Nevertheless, I have been
actively involved with the country for more than two decades and now
lead the Center for Global Development's work on Zimbabwe.
After 33 years in power, Robert Mugabe is running for yet another
term. To put this in perspective, jump forward to the year 2041 and
imagine that President Obama is still President, has deployed the FBI,
CIA, and U.S. Marines to crush his domestic opponents, and is then
running again for another term. Unthinkable? That's the situation in
Zimbabwe today.
This is therefore a timely opportunity to shape U.S. policy, not
only because Zimbabwe is facing a critical juncture, but also because I
am increasingly concerned our government may be sleepwalking down the
wrong path. Before making recommendations for U.S. policy, let me make
three analytical points.
First, it is already far too late for a free and fair election in
2013. The window for a truly competitive election reflecting the will
of the people has long closed. The ZANU-PF machine of intimidation has
been, over the past 4 years, methodically ensuring the outcome of the
next election. Local party bosses are well aware of who might be
sympathizers for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), including
going door to door and marking houses. If the past is any guide, they
also have contingency plans in place for deploying armed groups if
necessary. The arrest and unlawful detention of human rights lawyer
Beatrice Mtetwa in March was only the most well-known incident of
government repression. Civic organizations, especially those involved
in electoral education (e.g., the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network)
and victims' assistance (e.g., the Counseling Services Unit, The
Zimbabwe Peace Project) have been especially targeted. A list of
arrests and raids on civic groups over just the past 10 months,
compiled by researchers at the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and
Human Rights (Appendix A), paints a chilling portrait of a government
afraid of its own people and willing to take extraordinary efforts to
suppress their views.\1\
The Government of Zimbabwe has even taken the highly unusual step
of confiscating all radios in many rural areas, where most of the
population lives. Radios are the principal way most Zimbabweans get
news--and yet they are banned. As a result of the systematic campaign
of fear and intimidation that is already in place, we should not be
surprised if the actual election day passes peaceably. Thus, we should
severely discount the relevance of observers that fly in a few days
prior and then declare voting is calm and mostly orderly. I would be
surprised if it was otherwise.
Second, even if Mr. Mugabe somehow loses, ZANU-PF will not allow
Morgan Tsvangirai to become President. I am confident in this
assessment because we have already seen how ZANU-PF responds when they
lose. In the March 29, 2008, vote, Mr. Mugabe lost the first round.
There are credible reports, including excellent Washington Post
reporting (Appendix B), that Mr. Mugabe was surprised at his defeat but
prepared to accept the will of the people and to step down. However,
the military leadership, desperate to protect their insider privileges,
convinced Mr. Mugabe that he should instead compete in a second round
and that they would ensure his victory. Indeed they did. ZANU-PF
militias, under the direction of senior army officers, attacked the
MDC's supporters and civil society networks. By the time of the second
round 3 months later, at least 80 people were dead, hundreds missing,
thousands injured, and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes.
The violence against ordinary citizens was so severe that Mr.
Tsvangirai sought refuge in a foreign embassy and was forced to
withdraw from the race to spare further death and destruction. There is
no reason whatsoever to believe that 2013 will be any different. Mr.
Mugabe will not step down if he loses again. Thus, if the outcome is
already decided, then it cannot, by definition, be a free and fair
election.
Third, Zimbabwe's economic collapse has been halted but reports of
a broad recovery are premature. It is true that hyperinflation and a
worthless local currency are both gone, enabling some modest bounce
back. This is the predictable result of dropping the Zimbabwe dollar
and moving to a currency system based on the U.S. dollar. These are
positive steps to be sure, and the Finance Minister Tendai Biti has
done an impressive job managing the country's finances under grim
conditions. Mr. Biti has also begun responsible first steps toward
reengagement with the international financial institutions. But the
foundation for a full economic turnaround--which requires restoration
of private property rights, security of contracts, and protection of
individual rights of association--are sorely missing.\2\ In the World
Bank's Doing Business indicators, Zimbabwe is still ranked near the
global bottom, at 172nd out of 185 countries. Most tellingly, the
Zimbabwean professional and working classes have continued to vote with
their feet by leaving the country in droves and staying abroad. (The
millions of Zimbabwean citizens in South Africa and elsewhere abroad
who are denied their right to vote is another factor that will sway the
outcome.)
Also missing from the recovery are the hundreds of millions of
dollars in diamond revenues that should be in the Zimbabwean Treasury.
According to credible reporting from groups like Partnership Africa
Canada and Global Witness, Zimbabwe's diamonds are tightly controlled
by a web of corrupt and secretive business networks linked to ZANU-PF
and the country's military.\3\ Instead of paying for teachers or
stocking health clinics, Zimbabwe's diamonds are funding the repression
machine.
What does this all mean for U.S. policy? I offer three suggestions.
First, the United States should become more active and creative on
Zimbabwe policy than has been the case for the past 4 years. If we hope
to help shape events in that part of the world, we cannot continue to
be passive bystanders. Neither can a superpower that believes in
democracy wash its hands of a country just because the options are all
challenging. Instead we should actively engage with our allies, with
Zimbabwe's neighbors, and, when appropriate, with Zimbabwe's political
and civic leaders. Zimbabwe does not want to remain a pariah state, a
fact that we should leverage. This means working in a nuanced and
resourceful manner to find opportunities to increase political and
economic freedom for Zimbabweans by working with others that share our
goals and, when necessary, deploying the full capabilities of the U.S.
Government, including and beyond the State Department.
One important caveat to emphasize is that we should not expect
South Africa, the regional power, to be much help. Despite its own
proud history of fighting oppression, the Government of South Africa
has, for a variety of reasons, shown little willingness to support
democratic forces in Zimbabwe and has instead too often been willing to
look the other way when horrific abuses have taken place under its
nose. After repeated attempts by American officials to try to sway
South Africa, it should be clear that this is a losing strategy.
Second, we should not endorse an election whose outcome is already
known nor should we prematurely lower our guard on sanctions or aid.
