[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-56]
UNDERSEA WARFARE CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 12, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Douglas Bush, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, September 12, 2013, Undersea Warfare Capabilities and
Challenges..................................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, September 12, 2013..................................... 29
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013
UNDERSEA WARFARE CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 3
WITNESSES
Breckenridge, RADM Richard P., USN, Director, Undersea Warfare
Division (N97), Department of Defense.......................... 4
Johnson, RADM David C., USN, Program Executive Officer for
Submarines, Department of Defense.............................. 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Breckenridge, RADM Richard P., joint with RADM David C.
Johnson.................................................... 37
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 51
Mr. Langevin................................................. 54
UNDERSEA WARFARE CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 12, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES.
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome our members and our
distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing that will
focus on our undersea warfare capabilities and challenges.
Before we begin our discussion today on undersea warfare, I
wanted to quickly discuss sequestration and the alternatives
that are facing the Navy. It is apparent to me that the largest
threat to the United States Navy is of our own making. Despite
repeated attempts by the House of Representatives to rein in
our Nation's spending and properly resource the Department of
Defense, the administration has instead offered an alternative
plan that would raise our Nation's taxes, creating a logjam
that ensured sequestration continues to decimate our Nation's
defense.
When budget cuts were compared with the Nation's risk
associated with our Syria interest, even Secretary Hagel agreed
that dismantling of our military by budget cuts constitutes the
greatest risk.
If this administration remains supportive of the continued
deterioration of the military because of sequestration, I look
forward to the day when a new leadership in our country is
established to overcome this shortsighted agenda. We need to
ensure that strategy drives budget decisions, we need to
provide a voice to our combatant commanders, and we need to
ensure that every time we put our soldiers and sailors in
harm's way, we provide them with every tool and every resource
to ensure that we retain a superior advantage over any
competing interest.
If sequestration is allowed to remain during the remaining
tenure of this administration, I would urge the Department to
adopt a strategy that retains our current force structure in a
reduced operational status to allow the next administration the
opportunity to reverse our military's decline.
A decision that reduces our Navy by three aircraft carriers
will take 20 years to recover. This type of irreversible action
by the administration will irreparably harm our Nation. A hold-
and-wait strategy is superior to any strategy that would reduce
our force structure, as is being considered by the
administration.
As to this hearing, I continue to believe that the undersea
warfare capabilities provided by our United States Navy provide
a preeminent role in the--our control of the global commons.
These capabilities provide the United States with a key
asymmetric advantage over any potential aggressor. Even in a
time of declining resources, it is crucial that our Nation
continue to retain our strategic advantage in undersea warfare.
At the heart of our current fleet is the Los Angeles-class
attack submarine. To augment the Los Angeles class, this
committee has been successful in the authorization of two
Virginia-class submarines per year, and we authorized another
two boats in the fiscal year 2014 NDAA. However, with the
accelerating retirement of the Los Angeles-class submarine, our
Nation will drop below the 48-boat goal starting in 2025.
I believe that our attack submarines are an essential
element to any of our Nation's high-end war plans and I remain
committed to continuing the annual procurement of two Virginia-
class submarines to retain our asymmetrical advantage.
Our submarines force also provides a substantial strike
capability with the land-attack Tomahawk cruise missile. Our
Navy has four Ohio-class guided missile submarines that can
each carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Unfortunately, these
four boats are scheduled to be retired.
The Navy has proposed to replace this reduced strike
capacity with the Virginia Payload Module [VPM]. I believe that
the Virginia Payload Module could provide this additional
capability to the fleet, and I will closely monitor the
affordability of the Virginia Payload Module to ensure that the
benefits outweigh the associated costs.
Finally, the Ohio-class replacement program is expected to
provide almost 70 percent of our Nation's entire strategic
arsenal. Our national security rests on our ability to deliver
this boat on time and within budget. Unfortunately, the cost of
these 12 boats will each average $6 billion and may crowd out
other shipbuilding interests starting in the next 5 years. I
believe it is imperative that the Department of Defense
allocate the correct funding towards these strategic assets and
ensure that our United States Navy does not disproportionately
bear the burden.
The fair share division of our Nation's defense resources
at the Pentagon needs to come to an end to ensure that our
naval forces are properly resourced for our future challenges.
Today we are truly honored to have as our witnesses the
director of the Undersea Warfare Division, Rear Admiral Richard
Breckenridge, and the program executive officer for submarines,
Rear Admiral David Johnson.
Gentlemen, we want to thank both of you for your service.
You are the best our country has to give. We thank you both for
being in the role that you are in, and we are looking forward
to hearing your testimony today.
I now want to recognize my friend, the ranking member from
North Carolina, Mr. McIntyre, for any remarks that he might
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As we look at the Navy's current and planned undersea
warfare programs, we couldn't have two better witnesses. So
thank you to Admiral Johnson and Admiral Breckenridge for your
service and for being here today.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing,
because we do know the Navy's undersea capabilities are
critical, critical issues facing the DOD [Department of
Defense] and the Congress as a whole. I particularly want to
thank Admiral Breckenridge, whom I have known since I first
came to Congress, for his leadership and character, for his
integrity and for your service. And thank you for being a
continuing example of that from the time I knew you when you
were studying for your first exam to be able to do nuclear
engineering and to go on to submarines. And to have risen today
to the responsibility and rank you have; you have been
steadfast in that, and thank you for that great witness of
character.
As we look ahead to examining the Navy's plans in this
area, there is a lot of talk about China, about other countries
having asymmetric advantages over the U.S., but we know in
terms of submarines, the reverse is true, and you gentlemen
know that better than anybody, which is, of course, why you are
here today.
We know that our submarines are clearly at the forefront
and clearly have the most mobility to do what needs to be done
quickly, accurately and responsibly. We know that that means we
can't take that advantage for granted, and it means that we
can't simply stand still, or I guess the better parallel is say
we shouldn't just simply stay anchored, we must get underway,
and we must stay underway with the advancements in our
submarine fleet and our underwater warfare capabilities.
Another reason, of course, we want to talk with you
gentlemen is we are concerned about the cost of the current
submarine programs and how that is going to impact what we do
now, but obviously what we do in the future. In the fiscal year
2013 budget alone, there is more than $5 billion in
shipbuilding procurement accounts for the Virginia-class attack
submarine program. That is supposed to continue for many years.
There is also about $750 million in research and development
for the Ohio-class replacement submarines, which I know we have
had some conversations about, even though we are years away
from actually starting construction. In both cases, in plain
terms, that is a lot of money, but as things stand today, it
looks like the Nation gets the most bang for its buck out of
these investments.
With falling budgets for sequestration, we are concerned
about how the Navy will be able to keep these programs on
track. It is not only a personal interest, a professional
interest for you, I know as Navy officers, but it is an
interest that I know you share in our national defense, in a
concern on behalf of our Nation.
Finally, I want to mention the future of unmanned
underwater vehicles. The progress in this area is raising some
important questions. Will the Navy be able to expand its global
undersea presence without the expense of building more and more
large, very expensive manned submarines, or alternatively, will
the Navy in the future do more to have a balance of some type,
and if so, in what proportion of both manned and unmanned
submarines working together to make our overall submarine fleet
more effective.
These are the type of questions we know that--we hear a lot
of about unmanned aerial vehicles these days and that has
captured the public's imagination, but also have been the
reality in our military. This is a new area, though, for many
people, and as our citizens start asking questions, we would
like to hear your answers as we look ahead to those unmanned
submarines and other ways of having unmanned underwater
vehicles and activities.
We look forward to your testimony. Thank you for your
service, and indeed we pray God's blessings upon you and your
families, because we know they make great sacrifices in the
lengthy times that you have been away and will continue to be
away as you serve our great Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, we thank you both. And as you know,
as you look at this subcommittee, we are building a record so
that we can use it for making the decisions that we need. It is
probably one of the most bipartisan subcommittees that you will
find in Congress. Mike is one of my closest friends in
Congress. And Mr. Courtney is representing the northeast for us
up here today. Mike and I are carrying the southern portion.
And we have got Mr. Cook bringing up our western flank over
there, so we are well represented in here.
But, Admiral, we are going to turn it over to the two of
you. And I think, Admiral Breckenridge, are you going to go
first?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Then we will turn it over to you. Thank you for
being here.
STATEMENT OF RADM RICHARD P. BRECKENRIDGE, DIRECTOR, UNDERSEA
WARFARE DIVISION (N97), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Breckenridge. Well, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members, Rear Admiral Dave Johnson and I thank you for the
opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Seapower, as
we represent the men and women of your Navy's undersea forces.
And in both your opening statements, again, the special
relationship the Navy has enjoyed with Congress since the very
beginning of our country is an underpinning of our greatness as
a Nation.
With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to
provide a brief statement and a separate written statement for
the record.
By any objective measure, the United States has the finest
undersea force in the world. We enjoy a distinct military
advantage in the undersea domain unlike any other. When you
consider land, the surface of the sea, air, even space and
cyber, these domains are becoming more and more heavily
contested between us and our adversaries, but in the undersea
domain, we have a unique military advantage, and that advantage
has been the bedrock of our greatness as a Nation, a crown
jewel, if you will, of our global strength and security.
Strength, I might add, that is not used to add to our own
national glory, but is instead given sacrificially as we stand
by others who are severely oppressed, as they pursue the ideals
of democracy and freedom.
The outstanding reputation enjoyed by our submarine force
is the result of sustained excellence by our shipbuilders, our
maintainers, our shore staffs, our planners, and most of all by
the men and women who operate our submarines day in and day
out. This is demanding, highly technical work that requires the
best people our Nation can produce, and we are very fortunate
as a country to draw the members of this great team from all
over the Nation.
Our undersea forces have a unique role within the Navy,
just as the Navy has a unique role within the joint force.
Undersea forces leverage the concealment of the undersea to
provide what no other part of the joint force can deliver, and
that is persistent, undetected, assured access far forward and
the ability to deliver unique military advantages. By
leveraging stealthy concealment, our undersea forces can deploy
forward without being provocative, penetrate an adversary's
defensive perimeter, and conduct undetected operations. These
undetected operations might be precautionary ship movements,
intelligence collection and surveillance missions, or special
forces operations.
Should it be necessary, our concealed undersea forces can
exploit the element of surprise and attack at a time and place
of our choosing. These attacks could include efforts
specifically focused on helping ensure access into a denied
area by our follow-on general purpose forces. Feedback from our
operational commanders indicates that the demand for this
capability is strong throughout the globe.
In addition, looking into the future, the threat to our
ships and aircraft from cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic
missiles and integrated air defense systems is growing. This
will create more military demand for undersea forces.
Against this backdrop of increasing undersea force value
and continued strong demand, we must consider the trends in
undersea force structure. The Navy has worked hard to stabilize
overall naval forces near or slightly above the current level;
however, within this stabilized Navy, there is a submarine
force that will decline by more than 25 percent over the next
15 years. This decline is not the result of some recent
decision, as you mentioned. It is the gradual consequence of a
long list of choices made over many years.
