[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-58]
THE U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN POST-2014: VIEWS OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, September 19, 2013, The U.S. Presence in Afghanistan
Post-2014: Views of Outside Experts............................ 1
Appendix:
Thursday, September 19, 2013..................................... 39
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
THE U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN POST-2014: VIEWS OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Flournoy, Hon. Michele, Former Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 3
Keane, GEN Jack, USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army........................................................... 6
Lockhart, Clare, Director, Institute for State Effectiveness..... 10
Neumann, Ambassador Ronald E., President, American Academy of
Diplomacy...................................................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Flournoy, Hon. Michele....................................... 47
Keane, GEN Jack.............................................. 60
Lockhart, Clare.............................................. 85
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 43
Neumann, Ambassador Ronald E................................. 72
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Speier................................................... 101
THE U.S. PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN POST-2014: VIEWS OF OUTSIDE EXPERTS
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 19, 2013.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Good
morning, ladies and gentlemen, the House Armed Services
Committee meets to receive testimony from outside experts on
the United States presence in Afghanistan post-2014.
Today we have with us Ms. Michele Flournoy, General Jack
Keane, Ambassador Ronald Neumann and Ms. Clare Lockhart, all
experts on the subject from different areas. We are really
appreciative of having you here today, thank you very much.
A discussion of a post-2014 presence in Afghanistan should
start with a reminder of why the United States went there in
the first place. The most lethal and complex terrorist attack
in U.S. history was plotted and perpetrated by Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. The United States continues to have a vital
interest in making sure that never happens again and the Afghan
government can secure their own country.
It has been a long fight. The United States has committed a
wealth of resources, both blood and treasure, to preserve U.S.
vital national security interests. The question before us is
whether we should continue to commit resources after 2014. And
if so, what level of resources is sufficient to minimize the
risk that Afghanistan could be used again as a platform for
terrorist attacks against the United States and risk to the
remaining troops that we leave behind.
This hearing is timely because in the near future the
President will order additional troop withdrawals and announce
the United States post-2014 mission set and military posture in
Afghanistan. We have received mixed messages from the White
House about the President's commitment to a post-2014 military
presence. Many of us have traveled into theater and met with
our commanders. We know there is much at stake, but our
witnesses have significant expertise in these matters, and
their views will help inform our thinking on the matter.
I, for one, am not advocating for a never-ending combat
mission in Afghanistan. In fact, we have turned over the
fighting at this point to the Afghans. But as recent events
have made clear, the President must ensure that our interests
are secure after we leave. I believe that requires a credible
residual presence to train, advise and assist the ANSF [Afghan
National Security Forces] and counterterrorism operations. We
owe nothing less to the victims on 9/11, the U.S. troops and
their families, who have served and sacrificed, not to mention
our sons and daughters who will have to return if we get this
wrong, and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies
and those who have been working and fighting side by side with
us. The simple justice that comes from that principled position
can not be overstated. I look forward to your testimony and
your insights here today.
Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to our very distinguished panel. I look forward
to your comments and insights and answers to our questions.
I agree completely with the chairman, I think the mission
in Afghanistan has always been very, very clear. After 9/11, we
want to make sure that Al Qaeda, the Taliban, anyone who
threatens us here in the West does not have a safe haven in
Afghanistan. And to do that, regrettably, we had to face the
challenge of building a sufficiently strong government in
Afghanistan to make sure that doesn't happen. And that was a
significant challenge after decades of war, very low literacy
rate, very low economic position. I think we have done
admirable work in cooperation with Afghanistan and our NATO and
other partners to get there.
Now, it is time, the difficult time, to make that
transition, to transition responsibility over to the ANSF onto
the Afghan people. They ultimately have to run their country;
we can't do it from the outside and shouldn't do it. I think an
enormous amount of progress has been made; that the sacrifices
that our men and women who serve us both in the military and in
the many civilian jobs as well, that have made to get us to
this point is something we should all be very proud of and
never forget. Now we want to make sure that we make that
transition in an effective way.
And progress has already been made. I was there just a few
weeks ago with Congressman Hunter. I was very, very impressed
with the progress that the ANSF has made. It will be a very
difficult transition, but we have come a very, very long way. I
think there is no question that we have a commitment to a post-
2014 presence. The challenge, of course--and I am interested in
hearing all the panelists' comments on this--is the bilateral
security agreement. We have to get that agreement with
Afghanistan to maintain the type of presence that we want. I
think people are cautiously optimistic that we can get there,
but that is an absolute necessity.
Then, of course, the next big challenge is the transition--
the other transition from President Karzai to whoever the next
president is going to be. Making sure we that have successful
elections in April 2014 in Afghanistan is critical. Now those
two things--getting a bilateral security agreement, having
successful free and fair elections in Afghanistan 2014--are the
two biggest blows that we can strike against the Taliban in the
next 8 months. If that sort of legitimacy can be shown in the
Afghan government, if we can have an ongoing relationship with
Afghanistan and a post-2014 presence guaranteed, that will
undermine many of the central arguments that the Taliban are
making going forward.
So I look forward to your testimony. I think this is a
very, very critical time in Afghanistan. The world and the
country has been distracted to some degree by Syria, Egypt and
other problems, but Afghanistan is still the one place in the
world where we have a substantial true presence and where the
U.S. is in fact at war. So getting this policy right, I think,
is one of the most important national security challenges we
face.
I look forward to your help today in getting us to that
point.
I yield back, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE FLOURNOY, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Flournoy. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting me back to speak before this committee and this time
in a private capacity, but I am honored to be here, especially
to talk about such an important topic.
I believe the United States can achieve its strategic
objectives in Afghanistan if we maintain and adequately
resource our current policy course and if our Afghan partners
do their part. This judgment is based on the impressive
progress of the Afghan security forces, the significant strides
in areas from health, to education, to agriculture, and the
promising next generation of Afghan leaders who are poised to
gain greater influence over their country's future.
However, the United States and our international partners
would risk snatching defeat from the jaws of something that
could still resemble victory if, due to frustration with
President Karzai or our own internal budgetary pressures, we
were to accelerate our disengagement between now and 2014 or
under-resource our commitment to Afghanistan after 2014.
It is important, I believe imperative, that Washington and
Kabul clarify and solidify their commitment to an enduring
partnership as soon as possible. If the United States were to
announce its intended size and missions of the U.S. forces plan
for post-2014 period, it would greatly reduce Afghan fears of
abandonment and put pressure on the Afghan government to agree
to an acceptable bilateral security agreement. It would also
greatly reduce incentives for hedging behavior in Afghanistan
and Pakistan and contribute to a very constructive atmosphere
for the campaigns leading up to the crucial April 2014
presidential election.
In my written testimony, I argue that Afghanistan is not a
lost cause, that the United States can still achieve its core
goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever again reverting to
being a safe haven for Al Qaeda and its affiliates. So in that
context, now is the time to lock in hard-fought gains, not cut
our losses.
Looking at the security situation, although it is true the
Taliban insurgency remains resilient, particularly in the east
and south of the country, and though it does retain sanctuary
in Pakistan, its momentum on the ground in Afghanistan has
stalled. The insurgency is still capable of some high-profile
suicide bombing, small-scale attacks, intimidation at the local
level, but it has not succeeded in winning over Afghan hearts
and minds or expanding its control and influence in the
country's major populated areas. It no longer has the strength
to overthrow or threaten the Afghan government. Indeed, the
greatest threat to the Afghan government today is not the
insurgency but the government itself; corruption, the risk that
power brokers could seek to rig the coming elections.
Perhaps the most important factor in this security progress
has been the development of the ANSF, especially the Afghan
National Army, which has been frankly under-reported in the
Western press. They have made serious strides in taking the
lead for the country's security in the last half decade or so.
Afghan forces, as you know, are now responsible for the
security of the country nationwide. Almost all, upwards of 95
percent, of military operations in the country are now Afghan
led, with the vast majority of those being conducted
independent of ISAF [International Security Assistance Force]
help. ANSF personnel are now taking most--almost all of the
casualties, not ISAF. Eighty-five percent of their training
programs are Afghan led. There has been significant success in
establishing control over key cities, significant lines of
communication and so forth. And Afghan units are becoming
increasingly proficient in countering IEDs [improvised
explosive devices].
It is true that logistic support remains a huge challenge
for Afghans, and that will be an ongoing project, but there has
been progress there as well. In the south, for example, which I
visited late last spring, Afghan units have been resupplying
themselves without significant ISAF help since last December.
ANSF special operations forces have achieved very high level of
competence and are increasingly capable of conducting
sophisticated special operations. ANSF still needs help in
important areas, from logistics to intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, air support, artillery and institutional
capacity building, but there is, as I said, substantial
progress.
The most important thing I saw my last trip there was
Afghan forces, different elements really starting to work
together, coming to one another's aid when necessary, really
operationalizing what I would call a layered security concept.
In my written testimony, I also address the political
situation, especially the importance of the 2014 presidential
elections as a make-or-break event. And I also talk about what
the U.S. and international community can do to help.
But in the interest of time, I would like to focus the
remainder of my remarks on the importance of clarifying the
U.S. commitment to Afghanistan post-2014 and what our so-called
enduring presence should look like. While actual deployment of
any such force would, of course, be contingent on including an
appropriate bilateral security agreement, clarifying the U.S.
commitment now would make it clear to Afghans that only their
own government's reluctance stands in the way of firming up our
partnership. Given Afghanistan's historical fear of
abandonment, the impact of such a clear American commitment of
intent would be both powerful and positive. It would also help
our NATO allies to firm up their own plans and contributions.
This doesn't mean that the U.S. should rush to an agreement
or show impatience to conclude one, as that would potentially
weaken our negotiating position. But there is absolutely no
need to be ambiguous about something that would be so very
clearly in the United States national security interests if our
Afghan partners do their part.
As for what an enduring force should look like, the United
States needs several things as a matter of prudence. First,
there needs to be enough force to advise and assist the ANSF
effectively, including geographic distribution to cover the ANA
[Afghan National Army] corps in Kabul and the four corners of
the country, north, south, east, west, and capacity, when
necessary, in extremis to go below the Afghan corps level with
mobile teams to support Afghan brigades in pre-operational
preparations should problems develop.
Second, in the country's north and west in particular, it
is critical that we provide enough enablers to support key
allies, like the Germans and the Italians, to actually stay in
the game and to contribute substantial forces.
Third, the United States needs some counterterrorism
capabilities in country for strikes within Afghanistan to keep
pressure on Al Qaeda and the insurgents and also along the
border.
Finally, for 2 or 3 years after 2014, we may need an
additional force package of several thousand personnel to help
the Afghans build out their Air Force, their special operations
forces and certain enablers in the medical realm, counter-IED
capability, and intelligence collection.
Now to achieve this, the United States and its NATO allies
should deploy an enduring force size and shape for these tasks.
It is not my purpose here today to recommend a specific number.
I think of the range of numbers that has been reported--9,000
to 10,000 for the U.S.; 12,000 to 15,000 overall, including
NATO contributions of, say, 3,000 to 6,000 allied troops. These
are all within the ballpark of what would be acceptable, and I
look forward to hearing about General Dunford's recommendation
this fall.
In conclusion, despite the very near-term challenges that
Afghanistan faces, ranging from security, to corruption, to
narcotics, and difficult neighbors, I remain fundamentally
optimistic about Afghanistan's mid- to long-term future. True,
it will remain one the poorest countries and most corrupt
countries in the world for years to come. But the United States
and its partners, who have sacrificed so much, we have a chance
to ensure that Afghanistan does not return to being a safe
haven for international terrorists, that it has the opportunity
to stay on a path toward greater stability, human and economic
development. Compared to what we have already invested in blood
and treasure, the cost associated with sustaining this future
course seems to me to be a very wise investment.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Keane.
STATEMENT OF GEN JACK KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. ARMY
General Keane. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Minority Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you also for
allowing me to testify today on a critical subject, such as the
presence in Afghanistan post-2014. I am honored to be here with
such a distinguished panel, many of whom I have known for
years.
I want to associate myself with what Secretary Flournoy has
just said in her remarks. I agree with just about everything
she said. And also I think she is absolutely right that sooner
rather than later in making a commitment to the Afghans in
terms of a bilateral security agreement is really in our
interest and certainly in the interest of the Afghans.