Engagement and flexibility does not mean appeasement. The
administration should be wary of rash declarations of success and
should view the 2013 Presidential election within the context of the
broader environment for the free expression of political beliefs, not
just a one-day exercise in political theater under the watchful eye of
the security forces. The absence of wide scale violence is not the same
as a credible election or a signal that it is time to normalize
relations. We should, until the signs of true political reform are
clear, keep in place our current travel and financial sanctions against
those responsible for violence and political repression. Those who
argue for sanctions to be lifted now have not yet made a convincing
case for how removal would credibly help the democratic process.
Similarly, until we have confidence that change is real, the U.S.
should resist any premature efforts to clear Zimbabwe's arrears at the
World Bank and other international financial institutions, which would
be a step toward significant new lending to the country.\4\ The
conditions for reengagement outlined in the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act are still apt. Recall if you will that ZDERA
became U.S. law in 2001 and was cosponsored by Senators Bill Frist,
Jesse Helms, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Russ Feingold.
Finally, the U.S. should prepare for real change. Even though I am
pessimistic about the chances of immediate political change, I am
optimistic about Zimbabwe's long-term future. Zimbabwe's elderly
political class cannot be in power forever. A new generation, including
within ZANU-PF, longs for Zimbabwe to return to the community of
nations and finally reap the bounty of its natural wealth and abundant
human capital. The U.S. should be actively seeking dialogue with
potential future leaders, planning for quick-reacting forms of recovery
assistance, and finding ways of aiding democratic forces.\5\
Zimbabwe has fallen off the U.S. foreign policy agenda just as the
rest of Africa is booming economically and becoming an important
partner for the United States. The southern African region cannot
thrive while Zimbabwe remains an outlier. We may have few good options
and limited policy tools, but it is still in the long-term interests of
the United States to help encourage Zimbabwe to turn away from the
hatred and fear of the past and toward a new Zimbabwe based on
openness, prosperity, and freedom.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ See also ``Pattern of Suppression in Zimbabwe a Concern for RFK
Center,'' Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, April
2, 2013.
\2\ Michael Clemens and Todd Moss, ``Costs and Causes of Zimbabwe's
Crisis,'' CGD Brief, 2005.
\3\ ``Reap What You Sow: Greed and Corruption in Zimbabwe's Marange
Diamond Fields,'' Partnership Africa Canada, November 2012;
``Zimbabwe's diamond sector and EU restrictive measures,'' Global
Witness, January 2013; ``Financing a Parallel Government? The
involvement of the secret police and military in Zimbabwe's diamond,
cotton and property sectors,'' Global Witness, June 2012.
\4\ Benjamin Leo and Todd Moss, ``Moving Mugabe's Mountain:
Zimbabwe's Path to Arrears Clearance and Debt Relief,'' CGD Working
Paper 190, 2009.
\5\ Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, ``The Day After Comrade Bob:
Applying Post-Conflict Reconstruction Lessons to Zimbabwe,'' CGD
Working Paper 72, 2005.
[Editor's note.--Appendixes A and B mentioned above can be found in the
``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at the end of
the hearing.]
Senator Coons. Well, thank you, Mr. Moss, Mr. Schneider,
Mr. Mahvinga.
Mr. Moss, if I might, you offer in some ways the most
bracing and broad summary of what I think is a common theme
across all five witnesses today, which is grave concern that
should elections be held on an accelerated timeline there is
virtually no chance that they will be peaceful, free, fair,
effective, respectable, certifiable.
You urge that the United States become more active and
creative on Zimbabwe policy, yet also recognize we have
relatively limited policy tools. I would agree with your
assertion that we should not be lifting sanctions simply in
response to a peaceful election, but should instead insist on
the whole menu of respect for private property, for human
rights, for open civil society, for free media, as well as the
precondition of being a free and fair election.
How would you suggest we go about being more innovative,
more active, more creative on Zimbabwe policy? What else would
you urge us to do?
Mr. Moss. Thank you for the question. I think it is not
just a matter of engaging or not engaging, lifting sanctions or
not lifting sanctions. The United States can be a very creative
and powerful actor. It can be a player if we are actively
engaged, and it can be a player if there is direction given to
the administration from above or from Congress to try to
achieve a particular outcome.
What I fear I have seen, particularly over the last 4
years, is a stepping back of the United States, where they are
frustrated that sanctions have not led to the outcome that we
may desire and that our policy tools are limited, so we become
passive actors and in a sense we outsource our foreign policy
to SADC or sometimes to the South Africans, which may have very
different outcomes in mind. And while on paper we may share
some of the very same interests, we do not always behave in the
same manner.
So I believe that the United States, through various
components of the U.S. Government, if it was given clear
direction on what the United States was trying to achieve,
could come up with much more creative strategies to try to, for
instance, peel away part of ZANU-PF with which we will have to
work with in the future, and try to further isolate parts of
ZANU-PF with which we should not work with in the future. I
think that kind of nudge could make an important difference,
not just in Zimbabwe, but internationally, where we have seen a
general stepping back, including among our European and other
allies, which have also gotten frustrated with Zimbabwe.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider, ICG's recent report also indicates MDC-T and
ZANU-PF may be internally fragmented. This is not unusual for
long-standing contestants for political parties that are
created more around an individual than around a policy agenda,
but do you see this as a sign of the emergence of more
pragmatic or reformist leaders within these groups, or is it
just a sign of ongoing competition for the spoils of power?
Mr. Schneider. Within some of those factions, clearly there
is a pragmatic effort to move forward. I think they recognize
that Zimbabwe is sort of poised on the edge of a cliff and it
is either going to go over that cliff and see further violence,
further disaster, or move away from it and hopefully build a
different kind of future.
I will say that right now, at least within ZANU-PF, it is
the minority of those who have expressed those kinds of views,
but I do think we should try to find ways to work with them as
well as those within MDCT that are ready to respect the
constitution, respect the rule of law, and abide by the clear
conditions that are required in order to have a free, fair,
election and then to move forward on the reforms that remain to
be achieved.
There are a series of reforms on removing the repressive
provisions on the media law, on security, that have not taken
place. Those need to take place. There needs to be far more
done with respect to ending impunity for violations of the law,
violations of human rights.