The total submarine force will drop from 73 submarines to
52 ships, a cut of about 30 percent. The vertical strike
payload volume of the undersea force, as our SSGNs [guided
missile submarines] retire and we reach the bottom of this
trough area with our SSNs [attack submarines], will drop by
over 60 percent. The forward presence of our submarines around
the globe will decline by over 40 percent. This is the program
of record. This is with the two per year Virginia construction
rate, of which we received great support from Congress.
So facing a long-term trend of increasing undersea
importance and decreasing undersea forces capacity, the Navy
has developed an integrated approach to provide as much
undersea capability as possible, yet within realistic
constraints. This integrated approach does not solve all of the
shortfalls faced by the Navy, but it makes significant progress
with limited resources. I would like to discuss the top four
priorities of this integrated undersea future strategy.
First and foremost, it is mandatory that we sustain our
survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent with about the same
level of at-sea presence as today. The Ohio class represents
the best lessons learned from the SSBNs [ballistic missile
submarines] that preceded it, and the Ohio replacement will
likewise benefit from the Ohio class. Although we have delayed
this program for over 20 years, it is now time to make the
necessary investments to support procurement of the first Ohio
replacement in 2021. There is no allowance for any further
delay.
Second, to prevent the attack submarine reduction from
getting any worse than the 29 percent currently programmed, it
is essential that we protect the Virginia-class SSN procurement
plan and hold the line at two SSNs per year.
Number three, to cost-effectively compensate for the
retirement of the four SSGNs and the reduction in our SSN force
below the required minimum level of 48 ships, we need to invest
in the Virginia Payload Module. In addition to partially
compensating for the lost strike volume, the Virginia Payload
Module will distribute this volume over more hauls, providing
greater security and military utility. This module will provide
valuable payload flexibility in the future that will otherwise
be unobtainable.
And lastly, it is essential that we restart torpedo
production to fill empty torpedo stows, create the required
reserves and reestablish a capable producer of these highly
specialized weapons.
Taken together, this integrated program will provide us
with the platforms, the payload volume and the capable payloads
to address emerging future needs.
The United States is fortunate to have the best undersea
force in the world. At the same time, we have the greater
burden of responsibility of any Nation in the world, with
scores of countries looking to us for nuclear security and
defense in a world that is increasingly uncertain and
combative. Our undersea forces are up to the task today and
will continue to be up to the task in the future provided they
are supported with the right resources. Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Breckenridge and
Admiral Johnson can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral Breckenridge.
Admiral Johnson.
STATEMENT OF RADM DAVID C. JOHNSON, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER
FOR SUBMARINES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
I would like to thank the Seapower Subcommittee for inviting me
here today to talk to you about the Navy's undersea warfare
programs. My role as program executive officer for submarines
is to provide the Navy with the platforms, the weapons, and the
sensors required to ensure the United States maintains its
unquestioned dominance in the undersea domain, done so both
affordably and on time.
This past Saturday, we commissioned the tenth Virginia-
class submarine, the USS Minnesota, SSN 783, which delivered 11
months early to her contract delivery date and closed out the
second, or Block II, contract.
Of the 10 Virginias now in the fleet, we have delivered 7
early, including all of the 6 Block II submarines.
When looked at in terms of relevance to the warfighter,
these submarines, from Virginia to Minnesota, gave the fleet
over 4 years of additional Virginia-class submarine use because
of the early delivery, and the fleet has used these ships,
deploying them to frontline missions at on-station rates that
meet or exceed the Los Angeles-class submarines they are
replacing. That kind of performance is a testament to the
strong Navy industry team that is one of the strongest in all
of the Department of Defense.
Not being satisfied with our past successes, we continue to
reduce delivery spans, and deliver ever more capable ships. Two
days ago, the 11th Virginia-class ship, the future USS North
Dakota, SSN 784, rolled out of the construction facility at
General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut, and into
dry dock in preparation for float-off this Sunday. North Dakota
is the first of the Block III ships, the ships we modified for
cost reduction and designed and built with large payload tubes
in the bow.
North Dakota is tracking to a January of 2014 delivery, and
if that holds, she will be 7 months early and break the 60-
month barrier on the lead ship of a new contract. That is truly
phenomenal performance.
Now, over the course of the Virginia-class program, each
ship delivered more complete and more ready for tasking. One
measure I use is how each ship is graded by the Navy's
independent assessor, that is the Board of Inspection and
Survey, or INSURV for short. The Huntington Ingalls Industry
Newport News delivered ship, Minnesota, received the highest
score yet from INSURV and continued a trend also seen on her
predecessor, the Electric Boat delivered ship, USS Mississippi.
Beyond new construction performance, the program is focused
on maximizing the operational availability. We executed a
number of modifications to the design in the Block IV
Virginias, the 10 ships we are in negotiations with General
Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industry Newport
News today. That will add one deployment to each boat and
reduce to three the number of major shipyard availabilities
over the ship's 33-year life.
We intend to continue our collective work to lower cost,
both construction and in service, and deliver these capable
Virginia-class submarines affordably.
As Admiral Breckenridge mentioned, we have the initial
research and development funds to design a payload module to
accommodate up to 28 Tomahawk cruise missiles and future
payloads. The Virginia Payload Module will utilize the
modularity and the flexibility inherent in the Virginia-class
base design and reconstitute the SSGN's payload volume in a
cost-effective manner. The Virginia-class program, with its
industrial partners, has proven its ability to incorporate new
design concepts without disrupting a successful production
program. I am confident that we will be in a position to
execute the Virginia Payload Module affordably in the fiscal
year 2019 Block V contract.
The experience and knowledge gained from the successful
Ohio-class ballistic missile and Virginia-class fast attack
submarines are being used to design the Ohio replacement ships.
Since the program's initial acquisition milestone, we have
focused on delivering a ship with the right capability at the
lowest possible cost. The program is a model for Secretary
Kendall's better buying power approach to defense acquisition,
incorporating from the start key tenets, such as affordability
targets and innovative contracting.
The R&D [research and development] contract with Electric
Boat contains discrete incentives for reaching significant,
specific non-recurring engineering construction and operating
support costs. This is the first time in a shipbuilding
research and development contract we have tied substantive
incentive fees to cost reduction across the entire life cycle.
This is but one example of how the Ohio replacement program is
reducing its costs.
And finally I would like to mention our torpedo work. It
has been 17 years since the last Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo
was built. Restarting that production line is, as Admiral
Breckenridge said, a top submarine force priority. We have
demonstrated our ability to reduce costs and improve capability
in this world's best torpedo, using hardware upgrades with
software improvements to the front end electronic kits. We are
developing our acquisition strategy to leverage our current
industrial base and develop the industrial base elements to
restart the build of the entire weapon using the proven Mark 48
advanced capability heavyweight torpedo design. The restart
effort is critical to replenishing our torpedo inventory, and
like the Navy's other undersea programs, will be done
affordably.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Johnson and
Admiral Breckenridge can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral Johnson.
And, Admiral Breckenridge, you had mentioned a couple of
alarming statistics in terms of our subs reducing from 73 to
52. And can you give us that timeframe again.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. That
timeframe is between now and 2030.
Mr. Forbes. And that would be exclusive of sequestration.
Isn't that correct?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Forbes. So if you add sequestration onto that, those
numbers become even more staggering.
Admiral Breckenridge. Exacerbated further, yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. The other thing that I would love for you to
address, if you would, is as you see the reductions that we are
recognizing with reducing our subs to 73 to 52 by 2030, our
presence in subs dropping 40 percent, I think your statistics,
can you give us a little snapshot of what you see happening
with some of our peer competitors, and specifically with Russia
and China, in terms of what they might be doing to compete with
some of our capabilities?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. The first thing I would
like to emphasize is the Chief of Naval Operations understands
the undersea asymmetric advantage very well, and one of his top
priorities is making sure that we never forfeit this advantage
that we have in the undersea domain. So even in the face of the
budgetary pressures of things like sequestration, the Navy is
committed to providing as much stable funding as we can to
continue the success story that Admiral Johnson mentioned with
our shipbuilding industry partners to keep, you know, rolling
with the Virginia class and Ohio replacement. So we are going
to do our best within naval service to hold the line and make
sure that we don't----
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral, I don't think any one of us on
the committee question you doing your best. We just want to
make sure we are doing our best.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And I am afraid we are not.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. But let us know, what do you see with our peer
competitors?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. And that is a great
question. And Congressman McIntyre alluded to it in his
remarks, is our adversaries are not standing still, and so even
though we have an advantage and we have a lead, we can't sit on
our lead. So we have to continue to move, or we do have the
potential within 20 years of losing this crown jewel, this
advantage that we have in the undersea domain.
So if I could, I would like to address three countries to
just talk about how other nations use the undersea domain, and
the first one I would like to address is Iran. So if you look
at Iran, they, like many other countries, use the undersea
domain from a purely maritime, sea denial, local region type of
influence, much like we did in World War II in the Pacific. We
used it as an asymmetric advantage, but it was for a maritime
purpose, to hold that risk, predominantly in surface warships.
So Iran has a submarine force. It is a disruptive force, a
challenging force, and one that we deal with with regard to our
ability to project stabilizing influence around the globe,
but--so there is a maritime geographic use of undersea domain.
I would like to contrast that with Russia. So Russia and
the United States use the undersea domain in a much, much
larger level. It is a global strategic, you know, lever of
power. It is more than just a region; it is the ability to
control the seas, it is the ability to do land attack from
covert positions. It has a much larger utility than just a
maritime sea control, sea denial perspective alone. And the
Russians have always maintained a very capable submarine force.
I mentioned that we have an advantage. You know, they are a
close second with regard to their capability and with regard to
their shipbuilding industry and the capabilities they are
putting into their new classes of submarines.
The Russians today have a two-line production in their
major submarine shipbuilding. They are recapitalizing their
SSBN force. As their SSBN force is retiring, they have the new
Borei class. The lead ship is the Dolgorukiy. The first three
ships are seaworthy in end testing, and they intend to
recapitalize with at least a class of eight. There has been
talk of a higher number of SSBNs within their force, but that
machine is running. Those--very good quality ballistic missile
submarines are being produced in Russia.
Their second line is an SSGN, and so I think they have
watched us closely with our SSGNs. They see the value of large
payload volume, the ability to take a large amount of strike
capability to the undersea, and so they are building the
Severodvinsk SSGN class. It has not four large-diameter tubes
like we envision within the midsection of the Virginia Payload
Module, but their midsection is an eight-pack. It is two
abreast by four. So they see the importance of the concealment
of the undersea to bring potency with that. They can be
threatening at a strategic level. And, again, we are mindful of
that and we are prepared to be able to counter that.
