[Senate Hearing 113-136]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-136
EXAMINING ONGOING CONFLICT
IN EASTERN CONGO
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 16, 2013
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut RAND PAUL, Kentucky
TIM KAINE, Virginia
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico RAND PAUL, Kentucky
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Borello, Federico, director, Investments, Humanity United,
Washington, DC................................................. 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Dizolele, Mvemba, strategy and advocacy fellow, Eastern Congo
Initiative, Washington, DC..................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona, opening statement... 3
Muhigirwa, Father Ferdinand, director, Centre d'Etudes Pour
I'Action Sociale, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo....... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Prendergast, John, cofounder, Enough Project, Washington, DC..... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Paper by Anthony Gambino and Stephen Weissman submitted for the
record by Federico Borello..................................... 44
Eastern Congo Initiative Report submitted for the record by
Mvemba Dizolele................................................ 52
(iii)
EXAMINING ONGOING CONFLICT
IN EASTERN CONGO
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TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:53 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
A. Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Coons, Durbin, and Flake.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. I would like to call this hearing of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee for African
Affairs to order.
Good morning. Before we get started, of course, as we all
know, yesterday three were killed and more than 140 injured
when two bombs went off near the finish line of the Boston
Marathon. I know yours does as well but my heart aches for
everyone who has been affected by this tragedy. And as we look
today at how violence
has devastated, has broadly affected the eastern Congo, we, in
the United States, are reminded that violence used as a tool of
fear all around the world has a horrible impact on families and
communities.
For every villain who would take a life to further their
ends, there are heroes ready to stand up to them and to stand
with those who are victimized. And I trust, as we hear today
from our panel of witnesses about their work, about the work of
the NGOs with which they are associated, and about the work of
many brave heroes in the eastern Congo, that we will be
reminded of that shared commitment to stand up to violence.
Today the African Affairs Subcommittee will focus on the
ongoing and deadly conflict in eastern Congo which has forced
millions of innocent people from their homes and contributed to
decades of human rights violations, mass atrocities, horrific
and widespread sexual- and gender-based violence, and disputes
over conflict minerals.
Before we begin, I would like to welcome Senator Jeff Flake
of Arizona who has joined the subcommittee as ranking member.
Senator Flake brings with him great expertise on Africa-related
issues, both from his time of service in the House of
Representatives and from his personal and business experience.
This is our first hearing together of the 113th Congress, and I
look forward to working in partnership with Senator Flake to
advance our shared interests in promoting good governance,
economic engagement, and security throughout sub-Saharan Africa
over the next 2 years.
I would also like to welcome our distinguished witnesses:
John Prendergast, cofounder of the Enough Project; Mr. Mvemba
Dizolele, strategy and advocacy fellow at the Eastern Congo
Initiative; Mr. Federico Borello, a director of the Investment
Team at Humanity United; and Rev. Ferdinand Muhigirwa--I am
going to struggle, Father, aren't I, to get that exactly right.
[Laughter.]
Director of the Center of Study for Social Action and who
has traveled to be with us here today from Kinshasa. Thank you,
Father, and all of our witnesses for your effort to be with us
here today and, in particular, Father, to speak with us more
directly about current conditions on the ground.
Since April 2012, more than 650,000 men, women, and
children have been displaced mostly by recent fighting between
the M23 rebel group and the Congolese Army in the North Kivu
province of eastern Congo. The M23 has reportedly benefited
from the illicit support of neighboring states, including
Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda. There has been some
accountability for such actions in the form of sanctions
imposed by the United States and United Nations last year. I
traveled to Kinshasa in February to learn more about this
conflict, see the situation for myself, and support the
regional framework for moving negotiations forward.
The United States has made a substantial financial
investment in addressing the ongoing humanitarian needs in the
DRC, more than $4 billion since 2008, and we have a
responsibility to ensure that money has been well spent and the
gains that are being made are sustainable. It is essential the
U.S. Government, in partnership with the international
community and the regional governments and organizations,
pursue an active policy to tackle the pervasive challenges
endemic to eastern Congo.
Unfortunately, instability and conflict are not new to the
DRC. Estimates by NGOs indicate nearly 5.5 million people died
from war-related causes in the DRC in the nearly decade from
1998 to 2007 alone, making it the world's deadliest documented
conflict since the Second World War.
The lack of effective governance has contributed to decades
of sexual- and gender-based violence and misuse and abuse of
vast mineral wealth, both of which have been particularly
concentrated in the east. According to the United Nations,
roughly 160 women are raped every week in North and South Kivu,
with members of the army frequently among the perpetrators.
Mineral extraction of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold has
also fueled the armed conflicts and human rights abuses in
eastern provinces of the DRC and robbed the Congolese people of
their opportunity for legitimate livelihoods.
Despite this bleak context, of which these are just a few
symptoms, the past few months now offer genuine reasons for
hope and optimism. Since the signing of the Peace, Security,
and Cooperation Framework in February, negotiations have
continued. The United Nations has appointed a special envoy to
the region and progress is being made to implement the
framework. The U.N. Security Council recently authorized the
deployment of a regionally led intervention force to engage in
targeted offensive operations in the east and to augment the
ongoing peacekeeping efforts led by MONUSCO. If this new force
is effective, it can help usher in sustainable security gains
that will contribute to long-term stability.
Fighting perpetrated by the M23 has slowed since its
withdrawal from Goma in November, and in another striking and
unexpected development in mid-March, one of M23's commanders
and indicted war criminal, Bosco Ntaganda, surrendered at the
U.S. Embassy in Kigali and was transferred to the ICC at The
Hague, a first in the history of the court.
With the implementation of sanctions against M23
supporters, there has been accountability. With the Dodd-Frank
legislation, there has been progress, and with reforms adopted
by the European Union, these in combination have also helped to
shift some commercial incentives for mineral extraction from
conflict to business activities that are legal and peaceful I
hope we will further examine today.
This hearing will evaluate recent steps taken by the
international community to mitigate conflict and examine the
root causes of instability in the eastern Congo, as well as
current United States and international efforts to counter
support from the M23 from state and regional actors. We will
hear from a distinguished group of witnesses about their view
of U.S. policy and request their concrete recommendations for
action.
Following today's hearing, I plan to present the
administration with a list of key recommendations for changes
or for a path forward to United States policy and to introduce
a resolution calling for Secretary Kerry to appoint a special
envoy to address the conflict in eastern Congo. That resolution
will, hopefully, also call on the administration to do more to
mobilize a comprehensive response in partnership with
international and regional partners to move steadily toward
peace and stability and to addressing root causes of conflict.
I look forward to working with Senator Flake and hopefully
other members of the subcommittee as well to further these
efforts.
And with that, I will turn it over to Senator Flake for his
opening statement.
Senator.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate
the opportunity to be in this committee and to work with you.
During my time in the House, I served on the Foreign Affairs
Committee on the Africa Subcommittee most of that time, just
taking a brief hiatus to be on the Appropriations Committee in
the last 2 years. So it is great to be back on the African
Subcommittee and I look forward to these and other issues.
With its vast resources, the DRC holds the promise of being
a success story. Over the past couple of years, you have seen
how resources can certainly contribute to the economic growth
of these countries, and in the DRC, they had a growth rate of
about 6.5 percent last year with the economy.
That is about where the good news ends. Ongoing conflict
between the DRC Government and rebel factions in the east,
coupled with the central government that obviously needs some
more serious reforms, has halted the development of the DRC in
general. The problem is compounded by regional neighbors
throwing their weight behind some of the warring factions to
serve their own interests. Regional stability in the area of
the Great Lakes threatens to be undermined by this persistent
conflict as well.
Given the resources that we have brought to bear directly
in terms of bilateral aid and contributions to the United
Nations, we need to take a look to see how we can do this
better to make sure that there are not other ways that we could
proceed that would be of benefit to the DRC.
Our witnesses today bring a unique perspective to this
issue. I have no doubt that they will contribute to this debate
at hand. I look forward to the testimony and thank you for
coming here.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
We are now going to turn to our panel of distinguished
witnesses. We will work our way from right to left. And I would
like to invite Mr. John Prendergast to make his statement to
the subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, COFOUNDER,
ENOUGH PROJECT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Prendergast. Well, thank you so much, Senator Coons,
for your leadership, and welcome to the African Subcommittee,
Senator Flake. Thanks for being here on a difficult day for
America.
Like you, Senator Coons, I traveled to Congo earlier in the
year, just a couple months ago, and I want to begin with a very
simple proposition, but a potentially and hopefully powerful
one.
There now exists a better chance for peace in eastern Congo
than at any time since the current deadly cycle of conflict
began in the mid-1990s. I think there are a number of variables
that contribute to that, and in my oral testimony, I would like
to focus on the five main reasons that peace is possible now
and then six quick recommendations for how a new United States
envoy that hopefully will be appointed the day that you enter
that resolution can support--how that United States envoy can
support peace in the Congo.
The first reason why peace is possible, I think, is partly
rooted in congressional action: the Dodd-Frank conflict
minerals legislation; consumer pressure; and the resulting
market adjustments. Market incentives for the warring parties
are starting to shift away from the violent, illicit
profiteering that has marked Congo's natural resource
exploitation for centuries to beginning to move toward
legitimate trade. Just like with the blood diamonds story, the
profit incentive is shifting from war to peace. It is messy but
it has begun. And being on the ground in eastern Congo just a
couple months ago, it was evident everywhere, talking to people
on the ground, minerals traders, and commanders in armed
groups, all the folks that are remotely connected to it.
The second reason why peace is possible is donor and World
Bank pressure on Rwanda for alleged cross-border support for
the M23 rebel group has weakened the M23, helped foster those
divisions that led to the Bosco's move. And the main takeaway
here is that the cross-border military aid that has been
flowing across the border into Congo destabilizing that country
so terribly for
the last 15 or so years--that will never again go unnoticed, go
unremarked, or go unaddressed. The new normal, I believe, is
accountability, and that is partly due to the fact that this
committee was so strong in its condemnation of that,
particularly this last time.
The third reason why peace is possible is that the
International Monetary Fund has refused to renew aid to Congo
until there are reforms that are enacted, transparency reforms.
It gives a new impetus to addressing the governance issues
within Congo.
The fourth reason why peace is possible is, as you noted in
your opening statement, Senator Coons, this new Peace and
Security Framework that 11 countries have signed along with the
United Nations Secretary General which basically provides a
foundation for a sustained peace process. It is not a peace
agreement. It is the basis of one and it just needs to be
operationalized.
The fifth reason why peace is possible in two words is Mary
Robinson. I mean, I think that having a U.N. envoy of such
stature and such commitment and a focus not just on peace but
also on human rights and accountability is terribly important.
So in the interest of time, I am just going to skip right
to U.S. recommendations. Excited to hear, Senator Coons, that
you are going to submit your own list to the executive branch
following this hearing. So hopefully some of the stuff that we
talk about here on the panel can make its way into your memo.
So as a country with close relationships with all of the
regional actors in the Great Lakes and continuing substantial
international leverage, it is critical for the U.S. Government,
I think, to play a more active role than we have in the past in
any upcoming initiatives that are created out of that
framework, out of what Mary Robinson does, and whatever follows
from these Kampala talks. This is going to require far greater
attention from senior policymakers and a step change in
diplomatic engagement.
Let us get to the recommendations.
The first one. Help build a comprehensive peace process. We
need an unrelenting investment in the creation of a legitimate
peace process. There is going to be no solution without one,
and it does not exist now. That should be a major focus of this
subcommittee and this committee's work with the executive
branch, that that be the focus of what we are doing.
The second recommendation I would make is to deploy that
high-level envoy quickly. We understand that there is someone
that is on the radar, maybe even selected, maybe even agreed.
If that is the case, deploy that person as soon as possible to
the region, get them working with Mary Robinson, with the
African regional states and the players on the ground to push
the peace process forward.
Third recommendation is sanctioning arms and minerals
smugglers. We have just got to step up the game and create a
cost for those that are going to undermine the effort to have
peace in the region. We can provide you with names of all the
people that are on various lists, U.N. group of experts list,
even list of the NGOs, Human Rights Watch and others, that are
working so hard to try to collect data on who is doing what to
whom and why these arms continue to flow so freely.
Fourth recommendation I would make is to convene a
responsible investment initiative. The United States, we think,
should work with the European Union to convene all of these
companies in the supply chain, the electronics, the gold, the
smelting, the mining companies, socially responsible investors,
and all the NGOs that care about this stuff in a responsible
investment initiative aimed at addressing risks and identifying
opportunities to conflict-free economic investment in the Great
Lakes region.
The fifth recommendation I would make is to support
accountability for war crimes, and that is, I think, shared
universally amongst all of us, but now that Bosco has come in,
it gives a chance--an opportunity--for the United States to
step up our efforts in support of international law.
And then finally, to provide aid to the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration efforts, both the internal
ones for the Congolese armed groups and the external ones for
the Rwandans, the FDLR, that are destabilizing Congo today. We
think that perhaps given this foreign intervention brigade's
deployment, that it is possible that a relationship similar to
what the United States has provided the region, particularly
the Ugandan Government, with respect to counter LRA operations,
might be possible with respect to the FDLR and M23 having some
kind of support, direct training and operational support to the
efforts to try to counter any of the spoilers and stragglers
who do not get on the peace train going forward.
Thanks very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Prendergas
Thank you, Chairman Coons and Ranking Member Flake, for the
opportunity to testify at a crucial moment for the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Africa's Great Lakes Region.
There now exists a better chance for peace in eastern Congo than at
any time since the current deadly cycle of conflict began in the mid-
1990s. A number of variables contribute to this unique opportunity.
First, following the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals legislation,
consumer pressure, and resulting market adjustments, the economic
incentives of the warring parties are starting to shift away from
illicit violent profiteering to legitimate trade. Just like with the
blood diamonds saga, the profit incentive is shifting from war to
peace.
Second, donor and World Bank pressure on Rwanda for alleged cross-
border support for the M23 rebel group has weakened that group, and
rising calls for accountability for war crimes helped pave the way for
the surrender of one of Congo's worst warlords, Bosco Ntaganda.
Third, the International Monetary Fund's refusal to renew aid to
Congo until reforms are enacted provides a window to finally address
critical governance issues within Congo.
Fourth, the new ``Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region,'' signed by United Nations
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and 11 African heads of state in
February, provides a foundation upon which a sustained peace process,
led by African partners and the United Nations, can be operationalized.
Fifth, the recent appointment of Mary Robinson as the new U.N.
envoy, combined with the hoped-for naming of a significant U.S. Special
Envoy, will provide a major external boost to African regional peace
efforts.
The mere signing of agreements of course does not end the war in
Congo. Rather, it provides a starting point for a new, comprehensive
peace initiative led by U.N. envoy Robinson and key African actors. The
United States can play a vital role in shepherding a credible and
transparent peace process, but with new personnel in place or coming
soon at the White House and Foggy Bottom, it will require a rethinking
and expansion of the U.S. role in support of lasting peace in the Great
Lakes.
Why it's different now
Elaborating on the above, four important changes are underway in
Congo today, giving an internationally supported peace initiative a
much better chance than its more limited predecessors.
