[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-71]
U.S. ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 11, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Douglas Bush, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, December 11, 2013, U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic
Considerations Related to People's Liberation Army Naval Forces
Modernization.................................................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, December 11, 2013..................................... 23
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2013
U.S. ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Cropsey, Dr. Seth, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute............... 6
Erickson, Dr. Andrew, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies
Institute, U.S. Naval War College.............................. 2
O'Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 4
Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments............................ 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cropsey, Dr. Seth............................................ 67
Erickson, Dr. Andrew......................................... 31
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 27
McIntyre, Hon. Mike.......................................... 29
O'Rourke, Ronald............................................. 47
Thomas, Jim.................................................. 74
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 89
Mr. Langevin................................................. 105
U.S. ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 11, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:34 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. I would like to welcome everyone to our
Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee hearing today on
the People's Liberation Army [PLA] naval modernization efforts.
This is a continuation of the Asia-Pacific oversight series
that the full committee kicked off last month.
I want to apologize to our witnesses for the delay, based
on those votes, but thank you for your patience.
In just a few weeks, recent developments in the East China
Sea have demonstrated that improving our understanding of
regional events and key players is critical to assuring our
allies and partners of U.S. commitment to the region and
protecting U.S. interests. Tensions in the East and South China
Seas have been ongoing now for several years as China attempts
to exert its influence in claiming land, sea, and airspace that
is clearly beyond their internationally recognized borders.
While naval modernization is a natural development for any
seafaring nation such as China, it is clear the modernization
is emboldening the Chinese Government to exert their interests
by bullying their neighbors and pushing back the United States
in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, it is also critical that
we exercise congressional oversight of those requisite U.S.
Navy capabilities that will be needed to counter any anti-
access and area-denial capabilities the PLA Navy is rapidly
developing as they modernize and expand their fleet.
We also must understand how to engage with the PLA Navy in
a manner that is constructive for all parties involved and
demonstrates respect and adherence to established international
norms of maritime conduct. I hope our witnesses can provide
insight to these key issues.
I would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses
for appearing before the subcommittee today. And we have
testifying before us Dr. Andrew Erickson, associate professor
at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War
College; Mr. Ronald O'Rourke, specialist in naval affairs at
the Congressional Research Service; Dr. Seth Cropsey, senior
fellow at the Hudson Institute; and Mr. Jim Thomas, vice
president and director of studies at the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments. We look forward to your testimony.
And with that, I would like to turn to my good friend Mike
McIntyre, but I understand he is not here. So, Mr. Courtney, I
will recognize you for any remarks you would like to make
sitting in for Mr. McIntyre.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, my friend and chairman of the
subcommittee, Mr. Forbes, for holding this hearing. In many
ways, this is one of the most topical subject matters that we
could have for the Congress.
Mike had prepared some opening remarks. So, again, what I
would just ask is unanimous consent to submit those for the
record and look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, we will make those part of
the record.
I would also like to recognize my good friend and co-lead
for our Asia-Pacific series, the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms.
Colleen Hanabusa, for any remarks she may have.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very
brief.
I just want to say that one of the things that a good
friend of mine who has passed and a great mentor, Senator
Inouye, told me, I think it is very appropriate for these
hearings. He had said to me, he says, you know, after World War
II, the United States dominated the seven seas. He said, if we
do that now, he says, I would be really surprised. He says,
but, he says, never forget the one thing: We will always
dominate the deep blue sea.
So with that, I look forward to hearing from all of you.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Colleen.
And now we will start. And I don't know which order we
want. Mr. Thomas, were you going to start, or Dr. Erickson?
Okay. Dr. Erickson, they will let you start, and we thank
you once again for your patience in being here with us, and we
look forward to your remarks.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW ERICKSON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CHINA
MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Dr. Erickson. Chairman Forbes, Congressman Courtney,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity. I am testifying as an individual, not as a
representative of the U.S. Navy. While I have submitted a
detailed statement for the record, allow me to highlight the
issues I believe are most pertinent to the subcommittee's vital
work.
In contrast to ongoing limitations, shared interests, and
even opportunities for cooperation far away, China's navy and
other services are achieving formidable anti-access/area-
denial, A2/AD, capabilities closer to shore. Beijing seeks to
wield this growing might to carve out in the Yellow, East, and
South China Seas an airspace above them, a zone of
exceptionalism within which existing global security, legal,
and resource management norms are subordinated to its parochial
national interests. This threatens to weaken the global system
on which all nations' security and prosperity depends, and to
destabilize a vital but vulnerable region that remains haunted
by history.
To ensure that Beijing cannot use force or the threat of
force to change the status quo in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S.
must maintain military capabilities to deter any threatening or
aggressive actions by China, even as the two nations cooperate
in areas of shared interest. Given the inherent defensiveness
of the U.S. approach, it should be possible to meet core
objectives at an affordable price through the most critical
timeframe, likely over the coming decade, with a bottom-line
strategy of deterrence by denial.
Washington must be careful not to compete with Beijing in
excessively expensive and ultimately ineffective arms
competitions. It should not counter China's A2/AD weapons by
attempting to acquire a more sophisticated counter in each and
every instance. It must also avoid the temptation to embrace
approaches such as mainland strikes that would be unduly
escalatory or counterproductive and lack the credibility to
deter Beijing through their threatened use over issues in the
East and South China Seas, given a disparity of national
interests. A distant blockade, also escalatory, is likewise
unfeasible because of the logistical difficulty of
implementation in a dynamic commercial world.
Instead, as China works to deny U.S. forces an ability to
operate close to the mainland, the U.S. aim at a minimum should
be to deny China the ability to resolve territorial and
maritime disputes by the use of force. To resolve disputes
conclusively, China would have to seize and hold territory as
well as resupply its forces. This is inherently difficult on
small islands, where geography imposes vulnerability.
To demonstrate that China cannot achieve this, and thereby
deter it from ever trying to do so, the U.S. and its allies
should maximize disruption capabilities, their own form of A2/
AD. The U.S. should, therefore, develop, deploy, and
demonstrate in a measured, targeted fashion the capability to
deny China the ability to seize and hold offshore territories.
Here some pages can be taken from China's own A2/AD playbook.
Military capabilities are based on a complex system of
hardware and software. Amid this, certain platforms and weapons
offer disproportionate benefits, including submarines,
missiles, and sea mines. The tight fiscal environment and
threat timeline places a premium on deploying and maintaining
existing platforms and weapons systems with proven technologies
in limited numbers as rapidly and effectively as possible.
The most promising approach is to hold and build on
formidable U.S. undersea advantages to which China lacks
effective countermeasures and would have to invest vastly
disproportionate resources in a slow, likely futile effort to
close the gap. It is, therefore, essential to ensure the
present two-a-year construction rate of Virginia-class nuclear-
powered attack submarines, SSNs, ideal for denying the ability
to China to hold and resupply any forcefully seized islands.
The Virginia payload module allows for useful increases in
missile capacity. Given China's ongoing limitations in
antisubmarine warfare and the inherent difficulty of
progressing in this field, China could spend many times the
cost of these SSNs and still not be able to counter them
effectively.
Additionally, more can be done to better equip U.S.
platforms, such as submarines. The U.S. should do far more with
missiles, particularly with anti-ship cruise missiles. Recent
tests of the long-range anti-ship missile, LRASM, represent a
step in the right direction, but more ought to be done in this
regard. Offensive naval mine warfare is another underexploited
area that offers maximum bang for the buck.
U.S. submarines can oppose any Chinese naval forces engaged
in an invasion, resupply, and protection. Long-range air or
missile delivery can blow any lodgement off disputed islands or
rocks. To be sure, both U.S. SSNs and LRASMs and Chinese A2/AD
forces could achieve denial effects. Long-range surface-to-air
and air missiles from both sides might hold air operations over
the features in question at risk, prevent continuous
operations, or even fully create a no man's land. U.S. forces
other than SSNs might not be able to operate without assuming
great risk and hence be denied unfettered access. But Chinese
forces would also not have access and would thereby be denied
their objective of seizing and holding disputed territory.
Demonstrating this to China would be an effective
deterrent. Beijing could not afford to risk the likelihood of
not achieving its objective in this regard. By adopting this
deterrence-by-denial strategy, the U.S. can continue to
preserve the peace in the Asia-Pacific, which has prospered
during nearly seven decades of American protection. No other
nation has the capability and lack of territorial claims
necessary to play this still vital role.
Thank you very much for your attention and for your
continuing support for U.S. seapower. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Erickson can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Dr. Erickson.
And, Mr. O'Rourke, we welcome you back to this committee,
and we appreciate your taking the time, look forward to your
remarks.
STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Forbes and Representatives Courtney,
Hanabusa, and Conaway, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss China's naval modernization effort.
Chairman Forbes, with your permission, I would like to
submit my statement for the record and summarize it here in a
few brief remarks.
Mr. Forbes. Each of our witnesses' statements will be
submitted, without objection, to the record.
Mr. O'Rourke. Top-level U.S. strategic considerations
related to China's naval modernization effort include, among
other things, the following: preventing the emergence of a
regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another; preserving
the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World
War II; fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations; shaping the Asia-
Pacific region; and having a military strategy for China.
China's naval modernization effort appears aimed at
producing a regionally powerful navy with a limited but growing
ability to conduct operations in more distant waters. A near-
term focus of China's naval modernization effort has been to
develop military options for addressing the situation with
Taiwan.
Observers also believe that China's naval modernization
effort is increasingly oriented toward additional goals,
including the following: asserting or defending China's
maritime territorial claims; enforcing China's view that it has
the legal right to regulate foreign military activities in its
exclusive economic zone; protecting China's sea lines of
communications; protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals in
foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific;
and asserting China's status as a major world power. Consistent
with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to
be capable of acting as an A2/AD force.
China's actions in recent years have suggested to some
observers that China is pursuing an overarching goal of gaining
greater control of China's near-seas region and of breaking out
into the Pacific. If China were to achieve a position of being
able to exert control over access to and activities within the
near-seas region, it would have major implications for top-
level U.S. strategic considerations. It would constitute a
major step toward China becoming a regional hegemon, pose a
significant challenge to the preservation of the post-World War
II international order, and substantially complicate the
ability of the United States to fulfill treaty obligations to
countries in the region and to shape the region's future. It
would amount to a fundamental reordering of the Asia-Pacific
security situation.
Some observers have posited that China's growing
capabilities will at some point compel U.S. Navy surface ships
to remain outside China's A2/AD perimeter. That is far from
clear, however, as the Navy has numerous options it can pursue
for breaking the kill chains of China's maritime A2/AD weapons.
Electromagnetic rail gun and high-powered lasers can be the
U.S. Navy's own game changers for countering Chinese
capabilities.
To field such systems, the Navy would need to not only
continue their development, but also procure ships with
integrated electric drive systems or some other means of
providing enough electrical power to support them. The Navy's
30-year shipbuilding plan currently does not include any
surface combatants that will clearly have enough electrical
power to support lasers with more than a certain amount of
strength.
The geographic expanse of the Asia-Pacific and the
potential advantages of being able to outrange Chinese systems
when needed may focus attention on the option of acquiring
long-range to carrier-based aircraft, such as the UCLASS
[Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike]
manned aircraft, and long-range weapons such as the long-range
anti-ship missile and a long-range air-to-air missile.
Navy attack submarines can operate effectively well inside
China's surface and air A2/AD perimeter. This can focus
attention not only on the procurement of Virginia-class attack
submarines, but also on other options for expanding the
capabilities of the attack submarine force, such as the
Virginia payload module.
Operations by Chinese Coast Guard ships for asserting and
defending China's maritime territorial claims close to the
Philippines often go uncountered by equivalent Philippine
forces because the Philippines has relatively few such ships.
This may focus attention on the option of accelerating actions
for expanding and modernizing the Philippines maritime defense
and law enforcement capabilities.
None of this precludes cooperating with China in maritime
operations in areas where the two countries may have shared
interests, such as antipiracy operations, search-and-rescue
operations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response
operations. Such operations can provide an opportunity for
demonstrating to China the benefits that China receives from
the current international order and China's interest in
preserving that order.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again
for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to the
subcommittee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
Dr. Cropsey.
STATEMENT OF DR. SETH CROPSEY, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Dr. Cropsey. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Courtney,
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to speak
before this committee. Thank you for your invitation.
As dangerous as the threats posed by jihadism are, so far
they don't approach the risks of open confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union in the cold war. But the
likelihood is that we will again face a larger challenge than
the one the jihadists now present. No one is a better candidate
to offer such a challenge than China, which is not to say that
China is an enemy, or to predict that China will become an
enemy. But it is clear the Chinese leaders are ambitious, and
that their diplomatic policy and their military armament are
moving them toward great power status, or at least regional
hegemony, in a series of small steps designed to achieve these
ends with minimal resistance from their Pacific competitors,
America's allies.
The U.S. is not taking this possibility as seriously as it
should. This is different from the America of the 1920s and
1930s. The generation that had experienced a World War learned
the hard way why strategy was needed to be prepared for
whatever the future might bring. Then, U.S. anticipated a
potential future threat from Japan and acted to prepare for
such a threat. In what was known as, as you know, War Plan
Orange, U.S. military leadership devised and tested its
strategy for a potential conflict with Japan, which evolved
with new technology and tactics during the interwar period. It
incorporated the critical roles of aircraft carriers and
submarines, amphibious warfare, an island-hopping campaign, all
of them new, in any potential Pacific conflict.
The linchpin of this plan was the doctrine of ``advanced
base'' strategy, the idea developed and exhaustively tested
during the interwar period that a Pacific conflict with Japan
could be won by securing the outlying archipelagos and islands
of the theater. This would take place by amphibious assault
that would secure American bases from which to launch offensive
operations further and further into enemy territory. At the
same time, it would deny the enemy territory from which to do
the same. The result, the U.S. military had a strategy when the
conflict broke out, one whose familiarity to officers improved
its execution, and which was, in fact, highly successful.
We have no such strategy toward China today.
Diplomatically, the closest we have come is the long-standing
effort that existed since the administration of George H.W.
Bush to persuade China to become a stakeholder in the
international system. One of the most fundamental principles of
that system is respect for untrammeled navigation through
international waters and airspace.
The events of the past few weeks, as China declared an Air
Defense Identification Zone over a large section of the East
China Sea, show that they have no such respect. So, while
efforts to persuade China to become a stakeholder in the
international order should not be abandoned, we ought to
understand that those efforts have proved of limited value in
generating any positive effect on Chinese international
behavior. To the extent that any American strategy hangs on our
and the international community's attempt to transform China
into a state that accepts the general principles of the
international order, it has been a failure.
The Obama administration's much publicized pivot to Asia is
not a strategy for dealing with China. It is an idea which, if
sensibly implemented, would preserve and increase our influence
in the region. But so far all the hard power of the pivot is a
minor element of the administration's preference for using soft
power. The hard power consists of a Marine contingent in
northern Australia that remains much smaller than the
envisioned 2,500 Marine rotational force, eventually 4 littoral
combat ships to be based in Singapore, and, as you know, a U.S.
military budget that is being whittled away at a rate that
alarms our allies in Asia and the rest of the world.