Afghanistan is rapidly moving toward its most critical
milestone since 2001 when the Taliban were deposed. As 2014
approaches and Afghanistan participates in a political,
economic and security transition, it is U.S. and Afghanistan
written policy now that both countries will maintain a long-
term strategic relationship, which is mutually beneficial.
I am reminded we had a similar agreement with Iraq, titled
the Strategic Framework Agreement, which in my judgment, we
have not honored. Indeed, we have pulled away from Iraq,
allowing Iran to gain influence and encouraging the Al Qaeda to
reassert itself. The United States cannot make this mistake
again in Afghanistan. Not only is U.S. military presence
required but a determined, aggressive diplomatic and political
engagement is needed for years to come. It took multiple
generations after the Korean War for South Korea to transition
from a Third World nation run by military dictators to the
world's 12th largest economy and a flourishing democracy.
U.S. and international community presence in Afghanistan is
vital to its future success and for overall stability in the
region. After 2014, there will have been national elections in
Afghanistan. While there are no guarantees, a relatively fair
and open election that reflects the people's choices and
results in an improved national government will be a
significant step forward in the political development of
Afghanistan. As such, it will positively impact the confidence
of the Afghan people and the international community at large
in the Afghan political process. On the contrary, if the
election is perceived to be corrupt and basically unfair, it
will be a major setback, which will adversely impact the U.S.
and international community support.
As part of the post-2014 presence, the United States and
the international community should assist the Afghans to move
from a donor economy, with outside sources representing the
bulk of the resources, to a self-sustaining economy, focusing
on mining, agriculture and transportation. I am going to defer
economic engagement to my fellow panel member, Clare Lockhart,
who is a recognized expert in the area.
The central issue facing Afghanistan post-2014 is how to
manage the security risk. How do we avoid squandering the gains
we have made in Afghanistan security? Only if the security
situation is stable and the Taliban know they cannot win can
there ever be a realistic hope for a political settlement.
Three key decisions post-2014 can mitigate the security
risk and provide a hedge. Decision one is funding the Afghan
National Security Forces. Currently, their transition from
U.S./NATO leading combat operations to supporting a lead of the
ANSF in combat operations, frankly, is going better than most
expected. The growth and development of the ANSF into an
acceptable force which has the respect of the Afghan people is
quite an achievement.
While it is still too early to tell how they will do
entirely on their own, the preliminary indications are
positive. Currently, the ANSF is at a force level of 352,000,
which is funded through 2015. Options are under consideration
to draw down ANSF post 2015. To draw down the ANSF on the heels
of the U.S./NATO drawdown makes no sense and simply drives up
the risk. We can mitigate that risk by planning to fund the
ANSF at the current 352,000 to 2020. At some point, the Afghans
will be in a position to contribute to that funding level.
Decision two, the post-2014 residual force. The size of the
residual force should be driven by the missions that are
required for the force. Those missions are counterterrorism,
training and assistance and enablers to the ANSF. The CT or
counterterrorism focus is currently and should continue to be
on the Taliban leaders to disrupt their ability to plan,
support and lead combat operations. While leaders can be
replaced, successful CT operations are very disruptive to the
Taliban and definitely adversely impact their operations.
Successful CT operations not only require a direct action
force--in other words that is the force that makes physical
contact--but also drone crews, intel analysts, helicopter
maintenance and flight crews, medical trauma units and security
forces. Training and assistance are essential advisors to
assist the army and the police with their continued growth and
development. These advisors would be mainly at operational
headquarters spread over the six corps and the various police
provinces and to the Ministers of Defense and Interior.
The enablers for the ANSF is often misunderstood as to its
importance. Just about every NATO country in Afghanistan who
was involved in fighting requires enablers from the United
States in varying degrees, such as helicopters, intelligence,
medical, logistics and road and mine clearance. When the Afghan
National Army was organized, recruited, and trained, the
decision was to build an infantry force or a boots on the
ground force. The enablers would be provided by the United
States and are similar to what the United States currently
provides NATO forces. Eventually, the ANA will have its own
enablers but not until years beyond 2014. If the ANA is to be
offensive minded, they must have confidence in their support.
Otherwise, they will be paralyzed and be reduced to defending
the bases. I will be specific, a summary of the force level
requirements for the residual force in my view on
counterterrorism, 7,000; advisors training, 5,000; enablers,
8,000; with a total residual force level of 20,000.
Decision three, Pakistan sanctuaries. A third key decision
to reduce the risk is to authorize the targeting of the Taliban
and Haqqani leaders in the sanctuaries in Pakistan. Priority to
the Haqqani sanctuary because the situation in the east is not
as stable as the south. This would be an extension of the
mission the OGA [Other Government Agency] is conducting against
Al Qaeda in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas].
Once systematic targeting commences, the sanctuary will cease
to exist as we currently know it, a place where strategy,
training, operational oversight, intelligence and logistics is
executed routinely in safe haven. These functions will suffer
significantly, which will positively impact operations in the
east. Additionally, it would be a huge morale boost for the
ANSF.
Let me conclude by saying that if we are to avoid
squandering the gains that we have made in Afghanistan, the
U.S./international community presence post-2014 is essential.
The Taliban are hoping to regain the momentum 2014--post-2014
and will make a major effort to do so. What is key is the U.S.
policy commitment to the stability and security of Afghanistan
must be clearly stated time and again and moreover reflected in
the political, economic and military assistance that is
critical to reduce the risk of failure. We cannot afford any
equivocation or mixed signals about the strength and resolve of
the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan's future.
Thank you and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane can be found in
the Appendix on page 60.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Neumann.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RONALD E. NEUMANN, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY
Ambassador Neumann. Chairman McKeon, Representative Smith,
distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to appear
today. The subject of how the U.S. presence is constructed
post-2014 is truly important. It directly affects the issues of
success or failure in Afghanistan, for which I and so many
others have labored, for which some have made an ultimate
sacrifice----
The Chairman. Please pull your mike down.
Ambassador Neumann. Sacrifice for which many have labored,
billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent and for which many
thousand Afghans have also lost their lives and limbs.
Sacrifice creates a cost, but it is not a sufficient reason
to continue sacrificing if there is not a reasonable chance of
success, but neither is pain and fatigue, of which the American
people are showing advanced symptoms, a sound basis for policy.
I believe we will get the base security agreement. But I
want to focus on a number of other things for the moment. I
think we need to think of the post-2014 presence in terms of
events which will happen even before that, events that will
take place, actions we can take to undergird success and how we
react to success, or failure, or problematic Afghan
performance.
The April 2014 Afghan presidential election is crucial to
success. There are things we can do to make that success more
likely. We should be pressing Pakistan to reinforce the border,
as it did in previous elections, to slow infiltration. We
should be planning for election observers. We should be
instituting a brief increase in air support to increase Afghan
ability to secure the vote. And we should be publicizing far
more in Afghanistan our support for elections training and the
mechanics of an election. We should also be clear on
consequences if the electoral calendar is significantly
breached or the election is disastrously mishandled by Afghans.
Governance is a key part of future success. We have
demanded improvement but lost credibility through lack of
follow-through on our statements of conditionality. Change
before the election is unlikely. In our own system, you would
be unlikely to see painful major political changes in immediate
pre-electoral period. But we should institute some level of
pain so that we prove our seriousness now and not when a new
government is trying to take hold after an election, that will
provide, if we get lucky on the election, that will provide an
opportunity to reinforce actions. And we should be positioned
to take advantage of that if it happens.
It is essential that we maintain the minimum civilian
presence outside Kabul, both to manage program oversight and
evaluation of diplomatic developments in governance. Post-
Benghazi fear should not cripple our diplomatic effectiveness.
Concerning the military mission--and I associate myself
with my colleagues--I want to stress that personnel needs must
be related to greater clarity about what the mission actually
is. ``Train and advise'' can mean many things. I believe, and I
am joining my colleagues, that we need to be present at all
corps and frequently in the brigades. And building the Ministry
of Defense and Interior also essential tasks. And this probably
means U.S. forces somewhere in the 10,000- to 13,000-man range,
but the immediate issue for Congress is to demand that means be
logically linked to ends. Further, there are multiple parts of
the security mission and each needs to be clearly defined and
linked to required resources.
Some support and logistical elements are not finished, and
part of the responsibility is ours. I would be happy to talk
about that in greater detail, but we need to fill some gaps for
a transitional period, and we need to plan for how those forces
will be ramped down. Counterterrorist forces with a mission
outside Afghanistan quite possibly should be considered on
their own merits and not counted against a ceiling built around
support for the Afghan mission. Afghan forces need to be held
accountable for cleaning up corruption and implementing their
promotions. We should be prepared for some cuts if those
actions are not taken. We need not go into a frenzy of
retaliation, but we need predictable retaliation for lack of
performance and threats need to be implemented.
Finally, in closing, let me say that on the basis of
repeated trips of my own to Afghanistan, too, this year, I
believe that success is still possible. It is very tough, but
it is possible if we do not cripple ourselves through
indecision and vagueness, and maintain the follow-through
required of our policies.
Thank you. I would be happy to take questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Neumann can be found
in the Appendix on page 72.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Lockhart.
STATEMENT OF CLARE LOCKHART, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR STATE
EFFECTIVENESS
Ms. Lockhart. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to speak here today.
As my fellow panelists have said, decisions made over the
next few months will be foundational for security in the region
and U.S. interests for the next decades, possibly generations,
ahead. We can all acknowledge the mistakes in policy and
implementation that have been made over the last decade: under-
resourcing; backing strongmen with disregard to the impact on
corruption and governance; allowing an insurgency to emerge
unchecked; and perhaps, more recently, a lack of coherence in
political strategy. But despite this, it is clear that the
commitments that we have made at terrible cost, but the policy
course we have followed are now paying dividends; transition
and the campaign are now working.
Much of the pessimism about Afghanistan reflects news from
2 or perhaps 5 years ago, and despite this, I think there is
another story--and many of you have witnessed this in your own
travels to the country--in ANSF, that is gaining the trust of
the population and capability in carrying out their missions. A
surprising fact: Afghanistan has outperformed all other
countries on the human development index between 2000 and 2012,
it has made more gains than any other country in the world on
that index. And most of the challenges have been successfully
navigated, the election law has been passed and transition to
Afghan political and military control in all 34 provinces has
succeeded.
But considerable risks but also opportunities lie ahead,
and it is clear that we are at a crossroads. We are looking now
at a post-Karzai era. Political coalitions are emerging. A
national debate is being launched, and this political
transition has every prospect of succeeding if the right
commitments are made. If it fails, I think we see the prospect
of intensified conflict and the space for extremism to flourish
in the future.
I will start by mentioning some traps that I think we need
to avoid. I think sometimes analysts get trapped by a forced
dilemma between either a perpetual war or a grand bargain. The
U.S. can and, in fact, has already ceased its lead role in the
war, but it can still maintain a security commitment, as it
does to many countries around the world for the years to come.
I think the pursuit of a grand bargain with the Taliban and
other elements of insurgency has been something of a red
herring. I don't think it is attainable at the current time.
Even if it were attainable, I don't think it will be enduring.
And even if it were to endure, I don't think it's in either the
Afghan or the U.S. interests.
And final trap, a sense that Afghanistan is a graveyard of
empires. I had the privilege to serve on the Bonn negotiation
team in 2001 and lived for many years in Afghanistan, largely
living among Afghans. And what I witnessed and continue to
witness is that the majority of the population want a
partnership. The Afghans are capable of building institutions,
often at very low costs and perhaps, particularly, at low costs
and that they have built a number of institutions over time.
The key factor I believe in the security and stability of
Afghanistan and its region going forward are the Afghan people
themselves. I was once told by an Afghan civic leader that
Afghanistan, he said, like any country in the world, has 95
percent ordinary people, 4 percent thugs, and 1 percent
extremists. We get diverted if we focus only on the 4 percent
and the 1 percent and trying to construct bargains between
them. He said the 95 percent are the real allies of the Afghan
people. And these are the people who make up the ANSF, and
their families. They run businesses. They run schools, clinics
and farms. As we know, the new generation coming of age, 60
percent of the country under 25 or under 30, depending on the
statistics, represent an enormous opportunity for a different
Afghanistan in the future.
The key factor for the Afghan people to remain the bulwark
of stability is confidence. The critical ingredient is their
confidence of the Afghan people in their own future and their
own security so that they can take the burden of stabilizing
and rebuilding their country. They are not asking for a U.S.
nation-building effort; they are asking for the stabilizer
wheels that enable them to keep their own country on track.