First, U.S. and European consumer demands for a conflict-free
minerals trade, the Dodd-Frank legislation on conflict minerals, and
related corporate and regional reforms are making it harder to profit
violently and illegally from mineral smuggling. For decades, all of the
benefits of eastern Congo's vast mineral resource wealth have gone to
those with the biggest guns--the Congolese Army, local militias, or
neighboring countries. These minerals include gold, tin, tantalum, and
tungsten, or 3Ts, used in cell phones, computers, and jewelry. Dodd-
Frank has made the price of untraceable conflict minerals one-third the
price of tagged, traceable minerals, and thus it is no longer
profitable for many armed groups and their backers to trade in conflict
minerals. The Enough Project found in a study last year that because of
these economic changes, armed groups are now earning approximately 65
percent less from the minerals tin, tantalum, and tungsten. Gold still
remains a challenge, however, because it is more easily smuggled, and
this must be addressed through policy and corporate action,
particularly from jewelers. If the commercial incentives for the
minerals trade can continue to shift from violent, illegal extraction
to peaceful, legal development, Congo could enjoy a transition similar
to those experienced by West African countries plagued by blood diamond
wars a decade ago.
Second, for the first time, the international community is imposing
meaningful consequences for cross-border support to armed groups and
for a lack of reform. Regional support for armed groups inside eastern
Congo has been a staple of the ongoing cycle of war. Rwanda strenuously
denies involvement, but some donors have suspended certain aid programs
to that nation and will continue to do so until the evidence shifts
toward solutions. The International Monetary Fund's refusal to renew
aid to Congo until transparency reforms are enacted has placed Kinshasa
under pressure to transform its economic policies and governing
institutions.
Third, calls for international justice have intensified inside
Congo and beyond, and accused war criminals are beginning to face
sanctions. Until recently, accountability for war crimes was a distant
part of the discussion despite some of the worst crimes against
humanity being committed globally. Bosco's surrender ups the ante and
provides some potential momentum for further action.
Fourth, the reform of a U.N. peacekeeping mission that costs more
than $1 billion is under way. A new force intervention brigade has been
created, garnering troops from African nations to respond directly to
the threat of illegal armed groups in eastern Congo. This brigade has
been given a unique mandate by the U.N. to engage in offensive action
against these groups in the name of stability and civilian protection.
Refocusing the mission on eradicating the worst armed groups,
demobilizing rank-and-file combatants and helping to reform Congo's
army would go much further than the present mandate.
Despite the progress, closed-door talks are now taking place in
Kampala, Uganda between Congo and the M23 rebel group - with no
involvement of political parties, civil society elements (including
women who have borne the brunt of the war), religious leaders, or other
armed groups. Each time that rebels have taken or threatened Goma over
the past decade, hasty backroom negotiations have produced deeply
flawed deals that have reduced the military pressure on Congolese
President Joseph Kabila's weakened government and permitted the alleged
Rwandan-backed rebels to administer strategic eastern zones and oversee
taxation and resource looting. There is serious risk that a deal from
the Kampala talks will resemble the failed deals that came before it
through similar processes. The talks must be broadened into a wider
peace process.
A two-track peace process: regional talks and Congolese reform
The U.N. Framework lays a foundation for a successful peace process
that should contain two main elements: regional negotiations and
institutional reform within Congo. The Framework commits Congo and its
neighbors to deepen regional economic integration, increase judicial
cooperation, and respect legitimate regional security interests. In
order to turn these commitments into lasting change, Special U.N. Envoy
Robinson and her African partners should lead regional negotiations--
particularly between Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda--over key economic,
security, and accountability issues. Competition over control of
natural resources has been a critical driver of conflict in the region,
as armed groups backed by regional governments have sustained
themselves through profits from the illicit trade in natural resources.
It will thus be critical to incorporate economic drivers into the
regional talks, particularly on how Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda can
cooperate to more fully cut off smuggling and boost the legitimate,
conflict-free trade in natural resources and increase transparent
government revenue flows that can benefit all three countries.
Security issues will also be critical in the talks. Building on and
in support of the U.N. Force Intervention Brigade agreed to by the U.N.
Security Council on March 28, the countries should discuss and agree on
a comprehensive security strategy to deal with illegal militias.
Finally, it is critical for the peace process to foster accountability
for those who have committed mass atrocities. Rather than repeating the
practice from past processes of allowing human rights abusers to gain
positions of power in government or the military, the peace process
should ensure that the region cooperates to bring to justice those most
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. A possible
upcoming deal between Congo and M23 in Kampala is at risk of mirroring
past agreements that reinforced impunity and led to renewed conflict.
This deal must be different and leave out those most responsible for
atrocities.
The second track should focus on neglected issues within Congo that
continue to drive the war at a deeper level. The U.N. Framework commits
Congo to undertake institutional reform on critical issues that fuel
continued instability, such as decentralization, security sector
reform, and justice reform. To operationalize the Framework, a
multifaceted reform process is needed with proposals from the Congolese
Government, political parties, and civil society. To buttress this
process and following President Joseph Kabila's announced intention to
initiate a national dialogue, there is a need for an impartially
facilitated Congolese national dialogue that respects the Constitution
and allows civil society, government, key armed groups, and political
parties to discuss and debate reform proposals. This is critical to
ensure that an eventual agreement might have the buy-in of a wide
swathe of stakeholders. The U.N. Special Representative of the
Secretary General to Congo, or SRSG, mandated to help the Congolese
reform process in the U.N. framework, should work closely with Kinshasa
to ensure there is an impartial facilitator of the process and that it
is inclusive, particularly with women and gender issues fully
represented.
Recommendations to the U.S. Government
As a country with close relationships with all regional players and
substantial international leverage, it is critical for the U.S.
Government to play a much more active role in the upcoming initiatives.
This will require far greater attention from senior policymakers, a
step-change in diplomatic engagement in the region, and concentrated
focus on areas of U.S. leverage, especially efforts to transform the
trade in natural resources from a driver of violence into a catalyst
for regional peace.
Therefore, I strongly recommend that the United States urgently
take the following steps:
1. Help Build a Comprehensive Peace Process: The Kampala-based
talks are not enough. The U.S. should work with African partners, U.N.
Envoy Robinson, and the U.N. SRSG in Congo to build a peace process to
operationalize the commitments made in the U.N. Framework. Peace
efforts need proper staffing and coordinated leverage, two areas for
which the U.S. can provide key support.
2. Deploy a High-Level Envoy Quickly: If Beltway whispers are true,
a high-level U.S. envoy has already been selected. President Obama and
Secretary Kerry should deploy that envoy as soon as possible to
buttress U.N. Envoy Robinson and African efforts to build the
comprehensive effort for peace. The envoy should use incentives, strong
relationships, and leverage to help move the parties toward
constructive engagement in the process.
3. Sanction Arms and Minerals Smugglers: The U.S. Government and
U.N. Security Council should place targeted sanctions against officials
and arms and minerals smugglers in Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda that are
violating the U.N. arms embargo on Congo. In particular, the U.S.
should press to have the owners of gold smuggling businesses on U.N.
and U.S. lists sanctioned, as they continue to aid and abet violence by
M23, the FDLR, and other armed groups. There are five key gold
smugglers that have easily gotten around sanctions on their businesses
by changing business names, so it is time to sanction the owners of
these companies.
4. Convene a Responsible Investment Initiative: The U.S. should
work with the European Union to convene key electronics, gold,
smelting, and mining companies, socially responsible investors, and
NGOs in a responsible investment initiative aimed at addressing risks
and identifying opportunities to conflict-free economic investment in
the Great Lakes region. This should take place parallel to the peace
talks through a series of minisummits and a high-level conference and
build on lessons from Northern Ireland and Central America.\1\ The
initiative would gather
potential investors in natural resources, infrastructure, and financial
services and design further responsible trade partnerships, as well as
identify obstacles to
responsible investment and brainstorm solutions. With such a process
going on parallel to the peace talks, the African governments would see
outside interest in a
responsible economic trade, thus creating further incentives for
progress in the talks. The Public Private Alliance might be a good
vehicle for helping to organize this.
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\1\ Salili Tripathi and Canan Gunduz, ``A Role for the Private
Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for Third-party
Mediation,'' background paper, The Oslo Forum Network of Mediators,
2008, available at http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Salil Tripathi
Mediation Business WEB.pdf (accessed March 2013); Mats Berdal and Nader
Mousavizadeh, ``Investing for Peace: The Private Sector and the
Challenges of Peacebuilding,'' Survival Vol. 52, No. 2 (April-May
2010).
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5. Support Accountability for War Crimes: In the aftermath of Bosco
Ntaganda's surrender, the Obama administration should increase support
to the International Criminal Court to investigate and indict
additional leaders of the M23, FDLR and other armed groups most
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the
administration should work with regional partners to facilitate their
arrest upon indictment.
6. Provide Aid to DDR Efforts: The U.S. should work with the U.N.
to develop enhanced disarmament, demobilization, repatriation,
reintegration, and resettlement programs, or DDR/RR, and provide
special forces training to enhance the capacity of the new U.N. force
intervention brigade, along the lines of the model for the Lord's
Resistance Army.
conclusion
After nearly 20 years of war, peace will not come overnight to
eastern Congo. It has been one of the world's most protracted
conflicts, but there may finally be a glimmer of hope to end it because
the policy context for the war is changing. Ntaganda's surrender, the
new economic realities for armed groups, and the signing of the U.N.
Framework can lay the groundwork for a peace process, if the
international community sufficiently invests in such an initiative. The
issues to be dealt with in a genuine peace process are complex, and it
will require painstaking mediation work to hammer out agreements on
economic, security, and political issues that continue to drive
conflict. Such an effort will require the sustained attention of actors
from the U.N. Secretary General to local civil society activists. The
U.S. role will be key in creating coordinated international leverage
and buttressing the forces for peace on the ground in Congo.
The reward of these trials and tribulations will be great: peace in
eastern Congo, one of the most convoluted and destructive conflicts the
world has ever known.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast, for those
particularly spirited and focused remarks and recommendations.
Mr. Dizolele, we welcome your comments.
STATEMENT OF MVEMBA DIZOLELE, STRATEGY AND ADVOCACY FELLOW,
EASTERN CONGO INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Dizolele. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, on
behalf of Eastern Congo Initiative, I thank you for the
invitation and honor to testify before your subcommittee. I
commend you for your continued interests in developments in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and appreciate your continued
support of the people of Congo.
Mr. Chairman, after two decades of violence and political
upheaval in DRC, we realize how easy it might be for U.S.
leaders and the world to give up on Congo. From MONUSCO to the
FARDC to the Congolese Government, it seems as though none of
the major institutions are functioning well or are truly
committed to lasting peace. But I want to begin my testimony
today by offering a slightly different perspective.
From ECI's view on the ground in Goma, the reality is more
hopeful than the headlines suggest. The Congolese are among the
world's most resourceful people and a people who refuse to be
defined by circumstance or history. They are committed to a
positive change in their country and demonstrate that
commitment every day. The massive political mobilization and
voter turnout during the 2011 elections, despite overwhelming
challenges, including physical intimidation in some areas, is a
testament to their desire to shape a better future for
themselves and their families.
DRC is home to a vibrant civil society that is second to
none in Africa. Civil society and faith-based groups have been
substituting for this dysfunctional state across Congo
throughout many years of crisis. Not only do civil society
organizations provide services, they mobilize the population
for political change.
And ECI today is an investment in their vision. This is why
ECI's work is focused on developing and strengthening
partnerships with civil society organizations and providing
them with technical and financial support as they strive to
overcome the circumstances that impede their growth. We are not
alone in this, as there are many other foreign organizations
working with individual civil society entities, and the results
are palpable.
So on behalf of ECI, I am here to ask the United States
Senate to stand alongside civil society heroes in Congo. We are
not asking for more money. However, we are asking for American
leadership, particularly more leadership, as it will take that
to bring all parties together for peace and end this
instability in the region.
Last April, Eastern Congo Initiative and a coalition of
Congolese and international NGOs published a report called
``Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform.'' Mr. Chairman,
with your permission, I will ask consent to submit the report
and my written remarks for the record today.
Senator Coons. Without objection, they will be included.
Thank you.
Mr. Dizolele. The story of M23 offers three simple but
important lessons. The first lesson is that rushed, ad hoc, and
partial security sector reform does not work.
The second lesson is that military integration of rebel
groups cannot be a substitute for a real peace process. We are
here because of a botched peace process that quickly integrated
groups that should not be integrated.
The third lesson is, therefore, that unless the structural
problems are addressed, the FARDC is unlikely to ever evolve
into a professional and effective military.
While it is true that much of the responsibility for lack
of progress on SSR rests with the Congolese authorities,
MONUSCO bears part of the responsibility. The fall of Goma last
year is the apex of a long string of U.N. peacekeepers' failure
to protect civilians, despite a clear and strong mandate to do
so.
Beyond the United Nations, the international community also
has largely failed to act, despite widespread agreement that
military reform is the foundation for progress across all
conflict resolution, state-building, and development objectives
in the DRC. Over the past decade, security sector reform has
been crippled by poor coordination among donors who are driven
primarily by competing short-term imperatives and objectives.
But despite our dismal progress on SSR, we are seeing
glimmers of hope that a changing international political
environment may open opportunities for real reform.
The magnitude of the task ahead requires that it be a joint
effort and that all partners pull their weight. Donors must
build momentum toward progress by making high-level political
commitments to support military reform and back them with
immediate, practical, coordinated support. The road to
successful security sector reform goes through the following
steps.
The United States should unambiguously support MONUSCO to
fulfill its mandate as expanded in U.N. Resolution 2098,
particularly the appointment of the special envoy who needs our
full support.
In the region, members of the Contact Group need to convene
an immediate meeting of an expanded Contact Group which will
include the Southern African Development Community, the African
Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
to discuss the implementation of the renewed military reform,
but also the meeting could serve as a platform and a forum for
Mary Robinson to discuss her plan of action and engage the
leaders in a formal setting.
In the meantime, the United States should engage the
Government of DRC, in partnership with MONUSCO and other
donors, to draw up a comprehensive security sector reform
blueprint in a practical and inclusive process which involves
civil society and
establishes a robust working-level coordination and followup
mechanism.
In support of that SSR blueprint, the United States should
encourage our NATO allies and other key partners to provide
police, judicial, and military training to the DRC to help
bolster its capacity to protect its people and preserve its
territorial integrity.
U.S. Africa Command successfully trained a battalion that
performed well in LRA-affected areas in Orientale province. As
part of the comprehensive SSR blueprint, the United States
should increase its military assistance to DRC, including
training of more units of FARDC and greater access to United
States military training institutions for Congolese officers.
At the same time, the DRC Government has to learn from past
failures and avoid easy, expedient stop-gap measures that
reduce tensions in the short run but worsen the crisis in the
long run. The M23 may be reintegrated into the FARDC. For many,
this will be the third time they join the FARDC only to
subsequently desert. War criminals should not be integrated
into the Congolese military. The DRC cannot import rebel unit
structures and chains of command into the FARDC and expect
different results.
And finally, the Government of DRC, the regional states,
and moderators of the Kampala talks have to ensure that the
terms of any peace deal with the M23 respect human rights
considerations and break parallel chains of command.