A successful pivot to Asia would require more cooperation,
especially with our Asia treaty allies, the most important of
which is Japan. In the current and potentially risky matter of
the People's Republic's recently declared Air Defense
Identification Zone, Japan had said, as you know, that its
commercial airliners would not identify themselves when passing
through the airspace in question. At the same time, the State
Department of the United States has urged American commercial
flights to comply with the zone. I would not call this
cooperation.
China, by its own admission and actions, wants to deny us
access to large parts of the Western Pacific. The Defense
Department's response, a large part of it so far, has been a
set of ideas, as you know, called the Air-Sea Battle [ASB]. The
ASB itself is a plan for greater cooperation between the
military services in gaining access where a potential enemy
would deny it. Much like the pivot, or rebalance, it is not
based on a strategy, and it is not a strategy toward China. In
fact, as you know, it makes no mention of China.
China's leaders are more tolerant of risk than the Soviet
leaders were. The ASB talks about blinding a potential enemy's
surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence capabilities. In
China's case, this would mean striking targets on the mainland.
The wisdom of this should be questioned. But the U.S. is not
doing anything to turn even that idea into a strategic plan.
There are other possible strategic approaches to the same
problem of access denial; however, the first question that
needs to be considered is what is the objective of any strategy
toward China, and my colleagues here have already mentioned
that. I agree with them. The answer is the same as our
objective in World War I, World War II, and the cold war. In
each of those, our objective was to prevent the rise of a
hegemonic power on the European Continent. With China, our
objective ought to be to prevent the rise of an Asian hegemon,
a power that would destroy the current U.S. alliance system in
Asia, dominate the world's most populous region economically
and militarily, and perhaps extend itself into Eurasia and
beyond.
As in the U.S.'s experience in Europe, our first diplomatic
objective in executing a strategy that seeks to prevent the
rise of an Asian hegemon should be to establish an alliance of
like-minded nations. This is very difficult because of ancient
enmities in the region. But as the threat from China grows,
current realities might eclipse fear. An important part of U.S.
strategy toward China should be to prepare the groundwork now
for such an alliance, one which establishes contingencies for
repatriating allied business interests on the mainland back to
allied countries, so as to exert economic pressure on the PRC
[People's Republic of China] in the event of a conflict.
As for the immediate problem of access denial, which does
indeed require strategy to counter, there are approaches which
don't require an attack on China's mainland. One would be to
destroy the Chinese Navy at sea. Another would be to impose a
blockade on Chinese merchant and naval shipping. Like the ASB,
neither of these are being looked at as possible military
strategies toward China, nor, as Dr. Erickson pointed out, the
idea of denying them use of the islands, the disputed islands.
What is clear is that any strategy to counter China's
increasing access-denial capabilities should prioritize
deterrence--which means readiness, sustainability, and
overmatching firepower and defense--and be built upon an
integration of the ground forces necessary to control the
outlying islands, archipelagos, littorals, and straits of the
Pacific with the naval and air power necessary to control the
air and seas. Such a strategy should also include an increased
focus on missile defense to protect civil and military
infrastructure, sea and airports, and mobile warfare
capabilities. And it should, I think, above all, be designed to
give the U.S. the power to assemble a durable forward defense
in the event of a long war.
But however one regards these strategic ideas, the fact
remains that we don't have any strategy toward the most
populous nation in the world, one whose economic strength is
considerable and in tandem with the military power its leaders
are gradually accumulating to match their ambitions. My
colleagues who are testifying here this afternoon are offering
a thoughtful account of the hardware and tactics that support
those ambitions. This needs to figure in our strategy as
clearly as it does in China's.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee,
Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cropsey can be found in the
Appendix on page 67.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Thomas.
STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF
STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Thomas. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, let me add my thanks
for convening these important hearings and inviting me to
testify today. I will discuss key priorities for the PLA's
naval modernization program and then turn to their implications
for U.S. and allied operational and force planning.
To begin, I think it is worth recalling just how far the
PLA has come over the past decade. Chinese defense spending has
increased from an estimated $45-$60 billion in 2003 to $135-
$215 billion today, roughly 25 to 40 percent of what DOD
[Department of Defense] spends annually on our defense. Unlike
the United States, however, with its competing global security
responsibilities, China is able to focus its resources almost
entirely on supporting its regional counterintervention
strategy, which emphasizes the buildup of anti-access and area-
denial, or A2/AD, capabilities and its ability to conduct
short, decisive campaigns before an outside party like the
United States could intervene effectively.
A decade ago China was also heavily reliant on Russian
assistance and its armaments, but has increasingly shifted
towards indigenous design and production. It is rapidly
building up a modern submarine force while retiring its older
submarines. Its advanced guided-missile destroyers represent a
major improvement in fleet air defense and, along with advanced
submarines, will allow China to protect its aircraft carriers
while pushing its naval perimeter farther out into the Pacific.
China is also fielding an armada of fast, smaller
combatants armed with anti-ship missiles. Their numbers could
create a significant tracking and targeting problem and make it
far more difficult for foreign surface forces to safely
approach within 200 nautical miles of China's coast.
The PLA Navy also now operates more than 100 modern land-
based strike fighters, equipped with sophisticated avionics,
sensors, and advanced air-to-air as well as anti-ship missiles
that could be used to overwhelm the defensive countermeasures
of U.S. and allied naval forces operating within their reach.
Finally, although it is not technically part of its naval
modernization program, China has placed priority on the
development of an anti-ship ballistic missile. The DF-21D
[Dong-Feng 21D] reached initial operating capability in 2010
and has a range exceeding 930 miles. Its maneuverable warhead
is optimized to attack large surface combatants, such as
aircraft carriers, underway.
The cumulative effect of all of these modernization efforts
is that the military balance in the Western Pacific is shifting
perceptibly, while U.S. costs to project power into the region
are rising. There is no single silver-bullet approach to
preserve the regional military balance. No one action alone can
do it. Instead, the United States and its allies will have to
undertake a combination of efforts to demonstrate their
defensive strength in the face of China's challenge, including
steps to, number one, counter hostile communications, command
and control, computers, and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance networks by being able to conduct operations to
degrade them, disrupt them, or spoof them. These efforts would
help to reduce the PLA's ability to effectively employ their
missiles against friendly forces. Ideally, this could be done
with nonkinetic activities that don't require strikes on the
mainland of China. But at the same time, I think it is probably
imprudent to rule out such strikes as they contribute to our
deterrent.
Number two, we should be able to sustain operations inside
hostile A2/AD envelopes by hardening our airbases against
attack, improving our air and missile defenses, including with
next-generation air defenses, as Mr. O'Rourke discussed, such
as solid-state lasers and electromagnetic rail guns. It will
also require the development of novel operating concepts as the
U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps are now pursuing to facilitate
distributed air operations from cluster airbases and ad hoc
forward arming and refueling points for short-takeoff and
vertical-landing aircraft.
Number three, our forces will also need to be able to
operate from beyond the range of hostile A2/AD networks. By
increasing the range and payload and stealth of our carrier as
well as our land-based aircraft, the strike payloads of our
submarine force, and also developing newer long-range missile
systems for both land attack and anti-ship missions, such as
the long-range anti-ship missile.
Number four, I believe our forces will need to build up
allied and partner anti-access and area-denial capabilities to
defend their own sovereignty by conducting air and sea denial
operations, especially around the first island chain and in
Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps in
particular may have prominent roles to play in helping build up
partners' air and sea denial capacities.
And last, number five, I think the United States does need
to be able to be prepared to conduct peripheral operations by
capitalizing on the U.S.--the United States air and naval
mastery beyond the reach of potential adversaries' A2/AD
systems to conduct indirect, peripheral operations, like
distant blockades.
In closing, PLA naval modernization and the contested
maritime environment it is creating offers a lens for
evaluating U.S. strategic choices in a time of austerity with
the objective of ensuring the U.S. military prioritizes the
most viable elements of its forces to remain in the power
projection business. That is why these hearings are so
important.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the
Appendix on page 74.]
Mr. Forbes. We thank all of our witnesses.
I am going to defer my questions until the end. So I am
going to recognize Mr. Conaway for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
Mr. Erickson and Mr. O'Rourke both talked about just the
mere presence of a very strong submarine capability would
somehow influence the Chinese to not put soldiers on all these
outlying islands that they are trying to claim. But yet at the
same time, we have just recently seen that they very
effectively said--declared an air superiority zone that has now
threatened commercial air traffic. And I guess commercial air
traffic has actually left the area, and we are still running
our planes through there.
Two questions. One, what did you think the Chinese were
trying to accomplish by the air superiority issue and--not
superiority, but--the air dominance or assertion of airspace,
what were they trying to accomplish with that? And how do you
distinguish that bold move and our lack of response there to
what a potential landing on one of these small rocks out there
that is currently uninhabited and us actually using a submarine
to do whatever it is you two guys think we would do to stop the
Chinese in that regard?
Dr. Erickson. Yes, Congressman, you have raised two very
important issues here. And I think we have seen a very
regrettable approach from China in terms of how they rolled out
their Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ] in the East China
Sea. I think this is related to a larger effort that I
described to try to establish a zone of exceptionalism within
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, an
area in which they can try to subordinate international norms
that undergird the effectiveness of the global system to their
own national interests in a way that is not in concert with
international law.
I think there already has been a positive element of U.S.
response. The B-52s being dispatched from Guam, I think, sends
a very clear message that an ADIZ does not give one the right
to regulate others' freedoms in that airspace.
I think it is a different issue when we are talking about
what submarines can deter and what submarines can do vis-a-vis
these disputed territories whose status should not be resolved
through the use of force or the threat of force. The capability
of submarines speaks to operational situations that go beyond
the peacetime scenario that we are seeing with the Air Defense
Identification Zone. So demonstrating, if necessary, in a
worst-case scenario the ability to use these submarines to
prevent and to stop and to roll back that kind of seizure of
territory, I think, can nevertheless be quite effective.
Mr. Conaway. How will they prevent stopping?
Dr. Erickson. The use of the submarines and their
affiliated weapons systems can literally, if necessary----
Mr. Conaway. The system has got to be fired. You can't just
simply pop up on the top of the ocean there from a submerged
position and stop something; you have actually got to go
kinetic, don't you?
Dr. Erickson. Yes. If necessary, as a last resort in a
worst-case scenario, that is exactly what the submarines are
good for. And even better news is the fact that demonstrating
that credible capability should be enough to prevent China from
engaging in the behavior that would necessitate such a
response. I think that is how the U.S. can preserve deterrence
and keep the peace in the region, even with this tremendous
uptick in Chinese A2/AD capability.
Mr. O'Rourke. I think the commentary about the ADIZ has
included speculation as to various goals that China may have
had in mind in announcing the zone. A lot of the commentary
mentioned the fact that it was intended, as these people saw
it, in part to strengthen China's position in the dispute over
the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
A second goal that appears in a lot of the commentary is to
generally strengthen or reinforce China's influence over
activities in that part of the near-seas region generally, and
as a part of that, perhaps, to challenge the international
norms relating to freedom of operation on the high seas and
international airspace. Some of the commentaries included other
goals as well, such as driving a wedge between us and Japan or
putting the United States in the position of being a mediator.
Mr. Conaway. In your statement, do you actually see that
working? In other words, is China accomplishing their goals?
Mr. O'Rourke. The opinions right now are mixed from what I
have seen in people's reaction and commentary. Some people
think that China's ADIZ has backfired for China by angering
many of its neighbors and perhaps encouraging greater
cooperation among the other countries in that region with the
United States. Other people see that China has had some
success, because, frankly, they don't care about that as long
as they achieve their goal in terms of establishing a new
reality on the ground or in the air.
The question you relate to earlier about the role of
submarines has to do with the fact that this is very much a
three-dimensional game: It is taking place in the air; it is
taking place on the ground, in the case of these territories in
the near-seas area; and also on the water and under the water.
It is taking place in connection with wartime scenarios and
scenarios that are short of full war, such as what we are
seeing with the generalized pressure and initiatives that China
is placing on its neighbors regarding how it would like to see
its disputes with these territories resolved. The submarines
play in part of that, and they don't play in other parts. So it
depends on what your scenario is.
Mr. Conaway. My time has expired. But I don't see China
being unduly impressed with our air capabilities and, hence,
this air identification zone that they have declared. So I am
not as confident that they are all that worried about our
submarines out there.
So, anyway, thank you all for your-all's opinion. Yield
back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.
Ms. Hanabusa is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I think one of the things that I am getting from all of
your testimonies, and thank you all for being here, is that
there seems to be a lack of strategy. And you are all coming up
with different ideas, but there is no overarching strategy
about what to do.
Having said that, Mr. O'Rourke, in reading your testimony,
the thing I was struck about is that you made a clear statement
about the fact that if we go below the 306 number in terms of
our fleet, that we are going to have a major problem. Then you
go on a couple of pages later and you talk about the fleet
architecture, which then seems to me, okay, we are talking
about this number, 306, but we are also talking about with A2/
AD that what we need to start to think about is the fleet
architecture, what would be the best architecture that we would
have in the region. So can you tell me, 306, fleet
architecture, what exactly--I mean, if we had to choose between
one or the other, what would prevail between them?
Mr. O'Rourke. That is a great question. The 306 is, as you
know, not just a number per se, it is not just a one-
dimensional figure, it is a figure that has a lot of dimensions
embedded into it, including the currently planned fleet
architecture. There is a debate under way as to whether that
architecture is the most appropriate one for ensuring our
interests, especially in that part of the world, especially in
the face of A2/AD systems in the future, especially in a
situation of constrained defense resources.
That debate is under way. It has been gaining steam. How it
is eventually resolved is not yet certain at this point,
although for the time being, of course, the program of record
stands.
If we were to switch to a different fleet architecture, we
wouldn't be talking about the 306 number anymore. It would be
some other number that reflected the mix of ships that we would
then be planning at that point. If the fleet falls short of
306, and we stick with the current architecture, and this
happens because of constraints on defense, then one of the
points I made in my testimony is that the Navy at that point
would have options for trying to enhance the forward presence
of the fleet that it did have, whether that was a fleet of 280-
something or 250-something or less. Those options include a
greater degree of forward homeporting, greater use of
lengthened deployments, greater use of multiple crewing and
crew rotation. All those options have certain costs associated
with them, and they would have to be considered very carefully.
So there are trade-offs involved here.
But I think what your question does is it pinpoints the
fact that there is a nexus between the number that we might
quote and what kind of fleet that we are talking about, and
that there is a discussion under way about what that should be,
especially in the context of constraints on defense forces and
rising A2/AD capabilities.
Ms. Hanabusa. Mr. O'Rourke, in the beginning part of your
testimony, you talk about the fact that you have been following
and studying China since the 1980s. And I was surprised to know
that since 2005 your report has been amended, like, 90 times
plus. But the focus since 1980 for yourself has been China. So
given that we are here to talk about China and its naval
modernization, and that is really--if we are being honest about
what we are doing and what we are studying, that is what we are
talking about; we are talking about China's modernization and
how it affects us.
