[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
A CLOSER LOOK AT CUBA AND ITS RECENT HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-79
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina Samoa
RON DeSANTIS, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TREY RADEL, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Hugh Griffiths, head, Countering Illicit Trafficking--
Mechanism Assessment Projects, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (appering via videoconference).............. 6
Ms. Maria C. Werlau, executive director, Cuba Archive............ 17
Ms. Mary Beth Nikitin, specialist in nonproliferation,
Congressional Research Service................................. 25
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Hugh Griffiths: Prepared statement........................... 10
Ms. Maria C. Werlau: Prepared statement.......................... 19
Ms. Mary Beth Nikitin: Prepared statement........................ 27
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 38
Hearing minutes.................................................. 39
The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arizona, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere: Material submitted for the record.................. 40
A CLOSER LOOK AT CUBA AND ITS RECENT HISTORY OF PROLIFERATION
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt
Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Salmon. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will
come to order.
I'll start by recognizing myself and ranking member to
present our opening statements, and without objection the
members of the subcommittee will be recognized to present their
opening remarks. I ask that they do so in a timely manner to
allocate time for all present members.
Now I yield myself time to present my opening statement.
Earlier this summer on July 16th the Panamanian Government
discovered and detained the North Korean flagged Chong Chon
Gang cargo vessel travelling from Cuba.
Found on board were 25 cargo containers of Cuban weapons
and other U.N.-sanctioned items bound for the rogue regime in
North Korea.
In anticipation of the U.N. Security Council Sanctions
Committee, its impending report on the incident, I've convened
this subcommittee today to investigate further Cuba's recent
history of military proliferation and noncompliance with U.N.
sanctions, and to review the options available to the
subcommittee to attempt to hold Cuba accountable for their
violations.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. At the time of
their discovery, the Cuban foreign ministry said that the
tanker was carrying 10,000 pounds of sugar--excuse me, 10,000
tons of sugar and 240 metric tons of ``obsolete defensive
weapons'' including disassembled missiles, two MiG-21 jet
fighters and two disassembled anti-aircraft missile complexes
``to be repaired and returned to Cuba.''
But here is what the Panamanian officials actually found
hidden among the bags of Cuban sugar: Night vision equipment,
small arms and light weapons ammunition, rocket-propelled
grenades and artillery ammunition for anti-tank guns.
This cargo is a clear violation of the U.N. sanctions
imposed on North Korea after its series of nuclear bomb tests.
This is a potentially groundbreaking case where a country
in the Western Hemisphere is likely to be found in violation of
the U.N. Security Council sanctions on weapons proliferation.
Many experts believe, and the Castro regime itself has
actually admitted, to the violation of international sanctions
in this case. I am convinced that this case should and would be
getting a lot more international attention if not for the daily
and deadly news coming out of Syria and now the heinous Al
Shabaab acts of terrorism at the mall in Nairobi, Kenya.
The narrative that defenders of the Castro regime would
like us to believe is that much of the weaponry was to be
repaired and/or modernized and returned to Cuba, and that it is
no longer involved in such illicit activities.
But at least in this instance, it is undeniable that they
got caught red handed in direct violation of the sanctions and
they must be held accountable.
This subcommittee has been told that knowing it is in
violation of international sanctions the Castro regime has
begun a full ``charm offensive'' at the U.N. to convince the
Sanctions Committee that it should in fact be applauded for its
compliance and cooperation in this case rather than punished
and sanctioned for its international and intentional breach of
the sanctions regime.
Failure to hold the Cuban Government fully responsible will
also be a slap in the face to our allies. If Cuba is allowed to
get away with this, this time, it would send a terrible message
to Panama, which put its resources and its reputation on the
line to intercept this vessel.
Even worse, other countries in the future might decide it
simply isn't worth the cost and energy of pursuing similar
violations to the benefit of rogue regimes in North Korea and
Iran.
Of further concern is that it appears that the Cuban
military's rogue business activities are growing increasingly
dangerous, yet current U.S. travel policy continues to feed the
Cuban military's business interests.
For example, U.S. travellers to Cuba stay almost
exclusively at the Cuban military's five-star hotels. I believe
that this policy should be halted and that remittances from the
U.S. should not be allowed to further fuel the moribund Castro
regime.
If Cuba is not properly reprimanded in the strongest terms
available, then it could very well embolden Venezuela and other
ALBA states to find ways to help other rogue regimes.
We know Venezuela has already been helping Iran skirt U.S.
financial sanctions. Allowing Cuba to get away with violating
international weapons sanctions would send a very dangerous
message to the international community at large.
I very much look forward to hearing from our expert
witnesses today as we delve further into these questions and
how this subcommittee can most effectively work to ensure
international sanctions are upheld with meaningful consequences
for any violations.
I yield time to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon. Thank you to our witnesses for being here
today. The last time advanced weapons were shipped to and from
Cuba the world had come close to the brink of nuclear war than
in any other time.
It was October 1962 at the height of the Cuban Missile
Crisis when the United States discovered that the Soviet Union
was installing ballistic and tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba
just 90 miles south of the United States' coast.
Today, we know that Cuba has the capability to launch
without Russian codes or consent and have even pleaded Moscow
to launch weapons already on the island even after the
withdrawal was initiated.
President Kennedy thwarted a dangerous game of nuclear
chess played by the Soviet and Cuban regimes. Now, nearly 51
years later, we find Cuba has taken in a different partner in
North Korea to partake in the illicit transfer of contraband,
arms and weaponry.