I will say one thing. The constitution that was adopted was
adopted as a result of compromise between the two major
political parties and with the support generally of civil
society. That provided for the transitional election, not July
31, but within 4 months and that, as we have heard, by the end
of October. And to the degree that we can press--and that is
what we should be focused on right now: How do we move all of
our diplomatic resources along with SADC and the AU in trying
to bring about the conditions, and particularly control over
the security forces, the conditions to permit that election to
take place and the transition to occur?
It is clear, election day is not the crucial issue. The
crucial issue is what happens before and after and ensuring
respect for the outcome, particularly if it is an opposition
outcome, is a critical part of the process.
Senator Coons. Mr. Schneider, do you think it is still
possible for there to be elections within this calendar year if
pushed back by several months, if all those preconditions are
met? The referendum that approved the constitution, was broadly
welcomed as being peaceful, with a high participation rate. But
as you comment, it was because there was agreement between the
political parties on the outcome.
Mr. Moss describes the likely outcome here as a, I think,
barely tolerated political charade if it remains on the
compressed schedule, but raises some question as to whether
there can be a credible election in 2013 at all. Do you think
it is still possible if SADC, AU, and other players like the
United States align their resources, and if wings of both key
political parties embrace the possibility of a positive path
forward here?
Mr. Schneider. The answer is one hopes so. One cannot be
confident, but I think that you have a much better chance of
having that outcome if everybody is focused on those reforms
and clearly sets them out as, these are the redlines, these are
the benchmarks. Without these, there cannot be anything that is
viewed as a credible election, even if it is peaceful on
election day. And we still do not see that in place, and that
is what we have raised in all of our reporting.
Senator Coons. Mr. Mahvinga, if I might, for all three of
you and across many different sources, a key concern is
security sector reform, the politicization of the police and
the military and the lack of confidence that they will remain
neutral in the election. What players inside or outside of
Zimbabwe, in your view, have the credibility or resolve to
successfully press for security sector reform, and is the
security sector challenge, including the ongoing politicization
of the security forces, really one of leadership or is it
deeply entrenched in the security forces at all levels?
Mr. Mahvinga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For Zimbabwe, the
major challenge is one of the leadership of the security
forces, which is extremely partisan and highly politicized. So
focus should really be on ensuring that the leadership are
reined in to conduct themselves in a politically neutral way.
Within Zimbabwe, President Mugabe as the Commander in Chief
of the defense forces has that political power to rein the
security forces in. For the U.S. Government, the best way would
be to work through and support SADC initiatives. South Africa
as the facilitator for Zimbabwe is best placed within the
framework of the roadmap to elections to put forward a code of
conduct for the security forces to comply with and to ensure
that there are mechanisms to enforce it. The challenge has been
a failure to enforce the laws.
The new constitution that was signed into law last month
has a provision in article 208 that all security force should
be nonpartisan, politically neutral, and should not align
themselves with any one political party. So it is just a matter
of ensuring that there are mechanisms to implement this article
that already is agreed to by all the political parties.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Mahvinga.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Let me follow up on a question Chairman Coons asked. Mr.
Schneider, you seemed to indicate that you believe that free
and fair elections could be held still this year if it is put
off a bit. Mr. Moss, you say not this year. Mr. Moss, do you
want to explain why that is the case, why a couple more months
would not do it?
Mr. Moss. Yes, thank you. I think we want to differentiate
between the mechanics and the legal provisions for holding an
election. Clearly you want to try to follow--you want to follow
the letter of the law to the extent you can. You obviously want
to have the ballots where they are supposed to be, so that the
mechanics operate as they should. Actually, USAID has an
extremely long and proud history of supporting these technical
preparations for elections, including in the 2008 elections in
Zimbabwe. Support there was essential to getting to that first
round loss for ZANU-PF and actually seeing what had happened.
Senator Flake. Just one second. On that first round loss,
then, your feeling was the technical aspects there, were there
sufficient ballots distributed in the rural areas? All of the
technical things were there for the first election?
Mr. Moss. To the best of my knowledge, yes. But we want to
separate the mechanics of an election from the environment for
people to use that election to express their political
preferences. Here we have to go back even before 2008, but
certainly 2008 was a watershed area where towns, villages,
regions that had voted in the first round election for the
opposition provided a map for the security forces to know where
to target. They then executed this plan of intimidation to
ensure that this next round and no future elections would ever
be lost to the ruling party.
That system, intense intimidation and organized violence,
including I have no doubt in my mind that there are contingency
plans in place for armed groups to be deployed if necessary--
and people know that. Once you have had your house burned down,
you have had a family member disappear, maybe you have had a
family member chased out of the country, and you have been told
that, we know how you vote, you are going to think twice before
expressing your political--and they have taken your radio away.
You are going to think twice about voting for who you really
want to vote for.
I do not believe in that environment, even if it is
technically capable, it is technically correct, that you are
going to see the true expression of the Zimbabwean people.
Senator Flake. You have outlined in your written testimony
a series of abuses that have occurred just over the past little
while. Is it your feeling that that is laying the groundwork,
obviously with the intimidation factor, but that they are
readying a plan to make sure that they do not go through what
they had to go through last time? Is that an accurate
assessment?
Mr. Moss. That is very accurate. You know, I do not think
that it is an accident that the groups involved in electoral
education have been specifically targeted. In my written
testimony I submitted a list from the Robert F. Kennedy Center
for Human Rights and Justice and I think that fits into a
larger pattern of the security forces working closely with the
ruling party to ensure the electoral outcome that they desire.
Senator Flake. Mr. Schneider, you mentioned that it would
be useful if SADC forces were embedded with Zimbabwean security
forces. How likely is it that ZANU-PF would allow that?
Mr. Schneider. It is an interesting question. SADC has done
this in other countries and that is a kind of--when you read
what they are asking for in terms of deployment with respect to
security, that would be a way to carry out what they are saying
needs to be done. That is, observation of the security forces
by SADC monitors. We urge that that be done and at least be
proposed as a way to try and avoid--first, reducing the
politics of fear; and second, actually avoiding, hopefully,
violence during the electoral and post-electoral process.