This confidence to keep this on track requires commitment,
a sense of commitment, a fulfilling of the commitments that
have already been made at Lisbon, Chicago, and Tokyo, in the
Strategic Partnership Agreement. If the U.S. and then its
allies can hold steadfast on these commitments, this will pay
dividends that will allow Afghanistan and its region to
stabilize.
The talk of zero option, I am told by many of my Afghan
interlocutors, seriously undermines confidence. And Afghan
citizens don't always distinguish between official policy and
statements by individual politicians and newspapers.
What more concretely should this commitment consist of my
fellow panelists I think have articulated extremely well, the
security, the economic, and the political components, and I
address these in my written testimony. To summarize them in
brief, the most important of these is the security commitment,
both the post-2014 commitment to forces that is sufficient in
number and sufficiently resolutely made to be a credible
backstop enabler and trainer to the ANSF and a credible
deterrent to countries in the region who may seek to threaten
Afghanistan sovereignty or territorial integrity. Commitment to
support for the ANSF sufficient that it can secure the country
against critical threats to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the country and any agreements--the Strategic
Partnership Agreement, of course, is already in place. The BSA
[Bilateral Security Agreement] is under consideration. I agree
that that is an absolutely critical agreement. My only caveat
is that if it meets obstacles, this piece of paper should not
become an obstacle to the U.S. making the commitments that are
in its interests. I think there are legal agreements that have
been already made that may provide sufficient legal basis for
continued U.S. presence.
I think there are two other critical factors: The economic.
I think we can acknowledge that many Members and particularly
their constituents, the U.S. taxpayers, have reached the limit
of bearing the cost in blood and treasure for foreign wars, and
this is very understandable. So I think this makes it all the
more critical that Afghanistan move towards economic self-
sufficiency. Afghanistan had the most flourishing agriculture
in Central Asia. Agriculture provides 80 percent of the jobs
and 20 percent of the GDP [Gross Domestic Product], so
continued investments in agriculture are critical.
Sometimes the discovery of minerals and hydrocarbons is
dismissed as a 20-year project that probably won't come to
fruition. I think this assessment is wrong. The recent
discoveries of hydrocarbons in the country and the mining that
is already happening presents a very realistic revenue base.
And the more that this can be developed, the more that
Afghanistan can pay for its own security forces and other
costs. And I think that development assistance needs to be
tailored to those investments that will see Afghan revenue
increase. The more Afghan revenue increases, the less it will
be dependent on U.S. and other financial commitments.
And then, finally, the political track. As I argued, the
focus on the grand bargain I think has been something of a red
herring, will bring neither peace nor stability in the short or
medium term, but there are other elements of a political
strategy that are fundamental to the security success. And the
first of these is getting elections right. The second is the
national dialogue amongst the nonviolent constituents of the
country, so that they can agree and particularly between
different ethnic groups. How do the different ethnic groups
agree on a formula for governance in their country and a sense
to share power.
Addressing both the real and perceived grievances of
different populations, and here particularly some of the
populations in the south and east; the disaffected Pashtun
population, not so much a question of bringing the Taliban back
in but addressing the grievances of Pashtun communities;
continued reform, the bulk of which will be on the shoulders of
Afghans, and then a different approach to Pakistan and asking
Pakistan to live to its international commitments of respecting
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbor.
And I think the region, there is a real opportunity to set
out a common agenda of regional stability and counterterrorism
that they are in concert with the interests of most countries
in the region, including critically China, India and Russia.
Finally, I was asked to consider the implications for
Afghan women and what will happen to them post-2014, and I
think that what is required to protect women are the same
factors that are required for the protection of any Afghan
citizen, man, woman or child, and it is this commitment to
Afghanistan's future security.
The recommendations are not a new set of recommendations;
most elements for this are already in place. But I believe all
of them are critical to see the campaign succeed.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lockhart can be found in the
Appendix on page 85.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I have been concerned that the United States policy in
Afghanistan is already focused toward the exits and not
sufficiently focused on our own long-term vital interests.
As you know, the President's decision on the post-2014
presence and mission set is forthcoming.
Ms. Flournoy, in your testimony, you encouraged the
President to describe the United States post-2014 commitment
sooner rather than later to counter the Taliban's narrative of
abandonment and bolster the confidence of the Afghan people and
security forces.
I know we were in Afghanistan at the same time earlier this
year. And that was a message I got also, that it was very
important to work on. In fact, I was hoping that we could have
had the agreement before now. You also indicated that such a
signal of commitment could reasonably be described by a range
of U.S. forces. How would a U.S. post-2014 commitment
announcement impact other actors in the region?
And is there a troop level at which our commitment would no
longer be perceived as credible, either by Afghans, our allies
or other regional actors? What is that threshold? I would like
each of our witnesses' thoughts on that matter.
Ms. Flournoy. So I do think a U.S. announcement of an
intended commitment, even if it is announced before the BSA is
concluded, would have several positive effects. Number one, it
would completely disrupt the Taliban narrative that we are
leaving, we are abandoning ship, you know, we will be gone, and
so they will be resurgent again.
Second, as several of my colleagues have said, I think it
would really bolster the confidence of those Afghan people and
those who are invested in a different and more stable and
hopeful future for Afghanistan.
Third, I actually think it would affect the environment in
which the elections will be held. And it would put an end to
some of the hedging behavior that we are seeing from different
parties, from Karzai to some of the opposition figures, because
of the uncertainty of their future and particularly the U.S.
commitment to their future. I think it would send a strong
message to Pakistan that would affect their calculations about
how they are going to behave and others in the region.
And finally, I think it would actually help us in
concluding the BSA negotiations. Right now, you know, Karzai
has made some demands that have I think put the U.S. a little
bit on the defensive in the negotiations. I think if we were to
state a clear commitment of intent, and the only thing standing
between realizing that commitment for the Afghan people is the
Afghan government being reasonable in the negotiations and
coming to a conclusion, I actually think it shifts the burden
in the negotiations and puts pressure on Karzai and the Afghan
government to get to an agreement, a reasonable agreement. So
that is why I think it is so important for us to try to
articulate this commitment clearly very soon.
You know, as for what the threshold is, I have to be
honest, since I have been out of government I have not been
privy to the sort of classified assessments of different levels
of forces. I think, I do think there is a band that could work.
I honestly don't know exactly where the threshold is, which is
why I focused on, what are the criteria that we should assess a
force against, and I would defer to General Keane and others at
the table who may have a better idea of a particular threshold.
General Keane. Yes, thank you.
You know, Ambassador Ryan Crocker made a statement that I
think is pretty revealing and insightful for all of us when he
said that how you leave a country and what you leave behind is
more important than what you began with. And that certainly was
the case in point in Iraq, and it is right in front of us again
in Afghanistan. War is fundamentally a test of wills and Sun
Tzu taught us that the ultimate objective of war is to break
your opponent's will. So will is very important here. And what
we want to demonstrate to the Taliban clearly, not just in our
words but in our actions, that we are committed, that the
stability of Afghanistan is real to us, and we are going to see
it through to the end. And we are not going to bail out as 2014
approaches and leave the Afghans with far too much risk. So how
we act in the next year or so I think is pretty critical to the
long-term security.
I believe fundamentally that we should be looking beyond
Karzai, put his mercurial personality--he drives us crazy with
his statements, you know, with his unpredictability. We have
got to look beyond him. We will have a new leader at the end of
next year, and I don't think his demands and his personality
should be affecting our decisions because we are talking about
a long-term relationship with Afghanistan that we have already
agreed to, that it is of strategic importance to us, and we
cannot let the personality get into this to the degree that it
does.
In terms of the numbers, I put them out there. I think
20,000 is what you need to get the job done, and that is done
on a fair number of analyses with a lot of people assisting
that. If you put a map of Afghanistan down in front you and the
size and scale of the country is significant, there is no way
that you can put all of our people at a base, secure them and
then conduct operations. It takes a couple of hours by C-130 to
get to Kandahar, which tells you, you have to have a base
there. Our major threat in the east is coming from Miranshah,
where the Pakistani sanctuary is. We cannot deal with that
threat operating out of Bagram Air Field by itself. That means
you have to have another base out there. If you look at the
geography of it and then you start to apportion resources, you
get to a number actually that is in excess of the number I gave
you. And I think that is the minimum number required to meet
the counterterrorism requirement, and as I tried to tell you,
out of the 7,000 I am recommending, only 2,000 of those go in
and kick doors down. All the rest is to support them in their
efforts that I tried to enumerate what those functions are that
are essential for those that kick doors down to be successful.
And we just can't arbitrarily dismiss the numbers, because
numbers do matter; they are tied to the functions that are
represented.
Iraq is a case in point, the commander in Iraq, Lloyd
Austin, now the CENTCOM [Central Command] Commander,
recommended a force of 23,000, 24,000. The personal envoy for
the President of the United States came into Iraq and in final
negotiations and put 10,000 on the table. No one took that
number seriously and that went to 6,000, to 3,000 to nothing.
And it began because the number put on the table was not a
serious number. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ambassador.
Ambassador Neumann. Thank you. It is a really important
question and one that I have looked at in some detail, although
not probably as closely as General Keane, but I very much agree
with his basic points. I think the starting point is to
understand that we are such a big player in Afghanistan, that
everyone, to some extent, takes position on us. Friend, enemy,
neutrals, they all condition their approach in part by what
they think we are going to do. And a lot now think that we are
going to bolt and leave. And so that produces what Michele
talked about, hedging behavior; that is if you are an Afghan
and you are trying to survive and you are making decisions on
that basis, whether that is, do I have to steal more because I
am going to have it to run? Do I have to tighten ties with
militia groups instead of work on professionalizing the army,
because I have got to have somebody I can rely on to fight with
me? All these so-called hedging behaviors are
counterproductive, but they are survival driven, and you get
them when we you are vague--when we are vague about what we are
doing.
We have a lack of clarity. We have a policy which has a
number of commitments in Tokyo, in Chicago, to maintain forces
in the last defense ministerial. And we have a public
discussion that emphasizes departure and rarely mentions any of
the commitments. It doesn't take brilliance to figure out that
there is a lack of solidarity in this piece.
You asked, is there a number below which we lose
credibility. I am sure there is. I don't know that I could or
any of us could exactly say because it a psychological
question; it is about will. But if the number of forces at the
end of the day is manifestly incapable of carrying out the
missions we have talked about, then I think that will become
readily evident in our public discussion, in a lot of other
people's discussion, and it will lead to reinforcing the view
that what we are doing is heading for the door. I don't know
that that number is exact. But at this point, there is so
little clarity on what these missions mean. General Keane has
talked quite correctly about what they ought to mean, but I
don't know what this administration actually intends to
accomplish with these missions. I think that discussion is
going to be illuminating if we get there.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Lockhart.
Ms. Lockhart. Chairman, to your first question, how does
the announcement affect our countries in the region, I think
the first is it affects, within Afghanistan, as Ms. Flournoy
articulated. It seeks to mitigate the hedging behavior that is
so prevalent at the moment because of the uncertainty. I think
the more certain and resolute the announcement can be, it is
this that will help the moderate middle to rally around the
future in such a way as to do the hard work of marginalizing
the extremes.
In terms of the region, I think it is particularly to the
calculus of Pakistan that it is relevant, but also to other
countries, India and China, and send a clear sign of the type
of post-2014 future that they could also rally around. And I
think here again, the clear interests that they have in both
stability and seeing the threat of extremism marginalized.
To the troop level, I have not seen the detailed analysis
and can't give a specific number, but I think I talked to two
factors: First is the troop-to-task analysis; what are the
missions and tasks, and what are the numbers that are required
to carry them out? It is clearly an important factor in the
analysis. And then the second is the symbolism, is the credible
signal that the commitment would send both to the Afghans and
to the region and perhaps the possibility to be considered of
leaving the door open to consider additional contingent forces
should the threats of insurgency or neighbors materialize to
provide a deterrent effect. And that may not be politically
feasible, but I think that may help send the kind of signals to
the region.