In the middle sits China. And China is sort of a hybrid
between the Iranian example I gave you and the Russian example
I gave you. So China right now is predominantly a maritime,
regional undersea force, certainly a larger region, with more
of our allies and partners that are sort of within their
bubble, but they predominantly use their undersea forces to
threaten the presence of our surface ships, to be able to
shoulder off on the positive stabilizing influence of our naval
forces in an anti-surface warfare dimension. But China is
growing towards more of a global strategic undersea force. They
have the Jin SSBN class, their own ballistic missile submarine
class, and a JL2 missile that they are developing. That will
put them into the stage of using the undersea for more than
just maritime regional control. And they also are in
development of a nuclear SSGN, a large vertical launch capacity
submarine.
So there are three pictures for you, sir, of the advances
that our potential adversaries are making and that we have to
be mindful of to make sure that we as a Nation preserve this
unique advantage that we have in the undersea domain.
Mr. Forbes. Do you see the Chinese numbers increasing
dramatically?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. That is a great question. I
failed to mention that, is the challenge that I see with China
is more of a capacity issue than necessarily a capability issue
in the near term. I think the capability, the quality of their
submarines will improve as we march forward a couple of
decades, but right now there is a capacity challenge that is
unique to what the Chinese navy has.
Mr. Forbes. Help us with the Virginia Payload Module. I
know that Admiral Johnson was at the nursery when the Virginia
class was born and has lived with it most of your career that
you have got, and you have been a part of that, too, Admiral.
Can you give us for the subcommittee and for our record exactly
what the Virginia Payload Module is, what it's designed to do?
And specifically there has been a little debate about the
timing of the requirements and where we are on that. And if you
could delineate that for us.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. So
let's pick for example Operation Odyssey Dawn against Libya.
When our country decided to make an attack to neutralize the
defense shield around Libya, we did that predominantly with
Tomahawk cruise missile strike, the bulk of which came from
undersea forces. We had three submarines that were involved in
that operation, one SSGN, USS Florida, and two fast attack
straight stick Virginia-class submarines.
So let's hypothetically say that you have a target
requirement where you need to strike 120 targets, which is a
reasonable, modest level for this type of operation. One SSGN
carries 105 Tomahawk cruise missiles, so it alone carries the
bulk of that service requirement. You add another 12-shooting
Los Angeles-class submarine, you are up to 117. Still doesn't
make the whole 120, but pretty close just for those two
submarines.
So as the SSGNs go away, that is going to have a very
significant impact for our ability to quickly mobilize a strike
force, an arsenal ship of that capacity.
You know, to put it in perspective, without an SSGN and
without the Virginia Payload Module, we will require 10 attack
submarines to be able to service 120 targets. And I am here to
tell you that it is highly unexecutable for us to mobilize and
surge 10 attack submarines into a domain with the agility that
we were able to muster forces for Operation Odyssey Dawn. So
that is problematic for us.
What the Virginia Payload Module does is it puts four
large-diameter tubes in the center of the Virginia class that
can carry seven Tomahawk cruise missiles each. So in addition
to the 2 large-diameter tubes forward that Admiral Johnson
mentioned with Block III that carry 6 Tomahawks each, we go
from a 12-shooter SSN to a 40-shooter Tomahawk strike SSN.
So 3 Virginia class with the VPM could service 120 target
package. So just from a capacity perspective, VPM is a very
cost-effective way to recapitalize it.
You know, as you well know, we don't have the ability as a
Nation to recapitalize our SSBNs, maintain two per year
Virginia, and develop a new SSGN replacement class. So this
integrated solution is a way to distribute that firepower over
a larger force in a very cost effective way. At less than 20
percent the cost of a Virginia, I can more than triple its
payload volume.
But I don't want to restrict this discussion to just land-
attack strike, although, again, that is a very asymmetric,
unique advantage for our country, but there are many other
things that we can do with a large capacity, large open ocean
interface. And Congressman McIntyre mentioned UUVs [unmanned
underwater vehicles] and supplementing our thin manned
submarine force with surrogates that are unmanned. And I will
have the ability to get those UUVs into theater in those
vertical payload tubes and deploy them and have a network or
constellation of UUVs to supplement our manned platforms.
So this payload volume is strategically important for us
and I think is a low risk, cost-effective improvement to the
Virginia class.
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral, just one more thing and then one
question, but, Mr. Johnson, I am hoping Mr. McIntyre will ask
some more about the U class [unmanned underwater vehicles], but
tell us about the requirements and where we are on those.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. So when the Nation made the
decision to go from an 18-SSBN to a 14-SSBN force, we had the
first four Ohios coming into the window to be refueled, so we
had this decision as a country, do we just decommission them at
the halfway point of their life or do we convert them to be
able to do more--something different, more from the undersea
for the country. And with great support from Congress and great
wisdom, the country went ahead and converted those four SSBNs
to this new SSGN platform.
That was a tremendous military benefit for us. There wasn't
a specific written requirement for that at that time, but we
have come to grow to depend heavily on that requirement. So in
both the Central Command and the Pacific Command, a good
portion of the Tomahawk strike requirement required day to day
in theater of those combatant commanders is delivered by our
SSGN force, so it has become a requirement for our military
that is in high demand by the COCOMs [combatant commands].
What we as a Navy have done to codify this requirement is
we have developed the Capabilities Development Document [CDD];
it is a joint staff process to formalize military requirements.
That has been approved by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations],
has undergone initial joint staff review, and is on its path to
JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] approval later this
year.
So on our side, we felt it important to show Congress that
we have a certified official military requirement for this
payload volume, and the CDD that is in process of final
approval will be that pedigree of why this is as important to
this country. So I expect to have that formal requirement by
the end of this calendar year.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
And, Admiral Johnson, tell us what we are doing so that we
can afford this very important module. What do you see us doing
to make sure that we are maintaining the affordability?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. Great question, Mr. Chairman. So
the first, as Admiral Breckenridge noted, we are working on the
requirements, getting those right up front. As you said, I was
in the early stage of the Virginia design. I watched us work
hard with the operators and the acquisition force to get the
requirements right back in the early 1990s, and we have
essentially not changed our operational requirements document
for Virginia in 20 years. And I think that is a first order
effector on why that program has executed in such a cost-
effective manner.
For Virginia Payload Module, we are doing the same thing.
We are working hard to get the requirement set, and as Admiral
Breckenridge noted, we are about done with that process through
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Second is to execute a carefully planned, designed program
where we would achieve an 80 percent design completed
construction start so that we can build the Virginia Payload
Modules cost-effectively, and is really one reason why we can't
continue to sustain cuts to the Virginia Payload Module
research and development funding, because we need to be going
on that program by 2014, early 2014 so I can build and install
that ship and the 19 ships.
The third is, is to make sure that we keep the technical
risk to as low as possible. The payload tubes that will be in
the Virginia Payload Module, two of them are about to be
floated off on Sunday. Essentially they are the same as what is
in the bow of the North Dakota today. That lowers our technical
risk by basically integrating instead of having to develop
something new.
And fourth, keep affordability on equal footing with our
technical requirements. Go forward through our design and do
these cost capability trades, keep pushing on it so that we do
effectively insert a Virginia Payload Module. That thinking has
already driven almost 40 percent out of the cost of our initial
estimate for the Virginia Payload Module. I anticipate that
will continue as we go through the design.
Mr. Forbes. Congressman McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
gentlemen, again, for your insight.
Admiral Breckenridge, at an estimated $6 billion apiece,
the 12 Ohio-class replacement submarines, we realize, won't
leave much room in the budget for other critical undersea
priorities. If hard choices have to be made, can you help us
understand will the Ohio-class replacements still be such a
clear priority one that the Navy would prioritize them over
having a full complement of attack subs?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. Thank you. Our ballistic
missile submarines are the bedrock underlying our national
nuclear deterrent. Americans are asked to invest in replacing
this force only once every other generation. The last time
Congress started procurement of a new class of ballistic
missile submarines was during the Nixon administration. The
next time will be in 2021 as we start to build the Ohio
replacement class, almost 48 years later. Recapitalizing this
force is a solemn duty we have to the nuclear security of
future Americans as well as allies. And I want to emphasize
with regard to the Ohio replacement program, we are designing
it in close partnership with the U.K. [United Kingdom], as they
have to replace their Vanguard class.
So the common missile compartment and the D-5 strategic
weapons systems will be common between both of our countries,
and both of our nations are committed to making sure that we
provide this capability on time.
Because ballistic missile submarines are infrequently
procured, they are not part of the Navy's stable shipbuilding
plan. Because this is episodic, it is an infrequent but
critical responsibility for our country. It is not built into
the rest of our shipbuilding plan.
In order to maximize the stability and cost efficiency of
the existing ship programs and to avoid reducing the size of an
already stressed Navy, the funding of existing programs should
not be disrupted. So often we hear the debate of, well, you can
either afford your general purpose force Navy, or we are going
to have to go ahead and do this ballistic missile force
investment, and we pit two equally important strategic
instruments of power against each other, which is just, you
know, an inappropriate friction.
So as Mr. Chairman mentioned, to best accomplish this,
Congress must look at a way to provide an annual supplement to
the Navy during the very small margin of time that we
recapitalize the submarine. So we will build these 12 ballistic
missile submarines, two less than what we currently use to
provide strategic deterrence, in a 15-year period, and these
SSBNs will serve for a 42-year life. So the return on
investment is sort of amortized over four decades as we go
ahead and recapitalize our SSBN force.
And so for a supplement amount of about $4 billion per
year, and to make that clear to the rest of the shipbuilding
industry, we can provide the stability we need to do both, to
build the right Navy forces, general purpose forces, as well as
recapitalize our SSBN force.
Now, that is a $60 billion total, and we have mentioned
that that is a lot of money. And, again, we are doing
everything in our power, and believe me, we are working on
affordability as one of our top priorities, higher than even
some of the military capabilities of this replacement SSBN. But
$60 billion in the grand scheme of the Department of Defense
budget represents less than 1 percent. So what we are looking
at is do we have the will as a Nation to be able to identify
less than 1 percent of the budget, to go ahead and commit it to
this 15-year recapitalization commitment without having an
adverse impact on the rest of our general shipbuilding force.
Just to try to give some examples to make this more
germane, let's say we only are able to identify a $30 billion
supplement, or $2 billion a year over the 15-year period. If
the Navy has to absorb that other $30 billion, we would be
required to cut from our other general purpose forces four
attack submarines; four large surface combatants, DDGs [guided
missile destroyers]; and another eight combatants. So the Navy
with only half of that supplement would have to compromise and
build 16 less ships for the inventory. And those numbers double
without any supplement to this important national strategic
priority.
The last comment I would make is, and I agree with Chairman
Forbes, is that I do think it is important for the country to
look at this as a requirement above the Navy. It is a strategic
level requirement and we ought to give it the gravity of
attention and focus and insulation from the pressures of
sequestration.
