[Senate Hearing 113-139]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-139
PROSPECTS FOR AFGHANISTAN'S 2014 ELECTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Chayes, Sarah, senior associate, South Asia Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.............. 22
Boot, Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National
Securities, Council of Foreign Relations, Washington, DC....... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Pearce, Hon. David, Deputy Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 36
Sedney, David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, U.S. Department of
Defense, Washington, DC........................................ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert P. Casey, Jr........................................ 38
Wilder, Dr. Andrew, director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs,
U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC........................ 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
(iii)
PROSPECTS FOR AFGHANISTAN'S
2014 ELECTIONS
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TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey and McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. Well, this hearing will come to order. We
are sorry about the delay. I know our witnesses understood that
we just had a longer session regarding Syria and important work
that had to be done. So we are grateful for the patience of our
witnesses.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
I will have a statement I will try to get through as
quickly as I can.
I am joined by Senator McCain, and I am grateful for his
presence here.
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near
Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs meets to discuss
Afghanistan's Presidential and provincial elections scheduled
to take place on April 5, 2014. While these elections are
almost a year away, preparations must begin now, given that
their outcome will determine the success or failure of the
international effort in Afghanistan. Simply put, the stakes
could not be higher.
These elections come at a pivotal time. A full-fledged
security transition from international forces to Afghan forces
is already underway. The United States is deliberating troop
levels post-2014 and negotiating a bilateral security agreement
with the Afghan Government. The success of the security
transition depends in large part on political stability and
whether a majority of the Afghan people see their next
government as legitimate and acceptable. If not, we can expect
ongoing political strife and possibly a return to civil war.
That is why preparing for successful and credible elections
must be one of our top priorities in Afghanistan. The American
people and the Congress will be watching this election process
closely as we determine future investments in this important
relationship.
As we begin this conversation about the 2014 Afghan
Presidential and provincial elections, I want to make one thing
clear at the outset. The United States nor others in the
international community should not be seen to interfere in
these upcoming elections. This is an Afghan exercise, an Afghan
election, whose outcome should be solely determined by the
Afghan people. The U.S. role is to support an open,
transparent, credible, and inclusive election process, but
should in no way seek to determine the actual outcome.
The United States does, however, have a stake in the
election process, and the equation is quite simple. If these
elections are seen as transparent, credible, and inclusive, the
United States and Afghanistan's allies will continue to support
Afghanistan's development and commitments made in the Tokyo
Mutual Accountability Framework. If not, we can expect to see
many countries, including the United States, possibly
dramatically reduce funding and support for Afghanistan. After
so many years of sacrifice by our service men and women, U.S.
taxpayers will have no patience for a flawed election. United
States support for independent electoral administration
mechanisms and respect for the Afghan Constitution, reflect a
respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty and a desire to ensure
that hard fought gains for Afghanistan's democratic system are
not lost.
Furthermore, a transparent, credible, and inclusive
election process will be an important determinant of the
stability of the country. If key blocs in Afghanistan do not
believe that the elections are inclusive and credible, we could
face a similar scenario to the 1990s when disaffected factions
expressed their political views through violence. It goes
without saying that the United States and regional actors are
deeply interested in ensuring that Afghanistan does not devolve
into a civil war like it did then.
Today Senator McCain and I introduced a Senate resolution
which emphasizes our concern that a flawed election process
could have a significantly negative impact on the stability of
the country. We hope that this resolution will send a clear
message to Afghan authorities that the United States is
committed to investing in Afghanistan's future and it is
largely contingent on the quality of the election process.
So far, the election preparations have been hampered by a
lack of a legal framework governing electoral bodies, their
composition, and conduct. Last June, I sent a letter to
Secretary Clinton expressing my concerns about the Independent
Electoral Commission, the so-called IEC, and the Electoral
Complaints Commission known as ECC. Since then, there has been
little progress made by Afghan authorities. President Karzai
recently vetoed a law passed by Parliament which would set the
terms for the Independent Electoral Commission and the
Complaints Commission. The independence of these bodies is
critical because it speaks to the ultimate impartiality of the
elections and helps to build confidence in the electoral
process.
Moving forward, I would recommend that the U.S.
administration consider the following measures--only three--to
improve the prospects for the elections.
No. 1, the United States should send a clear message to the
Afghan people that we consider the integrity of this process to
be a top priority and have dedicated key personnel to the task.
The election does not appear to be the sole purview of any one
of our five Ambassadors on the ground in Kabul. Like we did for
the 2009 elections, the United States should designate a
senior-level position in Embassy Kabul to focus solely on
coordinating policies and programs for the elections. Former
National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, and former White
House Chief of Staff, John Podesta, have also made this
important recommendation to the administration, and I hope it
is considered seriously.
No. 2, the United States should continue to reiterate the
importance of holding the election on April 5, 2014. Allowing
the election to slip would diminish public confidence in the
process and could have security implications if international
forces draw down troops throughout the course of the year.
Third, the United States should continue to call for the
adoption of an election law that establishes a transparent and
inclusive Electoral Commission and Complaints Commission.
Fourth, the United States should express its support for
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices to replace those
whose terms have expired.
During President Karzai's visit to Washington in January,
he reiterated his intention to step down at the end of the
term. The President told me in a meeting and he told others at
the meeting that he wanted to be the first democratically
elected President of Afghanistan to transfer power to the
second democratically elected President. This is a powerful and
inspiring statement. President Karzai has a golden opportunity
to cement a positive and long-lasting legacy with these
elections, one that I hope--I hope--he will seize.
The United States has sacrificed greatly in support of a
stable and prosperous Afghanistan free from extremism. Based on
these sacrifices and any future investments in the country, the
United States should clearly and unequivocally continue to
express support in word and deed for a democratic culture based
upon transparent, credible, and inclusive election processes
that protect the rights of all Afghans.
So today, we are fortunate to have with us two witnesses
who can speak the United States policy in Afghanistan: the
State Department's Deputy Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador David Pearce, who is with
us; and Dr. David Sedney, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. I
appreciate both being here and we will get to your statements
in 1 minute, 1 brief minute.
Our second panel will be Dr. Andrew Wilder, director of
Afghanistan and Pakistan programs at the U.S. Institute of
Peace; Ms. Sarah Chayes, senior fellow at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace; and Mr. Max Boot, the Jeane
J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations.
We thank all for being with us today, and Ambassador
Pearce, we will start with your statement. If you can try to
keep it to 5, I promise my questions will be short.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PEARCE, DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pearce. Thanks a lot, Senator. It is great to be
here, and I really appreciate the invitation.
Senator McCain, good to see you again too. I think the last
time was in Kabul in Ambassador Crocker's era when I was the
Assistant Chief of Mission there, sir.
First of all, Ambassador Dobbins was just sworn in on May
10, and he tells me that he would like me to convey the fact
that he is looking forward to working with you as well, sir, in
the future.
And on behalf of both Secretary Kerry and Ambassador
Dobbins, let me say that we really do appreciate the role of
this subcommittee and all the attention that you are bringing
to this important issue.
And I would say, Senator, you have already stolen a lot of
my talking points. So I think it will be easier for me to
dispense with part of my statement here.
But as requested, I will try to focus on the elections, and
I can tell you that Secretary Kerry has no higher priority. A
peaceful transition of Presidential authority, together with
the provincial council elections that will happen at the same
time, can cement the gains of Afghan society and set the
trajectory for Afghanistan's stability long into the future. So
as you said, sir, the stakes are high.
For more than a decade, President Karzai has led the
country through some very difficult times, but the biggest part
is yet to come, and that is handing over power next year. He
has stated repeatedly that he will honor the constitution and
step down. And as you said, indeed, nothing will do more to
cement his legacy than that.
Success requires that the election results be acceptable to
a broad majority of Afghans, including those who voted for
losing candidates, this so that Afghan citizens throughout the
country accept the winner as legitimate President. A peaceful
and constitutional transfer of power of this kind will send a
strong signal to all, including the Taliban, about the
resilience of Afghanistan's democratic institutions.
As Secretary Kerry said in January right here, if we do not
succeed in helping the Afghans administer an acceptable
election, it will be very difficult to convince the American
people and our allies to stay engaged in this effort.
So let me review first what the Afghans themselves are
doing and then a little bit about what we are doing.
First of all, in security, the security ministries--and
David will address this in more detail--in regular consultation
with ISAF, are engaged in active planning. The Independent
Elections Commission has produced a list of about 7,000 polling
stations which the ministries are reviewing, and the Afghan
forces will take the lead on election day, as in the past, but
we will still have forces on the ground to provide appropriate
support.
But meanwhile, with encouragement from the international
community, the Elections Commission has outlined a timeline for
the elections, designed a public relations campaign to educate
voters about the process, and developed a comprehensive
operational plan to combat fraud and increase participation,
including of women. The IEC is also undertaking efforts to
conduct voter registration to ensure that all who are eligible
to vote will have an opportunity to do so.
These are all positive developments, but that is not to say
that there are not some challenges. One, of course, is
security. The Afghans are holding an election amid an ongoing
insurgency in a country where institutions are still
developing. We expect the Taliban to try to disrupt the process
both in the lead up to and on election day, as they have in the
past.
The next issue, as you mentioned, sir, is the necessary
legislation to establish a sound electoral framework. It has
not yet been finalized, and time is running short as candidates
prepare to form their tickets and register in September.
President Karzai and the Parliament are working on these
issues. One of the key tasks is standing up a truly independent
electoral complaints body to adjudicate electoral disputes and
a credible appointment of a new IEC chairperson. While Afghans
must decide precisely what these mechanisms should look like
and who belongs in these positions, the process must be
credible. We believe an electoral framework, based on law and
founded on broad and inclusive consultations, is the best way
to do that.
Finally, as you said, there are Supreme Court Justices
whose constitutional terms have expired, and it is past time
for them to be removed and replaced. This will help legitimize
the Court's decisions and solidify confidence in the process.
This is significant because the Supreme Court may rule, as it
has in the past, on constitutional issues related to the
elections.
And as for the United States and the international
community, well, first let me say what we are not going to do.
The United States will not take sides or endorse any candidate
in these elections.
On security I will defer to David Sedney, but I will note
that we are focusing particular efforts on improved access for
women to polling centers by supporting the IEC gender strategy
and recruitment of qualified female election staff, promoting
public outreach to women, and ensuring that female searchers
are available to secure polling locations.
And as I said, we have three near-term electoral
priorities: the legislation to make sure we have got an
independent body to adjudicate complaints, appointment of a
credible IEC commissioner, followup on the IEC operational
plan.
And then to advance these, Senator, the Embassy in Kabul is
engaging intensively with election officials, security
ministries, Parliament, opposition, political parties, civil
society, and women's organizations. We emphasize that all
parties should stay engaged in the election preparations to
ensure a good process and avoid a disputed outcome. We speak
with political leaders about the importance of our bilateral
partnership and the need for this work to continue with the
next President. We discuss our security relationship, Afghan
commitments to the Tokyo Framework, support for an Afghan peace
process, and preserving the gains of the last 10 years,
including protections for women and minorities.
Afghan political players understand that a peaceful
political transition, following an inclusive, unifying
electoral process, is critical not just for Afghan stability
but also to sustaining international commitments.
Senator, we need to remain realistic and recognize that
these elections will not be perfect. There will be
irregularities. Security will be such probably in some parts of
the country that people may not be able to vote. And that is
why we have been providing significant financial and program
assistance to help our Afghan partners build credible and
independent electoral institutions. We coordinate closely with
the United Nations and other donors on training, public
information campaigns, fraud mitigation, domestic observation
efforts, and improved ways to identify eligible voters.
As the Secretary said in Kabul in February, these elections
should represent a unifying moment for Afghanistan. They are
the best chance Afghans will have to heal the wounds of the
past decade and to begin the process of putting the conflict
behind them.
So, Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work
with you and the committee and the subcommittee and look
forward to taking your questions today, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pearce follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador David D. Pearce
introduction
Thank you, Senator Casey, for the invitation to appear before the
subcommittee. Ambassador Dobbins was just sworn in as Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan on May 10 and asked me to
convey to the members of the subcommittee that he looks forward to
working with you.
On behalf of both Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Dobbins, let me
just say the Department of State appreciates the helpful role that the
subcommittee has played in focusing attention on a host of important
issues in South and Central Asia, and particularly your focus on
Afghanistan. Your travel to the region and your continuing
conversations with Afghan officials signal congressional attention to
all of these issues.
Today, as requested, I will focus on the elections, and I can tell
you Secretary Kerry has no higher priority. They are at the very center
of all that we are trying to achieve. In our Strategic Partnership
Agreement, Afghanistan reaffirmed its commitment to democratic
governance and free, fair, and transparent elections. The 2014
Presidential election, now less than a year away, will be a milestone
in Afghanistan's democratic development.
The elections will be an opportunity for Afghan men and women to
choose what kind of country they want to live in, what kind of leaders
they want to empower, and, ultimately, how they will resolve the
conflict that has divided their country for so many years. The
Presidential election, together with the 2014 provincial council
elections, will cement the gains of Afghan society and set the
trajectory for Afghanistan's stability long into the future.So the
stakes are high.
The elections are not happening in a void. Today, Afghans are
defending their country against the insurgents, and our troops are
starting the long journey home. This transition is extremely
challenging--and it is critical we get it, along with the election and
our long-term partnership, right. That is why we signed the Strategic
Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, and it is why we have placed
such great emphasis on the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Both
link the success of the elections to our long-term partnership and to
the continued support of the international community.
For pessimists out there, I'd like to point out that Pakistan just
came through an election campaign with violence, fraud allegations, and
other enormous challenges, but few doubt that the results represent the
voice of the Pakistani people. While the parallels are not precise,
Afghans nevertheless can take heart in this democratic transition and
understand that they control the direction of their future.