Staunch anti-Americanism, anti-democratic values and
defiance of world order have isolated and strengthened a
historically distant relationship between the two communist
nations.
On July 10th earlier this year Panamanian authorities
seized a North Korean freighter declared to be carrying 10,000
tons of sugar from Cuba, only to discover a hidden cargo of
Soviet-made anti-missile system components, fighter jet parts
and engines.
In doing so, inspectors encountered a defiant 35-member
North Korean crew and a captain who even attempted to take his
own life to prevent inspection.
Days later, the Cuban Government acknowledged the contents
of the cargo as mere obsolete defensive weapons to be repaired
and returned to Cuba, adding that the sugar was a humanitarian
gift to North Korea.
This was not the first transshipment of its kind and
neither Cuba nor North Korea had any intent of disclosing their
transgressions or contents of the illicit cargo.
Further inspection has in fact revealed the cargo to
include over 25 hidden containers, military vehicles and like-
new ammunitions and hardware in original cases.
However, North Korea's involvement and the Cubans'
declaration has only raised more questions than it has
answered. If only for repairs then why did Cuba not ask other
nations instead of breaking various U.N. Security Council's
resolutions banning arms transfers especially to North Korea?
With North Korea doing its best to refurbish its military
hardware, it is more likely that the fighter jets were intended
to stay in North Korea.
At the same time a barter arrangement may have been reached
to transfer some equipment to North Korea for repairs with
sugar serving as payment.
Without a doubt, the nature and contents of the seizure
itself and the existence of a barter agreement reflect the dire
economic conditions and level of desperation in both states.
Nonetheless, irrespective of the purpose or intent,
obsolete weaponry or not, the transfer of these items is a
clear violation of the U.N. Council's resolutions--Security
Council resolutions.
Meanwhile, Panamanian authorities have recently declared
that the preliminary U.N. Security Council report has
determined Cuba's North Korea-bound arms cargo to be in
violation of U.N. sanctions.
However, that Cuba has by its own admission acknowledged
its concealment and is presumably cooperating with the U.N.
inspectors should be seen with great doubt. Cuba and North
Korea starve their people of common dignity, freedom of speech
and human rights.
They have not abided by world norms and are unlikely to do
so. The U.S., together with the U.N. Security Council, should
enforce present sanctions against North Korea and be undeterred
in punishing Cuba for violating them.
Laws are not to be--that are not enforced and defended with
lose value and respect. The U.S. and the U.N. should
demonstrate that there are consequences to defying
international laws.
I look forward to hearing the panelists' comments.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
The Chair yields to the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
This weapons proliferation violation in our own hemisphere
poses a direct threat to our national security interest.
Allowing the Castros to go unaccountable sends a terrible
message to allies like Panama, who risked their time and
resources to stop this vessel, and also to Venezuela and other
rogue regimes who seek to cooperate further with North Korea or
Iran.
We must not allow U.S. People to People travellers to stay
at Cuba luxury resorts which are owned by the Cuban military,
as you pointed out.
Additionally, this administration must reinforce the
already existing ban on visas for regime officials and their
family members.
Allowing Castro family members and regime officials to be
issued travel visas to come here sends a message of impunity.
It eliminates the dissuasive effect for repressors.
This is a time for the administration to hold the Castro
regime accountable for its actions, not a time to engage in
normalization efforts with the regime.
A U.S. citizen languishes in a Cuban jail. This
international violation now comes to light and yet the U.S.
sits across the table from the Cuban regime on postal service
issues. Incredible.
Both North Korea and Cuba were in clear violation of U.N.
sanctions yet neither nation has suffered any consequences from
this act.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from American Samoa, Mr.
Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you and our ranking member for calling this
hearing. With Panama's recent interdiction of North Korea's
ship, the Chong Chon Gang, many of the issues that have
traditionally taken center stage in the Western Hemisphere
suddenly become somewhat trivial.
We are no longer just concerned with drug interdictions or
trafficking, government corruption or democracy. We have now
added, out of nowhere it seems, arms and proliferation the
ongoing agenda.
But did this exchange between Cuba and North Korea really
come out of nowhere? Were there any warning signs? Was this an
isolated incident?
What about the intelligence that Panama received? The
Panamanian authorities seized the vessel under suspicion of
drugs aboard the ship.
While the intelligence was wrong, it nonetheless led to the
discovery of a very alarming situation here in the Western
Hemisphere. I am concerned that there is much speculation and
supposition surrounding this event.
The truth is we just do not have the information we need to
take a next step or even appreciate the implications that the
situation will have on the United States, on our neighboring
countries and on our government-to-government relationship
within the region.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I want to
personally offer my welcome to Ms. Nikitin and Ms. Werlau for
their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Does the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, choose
to make an opening statement?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Just to thank you, Mr. Chairman, on
holding this hearing. I think it's vitally important that the
United States, while confronting serious challenges throughout
the world, not lose sight of the fact that we have one of the
world's longest lasting tin pot dictatorships right along--
right near our coast line.
This regime is a disgrace and has held the people of Cuba
back for so long. We need to again reaffirm that we are on the
side of the people of Cuba and against their dictatorship.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Pursuant to committee rule seven the members of the
subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to
be included in the official hearing record.
Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for
7 days to allow statements, questions and extraneous materials
for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Now I'd like to introduce the panel. First of all, we have
on Skype Mr. Hugh Griffiths. He's the senior researcher and
head of the Countering Illicit Drug Trafficking-Mechanism
Assessment Projects at the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute.
