[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE TROUBLING PATH AHEAD FOR
U.S.-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 12, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-101
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Shannon Smith, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State...................... 6
Mr. Todd Amani, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development.............. 15
Mr. Arthur Gwagwa, international advocacy coordinator, Zimbabwe
Human Rights NGO Forum......................................... 28
Ms. Imani Countess, regional program director for Africa, The
Solidarity Center.............................................. 53
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Shannon Smith, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 9
Mr. Todd Amani: Prepared statement............................... 17
Mr. Arthur Gwagwa: Prepared statement............................ 32
Ms. Imani Countess: Prepared statement........................... 56
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 74
Hearing minutes.................................................. 75
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations: Statement from the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. 76
THE TROUBLING PATH AHEAD FOR
U.S.-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. The subcommittee will come to
order.
We are joined by the distinguished chairman of the full
committee, Ed Royce, and I would like to yield to him such time
as he may consume.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much
you holding this hearing, and of course we have another
Zimbabwe election, another Mugabe victory through cheating and
strong-arming and harassment, and we have seen this before. I
have been in Zimbabwe and seen the ads run by ZANU-PF after
they were running cars off the road and killing opposition
candidates. And the ad shows a truck smashing into the back of
a car saying--I think the gist of it was, ``Driving can be
hazardous to your health, but so can voting against ZANU-PF.''
If it hadn't been mixed with the violence on the ground,
you wouldn't know the meaning of that ad. But after enough
opposition candidates or people were killed--now, this is an
election in the past, not the one we are talking about. But
what is happening now is more consequential in this election,
because the unity government has collapsed, the opposition
party has been sidelined indefinitely, and ZANU hardliners are
in control. And I mean the hardliners. I have talked to those
who had had second thoughts, that were trying to make some
change, but they have no input at this point.
Mugabe now has unfettered access to all government posts
and all state resources, and I think you can expect the graft
and the corruption to continue if it is possible to get any
more graft and corruption, if it can get worse.
Unfortunately, the regional bodies aren't any help, and I
have noticed this in the past, too, in my discussions, the
reluctance to say anything critical under any circumstances.
The performance of SADC, the Southern African Development
Community, has really been a disappointment here, heralded by
the administration at the start of the summer as a force for
positive change in Zimbabwe.
SADC, in my opinion, is still adding to the problem, as
they have failed in the past to speak out and this time the
parliamentary group assessment of the July elections, I think,
terribly missed the mark. Miraculously, they concluded that the
elections were--and I am going to quote from them--``a credible
reflection of the will of the people, free and fair,'' is what
they said, while civil society organizations that were on the
ground that actually saw the elections, and other domestic
observers, found rampant voter roll tampering, political
harassment, political intimidation.
And for those who have ever seen the results, because I was
there on another occasion in a neighboring state, speaking with
some of those who had been beaten, had been intimidated, poll
watchers, election--you know, party members who were in the
opposition, I have seen the consequences of what they have gone
through.
And this is so disturbing when you consider that SADC
financially backed the group's election observer mission. So
you would expect, you know, I mean, given SADC's past in this,
I just really wonder, the U.S. funded basically a flawed
assessment that Mugabe has used to legitimate his continued
despotic rule.
And I wrote a letter recently to Administrator Shah
expressing my deep concern of USAID's decision to put the money
into SADC, given their temerity in the past to speak out in any
significant way and with regard to human rights or anything
else in Zimbabwe.
So adding insult to injury, SADC just elected Mugabe as the
deputy chair of the regional body for this year and chair for
next year. The public statements coming out of the State
Department and our Embassy in Harare conveyed that our
engagement and sanctions policy will depend on the actions
taken by a new Mugabe regime, and, in particular, his cabinet
appointments.
Well, that is becoming clear because yesterday Mugabe swore
in his 62-member cabinet, a recycling of old ZANU hardliners,
the old guard, some of the most militant of the old guard, and
the new Information Minister who was the architect of the
sweeping law to clamp down on the media, to clamp down on press
freedom. The new Finance Minister was formerly Justice Minister
and responsible for the judicial crackdowns. And, frankly, he
is already on our sanctions list.
So in May the administration extended an olive branch and
eased sanctions on two Zimbabwean banks and delisted three
individuals from the sanctions list. I will be interested to
find if the July election will cause the administration to
reevaluate that decision, and I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses, and look forward to hearing about what the
administration's policy is going to be going forward.
