[Senate Hearing 113-138]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-138
REBALANCE TO ASIA II: SECURITY AND DEFENSE; COOPERATION AND CHALLENGES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Davidson, Dr. Janine, senior fellow, Center for a New American
Security, Washington, DC....................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Green, Dr. Michael J., senior vice president for Asia and Japan
Chair, Center for Stragic and International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Helvey, Hon. David F., Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia,
Office of Security and Defense, U.S. Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 17
Yun, Hon. Joseph Y., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
(iii)
REBALANCE TO ASIA II: SECURITY AND DEFENSE; COOPERATION AND CHALLENGES
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THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin, Murphy, Rubio, and Johnson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, good afternoon. Let me welcome you
all to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs.
Senator Rubio, the ranking Republican member, will be
joining us shortly.
This is our second hearing on the Rebalance to Asia policy.
In our first hearing, we assessed the rebalance values element,
including human rights, democracy, and good governance
programs, and I thought that hearing was very, very
constructive.
This hearing will deal with the defense and security
challenges in the East Asia-Pacific region. This is
particularly timely given the Shangri-La dialogue on defense
that will take place on May 31. In addition, General Dempsey is
visiting the region this week. So I think the timing of this
hearing is particularly appropriate.
In this hearing we will look at whether the rebalance is on
track to achieve the administration's goal of strengthening
strategic alliances, deepening partnerships, building a stable,
productive, and constructive relationship with China, and
empowering regional institutions to tackle shared challenges
and peacefully resolving conflicts.
A stable and cooperative regional security environment is
necessary for the free flow of commerce and ideas. The region
is undergoing a significant transition with signs of security
dilemmas and potential arms races. Our constructive engagement
in the region can help ensure the transition takes place in a
positive way, ensuring regional peace and security.
A rebalance is about supporting our allies, partners, and
interests in the region as together we face pressing security
challenges. For the last six decades, our policy has been about
constructive engagement, developing partnerships, and working
with countries in that region. And for the last six decades, we
have seen countries such as Japan, South Korea, and China
develop sophisticated economies, which certainly furthers
United States interests in the region.
But it is particularly appropriate that we have this
hearing today considering the escalating threat of North Korea,
the increasing prevalence of cyber attacks, which is becoming a
dominant concern on our security interests, and the rising
maritime tensions in the South and East China Seas, including
piracy and other transnational crime. And we must continue to
engage China in a constructive dialogue on all these issues. We
must deepen our United States-China military-to-military
dialogue to address many of the sources of the insecurity
between our two countries. We need China to understand and
respect our cyber security concerns. The April 13 agreement to
establish a United States-China cyber security working group is
an encouraging development and I look forward to our witnesses'
observations as to the merit of that agreement.
China's support for the recent U.N. Security Council
resolution on North Korea was a positive move toward securing
peace in the region. I am pleased to hear that China remains
fully committed to the six-party talks goal of verifiable,
peaceful, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
On North Korea more broadly, we must remain vigilant and
take threats seriously while not rewarding bad behavior. We
must continue to work closely with our allies, Japan and Korea
in particular, to maintain security on the Korean Peninsula
while ultimately pursuing denuclearization. The Helsinki
process model could be helpful in dealing with North Korea as a
confidence-building measure to discuss not just
nonproliferation, as the six-party talks did, but security,
economics, environmental, and human rights concerns.
We look forward to talking more about our new Republic of
Korea-United States combined counterprovocation plan and
celebrating the 60th year of our strong alliance with the
Republic of Korea when President Park Geun-hye arrives in
Washington next month.
On maritime conflicts, it is in our national interest to
protect free commerce along the world's busiest maritime trade
routes and ensure unimpeded access to the maritime commons of
the Asia-Pacific. To that end, we must support the
establishment of rules-based regional norms which discourage
coercion and the use of force. Instability undercuts economic
growth for the United States and for all of Asia. Competition
for energy and fishery resources only exacerbate the rising
maritime tensions. Countries with competing claims should
explore joint management of resources to promote peaceful
coexistence.
I was encouraged by the April 10 agreement between Japan
and Taiwan to jointly share fishing resources in disputed areas
of the East China Sea. Malaysia and Brunei established a joint
petroleum revenue area in 2009. These examples represent
significant diplomatic achievements which I hope will be
followed by other such agreements. The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and, in particular, Indonesia, has shown active
leadership on these issues. I hope that an ASEAN-China
agreement can be reached on a binding code of conduct for the
South China Sea.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
UNCLOS, is another important means to building a rules-based
order for the region. We should ratify it, but even without
Senate ratification, we must continue to adhere to UNCLOS
practices.
Our rebalance also must embrace critical military-to-
military programs to help professionalize the East Asian
region's militaries to better address regional challenges. But
equally critical is how we engage these militaries to integrate
core U.S. values: human rights, the rule of law, and civilian
control of the military. In Indonesia, our military-to-military
relationships helped them successfully transition to civilian
control and promote rule of law.
But emerging partnerships also present significant
challenges. Burma has made progress, but we must engage their
military in a careful, measured, and systematic fashion. We
must continue to press Burmese forces to make progress on human
rights and to protect and respect all ethnic groups.
Within every challenge lies opportunity. Positive military-
to-military engagement creates opportunities to advance human
rights. Likewise, the threat of North Korea is an opportunity
to work more closely with Japan, Korea, and China to find a
solution. The rebalance will shift more resources and attention
to the region and create more opportunities for positive
engagement.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about the
state of our alliances, our programs to make the region safer,
and how we will maintain the rebalance in the face of our
overall defense spending cuts.
I thank our witnesses from both our panels for being here.
On our first panel, we are pleased to have with us today Joseph
Yun, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State. Mr. Yun's
previous assignment was as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was sworn
in as Deputy Assistant Secretary on August 10, 2010. Mr. Yun is
a career member of the Senior Foreign Service class of minister
counselor. His overseas assignments have been in South Korea,
Thailand, France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong.
We are also pleased to have with us today the Honorable
David F. Helvey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East
Asia in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. Previously he served as the Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense and was the principal director for East
Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Prior assignments in the
Office of Secretary of Defense include Country Manager for
China, Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and Senior
Advisor for China Policy and Integration. He has also served as
a senior intelligence analyst for China military and political
affairs at the Defense Intelligence Agency.
So we have two experts on our first panel that can help us
understand the security challenges that we face in Asia today
and how the rebalance will be implemented to advance U.S.
interests.
So we will start with Mr. Yun.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH Y. YUN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Yun. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my thanks
also to Senator Murphy and for inviting myself and my good
friend David to testify on this important topic today.
Before we begin, I would like to thank you for your work on
building bipartisan consensus on engaging the Asia-Pacific. As
you have already noted, this is the second hearing under your
chairmanship already on this topic of Rebalance to Asia.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make
brief remarks and submit a more detailed written response for
the record.
U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific reflects the
recognition that U.S. prosperity and security will be defined
increasingly by what happens in the region and how we engage
the region. The Asia-Pacific is home to two-thirds of the
world's population and many of the world's fastest growing
economies. It offers enormous opportunities but also challenges
for U.S. political and economic interests. The annual flow of
U.S. investment to East Asia nearly doubled from $22 billion in
2009 to $41 billion in 2011. U.S. exports to the Asia-Pacific
now total over $320 billion, and the region is home to 3 of the
top 10 U.S. export markets.
This region is also home to some of our most enduring
security partners. In Japan, we currently station close to
50,000 Active-Duty U.S. servicepersons. In Korea, we have some
30,000 servicepersons, and of course, we also have important
treaty alliances with Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
As our response to recent events in North Korea
demonstrate, there is no uncertainty about United States
military and defense resolve in responding to security
challenges in the region. And of course, my colleague from the
Pentagon, Mr. Helvey, will get into more detail on these
issues.
However, Mr. Chairman, it is also very important to note
that security and defense cooperation is only one part of our
engagement. Many challenges, both present and future, will be
nonmilitary. So as we deepen our military engagement, we are
also engaging with our partners and allies in our economic,
political, and people-to-people initiatives to demonstrate our
longer term commitment to the region. We do this by making
progress on bilateral and multilateral trade and investment
agreements. We do this by coordinating on law enforcement and
counterterrorism initiatives, by adopting programs to combat
trafficking, and by advancing good governance, democracy, and
human rights under the important pillar of our active
participation in building regional architecture that
strengthens stability, security, and economic growth throughout
the region. To this end, we will deploy our most senior
officials.
In June, Secretary Kerry will participate in the ASEAN
Regional Forum ministerial meetings, and in July, Secretary
Kerry and Treasury Secretary Lew will be joined by their
Chinese counterparts for the fifth meeting of the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In October, President Obama
will attend the APEC summit in Bali and his third East Asia
summit and his fifth U.S.-ASEAN summit in Brunei. We believe
these multilateral institutions will deepen our security ties
and strengthen our alliances in the region.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to emphasize by taking this
opportunity that we in the State and Defense Department have
the closest of coordination to ensure our military presence and
operations in the region match our diplomatic goals and
objectives. These include what we do together to advance
freedom of navigation, to counter proliferation and counter
terrorism, and what we do together for the respect of human
rights and the rule of law. And they also include how we
operate for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and, of
course, our Nation's own ability to respond to security
challenges of the region. And as you know, Mr. Chairman, in
most of our missions in the region, we have the defense
attache's office that reports to the chief of mission and works
very closely with Foreign Service officers from the State
Department.
An example of how we are doing this is our close
cooperation with Japan on consolidation and realignment issues
of our forces there, which seeks to maintain a sustainable
military presence and preserve peace and security in the
region.
As we continue to work with DOD to enhance our partnership,
build local capacity to deal with threats and disasters, and to
promote democratic values, our security assistance resources
are very important. In particular, I would highlight foreign
military financing, FMF, and international military education
and training, IMET. Those funds have been critical in our
engagement in the
region.
Through these assistance programs and working together with
DOD, it remains vital that the United States continues to
demonstrate, through intensive and sustained nonmilitary
engagement as well, our firm and unwavering commitment to the
region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify. I am
very pleased to answer any questions you and the members of the
committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Y. Yun
Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and members of the subcommittee, thank
you very much for inviting me here today to testify on this important
topic. I would like to thank you for your work to build a bipartisan
consensus on the importance of engaging the Asia-Pacific region and
advancing U.S. interests there. We value working with you and look
forward to continuing to work closely with you and other Members of
Congress in the future.
United States policy toward East Asia and the Pacific reflects the
profound recognition that the future prosperity and security of our
Nation will be defined by events and developments in the region. While
our commitments to other regions remain strong, it is also important to
recognize just how significant East Asia and the Pacific are to the
United States. Home to two-thirds of the world's population and the
world's fastest growing economies, the Asia-Pacific offers growing
opportunities and challenges for U.S. strategic interests. Placing U.S.
interests in context, the annual flow of U.S. investment into East Asia
has increased from $22.5 billion in 2009 to $41.4 billion in 2011. U.S.
exports to the Asia-Pacific totaled over $320 billion in 2012 after
growing nearly 8 percent since 2008.
As the region rapidly grows and transforms, visible, sustained,
U.S. commitment is increasingly essential.
Our commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is demonstrated in a
number of ways, including through security and defense-related
cooperation. However, I would like to emphasize that security and
defense cooperation is only one part of the policy and to provide you
with the larger context of our engagement with the region.
Though we continue to face military challenges in the region,
nonmilitary issues are critically important to American and East Asian
prosperity and security and necessitate a broad diplomatic approach.
Although our security and defense commitments remain strong and
unequivocal, we must put more emphasis on strengthening our nonmilitary
engagement.
As our response to recent events in North Korea demonstrates, and
as Secretary Kerry emphasized on his recent trip to Beijing, Tokyo, and
Seoul, there is no doubt about U.S. military resolve in the region when
it comes to threatening behavior. Indeed, our allies and partners
continue to tell us that our clear and visible military presence is
reassuring to them and contributes to the stability of the region. But
what they also tell us is that, as we deepen our military engagement,
we should continue also to emphasize the diplomatic, development,
economic, and people-to-people engagement in order to demonstrate our
longer term commitment to our rebalance strategy. To be sure, there are
those in the region who have doubts about our ability to sustain our
high level of engagement, particularly in the current fiscal
environment. But we continue to reassure them that our commitment is
strong and enduring, because, as a Pacific nation, the United States
prosperity and security are inherently tied to the region.
To date we have demonstrated our commitment through intensive
engagement at every level, including interacting with our regional
partners at the highest levels. Last year, that high-level engagement
included 35 bilateral meetings, 6 trilateral meetings, 32 multilateral
meetings, and numerous strategic dialogues. The result of these
engagements was progress on trade agreements, closer coordination on
law enforcement and counterterrorism initiatives, and advancing
antihuman trafficking measures, and other efforts to advance good
governance, democracy, and human rights in the region. And we will
continue to press forward this year. In June, Secretary Kerry will
participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meetings in Brunei,
demonstrating U.S. commitment to the region and support for
strengthened regional institutions. At the fifth meeting of the U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Washington in July,
Secretary Kerry and Treasury Secretary Lew will be joined by their
Chinese counterparts for a discussion of challenges and opportunities
on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. In October,
President Obama will attend the APEC summit in Bali, his third East
Asia summit in Brunei, and the Global Entrepreneurship summit in Kuala
Lumpur, all of which showcase our commitment to comprehensive regional
engagement.
Our cooperation with the region is not limited to top-level
engagement. It also extends to ordinary citizens, including young
people. Public diplomacy initiatives, such as educational and cultural
exchange programs with citizens from across the Asia-Pacific region,
are increasing grassroots support for partnering with the United
States. In addition, we are utilizing new outreach platforms such as
social media and the innovative American cultural spaces in Rangoon and
Jakarta, to reach younger audiences, highlight the multidimensional
nature of U.S. foreign policy, and foster direct and long-term
relationships with broader and more diverse populations.
Our Asia-Pacific policy is multifaceted. Security takes a number of
forms and should not be defined or characterized solely by our military
engagement. Here are the key areas of our focus.
Asia's future stability and security are linked to its prosperity
and economic development. We are boosting U.S. trade in the region,
increasing investment flows, and deepening economic integration, all of
which will benefit U.S. businesses and help create jobs here at home,
while also creating improved and more inclusive development outcomes in
the region itself. Inward investment accounts for over 2 million
American manufacturing jobs, a number we are working to increase.
Similarly, exports generate over 10 million jobs for American workers.
Asia's prosperity is America's prosperity, and we will continue our
work to secure markets for U.S. goods and services and welcome
tourists, students, and investors to our shores. Establishment of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with 11 partners will
be one of the cornerstones of our ``rebalance'' toward the Asia-
Pacific. Our promotion, through the TPP, APEC, and elsewhere, of a
regional economic architecture in which the rules are open,
transparent, free, and fair helps U.S. businesses gain access to this
dynamic region and further integrate the regional economy under a set
of high-standard trade and investment rules. Meanwhile, State
Department missions in the field are stepping up their commercial
promotion efforts to supplement the Commerce Department's mission to
promote exports, tourism, education, and investment opportunities
within the United States.