With recent commitments from the United Nations, we as a
community of nations have an opportunity to ensure that 2013 is
not another year lost for the Congolese people. Both through
our Embassy in Kinshasa and here in Washington, the United
States can use its political, diplomatic, and moral capital to
invest in a people who continue to show courage, determination,
and commitment to build a better future for their country. ECI
believes there is no better investment we can make than the
success of the Congolese people.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dizolele follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mvemba Phezo Dizolele
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee on Africa, on behalf of Eastern Congo Initiative, I
thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your
subcommittee. I commend you for your continued interest in developments
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and I appreciate your continued
support of the Congolese people.
Mr. Chairman, after two decades of violence and political upheaval
in DRC, we realize how easy it might be for U.S. leaders and the world
to give up on Congo. From MONUSCO, to the FARDC to the Congolese
Government, it seems as though none of the major institutions are
functioning well or are truly committed to a lasting peace. But I want
to begin my testimony today by offering a slightly different
perspective.
From ECI's view on the ground in Goma, the reality is more hopeful
than the headlines suggest. The Congolese are among the world's most
resourceful people, and a people who refuse to be defined by
circumstance or history. They are committed to positive change in their
country and demonstrate that commitment every day. The massive
political mobilization and voter turnout during the 2011 elections
despite overwhelming challenges, including physical intimidation in
some areas, is a testament to their desire to shape a better future for
themselves and their families.
DRC is home to a vibrant civil society that is second to none in
Africa. Civil society and faith-based groups have been substituting for
the dysfunctional state across Congo throughout the many years of
crisis. Not only do civil society organizations provide services, such
as education, health, economic development and justice, where the state
fails, they mobilize the population for political change. Civil society
organizations are at the forefront of the struggle for a robust
democratic process. They drive the vote, shape the political debate and
induce reforms, including legislation against sexual violence, the
audit of mining contracts, the revision of the mining code, and the
restructuring of the national electoral commission. They envision a
better future for their country and they are doing everything they can
to craft it by their own hands.
ECI is an investment in their vision. This is why ECI's work is
focused on developing and strengthening partnerships with civil society
organizations, and providing them technical and financial support as
they push to overcome the circumstances that impede their growth. We
are not alone, as there are many other foreign organizations working
with individual civil society entities, and the results are palpable.
Our partners in the agricultural sector, amid a culture of
corruption and the constant threat of violence, have trained
smallholder farmers in improved techniques and built capacity to
improve the quality and yield of their crops. This kind of progress may
seem incremental, but those increments mean that many will be able to
afford better health care for their families and schooling for their
children. If properly farmed, DRC could feed one-third of the world's
population, and we believe if these farmers are given a chance, it can
become the breadbasket of Africa.
And when M23 overtook Goma last fall, it was not MONUSCO or FARDC
who guided civilians to safety, but courageous and resourceful citizen-
journalists. For 2 days straight, the 14 staff members of ECI's
partner, Mutaani FM, locked themselves in their station and remained
on-air as an independent source of information for the city and
surrounding communities. Mutaani also opened the airwaves for listeners
to share real-time updates from their neighborhoods, and send messages
of reassurance to those whose homes were suddenly at the center of a
battlefield. During this time of crisis and in the absence of
government support, Mutaani broadcasts became a timeline of trusted
information and a lifeline of human contact.
These are community leaders who, with limited resources, are
literally saving lives and keeping hope from fading. Progress is
possible, but without lasting government reform civil society's
progress is palliative care for a failing state. Community
organizations can't raise an army or maintain law and order in their
society.
On ECI's behalf, I am here today to ask that the United States
Senate stand alongside of these heroes. Finding a lasting solution to
the cycle of violence and creating an environment in which the
Congolese can grow and thrive does not require the expenditure of large
sums of money or the deployment of boots on the ground. It does,
however, require American political leadership--moral leadership even--
to bring the parties together to address the larger sources of
instability in the region.
The crisis that we are here today to discuss is a direct result of
DRC's lack of competent and adequate security and law enforcement
institutions. The ensuing insecurity affects all of DRC, taking
different forms in various regions of the country. Recent events in
Lubumbashi, where over 200 Mai-Mai militiamen armed with rudimentary
weapons walked mostly unopposed past security forces to the U.N.
headquarters, underscore the pervasiveness of insecurity. That these
bandits breached the security of DRC's second-largest city and most
important mining hub so easily is worrisome and may augur more such
disturbing developments.
Still, to date the most violent expression of insecurity centers in
the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Orientale, where
successive waves of foreign invasions and the continued emergence and
recycling of militias have caused the death of millions, displaced
around 2 million civilians, and led to an overwhelming incidence of
sexual violence and rampant looting of mineral resources. This brutal
manifestation of state dysfunction and militia rule now also affects
the civilian populations of northern Katanga.
This reality shapes the daily lives of millions of Congolese across
the country and exposes the pressing need for greater commitment to
security sector reform. Practically all stakeholders, including
President Joseph Kabila, the DRC Minister of Defense, the FARDC chief
of staff, DRC's neighbors and the U.N. Secretary General have
recognized the importance of security sector reform. This reform is
often mentioned as a top priority by donors, and was named as the first
commitment asked of the DRC Government in the Addis-Ababa framework
agreement signed in February this year by 11 regional leaders.
Last April, Eastern Congo Initiative and a coalition of Congolese
and international NGOs called donors to action in a report titled
``Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform.'' A year later, almost
nothing has been done. A followup report card on the recommendations of
that report will be published this month by Eastern Congo Initiative--
it reveals failing grades.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would ask consent to submit
the report and my written remarks for the record.
The rhetoric of stakeholders and donors voicing support for
security sector reform is no doubt genuine, but it is not matched by
progress on the ground. The continued imperative for meaningful
change--and the price of doing nothing--could not be clearer,
tragically underlined by the events of 2012. The M23 rebellion was born
in April 2012 following the desertion of hundreds of soldiers from the
FARDC, in part over poor conditions--notably lack of pay and food, and
political considerations. The new rebellion was led by individuals with
long and bloody histories of desertion and abuse, who had been allowed
to avoid justice and maintain parallel command structures inside the
FARDC--most notoriously Bosco Ntaganda. The Congolese defense forces
proved unable to defeat M23, despite an enormous advantage in numbers,
their effectiveness limited by poor support to troops in the field--
some were reported to lack food on the front lines--incoherent
leadership and poor morale, forcing them to desert their posts in the
name of self-preservation.
The cost has yet again been borne by Congolese civilians, hundreds
of thousands of whom have been displaced by fighting. Many others were
raped or killed. As the U.N. Secretary General has recognized ``. . .
the recent crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has again
underlined the need to reform the security sector, notably the FARDC.''
It is time to revisit the issues.
The story of the M23 offers three simple, but important lessons.
The first lesson is that rushed, ad hoc and partial security sector
reform does not work. The successive attempts to integrate former
rebels--the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-G) and
the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP)--ducked the most
difficult and most important issues. Former rebels were not vetted for
human rights abuses or other crimes. No coherent rationalization of
rank for newly integrated fighters was undertaken. Like other FARDC
soldiers, former rebels were not given sufficient material support or
pay. Perhaps most importantly, former rebels were not inserted into a
clear and well-respected command structure, allowing parallel loyalties
and chains of command to persist.
The second lesson is that military integration of rebel groups
cannot be a substitute for a real peace process. Past attempts at
integration were a product of ad hoc peace deals reflecting the
immediate imperative of conflict resolution and behind-the-scenes
political compromises. The ``mixage'' process for instance reflected
the CNDP's refusal to disperse its fighting strength, and the Congolese
Government's need to end the chaos and humiliation of fighting in the
East. Likewise, the integration of the CNDP following the agreement of
March 23, 2009, was a product of hidden negotiations between the
Rwandan and Congolese Governments that allowed the CNDP to retain
considerable influence in the East independent of formal FARDC command
structures. In both cases, the fix was only temporary, buying a brief
period of uneasy calm before fighting resumed.
The problems highlighted above apply to the whole of the FARDC, not
just to newly integrated elements. There are continual defections from
the FARDC across the whole country, and the ill-discipline and abuses
by FARDC personnel is well-documented and pervasive. Frightened
communities with no protection are more likely to mobilize around a
militia, causing further violence and chaos.
The third lesson is therefore that, unless these structural
problems are addressed, the FARDC is unlikely to ever evolve into the
professional, effective military that all actors, Congolese and
external, want to see.
With regard to Security Sector Reform, 2012 was a lost year. In
DRC, it had been anticipated that the 2011 elections would consolidate
the democratic gains of 2006 and open up a political opportunity to
move forward on much-needed reform. But the last elections were highly
contested, creating tension between the majority in power and the
opposition that have severely limited the government's ability to act,
much less tackle the difficult challenges of security sector reform.
While it is true that much of the responsibility for the lack of
progress on SSR rests with the Congolese authorities, MONUSCO bears
part of that responsibility. The fall of Goma last year is the apex of
a long string of U.N. peacekeepers' failures to protect civilians
despite a clear and strong mandate to do so. Without an effective
peacekeeping presence, stabilization and security sector reform cannot
take hold.
Beyond the United Nations, the international community has also
largely failed to act, despite widespread agreement that military
reform is the foundation for progress across all conflict resolution,
state-building and development objectives in the DRC. Over the past
decade, security sector reform has been crippled by poor coordination
among donors, who are driven primarily by competing short-term
imperatives and objectives. This approach has yielded piecemeal
interventions, and the resulting failures have led many to give up on
systemic reform altogether.
Despite our dismal progress on SSR to date, we are seeing glimmers
of hope that a changing international political environment may open
opportunities for real reform.
First, following the recent violence, regional actors--notably, the
Southern African Development Community--have collectively engaged in
the DRC at a level not seen since the end of the transition in 2006.
Second, Mary Robinson's appointment as the U.N. Special Envoy can
provide a much-needed focal point and energy at the precise moment when
the U.N. Security Council has unambiguously placed SSR at the heart of
its work in the DRC.
The magnitude of the task ahead requires that it be a joint effort
and that all partners pull their weight. Donors must build momentum
toward progress by making high-level political commitments to support
military reform, and back them with immediate practical, coordinated
support. The road to successful security reform goes through the
following steps:
The United States should unambiguously support MONUSCO to
fulfill its mandate as expanded in U.N. Resolution 2098. The
U.N. system, particularly the permanent five members of the
Security Council, must ensure that MONUSCO and the U.N. Special
Envoy have full support and all the necessary resources to
fulfill their mandates.
In the region, members of the Contact Group need to convene
an immediate meeting of an expanded Contact Group, to include
the Southern African Development Community, the African Union,
and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, to
discuss the implementation of renewed military reform. The
meeting may also serve as a platform and forum for Mary
Robinson, the newly appointed U.N. special envoy for the Great
Lakes Region, to present her plan of action to the Contact
Group.
In the meantime, the U.S. should engage the Government of
DRC, in partnership with MONUSCO and other donors, to draw up a
comprehensive security sector reform blueprint in a practical
and inclusive process, which involves civil society and
establishes a robust working-level coordination and followup
mechanism.
In support of that SSR blueprint, the U.S. should encourage
our NATO allies and other key partners to provide police,
judicial, and military training to the DRC, to help bolster its
capacity to protect its people and preserve its territorial
integrity.
U.S. Africa Command successfully trained a battalion that
performed well in LRA-affected areas in Orientale province. As
part of a comprehensive SSR blueprint, the U.S. should increase
its military assistance to DRC, including training of more
units of FARDC and greater access to U.S. military training
institutions for Congolese officers.
EUSEC and MONUSCO need to support the Government of DRC in
implementing a surge of support to the FARDC in the field. The
ISSSS has a remit to improve security and stability across the
East. MONUSCO has a mandate to protect civilians and collect
information on human rights abuses. A coordinated surge of
practical measures to improve the conduct and morale of the
FARDC is a vital factor in creating the conditions for
effective reform.
At the same time, the Government of DRC has to learn from
past failures and avoid easy, expedient stop-gap measures that
reduce tensions in the short run but worsen the crisis in the
long run. The M23 may be reintegrated into the FARDC. For many,
this will be the third time they join the FARDC, only to
subsequently desert. War criminals should not be integrated
into the Congolese military. DRC cannot import rebel unit
structures and chains of command into the FARDC and expect
different results.
And finally, the Government of DRC, Regional States, and
Moderators of the Kampala talks have to ensure that the terms
of any peace deal with the M23 respect human rights
considerations and break parallel chains of command.
With recent commitments from the U.N., we as a community of nations
have an opportunity to ensure that 2013 is not another year lost for
the Congolese people. Both through our Embassy in Kinshasa and here in
Washington, the U.S. can use its political, diplomatic, and moral
capital to invest in a people who continue to show courage,
determination and a commitment to build a better future for their
country. ECI believes there is no better investment we can make than in
the success of the Congolese people.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Dizolele.
And I would like to welcome Senator Durbin who has joined
us for the hearing.
Father Muhigirwa, we welcome your testimony now.
STATEMENT OF FATHER FERDINAND MUHIGIRWA, DIRECTOR, CENTRE
D'ETUDES POUR I'ACTION SOCIALE, KINSHASA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO
Father Muhigirwa. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Coons,
Ranking Member Flake, members of the Subcommittee on African
Affairs, thank you for the invitation and honor to testify
before your committee. I come before you as a Congolese Jesuit
priest, and the views expressed in this statement are mine
alone.
This present hearing is in a particular way timely and
critical for the DRC due to three very recent events: the
adoption of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework; the
appointment of a U.N. special envoy for the Great Lakes; and
the passage of a U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098.
Noting that after two decades the eastern Congo is
continuing to suffer from a recurring cycle of violence and
conflict by armed groups, both Congolese and foreign, what
should be done to put an end to these recurring cycles of
violence? My statement is a contribution to this question and
sharing briefly my insights on the three key issues of
electoral reform, peace and security, regional cooperation for
economic development.
First, electoral reform. Given the lack of a credible
electoral process in November 2011, the Government in Congo
does not have the full legitimacy to resolve this crisis. Thus,
what is urgently needed in 2013 is a reform of the national
electoral commission called the CENI, the training in civic and
voter education of the CENI members and those of the civil
society leaders through the electoral training school in
central Africa to ensure a real independence, fairness, and
transparency of the provincial and local elections are
hopefully held in November 2013. In November 2016, only
Presidential and legislative elections will take place. The
United States and other international partners should ensure
that the electoral process is financed, logistically assisted,
monitored, and evaluated closely with clear benchmarks and
appropriate followup measures and results.
Second, peace and security. In DRC, there are two
priorities in the area of peace and security: ending impunity
for sexual violence and neutralizing the M23 rebels. Without
equitable and restorative justice, there is no genuine and
lasting peace. Rapes and sexual-based violence continues to
occur because there is a widespread culture of impunity. So
this reform is needed to respect the rule of law, to end
impunity, and to get the rebels cumulative force and of sexual
violence. In this context, the role of the Congolese Government
and army is clear.
The United States Congress can help by calling on the
Congolese Government to undertake the following specific and
concrete reforms: to organize the army and the police and
improve the living conditions of the soldiers and police; to
establish a viable and professional army and police force that
respects human rights and the rule of law; to create a rapid
reaction force according to Resolution 2098; to pave the way
for an efficient military administration; to allow the police
to play its role in the establishment of public order.
Third, regional cooperation for economic development.
Regional cooperation should be grounded in regional economic
projects for sustainable development with special
considerations to the management of natural resources because
this has historically been one of the key drivers of conflict.