That said, the control of those resources must remain
resident within the Navy with the control of our acquisition
community. We know how to build submarines, we know how to
oversee the building of submarines. Electric Boat, Huntington
Ingalls, best submarine shipbuilders in the world. We need to
be able to make sure that if we come up with a creative, you
know, strategic account for this, that it is still the Navy and
the shipbuilding team that has the control and authority over
those monies as we do this recapitalization to make it as
affordable as possible.
Mr. McIntyre. Now, I appreciate the thoroughness and the
explanation, and I agree with your analysis, and ideally would
like to be able to look at it in a way with the supplements and
from this more strategic DOD perspective, since, as you know,
in the outset of my opening comments, the submarine force is
clearly, as you have said, the crown jewel, and as I was saying
in my opening comments is unmatched worldwide, and we know you
are at the forefront.
With regard to the priorities, when you talked about we
would have 16 less ships, so in other words, I guess, more
precisely, what I am asking if we unfortunately are put in that
situation of making priorities, you feel like it is so
important that we have to go ahead absolutely with the Ohio-
class replacement submarines, and in the unfortunate situation
it is, is it is going to make the loss of other ships if those
priorities have to be shifted around. Is that correct?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir, that is exactly correct.
And the CNO has stated his number one priority as the Chief of
Naval Operations is our strategic deterrent, our nuclear
strategic deterrent. That will trump all other vitally
important requirements within our Navy. But if there is only
one thing that we do with our shipbuilding account, we are
committed to sustaining a two-ocean national strategic
deterrent that protects our homeland from nuclear attack, from
other major war aggression, and also acts as an extended
deterrent for our allies.
Part of the reason we have been able to avoid proliferation
of nuclear weapons around the globe is the great responsibility
the United States has to assure our allies that we will also
provide deterrent effectiveness for them so that they don't
have to pursue their own nuclear weapons. If we don't build
these 12 SSBNs on this timeline, and again, it to me is mind-
staggering how much risk as a Nation that we have taken with
regard to this recapitalization timing decision. Even last year
in the Budget Control Act, we decided to delay this program by
2 years, such that we are going to go down to a minimum level
of 10 SSBNs during the transition between Ohio's timing out at
42 years and the Ohio replacement coming on as a new class.
That is just an astronomical challenge for us to be able to
maintain our vibrant and credible two-ocean deterrent to deter
bad behavior from powerful adversaries.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. That is the kind of summary that I
think is well stated and succinct, and that that message, I
hope and encourage you all to get that bullet point kind of
message so that our fellow colleagues can understand that
clearly, that this is what will happen, you know, one, two,
three, this is what our priorities are. And the way you have
stated the CNO's priority and how what you gentlemen do fit
into that is essential.
I have one other quick question, Mr. Chairman. I mentioned
in the opening remarks, and I don't want this to go by, because
I think it is a question. The large number of unmanned
underwater vehicles, will that allow the Navy to--I mean, could
a large number of unmanned underwater vehicles allow the Navy
to expand global undersea presence in a way that would make it
more cost-effective and that possibly could avoid building some
of the larger, more expensive manned submarines, or in light of
what you have just clearly explained about their importance, is
there a way in which manned and unmanned submarines could work
together to make the fleet more effective obviously from a
defense standpoint, but also from a cost-effective standpoint,
and how does that fit in as we do look ahead from the cost side
as well as the effectiveness side?
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. The manned platform
provides the country incredible influence and access from the
undersea domain. And as I work on the integrated undersea
future strategy, the platforms remain paramount in importance.
You know, we mentioned this minimum number from force structure
analysis of a 48 red line that we are going to go below for
over a decade as we bottom out to 42, based on decisions made
in the 1990s. That minimum red line doesn't really represent
the COCOM demand.
To keep 10 attack submarines forward deployed across the
globe in the hotspots and the places that they are operating
today requires a force of about 50 attack submarines. The COCOM
demand for what our undersea forces provide is about double
that requirement. So each year as we go to each of the COCOMs
and say, what do you need from an undersea presence perspective
for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, for Tomahawk
inventory in theater, for the other unique capabilities that
submarines provide, the combatant commanders typically request
greater than double the 10 SSNs that we are able to provide.
So there is always going to be a high demand for platforms,
of which we are not going to--you know, we are going to have
to, you know, make tough decisions and not be able to support
that.
So with regard to UUVs being a solution to reducing our
force structure, I don't see that as a likely utility of
unmanned undersea vehicles.
That said, is we have some untapped potential in the
undersea domain and the advantage that we have in the undersea
domain that we can leverage even greater than our manned
platforms. And I think a strategy of using unmanned vehicles,
of using seabed infrastructure with energy coms and power--I am
sorry, sensors will be vitally important to maintain our
advantage in the undersea domain.
So we are beginning as a Navy to do exactly as you have
recommended, and that is, how do I get even more bang for the
buck in that domain given the very tight limits, even with the
mobility we have with our nuclear fleet, that one ship can only
be in one place at one time. So what can I do to even leverage
greater influence, and it is going to come down to these large
displacement UUVs. And we are beginning to, you know, build
momentum, to have those to supplement.
Now, what will they do? What they will do is the missions
that are dull, dangerous, dirty or deceptive that the SSNs
can't do. So what we will do is we will be able to free up
those manned assets to go do our Nation's bidding at that
appropriate level while these UUV surrogates are able to take
care of sort of the run-of-the-mill missions where I don't have
to commit a manned platform to do it.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen.
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral Breckenridge, before we go to our
next member, I just want to clarify the answer you gave to
Congressman McIntyre. As I understand, you were saying right
now to have 10 forward deployed attack submarines, we would
need 50 in the fleet.
Admiral Breckenridge. I am sorry, sir. I was a bit unclear
there.
Mr. Forbes. Maybe I misstated it.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. A force of 50 total
submarines in the Navy, we are able to keep 10 attack
submarines forward deployed 365 days of the year.
Mr. Forbes. I got you.
Admiral Breckenridge. So that is sort of the ratio in
peacetime.
Mr. Forbes. And our combatant commanders need, I believe
you said, to meet their requirements, 20----
Admiral Breckenridge. That is right.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Forward deployed.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Would that math equate to needing 100.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Just wanted to make sure----
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. We have that clarified.
Admiral Breckenridge. That is right.
Mr. Forbes. The distinguished gentleman from California,
Mr. Cook, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Admirals,
thank you.
This is kind of ironic. You got an infantry officer from
the Marine Corps that is going to ask some questions. So I do
have to make a comment, and that is, many years ago when I was
a captain--that was about 1775--captain in the Marine Corps, I
had the honor to meet Admiral Rickover, and I have to tell you,
I talked--was in a mess line, ironically enough, and one of the
most brilliant individuals in the world, but I have to say, one
of the most intimidating, and I don't get intimidated easily,
but of course, you guys went through the Academy and screened
through the program, and you probably know that better than I
do, but I think you talk about somebody a long time ago that
realized how important submarines were, and what he did for the
Navy, for the country and everything else.
My fear is that a lot that has happened in the past, the
importance of what you do, and I went to the War College and I
tried, you know, to understand--and I am one of your big
supporters, because it is a force multiplier in so many
different ways, and I think you explained that tremendously.
I am afraid that it is becoming the silent service in terms
of the slice of the pie, you know, that DOD has when all those
things that you outlined so eloquently, you know, the public
just doesn't understand it. And it is almost like it is not
glamorous. And you mentioned it yourself about some of the
other things, and the remotely pioneered--powered vehicles, and
I can go on and on and on all the different things.
So I would hope that we can kind of change that, because I
think you are going to have some tough times in the budget
battles coming up, and a lot of it is going to be on public
perception so that--the people in this room, I think, are big
supporters of it, but this isn't going to be enough, and we
have got to change that.
The big question I have is, very quickly, about the intel
that the Russians and the Chinese have stolen, quite frankly,
from the United States. I am worried about this leakage, if you
will. They have got the money, they have got the will to
replicate what we have in your service. And do you have any
comments on that, because after what happened with the recent
scandal, it just frightens me to death that this is going to
continue to happen. And you have indicated that they are going
to do something about that. They have the money, the will and
power to do that, and they are going to pass us in terms of
overall technology.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. A few comments before I
answer your question. So Dave and I are classmates from the
proud class of 1982 at the Naval Academy. We were the last
class to interview with Admiral Rickover.
Mr. Cook. Was it fun?
Admiral Breckenridge. We will save that for another
hearing.
Mr. Forbes. It should be a classified hearing, probably.
Admiral Breckenridge. But Admiral Rickover still lives in
our nuclear force today. And I am very proud to say that. What
he brought into the culture of our nuclear-trained force
provides incredible return for the greatness of our Navy in
leadership, in discipline. The Rickover method is--I am proud
to say that I passed interview with Admiral Rickover.
The second thing that you mentioned is, I agree with you, I
think we are victims of our covert nature. And there is not
enough of America who understands or appreciates the brand that
is attack submarines, especially our ballistic missile force.
You know, these sentinels have gone for over 50 years on
continuous strategic deterrent patrols in two oceans, over
4,070-day patrols, safeguarding and protecting the United
States of America. And I would tell you that there is probably
less than 1 percent of the American citizens that even knows
what role that they can play, that they can sleep well at
night.
So we have to do a better job in getting that word out. And
I thank Chairman Forbes for this opportunity. I view this as so
important, to be able to get over here and lift a little bit of
the veil and discuss the paramount importance of our undersea
forces.
That said, there is a lot of things that are supersecret
that must remain so by nature of what we do and we will push
that as far as we can of that line. But we are more than happy
to come over and give you highly classified briefings of some
of the recent take around the globe of what our submarine force
is doing.
And what was the specific question?
Mr. Cook. The intel.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir.
So safeguarding our national secrets, particularly from
industry. You know, so the Walker-Whitworth espionage case that
compromised a lot of the lead that we had with stealth in the
undersea domain. And that is the coin of the realm. You know,
he who is more silent has the advantage over another. That was
compromised through spy craft. Nowadays with that spy craft
spreading to cyberexploitation and other ways that adversaries
can get information and leapfrog America's ability on the cheap
is an imposing threat to us, and we take that very seriously.
So part of our hard work within DOD is to put up those
firewalls even tighter, also with industry to make sure that we
have the right standards there to safeguard and protect that
information from being stolen.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. And having that infantryman on your side is a
pretty good asset to have. Our good friend, Mr. Courtney, has
little interest in submarines, but we are hoping he will have a
few questions to ask for the next 5 minutes. So Joe?
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, when we talk
about the submarine gap, which you have done an outstanding
job, I think it is important really also for the record to
remember that it was this subcommittee that in the spring of
2007, actually led the way in terms of an increase in submarine
funding. Over the objection of the prior administration, $588
million which, again, kick-started the two-sub-a-year
production which, again, the North Dakota is ahead of schedule,
under budget because of the quantity, economic quantity
savings. It was an incredibly important moment in terms of
addressing that submarine gap.
