[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-62]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEVELOP- MENT AND INTEGRATION OF AIR-SEA
BATTLE STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY INTO THE SERVICES' ANNUAL
PROGRAM, PLANNING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION (PPBE) PROCESS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 10, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Douglas Bush, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, October 10, 2013, Department of Defense Development and
Integration of Air-Sea Battle Strategy, Governance and Policy
into the Services' Annual Program, Planning, Budgeting and
Execution (PPBE) Process....................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, October 10, 2013....................................... 27
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2013
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF AIR-SEA BATTLE
STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY INTO THE SERVICES' ANNUAL PROGRAM,
PLANNING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION (PPBE) PROCESS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 2
WITNESSES
Cheek, MG Gary H., USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7,
Department of Defense.......................................... 12
Foggo, RADM James G., III, USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Operations, Plans and Strategy) (N3/N5B),
Department of Defense.......................................... 4
Jones, Maj Gen James J., USAF, Director of Operations, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements,
Department of Defense.......................................... 8
Killea, BGen Kevin J., USMC, Director of the Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory, Department of Defense.................. 11
Stough, Maj Gen Michael S., USAF, Vice Director, Joint Force
Development, J7, Department of Defense......................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 31
[Editor's Note: The witnesses did not provide written
statements of the proposed testimony in advance of the
hearing. The Chairman, in concurrence with the Ranking
Minority Member, agreed to waive Committee Rule 13 for this
hearing.]
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 35
Mr. McIntyre................................................. 35
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 41
Mr. Langevin................................................. 54
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF AIR-SEA BATTLE
STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY INTO THE SERVICES' ANNUAL PROGRAM,
PLANNING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION (PPBE) PROCESS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 10, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. I would like to thank our distinguished panel
of witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. Today
we have testifying before us Rear Admiral Jim Foggo, Assistant
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and
Strategy; Major General Mike Stough, Vice Director for Joint
Force Development of the Joint Staff, J-7; Major General Jim
Jones, Director of Operations for the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Air Force Operations, Plans and Requirements; Brigadier General
Kevin Killea, Director of the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory located within the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command; and Major General Gary Cheek, Assistant Deputy Chief
of Staff for the Army,
G-3/5/7.
Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing. And we thank you
for your service to this great Nation. Under the first tranche
of budget reductions that began in 2010 with $168 million of
efficiencies taken out of the Defense Department's budget, the
Joint Staff was understandably stretched thin, supporting OEF
[Operation Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom]
operations, and was unable to absorb critical joint force
integration functions and responsibilities of Joint Forces
Command after it was dismantled in August 2011. One significant
consequence of that budget cut was that a vacuum of
preparedness and increased risk manifested itself, resulting in
the Department of Defense's inability to maintain sufficiently
trained, equipped joint warfighting forces that could
strategize, integrate, and guarantee a successful and timely
outcome in an anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] high-end
contingency operation.
However, under the auspices of the new Defense Strategic
Guidance, issued by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012,
the services took it upon themselves to fill that institutional
void and establish the Air-Sea Battle Office, acknowledging our
military's need to refocus capabilities on global full-spectrum
contingencies in A2/AD environments.
I do not believe that Air-Sea Battle in itself is a
strategy, a budget preservation gimmick, nor is it focused
particularly on a specific country or entity. What I do believe
is that it is the services' best attempt to hold themselves
accountable to their title 10 obligations of preparing for and
defending the freedoms and liberties that we as Americans hold
dear. It is extremely important that our military remains
capable and equipped to fight full-spectrum warfare, whether it
is in permissive environments such as what we have experienced
for the past 10 years, or in high-end contingencies against
adversaries with advanced air and missile defense systems and
near-peer force structure.
What we would like to discuss with our witnesses today is
how the efforts and products developed by the Air-Sea Battle
Office are integrating into each service's planning and
budgeting process, as well as how the Joint Staff plans to
institutionalize the Air-Sea Battle initiative of the services
within the Department of Defense. We would also like to
understand how the Air-Sea Battle Concept informs the
Department's anti-access/area denial warfighting strategy,
recognizes capability gaps and shortfalls, applies the
necessary resources to mitigate those gaps, and tailors joint
force training and exercises towards joint seamless integration
continuity. The Air-Sea Battle Concept is an important
initiative that will help determine how the joint force will
gain and maintain access in future military operating
environments.
I look forward to hearing an update from our witnesses
about the concept's development and future outlook. I also view
this hearing as a good public opportunity for our witnesses to
clarify intent and respond to misconceptions and falsities that
have surrounded the Air-Sea Battle Concept over the past few
years. With that, I turn to my good friend and colleague, the
ranking member of the subcommittee, Representative Mike
McIntyre.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing today. Thanks to all the witnesses for
your decades of service that you have given individually and
collectively. And I know that there is concern about the
importance of the Air-Sea Battle Concept. There has been
support for this, but it seems like the question is how much
has really happened within DOD [Department of Defense] to
proceed on this? And I wanted just to lay out a few things in
layman's terms that maybe will help us focus today in the time
we have together. First, we realize that Air-Sea Battle is not
necessarily just a strategy, but rather an approach or a
framework. And we want to make sure, is that a clear
understanding? To solve a very difficult military challenge
that U.S. forces may face in the future.
First, assuming that future enemies will use a wide array
of methods to slow down or prevent U.S. military forces from
moving to critical locations. Simply put, if the military
forces can't actually get there, then they can't influence the
battle. Second, we know that Air-Sea Battle assumes that even
when the U.S. forces arrive, a smart enemy will try to use an
array of asymmetric means to stop the U.S. military from
operating the way it wants to, such as taking away the
advantages in standoff-range weapons or logistics, or long-
range sensors and other areas such as that.
If they can do this in the future, if our enemies can do
it, then our forces may end up not getting to the fight in time
to make a difference, and may take many more casualties than we
would expect once they do get there. Clearly, those would be
bad outcomes for the United States. And clearly, I know that
the chairman and I on this subcommittee and our full committee
would want to make sure that those types of things were
prevented as far as possible, and ultimately not happen at all.
We want to make sure that the Air-Sea Battle Concept helps the
DOD develop the weapons, the doctrine, the organizations, and
the training needed to overcome these types of challenges in
the future.
Also, despite the clarity of this military challenge, we
may also want to look at, is the DOD really progressing to make
progress in these areas? For instance, the Asia-Pacific shift
we hear so much about now with the focus on the Pacific Rim and
with Air-Sea Battle Concept, we are told taking three aircraft
carriers out of the fleet was one of the options looked at
during the strategic management choices review. With the
concern about anti-access and area denial capabilities, the
question is, why would that type of step even be considered?
Also from a larger perspective, DOD has not yet proposed a
significant shift of funding within the DOD budget to two
military departments, the Navy and the Air Force, who have the
largest roles in the Air-Sea Battle Concept by definition. The
Navy's total budget share has yet to return to pre-9/11 levels
despite the end of the war and the rapid drawdowns that are
occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. The Air Force's
situation is even worse, with the Air Force dropping just under
30 percent of the total DOD budget before 9/11 to just under 25
percent today.
So the concern I have and that many of us share is that
until substantial resources shift within DOD to put back in
place what the Navy and Air Force may need, that we would not
see real implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept or the
real progress necessary or understood to be necessary in the
Asia-Pacific shift. So with that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I want
to thank you for this opportunity, and would like to hear these
areas addressed from our witnesses, and see what the prospects
are for real progress as we look ahead to 2015 budget and
beyond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mike. And Admiral, I think you are
going to start us off. And just before you start, I just wanted
to take just a moment and tell you this is probably one of the
most bipartisan subcommittees we have in Congress. We all have
a lot of respect for each other, and you have a lot of
expertise on here. Later, Mr. Courtney, who has a lot of
expertise in submarines and naval situations, will be asking
questions. Mr. Wittman is the chairman of the Readiness
Subcommittee. And all of you know him and look forward to his
comments and questions. And of course, the gentleman from
California, Mr. Cook, served us well in uniform, as all of you
know.
So we are looking forward to our questions. But Admiral, as
we start off, I would just like for you or someone else as you
address in your opening remarks, since we are laying a
transcript and a record to be used for other Members, Mike was
correct in saying sometimes there is just a little confusion in
what we are even talking about. And I want to go back to even
what anti-access/area denial really means and how it has
changed and transformed from maybe 20 years ago. But the second
thing is, if you could address for us, I think part of this
confusion we have is in the name. When you look at Air-Sea
Battle, it is remarkably like AirLand Battle concept. And
AirLand Battle was, I believe, a strategy. But Air-Sea Battle
Concept is a concept. And if you could elaborate on maybe the
difference between the two, because that nomenclature might
have left some misconceptions in some people's mind. With that,
Admiral, we look forward to your remarks, and thank you again
for being here.
STATEMENT OF RADM JAMES G. FOGGO III, USN, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY) (N3/
N5B), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Foggo. Chairman Forbes, thank you, sir. Ranking
Member McIntyre and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to come here and testify today on
the Air-Sea Battle Concept. I am joined by Major General Jones
of the United States Air Force, Brigadier General Killea of the
United States Marine Corps, Major General Cheek of the United
States Army, and Major General Stough, Vice Director, Joint
Force Development Joint Staff, each providing their individual
service and Joint Staff perspectives for you today.
So let me begin by answering the question, what is the Air-
Sea Battle Concept? The Air-Sea Battle Concept was approved by
the Secretary of Defense in 2011. It is designed to assure
access to parts of the global commons, those areas of the air,
sea, cyberspace, and space that no one necessarily owns, but
which we all depend on, such as sea lines of communication. Our
adversaries' anti-access/area denial strategies employ a range
of military capabilities that impede the free use of these
ungoverned spaces. These military capabilities include new
generations of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, surface-to-air
missiles, with improved range, accuracy, and lethality that are
being produced and proliferated. Quiet, modern submarines and
stealthy fighter aircraft are being procured by many nations,
while naval mines are being equipped with mobility,
discrimination, and autonomy.
Both space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly
important and contested. Accordingly, Air-Sea Battle in its
concept is intended to defeat such threats to access and
provide options to national leaders and military commanders to
enable follow-on operations, which could include military
activities, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster
response.
In short, it is a new approach to warfare. The Air-Sea
Battle Concept is also about force development in the face of
rising technological challenges. We seek to build at the
service level a pre-integrated joint force which empowers U.S.
combatant commanders, along with allies and partners, to engage
in ways that are cooperative and networked across multiple
domains: The land, maritime, air, space, and cyber domains. And
our goal includes continually refining and institutionalizing
these practices. When implemented, the Air-Sea Battle Concept
will create and codify synergies within and among the services
that will enhance our collective warfighting capability and
effectiveness.
So that is, in a nutshell, what the Air-Sea Battle Concept
is. But now what is it not? Sir, you pointed out the Air-Sea
Battle Concept is not a strategy, to answer your question on
the difference between AirLand Battle and the Air-Sea Battle
Concept. National or military strategies employs ways and means
to a particular end or end state, such as deterring conflict,
containing conflict, or winning conflict. A concept, in
contrast, is a description of a method or a scheme for
employing military capabilities to attain specific objectives
at the operational level of war. The overarching objective of
the Air-Sea Battle Concept is to gain and maintain freedom of
action in the global commons. Air-Sea Battle does not focus on
a particular adversary or a region. It is universally
applicable across all geographic locations, and by addressing
access challenges wherever, however, and whenever we confront
them.
I said earlier the Air-Sea Battle Concept represents a new
approach to warfare. Here is what I meant by that.
Historically, when deterrence fails, it is our custom to mass
large numbers of resources, leverage our allies for coalition
support and base access or overflight, and build up an iron
mountain of logistics, weapons, and troops to apply
overwhelming force at a particular space and time of our
choosing. This approach of build up, rehearse, and roll back
has proven successful, from Operation Overlord on the beaches
of Normandy in 1944, to Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Middle
East. But the 21st century operating environment is changing.
Future generations of American service men and women will not
fight their parents' wars. And so I will borrow a quote from
Abraham Lincoln written in a letter to this House on 1 December
1862, when he said, ``We must think anew, act anew. We must
disenthrall ourselves from the past, and then we shall save our
country.''
New military approaches are emerging, specifically intended
to counter our historical methods of projecting power.
Adversaries employing such an approach would seek to prevent or
deny our ability to aggregate forces by denying us a safe haven
from which to build up, rehearse, and roll back. Anti-access is
defined as an action intended to slow deployment of friendly
forces into a theater, or cause us to operate from longer
distances than preferred. Area denial impedes friendly
operations or maneuver in a theater where access cannot be
prevented. The Air-Sea Battle Concept mitigates the threat of
anti-access and area denial by creating pockets and corridors
under our control.
The recent conflict in Libya, Operation Odyssey Dawn in
2011, is a good example of this paradigm shift. Though Air-Sea
Battle was still in development, the fundamental idea of
leveraging access in one domain to provide advantage to our
forces in another was understood and employed against Libya's
modest anti-access/area denial capability. On day one of combat
operations, cruise missiles launched from submarines and
surface ships in the maritime domain targeted and destroyed
Libya's lethal air defense missile systems, thereby enabling
coalition forces to conduct unfettered follow-on strikes and
destroy the Libyan air force and control the air domain.
Establishing a no-fly zone, key to interdicting hostile
regime actions against innocent civilians, and that was our
mission, protect civilians, was effectively accomplished within
48 hours of receiving the execution order from the President. I
was the J-3, or the operations officer for Admiral Sam
Locklear, commander of Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn. And I
transitioned from U.S.-led coalition operations to Operation
Unified Protector as a task force commander for NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization]. During the entire campaign,
which lasted 7 months, NATO reported in its U.N. [United
Nations] after action report that there were just under 18,000
sorties flown, employing 7,900 precision guided munitions. That
is a lot. More than 200 Tomahawk land-attack missiles were
used, over half of which came from submarines. The majority of
the Libyan regime order of battle, which included 800 main
battle tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces, 2,000 armored personnel
carriers, 360 fixed-wing fighters, and 85 transports, were
either disabled or destroyed during the campaign. Not one
American boot set foot on the ground. No Americans were killed
in combat operations. We lost one F-15 due to a mechanical
failure, but we recovered both pilots safely.
Muammar Gaddafi, as you know, was killed by Libyan rebels
in October 2011. The Air-Sea Battle Concept in its classified
form was completed in November 2011, one month later. I
provided Admiral Locklear with a copy of the Air-Sea Battle
Concept, and we reviewed it on a trip to the United Kingdom.
Upon reading it, I thought back to the Libya campaign, and I
wondered how I might leverage the concepts of Air-Sea Battle to
fight differently, to fight smarter. Operation Odyssey Dawn
accelerated from a noncombatant evacuation operation and
humanitarian assistance to kinetic operations in a very short
period of time. There was little time to build up and rehearse
our forces.
To coin a phrase from my boss, this was like a pickup game
of basketball, and we relied on the flexibility, innovation,
and resiliency of the commanders and the forces assigned to the
joint task force. The Libyan regime's anti-access/area denial
capability was limited, as I said, and we were able to
overwhelm and defeat it with the tools that we had. But we must
prepare for a more stressing environment in the future.
Air-Sea Battle does so by providing commanders with a range
of options, both kinetic and nonkinetic, to mitigate or
neutralize challenges to access in one or many domains
simultaneously. This is accomplished through the development of
networked integrated forces capable of attack in depth to
disrupt, destroy, and defeat the adversary. And it provides
maximum operational advantage to friendly, joint, and coalition
forces. I am a believer, and so are the rest of the flag and
general officers here at the table with me. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. General Stough.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN MICHAEL S. STOUGH, USAF, VICE DIRECTOR,
JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT, J7, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Stough. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member
McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thanks
for allowing me the opportunity to be here today to discuss how
the joint force is addressing access challenges. My role here,
I think, is to give you an idea of how this integrates into the
Joint Staff. I am going to discuss the overarching concept very
briefly, the Joint Operational Access Concept, its relationship
to Air-Sea Battle and other supporting concepts, and our
ongoing implementation efforts. The Secretary of Defense, as
Admiral Foggo pointed out, clearly established as one of the 10
primary missions of the joint force the ability to project
power despite anti-access/area denial challenges. To meet that
objective, the Secretary directed the implementation of the
Joint Operational Access Concept, or JOAC. JOAC describes the
chairman's vision for how joint forces will operate in response
to emerging anti-access and area denial challenges as part of
our broader national approach. It seeks flexible integration of
service capabilities across multiple domains. And those include
space and cyberspace and the traditional air, maritime, and
land domains as well, and it identifies 30 required operational
capabilities needed to gain operational access.
Now, supporting concepts, Air-Sea Battle is one of those,
provide the greater operational context to the JOAC itself. The
Air-Sea Battle Concept is one of the most critical, as it
focuses on the development of integrated forces to, again, as
Admiral Foggo said, to gain and maintain freedom of action in
the global commons. We are also developing the joint concept
for entry operations. It is currently in work, and it describes
how a future joint force will overcome area denial threats to
enter into hostile territory.