In the Great Lake region, regional cooperation for economic
development has failed. Why? Because there is lack of political
will, lack of strategic vision for development of the region,
and no sufficient financial support from the U.S. Government
and from the financial institutions and bilateral partners. The
U.S. Government can promote and support financing from the
World Bank of regional economic projects in the area of roads,
rail, electricity, oil, and gas. These projects will become
also a factor of political stability and social reconciliation
among the people in the Great Lakes region.
Mr. Chairman, my hope, my prayer is that the full
implementation of the United Nations framework and Resolution
2098 by all the stakeholders will put an end to recurring
cycles of violence in eastern Congo, promote peace and security
for provincial and local elections, strengthen the cooperation
for sustainable economic development for DRC and the entire
region.
Thank you for the opportunity to present my insights on
this important issue. I welcome the engagement of the
subcommittee and the U.S. Congress and I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Father Muhigirwa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rev. Prof. Muhigirwa Rusembuka Ferdinand SJ
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, members of the Subcommittee
on African Affairs, thank you for the invitation and honor to testify
before your committee. I come before you as a Congolese Jesuit priest.
The views expressed in this statement are mine. This present hearing is
particularly timely and critical for the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) due to three very recent events: the adoption of the Peace,
Security and Cooperation Framework; the appointment of a U.N. Special
Envoy to the Great Lakes; and the passage of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2098.
From 1996 to 2013, the suffering in Congo has included 5.4 million
people dead, 2 million refugees and IDPs, and an untold number of
rapes, killings, and other human rights violations. Congo is thus the
``home of the deadliest conflict since World War II.'' The conflict is
complex but the fundamental problems remain the same: poor governance,
unresolved grievances, competition for natural resources, and outside
interference. There is a new window of opportunity due to recent events
that offers the United States, the United Nations, and the rest of the
international community the chance to help end this terrible conflict
for good.
The important and positive recent events started on February 24,
2013, in Addis Ababa, when a Peace, Security, and Cooperation (PSC)
Framework for the DRC and the region was signed by 11 Heads of States
or their Representatives, together with the Secretary General of the
United Nations, the Chairperson of the African Union, the Chairperson
of the Southern African Development Community and the Chairperson of
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. To fulfill one
of the recommendations of the PSC Framework, former Irish President
Mary Robinson was appointed as a high-level U.N. Special Envoy in the
Great Lakes Region. On March 28, 2013, the Security Council voted for
U.N. Resolution 2098, which demonstrates the Council's solidarity and
wish to work for peace and security in the Great Lake Regions.
The United Nations has taken the lead on a new approach to the
ongoing conflict in Congo by proposing a framework agreement among 11
countries in the region (known as the ``11+4 mechanism framework'') to
promote peace, security, and cooperation for DRC and the region, to put
an end to recurring cycles of violence, and to promote cooperation and
economic integration in the Great Lakes Region.
While this evolving framework is a positive step, it is crucial
that it does not fall back on the half-measures of past initiatives. A
comprehensive, holistic, and synchronized approach is needed for the
implementation of this framework.
From 1997 to December 2012, 15 UNSC resolutions have been made, and
7 peace agreements have been signed. All of these resolutions and peace
agreements have failed to bring lasting peace for many reasons:
lackluster implementation, lack of political will, lack of strategic
vision for the development of the region, and no sufficient financial
support from the multilateral financial institutions or bilateral
partners. This is why peace, security, and cooperation for the DRC and
the region are more remote today than 15 years ago.
In this statement, I will share my insights on the three key
issues: peace and security; democracy, provincial and local elections;
and regional cooperation for sustainable development. And lastly, and
perhaps most relevant to this committee, I will offer specific
recommendations to the DRC and U.S. Governments.
1. peace and security
There are two key priorities in the area of peace and security--
ending impunity for sexual violence and demobilizing M23.
In the context of Congo, the first priority for the restoration of
the State is the establishment of the rule of law through justice. Why?
Because without equitable and restorative justice, there can be no
genuine and lasting peace and no economic development. Sexually based
violence continues to occur because there is a widespread culture of
impunity. Perpetrators of sexual violence are not held accountable,
thus they do not fear repercussions and the victims of sexual violence
continue to suffer.
Obviously, one of the most pressing challenges is the
demobilization of the M23 and other armed groups, in the context of a
renewed stabilization strategy which should also include armed groups
active in the provinces North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga, and Orientale.
In this context, the role of the Congolese Government and Army is
clear. The government must undertake specific and concrete reforms to
organize the army and improve the living conditions of the military.
The government in Kinshasa must also pave the way for an efficient
military administration to allow the police to play its role in the
establishment of public order. They must also strengthen local
governance and resolve customary conflicts and land issues. Again, it
is also important that the DRC Government proactively begins to fight
impunity and arbitrariness in all its forms.
It is imperative that no deal includes amnesty for war crimes or
crimes against humanity. Another aspect of regional engagement should
be a ramped-up effort for dealing with the FDLR based on elements of
the 2007 Nairobi Communique.
2. democracy, provincial and local elections
Given the lack a credible electoral process in November 2011, what
is urgently needed is the restoration of the confidence of the
Congolese people in the electoral process through the restructuring of
the electoral commission to ensure real independence, fairness, and
transparency of the provincial and local elections.
The delay in holding local elections hinders the emergence of
grassroots democracy. Without local governance, there is a significant
negative impact on peoples' perceptions of the authority of the State,
leading to an identity crisis, hindering the social reintegration of
demobilized combatants and the fight against the proliferation of armed
groups.
The U.S. Government has an important role to play in ensuring that
the DRC Government reestablishes its legitimacy. First, we must work
with them to establish in an inclusive manner a realistic and credible
timeline for the elections and to ensure that the electoral process is
monitored and evaluated closely. One particular thing to flag is that
we must be sure the political space is open and that the political
opposition is allowed to operate and air their views freely.
DR Congo is engaged in a process of restructuring the Independent
National Electoral Commission (CENI). We must learn from the faulty
2011 elections and build the capacity of the new CENI in order to
establish a credible and realistic timetable for local and provincial
elections, taking into account the financial and logistical constraints
and the stipulations of the electoral cycle. We also must promote the
participation of all stakeholders and develop a rigorous scheme for
electoral integrity.
The U.S. message should be clear: the Government of DRC must use
2013 to prepare and organize to hold both provincial and local
elections in 2014--ideally at the same time. In November 2016, only the
Presidential and legislative elections will take place.
The major financing of the elections will be provided by the DRC
Government, but the support of the international community should be
complementary and should specifically include the following: support
for training through the electoral training school in Central Africa
(EFEAC); civic and voter education; supporting election monitoring by
civil society and political parties; strengthening the capacity of
those mechanisms charged with electoral dispute resolution and media
regulation; and lastly, logistical support to CENI.
3. regional cooperation for sustainable development
Regional cooperation should be based on regional economic projects
for sustainable development. The U.S. can promote and support financing
(through international financial institutions) for those economic
regional projects that incorporate the regional interests of all
parties. If well-conceived and well-managed, Economic Community of
Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) projects in the area of roads, rail,
energy, gas, oil, mining, and fisheries could reduce tensions,
competition, and become an important factor in stabilization and
economic development. This process should also seek input from the AU,
the ICGLR, SADC, and Congolese civil society.
4. specific recommendations
1. To the U.S. and the broader international community
In 2006, the U.S. Senate passed the ``Democratic Republic of the
Congo Relief, Security and Democracy Promotion Act.'' (Public Law 109-
456, SEC 101 and 102) When considering recommendations for the United
States Government, many of the priorities outlined in this legislation
still resonate today. That law specifically mentioned the need for
rehabilitation of the national judiciary to enhance the rule of law,
the importance of combating corruption and the need to institute
economic reforms to promote development. The legislation also mentioned
the need for the U.S. to support security sector reform, including the
army, military, justice system, and police force. These are still the
key necessary preconditions for peace and stability in the region.
Taking that into consideration, the U.S. and broader international
community should:
--Support the Peace, Security and Cooperation framework by financing
integrating projects between the DRC and neighboring countries;
--Organize a donors' conference on the DRC and the Great Lakes Region
where the international community would demonstrate its financial
commitment to support institutional reforms and cross-border
economic initiatives;
--Sustain a renewed commitment by bilateral partners to remain engaged
in supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region,
including with appropriate means to ensure long-term
sustainability; and
--Assist the DRC Government in developing a robust monitoring and
evaluation mechanism for assessing progress.
2. To the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo should:
--Create a robust monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess
progress in a transparent manner by a multistakeholder group,
including the international partners of the DRC and DRC civil
society;
--Promote a concerted effort by governments and companies to
demilitarize mining areas in the Kivus to promote clean trade,
which should comply with the ICGRL measures, OECD and U.N.
standards, governments, and companies to deny funding to
belligerents, create better working conditions for artisanal miners
and build investor confidence;
--Expand use of the credible mechanism for certification and
traceability to monitor conflict-free minerals to export to
downstream and end-users. This mechanism for certification and
traceability to monitor conflict-free minerals is financed by USAID
and BGR and coordinated by the ministry of mines and PROMINES. Work
has shown that 55 artisanal mine sites out of 82 assessed have been
validated as free from child labor and illegal taxation.
Thank you for the opportunity to present my perspective on this
important issue. I welcome the engagement of this subcommittee and the
U.S. Congress and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Father, for your testimony today.
Mr. Borello.
STATEMENT OF FEDERICO BORELLO, DIRECTOR, INVESTMENTS, HUMANITY
UNITED, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Borello. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, Senator
Durbin, on behalf of Humanity United, a private philanthropic
institution that tries to build peace and advance human
freedom, I thank you very much for inviting me to testify on
the critical situation in eastern Congo.
After years of international apathy toward the region, a
new crisis, provoked by the M23 and supported by Rwanda, seems
to have shaken concerned international policymakers into
action. Like my colleague and like you, Chairman, I welcome the
Peace and Security Framework, the appointment of Ms. Mary
Robinson, and the renewed mandate and enhanced mandate from
MONUSCO. However, very little has changed on the ground yet.
In the past, the United States and the international
community have prioritized reactive and short-term initiatives
and refrained from confronting the deep and uncomfortable
political issues that are at the root of the region's ongoing
conflict. We must not let that happen again. We cannot choose
among the full range of recommendations that are contained in
my written statement, many of which have been already mentioned
by my colleagues, although in each of these areas, there are
concrete and realistic first steps that could be taken to make
progress. Only by addressing all these issues simultaneously
and comprehensively can we support the Congolese people to
break this 20-year-old cycle of violence.
Let me outline a few key areas including reforms needed at
the regional, national, and local level.
First, regional issues must be addressed. The
noninterference pledge formalizing the framework must be fully
implemented and Rwanda's determination to create and support
abusive rebel groups in the Congo must be broken at all costs.
In parallel, significant efforts are needed to promote greater
regional economic progress along the line of what my colleague,
John Prendergast, has suggested and to address Rwanda's
concerns with the FDLR rebel group based in eastern DRC
according to a DDR plan that I outlined in my written
testimony.
Second, national issues must be addressed. The increasing
focus on Rwanda's role does not excuse the Congolese
Government's near total failure in fostering good governance
and the rule of law. The following reform needs to be urgently
launched: security sector reform, accountability for war crimes
and crimes against humanity, comprehensive land reform, and a
democratization process as described in a recent paper by
Gambino and Weissman that I respectfully request be added to
the records of this hearing.
Senator Coons. Without objection.
Mr. Borello. Thank you.
Third, local issues must be taken head on. Offensive
military operations by the new MONUSCO Intervention Brigade
must be accompanied by a revamped disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration program, and most importantly, by a state-
sponsored intercommunity dialogue process in the Kivus.
Ultimately, it is up to the Congolese Government, civil
society, and people to identify the solution to the violence
that continues to plague their country once external
interference ceases. However, the international community and
the United States in particular can play an important role in
facilitating this process. My testimony outlines 10
recommendations for the United States which I hope we can
discuss during the hearing. But let me highlight five in
particular.
First, as already mentioned first by you, Chairman, and by
my colleagues, a high-level envoy is urgent and the No. 1
priority, someone with the political stature, experience, and
skills necessary to engage at the highest level with regional
Presidents and the U.N. envoy.
Second, the United States must fully support Ms. Mary
Robinson as she tries to hold governments accountable to their
pledges and closely coordinate in the development of benchmarks
for both regional and national commitments as outlined in the
Peace and Security Framework.
Third, the United States, under the leadership of its own
envoy, should redefine its political and aid strategy toward
the region and hold the DRC and Rwanda accountable to agreed-
upon benchmarks.
Four, the United States, in close coordination with the
United Nations and other donors, must commit to technical and
financial support for long-term and sustainable security sector
reform in the DRC.
Five, the United States should continue to provide strong
support to the creation of an internationalized judicial
mechanism to prosecute serious human rights abuses, including
sexual- and gender-based violence, in the DRC.
In conclusion, in diplomatic circles, one often hears that
we have tried everything in the Congo and nothing works. I
strongly reject this defeatist attitude. We have not tried
everything.
Since 2006, after a relatively successful electoral
process, the international community has drifted toward purely
military and technocratic solutions to deep-seated political
problems. We have prioritized an increasing militarization of
MONUC and MONUSCO and its checkered relationship with the
Congolese military and powerlessly witnessed the creation of
new armed groups and the continuing abuses of the Congolese
Army. We have built buildings to house institutions, but forgot
to build the institutions themselves. We have rightfully
applauded Rwanda's spectacular recovery from the ashes of
genocide, but we have stayed silent for too many years about
its abuses in the Congo. We have provided technical and
financial support to the 2011 DRC elections but silently
witnessed as massive fraud voided them of any significance. For
these reasons, we failed the Congolese people.
We now need a comprehensive process that creates incentives
for Rwanda to stop supporting armed proxies, for the Congolese
Government to start the overdue process of reforming its ailing
national institutions, and for local communities in eastern DRC
to stop supporting armed groups to further their grievances.
For this, a sustained, robust political process led by the U.N.
envoy and supported by the U.S. Government and this committee
is the best hope we have had in a decade to help move this
region and its people toward peace and prosperity.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Borello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Federico Borello
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and other members of the
subcommittee, I would like to thank you very much for inviting me to
testify on the critical situation in eastern Congo and for your
continuing attention to the plight of ordinary men, women, and children
in this troubled part of the world.
My name is Federico Borello, and I am Director of Investments at
Humanity United, a private philanthropic institution that strives to
build peace and advance human freedom. I have been working on and in
the Great Lakes Region of Africa since 2002, in the fields of human
rights promotion, transitional justice, and conflict prevention.
After years of international apathy toward the region, a new
crisis, this time provoked by a rebel movement known as M23, seems to
have shaken concerned international policymakers into action. Now is
the time to turn promising but vague commitments and principles into
action. Though this crisis manifests itself acutely in eastern Congo,
where civilians have lived in an almost perpetual state of violence
since 1993, the solution to the problem lies in a sustained and
comprehensive approach that looks at the regional, national, and local
dimensions of this conflict.
