[Senate Hearing 113-153]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-153
SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA: CONSOLIDATING GAINS, CONFRONTING
CHALLENGES, AND CHARTING THE PATH FORWARD
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 8, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico RAND PAUL, Kentucky
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Aynte, Abdi, director, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies,
Mogadishu, Somalia............................................. 34
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Dory, Amanda, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC..................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona, opening statement... 3
Hogendoorn, Dr. E.J., deputy director for Africa, International
Crisis Group, Washington, DC................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Le Sage, Dr. Andre, senior research fellow for Africa, Institute
for National Strategy Studies, National Defense University,
Washington, DC................................................. 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Lindborg, Hon. Nancy, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC.................. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
(iii)
SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA: CONSOLIDATING GAINS, CONFRONTING
CHALLENGES, AND CHARTING THE PATH FORWARD
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
A. Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Coons, Flake, and McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. I am pleased to call to order this hearing
of the African Affairs Subcommittee on security and governance
issues in Somalia.
Let me at the outset say that in this Government shutdown,
I think it remains critical first that we fulfill our
constitutional duty in a bipartisan manner to examine ongoing
and pressing national security issues. I also think that the
shutdown, as we will examine in this hearing, is having a
significant and potentially greater impact on our ability to
execute effective diplomacy, to provide meaningful development
assistance, to analyze intelligence in a timely and thoughtful
way in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. And so I think it is
relevant to our current state to have this hearing today, and I
am grateful for the cooperation of the full committee chair and
ranking and my ranking, Senator Flake, in allowing us to move
forward today particularly given the very strong panels of
witnesses we have before us.
As we work together to help Somalia chart a course that may
lead to a more stable and secure future, I think it is
additionally helpful for us to provide a strong example of a
functioning democracy that we can be proud of here at home.
I would like to welcome, as I mentioned, Ranking Member
Flake and other members of the committee who may join us and
our distinguished witnesses on our first panel: Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Linda Thomas-
Greenfield; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa,
Amanda Dory; and USAID Assistant Administrator for
Bureaucracy--excuse me--Democracy----
[Laughter.]
Senator Coons [continuing]. Conflict and Humanitarian
Assistance, Nancy Lindborg. Nancy Lindborg is not the Assistant
Secretary for Bureaucracy but for Democracy. Forgive me.
On our second panel, we will have Andre Le Sage, senior
research fellow for Africa at the National Defense University's
Institute for National Strategic Studies; Abdi Aynte, founder
and executive director of the Heritage Institute for Policy
Studies in Mogadishu. And thank you for the effort involved in
your travel here to join us today. And E.J. Hogendoorn, deputy
director for Africa at the International Crisis Group.
Thank you to all of our witnesses. I know in several of
your cases it was difficult to make preparations, given the
shutdown. I am grateful for your cooperation and presence here
today.
Today's hearing comes almost exactly two decades after the
battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 Americans were killed
defending U.S. interests and providing vital humanitarian
assistance to Somalia. Following the United States withdrawal
that occurred after that and after 20 years of state collapse,
lawlessness, and general difficulties in Somalia, recent
developments have given us significant reasons to be hopeful.
Broad progress in Somalia is due, in no small part, to the
security gains made by the African Union mission in Somalia
known as AMISOM, consisting of Kenyan, Uganda, Burundian, and
other African national troops in coordination with the
Ethiopian military. AMISOM has deprived al-Shabaab of territory
and revenue creating much-needed space to begin building a
functioning state and state structures. This stability has
allowed Somalia to form a constituent assembly, an elected new
government which was official recognized by the United States
last year.
As our witnesses will testify, while much progress has been
made, significant challenges still remain. The Somali people
are frustrated with the government's failure to provide basic
services, education, and health care and others, and the
humanitarian situation remains severe. This year, for example,
there are more than 2 million Somalis without adequate food
access, and recently more than 160 confirmed cases of polio
have emerged, just a reminder of the very fragile health and
humanitarian situation in Somalia.
Recognizing these matters cannot be fully addressed without
a functioning state, the Somali people are impatient with the
central government's lack of leadership on forming federal
states, as required by the constitution. The government now has
36 months to complete a constitution, conduct a constitutional
referendum, and hold national elections. Increased security has
provided the foundation for stability and governance, but as
the horrific attack in Kenya 2 weeks ago demonstrates, al-
Shabaab still is capable of operating both within and beyond
Somalia's borders. The unconscionable targeting of innocent
civilians by al-Shabaab requires our attention and resources,
and as we consider what it means for Somalia, American
interests in the region, and our allies in the region, it is
worthy of extra attention today. This is why I will soon
introduce, along with Senator Flake, a resolution condemning
the Westgate attack and reaffirming U.S. support for Kenya and
for regional efforts to counter terrorism.
This hearing is an opportunity to consider how U.S. support
can help Somalis build on gains in security and governance.
Since 2006, our country has provided nearly $700 million of
support to AMASOM and the Somali National Army, in addition to
the nearly $140 million to support stabilization, democracy,
and economic growth in the past 2 years.
Despite these investments, I am concerned our strategy has
not fully kept pace with changing realities on the ground,
particularly concerns about governance, and I intend to
introduce legislation requiring the administration to present
its Somalia strategy to Congress with benchmarks for progress
and a timeline for implementation, which I hope we can discuss
in more detail today.
I am particularly pleased to welcome Assistant Secretary
Thomas-Greenfield for her first hearing before our committee
before being confirmed to her post and again express gratitude
to Mr. Aynte for traveling from Mogadishu to be with us today
and to all of our witnesses for the skills, expertise, and
background you will bring to this hearing.
With that, I will turn it over to Senator Flake for his
opening statement.
Senator.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Flake. I thank the chairman. I appreciate him
holding this hearing and for you making the sacrifice to be
here and some challenges with the shutdown and obviously
geographical challenges as well. So thank you for being here.
As events of the past weekend indicate, United States
interests continue to be threatened in Somalia. Nearly 20 years
to the day after the battle of Mogadishu, unfortunately known
as ``Blackhawk Down,'' U.S. special forces once again risked
their lives in defense of those interests. Yet, 20 years later,
it seems that the same problems that plagued Somalia earlier
since the collapse of the central government in 1991, and
perhaps even before, continue to plague it today.
Today's hearing will provide us with an excellent
opportunity to evaluate current United States policy toward the
Somali Government, which the U.S. Government recognized for the
first time earlier this year. That is significant and we need
to make sure that that leads to something positive. It is
encouraging that the recognition occurred, but we need to make
sure, like I said, that is moving in the right direction.
The security situation and the threat posed by al-Shabaab
also need to be assessed, especially in the wake of the Nairobi
terror attack in the past couple of weeks.
Lastly, the assistance that the United States provides to
Somalia for development and security needs to be examined to
ensure the tax dollars spent in Somalia go to support United
States objectives there.
This hearing today I feel is important as a first step to
help ensuring that in another 20 years we will not be hearing
reports of United States special forces risking their lives
again in Somalia.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today, and
again thank you to the chairman for pushing forward on this. I
think it is a good show that we are still having hearings and
moving forward even with the shutdown. So thank you for being
here.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
And now we will move to our first panel of witnesses.
Broadly speaking, we would encourage you to keep opening
comments to 5 minutes, but please, we are here to hear from
you. So first, if we might, Madam Assistant Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. Good afternoon, Chairman Coons,
Ranking Member Flake. It really is my pleasure to appear before
you today to talk about Somalia. You reminded me this is my
first hearing since taking over my position about 2 months ago,
and it really is important for me because, as Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, Somalia will remain a top
foreign policy priority for the Department of State as it has
for the Obama administration.
This past year marked significant changes in Somalia and in
our bilateral relationship with Somalia. The election of
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was a welcome signal that room
for political progress in Somalia was opening. This was made
possible in part because of the international community's
support for the Djibouti Peace Process and the leadership role
of our regional partners, notably the African Union and the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. On January
17, we formally recognized the Federal Government of Somalia
after two decades of transitional governments. Nonetheless, the
U.S. Government also understood very clearly that Somalia would
face considerable challenges as it worked to rebuild its
statehood.
The successes of the African Union mission in Somalia,
AMISOM troop-contributing countries, and strategic partners to
combat and eviscerate al-Shabaab are demonstrating the strength
of an African-led model. Nonetheless, this Somalia-based al-
Qaeda affiliate remains a dangerous presence. The all-too-
recent terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in
Nairobi, for which al-Shabaab has taken credit, is a chilling
example of the challenges for Somalia and the region. The
attack suggests that violent extremism in the Horn of Africa
may be evolving. It also makes clear that
al-Shabaab presents a threat to U.S. partner nations in East
Africa, to American citizens, and to U.S. interests in that
region and elsewhere.
Al-Shabaab must be stopped. The Federal Government of
Somalia must increase its capacity to counter al-Shabaab, unify
a fractured political system, and provide basic services to the
Somali people. For all this, the Government of Somalia needs
our support and much more. Our primary interest in Somalia is
to help the people of Somalia build a peaceful nation that is
stable with a stable government that is able to ensure civil
security and services for its citizens.
This leads me to turn to what our policy engagement is in
Somalia.
Prior to our recognition of the Federal Government of
Somalia, our Somalia policy had three primary elements: provide
support for the African Union mission in Somalia, or AMISOM as
it is commonly known, and AMISOM's strategic partner Ethiopia,
to combat al-Shabaab and provide political space for the
government to operate. Second, we wanted to respond to the
humanitarian crisis and initiate stabilization where possible.
And third, we wanted to promote our dual track policy. This is
prior transition.
Post transition, the three elements of our Somali policy
have evolved and it is as follows.
First, we continue to support AMISOM as the primary
stabilizing force in Somalia, as we expand our assistance to
the Somali National Army to build its institutional and
operational capacity. From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year
2013, the United States obligated approximately 512 million
U.S. dollars in support of AMISOM, in addition to our assessed
contributions for the U.N. logistics support package for
AMISOM. During the same period, we obligated more than $170
million to support the Somali National Army to counter al-
Shabaab more effectively.
Second, we have shifted focus from humanitarian crisis
response, now concentrating on security and stability, laying
the foundation for economic recovery through our development-
focused programming. In fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013,
we provided nearly $140 million in funding to support Somalia's
stabilization, democracy, and economic growth activities.
Third, our dual track approach concluded with the
successful completion of the Djibouti Peace Process and the
recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia. The United
States has underscored the importance of outreach and
engagement with the regional administrations to form the
federal framework. We will continue to fund humanitarian
assistance and civil society programs in Somaliland and
Puntland with an objective of improving regional collaboration
toward federalism.
Our assistance to Somalia includes an emphasis on human
rights, on accountability, child soldier prevention, countering
human trafficking, and budget transparency and fiscal
management.
The tragic and cowardly attack on innocent civilians at
Kenya's Westgate Mall has underscored vulnerabilities in the
Horn of Africa and demonstrates that al-Shabaab has a capable
network in East Africa and it is willing to carry out attacks
outside of Somalia. Concerted pressure from AMISOM and the
Somali National Army has weakened al-Shabaab's ability to wage
conventional military offensives and to hold territory inside
Somalia. We attribute this to the success of the African-led
model for achieving greater stability in Somalia. However, al-
Shabaab is able to conduct destabilizing operations in East
Africa.
The Department is working closely with our regional
partners on counterterrorism efforts and we are reviewing
internally what further resources we can provide to shore up
AMISOM and further support their efforts, secure the border of
Somalia and its neighbors, and contribute to the international
effort to shape the Somali National Army into a cohesive,
professional, and effective force.
For the United States to effectively engage on these
complex issues, understand local dynamics, build relationships,
and manage our expanding programs in Somalia, we eventually
need to establish a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence there.
Ultimately, it is the security condition in Somalia that will
dictate when we can establish a more permanent presence, and we
recognize that the time is not right for that at this time.
However, we are moving in that direction. Our current posture
allows for our Nairobi-based diplomatic team to travel to the
Somali capital and other key regions with increased frequency
and duration, as security conditions permit.
Building political cooperation among Somali regions and
clans in support of the federal framework is essential if
democracy, economic growth, and security are truly to take hold
in Somalia. This is a message that President Hassan Sheikh
emphasized during his Washington meetings with Secretary Kerry,
with Secretary Hagel, with National Security Advisor Rice, and
with me when I met with him in New York. We see budding signs
that Hassan Sheikh is meaningfully engaging regional
administrations: the Somalia Federal Government signed the
Jubaland Accords on August 22, recognizing that regional entity
and mapping a way forward to become a federal state; the
federal government introduced a roadmap to the 2016 elections
with a focus on political inclusion and security; and Mogadishu
and Somaliland came to an agreement on regulating air space, a
step toward wider reconciliation.
Ultimately, the development of participatory, accountable,
and representative governmental institutions that respond to
the needs of the Somali people will secure that country's
future. We are committed to working with the government and the
people of Somalia to help them realize that vision.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Thomas-Greenfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield
introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and
distinguished members of the mommittee. It is my pleasure to appear
before you today to talk about Somalia, which, during my tenure as
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, will remain a top
foreign policy priority for the Department of State, as it is for the
Obama administration. The past year marked significant changes in
Somalia and in our bilateral relationship with Somalia. The election of
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was a welcome signal that room for
political progress in Somalia was opening. This was made possible, in
part, by the international community's support of the Djibouti Peace
Process and the leadership role of our regional partners, notably the
African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD.
On January 17, we formally recognized the Federal Government of Somalia
(FGS), after two decades of transitional governments. Nonetheless, the
U.S. Government also understood very clearly that Somalia would face
considerable challenges as it worked to rebuild its statehood.
The successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
AMISOM troop-contributing countries, and strategic partners to combat
and eviscerate
al-Shabaab are demonstrating the strength of an Africa-led model.
Nonetheless, this Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate remains a dangerous
presence. The all-too-recent terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping
Mall in Nairobi, for which al-Shabaab has taken credit, is a chilling
example of the challenges for Somalia and the region. This attack
suggests that violent extremism in the Horn of Africa may be evolving.
It also makes clear that al-Shabaab presents a threat to U.S. partner
nations in East Africa, to American citizens, and to U.S. interests.
Al-Shabaab must be stopped. The Federal Government of Somalia must
increase its capacity to counter al-Shabaab, unify a fractured
political system, and provide basic services to the Somali people. For
all this, the Government of Somalia needs our support--and much more of
it. Our primary interest in Somalia is to help the people of Somalia
build a peaceful nation with a stable government, able to ensure civil
security and services for its citizens. This in turn will prevent
terrorists from using Somali territory as a safe haven.
u.s. policy and engagement in somalia
Prior to our recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia, our
Somalia policy had three primary elements:
(1) Provide support for the African Union Mission in Somalia,
or AMISOM as it is commonly known, and AMISOM's strategic
partner Ethiopia, to combat
al-Shabaab and provide political space for the government to
operate;
(2) Respond to humanitarian crises and initiate stabilization
where possible; and
(3) Promote our ``dual-track'' policy.
Post transition, these three elements of our Somali policy have
evolved as follows:
First, we continue to support AMISOM as the primary
stabilizing force in
Somalia, as we expand our assistance to the Somali National
Army to build its institutional and operational capacity. From
FY 2007 through FY 2013, the United States obligated
approximately $512 million in support of AMISOM, in addition to
our assessed contributions for the U.N. logistics support
package for AMISOM. During that same period, we obligated more
than $170 million to support the Somali National Army to
counter al-Shabaab more effectively.
Second, we have shifted focus from humanitarian crisis
response, now concentrating on security and stability, laying
the foundation for economic recovery through our development-
focused programming. In FY 2012 and FY 2013, we provided nearly
$140 million in funding to support Somalia's stabilization,
democracy, and economic growth activities.
Third, our dual-track approach concluded with the successful
completion of the Djibouti Peace Process and the recognition of
the Federal Government of Somalia. The United States has
underscored the importance of outreach and engagement with the
regional administrations to form the federal framework. We will
continue to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society
programs in Somaliland and Puntland, with an objective of
improving regional collaboration toward federalism.
Our assistance to Somalia includes an emphasis on human rights and
accountability, child soldier prevention, countering human trafficking,
and budget transparency and fiscal management.
westgate attack
The tragic and cowardly attack on innocents at Kenya's Westgate
Mall has underscored vulnerabilities in the Horn of Africa and
demonstrates that al-Shabaab has a capable network in East Africa and
is willing to carry out attacks outside Somalia. Concerted pressure
from AMISOM and the Somali National Army has weakened
al-Shabaab's ability to wage conventional military offensives and to
hold territory inside Somalia. We attribute this to the success of the
African-led model for achieving greater stability in Somalia. However,
al-Shabaab can still conduct destabilizing operations in the East
Africa region. The Department is working closely with our regional
partners on counterterrorism efforts, and we are reviewing internally
what further resources we can shore up to further support AMISOM,
secure the borders of Somalia and its neighbors, and contribute to the
international effort to shape the Somali National Army into a cohesive,
professional, and effective force.
u.s. presence
For the United States to effectively engage on these complex
issues, understand local dynamics, build relationships, and manage our
expanding programs in Somalia, we eventually need to establish a
permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in Somalia. Ultimately, it is the
security conditions in Somalia that will dictate when we can establish
a more permanent presence and we recognize that the time is not right
to do this. However, we are moving in that direction. Our current
posture allows for our Nairobi-based diplomatic team to travel into the
Somali capital and other key regions with increased frequency and
duration, as security conditions permit.
federalism/political cooperation
Building political cooperation among Somali regions and clans in
support of the federal framework is essential, if democracy, economic
growth, and security are truly to take hold in Somalia. This is a
message that President Hassan Sheikh emphasized during his Washington
meetings with Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, and National Security
Advisor Rice. We see budding signs that Hassan Sheikh is meaningfully
engaging regional administrations: The Somali Federal Government signed
the Jubbaland Accords on August 22, recognizing the regional entity and
mapping a way forward to become a federal state; the Federal Government
introduced a roadmap to the 2016 elections with a focus on political
inclusion and security; and Mogadishu and Somaliland came to an
agreement on regulating air-space, a step towards wider reconciliation.
conclusion
Ultimately, the development of participatory, accountable, and
representative governmental institutions that respond to the needs of
the Somali people will secure the country's future. We are committed to
work with the Government and people of Somalia to help them realize
this vision.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Madam Assistant
Secretary, and I look forward to a round of questions on the
topic.
If I might, next Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory. We look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF AMANDA DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Dory. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, and staff, thank you
for the opportunity to appear today to update you on the
Department of Defense's role vis-a-vis Somalia and the way
ahead there.
The United States, as you know, has not maintained an
official military relationship with Somalia since the early
1990s, in large part because there was not a United States-
recognized Government of Somalia until 2013.
In light of the recognition in January 2013, the Department
of Defense, in close cooperation and coordination with the
State Department, seeks to develop a normalized military-to-
military relationship with the Somali National Security Forces,
SNSF.
Somalia is emerging from 20 years of civil war, as all have
acknowledged. Since 2006, al-Shabaab has led a violent
insurgency in southern and central Somalia, first against the
former transitional federal government and now against the
Federal Government of Somalia and African Union Mission in
Somalia--AMISOM--forces. Once controlling most major Somali
cities,
al-Shabaab operated with impunity.
Today, Somali, AMISOM, and Ethiopian forces have weakened
al-Shabaab as a conventional fighting force in Somalia.
However, al-Shabaab is still dangerous and capable of
conducting sophisticated, unconventional attacks to disrupt
AMISOM operations and the Somali Government. Recent events in
Mogadishu and Nairobi are sobering reminders. Thus, for the
foreseeable future, we must maintain focus on Somalia to
sustain security progress made to date, as al-Shabaab is likely
to remain the primary threat to Somalia and East African
stability for some time to come.