We are also engaging with an emerging and growing regional
architecture of robust regional institutions and multilateral
agreements that result in a more positive political and economic
environment for the United States and strengthen regional stability,
security, and economic growth. Multilateral institutions are
positioning themselves to better handle territorial and maritime
disputes such as in the South China Sea. Through engagement with
multilateral structures such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), we are able to encourage a peaceful resolution of
contentious transnational issues and discourage escalation of tensions.
By developing our relationships with partners and emerging leaders,
and deepening cooperation across the region, we are strengthening U.S.
national security, promoting economic growth and trade, and creating a
better platform from which to tackle transnational challenges such as
terrorism, organized crime, and trafficking.
This kind of cooperation very much includes China. We want China
and the countries of the region to partner not only with us, but with
each other and multilaterally so that we can deal with shared
challenges like cyber security, climate change, and North Korea, which
were significant points of discussion with the Chinese on Secretary
Kerry's most recent trip.
At the heart of our efforts to contribute to a peaceful,
prosperous, secure, and stable region is a desire to expand democratic
development and human rights. Our commitment to advancing freedom,
democracy, and the rule of law has manifested itself in our steadfast
support for reform and opening in Burma, where positive developments on
a range of concerns of the international community have allowed us to
open a new chapter in bilateral relations. However, there is still a
great deal to be done, for example in terms of the widespread abuses
targeting Muslims, including ethnic Rohingya. We will continue to press
for improvements with governments that fall short on human rights and
democracy issues while supporting those promoting the values we share.
We work closely with key allies and partners to find ways to support
the return of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights
standards to Fiji.
So, as we deepen our traditional security ties and build on our
alliances to deter and defend against military and nonmilitary threats
to the United States and the region, we will continue to seek peaceful
resolution of disputes and confront emerging challenges that could harm
U.S. national security interests. We will do so in a way that engages
our partners, helps build multilateral cooperation and solutions,
encourages economic growth and prosperity, and promotes democratic
development and human rights. Each element of our engagement strategy
is mutually reinforcing. And thus far, Asian states have warmly
welcomed our efforts.
Of course, the stability that has enabled the Asia-Pacific's
remarkable economic growth over the past decade has long been upheld by
the U.S. military. And we are seeking to ensure that our military
activities, force posture, and presence enable us to improve our
cooperation with our allies and partners and respond to current as well
as emerging security challenges and threats. Together with our
Department of Defense colleagues, we have begun work on a comprehensive
defense strategy review to develop a force posture and presence in the
region that can better respond to nontraditional security threats,
protect allies and partners, and defend U.S. national interests. And in
our military-to-military engagement throughout the region, we continue
to emphasize norms regarding respect for human rights, civilian
populations, and the law.
As our military cooperation around the Asia-Pacific continues to
evolve and adapt to 21st century challenges, we strive to optimize our
military force posture so that it is geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. An example of how
we're doing this is our close cooperation with Japan on consolidation
and realignment issues.
The Japanese Government's March submission of the landfill permit
request for construction of a replacement Marine Corps Air Station to
the Okinawa Governor, together with the April bilateral announcement of
a Consolidation Plan, are significant milestones in our bilateral
partnership and important steps closer to realizing the vision of the
2006 Realignment Roadmap. Both sides have reaffirmed that the Futenma
Replacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko remains the only viable
alternative to the current location of Marine Corps Air Station
Futenma.
We take our alliance responsibilities seriously. The Consolidation
Plan will help us maintain a sustainable U.S. military presence in
Japan with a reduced impact on crowded urban areas. This step will also
help ensure the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and promote peace,
stability, and prosperity in the region. Due to its geographic
location, Okinawa plays a crucial role in the defense of Japan and the
preservation of peace and security in the region. U.S. forces on
Okinawa are ready to respond to regional contingencies, including
humanitarian crises and natural disasters. We recognize the impact that
our bases have on local communities, and we are committed to continuing
to address those concerns.
In addition to this work with Japan, we are also strengthening and
modernizing our longstanding treaty alliances with the Republic of
Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. This year marks
the 60th anniversary of our alliance with the Republic of Korea, a
linchpin of security and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Our cooperation
has evolved over the years into a truly global partnership, and we are
working together in places such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, and off
the coast of Somalia. The United States is steadfast in its commitment
to the defense of the ROK, and both governments fully support the
modernization of our alliance, including the U.S.-ROK Strategic
Alliance 2015 plan. Strengthening our alliance includes both preparing
for and deterring North Korean aggression. Building on our successful
counterterrorism partnership with the Philippines, we are expanding our
security engagement to focus on building the Philippines' military and
law enforcement agencies' indigenous capacity in order to address areas
of common interest in maritime security, disaster relief, and
nonproliferation.
Our force posture initiative with Australia, another close ally,
supports a more flexible and resilient capability to respond to
contingencies across the region and globally. Our Defense Strategic
Talks with Thailand have yielded a new Joint Vision Statement that is a
blueprint for our 21st century security partnership and a reflection of
Thailand's key role in our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Given the
strategic importance and collective significance of Southeast Asia and
the Pacific, we have increased our military engagement with Indonesia,
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, New Zealand, and the Pacific
Islands. The U.S. Pacific Fleet's Pacific Partnership program brings
the best of our partners' military expertise and capabilities to
multiple Pacific Island countries to help meet critical infrastructure,
water, sanitation, and health challenges.
We also continue to seek improved military-to-military relations
with China by advancing our successful high-level dialogues and
exchanges, as well as expanding our cooperation on counterpiracy,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
activities. Strengthening our military and broader economic and
security relationship with China is a critical component of our
rebalance. Let me be clear that we have no interest in containing
China, but rather our policy is designed to increase cooperation with
China on a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues.
The United States has also played an important role in ensuring
continued cross-strait stability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations
Act and our one-China policy. The United States makes available to
Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This longstanding policy
contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait, and we welcome the progress that has been made in cross-strait
relations in recent years.
Turning to Southeast Asia, our engagement builds upon the
principles of good governance and respect for human rights. Following
the restart of our military relationship with Indonesia after that
country's democratic transformation, it remains important to continue
to provide technical assistance and support to Indonesia's military
reform, professionalization, and modernization process. Other
priorities in the military-to-military relationship include a focus on
maritime security and interoperability to provide humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. These same principles also apply to
assistance programs that support the Indonesian National Police--a
significant contributor to security forces and the primary implementer
of counterterrorism strategies and programs in Indonesia. Among
countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia provides the greatest number of
troops to peacekeeping missions worldwide and is also building a
training center for peacekeepers that the U.S. Government strongly
supports.
In Burma, we are increasingly hearing from civil society activists
and other reform advocates that the United States can and should help
the Burmese military shed its legacy of decades of oppressive rule to
become a modern force subordinate to civilian rule that respects human
rights and is held accountable for its actions. To that end, we are
currently looking at ways to support nascent military engagement--such
as exposure to standards on human rights, international humanitarian
law, humanitarian assistance, and civilian-control of the military--
that would encourage further political reforms. We continue to ask the
Burmese Government to demonstrate concrete progress in achieving
respect for human rights, national reconciliation, democratization, and
an end of military ties to North Korea.
While bilateral efforts across the Asia-Pacific are demonstrating
positive results, we are also working trilaterally. Our trilateral
defense talks, including those with Japan and Australia and with Japan
and the Republic of Korea, help coordinate our defense policies, and in
tight budget times, reinforce synergies and promote interoperability to
deal with regional and global challenges. These trilateral arrangements
allow us to work together to address a range of issues, such as
humanitarian disaster response efforts and counterpiracy operations,
while leveraging and learning from major allies' knowledge and
experience on security issues from across the region. They also ensure
that, working together, we are better able to coordinate on threats
such as those from North Korea.
We are working with regional partners, including China, through
numerous mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asian
Defense Ministerial Mechanism Plus to build military and civilian
capacity to respond to natural disasters and to support humanitarian
relief efforts. Following the devastating experiences of the 2010
earthquake, tsunami, and ensuing Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan
and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, nations in the Asia-Pacific are
keenly aware of the importance of regional cooperation to respond to
natural disasters. Since 1995, the United States has invested more than
$155 million in disaster risk reduction efforts in the region and in
2012 provided an additional $23 million for disaster risk reduction
programs that save lives at the time of disasters. From May 7 to 11,
the United States will also participate in the third ARF Disaster
Relief Exercise (DiREX) to be held in Thailand. The Pacific Command
(PACOM) sponsors a range of exercises hosted by our partner nations
that include broad regional participation. My Department of Defense
colleague can speak more specifically about those exercises, but I
would stress the strong political will to promote closer cooperation,
build on essential capabilities, and ensure that, in the face of
disaster or threat, the United States and its partners are able to
operate effectively and respond smoothly together.
The Department of State works closely with the Department of
Defense and PACOM to support military engagement throughout the region
in a way that enhances our partnerships, builds local capacity to deal
with threats and disasters, and promotes democratic values and
development. For the United States to continue to meet our security
objectives in the region and build long-term, meaningful partnerships
to deal with emerging challenges, security assistance resources are
critical to our mission. In particular, Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs
play a key role by building partner capacity, including strengthening
maritime domain awareness capabilities, working with partners as they
develop and professionalize their armed forces, and enhancing our
partner capabilities and interoperability to work with the United
States to address emerging challenges, both internationally, and in the
region.
Our engagement on the military front is formulated in concert with
our allies and partners in the region and will continue to reinforce
the other aspects of our Asia-Pacific policy. Our security efforts will
continue to underpin stability, and provide reassurance to the region
as we concurrently focus on fostering economic growth, increasing
coordination on transnational issues, strengthening people-to-people
ties, and encouraging democratic development. It is increasingly vital
for the United States to demonstrate in concrete terms our firm and
unwavering commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, not only through our
military presence and alliances, but also through our engagement in the
full range of issues important to countries in the region.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify on our
engagement with and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. I am pleased
to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much.
Secretary Helvey.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID F. HELVEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR EAST ASIA, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Helvey. Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you very much for inviting me here today to
testify on this important topic.
I would like to commend the committee for its ongoing
efforts to highlight the challenges and opportunities that the
United States faces in the Asia-Pacific.
As President Obama has stated, the decision to rebalance
toward the Asia-Pacific reflects a fundamental truth: the
United States has been and always will be a Pacific nation.
Generations of U.S. service men and women have fought to help
advance the security of this region. The efforts help support
our fundamental goal in the Asia-Pacific to advance security so
that broader efforts to promote prosperity and to expand human
dignity across the Asia-Pacific region will continue to grow
and to flourish.
The core element of the Department of Defense's approach to
the Asia-Pacific remains our network of alliances and
partnerships. Together with our allies, we are working to
reinvigorate and modernize these relationships to ensure they
remain relevant to the challenges that we will face in the
future.
For example, in Australia, we are enhancing our combined
defense posture and we recently signed a space situational
awareness sharing agreement, the first bilateral arrangement of
its kind.
In Japan, we continue to deepen our bilateral efforts on
ballistic missile defense, as most recently demonstrated by our
plan to introduce a second ground-base X-band radar, TPY-2
radar.
In Korea, in the face of continued provocations from the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, the United States has
reaffirmed its longstanding commitment to provide and
strengthen extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea using
the full range of United States military capabilities.
Working with the Government of the Philippines, we are
developing a long-term plan to enhance their maritime
capabilities, and we are also jointly examining options to
increase our rotational presence there.
And in Thailand, we reached a historic milestone last
November when we jointly signed a new United States-Thai joint
vision statement for the defense alliance, the first
foundational alliance document we have had with Thailand in
over 50 years.
Beyond the progress we are making in modernizing our
longstanding treaty alliances, we are also enhancing our
defense relationships with regional partners. We are
particularly pleased by the progress we continue to make in
deepening our defense partnership with India where Deputy
Secretary of Defense Carter is spearheading an initiative to
expand our bilateral defense trade and to increase coproduction
and codevelopment.
In Southeast Asia, we are excited by the growing defense
relationships with important regional partners such as
Indonesia and Vietnam.
And in Oceania, we have overcome longstanding obstacles in
our military-to-military relationship with New Zealand that
will allow exciting operational cooperation that we have not
seen for over 25 years, including military staff talks and ship
visits to U.S. military ports.
The United States-China relationship is also a central part
of our overall rebalance efforts. We are continuously pursuing
a more sustained and substantive military-to-military
relationship, which is underscored by the chairman's recent
visit to China. We believe it is not only in the interests of
both China and the United States, but also in the region as a
whole. In all our discussions with the Chinese, we continue to
urge the importance of increased communication between our
militaries and enhanced transparency about the intentions
behind China's military modernization. We are pleased to note
that just days ago, China accepted a United States proposal to
form a working group on cyber issues under the auspices of the
civilian-military strategic security dialogue.
While not a treaty ally, Taiwan is an important partner in
the region, and we welcome the progress that has been made in
cross-trade relations in recent years. We take seriously our
responsibilities as laid out in the Taiwan Relations Act and
believe that the preservation of stability in the Taiwan Strait
is fundamental to our interests in promoting peace and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.
Alongside our attention to our bilateral relations, we are
deepening U.S. multilateral security engagement throughout the
region. Multilateral engagement helps us to strengthen habits
of cooperation and to promote trust and transparency and to
build regional capacity. This is one reason that we have
decided to increase funding for regional exercises and our
support for participation by developing countries in
multilateral training and exercise programs.
The second element of U.S. defense strategy in Asia is our
efforts to enhance our defense posture. We have committed to
developing a posture that is more geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. Some key
efforts in this
regard include our efforts to enhance missile defense posture
by deploying the second radar to Japan and the deployment of a
Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense system, or THAAD, to Guam.
The recent announcement of a new plan for the consolidation of
the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa is another example of
this, as are the initiation of rotations of U.S. marines to
Darwin and the arrival just last week of the first of up to
four littoral combat ships that will all be rotating through
Singapore.
The third element of our defense strategy in Asia is
shifting our long-term capacity investments toward the Asia-
Pacific region. As the United States continues to draw down our
military presence in Afghanistan, we are increasingly freeing
up our capacity that can be reinvested in Asia. This includes
our commitment to employ 60 percent of our forward-deployed
naval forces in the Pacific by 2020, but it also includes a
broader effort to shift air and ground capabilities, special
operations forces, and our intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets back to the Asia region.
We are also prioritizing investments in our budget to
develop platforms and capabilities that have a direct
applicability and use in the Asia-Pacific region. These
investments include programs such as the Virginia class
nuclear-powered submarine, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, and
the Broad Area Maritime Sensor, air dominance and strike
capabilities such as the fifth generation Joint Strike Fighter,
a new stealth bomber, and the KC-46 tanker replacement.
In addition to investments in hardware and technical
capabilities, we are also investing in our people in language
and culture skills, regional and strategic affairs to ensure
that we cultivate
the intellectual capital that will be required to make good on
our rebalance.