Let me just say one other thing. I have always believed
that the United States and others on the outside should listen
very carefully to people on the inside. So it does seem to me
when trying to reach judgment whether or not it is worthwhile
taking the risk of going forward with elections, we need to be
sure that we are listening to civil society groups inside
Zimbabwe, the church, and other nongovernmental organizations,
as well as the opposition political parties, the ones who are
going to put their lives on the line to be candidates, to run
for office, to campaign, to go out and vote. So we should be
listening to them in coming to a judgment about whether or not
we should support the process.
The other point I would make is that one of the things that
does give us concern as well, which I hope would be reversed,
is the government rejected the permission for the U.N.
elections needs assessment mission to enter the country. U.N.
elections is part of the technical operations that essentially
say, this is what you need in order to carry out the elections,
this is what it costs, et cetera. It is something that still
needs to be done and I think would give confidence to others
that at least if these standards are met at least the technical
side of things would be covered.
But I agree with Tom in the sense that the fundamental
issue is are there going to be pressures, political and
otherwise, so that the security forces feel that they cannot do
what they did in 2008.
Senator Flake. Mr. Mahvinga, how significant is it that the
AU has stepped forward now and will monitor? Is that likely to
have more of an impact on the ZANU-PF's thinking than SADC or
other international organizations?
Mr. Mahvinga. There are challenges with the statement from
the African Union on deploying long-term observers to Zimbabwe.
The first is that it appears to endorse the idea that elections
should happen by end of July. So that is likely to strengthen
ZANU-PF's resolve to move ahead because the AU is saying now we
are moving in to observe. We have wanted to a see a situation
where there is a clear position to insist on the reforms that
must take place ahead of elections, which the AU simply has not
addressed.
It also appears to be bringing tension between SADC and the
AU, because the SADC leadership has said there is need to
extend the date for elections and to look at the minimum
conditions for free and fair elections, particularly the role
of the security forces, before, during, and after the
elections.
Senator Flake. You sound as if the AU is almost acting as
an enabler for this. Is that your assessment? Mr. Moss, you
seem to be nodding your head there.
Mr. Moss. I think there is certainly a risk there,
especially if we are focused on the technical observation of
the conduct of the elections rather than the broader political
environment. I do not know if they are accurate, but certainly
comments by the AU chair this morning would seem to say that
the problems over the electoral schedule were up to Zimbabweans
to resolve, the AU was not going to get involved, does not
suggest to me--if they are accurate--does not suggest to me a
very active role for the AU.
The AU, I should add, has come a very, very long way in
standing up against coups and standing on principle against
coups. They have a much tougher time standing up to a sitting
head of state that may be behaving in a way worse than
coupmakers.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. If you have any closing questions, feel free
to ask them now.
Senator Flake. No, thank you.
Senator Coons. If I might, first Mr. Moss. The question
that I asked previously of Ambassador Yamamoto about diamond
revenues: What measures do you believe can and should be taken
to ensure that diamond revenues are not being diverted and
misused? I believe in your testimony you suggest that you
believe this is in part financing the ZANU-PF intimidation
machine. Should the United States press for Zimbabwe's
expulsion from the KP, from the Kimberley Process, seek to
engage it in the EITI, the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative? Or is there some other credible, creative path
forward for ensuring transparency in this vital sector that is
likely generating hundreds of millions of dollars that are
currently unaccounted for?
Mr. Moss. Yes, thank you. There is some very good research
on the Zimbabwean diamond sector from Partnership Africa,
Canada, and from Global Witness that are both footnoted in my
written testimony. I would urge anyone looking for details to
turn there for evidence of the problem.
What is clearly happening is that diamonds are being taken
directly out of the country. They are controlled by a secret
network of businesses, likely linked to the military forces.
What we do know is that the revenues from those diamonds are
for the most part not going into the Treasury where they
belong. I think it is reasonable to assume that if it is going
to the military then that is also being used as a parallel,
almost a parallel government to run the security forces and
intelligence services.
The Kimberley Process itself is not set up to deal with
human rights abuses or to deal with theft of mineral revenues.
It was set up principally to try to squeeze so-called conflict
diamonds out of the global supply chain. It did a pretty good
job at that. I am sympathetic to those within the KP that think
that this is a bridge too far and that the KP is not set up to
deal with this problem.
EITI would be helpful, but EITI is entirely a voluntary
organization. So the Government of Zimbabwe would have to
volunteer to release information on where its diamond revenues
are going. I think that is extremely unlikely.
I do think that the United States could use its diplomatic
and other influence, particularly working with our like-minded
allies, to try to squeeze the diamond centers that are
purchasing these diamonds and enabling the violence and
repression in Zimbabwe quite directly. But I do not have a
simple off-the-shelf answer for--and there's no simple
mechanism that exists now to do that.
Senator Coons. You mentioned, in response to a question
from Senator Flake and in your previous testimony, some
skepticism about just how far South Africa is willing to go in
order to press for fundamental reform in order to ensure not
just a peaceful election, but a truly free and fair and open
election. What other regional partners, what other regional
allies, what other leaders in SADC, might we be looking to to
help insist that Zimbabwe upholds the SADC principles in its
conduct of the upcoming election?
Mr. Moss. There are other members within SADC which I think
are more willing to be forward-leaning on Zimbabwe.
Unfortunately, they are much smaller and less influential than
South Africa. Some of the other bigger players have very long
historical links with ZANU-PF and are much less likely to try
to influence them.
I think it was a terrible accident of history that
President Mwanawasa, who had been leading the charge before his
death, the SADC pressure sort of evaporated after his death.
What is striking to me when I look at the entire African
Continent is that you would think that southern Africa should
be the region driving the continent politically, economically,
diplomatically, and it is just not the case. East and West
Africa are much further ahead in democratic reforms, in pushing
for sound economic policies. I actually think we could get more
leverage in working with countries like Ghana, like Nigeria,
like Tanzania, to try to encourage a broader African stand
against what I think everybody recognizes is a disaster in
Zimbabwe. And everyone is just sort of waiting for the
President to die to move to that next phase.
But I think that a lot of the region would like to try to
push it and not just sit back and wait for that event.
Senator Coons. My last question for you, if I might. On
this panel you have sort of pressed hard on a view that we
should not simply wait, we should not simply accept peaceful
elections; we should be using all the levers available to us.
Others have suggested it is important for us to convey an
openness to reducing sanctions on Zimbabwe should there be
progress.