The significant gains achieved by Somali and AMISOM forces
over the past few years have been critical in providing space
for the political process that resulted in Somalia's transition
to government now officially recognized. Somalia faces many
challenges ahead, but it is moving forward on a positive path
that was hard to imagine 5 years ago. As military-to-military
relations mature and are normalized with Somalia, DOD, through
U.S. Africa Command, will work with the State Department to
design security cooperation activities to assist with the
development of a unified Somali security force.
There have also been tremendous gains at sea. In and around
the Horn of Africa, piracy has virtually been eliminated. As a
maritime nation, the United States relies on the unhindered use
and access of the seas to ensure our economic well-being. As
recently as 2011, Somali pirates held nearly 600 mariner
hostages aboard 28 captured ships and roamed an area the size
of the United States. Today, thanks to changes in business
practices by the commercial maritime industry and the presence
of international naval forces, piracy is almost nonexistent off
the coast of Somalia.
DOD's approach to the region and to Somalia reflects the
U.S. national security strategy, the strategy vis-a-vis sub-
Saharan Africa, and the Defense Strategic Guidance. DOD focuses
in particular on advancing peace and security by working with
partners to address security threats of shared concern and to
create an environment that enables improved governance and
sustainable broad-based development.
Looking forward, DOD will work, in conjunction with the
State Department and other U.S. Government agencies, to provide
security assistance to build the capacity of Somalia's security
institutions, including their ability to counter terrorism,
secure borders and coastline, and reinforcing democratic values
and the rule of law. Additionally, we will continue to work
with the State Department to support AMISOM and its troop-
contributing countries in their efforts to counter and defeat
al-Shabaab.
AMISOM represents an important success story in which
African forces from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and
Sierra Leone have collaborated to progressively regain
territory from al-Shabaab, working in collaboration with the
Somali National Army, as well as Ethiopian forces. The United
States and other international partners have provided critical
training and equipment assistance to facilitate these efforts.
Once appropriations are approved for the Department of
Defense, fiscal year 2014 would be the first in 20 years in
which DOD is able to support Somali National Security Forces
directly with title 10 activities.
DOD has put in place a senior military representative at
the Somali Affairs Unit in Nairobi, who performs a role similar
to that of a defense attache, and we will increase our presence
in Mogadishu in tandem with the State Department.
DOD personnel are now participating in both the Joint
Security Committee led by the Somali Government and the Somalia
Defense Working Group led by the United Nations on a regular
basis. Moreover, we have made a concerted effort to increase
our key leader engagements with senior Somali officials. This
summer, the commander of USAFRICOM, General Rodriguez, made his
initial visit to Mogadishu. Additionally, Secretary Hagel
hosted the President of Somalia and his Chief of Defense at the
Pentagon at the end of September. These face-to-face
engagements have been critical in identifying and better
understanding Somalia's security needs and concerns.
In conclusion, Somalia will continue to present a complex
and fluid set of challenges and opportunities. However, with
sustained assistance from the United States and other
international partners, Somalia's national security apparatus
will be better positioned to fend off the al-Shabaab insurgency
and gradually transform the fragile state into a success story.
Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in
uniform and our dedicated team of civilian professionals. We
look forward to working with you on Somalia and the other
elements of our Africa policy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda J. Dory,
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for this opportunity to
update the subcommittee on the Department of Defense's (DOD) vision and
role in Somalia.
introduction
The United States has not held an official military relationship
with Somalia since the early 1990s, in large part because there was not
a U.S.-recognized Government of Somalia until 2013.
In light of the January 2013 recognition of the Federal Government
of Somalia, the Department of Defense, in cooperation and close
coordination with the Department of State (DOS), seeks to develop a
normalized military-to-military relationship with the Somali National
Security Forces (SNSF). Both agencies intend to work together in
assisting Somalia to build the operational capacity of the SNSF and
support the development of Somali security institutions.
security environment
Somalia is emerging from 20 years of civil war and the oppressive
control of
al-Shabaab. Since 2006, al-Shabaab has led a violent insurgency in
southern and central Somalia, first against the former Somali
Transitional Federal Government, and now against the Federal Government
of Somalia and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces. Once
controlling most major Somali cities, al-Shabaab operated with
impunity.
Today, Somali, AMISOM, and Ethiopian forces have weakened al-
Shabaab as a conventional fighting force in Somalia. However, al-
Shabaab is still dangerous and capable of conducting sophisticated
unconventional attacks to disrupt AMISOM operations and the Somali
Government. Recent events in Mogadishu and Nairobi are sobering
reminders. Thus, for the foreseeable future, we must maintain focus on
Somalia to sustain security progress made to date, as al-Shabaab is
likely to remain the primary threat to Somalia and East Africa
stability for some time to come.
The significant gains achieved by Somali and AMISOM forces over the
past few years have been critical in providing space for the political
process that resulted in Somalia's transition to a government now
officially recognized by the United States. Somalia faces many
challenges ahead, but it is moving forward on a positive path that was
hard to imagine 5 years ago. As military-to-military relations mature
and are normalized with Somalia, DOD through U.S. Africa Command
(USAFRICOM) will work with the DOS to design security cooperation
activities to assist with the development of a unified Somali security
force.
There have also been tremendous gains at sea. In and around the
Horn of Africa, piracy has virtually been eliminated. As a maritime
nation, the United States relies on the unhindered use of the seas to
ensure our economic well-being, and we seek to ensure the same freedoms
for other nations. As recently as 2011, Somali pirates held nearly 600
mariners hostages aboard 28 captured ships, and roamed an area the size
of the United States looking for their next opportunity. Today, thanks
to changes in business practices by the commercial maritime industry,
and the presence of international naval forces, piracy is almost
nonexistent off the coast of Somalia. The last successful hijacking of
a major commercial ship was in May 2012.
dod security assistance /cooperation
DOD's approach to the region and to Somalia reflects the U.S.
National Security Strategy, the U.S. Strategy toward sub-Saharan
Africa, Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance
(SSA), and the Defense Strategic Guidance. DOD focuses in particular on
advancing peace and security by working with partners to address
security threats of shared concern and to create an environment that
enables improved governance and sustainable broad-based development.
Looking forward, DOD will work, in conjunction with the DOS and
other U.S. agencies providing security sector assistance to build the
capacity of Somali security institutions in pursuit of the following
objectives: (1) improve Somalia's ability to counter terrorism and
secure its borders and coastline, and (2) reinforce democratic values
and respect for rule of law. Additionally, we will continue to work
with the State Department to support AMISOM and its troop-contributing
countries in their efforts to counter and defeat al-Shabaab, creating
space for the extension of governance throughout Somalia's territory.
AMISOM represents an important success story in which African forces--
from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone--have
collaborated to progressively regain territory from al-Shabaab, working
in collaboration with the Somali National Army as well as Ethiopian
forces. The United States and other international partners have
provided critical training and equipment assistance to facilitate the
efforts of these forces.
Once appropriations are approved for the Department, fiscal year
2014 (FY 2014) would be the first in 20 years in which DOD is able to
support the SNSF directly with title 10 funding. Accordingly, USAFRICOM
is working closely with Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-
HOA) and DOS to ensure all proposed security cooperation programs are
complementary to other ongoing U.S. Government and international
efforts and are consistent with all laws affecting U.S. assistance,
including the Child Soldiers Prevention Act. Initial training proposals
for FY 2014 will likely focus on logistics, personnel management,
finance and budgeting, and maintenance, all of which were requested by
the Somali leadership.
DOD has put in place a Senior Military Representative at the Somali
Affairs Unit in Nairobi, who performs a role similar to a Defense
Attache, and we will increase our presence in Mogadishu in tandem with
the State Department. CJTF-HOA personnel are now participating in both
the Joint Security Committee led by the Somali Government and the
Somalia Defense Working Group led by the United Nations
on a regular basis. Moreover, we have made a concerted effort to
increase our key leader engagements with senior Somali officials. This
summer, the Commander of USAFRICOM made an initial visit to Mogadishu.
Additionally, Secretary Hagel recently hosted the President of Somalia,
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his Chief of Defense, General Elmi, at the
Pentagon. These face-to-face engagements have been critical in
identifying and better understanding Somali security needs and
concerns.
With regard to maritime security, DOD has played and is playing a
significant role in countering piracy and maritime crime.In 2009, we
established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) in a dedicated effort to
prevent further attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast
of Somalia. The United States has both commanded this Task Force and
provided naval forces to it. In addition to CTF-151, the U.S. Navy also
participates in NATO's counterpiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa, as
part of Operation Ocean Shield. Today, pirates no longer roam freely.
However, notwithstanding the positive trends of the past 2 years, the
decline in piracy is perishable if these measures are not maintained.
Finally, DOD and DOS will explore opportunities to increase the
SNSF border security capabilities; assist Somalia's maritime security
capacity; build a Somali counterterrorism capability to deal with
terrorists threats; and assisting in justice sector reforms.
conclusion
Somalia will continue to present a complex and fluid set of
challenges and opportunities. However, with sustained assistance from
the United States and other international partners, Somalia's national
security apparatus will be better positioned to fend off the al-Shabaab
insurgency and gradually transform the fragile state into a success
story.
Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in
uniform, and our dedicated team of civilian professionals. We look
forward to working with you in the months ahead.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
Last on our first panel, Assistant Administrator Lindborg,
please.
STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Lindborg. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Coons and
Ranking Member Flake. I really appreciate the opportunity to
speak with you today and most importantly appreciate your
ongoing support for our assistance programs that make a
difference in the lives of millions around the world.
I last testified in front of this committee about Somalia
in August 2011, and that was as the worst drought in East
Africa in 60 years had plunged more than 13 million people in
the region into crisis and just after the July 20th U.N.
declaration of famine in Somalia. At the height of that crisis,
4 million Somalis' survival depended on receiving emergency
assistance, and although the entire region suffered, only in
Somalia did the drought result in famine. As noted, it was the
deadly combination of drought, 20 years of conflict, a failed
state, and the presence of armed terrorists that led to the
death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. And as Amartya Sen
has famously said, famines do not happen in democracies.
So 2 years later, it is a remarkable story that we are
telling right now, that Somalia has its first legitimate
central government since 1991. It has a democratically elected
President and Parliament. And I am very pleased to report that
just recently I was in Brussels where 58 countries gathered in
support of a compact for Somalia that focuses not on famine,
but on peace and prosperity. The recent, very tragic al-Shabaab
attack in Nairobi underscores the need to reaffirm our
commitment to helping Somalia on its pathway to peace and
prosperity and economic growth and providing alternatives to
violent extremism.
Since 1991, USAID's work in Somalia has been defined by a
prolonged, complex humanitarian emergency. However, over the
past 5 years with increasing security gains, USAID has been
able to increase our support in five key areas for transition,
and most importantly in 2012, USAID's democracy and governance
efforts supported the formation of Somalia's first national
government in 22 years. With other donors, we provided
logistics support, constitutional experts to help convene
traditional elders and representatives from a cross section of
Somali society into a constituent assembly. USAID partners
mounted a massive civic education campaign to mobilize support
for the constitution drafting process and its eventual adoption
by the constituent assembly. This assembly elected new members
of Parliament who then selected the new President, Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud, through a democratic process.
Globally we see that the greatest poverty and insecurity
persists in weak and fragile states that are plagued by
stubborn conflict.
In 2011, a group of 19 self-identified conflict-affected and
fragile states established a new framework for helping
countries climb out of protracted conflict called the ``New
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.'' This new deal calls
for a clear focus on five key peace-building and state-building
goals, including legitimate politics, security, justice,
economic foundations, and revenues and services. The compact
that we all just endorsed in Brussels with the Government of
Somalia sets us on a roadmap to achieve those goals with very
clear benchmarks: a federal constitution by 2015; credible
elections by 2016; 30 percent quota for women's participation;
state security institutions; and so forth. The new deal hinges
firmly on mutual accountability and a state-society
relationship that is based on inclusion and on dialogue. This
very specifically means involving previously marginalized
populations, broad civil society consultations, and vital
dialogue with regional entities like Somaliland and Puntland.
This approach recognizes that security, development, and
governance are deeply intertwined and must be pursued together.
Today food insecurity levels in Somalia are at the lowest
point since before the 2011 drought. Yet, three key challenges
remain. These food security gains are very fragile. We have
ongoing humanitarian needs with 870,000 people still in crisis;
insecurity, as al-Shabaab and other armed groups continue to
limit access; and thirdly, access, which is vital to carrying
out both continuing humanitarian efforts and expanding our
development actions.
Finally, Somalia is challenged not only by conflict and
weak governance but also with the severe weather shocks that
are coming in ever-faster cycles. So it is impossible for
communities to escape these cycles of crisis. As we have done
in other parts of the Horn and in the Sahel, USAID is focused
not just on saving lives but building resilience so communities
are better prepared for, and able to recover from, the next
shock like the drought of 2011.
Ultimately, the Somali people must be the primary
architects of peace, democracy, and development in their
country, and Somalia would not have the opportunity that it has
today were it not for the many members of the Somali community
in and outside of the country who are making a daily decision
to focus on a future built on hope and peace rather than on
conflict and despair. We know the road is long. The challenges
are steep this will not be fast nor will it be easy, but with
the specific commitments of the new deal, that roadmap, with
the specific commitments and continued focus by the people and
the Government of Somalia, we believe that right now represents
the best chance for peace in two decades and the United States
will remain a committed partner.
Thank you again and I look forward to questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Administrator Nancy Lindborg
Good afternoon and thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake,
and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on
African Affairs for the opportunity to speak with you today about the
complex state of governance, development, and security in Somalia.
Thank you also for your continued support for our assistance programs
that make a difference in the lives of millions every day.
introduction
In 2011, the worst drought in East Africa in 60 years plunged more
than 13.3 million people into crisis. USAID and the international
community's response to the devastating Horn of Africa crisis helped
meet the needs of 4.6 million people across the region. Despite these
efforts, in July 2011, the United Nations declared famine in two areas
of southern Somalia. Additional areas slipped into famine in the weeks
to follow and at the height of the crisis, 4 million Somali lives
depended on receiving emergency assistance.
While the drought affected millions across the region, only in
Somalia did drought result in famine. This is not a designation we use
lightly, as it means that at least 20 percent of households face an
extreme lack of food with evidence of starvation, death, and
destitution; more than 30 percent are acutely malnourished; and the
mortality rate exceeds two deaths per 10,000 people a day. In Somalia,
it was the deadly combination of drought, 20 years of conflict, a
failed state, and the presence of armed terrorists that led to the
deaths of hundreds of thousands Somalis. As Amartya Sen famously said,
famines don't happen in democracies.
Now, 2 years later, Somalia has its first effective central
government since 1991, with democratically elected President Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud and a new Somali Federal Parliament. Somalis have worked
hard to establish the foundation of their state based on significant
efforts to forge a national consensus. And I am very pleased to report
that I recently returned from an international meeting on Somalia
focused on peace and prosperity, not famine. In Brussels on September
16, 58 countries and 11 international organizations gathered in support
of a compact that outlines a roadmap forward. Emerging from 20 years of
conflict will be a long and bumpy road, but Somalia is now heading in
the right direction, with the best chance in 20 years to move toward a
better future.
Today I am pleased to talk to you about this opportunity, the new
frameworks and international partnerships in support of Somalia, and
what USAID is doing to help Somalia transition out of conflict,
fragility, and chronic poverty.
The recent, tragic al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi only underscores
the need for the international community to reaffirm our commitment to
assist the development of a more legitimate, inclusive democracy in
Somalia. This will be central to peace, prosperity, economic growth,
and to providing positive alternatives to violent extremism in those
communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to violence.
emerging from two decades of conflict
USAID's work in Somalia for the last two decades has been defined
by a prolonged complex humanitarian emergency and significant security
constraints. Since 1991, widespread and persistent food insecurity,
civil strife, interclan conflict, political instability, endemic
poverty, and recurrent cycles of flooding and drought have resulted in
severe humanitarian needs. For decades weak governance and insecurity
have inhibited meaningful solutions and prevented humanitarian aid from
reaching many who need it most.
However, over the last 5 years, enabled by security advancements
made by the U.N. Security Council authorized African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), USAID has increased support focused on three areas
critical for transition: stronger ties between government and
community; economic opportunity through improved government-private
sector relations; and improved government ability to provide basic
services.
Most importantly, in 2012, USAID's democracy and governance efforts
supported the formation of Somalia's first national government in 22
years. USAID and other international development partners provided
logistics support and constitutional experts to help convene
traditional elders and representatives from a cross-section of Somali
society in a Constituent Assembly. This Assembly elected new Members of
Parliament, who then selected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud through a
democratic process. USAID partners mounted a massive civic education
campaign to mobilize support for the constitution-drafting process and
its eventual adoption by the Constituent Assembly.
the new deal for engagement in fragile states: a way forward for
somalia
Globally, we are seeing that the greatest poverty and insecurity
persists in those states plagued by weak and fragile governments and
stubborn conflict. These environments require a distinct approach. In
2011, a group of 19 self-identified ``conflict affected and fragile
states,'' working with development partners and international
organizations, identified a new framework for helping countries climb
out of protracted conflict called the New Deal for Engagement in
Fragile States. The New Deal calls for a clear focus on five key peace-
building and state-building goals: legitimate politics, security,
justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. Based on
research by the World Bank, this approach recognizes that security,
development, and governance are deeply intertwined.
The New Deal calls on Somali Government officials, international
donors, and civil society to work together to create a common plan. It
hinges firmly on the notion of mutual accountability and a commitment
by both fragile states and their international partners to build mutual
trust by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and
aligning these resources for results.
Since 2013, with the consolidation of the Somali Central Government
and a new committed government partner, USAID has been working closely
with international development partners to apply the New Deal in
Somalia. Just last month in Brussels, together with our colleagues at
the State Department, international development partners, and Somali
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, we endorsed the terms of a compact
focused on moving all stakeholders toward shared state-building and
peace-building goals. This plan includes benchmarks for success and
roles and responsibilities with clear leadership by the Government of
Somalia.
Fostering a strong state-society relationship, inclusion, and
dialogue are all key elements of this effort; in Somalia this means
involving previously marginalized populations and vital dialogue
between the Government in Mogadishu and regional entities like
Somaliland and Puntland. Planning endeavors must be given the necessary
time, enabling outreach to regional stakeholders and civil society.
This is key to participatory democracy. We understand that such
consultations are time-sensitive, but it will be time well-spent. By
their nature, consultations often generate a wide range of opinions
regarding the best way forward, which helps leaders chart effective
solutions with buy-in from the people.
The Compact sets forth the intent of the Government of Somalia and
the international community to work together to achieve vital
priorities including: finalizing and adopting a federal constitution by
December 2015, holding credible elections by 2016, fulfilling a 30-
percent quota for women's participation in representative bodies,
strengthening the capacity of state security institutions to provide
basic safety and security, and implementing a national program for the
treatment and handling of disengaged combatants. Importantly, it
commits donor participants to provide aid in a conflict-sensitive
manner, which is crucial given Somalia's complex conflict history and
dynamics.
USAID's ongoing democracy and governance work is already helping to
make progress toward these goals by supporting Parliament's capacity-
building and engagement with civil society as well as the use of
financial software systems to improve revenue collection and promote
accountability.
The last 20 years in Somalia have demonstrated just how fragile the
state-building process can be. In Somalia, we all know that the road is
long and challenges remain steep, but with its specific commitments,
and committed partners, we believe the New Deal represents the best
chance for peace and development in two decades.
continuing challenges
Today, food insecurity levels in Somalia are at the lowest point
since before the 2010-11 drought. However, insecurity, lack of access,
and ongoing humanitarian needs remain key challenges. These recent food
security gains are very fragile with 870,000 people still in crisis and
another 2.3 million people on the brink of falling back into crisis.
Malnutrition levels remain elevated, with roughly 206,000 children
under the age of 5 acutely malnourished; more than 1.1 million people
are internally displaced, primarily in southern and central Somalia, in
addition to the 1 million Somali refugees in the region.
Recent violence--including intercommunal violence in Kismayo town,
surrounding areas of Lower Juba Region, and in and around Mogadishu--
underscore the ongoing insecurity challenges throughout the country.