The final element of our defense strategy is promoting a
continued commitment to those principles that we believe are
essential to building a safe and secure world where all can
prosper. These include our commitment to free and open
commerce, open access
to the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains, adherence
to
the rule of law, and to the principle of settling disputes
through peaceful means without coercion. These core principles
guide the decisions the Department of Defense makes every day
and connects our strategic rebalance to the values that are
important to peace and security throughout the world.
At its core, the Department of Defense's Rebalance to Asia
is about supporting a system that the United States, our
allies, and partners have benefited from for the past 60 years.
This system has not only enabled millions to move out of
poverty, it has also facilitated tremendous democratic reforms,
economic growth, and prevented deadly conflicts and the
devastating casualties and destruction that they can bring.
That is why the United States has been deeply engaged in the
Asia-Pacific for generations, and that is why we will remain a
Pacific power for generations to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for giving me the
opportunity to testify before your subcommittee today, and I
look forward to answering any questions that you or your
colleagues may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Helvey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Helvey
Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and members of the subcommittee, thank
you very much for inviting me here today to testify on this important
topic. I'd like to commend the committee for its efforts to highlight
the ongoing challenges and opportunities the United States faces in
Asia and for its continued commitment to U.S. engagement in the Pacific
region. We in the Department of Defense greatly appreciate the
bipartisan support this committee has offered for growing U.S.
engagement in Asia and we look forward to working closely with the
Congress and our interagency colleagues to support a whole-of-
government approach in this critical region.
As President Obama has noted, the decision to rebalance toward Asia
reflects a fundamental truth--``the United States has been, and always
will be, a Pacific nation.'' Generations of U.S. service men and women
have fought, bled, and died to help advance the security of this
region, to protect cherished freedoms and democracy, and to make
possible the tremendous economic growth that has transformed the daily
lives of men, women, and children across the Asia-Pacific region. And
so, the decision to rebalance toward Asia not only reflects our belief
that the future security and prosperity of the United States is
dependent upon Asia's success but also reflects the deep and binding
ties of our past.
It is also important to note that the U.S. approach to Asia will
continue to be, as it always has been, a whole-of-government effort.
Our defense and security policies, while essential, do not exist in a
vacuum, but serve to support an over-arching purpose. As we have for
the past 60 years, the Department of Defense works to advance security
so that broader efforts to promote prosperity and expand human dignity
across the Asia-Pacific region will continue to grow and flourish.
The core element of the Department's approach to the Asia-Pacific
region remains our network of alliances and partnerships. Our treaty
allies--Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and
Thailand--have formed the bedrock of our security engagement in Asia
for over 60 years. Together with our allies, we are working to
reinvigorate and modernize these alliances to ensure they remain
relevant to the challenges we will face in the future.
In Australia, we continue to broaden and deepen our robust
relationship into new areas to meet emerging needs in both the region
and across the globe. Our efforts to enhance our combined defense
posture through the rotation of U.S. Marines to Northern Australia will
provide expanded opportunities for U.S. and Australian forces to train
and exercise together and will promote security cooperation with a wide
range of partners in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, we are
pursuing new bilateral initiatives in areas such as space and cyber
that will be particularly relevant to global security in the 21st
century. For example, at the Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations
last year Secretary Panetta and the Australian Minister for Defence
signed a memorandum of understanding to relocate a U.S. Air Force space
situational awareness C-Band radar to Australia. And just last month
the U.S. and Australia signed a Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
sharing agreement--the first bilateral arrangement of its kind--which
will permit an advance exchange of this data.
In Japan, we have seen strong momentum on the defense side over the
last year. We are taking steps to further strengthen our alliance, and
to ensure its relevance against the full spectrum of possible regional
security challenges. Through our ongoing Roles, Missions, and
Capabilities dialogue, we are exploring ways to improve
interoperability and strengthen bilateral defense cooperation. We are
discussing the future of our alliance to ensure that the alliance
remains adaptive in the face of 21st century threats. We continue to
deepen our bilateral efforts to deter ballistic missile threats in the
region and beyond. Japan remains our most important partner in regional
ballistic missile defense, as most recently demonstrated by our plan to
introduce a second TPY-2 radar. This radar will provide critical added
protection against continued North Korean threats and provocations. We
are also steadily upgrading our capabilities resident in Japan, as the
recent introduction of the MV-22 into Okinawa, and our plans to
introduce the F-35, demonstrate.
In Korea, our shared efforts to establish a Strategic Alliance 2015
are ensuring a shared vision for the future that will deter aggression
and maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as expand security
cooperation across the region. The foundation of our alliance remains a
steadfast commitment to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. North
Korea remains a security threat because of its pursuit of nuclear
weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, its willingness to
proliferate weapons in contravention of its international agreements
and United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and its willingness to
engage in provocative and destabilizing behavior. In the face of these
provocations, the United States has reaffirmed its longstanding
commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK,
using the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including the
nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense
capabilities. Through a bilateral Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,
our two countries are developing a tailored deterrence strategy to
improve the effectiveness of extended deterrence against North Korean
nuclear and WMD threats.
As the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, we look to our
key allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea, to help us shape and
influence the regional agenda. We have put significant effort into
developing the Defense Trilateral Talks, which gives us the opportunity
to engage in dialogue with counterparts from Japan and the ROK and seek
areas of trilateral cooperation such as HADR, information-sharing, and
maritime security. We continue to work toward trilateral intelligence
sharing and joint operations. Trilateral cooperation strengthens
deterrence and contributes to stability in the region, especially in
the face of North Korea's ongoing missile programs and efforts to
develop nuclear weapons.
We are also ensuring our alliances with the Philippines and
Thailand are robust and able to contribute to security across the
region. Working with the Government of the Philippines, we are
developing a long-term plan to enhance the capabilities of the
Philippine Armed Forces, especially in the maritime domain. In addition
to our regular bilateral trainings which enhance interoperability
between the U.S. and Philippine militaries, we are jointly examining
options for increasing our rotational presence in ways that serve our
mutual interests.
In Thailand, we reached a historic milestone last November when
Secretary Panetta and Thailand's Minister of Defense jointly signed a
new U.S.-Thai Joint Vision Statement for the Defense Alliance, the
first foundational alliance document in over 50 years. Our new vision
directs the relationship in important areas such as improving readiness
and interoperability and enhancing regional security in Southeast Asia
and beyond.
Beyond the progress we are making in modernizing our longstanding
treaty alliances, we are also enhancing our defense relationships with
regional partners. One of our most important relationships is our
bilateral defense partnership with India. India and the United States
share common values and interests, and we support India's growing role
in strengthening regional security, protecting shared domains,
countering terrorism, and bolstering international nonproliferation.
Our defense relationship with India has never been stronger, and it
continues to mature on both the strategic and operational levels. We
are particularly pleased by the progress we continue to make in our
military-to-military engagements and expanded bilateral defense trade.
The United States and India are working together to address
bureaucratic impediments that hamper our ability to fully realize the
possibilities of our defense partnership. Deputy Secretary Carter has
spearheaded an initiative to streamline our bureaucracy that will help
better realize the potential of our defense trade relationship,
including with efforts to increase coproduction and codevelopment.
In Southeast Asia and Oceania we are excited by the growing defense
relationships with important regional partners. In recent years we have
been working closely with the Indonesia Ministry of Defense to support
their efforts to establish more capable, responsible, and transparent
defense institutions. This includes training and discussions to enhance
civilian institutional leadership and capacity-building, as well as
operational cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance and
international peacekeeping.
Similarly, we have made tremendous strides in our bilateral defense
relationship with Vietnam. In 2011, we signed the first bilateral
Defense Memorandum of Understanding between our two countries,
expanding cooperation beyond legacy of war issues into areas of
importance for the region, including search and rescue operations and
disaster relief. And with New Zealand, we have overcome longstanding
obstacles to enter a new era of military-to-military relations. New
Zealanders have fought alongside Americans in every modern war, and our
recent signature of the bilateral Washington Declaration and subsequent
changes of U.S. defense policy on New Zealand provides a common vision
for defense cooperation that will allow exciting operational
cooperation not seen for over 25 years, including military staff talks
and New Zealand ship visits to U.S. military ports.
We are also cautiously optimistic about the positive steps toward
reforms that we have seen from the Burmese Government. As a result, DOD
is beginning a cautious and calibrated defense engagement intended to
advance the ongoing reform movement and encourage adherence to
international norms of behavior in the areas of human rights and rule
of law. This engagement is very limited and has included DOD
participation in the 2012 U.S.-Burma Human Rights Dialogue led by the
State Department and the participation of two mid-level Burmese
military officers to observe humanitarian portions of the 2013 COBRA
GOLD Exercise. We look forward to discussing with Congress the
appropriate scope and scale of defense engagement. Normalization of
defense relations can only occur if Burma continues its efforts to
democratize, improves its human rights record, implements national
reconciliation efforts with ethnic groups, and severs its military ties
to North Korea.
The U.S.-China relationship is also a central part of our
rebalancing efforts and a critical component of our efforts to broaden
and deepen defense relations with regional partners. The United States
welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a
greater and more responsible role in world affairs. We are continuously
pursuing a more sustained and substantive military-to-military
relationship, which we believe is not only in the interests of both
China and the United States, but also the region as a whole. As part of
this effort, we are working to build practical cooperation and dialogue
in areas of shared mutual interest. For example, we have invited China
to participate in the annual Rim of the Pacific Exercise. We are also
looking to expand our opportunities for frank and open dialogue, which
we believe promotes trust and transparency, and reduces the risk of
miscalculation or misunderstanding. To this end, we are increasing
senior-level engagements, including visits by the Secretary of Defense,
the PACOM Commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who was
just in China earlier this week), the Secretary of the Navy, and
reciprocal visits by Chinese counterparts. Just days ago, China also
accepted a U.S. proposal to form a working group on cyber issues under
the auspices of the civilian-military Strategic Security Dialogue. In
our discussions with the Chinese, we continue to urge enhanced
communication between our militaries, and increased transparency about
the intent behind China's military modernization effort.
The United States has also played an important role in ensuring
continued cross-strait stability. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations
Act and our one-China policy, the United States makes available to
Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This longstanding policy
contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait, and we welcome the progress that has been made in cross-strait
relations in recent years.
Alongside our attention to bilateral relations, we are deepening
U.S. multilateral security engagement in the region. Multilateral
engagement helps us strengthen habits of cooperation that promote trust
and transparency, and build regional capacity to respond to
transnational challenges such as natural disasters, piracy,
proliferation, and trafficking.
We welcome the leadership of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and believe a strong ASEAN will be essential for
regional peace and stability. We are particularly pleased with a
relatively new forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-
Plus), which has made rapid progress toward action-oriented
multilateral defense cooperation. In the few years since former Defense
Secretary Robert Gates attended the inaugural ADMM-Plus ministerial in
2010, the ADMM-Plus has stood up five staff-level Experts' Working
Groups and will hold no less than three multilateral exercises this
year. The Experts Working Groups focus on HADR, Military Medicine,
Peacekeeping Operations, Counter Terrorism, and Maritime Security, and
have developed work plans aimed at sharing best practices and
undertaking practical cooperation that builds capacity and increases
interoperability. The ADMM-Plus HA/DR-Military Medicine Exercise that
will take place in June represents a historic advance in ASEAN-led
defense cooperation.
Bringing together ASEAN members, the United States, China, Russia,
India, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, for multilateral exercises is
critical to building regional interoperability and capacity to maintain
peace and security and respond to shared challenges. This is one reason
we decided to increase funding for regional exercises and support for
the participation by developing countries in multilateral training and
exercises.
The second element of U.S. defense strategy in Asia is our efforts
to enhance our defense posture. U.S. forward defense posture plays an
important role in the Department's efforts to shape the security
environment in Asia. Shortly after this administration came into
office, it began to lay the intellectual foundation for the importance
of U.S. forward presence and posture and how best to develop it in key
regions. The 2010 QDR outlined the core elements that continue to
inform how we are pursuing enhancements to our posture; in the Asia-
Pacific we seek a posture that is geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. To achieve this
posture, the Department is modernizing U.S. basing arrangements with
traditional allies in Northeast Asia, continuing to build up Guam as a
strategic hub in the western Pacific, and expanding access to locations
in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
As U.S. forces return from Afghanistan and reset globally, one of
our top priorities is to have forces present and positioned in the
Pacific to assure regional allies and partners, deter threats to
regional stability, and prevail in conflicts if necessary. We are also
taking steps to respond to evolving threats in the region: for example,
in light of the growing North Korean missile threat, we are enhancing
our missile defense posture, including a second TPY-2 radar system to
Japan, the deployment of a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
system to Guam, as well as the increases to our Ground-Based Mid-course
Defense system for homeland defense.
We are making steady progress in our efforts to realign U.S. forces
across Japan, to ensure our presence is sustainable for the life of the
alliance. The centerpiece of this effort is in Okinawa. We recently
announced a new plan for the consolidation of the USMC presence on
Okinawa, as Marines relocate to Guam and after MCAS Futenma is
relocated to a new facility in the northern part of the island. Prime
Minister Abe's recent submission of the landfill permit application to
the Okinawa Governor for the Futenma Replacement Facility has
reinforced our conviction that this plan is achievable and represents
the best outcome for the alliance and for the people of Okinawa.
We are also working to enhance our combined defense posture on the
Korean Peninsula. As a part of this process, we are working with the
Republic of Korea to complete the transition of wartime operational
control from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to the ROK military
by December 2015. We are also working to consolidate our footprint on
the peninsula, a process that will result in a more efficient U.S.
posture and that will allow us to return land in the Seoul area to the
ROK. Over the last few years, we have made great strides in improving
our combined defense posture by enhancing intelligence and information-
sharing, strengthening operational planning, developing capabilities to
address the North Korean ballistic missile threat, enhancing combined
exercises, and increasing interoperability.
In 2011, the Prime Minister of Australia and President Obama agreed
to establish a rotational U.S. Marine Corps presence in northern
Australia of up to 2,500 Marines and to increase cooperation between
our two Air Forces. The first rotation of approximately 200 U.S.
Marines was successfully conducted from April-September of last year,
and the second rotation of Marines arrived in Darwin last week. The
United States also agreed to closer cooperation between the Royal
Australian Air Force and the U.S. Air Force that has resulted in
increased rotations of U.S. aircraft through northern Australia. These
two initiatives further enhance the capabilities of both partners by
increasing opportunities for combined training and enabling both
countries to work together even more effectively to pursue common
interests.
Our efforts in Australia also help support our commitment to
establish an expanded defense presence in Southeast Asia and into the
Indian Ocean, which will ensure the United States is postured for a
wider array of challenges we face across the region, including natural
disasters, humanitarian crises, and the proliferation and trafficking
of weapons of mass destruction and illicit goods. To this end, we have
agreed with the Government of Singapore to forward deploy up to four
Littoral Combat Ships. The first of these ships, the USS Freedom,
arrived last week, where it was warmly received by our Singaporean
hosts and the region more broadly.