He's conducted a wide variety of investigation into arms
trafficking via sea and air in Africa, the Middle East and
Korean Peninsula working on behalf of a variety of United
Nations, European Union and North American organizations,
agencies and member states.
He holds a Ph.D. research certificate and a Master's of
philosophy in international political economy as well as a
post-graduate degree in international relations and law from
the University of Amsterdam.
We also have Ms. Werlau. She is the executive director of
Cuba Archive. This initiative seeks to advance human rights
through research and scholarship.
For years she has tracked Cuba's relationship with North
Korea and other rogue states. Ms. Werlau holds a Bachelor's
degree of science in foreign service from Georgetown University
and a Master's degree in international affairs from Universidad
de Chile.
Ms. Nikitin--did I say that right? What is it, Nikitin?
Nikitin. Is a specialist in nonproliferation in the Foreign
Affairs Defense and Trade Division at the Congressional
Research Service.
Ms. Nikitin's research covers nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons nonproliferation issues including nuclear
security, nonproliferation, threat reduction assistance and
nuclear energy cooperation.
She earned a B.A. with majors in government and French at
Dartmouth College and a Master's in international policy
studies and a certificate in nonproliferation studies from
Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Let's begin. Mr. Griffiths, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF MR. HUGH GRIFFITHS, HEAD, COUNTERING ILLICIT
TRAFFICKING--MECHANISM ASSESSMENT PROJECTS, STOCKHOLM
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (APPERING VIA
VIDEOCONFERENCE)
Mr. Griffiths. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the committee,
thanks for this invitation to testify today.
I've been asked to present on SIPRI's investigation and
analysis of the attempted illicit transfer associated with the
North Korean vessel, the Chong Chon Gang, that was interdicted
by the Panamanian authorities transporting arms from Cuba in
July 2013.
Given your geographic focus on the Western Hemisphere, I
will today mainly address Cuba's role in this violation of
United Nations sanctions as well as Cuba's links with North
Korea and in particular earlier voyages by North Korean vessels
to Cuba in the period 2006 to 2013 that I believe merit further
investigation.
The focus here will thus be on maritime trafficking. Before
addressing these matters, I would like to say a few words
regarding the work of U.S. Government-related entities in the
fields of counter proliferation, export control, as well as
maritime and airborne-related trafficking.
The SIPRI research publications for which I have been
responsible acknowledge the cutting edge science, unique
expertise and resources of a wide variety of U.S. Government
departments, agencies and related entities charged with counter
proliferation and export control as well as maritime
trafficking of military equipment, dual use goods for weapons
of mass destruction purposes and narcotics.
Over the years, during the course of field investigations
and research around the world, I've had the privilege of
interacting with dedicated officials and experts from the U.S.
Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury as well as
members of the U.S. intelligence community.
The breadth and depth of their expertise and resources are
unparalleled as are their abilities to build capacity amongst
U.S. allies and partner states in the fields of counter
proliferation, export control and counter trafficking.
As Federal lawmakers and budget approvers, I'd like to say
to you today that U.S. engagement at the international level on
these issues is really critical in terms of mitigating the
associated risks.
Both the dedicated individuals and programs that I've had
the opportunity to interact with over the past 10 years deserve
your continuing support because they do a good job on these
critical issues of national and international security concern.
Put simply, no other country has the expertise and
resources to undertake this work in the same way. I should make
full disclosure and note that in 2013 the projects at SIPRI
that I am responsible for received a grant from the Department
of State's Export Control and Related Border Security Program,
EXBS, whose mandate covers some of the areas I've mentioned
above.
But to sum up and introduce the rest of this testimony, I
believe the Chong Chon Gang case serves as the most recent open
source example to highlight the critical role played in counter
proliferation and export control by U.S. Government
departments, agencies and programs funded from the Federal
budget.
As Members of Congress may be aware, following the Chong
Chon Gang seizure in July of this year, open source media
reports quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying that the
Panamanian authorities were tipped off by their U.S.
counterparts as to the illicit nature of the vessel's cargo.
In other words, it was a U.S. tip off that prompted the
interdiction by Panama. It should also be noted that Panama is
a U.S. partner thanks to longstanding bilateral counter
trafficking activities as well as through multilateral export
control and customs initiatives such as the United Nations
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Container Control Program
(CCP) which is also supported by the U.S. Department of State.
Set against this background of U.S. expertise, partnership
and information sharing that you in Congress can be rightly
proud of authorizing the budgets for, I'd now turn to some of
the specifics of the Chong Chon Gang and the Cuban role.
It's already been covered by Members of Congress so I won't
go there again except to say that the evidence and testimony
provided today make clear that contrary to both the North
Korean shipping declaration, which I provided you a copy of,
and Cuban Government statements, which were highlighted earlier
by Members of Congress, the shipment was without doubt a
violation of U.N. sanctions on North Korea.
The statements issued by the Cuban authorities following
the seizure are misleading to say the least because of the
other cargo of miliary equipment that the ship was transporting
which they failed to mention.
Within the context of Cuba-related North Korean vessel
movements, I think it is important to note that prior to the
seizure of the Chong Chon Gang there were a number of other
North Korean vessels calling at Cuban ports.
Some of these voyages may be assessed as carrying a high
risk of proliferation concern on the basis of the vessels'
flag, age, past registration, ownership patents, its safety
record and, most importantly, various voyage routing anomalies.
A number of these vessels were bulk carriers that may have
contained the same hidden compartments or hold space that the
SIPRI investigation highlighted were found aboard the Chong
Chon Gang.