The development of the 30 JOAC capabilities and the
associated capabilities from the supporting concepts is key to
ensuring the joint force has the requisite capabilities to
counter emerging A2/AD threats. To improve efforts to implement
JOAC and its supporting concepts, the chairman has directed an
approach to integrate, oversee, assess, and communicate joint
force development efforts required to overcome emerging
challenges. This approach focuses on the four operational
objectives and associated capabilities that the combatant
command require to operate in an A2/AD environment: Gain and
maintain regional cooperative advantage to counter A2/AD
strategies, more the shaping the environment; rapidly aggregate
the force; disrupt, destroy, and defeat A2/AD capabilities; and
conduct sustained operations in an A2/AD environment.
The Joint Staff J-7 will lead a multiyear iterative effort,
with the oversight provided by the director of Joint Staff and
the service operations deputies, in order to implement these
concepts. In closing, I would offer two thoughts. First, the
efforts to implement the JOAC, or Air-Sea Battle for that
matter, don't supplant established authorities or processes
that are a means to increase focus and integrate efforts across
the services and the joint force to address a critical set of
challenges. And second, in support of Joint Operational Access
implementation, the Air-Sea Battle Office serves a critical
function in integrating the development of service-specific
capabilities that the joint force commander will require. The
current Air-Sea Battle implementation plan will be leveraged to
the maximum extent possible to inform relevant segments of our
own Joint Operational Access implementation plan.
On behalf of our military members and civilian employees at
work every day to ensure our country is successful in preparing
for and countering these challenges, I would like to thank you
for your support, and I look forward to the discussion.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. General Jones.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES J. JONES, USAF, DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Jones. Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member McIntyre,
and again, the distinguished members of the subcommittee, I
also want to thank you for the opportunity to come and speak
with you today and present the Air Force perspective on how we
are executing the Air-Sea Battle construct. As I know you are
aware, Admiral Greenert and General Welsh recently collaborated
on an article that was called ``Breaking the Kill Chain.'' It
is a very descriptive term of one of the constructs that we are
addressing in this Air-Sea Battle. And it was intended to
describe the methodology that we would use to implement this
overall concept. And there were three supporting efforts that
were clearly identified in there: Compelling institutional
change, fostering conceptual alignment amongst the services,
and then promoting programmatic changes. And given this rapidly
evolving, very sophisticated, and challenging operational
environment that was described by Admiral Foggo in his opening
remarks, I would like to further elaborate on how we are
integrating the Air-Sea Battle Concept into our established
service processes.
I would like to start by saying that there is a big
difference between deconflicting among services and integration
amongst our services. And as we work to conduct these
operations across the multi-domains that Admiral Foggo
described, it requires a very rapid and a very tight
coordination amongst the air, the ground, and the naval forces.
It is a level of integration that goes far beyond what we may
do to preplan or merely deconflict those actions. And it is not
something that can be effectively and efficiently conducted on
an ad hoc basis for any response that we may have to provide.
Our forces need to be pre-integrated. We need to make sure that
we have this ability inculcated into everything that we do.
Sir, our adversaries have witnessed the power and the might
that our services together can bring, the overwhelming force
when we are given the opportunity to assemble forces in
theater, do multiple mission rehearsals before the operations
commence. And their concerns are clearly evident by the rapid
proliferation of more lethal air defenses, the anti-ship cruise
and ballistic missiles, and more integrated surveillance
systems. In addition, our military has evolved from a force
that was largely dependent on large bases and forward garrisons
that were close to the potential battlefields, to a more
expeditionary force that could support a smaller overseas
presence by surging into the area from hundreds, or even
thousands of miles away.
Sir, you asked in your comment how has the anti-access/area
denial threat evolved over the last couple of decades? And,
sir, as you well know, the idea of anti-access or area denial
is not new. But what has changed is the range that these
systems are able to employ at, a networked capability that ties
into surveillance to be able to queue those systems in, and the
incredible accuracy that those bring. So while the basic
construct itself is part of warfare for decades past, this
emerging technology and the proliferation of that technology
that ties the integration of the sensors that sense where
people are, and queues, and the range and precision that those
bring have driven a much larger operational problem for us. We
are leveraging Air-Sea Battle to build these pre-integrated
joint forces that I talked about. And there is plenty of
examples.
Our brethren from the Navy and their Top Gun school
routinely train with our Air Force's weapons school. In recent
Red Flag exercises that historically have been for our air
services, we had planners, Navy TLAM [Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile] planners from the Third Fleet, that were integrated
into the air operations planning. And that enabled us to
familiarize both the Air Force and the Army planners on how to
integrate operations on a more frequent basis.
Air Combat Command and Navy Fleet Forces Command are
working on common problems together in this newly formed Navy-
Air Force integration forum. And just 2 weeks ago, the Navy
sponsored an exercise, Navy Global 13, that examined three
different concepts for doing command and control in a cross-
domain environment. And we participated in those, and we will
take those, those will be further developed, and those will
lead into the Air Force's Unified Engagement. And we will
exercise in 2014, and we will further build on those and work
towards a development of joint doctrine.
We continue to expand doctrine integration and enhancing
collaboration with the Army air defense forces, Marine
reconnaissance forces. And each one of these small steps takes
us closer to our objectives of conceptual alignment and the
pre-integration of joint forces across the warfighting domain.
Sir, Air-Sea Battle is not about adding processes to the
existing DOD governance. We are working within the existing
requirements and the resourcing processes that each service and
the Joint Staff already use. Countering this anti-access/area
denial environment has caught the attention of nearly every
organization within DOD. And the Air-Sea Battle Office's
efforts to enhance that joint response across the full range of
doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership,
personnel, and facilities across that whole spectrum provides a
prism through which each service can assess their resource
priorities to enable their advancements to counter the anti-
access/area denial environment.
And I want to stress again this provides a prism that each
service can look through to identify what they might need to
do. We advise and we assist those service resource planners and
perform the specific roles as they ask us to look into their
processes. And as we continue to mature the Air-Sea Battle
Concept, the inter-service collaboration is occurring more
frequently on resource priorities that may cross service lines.
These enhanced relationships across the services are essential
to create a more highly networked, cross-domain operational
mindset in all of our forces.
Sir, you mentioned AirLand Battle. And Air-Sea Battle's 10
mission focus areas can be roughly compared to the AirLand
Battle's 31 initiatives. What might be different about Air-Sea
Battle is that it is not tied to one particular focus area. And
as you are well aware, the AirLand Battle was designed to help
us perform more effectively in the Fulda Gap scenario. This has
nothing to do with a region. It is a concept that can support
that strategy and provide choices to our combatant commanders
wherever they may need to counter that anti-access/area denial
threat.
These mission-focused areas are helping us more carefully
align and incorporate what we learn from exercises, from war
games, training and experiments, and advance the counters, the
anti-access/area denial threats, much like AirLand Battle's 31
initiatives helped us focus our response to that Fulda Gap
problem in the cold war.
Sir, we have had healthy discussions about our relationship
with the Joint Staff and potential areas of duplication, and I
am very confident that we have the right constructs in place.
We are well integrated and mutually supporting each other's
work. And that relationship remains strong as we continue to
refine our operational constructs. As mentioned earlier, the
Air-Sea Battle is an accepted supporting component of the Joint
Staff's Joint Operational Access Concept, JOAC, and it sits
alongside the forthcoming joint concept for entry operations.
And as General Stough previously mentioned, while the Air-Sea
Battle Concept is fully nested within those concepts, each of
our services have unique roles and responsibilities under title
10 that need to continue outside that Joint Staff planning
process.
The identification of the capability gaps, the
identification of solutions, and the resourcing of those
solutions all begin with our services. And while the Joint
Staff and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] offices
have oversight roles and numerous activities, the genesis and
development of the requirements and the resource
recommendations remain with those services. But what the Air-
Sea Battle Office presents as an action arm of those services
is assisting the evaluation of those DOTMILPF [Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel, and Facilities] options to address the overall anti-
access/area denial requirements.
So sir, in conclusion, while the anti-access/area denial
problems definitely present a significant challenge to the U.S.
and our allied forces, sustaining the teamwork that we have
established and the things that are resulting from the catalyst
of this Air-Sea Battle Concept and the Air-Sea Battle Office's
efforts offer a path to success. Compelling the institutional
change amongst our services, fostering the conceptual
alignment, and promoting programmatic collaboration are broad
actions taken to ensure the global commons remain free in the
face of ever-increasing threats.
Sir, again I thank you for this opportunity to address the
subcommittee, and I look forward to addressing your questions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General Jones. General Killea.
STATEMENT OF BGEN KEVIN J. KILLEA, USMC, DIRECTOR OF THE MARINE
CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Killea. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre and
members of the subcommittee, as the director of Marine Corps
concept development and experimentation, I appreciate the
ability to talk today about our perspective on anti-access/area
denial challenges and our role in the Air-Sea Battle Office.
While the development and proliferation of increasingly
advanced A2/AD systems threaten our ability to gain access and
achieve freedom of maneuver in the global commons, the A2/AD
challenge isn't new territory. Although, as you said, Mr.
Chairman, it is evolving and developing. But addressing it
continues to demand a balanced, joint approach, both non and
material solutions. It is important that we not lose sight of
this and allow A2/AD to become some entirely new problem that
requires a solely technical solution. And I think everybody at
this table agrees with that.
As we recognize the formidable challenge the proliferation
of advanced technologies presents to our long held military
advantage, we must keep in mind that our operational approach
to counter access and area denial threats will remain a key
component to any successful strategy. In short, access
challenges can't be overcome by technology alone. The A2/AD
discussion must continue to include the operational approach
that leverages all the capabilities of the joint force. The
overarching Joint Operational Access Concept, supported by the
subordinate concepts of Air-Sea Battle, and the forthcoming
joint concept for entry operations, gives due consideration to
adversary systems, but also places emphasis on the joint
force's need for an effective operational approach.
Along these lines, the Marine Corps continues to support
the increasingly convergent efforts of the Air-Sea Battle
Office and the Joint Staff to develop a more capable cross-
domain force prepared for the range of missions laid out in the
Defense Strategic Guidance. And it is a range of missions. As a
pre-integrated naval force inherently equipped to fight across
multi-domains, the Marine Corps supports Air-Sea Battle's
efforts to increase the interoperability of our joint forces in
the A2/AD environment. To that end, the Marine Corps supports
implementing both the Joint Operational Access and Air-Sea
Battle Concepts through war gaming, experimentation, and
exercising existing planned and developing capabilities.
Specific efforts on our part include developing force
postures and concepts for increased phase zero engagement and
crisis response that will be critical to both deterring threats
and maintaining access, developing concepts and longer range
capabilities that will enhance our operational maneuver and our
ability to seize and defend forward bases, airfields, strategic
chokepoints, and other key terrain in support of a joint
campaign.
These Marine Corps concepts and capabilities are intended
to lend resiliency to the joint force by employing mobile
platforms and dispersed aviation and ground assets that
increase the number of sea- and land-based launch points.
Lastly, projecting power despite A2/AD is just one of the
many mission sets that the services must be able to accomplish
per the Defense Strategic Guidance. As such, Air-Sea Battle is
one of many lenses the Marine Corps uses to view its
programming priorities. This is why collaboration between the
services in Air-Sea Battle is so important. The Marine Corps
will continue to maintain investment in a broad portfolio of
capabilities to support the joint force across the entire range
of military operations.
In closing, the Air-Sea Battle's Office efforts have been
an important step in addressing the evolving access and area
denial challenges our forces will face in the future. The
Marine Corps looks forward to continued service-to-service
collaboration in this area, as well as the integration of the
appropriate ASB [Air-Sea Battle] efforts with those of the
Joint Staff. Sir, I thank you for your support and the
committee's support, the subcommittee's support for the men and
women in uniform, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General. General Cheek.
STATEMENT OF MG GARY H. CHEEK, USA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, G-3/5/7, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
General Cheek. Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member McIntyre,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today about Air-Sea Battle. Now
some might be surprised that an Army general would be before
Congress talking about Air-Sea Battle, and I confess, I am a
little surprised myself to be here. But I would frankly tell
you that for the Army, we look forward to any and every
opportunity to partner with our joint brothers and sisters for
operations. And we get a lot of benefits from those. And we
give a lot of benefits to our other joint services. And
frankly, this is really what makes our military unique, is the
fact that we can bring these pieces together in a synergistic
way and achieve great effect against our Nation's enemies. But
we also recognize that we have got to be able to look beyond
what we are doing today currently in Afghanistan to future
conflicts. And we recognize that there is a very real
likelihood that those future conflicts could require us to go
into areas that an adversary would deny us in either the global
commons or an area that we are trying to operate in.
So we are very happy to be part of this process. Now, maybe
even more surprising is my own personal experience, having just
come from the CENTCOM AOR [United States Central Command area
of responsibility] and serving with my good friend General
Jones, where I was the deputy for the Army component to CENTCOM
and he was the deputy for the Air Force component. But we dealt
on a daily basis there with this very issue in the Persian Gulf
and the Straits of Hormuz. So you would be interested to know
that the things that we had to do to kind of counter that
environment I guess is the best way to describe it with a lot
of joint interoperability.
And so, for one example, for air and missile defense, we
provided Army Patriots, the Navy provided Aegis cruisers, but
we put them under the tactical control of the Air Force. And
they did a great job of exercising those routinely so that we
maintained the capability to take advantage of each other's
capabilities and provide overlapping and appropriate coverage
of the critical assets in the theater. A second thing that we
did, we provided Army tactical missiles as part of the air
tasking order and the joint targeting plan. So again, an Army
contribution to that effort. And maybe most uniquely, and
something that I know our soldiers really enjoyed, was
operating Apache helicopters off the decks of Navy ships, where
we would receive moving target indicators from Air Force AWACs
[Airborne Warning and Control System] aircraft and operate
under the tactical control of the Navy against small attack
craft in the Persian Gulf.
So those are just examples of what is happening today. And
I think what is really great about this concept is we can take
those very real activities that we are doing, codify them,
improve them, test them, and further develop them and then
return those to the field. So despite the title Air-Sea Battle,
I am very happy and the Army is very happy to be a charter
member of the organization and active participant. And we think
we have a lot to benefit from this because we recognize that
any future land campaign will likely have to use the
techniques, procedures, technologies that we have developed in
support of this. So again, thank you for the opportunity to
speak with you today.
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you. And we thank all of you for
those opening remarks. And any written statements you would
like to put in the record in addition to that, we certainly
would welcome them. And I am going to defer my questions until
the end so we can get all of our members' questions in. But at
this time, I would like to recognize our ranking member,
Congressman McIntyre, for any questions he may have.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief so
that we can afford our other members an opportunity. Rear
Admiral Foggo, beyond the military weapons systems, are there
specific examples you can cite in the areas of training or
organizational change that are a product of the Air-Sea Battle
Concept?
Admiral Foggo. Yes, sir. We talked about our recent war
game in Newport, Rhode Island, just about 10 days ago, Global
13. Global 13 took a look at command and control in the Air-Sea
Battle context with two additional domains that are rather new
in terms of warfighting, space and cyber. And part of the
challenge was to determine how to create a command and control
construct that would operate in the space and cyber domain, and
how you would control the space and cyber domain, and how you
would integrate that with the rest of your forces. The outcome
of that war game is being written up in conclusions and lessons
learned by our War College, and it will come back to the Air-
Sea Battle Office and be distributed to the services. That will
be used next year in the Air Force's Unified Engagement game as
a baseline for future progression in the determination of how
we best operate together.
Then those will be tested out in exercises in the fleet, in
the Air Force, and amongst the joint force and the services.
So, General Jones mentioned Red Flag. That is one aspect of an
actual exercise that takes place out in the field, training.
There is a joint effort right now, sir, Iron Crucible, which is
a part of the JOAC [Joint Operational Access Concept] process,
that will help train the joint force in the scheme of maneuver
of the Air-Sea Battle Concept. So I hope that answers your
question.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Major General Killea, with the
Marine Corps, what efforts do you feel like the senior leaders
feel are the top five things that could be done to help build
the kind of military capabilities that we need to operate in an
anti-access/area denial environment? And do you feel like we
are making progress in any of those areas?
General Killea. Well, sir, I think areas of development
that would help us in the Air-Sea Battle environment, I think
Admiral Foggo touched on a piece that is very critical right
now, it is the initial war gaming, experimentation and then
what leads to exercising and training as a joint force. We are
still pretty much developing this. And we still don't know what
we don't know in that realm. And I think that is going to
uncover a lot of things that lead to the chairman's question
early on about what can we do to inject into the process that
we can obtain to help in the Air-Sea Battle environment.
So, sir, I don't have anything more specific than that. I
can take your question for the record and see if there is
something more to it. But I think we have an opportunity here,
as a joint force, to uncover some things as we go forward with
war gaming, experimentation, and exercise.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 35.]
Mr. McIntyre. That would help in listing what you feel like
may be the top five things that would help you in that regard
so that we will know how to prioritize. And then Major General
Jones, the Air Force, we know that if there was a shift of
funding that I alluded to in my opening remarks, that would
clearly help. But in the little bit of time that I will take
left, so that we can go to other questions, let me just ask
you, absent a shift of funding share to the Air Force in this
difficult budget time, what progress do you feel the Air Force
can make in the next 5 years so that this moves forward?