The United States firmly believes that the future stability of
Afghanistan rests on a peaceful transition of political authority from
President Karzai to his successor in 2014 following a democratic,
inclusive, and credible election. For more than a decade, President
Karzai has led the country through some very transformative and
difficult times, but the biggest piece is yet to come: handing over
power next year. Today's hearing takes place exactly 1 year before the
last day of President Karzai's term of office. He has stated repeatedly
that he will honor the Constitution and step down, and nothing will
cement his legacy more as an Afghan patriot and democratic leader. For
our part, we will do all we can to help ensure that a year from today,
Afghanistan experiences the first peaceful and constitutional transfer
of power in its history.
Success requires that the election results be acceptable to a broad
majority of Afghans--including those who voted for losing candidates--
so that Afghan citizens throughout the country accept the winner as the
legitimate President. Such a handover of power will send a strong
signal to all--including the Taliban--about the resilience of
Afghanistan's democratic institutions and the paramount importance of
the Constitution and rule of law.
After years of service in the Senate and frequent trips to
Afghanistan, no one understands better than Secretary Kerry the stakes
involved. As he said here in his testimony in January, if we don't
succeed in helping Afghans administer an acceptable election, it will
be very difficult to convince the American people and our allies to
stay engaged in this effort.
afghan preparations for the elections
I would like to report to you on what the Afghans are doing
themselves to make Secretary Kerry's words a reality. The Afghan
Government, election officials, opposition leaders and civil society
understand that having a sound democratic framework for the elections
in place well in advance of election day is critical to Afghan
stability, as well as to sustaining international commitments to
Afghanistan. With encouragement from the international community, the
Independent Election Commission (IEC) has outlined a timeline for the
elections, designed a public relations campaign to educate voters about
the process, and developed a comprehensive operational plan to combat
fraud and increase participation, including of women. The IEC is also
undertaking efforts to conduct voter registration to ensure that all
who are eligible to vote will have the opportunity to do so.
Security preparations are well under way. The Afghan security
ministries, in consultation with ISAF, are engaged in active planning,
including for access of women to polling stations. The IEC has produced
a list of polling stations, which the security ministries are
reviewing. Afghan forces will take the lead for security on election
day as in the past, but we will still have forces on the ground to
provide appropriate support.
These are all positive developments. And though the planning
process can be slow, it is achieving results. This is not to say there
are not serious challenges. The necessary legislation to establish a
sound electoral framework has not yet been finalized, and time is
running short as candidates prepare to form their tickets and register
in September. President Karzai and the Parliament are working on these
issues. One of the key tasks is standing up a truly independent
electoral complaints body to adjudicate electoral disputes and a
credible appointment of a new IEC chairperson. While Afghans must
decide precisely what these mechanisms should look like, and who
belongs in these positions, the process must be credible. We believe an
electoral framework based on law, founded on broad and inclusive
consultations, is the best way to achieve that.
Additionally, it is important that the Supreme Court justices whose
constitutional terms have expired, be removed and replaced. This will
help legitimize the Court's decisions and solidify confidence in the
process. This is critical as the Supreme Court may rule, as in the
past, on fundamental constitutional matters related to the elections.
And apropos of security, let's not forget that Afghans are faced
with holding an election amid an ongoing insurgency in a country in
which institutions are still developing. We expect the Taliban to try
to disrupt the process both in the lead-up to and on election day as
they have in the past. We have to be realistic and acknowledge that
this will be a challenge to the process.
support from the united states and the international community
What are we doing to keep this process on track? First, let me tell
you what we will not do. The United States will not take sides or
endorse any candidate in these elections, as ultimately this election
belongs to the Afghans. A fair and inclusive electoral process and a
unifying, widely accepted outcome are key to achieving our goal of
strengthening Afghan democracy.
We have identified three near-term priorities that we believe will
lay a solid foundation for credible elections. First, as I mentioned,
this includes Parliament passing legislation that to establish a truly
independent body to adjudicate complaints. Second, the IEC must be led
by a credible and competent commissioner. And third, the IEC needs to
finalize and begin to implement its operational plan. Our colleagues at
U.S. Embassy Kabul are engaging intensively with Afghans across the
board to achieve these goals. This includes election officials,
security ministries, parliament, opposition, political parties, civil
society, and women's organizations in support of Afghan aspirations for
elections that are as free, fair, and transparent as they can possibly
be.
And while the United States will not support any particular
candidate, we believe that Afghans will want their next President to be
someone who can work in close partnership with the international
community to achieve our mutual interests. And so we are speaking with
political leaders on the importance of our bilateral partnership and
the need for our important work to continue with Afghanistan's next
President. This includes important issues like our security
relationship, Afghan commitments on the Tokyo framework, support for an
Afghan peace process, and preserving the gains of the last 10 years,
including protections for women and minorities. We also emphasize that
all parties should stay engaged in the election preparations to ensure
a good process and avoid a disputed outcome.
We see signs that Afghans are now working to identify candidates
well in advance of the elections. Key political leaders from major
parties and groupings have been engaging with each other about who
should run and on what platforms. Civil society and women's groups are
actively engaged with government, political leaders, and the
international community. We applaud efforts to put aside old
animosities and forge consensus, engage in genuine national dialogue,
and place the good of the nation ahead of factional or personal
interests. That's what democracy, at its best, is all about.
Of course, we need to remain realistic and recognize that these
elections will not be perfect--there will be irregularities and
security will be such in parts of the country that people may not be
able to vote. This is why we have been providing significant financial
and program assistance to help our Afghan partners build credible and
independent electoral institutions. We coordinate closely with the U.N.
and other donors on training, public information campaigns, fraud
mitigation, domestic observation efforts, and improved ways to identify
eligible voters.
We are committed to supporting IEC plans to combat fraud by better
controlling ballots and training and vetting its staff. We view
transparency is key to reducing fraud, and therefore we are also
encouraging a strong program of domestic monitoring of elections.
On security, we are strengthening the capacity of the ANSF to
secure the elections with ISAF support. As part of this we are focusing
particular efforts on ensuring women have greater access to polling
centers than in prior election cycles by supporting the IEC's gender
strategy and recruitment of qualified female election staff, promoting
public outreach to women, and ensuring that female searchers are
available to secure polling locations.
Most importantly, we regularly discuss with our Afghan partners the
nature of our enduring partnership. Afghan political players and
members of civil society understand that a peaceful political
transition following an inclusive and unifying electoral process is
critical not just for Afghan stability but also to sustaining
international commitments to Afghanistan made last year in Chicago and
Tokyo.
conclusion
National dialogue among all Afghans through political processes is
critical to ending the decades of conflict. This will take time. But
successful elections can promote this dialogue and provide a real spark
to a peace process, as they will send a strong signal that
Afghanistan's democratic institutions enshrined in its 2004
Constitution are an enduring reality. Pluralism and tolerance are
bedrock principles of democracy. These elections offer an opportunity
to bring many Afghans into the political process who have previously
stayed on the margins.
As Secretary Kerry said in Kabul in February, the elections should
represent a unifying moment for Afghanistan. We see the success of the
elections as critical to our own mission and as giving the Afghans the
best chance they have at healing the wounds of the past decade and
beginning the process of putting the conflict behind them.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work with you, your
office, and this committee on these important issues in the months
ahead. And I look forward to taking your questions today.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
Mr. Sedney.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SEDNEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Sedney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
McCain.
I also had the pleasure of hosting you in Afghanistan many
years ago when we were together in the rocks beneath the
destroyed bombing and statues. I recall your conversation with
a young Afghan boy. It was one really inspiring moment. So
thank you, sir.
Today, from the Department of Defense, I am here to review
where we are in security-related planning for the political
transition next year. But first I want to make sure I put this
in the context of our overall effort in Afghanistan and the
historic transition that the security forces are undergoing
right now.
In 2008, after years of underinvestment in Afghanistan, the
Taliban had resurged and were at the gates of Kabul and
Kandahar. In many ways, failure stared us in the face.
Following a surge to Afghanistan of military and civilians,
greater investment in the Afghan National Security Forces, we
have arrived at a point where the Afghan security forces number
close to 350,000 and are in the process this year of taking the
lead for security in their entire country, with our continuing
support, but they are in the lead. Over 90 percent of the
operations that the Afghan security forces are carrying out--of
security operations in Afghanistan are now being carried out
with Afghanistan forces in the lead. That is what is happening
this summer.
This will be preparation for the Afghan security forces
taking the lead, as you said, Mr. Chairman, for an Afghan-led
elections process in the spring of next year. This is a testing
time for the Afghan security forces as they take up this
challenge of the lead. So far, the returns are very good in
terms that they are meeting that challenge. There are areas of
success and areas of failure. So at the same time that the
election preparation is going on, the Afghan security forces
are stepping up to this new challenge.
Wherever the Taliban have taken territory from the Afghan
security forces, the Afghan security forces have, in turn,
reattacked and taken it back. They are in the process of
building that security that will be necessary for the
elections.
As the Afghan security forces step into that new role, they
are also working with the Elections Commission and the rest of
the Afghan Government to prepare for the elections next year.
The entities involved, primarily the Ministry of Interior and
Ministry of Defense, have reviewed what happened in 2008 and
2009 and 2010, and similar to that, a three-tier security model
will be used with the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of
Defense, and the National Director of Security, the
intelligence agency responsible for providing security around
the polling station in different layers.
It is important to note that the planning and logistics
capabilities of the Afghan security forces have improved
greatly since 2008, 2009, and 2010, the last election cycle.
They still have, however, a lot of challenges.
This year, however, planning is well ahead of where it was
5 years ago in 2008. The security ministries are completing
security assessments, and we expect those to be done before
candidate registrations in September of this year.
In March, the IEC, working together with the security
ministries, put forward a comprehensive operational plan,
something that was not there in the 2009 and 2010 elections.
This plan is a comprehensive document dealing with all the
requirements for the elections. While not a security plan, it
includes a discussion and a setting forth of security
requirements that will enable the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior to continue their planning and do a better
job than 5 years ago.
However, I would like to stress that there are challenges.
While security planning, as I said, is ahead of where it was 5
years ago, levels of violence are much higher in 2013 than they
were in 2008 and 2009. As we draw down our forces, the stakes
are higher and the complexity of the operation that the Afghan
security forces will be undertaking is greater than that they
faced in 2008 and 2009.
However, the returns so far of the way the Afghan security
forces are stepping up to the new tasks they are taking on this
year give great promise that they will be able to meet the
requirements of security for the elections in April of next
year.
With that, Mr. Senator, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary David Sedney
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for this opportunity to provide the Department of Defense
perspective on the current outlook for the Afghan Presidential and
provincial council elections in 2014.
Today, I plan to review the current state of security-related
planning for a successful political transition next year. But first, I
want to place the discussion in the context of our overall effort in
Afghanistan and recognize the truly historic transition that is
underway. Over 11 years ago, in response to one of the worst attacks on
our homeland, the United States, together with our allies and partners,
initiated a campaign in Afghanistan to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al-Qaeda and its affiliates, with the mission to ensure that it would
never again become a safe haven from which terrorists could launch
attacks on the United States and to ensure the Taliban did not regain
power through force. In 2008, after years of underinvestment in
Afghanistan, the Taliban had resurged and were at the gates of Kabul
and Kandahar. Failure stared us in the face. In 2009, after reviewing
our Afghan policy, President Obama ordered a surge of U.S. troops and
civilians to give us the chance to reverse the insurgency's momentum
while, for the first time, effectively building an Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) capable of defeating the Taliban. The
President's message drew strong response from our coalition partners
and new commitments from many countries that had previously stood aside
from the Afghan effort as they saw it as too little and too late. Ever
more importantly, Afghans also saw new hope and began flooding in to
join the Afghan security forces in unprecedented numbers. These forces
grew from roughly 170,000 in May 2009 to over 335,000 today currently
fielded or in training, and we went from too few recruits to turning
away tens of thousands. As a result of the concerted effort by the
Afghans, U.S. and coalition partners along multiple lines of effort--
military, diplomatic, reconstruction, governance, and economic
development--we have seen a remarkable turnaround in Afghanistan, most
dramatically in the security area. The ANSF grew from a static force
with severely limited combat capability to a force conducting corps-
level combined army and police operations, as well as border security
enforcement.
Over the past 12 months the ANSF, particularly the Afghan National
Army (ANA), have made remarkable progress--now leading over 80 percent
of operations and carrying out many unilaterally. They have succeeded
well beyond expectations and when they have encountered tactical
failure--the loss of territory or a battlefield setback--they have re-
attacked, retaken territory, and pushed the Taliban back. The Afghan
Government will soon announce Milestone 2013, at which point the
Afghans will assume the security lead for 100 percent of the Afghan
population and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will
shift to a support-role. The Afghans are entering a fundamentally new
phase as they assume the sovereign responsibilities that will put them
on a path toward self-reliance. Holding a legitimate election process
that enables a peaceful transition of power will be a milestone in
Afghanistan's path forward.
The Presidential and provincial council elections, set for April 5,
2014, hold promise to be the first constitutional transfer of power
from one President to another in Afghanistan's history. For the first
time, Afghans will be solely responsible for administering the process
and providing security with international forces in support only. A
credible process with the fullest possible voter participation is
critical. The challenge for Afghans will be to demonstrate that
elections have qualitatively improved since 2009-2010 with the
implementation of better fraud-mitigation procedures and more polling
stations accessible to eligible voters. Helping Afghans achieve a
peaceful transfer of authority in 2014 is one of the administration's
highest priorities in Afghanistan, with DOD focused on the security
front. However, I want to highlight that this will be an Afghan-led
process. In accordance with the overall security transition and respect
for Afghan sovereignty, ISAF, including U.S. forces, will maintain a
support role during the elections process: ISAF will be prepared to
take action only when--and only if--requested by the Afghan Government.