Moreover, without consistent government control over rural areas,
armed groups will likely continue to limit access for humanitarian and
development workers. Al-Shabaab and other violent extremist groups
continue to interfere with relief operations in rural areas across
southern Somalia, including in Middle Juba Region and parts of Bakool,
Bay, and Gedo regions. The withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defense
Force from Bay Region's capital city of Baidoa may further restrict
humanitarian access and result in additional population displacement.
Similarly, increasing security efforts by the Kenya Defense Forces may
have access implications in Kismayo and reignite tensions in the
community. Access will be vital to carrying out both continuing
humanitarian efforts and expanding development activities.
building resilience
With climate change, we know severe weather shocks are coming even
faster, making it even more impossible for the poorest communities to
escape a vicious cycle of crisis. We are bringing our development and
humanitarian teams together for joint analysis and planning toward the
shared goal of strengthening resilience to make communities,
institutions, and society as a whole better prepared for and able to
recover from shocks such as the drought and famine of 2011 and 2012.
For example, humanitarian activities supporting pastoralist
livelihoods are linking up with long-term economic growth efforts
focused on animal health and livestock production. USAID's Resilience
Agenda--an effort to do business differently and more closely
coordinate with international partners to help vulnerable communities
escape cycles of crisis--and the New Deal framework share the goals of
improving livelihoods, generating employment, fostering inclusive
growth and conflict management. Importantly, good governance is at the
center of both comprehensive approaches.
conclusion
For Somalia to break free of recurrent violence, stabilization
activities must be supported by political actors, civil society
members, and a Somali population committed to a comprehensive peace-
building process that ensures widespread participation but also
emphasizes reconciliation over narrow interests. Ultimately, the
primary architects of what peace, democracy, and development efforts
look like must be the Somali people. Somalia would not have the kind of
opportunity it has today were it not for the many members of the Somali
community who make a daily decision to focus on a future built on hope
and peace rather than on conflict and despair. And the United States
remains a committed partner.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
I think we will do 7-minute rounds, if we might.
Thank you very much to all the members of the first panel
for your testimony and frankly for starting by focusing on the
enormous progress that has been made in the last 2 years since
you first testified, Assistant Administrator Lindborg, a
reminder that there has been real progress in dealing with the
famine and the humanitarian crisis, in dealing with piracy
which has been dramatically curtailed, and in making steady
progress toward a legitimate state recognized by the United
States and laying the platform for progress toward a federal-
state structure and toward moving forward with dealing with
some of the unresolved constitutional issues. Significant
progress.
I would like to ask first of all three of you, if I might,
what impact is the current federal government shutdown having
on your ability, your departments' abilities or stations'
abilities to review and approve programs, to carry out and
deliver needed development, diplomacy, intelligence, or other
defense-related services, and were this shutdown to continue
for another few weeks, would those impacts strengthen or become
more pronounced in any way? Please, if you might.
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. If I may start. Thank you very much
for that question. And I think I can say and I am sure my
colleagues will agree that the shutdown has had an enormous
impact on our ability to coordinate foreign policy within the
interagency framework as some of our colleagues within the
interagency are on furlough and they are not available for us
to coordinate with or speak with. And it is really important,
if we are to have an interagency process, that everyone is at
the table.
We are also not in a position to travel. In the case of
travel to Somalia, that is a two-sided problem because of
security now--our people are not traveling, but had there not
been a security issue, they still could not travel because we
have a travel moratorium.
And then, thirdly, our Ambassadors are not able to host
events that build on the critical relationships that we need to
develop to do our jobs.
I think an important part is we are not able to monitor our
assistance. Senator Flake mentioned the large amount of
taxpayer dollars that are supporting Somalia. We feel
responsible for those taxpayer dollars, and in order to ensure
that those dollars are going to where they need to go, we need
to be able to get out in the field and monitor, and the
shutdown will certainly impact that as well.
Senator Coons. Ms. Dory.
Ms. Dory. Similarly to the areas laid out by my colleague,
I would just add from DOD's perspective, civilian employees in
particular for the first week of the shutdown were affected and
that significantly diminished our ability to operate across the
Department in all key areas, whether it was acquisition,
personnel readiness and training, policy development, et
cetera, et cetera.
There are also kind of unexpected ways where the shutdown
impacts, for example, the inability to make cash expenditures.
That could be fine as far as if you are thinking about cash
expenditures to entertain a visiting delegation, for example,
that perhaps that could be set to the side temporarily. But
when it comes to aircraft who are paying fees of various kinds,
whether it is refueling in overseas locations and you are
unable to expend cash, that is just a very small example of the
limitation imposed by the shutdown.
And then perhaps most fundamentally is just the absence of
understanding for fiscal year 2014 what our planning levels are
to work with and that impedes on the longer term business in
the Somalia context, for example, what title 10 DOD resources
and title 22 State Department resources will be available to be
brought to bear, whether it is vis-a-vis Somalia or any of the
other countries in the region.
Senator Coons. Ms. Lindborg.
Ms. Lindborg. I would just add to that. We are in a really
critical time as we move toward these important milestones that
will be critical for seizing this moment for helping Somalia
move forward. This is an effort that the United States is doing
in close partnership with the international community. There
are a number of important meetings that we are constrained in
being able to participate in right now. At a moment where we
want to be at the table to talk about the importance of
accountable transparent governance and of a functioning
government, we are not able to be there in addition to the
constraints to our travel and our ability to work with the
interagency because of furloughs.
Senator Coons. Several of you mentioned that this
particular structure, AMISOM, is in some ways a model of
African-led regional security being successful. I would be
interested in each of your respective spheres sort of how you
see that model playing out going forward. What are the lessons
learned, strengths, weaknesses? I have represented in a number
of settings that this is something we really ought to be
looking to more broadly where we have a number of different
nations coming together operationally driving al-Shabaab out of
significant swaths of the country, stabilizing the security of
the country, making possible development, improved security,
improved statecraft. Overall, frankly, it has gotten very
little attention in the domestic U.S. press, but compared to
what was the condition in Somalia a year or 2 ago, this has
been a truly outstanding success of a model that is AU-chaired
and African-led. So I would be interested, if you might, Madam
Secretary, what you see as the lessons learned, the strengths
and weaknesses, and what we should be expecting going forward
for the AMISOM mission. And then each of you in turn.
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you very much for that
question.
And I do think the AMISOM model is a model that can be
used. Some of the lessons, as I look back on this in my limited
time in this office, but with much experience on the continent,
is, I think, we have to do a better job of ensuring that we
provide the support that AMISOM needs to do its job. While at
the UNGA in New York, I met with the Foreign Minister of
Uganda, and he said we have the people to put on the ground,
but we still need the support to move those people around. We
need the enablers. And because of our budget cycles and how we
budget, we are not always able to provide them with that
support as early as they need that support. We also want to be
able to continue to support them, and each year, because of our
funding cycles, sometimes there is a delay in when we can get
our support out to them.
You talk about how we might use this model. A similar model
was used in Mali where I was a few weeks ago for the
inauguration of the new President of Mali. In less than 18
months, we were able to bring that country back into a
democratic country moving forward because of an African-led
process supported by us.
Thank you.
Senator Coons. And what sort of lessons might we learn
about the stabilization and the transfer of security function
from 11 to the Somali National Forces, Assistant Secretary
Dory?
Ms. Dory. I think as we look at the success of AMISOM--and
there are many successes associated with it--one of the
challenges is just the pulling together all of the external
supporters with all of the different coalition of the willing
that the troop contributing countries who step up and answer
the call and just managing across that complexity is one of the
biggest challenges and can make things slower and less
efficient than otherwise would be the case.
I do think you are seeing replication of the model in other
locations because it is successful, whether it is countering
the Lord's Resistance Army that we have talked about in other
contexts where you have the United States and other enabling
regional partners taking the lead to pursue the Lord's
Resistance Army, a similar model in the Mali context where you
had regional forces first in the African-led International
Support Mission to Mali --AFISMA--configuration and now as a
U.N. mission, that are being supported by external parties as
well. So I think the replication is an indicator of the
success.
Our part is really bringing the targeted training capacity
and bringing in enablers, as Assistant Secretary Thomas-
Greenfield referred to. Sometimes that can be quite
challenging, especially in the area of logistics, which is the
true shortfall when you look across the many different missions
on the African Continent, both the logistics capabilities of
African partners themselves and then the tools with which we
are able to support them.
Thank you.
Senator Coons. Building on airlift capacity is, I think, a
long-term goal we all share.
And if I might, just in conclusion, Assistant Administrator
Lindborg, how do you see AMISOM's success in terms of
stabilization and security contributing to the development
picture you mentioned in your testimony, that they are
inextricably intertwined?
Ms. Lindborg. Absolutely. Somalia is a perfect example of
how one needs security for development but also how development
leads to greater security. And so as we continue to push our
development programs into south-central Somalia, the
opportunity is to help citizens gain greater confidence in both
local and central governing structures and to receive the
services that are absolutely essential for their well-being and
for their support for the way forward. This is supported by
greater security. So it is a hand-in-hand proposition that
going forward will be important that we are able to realize the
gains from both security and development working together for
peace and prosperity.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you. Thank you all.
Continuing on AMISOM, I was just looking at a map provided
by the Atlantic Council in terms of the area of the country
controlled by government forces and whatever, and it is pretty
small. Ms. Dory, can you explain how far out of Mogadishu does
the government's writ actually go? I mean, how much are we
actually controlling outside through AMISOM or the security
forces there?
Ms. Dory. Right. So what AMISOM has succeeded in doing
essentially is taking away the revenue generation prospects for
al-Shabaab that were related to the port operations in both
Mogadishu and Kismayo. So in focusing first on those population
centers and liberating them from al-Shabaab, that was a
critical step taken in terms of weakening their sustainment
capabilities. As you have seen on the map, the forces have
since pushed out of both of those population centers farther
into the countryside, but there are swaths of Somali territory
that are not under effective control of the central government
at this point. And there are corridors in between, some of the
major centers that are maintained and patrolled by AMISOM. But
it is quite clear that there remains additional territory that
is available to al-Shabaab as a sanctuary, and that is really
the work ahead both with AMISOM and with the Somali National
Army to continue to pressure al-Shabaab so that they continue
to fracture and continually are displaced from the locations
that they are currently occupying such as Barawe which we saw
over the weekend is a current node for al-Shabaab.
Senator Flake. Is AMISOM engaged in counterinsurgency
activities at all, or is that just the security forces?
Ms. Dory. AMISOM is pursuing al-Shabaab directly alongside
the Somali National Security Services. So they are enabling one
another. At various times, one takes the lead or the other
takes the lead. But in the vast majority of operations, they
are operating together.
Senator Flake. And in 2010, the AU wanted to change the
role of AMISOM from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, and that
was objected to by the United Nations. Is that a distinction
without a difference, or does that matter?
Ms. Dory. I think that refers to the rules of engagement
that they are operating under, and AMISOM at this point is
operating with robust rules of engagement where they are not a
defensive force, they are an offensive force. They are making
peace.
Senator Flake. Now, is the transition happening quickly
enough in terms of turning over the security functions to the
country's security forces?
Ms. Dory. In my view, the transition is happening as
quickly as it can, which by definition is slowly because the
ability of the Somali National Army to actually take over is
quite constrained at this point. The Somali National Army is
about 17,000 strong at this point based on the count from their
chief of defense, General Elmi, but of that force, many are
militia forces or other individuals who are under the banner of
the Somali National Army, some of whom have been trained. Many
have not. They have been trained by a variety of external
sources. So there are some major capability gaps as far as the
Somali National Army's ability to step in for AMISOM. And I
think we would forecast that it will be a period of time before
the SNA is ready to step up and take over the mission currently
performed by AMISOM.
Senator Flake. Ms. Lindborg, you were talking about the
government there. You mentioned that the Parliament is
democratically elected, as well as the President or you
referenced them as democratically elected. Is it not more of an
appointment there by tribal elders? And then the President is
then elected by the MPs. But how much of an election is it for
the Parliament, and how much legitimacy do they have going
forward?
To preface that, there was some criticism. I think the
Economist wrote a year ago or so that some of the MP slots were
going for about $25,000, and there was some corruption alleged.
Can you talk about that and how we are moving away from that or
what legitimacy the government has going forward?
Ms. Lindborg. Yes. There have definitely been challenges of
corruption in Somalia through the years. The importance is the
commitment of the current government to move beyond that as
they look at that list of benchmarks with the elections and the
new constitution over the next several years. It is a 36-month
timetable.
There is historically a great deal of factionalism within
Somalia that will be important to have the kind of inclusive
dialogue over the next 36 months to find a way forward that
enables that kind of participation in the solution. This is one
of the best opportunities that Somalia has had in two decades
with an inclusive process, and that kind of planning will have
to continue where you bring in regional entities and you bring
in a lot of the local governments that have been critical for
holding communities together over the last several decades but
now need to come together under an umbrella of the central
government or a federated government.
Senator Flake. The President was elected by the Parliament.
The Parliament was elected or appointed? The current
Parliament.
Ms. Lindborg. It was selected by this assembly process, and
then, yes, they selected the President. And as we gear toward
the 2016 Presidential elections.
Senator Flake. Great. Back to the security environment, the
raid that occurred last weekend, nobody faults--I guess it was
not successful. We did not get our target there, and I am sure
the commanders made the right decision. But how does that
affect our policy going forward? What challenges does that
present to us to have another failed raid into the country?
Does that embolden al-Shabaab, or what happens, Ms. Dory,
moving ahead?
Ms. Dory. From my perspective, taking direct action is one
element of the multifaceted approach being taken vis-a-vis al-
Shabaab and the circumstances under which that is pursued were
outlined by the President in his National Defense University
speech. There are selected cases where that will be pursued.
More importantly, though, is the indirect approach and the
three major pieces of that. We have talked about two of them in
particular. One is continuing to support AMISOM and its
activities against al-Shabaab. The second is working with
Somali National Security Services and their ability to develop
an effective counterterrorism capability going forward. And the
third that we have not really touched on yet is the work that
we are doing with the other partners in the region on a
bilateral basis, whether it is directly with the Kenyans,
directly with the Ethiopians, Djibouti, and Uganda. All of them
have faced various threats from al-Shabaab based on their
willingness to participate in AMISOM. Several of those have
borne the results in terms of attacks in their territory. And a
key part of the strategy vis-a-vis al-Shabaab is also the
continued support to those bilateral partners in the region.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
Ms. Dory, the operation in Somalia--it is my understanding
from published reports that they did not go forward with the
mission because there was greater resistance than they had
anticipated. Is that an accurate media depiction of what
happened?
Ms. Dory. Senator, I think to discuss the operational
details; we would have to move into a different setting.
Senator McCain. Well, could you say whether the media
reporting was accurate or inaccurate?
Ms. Dory. I think to get into the operational details that
would confirm or not confirm the media reporting would require
us to move into a different setting.
Senator McCain. So I guess what you are saying is that we
have to have information in a secure setting, but it is OK if
the media report events and yet you can neither corroborate nor
deny those events. Is that correct?
Ms. Dory. That is correct in this setting.
Senator McCain. Well, do not be surprised, Ms. Dory, when
there is skepticism here about the activities that you engage
in. The fact is it was a failure. The fact is that there was an
intelligence failure there, otherwise the mission would have
been completed. And I guess maybe in another setting, maybe in
the New York Times or the Washington Post, we will find out
exactly why it failed.
Ms. Dory, given last weekend's operation was justified
under the AUMF which, we understand from his State of the Union
speech, President Obama seeks to repeal, how will terrorist
groups like
al-Shabaab be targeted and will these types of operations be
justified in the future, absent an AUMF?
Ms. Dory. Senator, I believe going back to the earlier
discussion about the direct and indirect approach, at the
present time Authorization for Use of Military Force--AUMF--
remains in force and is legally available for the direct
approach, and the corollary to that is enabling the regional
partners, whether it is the Somalis directly, whether it is the
regional players who are willing to participate in AMISOM as
troop-contributing countries, or others on a bilateral basis,
that that will continue to be a core element of the strategy in
terms of countering the activities and disrupting
al-Shabaab.
Senator McCain. Absent an AUMF, would this operation have
been legal?
Ms. Dory. Senator, I am not prepared with the legal
analysis for you today, but I can come back to you with a
response on that.
[The following information for the record from the
Department of Defense to the above question follows:]
Absent the 2001 AUMF, the President always reserves the right under
constitutional authority to order certain types of military action in
the interest of national security. For example, U.S. Armed Forces took
limited forcible action against elements of al-Qaeda in the 1990s,
prior to the enactment of the AUMF. Accordingly, without the current
express statutory authorization, the recent counterterrorism operation
in Somalia would have been permissible.
Senator McCain. Is it your opinion as to whether it would
be legal absent an AUMF?
Ms. Dory. I do not have an independent personal opinion to
complement the legal analysis at this point.
Senator McCain. Ms. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, in Somalia it
is my understanding that most of the work is being done by
private contractors. Is that true?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. We do have private contractors
assisting us in Somalia, but we are using a mixture of that, as
well as direct support to our AMISOM and other strategic
partners such as the Ethiopians, and we also work very, very
closely with AFRICOM and have some AFRICOM support there.
Senator McCain. Does that mean you have American troops in
Somalia?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. No, sir. We do not have troops, but
we do have an advisor working with the Somalia Government and
we do work with the Somali national military outside of Somalia
doing training, and we also occasionally send people in to do
training with them.
Senator McCain. How do you maintain oversight of what these
contractors are doing if there is no American military there?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. We do send people in on a regular
basis to monitor when we are able to travel, when security
allows us to travel inside. And that is part of the issue that
we have, that we are not able to travel on a regular basis, but
when we are able to travel, we are able to do that kind of
monitoring. And we also work and monitor them through our
operations in Nairobi.
Senator McCain. These contractors are often operating in
what is effectively a combat zone. Would you agree?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. Occasionally it is a combat zone.
Senator McCain. You spoke about the goal of normalizing our
military-to-military relationship with Somalia. Could you
describe what that would look like?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. What I would hope for--and it was
DDAS Dory who talked about the military-to-military
relationship. It is my hope that once the security situation
there is enabling, that we would have our military doing
regular programs through the same kinds of programs that we do
elsewhere in Africa that provide direct training and support to
the Somali military. One of our primary goals is to build a
professional army there that is able to provide security and is
professional and has capacity to respond to al-Shabaab.
Senator McCain. On what grounds did we decide to send
contractors in as opposed to our military in? Was it the
threat? Was it contractors do a better job? What guided that
decision?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. We do a mix. We have always had
contractors who have supported our efforts, but in some places
we do have military. So it was not a decision that we would
only use contractors. I think contractors were simpler for us
to use on this occasion, but at a point when the security
situation changes, we certainly would look at other options.
Senator McCain. So it was based on the security situation.
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. I think that was part of the issue.
Senator McCain. Well, if it is the security situation that
would guide your decision whether to send them in, I would
imagine it was the security situation that led you to keep them
out.
I thank the witnesses.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
As the Senator referenced and as a number of us have
discussed, there have been developments in the region, both in
Kenya and Somalia that I think called for a classified
briefing, particularly on the Westgate attack in Nairobi and
some of the intelligence gathered from there and the regional
implications, as well as recent developments in Somalia. And I
would welcome the opportunity to discuss the timing in which
that might be possible.
Senator McCain. Could I just say I am sure the chairman
understands the frustration when we read things in the media
that are believed to be factual and we cannot find out in open
session whether it is true or not. I think the American people
probably deserve to know if it is carried in the media.
Senator Coons. I suspect we broadly share frustration about
many of the things we read in the media, not all of which I
believe. But I do think at the outset of the hearing I
expressed my gratitude to the witnesses for their ability to
come today given the impact of the shutdown on departmental
resources, legal advice, preparation, and otherwise. And I do
think it is appropriate for us to continue some of this line of
dialogue in a classified setting, if we could, as soon as
possible.