But one of the testimonies here is saying that what we are
allowing to happen to us is that China is defining what we are
then doing. So do you see that as we look at the fleet
architecture, and as we look at the number 306 or whatever that
number would be, that we are really looking as responding to
what we may foresee as a threat to China and how to best combat
that or be prepared for that? Is that what the underlying, I
guess, the threshold that we are going to be dealing with?
Mr. O'Rourke. The debate over fleet architecture has been
occasioned in part, in large part, by what China is doing and
the challenge that observers see that posing to the future of
the Navy and U.S. military generally. Not only China, though;
it has to do in part with what other countries, particularly
Iran, is doing in terms of its A2/AD forces in the Persian Gulf
region.
But, yes, that is the dynamic that we are in right now.
Other nations are rising in terms of their military
capabilities. They are doing so in a certain way, and that is
causing us to ask whether we are currently on the proper path
for responding to that.
Ms. Hanabusa. And you did mention Iran also in your
testimony. It was ``China parens (Iran)'' and ``A2/AD.'' So I
guess the question is do you see a point where the United
States is the power--we are not talking about a hegemonic
power. We are trying to prevent a hegemonic power, a hegemon,
from developing in Asia. But notwithstanding, it seems like we
are reacting to others versus others reacting to us. Would that
be a correct statement?
Mr. O'Rourke. I think that is certainly a good issue to
raise. In devising our strategy, whatever it may be, we should
ask ourselves whether we are simply reacting to what the other
side is doing or instead also posing a challenge that the other
side has to react to.
If the United States is in a situation of only reacting to
what the other side is doing, then what in the long run is the
best we can do in that situation? If we do not put into the mix
our own initiatives that pose problems for the other side, and
we restrict ourselves only to reacting to what the other side
is, how well can we do in the long run? I think that is a
question we need to ask ourselves and keep in the back of our
mind.
Ms. Hanabusa. It comes back to strategy.
Mr. Chair, I know that it is not blinking, but I am pretty
sure my time is up. Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa.
Mr. Courtney is recognized.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Erickson, when you talked about that sort of disruption
strategy as a smarter response than sort of a full-blown arms
race or, you know, tit-for-tat kind of approach to China's
buildup, undersea seemed to be sort of the domain that you, I
think, stressed was where we have an advantage and also a
better capability to employ that strategy.
You know, the Office of Naval Intelligence is saying,
however, that China is building up its own submarine fleet, and
that they are going to have 60 submarines in the relatively
near future. And I guess the question is if your strategy, you
know, is the approach that the U.S. adopts, is our inventory
adequate to execute it, even with the two-sub-a-year build rate
that you mentioned in your remarks?
Dr. Erickson. Sir, those are excellent questions, and I
think they cut right to the heart of the matter of how we
should be prepared to execute what I would advocate, the
strategy of deterrence by denial, which--I call it a bottom-
line strategy because I see as the bottom line we ought to be
able to do this. There is a lot more that I hope we could be
able to do on top of that to include peacetime shaping and
other capabilities, but at a minimum I think we need to be able
to do this to keep the peace over time in the region.
You are absolutely right to refer to analyses that suggest
that the number of Chinese submarines will continue to
increase. Obviously, the vast majority of those will be focused
on the immediate region as opposed to U.S. submarines and other
forces which are dispersed around the world. And even more than
quantity, it is the quality that will continue to increase. So
this is very significant.
What I should stress, though, is that this increased
submarine numbers and presence by China does not automatically
translate into across-the-board antisubmarine warfare [ASW]
capabilities. In fact, my colleague William Murray at the Naval
War College calls Chinese approaches to their conventionally
powered submarines making them aquatic tells or aquatic
transporter erector launchers; in other words, a large focus on
missile firing. And if you look at photographs available, you
will see some load-outs that have a high ratio of anti-ship
cruise missiles to torpedoes.
My point there is, yes, China is putting a big focus on
submarines, but I don't think that negates the points that I
was making about ASW being a major vulnerability that we can
target in this regard.
What I do think this highlights, though, is in order to
make sure we have that ASW capability, we do need to emphasize
certainly keeping the current build rate on Virginia-class
submarines. And I am not an expert on this subject per se, but
I would say look at the great studies by CBO [Congressional
Budget Office] and others. The number of U.S. SSNs in the
outyears going forward, I think, is something we have to keep
our eyes on very closely. I don't know what the exact number
is, but if that gets too low, it is really going to have a
negative impact on our ability to hold this bottom-line
strategy. And I can tell you that Chinese publications,
including some fairly serious publications, look very seriously
at these issues. So by even having these reports come out that
our numbers may get that low for SSNs, we are sending a
powerful message to China in that regard, whether we intend to
or not, and it is not necessarily a message that works in our
favor.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just as a quick addendum to what Andrew said,
even at two per year, as you know, we will experience a
shortfall in the attack submarine force in the 2020s relative
to the 48-boat force level goal that forms part of the 306-ship
fleet.
And the other thing I would say is that there is nothing
physically limiting us to two per year. Two per year is the
current program of record over the next few years before we get
into the Ohio replacement years, at any rate. But there is
nothing saying that physically that you couldn't do more than
two. You could talk about three per year if you wanted, if you
felt it was a high enough priority, if you felt that was the
right thing to do, and you wanted to shift the resources into
that.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Joe.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for being here today and sharing your insights with
us.
So obviously today's budgetary constraints are familiar to
all of us, and some of the hardest decisions that we are going
to make will be basically trade-offs between the highly
capital-intensive investments in platform modernization. And in
the context of the focus on the Asia-Pacific region and the
PLA's modernization, what military capabilities should we be
prioritizing, developing, or maintaining? And, in particular,
are we making strong enough investments in sub service and
autonomous systems as well as maybe so-called a game-changer,
next-generation technology such as directed energy and
electromagnetic rail guns?
Now, Mr. Thomas, you kind of touched on some of these
things. Maybe we could start with you.
Mr. Thomas. Thank you, Congressman. I think you already put
your finger on two of the things I put on the top of my list,
which is doing everything we can to maximize the stealth and
the weapons capacity of our manned submarines, and at the same
time accelerating development of complementary unmanned
underwater vehicle capabilities. And how these will work is
essentially an undersea family of systems, just as we are
building a long-range strike family of systems in the air
today.
I think the second area is looking at game changers in
terms of how we are going to do air and missile defense in the
future not only for the fleet, but how we will protect forces
ashore. Electromagnetic rail gun as well as solid-state lasers
are two potential directions that we could be pursuing.
One of the things that is so attractive about these systems
is, in fact, their ability to free up vertical launch system
tubes on our surface combatants so we can focus more on
offensive strike power, land-attack missiles, anti-ship
missiles, and less on the air and missile defense mission. This
is a broader concern with our naval investments as a whole,
which is increasingly we are focusing more on our own self-
defense and less on the offensive striking power that we can
bring to bear for deterrence.
The third area that I would point out really is the
transformation of the carrier air wing. How do we extend the
reach of that carrier air wing through unmanned, longer-range,
stealthier, and greater payload systems so that our carriers
can operate beyond the range of anti-ship ballistic missiles
and other threats to them and still maintain their punch?
And the last I would say is an area that is two
interrelated areas that don't get a lot of attention and aren't
terribly sexy. One is our fleet logistics that I think we are
probably underinvested in terms of fleet logistics to support
forward operations. And related to that is both the types of
munitions that we have, that we are going to need longer-range
munitions, stealthier munitions, hypersonic munitions. But we
are also going to need a greater magazine of them. And we have
got to find a way to reload our combatants, particularly our
submarines at sea, so that we can keep them on station longer.
Submarines are great, and they have a lot of advantages,
but one of them is they have a very small magazine, and they
have to return to ports. If we could overcome that problem
technologically, I think that would a game changer also.
Mr. Langevin. On that point do you have suggestions of how
we would actually undertake that kind of a----
Mr. Thomas. I am not an engineer, but I think the idea of
rather than switching out missile per tube to actually think of
entire missile sets of VLS [vertical launch system] cells that
you could switch out en masse might be part of that. But I
think we have a long way to go. It is a well-recognized
problem, but we haven't solved it yet.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke, do you have anything that you wanted to add?
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes. In terms of expanding the capabilities
of the attack submarine force, we have already talked about the
option of building Virginia-class boats, we have talked about
the Virginia payload module. There are a couple of other things
you could put on that list if you wanted to put more money into
that area, and some of which we are already doing, and that
would be to further the development of submarine-launched
unmanned air vehicles and submarine-launched unmanned
underwater vehicles to extend the eyes and the ears and the
reach of the attack submarines.
Then I also want to call out one program that already is
under way to modernize our existing Los Angeles-class attack
submarines, and that is the Acoustic Rapid COTs [commercial-
off-the-shelf] Insertion Program, or the A-R-C-I, ARCI,
program. This is a very important program for getting increased
utility out of our existing Los Angeles-class attack submarines
in terms of their sonar signal processing. It makes them better
boats, and that is important because they will continue to
constitute a large share of the attack submarine force going
many years into the future.
In terms of the air wing, we talked earlier about the
UCLASS. We have talked about the issue of payloads for their
airplanes. And one that I did call out in my testimony and I
will repeat it here is the option of a new generation of long-
range air-to-air missile. When we were encountering what was
then called the Soviet sea-denial force, and what in today's
terminology we would refer to as the Soviet A2/AD force, we had
the F-14 armed with the Phoenix long-range air-to-air missile,
and that was going to be succeeded by a next-generation long-
range air-to-air missile called the Advanced Air-to-Air
Missile, or the AAAM. That missile was under development in the
late 1980s going into the early 1990s when it was cancelled as
a result of the end of the cold war.
But if you want to extend the reach of the strike fighters
that will continue to make up a large share of the carrier air
wings alongside whatever UCLASSs we eventually deploy, then you
would want to look at air-to-air refueling for those strike
fighters, and you would also want to look at the option of
giving them a next-generation long-range air-to-air missile,
which they currently do not have. They only have a medium-range
missile. So that would be a couple of other possibilities.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. And let me move on to just one other
question. Then I will yield back.
We touched on this already, but the U.S. Office of Naval
Intelligence does project an unclassified assessment that China
will have between 313 and 342 submarines and surface combatants
by 2020. Approximately 60 of those would be submarines,
potentially, that are able to employ submarine-launched
intercontinental ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise
missiles. My question is do you believe that the projected U.S.
Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to sufficiently
counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy?
Mr. O'Rourke. That goes back to the issue I discussed
earlier about the shortfall in the attack submarine force that
we will experience in the 2020s going into the early 2030s.
That creates a period of increased operational risk for the
submarine force and the Navy as a whole. The Navy can attempt
to mitigate against that by pushing the maintenance for the
submarine into the earlier years and the later years so as to
maximize the operational availability of the attack submarine
force during that period in question, although that will also
bear costs on the submarine force in those years prior to and
after.
But that is a matter for policymaker judgment about whether
that operational risk is acceptable or not, and if it is not,
then you have the option of considering adding additional
Virginia-class boats into the shipbuilding plan. That has a
cost associated with it, and in a period of constrained
resources, doing that would mean not doing something else. That
is the trade-off that you would have to weigh and decide
whether in the end the net result was better.
Mr. Langevin. In your professional opinion, is it an
unacceptable risk?
Mr. O'Rourke. I think that in the long run, that is a
policymaker judgment. What I can tell you is that there is some
degree of risk, and that during a period of shortfall, whatever
that risk is, it will be, other things held equal, greater if
you have a period when the shortfall is in play. But whether it
is acceptable or not ultimately is something for policymakers
to judge based on the input that they get from military
professionals.
Mr. Langevin. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thanks, Jim.
I just have three questions and I would like each of your
opinions on this. The first one is this: If I could have a
little bit larger room here, and I could bring Members of
Congress and sit them over here, because obviously they have to
weigh in on the resourcing that we are going to do, and I
brought our allies over here and I sat representatives from
them there, do each of you--you were some of the best experts
we could bring on this. You write, you study, you look at it
all the time. Could any of you--I am not asking you to do
this--but could you articulate a U.S.-China strategy right now
that exists for our country, and would you be able to
articulate that to Members of Congress or to our allies?
Mr. Thomas, we will start with you.
Mr. Thomas. Well, I think the short answer is no. And I
think we don't have that strategy today. And I think it has to
be established on multiple levels. Ultimately we need a grand
strategy, which thinks about the problem from an interagency
perspective, using all instruments of national power. And this
gets to this issue of how we think about buying time and a
long-term strategic competition.
And then I think it gets down to the military dimension.
And it has to start with, you know, an understanding of what
our shared objectives are with our allies. What are we trying
to accomplish in terms of maintaining the credibility of our
security commitments and how we sustain those with the shifting
challenges that are posed by China?
And then I think it has to get down to the operational
level, and here I think it has to provide useful guidance on
how we should think about presenting China with a multiplicity
of problems that it would have to contemplate before it tried
to undertake any form of coercion or aggression.
And here, again, I would just underscore the importance of
presenting China with a multiplicity of challenges. The harder
you make this--it cannot rely on some single silver bullet sort
of solution. It is going to take the entire joint force; it is
going to take air, surface and undersea, as well as space and
cyberspace assets, I believe.
Mr. Forbes. But to the best of your knowledge, no such
strategy exists right now.
Mr. Thomas. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. All right.
Dr. Cropsey.
Dr. Cropsey. No such strategy exists. Forming one is
difficult. When President Eisenhower had the problem with the
cold war before him and the question of how to deal with the
Soviet Union, I think you know he ran the Solarium Project, and
he sat in on the meetings himself. At least that is what the
record says. Someone with that distinguished a record in
strategy felt that it was necessary to bring in a group of
advisers and talk the issue through and sit there himself.
Probably something like that is needed right now. If you are
asking what I think we should do----
Mr. Forbes. Well, I will come back to that another time. I
just want to know if we have got one right now.
Dr. Cropsey. We do not.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. I will give you a two-part answer to that.
One is you have the option of examining the classified war
plans that we have for that part of the world, and you can
decide whether those war plans reflect a strategy for
conducting an upper-level war.
But to get back to Representative Conaway's point earlier,
it is not just a matter of war at the high level, it is a
matter of what is happening on the days when we are not at war
in the situation short of war that we currently have in the
East China Sea and the South China Sea, with this pattern of
pressure and tactics short of outright conflict that China is
using to pressure and consolidate its control of that area, and
it is not clear to me that we have a strategy for that. That is
a strategy that really I think needs to involve our allies
inherently--it is not something for us to do by ourselves--and
which the allies need to play a significant role in.
And so when you say do we have a strategy that we can
articulate, I don't know about the big war, but at the moment I
am just as worried about whether we have a strategy for
countering what China is doing in--currently on a day-to-day
basis in the situation short of war for putting pressure on its
neighbors regarding these maritime territorial issues.
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Erickson.
Dr. Erickson. This is an excellent point. I could spend a
lot of time explaining why I think it is important to have
explicit and understandable strategy, but I assure you I won't
do that.