A number of these other vessels also switch off their
automatic--their AIS radar transponders and this is a common
risk indicator for various forms of maritime trafficking.
A number of these vessels were ultimately owned by shell
companies behind which stand the same company that owned the
Chong Chon Gang. Given the illicit cargo and the concealed hold
space found aboard the Chong Chon Gang, it is my opinion that
these earlier North Korean voyages to Cuba would be worthy of
investigation.
But what Congress is asking is what has to happen now and
what has to happen now is really full disclosure and access to
Cuba for the United Nations Panel of Experts attached to the
Sanctions Committee responsible for DPRK sanctions.
As a first step, the Cuban authorities will need to invite
the United Nations Panel of Experts charged with investigating
violations of U.N. sanctions on North Korea to Cuba. The Cuban
authorities would have to provide the U.N. Panel of Experts
with full disclosure on all aspects of the agreements,
contracts, background, loading and transfer of the illicit
Cuban-origin military equipment that was seized aboard the
Chong Chon Gang.
Once the Panel of Experts were satisfied that the terms of
full disclosure for this voyage had been met, they would have a
clearer understanding of the Cuban personalities, ministries
and agencies involved in that illicit transfer.
Secondly, for the purposes of full disclosure relating to
the other North Korean vessel voyages to Cuba, the Cuban
authorities would have to grant the United Nations Panel of
Experts access to all port authority documentation and all
documentation relating to the voyages themselves, any port-
state control safety inspections that may have been partially
carried out but not filed with the respective port-state
control memorandum of understanding, the MOU.
The Cuban authorities would have to provide access to the
relevant customs officials and dock workers for interview
purposes as well.
If the Cuban authorities are unwilling to make this kind of
full disclosure and provide the invitation to visit Cuba and to
interview officials, then the earlier misleading statements
made on 16th July by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs will
appear to be more than a one-off.
It will appear as if they have something to hide on a
systematic basis. In concluding this testimony, I should say
that on the basis of our research we believe that the Chong
Chon Gang incident is unusual not because the vessel was
transporting concealed illicit commodities.
The Chong Chon Gang incident was unusual because it
involved an actual seizure and confiscation of illicit
commodities. It may seem strange to Members of Congress that a
North Korean vessel with a very large North Korean flag painted
on the ship's funnel could expect to sail in and out of the
Caribbean Sea, which is effectively America's back yard, the
most intensely surveilled waters in terms of counter narcotics
trafficking anywhere in the world and take delivery of an
illicit arms shipment from Cuba.
Such a gamble certainly appears foolhardy with the benefit
of hindsight but it may not have been seen as a great risk if
such shipments were undertaken in the past without problems.
There were certainly less obtrusive options open to the
North Koreans. They could have used a variety of other North
Korean controlled ships that are registered under other flags
of convenience formally owned by offshore entities registered
in east or southeast Asia.
And compared with the Chong Chon Gang these high-risk
proliferation vessels are much more difficult to identify and
the majority of them do not sail under the flags of states that
have signed boarding agreements with the U.S. as part of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI.
So to summarize, I believe that the Chong Chon Gang seizure
highlights a number of points. The first is the need for full
disclosure by the Cuban authorities to the U.N. Panel of
Experts on North Korea on both this shipment and other North
Korean-related voyages of concern to Cuba in recent years.
The second point is that the Chong Chon Gang seizure
demonstrates the continuing utility of building the capacities
of choke point ports and nations such as Panama as well as
other partner states and open registries that occupy strategic
positions along potential proliferation supply chains.
In these activities the United States is well placed to
assist partners and allies around the world to counter such
acts of proliferation.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffiths follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Werlau.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARIA C. WERLAU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CUBA
ARCHIVE
Ms. Werlau. Good afternoon. Can you hear me? Good
afternoon, Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to offer you this testimony.
My written statement is much more extensive and I respectfully
ask that it be considered for the record.
As we have been discussing, on July 15th Panama discovered
the North Korean flagship with concealed weapons from Cuba. To
those familiar with the history and true nature of the Cuban
regime, the only surprise is that it got caught and that it was
widely reported by news organizations.
In 2003, David Kay, special advisor on Iraqi WMD search,
said on national TV that remarkable evidence had been found in
Iraq of North Korean missiles going to Cuba. Nobody seemed to
take notice, at least publicly.
North Korea and Cuba, it turns out, have much in common.
Both regimes have been ruled for decades by military
dictatorships under the helm of respective families controlling
a vast repressive apparatus.
Both pay homage to orthodox communism, at least in theory
and when convenient. Both have terrified their people into
submission, flaunted basic rules and standards of civilized
nations and committed crimes against humanity.
Both work actively against our interest and threaten our
security. Their command economies are both technically
bankrupt, spreading misery amongst the people yet allowing
privileges to the ruling elite.
Both have perfected the art of milking the international
community for concessions, massive aid and subsidies, favorable
terms of trade and investment and loans they never pay.
Their allies are fellow rogue regimes and together they
have formed what in their own words is a joint front against
the common enemy, the United States.
My written testimony offers considerable detail of evident
ties between the two. Since 2001, official visits, especially
of a military nature, mutual praise and reiterations of the
strong fraternal ties have visibly multiplied. Two visits stand
out.
In November 2004, several North Korean senior generals
arrived in Cuba and met with then-President Fidel Castro and
Defense Minister Raul Castro.