Support will likely be in logistics, intelligence, route clearance, and
in extremis support. As a contingency, ISAF will be prepared to deploy
quick reaction forces in the event the ANSF are not able to provide for
the safety of members of the international community, such as election
observers. Together with their Afghan counterparts, coalition forces
will have the ability to provide a rapid response in the event security
deteriorates beyond the ANSF's ability to control.
There are several Afghan entities that play a role in security
planning for the upcoming election. While the Independent Election
Commission (IEC) has the lead in election administration and
supervision, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) has an overall coordinating
role for security of the electoral process, with support from the
Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the National Directorate of Security
(NDS). Similar to the 2009-2010 election security model, a three-tier
approach will be employed to secure the polling centers, with MoI, MoD,
and NDS responsible for providing security around the polling stations.
It is important to note that the ANSF conducted security for earlier
elections, and their planning and logistics capabilities have improved
considerably since then. Planning has benefited from lessons learned in
previous elections. Furthermore, the Afghan forces providing security
for this election has almost doubled in number since 2009.
Following lessons learned from the 2009 and 2010 elections, the
U.S. Government has encouraged early and close liaison among the IEC
and the security ministries. The IEC has already started coordinating
with the MoI and MoD on security planning. At the end of February 2013,
the IEC provided the MoI with a list of almost 7,000 polling centers to
allow the MoI ample time to conduct security assessments for each site,
take measures to open stations that had not been accessible previously,
and provide adequate time for the delivery of election materials. The
security ministries are scheduled to complete security assessments
before candidate registration begins in mid-September 2013. In March
2013, the IEC, together with the security ministries, released a
comprehensive operational plan a year ahead of the elections--something
that we did not achieve in the run up to the 2009 and 2010 elections.
The IEC operational plan is a comprehensive document detailing voter
registration and voting procedures, training and fielding of observers,
fraud mitigation, and public messaging, both to encourage participation
and to explain procedures. While not a security plan, it does include
some discussion of security considerations for the main components of
the electoral process, the general concept of security operations, and
processes that support the IEC Security Operations mission.
Although election preparations are progressing, challenges remain.
Afghan security institutions have yet to turn their full attention to
security planning, having focused resources on the current fight and
its challenges while also helping support voter registration and roll-
out of the e-tazkera, the biometrically linked electronic national
identity card. The MoI began an e-tazkera pilot program in Kabul in
mid-April, which will expand nationwide once voter registration begins;
however, progress on the issuance of e-tazkeras has been slow. Public
demand for the
e-tazkera has increased as public awareness of the program has become
more widespread. This places the MoI under considerable pressure to
meet demand and will continue to present a challenge for the MoI, as
they work to meet their very aggressive goal of enrolling 14 million
Afghans by March 31, 2014. Despite earlier and closer coordination
between the IEC and security ministries, communication between these
institutions has been poor and still needs improvement. ISAF will
continue to support MoI and MoD to prepare effective security plans and
facilitate closer coordination between the two ministries and with the
IEC. While security planning for the 2014 election is ahead of the 2009
election, levels of violence are much higher in 2013 than in 2008. With
the anticipated drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces by the end of
2014, the stakes are much higher, and the political complexity of an
election without an incumbent makes the risk greater than in the past.
The 2014 Presidential election presents an opportunity for the
Afghan Government to demonstrate its ability to conduct a peaceful
democratic transition of political power; however, the election will
also challenge the government to conduct an election that is viewed by
the Afghan people and international community to be legitimate. The
United States continues to urge consultation in these efforts among
President Karzai, Parliament, the IEC, the political opposition, and
civil society organizations to help ensure that decisions ultimately
have buy-in from the Afghan population. Secure, transparent, and
orderly elections in 2014 will be important to a peaceful transfer of
power and, ultimately, the recognition by the Afghan people that the
government is both legitimate and representative of Afghanistan.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much, Mr. Sedney.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is good to see both of you again, and thank you for
your years of service as Members of Congress parachute in and
out and tell you what you ought to be doing. I appreciate your
patience and your forbearance on those occasions.
It seems to me that there are several seminal events or
situations that will determine success or failure, and let me
just run through a couple of them real quick.
One we cannot do a lot about and that is the Pakistan safe
haven.
Another, of course, is corruption in the Karzai government.
Another is the number of troops that we will leave behind
in a residual force in 2014.
And, of course, the other is the funding for the Afghan
security forces in order to maintain a force of 352,000. Now,
it is my understanding that that is around $5 billion. And at
Chicago, there was only $4.1 billion, and of course, these
conferences are pretty well known for pledges that never really
become reality.
So I think, Mr. Chairman, that we do have a vote coming up.
So maybe I could just ask them to respond to those so that you
would have an opportunity. Maybe we could have some responses,
your views on each of those. Those are not the only issues that
face us, but I think that you would agree that that summarizes
at least most of the major challenges.
Mr. Sedney. Thank you, Senator. Everything you have laid
out is certainly a challenge.
Taking them in the same order, the Pakistan safe havens
exist now. My comments about the success that the Afghan
security forces are having now in holding their own includes
operations that build upon the layered security along the
border, that layer of security design that ISAF put in place
with the Afghans now moving into the lead on that as well. But
it is, nevertheless, a challenge. The insurgents get to back
into Pakistan for resting, refitting, planning, rearming, all
that. And it will be a challenge for the Afghan security forces
to maintain security this year and during the elections with
those safe havens there. They will learn a lot this year about
how well they are able to do that and how well they are able to
do that with less support from us as our forces continue and
ISAF forces continue to reduce.
In terms of corruption, I will leave that for my colleague,
Ambassador Pearce. But there is certainly corruption in the
security forces as well. I am not saying it is civilian.
In terms of the number of United States forces, as you
know, Senator, President Obama announced at the State of the
Union that we will withdraw half of the forces we have now, so
we will have 34,000 forces in Afghanistan in February of next
year. Those forces will be there for the election period.
Senator McCain. The key, I think, is the number following
that, the permanent support force that is going to be there for
the foreseeable future. There are estimates ranging from 20,000
down to 13,000 down to 5,000. And I would argue that the sooner
the Afghans know that, the more predictable they believe their
future will be. Would you agree?
Mr. Sedney. I agree that the continuing presence and
commitment of the United States and others is really important.
In terms of the final decision, as you know, that has not been
made yet.
Senator McCain. Do you have any idea when that decision
might be made?
Mr. Sedney. I am afraid I do not, Mr. Senator, but I will
take your comments and your question back with me.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Sedney. On the funding for the Afghan security forces,
you are correct about the increased amount. Part of that comes
because we are looking to provide additional enablers for the
Afghan security forces beyond those that we thought we would
need last year, trying to get such things as helicopters,
artillery in place more quickly and to give the Afghans the
ability to operate independently. Some of that additional
amount was reflected in the OCO budget that was submitted to
Congress for the coming fiscal year. That will entail some
additional cost beyond the original estimates and we are still
working on those numbers.
Senator McCain. Did you want to say anything about
corruption in the Karzai government?
Ambassador Pearce. Well, sir, as you know--you have been
yourself to Afghanistan so many times--it is a fundamental
challenge. It has been for some time and it will be for a
while.
The government has committed to reducing corruption and
increasing transparency and accountability and building
judicial capacity and the rule of law. But, of course, there is
a lot to do. They pledged to fight it at Bonn. They reaffirmed
it last July in Tokyo. Of course, this is one of the
fundamental things that the international community is going to
be looking at very closely going forward.
We have, as you noted, made substantial undertakings to
work to secure funds going forward after 2014, both in Chicago
at the NATO conference for the Afghan National Security Forces
and in Tokyo. But it is clear that your very question in this
setting shows what the issue is, that if we are going to be
able to follow through on the commitments that we have made and
which are quite sincere, then this is going to be an important
factor in that, and the international community is going to be
watching that very closely.
I would just say in that regard, though, that it really
does tie into the political framework, political transition,
and the whole question of the elections and the reason that
Senator Casey called this meeting today.
And I would just note, sir, I have been in SRAP for the
last year or so, and I was in Kabul for a year before that. And
I think that there is a lot of attention, first, on the
drawdown of troops. There is also a civilian drawdown, as you
know, that is going to be going on at the same time. I would
argue that one of the important things that has changed in the
last couple of years, which does not get a lot of attention, is
the really patient, block-by-block political and diplomatic
work that has been done to put in place an architecture of
support for Afghanistan that was not there before. Two years
ago, the kind of support that we have now just was not there.
And now we have had conferences in Bonn and Berlin and
Istanbul very importantly for the region to be invested in the
future of Afghanistan in a much greater degree than they were
before and Chicago and Tokyo, of course. And I think what that
has done is--and, of course, more than a dozen bilateral
security agreements as well, not only ours, but India and the
Europeans and Japan and Australia, the Scandinavian countries.
This means that there is an architecture of support for
Afghanistan that is a new factor, and I think it has changed
the equation in the region. It has affected the calculations of
the regional countries, and I think it has affected the
calculations of the Afghans.
And I believe that this has opened up additional political
space. And that is the backdrop that these elections are going
to take place in. That is the backdrop that the possibilities
for reconciliation and the peace process will take place in,
and that is the backdrop for the larger political transition in
Afghanistan.
So, yes, I think, corruption is a problem. Our decisions on
the post-2014 presence are going to be extraordinarily
important. They are going to have not only a practical military
impact, but a very important psychological impact. But there
are really opportunities too, and I think that some of these
things are in the political area.
Thank you.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Ambassador Pearce, I wanted to get back to something you
mentioned and I mentioned as well, the Supreme Court and the
concern that has been raised here and in other places about
members of the Afghan Supreme Court remaining in their posts
beyond the expiration of their terms. How do we engage in that
and how do we positively impact that issue?
Ambassador Pearce. Well, Senator, I mean, this hearing, I
guess, is one of those opportunities.
We engage intensively on not only this issue but all of the
issues related to the electoral process, on the legislation,
the commissioners. The whole complex is something which we are
intensively engaged in and have been for some time.
The Embassy, Secretary Kerry--I was with him on his last
trip, and I can assure you that he raised all these things very
directly and personally in his own meetings. I think you know
how he feels about this. His own experience in 2009, of
course--he is one of the most knowledgeable people there is
about this whole issue. I remember that before he even was
confirmed in his initial prebriefings, but when he came to
visit us in Kabul over breakfast at the Ambassador's house and
during the briefings we had, he always raised this issue. And
when he came to the State Department, it was the first thing he
mentioned with us.
So I think that this is really front and center, not only
the Supreme Court justices, but the quality of the process in
general because it is fundamental to what we are trying to
achieve in Afghanistan.
This is an election which the Afghans are running. We are
going to support, as best we can, and I think, as you said,
that is the proper role. We are not going to be picking a
horse, not picking a candidate. Nevertheless, we are also not
indifferent to the outcome. And all of these things are
important to getting the process right and doing everything we
can together with the United Nations and the other donors to
try and do that. So we follow up almost every day, I would say,
high and low, sir.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ambassador, because of our votes and
because we started so late, I think I am going to let both you
and Mr. Sedney go, and we are going to transition to the second
panel.
But before I run out the door to vote, Mr. Sedney, the
report that is due pursuant to my amendment in the Fiscal Year
2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the report that
relates to women in Afghanistan--the report is due in June, and
I hope--and tell me if I am wrong--that we can expect that
report delivered on time.
Mr. Sedney. Mr. Senator, our intention is to have it in on
time. However, I will note that our report-writing capacity has
been taxed by the additional requirements for the 1230 report
which is increasing in size by 40 percent. So we are at a time
of reduced resources. That increase in the 1230 report
requirements may impact the delivery of the report you
mentioned on women in Afghanistan, but we are already working
on that report and I still hope to have it in on time.
Senator Casey. Well, I appreciate those efforts and
anything to make sure that happens because--I guess it was
Ambassador. You noted about women's participation in the
election and obviously well beyond the election is critically
important not only for the obvious reasons but also because how
women fair will largely impact the security environment.
Both of you have been very patient. We will submit more
questions in writing, and maybe as I run to vote, we can
transition to our next panel. We will take a brief recess.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Casey. OK, we are back. Thanks very much, everyone,
for your patience. We actually had two votes, so that explains
part of the time lag.
But I appreciate the opportunity that each of you presents
to us to be able to discuss these important issues that relate
to the elections in Afghanistan. I know we do not have
unlimited time, but I did want to hear from each of you, if you
can summarize your testimony.
I should also say for the record that, obviously, on our
first panel both Mr. Sedney and the Ambassador--their full
statements will be made a part of the record. The same holds
for each of you.
You know the drill, but to the extent that we can try to
keep your opening statements to 5 minutes, and then we will do
a round of questioning. But, Dr Wilder, if you want to start.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW WILDER, DIRECTOR, AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN PROGRAMS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Wilder. Thank you. Chairman Casey, thank you for this
opportunity to present my views on the upcoming elections. I
would like to note that the views I express today are my own
and not necessarily those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which
does not take policy positions.
For the past 2 years, the top priority of USIP's
Afghanistan program, both in Washington and through our office
in Kabul, has been to raise greater awareness of the importance
of the 2014 political transition. We have prioritized this
because we strongly believe that a credible election that
produces a legitimate successor to President Karzai is the best
way to promote peace and protect the tremendous achievements of
the past decade. I also believe that this is the best way to
promote the United States objective of a relatively stable
Afghanistan that does not slide back into civil war, does not
once again become a haven for transnational terrorist groups,
and does not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan.
In spite of the problems that Afghanistan continues to
face, its current constitution has held together a disparate
group of political elites. Without legitimate elections next
year, the fabric of the constitution will be torn and, with it,
the existing consensus on how to allocate power and determine
legitimacy. This would be tragic for Afghans, damaging to
United States interests in the region, and would reinvigorate
the Taliban insurgency.