Would you suggest strengthening or tightening sanctions?
Are there tools that the United States unilaterally can deploy
in the event that the very bad outcome you are predicting comes
to pass?
Mr. Moss. Yes. I think that we can do both. We are
absolutely correct to continually review and reduce or take
people off the sanctions list when they are no longer becoming
a problem, and we should make it very clear that we are willing
to do that when there are appropriate actions taken on the
other side.
At the same time, there are areas where the United States
could be looking to further squeeze and tighten those
recalcitrant elements within the government, particularly if
there is a bad election or a violence-driven election result
that either rejects an opposition victory or enforces a
noncredible win by certain parties.
One example could be preemptive contract sanctions, which
is a tool that exists out there. It has not been deployed yet.
What that would mean is that the United States, working with
the Treasury, working with some of our allies in Europe, could
make, if Zimbabwe blows up, could make a preemptive statement
that future loans or contracts signed by an illegitimate
Zimbabwe Government would not be enforceable in United States
courts. That could have a chilling effect not only on United
States and European foreign investment, obviously, but could
also have a chilling effect on investment from places like
Russia and China.
Senator Coons. Interesting.
If I could, Mr. Schneider, the International Crisis Group's
recent report concludes that, if I read this right, it may be
the best way forward to prepare for a plan for further power-
sharing. Is ICG suggesting a managed democracy approach is
better than a truly failed outcome, than a military rejection
of an electoral outcome that is suspect at best? And does this
put at risk short-circuiting the popular will of Zimbabweans?
Mr. Schneider. What we were essentially saying is if there
is, in fact, no movement toward setting the ground for an
adequate electoral process, that you have to think what then do
you do. It is in that context, an extension of the transition
government in some way. But the answer is, at least at this
stage, still to focus on the reforms required so that there are
conditions for, at the very least, a peaceful, credible
election, and then as much pressure as is possible on the
security forces to accept the outcome where it goes against the
ZANU-PF.
I should make one other point. The diamonds issue is part
of the security problem in Zimbabwe. The information that we
had in one of our reports a while ago indicated that Zimbabwe
Defense Industries, which is an army-owned company, holds a 40-
percent stake in the Anjin diamond mine operation. The Minister
of Finance at the time, Tendai Biti, noted that, where the
estimate was about $500 million in revenues from diamonds, that
the state Treasury received only about 10 percent.
So there is clearly mechanisms there and an interest on the
part of the security forces not to see the situation changed in
this regard, and there have to be efforts made to put
additional pressure on where they act in a way that violates
the constitution and prevents a democratic expression of the
voters from being realized.
Senator Coons. Mr. Mahvinga, if I might, Ambassador Andrew
Young recently met with President Mugabe at the suggestion of
the administration and was accompanied by the U.S. Ambassador.
The U.S. Ambassador has also accompanied Jesse Jackson to a
meeting with President Mugabe. How is this engagement viewed by
Zimbabwean civil society? What have you heard in your recent
visits in terms of how the United States outreach or recent
efforts has been received?
Mr. Mahvinga. There has been concern that perhaps that kind
of engagement is premature, given the conditions on the ground,
and that there is really need for the U.S. Government now to be
supporting processes toward credible elections that lead to a
peaceful transfer to the government-elect, and that really
focuses and supports to civil society groups at two levels, the
first level being financial support for their activities,
election activities within the country, but also increasing
pressure through SADC and other players to ensure that there is
no harassment and intimidation and the beatings that we have
been witnessing in the recent months of civil society groups.
So there is a real concern that perhaps the U.S. Government
should closely look at what is happening on the ground, closely
look at the whole of the security forces and ensure that its
action position toward Zimbabwe is in response to clear
improvements on the ground and not just incentives that are not
related to progress and reforms achieved.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Mahvinga.
Senator Flake, did you have any further questions?
Senator Flake. No, thank you.
Senator Coons. Let me, if I might, thank you, Mr. Moss, Mr.
Schneider, Mr. Mahvinga. We will be consulting afterward.
Obviously, President Obama is about to take his first trip to
the region with an impending trip to South Africa. I think
there is still the possibility of progress in security sector
reform, in electoral reform, and with some significant changes
it is still possible for there to be credible, free, and fair
elections later this year.
But we are clearly at a tipping point. All five of our
witnesses today have drawn in sharp terms the grave concerns
that the United States should have and the hesitancy we should
have toward lifting any sanctions prematurely and the
redoubling of effort that is required with our regional
partners and our diplomatic efforts to ensure that we do not
lose this opportunity for progress in Zimbabwe.
So we will leave the record open for a week for other
members of the committee who may have wanted to be with us but
were at another event that was happening at the same time. I
want to thank all the members of our second panel and all of
our witnesses today for your engagement and for your
determination, for your insight.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Two Articles Submitted by Todd Moss as Attachments to
His Prepared Statement
APPENDIX A
Arrests & Raids of Civic Groups in Zimbabwe (Aug. 2012-May 2013)
Source: Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights
On April 23, Advocacy Officer Trevor Murai, with Student's
Solidarity Trust, was arrested and detained after making a
presentation on elections during a workshop organized by the
Christian Alliance. Under the amended Electoral Act of 2012,
``voter education,'' strictly understood, can only proceed
under the authority of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC),
a body that is staffed by President Mugabe and ZANU-PF
loyalists.
Beatrice Mtetwa, Zimbabwe's most prominent human rights
lawyer--and founding board member of Zimbabwe Lawyer's for
Human Rights (ZLHR)--was arrested on Sunday, March 17, for
allegedly ``obstructing'' the police as they raided an office
of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) without a warrant.
Beatrice was transferred to the notorious Rhodesville Prison in
Harare, kept in solitary confinement, and consistently denied
access to family members despite a court ruling that ordered
her release. African, regional, and international human rights
groups denounced the ``alarming'' and ``unlawful'' arrest.
State prosecutors during the week of April 8 served
Mtetwa's attorneys with the new allegations together with
court papers to prepare for her trial, which has been set
for the May 27-31 at the Harare Magistrates Court. Mtetwa
faces 20 allegations by the State in its criminal case
against her in what has been described as a ``desperate act
of ``embellishment.''