They spent several days evaluating Cuba's military
infrastructure and touring manufacturing and assembly
facilities of its defense industry conglomerate. Cuba confirmed
a strengthening military cooperation and pledged to fight
shoulder to shoulder with the Korean army and people.
Another unusual visit concluded around 10 days--less
actually--than before the ship was seized by Panama. The
general's staff of North Korea's army, who had already been to
Cuba, led a high-ranking military delegation to, as he
proclaimed, meet colleagues in the same trench.
They stayed several days, met with top military brass
including President General Raul Castro, toured military
installations and inspected military equipment.
According to Cuba's state media, the highly fraternal
exchange included detailed information on combat readiness,
staff training and the use of the technology and weaponry.
On August 25th, 38 days after the ship was stopped in
Panama, the head of Cuba's air force, a division general said
to have been in charge of the shipment, was reported by state
media killed in a car accident. It was a Sunday morning and
details such as location, circumstances or witnesses were not
provided.
He was immediately cremated and buried 2 days later. Five
days later, reports surfaced that the four-star North Korean
general who had just returned from Cuba had been removed, his
fate unknown. Two timely and convenient coincidences.
What explains the arms trafficking? In my view, these
visits and others in between point to deliberate and concerted
efforts.
As for North Korea, our Government confirmed last May that
it defies sanctions through established channels to supply its
missile and nuclear programs. Regarding Cuba, it is entirely
feasible that the Castro regime would risk getting caught.
First, it is in desperate need of hard currency to keep the
dictatorship in power and rescuing its faltering economy. The
Venezuelan economy is in dire straits, facing a huge liquidity
crisis and its massive subsidies to Cuba are probably
declining.
Second, the Cuban regime is emboldened by the impunity the
international system has afforded even its worse crimes. For
Cuba and North Korea, nothing is too outrageous.
There's a saying in Spanish (foreign language spoken)--God
creates them and they find each other.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Werlau follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Ms. Nikitin.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARY BETH NIKITIN, SPECIALIST IN
NONPROLIFERATION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Nikitin. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, and
distinguished members of this subcommittee, I want to thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today on the recent
incident of proliferation from Cuba and the U.N. Sanctions
Committee's possible response.
Chairman Salmon, with your permission I'd like to submit my
statement for the record and summarize it here in a few brief
remarks.
Interdiction of banned goods to and from North Korea is a
binding obligation on all U.N. member states but implementation
has been uneven. Overall, the risk of interdiction has likely
raised the cost of illicit transfers for the North Korean
regime and limited the number of its trading partners, most of
them outlier states like Cuba.
However, multiple reported cases of arms interdictions over
the past 5 years show that North Korea continues to work to
evade U.N. sanctions.
Each time there is an interdiction of a banned shipment the
international community learns more about North Korea's evasion
techniques.
Panama's seizure of the North Korean freighter, the Chong
Chon Gang, and its cache of hidden weapons will provide
insights into North Korean sanctions evasion. If the U.N.
confirms the ship was carrying banned weapons, then the seizure
would be the first case of a North Korean arms shipment to or
from Cuba being reported to the U.N. Security Council and the
first time such a case would be reported in the Western
Hemisphere.
There is not yet any official confirmation of the exact
content or the reasons behind the shipment. But even if the
shipment was sent to North Korea for repair, as the Cuban
Government claims, it would still be an arms transfer and
therefore prohibited.
This shipment raises questions about whether there have
been other undetected shipments of weapons between Cuba and
North Korea, as my fellow witnesses have raised.
All U.N. member states are authorized to interdict
suspicious shipments to or from North Korea but these measures
are not always followed.
Panama did follow these procedures. They stopped a
suspicious ship for inspection and when it discovered the
weapons they seized them and promptly invited the U.N. Panel of
Experts to go there to inspect.
The Panel of Experts is a group of technical experts as
part of the U.N. Secretariat that reports to the Security
Council's Sanctions Committee.
The U.N. investigation of this case is still ongoing and
the results of the inspection in Panama have not been made
public. That visit would have focused on identifying the cargo
and interviewing the crew.
Most likely the experts will next seek to identify the
specific actors that were involved in the transaction including
seeking information from the Cuban Government, as Mr. Griffiths
pointed out.
One possible--excuse me, the Sanctions Committee, which is
actually the same as the members of the Security Council, will
then examine the information from the experts and determine
whether there was a violation and decide what to do.
One possible response would be to add the names of the
parties involved to a designation list. This list identifies
individuals, companies or government entities involved in
illicit transfers.
Member states are then expected to deny transactions with
those on the list. In the past, adding names to this list has
been highly political and has only been done as part of a new
Security Council resolution after major breaches such as a
North Korean nuclear missile test.
However, the Security Council could decide to amend this
list at any time. Separately, individual countries may choose
to add these entities or individuals to their own watch lists.
Outside the U.N. context, the U.S. has worked to improve
other countries' interdiction capabilities through the
Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. Panama is a strong
PSI partner and U.S. and partner countries hold annual training
exercises under Panamax to prepare for interdiction scenarios
in the Panama Canal.
The Government of Panama's successful seizure of the Chong
Chon Gang's shipment may encourage additional states in Latin
America and the Caribbean to take similar action.
Congress may wish to consider whether adequate resources
are being provided to support PSI and other programs that help
countries strengthen their export controls, train custom
officials and improve detection of illicit shipments. This may
be particularly important for Latin American and Caribbean
countries who may be transshipment points.