Similarly we are also exploring with the Government of the
Philippines, opportunities to increase rotational presence of U.S.
forces that are geographically distributed, operationally resilient,
and politically sustainable.
The third element of our defense strategy in Asia is shifting our
long-term capacity and investments toward the Asia-Pacific region. As
the United States continues to draw down our military presence in
Afghanistan, we are increasingly freeing up capacity that can be
reinvested in Asia. This includes our commitment to employ 60 percent
of our forward-deployed naval forces in the Pacific by 2020, but it
also includes a broader effort to shift air and ground capabilities,
special operations forces, and ISR back to the Asian region.
Additionally, the Department has made a long-term commitment to
invest in critical capabilities that will sustain the United States
ability to deter and respond to any contingency or crisis we may face
in the region. In particular, this includes investing in those
capabilities that will ensure U.S. forces can maintain access and the
ability to operate freely in all environments, including those where
our power projection operations are challenged by adversaries.
As part of this effort, we are prioritizing investments in our
budget to develop platforms and capabilities that have direct
applicability and use in the Asia-Pacific region. The Department has
also made a commitment to ensuring our newest and most cutting-edge
technologies will be deployed first to the Asia-Pacific region. These
investments include programs to sustain undersea dominance, such as the
Virginia-class nuclear powered submarine, increased payload, the P-8
maritime patrol aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Sensor. We are
also focused on sustaining and expanding our air dominance and strike
capabilities, through such investments as the fifth-generation Joint
Strike Fighter, a new stealth bomber, the KC-46 tanker replacement,
cruise missiles, and ISR platforms. We are also protecting our
investments in future-focused capabilities that are so important to
this region, such as cyber, science and technology, and space.
In addition to investments in hardware and technical capabilities,
we are also investing in our people: in language and culture skills,
regional and strategic affairs--to ensure that we cultivate the
intellectual capital that will be required to make good on our
rebalance. And we are turning the great ingenuity of the Department to
the Asia-Pacific region intellectually, to develop new operational
concepts and ways of engaging partners and deterring and defeating
adversaries.
The final element of our defense strategy is promoting a continued
commitment to those principles that we believe are essential to
building a safe and secure world where all can prosper. These include
our commitment to free and open commerce; open access to the air,
maritime, space, and cyberspace domains; adherence to the rule of law;
and to the principle of settling disputes through peaceful means,
without coercion. These core principles guide the decisions the
Department makes every day and connects our strategic rebalance to the
values that are important to peace and security throughout the world.
This is one reason why we continue to reiterate the importance of
agreed-upon rules of the road in areas such as the maritime domain.
Situations, such as those in the East and South China Sea, have the
potential to provoke miscalculations or misunderstandings that could
unintentionally escalate into conflict. For this reason, the United
States has been clear about our policy in these areas: the United
States pursues a principles-based policy on maritime disputes. The
United States does not take a position on the question of ultimate
sovereignty in these situations and encourages all parties to employ
diplomatic and other peaceful avenues for resolution of these types of
matters. The United States has a national interest in the continued
guarantee of navigational rights and freedoms provided for under
international law. We are particularly concerned about the potential
for an accident or misinterpretations of tactical intentions brought
about by the operation of vessels and aircraft in proximity to one
another and urge all parties to remain vigilant with regard to
adherence to safe operating procedures.
At its core, the Department's efforts to rebalance to Asia are
about supporting a system that the United States, our allies, and
partners, have benefited from for the past 60 years. This system has
not only enabled billions of individuals to move out of poverty, but
has also facilitated tremendous democratic reforms, economic growth,
and prevented deadly conflicts and the devastating casualties and
destruction they can bring. The fortunes of the United States and our
people are inextricably tied to the Asia-Pacific region. This is why
the United States has been deeply engaged in the Pacific for centuries
and why we will continue to remain a Pacific power in the centuries to
come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to testify
before your committee today. I look forward to answering any questions
you or your colleagues may have.
Senator Cardin. I thank both of you for your testimony and
for your service to our country.
Before turning to a round of questioning, I want to
recognize Senator Rubio for any opening comments that he would
like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
being a few minutes late. I will keep my comments brief.
I appreciate your interest in organizing this hearing on
what has arguably been the administration's linchpin of the so-
called rebalance toward East Asia.
As we have read, the administration has taken high-profile
steps to shore up the idea of a renewed focus on this important
region, including Presidential participation in regional
forums, the deployment of 250 marines in Australia, and
rhetorical assurances that its request to dramatically reduce
defense spending will not come at the expense of defense
commitments in Asia.
But our friends in the region are carefully watching
whether America's stated commitments to the region are matched
by our actions and, more importantly, by our resources, be they
diplomatic or military. This is especially important given
growing geopolitical competition in Asia, and the significant
resources being spent by many countries in the region on their
military capabilities.
From my standpoint, it is important that we clearly
understand that the administration's promises include things
that are new and innovative and things that will be considered
game changers regarding America's security commitments in the
region. For example, I would like to see more conversation
about how NATO or other close alliances around the world can
contribute to this rebalance, as they have in the past in other
parts of the world.
I do welcome the recent deployment of military assets to
the region, as well as the decision to increase the number of
missile interceptors in Alaska. It is a welcome development,
given the rhetoric emanating out of North Korea. This renewed
focus on missile defense is important, given the President's
earlier cuts to these programs, but the way in which
administration officials have implied that many of these
resources could be withdrawn do raise questions in the region
about the duration of our commitment.
I am very interested in asking questions. So let me just
close by echoing what I have heard both witnesses say, and that
is the United States has long been a Pacific power and I think
it is critical that we continue to strengthen our existing
alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and we
help these partners also strengthen their relationships to each
other. And I also think it is a good time to reinvest in
relationships with India and hopefully incorporate their
security concerns into our regional engagement.
So thank you both for your service to our country and for
being here today and to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Secretary Helvey, let me start with you, if I might.
Secretary Hagel is reported to be representing the United
States at the May 31 Shangri-La Dialogue. Can you just share
with this committee what the United States hopes to achieve in
its participation at this meeting?
Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, thank you very much.
Obviously, I do not want to preempt my leadership in terms
of what Secretary Hagel may say. But the opportunity for him to
participate at the Shangri-La Dialogue will certainly afford us
a platform to talk about our strategy for the Asia-Pacific
through a speech, through interactions with senior leaders
there.
In addition to the speech, there will also be an
opportunity to meet and interact with senior officials from
countries that are sending their representatives to the
dialogue. So it is part of establishing strong people-to-people
relationships with counterparts and continue to develop the
network that is so critically important to accomplishing things
in the region.
Senator Cardin. I saw a tentative agenda in which U.S.
participation was pretty dominant, at least in the first
section on our policies on Asia. It seems to me that that
region is going to be looking at that conference to judge the
sincerity of the United States rebalancing strategy as far as
security issues in Asia.
President Obama made it very clear in his speech--I believe
it was in Australia--that sequestration would have no impact on
the commitment we have to strengthen our security commitments
in Asia.
Secretary Yun, I am curious as to how the Chinese are
responding to these developments. We need China's cooperation
as it relates to North Korea, and there have been at least some
positive signs that China shares our concern and wants to make
sure that the Korean Peninsula is free of nuclear weapons.
What impact does the realignment of United States military
presence in Asia have on our relationship with China?
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me take your
questions bit by bit because you have got a number of questions
there.
On North Korea, let me try to frame it a little bit. As you
know, Secretary Kerry was out there only 2 weeks ago. I
accompanied Secretary Kerry in his stops both in Beijing, in
Seoul, and Tokyo. And I would say, you know, of course, in
Tokyo and Seoul, we conveyed very strongly to our alliance
partners what our side has done on security defense, military
side, as well as commitment that they will be defended. That
includes extended deterrence.
With China, the discussions were long and deep, Chinese
side, and this was coming from all of their leadership.
Secretary Kerry had met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li
Keqiang, as well as State Councillor Yang Jiechi and Foreign
Minister Wang. And their point was that they are prepared to
engage us in really unprecedented ways in terms of depth and
breadth of discussions because they too are committed to
denuclearization. And as a start, this week we have had the
chairman of the six-party talks, Wu Dawei, in town, and of
course, we have Chairman Dempsey in Beijing, as well as Deputy
Secretary Bill Burns in Beijing.
So, Mr. Chairman, in answer to your question, on our side,
on the diplomatic side, we have got a series of engagements
that are lined up, and this will be the beginning, I believe,
of very in-depth discussion with the Chinese side.
Regarding your second part of your question on how do
Chinese feel about our renewed focus on Asia; I think there is
serious concern on the Chinese side whether this is aimed at
them. And our response has been, no, it is not aimed at them.
It is because we perceive our interests, economic interests,
our global interests as being in Asia, which is why we are
going to expend resources.
In regards to resources, Mr. Chairman, on the diplomatic
side, you will have noticed the fiscal year 2014 budget which
includes, both on the diplomatic side, as well as the foreign
assistance side, requests for an increase of, I think, about 7
percent or so, which is kind of more than what other bureaus
are doing. So I would like to put in a plug for that, sir.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
There have been widely reported episodes of attempted cyber
attacks against the United States. The origin of some of those
attacks appear to be China, at least it has been reported that
way. Now we have some form of an agreement of cooperation that
was entered into on April 13. We all agree that is a positive
sign. But is this really sincere or is this an effort being
made to perhaps distract us and to perhaps for us to be less on
guard? The vulnerability to cyber attack is real, what role
does the Rebalance to Asia play as far as protecting America
against cyber attacks?
Mr. Yun. First, Mr. Chairman, I will talk a little bit and
then I will turn it over to my colleague, Mr. Helvey, too.
Again, in the same trip, I would say Secretary Kerry had a
lengthy, lengthy conversation on cyber issues with the Chinese
leadership. Really, there are two dimensions of cyber issues.
And of course, China and the United States are most significant
players in cyberspace, and it is very important for us to have
a deeper understanding together with us.
And one part of that issue is what I would call business
and commercial issues where there have been thefts of business
secrets, IP, intellectual property, being violated, and I think
U.S. business has suffered quite a bit at this. And of course,
there is another element which is the government involvement,
state involvement in cyber theft.
And so based on these two issues, we have reached an
agreement with the Chinese that we will begin a working group
that will report to what we call the SSD channel, that is the
Strategic and Security Dialogue. And so we will be having a
working group meeting with the Chinese very soon on this. I
expect this will happen probably before the big dialogues take
place in July.
So let me see if David has something to add.
Senator Cardin. I would appreciate it if you could also
just tell us how sincere you believe the Chinese would be. I
assume there are the two baskets of what you are talking about.
A lot more problems can be caused in cyber, including actual
attacks. But you are looking at the commercial theft issues, as
well as some security issues. How detailed have we gotten? And
how much of a commitment is there?
Mr. Yun. Mr. Chairman, these are commitments to begin
discussions by forming a working group. So I think it will be
premature to make any comment on how detailed their commitment
is, how sincere it is. So, Mr. Chairman, maybe after the first
meeting, we can report back to you for a better answer to your
questions on those.
Senator Cardin. Secretary Helvey, did you want to add
anything?
Mr. Helvey. Yes, sir, just very briefly.
Within the Department of Defense, we are working to enhance
awareness of a variety of different types of cyber threats. We
are also developing cyber dialogues as part of our bilateral
discussions with our allies and partners around the region,
again to enhance awareness among others of threats and also
best practices, things like cyber hygiene to reduce the risk
that you could be targeted or, if you are targeted, to limit
the damage that could happen from that.
With China, obviously, we are supporting the State
Department in an interagency approach to engage the Chinese. We
are very optimistic about the beginning of this cyber working
group under the Strategic Security Dialogue. This is an
important topic for discussion between the two sides, and we
very much look forward to participating.
Senator Cardin. I would just caution. There are cyber
criminals that you point out are trying to steal--cyber theft.
And there are cyber soldiers out there trying to harm or to get
a security advantage over the United States. Both we believe
are concerns from China. So I hope that we are going into this
with our eyes fully open and recognizing that there are very
serious issues here. Dialogue is always helpful. I am for that.
But I hope that we are not going to compromise on our
aggressive action to protect this country against cyber
mischief.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Helvey, I wanted to ask you about NATO. What role
do you see for NATO in the Rebalance to Asia? We have worked,
obviously, together with NATO in Afghanistan and in other
places. Is there a role for NATO potentially? Are we exploring
that? What is your view or what is the administration's view
with regards to how we could work with NATO and those assets to
help with the military component of our rebalance and pivot?
Mr. Helvey. Well, Senator Rubio, I would say that we have
had some very initial discussions with NATO partners about the
Asia-Pacific, but we do not have--there is very little role, I
think, that has been defined to date about how NATO can play in
the Asia-Pacific region--NATO as an institution.
We have had some discussions with our European partners
outside of the context of NATO where we find that we have
shared values and principles as we look toward the Asia-
Pacific, and we are identifying areas where we can work
together to either engage in China or to cooperate with other
countries in the Asia-Pacific region to support common goals.
Senator Rubio. One more question, this one with regards to
China's military. Obviously, we are aware that in this country
we have civilian control over the military. Obviously, the
commander in chief is a civilian.
How would you describe or what is our understanding of the
civilian control over military decisions that are made? And in
particular, I am curious whether it is the military buildup or
military decisions in China are the result of military orders
that are separate from civilian leadership. Are they
integrated? What is our understanding of that chain of command
within the Chinese military structure?
Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, the Chinese military is an
institution of the Chinese Communist Party. The General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, also the President of
China, Xi Jinping, is the Chairman of the Central Military
Commission. And so the principle of civilian control of the
military is embodied in that one individual who presides over
the Central Military Commission.
In terms of the military buildup in China, military
modernization is something that has been going on for decades.
It is something that I think has enjoyed a great deal of
support among both military and civilian leaders in China. I do
not view it as being it is just something that the military is
doing. Having a stronger military is something that has been a
key part of China's modernization across the board.
Senator Rubio. I understand the structure of the chain of
command. I guess what I am wondering is are there indications
that we have of any kind that the military officials in China
act with a certain level of independence from civilian--for
example, do they make their own decisions irrespective of what
some of the civilian priorities might be? Your answer is that
it is largely confined to the existing structures--our view
that they pretty much stay within those confines?
Mr. Helvey. We have seen evidence and cases in the past
where there might be frictions or perhaps miscues between the
military authorities and the civilian authorities in China.
This is something that Xi Jinping's predecessor, Hu Jintao, and
Xi Jinping himself have sought to strengthen, to try to avoid
those types of miscues and to improve coordination across the
bureaucracy.
Senator Rubio. And I do not expect you to comment on this
particularly because we just do not know a lot of this. But I
will tell you the context in which I raise it primarily is with
these territorial disputes that continue to arise. And the
question that I often have is, is that a priority of the
civilian government that they want to push and create some of
these conflicts, or is it an emboldened military leadership
that wants to stretch out and feel its--kind of spread its
wings a little bit and show what it is capable of doing? And I
just do not know the answer to that, but it is something we
want to watch.