What I will say is I think the U.S. has an implicit
collection of approaches that together can constitute a
strategy, but it would be far more effective and clear to all
the right people if this were brought together in a more
cohesive framework invoked more consistently. I don't know if
now is the time, but I can say very briefly what I think that
strategy----
Mr. Forbes. I will let you do that another time because we
are kind of out of time.
Last question I want to pose to each of you, and it is a
two-part question, and then we will be done.
We have talked about China, and sometimes we think they are
10-foot tall, sometimes we think they are 6-foot tall, but we
look at these projections of how much money they are spending
for their military buildup. I would like for each of you to
tell me, do you think they can sustain this, and if not, why
not?
And the second thing is, what do you believe is the likely
domestic pressure which may force them to do something
militarily in the next 10 years as opposed to international
pressures that might come on? And, Dr. Erickson, why don't we
start with you, and we will work back to Mr. Thomas.
Dr. Erickson. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent
question, and that gets to the strategic issue of how do we
approach things.
I think many people who are experts on China's economy and
domestic issues would agree with the argument increasingly that
China is facing a slowdown in the rate of national growth to
the point that this coming decade will see increasing pressure
and challenges for China to maintain its trajectory in the
international system and also domestic support because so much
of that has been contingent on economic growth.
And I think the risk is, as it becomes more and more
difficult to generate a rate of economic growth that is seen as
desirable for political purposes, the other main pillar of
legitimacy, nationalism, will increase the chance of pursuing
not diversionary war per se, but diversionary tension in the
Yellow and especially the East and the South China Seas.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. I think in recent years there has often been
an image of China as a juggernaut that is just going to be
growing at some relentless pace, and that this would eventually
pose an overwhelming problem. The concern, in fact, may not be
that the juggernaut continues and that you can straight-line
their growth, but that their growth will bend over and slow
down to one degree or another as a result of the buildup of
debt in the Chinese economy, bad debt, their demographic issue,
the buildup of environmental issues.
If that is the case, if their growth line is going to bend
downward, and if the Chinese Government is aware of that, they
may see the next few years as their period of maximum
opportunity for pursuing their goals in the near-seas area. If
that is the case, then they are going to be in a hurry. They
are not going to see themselves as a situation in which time is
necessarily on their side, but one in which time is not
necessarily on their side. And if that is the case, it says
something about the urgency of the years ahead and about their
ability to sustain the kinds of growth and activities that we
have seen over the last 30 years. It tends to put a premium on
the next decade, which I think in part was what Andrew's
presentation was getting at earlier.
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Cropsey.
Dr. Cropsey. I agree with my colleagues' assessments about
the Chinese future. It may not be all rosy. They are going to
have problems ahead. But are those problems the kind that will
turn China back into the country that it was before Deng
Xiaoping? I don't think so. Is China going to revert to a small
power with a failing economy and accept Third World status
again or something minor? I don't see that in the future at
all.
So I think that while I agree that they have significant
problems ahead, that that does not mean that we can go home and
rest easily.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Thomas, we will let you have the last word.
Mr. Thomas. Chairman, I think we share an interest with
China in the sense that we want a China that is secure and
prosperous. But I think there are real questions as we look
ahead for China, whether it is demographically and the
pressures it faces with the end of cheap labor, the
environmental problems that are just enormous that it faces,
very heavy municipal debt that I think goes unreported and
nonperforming loans, as well as reliance on over-investment and
infrastructure for GDP [gross domestic product] growth. So
there are an awful lot of pressures out there that are going to
require reforms.
At the same time, I think the honest answer is we simply
don't know what China's future trajectory is going to be in
terms of its defense program. I think that a strategy which in
part helps us to buy time and manage through this period is
probably the right course, but at the same time we have to
hedge against continued growth in China's military
capabilities.
And as far as domestic pressures for external actions, I
agree with my colleagues that I think that China's increasing
reliance on nationalism in its domestic policies as almost a
replacement for a Communist ideology is of real concern because
it introduces emotionalism into these discussions over disputed
islands and so forth, which can lead to inadvertent escalation.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you all so much for your work
in this area. Thanks for your willingness to help this
subcommittee. All of us, I know, appreciate you being here
today, your patience with us, and this late hour.
And, Mr. Conaway, if you or Ms. Hanabusa have nothing else,
we will be adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?
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A P P E N D I X
December 11, 2013
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December 11, 2013
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=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 11, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that the United States currently
possesses a relevant and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense
Strategy, and Military Strategy for successfully addressing China's
growing regional and global influence? If not, why not?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Trends in China's defense spending, research and
development, and shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its
naval modernization for the foreseeable future and may field the
largest fleet of modern submarines and surface combatants in the
Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers
consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military
force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. The PLA Navy's expanding role in military missions
other than war and new willingness to operate beyond China's immediate
periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between
the United States and China. How do you believe the United States
military should leverage these opportunities for increased engagement
with the PLA Navy?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Regarding United States current and planned naval
modernization and recapitalization programs, do you believe the
Department of the Navy is on the right track to project global power in
the foreseeable future for anticipated missions the Department may have
to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing
well? What are the gaps?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. The challenges associated with fiscal resource
constraints stemming from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and
subsequent sequestration will make it nearly impossible for the
Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient force structure
required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain.
In the context of the ``rebalance to Asia'' strategy, what maritime
naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to
develop and/or maintain given limited fiscal resources to maximize
flexibility and elasticity in meeting global force projection
requirements in the maritime domain?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Although China's primary maritime focus remains
regional, Beijing aspires to play a larger role in select global issues
that will require a naval power projection capability. These ambitions
are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a
limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At what point in
time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime
global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval
power in the maritime domain?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an
unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342
submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60
submarines that are able to employ submarine-launched intercontinental
ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. Do you believe the
projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to
sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort
forms part of a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence,
and if so, how should the United States respond?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-
Pacific region include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based
system grounded in international law, the use of international law and
other non-coercive mechanisms for resolving disputes, market-based
economies and free trade, broadly defined global commons at sea and in
the air, and freedom of operations in international waters and
airspace. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort forms
part of a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this
international order, at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so,
how should the United States respond?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in
the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines, and certain obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty claims in the
Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones in
the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United
States balance international obligations with China's desire to exert
territorial influence in the Asia-Pacific?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that the United States currently
possesses a relevant and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense
Strategy, and Military Strategy for successfully addressing China's
growing regional and global influence? If not, why not?
Mr. O'Rourke. Regarding potential combat operations, the
subcommittee has the option of examining classified U.S. war plans and
deciding whether those plans reflect a relevant and tangible U.S.
wartime strategy. A related issue is whether the strategy reflected in
classified U.S. war plans should be articulated publicly in
unclassified form (i.e., be issued as a declarative strategy) for
purposes of deterring China, reassuring U.S. allies and partners in the
region, and otherwise shaping the security environment of the Asia-
Pacific region.
Some observers perceive China to be implementing a concerted
strategy for gradually asserting and consolidating control of its near-
seas regions using measures, many implemented by Chinese Coast Guard
ships, that fall short of war. The United States, in addition to
periodically reiterating U.S. positions regarding the resolution of
maritime territorial disputes and operational rights in EEZs, announced
on December 16 an expansion of U.S. regional and bilateral assistance
``to advance maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia,''
particularly Vietnam and the Philippines.\1\ A potential oversight
issue for the subcommittee would be to see whether the December 16
announcement is followed in time by other U.S. actions that might
reflect a more active U.S. strategy for countering the strategy that
some observers perceive China to be following for gradually asserting
and consolidating control of its near-seas regions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of State, ``Expanded U.S. Assistance for Maritime
Capacity Building,'' fact sheet, December 16, 2013, accessed December
19, 2013, at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218735.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Forbes. Trends in China's defense spending, research and
development, and shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its
naval modernization for the foreseeable future and may field the
largest fleet of modern submarines and surface combatants in the
Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers
consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military
force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region?
Mr. O'Rourke. Top-level U.S. strategic considerations that
policymakers may consider in determining U.S. military force structure
and posture for the Asia-Pacific region include:
preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one
part of Eurasia or another,
preserving the U.S.-led international order that has
operated since World War II,
fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations, and
shaping the Asia-Pacific region.
Additional factors that policymakers may consider include:
the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners in the
region, and the likelihood that those capabilities will be committed in
crisis and conflict scenarios involving China,
demands for U.S. forces in other parts of the world,
constraints on U.S. defense resources,
the benefits and costs of measures such as forward
homeporting, forward stationing, multiple crewing, and crew rotation,
and
industrial-base considerations.
Mr. Forbes. The PLA Navy's expanding role in military missions
other than war and new willingness to operate beyond China's immediate
periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between
the United States and China. How do you believe the United States
military should leverage these opportunities for increased engagement
with the PLA Navy?
Mr. O'Rourke. Cooperative maritime operations with China's navy can
be used as an opportunity to:
marginally reduce demands on U.S. Navy forces for
performing certain missions (such as the anti-piracy mission),
demonstrate the professionalism of U.S. naval personnel
to Chinese personnel,
build trust among Chinese personnel regarding U.S.
intentions,
help reinforce Chinese compliance with existing rules for
operating ships and aircraft safely in proximity to one another
(including the October 1972 multilateral convention on the
international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly
known as the COLREGs or the ``rules of the road,'' to which both China
and the United States are parties),\2\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 28 UST 3459; TIAS 8587. The treaty was done at London October
20, 1972, and entered into force July 15, 1977. A summary of the
agreement is available online at http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/
listofconventions/pages/colreg.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
demonstrate to China the benefits that China receives
from the current international order, and China's consequent interest
in preserving that order.
Mr. Forbes. Regarding United States current and planned naval
modernization and recapitalization programs, do you believe the
Department of the Navy is on the right track to project global power in
the foreseeable future for anticipated missions the Department may have
to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing
well? What are the gaps?
Mr. O'Rourke. Regarding the Navy's plans for modernizing and
recapitalizing the cruise-destroyer force, the replacement of the CG(X)
and DDG-1000 programs with resumed DDG-51 procurement leaves the Navy
without a clear roadmap in the 30-year shipbuilding plan for
accomplishing certain things for the cruiser-destroyer force that were
to have been accomplished by the CG(X) and DDG-1000 programs, including
but not limited to the following:
restoring ship growth margin for accommodating future
capabilities;
introducing integrated electric drive technology into a
large number of ships, particularly for supporting future high-power
electrical weapons such as high-power lasers; and
substantially reducing ship life-cycle O&S costs by,
among other things, reducing crew size.
Accomplishing the above three items will depend to a large degree
on when procurement of large surface combatants shifts from Flight III
DDG-51s to some follow-on design, and on the features of that follow on
design. Options for the next large surface combatant after the Flight
III DDG-51 include a further modification of the DDG-51 design (i.e., a
Flight IV design, which might include a lengthening of the hull to
accommodate new systems and restore growth margin), the current DDG-
1000 design or a modified version of the DDG-1000 design, and a clean-
sheet design that might be intermediate in size between the DDG-51 and
DDG-1000 designs.
Regarding the Navy's plans for developing and procuring new
aircraft, a potential oversight item for the subcommittee concerns the
mission definition for the UCLASS carrier-based unmanned aircraft.
Recent press reporting suggests that there is some debate and
uncertainty within the Navy regarding whether the UCLASS should be
designed to be capable of penetrating capable air-defense systems.\3\
Given potential constraints on Navy funding and potential future
mission demands, the subcommittee may also wish to examine the future
mix of strike fighters on carrier air wings. The current plan is for
each air wing to include two squadrons of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and
two squadrons of F-35C Joint Strike Fighters (i.e., ``2+2''). Potential
alternative mixes that might be examined include 0+4, 1+3, 3+1, and
4+0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For a discussion, see Dave Majumdar, ``Navy Shifts Plans to
Acquire a Tougher UCLASS,'' USNI News (http://news.usni.org), November
12, 2013; USNI News Editor, ``Pentagon Altered UCLASS Requirements for
Counterterrorism Mission,'' USNI News (http://news.usni.org), August
29, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding the Navy's plans for developing and acquiring unmanned
vehicles (other than the above discussed UCLASS), a potential oversight
item for the Navy concerns the Navy's plans for transitioning current
experiments and demonstration efforts in submarine-launched unmanned
vehicles into procurement programs of record.
Regarding the Navy's plans for developing and procuring new
weapons, potential oversight items include the Navy's plans for
developing and procuring:
the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) as a next-
generation successor to the Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile;
a long-range air-to-air missile for use by carrier-based
strike fighters (no such weapon is currently planned); \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Such a missile might be broadly similar to the Advanced Air-to-
Air Missile (AAAM), a long-range air-to-air missile that was being
developed in the late-1980s as a successor to the Navy's long-range
Phoenix air-to-air missile. The AAAM program was cancelled as a result
of the end of the Cold War.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the previously mentioned anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT);
the electromagnetic rail gun, including its use as an air
and missile defense weapon;
solid-state lasers (SSLs) with beam powers of a few
hundred to several hundred kilowatts that could be capable of
countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and perhaps also anti-ship
ballistic missiles (ASBMs); and
a megawatt-class free electron laser (FEL).
Mr. Forbes. The challenges associated with fiscal resource
constraints stemming from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and
subsequent sequestration will make it nearly impossible for the
Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient force structure
required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain.
In the context of the ``rebalance to Asia'' strategy, what maritime
naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to
develop and/or maintain given limited fiscal resources to maximize
flexibility and elasticity in meeting global force projection
requirements in the maritime domain?
Mr. O'Rourke. Naval capabilities that policymakers might consider
as candidates for receiving priority in a context of the U.S. strategic
rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and limits on fiscal resources
include but are not limited to the following:
platforms that can evade China's A2/AD capabilities--
attack submarines and stealthy aircraft are the examples usually
mentioned, but they may not be the only examples;
capabilities of all kinds (both soft-kill and hard-kill)
for breaking the kill chains of China's A2/AD weapons;
platforms and weapons that can improve the Navy's ability
to outrange China's A2/AD capabilities when needed;
capabilities that can substantially increase surface ship
magazine depth and, by dramatically reducing cost per shot,
substantially improve cost-exchange ratios against China's A2/AD
weapons, such as electronic warfare capabilities, other soft-kill
mechanisms, electromagnetic rail guns, and lasers;
technologies for reducing ship operation and support
(O&S) costs, so that a Navy budget of a given size can more easily
support a force structure of a given number of ships;
measures (such as forward homeporting, forward
stationing, multiple crewing, and crew rotation) that can increase the
fraction of the fleet that can be forward-deployed sustainably (i.e.,
without overburdening crews or wearing out ships)--although, as
mentioned earlier, the costs as well as the benefits of such measures
would need to be weighed;
capabilities that would be expensive for China to counter
(i.e., so-called cost-imposing or competitive strategies)--attack
submarines are often mentioned in this connection; mines and large
numbers of inexpensive unmanned vehicles might additional examples;
capabilities for performing missions that, within DOD,
are performed solely or largely by naval forces, such as ASW or mine
countermeasures; and
improved capabilities for other nations in the region
(particularly the Philippines and Vietnam) for maintaining maritime
domain awareness (MDA) and defending territorial claims and operational
rights in the South China Sea.