And the final comments here I think the vision of a
minimalist CT mission should not beguile us. This is pretty
much what we tried in 2002 to 2004. A minimalist CT mission in
the countryside partnered with strong men and their militias,
but it was precisely this type of approach that so alienated
the Afghan population because of the behavior of the militia
groups and the lack of attention to the basic fundamentals of
governance.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just following up a little bit and directly, General Keane,
some of your comments about the numbers. I think the will that
is most important here is the will of the Afghan government and
ANSF and the Afghan people, and that is really the fight here,
is will they stand? Will they maintain their government? And
part of our mission has been to help them but also not make
them dependent, and that is the difficult balance, because we
cannot stay there forever. In fact, to some degree, our goals
in Afghanistan are undermined if we stay there forever.
One of the things that has happened recently is that the
Taliban have been presenting themselves first and foremost as
fighting off a foreign invader, which is a pretty popular thing
generally in Afghanistan. But now, certainly for the last 6
months to a year, they have primarily been killing other
Afghans, which undermines that argument, and that is where we
have got to get to, is the Afghan people being responsible for
their own security.
Now I will grant you, it is a tough balance. You don't want
to leave them too soon. But if we stay there--if we look at
this solely from the standpoint of--obviously, we are more
capable than they are. If the analysis was simply that, we
would keep 100,000 troops; we would keep 150,000 troops there
if that is the sole equation. But the real equation is, how do
we transition?
And also, I just want to say, on Iraq, the reason things
fell apart in Iraq was not because we didn't sufficiently
commit the numbers; it is because the Iraqi people didn't want
us there. And it was a democracy. And their members of
parliament knew what their people wanted. They weren't willing
to give us the agreement, give us the immunity that we wanted
to, and ultimately, whether it was 2,000, 3,000, 10,000 or
100,000, they weren't willing to give us what we needed to stay
there, and that is a different equation. That is the difficulty
of sovereignty.
So when you were running through the numbers of the need to
be in Kandahar, the need to be in the east, one piece of that
is the ANSF. I mean, the way you stated that sort of assumes
that we are the only fighting force there. I will grant you, we
are vastly more capable. And I was just in Afghanistan, as I
mentioned, and there is a lot of improvement that they have
made, but I still have questions about the capability of the
ANSF, certainly in terms of their air support, in terms of what
they have.
But in analyzing the chairman's question, if you could talk
a little bit about what the ANSF presence, how does that help
us in Kandahar? How does that help us in the east? How do we
balance what they are able to bring to the fight with the
number that we need to bring to the fight? Your 20,000 and up
number, how does that factor in with what you think the ANSF is
going to be capable of, keeping in mind, they have got to get
capable at some point. It has been at least now 4 years since
we moved in with a very aggressive train-and-equip mission. And
I think they have shown improvement. I think all of you have
acknowledged that. So how do you see their capability as being
able to fill some of those gaps that you described?
General Keane. Well, certainly, I think we have had the
most success in the south, and we had some success in the east
that exceeded our expectations as well, but there are still
more challenges in the east. Look, the ANSF is clearly doing a
good job, and the fact of the matter is, they are able to hold
onto the gains that we made when we cleared out the Taliban in
the Arghandab Valley in the south. It was the toughest fighting
we have been involved in, in Afghanistan, and they have been
held--they have held, and that is a good thing. But all I am--I
think we are just arguing over X thousands of numbers here,
which in of itself could detract from the will issue, because
it--the Afghans will perceive that the number is not
sufficient, and they understand what they need.
The fact of the matter is, what I tried to illustrate, the
Afghans are in the lead. They have an infantry-based force, and
they need some enablers to help them do their job day in and
day out, so we have to give them some of that because they
don't have it. They will eventually get it, and as they get it,
we bring that number down.
The counterterrorism mission is you cannot run
counterterrorism in the south to attack Taliban leaders, which
would be very helpful in disrupting operations, out of Bagram
Air Base. It is just not going to work. So you got to have some
capability down there, and that means, okay, then we got to
bring helicopters. We got to bring drones down there. We have
to bring intel analysts and do all of that. We have that there
now.
And then the other thing is, those forces say--I am just
using the south as an illustration. Those forces in the south
that are operating there, admittedly capable, we would like to
have some advisors stay in those headquarters to assist them in
the planning of their operations and also to provide them
feedback into the execution of it.
So, those are the three things that would be there, and
they get you to the kind of numbers that I am providing to you.
Can we take that down to 10,000 and say that is going to--we
are going to make due with 10,000? I think that would--I don't
believe the analysis would support that number, and I actually
think what you get from that is a sense of a lack of support
from the United States.
Mr. Smith. I think that is----
General Keane. Our force level right now is 87,000,
counting NATO and U.S. U.S. is about 60,000, and we were coming
from a high of 130,000, so there is no doubt we are leaving,
and we are pulling out forces. What we are arguing over, what
is an acceptable force to meet the requirements that still
exist there in terms of our responsibilities.
Mr. Smith. Right. But I think if you look, look at the
analysis the way you do, I mean, we should leave 100,000 based
on your analysis. If it is simply a question of will, if that
is the only analysis, then why are we drawing down at all. I
just think that there is that other piece to it is limiting the
dependency and building up, you know, Afghan sovereignty, which
I think is an enormously important goal as well.
But, Ms. Flournoy, you want to get in there.
Ms. Flournoy. I just wanted to interject.
I think in terms of based on press reports, the--the
initial discussions and estimates from, coming in from
commanders in Afghanistan have been more in the range of 12,000
to 15,000, and I think that number is inclusive of NATO
contribution. So I think that has been the band that has been
most focused on so far as a sort of trying to find that--the
balance between what I think you rightly pointed out, what do
we need to successfully do all of the tasks that have been
outlined but still ensure that we are really enabling the ANSF
to be in the lead and stay in the lead and build up their
capacity over time.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Ambassador Neumann. Could I join that for just one second?
Mr. Smith. If you could do it quickly. We have got a lot of
other members here. I don't want to monopolize.
Ambassador Neumann. The fact that we have begun to pull
down has pushed the Afghans to better performance. That is very
clear. The question is, how do you keep that momentum within a
realm of possibility? If you move it too quickly where they
can't do something, then you diminish the will. That is the
only point I wanted to make.
Mr. Smith. Absolutely. I think that is the exact analysis.
I agree. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
We now recognize Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry of Texas.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask briefly about a couple of issues that we have
talked about in previous hearings that we really haven't talked
about today. One is force protection.
General Keane, as you are looking through these numbers, I
assume we are--our folks, who would remain, would rely upon the
Afghans for force protection. Is that true? Are you comfortable
with that?
General Keane. I think we would rely on--yes, it is true
that we would rely on them, but we would also rely on some of
the bases that we are running. We would continue to use
contractors to help us with the security that we have. And I am
assuming that they would not be, obviously, in our numbers. So,
some of that security can be taken care of using ANSF and also
contractors.
Mr. Thornberry. I think that is an important point because
there is lots of contractors doing a variety of things in
Afghanistan, and while it may not be on some of our numbers,
still, it plays a role in how many Americans are there for the
future.
The other issue that we talked a lot about is Afghan Local
Police [ALP] program. And I would be interested in--as a matter
of fact, it may have been Secretary Flournoy who has testified
in the past, it was one of the most promising things going on
in Afghanistan. So, where is that now and where does that head
2014 and beyond?
Madam Secretary.
Ms. Flournoy. So, the ALP program has been a very important
part of shifting the momentum on the ground. It is the most
feared element of the ANSF by the Taliban because it is so
organically of the local population and, you know, so much
rooted in the local population.
There have been some problems with individual units, either
units that were calling themselves ALP but were really militias
or a few units who had human rights transgressions and so
forth. I think those have been addressed. The real problem--the
real challenge for the ALP going forward is to--the transition.
These are forces that have been mentored by our Special
Operations forces. They are now being transitioned to oversight
by the district police chiefs, the Afghan police.
That makes sense as a long-term solution, but I think right
now the capacity of those district police chiefs to actually
effectively have that oversight is very uneven in the country,
so I think this is something that is very important for us to
get it right, but we have to watch it very carefully and sort
of hand tool each of these transitions so that we don't end up
with rogue elements that are not responsive to the Afghan
government. But they have the potential to continue to play a
very positive and important role going forward.
Mr. Thornberry. Anybody else like to comment on that?
Ambassador.
Ambassador Neumann. I just spent the last 2 weeks looking
specifically----
Mr. Thornberry. If you would punch your button, please.
Ambassador Neumann. I just spent 2 weeks looking
intensively at ALP, particularly with a number of colleagues,
but I was particularly in Zabul, Kandahar, and Helmand. There
are a lot of positives. There are some places where they are
really good. There are a lot of problems, and there are a lot
of political issues that are also intertwined with ALP. I am
all in favor of doing--supporting what we have got so far, but
in order to do exactly what Ms. Flournoy was just saying, be
careful. We should not be trying a rapid expansion of those
forces. That exceeds our capability. If we are going to fix and
sustain the positives in what we have created now, we have to
focus down on that and not try to go in two directions at once.
I am convinced we do not have the capability to do that.
Mr. Thornberry. And the danger is we rush this through, and
so what you end up is someone--or units that may be more like
militias than otherwise, and I worry about that rush----
Ambassador Neumann. You have some of those already. You
have some areas that are tremendously positive. You have some
areas that are incredibly politicized; some where they are not
actually from the villages at all. And you, frankly, have to go
at a very high level of detail. I think the only thing I can
conclude is that any generalized single statement about the ALP
is wrong.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you all.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
We now proceed to Congresswoman Susan Davis of California.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, and thank you all so much for being
here.
I suspect the American people who are watching this, and
you can just tell partly from attendance and the fact that we
have no media here, that it is a little bit of a yesterday's
war to people, but I also, and we know that men and women are
still dying there, and so it is not for us.
But I just wonder about that, you know, and the ability
that we have even as Members of Congress to convince
constituents that we--there is still a very important role that
we are playing there, and that is difficult.
What I would like to focus on is the election, because, on
the one hand, we know that it is very important. On the other
hand, we are also suggesting that it is not a panacea, of
course, that we can't predict a positive outcome necessarily,
but I hope that you can address what--what are the levers that
we have there? Because for us to speak to it being an inclusive
election when we, on our last trip to Afghanistan over Mother's
Day, I can assure you that one of the biggest concerns is the
election and whether or not there are going to be people at the
polls to help women to vote because they have to, you know, be
inspecting people as they come to the polls. They may not have
enough people to do that. We have our own services that are
being drawn down, and we want to be sure we have them as well
as the police, and Afghan military is helping as well.
What--what ought we be doing? We don't have a lot of time,
and I certainly wouldn't want us to say, well, you know, we are
not going to put all of our efforts in there, even though we
know it is important, because if it fails, we--you know, we
don't want that to be taken as the failure of the future of
Afghanistan. What ought we be doing?
Ambassador Neumann. You are asking?
Mrs. Davis. Ambassador.
Ambassador Neumann. In my written testimony, I have made
four specific recommendations about the election. The question
of people going to the polls, and women going to the polls, the
first piece is the security piece; will they feel they can go
there at all?
Mrs. Davis. Exactly.
Ambassador Neumann. That is why I believe we need a time-
limited reinforcement of air during the election period,
because the Afghan forces are going to be responsible for
security. But giving a little more combat air cover, transport
and helicopters would incredibly extend their reach and their
self-confidence in providing that security, which I think is
the first key to people actually going to the polls.
Helping women go to the poll is a very complex issue. We do
have some programs, and I think they need to be reinforced, but
I am dubious that there is anything within our power within the
next few months beyond the selection itself. But showing that
the election is important to us also makes the issue to the
Afghan politicians, because a bad vote is one catastrophe, an
election that is--whose results are not treated as legitimate
is also a disaster. So, too, would a very narrow victory and a
hard-fought emotional election where you don't have a tradition
as we do of accepting the winner and you get recrimination, and
so, for that, we need to be pushing also on Afghan politicians.
We need to make clear that a really disastrous election is
going to have consequences for them, because I think that is
the reality of our political support of what you were just
talking about.
Mrs. Davis. And should that be done in terms of resources
in addition to the air cover? You know, what are the specifics,
because we get a lot of lip service for this, but it worries me
that we are not acting on that.
Ambassador Neumann. Two specifics: One is to continue,
reinforce and publicize the amount that we are working with the
Afghan electoral commission, the electoral complaints
commission, the training--well, three suggestions. The second
is mobilize international observers, including Americans. The
Afghan observers will be key because internationals will not
get too far out of cities, but international observers will
give a huge megaphone to Afghans who will otherwise have a
great deal of trouble having their voice heard, and that also
focuses on the correctness of the election.