General Jones. Sir, as we have worked our way through the
challenges that are associated with this fiscal environment,
and we are focusing very much on what we need to continue to
develop in this anti-access/area denial environment, things
that we have protected to move forward in that is our effort to
protect the F-35, the development of that airplane, which is
not only important for the Air Force but for our joint sisters
and for our coalition partners as well. And that will be a key
piece of what we bring in terms of air power in this anti-
access/area denial environment. So we are working hard to
protect that within our existing budget.
Mr. McIntyre. Which did you say?
General Jones. The F-35, sir. Protecting the F-35 platform.
We are also protecting the development of our next long-range
strike bomber. And so, sir, as we work our way through this,
the things that we are focused on within our existing budget
are the things that are unique to the Air Force to bring in
terms of how we will contribute to the joint fight. And we
think that is that global power capability that we bring, and
the capabilities and the technology that we need to be able to
continue to counter this proliferation of technology.
We are also focusing on, and continuing on track with our
next tanker, the KC-46. And again, that is a global capability
that enables us to have the reach, the speed of response, and
the flexibility to help not only the Air Force, but to set the
stage and to support the other components to arrive. So sir,
where we are in our budget and our priorities, protecting those
capabilities I think is key to advancing where we need to go.
Mr. McIntyre. Do you know if the intent to use those
tankers would still be at Seymour Johnson Air Force [Base]?
General Jones. Sir, I will have to take that and get back
with you as we work our way through that final, the total
basing. But I will take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 35.]
Mr. McIntyre. Please let us know. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank our witnesses for their testimony. And I appreciate you
appearing before this committee, and thank you for your service
to our Nation. Brigadier General Killea, what role does the
Marine Corps play in the highly contested threat environments
A2 and AD?
General Killea. Sir, thank you for that question. I think
as a part of a larger naval team, the pre-integrated Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces [MAGTF] operate from amphibious
platforms and ships and also from austere sites ashore. And
what this brings, that MAGTF, what that brings to this
environment is the ability, when necessary, to obtain entry
against a determined foe and also against a defended area. And
what that does is it gives the--it facilitates freedom of
action. So littoral maneuver, dispersed operations can help to
uncover anti-access/area denial threats, and by neutralizing
them support freedom of action. As well as, as I mentioned in
my statement, securing advanced bases, strategic chokepoints,
and even finding and securing areas where we can set up forward
operating refueling points and arming points, not bases, but
points where we can go in and quickly turn to challenge the
enemy's targeting processes and continue to spread out the
fight so it challenges their ability to defend. So in a
nutshell, I think that is what the Marine Corps and the MAGTF
bring to this environment.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, General. I have no further
questions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman for his questions. The
gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Foggo, you
sort of used the Odyssey Dawn recent experience, which is kind
of a, you know, textbook example of what we are talking about
here today, although as you point out, that was kind of a
limited foe in terms of, you know, the challenges in other
places.
Admiral Foggo. Yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. In that first 48 hours, the Tomahawk missiles
that were utilized, as you point out, a number of them came
from submarines, the Providence, Scranton, and Florida. The
Florida, obviously, had the highest payload capacity of the
SSGN [guided missile submarine]. I was just sort of wondering
if you could talk a little bit about, you know, what will
happen when those SSGNs go off line if we don't replace that
payload capacity in terms of just, you know, the whole approach
that we are talking about here today.
Admiral Foggo. Sir, thanks for that question. And it is a
great question, because Florida shot over 100 missiles in the
campaign. I think you and I have spoken before in a previous
hearing on the 30-year shipbuilding plan, that that ship was 14
months with a rotational crew when she came back through the
Mediterranean, so it was absolutely spectacular.
We have four SSGNs. I think Florida demonstrated the
capability and the massive strike capacity that one platform
can generate. And they will go out of service around 2026. And
so I think it is absolutely essential that we make up for the
loss of the four SSGNs. And our plan, which is part of the Air-
Sea Battle Concept when we talk programmatically, is to
introduce the Virginia payload module on USS Virginia, with a
number of missile launchers that will assist in boosting our
capacity for TLAM strike in light of the loss of the SSGNs.
Otherwise then, we will have, the rest of the force will be
stressed to provide the same level of capacity and capability
that we saw during Odyssey Dawn. That is not to say that we
can't do it. There was Stout and Barry who did a fantastic job
as the DDGs [guided missile destroyers] that were TLAM missile
launchers during the campaign. And they have quite an inventory
and payload of weapons.
Mr. Courtney. So again, if we are talking about adversaries
that are not as limited as Libya was, I mean obviously losing
payload is really actually going to handicap us more in terms
of overcoming those----
Admiral Foggo. Yes, sir, absolutely. I mean TLAM is a
fantastic weapon. It is precision strike. We were very, very
concerned about collateral damage during that campaign. So
otherwise then, you are putting a man in the cockpit at risk
going in on a weapons system. The TLAMs were very, very
effective against the SA-5, 165-kilometer surface-to-air
missile, which the Libyans maintained and were often tested.
And so that was their job. And then almost near
simultaneously our Air Force brethren came in with TAC
[tactical] air in the first night of the campaign to destroy
fixed-wing targets on the ground and other C2 nodes. So you are
absolutely right.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman. And one question I have,
as we go to Mr. Wittman, is if you are looking at current ways
that we can bring together the services so that we can fight
the challenges we have to anti-access and area denial now, are
you looking at what we currently have and how we best integrate
that, or are you looking at what we need and how we get to that
point? And if you are not looking at that, who is it that is
looking at that?
General Jones. Sir, we are looking at not only what we
have, but what we are evolving to. And a good example of that
is we continue to develop fifth generation fighters. The
technology that they bring, the sensor integration, and the
challenge of how do we integrate that information not only
across the fourth generation fighters, but to other command and
control assets that may need to be there is something that we
need to work through in terms of the data links and how we will
work that through. And so we are absolutely focused on future
requirements as well as the current environments.
And, sir, if I could return back on just briefly on your
question about what we would protect in our budget, those are
the things that we are focused on. But what I was perhaps not
clear with is as a result of that what we are not able to focus
on. And by focusing on these future capabilities that we will
need to continue to integrate, then we are having to take
decrements in our near-term readiness and modernization of our
current fleet. And so we are faced in a somewhat untenable
position of either maintaining our readiness for the future and
continuing to advance in the anti-access/area denial
environment, or having a more ready force now at the expense of
that technological advance in the future.
Mr. Forbes. That is crucial, because as all of you
mentioned, we are seeing this evolving much quicker than we
have ever seen it before. We have got to stay on top of that
curve. But even things like the amount of munitions and all we
have to make sure that you have got those amounts if we are
going to be using these concepts. The chair recognizes the
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. I
appreciate you taking the time to give us your perspectives on
the Air-Sea Battle Concept.
Brigadier General Killea, I would like to go to you and get
your perspective on the Marine Corps' role within that Air-Sea
Battle Concept. Looking at where we have been and where we are
going with the size of our amphibious lead, as you know, it
continues to be on the decline. The proposal is to retire early
two more LSDs [Dock Landing Ship]. How does the size of our
amphibious fleet affect the Marine Corps' ability to carry out
its role in an Air-Sea Battle plan?
General Killea. Thank you for that question, sir. That is a
fantastic question, and I think that goes to the collaboration
that has to go on amongst the services within the Air-Sea
Battle Office. Once we identify the capabilities that we have,
and then the gaps are identified from that, and then the
services propose solutions to those gaps and the Air-Sea Battle
Office will take those solutions and rack and stack them and
then provide them and advocate the capabilities list that goes
forward. So if that capabilities list includes additional
amphibious shipping or something that could augment the
capabilities of that amphibious shipping, that would come out
of the functions and the process of the office. But I think for
the Marine Corps, where we stand today with our amphibious
shipping is actually on pretty good stead for the missions that
we have, for our focus, for forward presence and crisis
response, and as we get into a major combat operation that
would involve this kind of environment, then our participation
with that is only going to be as good as we are preintegrated
with that joint force through the efforts that we have been
talking about this morning. I hope that answers your question,
sir.
Mr. Wittman. It does, it does. So I take what you are
essentially saying is that you will do what you can within that
context. If there is a need for more and you don't have it,
then it is going to be a problem?
General Killea. Yes, sir, yes, sir, that will be a problem
just based on resources, and then also the range of missions
that the Marine Corps needs to address. My sense is that if
something comes out of the air speed--I keep saying air speed--
Air-Sea Battle Office that prioritizes a specific Marine
capability, which hasn't been the case yet, then it will become
something that we push back to the service chief and the
programmers to address.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask: I was at Quantico the other day
and had the opportunity to visit with Dr. Burrow and his team
with the development of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle [ACV]. By
the way, they are doing a great job, on track for General Amos
to make a decision. Tell me, in the Air-Sea Battle plan
concept, what role does the ACV play in the need for the Marine
Corps to have that online in being able to meet its role in
that battle concept?
General Killea. Sir, thank you for that question, and it
goes back to the portion of my statement where I kind of
stressed operational maneuver as well as technical advances and
matching technologies that our adversaries may pose against us.
I think that with the services being integrated in their
capabilities, addressing what capabilities we would be facing
in a specific AOR [area of responsibility], that having
multiple maneuver units and deep strike capabilities is going
to force the adversary to react to us. What we don't want to do
is go to where he thinks we are going to show up and have a
bullet-on-bullet, missile-on-missile type of fight.
So what does the ACV bring? It brings a great--it is an
enabler to the MAGTF, because it gives us maneuver options.
Whether that is 12 miles offshore or 50 miles offshore, I don't
know the answer to that right now, the replacement. We don't
know the exact answer to that, but what I do know is that we
are going to have to have the ability, when required, to gain
entry against a, you know, determined foe but also against a
protected area so that we can open up access. It is kind of a
little bit backwards in what most people think about Air-Sea
Battle, which is access to get entry. I think in some cases,
you are going to have to--you may have a situation where you
are going to have to do some entry to support additional access
or freedom of access.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Admiral Foggo, tell me this, I just had the opportunity to
visit recently Australia and Singapore and talk to them about
their relationship with the United States with the LCS
[Littoral Combat Ship] now being not ported, but they are
rotationally through Singapore and also Marine Corps presence
now building in Australia. How important are our allies in the
Asia-Pacific with the implementation of the Air-Sea Battle plan
concept?
Admiral Foggo. Sir, the allies are extremely important, not
just Asia-Pacific but globally in any area where there might be
an anti-access/area denial threat. So I think it is commendable
that we are able to put our rotational LCS force into
Singapore. It is a fantastic ship; I rode one out of San Diego
a couple weeks ago. We were up at or in excess of 40 knots on
the ship. The mission modules, which are maturing, are going to
give us a tremendous mine warfare capability, ASW [anti-
submarine warfare] capability, ASUW [anti-surface warfare]
capability. I think the allies understand that. And one of the
most important things, and we talk about a lot of asymmetric
capabilities that we hold from the perspective of hardware and
force structure, one of the most asymmetric capabilities that
we have as the United States of America that does not get
mentioned enough in, my humble opinion, are our allies, and
they are enablers, they are force multipliers, and they are by
our side not just in the Pacific, Europe, Africa, all over the
globe.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, can you elaborate on what Mr. Wittman
just asked you in this regard, how do our allies even know what
to do? I know we have mil-to-mil contact and all, but I have a
number of them that come to my office. They are confused right
now as to what Air-Sea Battle really means. They are trying to
make decisions about their own procurement situation so they
can integrate, and one of the questions we would have is, how
are we engaging them as part of this process so that when they
have a choice between procurement A and procurement B, they are
getting the one that integrates best?
And, secondly, how are you communicating those needs to us?
Do we need a classified setting for that or what do we need to
make sure that we are meeting the needs that you have?
Admiral Foggo. Sir, as far as conveying the needs, that
might be best to do in a classified setting. As far as our
ability to communicate with the allies, we have several modem
for communication. The first would be counterpart visits and
country visits where Air-Sea Battle Concept comes up in many
conversations.
Secondly, I mentioned Global 13. That was our first war
game where we have actually invited members of our five eyes
partners and Japan to the war game, and so I think that was an
eye opening experience for those partners who took a look at
our Air-Sea Battle Concept in the five domains that I mentioned
earlier. We will continue to do that, and we will continue to
try to expand our ability to explain to our partners and to
bring them into our implementation master plan. That is
currently out in U.S.-only distribution. It looks at 10 mission
focus areas. Many of the things that we do in the Air-Sea
Battle Concept to assure access in the undersea domain, in the
air domain, antijamming, and then the facilitation through
force development activities, through exercising, training, and
integration, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and a list of
six things that we have asked our joint force and our service
brethren to tell us how we can do better and adopt best
practices.
So your point is very well taken. We are at the infancy in
sharing with our allies and partners, but as I said, that is a
very, very powerful asymmetric capability to the United States
of America. We need to leverage off of it.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. The gentleman from
California, Mr. Hunter, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen
for being here. The first question, I guess, how much harder is
this than AirLand? I guess that is it. I mean, we know what
AirLand Battle is, and how you have got to bring it all
together as a joint force, whether it is an asymmetric warfare
or symmetric, relatively symmetric warfare. How much harder is
this than that, if you had to give it, like it is 20 percent
harder? I am just curious. I mean, how much harder is this than
that?
General Jones. Sir, it is going to be difficult to give you
a quantitative number and a percentage, but I will say----
Mr. Hunter. I mean, is it a lot harder? Is it kind of the
same?
General Jones. Sir, what I will share with you is that the
environment is so much more complex than it was when we started
AirLand Battle. And so this with--really focusing on cross-
domain, if you think of where we have advanced in terms of
space, where we have advanced in terms of cyber, where we have
advanced, and not only have we advanced but our adversaries
have advanced.
Mr. Hunter. But you would use that in an AirLand Battle,
too, those things, space, cyber, but you wouldn't be floating
while you do it.
General Jones. Yes, sir, and my initial response was based
off of where we started with AirLand Battle and where we are
starting with Air-Sea Battle in terms of the levels of
complexity.
What we have found and what we actually hope to migrate to
in Air-Sea Battle is the things that we worked with a focused
effort in AirLand Battle, and got to the point where we don't
use the term AirLand Battle anymore, but those concepts are
still resident amongst the services. And so it is that initial
focusing effort to go against an operational problem set, work
to drive the institutional change amongst the services that
gets to the point where it now becomes part of our normal
lexicon, and so what I would compare in difference of
difficulty is the nascent stages of AirLand Battle, the nascent
stages of Air-Sea Battle, but with the ultimate goal of those
becoming about the same where it is part of our normal
processes.
Mr. Hunter. So let me ask you this, then: When you get a
new system like an LCS, or you get F-35 where we are
discovering the operational plans for it and how we are going
to use it and the Marine Corps is working on it, do we just fly
five of them over here and land them here, we can refuel them,
we don't need, you know, runways anymore, we don't need bases?
When each service comes up with their own ways to deploy those
new weapons systems, is your group the group that vets how that
all works together at the joint level, or is that a joint thing
or is that you when it comes to Air-Sea Battle or how does it
work?
Admiral Foggo. Sir, I would like to take that one on and
leave it open to anybody else. It is a great question, and you
mentioned AirLand Battle, and we have drawn a distinction
between AirLand Battle as a strategy and Air-Sea Battle as a
concept. There were, I think, if I am not mistaken, my staff
has given me the right number, about 31 lines of effort in
AirLand Battle. We took a hard look at those and scrubbed them,
and we came up with the 10 mission focus areas I mentioned
earlier for Air-Sea Battle, across the main operations,
undersea warfare, war at sea, attack operations to defeat A2/
AD, active and passive defense, the list goes on. That is our
playbook for Air-Sea Battle, and then the force development
activities, I mentioned training and integration tactics,
techniques, and procedures. To your point, if you take the F-
35, relatively new aircraft, in test and first airframe soon to
be delivered, how are we going to deploy that, and who is going
to decide what the best practices are? How are we going to get
a synergy across the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy
for the A, B, and C model? Great question.
So we sent out this implementation master plan about a
month ago, told all the services, all the combatant commanders,
and all the fleet commanders, the Echelon II, to absorb it and
come back to us in November with recommendations on what force
development activities we need to do to enable Air-Sea Battle
and how we are going to prevail in each one of these mission
focus areas. Following that, we will assemble that and we will
get those lessons redistributed to all of the people I
mentioned, combatant commanders, Echelon II, and we are going
to bring them to Washington in January for a conference, budget
permitting, and sit down at the table and adapt a plan and a
way ahead for the future that leverages off of some of the
things the Marines do, the Air Force do, and individual
geographic combatant commanders, who may have a different view
of the world than somebody else.
Great case in point. CENTCOM commander, NAVCENT [U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command] and AFCENT [U.S. Air Forces Central
Command] probably ought to be the best at mine warfare in the
world, because that is what they do in the Straits of Hormuz,
and they have tested it twice during international mine
countermeasures exercises, and they probably have lessons
learned for the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] commander with his
mine problem in Korea, and so we are going to bring all that
together.