I was just in Kabul a few weeks ago, and one of the senior
Afghan political figures I spoke with there said to me if
elections are not held, it will be a big propaganda victory for
the Taliban. And I think that is the case.
Whether we like it or not, the United States plays a major
role in the electoral calculations of Afghan political actors.
However, there is currently a politically damaging mismatch of
perceptions between the signals we think we are sending and the
signals that Afghans say they are receiving. There is no
question that the United States has been clear in its official
statements and bilateral discussions with Afghans about the
United States desire for credible elections in 2014.
Unfortunately, many Afghans continue to question our
commitment to their democracy. They note our actions, as well
as our statements. The recent reports in the media, for
example, that some parts of the U.S. Government continue to
provide President Karzai with unofficial cash payments is
interpreted as a sign that whatever the United States says
about elections, it, in fact, remains wedded to supporting the
President and his patronage networks. Karzai's very public
acknowledgment that he received these funds and the assurance
he says he was given that he will continue to receive them
clearly show that he recognized the political value within
Afghanistan of highlighting this direct United States support.
In 2009, President Karzai accused the United States of
undue interference in the electoral process, including favoring
certain candidates over others and actively undermining his
reelection. Since 2009, the international community has
responded by adopting an approach that perhaps has gone too far
in the other direction. Afghan politicians regularly complain
that the international community's reluctance to push the
Afghan Government on election-related issues results from a
tendency to confuse President Karzai's sovereignty with
Afghanistan's sovereignty. As one Afghan put it to me, the
United States is interfering in the process as much by staying
out of it as it would by being involved. The question is
whether its interference is positive or negative for the future
of Afghanistan.
While Afghan sovereignty must be taken seriously, it is not
a violation of that sovereignty for the United States and its
international partners to highlight publicly, as well as
privately, the need for appropriate electoral laws, effective
and independent electoral institutions, and robust fraud
mitigation measures.
To summarize my main recommendations, the first one is that
the top priority of United States policy in Afghanistan for the
next year should be to support credible elections on April 5
next year, which will provide a new leadership team for
Afghanistan and preserve the integrity and continuity of the
Afghan Constitution.
The second recommendation is that the United States should
appoint an official of ambassadorial rank in the Embassy in
Kabul specifically tasked to focus on elections, echoing the
recommendation you made in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman.
In addition to helping coordinate the various lines of the
United States elections-related support, this would also help
to send a clear signal to Afghans that the elections are,
indeed, a top policy priority of the U.S. Government.
The third recommendation is that in actively supporting the
electoral process, the United States must avoid the impression
that it supports any specific candidate.
And No. 4, the United States should actively support the
voter education efforts of civil society organizations and the
media. Civic education and robust support for an independent
media will play a critically important role in mobilizing and
educating voters, especially women voters. It will also help
generate demand for the elections and promote transparency and
accountability.
I would like to conclude with a question that an Afghan
friend posed to me recently. He said, ``We have tried every
form of government in the past 100 years in Afghanistan:
monarchy, a nonelected Presidential republic, anarchy,
theocracy, and now democracy. He said if democracy cannot work,
then what is left?'' That I believe is how many Afghans see the
stakes of next year's political transition and why they place
so much importance on the elections. And that is why we must as
well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wilder follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Andrew Wilder
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to present my
views on the upcoming elections in Afghanistan. Thank you for this
opportunity. The views I express today are my own and not necessarily
those of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), which does not take policy
positions.
introduction
I currently direct USIP's programs on Afghanistan and Pakistan. My
views are informed by my work at USIP, and by a longstanding
involvement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. I began to work in the
region in 1986 with U.S. humanitarian and development NGOs assisting
Afghans, and spent all but 3 of the following 20 years in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. I saw first-hand the tragic and devastating consequences
for Afghans--and eventually the U.S. as well--when peace settlements
failed, and when the international community lost interest in
Afghanistan. While much of the press these days is filled with negative
stories from Afghanistan, I can also attest to the remarkable progress
made in Afghanistan during the past decade, which stands in stark
contrast to the dark days of civil war and Taliban oppression of the
1990s. Much of this progress was made possible by generous U.S.
financial support and the brave efforts of our military and civilian
personnel who have served in Afghanistan.
USIP has been working in Afghanistan since 2002, focusing on
identifying innovative ways to prevent and mitigate conflict through
nonviolent means. Our team, based in Kabul and supported by colleagues
in our headquarters in Washington, DC, implements programs designed to
improve understanding of conflict dynamics and peaceful dispute
resolution mechanisms, supports and strengthens the important work of
civil society organizations to prevent and resolve conflict and promote
the rule of law, and advances peace education in schools and
communities. We work closely with colleagues at the State Department,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, and through
our research and programs help to inform their work and
the work of other organizations and policymakers. USIP also frequently
convenes
and facilitates dialogue with key actors from across the Afghan
political spectrum, as well as with U.S. civilian and military
officials, including visiting congressional
delegations.
For the past 2 years, the top priority of USIP's Afghanistan
program has been to conduct research, facilitate discussions, and raise
greater awareness through publications, events, and briefings of the
importance of, and need to, support the 2014 political transition in
Afghanistan. Throughout 2011, USIP and the Center for American Progress
supported a high-level working group cochaired by Steve Hadley and John
Podesta, which highlighted the need for a clearer U.S. political
strategy in Afghanistan, and in particular stressed the importance of
the 2014 political transition. Since 2011, USIP has also been hosting a
monthly interagency Afghan Elections Working Group meeting in
Washington, DC. In Afghanistan, USIP is currently designing a program
to help develop the capacity of women to participate in the elections,
as well as a broader effort to inform and support election-related
civic education efforts.
A Credible Election is Essential for Peace and Stability
Today's hearing is critically important and timely. I strongly
believe that the single biggest opportunity to protect the tremendous
achievements of the past decade and to promote the U.S. objective of a
relatively stable Afghanistan that does not slide back into civil war,
once again becoming a haven for transnational terrorist groups and
destabilizing its neighbors, especially Pakistan, is a credible
election in 2014 that produces a legitimate successor to President
Karzai.
Until recently this critically important political transition in
Afghanistan has been overshadowed by the security transition--the
ongoing process by which international forces are drawn down and Afghan
forces take full responsibility for their own security. However, many
Afghans do not believe it will be possible to have a successful
security transition without a successful political transition that
ensures there is a legitimate civilian government to control and
maintain the cohesiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces.
Furthermore, there is a clear recognition among Afghan political elites
that cancellation of the election, or a deeply flawed election that
does not produce a legitimate outcome, will have a very negative impact
on the willingness of major Western donors to continue generous levels
of financial support to sustain the Afghan economy and the Afghan
National Security Forces. They know all too well that it was not the
withdrawal of Soviet troops that led to the downfall of the Najibullah
regime in 1992, and the resulting descent into a bloody civil war, but
the end to the Soviet subsidies following the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
The stakes in 2014 are not simply the election of a new Afghan
leadership, but the endurance of Afghanistan's constitutional political
order. In spite of the problems that Afghanistan continues to face, its
current constitution, ratified in January of 2004, has succeeded in
holding together a disparate group of political elites. Many of these
elites still have the means to contest for power with arms, but they
have accepted that constitutional process and electoral contests are
better ways of resolving leadership conflicts. Without elections next
year, or with flawed elections, the fabric of the constitution will be
torn, and with it the existing consensus on how to allocate power and
determine legitimacy. If this happens, it is likely that some of
Afghanistan's major powerbrokers will resort to the only other set of
rules for power available to them--those of force and violence. This
would not only have tragic consequences for Afghans, but also seriously
damage U.S. interests in the region and reinvigorate the Taliban
insurgency. As one senior Afghan political figure told me last month in
Kabul, ``If elections are not held it will be a big propaganda victory
for the Taliban.''
Foundations for a Democratic Future in Afghanistan
While the last round of Afghan elections in 2009/2010 were
problematic for many reasons, a focus on the flaws of past elections
would overlook some important achievements of Afghan democracy.
Elections have worked in Afghanistan, at least in terms of their most
basic function. They have legitimized executive power, elected
representative parliaments and provincial councils, and have begun to
accustom Afghan citizens to the rites of democracy. However imperfect,
Afghanistan has achieved a government that exercises civilian control
over its security forces, negotiates trade deals with its neighbors,
seeks loans from international financial institutions such as the World
Bank and the IMF, represents Afghanistan at the United Nations, and
maintains important bilateral relationships on a sovereign footing. All
of this is possible because the government is recognized by the
international community because it has been established on the basis of
the mechanisms prescribed in its constitution.
There is, of course, much room for improvement, but the two post-
2001 electoral cycles have laid a foundation from which Afghans can
continue to grow into their democracy. Elections are also accepted by
most Afghans as a means of determining political power. A recent survey
conducted by Democracy International and funded by USAID reveals that
76 percent of those surveyed intend to vote in the next Presidential
election. In another study published by USIP, Afghans surveyed say they
recognize the flaws of their electoral system, but also value it. They
expressed pride in the fact that their country has joined the family of
democratic nations. Furthermore, despite past flaws, and undoubtedly
future ones as well, they see no better alternative.
At the level of elites, the prospect of next year's election has
led to significant political mobilization. Electoral politics is
happening in Afghanistan--the democratic politics of coalition-
building, platform-drafting, and campaign strategizing. The fact that
President Karzai is constitutionally barred from running for a third
term is the most salient feature of the 2014 election. While making
predictions about Afghanistan is always a risky business, one possible
scenario is the emergence of two strong electoral coalitions, one
supported by President Karzai, and entrusted by him to protect and
carry on his political legacy, and the other formed by an opposition
team, made up largely of former (and in some cases current) senior
office-holders in Karzai's government, though both coalitions will need
the support of more traditional sources of power. A strategy being
pursued by some political actors is to try to generate a consensus
prior to the elections among key political elites around a post-
election national agenda and power-sharing arrangement. If successful,
this elite consensus-building effort would be followed by a national
campaign to endorse this effort, with the hope that the 2014 elections
would ultimately serve more as a referendum on this national agenda and
power-sharing agreement rather than a highly contentious and divisive
electoral contest.
United States Support for Elections
Whether we like it or not, the position adopted by the United
States plays a major role in the electoral calculations of Afghan
political actors. However, there is a politically damaging mismatch of
perceptions between the signals we think we are sending and the signals
that Afghans say they are receiving from us. There is no question that
the United States has been clear in its official statements, program
documents, and bilateral discussions with Afghans about the U.S. desire
for a credible election process in 2014 that yields a legitimate
result. For example, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
specifies a credible election as a condition for long-term assistance
to Afghanistan beyond 2014. The elections were prominently mentioned
during the press conference that Presidents Obama and Karzai held in
Washington in January of this year, as well as during Secretary Kerry's
visit to Kabul in March. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul is closely following
the elections and USAID and its partners are actively supporting the
electoral preparations. On visits to Kabul in February and April of
this year, I was struck by the number of Afghan political figures who
spoke of the significance for Afghans of then-Senator Kerry's remarks
about the importance of the elections, made in his confirmation hearing
before this committee.
We might therefore conclude that the U.S. Government has said
enough and that our position is clear. But many Afghans remain hesitant
and continue to question our commitment to their democracy. They note
our actions as well as our statements. The recent reports in the media,
for example, that some parts of the U.S. Government continue to provide
President Karzai with unofficial cash payments is interpreted as a sign
that, whatever the U.S. says about elections, it in fact remains wedded
to supporting Karzai and his patronage networks. His very public
acknowledgment that he received these funds, and the assurances he says
he was given that he will continue to receive them, clearly show that
he recognizes the political value within Afghanistan of highlighting
this support. The fact that the U.S. has not been more vocal on issues
such as Karzai's recent veto of an electoral law that would ensure a
more independent election commission is also seen as a sign by some
Afghans that credible elections in 2014 are not a top U.S. policy
priority. The U.S. refusal, along with other donors, to finance a plan
last year to improve the voter register--leaving aside the feasibility
of that plan--is similarly interpreted as the U.S. Government's
unwillingness to invest in as credible an electoral process as
possible.
In 2009, President Karzai accused the U.S. of undue interference in
the electoral process, including favoring certain candidates over
others and actively undermining his reelection. Whatever the merits of
this accusation, Karzai considers it to be fact, and that must be
accepted by policymakers as a reality of the Afghan political scene.
Since 2009, the international community has reacted by adopting an
approach that perhaps goes too far in the other direction. Rightly or
wrongly, many Afghan opposition politicians regularly complain to me
that the U.S. has been conspicuously absent from involvement in the
elections on the grounds of respecting Afghan sovereignty--but that too
often there is a tendency to confuse President Karzai's ``sovereignty''
with Afghanistan's sovereignty. As one Afghan put it to me, ``The
United States is interfering in the process as much by staying out of
it as it would by being involved. The question is whether its
interference is positive or negative for the future of Afghanistan.''
There is no question that Afghan sovereignty must be taken
seriously. Active U.S. support for a credible election bolsters Afghan
sovereignty and reinforces the primacy of the constitution. It is a
critical component of the future relationship between our two
countries. This discussion cannot be held only with President Karzai.
It must be held more broadly with the Afghan political community and
even the Afghan public, because they will be the main partners and
hopefully beneficiaries in that future relationship. It is not a
violation of Afghan sovereignty for the U.S. Government and its
international partners to highlight--publicly as well as privately--the
need for appropriate electoral laws and effective and independent
electoral institutions, and that future levels of external support will
undoubtedly be affected by the extent to which the elections are
perceived to be credible.