Three recent developments have helped to shape the current
opportunity for progress. First, the recent Peace, Security and
Cooperation Framework (hereby ``the framework'' or ``11+4 framework'')
signed in Addis Ababa on February 24, 2013, though it has its
weaknesses, correctly identifies the need for such a comprehensive
approach. Second, the appointment as U.N. Special Envoy to the region
of former Irish President Mary Robinson, a proven leader with the
appropriate political stature, experience, integrity and commitment to
human rights and accountability, could prove a vital contribution to
the cause of bringing peace to the region. Finally, the redefinition of
the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) and its newly
enhanced strength can help the battered peacekeeping mission to become
more effective in protecting civilians and bringing stability to the
region. Combined, these measures offer an unprecedented opportunity to
comprehensively tackle the root causes of conflict and violence.
However, very little has changed on the ground yet, and there is a
serious possibility that the United States and the international
community will repeat past mistakes. There is a real risk that the
international community will not fully attend to all critical aspects
of the crisis, squandering this opportunity by continuing to engage in
a superficial and reactive way, taking cosmetic, short-term, and half-
hearted initiatives but refraining from focusing on the deep and
uncomfortable political issues that have defeated all efforts to bring
peace to the region until now. This has been the modus operandi of the
international community over the last two decades in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), one of reacting to the symptoms, rather than
the causes, of the problem, and always focusing on short-term measures
in reaction to successive crises, rather than seeking to implement
durable solutions.
This scenario would be a new variant of past attempts and would
result in the resumption of aid to Rwanda, the restoration of
legitimacy to a much-weakened President Kabila, and the rehabilitation
of the public image of MONUSCO. The Congolese people, however, would
see no end to their misery. Further, the U.S. taxpayer would have to
shoulder the burden of paying for MONUSCO for years to come, given that
the perpetuation of conflict in this context is almost inevitable.
Today, we are not one day closer to MONUSCO's safe withdrawal than we
were in 2006 when Congo held relatively successful national elections.
The U.S. Government and others in the international community must
not allow this unfortunate scenario to happen. The administration and
Congress must reevaluate the current approach by the United States and
move away from ineffective and short-term policies toward a long-term
strategy. Deep and sustained political and economic engagement is
sorely needed by the U.S. Government, the U.N., the African Union (AU)
and the donor community, to gradually but radically change regional,
national, and local dynamics and incentives for governments and
communities in the region.
In my testimony, I will lay out the steps that must be taken at the
regional, national, and local level to create a sustainable resolution
to the challenges in the DRC, and I will conclude with a series of
recommendations for the U.S. Government.
Unfortunately, we do not have the choice to prioritize among these
recommendations, or the other elements I will address in my testimony.
Only by addressing them simultaneously and comprehensively can we
support the Congolese people to break the 20-year-old cycle of
violence.
i. actions to be taken at the regional level
A. Implementation of noninterference pledge
The 11+4 framework is very clear: all countries in the region have
committed ``not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring
countries'' and to ``neither tolerate nor provide assistance or support
of any kind to armed groups.''
Rwanda is the unnamed main target of this provision, having been
the primary supporter of some of the largest insurrections in eastern
Congo over the past two decades. After 15 years of regrettable
tolerance, reports documenting the extent of the Rwandan Government's
support to the M23, including in its creation and the occupation of
Goma, coupled with reports documenting the extent of M23's atrocities
against civilians, led to an unprecedented wave of international
condemnation, and the suspension of aid by several donors. These
decisions by members of the international community were initially met
with defiance by the government in Kigali. In recent months, however,
we have seen signs that international pressure in general--and these
sanctions in particular--are starting to produce the intended effect,
and may eventually produce lasting change in the Rwandan Government's
attitudes and actions in the region, provided that pressure and intense
scrutiny are maintained over the next few months and years by the
international community. On the one hand, there has been no major
Rwanda-supported military offensive by the M23 since the occupation of
Goma, but on the other hand there have been credible reports over the
past 2 weeks about the movement of armed troops and supplies from
Rwanda to Congo in support of the M23. In this context, the surrender
of Bosco Ntaganda to the International Criminal Court through the good
offices of the United States was a notable success of this pressure,
but it would be premature to declare victory and assume that Rwanda's
determination to support abusive armed groups in Congo has been broken.
Donors, including the U.S. Government, are mulling over the
appropriate benchmarks that need to be agreed upon to resume aid to
Rwanda. Some donors have prematurely already partly restored aid. I
would strongly urge that the United States and the members of this
committee make the dissolution of the M23 the main precondition for
restarting aid. As has been documented by the U.N. Group of Experts and
various nongovernmental organizations, the M23 has been created,
trained, supplied, and directed by Rwandan officials, and its leaders
regularly travel to Kigali when summoned. It is now the Rwandan
Government's responsibility, and fully within its power, to push their
proxy group to depose of their arms. This is not in any way a call for
the Rwandan Army to go back into Congo, as it did in 2009, and arrest
M23 leaders, but rather a call for Kigali to use its considerable
political leverage to convince the M23 to lay down their arms. The M23
should go through a rigorous Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) program, just like any other armed group, in
accordance with the principles outlined in section III below.
Several times in the past, Rwanda formally committed to not create
or support armed groups in eastern DRC, but it has repeatedly broken
these promises. Using this diplomatic window of opportunity, we must
now ensure that this is the last time. The U.N. Group of Experts will
continue to be a vital source of information on documenting outside
support to armed groups, and its mandate will need to be renewed for at
least another few years.
In order to address Rwanda's legitimate security concerns, a
renewed effort for dealing with the Armed Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR, from its French acronym) rebellion, which continues to be
based in the eastern Congo and terrorizes civilians, should be
launched. The new MONUSCO Intervention Brigade (IB) could be tasked
with conducting targeted operations against the FDLR leadership, in
strict compliance with international humanitarian law and with
MONUSCO's protection of civilians mandate. However, a purely military
solution would be insufficient, and the governments of the DRC and
Rwanda should launch a new, comprehensive process to address this
challenge. This should include:
The publication of the list of suspected genocidaires by the
Rwandan Government (as agreed in a 2007 agreement between the
Governments of Rwanda and DRC);
The possibility of third-country resettlement for leaders
not charged with genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity;
Supporting the return, demobilization, and safe
reintegration of the FDLR to Rwanda if they have not committed
crimes;
Better information-sharing between the United Nations, the
Congolese Government, and Rwanda regarding the remaining FDLR
troops;
Public denunciation and, if appropriate, prosecution of
FARDC officers collaborating with the FDLR; and
Ramping up U.N. sensitization efforts of FDLR combatants to
induce them to demobilize and reintegrate civilian life.
Finally, the international community needs to be mindful of other
regional players, such as Uganda. Uganda's historical involvement in
the eastern Congo is well-known. Though Rwandan influence has been the
largest factor in the development of the M23, we need to ensure that
other countries do not fill what they may perceive to be a vacuum and
benefit from a decreased footprint by Rwandan actors.
B. Regional economic progress
In parallel, significant efforts are needed to promote greater
regional economic progress. The international community should back
projects that demonstrate the benefits of regional peace and stability
and help create mutually beneficial economic interdependence, possibly
through the creation of a World Bank Fund. Such a Fund could help
countries in the region adopt a common legal framework to facilitate
cross-border trade and provide funding for projects that would benefit
the entire region, such as in the electricity and mining sectors.
Developing new approaches to further economic progress in DRC and
Rwanda needs to be done in consultation with local communities along
the two sides of the border and not imposed through a top-down approach
by regional governments and foreign donors. The 11+4 process needs to
develop new solutions to the needs of these communities and generate a
win-win mentality over the riches that should bring prosperity in both
countries. As Ms. Robinson carries out her work, she needs to be
particularly cognizant of the concerns of local communities in Congo in
this regard. Given that the conflict has led to individuals outside
these communities benefiting from the wealth of eastern Congo,
proposals to foster improved economic cooperation will be greeted with
concerns that they are, in fact, an effort to normalize an unfair
status quo. Communities in eastern Congo need to be convinced that any
economic arrangement is in their long-term economic interest and will
help both their own peace and prosperity.
ii. actions to be taken at the national level
The increasing focus on Rwanda's role in destabilizing its neighbor
should not lead us to be oblivious to the Congolese Government's near
total failure in creating functioning institutions and establishing at
least the foundations of the rule of law. Eliminating Rwanda's
destabilizing influence in the east is merely a necessary precondition
to resolving the internal root causes of the conflict, which lie in
longstanding governance failures.
The November 2012 rape of at least 126 women in Minova, South Kivu
province by retreating Congolese army units, and the most recent
involvement of other units in ethnic clashes in Kitchanga, North Kivu,
which left at least 55 civilians dead, prove once again that the
Congolese Army (know by their French acronym, FARDC) are as abusive as
any armed group roaming eastern DRC and terrorizing the civilian
population.
The following reforms need to be urgently launched:
Security sector reform: The reform of the security sector, starting
with the army and the police, is the most urgent priority. Bilateral
train-and-equip approaches, including the U.S. Government's, should be
reevaluated and where appropriate suspended, in order to forge a
multilateral, comprehensive reform strategy. The Congolese Government,
supported by the U.N. Envoy, MONUSCO, and its main donors, should
develop a comprehensive proposal to create an effective and accountable
security sector, in consultation with wide sectors of civil society.
Any effort must include, and possibly start with, a vetting process to
exclude alleged human rights abusers from all security services. The
development of a concrete, realistic, and participatory army and police
reform plan should be the first benchmark against which Kinshasa's
commitment to the 11+4 framework should be evaluated.
Judicial reform and accountability: Bosco Ntaganda's recent
surrender to the International Criminal Court was an important
development for justice and accountability for the DRC. However, it is
just the tip of the iceberg. The creation of an internationalized
judicial mechanism to end impunity for serious human rights violations
should also be a top priority for Kinshasa. It is clear that, despite
the competence and the valiant efforts of some of its members, the
Congolese judiciary still does not have sufficient capabilities,
resources, and independence to resolutely break the cycle of impunity,
which is closely correlated to the cycle of violence. National
legislation on mixed Congolese-international chambers within the DRC's
judicial system should be supported and funded so such a mechanism can
be established at the earliest possible time. This should be a second
benchmark.
Democratization, decentralization, and local elections: The
complete stalemate in the democratization agenda, and the failure to
hold local elections are also a cause of serious concern. I would like
to refer to an excellent paper recently published by Anthony Gambino
and Stephen Weissman, which includes concrete and practical
recommendations, and respectfully ask that this paper be included in
the record of this hearing.
Land reform and natural resource management: Some of the other
urgent priorities are comprehensive land reform and the creation of a
more accountable and transparent natural resource management system.
Donors should support the nascent land reform process led by the
Congolese Ministry of Land Affairs, which was launched in July 2012
with USAID support. In the context of this process, the government has
developed a roadmap and is setting up a Steering Committee that would
oversee the reform process, whose ultimate goal is to give land tenure
security to individuals and businesses. It is also imperative that
donors coordinate their efforts among themselves, and ensure that this
process is ultimately structured to deliver security of tenure over
land to the largely agrarian poor communities in eastern DRC, thus
eliminating a major grievance of many such communities, which often
leads them to lend support abusive armed groups.
President Kabila, by signing the framework agreement, has formally
committed to undertake most of these reforms. However, there are few
reasons to assume that the Congolese Government, after stalling on
these reforms for a decade, will suddenly take a keen interest in their
implementation. Its main diplomatic offensive during the negotiations
of the framework agreement has been aimed at excluding donors and civil
society from the proposed ``national oversight mechanism,'' set up
under the framework to monitor the Congolese Government's compliance
with its obligations to conduct a set of crucial institutional reforms.
The revised mechanism includes only the Congolese Government, which is
now solely responsible for overseeing itself. In my view, this weakened
method to monitor the Congolese Government's performance of the
benchmarks in the framework agreement is a notable flaw in an otherwise
important step toward regional peace. It is imperative, regardless of
the terms of the agreement, that donors and civil society be brought
back into this mechanism, or that an alternative and truly independent
and effective monitoring mechanism is set up to review the DRC
Government's compliance with its obligations under the framework and
agree on consequences to be imposed for failure to meet those
obligations.
The role of Ms. Robinson in overseeing the implementation of the
entire framework, and not only of the commitments of regional
governments, is therefore crucial to ensure the success of the 11+4
framework. With no progress at the national level, any progress made on
other levels will be undermined, if not lost altogether.
iii. actions to be taken at the local level
Cutting Rwanda's support for illegal armed groups and launching
crucial reforms at the national level are necessary but insufficient
measures to bring peace to eastern Congo. The lawlessness and
proliferation of armed groups require energetic measures to restore
security to Congo's eastern provinces.
Three simultaneous local-level processes are needed to bring some
stability to eastern DRC: (1) military operations by the MONUSCO
Intervention Brigade; (2) a revamped Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) process; and (3) a serious intercommunity dialogue
process.
The creation of the new MONUSCO Intervention Brigade, authorized in
the recent U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098 on MONUSCO, can prove
to be a positive development, and there are already signs that armed
groups are concerned about its imminent deployment. The Brigade's
military operations, to be conducted in strict compliance with
international humanitarian law and with MONUSCO's protection of
civilians mandate, should target the leadership of all armed groups
(M23, FDLR, Congolese Mai-Mai groups, other foreign groups). In
execution of the new MONUSCO mandate, the IB should also conduct
targeted operations to arrest those against whom authorities in Congo
or elsewhere have issued arrest warrants.
However, it is necessary to learn lessons from past failed attempts
to use foreign forces to bring peace and stability to this troubled
region.
First, absent any serious reform and sufficient accountability for
past human rights violations, MONUSCO should carefully reevaluate its
support to the FARDC and joint operations with them, particularly
because this army continue to behave just like many other armed groups
in the region. The Brigade may want to consider conducting operations
on its own, at least until concrete safeguards are created
to prevent the FARDC from perpetrating abuses during or after joint
military operations.
Second, any purely military approach is destined to fail. Such
targeted military operations would weaken and demoralize armed groups
members, and encourage them to lay down their weapons. However, it is
imperative that a new DDR program is conceived and implemented, ideally
prior to the beginning of the IB's military operations. Such a program
would organize the combatants' vetting, training, integration, and
deployment, and offer alternative opportunities to rejoin civilian
life, such as road construction projects or other work opportunities.
These projects should be funded by the international community in part
for several years, and include a mix of former combatants and
civilians, so that the perception is not created that economic
opportunities are reserved for former combatants, but are rather
available to communities as a whole.
A new DDR program and strategy should also ensure that those
responsible for serious abuses are not integrated into the army but
instead arrested and brought to justice. Finally, those who do wish to
join the army and fit the criteria should be trained and then deployed
into army units throughout the country; they should not remain in units
operating in their former area of operation as an armed group.
Finally, a serious process of intercommunity dialogue is necessary
to address the legitimate community grievances that have previously
moved many communities to lend support to abusive armed groups. Such a
process, if accompanied by the crucial reforms mentioned in section II
above (particularly land reform and decentralization) would focus on
cutting the links between communities and armed groups and work to
prevent future instances in which communities resort to violence to
accomplish their interests. Local, mostly NGO-led initiatives have
tried to stimulate intercommunity dialogue. The government, with the
support of the international community and MONUSCO in particular,
should institutionalize and expand such dialogue initiatives, within
the framework of the revised International Security and Stabilization
Support Strategy (ISSSS), a joint U.N./donors effort that serves as the
main vehicle for international support to the DRC's own Stabilization
and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC), launched in
June 2009. The ISSSS, revised in 2012, is a program aimed at supporting
the establishment of sustainable security forces and the consolidation
of state authority in eastern Congo. All donors wanting to contribute
to the stabilization effort in eastern DRC are expected to do it within
the ISSSS framework.
iv. recommendations for the united states and the international
community
Ultimately, it is up to the Congolese Government, civil society and
people to find a solution to the lack of governance and violence that
continues to plague their country, once external interference ceases.