Mr. Hunter. So let me just, to try to get my hands around
it just here as my time runs out. It looks like you are
bringing together all the new technologies that we have,
everything from UCAS [Unmanned Combat Air System], F-35, LCS,
EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] or whatever it is called
now, ACV, you are bringing all those things together to counter
the newer technologies that our symmetric foes or possible foes
would bring against us, and that is what you are doing. I mean,
is that basically it?
General Jones. Sir, basically. What I would like to do, I
would like to, if I can, circle back to your F-35 question as
an example, and so what I will tell you is that this
organization is not geared to drive the multi-service
development of tactics for any particular program. That is
still the responsibility of the MAJCOM [Major Commands], and
the MAJCOM commanders for us, and we do that in concert with
the different services as they approach their way through. So
we have established methodologies that will figure out how to
use any individual weapon system. That is not the purview of
this organization to drive a tactics development, but what we
are able to do is use as a prism as we look at, as the services
identify capabilities gaps, as the services look about the
resources that they are trying to bring to address those gaps.
A central organization, a multi-service organization that can
be a prism through which we assess those and help the services
assess those is very valuable as we start looking to maybe not
so much about what we add to a program but the deficit, the
challenges of things that may have to be cut. This organization
can be a prism to look through those to identify the
capabilities that might be remaining.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Conaway. No questions.
Mr. Forbes. Then if the gentleman has no questions, I have
just three left. As I said, I deferred mine until the end.
The first one is, we understand that the Secretary of
Defense released the Defense Strategic Guidance in January
2012, but as yet, an actual defense strategy has not been
released. How is the Department designing and executing
operational concepts such as Air-Sea Battle in the absence of
an actual defense strategy? In other words, what defense
strategy is the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and services
using as the baseline to design operational concepts such as
Air-Sea Battle, and if a defense strategy does exist in your
view, can you describe it for us and what formal document
articulates it for the public?
Admiral Foggo. Sir--go ahead if you like, Mike.
General Stough. Sir, I was just going to say from the joint
perspective, from the view of the Joint Staff at this point,
really the focal point as far--when we talk about force
development activities, which is really I think what we are
talking about here, it is the Defense Strategic Guidance, it is
the 10 missions that are laid out there. For example, we are
talking about here the mission to defeat the anti-access/area
denial challenge, to be able to address that, and--but that is
a precursor, if you will, or is foundational to all the other
missions that we need to be able to accomplish.
Mr. Forbes. General, is it your thought that that
guidance--and how many pages was that guidance? Eleven?
General Stough. I think that, yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. About 11 pages, that that guidance was in fact
or now our national defense strategy?
General Stough. No, sir, I am not that--I think our
strategy was published probably 2011 is the last strategy that
was published.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. So we had a strategy in 2011, but the
guidance has basically changed that strategy, has it not, or--I
am just asking. I am not----
General Stough. That is a good question. I can't say it has
fundamentally changed the strategy because the missions that it
has outlined----
Mr. Forbes. And maybe you can take that for the record. We
don't want to put you on the spot, but one of the things we are
wrestling with now is what is our strategy? You know. We don't
want to have a strategy that develops based on our procurement
policy. We would prefer to have a strategy that we are doing
our procurement after that, but at least for most of us sitting
up here we have had a rough time getting our arms around that
or getting someone that can answer that for us, and I don't
think we want to, we feel comfortable relying on an 11-page
guidance and saying that is our strategy. So if you guys would
confer at some point in time and get back to us for the record
on that, I think all of us would appreciate that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 35.]
Mr. Forbes. My second question, there has been much written
and discussed regarding perceptions about the escalatory nature
of the Air-Sea Battle operational concept. Some have gone so
far as to conclude, incorrectly in my opinion, that this
operational concept presupposes conventional strikes into China
and encourages the potential for nuclear escalation. Can you
please clarify for us today how escalation management in phase
zero and phase 1 of contingency operations is designed into
this concept?
Admiral Foggo. Yes, sir. I think that is a misperception
with respect to one particular adversary and one geographic
domain. As I said, Air-Sea Battle looks at anti-access/area
denial strategies globally, and part of what we do in phase
zero is being there to try to shape the battle space and to
know through our awareness, through our systems of intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance what is going on in the region
and how the region is changing, and then to be able to react to
it.
So it is a very deliberate process through Air-Sea Battle.
We are there, we are present. You mentioned the DSG [Defense
Strategic Guidance]. Part of the DSG was to rebalance to the
Pacific because it is such an important region, but not just
militarily, for all the reasons in the DIME [diplomacy,
information, military, economics] concept. And so we are there,
we are watching, and then we react accordingly to try to
prevent any kind of escalation or regional conflict from
burgeoning out of control, and that would apply in other places
as well, in the Mediterranean, currently a very interesting and
crisis-oriented area in the Eastern Med [Mediterranean] and
also around Africa, as we saw in the past weekend.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. And the last question I
have for you is this, first of all, preface on it. Congressman
McIntyre and I and several of the members of the committee
actually wrote a letter that I mentioned to each of you on
Tuesday that we sent to leadership of both parties, and also
requesting that they have a classified briefing regarding the
impacts to national defense that is taking place based upon
sequestration and where that is. Whatever decisions they make
after they have that knowledge, it is up to them, but to not
have the knowledge is concerning to many of us.
We would like to hear, and I know Mr. Courtney asked you a
little bit of this, and General Jones you responded somewhat,
but as you see sequestration playing out, what impacts is that
going to have to the Air-Sea Battle Office, to the Air-Sea
Battle Concept? If you know any of that today, you can share
with us, fine, we would appreciate it. If you want to get back
to us for the record with that, we would welcome that. If you
feel that needs to be done in a classified setting, we
understand that. But I want to make sure you have the
opportunity for the record at some point in time, be it today
or whenever you feel appropriate, to give us that because I
think you feel appropriate to give us that because I think that
is vitally important that we be able to communicate that.
So I open that to you, and maybe, Admiral, since you have
been quarterbacking some of this, any comment on that now or is
that something you would like to get back to us on, and how do
you feel about that?
Admiral Foggo. Sir, I would like to comment on that now,
and I think our Chief of Naval Operations, and I will defer to
the others here in a moment, made a pretty good and clear
statement of where the Navy would be in particular with regard
to Air-Sea Battle under the current PRES BUD 14 [President's
Budget for fiscal year 2014], and then again under the full
impact of sequestration with the Budget Control Act from now
through 2023 and a $500 billion reduction in our ability to put
resources into Air-Sea Battle.
So some of the things that we remain concerned about would
be our P-8 program would be delayed, multi-function towed
arrays for DDGs, no change, and that is good as far as ASW and
the undersea domain is concerned. LCS mission packages for ASW
would be delayed. No change in the Virginia payload module. LCS
mine mission modules still deliver the first increment 2015. On
air and missile defense, integral and part of the Air-Sea
Battle Concept, our surface electronic warfare implementation
program would be slowed down, that is antijamming, it is
critical to Air-Sea Battle. The evolved SeaSparrow missile
still delivered on the same rate to 80 platforms by 2020.
Advanced missile defense radar, only four ships would receive
it as opposed to a larger number under PB14 [President's Budget
for fiscal year 2014]. Infrared search and track, which is
another antijamming capability that uses infrared instead of
other means, delayed by about 2 years. The radio frequency kill
chain in AM 120 delta delayed to about 2020, and the naval
integrated fires and counter air with our E-2D Deltas, we would
have a reduction in the number of air wings that would be fully
complemented by 2020. And so that is the impact on the
capabilities which ultimately would have an impact on our
ability to carry forward Air-Sea Battle, so whatever relief you
can provide us we would appreciate. And I defer to my Air Force
counterparts.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
General Jones. Sir, I would like to. I will address that,
and if you don't mind at the end, I would like to circle back
to your question about escalatory perceptions.
Sir, we absolutely will feel the impact of the ongoing
sequester. As I said before, we are trying to protect and will
try to do our best to protect the F-35, the KC-46 long-range
strike development, and our space strategic warning and secure
communications. However, we are faced with making some
difficult choices that may require the need for us to divest up
to 550 aircraft and over 25,000 airmen. So, sir, we are already
facing a fleet that is aging an average of 24, 25 years, and
getting older, and as we have to make those hard choices, the
key thing that we are faced with is a force that will be
smaller, and with the trades that we have to make, that force
is going to take offsets in readiness, and so you will have a
force that will be smaller, it will also be less ready and
therefore less responsive to our ability to meet the Nation's
needs if and when we are required. We are protecting everything
that we need to do to do the current operational fight that is
out there, and we are meeting the combatant commander demands,
but the risk comes at what is available to do anything else
that our Nation may evolve. And, sir, I will be happy to come
back to you for the record with a full list of what those
impacts may be.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 35.]
General Jones. I would like to address your question about
escalatory concepts, though, sir. And what I would like to
clear up is the perception perhaps may be that this Air-Sea
Battle is a thing that if a conflict happens you reach over to
the shelf and you pull out the Air-Sea Battle chip, and you
execute. What Air-Sea Battle is designed to do, sir, is provide
our combatant commanders a range of options to address a
problem that is out there. It is not one thing, it is not a
given playbook. It is the conceptual design that will enable
our services to be networked and fully integrated, and then our
combatant commanders have the responsibility to manage how they
use the forces, and the full range across the diplomatic
information, military, and economic environments to achieve the
desires that they need.
So, sir, I think what I would offer to you is those that
think there is an escalatory construct to this, my counter
would be that implies that it is a push a button and this
happens, this is nothing but an enabling concept that provides
a full range of options to our combatant commanders to apply as
they see fit for the environment that we are in.
Mr. Forbes. General.
General Killea. Yes, sir, thank you for that question, and
it circles back to Congressman McIntyre's question that he
asked me that I took for the record about top five things to
put into ASB. I took that as additional capabilities and not
capabilities that we currently are fielding or have fielded to
protect. I think the entire MAGTF is an enabler to the ASB
implementation and concept. We add capacity to the joint force,
and capacity is critical when the potential adversaries are
matching that capacity, or in some cases, succeeding it with
lesser technology, but also very lethal capabilities.
So that capacity is important to make sure that a potential
foe has to defend across a vast area, and it goes back to the
maneuver that the MAGTF provides to the solution, whether it is
from the sea or ashore in austere sites.
But for your specific question on sequestration and what
that will do to current programs, our focus right now is on
forward presence and crisis response and readiness, and the
Commandant has been clear on that, and so something has to
give, and I think--I don't think, it has been stated that that
would have to take, you know, something away from the
modernization of forces down the road, something that would
have to be delayed. It wouldn't be something that we shelve, it
would be something that we would keep focused on, but the
priority for the Marine Corps right now is forward presence,
crisis response, and the readiness of those forces and the
forces that would follow in behind them.
Mr. Forbes. Very good. Well, gentlemen, thank you. General
Cheek, I am sorry.
General Cheek. Yes, sir, if I may, I think it is a great
question in the way it is captured, so all the questions about
strategy really feed into this because we are talking ends,
ways, and means, and so when our means are reduced under
sequestration, there is a direct effect on both the ends that
we can achieve and the ways that we would go about doing it,
which I would categorize Air-Sea Battle as a way of getting an
end of keeping open global commons, if you were, access to the
global commons.
So if in the times of the reduced resources we make a
choice to resource something like Air-Sea Battle, there will
be, as my colleague here pointed out, there will be a cost in
some other area, we will have reduced capability. So I know for
us, we share the same focus of our forward forces being ready
for combat. The next tier of forces ready to deploy, and then
there is other forces, frankly, we are going to struggle to
find the funds to keep them ready for an unforeseen
contingency.
So the risk is building, you know, as we speak, and I think
the sequestration will definitely affect Air-Sea Battle. It may
delay it. It may weaken it, but it will have an effect, I
think, in a number of areas that we are responsible for.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. Any other comments? Well, if not,
let me first of all thank you all for your service to our
country. Thank you for being here and for answering our
questions today and enlightening us on this. I would like to
leave you, again, with the opportunity, if you would, to give
us, with any specificity that you would like to, what you
believe the impact of sequestration could be on what you are
trying to do and how you are doing it; and then if you would,
as part of that, if you would tell us the additional risk that
we are having to accept by having those shortfalls, because it
all equates to risk to our men and women that are fighting, and
sometime we miss that. It helps us give a picture that we can
paint to individuals as we are fighting to get this turned
around.
Mike, did you have anything else? Mr. Conaway, anything
else? With that, then, thank you all and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
October 10, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 10, 2013
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
October 10, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
General Stough. Our current strategies are the 2010 National
Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the
2011 National Military Strategy. The writing of the Joint Operational
Access Concept (JOAC) was informed by these strategies. The JOAC was
also informed by the congressional testimonies and expressed needs of
the Combatant Commands, and a detailed examination of the emerging
operating environment.
In January 2012 the Secretary of Defense released, Sustaining
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, to articulate
priorities for 21st century defense that sustains U.S. global
leadership. This guidance does not replace current strategies but
provides amplifying guidance to reflect the President's strategic
direction to the Department. [See page 23.]
General Jones. Sequestration impacts to the ASB Office itself will
be minimal, if any. The office is very small and requires minimal
resources to continue concept development and implementation effort
coordination. From an Air Force perspective, sequestration level
budgets will severely impact concept implementation in the same way
they will impact the Air Force at large. We'll likely be forced into
choosing between near-term readiness and sufficient forces/force
structure that are properly modernized to address A2/AD threats. We'll
have to assess our ability to sustain major exercises and many of our
flying units won't be able to maintain the requisite readiness levels
to meet operational requirements. Regardless of readiness impacts,
we'll almost certainly have to pare back forces/force structure
(potentially up to 25,000 Airmen and over 500 aircraft, including
entire fleets of aircraft). Modernization and recapitalization of
existing capabilities to address A2/AD threats will be significantly
impacted, though we'll do our best to sustain our top three acquisition
programs: the F-35, KC-46, and the long-range strike bomber. [See
page 25.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE
General Jones. Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base was included in the
Strategic Basing Process to identify the bed-down location of the first
KC-46 Main Operating Base and the Formal Training Unit. It will
continue to be considered in future rounds of KC-46 basing. [See
page 15.]
General Killea. The ASB Office has previously identified Advanced
Electronic Warfare/Operations in a Digital Radio Frequency Memory
environment, Undersea Dominance, Long-Range Strike/Countering Long-
Range Integrated Air Defense Systems, Multi-Domain Command and Control/
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Integrated Air and
Missile Defense as critical capability areas needed to operate in an
A2/AD environment. It is vital to note, however, that this list focuses
narrowly on gaining access in the global commons, and fails to address
either the requirements for entry and landward operations or overall
sustainment of the Joint Force in an A2/AD environment. As such, the
identified ASB capability areas represent a subset of the greater
requirements needed for the Joint Force to achieve operational access
and project power despite advanced threats. In short--ASB's
capabilities set the conditions and enable follow-on decisive
operations and should not be viewed as either comprehensive or an end
unto themselves. A2/AD threats do not end at sea or in the other global
commons, but persist well into an adversary's littorals and ashore.
Advances in and proliferation of area denial systems such as Guided-
Rockets, Artillery, Mortars, and Munitions (G-RAMM) will present Marine
and Army forces with equally daunting challenges in gaining access--
especially when combined with advanced air, space, and cyber
capabilities. Additionally, as can be seen from the recent disaster in
the Philippines, access challenges can also be caused by natural
disasters that make ports, airports, and roads unusable. Such
challenges will require different capabilities to overcome them outside
the list provided by the ASB Office. These access challenges as well as
those cited in the ASB Concept are outlined in the JOAC and will be
further defined and developed through implementation of it and its
supporting concepts which include the Joint Concept for Entry
Operations (JCEO) as well as ASB.
Accordingly, the Marine Corps sees the solutions to countering A2/
AD threats much more broadly, and we see several planned and existing
capabilities as critical as we go forward:
#1 F-35B
Future A2/AD threat environments will place a premium on stealth,
dispersion, and tactical flexibility. The F-35B Lightning II will reach
its initial operational capability in 2015 and will provide the Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with
a transformational leap in capability. Fundamentally, the F-35B
supports our doctrine of maneuver warfare and our operational
requirement to provide close air support while operating in austere
conditions. Additionally, the F-35B's short take-off and vertical
landing capability will help increase sorties and greatly complicate an
adversary's planning by enabling operations from mobile, dispersed
forward sea-based and remote landing sites. The F-35B is an essential
part of our effort to modernize our aging aviation fleet and exploit
fifth generation technologies. Advanced stealth and other technologies
in the aircraft will greatly enhance our capabilities as America's
expeditionary crisis response force.
#2 Amphibious Surface Assault
Advanced guided munitions threats will require expeditionary forces
to operate further out at sea and at greater risk in the littorals and
ashore. Nothing is more important to the Marine Ground Combat Element
in this environment than an improved surface assault capability such as
the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). The current amphibious assault
vehicles are 1970's vehicles with 1960's technology. The ACV is
envisioned to provide improved speed and range to enable over the
horizon ingress, enhanced survivability, firepower, and inland mobility
to potential hotspots. An improved vehicle such as the ACV will help
the Joint Force to ensure freedom of maneuver and rapidly project power
inland from the sea despite increasingly sophisticated threats. When
coupled with the long-range vertical assault capabilities of the V-22,
forward deployed amphibious forces will possess the capacity and
tactical flexibility to rapidly get to problems and potentially diffuse
them before they escalate into crisis. The Marine Corps is continuing
to seek the balance of required performance and affordability with the
amphibious assault vehicle replacement.