The veto a few weeks ago by President Karzai of the law governing
electoral institutions is cause for significant concern. Karzai's main
criticism was that the law restricted his so-far unfettered ability to
pick the members of the Independent Electoral Commission. His veto of
the law will, in the least damaging scenario, cost precious time in the
preparation of the elections. At worst, it will result in a situation
where Parliament adjourns in July without an agreed-upon law, and
President Karzai will either decree a new law, or the elections will
take place according to the old law. Irrespective of the merits of the
various legislative drafts, and of the arguments behind Karzai's veto,
the electoral optics are of great concern. For an opposition already
skittish about contesting an election that they fear will be rigged,
the fact that the President might be the sole decider of the
legislation under which the election takes place, and the sole
appointer of the figures who will oversee the contest, is dissuasive to
say the least.
Despite the risks of a destabilizing election, the greatest fear of
many Afghans is an election that doesn't take place. Various factors
heighten that concern--
a delayed or uncertain legislative framework, an opposition that is
ill-prepared to contest an election because it doubts the election's
fairness, the security situation which could further deteriorate if the
Taliban decide to actively target the elections, the impact of the
drawdown of international military forces on their capacity to provide
security and logistical support, questions about how the electoral
budget is administered, logistical challenges of carrying out a spring
election--all lead to a situation where many may conclude that an
election cannot be held. Where would that leave Afghanistan? It is
anyone's guess, but without question it would create a destabilizing
constitutional crisis, which I have argued it is imperative to avoid.
It must be the unwavering policy of the U.S. to support an election
in April 2014 that will provide a new leadership team for Afghanistan
and, most importantly, preserve the integrity and continuity of the
Afghan Constitution. This policy objective should be prioritized above
all others, including that of a negotiated solution with the Taliban.
Working with Afghans to ensure that a credible election is held should
also take precedence over certain bilateral issues, such as the
negotiation of the Bilateral Security Agreement that determines the
status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan beyond 2014, should these two
issues be placed in conflict.
The U.S. must make very clear to the Afghan Government, political
parties and candidates, and the Afghan public that a credible election
and a peaceful political transition to a legitimate successor to
President Karzai is currently the top policy priority of the U.S. in
Afghanistan. This need not be communicated through threats or
ultimatums. Megaphone diplomacy in Afghanistan often backfires. U.S.
officials must simply state the obvious--that the U.S. and its
international partners would find it difficult to sustain a robust and
long-term economic and security relationship with an Afghanistan that
did not have a legitimate democratically elected government. On the
other hand, the U.S. would welcome deepening its relationship with a
new, elected government that sees itself as a strategic partner.
Recommendations
In summary, my recommendations are:
1. The top priority of U.S. policy in Afghanistan should be to
support credible elections on April 5, 2014, in accordance with the
Afghan Constitution. We have many competing interests in Afghanistan
and many short-term crises that come up in our relationship with the
Afghan Government. These should not be allowed to overshadow the fact
that our long-term relationship depends on a legitimate post-2014
government.
2. The U.S. should appoint an official of ambassadorial rank in the
Embassy in Kabul specifically tasked with focusing on elections,
offering both technical and political guidance. Ambassador Tim Carney
played this role in 2009 and it was seen as extremely valuable by
Afghans and the international community in coordinating the various
lines of support provided by the U.S. Government. Because the elections
are taking place in the spring when weather conditions make parts of
the country difficult to access, the 2014 elections will be more
complicated logistically than previous elections, and ensuring
efficient lines of support will be more important.
3. In providing support to the electoral process, both through
technical means and through our statements to Afghan leaders, the U.S.
must avoid the impression that it supports any specific candidate. It
is extremely important for the legitimacy of the process and the
government that emerges from it, that the electoral decision is an
Afghan one.
4. The U.S. should actively support civic education efforts of
civil society organizations and the media. Civic education and robust
support for independent media will play an important role in mobilizing
and educating voters, especially women voters, generating demand for
the elections, and promoting greater transparency and accountability.
5. Finally, we should work with Afghanistan's regional partners to
improve the environment in which the elections take place. The election
of a new government in Pakistan, for example, creates an opportunity to
gain greater cooperation in promoting stability in Afghanistan in the
runup to the election. Neighboring countries will seek to influence the
election, but can be convinced that they also all stand to lose if a
failed process leads to renewed conflict.
conclusion
The true value of the efforts of many American service men and
women, diplomats, and civilians over the past 12 years will be put to
the test a year from now. As I mentioned at the beginning of my
remarks, the stakes are high for all Afghans, but they are also high
for us. An Afghan friend recently told me, ``We have tried every form
of government in the past 100 years: monarchy, anarchy, theocracy, a
nonelected Presidential republic, and now democracy. If democracy
cannot work, then what is left?'' That, I believe, is how many Afghans
see the stakes of next year's election, and why they place so much
importance on them--and why we cannot let them down.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to take questions.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Ms. Chayes.
STATEMENT OF SARAH CHAYES, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, SOUTH ASIA
PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Chayes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think all
of us--I can probably speak for all of us in just expressing
appreciation for your initiative with this because I can say,
at least, if the same foresight had been shown in 2009, we
might be in a different place today.
I would like to just give you a couple of words to give you
a sense of my own perspective. I was asked to discuss a little
bit how things went down in 2009, you know, just to provide a
context for the types of actions that you might be considering
proposing at the moment.
At the time, I was the special advisor to the ISAF command.
I had lived in Afghanistan for 7 years, almost all of that time
in a regular house in Kandahar, and I speak Pashtu and the
people I worked with were ordinary Afghans, men and women, from
the Kandahar area. And so that experience gave me an intimate
insight into how the massive fraud of 2009 was brought about.
And what I am going to describe comes from an unclassified
analysis that I provided to the ISAF command, and that was
everyone, General McChyrstal, General Rodriguez at the time,
the intel and ops bosses, et cetera.
So one of the things we heard today repeated quite often
was the issue of Afghanizing the election. I think we need, as
Dr. Wilder suggested, to think carefully about what we mean by
that. What I found was that the fraud operation was incredibly
sophisticated, and it began with what I could call a PSYOPS
campaign, a psychological operations campaign, against us by
Karzai and the key ministers, and by that I mean, you know, the
Minister of Defense, the Minister of the Interior, the key
IDLG, the independent--what was it--directorate of local
governance. Sorry. And that was a main point they were all
trying to impress on us, is we need to Afghanize this election.
And I have to say the international community jumped on board
with that concept, in particular, the United Nations which saw
this as a mark of success, the degree to which we backed out
of--we, the international community--backed out of involvement
in, again, the process. It is not about picking winners. It is
about oversight over the process. ISAF, I have to say, was
delighted to be relegated to third rank security. So not even
eyes on to polling stations.
The effect was--so these were concepts that we really were
sensitive to. We did not want to impinge on Afghan sovereignty.
But that was a very effective way for the Karzai machine, more
or less, to protect itself from observation. In fact, the
Afghan Government was not neutral. It had been set up to pursue
the objective of reelecting President Karzai, and that is how
every Afghan citizen that I interacted with--and that was a
lot--saw it. And they saw at the time the international
community as the sole potential guarantors of the independence
of the process.
And again, I can remember the night before the election
getting a call from a town on the border with Pakistan. They
have started stuffing the ballot boxes already. It is at so and
so's house on such and such a street, and the implied plea
there was send somebody. Make it stop.
And so there was a real disconnect between our sense of we
need to respect Afghan sovereignty and the Afghan population's
sense that we were respecting, as Dr. Wilder put it, Karzai's
sovereignty and not their sovereignty.
The other really important sort of psychological operations
effort was to reduce the number of so-called black districts.
So there were a lot of districts that were considered too
insecure to open polling stations, and there was huge pressure
put on the ISAF management to do whatever it could to reduce
the number of black districts. And the notion that was handed
to us was most of those were in Pashtun areas and Pashtuns want
to vote for Karzai. So Karzai's voters will have been
disenfranchised and therefore he could contest the election.
That begs the question whether Pashtuns were, in fact,
supportive of President Karzai.
But two things happened. A couple of things happened. One
was there were elections operations which ISAF did not want to
conduct at the time. The doctrine at the time was you do not do
an operation where you do not plan to stay. But the pressure
from the Afghan Government was such that ISAF decided to do
these clearing operations just for the purposes of the
elections.
The second thing that happened that was really interesting
was deals with the Taliban. And these were briefed to us by the
director of the national security directorate. And it was
offering de facto recognition by entering into deals with them.
It was sanctuary within their districts because in a number of
these cases, ANSF agreed not to go in. You had money. And
again, when we are talking about cash being handed over to
Afghan Government officials, the question arises what is that
cash being used for. Well, one of the purposes was paying off
Taliban so that they would do what? Allow people to vote? No.
What they had to do was allow voting materials to enter and
then return from the district. Now, nobody voted in these
districts. And I knew people in a lot of them, and I checked
this.
So why did Karzai not complain about his voters being
disenfranchised? The objective was to obtain empty ballot boxes
that were official ballot boxes, but empty, emanating from
districts that were believed to be supportive of President
Karzai, and that is where most of the ballot box stuffing
happened.
Then you had small, weak, underresourced oversight bodies.
As you mentioned, we have got vetoes on the ECC and the IEC
structures right now, not only vetoes. We have got Karzai there
should be no ECC. The ECC, in fact, should be the Attorney
General who--again I know from having followed anticorruption
very, very closely, this is a guy who answers--Karzai picks up
the phone to him and tells him what to do. Currently Karzai is
standing up for being able to simply appoint all the members of
the IEC. You could not imagine two bodies that are less
independent than that. And so, again, I find the sort of wishes
that were expressed by the earlier panelists a bit--there is a
delta between what they were saying and what the likely
realities are.
Those were the conditions at a time when United States
involvement in Afghanistan was the highest it ever has been in
the past 13 years. So I just leave you to imagine what the
level of involvement in the process that would be required from
the United States in order to bring about something that was
better than 2009.
The upshot at that time was that the Afghan population felt
unbelievably betrayed by us because they trusted us to bring
about a credible process. Surprisingly to me, I am finding that
my Afghan friends are very excited about the upcoming election.
I just think we need to be very careful. While I agree that we
need to message how important this event is, we also have to be
careful that if we say we consider it to be important, then we
need to think through what are the concrete steps that we are
going to take.
Senator Casey. We are going to have to move along.
Ms. Chayes. I am already over. Yes. All right. I will stop
there, and then if you have further questions.
Senator Casey. We will have some time.
Ms. Chayes. Thanks a lot.
Senator Casey. Mr. Boot, thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF MAX BOOT, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK SENIOR FELLOW FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Boot. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting
me, and congratulations to you and the rest of the committee on
the passage of what I hope will be a very important resolution
on Syria earlier in the day.
I just returned a few weeks ago from my latest trip to
Afghanistan where I have been traveling regularly since 2008 at
the invitation of our military commanders to assess the
situation. And on this trip, I saw much cause for confidence in
Afghanistan's future, as well as considerable cause for
concern.
The factors that are positive really relate to the security
situation in the southern part of the country which was,
obviously, the focus of ISAF and Afghan operations in the last
few years, and there is also pretty decent security, I would
say, in the west and the north, as well as in Kabul in most of
those areas not through anything that we have done but simply
because there are not a lot of Pashtuns there and it is largely
a Pashtun-based insurgency.
There was considerable cause for concern for reasons that
Senator McCain alluded to earlier having to do with the
continued existence of Pakistan's role as an enabler of the
insurgency, the lack of security, especially in eastern
Afghanistan, including provinces like Logar and Wardak which
are on the very doorstep of Kabul itself, and of course, the
corruption which continues to cripple the ability of the
government to gain the confidence of its own people.
I think at this point, if I had to prognosticate about the
outcome in Afghanistan, I think I would have to say it is very
evenly balanced, maybe 55/45, maybe 51/49. I think the odds are
still in favor of a positive outcome but only barely so. And I
think a lot of it will depend on crucial factors, some of which
are not entirely in our control.
What I would like to talk about in the few minutes that I
have here today is four recommendations for action, one of them
focusing on the Presidential election in which I will differ
from some of what you have heard earlier in the day. But before
I get to the election, let me just mention three other things
that I think need to happen for a successful outcome in
Afghanistan.
First, I think we need to continue providing at least $5
billion a year indefinitely to support the Afghan security
forces. If we cut down to the $4 billion goal, which was
reached in the Chicago NATO summit, the result would be to lay
off something like 120,000 soldiers and police at the very same
time that we are pulling out most of the international security
forces. That would be a disaster and would be an invitation to
a Taliban victory. So I think we need to keep funding the ANSF
at at least the level of $5 billion a year.
We need to have a substantial advise-and-assist force there
after 2014 at a minimum, I would say, the level of 13,600
recommended by General Mattis, although I would be more
comfortable with a level of 20,000 to 30,000.
The third point that I would make is that we need to have a
substantial campaign to counter the malign influence of
Pakistan and the ISI modeled, I would argue, on the campaign we
waged in Iraq in 2007-2008 to counter the influence of the
Iranian Quds Force using all of our covert and overt
capabilities to identify and target Quds Force operatives for
capture or deportation or, at the very least, to publicize
their activities and discredit what they were doing. I think we
need a similar campaign in Afghanistan. We need to get over the
illusion that Pakistan is our friend. They are not. They are
actively supporting our enemies, and we need to recognize that
and act accordingly.
The fourth and final point that I would make is in regard
to the elections, and here I differ a little bit, Mr. Chairman,
from what you said earlier and from what some of the other
witnesses, especially from the official administration
witnesses, have said because I do believe that we have no
choice but to pick winners and losers in this election. And
effectively we will do that. As Dr. Wilder suggested, even if
we take a hands-off attitude, we are effectively picking
winners and losers because if we take a completely hands-off
attitude at this point, we will be seen as endorsing Karzai and
whoever his hand-picked candidate is to succeed him because
that is the effect of these bags of cash that the CIA is
delivering to him.