Congress may also wish to examine whether the Security
Council should revise the designations list on a more routine
basis and could also show support for continuing to make
publicly available the Panel of Experts' findings on these
illicit transfers.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again
for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to the
subcommittee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nikitin follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
I'd really like to thank our three distinguished witnesses
for sharing these very thoughtful and provocative ideas.
The big reason that we convened this hearing is because
this was a very, very significant incident here in the Western
Hemisphere and because I don't believe that there's been
adequate scrutiny with the international media on this subject,
this issue.
I've also had conversations with people that are close to
the process of what's happening with the Sanctions Committee at
the United Nations and, quite frankly, I'm very sceptical that
given the fact that the Cuban representatives have been putting
on what I'd call a charm offensive and acting--I don't know,
kind of reminds me of ``Leave it to Beaver,'' you know, Eddie
Haskell. Good morning, Mrs. Cleaver, you know, turning on all
the--turning on all the charm looking like you're actually
cooperating when the effort is actually a public relations
effort to try to deep six everything.
And I'm really sceptical as to whether the Sanctions
Committee is going to have the wool pulled over their eyes in
this instance and the Cuban companies involved are going to get
just a mere slap on the hands and try to sweep everything under
the rug. That's why we called this hearing.
I think we need to call world attention to a very, very
serious issue. And given that the sanctions contained in Iran--
I'm going to ask my question of Mr. Griffiths--given that the
sanctions contained in Iran, North Korea, Syria
Nonproliferation Act already ostensibly apply to Cuba what
beyond the current range of sanctions that we have in place
against the Cuban regime could we do and what additional
legislative measures do you think we should take? Please
elaborate.
Mr. Griffiths. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm not an expert on U.S. legislation but if your end goal
is to find out more and you fear the wool may be pulled over
people's eyes, for me the first one very concrete thing would
be to get full congressional support for making sure that the
Cuban authorities really extend an invitation to the U.N. panel
of experts to Cuba and provide the full disclosure I mentioned
earlier.
And if they don't, that will prove that they have quite a
lot to hide, especially regarding the command and control of
this illicit transfer--who was responsible--because if they
don't provide full disclosure it will indicate that this
perhaps went to the very top and, as I said before, to--for
Congress to really push to make sure that the--that other--that
the U.S. Government or other U.N. member states really ensure
that the Cubans cooperate over these earlier voyages as well.
Right now, the U.N. Panel of Experts has not been invited
to Cuba and has not been offered full disclosure and this is
the litmus test, if you will, and if they, you know, they don't
go down that road of cooperation and share information then I
would suggest, you know, further investigation is merited to
determine the extent of these shipments and this trade.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
I also--I believe it was you, Ms. Werlau, that mentioned
that the two principal negotiators of this deal--one from Cuba
and one from Korea--are both--well, one's dead and one's
missing, and so it's going to be very, very difficult to get at
the truth.
Given the fact that these two principals are gone, how
confident are you that the Sanctions Committee is going to be
able to get to the bottom of this?
Ms. Werlau. I'm very confident that Cuba's going to manage
it and they can. They own the economy. They own the country--
the regime.
They're going to clean up their act, and I've worked in--at
the U.N. I've had the opportunity to work in Geneva and New
York to do advocacy activities.
The power of the Cuban delegations there, the size, the
influence is impressive and they have their allies. So I don't
think we're going to get to the bottom of this, not through
that channel.
Mr. Salmon. You think they're pretty good at public
relations campaigns?
Ms. Werlau. Cuba has a vast propaganda apparatus that is
supported not just by a huge public relations empire--media,
radio stations, publications, news agencies, cultural centers--
they have a very effective, well trained and large intelligence
service.
Most of their diplomats are trained intelligence officers.
Yes, it's very effective and they convince a lot of people who
are not well informed, who are well meaning, who think that
they're changing, that don't understand the criminal nature of
this regime.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I yield back.
I recognize the ranking member.
Mr. Sires. You know, I find it very difficult to think that
the Cuban Government is going to cooperate on any kind of
committee going to Cuba and trying to investigate whatever
company because the company is the state, and so is North
Korea.
So I just find it very difficult to think that the Cuban
Government is going to open its doors and say oh, here's what
happened and tell the world what happened. I just don't see
that happening.
I worry about the U.N. because, quite frankly, in the past
they have disappointed me many times when it comes to issues of
human rights in Cuba.
I mean, at one time they had the vice president of the
Human Rights Commission being from Cuba. I mean, that is the--
that is the most absurd situation you could have when human
rights in Cuba they are nonexistent and yet at the U.N. you had
somebody from Cuba being part of the Human Rights Commission.
That just--you know, I guess the military apparatus of
these two countries has to be pretty in dire condition to have
this exchange.
I just wonder what you think about that. Why at this time
have such a shipment? I'm curious. If anybody can take a shot
at that. I know that North Korea has been rattling the saber
down on South Korea.
So I was just wondering if it's all related and I'm, quite
frankly, concerned with the relationships between Cuba, Iran
and the Western Hemisphere, you know, and the people travelling
back and forth from Cuba to Iran.
So can you--can you comment on that? We'll start with you.
Ms. Nikitin. Thank you very much.
I don't have an independent source of information, you
know, that confirms what the motivations were. But in doing a
survey of the experts' views on this shipment I think we can
narrow it down to a few other options besides this idea of Cuba
sending the equipment for repairs, that--you know, that was
their story.
They apparently said that they thought that would not
contradict the U.N. Security Council resolutions. But the most
recent versions of those resolutions have been strengthened to
also prohibit that kind of activity.