If I might, Assistant Administrator Lindborg, I would be
interested. USAID has run programming designed to counter
violent extremism and jihadist tendencies within Somalia. Could
you say something about the small scale or local or quick
impact projects that I believe have been sort of the exemplar
of this sort of ongoing effort in the areas that have been
secured through AMISOM efforts to try and stabilize the
situation and then lay the groundwork for more long-term
development work?
Ms. Lindborg. Yes. You characterized that exactly right.
There is an opportunity to show quick wins to some of the
communities where you have initial greater security and work
with them so those communities identify what are their
priorities and coinvest with them in a way that enables local
governance structures to have greater credibility with their
communities and to align that then with the central approach as
it evolves and address essential services, things like
additional schools, basic infrastructure.
At the same time, we are very focused on what is a large
youth population to provide alternatives to extremism and
through our Somali youth initiative working to both provide
secondary education opportunities, as well as economic options
and ways for them to participate in civic life. We think this
is absolutely critical especially for those groups.
And with your permission, I also wanted to just clarify
Senator Flake's question about the democratic election of the
President and the assembly. The constituent assembly was formed
and they then elected the President. Somalia is not currently
able to have the kind of representative elections that we think
about in this country. That is a part of the big effort over
the next several years, is to provide that kind of election
commission and voter registration that they are simply not
equipped to do right now. So there is a difference between
democratically elected and elected through representative
voting that I wanted to just use the moment to clarify.
Senator Flake. Yes. I just was taken a bit aback when you
said ``democratically elected'' earlier on. It is more like
selected. And I agree we are not at a point where we can expect
anything else, but we cannot lead people to believe that we
have a democratically elected government there.
Ms. Lindborg. It was not a full every voter through the
country but a cross section in this constituent assembly which
did provide a legitimate government to enable us through this
important period at the same time that we are working at the
community level to enable those gains to be realized.
Senator Coons. And the overarching goal of the 2016 process
is to ultimately get to a place where a legitimate national
election is possible.
Ms. Lindborg. That is right.
Senator Coons. Universal suffrage.
Ms. Lindborg. Absolutely, with a constitution. And so it is
also the process of drafting the constitution and enabling a
process of reconciliation and a more inclusive dialogue
including, by the way, the diaspora, which is an important
player in all of this.
Senator Coons. A steady transition from 20 years of
statelessness, lawlessness, and violence to a functioning
democracy is part of the objective of this hearing is to
understand how best we can support that work.
You have just come back from the new deal conference. I
would be interested in hearing in a little more detail how the
international community is coordinating its support for this
ongoing transition in Somalia and what you see as our role and
the international community's role in how well coordinated it
is toward the goals we have been discussing.
Ms. Lindborg. I think this is an essential opportunity
because it enables the international donor community to come
together in a more coordinated way and to support a plan and a
framework that is owned by the Somalis with the key priorities
that were laid out. We are able to work together against those
priorities, and there are conversations, very vigorous
conversations, with the U.K., with Sweden, and our other
development partners on how to ensure that our support equals
and aligns behind the key priorities.
There is also a timing urgency here, that it is in these
moments where there is this rush of confidence and the sense of
possibility that we step forward in a coherent manner that
moves us forward against a very ambitious timetable. So it is
important to grasp, as they call this, ``the golden hour'' of
possibility and enable that confidence to turn into real
results.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Madam Assistant Secretary, if I might, what is our overall
strategy--help me better understand it--to simultaneously
strengthen ongoing Somali-led efforts to develop centralized
state institutions and a coordinate federal system given clan-
based power centers and some recent ad hoc efforts to form
federal states such as Jubaland. My impression from your
opening testimony is you think there is steady progress toward
both, but there is some tension between whether there is a
centralized strong state or a really federalized structure.
What do you see as our strategy and the path forward in this
particular part of the process?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. Our primary goal is that there will
be a strong federal framework that will allow the various
components and various groups outside the central government to
participate in a process of governing the entire country of
Somalia. We do need a central government that can provide
services, that can lead, that can develop the policies and
strategies going forward, but that government has to recognize
the components outside of the central government. So we have
encouraged cooperation and implementation of the federal
framework. We have encouraged the government to be in close
coordination and cooperation with Somaliland. We were very
supportive of the Jubaland agreement, and we are encouraging
further agreements along those lines. The President of Somalia
has expressed his views that he is prepared to move forward in
that direction, and we are backing him in those efforts.
Senator Coons. Terrific. Thank you very much.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Ms. Thomas-Greenfield, you mentioned $140
million going to, I think you said, economic growth activities
and democracy activities. Can you further detail where that is
going and who is administering that? I think you mentioned the
figure $140 million. Right?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. That's correct. AID Assistant
Administrator Lindborg will address those details. Some $170
million is going to our efforts to support the capacity of the
Somali National Army and supporting training for that, but we
also are building democratic institutions that are being worked
with USAID.
Senator Flake. OK. Can you further detail the democracy
activities or economic growth activities that we are involved
in?
Ms. Lindborg. Sure. We have about a $64 million program for
2011 and 2012--sorry--2012 and 2013 that is working to--some of
the activities that I already detailed to help set up the
constitution, to support the move toward elections. That also
includes work in Somaliland and Puntland with those governments
to continue to support the very important advances they have
already made on democratic approaches, transparency,
accountability, and to align their policies with the federal
government and includes a lot of the work on setting up the
independent election commission and the electoral law, the
mechanics, to make the gains that we need in the next 36
months.
Senator Flake. Turning to Somaliland and Puntland, you kind
of make it sound as if they are okay with this arrangement, and
that is not the sense I have received from them. They want to
be recognized on their own. Can you kind of explain the
difference here?
Ms. Thomas-Greenfield. Yes, and that is the sense we have
gotten as well, that they have worked to develop and stabilize
the areas that are under their control, but we are following in
the lead of the AU. We have not recognized them as separate
governments at this time because the AU has not made that
recognition. But we continue to support their efforts to
provide security and services to the people that they are
currently supporting.
Senator Flake. You mentioned some of the funding is
actually going to Somaliland and Puntland to help them. What is
their understanding as to what they are to do with this money?
Are they establishing their place in a federal system? Because
it sounds to me, when you talk to them, that they have a
completely different idea of where they are going. What is your
understanding, Ms. Lindborg?
Ms. Lindborg. As I indicated, there is continued help
particularly to support the accountability and transparency
that they quite appropriately have already made gains with, and
at the same time, we are doing it in a way that very expressly
indicates the goal of having that align with the central
government in a centrally federated system.
Senator Flake. And they accept that?
Ms. Lindborg. There are conversations ongoing.
Senator Flake. All right. Just kind of a general
observation and I will go ahead and stop. But we all know this
is tough work. This is a tough environment. You know, where you
had basically a lawless situation with no central government
for 20 years, nobody can expect it to immediately transform
into some flourishing democracy. We understand that. But I get
the sense from the testimony that you are painting a little
rosier picture than actually exists there, and I am not sure
that that does us any good as those who have to authorize and
appropriate money to sustain programs. And I will be interested
in the next panel to see their thoughts on that.
But just to let you know, we recognize this is tough and it
is going to be a rocky road, but it does not do us any good to
gloss over difficulties. And my suspicion is that, you know,
the government--they are trying. We want them to succeed. We
recognize them. But there are likely large swaths of the
country that do not recognize the government as legitimate, and
we need to recognize that and move forward. But it is a tough
road. I know we are doing the best we can, but it is likely a
more difficult situation than perhaps we are told.
But I thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. No more questions.
Senator Coons. For this panel then, if I might--we do have
a whole other panel, and we hope to come to some conclusion of
this hearing. I want to thank you for your testimony and for
your very hard work. There has been significant progress made
in Somalia relative to where it was 2 years ago, a lawless
state characterized by widespread piracy, humanitarian crises,
and the utter absence of a functioning federal government. So
to Senator Flake's point, great progress has been made, but
significant hurdles and challenges remain, as I believe you
have been clear. And I look forward to working with you closely
as we articulate together a coherent U.S. strategy moving
forward to take advantage of this moment and this opportunity.
Thank you.
And I would like to invite our second panel to take their
places in front of the committee.
[Pause.]
Senator Coons. I would like to welcome our second panel
today: first, Andre Le Sage, senior research fellow at the
National Defense University's Institute for Strategic Studies;
Abdi Aynte, founder of the Heritage Institute for Policy
Studies in Mogadishu; and E.J. Hogendoorn, deputy director for
Africa at the International Crisis Group. And I would like to
invite each of you in turn to make your opening statement, if
you might, to the committee.
Dr. Le Sage.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDRE LE SAGE, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR
AFRICA, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Le Sage. Thank you, Senator Coons, Senator Flake, and
members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before
you today.
As requested in your invitation, I will focus my remarks on
the status of al-Shabaab and international efforts to defeat
that terrorist group. I would be grateful if my full written
statement could be included in the record.
Senator Coons. Without objection.
Dr. Le Sage. Al-Shabaab has been weakened as a national
insurgency force. However, it retains the capability to conduct
targeted guerilla and terrorist attacks against Somali, United
States, and partner nation interests. This was vividly
demonstrated in September when al-Shabaab-linked gunmen stormed
the Westgate shopping complex in Nairobi killing scores of
innocent civilians. Without additional efforts to defeat al-
Shabaab, it is only a matter of time before the group and its
affiliates undertake additional deadly attacks.
Al-Shabaab, currently led by the group's emir, Ahmed Abdi
Godane, has controlled much of south-central Somalia since
2006. However, over the past 2 years, the tide has turned
dramatically. AMISOM has partnered with former clan militia
that have integrated into the Somali National Army. They
pressured al-Shabaab to withdraw from Mogadishu in August 2011
and then seized neighboring towns. In 2012, Ethiopia and Kenya
also worked with clan militia to liberate the towns of Baidoa
and Kismayo. In central Somalia and Puntland, clan leaders and
local administrations have also mobilized to resist the al-
Shabaab movement.
In response to the military superiority of AMISOM in
Ethiopia, al-Shabaab has avoided conventional engagements.
Instead the group has shifted its forces to safe havens that
lie just outside of AMISOM's reach. Examples include Barawe in
Lower Shabelle, Bulo Burti in Hiran region, and the Golis
Mountains in Puntland. From these locations, al-Shabaab employs
its intelligence wing, the Amniyat, to launch hit-and-run
attacks and place IED's and carry out assassinations and
suicide bombings. The Amniyat, led my Mahad Karate, is
comprised of hard-liners loyal to Godane.
At the same time, al-Shabaab's regional governors are
essential components of its network. They maintain al-Shabaab's
control over local populations, allow terrorist training camps
to operate, raise funds through taxes and extortion, conduct
recruitment, and manage clan relations.
As the Westgate attack shows, al-Shabaab also retains a
significant external operations capability. These individuals,
including both Somalis and foreign fighters, are only loosely
under Godane's control. They are dedicated to exporting
terrorism across East Africa and work closely with affiliates
such as al-Hijra in Kenya and the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in
Tanzania.
Since becoming the group's emir, Godane has personalized
command and control and marginalized senior al-Shabaab leaders
who disagree with his decisions. Long-standing tensions between
Godane and his deputy, Mukhtar Robow, broke into open violence
in June 2013. Many analysts hoped this internal conflict would
weaken al-Shabaab. However, this is not the case. For several
years, Godane has been building a splinter faction primarily
based around the Amniyat and has taken control of the group's
funding and operational planning.
Al-Shabaab's long-term strategy does remain a matter of
debate. The group may be playing a waiting game, retreating
from large battles to preserve its strength and using terrorist
attacks to stay relevant for as long as possible in hopes that
the wider political context in Somalia and East Africa will
change, allowing al-Shabaab to resurge. This would be the case
if the Somali Government fails, if al-Shabaab can align with
clan-based opposition groups, or if new regional crises force
AMISOM troop-contributing countries to depart Somalia.
Godane and his hard-line supporters have no allusions that
they can impose an extremist state on Somalia if AMISOM and
regional forces continue to make the progress they have done
and the Somali Federal Government works to stabilize the area.
In this case, the group may be satisfied managing a clandestine
jihadist struggle that commits nihilistic acts of violence for
as long as possible.
To conclude, although al-Shabaab has, indeed, lost control
of key cities in Somalia, the group has recalibrated its
approach and remains a vicious enemy. The United States and its
Somali and international partners need to redouble efforts to
roll back the group while supporting Somalia's Federal
Government to consolidate security gains. This requires a
combination of efforts.
First, we must revive the regional offensive against al-
Shabaab, including increased operational and intelligence
support for both AMISOM and Ethiopia.
Second, it is critical to develop a capable and
professional national security structure in Somalia that can
fight side by side with its regional partners.
Third, additional diplomacy and foreign aid are needed to
support the Somali Federal Government and the local
administrations with which it is working to oppose al-Shabaab
and to build a federal structure. They need to negotiate power
and resource-sharing deals that allow the country's federal
structure to function.
Finally, we must continue supporting Somalia's neighbors,
particularly Kenya where the Westgate attacks took place, but
also Tanzania and other countries that serve as hosts to al-
Shabaab-affiliated movements in the region.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to
testify, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Le Sage follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Andre Le Sage
Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and
members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today
to discuss Somalia's ongoing political and security transition, and the
ways in which the United States can promote stability and combat
terrorism in East Africa.
Mr. Chairman, as requested in your letter of invitation, I will
focus my remarks on the status of al-Shabaab in Somalia, and the
progress of international efforts to defeat that terrorist group.
Before I begin, let me note that my comments reflect my personal
analysis, not the positions of U.S. policy or the National Defense
University (NDU).
My overall assessment is that al-Shabaab has indeed been weakened
as a conventional insurgency force. However, it retains the capability
and intent to employ guerilla and terrorist attacks that inflict deadly
harm against U.S. and partner-nation interests both inside Somalia and
across the region. This was vividly demonstrated on September 21, when
al-Shabaab-linked terrorists stormed the Westgate shopping complex in
Nairobi, Kenya, killing scores of innocent civilians--including
Africans and non-Africans; Muslims and non-Muslims; men, women and
children.
Without additional efforts to defeat the group, it is only a matter
of time before al-Shabaab undertakes additional deadly attacks.
Moreover, there is a significant danger that al-Shabaab's brutal
tactics will set a precedent for other al-Qaeda-affiliates and ``lone
wolf'' terrorists that are intent on doing harm to the United States
and its allies.
the political & security context
Al-Shabaab--which is currently led by the group's emir, Ahmed Abdi
``Godane''--was established by 2004 by a small group of Somali Islamist
militants. They had been part of an earlier Islamist movement--Al
Itihad al Islamia (AIAI)--and had provided protection and support for
the Al Qaeda East Africa (AQEA) cell that was responsible for the 1998
attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As of 2004, al-
Shabaab operatives were functioning independently from AIAI, conducting
assassinations of Somali peace activists and security officials, as
well as foreign journalists and aid workers.
Al-Shabaab's existence became publicly known in 2006 when it served
as a self-appointed vanguard force within the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC). The UIC took control of much of southern Somalia after it
defeated the clan-based warlords that had dominated southern Somalia
since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Ethiopian military
intervention in Somalia from 2007-2009 defeated the UIC, and installed
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African Union (AU)
peacekeepers in Mogadishu.
While the TFG languished amidst political infighting, al-Shabaab
successfully launched an insurgency campaign that gradually retook
control of southern Somalia. Moreover, al-Shabaab increasingly gained
control over all foreign fighters in Somalia, including those loyal to
AQEA. This was a byproduct of the success of international security
operations targeting senior AQEA operatives Saleh Ali Saleh ``Nabhan,''
Fazul Abdullah Mohamed ``Harun'' and others. As a result, the al-
Shabaab movement today combines the traits of a local insurgency
seeking to impose an extremist Islamic state on Somalia, and the traits
of a transnational terrorist group that seeks to conduct attacks
outside of Somalia's borders in the name of global jihad.
In 2011, the tide began to turn dramatically against al-Shabaab.
The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) partnered with former
clan-based militia in Mogadishu that had been integrated into a nominal
Somali National Army (SNA). They succeeded in pressuring al-Shabaab to
execute a ``tactical withdrawal'' from Mogadishu in August 2011, and
subsequently liberated several key towns in Lower and Middle Shabelle
regions from al-Shabaab control (including Afgooye, Merka, Jowhar,
Wanleweyn and others). Combined ground offensives by Ethiopian and
Kenyan militaries then succeeded in wresting control of those
countries' border regions from al-Shabaab, and liberated the major
cities of Baidoa and Kismayo in 2012. Finally, in Central Somalia,
Ethiopia supported clan leaders and the Sufist movement Ahlu Sunna wal
Jama'a (ASWJ) to create local administrations that could resist al-
Shabaab's presence.
somalia's federal government
As al-Shabaab lost ground, there was a general assumption that the
movement was significantly weakened and could be defeated by (1) the
gradual expansion of AMISOM's area of control, and (2) efforts to build
a post-transitional national government. Global attention slowly
shifted away from security issues to Somalia's political scene with the
establishment of Somalia's Federal Government (SFG) in September 2012.
The SFG--led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Speaker of
Parliament Mohamed Osman Jawari, and other Somali intellectuals with
longstanding civil society ties--has received remarkable levels of
international support. This includes inter alia the formal recognition
of the Federal Government by dozens of countries around the world and
the reestablishment of traditional diplomatic ties; increased foreign
aid from the United States and other major donors; the partial lifting
of the international arms embargo on Somalia; negotiations with the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund to reestablish formal
relations; and efforts by the United Nations to shift from Kenya-based,
cross-border to in-country operations.
The leadership of the SFG will be critical to completing Somalia's
transitional process, and they will require substantial international
diplomatic, military and financial support in the process. At the same
time, it is important to understand that much of Somalia's political
and security progress over the past few years has been the result of a
combination of factors:
1. Somalia's warlords and militia-factions, which dominated the
country's political, economic, and security affairs since 1991, were
disarmed by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. Since then, the
warlords have not been able to rebuild their powerbase and no longer
exercise a veto on Somalia's progress.
2. At the same time, popular support for al-Shabaab has dwindled
quickly. When it controlled most of southern Somalia, the group failed
to govern effectively. It dispensed with international aid agencies
amidst famine conditions, levied high taxes and forced conscription to
support the group's war effort, and imposed extremely severe forms of
shari'a law. As a result, Somalis had little interest in continuing to
support the group, while more moderate Islamist movements splintered
away.
3. Many major clans--whose warlords had been disarmed by al-
Shabaab--have worked to reestablish their political position and began
to resist the movement. This includes major segments of the Marehan and
Ogaden in Gedo Region, former supporters of the Rahanweyn Resistance
Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakol Regions, the Hawadle in Hiraan, and the
Habr Gedir who supported formation of the Sufist movement Ahlu Sunna
wal Jama'a (ASWJ) movement, Galmudug State and Himan and Heeb State.
With assistance from Ethiopia and Kenya, these groups began to create
local administrations and participate in anti-Shabaab military
activities.
4. AMISOM is an overwhelming military force relative to both al-
Shabaab and any clan-based forces that may oppose its mandate. AMISOM
now requires additional forces and enablers (including helicopters) to
continue their advance, but thus far have been able to roll back al-
Shabaab and hold locations that they ``liberate.''
5. Many of Somalia's militia are slowly integrating into battalions
and brigades that form the nucleus of the Somali National Army (SNA) in
Mogadishu. Outside the capital city, militia that were initially proxy
forces for Ethiopia or Kenya may now be incorporated into a national
command-and-control structure. All of this is supported by Western aid
that provides salaries, training, equipment and mentors to
professionalize the SNA--much of which has been funded by the United
States.
6. Finally, regional politics across the Horn of Africa have begun
working in Somalia's favor. In particular, Ethiopia is now working to
support the SFG, including brokering the recent Addis Ababa agreement
to form the Interim Jubba Administration. At the same time, countries
such as Eritrea--which previously supported spoilers of Somalia's peace
process--are no longer significantly active in the country.