I am not averse to the idea of the CIA exerting its
influence through the use of money. That is something we have
done in the past successfully, for example, in the early years
of the cold war in places like Europe resisting the attempts of
Communists to take power at the ballot box. I think that is a
legitimate thing to do.
My concern is, from what I understand--and of course, these
are all highly classified programs that I am not read into, but
certainly from the public reporting which has occurred, my
sense is that what the CIA does is very short-term oriented,
really designed to grease the way for their strike forces,
their ability to continue counterterrorism operations and to
enhance their limited influence. My sense is they are not
really taking a long-term view of the country's future, and
they are not really using their clout to enhance the long-term
prosperity and stability and security of Afghanistan which I
think should be our goal.
We can take what I believe to be a self-defeating attitude
of saying, well, all we care about is the sanctity of the
electoral process, but the reality is, first off, I have very
little confidence in the sanctity of the electoral process in
Afghanistan especially when it is going to happen after we have
withdrawn most of our troops from that country. The ANSF, I do
not think, is going to be interested in guaranteeing the
sanctity of the outcome. They are going to be working for
whoever gives them the orders to do so. So the notion that
there is going to be some pure electoral process I think is a
myth.
What is really going to happen and what is happening right
now in Kabul is that the power brokers and outside players like
the Iranians and Pakistanis or others are politicking to
determine who will be the next leader of Afghanistan. I would
hope that we would be actively casting our vote because we have
a large vote in that. I think we mishandled the last process in
2009 in part because we were so diffident about exerting our
influence, and the result of that was we gave Karzai the
impression that we were opposing him without doing anything
effective to oppose him. So we got the worst of both worlds. We
got the leader we did not want and he was annoyed at us for
seeming to try to block his way.
But in this instance, I think we need to make clear that we
will not allow Karzai to abuse the process to entrench himself
or his relatives in power. This ought to be a redline and we
should make clear we will not give Afghanistan a dime if the
election is not held and if Karzai somehow maneuvers to keep
himself in power through extra-constitutional means.
But beyond that, I think the succession race right now is
wide open. There are many candidates. There is no clear front
runner. I think we have a tremendous opportunity to try to
figure out who is going to be the strongest and least corrupt
candidate, the one who is most likely to unite Afghanistan and
to move it forward. And I think that is a determination that we
need to make. We should not announce it, obviously, but it is a
determination that the Ambassador and station chief should be
making and we should be doing what we can behind the scenes to
aid whoever we think is going to be the strongest candidate or,
put another way, the least bad candidate.
I am sorry that does not comport with civics 101, but I
think that is the reality of Afghanistan and we need to do that
to protect the monumental investment in blood and treasure that
we have made in that country and to prevent a criminal clique
from stealing the election which, otherwise, I think is the
likely outcome.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot follows:]
Prepared Statement of Max Boot
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee, I
recently returned from a week in Afghanistan where I have been
traveling regularly since 2008 to assess the state of the military
campaign at the request of our military commanders. During this visit I
went to Kabul as well as to Regional Command South (in Kandahar) and
Regional Command Southwest (in Helmand). Along with a delegation from
the Council on Foreign Relations, I met with Afghan and American
soldiers and officials including Gen. Joe Dunford, Ambassador James
Cunningham, and Defense Minister Bishmullah Muhammad. I thank you for
inviting me to testify about the Afghan election in 2014 which is one
of the most important factors determining Afghanistan's future. To
place it into context I would like to comment not only on the election
but on other factors of vital important to the outcome of our mission.
What follows is closely based on an article I have written for the June
5 issue of National Review summing up my most recent observations.
The fundamental question we face is: Will America's decade-plus
effort to bring stability and security to Afghanistan succeed? I saw
cause for both pessimism and optimism as the country hurtles toward a
turning point: the self-imposed December 2014 deadline for all NATO
``combat'' troops (though not necessarily military advisers and Special
Operations Forces) to leave the country.
The most important reason to think that Afghanistan may turn out
just fine is the progress being made by the Afghan National Security
Forces, now 352,000 strong. The formal forces are augmented by 20,000
Afghan Local Police, an auxiliary, village-based security force that is
particularly feared by the Taliban, who are targeting its leaders for
assassination. The Afghan security forces, and in particular the army,
are now in the lead in 80 percent of all security operations, and in
June they will take control of the entire country. Already the Afghans,
not coalition troops, are bearing the brunt of the battle as evidenced
by casualty figures which show that far more Afghan than coalition
troops are being killed and wounded--a reversal of the prevailing trend
of the past decade.
I came away impressed from my meetings with Afghan army officers
such as Maj. Gen. Sayeed Malook, commander of the 215th Corps in
Helmand province, who present a professional appearance and convey an
unyielding determination to fight the dushman (enemy) as they call the
Taliban. If the Afghan Army continues to receive substantial Western
support (a big if, to be sure), it is unlikely to lose a single battle
to the ragtag fighters of the Taliban.
Another cause for optimism is the result of American-led
counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, both of
which I visited. U.S. troops, along with the international and Afghan
partners, have routed the Taliban out of most of their southern
sanctuaries. Enemy-initiated attacks in Kandahar province, I was told,
fell 70 percent between 2011 and 2012. Kandahar City, the biggest urban
area in the south, remains more secure than ever despite (or possibly
because of) the assassination in 2011 of Ahmed Wali Karzai, a half-
brother of the President who was the de facto political boss of the
region. Last summer the Taliban did not succeed in killing a single
significant leader in Kandahar where security is now in the hands of
the much-feared police chief, Gen. Abdul Razik.
Yet more grounds for optimism can be found in the continuing
security and growing economic development of western and northern
Afghanistan, the region anchored by Herat in the west and by Mazar-e-
Sharif in the north. This has less to do with security operations by
Afghans or their coalition allies than with simple demographics: The
insurgency is largely confined to the Pashtun population and there are
few Pashtuns in the north and west.
Against these positive factors must be weighed three major
negatives. First, and most important, Pakistan. The rift in U.S.-
Pakistan relations which opened after the 2011 Osama bin Laden raid has
superficially healed--the Pakistanis have reopened NATO's supply line
from the port of Karachi and resumed nominal cooperation on cross-
border security. But in reality the Pakistani Army, the real arbiter of
its foreign policy, continues to support the Afghan Taliban even while
fighting its counterpart, the Pakistani Taliban. Some factions of the
Taliban might want to make peace, but the Pakistanis are not allowing
it--they see the Taliban as their best bet to exert influence in post-
2014 Afghanistan. That's why peace talks, in which the Obama
administration has invested so many hopes, are going nowhere fast.
Given that cross-border sanctuaries are a big boon for any insurgency,
Pakistan's role remains a spoiler even though security forces have made
considerable progress in southern Afghanistan since 2009 in spite of
Pakistan's support for the insurgency.
A second, and related, negative is the continuing instability of
eastern Afghanistan, the region located along the mountainous frontier
with Pakistan. U.S. commanders have never had enough troops to do
``clear and hold'' operations in most of this area. While Kabul itself
remains secure and bustling (notwithstanding a recent suicide bomber
attack on a convoy carrying U.S. military advisers and contractors),
nearby provinces such as Ghazni, Logar, and Wardak are still infested
with Taliban and Haqqani Network fighters. This insecurity, if left
unaddressed, eventually could spill over and threaten the capital,
which also happens to be the country's largest and most important city.
A third and final negative--one too seldom mentioned by U.S.
officials--is the continuing corruption of the Government of
Afghanistan, which is dominated by an avaricious clique of warlords,
drug barons, and powerbrokers in cahoots with President Hamid Karzai
and his family. Afghanistan's leading clans have robbed the country
blind over the past decade, stealing billions in foreign aid. Their
rapaciousness has alienated substantial sectors of the population and
provided an opening for the Taliban who, while themselves complicit in
the drug trade, promise to deliver a harsh brand of Islamic justice.
The positives and negatives of Afghanistan are closely balanced.
The ultimate outcome may well be decided by three upcoming events.
First, the Afghan security forces must show that security gains in
the south are sustainable. This summer will be their first major test--
the first fighting season when coalition troops are not in the lead. If
the Afghan Army and police can hold onto gains achieved largely by U.S.
forces, that will be a major psychological boost for them--and a major
blow to the Taliban. While U.S. commanders are understandably focused
on this immediate challenge, an even bigger test will come in the
summer of 2014 when there will be no more than 34,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan. The ultimate test will come after 2014 when the U.S.
presence will be even further diminished.
Second, Afghans must emerge from their April 2014 Presidential
election (assuming it occurs as planned) with a new leader who can
unite diverse sectarian and political factions. A fractious outcome,
with ballot-stuffing rampant and no candidate able to claim legitimacy,
would be disastrous for the country's long-term prospects. So, too,
would be any attempt by Hamid Karzai to hold onto power beyond the
length of his current term, whether by postponing the election or
simply by changing the constitution. On the other hand, a peaceful
transfer of power, the first in Afghanistan's modern history, to a new
President with widespread support would be a major blow to the Taliban
and their al-Qaeda allies.
Third, Afghans must know that the U.S. will provide the support
necessary to keep their country together. Afghans understandably fear
they will be abandoned after 2014, just as they were abandoned by the
West after the departure of the Red Army in 1989. That is why property
prices in Kabul are falling and capital flight is increasing. Only the
announcement of a substantial post-2014 commitment by the U.S. can
reassure Afghans that the Taliban will not come back.
What can we do now, at this late date, to ensure that the negatives
do not overwhelm the positives? Plenty. For a start, the U.S. and its
allies must continue to provide at least $5 billion a year to the
Afghan security forces, the minimum necessary to preserve a force of
352,000, but more than the $4.1 billion pledged at the Chicago NATO
summit last year. Unless the $4.1 billion figure is increased, the
Afghan forces will have to lay off 120,000 soldiers and police at the
very time when coalition forces are withdrawing. That would be a
disastrous combination.
The Obama administration should also announce that it will keep at
least 13,600 U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014 to assist the Afghan
security forces--the minimum number recommended by recently retired
Gen. Jim Mattis of Central Command. If the U.S. were to ante up, our
allies would probably provide another 6,000 or so troops, bringing the
total coalition presence to around 20,000. That is still short of the
30,000 or so troops that ace analysts Fred and Kim Kagan have argued
would be needed to maintain robust operations in eastern and southern
Afghanistan--but it should be sufficient, if just barely, to avert
disaster. It is especially important that the U.S. continue to provide
air support and medevac capability since Afghanistan will not have a
functioning air force before 2017 at the earliest.
Unfortunately the administration is hinting it will send
substantially fewer troops--the President has told NATO to begin
initial planning for a force of 8,000 to 12,000 troops. The U.S., which
has historically provided two-thirds of all coalition forces,
presumably would provide no more than 5,400 to 8,000 of the total. That
is such a low figure that U.S. troops would have trouble sustaining and
defending themselves, much less projecting power to outlying regions.
That, in turn, will make it hard for the Afghans to fight effectively
and thus increase the risk of the army fracturing along ethnic lines,
with the Pashtuns making common cause with the Taliban and the Tajiks,
Hazaras, and Uzbeks recreating the Northern Alliance. Such an outcome
would plunge Afghanistan back into the disastrous civil war of the
1990s which led to the rise of the Taliban in the first place.
President Karzai can help to avert this dire fate by being more
cooperative in efforts to negotiate a status of forces agreement with
the U.S. that would allow our troops legal immunity. He does not want
to make the mistake that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq made:
He tried to drive a hard bargain, only to have Obama walk away from the
negotiations and pull all U.S. troops out. That remains a possibility
in Afghanistan, too, especially if Karzai continues to bad-mouth the
U.S. publically, thereby undermining American support for a continuing
commitment.
In addition to keeping a substantial contingent of advise-and-
assist and Special Operations troops after 2014, the U.S. must launch
an immediate campaign to counter Pakistan's destabilizing efforts in
Afghanistan. The model is the covert campaign mounted by U.S. forces in
Iraq in 2007-2008 to blunt the influence of Iran's Quds Forces, which
involved doing everything from arresting and deporting Iranian
operatives to publicizing their machinations. The U.S. must recognize
that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence is our enemy in Afghanistan
and act accordingly, instead of clinging to the fiction that the
Pakistanis are our friends and allies. Nor should we cling to the
illusion, so beloved of diplomats, that Pakistan can be induced to
jettison the Taliban as a part of some kind of regional ``grand
bargain'' involving Iran, China, and Russia. That is about as likely to
occur as a breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, another
chimera pursued by generations of diplomatists.
Given that we have less need of Pakistani support than we once did
to target
al-Qaeda's much-weakened central organization, we should also not be
afraid of using drones and, if necessary, Special Operations raids to
target Taliban leaders and arms caches in Pakistan--something we have
not done to date for fear of offending Islamabad. It is shameful that
the Taliban are allowed the free run of towns such as Chaman, a
Pakistani border crossing facing the Afghan town of Spinbaldak in
Kandahar province. Coalition air strikes would not defeat the Taliban
but they would break Taliban leaders' sense of impunity and keep them
balance as U.S. troops draw down.
Finally to the subject you have highlighted in this hearing: I
believe the U.S. Government must become more active in shaping the
outcome of the Afghan Presidential election. Ballot fraud is likely to
be prevalent again, as it was in 2009, but that need not be fatal since
the outcome is likely to be determined not in the actual voting but in
backroom deals among political bosses--as was the norm in an earlier
period of American history. Talks are currently going on among
powerbrokers in Kabul, what some jocularly refer to as the ``Afghan
primary,'' to sort out a long list of Presidential wannabes such as
Education Minister Farooq Wardak; former Karzai chief of staff Umer
Daudzai; former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani; former Interior Minister
Ali Jalali; the President's brother, Qayum Karzai; former intelligence
chief Amrullah Saleh; former Presidential candidate (and Foreign
Minister), Abdullah Abdullah; and even the Afghan-American former U.S.
Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad.