Radio Dialogue, a popular community radio station in
Bulawayo, was raided by police and officers from the Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO) on March 1. Police allegedly
confiscated 180 shortwave radios and later broke into the
director's personal residence looking for similar devices. The
director, Zenzele Ndbele was interrogated by police for several
hours, later released, and asked to appear before a magistrate
the following Monday. In another report, police allegedly went
door to door in Gandanzara, Ward 23 of Makoni South in search
of radios. The ``ban'' on radios was announced on February 19
by Assistant Police Commissioner Charity Charamba, who claimed
that the radios would be used to ``communicate hate speech''
ahead of the constitutional referendum and elections.
On Tuesday, February 19, the headquarters of the Zimbabwe
Electoral Support Network (ZESN) were raided by police,
breaking down the organization's main security gate in the
process. During the same day, the ZESN regional office in
Masvingo was also broken into by unknown individuals, but
largely believed to be the work of the police and related
security forces. Much like the February 11 raid of the ZPP
offices, police came armed with a warrant in search of
``subversive material.'' On February 21, the ZESN Masvingo
offices were broken into again; their security guard reported
that armed persons ``entered the premises and broke a window,
taking the field officer's desk drawers which included over 800
T-shirts, power adapters, and a blackberry phone.
On Monday, February 11, plain-clothed police officers raided
the Hillside offices of the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), which
documents instances of police misconduct, human rights abuses,
and political violence across the country. Police claimed to
have a warrant for ``illegal entry of goods, persons or
communications equipment.'' According to several reports,
police confiscated ZPP's violence incidence reports, as well as
upwards of 60 phones and 60 wind-up radios that are frequently
used by ZPP staff during grassroots outreach activities. Police
returned again that night, demanding entry into the director's
office. ZPP is led by Jestina Mukoko, a former newscaster and
prominent human rights activist who, in December 2008, was
abducted, tortured, and held incommunicado for nearly a month.
The police vendetta against Jestina Mukoko escalated in
early March. The national police commissioner, Augustine
Chihuri, stated on national television his intent to detain
Mukoko and requested the public's help in ``tracking her
down.'' Mukoko presented herself before the state
authorities on Friday, March 8, where she was formally
charged with ``running an unregistered organization,''
``smuggling radio sets and mobile phones,'' and
``broadcasting without a license.''
Also on February 11, police raided the offices of the
Community Tolerance, Reconciliation, and Development Group
(COTRAD) and the National Association of Nongovernmental
Organizations (NANGO), one the largest civil society coalition
groups in Zimbabwe. Two people were reportedly arrested during
these raids.
On February 6, 2013, police once again raided the Bulawayo
offices of the
National Youth Development Trust (NYDT) on the grounds that the
group was in possession of ``subversive material'' and for
allegedly ``conducting illegal voter registration activities.''
The raid came two days after two other members from NYDT were
arrested in Lupane after being found in possession of voter
registration receipts. The police initially detained 40 people
affiliated with NYDT, but were later released.
On April 10, 2013, three NYDT members were arrested in
Bulawayo for mobilizing residents in Pumula to register as
voters. NYDT was implementing a plan whereby the urged
residents with Econet phone lines to register using their
SIM card receipts, which contains proof of where they
reside.
On January 14, 2013, Okay Machisa, director of the Zimbabwe
Human Rights Association (ZimRights) was arrested and charged
with conspiracy to commit [voter registration] fraud, forgery,
and publishing falsehoods. This arrest followed the December
2012 arrest of another high-ranking ZimRights employee, Leo
Chamahwinya, also for allegedly conducting ``illegal voter
registration'' activities. Three other individuals who are not
ZimRights employees have been implicated in the case as well,
and have been repeatedly denied bail and access to lawyers.
In December, two officials from the Zimbabwe Electoral
Support Network (ZESN) were detained for organizing an
``unsanctioned public meeting'' on International Human Rights
Day. The same afternoon, two leaders of the Zimbabwe Congress
of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the largest grouping of trade union
activists in the country, were briefly arrested in Bulawayo as
they attempted to march in the city center.
Several employees from the Counseling Services Unit (CSU)--a
nonprofit organization that provides support to victims of
torture and political violence--were arrested and illegally
detained in November because CSU was allegedly in possession of
``offensive and subversive material.'' The three individuals
were eventually charged with causing ``malicious damage to
property'' in contravention of Section 140 of the Criminal Law
(Codification and Reform) Act, 4 days after their arrest.
In October 2012, Nkosilathi Moyo, director of the Zimbabwe
Organization for Youth in Politics (ZOYP), was convicted under
POSA for organizing a civic education workshop without getting
``permission'' from the police. Police disrupted the workshop
and arrested Nkosilathi, along with Maureen Gombakomba and
Beloved Chiweshe from the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. The
Crisis officials were cleared and released the same day but
Moyo was detained, charged, and ultimately found guilty by a
Kwekwe magistrate. He received a 12-month jail sentence. Six
months were suspended with a $500 fine, on condition that he
not commit the same crime again for the next 5 years.
In September, police arrested 10 members of Women of
Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) during a peaceful protest and again
during a November 13 altercation during which police officers
verbally referenced the Gukurahundi massacres and ordered WOZA
members to not speak in their native Ndebele language. National
Coordinator Jenni Williams and Programs Coordinator Magodonga
Mahlangu were arrested and later released without charge. On
December 11, upwards of 80 WOZA members were again arrested,
physically assaulted, and detained at Bulawayo Central police
station for staging a peaceful protest about the deteriorating
water situation in the city. Most recently, during a peaceful
protest on February 13, police assaulted and arrested nine WOZA
members, including Jenni Williams. WOZA members filed an
official complaint due to the harsh treatment they received,
and all members were later released without charge.
A life skills workshop organized by the National Youth
Development Trust (NYDT) was barred from taking place in
September without legitimate reason from the local police, the
second such instance in less than a month when an event was
illegally dispersed. On both occasions, NYDT employees were
detained, questioned, and later harassed by local authorities.
On September 28, the president of the Zimbabwe National
Students Union (ZINASU) was arrested, along with three
colleagues, for organizing and an ``illegal demonstration.''