So, observers, the force, publicizing what we are doing and
making clear in our public statements that if this is a
fraudulent mess, if the Afghan politicians can't come together
and you have got 20 candidates dividing up the vote, expect
that this is going to have consequences in our support because
much as I support this mission and have spent a lot of time on
it, I think the reality is we will have trouble maintaining
that support if this election is a disaster, and we ought to
make that clear.
There is a lot of fear driving the Afghan politicians
momentarily to get together. The fear is correct, and we ought
to make sure they understand it is correct.
Mrs. Davis. I was going to go to Ms. Lockhart, but I am
sorry that our time is up. Maybe you can pick up on it.
Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mrs. Davis.
I have the unique opportunity to recognize myself, and I
have actually--I am really grateful to be here with this panel
because I have had the privilege of working with you over the
years, and I want to thank each of you for your service,
commitment, dedication. Each of you are extraordinary people,
and I have been looking forward to the hearing.
Additionally, I sincerely believe that this is so important
because the attack of September the 11th originated in
Afghanistan. The security and success for the people of
Afghanistan is important for the people of America. My home
State particularly appreciates this. South Carolina, my former
National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade, served in Afghanistan.
It was the largest commitment, 1,600 troops, since World War
II, and the leader, General Bob Livingston--we still have
battalions there--he has described it that, indeed, we have
created a warm relationship with our Afghan brothers, and so
I--it is very meaningful to the people that I represent.
Ms. Flournoy, your opening statement, I thought, was very
positive. I appreciate your efforts to fulfill the President's
commitments, understanding the extraordinary relationship
between our success for the people of Afghanistan and a nuclear
Pakistan.
With that in mind, what do you see the status of the
Bilateral Security Agreement? Are there any timetables that we
can look for?
Ms. Flournoy. My understanding is that the informal
negotiations at the working level on the Bilateral Security
Agreement have actually made a lot of progress. The--I think
the two outstanding issues from--that President Karzai has
publicly spoken to are the desire for an explicit U.S. security
guarantee for Afghanistan, comparable to what we have with some
of our treaty allies around the world, and promises of much
more sophisticated and advanced military weaponry for the
future, which, frankly, at this point in time, the Afghan
security forces would have trouble integrating, and trying to
do so would sort of take their eye off the ball of getting to
proficiency in the--on the ground and with current threats.
But I think those are the two sticking points from the
Afghan perspective. I think from the U.S. perspective, the most
important issues are immunity for our soldiers from prosecution
in Afghanistan and also the ability to lease the Afghan
infrastructure and bases that we need. So, I think there has
been a lot of progress made. My--I think everybody is aiming
towards--at least the American side is aiming towards October/
November timeframe. Again, I think that would be facilitated by
an announced commitment, the nature of our commitment going
forward, but, you know, will--to be determined in terms of how
those negotiations conclude.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I greatly respect your judgment, and
indeed, General Keane, as a veteran myself of 31 years in the
Army and son of a Flying Tiger but very grateful dad. I have
four sons currently serving in the military. I have great
respect for you. You have already really hit on this, but why
is Afghanistan important to the American people?
General Keane. Well, you--you mentioned it. It was a
sanctuary from which the Al Qaeda attacked us, and we certainly
want to prevent another sanctuary from being established there.
We deposed a regime, and in deposing that regime, we had some
responsibilities to what comes after that. We certainly didn't
invent the reemergence of the Taliban that came--tried to come
back and take power, but I do believe we contributed to it
because Iraq distracted us from the priority that Afghanistan
had, and they immediately went on a diet starting around as
early as 2002. And the truth is, we never got the force level
right to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban until 2009
when President Obama made the decision to escalate.
So that contributes, you know, to the whirlwind. It's our
policy decisions that contributed to it. We could have dealt
with this a lot sooner, but it matters to us because of
stability in the region and it matters to us also because of
the threat that is in that region, and we don't want them back
establishing a sanctuary again in that region.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, and Ambassador Neumann, I
have had the privilege of seeing you firsthand in Kabul, and I
know your extraordinary work. How do you perceive the influence
of Pakistan in the future of Afghanistan?
Ambassador Neumann. Pakistan's influence is going to remain
very strong. They are sewing the seeds for a really bitter
harvest. The Afghan resentment of sanctuaries in Pakistan has
always been large, but it is, in my judgment, getting even
larger, and some of that Afghan fear of Pakistan drives the
commitments that they are asking for the BSA.
But Pakistan's operations also come out of a mixture of,
frankly, weakness and also fear that they will have to deal
with chaos in Afghanistan. So that if one wants to change
Pakistan's policy, I think we have to change their fundamental
belief that we are going to abandon the place and leave a mess
because that is--and they have been very explicit about that at
least in private--that is what drives their views. So when
people say, for instance, why doesn't Pakistan see the
stability of Afghanistan is in their interest? The answer is
that they don't believe that that is something within their
means to influence because they think we will leave too early
and we will leave chaos, and so they base policy on that as a
starting point.
If we want to change their actions, we need to change the
paradigm in which they are viewing the world around them.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate all of you all's perspectives,
and thank you, again, for your service.
Congresswoman Niki Tsongas of Massachusetts.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being here. Since becoming a Member
of Congress, I have had the chance to visit Afghanistan five
times, and on my last trip with Congresswoman Davis and a group
of us that went over on Mother's Day and have done so for a
number of years with a twofold emphasis, one, to meet our women
serving in our behalf and to thank them and to see what their
experiences are but also to sort of see where Afghan women are.
And in every instance, but in particular, in this time, you
know, we always meet with an impressive group.
We met with female cadets at the country's military
academy. We met with women working at the U.S. Embassy in
Kabul. We met with a whole host of students and teachers,
university students in Herat, government officials, and
community leaders, and their stunning accounts really of life
in Afghanistan before and after Taliban rule really makes so
real for us something that we already know, that Afghan women,
in the course of our being there, are now broadly participating
in Afghan society, particularly in urban areas, and that they
are vital to the stability of their country.
Countless studies have shown that gains for women have a
direct positive effect on sustainable development, economic
growth, and most importantly, peace. Women's equality is more
than a moral issue. The investment in women and girls is a
matter of national security for Afghanistan and I think for our
country. Significant gains have been made over the past decade,
and I think it is really important for us to make sure that
they are protected to the greatest extent possible as we
continue to draw down.
We also heard, really, their--talk about the whole notion
of abandonment and how concerned the Afghanis are that they
will be abandoned as we draw down. This was particularly true
with many of the women that we met with. They have taken
advantage of the opportunities that have been offered. They
have brought great talent and professionalism to what they do
in Afghanistan. They are deeply committed to their country and
very worried as we draw down as to where they will be left.
And it actually troubles me that today, other than Ms.
Lockhart, that I haven't really heard, except in response to a
question, any of you really mention that--mention Afghan women,
because we also heard over and over again how important it is
that, at the very least, we talk about women as we do all that
we need to do.
So, you all have mentioned a lot of facets to our
drawdowns. It is the elections, I think, we should be talking
about, what we do to have women fully participate. We did, with
Congresswoman Davis' question, negotiations of the Bilateral
Security Agreement, how do we put these issues on the table,
participation in the security forces and the police. We met
with young cadets who are participating in the security forces.
We hear some of the alarming incidents that are visited upon
them as well as on the--on the police. And even in terms of the
conditionality, as we draw down, you know, what do we put in
place to hold the new government's feet to the fire.
So, my question is really--is for all of you. I won't have
time really, but I would like to ask you, Secretary Flournoy,
that understanding the current situation for Afghan women, both
plus/minus the very fragile nature of their gains, do you
believe it is possible for Afghan women to play the necessary
role in shaping Afghanistan's future, and how do we make that
happen? What is it that we, in particular, can do, not just
broad statements, but are there metrics we should put in place
so that we can actually measure and hold--hold all of us
accountable as we draw down?
Ms. Flournoy. Absolutely.
And Congresswoman, I couldn't agree with you more. In fact,
in my written testimony, I do actually address this issue and
agree with many--make actually some of the same points you just
made about the importance of women in the overall development
of Afghanistan.
I do think it is important that we track very carefully
women's participation--access to education and healthcare,
participation in the economy, everything from their, you know,
roles as entrepreneurs to more broadly and also participation
in politics as more and more women have done. They have taken
real risks to become more fully part of Afghan society again,
and they are--they will face substantial danger if there is any
sort of rollback of that trend.
I agree with Clare that the biggest thing we can do is
shore up our commitment, but I think tracking metrics
associated with women, reaching out and engaging, as you have
been doing, as other officials travel, people to people, but
building those ties and ensuring that we are supporting them
and then trying to ensure that there isn't any kind of
backsliding as we draw down and the transition occurs, I think
it is a very, very important element of our policy.
Ms. Tsongas. I am sorry I don't have a chance to hear from
all of you, but just a hedging that might be going on for
Afghan women as they are trying to calculate what lies ahead
for them. At the very least, if we don't bring them up in
public discussion, that that will be a self-fulfilling
prophesy. They will begin to withdraw on their own.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ms. Tsongas.
And I have had the privilege of being with Ms. Tsongas to
see how inspiring it is to see little girls going to school. It
just is a heartwarming experience.
We now recognize Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you being here.
General Keane, if it is alright, I will begin with you,
sir. Thank you for your lifetime of service to protecting human
freedom. I have 5-year-old twins, and I know that they have a
better chance to walk in the light of freedom because of people
like you, and I appreciate it.
General Keane, al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al Qaeda recently
issued directives named ``General Guidelines for Jihad,'' and
the first point he made is, is as follows: He said, it is not a
hidden secret that our work in this stage has two aspects; the
first is military, and the second is propagational.
And you know, I have no doubt that, after 12 years of war
with Jihad, we have become more tactically inclined in fighting
the enemy in armed combat. In fact, I think we have engaged
them on a kinetic and tactical level in unsurpassed success,
but I am concerned that we perhaps have not engaged them on the
strategic level, mainly, the narrative of why they do this. You
know, we try to play down that there is an ideological core
when yet it is obvious that this enemy feels transcendentally
justified to do what they are doing.
And I kind of fear that Al Qaeda might be winning in their
second most important tactic, which is the propaganda war, and
I am wondering, you know, as a general you know better than
anyone that it is not just about destroying your enemy, it is
about converting the observers and those country populations of
that particular country so that you don't have to, to fight
everybody. We have to somehow win this battle of ideals.
And with that in mind, could you sort of elaborate on the
importance of winning this anti-propaganda war with Al Qaeda
and lay out some budgetary realities that may affect this
effort and how do we sustain this in a post-2014 Afghanistan.
General Keane. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
You know, the Al Qaeda declared war on us in the early
1990s, and we sort of ignored it until 9/11 certainly, and we
treated that kind of activity as criminal activity when it
always was an act of war. I think the Israelis had this right,
right from the beginning, but we have to draw back and look at
Al Qaeda strategically.
I mean, it is essentially a political movement. It has a
fundamental ideology, and it uses religion as part of its
belief system to educate and inform, motivate and inspire its
members. And their near-term goals are to establish a caliphate
in the region where Muslims live, to dominate and control that
region. To be able to do that, their number one objective is to
drive the United States out of the region, and they began in
earnest of that in the 1990s with a series of attacks, and it
culminated in 9/11. And I think what shocked them was the speed
of which we came into Afghanistan to get rid of that sanctuary
that they had.
All that said, Al Qaeda has had to adjust, and they have
adjusted. Remember, the--we have gone after central Al Qaeda
leadership, but their intent was always to decentralize and to
move into other countries, which is what you see happening as
we speak, as Al Qaeda has reemerged in Iraq. And yes, we know
how to defeat this movement from a military perspective. We did
that in Iraq.
The problem we have is we take a tactical approach to Al
Qaeda. Tell me what is the comprehensive U.S. strategy to
defeat Al Qaeda and radical Islam? We don't have it.
Mr. Franks. That is right.
General Keane. We don't even have a competent military
strategy. A military strategy isn't the use of drones. That is
a tactic, and we are using that tactic against the leadership
of Al Qaeda central. But we have no comprehensive strategy in
this nation, as a matter of policy, to deal with the defeat of
a system that is spreading through the Middle East. That is our
fundamental core problem.
And not only that, we do a very poor job, and the previous
administration is as guilty as this one, in not educating the
American people properly on what is this movement, what are the
tenets of it, what are their objectives, and what are we doing
about it ourselves and what our strategy should be to deal with
that.