And as I said, as being someone who was on the ground in
Zimbabwe in the past, and has talked to those who were
tortured, talked to those who spent their life's work,
Africans, who have spent their life's work trying to get
democratic governance, only to be beaten and have their friends
killed, it is truly distressing to me the way--the situation we
are at right now.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say to Dr. Smith and to Mr. Amani, I apologize for
being a little bit late. Both Ranking Member Bass and I were
meeting with a group of Nigerian lawmakers who are in town, led
by the chairwoman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the
House of Representatives. So, again, I apologize for that
lateness in kicking off this hearing.
I want to wish a good afternoon to everyone. And despite
more than a decade of targeted sanctions, Zimbabwe has
continued to be a major U.S. trading partner through the
Generalized System of Preferences, even though it has been
excluded from the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
Chromium, platinum, and diamonds have enriched Zimbabwe's
leaders but not its people. Zimbabwe had been one of Africa's
leading industrial powers and agricultural producers until its
government diminished the ability of the country to sustain its
industrial or agricultural production.
Illegal and disruptive land seizures resulted in political
cronies gaining control of productive agricultural land rather
than the Black farm workers as promised. Agricultural
production suffered, dragging down manufacturing of
agricultural equipment, the base of the country's industry.
The reduction in tax revenues led to a desperate search of
foreign funding to stabilize an economy whose inflation rate
reached globally historic levels. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is a
major player in Southern Africa, even more so now that newly-
elected President Mugabe has been chosen as Vice President of
the Southern African Development Community, or SADC, as
Chairman Royce pointed out, and the organization's anticipated
chairman next year.
Facing international appeals for an end to sanctions on
Zimbabwe, and threats from the Mugabe government of economic
retaliation, U.S. must devise a policy that safeguards American
interests while maintaining our support for democracy, human
rights, good governance, and economic development.
Today's hearing will examine how the process of policy
formation is going now and discuss what that policy should look
like at the conclusion of the process. The United States has
experienced, as we all know, a troubled relationship with
Zimbabwe, since the Southern African nation achieved majority
rule in 1980.
Robert Mugabe, the liberation leader who had led his
country since 1980, has always resented that our Government did
not support his war against the previous white minority
government. Despite our efforts to establish a mutually
beneficial relationship with Mugabe's government over the past
couple of decades, his regime has spurned our hand of
friendship and flouted international law and convention.
Using colonial era laws as models, Mugabe's government has
eliminated the possibility that the political opposition can
credibly challenge his rule. It has limited the ability of the
media to effectively report on the news of the day. It has
restricted civil society advocates from advocating and
verifying the many human rights violations that have taken
place in Mugabe's Zimbabwe.
When Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act of 2001, it sent out a range of aid restrictions
requiring U.S. representatives on the boards of international
financial institutions to vote against loans or debt
cancellations befitting the Zimbabwean Government, pending
fulfillment of a range of conditions based on repeal of the
limitations on the freedoms of the people of Zimbabwe.
Recent annual appropriations laws have also barred U.S.
support for international loans or grants to the government,
except to meet basic human needs or to promote democracy.
Generally, bilateral aid is prohibited, except that pertaining
to health, humanitarian needs, education, or macroeconomic
growth.
Such prohibitions are maintained unless the Secretary of
State certifies that the rule of law has been restored,
including respect for ownership, entitlement to property,
freedom of speech, and association.
However, Mugabe's August 22, 2013, inauguration marked the
end of a 5-year period of often uneasy political power-sharing
with the opposition and partially fulfilled reforms pursued by
the government of national unity under the global political
agreement. The end of the unity government means that unless a
deal is struck with the ruling ZANU-PF party, its former
partner in government, the opposition MDC-T party, will likely
no longer play a role in executive branch policy-making.
Past patterns of ZANU-PF governments, along with recent
actions by the party officials, and the MDC-T's new
marginalization, indicate that Zimbabwe may be entering a
period characterized by a pattern of unilateral exercise of
state power, potentially accompanied by a manipulation of the
rule of law in its favor, a lack of national political
consensus, and the absence of vehicles for alternatives to
ZANU-PF policies, continued restrictions on the activities of
civil society and opposition activists, including legal,
extralegal harassment, and violence by both the police and the
ZANU-PF supporters, and weak economic growth due to the party's
pursuit of a nationalistic economic agenda focusing on state
intervention in the economy.