In addition to supporting the SFG, defeating al-Shabaab and
building a sustainable post-transition government for Somalia will
require national, regional, and international efforts to sustain these
trends.
the current al-shabaab threat network
Despite these positive political developments, al-Shabaab remains a
determined and vicious enemy. To conserve its forces and resources, al-
Shabaab has avoided direct, conventional engagements with AMISOM, the
Ethiopian military and the emerging SNA forces. Instead, al-Shabaab has
withdrawn from their areas of advance and shifted its forces and focus
in several directions to establish new safe haven areas, including:
Southwest Somalia Safe Haven: A zone in the far southwest of
Somalia that lays between the villages of Barawe in Lower
Shabelle, Jilib in Lower Juba, Bardhere in southern Gedo, and
Dinsoor in Bay region.
Central Somalia Safe Haven: A zone in the central regions
north of Mogadishu, based in Bulo Burti village of southern
Hiran region and extending west in Bakol region, east to the
towns El Bur and El Dheer in Galgadud, and south into rural
areas of Middle Shabelle.
Golis Mountains Safe Haven: A small, mountainous zone
outside Bosasso city in the northeastern region of Puntland,
running from Galgala toward Badhan, and affording al-Shabaab
with the potential to attack key Puntland cities including
Bosasso, Garowe and Galkayo.
Somaliland Safe Haven: The northwestern area of Somaliland,
al-Shabaab likely retains a limited capacity to operate. While
al-Shabaab has no standing military capacity in this region, it
does maintain a clandestine network capable of terrorist
attacks, and a network of facilitators that support
recruitment, indoctrination, training, weapons trafficking and
support for the movement of men and materiel.
In these safe havens, al-Shabaab's regional governors and
ideologues are essential components of the network. They maintain al-
Shabaab's local control, allow for terrorist training camps to operate,
raise funds from taxes and extorting the local community, and manage
clan relations and recruitment. Their ranks include well-known al-
Shabaab leaders--such as Yassin Kilwe and Abdulkadir Mumin in Puntland;
Hassan Yakub and Hassan Fidow in Central Somalia; Yusuf Kabakutukade in
Middle Shabelle; Moalim Jinow in Bay and Bakol Regions; and Abdirahman
Fidow and Mohamed Dulyadeen in the Juba Valley area. However, despite
their critical role in the group's hierarchy, these leaders do not
appear to be the focus not a focus of counterterrorism efforts.
Al-Shabaab employs its intelligence wing, the Amniyat, to
infiltrate SFG- and AMISOM-held cities and to emplace improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), conduct assassinations or carry out suicide
bombing attacks. This group, led by Mahad Mohamed Ali ``Karate,'' is
comprised of hard-liners loyal to al-Shabaab's emir Godane and serves
as the movement's parallel governance structure to monitor and regulate
the actions of other leaders who may be opposed to Godane. In addition,
al-Shabaab's guerilla militias are used primarily for hit-and-run
attacks against AMISOM and SNA forward operating bases and main supply
routes.
Finally, as demonstrated by the Westgate mall attack last month,
al-Shabaab retains a significant ``external operations'' cadre,
existing either within or distinct from the Amniyat unit. These
individuals, including both Somalis and foreign fighters, are dedicated
to expanding the reach of al-Shabaab and the wider al-Qaeda network to
conduct terrorist operations outside of Somalia. The region has a long
history of terrorist attacks, including the 1998 bombings of the U.S.
Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the 2002 attacks targeting
tourists in Mombasa, and the 2010 Kampala attacks the end of the 2010
FIFA World Cup. As al-Shabaab has lost ground in Somalia, more of its
trained and battle-hardened fighters have focused on other parts of
East Africa, particularly through cooperation with local affiliates
such as Al Hijra in Kenya, and the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (A-MYC) in
Tanzania.
sustaining al-shabaab: funding and personnel
Al-Shabaab's finances have been dramatically reduced as a result of
its loss of safe haven to the military offensives undertaken by AMISOM,
regional partners and the SFG. Prior to those offensives, Kismayo
seaport--from which charcoal and other commodities were traded--
provided al-Shabaab with its primary source of revenue. Nonetheless,
al-Shabaab is still able to access funds and manage their distribution
across its areas of operations in order to sustain its personnel and
undertake guerilla attacks. In particular, al-Shabaab continues to levy
taxes on national and regional trade routes that cross al-Shabaab safe
haven areas. The group extorts revenue from major businesses under
threat of attack and coerces donations in cash or in kind from clan-
based communities in areas that it controls. Finally, al-Shabaab likely
still receives foreign donations by supporters of its jihadi ideology.
Al-Shabaab today has a reduced number of personnel as the result of
two factors: first, the growing resistance of major Somali subclans,
and second, the successful military offensives by AMISOM, regional
partners and the SFG. As a result, many clan-based militia who joined
al-Shabaab when the movement occupied their traditional clan areas or
who supported al-Shabaab in order to gain financial payments have left
the movement. The reduction in the number of clan-based personnel
supporting al-Shabaab is a positive factor in so far as the reduction
degrades the fighting capabilities of the movement. However, a smaller,
more ideologically committed force is easier to sustain for al-
Shabaab's leadership, particularly given the group's potentially
declining access to funds.
Nonetheless, al-Shabaab has demonstrated its capacity to sustain
thousands of personnel in its safe haven areas, and remains able to
surge militia in the hundreds against specific targets, particularly in
rural areas of south-central Somalia. In addition, some Somali sub-
clans--for example, the Duduble and Murosade in Mogadishu and Central
Somalia, or the Warsangeli and Lelkase in Puntland--have aligned
themselves with al-Shabaab in order to strengthen their lineages' hand
in longstanding struggles against other subclans for local political
and economic control. This affords al-Shabaab a continued supply of
militia recruits and funding, as well as safe haven and safe passage.
al-shabaab's internal conflicts
Since its creation, al-Shabaab was nominally led through the
collective decisionmaking of its Shura Council. However, following the
appointment of Godane as the group's emir, he has personalized command-
and-control, marginalized other senior al-Shabaab leaders who disagree
with his decisions, and even arrested or killed Somali and foreign
fighters who seek to develop their own operational plans.
Longstanding leadership tensions between al-Shabaab's emir Godane
and his deputy, Mukhtar Robow, broke into open violence in June 2013.
Forces loyal to Godane killed several key leaders, including Godane's
mentor, Ibrahim Haji Jama ``al- Afghani.'' Following the fighting,
Robow has sought protection in has clan's home on the border between
Bay and Bakol regions. Meanwhile, the U.S. jihadist Omar Hammami ``Abu
Mansor al-Amriki'' was killed by Godane's faction, Hassan Dahir Aweis
(one of the original AIAI leaders from the 1990s) fled and was arrested
by the SFG, and other senior leaders expect they may be next.
Many analysts and policymakers hoped this internal conflict would
weaken al-Shabaab and make it less capable to launch attacks. However,
that is obviously not the case. For several years, Godane had been
building and taking firm control over a splinter faction of al-
Shabaab--primarily based around the Amniyat intelligence unit--and he
has centralized control over the al-Shabaab movement, including its
forces, funding and operational planning.
It is worth noting that the Amniyat, which leads attacks against
Somali and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu, was barely impacted when the
infighting broke out this past summer. Their attack rate in Mogadishu
never fell, and the severity of those attacks never dulled. Over the
past year, they have also succeeded in conducting several major attacks
including those against senior SFG officials, the Turkish Embassy, the
United Nations compound, as well as popular restaurants and hotels.
al-shabaab's strategy and the westgate attack
Al-Shabaab's long-term strategy is not entirely clear. On the one
hand, the group may be playing a ``waiting game.'' By this analysis,
al-Shabaab is working hard to stay alive, to preserve its strength and
to stay relevant for as long as possible. It hopes that the wider
political context in Somalia and the region will change and al-Shabaab
will have an opportunity to resurge. This would be the case if the SFG
fails to rebuild a national government, if new clan-based opposition
groups emerge with which al-Shabaab can align its movement, or if new
regional crises force AMISOM to depart Somalia.
On the other hand, Godane, his loyal Amniyat structure, and his
external operations cadre may have no illusions that they will
eventually succeed in imposing an extremist Islamic state on Somalia.
By this account, the group is satisfied with managing a clandestine
jihadist movement that inflicts serious harm through nihilistic
violence for as long as possible.
In this context, the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in
Nairobi should not come as a surprise. Al-Shabaab and its regional
networks across East Africa have long harbored both the ambition and
capability to conduct such a deadly attack. Nonetheless, the attack
begs a series of questions regarding the level of external threat posed
by al-Shabaab.
There should be no doubt that al-Shabaab's emir and spokesman both
claimed credit for the attack, and have threatened additional
bloodshed. Almost certainly, the Westgate attack was a combined
operation involving an element of the al-Shabaab network in Somalia,
and an element of the its Kenyan affiliate, the Al Hijra network. From
an intelligence perspective, the key is to identify exactly which
individuals were involved and their chain of command. Was the attack
authorized and directed by Godane to demonstrate that he is now fully
in charge of the al-Shabaab movement and indispensable to al-Qaeda's
senior leaders despite his group's recent infighting? Or, was the
attack planned and undertaken by remnants of the AQEA network and
foreign fighters that have felt undermined by Godane--acting
independently and forcing al-Shabaab leadership to catch up?
It will also be critical to assess what form of ``intelligence
failure'' allowed the Westgate attack to happen. In short, we need to
understand why the attack cell was not identified in advance. How long
was the attack cell in Kenya before they took action? Was the attack
cell ``too quick'' from its infiltration into Kenya until the execution
of their plot for local security service (even with foreign assistance)
to take action? Was the attack cell in Kenya for a long time and parts
of previously identified, but considered a ``watch target'' by mistake?
Or, was the attack cell not identified at all due to sufficient
compartmentalization and operational security?
The challenge in answering these questions today is the huge amount
of contradictory information that exists in the public domain, and the
possibility of developing reasonable hypotheses to support many
different assessments. Answers to these questions will eventually
emerge as the investigation moves forward. In the meantime, it is
critical to focus on the best possible response to prevent such an
attack from happening again.
continuing the fight against al-shabaab
As detailed above, al-Shabaab has indeed been weakened as a
conventional insurgency force inside Somalia. However, the group has
recalibrated its approach and retains the capability and intent to
employ guerilla and terrorist attacks. In response, the United States
and its Somali, regional and international partners need to redouble
their efforts to roll back al-Shabaab and build a national, federal
government for Somalia that can consolidate the country's security
gains into the future.
Succeeding to defeat the al-Shabaab insurgency and prevent the
resurgence of
al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cells across East Africa will require a
combination of efforts:
Reviving Regionally-Supported Offensive Operations against
al-Shabaab:
Increase intelligence collection and sharing, as well as
operational support, for regional security partners to
support targeted operations that remove key al-Shabaab and
other al-Qaeda-linked operatives from Somalia, and disrupt
terrorist training camps.
Strengthen regional military commitments to sustain and
increase the
capabilities of AMISOM and their ability to work alongside
the SFG's security structure and regional partners,
including Ethiopia.
Invest in the development of a capable and professional
national security structure in Somalia, including the
Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence and
Security Agency (NISA) and the Somali National Police
(SNP), including careful attention to the integration of
anti-Shabaab forces at the local and regional levels.
Support for the development of Somalia's federal system:
Provide diplomatic and foreign aid support to the SFG and
its local-level Somali governance partners to achieve
negotiated durable political agreements, power-sharing and
resource-sharing deals that allow for the emergence of a
federal governing system.
Address the vexing and politically charged question of how
``federalism'' will be implemented, including the need to
finalize the Provisional Constitution and to negotiate with
both longstanding, quasi-independent administrations in
Puntland and Somaliland, and nascent, clan-based
administrations formed across south-central Somalia.
Ensure the continued formation of national security forces
that reflect the decentralized, clan-based reality of the
country's post-war political economy, which is enshrined in
Somalia's new federal structure.
Support the SFG and its federal units to develop,
resource, and implement sectoral strategies and regulatory
mechanisms to ensure the delivery of essential public
goods, including health care, education and development, as
well as training a new civil service cadre after 20 years
without a functioning government.
Support the SFG and its federal units to establish
positive control over Somalia's resource flows, including
anticorruption efforts and tax revenues from Mogadishu's
key economic infrastructure points (airport, seaport,
checkpoints, and markets).
Support for regional partners to combat terrorism:
Continue support for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and
other regional partners who are vulnerable to attacks by
al-Shabaab and its regional affiliates, including Al Hijra
and the A-MYC.
Build regional security cooperation between these
countries and the SFG to prevent future attacks.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Dr. Le Sage, for that
testimony. I look forward to the opportunity to ask questions,
if I might.
Next, Mr. Aynte.
STATEMENT OF ABDI AYNTE, DIRECTOR, HERITAGE INSTITUTE FOR
POLICY STUDIES, MOGADISHU, SOMALIA
Mr. Aynte. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, thank you
very much for the opportunity to participate in this important
panel at this critical juncture in Somalia's history.
One year after the formation of the first nontraditional
government in over 20 years, there are reasons to be cautiously
optimistic about the future of Somalia. The Somali people are
determined more than ever to reclaim their dignity and, above
all, their place among the community of nations.
They have also identified a common enemy to peace and
stability. Citizens across the country are countering al-
Shabaab's destruction and despair with construction and hope.
Signs of economic vibrancy are reemerging. The Somali diaspora
are returning in large numbers, bringing with them much-needed
skills, business opportunities and, most importantly, a sense
of normalcy. And this is where the issue of remittance comes in
and it is important for the United States to support the flow
of remittance to the people of Somalia.
Significant parts of Somalia suggest Somaliland and
Puntland and others are also enjoying relative peace,
stability, and self-governance.
With regards to security, gains are less encouraging.
Despite losing control of most major cities in Somalia, al-
Shabaab fighters remain a major threat to peace. The capital of
Mogadishu, where I came from just 2 days ago, is under constant
assault.
A key challenge to the restoration of stability is the
chronic weakness of security apparatuses. Command, control, and
coordination is demonstrably weak due to the fragmentation of
militias forming the security forces. Training, especially on
protection of vulnerable civilians, remains poor and
uncoordinated with many countries running various programs. The
composition of forces does not reflect the regional and clan
diversity of the Somali people, depriving the security forces
of a much-needed legitimacy.
The U.S. Government has provided significant support to
Somalia's struggling security forces and the African Union
peacekeeping missions for many years. This support from the
United States and other development partners is literally all
that is standing between the collapse of the federal government
and its survival.
The U.S. Government must, however, utilize its support
innovatively. Tactical counterterrorism measures, surgical
strikes, and the provision of ammunition were necessary for
some time, but now there is a greater need for strategic
partnership. Resources must be channeled toward rebuilding
competent, professional, accountable, and broadly
representative Somali security services that have both the
qualitative and quantitative advantage over the enemy. AMISOM
has done an excellent job of recovering regions from
al-Shabaab's tyranny, but they cannot become a substitute for
indigenous forces. Somali forces can ultimately defeat al-
Shabaab.
Security is inextricably linked to political accommodation
and reconciliation, which is partially why Somalia adopted a
federal model of governance nearly 10 years ago. But a
consensus on which type of federalism remains elusive.
Successive governments have failed to translate the federal
vision into viable member states. Frustrated with the lack of
progress at the national level, communities across the country
are taking matters into their own hands and are carving out
fiefdoms along clan lines. The American dual track policy,
which led to direct U.S. engagement with subnational entities,
sent the wrong signal that the international community was
promoting sectarian polities at the expense of a contiguous
federal government.
The process of federating the government faces three
enormous challenges.
First, the provisional constitution is deeply ambiguous and
contradictory about the shape and the future of the Federal
Government of Somalia and divisions of powers between the
center and the peripheries. The meaning of federalism broadly
misunderstood by the Somali people, many of whom are
legitimately nervous about an overly centralized state. This is
compounded by the absence of an effective judicial branch that
can interpret constitutional provisions.
Second, state institutions that are supposed to play a
leading role in the national dialogue and the design of a
suitable federal structure are yet to be established. The
constitution calls for the formation of nearly a dozen
independent commissions, half of which are instrumental to the
federation process, such as the Boundaries and Federation
Commission, the Inter-State Commission, and the Constitution
Review and Implementation Commission. These delays are
inexcusable.
The federal government garnered an unprecedented support
from the Somali people following its inauguration in September
2012. It also won an unparalleled backing from the
international community, including formal recognition by the
U.S. Government for the first time in 20 years, easing of the
U.N. arms embargo, monthly direct budgetary support from
Turkey, and an expanded African Union peacekeeping mission.
Many Somalis believe that the federal government has fallen
significantly short of using that positive momentum to advance
inclusive politics and dialogue with key domestic actors,
including existing and emerging federal member states,
traditional elders, and civil society.
Third, neighboring countries are sometimes seen as
undermining state-building efforts by encouraging and sometimes
helping with the formation of more subnational entities to suit
their own interests. While Ethiopia and Kenya face real threats
from Somalia, as we have seen in the recent appalling attack in
Nairobi, their unchecked interference risks destabilizing the
country and a reversal of recent fragile gains.
The provisional constitution of Somalia envisions elections
to take place toward the end of 2016. While this is not
impossible, it is highly improbable, given the magnitude of
tasks ahead. It should remain an admirable goal for the current
government, but we must not substitute state-building for
process-building. Elections are not an end in themselves, but
rather a means toward the more vital objective of forming a
viable state. That includes finalizing the constitution,
settling on a federal structure, and adopting political party
laws.
The challenges of facing the process of federation and
political consolidation in Somalia are tremendous but not
insurmountable.
First, the provisional constitution is a deeply flawed
document that contradicts itself and puts future member states
and the federal government on a direct collision course. The
Somali people and their government need urgent assistance in
this regard.
Priority must be given to the formation of the Review and
Implementation Commission and Boundaries and Federation
Commission. Once established, they will need considerable
financial and human resources to engage in genuine national
dialogue. There are a number of American institutions with
relevant experience that can provide essential support in this
area.
Second, assistance to the Somali Government must be
contingent upon measurable gains. It must be held accountable
to the provisional constitution and its own national plan. If
none of the commissions is established by early next year, the
Somali people will lose faith in the government's commitment to
offer something more than its predecessors.
The United States and its allies should assist the Somali
people to develop mechanisms to hold their government
accountable. Somali civil society has always been, and will
continue to be, a powerful force for progress. The role of
civil society is currently worryingly absent. Civil society
institutions must be strengthened and given the tools they need
to effectively monitor the progress and integrity of the
government.
Third, as an important ally to both Kenya and Ethiopia, the
United States has a moral obligation to exert pressure on the
two countries to allow the Somali people and their government
to engage in a national reconciliation. Interference galvanizes
militant groups and further divides Somali communities.
The United States should certainly continue to assist both
countries in mitigating the security threats they face, but
Kenya and Ethiopia must realize that only a democratic, strong,
and vibrant Somali state on their borders is the greatest
guarantor of security and prosperity in the region.
Mr. Chairman, it is at times easy to dismiss Somalia as
being irreparable and the archetypal failed state beyond hope.
But as those of us who have given up their comfortable lives
and families in the diaspora and returned home can attest to,
progress is possible, and it is happening right now.
Somalia has made a profound leap from where it was just
3\1/2\ years ago when I first started going back home. At the
time,
al-Shabaab controlled 75 percent of Mogadishu and almost 60
percent of the entire nation. Pirates were disrupting global
shipping lanes. The very notion of government was actually
contested across the country.
But with the support of international partners like the
United States, the European Union, the African Union, the
United Kingdom, and Turkey, and others, Somalia is slowly
emerging from the abyss. What it now needs is relentless
efforts to rebuild inclusive state institutions that have
legitimacy, capacity, and resources needed to finish the
mammoth tasks ahead.