The four individuals were denied access to food, lawyers, and
their respective family members for extended periods of time.
In August, the headquarters of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance
of Zimbabwe (GALZ) was ransacked on multiple occasions, during
which visibly drunk riot police assaulted GALZ employees and
illegally seized office materials. Authorities later attempted
to shut down GALZ operations altogether, charging a co-
chairperson with running an ``unregistered'' organization, the
same rationale used to arrest and detain the director of the
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum the previous month.
______
APPENDIX B
[From the Washington Post, July 5, 2008]
Inside Mugabe's Violent Crackdown Notes, Witnesses Detail How Campaign
Was Conceived and Executed by Leader, Aides
(By Craig Timberg)
HARARE, Zimbabwe.--President Robert Mugabe summoned his top
security officials to a government training center near his rural home
in central Zimbabwe on the afternoon of March 30. In a voice barely
audible at first, he informed the leaders of the state security
apparatus that had enforced his rule for 28 years that he had lost the
presidential vote held the previous day.
Then Mugabe told the gathering he planned to give up power in a
televised speech to the nation the next day, according to the written
notes of one participant that were corroborated by two other people
with direct knowledge of the meeting.
But Zimbabwe's military chief, Gen. Constantine Chiwenga, responded
that the choice was not Mugabe's alone to make. According to two
firsthand accounts of the meeting, Chiwenga told Mugabe his military
would take control of the country to keep him in office or the
president could contest a runoff election, directed in the field by
senior army officers supervising a military-style campaign against the
opposition.
Mugabe, the only leader this country has known since its break from
white rule nearly three decades ago, agreed to remain in the race and
rely on the army to ensure his victory. During an April 8 military
planning meeting, according to written notes and the accounts of
participants, the plan was given a code name: CIBD. The acronym, which
proved apt in the fevered campaign that unfolded over the following
weeks, stood for: Coercion. Intimidation. Beating. Displacement.
In the three months between the March 29 vote and the June 27
runoff election, ruling-party militias under the guidance of 200 senior
army officers battered the Movement for Democratic Change, bringing the
opposition party's network of activists to the verge of oblivion. By
election day, more than 80 opposition supporters were dead, hundreds
were missing, thousands were injured and hundreds of thousands were
homeless. Morgan Tsvangirai, the party's leader, dropped out of the
contest and took refuge in the Dutch Embassy.
This account reveals previously undisclosed details of the strategy
behind the campaign as it was conceived and executed by Mugabe and his
top advisers, who from that first meeting through the final vote
appeared to hold decisive influence over the president.
The Washington Post was given access to the written record by a
participant of several private meetings attended by Mugabe in the
period between the first round of voting and the runoff election. The
notes were corroborated by witnesses to the internal debates. Many of
the people interviewed, including members of Mugabe's inner circle,
spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of government retribution.
Much of the reporting for this article was conducted by a Zimbabwean
reporter for The Post whose name is being withheld for security
reasons.
What emerges from these accounts is a ruling inner circle that
debated only in passing the consequences of the political violence on
the country and on international opinion. Mugabe and his advisers also
showed little concern in these meetings for the most basic rules of
democracy that have taken hold in some other African nations born from
anti-colonial independence movements.
Mugabe's party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front, took power in 1980 after a protracted guerrilla war. The notes
and interviews make clear that its military supporters, who stood to
lose wealth and influence if Mugabe bowed out, were not prepared to
relinquish their authority simply because voters checked Tsvangirai's
name on the ballots.
``The small piece of paper cannot take the country,'' Solomon
Mujuru, the former guerrilla commander who once headed Zimbabwe's
military, told the party's ruling politburo on April 4, according to
notes of the meeting and interviews with some of those who attended.
``Professional Killers''
The plan's first phase unfolded the week after the high-level
meeting, as Mugabe supporters began erecting 2,000 party compounds
across the country that would serve as bases for the party militias.
At first, the beatings with whips, striking with sticks, torture
and other forms of intimidation appeared consistent with the country's
past political violence. Little of it was fatal.
That changed May 5 in the remote farming village of Chaona, located
65 miles north of the capital, Harare. The village of dirt streets had
voted for Tsvangirai in the election's first round after decades of
supporting Mugabe.
On the evening of May 5--three days after Mugabe's government
finally released the official results of the March 29 election--200
Mugabe supporters rampaged through its streets. By the time the militia
finished, seven people were dead and the injured bore the hallmarks of
a new kind of political violence.
Women were stripped and beaten so viciously that whole sections of
flesh fell away from their buttocks. Many had to lie facedown in
hospital beds during weeks of recovery. Men's genitals became targets.
The official postmortem report on Chaona opposition activist Aleck
Chiriseri listed crushed genitals among the causes of death. Other men
died the same way.
At the funerals for Chiriseri and the others, opposition activists
noted the gruesome condition of the corpses. Some in the crowds
believed soldiers trained in torture were behind the killings, not the
more improvisational ruling-party youth or liberation war veterans who
traditionally served as Mugabe's enforcers.
``This is what alerted me that now we are dealing with professional
killers,'' said Shepherd Mushonga, a top opposition leader for
Mashonaland Central province, which includes Chaona.
Mushonga, a lawyer whose unlined face makes him look much younger
than his 48 years, won a seat in parliament in the March vote on the
strength of a village-by-village organization that Tsvangirai's party
had worked hard to assemble in rural Mashonaland.
After Chaona, Mushonga turned that organization into a defense
force for his own village, Kodzwa. Three dozen opposition activists,
mostly men in their 20s and 30s, took shifts patrolling the village at
night. The men armed themselves with sticks, shovels and axes small
enough to slip into their pants pockets, Mushonga said.
The same militias that attacked Chaona worked their way gradually
south through the rural district of Chiweshe, hitting Jingamvura, Bobo
and, in the predawn hours of May 28, Kodzwa, where about 200 families
live between two rivers.
When about 25 ruling-party militia members attempted to enter the
village along its two dirt roads, Mushonga said, his patrols blew
whistles, a prearranged signal for women, children and the elderly to
flee south across one of the rivers to the relative safety of a
neighboring village.