The Mugabe government has long blamed the United States and
Britain for hampering its economic growth due to sanctions. But
aside from direct aid limitations, most sanctions are targeted
toward Mugabe and his government leadership. SADC is now
calling for the removal of sanctions against Zimbabwe and is
being joined by a growing international chorus that includes a
few voices from within the Congress in the United States.
Meanwhile, President Mugabe has threatened to punish
Western firms operating in Zimbabwe unless sanctions are
lifted. But questions remain about the willingness of the
Mugabe government to take the steps necessary to rescind the
U.S. sanctions. If Zimbabwe takes a defined stand, where does
that leave the U.S.-Zimbabwe relationship? The administration
has tried limited relaxation of sanctions only to be met with
continued refusal to accept reform. Where does this leave U.S.
policy?
We have with us today U.S. Government officials involved in
developing and implementing our Nation's policy toward an
important nation in Southern Africa. We also have with us civil
society observers who will speak to the issues before us as
well.
And, again, I would like to thank all of our witnesses for
being here, taking the time to give us the benefit of their
counsel and wisdom, and I do now yield to my friend and
colleague Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. Mr. Chair, as usual, I want to thank you for
holding today's hearing. As a member of the Southern African
Development Community, Zimbabwe is an important player in
Southern Africa, politically, economically, and socially.
I want to recognize and thank today's witnesses for their
willingness to come before this committee and assist all of us
in better understanding the policy opportunities and challenges
toward engaging the Zimbabwean Government. This includes the
opposition party, the MDC.
For today's hearing, I want to focus my comments on two
primary areas, good governance and economic growth. We all know
that President Mugabe has led Zimbabwe for more than three
decades. And recently we witnessed the power-sharing government
between ZANU and the MDC, but the uneasy 5-year power-sharing
government of national unity has now ended and it is unclear as
to how the MDC will continue to play a governing role.
There is no question that MDC's role within the larger
government apparatus showed to the world that perhaps an
alternative to one-party dominance was possible. As many will
recall, the elections of '08 cast a dark shadow in Southern
Africa, with government intimidation at many levels including
that of journalists and opposition leaders. There was deep
concern over whether Zimbabwe would uphold democratic
principles in the rule of law.
Questions remain with respect to the most recent election
in July, as well as those in '08. The Congressional Research
Service reports that Zimbabwe may be entering a new time, and I
am wondering if today's witnesses can comment about that and
tell us whether they agree. And that new time would be
characterized by unilateral state power, which accompanies the
manipulation of the rule of law, where is a lack of political
consensus and the absence of pluralist institution, where
activities of civil society organizations and opposition
activists are restricted, and where there is weak economic
growth.
I recently returned from the AGOA Forum in Addis where I
sat with African leaders eager to tell the U.S. that the
development agenda of yesterday must be replaced by a new
vision of trade and investment, but we all know that this can't
be achieved if governments don't take the necessary steps to
create investment climates that attract business capital and
that spur trade, both regionally and globally. This can and
must be done by strengthening institutions, but it must also be
done by creating political space.
Zimbabwe needs strong institutions if it is to join other
African nations that have proven year after year that strong
economic growth is not only possible but sustainable. Between
'09 and 2011, Zimbabwe saw an expansion of its economy with
strong in sectors that included mining, services, and
agriculture, yet those trends stagnated.
The World Bank attributes this economic slowing to poor
agricultural seasons, binding credit constraint, fiscal revenue
underperformance, and the slow pace of economic reforms. The
Bank also acknowledged that slow growth was due to continued
political uncertainty around the road map to elections
resulting in low business confidence and other government-led
policies.
We know that Africa has the tools and the know-how to solve
its own problems, and overwhelmingly I am positive about the
continent's future, but I am also sensitive to the fact that in
Zimbabwe, despite fairly peaceful elections, still has deep and
persistent problems that remain unresolved. A focus on good
governance, government accountability, creating legitimate
space for opposition parties, and observance of human rights,
will only strengthen Zimbabwe and its people.
I am confident that with the support of the African Union
and the African economic community, such as SADC, Zimbabwe's
economic, political, and social future can be bright for all
its people, and I look forward to today's discussion and the
testimony from the witnesses.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I would like to now introduce our
two distinguished witnesses from the administration, beginning
with Dr. Shannon Smith, who was appointed Deputy Assistant
Secretary for State in the Bureau of African Affairs in May
2013. Prior to joining the State Department, she served as a
Senior Policy Advisor for Africa and Global Health for the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 2007 to 2013.