The U.S. Government was burned by its experience in 2009 when
efforts by former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and the late special envoy
Richard Holbrooke to encourage a more competitive election were
interpreted by Karzai to mean that the U.S. was trying to block his
reelection, thereby making him even more difficult to deal with once he
secured a suspect victory. As a result, U.S. Embassy officials today
are loathe to discuss Presidential candidates, even in private, for
fear of appearing to choose sides. This crippling reticence only
increases the prospect of either a deadlocked process or the emergence
of discredited front-runner, e.g., Qayum Karzai, who would have a hard
time winning credibility either in Afghanistan or in the West. Instead
of standing on the sidelines, the U.S. needs to use its considerable
clout--including, if necessary, the bags of cash the CIA has been
providing to President Karzai--to ensure the selection of the strongest
possible President, one who would take on warlords and the Taliban more
effectively than the incumbent has done.
Based on the current situation, I would put the odds at roughly 55-
45 percent that Afghanistan will be able to avoid a civil war and a
possible return to Taliban rule. That is more optimistic than the
pessimism which prevails in the U.S., where most people wrongly assume
the war is already lost, but it is hardly a ringing endorsement. With
the relatively modest steps outlined above, however, President Obama
could dramatically increase the odds of success.
Senator Casey. Mr. Boot, thank you very much.
What I am hearing from a lot of the members or several of
the members of this panel is we better have our eyes wide open,
that the reality of an election is not always what is in the
civics books. You are right. And that is why we have these
hearings where we have not just two panels, but I think in some
ways two different vantage points.
Let me go back to this question of either the reality of
interference or the perception thereof. Dr. Wilder, you have
talked a little bit about this. Mr. Boot, there seems to be
some conflict here. What is your reaction to, or your comment
on, that interference question, especially in light of what Mr.
Boot said? We try not to create arguments within the panel, but
sometimes it is helpful and illuminating.
Dr. Wilder. Yes, I think it is helpful to go back to 2009
and look at that because I often think that the wrong lessons
have been learned from 2009. I think trying to pick favorites
is not something we should be doing, as I mentioned in my
testimony, for a number of reasons. One reason is we do not
have a track record that is terribly good in getting that
right. We only have to go back to November 2001 at a conference
in Bonn where we actually played an instrumental role in
picking a winner--now I think we do not feel that went
according to plan. But there has been a track record of
actively backing President Karzai in the past as our candidate,
our man.
I have actually a lot more confidence in the Afghan voters
in terms of picking their next leader than in our ability to
hand-pick the right successor. It is critical that whoever
becomes President next is perceived as legitimate. The more it
is perceived that our fingers are on it, trying to determine
who the winner will be, the greater the risk that whoever ends
up in that position will be perceived as less legitimate.
The lesson from 2009 is do not interfere by picking
favorites, but do interfere by trying to ensure that this
election is going to be held on as level a playing field as
possible. Do interfere in terms of trying to ensure much more
rigorous fraud mitigation measures for this election, trying to
put pressure on in terms of the electoral laws, but in
particular, signaling that the elections are the U.S.
Government's No. 1 foreign policy priority in Afghanistan for
this coming year. The security transition and the economic
transition cannot succeed without the successful political
transition. If we can give more confidence to the Afghans that
the United States is behind these elections, we will see more
Afghans stepping up to the plate to actually start contesting.
Every night in Kabul, the political elite are meeting and
wheeling and dealing, and electoral politics is happening. And
I think that is actually one of the most encouraging things
about what is happening in Afghanistan today. Many of these
elites have done fabulously well in the last decade and have a
lot of vested interests in making sure that the country does
not fall apart.
We should be actively looking at ways to support consensus
building efforts that are trying to create coalitions to
contest the next election. Some of them are holding back
because they are concerned about whether there will be
elections. Why put your life on the line and put your resources
on the line to contest an election that likely will not happen?
There is no confidence that President Karzai's No. 1 objective
is to hold elections. That is where we need to be continuing to
make strong statements that this is our priority. That will
give incentives to the Afghan candidates to start campaigning.
I do not like to use the word ``opposition'' because we are
going into an election where President Karzai, by the
constitution, is not allowed to contest. We need to look at all
the candidates on an equal basis, not government versus
opposition.
So again, do not support individuals but do interfere in
supporting the process.
Senator Casey. And I want to continue this line of
discussion, but I have to say for the record probably a lot of
Members of Congress over the last couple years have been pretty
critical of Mr. Karzai. I am one of them. In fact, for a couple
of years, I was probably one of the leading critics, and that
is on the public record. I am sure he does not recall that, but
I was.
The last time I saw him--the first time I met him was in
2008 and then 2009 within a day or 2 of the election. And I and
others pressed him on making sure that now that the election
had taken place, that they take steps to meet the legitimate
expectations of the people. And of course, he assured us he
would.
I did not have a chance to see him when I went back in
2011, but I did see him earlier this year when he came to
visit, just a brief visit on Capitol Hill. We were actually in
Senator McConnell's office, and it was just a small group of
us.
But I said that to him. I said I have criticized you a lot
in the past, and I am going to try to refrain from that today
and say that you should use this opportunity to make sure that
you have an election and it goes well, and that will be your
legacy and not something else. Of course, he, I guess, somewhat
agreed with that but then seemed to be critical of us in not
interfering in a process that he does not seem to conduct very
well.
But, anyway, let me get back to the question of
interference. Ms. Chayes, I know you have raised a lot of
concerns about what happened last time in your testimony and
how we prepare for this. What is your view on this question of
interference?
I think it is an interesting idea that a really tough,
aggressive imposition or us having an impact on the rules and
how the election is conducted could be seen as interference but
might be the most constructive way that we have an impact apart
from or separated from the question of picking a candidate.
Maybe that is an area where we can agree that if we institute
or push them to institute as rigorous a process as possible,
that that might be the best.
What is your view on what you have heard from your two
colleagues here and how you view it?
Ms. Chayes. I would probably concur with what you just said
and what Dr. Wilder said.
I guess I just have to again try to impress on you and on
the record what ``rigorous'' would have to mean. So, again, you
just phrased the issue of the vetoes by President Karzai of the
IEC and ECC structures. What do we do? How do we participate in
making this a credible and free and fair exercise if the two
bodies charged with running it belong to President Karzai?
Honestly. We are really in a bind because, on the one hand, we
are saying there has to be an election. It has to be Afghan-
managed, Afghan-led. And on the other hand, if Afghan-managed,
Afghan-led means Karzai-managed, Karzai-led, you know, do we
fund the exercise anyway? If we decide not to fund it, Karzai
is thrilled. Great. No election.
So I have to say I do not have a great answer to that
question, but I do not think picking the guy, fundamentally
because we do not have a great track record, is probably the
right solution. On the other hand, continuing to pay one of
them--so one of the things I think is really important, if we
care how things work out in Afghanistan, is arbitrating between
the different USG equities that are at play here because if we
are paying President Karzai, it does not matter what you say to
him or what any other member of the U.S. Government says to
him, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the
Secretary of State, up to the President. Once he is getting
money from the Central Intelligence Agency, that strengthens
him to do whatever he wants in spite of anything that any other
member of the U.S. Government, with the exception of the
President, could say.
So I think that is really important issue to think about.
If he or somebody chosen by him is a candidate--I mean, he will
not be, but if there is some Karzai proxy who is a candidate,
which I think is really likely, is that person on the payroll?
Does that get debated at a principals' committee meeting? So it
is one thing to say we should not pick an ``opposition''
candidate, but therefore we need to really be clear about where
is our private bags of cash. Where are they going?
I think another really important aspect of this that has
not been brought up but has to do with the security, which is
to say--and I did bring it up at ISAF in 2009--are we
construing our mandate to protect the security of these
elections as a mandate to protect it from intimidation from the
government, as well as intimidation from the Taliban? That was
not a question that got a very coherent answer. I think that is
a really important issue to think about this time. If we are
really about protecting the integrity of the process, that
means we have to be just as rigorous about violations of that
integrity, physical violations that are caused by non-Taliban
as well as ones that are caused by Taliban.
Senator Casey. Mr. Boot, if I keep giving you the last
word, that is an advantage to you. Let me just ask you more
precisely because you have addressed it. Is the question of
interference perceived or in reality? A, I guess you would say
that that is not a great concern for you. I guess what would
you place greater reliance on or place greater weight on?
Actually getting involved in picking a candidate, as you seemed
to hint at, or being much more focused on the rules imposing a
free and fair election as best we can? What do you think is the
preferable path?
Mr. Boot. Well, in terms of avoiding the perception of
interference in Afghan elections, as my colleagues and Sarah in
particular have pointed out, we are interfering right now, and
Afghans know that. I mean, they know we are giving bags of cash
to Karzai. So it does not really matter what we do. We are
going to be seen as interfering. At the moment, we seem to be
interfering to buttress a President who is deeply enmeshed in
this corruption and dysfunctionality that grips his country.
All I am saying is instead of taking a completely hands-off
attitude, let us interfere or try to interfere in a more
positive direction, and I do not think that is impossible. I
mean, it is true that we made a mistake in hindsight, I think,
in picking Karzai at the end of 2001, and it is quite possible
we might make another mistake in the future. But at least I
would draw some solace from the fact that at the end of 2001,
we knew very little about Afghan politics. At least we have had
a dozen years since then to hopefully--hopefully--and I am not
sure it has happened, but hopefully have a little bit of a
learning process within the USG and at least a little more
familiarity with who the players are, what they stand for, and
the intricacies of Afghan politics. So I think there is a
slightly better chance that we might get it right this time
than we did last time.
You know, as a historian, I would point you to a historical
example which was the way that we defeated the Huk rebellion,
the Communist uprising in the Philippines in the late 1940s/
early 1950s. The most important thing we did was to send one
man to the Philippines, Edward Lansdale, who was a CIA
operative, as well as an Air Force officer. And the most
important thing he did was to befriend a gentleman named Ramon
Magsaysay, who just a Filipino state senator when they met, but
with Lansdale's support and the support of the CIA, they
managed to get Magsaysay promoted, first to Defense Minister,
and then Lansdale was virtually his campaign manager to help
him win the Presidency of the Philippines. And Magsaysay was
the best thing that ever happened to the Philippines because he
was honest. He was strong. He fought corruption and abuse in
the army, and he managed by those methods to defeat the Huk
uprising. That is an example that I think we need to be
cognizant of.
In the case of Afghanistan, certainly I am not, by any
means, saying we should give up on the election. I agree with
my colleagues. We need to do everything possible to have a free
and fair election. And I hope I am not being overly cynical
here by suggesting that is not likely to happen. I mean, if it
did not happen in Chicago in the old days, it is not going to
happen in Afghanistan today I think especially when our troop
presence is going to be so markedly reduced.
But just as in this country, I mean, we have free and fair
elections, but let us be honest. There is a primary process
that happens even before anybody casts a vote. In the last
election, I think people generally knew that Mitt Romney was
going to be the Republican candidate well in advance of the
first primaries or caucuses because he, in effect, won this
preprimary for the backing of donors and other power brokers
within the Republican Party.
The exact same thing is happening in Afghanistan right now,
and certainly Karzai and the ISI and the Iranians and others--
they are casting their votes, and the question is, Are their
votes going to be decisive? Are we going to do something to try
to counterbalance their vote by trying to push forward a leader
who will truly not be an American puppet--that is not what I am
looking for--a strong leader who will truly have the interests
of Afghanistan at heart? And that leader may well do things
that exasperate us in the way that DeGaulle did, for example,
in France, but nevertheless somebody who would not be a cat's
paw of the ISI or Iranians or the warlords. I think that is
what Afghanistan needs, and I think in many ways the only
chance that the political process has to produce somebody like
that is with a little outside assistance from us.
Senator Casey. I am reminded that in this country it took
most of 100 years before a lot of places, a lot of States got
the secret ballot. So it took us a while.
I know we have to wrap up. But I guess in more of kind of a
lightning round, if you could just outline the two or three
steps--you might have four or five, but if you could prioritize
one or two steps that we should take really in the next several
months or the next 6 months to get the result that we hope for,
which is a free and fair election. We will set aside the
question of who wins or what is the optimal, but to get as free
and as fair an election as possible. Any quick summary of one
or two steps that we should take.
Dr. Wilder. I would come back to the point--how do we make
clear that this is, for the next year, the No. 1 U.S.
Government priority? And I think that is where the appointment
of an ambassador-rank official in that role would be one way of
signaling that, but then also following up with frequent high-
level statements of their importance to the U.S. Government
because, as I said, this is where there is a mismatch. We do
often say that the elections are a priority, and we say the
right things about them, but Afghans still need to hear it more
often because they remain skeptical. Just in the last two trips
I made to Afghanistan in March and April,
it was striking to me how many Afghan politicians referenced
then-Senator Kerry's confirmation hearings in front of this
committee where he very clearly spoke about the importance of
the elections as a priority issue. That created very positive
vibes in Kabul and gave a little encouragement to those who do
believe in the elections.
Just last week, here at USIP we hosted a fairly prominent
Afghan opposition figure, and one of his key points was, in
terms of the priorities in the elections, fight the doubt,
because it is easy to think of all the reasons why elections
will not be possible in Afghanistan, and if we really give into
that, the skepticism will become self-fulfilling. We have to
believe the elections can happen and then prepare for them with
the measures I mentioned. Afghans will then take the lead to
make sure that they do, indeed, happen.
But the final point to emphasize is that while there is a
supply side to this which requires financial and technical
support to electoral institutions to manage the elections, we
also need to focus on the demand side, with early support to
civic education. The media play an incredibly important role.
The Afghan public needs to also feel that the elections are
going to happen and we need to work
on the demand side. Too often, civic education is left as an
afterthought until just before the election. We need to be
investing in and supporting those efforts earlier than in past
elections.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Ms. Chayes.