So North Korea is also strapped for hard currency and it's
possible that they--if they were not going to use those systems
in their own military that they would have a capability to
refurbish and sell to third parties.
We just don't know. So that's another possibility that's
being discussed.
Mr. Sires. Ms. Werlau.
Ms. Werlau. Well, as I said in my testimony it doesn't
surprise me that they would attempt this. There certainly is a
need in Cuba and they are using the most outrageous schemes to
get hard currency. Exploiting their own people, sending people
off to--as migrants to send money back to the regime, exporting
doctors as temporary workers in schemes of modern slavery--
anything can be expected of Cuba to make a buck.
There's a report in Uruguay I believe in late July that
Uruguay imported $1 million in blood from Cuba. Now, I looked
into this. We're going to publish a report. Turns out Cuba
massively collects blood from their citizens, telling citizens
that it's to save lives and they're actually turning people
into donors, regular donors, saying that they're going to get
sick if they don't donate blood, and this is to sell it.
This is a regime that drained the blood of political
prisoners on their way to execution in the 1960s and sold it to
Vietnam, for example, including, by the way, an American
citizen, Robert Fuller.
His blood was drained on the way to execution just for
trying to form a resistant movement in Cuba very much like the
Castro brothers had against the Batista dictatorship. Anything
is possible from this regime to make a buck.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Mr. Griffiths, I was just wondering if you really think
that Cuba is going to cooperate in any way, shape or form with
this.
Mr. Griffiths. Well, on a point made by yourself and a
colleague, I mean, I don't think anyone would deny the fact
that the U.N. has some limitations, given its membership and
its mandate.
But I have to say that the U.N. Panel of Experts on North
Korea and those members of the Secretariat associated with the
panel have done a very good job. They're one of the best
panels.
You read the latest report by that panel published earlier
this summer, 2013, and it's really an outstanding piece of
investigative research.
They've dug up some very interesting shipments and they've
identified suspected parties in places as far away as
Kazakhstan relating to North Korean shipments to Iran. So if
that team are invited into Cuba and are given access to the
officials and the documents both on the Chong Chon Gang and
these earlier ship voyages--North Korean ship voyages, I'm
quite confident that they would get to the bottom of it.
The question is will they be invited, and you Members of
Congress are sceptical that they will be invited. But that
decision, I guess, hasn't been made yet.
So in some way maybe this hearing will contribute to an
understanding at the U.N. and amongst Cubans who are open to
listening that full access and full disclosure is absolutely
necessary and if it's not granted that's going to confirm many
people's worst fears.
So that's what I can say on that subject. On the other
issue, the nature of maritime trafficking is such that if the
arms or drugs are not being shipped directly to a country like
the United States or France or Spain or Britain but to two
third countries such as Cuba and North Korea then, you know,
there are very few open source reports on maritime trafficking
and there are very few seizures.
So much goes underneath the radar, so many vessel movements
that are suspect that are never investigated because the
International Law of the Sea gives sovereignty of the vessel to
the flag state which in this case is either North Korea or some
open registries, flags of convenience that can't exercise their
sovereignty or are unwilling to exercise their sovereignty, who
don't have the intelligence or the law enforcement capacities
to do so.
So the Chong Chon Gang is probably not an isolated case, in
my opinion. When you say why now, given general patterns it's
quite possible there have been other earlier ones. But as we
make clear in our investigation and has been documented by the
U.N. Panel of Experts and others, the North Koreans are on the
lookout for jet fighter spare parts to maintain their fleets.
So they're always on the lookout for those.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Mr. Griffiths. So they're in the market.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. We are probably going to be called
for a vote on the floor for two amendments anytime now but we
have about 10 minutes at least that we can go. I recognize----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
As we know, the Castro regime is and always has been a
supporter, a facilitator of terrorism. It has a long history of
proliferation activities, has actively sought to undermine the
U.S. and our interests by any means possible.
For decades the Castros have harbored fugitives from U.S.
justice including convicted cop killer Joanne Chesimard, as
Congressman Sires always reminds us, and he has a vast and
sophisticated intelligence network operating against the United
States.
And the Castro brothers also have a well documented deep-
rooted connection to rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea,
united in a mutual hatred for the United States. As we have
been talking about, days after the seizure of this North Korean
flag ship the Cuban authorities released a statement claiming
that they were obsolete defensive weapons sent to North Korea
for repair, only to be returned to Cuba.
But as you've pointed out, it's obvious they were lying to
the international community to hide the fact that the final
destination was North Africa in violation of U.N. sanctions.
The Castro regime is desperate to keep its propaganda
machine running and its hold on power, and Kim Jong-un and the
North Korean regime will stop at nothing to continue its
illicit activities.
So I ask you what should the U.S. Government be doing to
support allies in the region like Panama for their security and
their law enforcement efforts? Also, what penalties do you
think the international community should impose on Cuba for
these activities in addition to the bans we have in place?
And despite these blatant violations of U.N. sanctions this
administration continues efforts to normalize relations with
Cuba, moving forward with talks regarding migration and direct
mail services in the middle of what has been going on.
What message do you think it sends to our commitment to
regional security to move ahead with talks with the regime
despite this blatant violation of international law like the
one involving the North Korean ship?
Anyone who'd like to take a stab. Thank you, Ms. Werlau.
Ms. Werlau. Well, thank you, Congresswoman.
I'm really not prepared to answer such a big question. All
I can say is that the people who understand the criminal nature
of this regime should inform others and it's the responsibility
of our Government.