#3 Amphibious ships
America is a maritime nation and forward deployed Navy and Marine
Corps forces area vital elements of national security that help ensure
freedom of navigation and operational access for the Joint Force. The
backbone of the Naval Expeditionary Force and our ability to project
force and secure operational access despite A2/AD threats is a
sufficient number of modern, capable, amphibious platforms that are
interoperable with the Joint Force, and survivable against increasingly
challenging A2/AD weapons that include anti-ship ballistic missiles,
anti-ship cruise missiles, sophisticated mines, subsurface threats,
etc. As critical as the number of amphibious platforms available during
operations is, equally critical are their organic C2 suites and
interoperability with the forces ashore, the supported Joint Force
Commander, and adjacent joint and coalition forces.
Due to current fiscal challenges, we must accept risk in the number
of amphibious ships to a fiscally constrained fleet of 33 amphibious
warships, translating into 30 operationally available ships if
readiness levels are significantly improved. Thirty operationally
available amphibious warships represent the minimum capability and
capacity necessary to fulfill our Combatant Commander commitments for
sea-based forcible entry.
#4 Readiness:
The stealth, speed, and precision of advanced A2/AD threats will
require U.S. forces to maintain a high state of personnel and equipment
readiness in order to rapidly respond and seize the initiative. Our
credibility as an effective deterrent to an A2/AD capable adversary, as
well as our success in that environment will be largely determined by
our readiness. Certain risks must be accepted in order to ensure that
the operating forces--particularly those operating at the forward
edge--maintain the highest state of readiness possible. Readiness is
the aggregate of the investment in personnel, training, and equipment
to ensure that units are prepared to perform missions at any given
time. Readiness is directly linked to resources and we are consuming
tomorrow's ``seed corn'' to feed today's requirements, leaving less to
plant for the future A2/AD challenges. In order to have the
capabilities needed to operate in an A2/AD environment we need
flexibility in our funding for readiness.
#5 Force Posture:
An important element to gaining and maintaining operational access
is a continued focus on not losing it in the first place by
establishing and nurturing partnerships with regional friends and
allies. To this end a balanced force posture, forward deployed--both
afloat and ashore--conducting cooperative engagement and training
activities, and ready to respond to crisis is critical to deterring
conflict and maintaining positional advantage should deterrence fail.
Naval expeditionary forces are a key element in a balanced force
posture, and nowhere is this requirement more acute than in the Pacific
theater. The Navy-Marine Corps team has been continuously forward based
in the Pacific for over 70 years and a ``pivot to the Pacific'' is like
returning home. The ongoing initiative to adjust our force laydown
represents much more than a simple redistribution of forces designed to
relieve pressure on our Japanese hosts. A reorientation on the Pacific
presents opportunities for cooperative engagement and training along
with our allies and partners in a region that includes 7 of 15 major
U.S. trading partners and 5 of our nation's most important mutual
defense treaties. A persistent Pacific presence and forward-leaning
operational posture reinforces our national commitment to this region
and highlights the importance to unencumbered access to U.S. national
security.
A significant concern with maintaining this Pacific posture is the
budget and the likelihood of continued sequestration beyond 2013. CMC
initiated a study to identify the future Marine Corps force structure
that would best meet the NSS requirements, while maintaining a high
rate of readiness. A 174K force design was determined to best balance
risk and resources with our most likely future operational environment.
Based on the detailed planning of an internal working group and in
conjunction with independent analysis, we have determined that within
sequestered-like budgets that our force design of 174K is the lowest
temporary level that can retain America's crisis response force. This
provides a minimum acceptable level of readiness, while maintaining
forward presence as a part of the Navy-Marine Corps team. This force
structure we would likely be forced to accept would not be the force
structure our strategy required, it would simply be the best we could
put forth with the resources we were given.
In summary, the Navy-Marine Corps team is essential to countering
future A2/AD threats and we are committed to fielding trained and ready
forces with the best equipment the nation can provide. The Navy/Marine
Corps team uses the advantage of all domains to project naval power at
the time and place of our choosing. The F-35B is the future of tactical
aviation and its development remains on track but the continued support
of the Congress is vital. The ACV is our number one ground procurement
priority but our solution must be affordable and we intend to get it
right. A forward postured, agile Marine Corps presence is largely
dependent on a fleet of modern, capable, and ready amphibious ships and
support platforms. The current ship-building plan is adequate but it is
not without risk. Forward deployed Marines must be ready to respond to
a range of possible scenarios that range from providing security and
humanitarian relief to conducting combat operations. Regardless of the
size of the force, the Marine Corps is committed to ensuring that they
will be poised and ready to respond when called. [See page 14.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 10, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not,
why has the concept been formalized with an official office?
Admiral Foggo. First, it's important to note that Air-Sea Battle
(ASB) is not a military strategy. It is an evolutionary set of ideas
focused on defeating threats to access in order to enable follow-on
operations--operations which could include military activities as well
as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. ASB is a concept that
enables the Joint Force to continue to operate in an anti-access area
denial environment as directed in accordance with the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance Joint Force mission to Project Power Despite Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges.
As a supporting operational concept to the Chairman's Joint
Operational Access Concept, ASB focuses on shaping any potential
adversary's anti-access and area denial environment to achieve access
and freedom of action in order to enable concurrent or follow-on joint
force power projection operations to achieve decisive results. By
identifying the actions needed to counter threats to the global
commons, the materiel and non-materiel investments required to execute
those actions, and the institutional changes needed to sustain them,
the ASB Concept serves to spur the development of better integrated
air, land, and naval forces required to address evolving threats to
access to ensure freedom of action in the air, space, cyberspace, and
maritime domains.
In the fall of 2011, following initial concept development by the
Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and recognizing the value of
further development and implementation of the concept, the Vice Chiefs
of all four Services signed a memorandum of understanding to officially
create the ASB Office and further build on the framework to implement
the ASB Concept. While at first this effort was outside the Joint Staff
and focused on primarily air and naval capabilities--it has since
become integrated into a larger force development effort focused on
capabilities in all domains including those needed to gain and maintain
access ashore.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced
with funding, office space and personnel at a level to be effective and
efficient?
Admiral Foggo. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, as currently
staffed and resourced, provides a fiscally efficient construct to
enable further development and implementation of the ASB Concept
through existing Service channels and processes. The office is manned,
funded, and located within existing Service headquarters budgets,
personnel, and spaces.
Mr. Forbes. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office
and how does it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities
within the Joint Staff, OSD Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the
JROC?
Admiral Foggo. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not have a
specific/unique budget line. The ASB Office stood up from within the
Services by redistributing existing headquarters billets and office
space from each Service. Funding for office activities comes from the
funding line that supports all headquarters personnel from each of the
Services. For example, individual travel funds come from the Service
headquarters staff directorate of the participating individual.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and
proportional enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating
resources and support staff provided by each of the services? How was
the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing and budget determined?
Admiral Foggo. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic
efforts, wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) Office has more than a sufficient workload for the
assigned personnel and support staff.
Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding,
the Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-
level ASB Executive Committee (EXCOM) that convenes on a quarterly
basis; a Senior Steering Group (SSG) that convenes on a monthly basis;
and supporting ASB Office staff charged with implementing the Concept.
The supporting staff is composed of personnel from each of the four
Services--sourced from existing military positions (i.e., ``taken out
of hide'')--with the mission to foster the development and adoption of
the related doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions based upon
Air-Sea Battle's conceptual design.
Current ASB Office manning:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Air Force Marines Army
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Military 2 Military 1 Military 1 Military
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Contractors 1 Contractor 1 Contractor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Civilian 1 Civilian
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Air Force Marines Army 4 Military 2 Military 1
Military 1 Military 4 Contractors 1 Contractor 1 Contractor 1 Civilian
1 Civilian deg.
The ASB Office does not have a specific/unique budget line.
Mr. Forbes. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in
2012, how did the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic budget priorities for training, equipping
and operating in anti-access/area denial environments?
Admiral Foggo. Each Service has long-standing processes used to
identify their specific capability requirements in order to inform
resource prioritization decisions. None of the Air-Sea Battle Office
analysis of force development activities conducted within each of the
Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The operational
environment, to include current and anticipated threats, remains an
important consideration for Service resource decisions. The function of
the Air-Sea Battle Office is to provide a more complete and thorough
level of integration across what would otherwise be more service-
centric solutions to the A2/AD challenges.
Mr. Forbes. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the
Air-Sea Battle Office as redundant or additive when compared to
existing functions within current organizational constructs and
authorities of each respective service's A8, N8/N9, or DCMC(P&R)
equivalent?
Admiral Foggo. While still in the early stages of development, the
Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office provides a complementary perspective to the
analyses conducted by the Services. The ASB Office provides a focused
view on a relatively narrow problem through a multi-domain and multi-
Service lens. This additional perspective enhances planning,
communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased
service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource
sponsors and programmers to use in their established deliberations.
Mr. Forbes. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-
Sea Battle Office integrated into each service's Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-
Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a
service's budget program?
Admiral Foggo. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of Understanding
explains the organizational structure, as well as the responsibilities
and authorities of the ASB Office. To summarize: the ASB Office
identifies key capabilities to enhance the ASB Concept and shares these
with the Services. The ASB recommendations are considered in the same
process as other Service doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)
recommendations. Programmatic decisions on these capabilities are a
Title 10 responsibility of the Service Chiefs. As such, the ASB Office
has no unique authorities in the development of the Services' budget.
Mr. Forbes. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the
Air-Sea Battle Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process?
Admiral Foggo. The Air Sea Battle (ASB) Office identifies key
capabilities to enhance the ASB Concept and shares these with the
Services. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle Office as providing a
valuable multi-Service ``joint view'' perspective on capabilities and
recommended solution sets. In the Navy, the effectiveness is
demonstrated by the increasing incorporation of identified ASB
capabilities in the PPBE process. ASB is expected to be a multi-year
process, whereby the Services will continue to strengthen and enhance
their habitual relationships, and more closely integrate their
``organize, train, and equip'' actions.
Mr. Forbes. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea
Battle products into the annual budget process and what percentage of
Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the
service's budget to date?
Admiral Foggo. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, along with OPNAV
N81 (Assessments), evaluates the ASB Concept with respect to capability
assessments to identify specific capability gaps and program
requirements for incorporation into programming guidance and the Front
End Assessment (FEA). The resource sponsors and programmers consider
these ASB inputs throughout the Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP)
development and review process, giving special consideration to those
that align with CNO priorities and compliment other FEA and SPP
requirements and capabilities.
ASB Office recommendations are one of many inputs given to
programmers. A high percentage of ASB recommendations are acted upon
favorably, but no defined percentage can be stated because
recommendations are typically capabilities-based and not discrete
resource allocation recommendations. Ultimately programmatic decisions
on capabilities are a Title 10 responsibility of the Service Chiefs.
Mr. Forbes. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities
tracked by the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget
execution to meet identified capability gaps and shortfalls of the
combatant commanders?
Admiral Foggo. The Services track budget execution of all resource
allocations; they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB)
recommendations outside the ASB Office.
Mr. Forbes. In the view of the service programmers, how did the
Air-Sea Battle Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal
Year 2014 President's Budget submission and the FY15-FY18 future years
defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary.
Admiral Foggo. Navy programmers carefully balance strategy,
capabilities, capacity and resources in building a future years defense
program. In our FY14 President's Budget (PB-14) submission, our
development of future capability, as benchmarked to support our
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific, is guided in large part by the Air
Sea Battle (ASB) Concept, which implements the Joint Operational Access
Concept. Both of these concepts are designed to assure U.S. forces
freedom of action and access to support deterrence, assurance of our
allies and partners, and the ability to respond to crises. PB-14
includes investments in both FY14 and over FY15-18 to focus on assuring
access in each domain, often by exploiting the asymmetric capability
advantages of U.S. forces across domains.
Specifically, PB-14 incorporated the ASB Concept in determining the
following investments to improve our ability to counter anti-access/
area-denial threats:
Mine threat: Countering potential enemy ability to use
mines to deny access to Naval forces continues to be a significant
emphasis in the near term. The Navy budget request funds Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) MCM Mission Package development to include MH-60S
helicopter Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) and Airborne
Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) systems, MCM hull-mounted sonar, and
accelerates fielding of the MK-18 UUV and Seafox mine neutralization
system.
Small boat and anti-ship missile threat: Small boats with
explosives and anti-ship missiles remain a potential threat to our
forces in the constrained waters of the Arabian Gulf. The Navy budget
request funds integration of Advanced Precision Kill Weapon system
(APKWS) into our MH-60R helicopters to counter small boats with
explosives or anti-ship missiles. The Laser Weapons system (LaWS) is
also being tested in the Arabian Gulf onboard USS Ponce and we are
investing in development and testing of near-term modifications to
existing weapons on our larger surface combatants.
Undersea threat: Navy's dominance of the undersea domain
provides U.S. forces their most significant asymmetric advantage. Our
investments continue to improve our capability to deny the undersea to
adversaries, while exploiting it for our own operations. The Navy
budget request sustains and plans production of proven Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) platforms including MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, P-8A
Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, DDG-51 and Virginia Class nuclear
submarines. The request also funds capabilities such as advanced
airborne sensors for the P-8A Poseidon, accelerates torpedo defense
systems for CVN, improves Navy's Undersea Surveillance system,
continues development of the Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater
Vehicles and additional payloads for existing submarines. We also
continue to practice and refine warfighting in war games and real-world
exercises including VALIANT SHIELD and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
which practices high-end ballistic missile defense, surface warfare and
anti-submarine warfare in simulations and live-fire missile and torpedo
events.
Air threat: Air power is a key component of the Naval
force, and improving the capability of our CSGs to project power
despite threats to access closes a key gap. The Navy Budget request
funds the continued development and low rate production of the new F-
35C Lighting II and capability improvements such as infra-red sensors
and weapons that provide air-to-air capability that are not susceptible
to RF jamming. The request also funds improvements to further network
sensors and weapons in the Navy Integrated Fire Control Counter Air
(NIFC-CA) capability that uses a network between AEGIS ships and the E-
2D aircraft to seamlessly share threat information. Lastly, the budget
funds the development and testing of the Unmanned Combat Air System
Demonstrator (UCAS-D).
Electromagnetic Spectrum and Cyber: Future conflicts will
be fought and won in the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace, which
are converging to become one continuous environment. This environment
is becoming increasingly important to defeating threats to access,
since through it we can disrupt adversary sensors, command and control
and weapons homing. The Navy budget request funds two additional
squadrons of EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, the Next
Generation Jammer, seven SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare Improvement Program
(SEWIP) block I upgrades, accelerates Research and development on SEWIP
Block 3, fields new deployable decoys to defeat anti-ship missiles and
continues procurement of improvements to Navy's Ships Signal
Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) to provide protection from electronic
attack.
Mr. Forbes. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea
Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and
subsequently with outside organizations such as OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L),
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council?
Admiral Foggo. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not solely
identify capability gaps. Each Service assesses its specific capability
gaps/shortfalls. These gaps are reviewed by the ASB Office for
applicability in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges.
Additionally, Service-provided solutions are consolidated in order to
provide a more holistic view of the collective Service efforts
addressing the A2/AD threat. This broad view of ongoing efforts allows
the ASB Office to identify opportunities for multi-Service
collaboration and make recommendations to their respective Services.
Since the ASB Office is a multi-Service organization,
recommendations originate within Service processes.
Mr. Forbes. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for
the services during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)?
Admiral Foggo. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office is not assigned a
specific QDR role. However, the QDR working groups are focused on
topics of ASB relevance and ASB-informed Service representatives
participate in QDR deliberations.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not,
why has the concept been formalized with an official office?
General Stough. Neither the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)
nor its supporting concepts are strategies, nor do they replace the
need for coherent strategies. Concepts by their very nature are
designed to bridge strategy to required capabilities. The Chairman's
Joint Operational Access Implementation Plan and the Services decision
to stand up the ASB Office are efforts to better focus and integrate
force development activities to provide the capabilities required by
Combatant Commanders to operate in the emerging A2/AD environment.
The writing of the JOAC was informed by current strategies--the
2010 National Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report, the 2011 National Military Strategy, and amplifying strategic
documentation as provided by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. The
JOAC was also informed by the congressional testimonies and expressed
needs of the Combatant Commands, and a detailed examination of the
emerging operating environment.
The JOAC describes the Chairman's vision for how joint forces will
operate in response to emerging A2/AD challenges as part of our broader
national approach. The growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe,
the changing U.S. overseas defense posture, and the emergence of space
and cyberspace as contested domains--is likely to lead future enemies,
both states and non-states, to adopt A2/AD strategies against the
United States as a favorable course of action.