Secretary Yun, I wanted to ask you about some comments
Secretary Kerry made about the military rebalance. This is a
quote. ``I am not convinced that increased military ramp-up is
critical yet. You know, the Chinese take a look at that and
say, what is the United States doing? They are trying to circle
us. What is going on? And so, you know, every action has its
reaction. I think we have to be thoughtful about, you know,
some sort of how we go forward.''
And then in a press conference in China on the 13th of
April, he said the following statement. ``If the threat
disappears--i.e., North Korea denuclearizes--the same
imperative does not exist at that point in time for us to have
that kind of robust, forward-leaning posture of defense.''
My question is, how do those comments line up with what I
think has been a pretty clear indication, I hope, from the
administration that, in fact, one of the ways we intend to have
influence in the region is to be able to live up to our
security obligations to our allies because if you put yourself
in the position of some of our allies in the region and they
see the Secretary of State saying these sorts of things, I
think it raises some concerns about whether our military
commitments are there.
So my question is--obviously, it is a better question for
me to ask of Secretary Kerry the next time we have him before
the full committee. But what is your take on how you reconcile
these comments with what I thought was a pretty clear
indication that we needed to have a more robust military
presence in the region, not just
vis-a-vis what is happening with North Korea, but in general,
to assure our allies that they do not have to go on a buying
and spending spree on their military hardware because we are
going to live up to our security commitments?
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
I think what we are hearing from the region is that there
has to be a balance between military presence, as well as
nonmilitary presence, and this is what I also try to emphasize
in my remarks. That is, U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific
cannot be only military, that it has to have economic content,
it has to have content such as climate change, education, all
those. And I believe that was the central point of Secretary
Kerry's remarks you just quoted.
On the second issue----
Senator Rubio. And I am sorry to interrupt. I understand
what you are saying. I agree with what you are talking about.
We do not just want to be a military power. We want to be an
economic and diplomatic one and have influence in the region.
But his comments--and it is not fair to you, I imagine. So
I just want to say this for the record. His comments did not
talk about a balance. His comments talked about if the United
States builds up militarily, there is going to be a
counterreaction from China, and he also goes on to say if North
Korea denuclearizes, then maybe we do not need as much of a
robust military presence in the region. My only point--and I do
not expect you to answer for him. I do not think that is fair.
But my only point is I think these comments are concerning
to our allies in the region who--on the one hand, we are saying
do not worry, we are serious about our security commitments,
and on the other hand, they are hearing but those security
commitments are going to be balanced against our concern that
China may not like it.
So I am sorry to interrupt you but I wanted to put that on
the record. Thank you.
Mr. Yun. If I may, regarding the second comment on North
Korea specific, again I think his point was that the additional
assets we put out there, including the THAAD in Guam, as well
as other missile defense, was specifically aimed because North
Korean capability had increased, and if there were no longer
the threat, then it could be adjusted. Again, I do not think
there was anything that was misleading about that, sir.
Senator Rubio. I apologize. I am not claiming that the
Secretary is misleading us. On the contrary, I am concerned he
was actually being brutally honest about the administration's
position with regards to the region. And I hope that is not its
position because our allies in the region want to make sure
that not only are we saying these things, but we are actually
in a position to do something about the security commitments.
My last point for the record. I want to be clear. I
actually believe the region would be more stable and more
peaceful if the United States has the capability and the
commitment to live up to its security obligations.
But thank you for your service and thank you for being
here.
Senator Cardin. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony.
Let me pick up a little bit where Senator Rubio left off in
terms of the military buildup in China. Can you put some
numbers on that, dollars spent over the last 10 years, percent
of GDP?
Mr. Helvey. I can get you some specifics in terms of the
dollar figures on an annual basis for the past decade, sir. But
I mean, in very broad terms, China's defense budget has
increased by over 10 percent for the past two decades. I think
the most recent budget increase from this past March was again
over 10 percent to something like $120 billion.
The concern that we have is the pace of this military
expenditure, as well as the scope of the investments. China is
investing in a comprehensive modernization of its military, and
this is something that we have documented annually in our
reports to Congress on military and security developments
involving the Peoples Republic of China under the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000.
Senator Johnson. So if they are spending $120 billion per
year, can you break that out for me in terms of personnel
versus procurement, weapons systems, ships?
Mr. Helvey. If I can get that for you in the response for
the record, sir, I would appreciate that.
[Editor's note.--The information requested for the record
by Senator Johnson was not supplied from the Defense Department
by the time this hearing went to press.]
Mr. Helvey. The challenge is that there is not a whole lot
of transparency in terms of China's military spending. I mean,
they have been able to provide to the United Nations some very
gross breakdowns in terms of personnel accounts, operations,
and equipment. But beneath that level, it is very difficult to
establish exactly what the budget--which line items for the
budget----
Senator Johnson. What area, just in general, of buildup is
of greatest concern to the United States? Is it their naval
buildup?
Mr. Helvey. Sir, I would say that there is a number of
different capabilities that we are paying very careful
attention to. China's investments in its nuclear and nuclear
capable forces is something that we are watching very
carefully, investments in its undersea warfare capabilities,
including submarines, both nuclear-powered and conventionally
diesel-powered submarines, as well as its long-range
conventional precision strike weapons systems, both ballistic
and cruise missiles. These are part and parcel of what we in
the Department of Defense refer to as an antiaccess and area
denial type of strategy which, if put into place and executed,
could be intended to limit the ability of the United States or
other militaries from operating in the western Pacific.
Senator Johnson. So when we go about our rebalancing, then
are we very specifically trying to counter those buildups? I
mean, is our rebalancing directly related to their buildup?
Mr. Helvey. I think the best way to characterize it, sir,
is the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is not about China. It
is about what we are doing with our allies and partners in the
region, and China can potentially be a partner in this regard.
It is what we are doing to support and sustain the regional
political and economic system that has persisted for the past
six decades. In this respect, the success of the rebalance
hinges on having a positive and productive relationship with
China. So absolutely, the rebalance is not about China.
What China does, though, of necessity does impact how we
think about the region and how others think about the region as
well.
Senator Johnson. Talk a little bit about the areas where we
actually cooperate where we have agreement with China versus
the areas that will create stress in the relationship. Either
witness can answer that one, or both. So we will start with the
best area of cooperation.
Mr. Yun. Sir, I would say we cooperate in a number of
fields, and even I would count North Korea as one of them in
which China has hosted the six-party talks for a long time.
And another area we do cooperate is in the trade area. I
mean, we have an enormous amount of trade and investment in
each other's country. Certainly this amount of trade--there
will be problems, but there has to be substantial cooperation
in order for this to go on.
I would also say in the education field. There are
tremendous amounts of Chinese students in the United States,
and there are now increasing amounts of American students in
China.
And then some further areas of cooperation we are looking
at is economic development in Southeast Asia. We have an
agricultural cooperation project with China on Timor-Leste.
So I would not minimize our cooperation agenda with China,
sir.
Senator Johnson. Senator Cardin talked a little bit about
cyber security issues that have come to light and been
publicized. And by the way, I appreciate the fact the
administration is highlighting that. I think information,
sunlight is probably the best cure there.
Can you speak a little bit in terms of what has transpired
over the last 10 years in terms of just intellectual property
and China's cooperation with us trying to protect United States
intellectual property?
Mr. Yun. This is a serious issue, IP issues, with China,
and we have got a number of companies that have suffered from
theft of IP from the Chinese side. They include some of our
optical glass wear, as well as, of course, computer information
technology. And this is a discussion that we have, as you know,
under the strategic and economic dialogue, and we will continue
to have these discussions. We have raised company-specific
issues, as well as general issues, and this is something that
is very serious. Again, Secretary Kerry raised it with all four
leaders he met with.
Senator Johnson. So as with cyber, we are talking about
awareness, we are talking about dialogue, about a working
group. Anything concrete occurring that you can report on? Are
we proposing some not only carrots but sticks? And has there
been any success in terms of actually enforcement of IP
protection?
Mr. Yun. I cannot cite any successes so far, but of course,
the problem areas are huge. Let me study the issue and get back
to you on how we have approached this issue, for example, in
WTO being one of the multilateral rules, whether that has seen
any results. But I have not seen any assessment of successes.
Senator Johnson. Let me just conclude. I guess for the
record, I look at China really as a 1.2 billion person
opportunity for the United States. But until China, I think,
starts enforcing things like IP and we really come to grips
with the cyber security threat, it is going to be very
difficult moving forward. So I want to fully cooperate with
China, and I certainly want to encourage the administration to
continue to highlight the problems and try and get some
resolution of those issues. But, again, in case my questioning
sounded a little more hostile, it is not. It is really looking
toward how we can cooperate.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Well, clearly, intellectual property and
cyber are security issues. There is no question about it. They
are also economic issues, and we do intend to hold a hearing on
the economic issues of the rebalance. So we will get into this
again. We may also get into currency manipulation in China. We
certainly will bring up the impact that TPP will have on the
economics of that region. So there is a lot of matters that,
Senator Johnson, you are raising that are critically important
to the United States. And I just want to concur. We all want a
very productive relationship, mutually beneficial relationship
with China, but there are serious issues that need to be
addressed.
I want to ask you one or two more questions. Hopefully we
can cover this pretty quickly.
Traditionally Australia and New Zealand have been very
active with the Pacific island countries. China, in the last
decade, has given a lot more attention to the Pacific islands.
As we rebalance in Asia, how does China's participation in the
region, particularly with the Pacific island countries, affect
policies that we might wish to pursue?
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would say there are a number of intersections on how we
work together with China on the Pacific islands and ocean
space.
Certainly one of them is fisheries, and these are very
important resources especially for islands like Samoa, Palau,
the Marshall Islands. So we have our own approach, obviously.
We have a compact with some of these countries that protect our
fishing rights. And so that is one area that we are working
very closely with the Pacific islands.
Second is our participation in the Pacific Islands Forum,
PIF. And that is where all the leaders of the Pacific islands,
as well as Australia and New Zealand, and we participate. And
this is becoming a very important forum, how the United States
with enormous equities in the Pacific islands deal with these
islands, as well as outside powers principally, as you
mentioned, China. I mean, there is an issue. Are we expending
the right amount of resources to help development, to help
overcome some of the problems in the Pacific islands? Because
in the end, of course, China has really upped their game in the
Pacific islands. Are we competing effectively? And that is a
question we are trying to step up. Last year, Secretary Clinton
went to participate in the Pacific islands. So it is very much
in our mind, sir.
Senator Cardin. Well, I think it should be priority, and I
appreciate your saying that.
Talking generally now on maritime security issues, I
mentioned in my opening statement the fisheries agreement
between Japan and Taiwan. I also mentioned the Brunei-Malaysia
agreement on petroleum.
Historically the United States has taken the position that
maritime disputes need to be resolved peacefully through
negotiation between the parties and with some orderly process.
But these disputes are somewhat frozen in time. They have been
there for a long, long time. And they could very well mushroom
at any time with an incident.
Has the United States looked at using some form of
cooperative agreements on resources as a model to make progress
on some of the disputes that exist in that region?
Mr. Yun. Thank you, sir.
I wish they would remain frozen in time. The problem is
they do not. As you can imagine, there are no resolutions.
Nobody is ever going to give up their claim. So really, the
question is, How do you manage it?
One of the models of managing is through joint use, joint
exploration, joint agreement. But, of course, in problem cases,
each country wants joint use, joint exploitation to be under
their sovereignty, and that is when it becomes a problem. If
all countries were to shelve their sovereignty issues and have
joint exploration, I think that would work out quite well. And
there are a number of examples where they have done that. They
include ones between Thailand and Malaysia and I think Thailand
and Burma have entered into joint exploration. So there are
some good examples, and we are trying to encourage them. But
the problem has been in very deeply rooted ones. Each country,
all the countries will not give up their sovereignty, sir.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Secretary Helvey, talking about sovereignty, the agreement
to allow the Republic of Korea to take wartime command back to
the country. Does that have any significant impact on the
United States security commitments on the Korean Peninsula?
Mr. Helvey. No, sir, it does not. In fact, the plan that we
have in place, as we work toward that OPCON transition,
Strategic Alliance 2015, is a mechanism by which we are
actually strengthening our alliance as we are working to
prepare and meet the joint certification requirements to enable
the ROK to take on this responsibility. So far from diminishing
our commitment. It is actually strengthening it, sir.
Senator Cardin. So that does not change the troop levels.
Mr. Helvey. We are committed to maintaining the 28,500
troop level, sir.
Senator Cardin. Well, we thank both of you again for your
testimony and for your service.
We will now go to the second panel. I am pleased to
introduce Dr. Janine Davidson who is a senior fellow at the
Center for a New American Security and assistant professor in
the School of Public Policy at George Mason University in
Arlington, VA, where she teaches courses on national security
policymaking, strategy and civil-military relations, and public
policy.
Dr. Davidson began her career in the United States Air
Force where she was an aircraft commander, senior pilot for a
C-130 and C-17 cargo aircraft. She flew combat support and
humanitarian air mobility missions in Asia, Europe, in the
Middle East and was an instructor pilot at the U.S. Air Force
Academy. Welcome. It is a pleasure to have you here and thank
you for your service.
You are joined by Dr. Michael Jonathan Green, who is the
senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, an associate professor
at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University. Dr. Green served on the staff of the National
Security Council from 2001 to 2005, first as the Director for
Asian Affairs and then as a Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and as Senior Director for Asia.
It is a pleasure to have both of you before our committee.
We will start with Dr. Davidson.
STATEMENT OF DR. JANINE DAVIDSON, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman Cardin and members of the
committee, for the opportunity to speak with you today on the
important topic of the U.S. rebalance in the Asia-Pacific.
Although most of the significant policy moves here are
economic or diplomatic, they are of course enabled by a stable
and peaceful environment. So my comments today will focus on
the role of the U.S. military in the rebalance.
Now, my perspective on this topic has been shaped not only
by my most recent experience serving as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Plans where I had the responsibility
for U.S. global defense posture policy, but also by my
experiences at the beginning of my career when I served as an
Air Force officer and
C-130 pilot stationed at Yokota Air Base, Japan. Flying
missions throughout the region, including training exercises in
Korea and Southeast Asia, the evacuation of the Philippines
following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, and also in support
of POW/MIA repatriation initiatives in Vietnam gave me a front-
row view of how our engagement in the region builds
relationships and promotes peace.
So in the interest of time, let me just cut to my bottom
line up front. America's forward-postured and actively engaged
U.S. military has been and will continue to be a smart
investment for the American people.
Now, let me just provide three reasons why I believe this
is true and how it works.
First, preventing conflict is much better than fighting
wars. Our military posture in the region, most notably our
bases in Japan and Korea and previously the Philippines, has
underwritten decades of peace and enabled the region's
extraordinary economic successes of the past 20 years. Thus,
the first imperative must be to sustain our core deterrence
posture and continue to assure our Northeast Asian allies
against the existential threat posed by a nuclear-armed North
Korea. As tensions rise on the Korean Peninsula or in the South
China Sea, the reaffirmation of the security guarantee can
prevent a destabilizing arms race among nervous countries in
the region.