There's more than 50 years--55 years of history there
including the murder of American citizens, citizens of other
countries, subversion, terrorism--I think thousands of deaths
worldwide caused by this regime. And it's important that we
don't get confused by the message. The Cubans are extremely
able----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I will interrupt you there because
you bring out an important fact, and then I yield back. We let
the Castro regime get away with the murder of four innocent
pilots of Brothers to the Rescue in the shoot down of their two
aircraft over international air space--three American citizens,
one U.S. resident.
And what price did the Castro brothers pay for their crime?
They signed a bill into law--the administration at the time--
that they have yet to put into action. That was it. That was
the penalty that they paid.
So we let that problem go unanswered and now we have
another horrible example of a violation of international law
and we're about to let them off the hook yet again. No wonder
they continue to do their espionage and dangerous activities
against the U.S. We are willing to look the other way because
it's just--to act would be inconvenient.
Ms. Werlau. Yes. May I add, Mr. Chairman, to that? It's
very frustrating when you're doing human rights documentation
and getting the reports from Cuba, where they're using surgical
repression to exterminate the opposition, assaulting women,
children. I mean, this is a regime that has massacred children
and----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The Tugboat--13th of March where they put
high-pressure water cannons----
Ms. Werlau. Exactly.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing]. Against people, killing
dozens of them for the crime of trying to leave the hell hole
that is the Castro regime's Cuba.
Ms. Werlau. And that is just one, and what we're getting in
our news reports are reports about old cars, Mojitos----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Oh, yes.
Ms. Werlau [continuing]. And Raul Castro's reforms.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It's an interesting place.
Ms. Werlau. Yes. I mean, it's very frustrating----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And if you're a media outlet and you
report on the human rights violations instead of reporting on
the cute 1950s cars then you get your license taken away.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
We have about 7 minutes left on the clock to get back for
our vote on the floor. But Mr. Rohrabacher is the only one
that's expressed that he does have a question and so I'm going
to go ahead and yield to Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. One minute. One minute. Thank you very
much.
Let me just note that Castro's regime has been a
disgraceful example of corruption and repression since day one.
One of the first things he did was, of course, send off aid
to insurgents in Venezuela to overthrow their elected
government. He then made his country into a haven for Robert
Vesco and other major drug dealers.
He murdered his own people by the hundreds, and I will tell
you it is a disgrace that the liberals in this country gave him
such leeway over the years, never calling Castro to task for
all of this violation of human rights on a mass scale in his
own country.
Let me just say that it's a miracle--it's a miracle to me
that he has lived as long as he has with as number of people
who have been praying that he was going to die soon over all
these years.
But I'm sure that he will be leaving this planet soon and
there will be a warm place waiting for him right next to Che
Guevara and none too soon.
Again, the American people need to see that all along he's
been conducting himself and involved with illicit activities,
drug dealing, arms dealing throughout the world and it
shouldn't surprise us now.
One last thought, Mr. Chairman, and that is we should be
insisting that all of the money that he has stored up in
foreign banks be found out and be given to the people of Cuba
once this dictator is dead.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I recognize the gentleman from
American Samoa.
Mr. Faleomavaega. That's all right, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, and as a follow up on my good friend from California's
line of question I just want to pose this to Dr. Griffiths and
our two witnesses here.
I said I'm very concerned of the fact that a noninspection,
at least the way the Chong Chon Gang was being inspected. I
believe, Dr. Griffiths, you mentioned that there have been
three other occasions or three other Korean vessels that have
gone between Cuba and North Korea.
Here's the--based on a hypothetical but the fact that the
noninspection--that these vessels could well have contained
nuclear weapons, missiles that are capable, they come in right
in the back yard of the United States, putting an obvious risk
on the security of this country is what concerns me.
So we can talk about drugs. We can talk about--but in fact
that if it was possible for North Korea to do this and three
other occasions that we have no idea what was being transferred
on those three earlier vessels, I am just curious.
Is the threat serious or is it just another one of those
bypass that we're not really concerned or should be concerned
about? Dr. Griffiths.
Mr. Griffiths. There have been at least 12 and possibly 13
instances of North Korean ships calling at Cuban ports since
2006 that we are aware of. So the figure is actually
considerably higher than reported in the media.
It's quite possible there could have been more because
these ships are turning off their radar--the AIS, the signal
that allows us to--our commercial databases to locate ships,
and signals can also be faked. I mean, it's between 12 and 13.
We're uncertain about the thirteenth 100 percent.
We don't know the content of what those ships were carrying
but some of them really do have what we call voyage anomalies
where the ship has sailed in a manner which makes no economic
or commercial sense and it's the typical risk indicator when it
comes to arms trafficking or indeed narcotics trafficking.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Dr. Griffiths.
I've got one more quick question to Ms. Werlau. You
mentioned that you published a paper in 2005 giving some
estimates of the corporate wealth of the Castro family.
Can you just give us a one liner? How much is the Castro
family worth right now in Cuba?
Ms. Werlau. I think nobody knows that, not even the people
who manage it. It is so well done the way that it's concealed
through safe havens, using other people as they present as the
owners of the bank accounts and corporations. It's impossible
to tell.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
All testimony concluded and questions concluded, I'd like
to adjourn this meeting. But before I do, I just want to say
that maybe it would be a good idea for the members of this
subcommittee to pen a letter to Mr. Ban Ki-Moon--Secretary Ban
Ki-Moon to voice our concerns over this process within the U.N.
Would that be something we could entertain? All right.
Well, thank you very much. This subcommittee hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Matt Salmon, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Arizona, and chairman,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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