Regarding the first part of the question, overall Navy force
structure and the 30-year shipbuilding plan will be affected in coming
years not only by the future DOD budget top line as influenced by the
Budget Control Act or other legislation, but also by additional
factors, such as the allocation of the DOD budget top line among the
military departments and by the portion of the DOD budget top line that
is used for other expenses, including military pay and benefits and
DOD's so-called overhead and back-office costs. Presentations from the
Navy, CBO, GAO, or other sources on future Navy force structure and the
30-year shipbuilding plan sometimes appear to assume little or no
change in these additional factors, perhaps because there is no
specific basis that can be cited for assuming a particular change. The
fact that other organizations choose to assume little or no change in
these additional factors does not prevent Congress from considering
such possibilities. The alternative of assuming at the outset that
there is no potential for making anything more than very marginal
changes in these additional factors could unnecessarily constrain
options available to policymakers and prevent the allocation of DOD
resources from being aligned optimally with U.S. strategy.
In a situation of reduced levels of defense spending, such as what
would occur if defense spending were to remain constrained to the
revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, the affordability
challenge posed by the 30-year shipbuilding plan would be intensified.
Even then, however, the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would not
necessarily become unaffordable.
The Navy estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully
implementing the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an
average of $16.8 billion in annual funding for new-construction ships,
compared to an historic average of $12 billion to $14 billion provided
for this purpose.\5\ The required increase in average annual funding of
$2.8 billion to $4.8 billion per year equates to less than 1% of DOD's
annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act. The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars,
fully implementing the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would require
an average of $19.3 billion in annual funding for new-construction
ships, or $2.5 billion per year more than the Navy estimates.\6\ This
would make the required increase in average annual funding $5.3 billion
to $7.3 billion per year, which equates to roughly 1.1% to 1.5% of
DOD's annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2014, May 2013, p. 18.
\6\ Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal
Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2013, Table 3 (page 13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some observers, noting the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the
Asia-Pacific region, have advocated shifting a greater share of the DOD
budget to the Navy and Air Force, on the grounds that the Asia-Pacific
region is primarily a maritime and aerospace theater for DOD. In
discussing the idea of shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to
the Navy and Air Force, some of these observers refer to breaking the
so-called ``one-third, one-third, one-third'' division of resources
among the three military departments--a shorthand term sometimes used
to refer to the more-or-less stable division of resources between the
three military departments that existed for the three decades between
the end of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War in 1973 and the start
of the Iraq War in 2003.\7\ In a context of breaking the ``one-third,
one-third, one-third'' allocation with an aim of better aligning
defense spending with the strategic rebalancing, shifting 1.5% or less
of DOD's budget into the Navy's shipbuilding account would appear to be
quite feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The ``one-third, one-third, one-third'' terminology, though
convenient, is not entirely accurate--the military departments' shares
of the DOD budget, while more or less stable during this period, were
not exactly one-third each: the average share for the Department of the
Army was about 26%, the average share for the Department of the Navy
(which includes both the Navy and Marine Corps) was about 32%, the
average share for the Department of the Air Force was about 30%, and
the average share for Defense-Wide (the fourth major category of DOD
spending) was about 12%. Excluding the Defense-Wide category, which has
grown over time, the shares for the three military departments of the
remainder of DOD's budget during this period become about 29% for the
Department of the Army, about 37% for the Department of the Navy, and
about 34% for the Department of the Air Force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More broadly, if defense spending were to remain constrained to the
revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, then fully funding the
Department of the Navy's total budget at the levels shown in the
current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) would require increasing the
Department of the Navy's share of the non-Defense-Wide part of the DOD
budget to about 41%, compared to about 36% in the FY2014 budget and an
average of about 37% for the three-decade period between the Vietnam
and Iraq wars.\8\ While shifting 4% or 5% of DOD's budget to the
Department of the Navy would be a more ambitious reallocation than
shifting 1.5% or less of the DOD budget to the Navy's shipbuilding
account, similarly large reallocations have occurred in the past:
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\8\ Since the Defense-Wide portion of the budget has grown from
just a few percent in the 1950s and 1960s to about 15% in more recent
years, including the Defense-Wide category of spending in the
calculation can lead to military department shares of the budget in the
1950s and 1960s that are somewhat more elevated compared to those in
more recent years, making it more complex to compare the military
departments' shares across the entire period of time since the end of
the World War II. For this reason, military department shares of the
DOD budget cited in this statement are calculated after excluding the
Defense-Wide category. The points made in this statement, however, can
still made on the basis of a calculation that includes the Defense-Wide
category.
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From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, reflecting a U.S.
defense strategy at the time that placed a strong reliance on the
deterrent value of nuclear weapons, the Department of the Air Force's
share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget increased by several
percentage points. The Department of the Air Force's share averaged
about 45% for the 10-year period FY1956-FY1965, and peaked at more than
47% in FY1957-FY1959.
For the 11-year period FY2003-FY2013, as a consequence of
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the Army's
share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget increased by roughly ten
percentage points. The Department of the Army's share during this
period averaged about 39%, and peaked at more than 43% in FY2008. U.S.
combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during this period reflected
the implementation of U.S. national strategy as interpreted by
policymakers during those years.
The point here is not to argue whether it would be right or wrong
to shift more of the DOD budget to the Navy's shipbuilding account or
to the Department of the Navy's budget generally. Doing that would
require reducing funding for other DOD programs, and policymakers would
need to weigh the resulting net impact on overall DOD capabilities. The
point, rather, is to note that the allocation of DOD resources is not
written in stone, that aligning DOD spending with U.S. strategy in
coming years could involve changing the allocation by more than a very
marginal amount, and that such a changed allocation could provide the
funding needed to implement the current 30-year shipbuilding plan.
As an alternative or supplement to the option of altering the
allocation of DOD resources among the military departments, the 30-year
shipbuilding plan could also become more affordable by taking actions
beyond those now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel
pay and benefits and reduce what some observers refer to as DOD's
overhead or back-office costs. Multiple organizations have made
recommendations for such actions in recent years. The Defense Business
Board, for example, estimated that at least $200 billion of DOD's
enacted budget for FY2010 constituted overhead costs. The board stated
that ``There has been an explosion of overhead work because the
Department has failed to establish adequate controls to keep it in line
relative to the size of the warfight,'' and that ``In order to
accomplish that work, the Department has applied ever more personnel to
those tasks which has added immensely to costs.'' The board stated
further that ``Whether it's improving the tooth-to-tail ratio;
increasing the `bang for the buck', or converting overhead to combat,
Congress and DoD must significantly change their approach,'' and that
DOD ``Must use the numerous world-class business practices and proven
business operations that are applicable to DoD's overhead.'' \9\
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\9\ Defense Business Board briefing, ``Reducing Overhead and
Improving Business Operations, Initial Observations,'' July 22, 2010,
slides 15, 5, and 6, posted online at: http://www.govexec.
com/pdfs/072210rb1.pdf. See also Defense Business Board, Modernizing
the Military Retirement System, Report to the Secretary of Defense,
Report FY11-05, posted online at: http://dbb.
defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2011/FY11-
5_Modernizing_The_Military_Retirement_
System_2011-7.pdf; and Defense Business Board, Corporate Downsizing
Applications for DoD, Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY11-
08, posted online at: http://dbb.defense.gov/
Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2011/FY11-
8_Corporate_Downsizing_Applications_for_DoD_2011-7.pdf.
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One potential way to interpret the affordability challenge posed by
the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan is to view it as an invitation by
the Navy for policymakers to consider matters such as the alignment
between U.S. strategy and the division of DOD resources among the
military departments, and the potential for taking actions beyond those
now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel pay and
benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs. The Navy's
prepared statement for the September 18 hearing before the full
committee on planning for sequestration in FY2014 and the perspectives
of the military services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review
(SCMR) provides a number of details about reductions in Navy force
structure and acquisition programs that could result from constraining
DOD's budget to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act.\10\
These potential reductions do not appear to reflect any substantial
shift in the allocation of DOD resources among the military
departments, or the taking of actions beyond those already being
implemented by DOD to control DOD personnel pay and benefits and reduce
DOD overhead and back-office costs.
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\10\ Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of
Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee on Planning
for Sequestration in FY 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services
on the Strategic Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, pp.
6-10.
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Mr. Forbes. Although China's primary maritime focus remains
regional, Beijing aspires to play a larger role in select global issues
that will require a naval power projection capability. These ambitions
are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a
limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At what point in
time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime
global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval
power in the maritime domain?
Mr. O'Rourke. China's ability to operate naval forces in more-
distant waters will likely continue to grow, but if ``project[ing]
maritime global power similar to how the Department of the Navy
projects naval power in the maritime domain'' is taken to mean a
capability to operate substantial forward-deployed forces on a
sustained basis in multiple ocean areas around the world, and to
project substantial power ashore in one or more of those areas on a
sustained basis, then I am not sure that China's navy will ever become
capable of doing that, or that China's leadership would aspire to
having a navy with that capability.
The missions assigned to navies reflect the national strategies of
their parent countries. The ability of the U.S. Navy to operate
substantial forward-deployed forces on a sustained basis in multiple
ocean areas around the world, and to project substantial power ashore
in one or more of those areas on a sustained basis, reflects the United
States' location in the Western hemisphere and the consequent top-level
U.S. strategic goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon
in one part of Eurasia or another. China's geographic setting and
consequent national strategy differ from those of the United States,
and may never require a navy that can operate substantial forward-
deployed forces on a sustained basis in multiple ocean areas around the
world, and project substantial power ashore in one or more of those
areas on a sustained basis. China's navy will, however, likely develop
a growing capability to operate in more distant waters on a focused and
selective basis, and may develop a capability for projecting some
amount of power ashore from those waters on a focused and selective
basis.
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an
unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342
submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60
submarines that are able to employ submarine-launched intercontinental
ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. Do you believe the
projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to
sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy?
Mr. O'Rourke. U.S. Navy operations to counter Chinese submarines
would be conducted not only by Navy attack submarines, but by aircraft
and surface ships as well. Conversely, U.S. Navy attack submarines have
missions other than countering submarines, such as conducting
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, attacking
land targets with Tomahawk cruise missiles, tracking and attacking
surface ships, inserting and recovering special operations forces, and
detecting and countering mines. So there would likely be U.S. platforms
other than attack submarines countering Chinese submarines, and
missions other than countering Chinese submarines being performed by
U.S. attack submarines. That said, the projected attack submarine
shortfall will, other things held equal, add some degree of risk during
the period of the shortfall to the ability of the attack submarine
force to contribute to U.S. operations for countering Chinese
submarines and to perform other missions. The Navy can attempt to
mitigate that risk by taking measures to maximize attack submarine
availability during the period of the shortfall, such as shifting
submarine maintenance work outside the shortfall period. Such measures,
however, might simply spread some of the added risk to neighboring
years.
Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort
forms part of a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence,
and if so, how should the United States respond?
Mr. O'Rourke. Yes, China's naval modernization effort forms part of
a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence. Factors that
policymakers may consider in determining the U.S. response include
those listed above in response to an earlier question, namely:
the following top-level strategic considerations:
preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one
part of Eurasia or another,
preserving the U.S.-led international order that has
operated since World War II,
fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations, and
shaping the Asia-Pacific region, and
the following additional factors:
the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners in the
region, and the likelihood that those capabilities will be
committed in crisis and conflict scenarios involving China,
demands for U.S. forces in other parts of the world,
constraints on U.S. defense resources,
the benefits and costs of measures such as forward
homeporting, forward stationing, multiple crewing, and crew
rotation, and
industrial-base considerations.
Regarding the goal of shaping the Asia-Pacific region, some
observers consider a military conflict involving the United States and
China to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese
economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the
U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Asia-Pacific region could
nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Asia-Pacific
countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more
closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions by
policymakers regarding U.S. Navy and other DOD programs (as well as
other measures, including possibly non-military ones) for countering
improved Chinese naval forces could influence the political evolution
of the Asia-Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the
United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both
in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.
As noted earlier, the Philippines military in particular currently
has relatively little capability for maintaining maritime domain
awareness (MDA) and defending its territorial claims and operational
rights in the South China Sea. In the eastern and southern portions of
the South China Sea, operations by Chinese Coast Guard ships for
asserting and defending China's maritime territorial claims and
operational rights often go uncountered by equivalent Philippine
forces. To the extent that gradual consolidation of Chinese control
over parts of the Spratly Islands and other South China Sea features
such as Scarborough Shoal would affect U.S. interests, policymakers may
wish to consider the option of accelerating actions for expanding and
modernizing the Philippines' maritime defense and law enforcement
capabilities.
Mr. Forbes. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-
Pacific region include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based
system grounded in international law, the use of international law and
other non-coercive mechanisms for resolving disputes, market-based
economies and free trade, broadly defined global commons at sea and in
the air, and freedom of operations in international waters and
airspace. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort forms
part of a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this
international order, at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so,
how should the United States respond?
Mr. O'Rourke. Views among observers on this question vary. My own
assessment as an analyst is that China's naval modernization effort
appears to form part of a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more
elements of the current international order. Specifically, my
assessment is that China appears, at a minimum, to be seeking to change
the international order as it relates to freedom of operations in
international waters and airspace. Although China may be seeking to do
this only for the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese success in that regard
would potentially have implications for other regions as well: Since
international law is universal in its application, changing its
application in one region would create a precedent for changing it in
other regions. In addition, my assessment is that China appears to be
seeking to change the international order as it relates to non-use of
coercive mechanisms for resolving disputes, at least in the Asia-
Pacific region. Again, views among observers on this question vary;
some might assess that China's effort goes further than what I have
described, while others might assess that there is no such broader
Chinese effort, at least not as a matter of conscious, coordinated
Chinese policy.
If policymakers judge that China's naval modernization effort forms
part of a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this
international order, at least for the Asia-Pacific region, there would
be various options for responding. One possibility would be to
recognize the issue formally and explicitly in the policymaking process
and devise an integrated, cross-agency strategy for addressing it. Such
a strategy might have multiple elements and involve U.S. allies and
partners in the region.
Mr. Forbes. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in
the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines, and certain obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty claims in the
Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones in
the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United
States balance international obligations with China's desire to exert
territorial influence in the Asia-Pacific?
Mr. O'Rourke. In seeking to balance U.S. international obligations
with China's desire to exert territorial influence in the Asia-Pacific,
one key factor to keep in mind is whether China's actions are
consistent with customary international law as reflected in instruments
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
and the October 1972 multilateral convention on the international
regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly known as the
COLREGs or the ``rules of the road,'' to which both China and the
United States are parties.\11\ The current international legal regime
provides mechanisms for resolving maritime territorial disputes that
can result in decisions in China's favor, and it provides for freedom
of operations in international waters and airspace that can benefit
Chinese maritime and air operations not only in China's near-seas
regions, but around the world. If China's actions to exert territorial
influence in the Asia-Pacific challenge the current international legal
regime, it could affect the ability of the United States to fulfill its
international obligations not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but in
other regions as well, because, as noted earlier, international law is
universal in its application, so changing its application in one region
consequently would create a precedent for changing it in other regions.