I thank you on the subcommittee for this opportunity to
present my views and will be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aynte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Abdi Aynte
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, subcommittee members, thank
you for the opportunity to participate in this important panel at this
critical juncture in Somalia's history.
My name is Abdi Aynte, and I am the executive director of the
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. Although born in Mogadishu, I
was reared in the United States. Our family fled to America to escape
the violence that engulfed Somalia as it degenerated into civil war and
state failure. I went to college in Minnesota, and graduate school at
Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC.
I include this personal history because in the aftermath of the
cruel attack on civilians at the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi,
some reports suggest one or more Somali-Americans, perhaps from
Minneapolis, may have participated in the attack. As once a member of
the Somali diaspora in America, I want to assure subcommittee members,
and indeed all Americans, that the overwhelming majority of Somalis
living in the United States love and respect this country and are
indebted to it for the opportunities it has provided to them. They have
nothing but contempt for the al-Shabaab terrorists and what they have
done to Somalia and stand with all civilized nations in denouncing
their actions.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies was established in
Mogadishu in January 2013. It is Somalia's first independent,
nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank. It aims to inform and influence
public policy and practice through empirically based research and
analysis, direct engagement with senior policymakers and advocacy
through the media, and to promote a culture of learning and research in
the Somali region. Our most recent publications are briefing papers
recommending how the international community can support the Federal
Republic of Somalia through
the ``New Deal'' development assistance and option for resolving the
crisis between the central government of the Federal Republic and the
people of Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, and Gedo regions. More on the
institute is on its Web site: www.heritageinstitute.org
One year after the formation of the first nontransitional
government in over 20 years, there are reasons to be cautiously
optimistic about the future of Somalia. The Somali people are
determined, more than ever, to reclaim their dignity and, above all,
their place among the community of nations.
They have also identified a common enemy to peace and stability.
Citizens across the country are countering al-Shabaab's destruction and
despair with construction and hope. Signs of economic vibrancy are re-
emerging. The Somali diaspora are returning in large numbers, bringing
with them much-needed skills, business opportunities and, most
importantly, a sense of normalcy. Significant parts of Somalia, such as
Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the northeast, are enjoying
relative peace, stability and self-governance.
With regards to security, gains are less encouraging. Despite
losing control of most major cities in Somalia, al-Shabaab fighters
remain a major threat to peace and stability. The capital, Mogadishu,
where I came from 2 days ago, is under constant assault. Grenade
attacks, assassinations, suicide bombings, and JED attacks remain all
too common. And as the recent Nairobi attack demonstrates, the Shabaab
remains a lethal force as a militia in an asymmetrical warfare.
A key challenge to the restoration of stability is the chronic
weakness of the security apparatuses. Command, control, and
coordination is demonstrably weak due to the fragmentation of militias
forming the security forces. Training, especially on protection of
vulnerable civilians, remains poor and uncoordinated with various
countries running programs. The composition of forces does not reflect
the regional and clan diversity of the Somali people, depriving the
security forces of a much-needed legitimacy. This is largely due to the
unintended consequences of liberating parts of the country from al-
Shabaab, and recruiting from these regions.
The U.S. Government has provided much-needed support to Somalia's
struggling security forces, and the African Union's peacekeeping
mission for many years. This support, from the U.S. and other
development partners, is literally all that stands between the collapse
of the Federal Government and its survival.
The U.S. Government must, however, utilize its support
innovatively. Tactical counterterrorism measures, surgical strikes, and
the provision of ammunition were necessary for sometime, but now there
is a greater need for strategic partnership. Resources must now be
channeled toward rebuilding competent, professional, accountable and
broadly representative Somali security services with clear command and
control. In order to defeat al-Shabaab, the Somali security forces need
to be given a qualitative advantage over their enemy. At the moment,
both sides are using mainly AK47s and RPGs. Armored personnel carriers,
night vision goggles and air capability would be necessary.
AMISOM has done an excellent job of recovering regions from the
Shabaab's tyranny, but they cannot become a substitute for indigenous
forces. Somali forces can ultimately defeat al-Shabaab.
Security is inextricably linked to political accommodation and
reconciliation, which is partially why Somalia adopted a federal model
of governance nearly 10 years ago. But a consensus on which type of
federalism remains elusive. Successive governments have failed to
translate the federal vision into practical and viable member states.
Frustrated with lack of progress at the national level, communities
across the country have taken matters into their own hands, and carved
out fiefdoms along clan lines. The American Dual Track Policy, which
led to direct U.S. engagement with subnational entities, sent the wrong
signal that the international community was promoting sectarian
polities at the expense of a contiguous, federal government. Regional
administrations practically run their affairs like independent states
with virtually no input from the federal government.
The process of federating the country faces three enormous
challenges. First, the Provisional Constitutional is deeply ambiguous
and contradictory about the shape of the future Federal Government of
Somalia, and division of powers between the center and peripheries. The
meaning of federalism is broadly misunderstood by the Somali people,
many of whom are legitimately worried about an overly centralized
state, much like the military regime of Siyad Barre. This is compounded
by the absence of an effective judicial branch that can interpret
constitutional provisions.
The ambiguity of the Provisional Constitution has allowed political
elites to interpret it to suit their own narrow interests.
Consequently, existing and emerging member states are being formed with
little or no consideration to economic, political, and social viability
of the state, and with a deeply worrying lack of inclusivity and
transparency. Rights of unarmed clans and minorities are routinely
ignored, and processes to establish federal member states are done in
the most secretive fashion.
Second, state institutions intended to play a leading role in
national dialogue and the design of a suitable and agreeable federal
structure are yet to be established. The Provisional Constitution calls
for the formation of nearly a dozen independent commissions, half of
which are instrumental to the federation process, such as the
Boundaries and Federation Commission, the Inter-state Commission, and
the Constitution Review and Implementation Commission. The Federal
Government is far behind schedule on the establishment of these
commissions.
These delays are inexcusable. The Federal Government garnered an
unprecedented support from the Somali people following its inauguration
in September 2012. It also won an unparalleled backing from the
international community, including formal recognition by the U.S.
Government for the first time in 20 years, easing of the U.N. arms
embargo, monthly direct budgetary support from Turkey, and an expanded
African Union Peacekeeping Mission.
Many Somalis believe that the Federal Government has fallen short
of using that positive momentum to advance inclusive politics and
dialogue with key domestic actors, including existing and emerging
federal member states, traditional elders, and civil society.
Third, neighboring countries are undermining national
reconciliation efforts by encouraging and sometimes helping with the
formation of more subnational entities to suit their own domestic
interests. Jubbaland was the most recent example. It was no secret that
Kenya has organized, financed, and lobbied the international community
to recognize the establishment of a ``buffer zone'' in its border with
Somalia. While Ethiopia and Kenya face real threats from Somalia--as
we've witnessed in the recent appalling attack in Nairobi--their
unchecked interference risks further destabilizing of the country and a
reversal of recent fragile gains.
The Provisional Constitution of Somalia envisions elections to take
place toward the end of 2016. While this is not impossible, it's highly
improbable given the magnitude of the tasks ahead. It should remain an
admirable goal for the current government, but we must not substitute
state-building for process-building. Elections are not an end in
themselves, but rather a means toward the significantly more important
objective of viable state formation, including finalizing the
constitution, settling on a federal structure and adopting political
party laws. In the absence of these steps, preparing for elections is a
futile exercise.
The challenges facing the processes of federation and political
consolidation in Somalia are tremendous, but not insurmountable.
First, the Provisional Constitution is a deeply flawed document
that contradicts itself and puts future member states and the federal
government on a direct collision course. The Somali people and their
government need urgent assistance in this regard.
Priority must be given to the formation of the Review and
Implementation Commission and Boundaries and Federation Commission.
Once established, they will need considerable financial and human
resources to engage in genuine national dialogue. There are a number of
American institutions with relevant experience that can provide
essential support in this area.
Second, assistance to the Somali Government must be contingent upon
measurable gains. It must be held accountable to the Provisional
Constitution and its own national plan. The culture of willfully
missing constitutional deadlines must not be tolerated. If none of
commissions is established by early next year, the Somali people will
lose faith in the government's commitment to offer something more than
its predecessors.
Somalis are rightfully worried that important transitional tasks
will remain unfinished in 3 years when the government's mandate comes
to an end. Without strong support from the U.S. and other development
partners there is a grave risk of the country slipping back into chaos.
The United States and its allies must seize this opportunity to
consolidate recent gains.
The U.S. and its allies should assist the Somali people to develop
mechanisms to hold their government to account. Somali civil society
has always been, and will continue to be a powerful force for progress.
The role of the civil society is currently worryingly absent. Civil
society institutions must be strengthened and given the tools they need
to effectively monitor the progress and integrity of the government.
Properly amplified internal voices can induce change from within.
Third, as an important ally to both Ethiopia and Kenya, the United
States has a moral obligation to exert pressure on the two countries to
allow the Somali people and their government to engage in a national
reconciliation. Interference galvanizes militant groups and further
divides Somali communities.
The U.S. should certainly continue to assist both countries in
mitigating the security threats they face. But Kenya and Ethiopia must
realize that a democratic, strong, and vibrant Somali state on their
borders is the greatest guarantor of security and prosperity in the
region.
It is, at times, easy to dismiss Somalia as being irreparable, the
archetypal failed state beyond hope. But as those of us who have given
up their comfortable lives and families in the diaspora to return home
can attest to, progress is possible. And it is happening across the
country.
Somalia has made a profound leap from where it was just 3\1/2\
years ago, when I first started returning home. At the time, al-Shabaab
controlled 75 percent of Mogadishu and almost 60 percent of the entire
nation. Pirates were disrupting global shipping lanes. The very notion
of government was contested across the country.
With the support of international partners like the United States,
the European Union, the African Union, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and
others, Somalia is slowly emerging from the abyss. What it needs now is
relentless efforts to rebuild inclusive state institutions that have
the legitimacy, capacity, and resources needed to finish the mammoth
tasks ahead.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Mr. Aynte.
Dr. Hogendoorn.
STATEMENT OF DR. E.J. HOGENDOORN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Hogendoorn. Thank you, Senator Coons and Senator Flake,
for this opportunity.
Crisis Group has been working on Somalia since 2002 from
our office in Nairobi, and we frequently travel to the country
for research purposes.
Conditions in Somalia have improved. AMISOM, now including
Kenya, has with the help of Ethiopia, the Somali National Army,
the Sufi group, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa, and various allied clan
militias, dealt al-Shabaab a serious strategic setback. Somalia
also has a new albeit provisional government that is
qualitatively better than previous administrations. The
international community quickly recognized this government, and
in September it pledged $2.5 billion in support.
However, the federal government only has de facto control
over Mogadishu and parts of the south. Al-Shabaab is down but
not out. It controls huge swaths of south and central Somalia
and it still is able to hit high-profile targets.
The government also needs donors to pay security forces and
to rebuild. Security in Mogadishu and elsewhere remains
dependent on AMISOM and will likely for some time to come.
Neither AMISOM nor the government can impose a peace.
Stability is only possible through a nationwide process of
negotiation, power-sharing, and improved governance.
Arguably, Somalia's most intractable issue is the question
of federalism. Simply put, there remains serious disagreement
between those who would like to see Somalia become a strong
unitary state, one that can stand up to its neighbors, and
those that fear a centralized government would be dominated by
a single clan or group of clans, as it was during the Siad
Barre era.
Agreement on the powers of the federal government needs to
be thrashed out quickly, otherwise Somalia risks embarking on a
disruptive, piecemeal approach in the establishment of local
administrations and federal states. The federal government
quickly ran into trouble on the issue of federalism in Jubaland
in southern Somalia, which was exacerbated by ambiguity in the
constitution about who leads the process of creating these
states.
Neighboring countries also have significant security
interests in Somalia, and all have sizeable forces in the
country. Beyond the Horn, Muslim Somalia is very much linked to
the Middle East, and Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey are very active
in the country.
Ethiopia is Somalia's historic rival. Addis Ababa,
promoting its own system of ethnic federalism, is a strong
proponent of federalism and a seemingly logical, bottom-up
approach of state-building in Somalia. However, many Somalis
see this as a ploy to keep their country weak and divided and
are, thus, wary of international pressure to devolve power.
Kenya forcefully intervened in 2011 to create its own
buffer state and facilitate the return of nearly half a million
Somali refugees. It subsequently joined AMISOM but often
follows its own interests. In Jubaland, Kenya has thrown its
support behind Ahmed Madobe and not the federal government.
Publicly Kenya is looking for an exit, but Somalis view this
claim with great skepticism. According to the U.N. monitoring
group, Kenyan politicians and officers are earning money from
the trade, including banned charcoal passing through Kismayo.
And more important, most believe Kenya wants to control
southern Somalia because it has large oil and natural gas
deposits.
Al-Shabaab is aggressively trying to turn the local
population against what it calls Christian Kenyan occupiers,
and the Westgate Mall attack was an attempt to trigger a
crackdown to that end.
Beyond the regional states, a number of Muslim countries
have taken an active interest in Somalia. This greater regional
interest allows Somalia to play different states off against
each other, particularly Muslim states against Ethiopia.
International cooperation is also complicated by a host of
international organizations, including the United Nations, the
African Union, and EGAD, the regional organization in East
Africa, with no clear division of responsibilities or a lead
actor.
The greatest problem was, and arguably remains, the
overlapping mandate of the AU and the United Nations. The AU
has the military peace enforcement responsibility, but by
virtue of having been in Mogadishu for the last 4 years in
fielding a force of over 17,000 troops, it is a political
actor. While the U.N. has a political mandate, it is very much
involved in security policy, security sector reform, and the
vexing issue of federalism. Both missions are also headed by
special representatives who reportedly get on well, but they
and their staff have no clear instructions on how to share
responsibilities.
The Westgate Mall attack. Much has been written about the
latest terrorist attack. It is, however, important to note that
this has long been expected and was certainly not the first,
only the most destructive. It is important that the Kenyan
Government prevent a backlash against its Somali and Muslim
population, lest it does exactly what al-Shabaab was seeking.
What should the United States do in the opinion of Crisis
Group?
First of all, it should support and prioritize nationwide
negotiations on the type of federalism this federal government
will implement and insist that the formation of new states
adhere to a rule-based process. It should continue to support
local and regional administrations' capacity-building, but this
must be linked to reconciliation and measures to ensure
minority clans are adequately represented in those governments.
Currently it is very difficult for aid agencies to provide
development assistance in insecure areas. Yet, it is in these
areas where assistance can be of the greatest benefit. Congress
should consider supporting a smaller, high-risk but high-reward
fund managed by the Office for Transition Initiatives for
symbolic projects in Somalia's periphery.
Congress should also note that the 2016 elections are not
far away. They are already behind schedule, and election
assistance should be quickly funded by donors.
More attention should also be given to countering
radicalization in Somalia and the horn. The United States
should be giving quiet assistance to such programs.
The U.S. Government should also place much greater emphasis
on reconciliation, both with armed factions and on a national
level between clans. It should provide support for local peace
and reconciliation conferences that can feed into larger
regional conferences.
It should also provide the new U.N. mission, UNSOM, with
all the capacity necessary to coordinate assistance
effectively, and it should insist that the federal government
does so effectively as well.
The State Department and DOD should also start working
with AMISOM to clearly articulate a multiyear exit strategy for
its intervention in Somalia, and this should be linked with
incremental support to the creation of a professional, mixed-
clan national army.
Last, the United States should convene an international
working group to help create a transparent mechanism to monitor
revenue collection in Somalia's major ports and airports,
including an oversight board with a mixed international and
Somali composition and supported by experts, as was done in
Liberia, to ensure that port revenue is used to develop all
regions in Somalia equitably.
In conclusion, Somalia remains an extremely weak and
fragile state. Its security is dependent on external sources.
Its sovereignty is threatened, and its stability is far from
certain. Yet, it is at an inflection point where the hope of
achieving sustainable progress is becoming real if, and only
if, the international community works together toward that goal
and Somalis honestly confront the governance challenges facing
their country.
I thank you and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hogendoorn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. E.J. Hogendoorn
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Chairman Coons
and the other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs for inviting Crisis Group to testify today on Security
and Governance in Somalia. Crisis Group has been working on Somalia
since 2002, and has produced some 18 in-depth reports and briefings on
the conflict there and continues to follow events there closely from
our office in Nairobi, with frequent visits to the country's various
regions.
Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental
organization that provides field-based analysis, policy advice, and
recommendations to governments, the United Nations, the European Union,
and other multilateral organizations on the prevention and resolution
of deadly conflict. Crisis Group was founded in 1995 by distinguished
diplomats, statesmen, and opinion leaders including Career Ambassador,
Mort Abramowitz; Nobel Prize winner and former Finnish President,
Martti Ahtisaari; late Congressman, Stephen Solarz; and former U.N. and
British diplomat, Mark Malloch-Brown.
Ambassador Thomas Pickering is our current chairman. Louise Arbour,
former chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia, and past U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights, is our current president. In 2011, Crisis Group was
awarded the Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service.
Crisis Group publishes some 80 reports and briefing papers
annually, as well as a monthly CrisisWatch bulletin. Our staff is
located on the ground in 10 regional offices, and 16 other locations,
covering between them over 60 countries and focused on conflict
prevention and post-conflict peace-building. We maintain advocacy and
research offices in Brussels (our global headquarters), Washington, and
New York. We have liaison offices in London, Beijing, and Moscow.
the situation in somalia
Conditions have improved in the last several years. The African
Union Mission for Somalis (AMISOM), now including Kenya, has with the
help of Ethiopia, the Somali National Army (SNA), the Sufi Ahlu Sunna
wal Jamaa, and various clan militia allies dealt the armed Islamist
fundamentalist group Harakat al-Shabaab
al-Mujahedeen (Mujahidin Youth Movement), better known as al-Shabaab a
serious strategic setback by formally ejecting it from Mogadishu,
Afgooye, Baidoa, Merca, and Kismayo (it still has an underground
presence in these cities). This represents a huge psychological blow
and has deprived the group of major revenue sources.
Al-Shabaab has also been weakened by internal conflict, and several
large and important factions have left the organization. Mogadishu,
although it continues to be plagued by assassinations and occasionally
larger asymmetrical attacks, is more secure; resulting in thousands of
residents returning, and a torrent of business investment in the city's
reconstruction.
Somalia also has a new, albeit still interim government that is
qualitatively better than previous administrations. Neither President
Hassan Sheikh nor Prime Minister Abdi Shirdoon played major roles in
civil war. They appointed a relatively lean and technocratic Cabinet.
In addition, the new 225-member Parliament is more representative than
previous iterations.
The Somali Federal Government (SFG) also developed a ``Six Pillar''
strategy that focuses on stability, economic recovery, peace-building,
international relations, and national unity. Optimism led the
international community, including the U.S., to quickly recognize the
new government and in September it pledged some $2.5 billion in ``New
Deal'' support that, conditioned on greater transparency and governance
reforms, will go through the SFG. If allocated efficiently, this money
could be a huge boon to the country and its people.
a reality check
Despite all its good will, the SFG is still a provisional
government, with de facto control only over Mogadishu and parts of the
South, and dependent on foreign troops to keep its enemies at bay. Al-
Shabaab is down but not out. It controls, or at least is able to
operate at will in, huge swaths of south and central Somalia, and still
able to hit high-profile targets in Mogadishu's heavily fortified
areas, including the national courts, the U.N. compound, the Turkish
Embassy, and popular gathering places such as the Village restaurant.
Somalia also remains an extremely poor country, the SFG generates very
few of its own resources, and is largely dependent on the international
community to pay its security forces and begin the difficult and very
expensive task of rebuilding after nearly 20 years of state collapse. A
lot of the taxes and fees on trade transiting through ports and
airports (the major sources of official revenue) is still ``captured''
by corrupt officials and local clans and businessmen. Furthermore, the
international community has pumped hundreds of millions of dollars into
security sector reform since 2000, with little tangible positive impact
and arguably exacerbated instability. Security in Mogadishu, and
elsewhere, remains dependent on AMISOM, and will likely for some time
to come.