Only a national process of dialogue over reform and reconciliation, in
which all actors assume their responsibilities and decide to work
toward peace, can change the current dynamics and move the country
closer toward peace.
Nonetheless, the international community and the United States in
particular can play an important role in facilitating this process.
1. The U.S. should appoint a high-level Presidential Special Envoy
to the Great Lakes Region, with the political stature, experience, and
skills necessary to engage at the highest levels with regional
Presidents and the U.N. Envoy. Given the relatively neutral profile of
the United States in the region's history and strong relations with the
key parties, the appointment of a high-level U.S. Envoy would signal a
renewed and stronger political engagement with the crisis to regional
governments. Such a position would enable the United States to develop
a long-term strategy and policies tailored to the regional dynamics
that require complex solutions. The Special Envoy must closely
coordinate with U.S. embassies in the region to ensure that the
position would enhance, rather than hinder, coordination across the
U.S. Government. This position must have broad authorities, sufficient
staff in Washington as well as in the region, and resources to execute
their duties both bilaterally and multilaterally. Ultimately, the right
U.S. Special Envoy can be a force multiplier, tipping the scales where
Ms. Robinson needs support and helping to coordinate donors who need to
be brought along to influence the DRC and Rwandan Governments. It
should be noted that there is strong bipartisan support in both the
Senate and the House of Representatives for the appointment of a
Presidential Special Envoy.
2. The United States and its allies in the international community
must fully support Ms. Mary Robinson as she tries to hold governments
accountable to their pledges. Given that the lack of political will in
both Kigali and Kinshasa is the main obstacle to peace, a political
process led by an experienced and principled politician is sorely
needed. The U.S. Government, therefore, should insist that both the
regional and the national processes fall under Ms. Robinson's watch.
While it is clear that she will preside over the regional oversight
mechanism, the language in the framework is more ambiguous when it
comes to the national reform process, which is probably more important
and complicated than the regional process.
3. The U.S. should closely coordinate with Ms. Robinson in the
development of benchmarks for regional and national commitments. In the
case of national commitments, Ms. Robinson should develop these
benchmarks in cooperation with MONUSCO, and in both cases in full
consultation with governments and civil society in the region as well
as with key donor governments, including the United States. The
benchmarks must be public and transparent. A wide variety of
stakeholders, particularly local civil society groups, should be able
to submit observations through clear mechanisms on the countries'
progress in meeting the benchmarks. Donors should also be part of the
process of developing benchmarks and monitoring progress, possibly
through the already existing International Contact Group on the DRC.
4. The United States, under the leadership of its own Special
Envoy, should redefine its political and aid strategy toward the
region. In this regard, the U.S. Government and other donors, acting in
a coordinated way, must be prepared to hold all governments,
particularly the DRC and Rwanda, accountable to their pledges and the
agreed-upon benchmarks, if necessary by suspending or modifying aid
programs. Aid to Rwanda should not resume until the M23 threat has come
to an end, and all future aid should be tied to Rwanda's commitment not
to support armed groups in neighboring countries. Evidence of such
support gathered by the U.N. Group of Experts or other reliable sources
should then automatically trigger the suspension of U.S. aid again. The
United States should also be ready to sanction Rwandan officials found
to be responsible for supporting rebel groups. In the case of Congo,
aid should be tied to progress in the benchmarks on national reforms
identified above.
5. The United States should never again refrain from airing
publicly its concerns over current and future violations of
international obligations by all governments in the region. The policy
of quiet diplomacy initially employed by the United States vis-a-vis
Rwanda in mid-2012 proved to be ineffective. After months of ignoring
private threats and warnings by their international partners--and
indeed even increasing support to the M23--it was only when public
denonciation was stepped up, including through a publicized phone call
from President Obama to President Kagame, that Rwanda started to
respond to international pressure.
6. The United States should strongly encourage President Kabila to
include donor governments and civil society in the national oversight
mechanism envisaged in the framework agreement. This is absolutely
necessary to lend credibility, competence, and legitimacy to the
national reform effort.
7. The United States, in close coordination with the U.N. and other
international donors, must commit to supporting sustainable security
sector reform, both technically and financially, over the long-term, as
described in the section above. The U.S. focus on ``train and equip''
programs and policies must be rigorously reassessed and, if necessary,
halted in order to support a multilateral, comprehensive reform
strategy. The current limited efforts at retraining some units to be
deployed in strategic parts of the country, in the absence of a
coherent vision on the future of the institution as a whole, have not
produced any lasting improvement, as we have seen once again in recent
months.
8. The United States should also provide strong support to the
creation of mechanisms for accountability in the DRC, such as the
internationalized mixed chambers described above. The existing
leadership of Ambassador Rapp in spurring the Congolese Government to
action on this point is noted and appreciated, and the 11+4 framework
provides a new opportunity to make further progress on this key issue.
9. The United States should use its influence at the World Bank to
ensure that the Bank's decisions and policies are coordinated and
aligned with the broader international effort. While the Bank is often
reluctant to engage in political processes, this is a unique and
concerted multilateral effort to which regional governments agreed, and
the World Bank is crucial in this regard. Ms. Robinson needs to know
that every major international player will rally behind her efforts, or
else the chances for her success will decrease dramatically.
As part of its work with the World Bank, the United States should
support the establishment of a fund to assist the development of the
region, particularly with joint projects that can encourage a ``win-
win'' mentality.
10. The United States should use its influence to ensure that an
appropriate new Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General,
or SRSG, is chosen by the U.N. to replace the outgoing Roger Meece. In
such a delicate phase, the mission will need to be led by someone with
political skills and clout in the region. The context calls for someone
with the profile of Ambassador William Swing, the former well regarded
SRSG during the Congolese transition of 2003-2006.
conclusion
In diplomatic circles, one often hears that ``we have tried
everything in the Congo, and nothing works. The conflict is just too
complicated.'' I strongly reject this defeatist attitude.
We have not tried everything. Since 2006, after a relatively
successful electoral process, we have privileged purely military and
technocratic solutions to fundamentally political problems. We have
supported an increasing militarization of MONUC/MONUSCO and its
checkered relationship with the FARDC, and silently watched the
creation of new armed groups and the continuing abuses by the Congolese
Army. We have constructed buildings to house institutions, but forgot
to build and develop the institutions themselves. We have rightfully
applauded Rwanda's spectacular recovery from the ashes of genocide, but
have tragically stayed silent for too many years about its abuses in
the Congo. We have provided technical and financial support to the 2011
elections, but witnessed with impotence as massive fraud voided them of
any significance. For these reasons, and because Congo has a tragic
history of extremely poor leadership, we have failed the Congolese
people, but there is nothing inevitable in this.
We should learn not only from failures, but also from past success
stories. In 2006, the Congo held relatively successful elections,
against all odds and predictions. That happened for two reasons: first,
the determination of the Congolese people to go to the vote despite all
barriers; and second, the determination of the international community
to make those elections a success. Donors remained focused and
politically engaged, MONUC led and coordinated the effort and the
messaging, and relatively free and fair elections took place.
We now need a comprehensive process that creates incentives for
Rwanda to stop supporting armed groups once and for all, for the
Congolese Government to start the long-overdue process of reforming its
ailing national institutions, and for local communities in eastern DRC
to stop supporting armed groups to further their grievances.
For this, a sustained political process, led by the U.N. Special
Envoy, and supported by the United States and this committee is the
best hope we have had in more than a decade to help move this region
toward the peace and prosperity that its people deserve.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Borello, and thank you so
much to all the four witnesses who have testified today.
We are now going to begin 7-minute rounds of questions.
And after all those different recommendations, comments,
observations, I am encouraged that all four of you have as a
common theme the idea that this is a moment--a moment when
peace is possible, when with a disciplined and engaged and
thorough international support and engagement, we might really
see the beginning of the end of what has been decades of
horrible challenge and conflict in the Great Lakes region in
eastern DRC.
So I am going to ask just a few focused questions, if I
could, to make sure I have got your recommendations clearly. If
I might first to Mr. Prendergast and Mr. Borello. Should the
United States appoint a special envoy? Would it make a real
difference? What difference would it make in U.S. policy and
what would you expect that envoy to do that would change the
future path of the DRC?
Mr. Prendergast.
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks. I think it would make a huge
difference. My understanding is that the executive branch is
pretty far along in deciding who they want, and that is great
news. As everyone has said and would say, if they had the time
to elaborate, it has to be a very high-level person with
stature so that it would be taken seriously in the region.
What to do, though? That is the key question of the four
you asked. And I feel the United States has leverage that we
are leaving on the table by not engaging more deeply. And I
think the leverage comes in the form of positive incentives and
real costs; positive incentives for peace and real costs for
those undermining peace.
In a couple of sentences, the positive incentives can
include implementation of the legislation that this very
Congress passed 2 years ago in the Dodd-Frank. By ensuring that
the regulations that the SEC has put forward are implemented
creates positive incentives for companies to ensure that on the
ground, they are not going to buy minerals that are mined
illegally and violently. It is a very simple concept. It is
supply and demand. If the demand is there for clean, peacefully
mined minerals, you are going to get a reaction on the ground,
and that is already happening. Having traveled there
extensively in eastern Congo earlier this year and seen the
effects, already, of how people are trying to reorganize, we
are going to see that increasingly.
And if the envoy as well can work to push forward working
with the companies, I think it is very important that we work
very closely--government works with the private sector and
civil society on the ground in eastern Congo--to figure out how
responsible investment can be organized because we want to see
the development of the natural resource sector in eastern
Congo. It is going to be the engine of development, as Ranking
Member Flake said in his opening statement about the enormous
potential of this country. It is going to be only unlocked if
those natural resources are exploited properly. And so having
some kind of an initiative that focuses on joint efforts to
define the rules of the game--there are no rules. There have
not been rules for centuries in Congo. People just take what
they want and with horrible cost to the Congolese people. That
is the incentives.
On the cost side, continuing to stand against cross-border
support for armed groups. If any government in the region
provides assistance to any armed group, then there has to be a
cost in terms of budget support and other assistance. The IMF
and the World Bank--we need to use our leverage in those
institutions. And we need to use our leverage to promote
transparency within Congo so that all of the governance reforms
that my colleagues talked about internally within Congo have a
better chance--stand a better chance, and they do not unless
there is some work done by the external aid agencies,
particularly the multilateral bodies, in encouraging those
reforms to occur.
Senator Coons. Mr. Borello, should we appoint a special
envoy?
Mr. Borello. Yes, thank you, Chairman.
Yes. I think the United States should appoint its own envoy
provided that that envoy has the necessary political stature to
engage directly with Presidents and with Ms. Mary Robinson. And
from what we hear, that is the kind of level that the
administration is considering.
First of all, such an envoy, as I said before, should
redefine a real long-term strategy for the United States. The
United States, like its international partners, have been
reactive. Every time there was a crisis, there was intense
engagement. Then when there seemed to be a truce or not real
peace, attention went down, and we do not have a coherent
regional strategy for the region.
Second, Ms. Mary Robinson brings an enormous political
experience and integrity and commitment to human rights. But
there is also suspicion in the region about the United Nations
and about the role of the United Nations. There needs to be
some help from the United States to such a process to make sure
that the process led by Ms. Mary Robinson succeeds.
Finally, the issue in the region is really political will.
Both President Kabila and President Kagame have shown in the
past that President Kabila is not interested in reforms and
President Kagame or the Rwandan Government is not interested in
stopping to destabilize the Congo.
Just to bring you an example, as an observer of the region,
I also read the Congolese and Rwandan press. When President
Obama called President Kagame, the change in the actions of the
Rwandan Government happened overnight. All the articles in the
Rwandan press, the coordinator of the group of experts--that
very belligerent and aggressive tone was really measured and
toned down as a result.
Senator Coons. In your view, our intervention, in terms of
accountability for Rwanda's role in this, has made a
difference.
Mr. Borello. It has been. It could have been stronger. I
think the aid suspended was only $200,000, but combined with
the actions taken by the World Bank, by DFID, the U.K.
development agency, and others have started to change----
Senator Coons. And a key role a special envoy could play is
to insist on accountability for the DRC and for Rwanda and to
implement this regional peace.
Mr. Borello. Exactly.
Senator Coons. If I might, Father Muhigirwa, before I run
out of time in my first round. A number of witnesses have
testified about the importance of Dodd-Frank of U.S. action on
conflict minerals. What role are the NGOs--the nongovernmental
organizations--on the ground in eastern Congo playing in moving
away from a conflict-based extractive mineral system that fuels
and funds rebel groups toward one that is more sustainable,
more legal, and contributes to the regional economic
development you spoke of?
Father Muhigirwa. Thank you for the question.
The first thing I would say is that when the Dodd-Frank Act
was published, we had a meeting in Kinshasa with the bishop
conference and some NGOs, and it was welcomed because in a way,
in Dodd-Frank you have this provision that is going to bring
peace by cutting the source of financing the rebel groups.
But what we have seen is that some mining companies mainly
from the United States taking into account that they had to
report to the Security Exchange Commission, according to what
was in the law. Somehow it happened--a kind of embargo. People
were afraid that when they will take the minerals from the
eastern Congo, it was not sure that this mineral will be free
from conflict. So there had been the discussion from the
promulgation of the law and the regulations.
And what we have noticed is that now there is a progress
from what is going on on the ground. We know that the work
being done by USAID and especially their section on mining and
also PROMINE that is working with the World Bank and the
Minister of Mines--we know that there are mining sites that
today are free from conflict, that we have, I think, 52 out of
82 that are--you do not have children who are being employed.
And also those minerals that are being exploited are free from
conflict, and also there is no illegal taxation. So I think
there is progress going on, and this should be, let us say,
reinforced. What could be then also is the building capacity of
the people who are involved in this area. That means the mining
companies and also civil society.
Senator Coons. Father, could a partnership between--Mr.
Prendergast suggested a responsible investment initiative of
investors from the United States and outside. Could that, in
partnership with NGOs and with the good work USAID is doing--
could that make further progress toward producing a conflict-
free mineral system?
Father Muhigirwa. Yes, I would think so because when you
see what is going on in Katanga, for example, where you have
people--Freeport McMoRan and when you see what is going on in
the South Kivu with Banro, the Canadian mining company, you
have in North Kivu not a single mining company. And this is why
there is a lot of trouble going on. This is why rebel groups
are coming in, and they are occupying mainly where you have the
mines. And so I am thinking that--and I am recommending this--
if you can have major U.S. mining companies coming into North
Kivu and investing, it will be a way of also bringing peace in
the region.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Father.
I am out of time.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. I enjoyed the testimony.
With regard to the United Nations and their presence, you
mentioned that MONUSCO's mandate had been changed. Mr.
Dizolele, what was the mandate and what is it now? How has it
changed? And with the new mandate, would the United Nations
have been able to help prevent the situation in Goma?
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you very much, Senator Flake.