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\11\ 28 UST 3459; TIAS 8587. The treaty was done at London October
20, 1972, and entered into force July 15, 1977. A summary of the
agreement is available online at http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/
listofconventions/pages/colreg.aspx.
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Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that the United States currently
possesses a relevant and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense
Strategy, and Military Strategy for successfully addressing China's
growing regional and global influence? If not, why not?
Dr. Cropsey. The U.S.'s current National Security, Defense, and
Military Strategy documents contain many admirable principles and
desired outcomes. The documents neither explain how these outcomes will
be achieved, what forces are needed to produce the outcomes, nor how
much these forces will cost. Closest to a strategy for addressing
China's growing regional and global influence is the current
administration's idea of a ``rebalance'' to Asia. This is longer on
soft power than the hard power needed to support it. However, current
and recent U.S. efforts to improve relations with Vietnam, Myanmar, and
other Southeast Asian states on China's periphery that fear it are
worthwhile and should be continued and accelerated. However, this is
necessary but not sufficient. China is seeking influence around the
world in the form of investments, presence, cultural exchange, and
foreign assistance. No sign exists that we have thought through how to
address this. What's needed is an Eisenhower-like approach similar to
the Solarium Project but broader in scope since China's wealth makes it
a more formidable global actor than the Soviets whose ideology had a
very restricted international appeal for which they had limited funds
to advance in any event. Congress could play an important role in
creating such a project whose ideas the current administration might
not adopt. But thinking through the questions and starting to answer
them would shape national attitudes and possibly the ideas of a future
administration. After the ``rebalance'' concept comes the Air-Sea
Battle concept. It is not a strategy, and does not claim to be one. The
project I propose ought to have a national security team that would
examine and make recommendations about U.S. security policy toward
China. Again, the current administration is not likely to look kindly
on a hard-headed recommendation about strategy. But, thinking ahead,
this is what is needed to shape thinking and action for a future
administration.
Mr. Forbes. Trends in China's defense spending, research and
development, and shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its
naval modernization for the foreseeable future and may field the
largest fleet of modern submarines and surface combatants in the
Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers
consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military
force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region?
Dr. Cropsey. The under-funded U.S. submarine force that Navy's 30-
year shipbuilding plans anticipates will be smaller than China's
current subsurface force. During the same three decades Chinese naval
modernization will continue. Even if the U.S. withdraws its commitments
from the rest of the world this will put us at a numerical disadvantage
compared to China which--even without its planners' admiration for the
ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan--is likely to concentrate its submarine
force in the West Pacific. Decision-makers should consider this
probable imbalance with particular attention because of the littoral
combat ship's (which is expected to include an ASW module)
vulnerability to China's growing arsenal of missiles, naval air, and
the reasonable possibility that the DF-21 missile will become a useful
instrument of China's anti-access/area denial strategy. Destroying
Chinese subs should be the U.S. and its allies' strategic objective.
This precedes using U.S. submarine-launched attacks on Chinese land
targets which are likely to produce a response against U.S. territory.
The more of their submarine force that is sunk the safer it will be for
the U.S. to hold at risk their amphibious capability, control the
island chains, and maintain their access to such strategic and sea-
borne supplies as energy. U.S. decision-makers should fund not only
unmanned subsurface drones that augment the capability of our current
SSN force and the networking capacity that multiplies their combat
effectiveness, but also a large number of (relatively) inexpensive and
quieter diesel-electric boats. Besides offering the U.S. submarine
fleet a low-cost numerical advantage these vessels should be based or
supplied from our treaty allies in the region thus offering the
additional benefit of assuring them that we continue to deserve their
trust. Navy will also need to make important investments in the
logistics ships that are particularly important for sustaining a naval
force at the western end of the Pacific. Navy's 30-year plan aims to
build more logistics ships but the entire plan lies under a cloud--as
Congress has noted--because of the gulf between the Navy's plans and
reasonable expectations for funding the SCN account. No appropriate
posture for the U.S. Pacific Fleet can reasonably ignore the necessity
of resupplying ships at sea including the ability to re-arm underway.
Moreover, the Flight III DDG-51-class only puts off the question of the
character of Navy's surface fleet backbone. By the time they join the
fleet--in the early `20s--the demand for electrical power from rail
guns and laser weapons, for example, will likely have exceeded the
power-generating capacity that the Flight IIIs volume can accommodate.
Despite submarines' increasing importance in the West Pacific, the U.S.
cannot maintain a force posture worthy of the name without a resilient
and dominant surface fleet. The Zumwalt has the needed capacity
including space for electrical generation. Alternatives include less
expensive surface ships that perform fewer missions that can be changes
in the same modular fashion as the LCS. Navy should be making and
funding decisions about the surface fleet now--one hopes--guided by
strategy. Finally, although the USAF is taking the increased importance
of Asia seriously, the Army is well behind and shows few signs of
catching up. The Army is responsible for the defending our bases in the
Western Pacific from air and missile attack. Rather than concentrating
on this mission the Army is looking at Asia as justification for
maintaining force structure. There may be something to this in holding
or retaking territory in the island chains that bracket the Asian
mainland--as the Army did in WWII. But--unlike WWII--we already have
good positions in WestPac. Our first priority should be to assure their
safety. Decision-makers would benefit our military posture by looking
more closely at the air defense of our bases in the region.
Mr. Forbes. The PLA Navy's expanding role in military missions
other than war and new willingness to operate beyond China's immediate
periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between
the United States and China. How do you believe the United States
military should leverage these opportunities for increased engagement
with the PLA Navy?
Dr. Cropsey. As noted above in the answer to Question 12, China's
aggressive actions of the past year make this the wrong time to
increase cooperation with the PLA Navy. If our goal is to encourage
China to become a stakeholder in the international order we do not
advance it by rewarding them for behavior that violates international
norms. However, if and when China ceases territorial and armed
provocations in the East and South China Seas maritime cooperation with
the PLAN could include search-and-rescue, disaster relief, and
humanitarian operations outside the states that border China. There can
be no point in suggesting to Southeast Asian states on China's
periphery that Beijing's intentions are benign. Nothing in these
smaller states' history would lead them to believe it. Africa offers
the best opportunity for cooperation between the U.S. and China in non-
combatant maritime operations. Ice-breaking if it is needed to open or
keep open sea lanes through the Arctic offers an opportunity for
maritime cooperation that has relatively few political implications
while it assists the most tangible benefit of U.S.-China relations,
trade. This would be better than the implicit message of U.S.-China
maritime cooperation in any state whose leaders could conclude that
cooperation between the two navies implies American collaboration with,
or approval of, Chinese foreign policy.
Mr. Forbes. Regarding United States current and planned naval
modernization and recapitalization programs, do you believe the
Department of the Navy is on the right track to project global power in
the foreseeable future for anticipated missions the Department may have
to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing
well? What are the gaps?
Dr. Cropsey. In many places, as with UAVs, UUVs, rail guns, lasers,
cyber security, the Navy is on the right technological track. On
funding platforms the widening gulf between plans and likely funding
Navy is on the wrong track. On strategy Navy is on no track at all. N3/
5 has been working on revisions to the '07 maritime strategy for years
and had a publishable document over a year ago. Release has been
postponed due to the revolving door of admirals responsible for the
document, unaccountable delays, and what appears to be a lack of
interest at the senior level of the department. The revised strategy
was supposed to be published last summer. This was delayed until the
autumn. Last I heard release has been rescheduled to `sometime soon.'
``Doing well'' would start with a strategy from which most of
everything else would flow--at a minimum the justification for
modernization, weapons, networks, and platforms.
Mr. Forbes. The challenges associated with fiscal resource
constraints stemming from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and
subsequent sequestration will make it nearly impossible for the
Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient force structure
required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain.
In the context of the ``rebalance to Asia'' strategy, what maritime
naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to
develop and/or maintain given limited fiscal resources to maximize
flexibility and elasticity in meeting global force projection
requirements in the maritime domain?
Dr. Cropsey. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) rests on the notion of
neutralizing China's growing anti-access/area denial capability by
degrading the C4ISR network on which it depends. This would require--
among other actions--striking targets on China's mainland. China has
the ability to retaliate against U.S. targets. Such retaliation would
escalate a conflict where U.S. strategy should seek to contain and end
it as quickly as possible. A strategy that sought to contain conflict
could be accomplished by seizing the key nodes of both 1st and 2nd
island chains as well as securing the land areas that surround the
straits through which traffic between the Middle East and Asia moves.
Holding these areas assisted by naval and air support would allow us
and allies to enforce a blockade with unacceptable economic
consequences to China. Alternatively, American seapower could destroy
the PLAN's fleet as quickly as possible. This would have both economic
and far-reaching military consequences that would encourage an end to
hostilities. The second strategy would require more naval forces to
command the seas that surround China. There are other possible
strategic approaches. They were not the subject of this question. The
point is that decision-makers' ability to prioritize naval capabilities
should depend on strategy. The `rebalance to Asia' lacks one. When this
problem is addressed the question of priorities and fiscal resources
can be better addressed.
Mr. Forbes. Although China's primary maritime focus remains
regional, Beijing aspires to play a larger role in select global issues
that will require a naval power projection capability. These ambitions
are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a
limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At what point in
time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime
global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval
power in the maritime domain?
Dr. Cropsey. It is not clear that China will ever be able to
project maritime power globally as does the U.S. The Chinese have many
obstacles to overcome: the numerical disparity between the coming
generation's genders, a population that as Nick Eberstadt has put it
`will grow old before it grows wealthy,' a brittle political system,
and the likelihood that they cannot sustain the economic growth of the
previous 30 years for the next three decades to name a few. Any one of
these will put China's continued rise in jeopardy. Together, they would
stop it. However, there can be no doubt that Chinese leadership aspires
to return the nation to the position of global influence it once
occupied. If it can maintain its double-digit increases in GDP and
surmount the serious obstacles to continued single-party rule and if
U.S. seapower maintains its current descending trajectory China will be
a peer-competitor--or better--before the midpoint of this century. If
both nations maintain their current seapower trajectories, the best
chance that China will not equal or surpass us is if they adopt Harold
Mackinder's idea of controlling the Eurasian landmass and succeed in
doing so. Then their markets, productive power, strategic commodities,
and wealth will depend very little on the seas, and we will have other
much more serious problems than vanishing seapower.
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an
unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342
submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60
submarines that are able to employ submarine-launched intercontinental
ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. Do you believe the
projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to
sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy?
Dr. Cropsey. I agree with Navy's general assessment that by 2020
PLAN modernization will not have matured sufficiently to overcome our
technology and experience with larger numbers of vessels. But China
knows its technological weakness. It has a strategy of anti-access/area
denial to compensate for their current technological inferiority. And
the strategy is based importantly on countering our strength
asymmetrically--for example, WU-14 hypersonic glide vehicle whose
testing was reported in the 13 January edition of The Washington Free
Beacon. (See http://freebeacon.com/china-conducts-first-test-of-new-
ultra-high-speed-missile-vehicle/) The trend line is what we should be
watching to understand if the projected U.S. submarine inventory will
be able to counter the PLAN in the future. And the trend line does not
favor us for many of the reasons already noted in these answers. It is
based on an unsupportable U.S. Navy shipbuilding plan, China's
increasing numbers of submarines, and its ever-expanding fleet. It
would be worth the effort to analyze at what point China's submarine
fleet will be a match for that which the U.S. is able to dedicate to
the Western Pacific.
Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort
forms part of a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence,
and if so, how should the United States respond?
Dr. Cropsey. I am not convinced that Chinese leadership has decided
yet what role the PLAN should play globally: I am convinced they
believe that China was once a major world power and want to restore it
to its proper place as one. China's interest in anti-access/area
denial; its investment in systems that would disrupt and degrade U.S.
forces' dependence on network-centricity; its development of such
weapons as the DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile; and its military and
diplomatic focus on the South and East China Seas are convincing
evidence that China aims first at asserting regional influence.
Regional influence will advance the larger and longer-term aim of
regional hegemony. U.S. policy aimed to prevent the hegemony of a
continental power in Europe from WWI through the Cold War. We have at
least as great an interest in preventing it in Asia. The U.S. should
respond to China's efforts through more effective alliance management
aimed at convincing regional allies and friends that we will remain the
dominant Pacific power; by increasing our naval presence in the region;
by securing our bases against potential Chinese threats; by encouraging
China--where possible--to cooperate with the U.S. in such non-combatant
operations as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; by diverting
China's attention to the seas through closer diplomatic, commercial,
and security ties to India and Southeast Asia; and by substantial
increases in public diplomacy efforts aimed at the Chinese audience as
well as public diplomacy and other efforts aimed to support the
Uighurs, Tibetans, and Mongolians. U.S. policy should aim to increase
the range of problems that China faces on land as a means of diverting
their attention from the seas. This should also include exploiting
China's reflexive imitation of American military technology by
investing in defense programs whose imitation will cost China heavily
as it forces the PLA to increase its investments in land warfare.
Mr. Forbes. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-
Pacific region include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based
system grounded in international law, the use of international law and
other non-coercive mechanisms for resolving disputes, market-based
economies and free trade, broadly defined global commons at sea and in
the air, and freedom of operations in international waters and
airspace. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort forms
part of a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this
international order, at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so,
how should the United States respond?
Dr. Cropsey. China's military buildup of which naval modernization
is a part of, but does not fully express, Chinese leadership's
unconventional view of international order. China's leaders do not
share our view that international order depends significantly on
balanced power. Peer competition in China's leaders' view eliminates
the possibility of true sovereignty. The global instruments that
Woodrow Wilson envisioned and which were created after WWII are as
inimical to true sovereignty as the ideas of sovereignty and non-
interference in other state's affairs that were codified in Europe at
the midpoint of the 17th century. Naval and military forces are means
to intimidate neighbors and gain psychological and defacto legal
advantage. Decisive defeat of an enemy remains a possibility but is as
likely to be achieved by--in the example of the Western Pacific--
denying the U.S. access as by traditional naval engagements. As the
utility of traditional military engagements recedes such non-kinetic
means as declaring limited control over international waters and
airspace; and such psychological/legal instruments as active pressure
to assert claims in international waters which Chinese leadership has
said represent core national interests are the evolving battlefield.
China's respect for international norms, as their actions in the
Senkakus show, is subordinate to its leaders' pre-modern view that
sovereignty rests ultimately on an imbalance, rather than a balance, of
great powers. The U.S. should not abandon its hope and efforts to
convince China that it can benefit from a liberal international order
but should add to these a serious and sustained attempt to loosen
Beijing's central authority, assert the superiority of international
order based on rules, and the fundamental principles of respect for
sovereignty as the West has understood and practiced it for nearly 400
years. Such efforts should be complemented by the understanding that
China's leaders are not likely soon to change either their views or
behavior. Our answer should be to respond in terms that Chinese
leadership respects. Naval power is necessary but in China's view not
sufficient to achieve the global power they seek. Besides countering
their non-kinetic approach to accomplishing their grand strategic
objectives, the U.S. should also emphasize forming and preserving
effective allied coalitions, increasing our diplomatic and naval
presence in the region, and building a fleet that maintains the
superiority we currently enjoy over the PLAN.