JOAC describes how future joint forces will achieve operational
access in the face of such strategies. Its central thesis is Cross-
Domain Synergy--which requires a greater degree of integration across
domains and at lower echelons and a greater degree and more flexible
integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional
air-sea-land battlespace than ever before.
To achieve this integration in joint force development, the
Chairman has directed the development and execution of the Joint
Operational Access Implementation Plan to better focus and integrate
development efforts to overcome A2/AD strategies and capabilities.
Likewise, the Services agreed to establish the ASBO to focus and
integrate Service Title 10 responsibilities for force development of
capabilities to overcome A2/AD threats.
Mr. Forbes. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in
2012, how did the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic budget priorities for training, equipping
and operating in anti-access/area denial environments?
General Stough. Generally, capability gaps are identified through a
capability based assessment (CBA). A CBA uses scenarios to set the
operational conditions, such as A2/AD, in which military objectives
must be achieved. The gap between current capability and what we need
to do to meet our objectives is the ``capability gap.'' Using the
current force structure and doctrinal approaches gaps can be
characterized as to whether they are due to proficiency, sufficiency,
lack of existing capability, needed recapitalization, or policy
limitations. The risks associated with the identified gaps inform the
programmatic and budget priorities of the Services.
Mr. Forbes. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities
tracked by the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget
execution to meet identified capability gaps and shortfalls of the
combatant commanders?
General Stough. The Joint Staff tracks and validates required
capabilities through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS). In addition to the traditional sponsor centric
requirements process, the Joint Staff tracks Combatant Commander's
needs through the Integrated Priority List (IPL) process and their time
critical urgent and emergent needs through the Joint Urgent Operational
Need (JUON) and Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) processes.
Mr. Forbes. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea
Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and
subsequently with outside organizations such as OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L),
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council?
General Stough. The ASB Office analyzes needed future military
capabilities based upon current and programmed force structure and
capabilities and compares this as-is state to the desired end-state of
executing the ASB Concept. The resultant gaps in capability are
documented and pushed from the ASB Office to the services for their
endorsement and development of formal capability requirements
documentation.
These capability requirements documents are submitted into Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) through the
Knowledge Management/Decision Support (KM/DS) system from the service
sponsors--this would include any ASB Office vetted recommendations. The
KM/DS system provides a method for staffing requirements documents to
ensure input from DOD components with equity, and provides an
authoritative database for DOD requirements documents.
Mr. Forbes. Are there any duplicative roles or functions within the
Joint Staff directorates that are inherently resident within the Air-
Sea Battle Office?
General Stough. We believe that the roles and functions are
complementary, vice duplicative, in that there are requirements for
joint force development, as well as Service and multi-Service
development consistent with Title 10 authorities. On behalf of the
Chairman, the Joint Staff directorates focus on joint force development
while the ASB Office provides a pre-coordinated and integrated view of
the required capabilities of each Service to assure operational access
through a multi-domain and multi-service lens. In practice, the Joint
Staff leverages the work done by the ASB Office to inform overall joint
force development. In an era of pressing A2/AD challenges and declining
resources, additional focus on the thorough integration of capabilities
at the onset of development efforts increases the effectiveness of our
efforts to meet Combatant Command operational requirements for cross
domain solutions during execution.
Mr. Forbes. Will services be able to more effectively meet
requirements and operational planning considerations of the combatant
commanders with implementation of the Air-Sea Battle concept? If so, in
what specific ways?
General Stough. The JOAC and its supporting concepts, Air Sea
Battle and the Joint Concept for Entry Operations, were predicated on
the current and emerging needs of the Combatant Commanders to overcome
access challenges. The CJCS's JOA Implementation Plan (JIP) is designed
to ensure joint force development is appropriately focused on the
Combatant Commanders requirements to overcome A2/AD challenges. It does
this by developing a comprehensive, department-wide understanding of
ongoing JOA implementation activities, identifying opportunities for
joint collaboration to solve potential shortfalls in development
efforts and/or reducing redundant or duplicative activities,
establishing a set of prioritized and approved recommendations for
implementation by Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)
processes owners, and by providing comprehensive assessments to
military decision makers on progress toward the development of required
capabilities.
JOA Implementation, which will leverage the complementary efforts
of the ASB Office, will result in an improved ability to operate across
multiple domains giving the Combatant Commanders the ability to defeat
A2/AD strategies and capabilities with less risk.
Mr. Forbes. How does the Air-Sea Battle Office products and
analysis contribute to CJCS functions and responsibilities contained
under 10 U.S.C. Section 153?
General Stough. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 153, the Chairman is
responsible for ``Planning; Advice; Policy Formation.'' To assist in
fulfilling that responsibility the Chairman releases Joint Concepts
that articulate his vision for how the force will operate to overcome
specific challenges. In Jan 2012 the Chairman released the Joint
Operational Access Concept (JOAC) to address emerging A2/AD challenges,
the implementation of which will result in changes to Joint Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel,
Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).
Efforts to implement the JOAC, or ASB Concept for that matter,
don't supplant established authorities or processes but are a means to
increase focus and integrate efforts to address a critical set of
challenges. In support of JOA implementation, the ASB Office serves an
important function in integrating the development of Service-specific
capabilities that the Joint Force Commander will require. The current
ASB implementation plan will be leveraged to the maximum extent
possible to inform relevant segments of our JOA Implementation Plan.
Mr. Forbes. Since the CJCS JOAC contains 30 precepts, and the Air-
Sea Battle Office is responsible and contributes to enabling 26 of
those precepts, why is the Air-Sea Battle Office a separate
organization outside of the Joint Staff with no authority over JOAC
implementation?
General Stough. While JOA Implementation focuses efforts that are
overseen by the Chairman commensurate with his Title 10
responsibilities and authorities--required changes to Joint Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel,
Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P), the ASB Office focuses on
integration of Service capabilities in accordance Service Title 10
responsibilities. These efforts are mutually supportive of and will be
integrated with, JOA implementation in order to ensure the Combatant
Commanders have the requisite capabilities to overcome A2/AD
challenges.
The JS J7, through a JOA Integration Working Group comprised of
members from the Joint Staff, Services and Combatant Commands, will
lead this multi-year, iterative effort with oversight provided by the
Director of the Joint Staff and the Service Operations Deputies. On-
going efforts by the ASB Office will be incorporated into this effort,
and the implementation responsibilities for each element of the overall
JOA Implementation Plan will be aligned consistent with appropriate
Title 10 authorities for the CJCS, Services, and CCMDs.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not,
why has the concept been formalized with an official office?
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle Concept was completed in 2011,
making it a relatively new concept within DOD. In the fall of 2011,
following initial concept development by the Departments of the Navy
and Air Force, and recognizing the value of further development and
implementation of the concept, the Vice Chiefs of all four Services
signed a memorandum of understanding to officially create the ASB
Office (ASBO) and further build on the framework to implement the ASB
Concept. While at first this effort was outside the Joint Staff and
focused on primarily air and naval capabilities--it has since become
integrated into a larger force development effort focused on
capabilities in all domains including those needed to gain and maintain
access ashore.
It's important to note that Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is not a military
strategy; it isn't about countering an invasion; it isn't a plan for
U.S. forces to conduct an assault. It is an evolutionary set of ideas
focused on defeating threats to access in order to enable follow-on
operations--operations which could include military activities as well
as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. ASB is a concept that
enables the Joint Force to continue to operate in an anti-access, area
denial environment as directed in accordance with the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance Joint Force mission to Project Power Despite Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges.
As a supporting operational concept to the Chairman's Joint
Operational Access Concept, ASB focuses on shaping any potential
adversary's anti-access and area denial environment to achieve access
and freedom of action in order to enable concurrent or follow-on joint
force power projection operations to achieve decisive results. By
identifying the actions needed to counter threats to the global
commons, the materiel and non-materiel investments required to execute
those actions, and the institutional changes needed to sustain them,
the ASB Concept serves to spur the development of better integrated
air, land, and naval forces required to address evolving threats to
access to ensure freedom of action in the air, space, cyberspace, and
maritime domains.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced
with funding, office space and personnel at a level to be effective and
efficient?
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, as currently
staffed and resourced, provides a fiscally efficient construct to
enable further development and implementation of the ASB Concept
through existing Service channels and processes. The office is manned,
funded, and located within existing Service budgets, personnel, and
spaces.
Mr. Forbes. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office
and how does it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities
within the Joint Staff, OSD Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the
JROC?
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not have a
specific/unique budget line. The ASB Office stood up from within the
Services by redistributing existing billets and office space from each
Service. Funding for office activities comes from the funding line of
the offices contributing personnel from each of the Services. For
example, individual travel funds come from the Service staff
directorate of the participating individual.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and
proportional enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating
resources and support staff provided by each of the services? How was
the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing and budget determined?
General Jones. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic
efforts, wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) Office workload is sufficient and proportional for the
assigned personnel and support staff.
Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding,
the Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-
level ASB Executive Committee (EXCOM) that convenes on a quarterly
basis; a Senior Steering Group (SSG) that convenes on a monthly basis;
and supporting ASB Office staff charged with implementing the Concept.
The supporting staff is composed of personnel from each of the four
Services--sourced from existing military positions (i.e., ``taken out
of hide'')--with the mission to foster the development and adoption of
the related DOTMLPF solutions based upon Air-Sea Battle's conceptual
design.
Current ASB Office manning:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Air Force Marines Army
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Military 2 Military 1 Military 1 Military
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Contractors 1 Contractor 1 Contractor 1 GS
1 GS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Air Force Marines Army 4 Military 2 Military 1
Military 1 Military 4 Contractors 1 Contractor 1 GS 1 Contractor 1
GS deg.
The ASB Office does not have a specific/unique budget line.
Mr. Forbes. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in
2012, how did the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic budget priorities for training, equipping
and operating in anti-access/area denial environments?
General Jones. Each Service has long-standing processes used to
identify their specific capability requirements in order to inform
resource prioritization decisions. None of the Air-Sea Battle Office
analysis of force development activities conducted within each of the
Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The operational
environment, to include current and anticipated threats, remains an
important consideration for Service resource decisions.
Mr. Forbes. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the
Air-Sea Battle Office as redundant or additive when compared to
existing functions within current organizational constructs and
authorities of each respective service's A8, N8/N9, or DCMC(P&R)
equivalent?
General Jones. While still in the fledgling stages of development,
the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office provides a complementary perspective to
the analyses conducted by the Services. The ASB Office provides a
focused view on a relatively narrow problem through a multi-domain and
multi-Service lens. This additional perspective enhances planning,
communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased
service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource
sponsors and programmers to use in their established deliberations.
Mr. Forbes. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-
Sea Battle Office integrated into each service's Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-
Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a
service's budget program?
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of Understanding
explains the organizational structure, as well as the responsibilities
and authorities of the ASB Office. To summarize: the ASB Office
forwards recommendations from its subject matter expert working groups
to the Executive Committee, who then sends approved recommendations to
the Vice Chiefs of Service for further consideration. The ASB
recommendations are considered in the same process as other Service
DOTMLPF recommendations. The ASB Office has no unique authorities in
the development of the Services' budget.
Mr. Forbes. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the
Air-Sea Battle Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process?
General Jones. The Services view the ASB Office as a valuable
complementary perspective that can enhance individual service
viewpoints and encourage increased programmatic collaboration.
Mr. Forbes. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea
Battle products into the annual budget process and what percentage of
Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the
service's budget to date?
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) working groups review
service programs at all stages of development, from RDT&E to Full
Operational Capability. ASB Office recommendations are one of many
inputs given to programmers, and historically a high percentage of
recommendations from the ASB Office are acted upon favorably. No
specific percentage can be attributed because recommendations are
typically capabilities-based and not discrete resource allocation
recommendations.
Mr. Forbes. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities
tracked by the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget
execution to meet identified capability gaps and shortfalls of the
combatant commanders?
General Jones. The Services track budget execution of all resource
allocations; they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB)
recommendations outside the ASB Office.
Mr. Forbes. In the view of the service programmers, how did the
Air-Sea Battle Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal
Year 2014 President's Budget submission and the FY15-FY18 future years
defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary.
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities
in the development of the Services' budget. The ASB Office provides a
complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by the Services.
This additional perspective informs and enhances planning, communicates
individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service
collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors
and programmers to use in their established deliberations. ASB
recommendations have been well aligned with Service emphasis areas and
have had particular impact shaping training, exercises, and wargames
where the ASB Concept are tested and evaluated for incorporation into
operational and strategic planning.
Mr. Forbes. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea
Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and
subsequently with outside organizations such as OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L),
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council?
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not author
capability gaps. Each Service assesses its specific capability gaps/
shortfalls. These gaps are reviewed by the ASB Office for applicability
in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges. Additionally,
Service-provided solutions are consolidated in order to provide a more
holistic view of the collective Service efforts addressing the A2/AD
threat. This broad view of ongoing efforts allows the ASB Office to
identify opportunities for multi-Service collaboration and make
recommendations to their respective Services.
Since the ASB Office is a multi-Service organization,
recommendations originate within Service processes.
As it relates to outside organizations, each year Services submit
to OSD their Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP) programmatic
requirements, including ASB recommendations. Subsequent to these
submissions, during Program Budget Review (PBR), the Joint Staff and
all OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSA), including USD(AT&L), submit
issue papers against the Services' program recommendations to
OSD(CAPE). Issues approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) are
assigned to Issue Teams for vetting. Joint Staff, USD(AT&L), and
OSD(CAPE) have opportunity to participate on any Issue Team vetting
ASB-related issues. Issue Teams either resolve issues internally or
propose alternatives in turn to OSD(CAPE) and DSD for resolution. Final
FYDP programmatic decisions are documented in a Resource Management
Decision signed by DSD.
The Joint Staff also conducts an annual Capability Gap Analysis
(CGA) that is directly linked to the CCDR Integrated Priority List
(IPL) submission--as well as their Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA)
data. The final outputs from the CJA are used to develop the Chairman's
Program Review (CPR) and Assessment (CPA), both reported to Congress.
The output from the CGA has historically been used to identify those
specific Service gaps that have been determined by the Joint Staff to
be of significant risk, and to recommend specific Service action to
close/reduce those risks. In the past, these recommendations have also
included ones programmatic in nature. A2/AD capability gaps are
adjudicated using the same Departmental processes that address other
capability gaps. The CCDRs have incorporated those specific gaps/
recommendations into their IPL submissions, to be adjudicated in a
larger `National' context by the Joint Staff. The CGA is approved by
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and documented in a
JROC Memorandum (JROCM) that captures the relevant Joint decisions to
inform many Service efforts (e.g., POM development, Science &Technology
investment, Manpower, Policy, etc.).
Mr. Forbes. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for
the services during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)?
General Jones. The Air Sea Battle Office will continue to encourage
strategic thought and innovative doctrine on the integrated application
of current and emerging counter A2/AD capabilities. They will continue
to investigate capability gaps, shortfalls and requirements to face
complex security threats in Anti-Access/Area Denial environments. The
Air-Sea Battle Office will continue to engage with all the Services,
Joint Staff and OSD Policy to ensure that new concepts of operations
and emerging doctrine inform the QDR 2018 strategic conversation.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not,
why has the concept been formalized with an official office?
General Killea. First, it's important to note that Air-Sea Battle
(ASB) is not a military strategy; it isn't about countering an
invasion; it isn't a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assault. It is
an evolutionary set of ideas intended to inform the development of
military capabilities for defeating threats to access in order to
enable follow-on operations--operations which could include military
activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
ASB is a concept intended to help enable the Joint Force to continue to
operate in an anti-access area denial environment as directed in
accordance with one of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance Joint Force
missions to Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
Challenges.
As a limited objective supporting operational concept to the
Chairman's Joint Operational Access Concept, ASB focuses on developing
forces capable of shaping any potential adversary's anti-access and
area denial environment in order to achieve access and freedom of
action; and to enable concurrent or follow-on joint force power
projection operations to achieve decisive results. By identifying the
actions needed to counter threats to the global commons, the materiel
and non-materiel investments required to execute those actions, and the
institutional changes needed to sustain them, the ASB Concept serves to
spur the development of better integrated air, land, and naval forces
required to address evolving threats to access to ensure freedom of
action in the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains.
In 2010 the Secretary of Defense directed the Departments of the
Navy and Air Force to develop the ASB Concept and to work together to
foster its implementation through focused wargaming, experimentation,
and exercises. To that end the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
established a project office to provide a standing multi-service forum
for both the exchange of ideas and the cross-coordination of service
initiatives related to developing capabilities to overcome anti-access
and area denial threats. Since then the effort has grown to include
representation from the Army as well as the Joint Staff J-7 who are
developing a framework for implementing the Joint Operational Access
Concept. This broader joint effort will include ASB's input and develop
the full range of capabilities needed for U.S. forces to gain and
maintain access in all domains in order to project power across the
range of military operations.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced
with funding, office space and personnel at a level to be effective and
efficient?
General Killea. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, as currently
staffed and resourced, provides a fiscally efficient construct to
enable further development and implementation of the ASB Concept
through existing Service channels and processes. The office is manned,
funded, and located within existing Service budgets, personnel, and
spaces. Given increased resourcing in any of these areas, the office
could increase its multi-Service and multi-national implementation
efforts through such activities as increased wargaming,
experimentation, exercises, and training.