But last night, I was walking around the Capitol with the
moonlight, thinking about, obviously, the anniversary of 9/11.
And I was walking by Jack Murtha's maple tree which was planted
there. And he, along with Gene Taylor and Roscoe Bartlett and
others, were part of the group that, again, led the way to make
sure that happened. And it is a reminder that we all can make a
difference here, and this subcommittee can make a difference in
terms of making sure that the important issues that you have
raised here today aren't going to get lost.
And the good news is, is that the Navy's request, which
came over with the administration's budget, the House defense
authorization bill and the House defense spending bill all
basically provide for two subs a year and full funding for
design work. And we have got to work on the Senate a little bit
with the Virginia payload. But there really actually is quite
extraordinary consensus in terms of the fact that we need to
protect this. And hopefully the bipartisan budget negotiations
that are going to start today are going to get us to a point
where we can, again, avoid all the negative consequences that
you have described here today.
One of the issues, again, which my friend Mr. McIntyre
raised was obviously that bulge in the shipbuilding account
that we are looking at. Again, it is important to start talking
about a national security funding mechanism, a la the missile
defense, as a way of trying to solve that problem. That is
probably a little bit off in terms of a decision point for
Congress. The one thing that we can control today is obviously
trying to keep the costs down by making sure that the defense,
the design, and engineering budget requests for Ohio
replacement is protected. And the one thing I am concerned
about, if a CR [continuing resolution] mechanism--and let's set
aside sequester for a moment--even if we do a straight CR
without sequester, using last year's budget levels, again, that
leaves a shortfall in terms of making sure that we are going to
get that investment in the design work. And I was wondering,
Admiral Johnson, if you could talk about that.
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, Congressman Courtney.
So under a continuing resolution, because of our starting
point in fiscal year 2013, which is about half of what the
budget request is for fiscal year 2014, a CR is particularly
harmful to the program. Because it is research and development,
the Department has the latitude, if it chooses, to alleviate
some of the issue of that by actually putting in research and
development funding to keep the program on its up-ramp.
As Admiral Breckenridge noted, in 2012, that was our time
to increase the designers and buying material and increasing
our prototyping work to support a 2019 lead ship. That has been
indexed to the right 2 years. So now it is 2014. 2014 is the
year that we need to significantly upscope our work so that we
are ready for a 2021 build. Continuing resolutions and
sequesters hamper my ability to plan and execute the program
required to tell Admiral Breckenridge that I will have a
submarine ready on patrol in 2031. The time scale really does
lay out that long.
So I think from a standpoint of where I sit, a CR, though
it is harmful if it is not mitigated by the Department, a
sequester is another issue because that is an outright cut
against the line, and that will, in fact, delay me.
As Rick said, ``insulate'' is a good word; but we do have
to take a step back and look at how should we continue to fund
this program? Do we continue the levels that we have put into
the budget to support us to have the research and development
prototyping and the design products disclosed to keep the
shipbuilding done predictably?
We have a very challenging shipbuilding schedule on this
ship. We are going to build it in 84 months. It took Virginia
86 months. That ship is about the third the size of Ohio
replacement. Now why would we think we could do that? The
reason is we have the experience of Virginias. At that time, we
will have at least contracted for over 30 Virginias by the time
Ohio replacement ship one is under contract.
So that alone, along with what we know now and how we are
designing the ship, we think we can be ready to build an 84-
month ship. But you back up 2021, 2028 is when I have to have
the ship built for a 2031 deployment. That means I have to
sustain the research and development and the design work now so
that I am ready in 2021.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney, we thank you for your service and
all of your hard work.
Admiral, as I understand what you have just responded to
Mr. Courtney, that delays that we are putting into effect today
will impact your ability to even deliver in 2031, that far out;
is that a correct assessment?
Admiral Johnson. That is correct. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Runyan, is
recognized for comments.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Johnson, you kind of touched on it with Mr.
Courtney's answer. I had an opportunity to go down to
Huntington--I think it was a little over a year ago--and asked
them the question. As we get here--and God help us that we are
not in this budgetary climate 20, 30 years from now. But as we
move down the road, when does the Navy start to put the crunch
on the shipbuilders to say, you are going to build these in
less and less time, as we try to anticipate our adversaries'
steps forward and actually make that time longer? So just in
your thought processes, in the acquisition realm on that.
Admiral Johnson. That is a great question, Congressman, in
that we are doing that today. We are today in the Navy Yard
sitting across from our Huntington Ingalls and Electric Boat
partners with my folks and the NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems
Command] folks to negotiate the next 10 ships, the 19th through
the 28th ship. If you look at where we were in Virginia, it
took 86 months to build that ship. The ship we just
commissioned, the Minnesota, was delivered in 63 months. So we
have actually taken almost 2 full years out of the build
stroke. We are approaching a point where we can't, on that
level magnitude, reduce the build span. Maybe we will get to
the mid 50s if, in fact, we continue to work this. We certainly
are challenging the shipbuilders along those lines because time
is money in the shipbuilding programs. And if we can get these
ships out quicker, it gets those to Admiral Breckenridge and
Admiral Connor so they are able to be used. As I said, we have
already returned 40 years of additional utility because of this
thinking. But it also lowers the cost of these ships.
Mr. Runyan. I appreciate that. Because I think sometimes--I
know we experience on the HASC [House Armed Services]
committee--sometimes I don't think the DOD thinks far enough in
the future to really acquire the savings and the planning. I
mean, obviously you have said a lot of what we are doing hasn't
changed in 20 years, especially in the submarine venue. And
that has some cost savings to it in the long run and being able
to plan for that stuff over the long haul. I have nothing else,
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both
our witnesses for being here today. I appreciate your
testimony, especially as we navigate the complex and
challenging issues that we are facing right now.
Like Mr. Courtney, I have a slight interest in submarines.
So I want to turn to that right now. As I am sure you are
aware, the CNO Admiral Greenert stated on September 5 that
shipbuilding will drop in fiscal 2014 and, specifically, that
he envisioned the loss of a Littoral Combat Ship and afloat
forward staging base and advanced procurement for a Virginia-
class submarine and a carrier overhaul.
Can you elaborate on what the CNO is referring to? In
particular, with respect to subs, would this be a fiscal year
2015 or fiscal year 2016 boat? And how would this affect the
proposed Block buy?
Admiral Johnson. Thank you, Congressman. As we look at the
sequestration continuing forward, that will impact my ability
to obviously fully fund not only the full funding for the ships
in those years but the advanced procurement. If you look at
2013, 2013 took out $492 million out of the Virginia program
specifically. Split between those ships and 2013 and the
advanced procurement for the 2014 and 2015 ships. That same
effect happens in fiscal year 2014. If it happens at the levels
we estimate, which is around 14 percent, that is almost $750
million out of the Virginia accounts in fiscal year 2014. And
the way the Department handled it in fiscal year 2013 is, we
have cost to complete bills that have now moved forward. This
committee was--we appreciate the add of $492 million showing up
in the 2014 budget for overcoming the sequester in 2013. That
type of behavior has to continue in 2014 and on. If we
eventually can procure 100 percent of a ship when, in fact,
have only been paid for 86 percent of a ship under the
sequester. I can't give you the specifics on what the CNO was
talking about relative to which ships. Is it a fiscal year 2015
or 2016 ship? But it will, over time, potentially impact that
Block IV 10-ship procurement, fiscal year 2014 to 2018, those
ships. Our tack right now though is to try to preserve that 10-
ship buy but then have the Department fund cost to complete
builds for the cuts that we have taken in the intervening
years.
It will be more challenging to sign off on a 10-ship
multiyear when, in fact, the budget doesn't reflect full
funding for all 10 ships going forward.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. So let me turn also then to Ohio
replacement. As I am sure you are well aware, the Navy ship
over budget clearly comes under significant future strain, as
the Ohio replacement program comes online. And to quote your
Department's 30-year shipbuilding plan, the cost of the Ohio
replacement SSBN is significant relative to the annual ship
procurement resources available to the Navy in any given year.
At the same time, the Department will have to address the block
retirement of ships procured in large numbers during the 1980s
which are reaching the end of their service lives. And the
confluence of these events prevents the Department of the Navy
from being able to shift resources within the shipbuilding
account to accommodate the costs of the Ohio replacement SSBN.
The plan further states that if the Navy has to take these
costs out of hide, the effects on the Navy's battle force will
be such that the fleet will not be as sufficient to implement
the defense strategic guidance.
So with that, can you inform the subcommittee as to the
current progress of efforts to fund the Ohio replacement
program as part of our deterrent and the national strategic
imperative outside the Navy shipbuilding budget akin to a
military sealift or ballistic missile defense? And
alternatively, is there talk of a supplement to the Navy
shipbuilding budget because of the strategic comparative
resident in ORP [Ohio replacement program]?
Admiral Breckenridge. Thank you, sir.
Just a little back step in history to talk about the two
other times that we have had to, as a Nation, build the
strategic deterrent. So in the 1960s, we built 41 SSBNs. They
were called ``The 41 for Freedom.'' We did that in a 7-year
period which, again, is just an incredible--only in America
could you go ahead and put out 41 ballistic missile submarines
in a 7-year period. There was an impact to other shipbuilding
accounts at that time. But the priority was such for national
survival that we had to go ahead and make that an imperative
and a priority. There was a supplement to the Navy's top line
at that time when we fielded the class, but it did cast quite a
shadow over the rest of the shipbuilding in the 1960s.
We recapitalized those 41 for Freedom with 18 Ohio-class
SSBNs in the 1980s. It was the Reagan years. There was a major
naval build-up. And underneath the umbrella of that build-up,
we were able to afford, as a Nation, the recapitalization of
building 18 SSBNs. Again, a very great success story from a
shipbuilding industry perspective. The maturity, the stability.
You know, Electric Boat, as they punched those out, did it at a
great bargain for the country to have that capability. Still
around today. A 30-year designed submarine that has been
extended half again to a 42-year total service life is just
sort of mind-staggering.
We are at that point right now where there is no more
delay, there is no more room to absorb risk in schedule where
we have to recapitalize the strategic deterrent force. The Navy
recognizes that without a supplement, this is going to have a
devastating impact on our other general purpose forces ship and
supports and is working with OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] and with Congress to identify the funds necessary,
which I mentioned earlier represent less than 1 percent of the
DOD budget for a 15-year period to go ahead and provide relief
and fund this separately above and beyond our traditional norms
for our ship control budget.