Mr. Franks. Well, General, I am in violent agreement with
you, sir, and I think perhaps you ought to come out of
retirement because we certainly need the voice of clarity that
you so ably put forward here today.
And with that, I am out of time. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Franks.
We now go to Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Lockhart, I wanted to touch on a little bit more on
what my colleague Ms. Tsongas was talking about in terms of
Afghan women. Specifically, you know, I am thinking of the
nature and structure of our presence post-2014 in terms of what
are we doing to improve rural development, agricultural
development, business development, education, all of those
specific to women. I went on my very first trip, and I have had
more senior Members tell me that the most dangerous person in
Congress is a brand new freshman who went on their first CODEL
[congressional delegation], and that was me, and so I am full
of all these ideas.
One of the things I heard from Afghan women time and again
is that the infrastructure simply is not there, either
administratively or actually physical infrastructure, so that a
woman in a rural region cannot go to the local police or report
a crime that has been committed against her, simply because
there is not a barracks there for female police officers so
that we can actually station female police officers in those
regions. And so we are really disenfranchising the Afghan women
and are not helping them do that.
Can you speak a little bit to both the administrative and
actual physical infrastructure, look at what we are doing post-
2014 for women?
Ms. Lockhart. Certainly. And with a starting point, as I
said in my testimony, that I think what we need to do for
Afghan women is similar as to what we need to do for all Afghan
citizens, which is the commitment to security.
But having said that, I think I agree wholeheartedly with
you, there is much, much more that can be done for women across
the different sectors.
I think women in politics is actually a good news story.
The 25 percent seats that are reserved for women in parliament
has meant that hundreds of women have served in positions of
leadership in the Afghan parliament and in provincial councils,
and this has been a tremendous step forward for the country.
There has been some backsliding on this. The number has now
gone down, but that is still there.
Women in government has been something of a--an
achievement. There are women in positions of senior leadership,
women serving as ministers, but also in the bureaucracy, and of
course, this did not happen pre-9/11. And then women serving as
teachers, as health workers across the country and as
beneficiaries of those services has been a tremendous advance
over the last decade, but there is much more that can be done.
In terms of the rural areas, there is a program, National
Solidarity Program. It is a program that gives a block grant to
now nearly every village in the country. Each village elects
their own village council, the Community Development Council,
and 100,000, well, more than 100,000 women now have served in
positions of leadership on those village councils, so the
infrastructure, that platform at the village level is there,
and Congress has played a tremendously important role in
ensuring support for that program, so I think that is one of
the very concrete things that could continue.
Women in the police force and the armed services, as you
know, is a challenging issue. Recently, there have been very
tragic assassinations of women police officers in Helmand and
one in Kabul, so it is not--it is a position of high risk, but
as you say, if there aren't women in the police force, women
are not going to feel able to go to stations and report on
crime. But I think going forward, it is women in politics, in
administrative positions, in the armed services, and then the
health, education, agriculture, and economic programs that are
going to be critical. If, I think, men see that women can
contribute to the household income, this does a lot to change
the balance of power within the household and thus within the
country.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I think I want to touch a little
bit on the women in politics and in government. One of the
things that was brought up by a woman parliamentarian to our
group was the fact that there were not enough female poll
station workers on election day so that when a woman went to
the polling booth, she could not go in by herself because her
husband or her brother or her father had to go in with her,
unless there was a female poll worker who could then go with
her, and that she truly could not independently vote.
Are we looking towards the politics towards that portion of
the work? Is there any attention being placed towards trying to
get more female poll workers trained and then having them
located more widespreadly across the nation?
Ms. Lockhart. I believe there has been some activity there.
I think a lot more--and as your colleague, Ms. Davis, raised
also, to ensure that women can, to the extent possible,
participate in the elections, both as candidates and the
candidate protections in terms of security that may be
required, and as voters, and it is instructive. In the 2004
elections, a lot was done. The 2009 elections, this type of
activity really fell through the cracks, and we all, I think,
we saw Afghans really suffer the consequences of this. I think
there is enough time between now and the elections in spring
2014 that these type of actions and programs could be put in
place if adequately resourced and paid attention to
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Duckworth.
I now go to Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Keane, on page 6 of your testimony, you list out
the 20,000 troops that you think would be necessary to remain
in Afghanistan. How long do you expect they would need to
remain and does that include diplomatic security?
General Keane. No, it would not include diplomatic
security. The--I think how long they stay is condition based. I
mean, clearly, as Afghan security forces increase in capability
as they--and the trajectory is all positive, you pull back the
number of advisors. And as the Afghan infrastructure begins to
take hold, in other words, the development of what we call
combat service support units, their logistics units and their
medical units begin to take hold, and there are plans for all
of this, you bring those forces down. So it is conditioned
based on the advancement of the Afghan National Security Forces
primarily.
The counterterrorism mission, I would suggest, would
probably stay the longest, and I think we are transitioning to
a capable force that the Afghans are developing. They are not
quite there.
Mr. Scott. General, if I may, I am going to run out of time
here. As you know, we are on a clock. Thanks for the answer
All of these would be uniformed personnel. There are no
contractors.
General Keane. No. In those numbers, I have no contractors.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Do you anticipate contractors being there
as well?
General Keane. Well, I would assume they would, because we
use a lot of contractors now to protect our bases as opposed to
putting, you know, fighters up on there, maintaining guard
point and access control points and the like. We did that. We
began that in Iraq, and we continued it here so we could put
maximum boots out on the ground.
Mr. Scott. Do you expect any other countries to maintain a
significant presence in the country or just the United States?
General Keane. Well, I would hope so. I mean, we have
87,000 troops there now; 60,000 of the 87,000 are U.S., so
obviously, there is international community presence. I would
see them participating in this. I think they--they are going
look at our commitment that it will help drive their numbers as
well in terms of the resolve that we are demonstrating.
Mr. Scott. Thank you for that answer. I guess one of--I
have two primary questions with the U.S. and the investment
that is going to occur over there going forward in money and
potentially in lives. One is, as other countries are being
brought in, China, for example, to develop the country, why
should the United States taxpayer and the United States soldier
provide the security and pay the price if other countries are
going to be developing that nation?
Shouldn't they play a role in the cost of the security in
that nation as well? And that is one of--one of my serious
concerns as we go forward.
The other is that--and you alluded to this with regard to
Iraq, we expected to have tens of thousands of troops there
until the Iraqis refused to exempt our soldiers from being
subject to their courts. And I was over there just before the
withdrawal. And some of the comments made from the Iraqi
leadership, well, we know we can't hold it without you, but we
are not going to exempt you from our laws, so you have got a
potential to run into that same system in Afghanistan where,
you know--sir, I know what I was told, but it----
Ambassador Neumann. Could I speak to that because I served
at both Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Scott. Sure.
Ambassador Neumann. And the moods were very different. I
spent 16 months in Iraq before my reward was to go to Kabul,
and I have been back quite a few times.
At the best of times, the Iraqis never liked us being
there, and I am generalizing, but even those who knew they
needed us really, really didn't want us there. In Afghanistan,
you have an over--still an overwhelming view that our presence
is the last thing that stands between them and descending back
into the nightmare that they have gone through for 30 years.
Mr. Scott. Fair enough.
Ambassador Neumann. I am utterly convinced that they--that
we will not face the kind of issue we faced in Iraq of this
being politically impossible for them to vote for the
immunities that are necessary. We have a problem with President
Karzai that I will leave for now, but that----
Mr. Scott. Ambassador----
Ambassador Neumann. That is one we will get past.
Mr. Scott. I am out of time. I certainly respect your
opinion. I know what I was told and as someone in both
countries.
And Ms. Flournoy.
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, if I could, on your concern about the
U.S. being the only country sort of shouldering the burden.
Several billions of dollars have been committed to the future
of Afghanistan post-2014 at the Tokyo conference, various
international donor conferences. Yes, the U.S. has signed up to
support some of that, but the vast majority of that
international support is going to be non-U.S. So there are
many, many other countries who are signed up to provide
financial assistance and also troops if, in fact, we can
negotiate the basis for a post-2014 mission. So I just wanted
to reassure you on that point.
Mr. Scott. Thank you for that answer, ma'am, and I know I
am out of time. If I may, I know you obviously have a close
relationship with the administration, but when the President
came out with a zero option, I think it threw a lot of us for a
loop. I think it threw this committee for a loop. I think it
threw the soldiers for a loop, and maybe he was trying to send
a message to President Karzai, but I think that message went to
a lot of other people as well that were working toward a common
goal, and I say that respectfully to you. So, thank you.
I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
We now go to Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And once again, I appreciate all of you in attendance here
today. Your information and your opinions are very insightful
to us.
One of the things that most of you have said is reference
to a clear policy from this administration as to where we are
trying to go in Afghanistan, and more importantly, I think what
we learned from this last debacle with Syria is, isn't it the
President's responsibility to talk to the American public about
where we expect to be and how we expect to get there, because
as 2014 is closely approaching us, it is kind of hard to do it
when you are in the midst of making a decision as to what our
footprint is going to look like in Afghanistan and what we are
supposed to accomplish. Do any of you have a clear indication
that the President is willing to do that?
Ms. Flournoy. Again, I am speaking as a private citizen and
no longer as a member of the administration, but you know, I
think the President has spoken about our strategy in
Afghanistan a number of times, and I believe that, you know,
there is a very good chance we are going to stay on that
articulated path going forward. That is certainly my hope.
I think as those decisions get flshed out this follows: He
gets the recommendation from General Dunford; as decisions, as
the BSA is concluded, as decisions are made, I fully expect
that he will be talking to the American people about the
longer-term future in Afghanistan and what the U.S. commitment
is going to be.
Mr. Nugent. Don't you think, though, that to preface that,
you would actually be talking about today what you think
Afghanistan could look like if things go correctly versus
waiting until the military comes out, you know, Department of
Defense comes out, Pentagon comes out in regards to the force
structure because then you are trying to play catch up, I
think. Is that it would be much easier when you--when that
comes out to have articulated what you would hope to
accomplish. You know what I am saying? It is sort of like
having a game plan before you actually find out who your
players are but at least you have a game plan as to how you are
going to move forward or what you expect to move forward.
Ms. Flournoy. Again, I think that this President has
articulated a vision for the whole--you know, from the
beginning of the Afghan strategy and his administration where
we are trying to go with Afghanistan. I think re-articulating
that in the context of these additional steps would also be
important. It is also part of a broader counterterrorism
strategy, and as someone who spent 3 years actually executing
the strategy, there is a counterterrorism strategy. We can
argue about whether it is, you know, a properly balanced
resource, et cetera, but there is a clear strategy. This has
actually been a strong suit for the administration, and I think
the President's NDU [National Defense University] speech
recently talked about how to put that on a more sustainable
footing beyond just the kinetic piece, which is important, but
really focused on building the partnership--the capacity of
partners, including places, like Afghanistan, to deal with
these threats going forward.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate your comment.
Ambassador, what is your take? Have we articulated our
positions strong enough to move forward to convince the
American people as to what our course of action should be in
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Neumann. No. I would dearly like to see more of
it. We have a range of statements to a range of audiences. We--
we are going to--if the President is serious about the policy
that he has articulated, then he is going to have to lead it
both with this body and with the American public, and I
devoutly hope he will, but we are not there yet.
Mr. Nugent. Well, and I think that is the point I am trying
to drive through is I would like to see the President be much
more passionate and articulate in regards to what he sees the
end game is in Afghanistan based upon, you know, what we have
done over the last 12 years.
You know, I can remember back in, I think it was 2009 or
2007, 2008 when ``Charlie Wilson's War'' came out and our older
son was in Afghanistan for 15 months in combat, and I recall
with my wife saying, you know, if we had only done just a
little more, maybe our kid wouldn't be there risking his life,
and so I am worried that we are heading down the same path.
So, I appreciate all your comments, and General, I
certainly do appreciate your leadership. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Nugent.
I now go to Ranking Member Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on that last train of thought because I
really believe the President, without question, has had a very
clear strategy on both combatting Al Qaeda and on Afghanistan.
I have two caveats to that. The first of which is I do not
think that he or his administration have done a very good job
of explaining it or of building support for it, and you know,
you talk about the American people. My own personal pet peeve
is I don't think he has done a good job at all of explaining it
to us, to Congress, or including us in it, and I think that has
hamstrung this effort.