Second, remaining forward-postured is a more effective way
to promote stability compared to projecting power from our
bases at home. During times of rising tensions or crises,
visibly sending forces from the continental United States can
not only take too much time to be effective, but may also be
seen as provocative or escalatory, ironically increasing rather
than calming tensions.
Third, remaining forward is an efficient way to promote
stability. Home-porting ships, for example, closer to their
areas of operation saves 3 to 4 weeks in transit times and
requires one-third fewer ships in the inventory, thus saving
billions of dollars in acquisition, operations, and maintenance
costs. Thus, when budgets are tight, we can actually get more
for less by positioning a larger percentage of a smaller force
forward, especially in places like Japan or Korea where the
governments share the costs to build and maintain our
facilities.
Going forward, however, we must recognize that this is not
the same Asia in which we based our forces at the end of World
War II. Although North Korea continues to menace our allies and
now even our homeland, necessitating our sustained military
commitment in the northeast, vibrant, growing economies across
Southeast Asia are enhancing their own militaries and learning
to work together and with us to promote security and stability
across the rest of the region. Our presence, policy, and
military posture must adjust to these changing dynamics.
New modes of military-to-military engagement and new
partnerships will promote stability and burden-sharing
throughout the region. The U.S.-hosted RIMPAC, for example,
which is the world's largest multilateral maritime exercise,
allows militaries from over 20 countries, including China in
2014, to develop shared norms for maritime security. So in
addition to promoting interoperability and building partner
capacity where needed, such military-to-military engagement
enhances personal relationships and develops modes of
communication that can prevent mishaps and unintended
escalation in future crises.
Over time, as partner militaries improve their own
capability and capacity, the possibility of burden sharing
increases, ultimately preserving U.S. resources as local actors
are better able to respond to regional security challenges and
to contribute to other multilateral operations in and out of
the region.
So the Obama administration's strategic approach to the
military in Asia is wise. They are focused on remaining
operationally resilient vis-a-vis core threats in Northeast
Asia, while also becoming more geographically distributed to
address the changing dynamics in the southeast. New moves in
Australia, Singapore, and elsewhere in the region reflect this
vision while also remaining respectful of the domestic
political issues in these countries.
So in closing, I believe that America must remain engaged
in this vibrant and growing region in ways that will promote
the multilateral cooperation, interoperability, and burden-
sharing that will underwrite the next 70 years of growth and
security. I hope Members of Congress will continue to protect
this investment and to also make the case to the American
people for why our military presence in the Asia-Pacific
remains vital for America's national interests.
Thank you for having me here today and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Davidson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janine Davidson
Thank you, Chairman Cardin and members of the committee. I am
honored to testify today on the important topic of the U.S.
``rebalance'' in the Asia-Pacific. I began my career as an Air Force
officer and C-130 pilot stationed in Yokota Air Base, Japan (1990-1993)
where I flew missions throughout the region, including multiple
bilateral training exercises in Korea and Malaysia, the evacuation of
the Philippines following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, and in support
of our POW/MIA repatriation initiatives in Vietnam. Most recently, I
served for 3 years as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
plans, where I had the responsibility for U.S. global defense posture
policy. As such, I helped develop options for the military's part in
the rebalance and was also the cochair for the U.S.-Australia Working
Group. Having left government over a year ago, my comments today
reflect my personal views, not those of the Department of Defense
(DOD), the U.S. Government, or the Center for a New American Security.
Although most of the significant policy moves for America's
``rebalance'' strategy are rightly focused on economic and diplomatic
engagement, such activities are enabled by a stable and secure region.
Thus, my comments today will address the importance of the Asia-Pacific
to U.S. interests as a whole; how a new U.S. role in the region can
better address emerging challenges and opportunities; and more
specifically, how a forward postured and engaged U.S. military can
support this strategy.
The United States in the Region
For 70 years America's sustained forward presence in Asia has been
a stabilizing force. As the foundation for our key alliances, our
military posture in the region has underwritten decades of peace and
enabled the region's extraordinary economic successes of the last 20
years. Sustained American military leadership in Asia, through which
flows 40 percent percent of global trade \1\ and which represents
nearly a quarter of global GDP,\2\ has paid dividends in peace and
prosperity for America and the world. In short, America's military
posture in Asia has been a smart investment for the United States.
Looking to the future, the economic importance of a rising Asia is
clear. Maintaining peace and stability in this region is thus vital to
America's continued prosperity. But this is not the same Asia in which
we based our forces at the end of WWII. Although North Korea continues
to menace our allies--and now our homeland--necessitating our sustained
military commitment in the Northeast, vibrant growing economies across
Southeast Asia are enhancing their own militaries and learning to work
together and with us to promote security and stability across the rest
of the region. Our presence, policy, and military posture must adjust
to these changing dynamics. America must remain engaged in this vibrant
and growing region, but in ways that promote the multilateral
cooperation, interoperability, and burden-sharing that will underwrite
the next 70 years of growth and security.
Security Challenges Old and New
For all the advances in the past few decades, the region still
faces a number
of challenges--some familiar, some emerging. North Korea is edging
closer to deploying nuclear warheads deliverable by long-range
ballistic missiles and has an untested young leader who may still be
consolidating his grip on power. China, despite a small dip in its
economic growth rate, remains a rising strategic competitor to the
United States with expanding military capabilities and potentially
destabilizing domestic problems. Regional maritime disputes abound in
the Asia-Pacific and while they don't present challenges as fundamental
as those of China and North Korea, the risk of miscalculation among
claimants increases the chances of sparking conflict, applying pressure
on the United States to intervene in defense of its treaty allies. Asia
is replete with nontraditional security threats as well. Given the
importance of Asian shipping lanes, piracy is an enduring challenge as
is the potential for international terrorist plots emanating from the
region. Global climate change threatens to exacerbate these challenges
over the coming decades through more severe natural disasters that will
no doubt require military responses. Finally, well-documented offensive
cyber activities in Asia further threaten stability.
In light of these issues, there is a need for a new model of U.S.
leadership in the region. Washington must take the steps necessary to
secure American economic and security interests, assure allies and
partners and promote multilateral cooperation and adherence to
international law. However, although a U.S. presence is widely desired
by our partners and allies in the Asia-Pacific, a heavy-handed approach
could undermine U.S. interests and inadvertently reverse longstanding
peace and stability in the region. Simultaneously, the United States
should recognize that there is a trend developing of strengthening
intra-Asian security relationships in Asia. Instead of trying to insert
itself into this activity, the United States should let it develop
organically. While U.S. military planners must continue to plan for
worst-case contingencies, these plans represent only a part of a larger
strategy that integrates ``partners''--not ``host-nations''--and works
in a measured, cooperative fashion to promote sustained peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific.
The Value and the Logic of Forward Stationed American Forces
As Senator McCain made clear in his recent speech at the Center for
a New American Security, America's current economic challenges and the
debilitating gridlock in Congress, have led many in Washington to call
for retrenchment. But the idea that disengaging from the world would be
in America's best interest is misguided. American forward military
presence remains a wise investment in a globally interconnected world,
especially in this fiscally constrained environment, for the following
reasons.\3\
First, as our decade-long experience in Iraq and Afghanistan should
suggest, preventing wars is undoubtedly cheaper than fighting them. To
the extent that America's presence in Asia can continue to deter
enemies from launching attacks that kill innocent people and
destabilize the global economy, we will save taxpayer dollars and
precious lives.
Second, our presence in Asia assures allies that there is no need
for them to overmilitarize or, worse, to develop destabilizing nuclear
arsenals. If the United States were to retrench from the region and
create doubts about its commitment to the defense of South Korea or
Japan, both of those countries, and maybe some others in the region,
would be pressured by their publics to develop nuclear weapons.
Although the immediate motivation would be protection against an
increasingly belligerent North Korea, a nuclear arms buildup in
Northeast Asia would be perceived as a threat to other countries and
have destabilizing spillover effects across the region. Given the
potential ripple effects of instability beyond the Asian region, this
is not a ``new normal'' anyone in the world should want to see emerge
across this region.\4\
Third, forward stationing military assets, especially naval ones,
is more efficient than rotating military forces from bases at home on
an as-needed basis. In addition to host-nation financial support, port
facilities in allied nations provide a forward location for periodic
maintenance, saving resources in transit time. Thus, as budgets shrink,
having a larger percentage of a smaller force forward, is a prudent
economic choice.
Fourth, forward stationed forces are better positioned to manage
tensions and to facilitate collective responses to crises. Deploying
forces all the way from the United States in times of crisis not only
takes more time than might be available; it can also be seen as
provocative and escalatory. In contrast, having forces in theater
conducting regular bilateral and multilateral exercises and other
training activities, allows for sustained engagement with ally and
partner militaries. Such engagement promotes interoperability, builds
capacity where needed, and, importantly, develops personal
relationships among military professionals that can pay dividends
during crises. Over time, as partner militaries improve their own
capability and capacity, the possibility of burden-sharing increases,
ultimately preserving U.S. resources as regional actors are better able
to respond to regional security challenges and to contribute to other
multilateral operations.
Finally, these steady state activities with our partners and allies
promote burden-sharing in and out of the region in a self-reinforcing
fashion. For example, our antipiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa are
fully multilateral, with 7 of the 27 participating nations coming from
Asia. These real-world multilateral operations, like the myriad
exercises conducted with partners in Asian waters, further develop
rules of engagement, interoperability, and shared values for
professional militaries that respect human rights, the rule of law, and
civilian control. Such lessons and common operating frameworks can be
brought to bear in places like the Straits of Malacca or the South
China Sea, where multilateral cooperation can similarly address piracy
and trafficking issues or mitigate potential territorial disputes and
freedom of navigation issues.
The ``Rebalance'' and the American Military
The Obama administration's emphasis on the importance of Asia is a
reflection of the rising economic role the region plays and the
interdependence of our economies. Thus, the economic and diplomatic
engagement is the core of the rebalance policy. That said, the military
has an important supporting role in America's overall Asia-Pacific
engagement, as peace and stability in the region enables economic
prosperity and free flows of trade.
The Pentagon's strategic approach here is wise. Our military
posture in Asia is meant to be ``operationally resilient'' vis-a-vis
core threats, while also becoming more ``geographically distributed''
to address the changing dynamics in Southeast Asia. Recognizing that
each of the emerging powers in the region has its own interests and
domestic political considerations, the Obama team also asserted that
U.S. military posture should be ``politically sustainable.'' Thus,
while the Pentagon had a vision for the long-term changes they might
want to see in the region, their adage was to ``go slow and consult''
with regional partners before making dramatic changes that might have
negative diplomatic repercussions. Thus, the term ``rebalance'' is more
appropriate than ``pivot,'' as the former connotes a more gradual
process and one that makes adjustments in approach and activities,
rather than a simple and abrupt repositioning of forces. Moreover the
changes are to occur within the region as more emphasis is placed on
activities and engagement in Southeast Asia (while holding strong in
the Northeast), as well as across regions, as more American resources
are made available following the large-scale wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Our military posture in the Asia-Pacific should adjust to the
changing dynamics and capabilities of emerging partners, while also
taking care not to abandon longstanding arrangements that are still
working or are still needed. Thus, the first imperative must be to
sustain our core deterrence posture and continue to assure our
Northeast Asian allies against the existential threat posed by a
nuclear-armed North Korea. Our longstanding posture in this region,
including nearly 30,000 troops in South Korea and an additional 50,000
in mainland Japan and Okinawa, are the key to remaining ready to
respond to emerging crises. Our bases in Guam, which will absorb
approximately 5,000 marines from Okinawa, also provide airfields and
naval ports for a more dispersed footprint and thus promote a more
operationally resilient posture.
Although we need not--and should not--build large new American
bases across the region, we should also be cautious as we make changes
to our legacy basing arrangements. As our experience in the Philippines
demonstrates, executing a precipitous departure can shock relationships
and limit future options. That said, where ally countries host our
military forces, we must remain conscious of the fact that these are
not our territories. In places like Japan and Korea, decades of
political change and economic growth have altered significantly the
local environments in which our forces reside. Our posture must account
for such shifts, taking an evolutionary, not revolutionary, approach.
As the recent adjustments in Okinawa and Korea demonstrate, it is
possible to make changes to our traditional posture model that meet our
operational requirements while also respecting our allies' political
realities and the need for change.\5\
Elsewhere in the region, where a robust U.S. footprint would not be
desirable or practicable, new modes of military engagement by the
United States should be designed to enhance regional stability.
Changing dynamics and challenges in the ASEAN region present
opportunities for constructive U.S. military engagement. ASEAN
countries are thickening bilateral ties among each other across the
region and promoting cooperative approaches to shared challenges. In
contrast to our partners in Europe who are decreasing defense spending,
many Asian countries are investing in new defense capabilities and
building their military capacity.\6\ The U.S. role here should be to
promote such regional engagement by hosting some of the larger
multilateral military exercises, such as RIMPAC7 (Rim of the Pacific)
and participating in activities hosted by others when invited, such as
ADMM, (ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting) or PITCH BLACK (multilateral
air forces exercise hosted by Australia). The fact is, the United
States has convening authority in the region such that if our military
is due to participate, others will sign on. Thus, just by showing up,
the U.S. presence can act as a powerful catalyst for multilateral
cooperation with very little investment.
As such activity expands, however, it is important that the United
States along with its allies and other regional militaries ensure that
China also has the opportunity to participate. Regular participation in
military exercises builds confidence among participants, dismisses
Chinese misperceptions about ``encirclement'' or ``containment,'' and
promotes shared norms for multilateral cooperation. Additionally,
should tensions rise over territorial disputes or other issues, the
military-to-military relationships forged through such engagement can
provide a valuable avenue for communication that can avoid
miscalculations or unintended escalation.
Being forward postured is the downpayment that enables all of this
engagement. The enhanced rotational Marine Corps presence in Australia
as well as the four littoral combat ships to be stationed in Singapore
are steps in the right direction. The agreement with Australia reflects
the shared desire to enhance interoperability on the very important
amphibious role for which the U.S. Marine Corps is so proficient. The
plan to start small with 250 marines and grow eventually to 2,500,
reflects the flexible ``go slow and consult'' approach. The engagement
should be assessed each year, lessons should be incorporated, and each
country should remain flexible along the way to the larger partnership.
Meanwhile, the LCS, is the right platform for the maritime challenges
in the region. U.S. forces' participation in the region's multilateral
and bilateral exercises on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) not only improves local capability and capacity to respond
locally to such crises, but also enhances the general interoperability
among all of the militaries participating that will pay dividends in
cooperative military responses to future crises of any sort.
These new models of engagement can be replicated elsewhere in the
region. Although the United States traditionally thinks of Southeast
Asia as a maritime domain, for many of the countries in the region
their armies are the dominant military branch. Thus, we might consider
more army-to-army engagements and partner capacity-building efforts
focused on land forces as a complement to our many maritime efforts.