Yet AMISOM alone, with some 17,000 troops cannot pacify an area the
size of New Mexico. The government also cannot stabilize Somalia
through military measures alone--it cannot impose a peace--it must
recognize its limitations and accept that stability is only possible
through a nationwide process of negotiation, power-sharing with other
political forces and improved governance.
Al-Shabaab also remains a potent threat, as demonstrated by
Westgate Mall operation in Nairobi, and high profile attacks in
Mogadishu and elsewhere. Ahmed Godane appears to have taken firm
control of the organization and seems intent on regionalizing his
operations. Al-Shabaab is a serious regional threat and has links to
other extremist groups in the Horn and the continent. ``Hard''
counterterrorist measures can only be so good, it will be extremely
difficult for regional states, the SFG, and AMISOM to protect soft
targets from terrorist attacks.
the challenge of federalism
Arguably the most intractable issue is the question of federalism.
Despite 5 years of work, the committee drafting Somalia's new
constitution was unable to reconcile different positions on the
devolution of power and left many provisions on federalism vague or
unaddressed in the provisional constitution that forms the basic law of
the SFG. Put simplistically, serious disagreements remain between those
who would like to see Somalia become a strong unitary state--one that
can stand up to neighbors, such as Ethiopia, that have long meddled in
its affairs--and those that fear a centralized government would be
dominated by a single clan, or group of clans--as it was during the
Siad Barre era--and would then deny them their fair share of resources.
This divide also tends to follow clan lines with many Hawiye clans, who
dominate central and south Somalia and particularly greater Mogadishu,
supporting a unitary state, while many Darod clans, who dominate
Puntland and Jubaland, are strong proponents of federalism.
Agreement on the powers of the federal government need to be
thrashed out quickly, otherwise Somalia risks embarking on a ``piece-
meal'' approach in the establishment of local administrations and
federal states. The SFG quickly ran into trouble on the issue of
federalism, exacerbated by ambiguity in the constitution about who
leads the process of creating states. Instead of building its own
legitimacy by focusing on the service provision in Mogadishu and other
liberated areas, or working with de-facto authorities, the SFG
forcefully inserted itself into the Jubaland process, in far away
Kismayo, southern Somalia, by appointing its own district-level
officials (as was allowed by the constitution). The local authorities
ignored the SFG (and the constitution), convened a conference, and
ultimately elected a former al-Shabaab commander, but now Ethiopian and
Kenyan ally, Ahmed Mohamed Islam ``Madobe'' in April. Pushed by
proponents of a strong central state, the SFG continued ratcheting up
the pressure and at one point al-Shabaab militias allowed pro-SFG
forces to move troops and ``technicals'' through their territory on the
way to Kismayo. Barre Hiraale, a SFG ally (and a former proxy of
Ethiopia) even publicly announced that his forces were colocated with
al-Shabaab and planning joint operations against Madobe. Several
violent clashes followed, and only under concerted pressure from
Ethiopia, Kenya, and the international community were the two sides
able to reach a tentative agreement, in Addis Ababa, on the
establishment of the Jubaland Interim Administration: with Madobe the
President for no more than 2 years and a promise that the SFG would
take control of Kismayo port and airport, provided the revenues would
remain in the region. The agreement was guaranteed by Ethiopia as chair
of the Intergovernment Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional
security organization. Somalia's neighbors thus facilitated the peace,
but at the same time also are laying the ground for further conflict.
This week Madobe, beholden to his Ogaden clan, refused to meet the
SFG per the Addis Ababa Agreement's terms, and thus seemingly rejected
it. Jubaland is very much an Ogaden-dominated state, and if the interim
administration is not careful it will drive alienate minority clans
from the region to support al-Shabaab or other armed opposition groups.
Kenya in particular may then be pulled into supporting an increasingly
unpopular regional government, which could be further exploited by al-
Shabaab to characterize its intervention as an ``occupation'' (much
like it did the Ethiopian intervention from 2006-2009) and Madobe as a
puppet. It must be the SFG's role to represent the interests of
minority clans, and not allow dominant clans to dictate particular
state's political dispensations.
regional politics
The region has significant security interests in Somalia, and
immediate neighbors Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda all have
sizable forces in the country. Beyond the Horn, Muslim Somali is very
much linked into the Middle East, and Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey are very
active in the country.
Despite its size, Djibouti plays a significant role, in large part
because much of its population is Somali and many Somali businessmen
either do business in, or have strong ties with businessmen from the
country. Djibouti has also hosted several multiyear Somali peace
processes and its elite have strong ties to Somali leaders. Its forces
are now based in relatively quiet central Somalia.
Ethiopia has been Somalia's historic regional rival: disputes over
control of the Ogaden region, which Somali nationalists consider to be
part of ``Greater Somalia'' continue, and led to a brief war (1977-78)
and much longer proxy conflict. Calls for the annexation of the Ogaden,
as well as other parts of greater Somalia, remain popular with Somali
nationalists, and pandering to this sentiment by the Islamic Court
Union (ICU) was part of the reason Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in
2006. Addis Ababa quickly expelled the ICU from major cities, and then
remained to prop up the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
This led to the rise of al-Shabaab, which presented itself as the most
effective force fighting Ethiopian ``occupation.'' It was during this
period that the group received its most significant diaspora support--
not because they shared its ideology, but because they saw al-Shabaab
as part of a liberation struggle. The intervention cost Ethiopia
dearly, and 3 years later, Addis quietly relented to the selection of
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former chairman of the ICU as the new
TFG President. Ethiopia quickly withdrew, with AMISOM only slowly
replacing it as the force protecting the embattled government. Since
then Ethiopia has focused largely on supporting groups that can
effectively act as a buffer along its borders, many of whom are
resistant to the new central government. This includes Somaliland and
Puntland State.
Ethiopia, promoting its own system of ``ethnic federalism'' is a
strong proponent of federalism in Somalia, and has long supported a
seemingly logical ``bottom up'' approach of state-building. Many
Somalis, however, see this as a ploy to keep their country weak and
divided, and this very much plays into the hostility of many toward
international pressure for the SFG to truly devolve power. While
overstated, Ethiopia is wary of a strong Somali central state,
particularly if it is close to countries perceived as hostile by Addis
Ababa.
Kenya is a relatively new entrant in Somalia. Nairobi forcefully
intervened in 2011 to create its own buffer state and facilitate the
return of more than 0.5 million Somali refugees currently living in the
country. Kenya subsequently joined AMISOM, but often follows its own
interests. In Jubaland, Kenya has thrown its support behind Ahmed
Madobe, its most effective proxy force leader. Publicly Kenya is
looking for an exit, but Somalis view this claim with great scepticism.
According to the U.N. Monitoring Group, Kenyan-Somali politicians and
Kenyan military officers are allegedly earning large amounts of money
from trade, including illegal charcoal, passing through Kismayo, and
more importantly most believe Kenya wants to control southern Somalia
because it has large oil and natural gas deposits. Al-Shabaab is
aggressively trying to turn the local population against the Kenyan
``Christian'' forces occupiers, and the Westgate Mall attack was an
attempt to trigger a crackdown to that end.
Uganda is most removed, but remains the dominant actor in Mogadishu
(despite the presence of a large Burundian continent) because of the
size of its contingent and the forceful personality of President
Museveni. It contingent is also accused by Somalis of profiteering from
the war. Previously very active, Museveni lately has been distracted by
political turmoil in Kampala and has taken a less force role, ceding
some influence to Ethiopia and Kenya.
Beyond the regional states, a number of Muslim countries have taken
an active interest in Somalia. Turkey is perhaps the most prominent
country, and to its credit played a major role in responding to the
latest famine in 2011, and then subsequently has arrogated a
substantial role for itself, and its companies, in the reconstruction
efforts. Qatar has also played a major role, particularly in its
support for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his supporters from
Damul Jadiid (New Blood), a faction of Al-Islaah, the Somali wing of
the Muslim Brotherhood. The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood has
also increased the interest of Egypt, which before Tharir Square had
been in major competition with Ethiopia over influence in Somalia. The
greater regional interest allows the SFG to play different states off
each other, particularly Muslim states against Ethiopia. The influence
of Damul Jadiid has led Somalia to re-orient somewhat away from IGAD
and AU toward Middle East. This has complicated Somalia's relationship
with Ethiopia and Kenya, and to a degree with the U.N.
the ``international community'': herding cats
Not only is international involvement complicated by numerous
bilateral countries with individual agendas, but there are also a
number of international organizations, including the U.N., AU, and IGAD
(not to forget, occasionally, the League of Arab States, the World
Bank, and NATO) active in Somalia with no clear division of
responsibilities or lead actor. (This sometimes was a problem within
the U.N. and AMISOM as well, where agencies did not cooperate or
contingents did not follow the chain of command). They are also joined
by a number of special envoys with unclear roles vis a vis the
international organizations, the missions in Somalia or ambassadors
accredited to Mogadishu.
The greatest problem was, and arguably remains, the overlapping
mandates of the AU and the U.N. The AU has the military peace
enforcement responsibility, but by virtue of having been in Mogadishu
for the last 4 years and fielding a force of over 17,000 troops is a
major political actor in Somalia, while the U.N. has a political
mandate, but by virtue of security being a huge part of reestablishing
stability in the country (as well as supply a great deal of support to
AMISOM, through UNSOA, and the government) was very much involved in
security policy and security sector reform. Both missions are also
headed by special representatives with no clear instructions on how to
share responsibilities. This was a particular problem for AMISOM and
UNPOS, particularly because UNPOS was based in Kenya and its senior
staff rarely spent much time in Mogadishu.
It is too early to tell if new United Nations Assistance Mission
for Somalia (UNSOM), established on 3 June 2012 can succeed where so
many others have failed. Its mandate includes the provision of policy
advice to the SFG and AMISOM on peace-building and state-building in
the areas of: governance, security sector reform and rule of law
(including the disengagement of combatants), development of a federal
system (including preparations for elections in 2016), and coordination
of international donor support. It is also tasked to help build the
SFG's capacity to promote respect for human rights and women's
empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual
and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions. To
strengthen intra-U.N. coordination, a major problem since UNPOS was
created in 1995, a post of the Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General/Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator will be
established on
1 January 2014 and ``structurally integrated into UNSOM.''
Importantly, UNSOM is based in Mogadishu and will be deployed
across Somalia, as requested by the Federal Government and as
conditions permitted--so far it is only present in the capital, Garowe,
Baidoa and Kismayo (it has not received permission to establish an
office in Hargeisa). The Security Council emphasized the need for
coordination, and UNSOM and AMISOM will work ``on parameters for
practical partnership on the ground.'' To date UNSOM is just starting
to deploy with approximately 50 staff in Mogadishu, whose mobility is
severely subscribed because of insecurity (the U.N. compound was
attacked on 19 June and 1 permanent staff, 3 contractors and 4 guards
were killed, along with at least 6 Somali bystanders). It will not be
up to full strength until early 2014, depending on the security
situation.
The major role for UNSOM will be coordinating security sector
reform and international support. As was noted by the U.N. technical
assessment team, ``A common and closely coordinated strategy for
international security support, which sets out clearly the respective
responsibilities for the Africa Union, the United Nations, other
allies, and Somali forces, with clear timelines and appropriate
resources is a priority.'' Security training is now being conducted by
Somali forces, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), Turkey,
Ethiopia, and Bancroft Global Development, a private company. This is
ostensibly coordinated through a UNSOM facilitated and Somali-led
steering group. Much work remains to be done. According to the last
U.N. report, Somali forces continue to face significant logistical
challenges and ``indiscipline continued to present a challenge, and
there were reports of clashes within Somali security forces in Baidoa
and Buurhakaba, and an increasing number of desertions in Bay and
Bakool. Furthermore, police continue to face serious capacity gaps and
``international support, including stipends and training continues, but
lack of coherence undermines its effectiveness.''
Donor coordination will be equally challenging. Encouragingly the
SFG has developed the Somali Compact that strives to provide an
overarching strategic framework for coordinating political, security
and development efforts over the next 3 years. It will remain to be
seen if the donor community, in its New Deal pledges, will adhere to
that framework, especially as counterterrorism priorities again rise to
the fore with the recent Westgate Mall attack.
the westgate attack
Much has already been written about the latest al-Shabaab attack in
Nairobi. It is however important to note that it had long been
expected, and it was certainly not the first, only the most
destructive, with consequently the most media attention. Since Kenyan
troops went into Somalia, militia groups have launched some 50 attacks
into northeastern Kenya, and a number of grenade attacks in Mombasa and
Nairobi. Almost all seem to have been aimed at creating a backlash
against Kenyan Somalis and Muslims, deepening sectarian divisions and
driving those populations to provide more support to radical Islamist
groups. A related goal was to put pressure on Kenya to withdraw its
forces from southern Somalia, either because it was unwilling to pay
the price at home, or because the local population was turning against
AMISOM. It is therefore important that the Kenyan Government prevent a
backlash against its Somali and Muslim population, lest it does exactly
what
al-Shabaab was seeking.
what the u.s. can do
Support and prioritize nationwide negotiations on the type
federalism the SFG will implement. Insist that the formation of
new states adheres to a rule-based process.
Continue to support local and regional administrations'
capacity-building, particularly through the Local Stability
Fund proposed by the U.K. at the London Conference in 2012, but
this must be linked to reconciliation and measures to ensure
minority clans are adequately represented in those governments.
It is very difficult for aid agencies to provide development
assistance in insecure areas of Somalia, yet it is in these
areas where assistance can have the greatest marginal benefit,
particularly for nascent local administrations. Congress should
consider supporting a ``venture development fund'' managed by
OTI to provide small and quick high risk, but high reward
grants for symbolic projects, such as medical clinics and
boreholes, focused on local governments in Somalia's periphery.
Such projects would provide much-needed services and much-
needed legitimacy to local authorities and a tangible reward
for withdrawing support from al-Shabaab. This is what many
Islamic NGOs are doing in Somalia.
The 2016 elections are not so far away. Crucial
constitutional commissions, such as Boundaries Commission and
Independent Constitutional Review Commission, are not yet
established. If there are many setbacks, it is quite likely the
polls will have to be delayed, which will be extremely
destabilizing. (The SFG's vision 2016, is already signaling the
need for contingency plans if one-person-one-vote elections are
not possible at that time.) Election assistance should already
be funded by donors. Thought should also be given to piloting
smaller municipal elections.
More attention should be given to countering radicalization
in Somalia and the Horn. The U.S. should give quiet assistance
to programs that articulate the argument that radicalisation is
largely driven by a unique set of beliefs alien to Somalis and
an extremist and literal interpretation of holy texts.
Help develop effective, long-term counter- and de-
radicalisation strategies for all the countries in the Horn of
Africa. As Crisis Group noted in ``Kenyan Somali Islamist
Radicalisation'' (25 January 2012), a link exists between
radicalization and terrorism, but counterterrorism tactics
aimed only at stopping al-Shabaab and other militant groups
should not become the only official response. Counter-
radicalization--reducing the appeal of radicalism--and de-
radicalization--persuading people who are already in radical
organisations to leave them--are long-term processes that
require tact and patience.
Place much greater emphasis on reconciliation, both with
armed factions and on a national level between clans. Provide
support to local peace and reconciliation conferences that can
feed into larger regional conferences only after most local
disputes have been resolved. These conferences should be
completed before elections.
Provide UNSOM with all the capacity necessary to
coordination assistance effectively. Insist that the SFG does
so effectively as well.
Have the State Department and DOD work with AMISOM to
clearly articulate a multiyear exit strategy for its
intervention in Somalia. This should be linked with incremental
support to the creation of a professional, mixed-clan national
army.
Develop a mechanism with AMISOM to coordinate the activities
of allied local administration security forces. This should run
in parallel to negotiations on the roles and responsibilities
of the regional, state, and federal governments.
Because no one knows how much revenue is generate by
individual ports and airports, much conflict in Somalia is over
assumed revenue flows and the division thereof. As Crisis Group
suggested in ``The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia''
(15 February 2012), the international community should convene
an international working group to help create a mechanism to
transparently monitor revenue collection Somalia's major ports
and airports, particularly in Bossaso, Mogadishu, Merca, and
Kismayo, including an oversight board with mixed international
and Somali composition and supported by experts (forensic
accountants) and international customs officers, much as was
done in Liberia; and ensure that the revenue is used to develop
all regions in Somalia.
conclusion
The SFG remains an extremely weak and fragile state, its security
dependent on external sources, its sovereignty threatened and its
stability far from certain. Yet it is at an inflection point where the
hope of achieving sustainable progress is becoming real if, and only
if, the international community work together to that goal and Somalis
honestly confront the governance challenges facing their country.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Dr. Hogendoorn.
Let me start with your last of many recommendations first
and work back to the previous.
First, I will ask of all three of you a question about sort
of the security situation and the financing of al-Shabaab and
what are the strategic challenges we face and then, second,
about federalism. All three of you had some interesting
comments about federalism.
On the first question, my sense is that al-Shabaab has been
principally financed through the charcoal trade when they
controlled Kismayo and parts of the coastline and through the
extraction of taxes from those communities they control. And
the U.N. monitoring group I think recently described how the
regional charcoal trade helps finance al-Shabaab.
What should we be doing here forward to ensure that al-
Shabaab loses the financial support to continue operations, and
what do you see as the most important next steps to strengthen
AMISOM to actually carry out its mission of stabilizing the
security of the country to make possible a transition to a more
broadly, representative, inclusive and professionalized Somali
national forces? I would be interested in all three of your
answers to that set of questions. Dr. Hogendoorn, Mr. Aynte,
Dr. Le Sage, in order please.
Dr. Hogendoorn. As I mentioned before, the charcoal trade
is actually banned by the U.N. Security Council, and I think
that the United States should do more to force its partners to,
in fact, adhere to those prohibitions.
I think that the real challenge with AMISOM is that it has
essentially reached a point where it can no longer push farther
out, and either the international community needs to provide
more resources to AMISOM to increase its troop capacity and
improve its ability to reach out or more needs to be done on
the political side to try to stabilize Somalia.
Senator Coons. Mr. Aynte, thoughts on how we reduce
financing to al-Shabaab by whatever means.
Mr. Aynte. I think the first thing is we need to know
exactly where the financing of al-Shabaab is coming from. And
the conventional belief was that it was mostly coming from the
cities that it controlled and the resources it controlled like
the Bakaara market in Mogadishu and the port. Now that has
gone, I think many of us are wondering where the financing
still seems to be coming through. Part of the answer lies with
the fact that they still control a considerable amount of land
in south-central Somalia. So the immediate answer to that is an
attempt to try to recapture that part of the land.
I do, though, in relation to this, want to emphasize the
importance of really creating an indigenous security force. I
think that is ultimately where the answer lies. It is
considerably cheaper than the African Union peacekeeping
mission, which is necessary and needed and has done a
remarkable job up until this moment. But I think a serious
attempt need to be made both by the Somali Government but by
the international partners to try and rebuild a professional,
inclusive, and competent security sector.
Senator Coons. What timeline do you think it is possible to
rebuild a representative, credible, vetted Somali national
security force?
Mr. Aynte. It is certainly going to take a considerable
amount of time in my view, and I think both the cases of Iraq
and Afghanistan are quite instructive to Somalia both in terms
of the timeframe that it could take, but also in the kinds of
numbers that we need. You have hundreds of thousands of forces
created and formed for Iraq and close to 300,000 for
Afghanistan. Somalia has so far only 18,000 security services,
half of which are probably engaged in VIP protection of
individuals and installations. So clearly half
of them are incapacitated from their main task of dealing with
al-Shabaab.
Senator Coons. Dr. Le Sage, if you might, for AMISOM to be
successful, they need--several of you have recommended greater
force projection capability, both more advanced weapons systems
and airlift and attack capabilities. If you might comment more
both on what AMISOM needs to be successful, what we need to do
to further restrict al-Shabaab's resources, and then what does
the transition look like to a credible national Somali security
force?