Mr. Forbes. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in
the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines, and certain obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty claims in the
Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones in
the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United
States balance international obligations with China's desire to exert
territorial influence in the Asia-Pacific?
Dr. Cropsey. The U.S. should balance its current international
obligations against China's territorial ambitions in WestPac on several
fronts but not at the expense of U.S. core interests in the Persian
Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and Caribbean. Diminished influence in the
Persian Gulf not only increases risk to our allies' energy supplies. It
risks allowing Iran to hold the whip hand with the Gulf States upon
which we remain dependent for oil, regional friends, and a balance to a
Shia-dominated Middle East. Adding to the large energy reserves which
have already been discovered off the Israeli and southern Cypriot
coasts are substantial natural gas discoveries off Greece's Ionian
coast. The likelihood is that scheduled exploration will produce
evidence of much more natural gas in the same region. Extracting,
refining, and transporting these deposits will strengthen our friends
in the region, address many of their financial problems, offer
alternatives to the EU's dependence on Russian-supplied energy, and
provide a bulwark against the radicalization that threatens the Eastern
Mediterranean littoral from Turkey to Libya. The U.S. has a very small
flotilla in the Med where once we had a robust Sixth Fleet. This should
be increased, not diminished to augment WestPac forces. The U.S. has a
core interest in limiting the flow of drugs from South and Central
America and maintaining naval presence in the Western Hemisphere. This
might be decreased by a very few ships but nowhere close to the number
required to counter the territorial influence that China seeks in the
Asia-Pacific. U.S. policy should increase naval shipbuilding and its
associated costs by reallocation of funds within the DoD budget, by
substantially devolving authority to the military services for
important defense functions from the currently over-centralized and
over-staffed agencies in OSD, by grandfathering some benefits to
military personnel, and by streamlining the heavily bureaucratized,
inefficient, and needlessly complex process of designing, contracting,
building, and testing military equipment. At the same time the U.S.
should adopt the measures needed to counter China's psychological
pressures, its regional territorial claims, and efforts to establish
legal support for its claims in the South and East China Seas all of
which are aimed over time to achieve the same hegemony for which force
has traditionally been the primary instrument.
Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that the United States currently
possesses a relevant and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense
Strategy, and Military Strategy for successfully addressing China's
growing regional and global influence? If not, why not?
Mr. Thomas. The United States lacks a particular, articulated
strategy for China. The NSS, Defense Strategy, and NMS are all
universal in their outlooks and do not provide specific strategies with
meaningful levels of detail for any particular countries or threats.
These documents are not very useful in marshaling all instruments of
national power to deal with a specific challenge like a long-term
strategic competition with China, because they deal with multiple
problems ranging from terrorism to environmental change. They also tend
to list objectives without necessarily explaining how their objectives
might be achieved.
Mr. Forbes. Trends in China's defense spending, research and
development, and shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its
naval modernization for the foreseeable future and may field the
largest fleet of modern submarines and surface combatants in the
Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers
consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military
force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region?
Mr. Thomas. There are any number of factors that U.S. decision-
makers should weigh in determining the necessary U.S. military force
structure and appropriate posture to preserve the security balance in
the Asia-Pacific region. Four in particular stand out in my mind.
Perhaps most importantly, decision-makers should consider the
potential of any change or investment to impose disproportionate costs
on a competitor. Too often we only look at the price tag of an option
to ourselves rather than consider the costs it might impose on a rival.
Another factor in determining our posture is the degree to which it
is distributed so that we can sustain combat operations under attack.
We have a situation today where we are putting too many of our military
``eggs'' in to few ``baskets'' in terms of forward bases in the western
Pacific. Diversifying our basing and access posture would enhance
deterrence and crisis stability by reducing the opportunity for an
adversary to deliver a single, no warning ``knockout blow.''
Third, decision-makers should question our investments in terms of
whether or not they increase the striking power of our forward naval
and air forces. Our current investment profile is skewed too much in
favor of defensive systems to protect our forces rather than increasing
their combat firepower.
Finally, it is important not to overlook logistics as a factor.
Decision makers should ensure that our combat logistics fleet is
adequate to support high-intensity combat operations in the region.
This may require increasing the number of logistics ships. It should
also prompt decision makers to prioritize R&D efforts to facilitate
reloading weapons at sea rather than transiting long distances back to
ports.
Mr. Forbes. The PLA Navy's expanding role in military missions
other than war and new willingness to operate beyond China's immediate
periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between
the United States and China. How do you believe the United States
military should leverage these opportunities for increased engagement
with the PLA Navy?
Mr. Thomas. PLA Navy operations in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere
expose Chinese naval personnel to multinational operations. Such
operations could be further leveraged to impress upon the PLA (N)
leadership the importance of standardized protocols and procedures such
as those of NATO or of Coalition Maritime Forces in the Arabian Gulf
and Arabian Sea. They could also help demonstrate the importance of
non-commissioned officers, the need for further professionalizing the
PLA (N), and the importance of adhering to shared norms and modes of
conduct in international waters. In particular, such operations could
provide an opportunity for engaging ``next generation'' PLA (N)
officers, whose worldviews may differ considerably from older
generations of officers.
Mr. Forbes. Regarding United States current and planned naval
modernization and recapitalization programs, do you believe the
Department of the Navy is on the right track to project global power in
the foreseeable future for anticipated missions the Department may have
to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing
well? What are the gaps?
Mr. Thomas. The DoN has made considerable progress conceptually
since the advent of AirSea Battle. There remains, however, a lack of
alignment between the DoN's conceptual advances and its investments.
There are five main shortfall areas that should be addressed as
priorities:
The first shortfall is the carrier air wing's viability in the face
of A2/AD threats, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles and
submarine and bomber launched anti-ship cruise missiles. The current
manned strike aircraft the Navy is fielding lack sufficient endurance/
range and all-aspect stealth to conduct carrier flight operations from
beyond ASBM range and penetrate sophisticated air defense networks.
Their limited payloads, moreover, limit the number of fixed or mobile
targets that can be engaged per sortie. The Navy's UCLASS program as
currently envisaged still falls short of Secretary Mabus' vision of a
system that can perform in highly contested environments. It is not
clear it would have all-aspect stealth and its limited payload
potentially would relegate it to serving only as a spotter for the
carrier--a role that already can be performed by BAMS--and to serve as
a communications relay point or inefficient tanker for manned strike
aircraft. The UCLASS program should be reevaluated to ensure it would
enable the Navy to exploit the mobility of the aircraft carrier in the
Asia-Pacific region and provide a credible penetrating strike option.
The second shortfall is in terms of the Navy's surface fleet as
currently envisaged. Our cruisers and destroyers devote an increasing
amount of their payload volume, sensor resources and training time to
defensive missions. As A2/AD threats improve, this trend will only
worsen if new capabilities are not fielded to improve their defenses
and relieve them of some defensive missions. Lasers and electromagnetic
rail gun will be fielded as demonstration capabilities on ships over
the next two years. These capabilities should be accelerated and
deployed on more ships to free VLS cells for offensive strike and
surface and anti-submarine attack. Also, non-kinetic missile defenses
will be improved with the fielding of systems such as the Surface
Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Blocks 2 and 3. This
deployment should be accelerated to provide surface ships a non-kinetic
option to defeat enemy C4ISR and missiles, as well as conduct a range
of other cyber and electromagnetic attacks. New weapons such as the
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) should be protected for the long-
term, while in the near-term the SM-6 surface-to-air missile should be
made surface and land-attack capable to increase the offensive capacity
of the ships' main battery. Cruisers and destroyers should be relieved
of defensive escort missions they may be tasked with in a conflict by
developing an escort frigate. By providing limited area air defense and
ASW capability for convoys and logistics ships, a frigate will free
cruisers and destroyers, with their greater weapon and sensor capacity,
to focus more on offensive missions.
Undersea warfare represents a third shortfall. The DoN has greatly
increased the capability and affordability of the Virginia class
submarine, with the Virginia Payload Module being the most important
upcoming improvement. But there are limits to a submarine-centric
approach to undersea warfare. While few navies do ASW well, new
sensors, the processing power of ``big data,'' and improving long-range
precision weapons will make ASW easier for more fleets. We should look
past the submarine being the tactical-level unit in the undersea fight
and further develop the family of undersea systems including UUVs,
unmanned fixed and mobile sensors, and aircraft and surface ship
sensors. With improvements in automation and energy storage, unmanned
systems will become more practical as tactical units, while manned
submarines will increasingly be operational-level platforms as the
carrier or ``big-deck'' amphibious ship is today.
The fourth shortfall is in munitions. As precision defensive
weapons systems become more common, successfully striking an enemy
target will require an increasing number of attack weapons. This will
put a premium on large magazines, reliable logistics, and at-sea reload
systems. These capabilities will only be useful, however if the number
and type of munitions is able to keep up with the demands of a high-
tempo operation. Our current weapons need greater range and
survivability to reduce the number of weapons needed to successfully
attack a defended target. At the same time, overall munitions
inventories need to be increased, at-sea reload capability developed,
and more magazine space afforded to offense to enable the Navy to
sustain operations in high-intensity combat.
The fifth change needed is in expeditionary warfare. The Marine
Corps would be called on in future Asia-Pacific conflicts to conduct a
wide range of amphibious operations that do not include a large, multi-
brigade amphibious assault. While the Marine Corps has stated they see
this emerging need, the DoN's investments and plans do not yet reflect
the changing nature of amphibious operations. These new operations
include establishing and sustaining austere rearming and refueling
bases for F-35B aircraft or conducting raids to eliminate coastal anti-
ship cruise missiles and ISR stations. At the lower end of warfare,
Marines will be needed to stand by in a growing number of locations to
evacuate Americans from unstable countries while continuing to be first
responders to humanitarian disaster. These trends argue for changes in
the makeup of the ARG/MEU, better expeditionary logistics and perhaps a
larger and more diverse set of ships capable of conducting amphibious
operations. While the DoN has talked about the intent to do this, no
concrete action has yet been taken.
Mr. Forbes. The challenges associated with fiscal resource
constraints stemming from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and
subsequent sequestration will make it nearly impossible for the
Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient force structure
required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain.
In the context of the ``rebalance to Asia'' strategy, what maritime
naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to
develop and/or maintain given limited fiscal resources to maximize
flexibility and elasticity in meeting global force projection
requirements in the maritime domain?
Mr. Thomas. The budget reductions of the BCA and subsequent
Bipartisan Budget Agreement do not prevent DoN from making the most
important investments for the future while accepting some reductions in
near-term capacity. Large-scale conflict is unlikely in the next few
years but the advance and proliferation of A2/AD capabilities will
require the future fleet to be able to project power in the face of
sophisticated defenses and while being attacked by long-range precision
weapons. Four areas are especially important:
1. UCLASS: This aircraft will need to be a survivable long-range
strike system with enough payload to destroy defended targets. If the
aircraft is not long-range or survivable, the carrier will be unable to
exploit its major advantage over land bases: mobility. Short-range
tactical aircraft and UAVs will not be able to penetrate an adversary
air defense envelope from far enough away for the carrier to be able to
effectively conduct operations.
2. Submarines and UUVs: The DoN should accelerate development of a
broader family of undersea systems including unmanned vehicles,
weapons, sensors, communications and command and control systems.
3. Weapons: The Navy should accelerate defensive weapons that do
not place demands on missile magazines such as lasers, railgun and
high-powered microwave. On offense, long-range survivable weapons able
to defeat defended targets are needed such as LRASM, SM-6 (for surface
attack) and intermediate-range conventional ballistic missiles. With
respect to the munitions inventory, DoD should sustain sufficient
production capacity to enable increased procurement in the 2020s.
4. Logistics: Adversary A2/AD capabilities will threaten
traditional ``just-in-time'' supply chains, while defended targets will
require an increasing number of munitions to destroy. The Navy's
current logistics approach will need to be more robust, with more CLF
ships, dedicated (i.e., frigate) escorts, protected communications and
an at-sea reload capability.
Mr. Forbes. Although China's primary maritime focus remains
regional, Beijing aspires to play a larger role in select global issues
that will require a naval power projection capability. These ambitions
are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a
limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At what point in
time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime
global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval
power in the maritime domain?
Mr. Thomas. Extra-regional maritime power projection probably
remains a generational challenge for the PLA. The PLA is unlikely to
follow the U.S. military playbook and may adopt different approaches to
power projection. It will require developing new training pipelines,
establishing a professional cadre of non-commissioned officers,
constructing a maintenance infrastructure that exceeds the PLA's
current maintenance posture, creating a rotational base to support
overseas deployments, and establishing a network of overseas bases and
facilities to support a more global military presence. There are
enormous challenges associated with each of these steps. Global naval
force projection would require success in all of them, which may take
several decades.
Mr. Forbes. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an
unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342
submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60
submarines that are able to employ submarine-launched intercontinental
ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. Do you believe the
projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to
sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy?
Mr. Thomas. While the U.S. submarine inventory should not be
allowed to shrink below the Navy's requirement and ideally should be
expanded, our submarines are only a small part of countering adversary
submarines. ASW is primarily conducted by aircraft such as the P-8A and
MH-60R, surface ships such as the DDG-51 and LCS with the Multifunction
Towed Array and SQQ-89 sonar processor, and an integrated system of
manned and unmanned sensors operated from ships and on the ocean floor.
The DoN continues to make robust investments in this family of ASW
systems, but this ``traditional'' approach to ASW, developed through
World War II and the Cold War, will need to change in light of the long
reach of adversary submarine weapons. The Navy will need to exploit
advances in sensors and processing to detect enemy submarines farther
from U.S. forces and employ new approaches to prevent attacks that
focus on denying enemy submarines an attack opportunity as much as
trying to sink them outright.
Mr. Forbes. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort
forms part of a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence,
and if so, how should the United States respond?
Mr. Thomas. China's naval modernization effort buttresses its
political aim to expand its regional influence in several ways. First,
it confers capabilities that underwrite China's counter intervention
strategy aimed at restricting U.S. access and denying it naval mastery
in the western Pacific. Second, it provides options for China to gain
local sea control and conduct limited regional force projection
operations in its near seas.
The U.S. response should include efforts to preserve or expand its
most viable power projection options, such as extending the reach and
striking power of its carriers, expanding the strike capacity of its
undersea forces, and pursuing game changing technologies such as
electro-magnetic railgun and directed energy systems that could provide
new defensive options for the surface fleet. The United States should
also encourage its allies and regional partners to develop their own
forms of A2/AD systems, such as land-based anti-ship missile batteries
and mobile air defense systems to defend their sovereign territorial
waters and airspace in the face of China's maritime expansion.
Mr. Forbes. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-
Pacific region include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based
system grounded in international law, the use of international law and
other non-coercive mechanisms for resolving disputes, market-based
economies and free trade, broadly defined global commons at sea and in
the air, and freedom of operations in international waters and
airspace. Do you assess that China's naval modernization effort forms
part of a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this
international order, at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so,
how should the United States respond?