Mr. Forbes. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office
and how does it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities
within the Joint Staff, OSD Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the
JROC?
General Killea. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not have a
specific/unique budget line. The ASB Office was established from within
the Services by redistributing existing billets and office space from
each Service. Funding for office activities comes from the funding line
of the offices contributing personnel from each of the Services. For
example, individual travel funds come from the Service staff
directorate of the participating individual.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and
proportional enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating
resources and support staff provided by each of the services? How was
the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing and budget determined?
General Killea. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic
efforts, wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) Office has more than a sufficient workload for the
assigned personnel and support staff.
Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding,
the Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-
level ASB Executive Committee that convenes on a quarterly basis; a
Senior Steering Group that convenes on a monthly basis; and supporting
ASB Office staff charged with implementing the Concept. The supporting
staff is composed of personnel from each of the four Services--sourced
from existing military positions (i.e., ``taken out of hide'')--with
the mission to foster the development and adoption of the related
DOTMLPF solutions that support the Air-Sea Battle Concept's objectives.
Additionally, the governance structure includes a number of working
groups, comprised of subject matter experts from the Services, which
meet periodically. These working groups ensure that the ASB office
maintains close linkages with the operating forces and other key
supporting organizations within the Services.
Current ASB Office manning:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Air Force Marines Army
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Military 2 Military 1 Military 1 Military
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Contractors 1 Contractor 1 Contractor 1 GS
1 GS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Air Force Marines Army 4 Military 2 Military 1
Military 1 Military 4 Contractors 1 Contractor 1 Contractor 1 GS 1
GS deg.
The ASB Office does not have a specific/unique budget line.
Mr. Forbes. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in
2012, how did the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic budget priorities for training, equipping
and operating in anti-access/area denial environments?
General Killea. Each Service has long-standing processes used to
identify their specific capability requirements in order to inform
resource prioritization decisions. None of the Air-Sea Battle Office
analysis of force development activities conducted within each of the
Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The operational
environment, to include current and anticipated threats, remains an
important consideration for Service resource decisions.
Mr. Forbes. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the
Air-Sea Battle Office as redundant or additive when compared to
existing functions within current organizational constructs and
authorities of each respective service's A8, N8/N9, or DCMC(P&R)
equivalent?
General Killea. While still in the fledgling stages of development,
the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office provides a complementary perspective to
the analyses conducted by the Services and Joint Staff. The ASB Office
provides a focused view on a relatively narrow problem (i.e. access to
the global commons) through a multi-domain and multi-Service lens. This
additional perspective enhances planning, communicates individual
service viewpoints, encourages increased Service collaboration, and
acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors and programmers to
use in their established deliberations.
Mr. Forbes. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-
Sea Battle Office integrated into each service's Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-
Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a
service's budget program?
General Killea. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of
Understanding prescribes the organizational structure, as well as the
responsibilities and authorities of the ASB Office. To summarize: the
ASB Office forwards recommendations from its subject matter expert
working groups to the Executive Committee, who then sends approved
recommendations to the Vice Chiefs of Service for further
consideration. The ASB Office recommendations are considered in the
same process as other Service DOTMLPF recommendations. The ASB Office
has no unique authorities in the development of the Service budget.
Mr. Forbes. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the
Air-Sea Battle Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process?
General Killea. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle Office as
providing a valuable forum and complementary perspective that enhances
individual Service viewpoints, informs related force development
activities, and encourages increased programmatic collaboration.
Mr. Forbes. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea
Battle products into the annual budget process and what percentage of
Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the
service's budget to date?
General Killea. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) working groups review
service programs at all stages of development, from RDT&E to Full
Operational Capability. The recommendations they make--especially for
mature programs--generally coincide with those of the programmers. As a
result, a high percentage of recommendations from the ASB Office are
acted upon favorably. Please note however that no specific percentage
can be attributed because recommendations are typically capabilities-
based and not discrete resource allocation recommendations.
Mr. Forbes. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities
tracked by the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget
execution to meet identified capability gaps and shortfalls of the
combatant commanders?
General Killea. The Services track budget execution of all resource
allocations; they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB)
recommendations outside the ASB Office.
Mr. Forbes. In the view of the service programmers, how did the
Air-Sea Battle Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal
Year 2014 President's Budget submission and the FY15-FY18 future years
defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary.
General Killea. The ASB Office does not, nor should it exert any
authority over Service resource or budget decisions. The ASB
implementation plan prescribes a programmatic collaboration process by
which the ASB Office reviews Service capability gaps and their
associated solutions for applicability in countering A2/AD threats. The
POM 14 ASB deliberations presented the first opportunity for all four
Services to participate in the nascent process. This review provided a
focused look at how the Services are addressing a very narrow slice of
the spectrum of military operations and threats that could be faced by
the Joint Force.
Though not a direct result of ASB recommendations, the Marine Corps
continues to invest in capabilities that enhance the effectiveness and
interoperability of the Joint Force in an A2/AD environment. Specific
investments in systems such as the F-35B and ISR systems are integral
to countering A2/AD threats. Additionally, the Marine Corps is making
significant investment in improving and defending our expeditionary
command and control networks. We remain committed to developing and
strengthening relationships with our allies and partners world-wide,
and we continue to refine our employment and sustainment concepts in
the context of A2/AD challenges.
The Marine Corps provides general purpose forces organized,
trained, and equipped to conduct military operations in myriad
scenarios against a wide array of adversaries and capabilities. The
analysis and recommendations provided by the ASB Office is one of many
viewpoints considered by the Marine Corps as part of our POM
development process. Even though the ASB office has not exerted direct
influence over the Marine Corps POM submission, many of our investment
decisions reflect a shared recognition of the challenges posed to the
Joint Force by adversaries equipped with sophisticated A2/AD
capabilities.
Mr. Forbes. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea
Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and
subsequently with outside organizations such as OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L),
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council?
General Killea. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not author
capability gaps. Each Service assesses its specific capability gaps/
shortfalls. These gaps are reviewed by the ASB Office for applicability
in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges primarily in
the global commons of air, sea, space, and cyber. Additionally,
Service-provided solutions are consolidated in order to provide a more
holistic view of the collective Service efforts addressing the A2/AD
threat. This broad view of ongoing efforts allows the ASB Office to
identify opportunities for multi-Service collaboration and make
recommendations to their respective Services.
Mr. Forbes. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for
the services during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)?
General Killea. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office is not assigned a
specific QDR role, however the QDR working groups are focused on topics
of ASB relevance and ASB-informed Service representatives participate
in QDR deliberations.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not,
why has the concept been formalized with an official office?
General Cheek. Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is a set of ideas focused on
defeating threats to access in order to enable follow-on operations--
operations which could include military activities as well as
humanitarian assistance and disaster response. ASB is a concept that
enables the Joint Force to continue to operate in an anti-access area
denial environment as directed in accordance with the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance Joint Force mission to Project Power Despite Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges.
As a supporting operational concept to the Chairman's Joint
Operational Access Concept, ASB focuses on shaping any potential
adversary emplaced anti-access and area denial environment to achieve
access and freedom of action in order to enable concurrent or follow-on
joint force power projection operations to achieve decisive results in
Joint Force campaigns. By identifying the actions needed to counter
threats to the global commons, the materiel and non-materiel
investments required to execute those actions, and the institutional
changes needed to sustain them, the ASB Concept serves to spur the
development of better integrated air, land, and naval forces required
to address evolving threats to access to ensure freedom of action in
the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains to enable follow on
intra-theater or force projection operations.
In the fall of 2011, following initial concept development by the
Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and recognizing the value of
further development and implementation of the concept, the Vice Chiefs
of all four Services signed a memorandum of understanding to officially
create the ASB office and further build on the framework to implement
the ASB Concept. While at first this effort was outside the Joint Staff
and focused on primarily air and naval capabilities--it has since
become integrated into a larger force development effort focused on
capabilities in all domains including those needed to gain and maintain
access ashore.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced
with funding, office space and personnel at a level to be effective and
efficient?
General Cheek. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office, as currently
staffed and resourced, provides an efficient construct to appropriately
enable further development and implementation of the ASB Concept
through existing Service channels and processes. The office is manned,
funded, and located within existing Service budgets, personnel, and
spaces. Given increased resourcing in any of these areas, the office
could increase its multi-Service and multi-national implementation
efforts through such things as increased wargaming, experimentation,
exercises, and training.
Mr. Forbes. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office
and how does it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities
within the Joint Staff, OSD Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the
JROC?
General Cheek. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office does not have a
unique budget line. The ASB office stood up from within the Services by
redistributing existing billets and office space from each Service.
Funding for office activities comes from the funding line of the
offices contributing personnel from each of the Services. For example,
individual travel funds come from the Service staff directorate of the
participating individual.
Mr. Forbes. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and
proportional enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating
resources and support staff provided by each of the services? How was
the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing and budget determined?
General Cheek. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic
efforts, wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) office has more than a sufficient workload for the
assigned personnel and support staff.
Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding,
the Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-
level ASB Executive Committee (EXCOM) that convenes on a quarterly
basis; a Senior Steering Group (SSG) that convenes on a monthly basis;
and supporting ASB office staff charged with implementing the Concept.
The supporting staff is composed of personnel from each of the four
Services--sourced from existing military positions--with the mission to
foster the development and adoption of the related force development
solutions based upon Air-Sea Battle's conceptual design. Service
representatives within the ASB office also leverage support through
reach-back capabilities to Service staff directorates and Major
Commands. As an example, the Army utilizes connectivity with Training
and Doctrine Command's Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) for
subject matter expertise support for identified focus areas.
Current ASB office manning is: Navy--4 military and 4 contractors;
Air Force--2 military, 1 government civilian, 1 contractor; USMC--1
military and 1 contractor; Army--1 military and 1 government civilian.
The ASB office does not have a budget line.
Mr. Forbes. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in
2012, how did the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic budget priorities for training, equipping
and operating in anti-access/area denial environments?
General Cheek. Each Service has long-standing processes used to
identify their specific capability requirements, as part of the joint
analytic community, in order to inform resource prioritization
decisions. These processes continue in use. None of the Air-Sea Battle
office analyses of force development activities conducted within each
of the Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The
operational environment, to include current and anticipated future
threats, has been, and remains, an important consideration for Service
resource decisions.
Mr. Forbes. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the
Air-Sea Battle Office as redundant or additive when compared to
existing functions within current organizational constructs and
authorities of each respective service's A8, N8/N9, or DCMC(P&R)
equivalent?
General Cheek. While still in the fledgling stages of development,
the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office provides a complementary perspective to
the analyses conducted by the Services. The ASB office provides a
focused view on a relatively narrow problem through a multi-domain and
multi-Service lens. This additional perspective enhances planning,
communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased
service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource
sponsors and programmers to use in their established deliberations.
Mr. Forbes. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-
Sea Battle Office integrated into each service's Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-
Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a
service's budget program?
General Cheek. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of Understanding
explains the organizational structure, as well as the responsibilities
and authorities of the ASB office. To summarize: the ASB office
forwards recommendations from its subject matter expert working groups
to the Executive Committee, which, if warranted, sends approved
recommendations to the Vice Chiefs of Service for further
consideration. The ASB recommendations are considered in the same
process as other Service force development recommendations. The ASB
office has no unique authorities in the development of the Services'
budget.
Mr. Forbes. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the
Air-Sea Battle Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process?
General Cheek. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle office as
providing a complementary perspective that enhances individual Service
viewpoints and can encourage increased programmatic collaboration.
Mr. Forbes. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea
Battle products into the annual budget process and what percentage of
Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the
service's budget to date?
General Cheek. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) working groups review
relevant service programs at all stages of development, from Research
Development Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E) to Full Operational
Capability. ASB office recommendations are one of many inputs given to
programmers. The recommendations they make--especially for mature
programs--generally coincide with those of the programmers. As a
result, a high percentage of recommendations from the ASB office are
received favorably. No specific percentage can be attributed since ASB
recommendations are typically capabilities-based and not discrete
resource allocation recommendations.
Mr. Forbes. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities
tracked by the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget
execution to meet identified capability gaps and shortfalls of the
combatant commanders?
General Cheek. The Services track budget execution of all resource
allocations; they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB)
recommendations outside the ASB office.
Mr. Forbes. In the view of the service programmers, how did the
Air-Sea Battle Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal
Year 2014 President's Budget submission and the FY15-FY18 future years
defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary.
General Cheek. The recommendations provided by the Air-Sea Battle
office to Army G3 and G8 provided a complementary supporting view for
maintenance or increased funding for several areas within the Army
Program. The most significant of these fell within the areas of
Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Cyber, and Space.
Mr. Forbes. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls,
requirements and programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea
Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and
subsequently with outside organizations such as OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L),
the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council?
General Cheek. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office does not author
capability gaps. Each Service assesses its specific capability gaps/
shortfalls. These gaps are reviewed by the ASB office for applicability
in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges. Additionally,
Service-provided solutions are consolidated in order to provide a more
holistic view of the collective Service efforts addressing the A2/AD
threat. This broad view of ongoing efforts allows the ASB office to
identify opportunities for multi-Service collaboration and make
recommendations to their respective Services for inclusion in existing
processes to include the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The ASB
office is a multi-Service organization, thus recommendations originate
within Service processes.
Mr. Forbes. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for
the services during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)?
General Cheek. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office is not assigned a
specific QDR role, however the QDR working groups that may include
topics of ASB relevance have ASB-informed Service representatives
participate in their QDR deliberations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. As I look at the Air-Sea Battle strategy, I don't see
a lot that is fundamentally new--in most cases this is activity and
thought that has been ongoing for some time.
What changed to merit the creation of the ASB office, and what
about the current joint structure was inadequate? In other words, what
is the secret sauce that ASB is providing that no one else can, and why
wasn't it already being done?
Admiral Foggo. Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and
strategies are not new. The objective to deny an adversary both access
and the ability to maneuver remain timeless precepts of warfare. The
difference today is that technological advances and proliferation of
A2/AD capabilities threaten stability by empowering potential
adversaries with previously unattainable military capabilities. A new
generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air
missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality is being produced
and proliferated. Modern submarines and fighter aircraft are entering
the militaries of many nations, while sea mines are being equipped with
mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Space and cyberspace have never
been more important and will be contested by our adversaries. The
pervasiveness and advancement of computer technology and reliance on
the internet and usable networks are creating means and opportunity for
computer network attack by numerous state and non-state aggressors, and
the domain of space is now integral to such military capabilities as
communications, surveillance, and positioning. In certain scenarios,
even low-tech capabilities, such as rudimentary sea mines, fast-attack
small craft, or shorter range artillery and missile systems render
transit into and through the commons vulnerable to interdiction by
coercive, aggressive actors, slowing or stopping free movement. The
range and scale of possible effects from these capabilities presents a
military problem set that threatens the U.S. and allied warfare model
of power projection and maneuver.
In response to this changing environment, Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates, directed the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force
to address this challenge and develop an operational concept as a means
of refocusing the joint force on these developing threats. The `secret
sauce' in ASB revolves around the central idea that better networked,
integrated forces capable of attacking and defending in depth will be
capable of disrupting, destroying, and defeating rapidly maturing and
proliferating A2/AD threats, while simultaneously maintaining joint
assured access. While at first this effort was outside the Joint Staff
and focused on primarily air and naval capabilities--it has since
become integrated into a larger force development effort focused on
capabilities in all domains including those needed to gain and maintain
access ashore.
Mr. Langevin. The ASB office exists within a very crowded
organizational construct--CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC,
among others. How do the services assess the roles and functions of the
ASB office in relation to the service-specific and joint organizational
constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the joint staff, the
combatant commanders, or the services disagree?
Admiral Foggo. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office as
one of several valuable complementary perspectives that inform and
enhance individual service viewpoints and encourages multi-Service
cooperation in force development activities such as wargaming,
experimentation, and exercises.
Any disagreement would be raised to the appropriate level in the
respective chain of command, starting with the ASB Senior Steering
Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in
our Memorandum of Understanding.
It is important to note that the ASB Office meets routinely with
the Joint Staff and Combatant Command staffs and their components to
discuss initiatives, receive input, and coordinate future activity.
This has greatly helped to avoid disagreements and disputes over roles
and functions.
Mr. Langevin. What authorities does the office have in the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this
include authority with regard to research and development investments?
Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has
affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been
substantially different? I bring this up as the ASB concept seems to
place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric or next-generation
capabilities--undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginia-class
and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber
fires, next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns,
and durable space capabilities, among others. I would say that the
services and the joint staff already recognize the value of these
capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for them, broadly
speaking, given the current fiscal constraints.
Admiral Foggo. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities
in the development of the Services' budget. This is an individual
Service Title 10 responsibility. The ASB Office provides a
complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by the Services.
This additional perspective informs and enhances planning, communicates
individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service
collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors
and programmers to use in their established deliberations. ASB
recommendations have been well aligned with Service emphasis areas and
have had particular impact shaping training, exercises, and wargames
where the ASB Concept is tested and evaluated for incorporation into
operational and strategic planning.