Going forward, discussions with the Philippines and Vietnam are
also promising. From a U.S. perspective, operating agreements in new
places enhance our own operational resiliency while military-to-
military engagement promotes stability. We must, however, remain savvy
about the rising tensions in the region. As we promote stronger
bilateral ties through military engagement, we must find a balance
between assuring our allies and accidentally emboldening them to take
more provocative actions that might enflame tensions. Our allies should
not mistake our enhanced engagement throughout the region as an effort
to encircle China or as carte blanche to fan the flames over
territorial disputes. In short, we should affirm our commitment to
defend our allies against attack; while also making it clear that we do
not condone military aggression.
The Immediate Challenge
With Asian defense budgets rising and weapons proliferating, the
United States must continue to serve as a moderating influence in the
Asia-Pacific region, promoting shared values for the rule of law, human
rights, and good governance. The low-cost, high-payoff initiatives
outlined here should be protected as we allocate our stressed defense
dollars. As Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, asserted, the
Pentagon is ``turning the great ingenuity of our Department to the
Asia-Pacific region, not only in hardware and technical investments,
but intellectually--in language and culture skills, regional and
strategy affairs.'' \8\ Congress should support such investments that
underwrite our rebalance in the Asia-Pacific.
But for countries in Asia, the uncertainties created by political
gridlock in Washington can have a destabilizing effect. Strategic
competitors like China are emboldened by American political dysfunction
and officials and strategists in allied and partner countries fear that
the United States will not remain committed to the region, despite
rhetoric to the contrary. It is imperative that the United States sends
strong signals to allies like Japan and South Korea that we are
adapting our security relationships to the changing strategic
environments. Our partners must believe that they can count on
continued U.S. presence and leadership. Lack of faith in U.S.
commitment will lead to further hedging by our partners and allies; and
such uncertainty will complicate an already complex web of security
relations in the region with the greatest long-term economic importance
to the United States. Congress has a vital role to play, not only in
budgeting and oversight, but also in affirming our commitment to our
allies and in speaking directly to the American people about the
importance of Asia and our national interests there.
In closing, let me express my gratitude to the committee for its
attention to this important issue and for providing me with the
opportunity to speak with you today. Thank you.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ ``Malacca Strait is Strategic Chokepoint,'' Reuters, 4 March
2010; http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/03/04/idINIndia-
46652220100304.
\2\ World Trade Organization, Statistics Database: http://
stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDB
CountryPFReporter.aspx?Language=E.
\3\ Michele Flournoy and Janine Davidson, ``Obama's New Global
Posture: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Deployments,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol.
91, No. 4, July/August, 2012, pp. 53-63.
\4\ ``Rising Voices in S. Korea, Japan Advocate Nuclear Weapons,''
Voice of America, February 12, 2013; http://www.voanews.com/content/
rising-voices-in-south-korea-japan-advocate-nuclear-weapons/
1604309.html.
\5\ In Okinawa, the overall number of marines will be reduced from
approximately 18,000 to 10,000 by moving some to Guam, Hawaii and
elsewhere in the region. In Korea, U.S. military personnel are moving
to less populated parts of the country to accommodate growth in more
urban areas. Karen Parish, ``U.S., Japan, Agree on Okinawa Troop
Relocation,'' Defense News, April 27, 2012; http://www.defense.gov/
News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=116105; T.D. Flack, ``Yongsan Relocation Plan
Moving Forward,'' Stars and Stripes, July 10, 2005, http://
www.stripes.com/news/yongsan-relocation-plan-moving-forward-1.35625.
\6\ ``Military Spending in Southeast Asia,'' The Economist, March
21, 2012; http://www.
economist.com/node/21551056.
\7\ ``PACOM Supports China Invite to RIMPAC 2014,'' Navy Times,
September 19, 2012;
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20120919/NEWS/209190323/PACOM-
supports-China-invite-RIMPAC-2014.
\8\ ``The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense
Perspective,'' Ash Carter, speech delivered Asia Society, New York
City, August 1, 2012; http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?
SpeechID=1715.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Dr. Green.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL J. GREEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
ASIA AND JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Green. Chairman Cardin and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to talk about the Rebalance to Asia.
Today, virtually all of our allies and partners in the
Asia-Pacific region want to increase security cooperation and
engagement with the United States in large part because of the
rise of China. But many of them trade more with China than they
do with us, including Japan, Korea, Australia, three of our
most important allies. And so none of them wants to be ever put
in a position where they have to choose between Washington and
Beijing.
So therein lies the environment within which we need to
strengthen our partnerships. We need to be ambitious, but we
need to be subtle. We are not always good at subtle, but we are
going to have to be.
I agree with Dr. Davidson. I think the administration's
rebalance is generally the right strategy. CSIS was asked by
the Congress to do an independent assessment of the strategy,
which I co-led with my colleague, David Berteau. We had some
specific quibbles which are available in the report. But let me
focus on five areas that concern me going forward about how we
are working with allies and partners.
First, Senator Rubio and Senator Johnson asked about the
maritime disputes in the first island chain. One thing that
concerns me is that we, in the United States or in the
administration, do not have a clear consensus on what is behind
these disputes. Some people argue that it is nationalism.
Others argue it is resources.
I think the underlying theme in these disputes along the
first
island chain in the East China Sea and the South China Sea is
China's pursuit of what in the PLA has called the ``Near Sea''
doctrine, dominance over the waters near their coast, which is
a logical thing for any rising power to do. But it puts this in
a particular context.
And frankly, we have not always been consistent in how we
articulate our interests and our commitments. We do not have a
position on these territorial claims, but we need to be crystal
clear and consistent that we will oppose efforts at coercion
against partners and allies.
A second concern. If we are going to strengthen these
partnerships and especially in a time of limited resources, we
need to be much more agile and smart about how we do
partnership capacity building. We ought to be doing a lot more
building of equipment together, submarines, jets. We need to
fix our broken foreign military sales, FMS, system so we can
get things to allies and partners when they need them. And we
need our Pacific Command and the Pentagon and the White House
to be thinking through what capacity we want our partners to
have and look for opportunities to advance that dialogue.
The third issue. We need to do a better job networking our
alliances. For three administrations, we have built trilateral
partnerships: Japan-Korea-United States; Japan-United States-
Australia. They are more important than ever. Right now the
Japan-Korea leg is a bit broken. We are not going to fix the
historical issues between those two countries, but we need to
be doing more to keep them both focused on common operating
procedures, intelligence sharing, and the kind of things that
add to everyone's security in the region.
The fourth concern. Dr. Davidson touched on our realignment
strategy. We found in our independent assessment that the idea
of dispersing our forces is very logical. We face ballistic
missile threats. Dispersal is one answer to that. We have more
requirements for engagement across Southeast Asia and the
southeastern part of the island chain. Dispersal is necessary
for that. And we want our alliances with Japan and Korea to be
sustainable, and so taking the pressure off Okinawa and Seoul
makes a lot of sense.
I understand in Congress there is a lot of frustration with
the administration's realignment plan. The budgets are
slippery. The politics are complicated. But the bottom line is
Prime Minister Abe in Japan has publicly committed to
implementing the Futenma replacement plan in Okinawa. President
Park Geun-hye and her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, are 100
percent behind our plans to realign forces around Camp
Humphreys. It would be unfortunate if frustration over flaws in
these plans--and there are flaws--caused us to do a cold stop
in place. We would lose a lot of credibility, a lot of
momentum.
Finally, the security dynamic in the region is becoming
more complicated in cyberspace, outer space, and in the nuclear
realm. We have dialogues with our allies on these areas. We
need to really ramp them up. We need to be making sure that we
are credible to them in terms of our doctrine and our
capabilities for the expanding and complicated nuclear threat
from North Korea and with the Chinese nuclear military
modernization. We need to be talking to them about cyberspace
and outer space so that we have some common operating
procedures, we understand what our roles and missions are, what
capabilities we think we each need so that we are able to
jointly deal with these challenges. I know the Department of
Defense is working on these things, but we have fewer resources
and the problems are more complex, and we are going to have to
step our game up considerably in this region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael J. Green
Chairman Cardin, Senator Rubio, and members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for asking me to testify before you today.
For two centuries the United States has pursued policies that kept
Asia and the Pacific open to our trade and our values and that
prevented a rival hegemon from closing the region off to us. Today Asia
is returning to the center of global affairs, and Americans knows it.
Sixty percent of our exports go to the region now and polls show that
for the first time Americans consider Asia to be the most important
part of the world to our national interests.
However, just as global power is shifting to Asia, power dynamics
within Asia are also shifting. Some scholars argue that we are
returning to a Sino-Centric system in Asia, pointing out that China
trades more with America's major allies--Japan, Korea, and Australia--
than the United States does. This thesis is popular in Beijing, of
course, where the forces of history are measured primarily through such
material metrics. However, these trade figures miss something more
fundamental about prevailing Asian views of their own region's future.
That vision is one in which regional integration is guided by the kind
of open and rules-based order we have sought throughout our history of
engagement with Asia. Recent surveys by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) and other institutes have demonstrated
that a growing number of elites across Asia are embracing democracy and
the rule of law as essential Asian values. Burma's transition, despite
remaining pitfalls, stands as an example of this trend. And Burma's
leaders tell me that their example was Indonesia; and Indonesia's
example of democratic transition was Korea.
China stands out in the region as a country where the elite do not
yet embrace these norms, and polls across the region demonstrating
wariness of China's rise reflect this to some extent. The so-called
``Beijing consensus'' of authoritarian economic development may
resonate in other parts of the world, but among the major states of the
Asia-Pacific region this is not an attractive ideology. Nor, frankly,
is there that much of a consensus in Beijing about the so-called
``Beijing consensus.''
In terms of U.S. interests, therefore, the key is to ensure that
the future vision of Asian order is written by all the powers in the
region without fear of coercion, and with confidence in American
forward presence and engagement. China's rise may be the central issue
in Asia, and every administration since Richard Nixon's has worked on
improving trust and cooperation with China. That will be even more
important and challenging in the years ahead. However, to get China
right (as Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, and a number of us have argued
in a series of reports at CSIS), we have to get Asia right.
Today, almost every country in the region wants closer ties to the
United States because of China's growing power. We must remain mindful
that none wants to ever be forced to choose between Washington and
Beijing, but the appetite for increased engagement across the Pacific
is strong.
Last year CSIS was asked by the Congress and the Department of
Defense to conduct an independent assessment of the administration's
strategy for realigning our forward presence and expanding engagement
in the Asia-Pacific. After extensive investigation, a team I led with
my colleague, David Berteau, determined that the general thrust of the
administration's so-called ``rebalance'' to the region was consistent
with U.S. interests and resources. Frankly, despite the hype about a
``pivot'' to Asia, we found that the policy largely built on existing
plans and policies started in the Bush and even Clinton
administrations.
There were a number of areas, however, where we determined that the
administration's strategy was flawed in terms of either concept or
communication to the Congress. The Defense Department has addressed a
number of these areas and I would single out Deputy Secretary Ash
Carter and Assistant Secretary Mark Lippert in particular for taking
the initiative to ensure better articulation and implementation of the
Department's policies. Four broad areas of concern remain with respect
to engagement of allies and partners, however.
First, I do not believe that there is a consensus within the
administration about why there are growing tensions along the First
Island Chain, which extends from the Japanese archipelago through the
Senkaku Islands, the Philippines, and the disputed islands in the South
China Sea. Some administration officials' comments seem to suggest that
the Philippines, Japan or Vietnam are provoking Beijing and that our
goal should be to prevent these allies and partners from entrapping us
in an unwanted confrontation with China. Others see the disputes as the
result of China's effort to establish dominance over its so-called Near
Sea and to complicate any U.S. intervention in security crises along
the Asian littoral. The assessment of this struggle is fundamental to
our understanding of what deterrence and reassurance strategies are
necessary with our allies and partners. I would place more of the
causality on the second factor--China's pursuit of a Near Sea
strategy--but if the administration is worried about our allies
entrapping us in a conflict, then it is important to understand that
insecurity on their part makes accidental conflict more likely. We
should be deepening our security cooperation and working through these
maritime security problems with them so that we are inside their
decisionmaking loop and able to both reassure and advise on de-
escalation strategies in the event of a crisis. The administration also
needs to establish greater consistency of message. We cannot say enough
that while we do not take a position on the territorial disputes
themselves, we do have a strong national interest in ensuring that
coercion is not used against our allies or any nation seeking peaceful
resolution of these territorial issues. This goes to the fundamental
question of who decides the future regional order and how it will be
decided.
Second, we have not established a coherent vision of what
partnership capacity is necessary in the region. If we did, our allies
and partners would know what it is. Instead, I have heard from senior
Australian and Japanese defense officials who say that they cannot find
an authoritative voice in the administration who can tell them what
requirements we would like them to have. The Air Force tells their Air
Force and the Navy tells their Navy, but we need a top-down integrated
assessment of the capabilities we think our allies and partners need to
support the larger strategic goals in the region and then we need a
comprehensive plan to build that capacity. The decision to review the
U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines will provide an important opportunity to
do just that with Japan; recognizing, of course, that the Japanese side
will appropriately have a view on the capabilities they would like us
to retain or strengthen. In Korea we have made progress along these
lines with the planning for Wartime Op/Con transfer in 2015. However,
the U.S. vision of partnership capacity across the region has to be
integrated in PACOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a
region-wide basis. We did this in the 1980s when the Soviet buildup
prompted the U.S. maritime strategy at PACOM and a common vision for
the capabilities we and our allies needed to maintain deterrence and
the common defense.
Third, we need to sustain our support for networking of alliances,
particularly through trilaterals such as the U.S.-Japan-Australia,
U.S.-Japan-India, or U.S.-Japan-Korea groupings. Unfortunately, and
through no fault of the administration's, the Korea-Japan leg is very
weak right now. Seoul refused last year to sign a basic agreement on
military information-sharing with Japan and contentious politics over
history have prevented much forward movement. Yet given North Korean
provocations, this is probably the most important of the trilaterals to
get on track. I do not think the United States can solve the historical
and territorial issues complicating Japan-ROK relations, but we can
make clear to both allies that moving forward is a priority for us. I
know that your two witnesses from the administration are working this,
but frankly, they will need backup from the White House as well.
Fourth, we need to keep moving forward on realignment of our
forces. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has committed to implementing the
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan and we should support him. We
concluded in our CSIS assessment that this plan was the best of a
series of politically complicated options. With Prime Minister Abe's
personal commitment the prospects are improving and worth pursuing. The
same stands for our plans for consolidation of U.S. bases in Camp
Humphreys and other facilities in Korea. I know from our CSIS
assessment that there is frustration in Congress with the vague cost
estimates and complicated politics of the realignment plan, and we had
a number of adjustments we recommended in the report, including built-
in reviews of progress with the Congress. However, a stop-in-place with
respect to realignment plans would undercut support for our presence
and confidence in our ability to execute strategy. Ultimately,
realignment makes sense in terms of dispersing assets in the face of
new ballistic missile threats; improving engagement along the Asian
littoral and the southern part of the First Island Chain; and reducing
the burden of a concentrated military presence in places like Seoul and
Okinawa.