Mr. Thomas. China's naval modernization provides a coercive
backstop for its non-military efforts to gradually alter the rules and
norms of the international system in ways that disproportionally favor
China. An important part of the U.S. response should be bolstering
frontline maritime states in Asia so that they are less susceptible to
Chinese coercion. Ultimately, international rules and norms may
continue to evolve as they have throughout history, but the United
States has an interest in opposing unilateral efforts by any state to
alter them.
Mr. Forbes. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in
the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines, and certain obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty claims in the
Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones in
the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United
States balance international obligations with China's desire to exert
territorial influence in the Asia-Pacific?
Mr. Thomas. The United States should make clear that it stands with
its allies and regional partners in defending their sovereignty and
that it opposes any unilateral moves to alter the geo-political status
quo of the region. This entails bolstering the capabilities of allies
and partners to defend themselves more effectively against acts of
coercion or aggression. Increasingly, this requires helping allies and
partners to deal with incremental paramilitary maritime encroachments.
Allies and partners will need to respond in kind, by beefing up their
own paramilitary surveillance forces and coast guards, as well as
improving their military capabilities for air and sea denial if crises
escalate.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine
construction, do you believe that our current investments in undersea
warfare and ASW capabilities and training is sufficient? If not, what
shortfalls are most concerning?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Langevin. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage
in C4ISR capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to
acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional
insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other
modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR is
still lacking?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Langevin. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a
boon to the domestic defense industry and our relationships with
foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the
enhancement of foreign military sales to other countries in the region
who are wary of China's increasing activity?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Langevin. In what ways can we encourage additional productive
Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms?
Dr. Erickson. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Langevin. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine
construction, do you believe that our current investments in undersea
warfare and ASW capabilities and training is sufficient? If not, what
shortfalls are most concerning?
Mr. O'Rourke. Proficiency in ASW takes effort to develop and
maintain, and can erode quickly in the absence of periodic training and
exercises. Since the end of the Cold War, Navy officials from time to
time have expressed concern over erosion of the fleet's ASW
proficiency. The Navy in recent years has increased ASW exercises and
training, particularly in the Pacific fleet, with the goal of improving
the fleet's ASW proficiency. Sustaining a high state of ASW proficiency
will require continued devotion of resources to ASW training and
exercises.
ASW and undersea warfare are conducted by aircraft, surface ships,
submarines, and unmanned vehicles, using various sensors and weapons.
Consequently, ASW and undersea warfare encompass a large number of
platform and equipment programs. Observers might focus on various
programs as items that might deserve increased oversight attention. In
my own work, I have called attention to the projected attack submarine
shortfall (an issue I first identified in 1995 and have testified and
reported on each year since) and to the value of fielding, sooner
rather than later, an anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT) that would give Navy
surface ships a hard-kill option for countering wake-homing torpedoes,
which are not very susceptible to soft-kill countermeasures such as
decoys. The projected IOC date for the ATT has shifted back and forth
from one budget submission to the next in recent years, partly due to
changes in funding profiles. Another area of potential focus for the
subcommittee are submarine-launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), which have the potential for
extending the reach and mission capabilities of attack submarines. The
Navy for the last several years has conducted numerous experiments and
demonstrations with various submarine-launched UAVs and UUVs, but has
not often transitioned these efforts into procurement programs of
record.
Mr. Langevin. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage
in C4ISR capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to
acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional
insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other
modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR is
still lacking?
Mr. O'Rourke. The fielding of improved C4ISR systems will improve
China's ability to detect, identify, and track adversary ships and
aircraft, and then target and attack them with anti-ship and anti-
aircraft weapons, particularly longer range weapons such as the ASBM.
More generally, the fielding of improved C4ISR systems will permit
China to operate its ships and aircraft in a more networked fashion,
and thereby improve their collective capability. In these ways,
improved C4ISR capabilities will permit China to increase the utility
of China's ships, aircraft, and weapons, and help complete and make
more robust the kill chains that China needs to execute to employ its
weapons, especially at longer ranges. Although China is fielding
improved C4ISR capabilities, China's potential C4ISR weaknesses include
a lack of operational experience in using these systems (particularly
in joint operations and combat situations) and the susceptibility of
these systems to countermeasures such as jamming, spoofing, computer
network attack, and electromagnetic pulse.
Mr. Langevin. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a
boon to the domestic defense industry and our relationships with
foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the
enhancement of foreign military sales to other countries in the region
who are wary of China's increasing activity?
Mr. O'Rourke. The United States could use FMS arrangements to sell
frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, land- and sea-based manned aircraft,
land- and sea-based UAVs, land-based radars, and command and control
systems to countries in the region, particularly the Philippines and
Vietnam, with the aim of improving their ability to maintain maritime
domain awareness (MDA) and defend their territorial claims and
operational rights in the South China Sea. The Philippines military, in
particular, currently has relatively little capability for doing these
things. In the eastern and southern portions of the South China Sea,
operations by Chinese Coast Guard ships for asserting and defending
China's maritime territorial claims and operational rights often go
uncountered by equivalent Philippine forces. To the extent that gradual
consolidation of Chinese control over parts of the Spratly Islands and
other South China Sea features such as Scarborough Shoal would affect
U.S. interests, policymakers may wish to consider the option of
accelerating actions for expanding and modernizing the Philippines'
maritime defense and law enforcement capabilities.
Potential FMS options for surface ships include but are not limited
to variants of U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), variants of U.S.
Coast Guard National Security Cutters (NSCs), Fast Response Cutters
(FRCs) and (starting a few years from now) Offshore Patrol Cutters,\12\
or variants of other ships that have been built in the United States
for foreign navies, such as the SAAR 5-class corvettes that were built
in the 1990s for Israel and the Ambassador IV-class fast attack craft
that are currently being built for Egypt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ For more on the NSC, FRC, and OPC programs, see CRS Report
R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Langevin. In what ways can we encourage additional productive
Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms?
Mr. O'Rourke. With regard to maritime operations, additional
productive Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms
can be encouraged through participation in anti-piracy operations,
search-and-rescue operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster response
(HA/DR) operations, multilateral exercises, international fora such as
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the North Pacific Coast
Guard Forum (NPCGF), and bilateral military-to-military discussions. A
Chinese navy frigate will reportedly help provide security for the U.S.
government ship that will be used to destroy Syria's chemical weapons.
Mr. Langevin. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine
construction, do you believe that our current investments in undersea
warfare and ASW capabilities and training is sufficient? If not, what
shortfalls are most concerning?
Dr. Cropsey. Even if the funds are available to build one or two
Virginia-class SSNs annually from 2014 to 2043--and both the
Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office identify
shortfalls between traditional funds available for SCN and what the
Navy must spend to execute the current 30-year plan--the U.S. combat
fleet will include fewer SSNs in FY43 than China's navy operates today.
China is modernizing its submarine fleet and will not only increase its
size but enjoy the advantage of being able to concentrate the
overwhelming majority of its subsurface fleet in waters immediately
adjacent to the mainland. Unless the U.S. ends or greatly diminishes
its current distributed global presence it will still need submarines
to patrol other parts of the world such as the Persian Gulf and the
Mediterranean. This is likely to create a strategically significant
difference between U.S. and Chinese attack sub capabilities in the
South and East China Seas. Under current plans, this is the greatest
shortfall. Changing the balance in favor of the U.S. might in part be
accomplished by the ASW capability of surface ships except that many of
those we are planning to build (LCS) lack sufficient protection from
the threat of China's growing missile and naval air forces.
Mr. Langevin. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage
in C4ISR capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to
acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional
insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other
modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR is
still lacking?
Dr. Cropsey. China's once inconsiderable amphibious capability has
developed impressively along with its sheer number of missiles and
other platforms that threaten Taiwan. China's military is being
modernized. The modernization includes substantive improvements in
Chinese C4ISR. Improvements in military hard- and software have
diminished the security Taiwan once enjoyed as a result of its superior
technology. The example demonstrates that China can narrow the gap
between itself and those of its potential adversaries who are
technically superior. C4ISR is also critical to China's DF-21 missile.
The missile narrows the same gap between China and U.S. military
technology. If someone had suggested 20 years ago that China would be
able to field a weapons system that might be able to target U.S.
aircraft carriers underway at sea at a distance of 1000 miles, most
experts would have been amused. They are less so today. There is no
reason to doubt that China's C4ISR capabilities will substantially
improve in the future.
Mr. Langevin. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a
boon to the domestic defense industry and our relationships with
foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the
enhancement of foreign military sales to other countries in the region
who are wary of China's increasing activity?
Dr. Cropsey. Had the F-22 production line not been closed, the
planes should be sold to Japan through foreign military sales. But this
is moot. More important than FMS is the defense industrial base
integration with Japan that would allow, to name one example, Japan to
manufacture the SM-3 missile and sell it to us and other allies thus
incorporating Japan into the international defense base that helps
supply the hardware on which democratic states depend for their
defense. A parallel point applies to Taiwan whose geographic position
in the middle of the first island chain offers the U.S. a salient in
any conflict as did England's position relative to the continent in
WWII. This is particularly important to U.S. and allied security
because control of the first island chain in China's likely long-term
plan precedes control of the second island chain (linking the Ogasawara
island chain with Guam and Indonesia) and finally achieving dominant
power status in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The fall or effective
Finlandization of Taiwan would be a giant stride in China's far-seeing
strategy. Taiwan has respectable military force and wants submarines to
protect against amphibious assault and blockade. Our nuclear boats are
not a realistic option for the Taiwanese, although such air-independent
propulsion boats as the German company's ThyssenKrupp Type 218SG are.
No less important are the C4ISR systems which would allow the U.S. and
Taiwan forces to conduct combined operations. Taiwan doesn't have these
and should. The U.S. ought to encourage Taiwan to buy them through FMS
and should use the FMS program aggressively to assure Taiwan's--and
thus, our--security.
Mr. Langevin. In what ways can we encourage additional productive
Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms?
Dr. Cropsey. The U.S. has invited China to participate in the naval
exercise RIMPAC 2014. Chinese students attend the Asia-Pacific Center
in Honolulu. Chinese naval officers regularly join in various functions
at the Naval War College in Newport. Chinese naval vessels have
participated for years in multi-national anti-piracy operations off the
Horn of Africa. At the same time, China has recently declared limited
control over large portions of international waters in the South China
Sea and airspace over the East China Sea. A Chinese vessel escorting
their aircraft carrier, Liaoning, crossed the bow of the guided missile
cruiser U.S.S. Cowpens which narrowly avoided a collision in December
2013. And China has been sending patrol ships and aircraft into the
territorial space of the contested Senkaku Islands, whose sovereignty
as Japanese territory the U.S. recognizes. Dismissing this as a
regional spat of no significance compared to trade between the U.S. and
China ignores what Beijing sees in the matter: an example of successful
execution of its ``Three Warfares'' strategy which, based on the idea
that nuclear/kinetic warfare is increasingly irrelevant to achieving
large strategic objectives, seeks to use psychological pressure, the
murky sphere of international law, and resource claims to accomplish
such goals as control over the Senkaku Islands. China's success there
would validate its Three Warfares strategy, invite more of the same,
and demonstrate the shallowness of Washington's security commitment to
Tokyo. Asking China to participate in additional international security
mechanisms now would send a message that the U.S. has all but abandoned
its long-standing policy of encouraging China to become a
``stakeholder'' in the international order that their aggressive
behavior contradicts. Continued U.S. efforts to persuade China to
become a stakeholder in the international order should be carefully
examined as should competitive strategies that would exploit the PLA's
historic imitation of U.S. technology by encouraging China's military
to make costly investments in technologies that produce no strategic
advantage over the U.S. or our allies. But China's aggressive actions
of the past year suggest that this is the wrong time to reward China by
including it in additional international security mechanisms.
Mr. Langevin. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine
construction, do you believe that our current investments in undersea
warfare and ASW capabilities and training is sufficient? If not, what
shortfalls are most concerning?
Mr. Thomas. I am concerned about the programmed shrinking of our
attack submarine fleet, as well as the impending retirement of our
SSGNs without replacement. A larger submarine force could be an
important element in a competitive strategy for competing with the PLA
longer term. As one of the most effective means of penetrating hostile
maritime A2/AD perimeters, it would make sense to reduce the reliance
on submarines for ASW. Using SSNs for ASW incurs an opportunity cost in
terms of foregone strike payloads and training time. Looking ahead, we
should reduce our reliance on submarines to conduct ASW and rely more
heavily on relatively more cost-effective surface and air systems, as
well as unattended undersea surveillance networks. U.S. investment
strategy should be informed by the potential challenge of having to
detect, track and engage large numbers of submarines that might be
flushed from their pens in crisis, as well as the opportunity to
develop an undersea ``family of systems'' including manned and unmanned
underwater systems, as well as new classes of submarine-launched
weapons and undersea sensors.
Mr. Langevin. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage
in C4ISR capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to
acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional
insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other
modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR is
still lacking?
Mr. Thomas. C4ISR systems represent a foundational capability to
enable China's whole approach to A2/AD and a core component of China's
``battle network'' that enables the PLA's arsenal of precision-guided
ballistic and cruise missiles, and other strike systems. They are
critical to detect, locate and track targets, as well as to transmit
such information to and from headquarters and to support battle
management. The PLA has made great strides improving its ability to
detect and monitor naval targets at long ranges (e.g., beyond 200
miles) with a variety of land-, sea-, air-, and space-based sensors. It
is unclear, however, how mature the PLA's efforts are to integrate its
ISR sensors to enable cross-cueing. Sensor integration is critical, in
particular, for an effective ``kill chain'' to support anti-ship
ballistic missile attacks.
Mr. Langevin. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a
boon to the domestic defense industry and our relationships with
foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the
enhancement of foreign military sales to other countries in the region
who are wary of China's increasing activity?
Mr. Thomas. Two areas stand out thematically when it comes to
future FMS. First, it is in the U.S. interest to encourage allies and
partners to expand their surveillance and early warning coverage of
their sovereign territorial waters and airspace. Second, as the United
States already done with the sale of JASSM to Finland and SM-3 to
Japan, it should consider FMS to expand the missile defense and strike
options available to allies and partners in the region so that they can
more equitably share the risks and responsibilities of collective
defense with the United States.
Mr. Langevin. In what ways can we encourage additional productive
Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms?
Mr. Thomas. There are a number of areas where the United States and
China would benefit from closer cooperation, and where China could make
greater contributions. No country is better positioned to influence
North Korea and move that country toward denuclearization and internal
reform. China could also play a constructive role in helping to defuse
Indo-Pakistani tensions and refocus Pakistan's military and
intelligence service toward addressing jihadist threats internally.
In East Asia, there are two major steps China could take that would
contribute significantly to international peace and security. First,
China could join the United States and Russia in the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces treaty and relinquish its stockpile of intermediate-
range ballistic missiles, which are destabilizing the regional security
balance. Second, China should sign codes of conduct with its maritime
neighbors to govern maritime activities and reduce the potential for
incidents at sea.
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