Mr. Langevin. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office recommended that each
of the services needs to continue to implement specific actions within
their organization, train and equip roles. In particular, one such
action item was that ``Full command and control connectivity and nodal
linkages between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime
Operation Centers (MOCs) do not currently exist.'' Does the ASB concept
have concerns about this capability gap that are not already
encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct,
which includes ``networked operations centers, core data centers, and a
global identity management system with cloud-based applications and
services''?
Admiral Foggo. The only concern that is not already encompassed
within the future Joint Information Environment construct is integrated
AOC/MOC training. Joint training and exercises that integrate AOC and
MOC operations on a habitual basis are needed to form permanent
relationships between the two communities. This training should seek to
proliferate best practices as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that
can be used or adapted across Service and Unified Command lines.
Mr. Langevin. ASB heavily emphasizes cyber capabilities. However,
the operational thought constructs seem to assume a much higher level
of delegation of authority for cyber actions than currently exists. I
am aware that OSD is working through some of the very thorny issues
regarding the use of cyber capabilities, but to what extent does ASB
inform that process, if it does at all?
Admiral Foggo. The ASB Concept identified the need for both
offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, but each of the Services
must determine its own required capabilities. Delegation of authority
policies are scenario specific and must still be developed through the
collaborative efforts of OSD, Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commander.
The Air-Sea Battle Office informs that process through lessons learned
from war games and exercises.
Mr. Langevin. Training in the complex environments of the future is
a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time--
particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly
there have been some strides in the generation of those training
capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not
adequate. What does ASB add to the services' current efforts to create
that ability? What was the current joint planning environment unable to
provide?
Admiral Foggo. All modern military operations are heavily reliant
on the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The
Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these
will be increasingly challenged by sophisticated anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB Office maintains awareness
of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the
ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats.
The ASB Office established working groups comprised of subject matter
experts from across the Services in both Electronic Warfare and
Cyberspace Operations, among others. During January 2014, the ASB
Office will convene its annual planning workshop as part of the FY14
ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this workshop,
participants will review and organize the planned exercise,
experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services
in order to determine the collective ``roadmap'' toward improvements in
capabilities in the presence of A2/AD threats. The Working Group
participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on
improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional
activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing
lines of communication.
Mr. Langevin. As I look at the Air-Sea Battle strategy, I don't see
a lot that is fundamentally new--in most cases this is activity and
thought that has been ongoing for some time.
What changed to merit the creation of the ASB office, and what
about the current joint structure was inadequate? In other words, what
is the secret sauce that ASB is providing that no one else can, and why
wasn't it already being done?
General Stough. Events of recent decades demonstrated the decisive
results U.S. joint forces can achieve when allowed to flow combat power
into an operational area unimpeded. Yet few if any enemies perceived
that they possessed the ability to deny U.S. access by armed
opposition, and U.S. operational access during that period was
essentially unopposed. What is new is that the ability to ensure
operational access in the future is being challenged--and may well be
the most difficult operational challenge U.S. forces will face over the
coming decades. Increasingly capable future enemies will see the
adoption of A2/AD strategy against the United States as a favorable
course of action. The combination of three major trends has altered the
calculus: (1) The dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons and
other technologies capable of denying access to or freedom of action
within an operational area. (2) The changing U.S. overseas defense
posture. (3) The emergence of space and cyberspace as increasingly
important and contested domains.
With the evolving A2/AD challenges comes the requirement to conduct
cross domain operations--the central idea of the Joint Operational
Access Concept--to overcome those challenges. Cross domain operations
requires an increased level of integration during force development,
and seeing a need to do so the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps (and
later joined by the Army) leaned forward to develop the ASB Concept and
to establish the ASB Office. Subsequent approval of the Joint
Operational Access Concept provided the overarching framework for how
to develop the Joint force to respond to access challenges, and ASB
Office efforts now remain complementary and supportive of JOA
implementation.
Mr. Langevin. The ASB office exists within a very crowded
organizational construct--CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC,
among others. How do the services assess the roles and functions of the
ASB office in relation to the service-specific and joint organizational
constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the joint staff, the
combatant commanders, or the services disagree?
General Stough. As capability requirements are identified and
brought forward for validation, the Joint Staff conducts an independent
assessment of the analysis and recommendations of the capability
sponsor. As the documentation describing capability requirements are
staffed through Joint Capabilities and Development System (JCIDS) to
the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC), views from the various
equity holders are raised and adjudicated appropriately. The final
arbiter of disagreements with respect to capability requirements is the
JROC where CAPE and AT&L are statutory advisors, and the applicable
Combatant Commanders are encouraged to attend and provide input.
Mr. Langevin. What authorities does the office have in the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this
include authority with regard to research and development investments?
Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has
affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been
substantially different? I bring this up as the ASB concept seems to
place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric or next-generation
capabilities--undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginia-class
and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber
fires, next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns,
and durable space capabilities, among others. I would say that the
services and the joint staff already recognize the value of these
capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for them, broadly
speaking, given the current fiscal constraints.
General Stough. The responsibility for planning, programming,
budgeting, and execution process, and the authority for research and
development investments resides with the Services per Title 10 U.S.C.
On behalf of the Services, the ASB Office analyzes needed future
military capabilities based upon current and programmed force structure
and capabilities and compares this to the desired end-state of the ASB
Concept. The resultant gaps in capability are documented and provided
to the Services for their endorsement and development.
The ASB Office is the appropriate organization to provide concrete
examples of how the ASB Office efforts have affected service budget
priorities that otherwise would have been substantially different.
Mr. Langevin. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office recommended that each
of the services needs to continue to implement specific actions within
their organization, train and equip roles. In particular, one such
action item was that ``Full command and control connectivity and nodal
linkages between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime
Operation Centers (MOCs) do not currently exist.'' Does the ASB concept
have concerns about this capability gap that are not already
encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct,
which includes ``networked operations centers, core data centers, and a
global identity management system with cloud-based applications and
services''?
General Stough. The Joint Information Environment (JIE) will
adequately address connectivity and nodal linkages between the Air and
Space Operations Centers and Maritime Operation Centers. The JIE
establishes a more secure and effective information technology
infrastructure that will enable better connectivity and communications
between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime Operation
Centers (MOCs). With the development of networked JIE Enterprise
Operations Centers and core data centers under the JIE construct, there
will also be increased capability to share information between AOCs and
MOCs.
In addition, the JIE provides a more seamless means of
collaborating between these two centers as standards, procedures,
policies and techniques are no longer Service specific, but defined and
conducted at a true joint level. While unique command, control,
communications and computer (C4) systems to each center would still
potentially pose a capability gap, the JIE enhances the overall fusion
of joint C4 systems by ensuring the visibility and accessibility of
data to improve operations.
To specifically address the Services' responsibilities in training
for the Air Sea Battle, the JSJ7 Deputy Directorate for Joint
Environment is moving to provide an accurate replication of the Joint
Information Environment (JIE) construct to enable distributed training.
The Joint Staff and the Services will be compliant with the JIE
construct for Joint Force Development activities, enhancing overall ASB
strategy efforts.
Mr. Langevin. Training in the complex environments of the future is
a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time--
particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly
there have been some strides in the generation of those training
capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not
adequate. What does ASB add to the services' current efforts to create
that ability? What was the current joint planning environment unable to
provide?
General Stough. The Joint Staff defers to the ASB Office to answer
this question.
Mr. Langevin. As I look at the Air-Sea Battle strategy, I don't see
a lot that is fundamentally new--in most cases this is activity and
thought that has been ongoing for some time.
What changed to merit the creation of the ASB office, and what
about the current joint structure was inadequate? In other words, what
is the secret sauce that ASB is providing that no one else can, and why
wasn't it already being done?
General Jones. Anti-access and area denial capabilities and
strategies are not new. The objective to deny an adversary both access
and the ability to maneuver remain timeless precepts of warfare. What
is different now is that technological advances and proliferation of
A2/AD capabilities threaten stability by empowering potential
adversaries with previously unattainable military capabilities. A new
generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air
missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality is being produced
and proliferated. Modern submarines and fighter aircraft are entering
the militaries of many nations, while sea mines are being equipped with
mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Both space and cyberspace are
becoming increasingly important and contested. The pervasiveness and
advancement of computer technology and reliance on the internet and
usable networks are creating means and opportunity for computer network
attack by numerous state and non-state aggressors, and the domain of
space is now integral to such military capabilities as communications,
surveillance, and positioning. In certain scenarios, even low-tech
capabilities, such as rudimentary sea mines, fast-attack small craft,
or shorter range artillery and missile systems render transit into and
through the commons vulnerable to interdiction by coercive, aggressive
actors, slowing or stopping free movement. The range and scale of
possible effects from these capabilities presents a military problem
set that threatens the U.S. and allied warfare model of power
projection and maneuver. We have taken our collective eye off these
developments, mainly because U.S. and allied forces have enjoyed
uncontested freedom of combined action in the air, sea, space, and
cyber domains for more than a generation. Going forward, we anticipate
adversaries will actively oppose deployment and sustainment of our
joint forces.
In response to this changing environment, Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates, directed the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force
to address this challenge and develop a new operational concept.
Mr. Langevin. The ASB office exists within a very crowded
organizational construct--CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC,
among others. How do the services assess the roles and functions of the
ASB office in relation to the service-specific and joint organizational
constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the joint staff, the
combatant commanders, or the services disagree?
General Jones. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office as
one of several valuable complementary perspectives that inform and
enhance individual service viewpoints and encourages multi-Service
cooperation in force development activities such as wargaming,
experimentation, and exercises.
Any disagreement would be raised to the appropriate level in the
respective chain of command, starting with the ASB Senior Steering
Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in
our Memorandum of Understanding.
It is important to note that the ASB Office meets routinely with
the Joint Staff and Combatant Command staffs and their components to
discuss initiatives, receive input, and coordinate future activity. In
addition, the Joint Staff J7 attends the ASB Senior Steering Group
meetings. This has greatly helped to avoid disagreements and disputes
over roles and functions.
Mr. Langevin. What authorities does the office have in the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this
include authority with regard to research and development investments?
Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has
affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been
substantially different? I bring this up as the ASB concept seems to
place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric or next-generation
capabilities--undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginia-class
and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber
fires, next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns,
and durable space capabilities, among others. I would say that the
services and the joint staff already recognize the value of these
capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for them, broadly
speaking, given the current fiscal constraints.
General Jones. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities
in the development of the Services' budget. The ASB Office provides a
complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by the Services.
This additional perspective informs and enhances planning, communicates
individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service
collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors
and programmers to use in their established deliberations. ASB
recommendations have been well aligned with Service emphasis areas and
have had particular impact shaping training, exercises, and wargames
where the ASB Concept are tested and evaluated for incorporation into
operational and strategic planning.
Mr. Langevin. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office recommended that each
of the services needs to continue to implement specific actions within
their organization, train and equip roles. In particular, one such
action item was that ``Full command and control connectivity and nodal
linkages between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime
Operation Centers (MOCs) do not currently exist.'' Does the ASB concept
have concerns about this capability gap that are not already
encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct,
which includes ``networked operations centers, core data centers, and a
global identity management system with cloud-based applications and
services''?
General Jones. The only concern that is not already encompassed
within the future Joint Information Environment construct is integrated
AOC/MOC training. Examining opportunities to develop joint training and
exercises that integrate AOC and MOC operations on a habitual basis to
form permanent relationships between the two communities is relevant to
DOD and the Air-Sea Battle Office is engaging in those areas. The
training should seek to proliferate the best practices as Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that can be used or adapted across
Service and Unified Command lines.
Mr. Langevin. Training in the complex environments of the future is
a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time--
particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly
there have been some strides in the generation of those training
capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not
adequate. What does ASB add to the services' current efforts to create
that ability? What was the current joint planning environment unable to
provide?
General Jones. All modern military operations are heavily reliant
on the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The
Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these
will be increasingly challenged by sophisticated anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB Office maintains awareness
of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the
ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats.
The ASB Office established working groups comprised of subject matter
experts from across the Services in both Electronic Warfare and
Cyberspace Operations, among others. During January 2014, the ASB
Office will convene its annual planning workshop as part of the FY14
ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this workshop,
participants will review and organize the planned exercise,
experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services
in order to determine the collective ``roadmap'' toward improvements in
capabilities in the presence of A2/AD threats. The Working Group
participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on
improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional
activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing
lines of communication.
Mr. Langevin. The ASB office exists within a very crowded
organizational construct--CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC,
among others. How do the services assess the roles and functions of the
ASB office in relation to the service-specific and joint organizational
constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the joint staff, the
combatant commanders, or the services disagree?
General Killea. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office
as one of several valuable forums and complementary perspectives that
help inform and enhance individual service viewpoints and encourage
multi-Service cooperation in force development activities such as
wargaming, experimentation, and exercises.
Any disagreement would be raised to the appropriate level in the
respective chain of command, starting with the ASB Senior Steering
Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in
our Memorandum of Understanding.
It is important to note that the ASB Office meets routinely with
the Joint Staff and Combatant Command staffs and their components to
discuss initiatives, receive input, and coordinate future activity.
This has greatly helped to avoid disagreements and disputes over roles
and functions.
Mr. Langevin. What authorities does the office have in the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this
include authority with regard to research and development investments?
Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has
affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been
substantially different? I bring this up as the ASB concept seems to
place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric or next-generation
capabilities--undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginia-class
and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber
fires, next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns,
and durable space capabilities, among others. I would say that the
services and the joint staff already recognize the value of these
capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for them, broadly
speaking, given the current fiscal constraints.
General Killea. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities
in the development of the Services' budget. The ASB Office provides a
complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by the Services.
This additional perspective informs and enhances planning, communicates
individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service
collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors
and programmers to use in their established deliberations. Some of ASB
recommendations have been aligned with various Service emphasis areas
and have shaped some training, exercises, and wargames.
Mr. Langevin. Training in the complex environments of the future is
a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time--
particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly
there have been some strides in the generation of those training
capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not
adequate. What does ASB add to the services' current efforts to create
that ability? What was the current joint planning environment unable to
provide?
General Killea. All modern military operations are heavily reliant
on the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The
Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these
will be increasingly challenged by sophisticated anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB Office maintains awareness
of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the
ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats.
The ASB Office established working groups comprised of subject matter
experts from across the Services in both Electronic Warfare and
Cyberspace Operations, among others. During January 2014, the ASB
Office will convene its annual planning workshop as part of the FY14
ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this workshop,
participants will review and organize the planned exercise,
experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services
in order to determine the collective ``roadmap'' toward improvements in
capabilities in the presence of A2/AD threats. The Working Group
participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on
improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional
activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing
lines of communication.
Mr. Langevin. The ASB office exists within a very crowded
organizational construct--CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC,
among others. How do the services assess the roles and functions of the
ASB office in relation to the service-specific and joint organizational
constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the joint staff, the
combatant commanders, or the services disagree?
General Cheek. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office as
one of several complementary perspectives that inform and enhance
individual service viewpoints and encourages multi-Service cooperation
in force development activities such as wargaming, experimentation, and
exercises. Any disagreement would be raised to the appropriate level in
the respective chain of command, starting with the ASB Senior Steering
Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in
our Memorandum of Understanding. The ASB office also meets with the
Joint Staff and Combatant Command staffs and their components to
discuss initiatives, receive input, and coordinate future activity
within existing processes. This has greatly helped to avoid
disagreements and disputes over roles and functions.
Mr. Langevin. What authorities does the office have in the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this
include authority with regard to research and development investments?
Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has
affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been
substantially different? I bring this up as the ASB concept seems to
place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric or next-generation
capabilities--undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginia-class
and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber
fires, next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns,
and durable space capabilities, among others. I would say that the
services and the joint staff already recognize the value of these
capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for them, broadly
speaking, given the current fiscal constraints.
General Cheek. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office has no authorities
in the development of the Services' budget. The ASB office provides a
complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by the Services.
This additional perspective informs and enhances planning, communicates
individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service
collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors
and programmers to use in their established deliberations. ASB
recommendations have been well aligned with Service emphasis areas and
have had particular impact shaping training, exercises, and wargames
where the ASB Concept are tested and evaluated for incorporation into
operational and strategic planning.
Mr. Langevin. Training in the complex environments of the future is
a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time--
particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly
there have been some strides in the generation of those training
capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not
adequate. What does ASB add to the services' current efforts to create
that ability? What was the current joint planning environment unable to
provide?
General Cheek. All modern military operations are heavily reliant
on the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The
Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these
will be increasingly challenged by sophisticated anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB office maintains awareness
of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the
ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats.
The ASB office is again establishing working groups comprised of
subject matter experts from across the Services in both Electronic
Warfare and Cyberspace Operations, among others, in support of its
annual planning workshop to be held in January 2014 as part of the FY14
ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this workshop,
participants will review and organize the planned exercise,
experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services
in order to determine the collective ``roadmap'' toward improvements in
capabilities in the presence of A2/AD threats. The Working Group
participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on
improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional
activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing
lines of communication.
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