Dr. Le Sage. Thank you, Senator.
Starting with the issue of al-Shabaab's funding, charcoal,
when the movement controlled the port city of Kismayo, was the
single largest foreign currency earner for the group, but it
also generated revenues by controlling road junctions and
levying taxes there, taxing at markets, and extorting money
from businesses which otherwise could not operate.
Now al-Shabaab has lost control of Kismayo, but it remains
very close by. So it can tax the charcoal trade at the source
of production, rather than at the source of onward
distribution. And in this sense, their control of the town of
Barawe in Lower Shabelle really is critical. This affords them
the opportunity to impact any trade that is coming from
Mogadishu to Kismayo and tax it and also to still make revenue
off of the charcoal business. So in that sense, more aggressive
operations to actually dislodge al-Shabaab from Barawe and
other key towns are really going to be the best and fastest way
of degrading their revenue-earning ability and sustaining the
movement in that sense.
It is absolutely true that AMISOM needs force multipliers,
needs helicopters, needs additional transport, and potentially
additional soldiers in order to undertake those movements.
Right now, AMISOM forces are limited to the same number that
they had when they only controlled the city of Mogadishu but
they are spread out in multiple locations, Afgooye, Jowhar,
Baidoa, many other cities. So they are stuck using that limited
number of forces in a static security role.
The fastest way for them to actually free up those forces
and be able to deploy them in an offensive operation would be
if the Somali Federal Government worked with local
administrations to actually craft consensual governance in the
area. Local forces, particularly the Somali National Army or
other militia forces, provide local security, and then let
AMISOM take the fight toward
al-Shabaab and other spoilers of the peace process.
Senator Coons. One question of all three of you on
federalism. There seems to be a real tension between a desire
for a strong national government to be able to resist intrusion
from Ethiopia, from Kenya sort of meddling by outside forces,
one perception goes. On the other hand, there is a suspicion of
a strong federal or national government because of experiences
under the Siad Barre government, because of the strength of
clans, and because of the very different cultural and political
traditions across the country.
Managing these with a constitution that in its current form
has significant internal contradictions around what the federal
structure should look like is quite difficult. It is very
different from our own Articles of Confederation period, but
there are some striking similarities in that moving toward a
healthy and functioning national government for purposes of
security, taxation, control of ports, control of trade is
necessary, but there are significant internal concerns that
mitigate against a strong unitary federal government.
What role should the U.S. Government be playing in
advancing a federal structure, and did our dual track policy
actually hurt that process? And what do you recommend for U.S.
policy with regards to federalism and implementation going
forward, if you could in order, Dr. Le Sage, Mr. Aynte, and Dr.
Hogendoorn?
Dr. Le Sage. Thank you, Senator.
The fact is that the Somali Federal Government right now is
a key actor. It is the key actor going forward in making
decisions for the establishment of a true federal system that
actually provides some degree of convergence between the local
actors in major towns across Somalia's regions and the central
government. But the Somali Federal Government is currently only
one actor on the scene. If we are talking about the locations
where Kenya, Ethiopia, other AMISOM forces are operating, if we
are talking about
those places where we need to fight al-Shabaab, there are other
actors of concern. This is the Jubaland authority, the interim
Juba authority that has been established in Kismayo. This is
Rahanweyn clan forces that are based in Baidoa working very
closely with Ethiopia. It is the autonomous regional
administration of Puntland and also the self-declared
independent state of Somaliland. In addition, there are many
other local administrations loyal to the Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa
movements or other smaller, sub-clan-based administrations.
These are actually facts on the ground.
There has been a great deal of concern that the United
States dual track approach was going to reinforce these and in
some way dismember Somalia and it was going to make it a weaker
country. The fact is 20-odd years of civil war have
decentralized Somalia radically and made it a remarkably weak
country. The dual track approach allowed the United States to
engage both at the capital level and at that local
administration regional level at the same time to promote an
agenda of convergence.
Maybe the language needs to be changed at this point in
time, but that ability to support both levels simultaneously is
what is ultimately required to promote these power-sharing and
resource-sharing deals internally within a town like Baidoa,
but then between that town and the central government.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Mr. Aynte. Senator, that is a good question.
I think it is important to highlight that Somali people,
wherever they are in Somalia today, do want some sort of a
federal structure. It is just unclear in their mind. We are
actually engaged in a research at the moment looking at this,
and what we found are that there are universal demands for
basic things in the debate on federalism. Every Somali wants to
elect his or her local and national leaders. Secondly, they
want to get government services closer to where they are.
Thirdly, they want to see an equitable sharing of natural
resources, and fourthly, they would like to see constitutional
guarantees against government intrusion upon their individual
and group rights.
We believe these are the four issues that can help and push
forward the debate and the framework for federalism in Somalia.
What could the U.S. Government do?
I think the first thing is really the building and
formations of the commissions that I talked about, the
Independent Commission to Review the Constitution, the
Boundaries and Federation Commission, and ultimately the Inter-
State Commission. I think what these three commissions can then
do with expertise from the United States and institutions that
are capable is to lead a national dialogue. At the moment,
there is virtually no dialogue about federalism at the national
level. You know, politicians are talking to each other and
mostly to advance a group or individual interests.
But I think what needs to happen is a national
understanding of the options of federalism. When we interviewed
people across the country about if they understood options on
federalism and confederation and decentralized unitary state
and devolution of power and all of these options, most people
did not really understand what these options are. So I think a
civic education process is really needed. But that needs to
happen alongside the commissions.
The third step that the United States could help with is
the finalization of the provisional constitution, which again
is deeply ambiguous, contradictory in many ways.
So I think these three steps could be a strong starting
point. Of course, it is unrealistic to expect that we will have
a clearer picture 3 years from now, but I think we could be at
a strong position 3 years from now.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Aynte.
Dr. Hogendoorn.
Dr. Hogendoorn. Well, as we know, here in the United
States, federalism remains an extremely contentious issue--even
in these hallowed halls.
I would agree with Andre Le Sage and Abdi Aynte that
perhaps we need to recast the dual track approach as perhaps
the parallel approach.
But I think the important point is that the money cannot go
to Mogadishu alone. If it goes to Mogadishu, it stays in
Mogadishu as it is currently mostly. All the progress that we
are seeing in Somalia is largely in Mogadishu and it is because
all the resources that are being pledged to the country are
largely staying in the capital. That is to some degree
understandable. I think when the federal government is trying
to do things, it is easier to do stuff in the capital than it
would be to do in places far away, especially when they do not
have formal links with these kinds of local administrations or
they are in very hostile relationships with them as they have
been with Jubaland.
I think the important point that people need to recognize
is that al-Shabaab benefits from these disagreements and it
benefits from these tensions. And one of the biggest problems
is that while Jubaland is somewhat more stable and it is
arguably less of a safe haven for al-Shabaab, the fact that
Jubaland is being dominated by a single clan allows al-Shabaab
to recruit from minority clans who feel that they are not being
adequately represented by those local administrations. And to
some degree, al-Shabaab is waiting that game in other areas as
well, waiting to see those political tensions come to the fore
and using that as an effective recruiting tool to rebuild its
ranks.
Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you for your answers to
that question.
Senator Flake, thank you for your patience.
Senator Flake. Thank you. No problem. Those were a lot of
the questions I had particularly on federalism.
Mr. Aynte, you kind of addressed it just now in your
remarks. The provisional constitution is a deeply flawed
document and contradicts itself. You were referring mostly to
the federalism aspects of that?
Mr. Aynte. Senator, it is all across, but the federalism is
the most important element where it really contradicts and puts
future federal member states on a collision course with the
federal government in that it gives--the division of power
between the periphery and the center is not clear in the
document as it stands at the moment. But it is only provisional
and it can be improved.
Senator Flake. You mentioned four things that you think are
expected of people, what they expect out of a central
government. Do those apply to the folks in Somaliland and
Puntland as well? It sounds to me as if, speaking with some of
their representatives, they do not want to share in the
country's resources. They have their own. They want nothing to
do with the rest of the country. Am I off base there or is that
their assessment?
Mr. Aynte. Senator, I think Somaliland and Puntland are
slightly different.
I think Somaliland is seeking an outright secession from
Somalia for the last 20 years. It has done a remarkable job of
stabilizing itself, having a self-rule, and really laying the
foundation for democratic institutions and democratic
processes, of course, with some flaws.
Puntland is not seeking secession from the rest of the
country, but it does--like other regions in Somalia, although
in theory, it is under the federal government, in practice it
is very much like Somaliland, carrying out its business
entirely independently from the federal government. Again, this
is because of the vacuum that exists with the federal
government.
I do, though, think that if a concerted effort is made to
clarify the constitution and begin this national dialogue on
federalism, I think there is a real opportunity for engagement
with Puntland and with other emerging and existing federal
member states.
Senator Flake. The last panel was talking about the
government there and at one point referred to it as a
democratically elected government. It is not quite that simple.
How is it viewed in the rest of the country?
I know going back to--what was it--1998 or so with the
first attempt to appoint traditional elders who would appoint a
constituent assembly of some type or the last kind of iteration
of this experience, and it did not take hold. What makes this
different here? Why is this government going to be viewed as
anything different than the last attempt, Mr. Hogendoorn? Or is
it?
Dr. Hogendoorn. Well, I mean, I would agree with everyone
or most observers that there were very significant flaws with
this election process. That said, I think that there was a
greater attempt to ensure that at least the majority of the
elders who were at this constituent assembly--who then picked
the Parliament; who then selected the President--were at least
somewhat more representative than they had been in the past. It
certainly was not a perfect process. There were lots of
allegations of vote buying, of vote rigging, of extortion, and
so on and so forth.
I think people focus mostly on the fact that the Prime
Minister and the President who were selected--or at least the
President who was elected and then the Prime Minister who was
selected were both notably not involved in the civil war in any
major way. And so this was kind of seen as a bit of a break
from the past. And to be perfectly honest, the President
especially was someone who came from civil society who we had
worked with in the past, who many of us had worked with in the
past and were quite excited about that possibility. That
certainly does not mean that the government is perfect, but we
certainly see it as an improvement on past regimes.
Senator Flake. How realistic is the 2016 timeframe for
elections? We seem to have backed a horse now with this
government. If it does not take place, what is our position?
What do we do? Mr. Aynte, do you have thoughts there?
Mr. Aynte. Well, as I said, I think elections are not
impossible but highly improbable to take place in 2016, as we
understand elections. We might be looking at another
``selectocracy'' as the 2012 was called by some people. It
could be that we might have elections in parts that are a
little more stable than others. But considering the slow pace
of progress in the last year and the work that needs to be
done, I would be pleasantly surprised if elections take place
in 2016.
What are the options after that? Well, I think it will
depend on what the stakeholders in Somalia want to do, the way
forward. Of course, not many people are looking forward to the
idea of extension. The ``E'' word is now seen as--you know, no
one wants to hear that. But I think there has to be some sort
of a selection process that then brings the country to the next
level.
I should finally say, though, that the reason why this
government is possibly seen as a little bit more hopeful than
the previous ones is people are seeing this as one step toward
the greater goal of consolidating the gains that have been made
over the years, so part of an incremental process.
Senator Flake. Mr. Le Sage, with regard to the failed raid
last week, the last panel did want to go there. What are the
implications for the future? Does this embolden the elements we
do not want to embolden? What happens? What are the practical
effects of this? And did it surprise you that, one, we launched
the raid and, two, it ended as it did?
Dr. Le Sage. I think the most important recent development
in terms of strengthening al-Shabaab and exacerbating the
threat that the movement poses to the region is the Westgate
attack. And we should not let the sensationalism, frankly, of
the events over the weekend overshadow that tragedy and the
precedent that that attack set for jihadists both within the
East Africa region but potentially on a global scale not to
undertake a suicide bombing operation that is highly
complicated, but to launch a commando raid against civilian
targets and kill such a large number of people in a small time.
I do believe that this has sent a signal to al-Qaeda senior
leadership from Ahmed Abdi Godane. Whether or not he was the
actual author of this operation, it sent a signal that al-
Shabaab is an
al-Qaeda affiliate that needs to be taken very seriously and
that his leadership at this point is not in question, that they
can launch these sorts of attacks.
And so preventing their affiliates, preventing their
external operations group and the larger national insurgency
movement that gives space for those extremists to operate,
preventing them from continuing to hold such space in Somalia
is really the critical element here. Something like the
operation that is reported to have taken place in Barawe
targeting a specific individual, al-Shabaab leader, or leader
connected to al-Shabaab--that could do some temporary damage to
the group, set back an immediate operational plan. But only by
removing this group's safe havens and establishing a
functioning national federal government that can actually
address many of the clan tensions and undermine clan support
and religious support for extremist splinter movements, that is
going to be the only way to actually reduce the threat longer
term.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. My time is out. I
appreciate it.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake, for your
engagement and your interest.
I have many more questions I would like to ask. Given the
lateness of the hour, I may ask just one or two more briefly,
if I might.
Dr. Le Sage, that last line of questioning suggests that we
now face some time pressure to support an expansion of AMISOM,
both its operational reach, its numeric strength, but that we
are, at the same time, running against a clock to transition to
a legitimate Somali security force because the longer security
across the country is made possible by an external
multinational force that is non-Somali, the more that creates
the opportunity for recruitment and for al-Shabaab to simply
cast this as an occupation army rather than a liberation force.
Would you agree with that? What do you think is the amount
of time we actually have, and how pressing is this for regional
security?
Dr. Le Sage. Senator, given the length of time it is going
to take to build up a professional and self-sustaining Somali
national security force, including its army component, its
intelligence component, and its policing component, it is
urgent that we begin work on this today. At the same time, I
think it is going to be urgent for the next several years, at
least 5, to continue very significant support for the African
Union mission in Somalia until the Somali national army forces
actually come on line and can take over some of the static
security positions that AMISOM currently holds.
If AMISOM was to leave today, the Somali Federal Government
would very likely fall very quickly, and that is because the
Somali National Army today is an amalgamation of different clan
militias that used to report to warlords. And if you go in and
look at the various brigades in Mogadishu that make up the
Somali National Army today, it is pretty quick to identify
which warlord and which militia faction they used to belong to.
Their level of national loyalty, their interoperability between
various subclans just in the city of Mogadishu is remarkably
low.
And frankly, the Somali National Army that is being funded
by the United States and European partners in Mogadishu is
primarily crafted from one clan, the Hawiye clan, to the
concern of all other clans in the regions across south-central
Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. For this reason, we actually
need very quickly to expand Somali National Army recruitment,
take the clan militias from those other areas that either are a
part of independent administrations or proxy forces for
Ethiopia and Kenya and use salary payments, frankly, to
integrate them into a national force, over time train them,
equip them, and develop something professional. But that is
going to take several years.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
If I might, Mr. Aynte, the issue of remittances, which you
mentioned in passing, has been a real concern of mine.
Describe, if you would, briefly the role of remittances from
the United States and from Europe and how the Somali economy
and the growing sort of capacity in Mogadishu and nationally
would be affected if the mechanisms for transferring
remittances were to be blocked? And what do you think we can
and should do to try and sustain a pathway for legitimate,
vetted remittances?
Mr. Aynte. Senator, the scale of remittances to Somalia is
larger than all international aid combined annually. It is
about $1.5 billion a year coming from the Somali diaspora in
the United States, Europe, Australia, and the Middle East and
Africa. There are about 2 million Somalis scattered around the
world sending money back to their relatives. So it is
essentially the most important lifeline the Somali people have.
I think the banks and other financial institutions have
legitimate concerns about the rules and regulations both here
in the United States but also in the United Kingdom where now
Barclays Bank is blocking, or it is about to block, remittance
companies to open bank accounts within Barclays. I think what
the U.S. Government can do is to work with partners,
particularly with the United Kingdom, to try and create a
framework whereby the remittance companies can continue to send
remittances legally to the Somali people.
The alternative now is, if Barclays goes ahead with its now
promise to shut down on the Hawale companies in the U.K.--the
alternative is that many people will go underground, and our
ability to see the activities of money transfer from the West
to Somalia will even become more constrained. So I think this
is an urgent matter, one that has serious implications, both
humanitarian, but as well as security both here for the United
States but also for the Somali people.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Dr. Hogendoorn, last question from me. The previous panel
spoke some about the model of an African-led indirect action by
the United States, financing an African-led multilateral force
as being a possible role model for multilateral action for
regional security. If we are at this sort of point of
inflection where AMISOM either succeeds or fails and if actions
like the attack in Nairobi put significant pressure on regional
partners like Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, how vital is
it for our interests on the continent and globally, how vital
is it for Somalia's future that AMISOM succeed and that the
regional partners continue to get bilateral support from the
United States to stay engaged in this fight and to not
withdraw?
Dr. Hogendoorn. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, I
believe, as Dr. Andre Le Sage mentioned, that absent AMISOM, it
is quite likely that the Somali National Government would
collapse. And I think that AMISOM has done a remarkable job
over the last 3 or 4 years to push al-Shabaab back at enormous
cost in blood and treasure to the troop-contributing countries.
I think the largest challenge really, to some degree, is
that while this has been a very effective military operation,
the African Union at the moment still lacks the capacity to
make this both an integrated political and military operation,
which is why we have created this unwieldy hybrid between the
United Nations, which has a political mandate, and the AU,
which has a military mandate. And it has always been very, very
difficult to try to meld those two organizations together since
they have different cultures, they oftentimes have different
leaders who sometimes do not get alone.
Currently the U.N. has transitioned to a new mission with a
new special representative for the Secretary General. That
mission was just established in June. So it is very early for
us to be able to see how that will work. He does have
instructions from the U.N. Security Council to cooperate with
the AU. Those instructions are not very clear, as I mentioned
in my testimony. And I think it remains a work in progress. And
unfortunately, as I think all of my colleagues would agree,
ultimately the solution in Somalia needs to be a political one
and AMISOM needs to work within a political framework to
achieve that goal, and kind of melding those two organizations
and have them working toward the same goal has and will
continue to be a challenge.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Flake, any further questions?
Senator Flake. Just one question.
Mr. Aynte, with regard to the diaspora, it is very
involved, obviously, with $1.5 billion a year in terms of
remittances. What is the feeling in the diaspora generally
about the national government and the situation there? Can you
give some sense of the feeling?
Mr. Aynte. Well, you know, I used to be part of the
diaspora myself, but now I am back home.
Senator Flake. I know it is not monolithic. I am not trying
to suggest that, but give me some sense of----
Mr. Aynte. Well, I think like most people in Somalia, the
diaspora have welcomed the inauguration of this government in
2012 in huge numbers. I think a year into it, many people have
realized that they probably had little higher expectations than
realistic and are understandably disappointed with the low
progress that has happened over the past year. But I think many
Somalis continue to be optimistic and, more importantly,
engaging what is going on in Somalia both not only in sending
remittances but actually the diaspora do dominate the political
structures across the country from Somaliland to Puntland to
the federal government where as many as 50 percent of the
entire Parliament is actually made up of diaspora. And
something like 60 or 70 percent of the cabinet, any given
cabinet, is diaspora. So the diaspora are vital to what is
happening politically and socially and economically and what is
going on and are engaged and sometimes are holding the
government accountable to its national vision.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
Thank you to our witnesses today from the first and second
panel. I will remind all of us where we began, which was the
impact of the Government shutdown on the capacity of different
agencies and departments within the United States to continue
to carry out our development, our diplomacy, our intelligence,
and our security missions. And I am grateful that all of our
witnesses were able to come and testify today, and I would
appreciate Senator Flake's cooperation in carrying forward this
hearing, which I do think is an important part of our ongoing
discussion about our role in Somalia and the region and the
world.
I will keep the hearing record open until Friday of this
week, October 11, so that members of the committee who were not
able to join us today might submit written questions for the
record.
And with that, this hearing is hereby adjourned.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]
[all]
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