So we are at the point where we need to really make this
decision. The stability of our other industrial bases count on
us at this time, as Admiral Johnson pointed out the schedule as
we march towards construction in 2021, is it is time to develop
this plan. It is time for, as Congressman Courtney mentioned,
you know, the courage that we have in Congress at moments like
this in our Nation's history with pivotal decisions regarding
shipbuilding that we go ahead and do the right thing by the
wholeness of the Navy as well as recapitalizing this vital
strategic imperative.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Forbes. As we talk about those pivotal times and, as
Mr. Courtney said, need to do that, one of the things that
helps us is information. And in our markup that we sent to the
Senate, we requested the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] to
give us an accurate depiction of where we will be with
shipbuilding based on the numbers that we can project. He has
said he is willing to do that.
This is not a question for you, but a request. If you
could, perhaps, ask the CNO and the Department, it would help
us. Because we talk about a 30-year shipbuilding plan, we
actually talk about it as if it is going to happen. And it has
been a little more than fantasy world in the past. But it would
be great for us to be able to show other Members and the
public. This is our 30-year shipbuilding plan. Here are the
numbers we can realistically expect based on the last 30 years.
And there is a $4 billion shortfall annually there. But then,
what is going to happen with sequestration if that carries
through? Because I think if we showed those pictures, it is a
frightening scenario for most individuals. It is my pleasure
now to recognize the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, my
good friend from Virginia, Rob Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Johnson, Admiral Breckenridge, thank you so much
for joining us. Thanks so much for your service to our Nation.
It means a lot, especially in these challenging times, to have
your leadership there.
Admiral Breckenridge, I want to begin with you. Give me
your vision about how the Ohio-class replacement program is
going to play out. And the reason I ask that is putting it in a
context of where we are now, with a tremendously successful
program with the Virginia class where we have a teaming
agreement with Electric Boat and HII [Huntington Ingalls
Industries], is that--what I think is a very efficient model,
is that a good, cost-effective way to look at how we pursue the
Ohio-class replacement program?
Admiral Breckenridge. I will take the first swing and then
I will turn it over to the expert, sir.
Good morning. Great to see you. Thanks again for hosting
that breakfast yesterday. I really appreciated the opportunity
to participate in that.
Sir, for a moment like this in our Nation's history, we are
going to depend and rely on the best engineers, the best ship
pipefitters, the best--you know, across our submarine
industrial base to make sure that we don't miss a beat and that
we deliver this national imperative. So this is going to
require a whole team effort. You know, both Electric Boat and
expertise from Huntington Ingalls are going to need to be
brought to bear with this challenge, make no mistake about it.
Now you mentioned a great point. And I have talked a lot
sort of in hyperbolic terms about the risk and the compounded
risk we have taken. I am optimistic, as a submariner and as the
director of undersea warfare, that we have this incredible
juggernaut that is our submarine shipbuilding industrial base
that is just humming in all cylinders with the Virginia class.
And we are going to be able to leverage that to be able to pull
off a pretty daunting challenge with the recapitalization of
the SSBN force. So I am very optimistic that we have the talent
in America. We have the capacity in America. We are going to
have to ramp up, as Admiral Johnson mentioned, to address that
challenge. But as far as the procurement strategy, which I
think is at the base of your question, I will turn it over to
the acquisition specialist to discuss that with you.
Admiral Johnson. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. Thank
you for that question. We have not yet determined how we will
procure the build of the Ohio replacement. It is still a little
bit to the right in our construct of thinking. Virginia,
obviously, a success story under a teamed arrangement. Whether
Ohio replacement follows on that or actually does more of a
prime sub relationship, yet to be determined. But I think it is
fair that as we acquire, I ask that we use the investments we
have put into the submarine industrial base to the maximum
extent possible. We built, as Admiral Breckenridge said,
significant capacity, capability, and competence in our
submarine industrial base both at Groton, in Rhode Island, as
well as at Huntington Ingalls in Newport News. And our intent
is to leverage that to the max extent possible for Ohio
replacement.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Well, thank you. And I think your
comments reflect how important the talent is with both of those
great shipbuilders. And as you know, that industrial base is an
important part of it, too. So to seamlessly go into that next
generation of ballistic missile submarine is an important
element, I think, in the decisions you all have to make.
Let me ask this: You have talked a lot about the attack
class of submarines. Putting it in perspective, [we've] talked
a little bit about sequestration. Let me ask you this: In
another envelope of having to make decisions, we are now at a
pretty significant rate of retirement of the Los Angeles class.
So you take that and coupling what potentially the effects are
of sequestration. Give us your perspective about what both of
those events colliding might mean for our attack-class
submarine fleet.
Admiral Breckenridge. Yes, sir. Thank you.
As I mentioned, beginning in 2025, we are going to dip
below the red line, the minimum agreed by all parties, break
glass if you cross this line, minimum force structure. We are
going to be below that line for a period of greater than a
decade. The minimum right now, with our current program of
record of two per year Virginia construction is 42 submarines
in approximately 2030.
The depth of the trough is not as significant to me as the
width of the trough. So whatever I can do to soften that. And
so our integrated strategy looks at that. There are three
things I would like to talk about to mitigate the risk that,
one, the Navy is below 48 SSNs. Number one is, as I build
Virginia class down at the 60-month point or less and get those
to the fleet quicker, that will have an effect on that trough.
That will give me more assets available during that time
period. So any efficiencies that we can make regarding the
delivery schedule is a win.
The current Los Angeles class, we are carefully monitoring
each hull. How much life is in their core, you know, what are
their other system health looking like to see if we can maybe
get a year or two extension on the Los Angeles classes. Again,
I don't like to talk about that as part of the plan because if
we suddenly have an intense period where I am surging
submarines, I am going to eat that margin. And so I sort of
keep it as an ace in the hole.
The last thing that we are looking at--and, you know,
again, it is a combination of forward deployed assets. We are
looking at going from three attack submarines to four in Guam.
We are looking at extending deployments during that time period
from a nominal 6-month deployment force to a 7-month deployment
force.
So there are a few other things that we can do to soften
the blow of being below the minimum force structure. But the
critical things that we must do is, as you mentioned, not
decommission any submarines before their time. If there are
some cost efficiencies that we might see there in a
sequestration-like myopic view of saving money, or disrupting
the two per year Virginia. And those are two very important
parts of the strategy to take care of that SSN shortfall.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
And I would like to just make sure I have given each of you
any additional time you need to wrap up anything that we have
left out that you think is important to have on the record. Any
clarifications that you would like to make. And Admiral
Breckenridge, since you started off, I will let you go.
Admiral Breckenridge. Well, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank
you very much for this opportunity to come this morning to
showcase one of the things that is vibrant and healthy and is a
powerful part of our national security strategy, and that is
our influence within the undersea domain. We have talked a lot
about some dire things ahead as we look at risks coming up. But
I want to emphasize on a positive note as we wrap up today that
the men and women that man our Nation's undersea craft--our
SSBNs, SSGNs, and SSNs--are just incredible warfighters. Most
recently we have opened the hatches to women onboard
submarines, you know, on our SSGNs and SSBNs. These officers
are performing in an incredibly exemplary fashion.
We are fortunate, as a Nation, that our sons and daughters
that we are able to recruit and bring into this very
specialized field are as talented and gifted as they are. So
your submarine force is out there doing great work, very
important things vital to security, and undergirding that is
this industrial base. A history lesson, as we sort of shut down
the submarine industrial base post-Cold War, we went for a
period of 8 years where we only built two submarines. That is a
quarter of a submarine a year. Those were dark times for our
Nation.
The fact that we have come through that and we now have
this vibrant shipbuilding industrial base is, we sort of
cheated death. And we are very fortunate that that is as
healthy and moving in all the right positive directions. And we
need to preserve and protect that with every instrument of
resources that we have as a Nation.
So I know that we are in tough fiscal times in this country
and we have to look at hard decisions. But we are doing
everything within our power to try to come up with an
integrated strategy to make sure that we don't lose our grip on
this advantage that we have in the undersea domain.
So, sir, I thank you very much for the opportunity to speak
with you this morning.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Johnson.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. And again, I will echo Admiral
Breckenridge in thanking you for the opportunity to talk about
the submarine force. It is a pretty good day when we get to sit
up here and talk about the programs and the progress that we
are making. I do think it is very important, as you have noted,
that we sustain the drumbeat we have established with Virginia.
It was a little bit of a climb to get in the 2011 budget. As
Congressman Courtney noted, we got to two a year through a good
bit of the actions this subcommittee took to get us in a
position to be at two a year. We are there, and we are now
seeing the benefits of it. Ships are being delivered not only
earlier, but we are also turning them over to Admiral Connor
and the fleet forces earlier.
One of our metrics is the time it takes to take a ship from
a delivery and get it into the fleet readiness training
program. It took 30 months for Virginia. On North Dakota, it
will be less than 12. So not only are we building them faster,
but they are ready to go to the fleet full up, get ready for a
mission and deploy and do the Nation's bidding. So I think that
is very important that we do not disrupt this drumbeat. And
that drumbeat isn't just at HII or Electric Boat, but it is
also in the 4,000 suppliers across the 50 States. It is very
important as we grow this competitive industrial base that we
sustain the continuity of the Virginia program.
We also have to think, I think, a bit innovatively about
Ohio replacement. As we get into the build of that and
sustaining at least a two-a-year build rate to the vendor base
means that we might have to think about multi-yearing across
both a Virginia-class and an Ohio-class SSBN so that the vendor
base still sees two ship sets of something coming out every
year. That will help us to keep the continuity and the cost
down as we go into the build for Ohio replacement and not
disrupt the pricing that I think you expect me to deliver on
those ships.
I can tell you that we are leading the charge in
affordability. We are at the forefront of implementing
Secretary Kendall's efforts. And every day my program offices--
from the guys who do Virginias to Ohio replacements to
torpedoes to combat systems--they think about it every day. And
we hold ourselves accountable because in the end, we are short
if we cost growth end results and less capability are delivered
to the fleet.
So my job is to deliver products affordably that the fleet
can use. And it is not just talk. We have objective quality
evidence, some of which I have talked about here today. So I,
again, thank you very much for the opportunity to talk.
Mr. Forbes. Well, once again, we want to thank both of you.
You are very complimentary of the valuable assets we have in
the United States Navy. This subcommittee recognizes both of
you as two of those valuable assets. So thank you for giving us
your time and expertise.
With that, if there are no additional questions, we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 12, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 12, 2013
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 12, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Per the House-passed FY14 NDAA Report directive
``Submarine Propeller Repair and Overhaul'' (SPRO) the committee is
concerned with the FY14 SPRO budget and FYDP proposal. The Navy has
stated that ``funding requirements for propeller repair and overhauls
are estimated based on historical and current year expenditures.'' In
the Navy's August 27, 2012, response to HASC RFIs regarding SPRO, the
Navy detailed historical SPRO funding levels between FY08-FY12.
However, the August 27th response also proposed a very concerning FYDP
funding forecast and a ``Repair Only'' ongoing approach to maintaining
submarine propellers. Without addressing a mix of both ongoing
propeller repair and overhaul needs, I believe that medium to high risk
to submarine operational readiness remains. Additionally, I believe
that the SPRO U.S. industrial base capability is highly skilled but
very fragile. Adequate funding and budget planning is crucial to
retaining this strategic asset.