But I think, without question, there has been a clear
strategy. I will agree with the ambassador on Afghanistan is
that, you know, I think a greater commitment to that strategy
and a greater commitment to explaining it is necessary, but
just in Al Qaeda, and there is a question at the end of this,
but I think the strategy has been clear, and I agree with Ms.
Flournoy that this has been a strength.
I mean, number one, there are certain identifiable people
within Al Qaeda that are plotting and planning attacks against
us. That is priority number one. There is a whole lot of other
stuff going on, but stopping them from hitting us has to be at
the top of that list, and the best way to do that, quite
frankly, is get them before they get us, and you know, I
wouldn't dismiss drones quite so quickly. A drone is but a
mechanism for taking, you know, for putting the policy in place
of getting them before they get us.
It was Afghanistan first, and then it was Pakistan, still
Pakistan. Then Yemen came up, so we put together a very, you
know, I think a robust plan to get them there, and I think that
has been reasonably effective, so that has been number one.
Number two, we can't simply leave Afghanistan to fall back
into the hands. So, in 2009, the President committed the
resources and committed to a new strategy to try to figure it
out, and it is a mess. Don't get me wrong. It is not an easy
problem to solve, but they actually committed the resources for
the first time in 8 years to go in there and train the ANSF to,
you know, try to give the Afghan government a chance to stand
on its own, which ultimately it has to, and to accomplish that,
we had to draw down on Iraq because the resources that were
being spent in Iraq were simply not worth the benefit that we
were getting from them, and they were consistently undermining
some of these other missions.
You know, the two final, I think, components to this have
been, number one, we need to try to appeal to moderate Muslims.
We try to fight the ideological war, counter the Taliban AQ [Al
Qaeda] narrative, find moderate Muslims. Now, the biggest
problem with that has been that they are not easy to find in
terms of, you know, them actually articulating it. Thomas
Friedman had a good column this weekend, I think, talking about
how, you know, think about the fact that, in Syria, you have
got jihadists coming from all over the Muslim world; people
going there to help Al Qaeda. Where are the people from the
Muslim world coming in to help the Free Syria movement, to help
build a reasonable alternative? It is not there, and that is, I
think, you know, part of the challenge. But the President has
tried to articulate that message. It is a difficult message to
deliver.
Then the final piece of it is, work with the international
community, because if we are going to focus on what I think is
our greatest threat, and I think the President has articulated
it that way, which is Al Qaeda and the threat they pose, we've
got to figure out how to get along with China. We've got to
figure out how to get along with Russia. You know, we've got to
build those support. Again, that is not easy. They are not
looking to get along with us, and I think there have been some
missteps there. So I think it is just wrong--one of the things
that has really frustrated me about both the drone issue and
Afghanistan, is I consistently hear people say we don't know
what we are doing; there is no strategy. And I am like, pay
attention for 10 seconds. There is a strategy. You may disagree
with how it is being implemented, but we absolutely know what
we are doing in Afghanistan, much better than a lot of other
places.
Now, the final caveat that I will throw out there is the
Arab Spring sort of threw a wrench in all this, and this is
where the administration has got to get its stuff together. It
is, you know, on Egypt, on Syria, on a bunch--on Libya. It has
been kind of doing this, yeah, we are kind of doing that. You
don't set policy in response to a reporter's question. Just as
a general rule, I would say you shouldn't try and do that. So I
think they need to better understand how to respond in Syria
and elsewhere, and that is my question.
How do we respond to the Arab Spring? Because I will cut
the administration a little bit of slack, it is difficult. You
want to support democratic values, but you also don't want to
cast important countries into chaos because they can't handle
democracy. On Egypt and the other, what would be the best
response on Syria, on Egypt, on all these other places?
General Keane. I will take a stab at it, but let me just
say, you know, on your position on strategy. Killing Al Qaeda
leaders doesn't defeat an Al Qaeda ideology or a movement.
Mr. Smith. Agreed. That was the only piece of it----
General Keane. Those leaders are replaced.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
General Keane. But that is our focus.
Mr. Smith. But you still think we should be doing that,
don't you?
General Keane. Of course, we should be doing that.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General Keane. We should always hold this horrific behavior
liable.
Mr. Smith. Stop it.
General Keane. And we should use drones, but it is not a
strategy is what I am suggesting.
Mr. Smith. It is a piece of a strategy.
General Keane. With an ideological movement like this,
killing them actually will not defeat them.
Mr. Smith. But again, though, are you suggesting that we
don't?
General Keane. Listen, I am all for killing them.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
General Keane. But what is going to defeat them is
rejection of them by moderate Muslims. That is----
Mr. Smith. Absolutely.
General Keane [continuing]. What is--but our strategy
should be fashioned around a long-term goal that will remove
the conditions that permit Al Qaeda to thrive.
Mr. Smith. Forgive me, but do you have some secret formula
for accomplishing that because my position is that the
President is trying to do precisely that. It is just that it is
very, very difficult.
General Keane. I don't hear it. I am glad that you hear it,
but I don't hear it. Getting to the Arab Spring. The drivers of
instability in the region have fermented and brought about the
Arab Spring, the lack of political and social justice, the lack
of economic opportunity, and I think the Arab Spring surprised
most analysts and experts who deal with the Middle East. Not
surprising, it began in the most repressive of the regimes.
And the fact of the matter is, is that we cannot control
the Arab Spring, nor should we try, but I do believe we should
try to influence, and I do believe we should try to provide
support. When millions of people are willing to stand up
against a military machine in a brutal dictatorship like Assad
has in Syria or a lesser one but nonetheless brutal in Libya, I
do believe we should try to support that. I am not talking
about military commitment. I am talking about providing moral
support. I am talking about helping them solve the problem.
They wanted weapons. They told us specifically what they
wanted. I have listened to them speak to me about it. They
said, We don't want your troops; we don't even want your
airplanes; just help us with these weapons.
Mr. Smith. I agree with you completely on that.
General Keane. And 2 years later, we are now finally giving
them something. I mean, something morally good was happening in
Syria in terms of watching those people struggle against a
mighty machine like he had and been willing to die in large
numbers to deal with it. I am not suggesting that is enough
motivation to commit us to war. It is not. But I do believe
strategically Syria matters because of its relationship to Iran
and the regional hegemony that Iran is trying to achieve there.
Mr. Smith. And the larger ideological struggle that you
described.
General Keane. Absolutely.
Mr. Smith. Very important.
General Keane. I don't want to steal anybody's thunder.
Mr. Smith. No, that is very helpful.
Ms. Flournoy
Ms. Flournoy. I certainly agree with the point that we
cannot control the events that are unfolding on the ground.
This is a history being rewritten, and the pen is in the hands
of the people of the--in the region. But I do agree that we do
have important and in some cases vital interests at stake. We
do want to use our influence and all of our tools, from
diplomacy to economic tools, to I think a more robust use of
assistance to moderate elements of the opposition in Syria, to
moderate elements elsewhere. We have to walk a line trying to
support the long-term arc of reform, which will ultimately
provide security in the region, with the need for some degree
of stability on the way.
And I think the most important thing I would focus on right
now is trying to actually contain the Syrian civil war. I am
very concerned about the overflow of instability into Iraq,
Lebanon, potentially Jordan and other countries in the region.
Mr. Smith. One of the things that we should have done I
think a long time ago--but certainly, there is still time to do
it--is a DOD [Department of Defense] train-and-equip mission.
And people have said, Well, we don't know who is who? Look,
if there are 10 people in Syria that are from the Free Syria
movement that we think we can trust, well, start helping those
10 and build from there. I think there are more than 10. There
are not the tens of thousands that some have said, but there
are hundreds and not thousands. They are our friends, and they
are looking at us, saying, You are not doing anything for us.
It can be small, but it has to be something. And it is
something that I think DOD has got to be part of. It is
something I will be working on.
I am sorry, I don't want to take too much time. I want to
give the other two a chance to say something.
Ambassador Neumann. A couple of just quick comments. Syria,
obviously, poses the problem that it has only lousy choices,
but not making a decision is also a lousy choice.
Mr. Smith. Even if there are only bad choices, there is
still a best one.
Ambassador Neumann. And there is the need to explain that,
that takes a lot of explanation, because we don't like to deal
in nuance. But I think one place we are not looking at enough,
nearly enough is the one that Michele just raised and that is
the consequences for the neighbors. If we cannot find a way
that this is going to end and the stability of Jordan and
Turkey--I would add Lebanon, but I think our resources are
going to be much more----
Mr. Smith. And I am not sure the word ``stability'' applies
to Lebanon----
Ambassador Neumann. Exactly.
Jordan, we have the issue--particularly, it is a fragile
state. It has a large nonnative population already with the
Palestinians. That needs both a lot of economic support, but it
needs thought about, how are you going to keep these people
from bleeding into the rest of the economy as a destabilizing
force? How are you going to keep them from becoming deeply
resentful against us as well as others. There, there are
policies that are possible, Turkey also, regional policies
where I see a need for more articulation, thought, because
ultimately, those things are going to cost money, which means
coming back to you, gentlemen, and they are going to go on for
a lengthy period of time. They are not going to be short-term
fixes. And so if we are going--I say ``we'' as though I were
still with the government and I am not. If there is going to be
support for those kinds of thoughts and policies, then they
need to be articulated, I believe, much more explicitly,
beginning with you all--or to you all, I should say.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Lockhart.
Ms. Lockhart. I believe that the Arab Spring calls for a
robust diplomacy tied to a security policy. I think too often
we see diplomacy and security as alternatives and sometimes
mutually exclusive. I think, like in Afghanistan and many
countries across the Middle East, the street represents our
best allies. It is the young men and women who came out in the
thousands and sometimes in the millions who are asking for the
very things that we stand for, economic opportunity, political
inclusion and democracy. And this is really the time in this
century to stand with them. It is going to require robust tools
of economic and diplomatic assistance that are missing in
action; perhaps not the business of this committee, but other
committees.
But I think we, from the security perspective, were
suffering from the lack of investment in those tools. And this
ties to your question of strategy for the defeat of Al Qaeda
and extremism. It is ways to engage with citizens and the next
generation that is going to provide the bulwark for stability.
I agree with the ambassador on the question of Syria. We
have focused too much on the risk of action and not enough on
the risk of inaction, and what is now most likely that the
conflict will continue to spiral out of control and spread and
the consequences that this will have for the survival of the
state system and the region as a whole for decades will be one
for which we will pay a very heavy price.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, appreciate your indulgence
Mr. Wittman. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Smith, and
I want to go ahead and thank our panelists for today.
I do have a few questions as we close, and I want to focus
on some of the logistical elements there. We know where we are
right now as trying to move lots of things out, about 70,000
vehicles, about 130,000 containers. We have seen the challenges
with the opening and closing of the Pakistani ground line of
communications. We also know the limitations of the northern
distribution network. We also know historically, too, that this
for the United States is the largest logistical movement of
goods and equipment in our history, but we also see
historically, you go back to 1842, when the British were
leaving Afghanistan, of the 17,000 troops that they had, very
few survived that effort to leave, and you saw how bloody the
effort was for the Russians when they left. The concern is as
we are pursuing this effort, not only to get our troops out,
but also logistically to look at how we are going to get this
done, I wanted to get the panelists' viewpoints on what do you
see as the greatest challenges, what are the greatest risks and
how do we manage those risks? I want to get your perspective on
that.
General Keane. Well, we have learned a lot in the last 20
years or so with major logistical retrograde operations, as we
like to refer to them as. In 1991, coming out of Kuwait and a
portion of Iraq, it was a logistical nightmare, and we learned
a lot from our mistakes. Leaving Iraq post-2010, 2011, was very
much a success and a lot of effort has gone into that. The
logistical planners who are working in Afghanistan to do this
are building on all of the lessons that they have learned
there. I think this operation, despite the formidable challenge
it is to move that much equipment over that kind of terrain in
a limited period of time, I think it is going to go much better
than people expect it to be. And I don't believe that the
Taliban is going to expend much effort in dealing with this.
They are not going to focus on that. They are going to focus on
controlling areas and where people are located and not on that
logistical operation. For them to do that would take them away
from what they believe is their center of gravity, and their
resources have been expended rather considerably in the last
few years.