Ms. Chayes. I am going to change the aperture a little bit.
I tend to agree with Mr. Boot that it is very unlikely that
we will supply what it takes to actually make this exercise
truly free and fair and credible.
I actually think there is something quite different we
could do that could help set the conditions which would have to
do with expanding the scope of the reconciliation process. I
think we have been stuck in a rut which has been speaking to
just one interlocutor or trying to speak. We have not even been
speaking to one interlocutor, which is to say the armed
opposition. But it turns out that most Afghan constituencies
have severe issues with the Karzai government and with the way
the Afghan Government has been executing its duties or not
since 2001.
I think this reconciliation process needs urgently--and it
ought to be U.S. Government policy urgently--to expand this
reconciliation process to include those constituencies. I would
give the current Afghan Government a seat but not a gavel, and
I would not give Pakistan a seat, and that is a whole other
issue, but that has the impact of rewarding the deliberate use
of violent extremists as an instrument of public policy on the
part of Pakistan.
But if you get a process like that going--and there have
been a couple of experiments of late in France, in Japan, but
in particular in France over the last few months or last 6
months or so that indicate that this is a doable process. We
have not been interested. President Karzai has extremely not
been interested. And again, it has to do with a little bit of
political will on our part to force a conversation, a
multipolar conversation. And I think a process like that could
start to work out what a lot of the equities are so that an
election at the far end of it--there would be less incentive to
try to rig an election at the other end of it.
Thank you very much. And thanks again for your interest.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Mr. Boot.
Mr. Boot. Mr. Chairman, I think there is a crisis of
confidence in Afghanistan right now. At least that is what I
saw and heard about when I was there a few weeks ago. Property
prices are falling. The amount of money exiting the country is
increasing. Afghans do not have a lot of confidence in their
post-2014 future.
I think the most important thing we can do right now, as
early as possible, is to signal what our level of commitment
post-2014 is going to be. I think that will increase
confidence. It will also boost our influence and our ability to
try to influence the future of Afghanistan in a positive
direction, whether you think all we should be doing is trying
to protect the integrity of the balloting process or whether
you believe, as I do, that I think we need to take a more
robust role. Whatever that role is, I think we will enhance our
influence by signaling what our level of commitment will be
because up until now, we have said we will stay committed, but
there is a big difference between levels of commitment and the
higher the level of commitment that we express, the more
confidence that the government and supporters of the government
will have and the more we will demoralize and weaken the
Taliban. So I think that is the most immediate thing that we
can do to affect the calculus in Afghanistan.
Again, I would just stress that I mentioned in my opening
statement I think we need to do much more to counter ISI
influence.
As we were discussing earlier, I also believe that we need
to play a more robust role in helping to select a strong leader
for Afghanistan. But the first thing I think is just to signal
that we will have a robust commitment post-2014.
And I thank you for inviting me. It is a pleasure to
testify with two leading experts. I am glad you are interested
because I think one of the biggest problems we face right now,
quite frankly, is there is not a lot of interest in the future
of Afghanistan in this country. So I am glad you are staying
focused on it. Thank you for inviting me.
Senator Casey. Thank you. Thanks to all of our witnesses.
The record will be open for questions for--I think, it is 5
days. We will correct the record if it is not.
And I also wanted to mention--I did not at the beginning--
that the resolution that Senator McCain and I introduced was
cosponsored by Chairman Menendez. So that is good news.
But we are done for today, but I am sure we will be able to
call upon each of you for further insight as we get closer to
this election day, which I realize has a lot of problems
connected to it. So we have got more work to do.
But thanks very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Special Representative David Pearce to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. In recent Afghan elections, key decisions were determined
by the Supreme Court. Many have expressed concern that members of the
Afghan Supreme Court have remained in their posts beyond expiration of
their terms and the President has yet to appoint replacements.
If there are no new appointments to the Supreme Court and
that body does end up providing judgments related to the
elections, how will the Afghan public react?
Which regions might you anticipate a need for funding that
is not in the current budget request?
Answer. Afghanistan and its allies have a common interest in
ensuring a peaceful, democratic transfer of authority from President
Karzai to his successor through elections accepted by the Afghan public
as credible and legitimate. The Supreme Court may play a significant
role in the electoral process if it rules, as it has in the past, on
fundamental constitutional matters related to the elections.
In his July 2012 decree specifying measures to address corruption,
President Karzai pledged his support for improving judicial and
prosecutorial institutions. Our Embassy and international partners have
since discussed with senior Afghan officials the need to remove Supreme
Court Justices whose constitutional terms have expired or will expire
before the 2014 elections and to nominate credible and independent
replacements. While we do not have a formal response, we continue to
raise this issue. Legitimately serving Supreme Court Justices will help
legitimize all of the Court's decisions, including any on elections,
and will help to instill confidence in the process.
Opposition figures and a number of prominent parliamentarians have
stated publicly that they would not accept any Supreme Court decision
as valid if there are Justices sitting on the bench beyond the
expiration of their constitutional terms. Serious disagreements over
the legitimacy of the Court's composition and, therefore, the validity
of its rulings could lead to constitutional gridlock at a time the
Court could be called to issue critical decisions related to the
elections.
Regarding the potential need for additional budgetary resources,
U.S. Government advisors are currently working with Afghanistan's
Independent Election Commission to finalize operational and contingency
planning and determine budget allocations from the Government of
Afghanistan and other international donors, including the United
States.
Question. Will the United States designate an ambassador-level
point person in the Embassy in Kabul to focus solely on electoral
issues prior to April 5, 2014?
Answer. The 2014 elections are the top political priority for our
mission in Kabul and our diplomats understand that the 2014
Presidential election will determine the future stability of
Afghanistan and the region. The Embassy regularly consults with Afghans
throughout the country to help them carry through on their commitment
to hold credible, inclusive, and democratic elections. Given sustained
senior-level Embassy attention, we currently do not see a need to
appoint a full-time elections Ambassador but would consider this in the
near future if our regular staffing needs assessments determine that
such a position is warranted. At present, we are satisfied with our
mission structure, which includes five civilians in Afghanistan who
hold the rank of Ambassador, led by our Chief of Mission Ambassador
James Cunningham. Ambassador Cunningham, reflecting the Secretary's own
personal commitment, is actively involved in our 2014 elections effort
and guides our full calendar of engagement efforts to support the 2014
political transition.
All ambassadors track election developments closely, notably
Assistant Chief of Mission Ambassador Hugo Llorens, who is the
Embassy's primary point of contact on elections. On an almost daily
basis he meets with Afghan Government officials, political party
leaders, Afghan National Security Force commanders, civil society, and
international partners to assess progress on elections and deliver
consistent U.S. policy messages of support for all aspects of planning
for this historic event.
Secretary Kerry, who has direct experience with Afghanistan's 2009
Presidential election, has made the 2014 political transition one of
his top priorities. He raises this issue in all his conversations and
meetings with President Karzai and other high-level Afghan officials,
most recently in Kabul in March and in Brussels in May, as Deputy
Secretary Burns did during his May visit to Kabul. The elections are
likewise a top priority for our newly appointed Special Representative
of Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), Jim Dobbins, who discussed the
elections during his meeting with President Karzai May 29.
Question. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Kerry said the
following in response to my question about election preparations in
Afghanistan: ``Having an election that passes muster and is acceptable
according to international observers and standards will be critical to
our ability to have the kind of transition we want to have, and to have
confidence that the government that succeeds in 2014 has legitimacy. If
it does not have legitimacy, if we do not succeed in that effort, it is
going to be very, very difficult to convince the American people and
convince our allies in ISAF and beyond to stay engaged in this effort
if they are not willing to provide for themselves with respect to
that.''
One of the provisions of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework addresses elections. Is the State Department prepared
to withdraw, or condition, some U.S. assistance to Afghanistan
on a transparent, credible election process and outcome?
Answer. We have consistently emphasized throughout the past year
the statement of fact from the July 8, 2012, Tokyo Mutual
Accountability Framework (TMAF): ``The International Community's
ability to sustain support for Afghanistan depends upon the Afghan
Government delivering on its commitments described in the Tokyo
Framework.'' The Afghan Government has not yet enacted new electoral
legislation that would serve as the framework for the 2014 Presidential
and provincial council elections and the 2015 parliamentary elections,
a TMAF indicator of its commitment to ``Representational Democracy and
Equitable Elections.'' Afghan authorities must urgently and
transparently enact reforms that will inspire widespread confidence in
the electoral process and enable a free, fair, and credible election.
The July 3 Senior Officials Meeting in Kabul is the first opportunity
to assess Afghan progress on TMAF reforms and plan for continued
constructive cooperation in the lead up to April elections.
We will reiterate our commitment to the people of Afghanistan and
the development of its democracy. In the spirit of mutual
accountability, we will also continue to press for electoral and other
critical reforms to justify our continued extraordinary assistance. We
are considering the use of incentive funding mechanisms to encourage
action on Tokyo reforms, but in ways that do not jeopardize the
progress we seek in the Tokyo indicators. As called for in the Tokyo
Framework, international donors will gather in London after the 2014
Presidential elections to assess progress and review our commitments.
Question. Last June, I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton
expressing my concerns about the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). President Karzai's recent
veto of the electoral law demonstrates his intransigence and desire to
control the electoral process. I understand that the lower House of
Parliament has passed another draft law and may be considering
overriding President Karzai's veto.
What is the State Department doing to press President Karzai
to work cooperatively with the Parliament to agree on an
acceptable electoral law?
What would be the consequences of failure to pass an
electoral law before candidate registration is scheduled to
begin?
Answer. We are monitoring electoral legislation closely, and have
underscored the importance of this legislation being adopted as a
matter of great urgency. There are two laws of particular importance:
the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) Structure Law, and the
Electoral Law. President Karzai vetoed and sent the IEC Structure Law
back to Parliament on April 27, arguing that a number of the draft's
provisions were unconstitutional. Parliament has since been debating
whether to attempt to override Karzai's veto or to resubmit a revised
draft that addresses Karzai's concerns. We are urging both the Palace
and Parliament to adopt the IEC Structure Law and the Electoral Law
well before candidate registration begins in September and preferably
before Parliament begins a 6-week recess in early July. SRAP Dobbins
reinforced this message during his visit to Kabul this week. We have
and will continue to strongly encourage the creation of independent and
credible electoral authorities and transparent and credible electoral
processes through these new laws. Voter registration began this week
and time is of the essence for establishing critical institutions
necessary to make sure a credible framework is in place, especially an
independent electoral complaints mechanism. Meanwhile, since this is an
Afghan-led process, we strongly encourage broad consultations among the
IEC, the Afghan Government, Parliament, political opposition groups,
civil society leaders, and other legitimate stakeholders on important
decisions regarding the new electoral law framework and the selection
of election commissioners.
Without new electoral laws, the 2010 Presidential decree on
elections will govern the election process, including the method for
candidates to nominate themselves and for their nominations to be
vetted, a process that begins in September. This 2010 decree requires
the President, in consultation with the Parliament and the Supreme
Court, to establish an Electoral Complaints Commission to adjudicate
complaints. Our strong preference and goal is the adoption of credible
IEC and electoral laws to further bolster Afghanistan's democracy.
______
Responses of David Sedney to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. What special preparations is NATO Training Mission
Afghanistan (NTMA) making to ensure that Afghan troops working to
safeguard elections take special care to ensure that women can safely
participate in the 2014 elections?
Answer. In accordance with the overall security transition and
respect for Afghan sovereignty, the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and its subordinate commands, including the ISAF Joint
Command (IJC) and the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), will
maintain a support role during the elections process. ISAF will be
prepared to take action only when requested by the Afghan Government
and support will likely focus on logistics, intelligence, route
clearance, and in extremis support. This support will help promote an
inclusive and secure election; however, further measures to promote the
participation of women are the responsibility of the Afghans.
Preparations and planning for the 2014 elections, including
promoting the participation of women, are an Afghan-led process. Both
the Independent Elections Commission (IEC)--which has the lead for
administration of the elections process--and the Ministry of Interior
(MoI)--which has the lead for security--are taking measures to
encourage increased female participation in the elections, including
the current voter registration and outreach education phase of the
election process.
For the voter registration effort, the IEC was able to recruit a
significant number of female officials, including for the first time in
some insecure provinces. The IEC is actively working with civil society
and local administrations to engage women in the voter registration
process. Additionally, the IEC is carrying out a voter education
campaign through public outreach officers and informational broadcasts,
which will include messaging on female participation. Finally, the IEC
plans to conduct consultations with community religious leaders, with
special attention on women's participation in the elections.
During previous elections, female participation on election day was
limited by insufficient female staffing at the separate women-only
polling facilities. Recognizing this as a key issue, the Afghans are
adjusting their plans to account for this shortfall. The MoI and IEC
are considering a proposal to hire women temporarily from the private
sector to be trained as security screeners for the approximately 7,000
polling centers.
Question. The United States has provided significant logistical
support to past
Afghan elections, and Afghan troops lack the same level of capability.
Will the United States continue to provide logistical support to the
2014 election, even though the coalition troop levels will likely be
diminished?
Answer. The current plan to draw down to a level of 34,000 U.S.
forces by February 2014 is consistent with Commander, U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan's recommendation and will provide enough forces to support
the Afghans through the April 5, 2014, election. In accordance with the
overall security transition and respect for Afghan sovereignty, the
elections process will be Afghan-led. However, the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including U.S. forces, will be
prepared to assist if requested by the Afghan Government. ISAF has
identified logistics as an area where the Afghans will likely need
international assistance and is planning accordingly. For the first
phase of voter registration, ISAF has provided air support to the
Afghans for the delivery of voter registration materials to a select
number of provinces. With this assistance, all voter registration
materials arrived on time to intended destinations to allow for the
first phase of voter registration to begin at the end of May.
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