The mandate has primarily changed. One, it has been
extended. Typically that is what we do every 6 months. But two,
the key change is the setting up or the pending setting up of
an intervention brigade which will use force to go after
targeted militias. This will be a force that will be made of
primarily African countries but under the leadership of the
United Nations. And then the appointment of the special envoy
for the Great Lakes region, the former Irish President, Mary
Robinson.
The challenge, of course, moving forward is that in many
ways the United Nations always had this mandate to protect
civilians. It is called Chapter 7 mandate. And over the years,
they have not been successful in applying it for various
reasons. We hope that the appointment or the raising up of this
new force will come with enough backing of the United States
and the other members of the Security Council so that it
performs the work that it is supposed to perform. Otherwise, it
will raise false hope for the people of the region.
Senator Flake. What precedent do we have with this kind of
more engaged force? I spent a year in Namibia when UNTAG was
there in a peacekeeping role. They did well in that role. But
the notion that they would have had an expanded role to be more
engaged would have been kind of contrary or certainly without
precedent from what the United Nations has been involved in in
terms of peacekeeping efforts. Are there are other areas in
Africa or elsewhere where we have had this kind of mandate
given to U.N. forces?
Mr. Dizolele. Senator Flake, in DRC we have stories of
success right in DRC. So in 2004, 2003, in Ituri, right just
above North Kivu, in Orientale province, there was a European
Union mission called Artemis--Operation Artemis--in Bunia, but
then you had a minigenocide underway between the Hemas and the
Lendus fighting each other, and the United Nations was
paralyzed, could not do anything to help the civilian
populations.
So under the leadership of the French, the EU appointed a
specific--they raised a force called Artemis led primarily by
the French but also supported by other countries. There were
special forces from Sweden. I think the United States actually
lent some support. And within a matter of a month, they cleared
that section.
During the elections in 2006, the international community
was worried about violence in Kinshasa. They raised a force
called L4, which was led by Germany, and actually kept the
peace in Kinshasa.
So in DRC itself, we have precedents of success stories
that we should look at as you plan to support this new brigade.
Thank you.
Senator Flake. Any others want to comment on that? Go
ahead, Mr. Borello.
Mr. Borello. Yes. I would like to point another important
development in the your solution which is a specific mandate to
arrest people indicted for war crimes--crimes against
humanity--by an international or a national court.
But I also would like to say that we welcome the creation
of this brigade. We think it can be beneficial particularly
because it comes at the same time as the political process.
Where we need to be really aware is that a purely military
solution will fail. So we need the military pressure employed
by the brigade, hopefully with targeted operation against the
leadership of these armed groups that would aim to arrest these
leaders, demoralize troops, and basically encourage them to
join a DDR program.
However, we have no real DDR program yet. So one thing that
the United States could do is to encourage both the Congolese
and the Rwandan Government for Congolese and Rwandan armed
groups to set up a new true DDR program that would welcome or
would be an alternative for these combatants.
And finally, a real intercommunity dialogue process because
we also have to be aware that many communities are supporting
armed groups to further their grievances related to land, to
their security, and to other issues. And unless we also tackle
that root cause, we are going to see new armed groups coming up
every year in the next future.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Father, go ahead and answer that question, and then I have
one more followup for you. Go ahead.
Father Muhigirwa. Thank you.
I would like just to say that there seem to be kind of
shifts in the U.N. mandate from the intervention--from the
position to the Intervention Brigade Force.
And I would add two more to what my colleagues have said. I
think this brigade will play a major role in the protection of
civilians, Congolese civilians. I think up to now, MONUSCO has
done quite a good job, but still there is a lot to be done in
the protection of the civilians. So one of the roles that this
special force will be doing is to protect more of the civilians
in the area where you have conflicts.
And the second one, which is in the Resolution 2098, is to
neutralize the M23 and the other rebel groups, as Federico has
just said. I think that is very, very important to neutralize
those groups that are really active in the area and that are
bringing a lot of human rights abuses, threats, and sexual
violence.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you.
I will ask this of Mr. Prendergast. With regard to U.S.
companies, Father mentioned that it seemed to be a positive
presence or can be from the presence of U.S. mining interests.
What has been the history--recent history--and is there
anything we ought to do here with regard to the actions of the
U.S. mining interests in the DRC to encourage them or encourage
them strongly to help out the situation? What is your feeling
as to their role so far?
Mr. Prendergast. There has been a great evolution, I think,
over the last few years. As consumer pressure has increased,
you have these conflict-free campus initiatives all over the
United States, sort of the inheritors who have saved our
foreign invisible children, another student-based movement that
is focused on electronics companies, as well as faith-based
groups. So a number of companies have started to respond to
that pressure. As Father was saying, some responsible
investment initiatives now have created connections from all
the way down to mines. So you can get a secure pipeline, supply
chain of conflict-free, legally mined minerals ending up in our
computer products, our cell phones, and all the other things
that we buy. So that is just beginning. Just beginning.
So that is our hope is that you are going to see expansion
of that because people that are mining there, the Congolese
that are mining there are getting fair value, market value for
what they mine. Those that are selling to sort of rogue Chinese
traders and others who are undermining and supporting this sort
of de facto boycott, are getting one-third, one-fourth, one-
fifth of the price that they were getting before. So I think
good practices in this case are going to incentivize because
the profits are going to incentivize additional expansion of
the zones where conflict-free mining can occur.
Senator Flake. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
This is very encouraging testimony. It broadly reflects
what I saw on the ground in Kinshasa, the great work by USAID
and the beginnings of real progress in conflict minerals.
I am pleased that Senator Durbin has joined us who played a
very central role in ensuring that the conflict minerals
provision was enacted in Dodd-Frank.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Flake and the witnesses who are here
today.
I have a couple observations and then a general question.
On the conflict minerals issue, Mr. Prendergast, I was one
of the authors with several colleagues on Dodd-Frank calling on
the Securities and Exchange Commission to set up a mechanism
whereby we could trace the conflict minerals and to encourage
American companies to do the same to reduce the likelihood that
the mining of these minerals would, in fact, finance the
killing and rape that is going on in DRC. It is unsettling not
to know whether I am carrying a conflict mineral in my pocket,
and it is important that we come to a place where responsible
corporate leaders around the world feel that this is absolutely
nonnegotiable. They have to deal with this.
I am saddened that the SEC rule, which took way too long to
promulgate, is now being challenged in court by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers,
and the Business Roundtable. But I am encouraged by the fact,
as you have reported here in The Enough Project's report, that
there are responsible corporate leaders who are voluntarily
moving forward to rid their companies of conflict minerals.
We have your publication from August of last year, and I
would like to ask you, separate and apart from this hearing, if
there could be an update so that we know which companies are
making a good faith effort and, conversely, which ones are not.
So if I could ask you to put that on your list of things to do,
it would be helpful for us who are very sensitive to this
issue.
Mr. Borello, I have been going back and forth on this
debate about the role of Rwanda in the problems in Kivu
province in DRC to the point where I think I am wasting my
time. I concede your point that when we get directly engaged
with Rwanda, good things seem to happen. That to me is proof
positive there is some linkage here. But I will not get deep
into this argument about the role of Rwanda other than to say I
do believe they play an important part in resolving the
conflict in DRC, which leads me to another point I would like
to make.
I want to talk about M23, but before I do that, I want to
say a word, a positive word, about Dr. Denis Mukwege, who
returned to Bukavu after an assassination attempt. He is one of
the heroes in this conversation, risking his life for the women
who have been so brutally raped and assaulted in DRC. I have
met him. I respect him so much. He has testified before our
committee, and to think that he has gone back after literally
facing an armed invasion, an attempt to take his life, is just
an incredible act of caring and faith in the future.
I also want to add, of course, the Lusis and Heal Africa in
Goma. Losing Lyn Lusi at one point was terrible, but I know
that her husband Jo continues the great work that they are
engaged in.
Let us go to M23. When I was in Uganda February 19, I met
with the Minister of Defense, Crispus Kiyonga, who was involved
in negotiations with M23. And I basically asked him if the West
was all wrong in its view of M23 because both at the United
Nations and in measures that I have sponsored in the Senate, we
have tried to exclude M23 in terms of travel, in terms of their
assets, in terms of where they can be, branding them as war
criminals. Now, Mr. Ntaganda stepped forward and surrendered
himself at this point.
But I really would like to know if there is a feeling here
that engaging M23 in negotiations is critical to finally
resolving the political issues and military issues of this
region or whether they should be excluded as war criminals.
There seems to be a real difference of opinion. I do not know
if anyone here would like to comment on it, but I would like to
hear your testimony. The floor is open for anyone who would
like to.
Mr. Prendergast. I think everyone wants a shot at this one.
How do you want to go? Left to right or right to left?
Senator Durbin. Go ahead.
Mr. Prendergast. Well, gee whiz. Thank you.
Let me just say one thing. Thank you so much for your
leadership on that conflict minerals stuff. We will put an
update to you, Senator, in the near future on the companies. A
quick note. Motorola Solutions, Philips, are now doing what I
described, direct supply chains. Apple is working on it. Steve
Jobs, before his death, was instrumental in changing the
company's policy on this, and now Tim Cook has carried it
forward. With respect to the jewelers, Tiffany's has taken the
lead, not unsurprisingly. So there are beginning to be real
champions standing up in the corporate sector. I wish Senator
Flake could be here because I know that he has worked a long
time with those guys.
On the M23 question, as Mvemba said, my colleague said, you
know, every one of these peace processes up till now has been
exactly what is going on right now in Kampala today, an attempt
at a back room deal where they are going to reintegrate some of
these human rights abusers, some of these rebels, back into the
Congolese Army, making it impossible to reform the Congolese
Army, creating this kind of a division within the army that
will break away again 3 years from now when someone else has an
issue. That kind of peacemaking, that strategy of peacemaking
has been proven over and over again to not work.
That is why it is so important for us to have a special
envoy from the United States to be working in support of the
building of a comprehensive peace process, where civil society
is at the table, all the different groups that represent
constituencies of the Congo are at the table, and the region is
involved because the region is a major player in undermining
stability and peace in the Congo and could be a major player in
helping to support it. It really is such a central issue. I
want to just leave it there.
The United States has to be a force for building a
comprehensive peace process and not allowing these kind of
side, back room deals, the side deals with one particular
faction trying to buy them off with positions and
reintegration, no vetting for human rights issues whatsoever,
just reinfecting the Congolese Army with a real serious human
rights problem and just continuing the kind of disempowerment
of a strong security sector that is needed for the building of
the Congolese state.
Senator Durbin. If any others would like to respond.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
I think, of course, we need to talk to the M23 like we need
to talk to everybody else. In that sense; yes. But I think
focusing on one rebel group in a country that has myriad of
them is a mistake. I mean, if we are talking about Mary
Robinson being a special envoy, if we are talking about a
comprehensive peace process, it has to have the country as a
whole as its objective. You know, just a few days ago,
Lubumbashi was attacked. So if we give such privilege and
prominence to groups like M23, which by the way has a long and
bloody history--before the M23, we had the CNDP. Before that,
we had the RCD. This is just the pedigree of one group without
counting the others.
So I think it will be very dangerous for us to go down this
road where group X sees how we treated the M23 and they say,
well, why cannot we do the same thing. So we will just go back
and fight. An initiative like Dodd-Frank will not succeed if we
take this path because while we make progress on one front,
everything will be a rival on the other fronts.
So I will say to your team we thank you for your
engagement. We think we should go further. We should do the
same principle we applied in Liberia and Sierra Leone. One of
the reasons that the Kimberly process worked was just not
cleaning the blood out of the diamond, but it was going after
the bad guys in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, going after
Charles Taylor for his involvement in Liberia, the Royal
Marines coming to Liberia to support that. So it has got to be
a convergence of something.
So the M23 is not special. If anything, we should make sure
that they do not have that platform anymore. It undermines the
framework in Addis Ababa. Thank you.
Father Muhigirwa. I will just add something on what he
already has just said. When we see the history of M23, in fact,
from RCD to CNDP to M23, from the beginning I think it was a
middle group, and because of, I would say, the killing, the
rapes, the violation of human rights, it has been known as a
negative force by the AU and the SADC organizations. And I
would say that the dialogue going on now between the delegates
of the DRC Government and the M23, I do not--that is my own
personal view. I do not expect much from that dialogue because
when you see carefully the revindication of M23, there were 21
revindications in the reports from the 23rd of March 2009. And
when you analyze them, 20 out of 21 revindications have been
fulfilled on the side of the DRC Government. So in fact, it is
empty. There is no revindication. And this is why when you see
the discourse and the speech of the leader of the 23, they are
moving from one revindication to the other. They even think to
bring other agenda which were not in the 2009 revindications.
And so I would say the outlook can be there, but one has to
take into account all those different type of groups being in
the area. There are more than 30. I mean, I was in Katanga when
the Mai Mai, the Katanga started. And so if you start with one
group, you have to take into account the others. And we know
that will come out--will be revindication at the political side
that they will want to be but of the government and also to be
having grades and promotion in the army. And that has been done
for many years, and it is not bringing peace.
Senator Coons. Let me, if I might, break in and we will
have a chance to continue on that.
On the specific issue of gender violence, of the use of
rape as a tool of war, if I could, Father, I would be
interested in your views. How do we accomplish restorative
justice? How do we accomplish accountability and the end of
impunity for gender violence? This is a critical piece of this
cycle through which all sorts of different rebel groups and the
FARDC are engaged in violating human rights and in creating an
environment of impunity and of abuse. How do we achieve justice
and accountability for gender-based violence?
Father Muhigirwa. Thank you for this question. Again, I
would like to praise Dr. Mukwege who is doing a lot in this.
Three years ago, there was a meeting here on global Congo
action. He spoke about what was going on about sexual violence.
And Archbishop of Bukaba talked about peace. And myself--I gave
a speech on the governance of natural resources.
And I think one of the key points will be, as I have
mentioned as a recommendation, to reform the judicial system
because rape and sexual violence is really evolving in a
culture of impunity. I do not know a single Congolese who has
been condemned or jailed because he has raped.
Senator Coons. And, Father, how has the 2006 sexual
violence law affected this? Has it had any impact at all, or
the lack of enforcement, the lack of training and support and
engagement by the police and the judicial system--is that the
core problem?
Father Muhigirwa. Yes, I think that is the problem. We have
to go to reinforce this, to train, and to install, even
criminals specialized in this field, as we are doing for the
trade, for, I do not know, other field. And this is going on
and it is really growing. As you mentioned, you have more than
170 or 180 rapes every week. And so the people who are raping--
they feel free. They are not, let us say, troubled. They are
not afraid of justice. So this will be going on for many years.
But once justice is doing its job and once we see--because
this is a matter of education also. When people in Congo in
communities will start seeing people who have been jailed, that
will be already a way of educating. And also naming--when you
are naming someone, when you put him on the front and this is
really someone who is raping, someone who is condemned by the
community, I think it will start helping even those who are
raping the women and the girls. So I think there is a lot to be
done, but it is still a long way.
Senator Coons. If I might, Mr. Dizolele, Mr. Borello, what
role does achieving justice in gender-based violence have in
achieving accountability and some sort of demobilization
process for all the different rebel groups from M23, FDLR,
others throughout the broader region? How critical is achieving
this kind of justice?