So I don't think it is going to be the security issue that
people believe it will be. And I do think that, based on all
the things we have learned in this, we are going to do this
pretty good.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. I know when I was visiting there,
there was quite an effort going into the logistical workup to
make this happen. Obviously, talking to the folks there, they
realized what the limitations are.
General Keane, do you believe that this can be accomplished
by the focal point for us to be leaving Afghanistan, which is
2014? Is that something that we can realistically accomplish by
then, or will it continue after January of 2014?
General Keane. I think some of it realistically will
continue after. And so those will have to be taken and counted,
the numbers that are still there. But there are enormously
detailed plans on all of this, and we have got some real
experts who know what they are doing in this area and they have
been working on it now for 18 months. This has been detailed,
strategic, operational, and tactical plans for some time to get
this done. I am expecting it to go well.
Mr. Wittman. Obviously, there is still a lot of discussion
about what presence will be, both ISAF forces and U.S. forces
as a part of that post-2014. Have we got any indication from
our allies whether parts of our or any of our allies are
willing to stay post-2014, is there a commitment there, Ms.
Flournoy?
Ms. Flournoy. Yes, I think both the Germans and Italians
have indicated that they would be willing to continue in
leadership roles in the north for the Germans and the west for
the Italians and play an important role in those areas with
other NATO allies and support. So I think they need to have a
U.S. commitment in place, U.S. BSA in place, that then allows
them to make their own commitments, understanding what kind of
enablers we can provide to them and then negotiate their own
SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] with the Afghan government.
Ambassador Neumann. If I can just add, the Canadians, while
they are taking out their troops, are still at this point
committed to retaining a police training presence, which is
also an important piece of the security posture. The Brits are
not--British are not fully clear at this point. But I think
chances of keeping some--right now, the single biggest
impediment to leading and getting an answer on that is our
piece.
I would note, on logistics, that since, by all accounts,
somebody is going to be there--where this is not the Russian
withdrawal over the bridge, and I do have an enormous respect
for what we are doing in logistics--but I don't think we
absolutely have to be in a panic or unnecessarily spend the
taxpayers money to get everything out by the time the troops
pull out. There is no really good reason why that process can't
finish some time after, because we are not pulling out in our
entirety. And if there are some cost savings that could be
undertaken by being a little slower and more deliberate, I
would be all in favor of it.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask you this, assuming we get a Status
of Forces Agreement going forward for all those that would be
involved post-2014, do you see that as an enduring mission,
either for the United States or for ISAF, if there are partners
there that continue in that operation?
Ambassador Neumann. I see it as a long-term mission. I
think some pieces of it, as General Keane was talking about,
will come down fairly rapidly, particularly on the support for
enablers. That is a comparatively short-term mission. Some of
the training will be long term. NATO is already looking out to
20--10-year vision and let me pass it to Michele.
Ms. Flournoy. I think, at some point, when ANSF reaches a
certain degree of self-sufficiency and mastery over its
equipment and institutions and processes, I think you
transition to a more normal security cooperation agreement,
where you would have training, visits, exercises, security
cooperation, foreign military sales. At some point, it would
transition to a more normal sort of security, long-term
security cooperation relationship.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Well, panelists, thank you so for
joining us today, we appreciate you spending your time. It was
very, very helpful to get your perspective. If there are no
further questions, and considering there is nobody else here
but me, there probably will not be, I hereby adjourn the House
Armed Services Committee.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 19, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 19, 2013
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 19, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. A New York Times article this week highlighted a UN
report on female police officers which found that about 90 percent of
the policewomen interviewed described sexual harassment and sexual
violence as a serious problem, and that about 70 percent of the
policewomen said that they had personally experienced sexual harassment
or sexual violence themselves. Do you believe that this horrific
problem will get better or worse after 2014?
Ms. Flournoy. Any incidence of sexual harassment or sexual violence
within the Afghan police force is cause for great concern and must be
addressed by the Ministry of Interior as an urgent priority. Whether or
not this problem improves or worsens after 2014 may depend, in part, on
the extent to which some international forces remain in the country as
trainers, advisors and mentors to Afghan police forces. The presence of
international advisors can help to teach and uphold international
standards of conduct and to ensure that incidents of sexual harassment
or violence are reported and investigated, and that those responsible
are held accountable.
Ms. Speier. It says a lot about who the Afghani government is
negotiating with, that taking away women's rights is a high valued
bargaining chip. Do you have the expectation that once our presence in
Afghanistan diminishes, the Taliban's presence and power will increase?
Do you believe that this won't precipitate a serious erosion of the
rights gained by women?
Ms. Flournoy. If the United States and the international community
do not provide an adequate post-2014 presence to continue advising,
assisting and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces in holding
their ground and protecting the population, there is a significant risk
that the Taliban-led insurgency will regain previously lost territory
and influence, particularly in the South and East. In areas where
Taliban regains dominance, the rights of women would likely be
endangered. This would be a serious reversal of progress for women's
education, health, and ability to participate in the Afghan economy and
politics. The best way to prevent this from occurring is to ensure that
the United States and the international community provide an adequate
post-2014 presence to help the ANSF continue to develop and secure the
population nationwide.
Ms. Speier. A New York Times article this week highlighted a UN
report on female police officers which found that about 90 percent of
the policewomen interviewed described sexual harassment and sexual
violence as a serious problem, and that about 70 percent of the
policewomen said that they had personally experienced sexual harassment
or sexual violence themselves. Do you believe that this horrific
problem will get better or worse after 2014?
General Keane. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Speier. It says a lot about who the Afghani government is
negotiating with, that taking away women's rights is a high valued
bargaining chip. Do you have the expectation that once our presence in
Afghanistan diminishes, the Taliban's presence and power will increase?
Do you believe that this won't precipitate a serious erosion of the
rights gained by women?
General Keane. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Speier. A New York Times article this week highlighted a UN
report on female police officers which found that about 90 percent of
the policewomen interviewed described sexual harassment and sexual
violence as a serious problem, and that about 70 percent of the
policewomen said that they had personally experienced sexual harassment
or sexual violence themselves. Do you believe that this horrific
problem will get better or worse after 2014?
Ambassador Neumann. Equal rights for women in Afghanistan still
face many social pressures although there is certainly a growing
understanding of the need for equal rights and protections for women. I
expect these strains and pressures to continue after 2014. To the
extent that the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior face serious
financial pressure as our aid declines there is the potential for the
problems you describe to get worse as they believe they have to shift
funding to immediate combat requirements. Therefore, we should be
careful to maintain both general support levels for the Afghan security
forces as well as funding for programs to develop training for women
and broader education about the need for women in the security forces.
Ms. Speier. It says a lot about who the Afghani government is
negotiating with, that taking away women's rights is a high valued
bargaining chip. Do you have the expectation that once our presence in
Afghanistan diminishes, the Taliban's presence and power will increase?
Do you believe that this won't precipitate a serious erosion of the
rights gained by women?
Ambassador Neumann. Overall the Afghan Army is fighting well and
taking a very high number of casualties as a result. However, there are
areas they do not control and these may get more numerous. If Taliban
power increases the condition of women will almost certainly get worse.
I think this is far less a concern about what the Afghan government
will give away in negotiations, in part because they understand the
negative effect on foreign support, and much more about whether the
Afghan forces will be able to hold their own militarily. If we want to
keep Taliban power from increasing, with all that implies for women
particularly and for the development of a more tolerant society
generally, then we must maintain our support for Afghanistan in the
years after 2014. It is also important to understand the
interrelationship between fighting and negotiating. The worse the
military situation the more desperate the Afghan government will be and
the stronger the Taliban hand in negotiations. On the other hand, the
more it becomes clear that the Afghan forces will not lose the more
incentive the Taliban will have to reach a reasonable agreement without
excessive demands, including those which would imperil the status of
women. The Taliban is already showing some sensitivity to this in their
public statements but statements are not necessarily the reality of
what they would actually negotiate. The military balance, and hence the
need for our assistance, are a critical part of the picture.
Ms. Speier. A New York Times article this week highlighted a UN
report on female police officers which found that about 90 percent of
the policewomen interviewed described sexual harassment and sexual
violence as a serious problem, and that about 70 percent of the
policewomen said that they had personally experienced sexual harassment
or sexual violence themselves. Do you believe that this horrific
problem will get better or worse after 2014?
Ms. Lockhart. As the UN report (as reported by the New York Times
article, ``Afghan Policewomen Say Sexual Harassment Is Rife'',
September 16, 2013, highlights, the incidence of sexual violence and
harassment is indeed a tragic and critical issue for women in
Afghanistan.
Sadly, it is possible that this problem will get worse after 2014,
especially if those segments of society who are opposed to women's
rights and protections are emboldened. The ISAF and international
presence in my view played a strong role in advancing the status and
role of women in society in general and professional positions in
particular, and enhancing protections for women.
It would be sensible to look at the post-2014 period in terms of
different scenarios. There is sadly one scenario where violence and
conflict in general spiral, as a consequence of an emboldened
insurgency, actions of neighbors, and/or failure of the political
process to result in a smooth transfer of power to a broadly accepted
and legitimate authority. There are also other scenarios, including
where the constitutional order increasingly takes root, and while
violence and conflict continue, a broadly accepted election outcome
results in a leadership team able to build consensus on Afghanistan's
future trajectory. There are strong signs that a new generation,
increasingly urbanized and integrated with global networks, is coming
of age and impacting societal transformations (see for example the work
of Alliance in Support of the Afghan People, www.afghanalliance.org for
documentation of these evolving trends). If there is a sufficient
security bridge to give this generation time to grow into leadership
positions across government, business and society.
Some measures can be taken to mitigate the incidence of violence
against women, including continued international force and civilian
presence in partnership with Afghan forces and the Government to
counter extremist and militia elements; building training and awareness
measures as well as sanctions into training and management procedures
for the army and police; and supporting those organizations and
procedures designed to protect women including the Human Rights
Commission, and specialized police units focused on protection of women
in general as well as domestic violence in particular.
Ms. Speier. It says a lot about who the Afghani government is
negotiating with, that taking away women's rights is a high valued
bargaining chip. Do you have the expectation that once our presence in
Afghanistan diminishes, the Taliban's presence and power will increase?
Do you believe that this won't precipitate a serious erosion of the
rights gained by women?
Ms. Lockhart. If the power of the Taliban and other groups within
Afghanistan opposed to the enfranchisement of women in politics,
government, the economy and society grows, it is certain that the
rights gained by women will be seriously at risk. This fear is well
documented by a number of surveys and reports investigating the status
of and prospects for women. The issue, as reported by women's and
citizens' groups, is extremist and conservative forces in general and
not those specific to the Taliban.
The question of whether the Taliban's presence and power will
increase will depend on what scenario develops post 2014, which in turn
depends in large measure on the commitments made and actions taken by
the United States Government in the coming weeks and months, as
different scenarios unfold. In my view, the scenarios that might unfold
are: first, a scenario where the fragile gains are eroded by an erosion
of trust and confidence of citizens in the political order, increasing
hedging behavior by key factions who align behind militias and
insurgent groups, leading to an exacerbation of conflict and a growth
of extremist elements in politics and society. This scenario is most
likely to develop should the commitment of the U.S. especially in the
form of a sufficiently robust continued presence and continued
commitment to the ANSF not materialize or remain in question. Second, a
scenario of continued consolidation of the constitutional order, with a
successful transfer of power to a broadly legitimate government in
spring 2014 is possible. This is most likely to materialize should
commitment of the U.S. to the post 14 era be resolute and have the
confidence of the Afghan citizenry. A third scenario is possible of
continued insecurity and conflict but where the center holds together;
one can imagine this scenario unfolding with limited commitment of the
US, an acceptable although imperfect election, and continued
interference by neighbors.
In the first and third of these, growth of extremist groups and
erosion of women's rights are likely. To minimize this risk, a U.S.
commitment to an enduring presence and financial support to the
essential functions of the state including the ANSF, in line with
commitments already made in the Strategic Partnership Agreement and at
Chicago, is critical. Additionally, the U.S. should focus its
diplomatic efforts to bolstering the moderate middle rather than at the
extremes, by focusing on supporting free and fair elections; the
formation of an inclusive and acceptable government and Parliament; and
supporting the next generation of leaders and managers who are now
coming of age. The U.S. should focus its economic interventions on
those elements which will increase domestic revenue collection, so that
Afghanistan can underwrite its own costs. With this set of policies,
Afghanistan will stand a fair chance of maintaining the gains that have
been made.
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