Over the next few hours, the two rival groups moved through
Kodzwa's dark streets. Shortly after dawn, Mushonga's 46-year-old
brother, Leonard, and about 10 other opposition activists cornered five
of the ruling-party militia members. One of the militia members was
armed with a bayonet, another a traditional club known as a knobkerrie.
In the scuffle, Leonard Mushonga and his group prevailed, beating
the five intruders severely. But he said that this small, rare victory
revealed evidence that elements of the army had been deployed against
them.
One of the ruling-party men, Leonard Mushonga said, carried a
military identification badge. In a police report on the incident,
which led to the arrest of 26 opposition activists, the soldier was
identified as Zacks Kanhukamwe, 47, a member of the Zimbabwe National
Army. A second man, Petros Nyguwa, 45, was listed as a sergeant in the
army.
He was also listed as a member of Mugabe's presidential guard.
Terror Brings Results
The death toll mounted through May, and almost all of the
fatalities were opposition activists. Tsvangirai's personal advance
man, Tonderai Ndira, 32, was abducted and killed. Police in riot gear
raided opposition headquarters in Harare, arresting hundreds of
families that had taken refuge there.
Even some of Mugabe's stalwarts grew uneasy, records of the
meetings show.
Vice President Joice Mujuru, wife of former guerrilla commander
Solomon Mujuru and a woman whose ferocity during the guerrilla war of
the 1970s earned her the nickname Spill Blood, warned the ruling
party's politburo in a May 14 meeting that the violence might backfire.
Notes from that and other meetings, as well as interviews with
participants, make clear that she was overruled repeatedly by Chiwenga,
the military head, and by former security chief Emerson Mnangagwa.
Mnangagwa, 61, earned his nickname in the mid-1980s overseeing the
so-called Gukurahundi, when a North Korea-trained army brigade
slaughtered thousands of people in a southwestern region where Mugabe
was unpopular. From then on, Mnangagwa was known as the Butcher of
Matabeleland.
The ruling party turned to Mnangagwa to manage Mugabe's runoff
campaign after first-round results, delayed for five weeks, showed
Tsvangirai winning but not with the majority needed to avoid a second
round.
The opposition, however, had won a clear parliamentary majority.
In private briefings to Mugabe's politburo, Mnangagwa expressed
growing confidence that the violence was doing its job, according to
records of the meetings. After Joice Mujuru raised concerns about the
brutality in the May 14 meeting, Mnangagwa said only, ``Next agenda
item,'' according to written notes and a party official who witnessed
the exchange.
At a June 12 politburo meeting at party headquarters, Mnangagwa
delivered another upbeat report.
According to one participant, he told the group that growing
numbers of opposition activists in Mashonaland Central, Matabeleland
North and parts of Masvingo province had been coerced into publicly
renouncing their ties with Tsvangirai. Such events were usually held in
the middle of the night, and featured the burning of opposition party
cards and other regalia.
Talk within the ruling party began predicting a landslide victory
in the runoff vote, less than three weeks away.
Mugabe's demeanor also brightened, said some of those who attended
the meeting. Before it began, he joked with both Mnangagwa and Joice
Mujuru.
It was the first time since the March vote, one party official
recalled, that Mugabe laughed in public.
``Nothing to Go Back To''
The opposition's resistance in Chiweshe gradually withered under
intensifying attacks by ruling-party militias. After the stalemate in
Kodzwa, the militias continued moving south in June, finally reaching
Manomano in the region's southwestern corner.
The opposition leader in Manomano was Gibbs Chironga, 44, who had
won a seat in the local council as part of Tsvangirai's first-round
landslide in the area. The Chirongas were shopkeepers with a busy store
in Manomano. To defend that store, they kept a pair of shotguns on
hand.
On June 20, a week before the runoff election, Mugabe's militias
arrived in Manomano with an arsenal that had grown increasingly
advanced as the vote approached.
Some carried AK-47 assault rifles, which are standard issue for
Zimbabwe's army. For the attack on Manomano, witnesses counted six of
the weapons.
About 150 militia members, some carrying the rifles, circled the
Chironga family home. Gibbs Chironga fired warning shots from his
shotgun, relatives and other witnesses recalled. Yet the militiamen
kept coming. They broke open the ceiling with a barrage of rocks, then
used hammers to batter down the walls.
When Gibbs Chironga emerged, a militia member shot him with an AK-
47, said Hilton Chironga, his 41-year-old brother, who was wounded by
gunfire. Gibbs died soon after.
His brother, sister and mother were beaten, then handcuffed and
forced to drink a herbicide that burned their mouths and faces,
relatives said.
Both Hilton Chironga and his 76-year-old mother, Nelia Chironga,
were taken to the hospital in Harare, barely able to eat or speak. The
whereabouts of Gibbs Chironga's sister remain unknown. The family home
was burned to the ground.
``There's nothing to go back to at home,'' Hilton Chironga said
softly, a bandage covering the wounds on his face and a pair of feeding
tubes snaking into his nostrils.
``Even if I go back, they'll finish me off. That is what they
want,'' he said.
Two days later, as Mugabe's militias intensified their attacks,
Tsvangirai dropped out of the race.
Groups of ruling-party youths took over a field on the western edge
of downtown Harare where he was attempting to have a rally, and soon
after, he announced that the government's campaign of violence had made
it impossible for him to continue. Privately, opposition officials said
the party organization had been so damaged that they had no hope of
winning the runoff vote.
On election day, Mugabe's militias drove voters to the polls and
tracked through ballot serial numbers those who refused to vote or who
cast ballots for Tsvangirai despite his boycott.
The 84-year-old leader took the oath of office two days later, for
a sixth time. He waved a Bible in the air and exchanged congratulatory
handshakes with Chiwenga, whose reelection plan he had adopted more
than two months before, and the rest of his military leaders.
About the same time, a 29-year-old survivor of the first assault in
Chaona, Patrick Mapondera, emerged from the hospital. His wife, who had
also been badly beaten, was recovering from skin grafts to her
buttocks. She could sit again.
Mapondera had been the opposition chairman for Chaona and several
surrounding villages. If and when the couple returns home, he said, he
does not expect to take up his job again.
``They've destroyed everything,'' he said.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