Mr. Dizolele.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the programs that Eastern Congo Initiative is
involved with is called Access to Justice. And what Eastern
Congo does is run clinics to give women access to just that,
justice. This will be the core, if you will, the tipping point
to end sexual violence. That will be justice because the day we
go after the bad guys, either through setting up tribunals,
special tribunals for this where it is a mixed court and others
by punishing the chains of commands of these various militia
groups including the FRDC, then we will see that change. Until
that happens--in fact, the DRC is in dire need of troop
reconciliation and justice. These are two things that rarely
come up in discussions like this. But those are key, along with
the political process, in order for us to see a turning point
in the development of DRC.
Senator Coons. So to your point, security sector reform
cannot just be the reintegration of those who have been bad
actors who need to be held accountable.
Mr. Borello.
Mr. Borello. Yes. Thank you, Chairman.
The accountability question is really close to my heart and
to my work. I worked for 10 years specifically on
accountability in the DRC with the United Nations and with an
NGO. So it is something I feel very strongly about.
First of all, on the rebel groups, we have what is known as
the revolving door for rebel groups, continued integration, and
the criminals get always the best positions. And that is what
the M23 is about. If we look at the number of officers formerly
of CNDP, many of them have not defected, have stayed loyal. Who
has defected? Those with the worst human rights record, those
with the criminal smuggling networks that need to protect their
networks. So I agree with all my colleagues. We have to deal
with M23 as like with any other rebel group with accountability
and a DDR program for combatants who have not committed abuses.
On this global accountability question, I have worked for
many years with the Congolese judiciary, and there are a lot of
people in the Congolese judiciary who are brave and competent
and would like to hold people accountable. However, I have
heard many times that that general is protected by this other
general and we cannot go after him, but we can go after this
guy.
So the United Nations Human Rights Mapping Report has
recommended in 2010 the creation of internationalized mixed
chambers, which means chambers in the judicial system of Congo
composed by Congolese and international judges, Congolese and
international prosecutors, and Congolese and international
investigators that would work together, thus building
capacities and other resources to the Congolese judiciary. As
you know, the criticism of the Rwandan and Yugoslavia tribunal
when they were sitting outside, but at the same time giving the
judges and the prosecutors that political coverage to go after
everyone.
Ambassador Rapp has been leading this effort in the
international community. Now is the time. There is a law in the
Congolese Parliament that was almost adopted in 2011. It is the
time to push for that and to push President Kabila through our
special envoy to do just that.
And if you allow me just 1 more minute, I would like to
thank you and Senator Durbin for the National Defense
Authorization Act and the provisions on accountability. And our
own special envoy could identify the names of the people who
then should be included in this list for sanctions.
Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
I hear a continuing theme that appointing a capable, high-
level special envoy. Empowering them to continue to engage
broadly in a regional, meaningful peace process but insisting
on accountability for gender violence, for war crimes and
investing in a strategic minerals system that is conflict-free
could all, in combination, really open up a positive future.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Mr. Prendergast, what leverage do we have or
does anybody have with Rwanda to get them to cooperate here?
What in their national security interest can they identify to
cooperate?
Mr. Prendergast. Well, I think the United States has a
pretty special relationship or has had a pretty special
relationship with Rwanda post 1994. I think that President
Clinton, in the aftermath of the genocide, worked very hard.
President Bush continued that. The relationship not only was
national to national but head of state to head of state. The
Obama administration has tried to do that as well.
I think the last chapter of the saga of cross-border
support from Rwanda to armed groups inside Congo in the form of
this M23 chapter was just overreach, was a bridge too far, was
a slap in the face of everyone. Having worked so hard for peace
in Congo, the United States investing almost $1 billion a year
of humanitarian and peacekeeping, all other kinds of assistance
into Congo, to have that all jeopardized and undermined and all
kinds of intelligence leading to that, it was just too much.
And I think it has affected the relationship quite
substantially in the short run between Rwanda and the United
States.
The leverage, however, is retained in a number of things.
First, there are tremendous relationships built up over the
years between people in the Rwandan Government and people in
the United States Government. That should not be discounted.
Anyone who has worked in government understands those
relationships can have a major influence over policy.
Second, though, I think the stand that the United States
took, even though it was a small one and a somewhat symbolic
one, of suspension of certain forms of assistance and then
working within the World Bank to suspend the budget support to
Rwanda I think made a very strong statement that business as
usual, which had been allowed for a long time for many
reasons--well, we are trying to counter the FDLR and all these
other reasons--was no longer acceptable. And so I think that
maintaining that principle and standing for principle on the
part of the United States that there cannot be interference
across borders in the affairs of neighbors in the Great Lakes,
the volatility is just too high as a precondition for
normalized relations I think is the key point of leverage. And
it does not always have to be a public one. It can be a very
important private one, as evinced by President Obama's
discussions on the phone with President Kagame.
Senator Flake. Mr. Dizolele, do you see a desire to have a
good relationship with the United States and the aid that
follows in connection with that--does that outweigh their
desire to have a more friendly government on its borders? Or is
the incentive there? Is it in their national security interest
to cooperate, aside from relationships or incentives, like I
said, in terms of aid and whatever else?
Mr. Dizolele. Senator, you mean for Rwanda.
Senator Flake. Yes; for Rwanda. I am sorry.
Mr. Dizolele. Well, it is hard to answer that because only
Rwandans can really answer that. But if we can look at the
history, it has been complicated because the Rwandans are not
forthcoming with the reasons of their involvement in DRC. They
have used the premise of going after the militias. If that was
the case, then when you consider the lengthy involvement of
Rwanda in DRC, which started in 1996, this issue should have
been resolved a long time ago. So it would have been great if
Rwanda will come and be much more bolder and say exactly what
in DRC. Is it because of minerals?
You know, Germany and France started their cooperation
after World War II over economics. It was about coal mining. So
there is actually opportunity for Rwanda to build a great
partnership with DRC that is not based on this partner military
approach.
So we should encourage that and I think we have heard that
theme today as well. Encourage Rwanda in becoming more
forthcoming and not playing this game of we are part of the
solution. Yes, you can be part of the solution, but for the
last 20 years, they have not really been part of that solution.
So we need to push them on that economic front as well, have
the transparency where you are looking at the issues, economic
interests.
Thank you.
Senator Flake. Mr. Borello, quickly on that.
Mr. Borello. Yes; very quickly.
Yes; regional economic integration I think is the answer.
And one idea would be to encourage the World Bank to set up a
Great Lakes fund that would look at cross-border projects, road
building, mining, hydroelectric that would create that
interdependence that is based on legitimate trade and
legitimate economic interests that would then create a strong
disincentive from continuing to support armed groups because
that would disrupt those economic activities.
Senator Flake. Father, you had mentioned that electoral
reform is needed in the Congo. What incentive there does Kabila
have to move ahead? Obviously, that might affect his ability to
perform in the next election. So what are our limits there in
terms of encouraging electoral reform? How receptive will the
government be?
Father Muhigirwa. I think there is the necessity to call
for this electoral reform because it is needed and we are
waiting for it since we had only regime Presidential and
legislative elections. And we have not yet had the provincial
and the local elections. And if we go back to the history, even
in 2006 election, we had only Presidential and provincial
elections. So Presidential, legislative, and provincial
elections. So up to now, we have not yet had local elections.
That means the gradual democracy, local, I would say,
governance in terms of democracy have not yet been really
rooted or grounded into the local population.
So the push would be to say, OK, there is an urgency of
doing that. And as I was saying in my statement, the first
thing to do is to push quickly this reform of the electoral
commission. We know what has happened with the November 2011
elections, and we know that there should be and there should be
a reform of the electoral commission, the CENI. And also the
composition of the members of the CENI--we cannot have an
independent electoral commission with four members of the
majority political parties and three from the opposition party.
It cannot be independent. And this is why there is a move and a
push from the civil society to have more civil society people
in the electoral commission, and I think that could bring--I
will say that it will be less politicized--the electoral
commission--and it could go forward.
So I think that the law, the electoral reform law, has been
passed by the Parliament. It is now on the table of President
Kabila. It went to the Court of Supreme Justice. So it is in
conformity of the Constitution, and it is waiting for the
promulgation by the President. And what the Catholic bishop
said or suggested to the President is to have more civil
society people in the actual composition of the electoral
commission, and I think that would help.
Senator Flake. I hope we can do that. Typically those who
win elections do not believe there is any need for electoral
reform. It is those who lose who do. So it is a difficult
subject I know.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Flake.
If I might, I have a last question I would like to ask the
whole panel to speak to. Part of the purpose of my visit to
Kinshasa was to urge President Kabila to travel to Addis and to
sign the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and to
actively participate. That happened not as a result of my
visit, I know, but that happened.
What is it that the United States and, more broadly, the
international community can be doing to support this agreement
and to ensure that the peace process that should follow, the
negotiations should follow are inclusive, transparent,
meaningful, and actually move us toward a real peace process?
Several of you have referenced that the previous efforts at
peace have been rushed, have been militarized, have been short-
term, have not addressed the underlying reasons for conflict.
And we have discussed at length gender violence, rapes and
sexual violence, conflict minerals, the repeated challenges to
the region, DRC's failures of governance, Rwanda's
interventions, all the different things that contribute to
sustaining decades of horrible conflict in the region.
What are the things the United States can do now that will
make the biggest difference in ensuring that this peace process
is different, that this peace process works and it addresses
the underlying causes of conflict? If you might, just from
right to left. That may be our closing comments from each of
the witnesses.
Mr. Prendergast. Thanks very much again for the thoughtful
questions.
I think two things for the United States.
First, it is the envoy when, not if, that person gets
appointed, they help support Mary Robinson and the key actors
in the Great Lakes to create a new forum, a comprehensive forum
that addresses some of these interstate problems. That does not
really exist. Francis Dangler has come here before, the South
Sudanese diplomat, and said what is not said is what divides.
And these real serious economic issues--I am going to get to
this point in a second--are underlying issues between the two
states and security issues between the three states actually,
Uganda, Rwanda, and Congo, need to be addressed and there needs
to be external support and facilitation for those new
agreements to operationalize what this framework says.
But I wanted to double back again and pound another point
home, if I can. The biggest incentive for peace I think that
exists for both Rwanda and Congo and for Uganda, for that
matter--the biggest incentive for those folks, the leaders in
those countries to move toward a peace process--and this is
where the United States holds a lot of cards and has not been
playing any of them--is to promote sustainable and responsible
investment, bringing the companies together, the private
sector, bringing the civil society, the NGOs together and
bringing those governments together to talk about, well, what
would the risks and opportunities be for responsible investment
in eastern Congo. How can we create policy incentives that will
help support responsible investment to allow for these
countries.
The engine for development of the Congo is obviously
natural resources, but that is also the engine of development
for future economic growth in Rwanda. It is cross-border. It is
like Mvemba said. The economic--and Father said--the economic
support through transportation, through cross-border trade,
electricity, all these kinds of issues, but more importantly
through the exploitation of resources. The private sector has a
huge role to play in that. American private sector, European
private sector, bringing them together and helping to support a
responsible investment initiative.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast. Thank you for
your leadership and for your testimony. Thank you for that
insight.
Mr. Dizolele.
Mr. Dizolele. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again
for hosting us today and for your continued interest.
I think I started by saying that the case is not all lost,
especially when you look at the role of the civil society in
DRC. We believe at Eastern Congo Initiative that our grantees
and our partners in the region will not know peace until the
political crisis is solved. And it is imperative for us as the
United States to look at Congo as a whole. We work in eastern
Congo, but the problem that we are facing in eastern Congo are
symptoms of the larger problem. And civil society across the
country has been working at this. So encourage the United
States to continue putting pressure on our actors in this
framework of peace to live up to the obligation they have
agreed to live up to.
Congo is a big country with nine neighbors. So there is
obviously a problem if continuously the only two neighbors that
are at loggerheads with the Congolese causing all this death
that we have been talking about, this kind of calamity. So we
need to put pressure on those neighbors, continued pressure.
They have maybe some legitimate concerns. But like Father was
saying earlier, most of these concerns are not so clear and, to
use the vernacular, are bogus. So we need then to support the
Congolese people in diffusing the crisis, and the crisis will
be diffused--start being diffused not only with security sector
reform but with the political reform. We need to hold the
elections, municipal and provincial, to help reestablish some
legitimacy to the process. And then the Congolese can take care
of what they need to take care of.
We need to push our diplomatic mission in Kinshasa to step
up to the plate. Over the years, traditionally Kinshasa had
been a very important posting for diplomats. We used to send
our best diplomats there. People like Melissa Wells, people
like Robert Oakley, they serve in Congo. But we have seen over
the years that the diplomatic post has not received the same
attention. So to support this process that we are talking
about, we need to raise that power that the U.S. Embassy has
and start acting like it is representing the United States.
So I thank you again for your support, and I think that
will be enough from me. Thank you.
Senator Coons. Father Muhigirwa.
Father Muhigirwa. Thank you, Chairman, for the question.
I would add only two things.
The first one will be to implement the DRC Relief, Security
and Democracy Promotion Act in section 102 which says that the
United States is called to support the security reform,
including the army, military, and justice system and the police
force in DRC. I think if that is implemented, it will help to
bring up a lasting peace.
The second recommendation would be in the Resolution 2098,
it asked the DRC Government to create the rapid reaction force.
I would recommend that the United States help the DRC
Government to create, to establish this rapid reaction force.
Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Father.
Mr. Borello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The framework requires the creation of clear benchmarks,
both for the implementation of regional and for national
commitments. I think the United States should support Ms.
Robinson in developing such clear benchmarks with the
participation of local civil society. So Ms. Robinson should be
encouraged to go during her trips to the region to really
consult civil society on the development of these benchmarks.
And then we need to help her to have the governments of Congo,
Rwanda, Uganda, and others accept these benchmarks. And
finally, we have to monitor compliance with such benchmarks and
be prepared to impose consequences for lack of compliance.
Let me give you just one example. We, at Humanity United,
are trying to think for Ms. Robinson some of these benchmarks.
For example, the FDLR Rwandan rebel group. What could these
benchmarks be? Well, Rwanda should publish the list of people
suspected of genocide from 1994, thus making it clear to the
FDLR who is wanted and who is not. Then the Congo should
publicly denounce its own army's alliance with the FDLR and
arrest and prosecute its own officers if they are found.
Sensitization efforts with the FDLR should be ramped up, et
cetera, et cetera. These are clear and concrete benchmarks that
could be agreed and the United States could help and then their
implementation could be monitored.
And finally, we need to make sure that the United Nations
appoints the right team to support Ms. Mary Robinson. She
cannot do it alone, as we know. And so we need to be sure that
proper experts and the appropriate number of experts are
appointed to her team.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much. I would like to thank
all four of our witnesses, those who have traveled long
distances and those who have come from nearby, for your
engagement, your service, your leadership, and your insight on
these issues.
I would like to thank Senator Flake and Senator Durbin who
joined us today. And I very much look forward to working
together to address these pressing and important issues in the
very near future. Thank you very much.
We will leave the record open for a week for any members of
the committee who were not able to join us who wish to submit
questions for the record.
With that, this hearing is hereby adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Paper by Anthony Gambino and Stephen Weissman submitted for the record
by Federico Borello
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Eastern Congo Initiative Report Submitted for the Record
by Mvemba Dizolele
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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