Please provide an update to the following:
1. Provide to-date and planned/expected FY13 total funding
expenditures for SPRO and break out base budget funding, reprogrammed
funding, and OCO funding.
2. Provide the funding level requested within the FY14 base budget
and OCO, and across the FYDP.
3. Provide a breakdown of the type and quantity of both repaired
and overhauled propellers currently in RFI status.
4. As stated, I am concerned with the Navy's ongoing proposed
``Repair Only'' approach to SPRO as outlined in the August 27th
response. I ask that the Navy reevaluate this plan and report back to
the committee with an approach, to include both FY14 and FYDP funding,
that adequately addresses the ongoing mix of both propeller repair and
overhaul needs.
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. 1. For the funding year
FY13, the Navy allocated a total of $5.867M for SPRO consisting of
$.418M base and $5.449M OCO funds. These funds have been provided to
NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support to support for the repair work to be
completed by the end of the fiscal year.
2. SPRO funds contained in OMN FY14 and across the FYDP are shown
in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base Budget (M) $2.274 $2.358 $2.439 $2.493 $2.601 $2.691
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OCO (M) $5.942 $6.055 ............ ............ ............ ............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total (SPRO) (M) $8.216 $8.413 $2.439 $2.493 $2.601 $2.691
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. The Navy has a total of 19 propellers in RFI status at this
time. Break down by type as shown in table below
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Propeller Total Quantity of RFI Repaired Overhauled
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I3B 1 1 ........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I3M 6 6 ........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LAHII 7 7 ........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IPMP 1 1 ........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEAWOLF rotor 0 0 ........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRIDENT 4 1 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hull applicability by Propeller Type:
I3B--Applicable to SSN 688-720 only.
I3M--Applicable to SSN 688-765, 767-770.
LAHII--Applicable to SSN 751-765, 767-770.
IPMP--Applicable to SSN 766, 771-773.
TRIDENT--Applicable to SSBN/SSGN 726 class.
4. The Navy shares the concern of maintaining the critical US
industrial base for propeller refurbishments. The large majority of
future propeller overhauls will be limited to the SSBN/SSGN 726 Class
due to two factors:
a. The current RFI inventory and SSN 688 demand history can be
adequately sustained by ``Repair Only''. This is the prudent approach
in a budget constrained environment.
b. The decommissioning rates of SNN 688 Class submarines over the
next decade will further reduce the demand signal for repaired or
overhauled propellers.
In addition to SSBN/SSGN 726 Class propeller overhaul activity, the
propeller refurbishment industrial base will be supported by the VA
Class propulsor rotor repair. These rotors are replaced on a periodic
scheduled basis and, coupled with unanticipated failures, will provide
additional work to maintain the industrial base.
Mr. Forbes. What is the impact of sequestration on the Navy's
acquisition strategy for the Virginia-class SSN program?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2014
President's Budget includes ten submarines in Block IV, two per year
for FY 2014-FY 2018. The Navy is currently negotiating the Block IV as
a Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) contract and
expects to sign it in early Calendar Year (CY) 2014 contingent on the
passing of the FY 2014 Department of Defense Authorization
appropriations bills. The full effects of sequestration in FY 2014 are
not yet known. However, it is expected that the Navy will be able to
fund the basic construction effort with Ship Construction, Navy funding
for the FY 2014 submarines (SSN 792 and SSN 793), but will require
additional funds to finish Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)
procurements and testing. Additionally, sequestration will result in AP
and EOQ reductions, thereby reducing the expected MYP savings. To
maintain construction schedule, procurement of Long Lead Time Material
(LLTM) occurs two years and one year prior to construction start, with
two year AP used to fund the most critical long lead components. FY
2013 sequestration reduced the Program's AP funding by $127M which was
restored and is in execution. The Navy is evaluating the potential for
sequestration reductions to the FY 2014 AP and EOQ to minimize the
overall impact to the program.
Mr. Forbes. How does the Navy intend to fulfill its requirements
given the future retirement of the SSGNs in light of purchasing
shortfalls of future SSNs?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. Submarines are meeting
combatant commander requirements today. The future challenge will be
ensuring that forward presence around the globe and surge requirements
can be met with a smaller submarine force.
VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) is needed to both 1) mitigate strike
capacity of the decommissioning SSGNs and 2) provide flexibility to
expand the range of payloads for the submarine force in response to
evolving mission needs. The VPM will be a new hull section containing
four large-diameter, SSGN-like, aft of the sail that can carry up to
seven TOMAHAWK cruise missiles each and will be able to readily accept
new future payloads. These future payloads could include unmanned
undersea vehicles (UUVs) and advanced weapons, as well as additional
sensors and stealth enhancements to counter capable adversaries,
maintaining our dominance in the undersea domain. To reconstitute the
payload volume lost when the SSGNs retire in the early 2020s in the
most economical manner, the Navy must design the VPM now for
incorporation into the Block V VIRGINIA Class contract that is schedule
for awarding in Fiscal Year 2018.
Mr. Forbes. In light of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, will the Navy
fulfill its requirements given the shortfall in the number of SSNs?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. Air-Sea Battle is an
operational concept designed to integrate air, land, and naval forces
required to address evolving threats. Undersea Forces with their
unimpeded access forward will play an important role within an Air-Sea
Battle Concept.
Air-Sea Battle is not an operational plan or strategy for a
specific region, adversary, or geopolitical situation. Instead, it
reflects an understanding of the threat and provides a means to develop
symmetric and asymmetric advantages to counter and shape A2/AD
environments. Air-Sea Battle seeks to develop an integrated force with
the necessary characteristics and capabilities to succeed in those
environments.
As such, Air-Sea Battle doesn't define required capacity of the
submarine force. Instead, our force structure requirements are based on
Navy's force structure assessment (FSA) which is based principally on:
a) meeting warfighting capability and response time requirements for
Combatant Commander operational plans b) providing a sufficient
rotation base to sustain global posture
Navy's January 2013 FSA specified an SSN requirement of 48. Today
we exceed that requirement with 54 SSNs. Based on Navy's PB14
shipbuilding plan we are projected to fall below this requirement from
2025-2034.
Mr. Forbes. Will cost increases in the Ohio replacement program
affect other ship building programs?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. Our ballistic missile
submarines are the bedrock underlying our national nuclear deterrence.
Because ballistic missile submarines are infrequently procured, they
place added pressure on the Navy's shipbuilding budget when they are
recapitalized once every other generation. To that end, the Navy must
ensure it controls the OHIO Replacement SSBN's costs to ensure other
shipbuilding efforts are not impacted and the Fleet has the right mix
of ships.
Cost control is of paramount importance to the OHIO Replacement
program. The Navy is working with industry and other government
activities to deliver the OHIO Replacement affordably while maintaining
mission requirements. The OHIO Replacement Program will continue to be
thoroughly reviewed and aggressively challenged to responsibly reduce
engineering, construction, and operations and support costs.
Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense established
aggressive cost targets for both operating and support costs and
average follow-on ship costs for ships 2-12 of the 12 ship class to
control OHIO Replacement's costs. The program is reviewed annually by
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to ensure affordability progress continues.
Mr. Forbes. Will the Navy suffer a capability shortfall given its
plan to replace 14 Ohio-class submarines with 12 vessels?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. No. 12 SSBNs with life-
of-ship reactor plants (no refueling required) will satisfy the core
requirement for a credible and effective two-ocean sea-based strategic
deterrent for the 42-year life of the replacement class (well into the
latter half of this century). Today 14 SSBNs are required to meet
strategic deterrent requirements since two to three SSBNs are off-
service for approximately three years during the mid-life refueling
overhaul period.
Mr. Forbes. What capabilities will the Navy lose if they decide to
only acquire less than 12 boats?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. The Navy cannot meet
STRATCOM's two-ocean, sea-based strategic deterrent requirements with
less than 12 SSBNs in the replacement class.
12 SSBNs provide the absolute minimum number of platforms to remain
undetected (survivable) and within the reach of key military targets of
nuclear powers that could threaten the U.S.
Mr. Forbes. How does the Ohio replacement support strategic warhead
requirements associated with the New Start treaty?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. Though the New START
Treaty will have expired when the OHIO Replacement (OR) goes into
service (treaty expires no later than 2026 and OR enters service in
2031), the OHIO Replacement program full satisfies STRATCOM
requirements associated with the Treaty.
Mr. Forbes. How does the Navy anticipate replacing the strike
capability lost with the retirement of the SSGN fleet? How does
Virginia Payload Module support this capability? What options exist in
lieu of the Virginia Payload Module?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. After the SSGNs retire in
the mid-2020s, the Navy will be unable to meet combatant commander
requirements for undersea-based, land attack strike with VIRGINIA Class
submarines as they are designed today. Combatant commander demand for
submarine presence and missions will continue to rise while the force
shrinks, requiring the undersea force to employ UUVs and other
distributed off-board sensors to increase the coverage provided by the
remaining SSNs.
All of this equates to payload volume. The Navy investigated
several options for meeting this payload volume and concluded that the
modular VIRGINIA design provides the opportunity to cost effectively
add that payload volume without significantly impacting mission
performance without redesigning the whole ship. Waiting for the next
design of SSN or for an ORP-based solution is not timely enough to fill
the gap in payload left by retirement of the SSGNs while fiscal and
strategic limitations do not allow for conversion of more SSBNs.
VPM will both mitigate strike capacity of the decommissioning SSGNs
and provide flexibility to expand the range of payloads for the
submarine force in response to evolving mission needs.
Mr. Forbes. What is the status of the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council's approval of the Virginia Payload Module?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. The Joint Staff completed
its review of the VIRGINIA Payload Module's (VPM) preliminary
Capabilities Development Document (CDD) in August 2013 prior to its
going to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for final
validation and approval. JROC approval is expected before the end of
the calendar year.
Mr. Forbes. How will the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's
approval materially impact the research and development and the
associated fielding of the Virginia Payload Module?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council's (JROC) approval of the VIRGINIA Payload Module
(VPM) Capabilities Development Document (CDD) will support acquisition
decisions as the program transitions into the engineering development
phase. Once JROC approval is received, the Navy will begin detailed
design efforts to fulfill the stated requirements as part of the
VIRGINIA Class Block V contract scheduled for award in Fiscal Year
2018.
In the past, Congress has withheld VPM funding based on the lack of
a validated requirement. With JROC approval, Congress will be able to
fully support the Navy's VPM design effort. The JROC approval is
anticipated early Fiscal Year 2014.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I am deeply troubled by any potential impacts on the
two-per-year procurement schedule for Virginia-class boats that we so
badly need. The economies and efficiencies that the men and women in
Virginia, Connecticut, and Rhode Island have worked so hard to make
possible would be seriously impacted by any change to the programmed
schedule, with potentially serious long-term consequences to this model
procurement program.