Finally, we need to recognize that the threat environment is
constantly evolving in this region, particularly with respect to
nuclear, cyber and outer space challenges. We need constant dialogue
with our allies to ensure that our extended deterrent capabilities and
doctrine with respect to nuclear threats are credible to them; that
they have the necessary capabilities--particularly missile defense--and
that we are developing the necessary capabilities and doctrine to
ensure credible deterrence and defense in cyber and outer space. We
have dialogues on all these areas with our key allies, but we have
considerable work to do before we begin to turn those dialogues into
joint strategies.
Senator Cardin. Well, once again, I thank both of you for
being here and for your testimony.
It is very clear that this administration is committed to
the rebalance in Asia, meaning a stronger U.S. presence in that
region on security issues. That is clear by the steps that have
already been taken by this administration on troop movement. It
is also true when you take a look at the President's budget
that he submitted to Congress where additional resources are
made available to East Asia and the Pacific.
For those countries that depend upon the United States for
security, that is good news. They welcome that announcement and
the actions that are taken. But as has already been pointed
out, one major country in that region is not exactly thrilled
with greater United States military and security presence, that
being, of course, China.
China is a very strategic player. They are very calculating
in all decisions that they make, very much focused on the
impact it has on their country, and they certainly want a
stable region, but they are not exactly thrilled by having more
United States military presence in the region. We need China's
cooperation on North Korea to resolve that in a peaceful
manner.
So the question has been asked by, I believe it was,
Senator Johnson or Senator Rubio or myself what does the United
States do--as it rebalances with greater security presence in
Asia--to build a more constructive relationship with China?
Dr. Davidson. Well, thank you for the question.
This is one of the issues that we talk about a lot. There
is no perfect answer. We often think of the need to assure
allies and to deter aggression from anyone in the region
requires a robust presence. But it is a bit of a black art.
Right? Because as you start to do that, then you get to the top
of the curve, as you just pointed out, and maybe start to
provoke the very behavior that you are trying to prevent. So
the problem is you never know where you are on the curve and
you do not know where that point on the curve is.
And so what it requires, I think in my opinion, is robust
engagement and dialogue all along the way, which is part of
what I think the strategy is. And like I said in my remarks and
in the previous panel, as they pointed out, some of these
territorial disputes, for instance, are going to persist.
People will have their own sovereign interests and they will
have their own domestic politics that they have to consider. So
this is where military-to-military engagement focused on shared
interests like humanitarian assistance, disaster relief pays
off in other ways. When you have shared norms for operating in
the region, you can have military-to-military relationships
developed over time where you can use those in times of crises
to tamp down crises.
I do not think it is a perfect science. I do think it is an
art. But I do believe that you have to take a long-term
approach to this very problem where you continue to reassure
the Chinese especially.
One other element. When America shows up on some of these
exercises or in anything, they act as a really powerful
catalyst. Other people show up and you get more robust
multilateral cooperation. I think it is really important that
as we continue to do that and as the actors in the region do
that themselves, that they continue to include China in those
activities. If they actively or accidentally do not include
China, then it will only feed that very dynamic that you
described.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Green.
Dr. Green. It is a hard question. Nobody knows exactly
where the tipping line is between dissuasion and provoking what
scholars call a security dilemma, that China starts reacting so
much we create the problem we are trying to avoid. I would
emphasize three tools that will help us.
First, every President since Richard Nixon, no matter what
they said on the campaign trail, when in office made it very
clear they were going to work hard to not only maintain but
expand the scope of United States-China relations. And every
President in one way or another has done that. So the first
tool is we need to, at the Presidential level and the Congress,
make it clear to Beijing that that bipartisan consensus in
American foreign policy continues and we want to work on more
stuff together with China, and we are going to try to nurture
and grow this relationship.
The second tool, I think, is we need to recognize--and it
is important that Beijing recognize--the rebalance came in the
wake of a series of quite aggressive Chinese moves in 2009 and
2010 in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. And the
demand side was important in this equation. It was our allies
and partners who were calling for more U.S. engagement and more
U.S. presence in this period. So we should not be apologetic
about that.
I think the effect on China was important. What happened
after the rebalance and the strategic guidance in 2012,
including the announcement of the Marine deployments, was that
the Chinese started coming back to their Southeast Asian
counterparts and agreeing to a code of conduct discussion on
how they would handle the South China Sea.
So the region is demanding this cooperation with the United
States--and they do not want too much of it, as I said. They do
not want to be confronting Beijing if they do not have to--I
think that has an actually quite important effect on China.
Now, the Chinese side will continue to argue it is containment,
but I think they have drawn a lesson. They imposed a self-
inflicted wound and on-side goal in 2010 by pushing their
neighbors closer to us. And that is not something we should be
apologetic about.
And finally, we have to be consistent. That is why I
mentioned consistency in our declaratory policy and our
understanding of what is happening with these territorial
disputes. Part of the problem with the rebalance, or the so-
called pivot, was it looked reactive and in many ways was
reactive. And we, for a variety of reasons, got in a position
where we had to, in effect, double down and demonstrate we were
committed to the region. We probably should not have gotten
there in the first place. We should not get to the point where
we are having to adjust suddenly because the balance of power
is out of whack.
That is partly why forward presence is important. As Dr.
Davidson said, if we have to surge from the homeland, that is
provocative. If we are there and have partnerships and have
presence, the dissuasion effect is there without the
provocation.
So we let ourselves in 2009 get in a place--and 2010--where
we had to, because of demand side pull from our partners and
allies, demonstrate our commitment, and that fueled some of
this rhetoric in Beijing about containment. So consistency is
also key.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for those responses.
Dr. Davidson, you mentioned military-to-military. Let me
put this question to both of you in context. The White House
issued a security sector assistance policy in April 2013 that I
agree with. It says one of our goals is to promote universal
values such as good governance, transparent and accountable
oversight of security forces, rule of law, transparency,
accountability, delivery of fair and effective justice, and
respect for human rights. I fully agree with that. As we deal
with security issues in countries, we should be always
promoting good governance values.
Well, some of the countries in Asia that we are dealing
with where we are looking at military-to-military, their record
in this regard is not exactly the best. So how do we balance
our concerns for human rights with our military-to-military
relationships? You can pick whatever country you want, but I
will mention Vietnam because it is a country that has received
a great deal of attention and one in which we have made
substantial improvements in our relationship over the last
several years, and yet, its record in regards to good
governance is not where we need it to be and there is a great
deal of interest in military-to-military. So how do we balance
that?
Dr. Davidson. Yes, sir. This is a bit of a conundrum on the
one hand because some of the countries, just in general, who
have the most problems are the ones who need the most
engagement. On the other hand, there is a need to balance
carrots and sticks. Right?
So I am personally not of the opinion that completely
removing engagement and isolating any country is going to help
the problem. That said, we cannot continue to throw good
efforts after bad over time. So I think that what we need to do
is have engagement but then also have firm dialogue and
conversation about whether or not that engagement will be
enhanced or whether it will be continued over time if the
countries in question can clean up their act.
In general, military-to-military engagement, I think, is a
positive force for enhancing the kinds of professionalized
militaries that you are talking about. We have a longstanding
history of doing that well, and we had a lot of mistakes along
the way. I think we should be learning from those experiences
in the cases that you cite.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Green.
Dr. Green. The capacity of Vietnam and Burma, or Myanmar,
is instructive in this regard. They are both countries that
want to engage with our military more. They are both countries
that have in different places and different ways human rights
or democracy or governance concerns.
In the case of Vietnam, the military is not engaged in
extensive repression at home, but the system denies religious
freedom and has problems with governance, corruption, and
obviously although there are reforms in Hanoi, obviously
limitations on political expression. So in the case of Vietnam,
I think we press our case in a variety of ways. There are
legislative tools to do that. There are diplomatic tools to do
that, in particular on religious freedom. But the military I
think we can engage more broadly.
Burma is different. The Burmese military is actively
engaged in 11 different counterinsurgencies. It would be very
hard for us to engage in IMET or E-IMET or other forms of
military exchange, to vet the officers. It would be, frankly,
hard to find officers who were not in some way or another
connected with some pretty brutal--you can call them
counterinsurgencies. You can call them repression. You can call
it forced resettlement. So I do not think personally we can go
to IMET or E-IMET with a country like Burma, or Myanmar, right
now.
But there are other things we can do. I was in Burma last
summer and spent time with the Ministry of Defense. They are
interested in training their troops. They hand out to every
second lieutenant a piece of paper that says Myanmar is now a
democracy. I said, is that all it says? And they said, yes,
that is basically it. We can engage, I think, not through IMET
or traditional channels but in other ways in helping them think
through how do they train, how do they create a doctrine and a
training program to understand what militaries do in
democracies.
So we are going to have to be agile and do it case by case.
And those two countries, illustrate, I think, the kind of menu
we need to think about.
Senator Cardin. I think you both raised very valid points
there.
I would point out with a country such as Vietnam, it is
reasonable for us to insist upon mechanisms to improve good
governance as the price of admission for a military-to-military
operation.
I understand your original comments, Dr. Davidson, about
avoiding conflict is always better than having to fight a war,
and I agree with that completely. And having a country that has
a sustainable economy and good governance makes it much more
likely that we are going to have an ally and not a country that
will present problems in the future. So, yes, we want to build
up a sophisticated, professional military capacity within these
countries. That is absolutely correct. We do. And military-to-
military helps. But if they do not have the good governance
structure, it is not going to provide the security we need to
avoid the type of conflicts in the future. So it seems to me
that we really need to make this an understanding up front,
particularly in a country like Vietnam.
Now, you raise a very good point about Burma. That is a
different situation. It is a much more complicated situation.
And our expectations in Burma--are on a different time schedule
than Vietnam. Both have significant problems. But we can, I
think, manage in both countries to make progress on good
governance.
Let me ask one last question dealing with the forward
deployment. You raise a good point that it is a lot easier to
have troops in place than having to move troops in for any
reasons. But part is also the perception of America. We want
our engagement in Asia to bring about a positive view of
America to the people of Asia. We want them to look at us as an
ally and friend. We would like them to be customers of our
products. We would like them to share our values. But if they
look at us more as just coming over to knock someone over the
head that they do not seem to have a concern about, that might
well present some problems for America advancing its values.
So as we look to this rebalancing with a greater U.S.
presence, a greater security presence, how do we go about doing
that in a way that maximizes the popular view of America in
Asia that in the long term would have a very positive impact on
America's interests? Any suggestions?
Dr. Green. Sure, thank you. Yes, a few suggestions.
One: the countries where we have troops or bases that have
the largest footprint, Japan and Korea, are the countries in
Asia where we are most popular. And so we need to sustain that
high level of support in the countries where support for the
alliance is highest.
We need, I think, to remember that these are countries that
have per capita GDP's comparable to our own that are very
successful. A place like Futenma, the Marine Corps air station
in Okinawa, 50 years ago was surrounded by fields and rice
paddies. Now it looks like downtown Bethesda where I live.
Yongsan, the major Army base in Seoul, might as well be in
Manhattan. That is why realignment is important.
We also need to find ways to give our allies more ownership
of bases. OPCON transition in Korea, giving wartime command--
transitioning that to Korea is an example. In Japan, people
like me and others in the administration have talked about
joint use of facilities for a long time. The Japanese ground
self-defense forces would like to collocate some of their
infantry regiments with our Marines so they can learn how to do
amphibious operations. And for bureaucratic reasons, we have
been slow rolling them. We ought to be looking at ways to have
flags that are not only Japanese and American flags on these
bases, but actually Japanese commanders commanding the bases.
We ought to be shifting toward that so that there is more
ownership of our presence to make it sustainable.
And finally, I think we have an asset in our National Guard
and Reserves who performed amazingly well in Southwest Asia and
Afghanistan and Iraq and who represent our whole country
geographically and who are coming home. And I think in a
variety of ways we can look at rotating guard and reserve units
in small units to engage in this region. It will show the best
examples of civil-military relations. There are specialty
skills the guard and reserves have. And it will really
introduce Asia to communities across this country.
So those are a few examples where we ought to be, I think,
more agile on the question you raise.
Senator Cardin. Do you both agree with the assessment that
was given by the last panel that the transfer of the wartime
military command in the Republic of Korea to Korea from the
United States--that there is not a risk factor looking at what
is happening in North Korea today? Is that a realistic change
that will take place in 2015 without affecting U.S. security
interests?
Dr. Davidson. Yes, I do agree with the previous panel with
David Helvey on that. We worked closely with the Koreans for
years. I think that it reflects a success story in partnership
actually that the Koreans are ready, willing, and able to take
on the operational control.
The military that we have on the peninsula are incredibly
professional, and they have been working for years to make sure
that this transition goes well. And it has been pushed off once
or twice because they did not think it was time. So I think
that is sort of a good news and bad news story because I do
think that they are going to make sure that they are ready by
the time it happens. And I do think they are tracking to do
that.
Dr. Green. I think we should proceed with plans for wartime
OPCON transition for the reasons that Dr. Davidson said. Korea
is ready. It is a sovereign country. And also there is a
military or operational problem to having this seam. In
peacetime they command; in wartime we command. That 24- or 48-
hour transition when you are going from one commander to the
other is a very vulnerable moment in the midst of any crisis
with North Korea. And so a seamless sequence of knowing who is
going to be in command at every stage of a crisis would be
advantageous to us, especially given North Korea's more
provocative moves. Changing hats, changing jobs, once we go to
a full crisis, is not the kind of bureaucratic game you want to
play. So it makes sense to move forward.
I am a little more concerned, though, than the previous
panel about how we are doing. There is a process for validating
that we are ready to do this transition. And my concern--and we
put this in our independent report on forward engagement that
CSIS conducted for the Congress and the Pentagon. My concern
is, first of all--and we can make that available.
But my concern is, first, that while very capable colonels
in U.S. Forces Korea are validating that we are ready--I think
there also needs to be a higher level check from the Congress
and from OSD, and also from the White House to make sure we
have really put in the capabilities that we said Korea had to
have before we were ready for this.
And the second concern is not capabilities per se, but the
signal. There is considerable opposition still within Korea to
doing this because particularly conservatives are worried this
sends a signal of weakness to the North. And we should not take
that lightly.
So I would proceed, but I would not go through the kind of
automatic validation and testing we are doing now. I would
elevate it, and I think the Congress and the President need to
think this through and make it clear that it has been thought
through so that we can have confidence in the capabilities and
that we are not sending the wrong signal as we move to this
next stage in the alliance.
Senator Cardin. Well, I thank both of you for your
testimony. I think it has been extremely helpful in
understanding the challenges of our policies in this region. As
I said at the beginning of this hearing, this our second
hearing in a series. We will be having further hearings dealing
with other dimensions of the rebalance policy. Your
participation has been extremely valuable. So thank you all
very much.
With that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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