Can you elaborate on the funding for the second FY14 boat and the
FY15 boats? What is the current funding plan in our various future
options--a CR, sequestration or no sequestration, et cetera?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. VIRGINIA Class
Submarine--Funding for the second Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 (14-2, SSN 793)
and the FY15 (15-1, SSN 794 and 15-2, SSN 795) boats: The President's
Budget for Fiscal Year 2014 (PB14) contains the required funding for
the four submarines in both Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and FY 2015. To
maintain construction schedule, procurement of Long Lead Time Material
(LLTM) occurs two years and one year prior to construction start, with
two year Advance Procurement (AP) used to fund the most critical long
lead components. In FY 2012, the VIRGINIA Program LLTM contract was
awarded for the 1st FY 2014 hull (SSN 792). In FY 2013, the LLTM
contract was modified to complete LLTM funding for the 1st FY 2014
hull, as well as fund LLTM for the 2nd FY 2014 hull (SSN 793), and for
two FY 2015 hulls (SSNs 794 and 795).
VIRGINIA Class Submarine Sequestration budget impacts: The FY 2014
President's Budget includes ten submarines in Block IV, two per year
for FY 2014-FY 2018. The Navy is currently negotiating the Block IV as
a Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) contract and
expects to sign it in early Calendar Year (CY) 2014 contingent on the
passing of an FY 2014 Department of Defense appropriations bill. The
full effects of sequestration in FY 2014 are not yet known. However, it
is expected that the Navy will be able to fund the basic construction
effort with Ship Construction, Navy funding for the FY 2014 submarines
(SSN 792 and SSN 793), but will require additional funds to finish
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) procurements and testing.
Additionally, sequestration will result in AP and EOQ reductions,
thereby reducing the expected MYP savings. To maintain construction
schedule, procurement of LLTM occurs two years and one year prior to
construction start, with two year AP used to fund the most critical
long lead components. FY 2013 sequestration reduced the Program's AP
funding by $127M which was restored and is in execution. The Navy is
evaluating the potential for sequestration reductions to the FY 2014 AP
and EOQ to minimize the overall impact to the program.
VIRGINIA Class Submarine Continuing Resolution (CR) Impacts: The
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, prevents the Navy from entering
into MYP contracts. If MYP authority language is provided in a follow
on CR or appropriations bill, the Navy could execute an MYP contract.
The Navy must award the Block IV contract by January 31, 2014 in
order to take advantage of AP/EOQ savings, award the FY 2014 ships, and
not disrupt construction. By leveraging AP/EOQ, the Navy is able to
produce VIRGINIA Class submarines in the most cost and schedule
efficient manner possible.
The Navy requires MYP contract authority and funding for the
increased rate of spending as AP/EOQ amounts in FY 2014 are greater
than FY 2013.
Mr. Langevin. While the Virginia program has been a model
procurement story, there are clearly some other procurements in the
Navy that have had more trouble. If the ORP program remains within the
Navy shipbuilding budget, or even if it does not, how will the Navy
seek to insulate the program from cost overruns in other shipbuilding
lines?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. Submarines are meeting
combatant commander requirements today. The future challenge will be
ensuring that forward presence around the globe and surge requirements
can be met with a smaller submarine force.
VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) is needed to both 1) mitigate strike
capacity of the decommissioning SSGNs and 2) provide flexibility to
expand the range of payloads for the submarine force in response to
evolving mission needs. The VPM will be a new hull section containing
four large-diameter, SSGN-like, aft of the sail that can carry up to
seven TOMAHAWK cruise missiles each and will be able to readily accept
new future payloads. These future payloads could include unmanned
undersea vehicles (UUVs) and advanced weapons, as well as additional
sensors and stealth enhancements to counter capable adversaries,
maintaining our dominance in the undersea domain. To reconstitute the
payload volume lost when the SSGNs retire in the early 2020s in the
most economical manner, the Navy must design the VPM now for
incorporation into the Block V VIRGINIA Class contract that is schedule
for awarding in Fiscal Year 2018.
Mr. Langevin. Can you give us an update on the Virginia Payload
Module and how the program is faring given sequestration, a potential
CR, and other fiscal adversities? How much more bend is there in this
program before we jeopardize the ability to include this capability in
the Block 5 Virginias?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. Initial concept
development for VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) is largely complete. The
concept leverages existing technology, previous Navy experience with
lengthening submarines, and the modular VIRGINIA Class design. Internal
components required by VPM can be provided by existing systems. For
example, VPM tubes have the same diameter (87") as the VIRGINIA Payload
Tubes (VPT) located forward of the sail in Block III and beyond SSNs.
This modification has minimal cost and technical risk in terms of
development and procurement if funded to the President's Budget.
Delaying design and construction will make VPM more expensive and place
at risk the opportunity to leverage the VIRGINIA Class Block V multi-
year procurement contract.
The Navy's approved capability requirements document, which defines
this undersea payload strike requirement for submarine launched
vertical strike, has been submitted to the Joint Staff for final
approval. The document is on track for validation by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council in the first quarter of Fiscal Year
2014.
The Department of Defense and the Navy support VPM as the most
viable near-term option for this capability. The combination of
sequestration and the possible CR will delay the VPM design effort,
thus impacting the introduction of VPM in Fiscal Year 2019 with the
start of Block V. If VPM development funding is zeroed in Fiscal Year
2014, as is recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee, it will
not be ready for inclusion into the start of Block V VIRGINIA SSNs and
will not deliver in time to help mitigate the dramatic reduction in
undersea vertical launchers when the SSGNs begin to decommission in the
early 2020s. Delaying the VPM effort will result in having insufficient
strike volume to meet campaign requirements, an inability to enable
early successful prosecution of adversary A2/AD networks, and will
close off opportunities to significantly improve VIRGINIA Class
performance and capabilities against advanced adversaries.
Mr. Langevin. Stepping back a bit, can you remind me why these
programs--VCS, VPM, ORP--are so important, given the intense A2/AD
challenges we are likely to face in future contingencies?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. As anti-access/area-
denial technologies have advanced and proliferated, submarines have
grown in importance. Thanks to their stealth, they can operate where
other naval forces cannot--inside the adversary's A2/AD perimeter--
performing peacetime missions and, in the event of hostilities, opening
the door for the joint force with kinetic attacks.
VIRGINIA Class attack submarines are deployed globally, meeting
combatant commander requirements. They routinely have the highest
operational availability in the Submarine Force. The VIRGINIA Class as
a platform will have to evolve to maintain the Navy's edge and continue
to carry out changing combatant commander requirements. After the
guided missile submarines (SSGNs) retire in the mid-2020s, the Navy
will be unable to meet combatant commander requirements for undersea-
based, land attack strike with VIRGINIA Class submarines as they are
designed today.
The VIRGINIA Class' modular design provides the opportunity to cost
effectively add that payload volume without significantly impacting
mission performance and without redesigning the whole ship. The
VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM), which will consist of four large-
diameter payload tubes located in a new hull section aft of the sail,
will mitigate loss of strike capacity as a result of the
decommissioning SSGNs, allow for the employment of future payloads such
as UUVs and advanced weapons, and serve to maintain our unquestioned
dominance of the undersea domain by providing flexibility for
incorporating additional sensors and stealth enhancements to counter
capable adversaries.
Finally, our OHIO ballistic missile submarines, which are the
bedrock underlying our national defense, require recapitalization. For
over 50 years the SSBN fleet has provided the most survivable leg of
the nation's strategic nuclear deterrent. The OHIO's stealth, designed
over 30 years ago, continues to allow it to operate undetected by
adversaries. Based on the intelligence community's projections,
advances in stealth are required for the future. The OHIO Replacement
fleet is being designed to operate against anticipated future threats
to remain a credible and effective strategic deterrent through the
2080s.
Mr. Langevin. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) provide capable,
relatively low cost alternatives to addressing certain mission sets
while reducing operational risk, removing the warfighter from harm's
way, and potentially improving situational awareness. Can you provide
this subcommittee with an update on UUV development programs,
particularly the large-diameter UUVs?
Admiral Breckenridge and Admiral Johnson. UUVs are a critical
component of the future Navy Force and contribute to dominance in the
undersea domain. UUV development efforts, mission areas, and vehicle
systems include:
Large Displacement UUV (LDUUV) will be a reconfigurable multi-
mission UUV that can be launched from multiple platforms using modular
payloads and energy sections. The program will leverage the Office of
Naval Research's Innovative Naval Prototype to develop advanced energy
sources and autonomy for long duration missions. Acquisition Gate 2 was
completed in August 2013 and the Capability Development Document (CDD)
for Increment 1 is currently being drafted. Increment 1 mission
capabilities will be Intelligence Preparation Of the Environment (IPOE)
and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Fleet
Demonstration and Testing with prototypes will begin in FY16 with
program Initial Operational Capability 2022.
Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance (PLUS) System provides
effective, adaptive and persistent undersea surveillance of multiple
quiet targets over large littoral areas. It is a multi-node network
that consists of mobile UUVs with sensors, UUV gliders for
communications, and a remote control station that can be placed
anywhere in the world. In-water components can be launched and
recovered from a variety of vessels. PLUS is a User Operational
Evaluation System (UOES) that will be operational and deployed in the
second quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. Development Squadron 5 UUV
Detachment and LCS Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package
Detachment 1 have started operator and maintainer training in
preparation for the deployment.
Knifefish Surface Mine Countermeasure (SMCM) UUVs are designed to
detect, classify, and identify bottom, buried, and volume mines in high
clutter environments while conducting IPOE. They are deployable from
LCS or crafts of opportunity. The program has completed Milestone B and
critical design review. The program has an acquisition objective of 30
systems and initial operational units will be delivered to the Fleet in
FY17.
Mk18 Mod 2 is a lightweight Mine Counter Measure UUV that augments
search capability for expeditionary response, amphibious operations,
maritime homeland defense, and hydrographic survey operations. The
MK18's are being used in theater in an operational environment
currently run by civilians/contractors. The program has a objective
inventory of 8 systems (3 vehicles per system) will be reached in
Fiscal Year 2017. Inventory of 4 systems will be realized by first
quarter Fiscal Year 2014.
The Littoral Battlespace Sensing (LBS) Autonomous Undersea Vehicle
(AUV) provides oceanographic, bathymetric, and hydrographic battlespace
awareness including high resolution bathymetry and ocean bottom imagery
in support of ASW and Mine Warfare (MIW). The program is operational
and objective inventory of 8 will be reached in Fiscal Year 2017.
LBS Gliders provide Battlespace Awareness by gathering
oceanographic data in support of ASW and MIW. Buoyancy driven gliders
can operate for up to 180 days. The program is operational and
objective inventory of 150 will be reached in Fiscal Year 2015.
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