As a senior staffer for Africa, she traveled widely on the
continent leading staff delegations and accompanying the
chairman on the Senate side on numerous trips to Sudan and
South Sudan during the process leading up to the 2011
referendum on independence. Prior to her work in the policy
area, Dr. Smith was a history professor.
We will then go to Mr. Todd Amani, who is the Senior Deputy
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development's Bureau for Africa. He oversees operations in the
Bureau's Office of Development Planning, which provides
leadership and policy outreach strategy, program analysis, and
budget; the Office of Administrative Management staff, which
handles personnel assignments, organizational management, and
administrative support; and the Office of Southern Africa
Affairs.
Mr. Amani has been with USAID since 1987 and has served in
Egypt, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and most recently
Mozambique. Before joining USAID, he was a Peace Corps
volunteer, worked in Congress, and was a political science
professor.
Dr. Smith, if you could proceed.
STATEMENT OF SHANNON SMITH, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Smith. Thank you. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass,
thank you for holding this hearing on Zimbabwe and for inviting
me to testify before you.
We appreciate the deep interest of this committee, and we
are pleased to work with Congress in support of our national
interests in Zimbabwe and the region. The seriously flawed
Presidential and parliamentary elections of July 31 were a
missed opportunity for Zimbabwe.
The United States and other members of the international
community had clearly communicated, both publicly and
privately, a willingness to consider rolling back sanctions and
other restrictions and charting a path toward full
normalization of relations, if Zimbabwe demonstrated that it
was ready to allow its deserving people to freely choose their
next government through a fair, peaceful, and credible
election.
The fundamental challenge the United States faces now that
President Mugabe has been sworn in for another 5-year term, the
new Parliament has been seated, and a new cabinet has been
named, is how best to put into action our long-standing
commitment to the Zimbabwean people while maintaining a firm
stance against those who continue to undermine democracy and
hinder Zimbabwe's progress.
The recent elections were a particularly acute
disappointment because they followed some encouraging
developments earlier this year when the parties of the former
government of national unity agreed on a draft constitution,
and the Zimbabwean people overwhelmingly approved it in a
peaceful referendum.
However, in the days and weeks leading up to the election,
that promise faded as the electoral process was systematically
manipulated. There were serious irregularities in the
provision, composition, and distribution of the voters roll.
Political parties had unequal access to state media, and the
security sector did not safeguard the electoral process
equitably.
These problems were highlighted by credible domestic and
regional observers. We were disappointed that the Southern
African Development Community, SADC, and the African Union
chose not to adhere to their own standards or address the
irregularities highlighted by their observers in making their
determination that elections were free and fair.
Secretary Kerry and leaders from other governments noted
the deep flaws in the process leading up to the elections and
concluded that although generally peaceful, the elections could
not be seen as a credible reflection of the will of the
Zimbabwean people. Elections are a process. They are not a
single-day event, and that process was simply too flawed to be
credible.
While we are all grateful that polling was not marked by
violence this year, the absence of overt violence is not
sufficient for the outcome to be considered legitimate. True
democracy will come to Zimbabwe only when the Zimbabwean people
are free to exercise the rights afforded them in their new
constitution, free of fear and manipulation.
President Mugabe and certain elements of his party
conducted a sustained campaign of intimidation against civil
society organizations, political party members, and ordinary
citizens. They allowed partisan conduct by the Zimbabwean media
and security sectors, and they made sure the election
preparations tilted the playing field heavily in their favor.
In doing so, they sent a clear signal to the people of
Zimbabwe and the international community that they were more
interested in retaining power at all costs than in rejoining
the community of democratic nations.
U.S. policy reflects the recognition that a select few in
Zimbabwe remain committed to maintaining power and wealth at
the expense of their people and their nation. We, therefore,
continue to maintain targeted sanctions aimed at those who are
actively undermining democracy in Zimbabwe, and, thus,
depriving all its citizens of a more democratic, prosperous
future.
Currently, the list of specially designated nationals
includes 113 individuals and 70 entities. In the future, we may
add new names to the list or move others as conditions warrant.
We want all Zimbabweans to know that the United States remains
a friend of the Zimbabwean people and that we make a strong
distinction between Zimbabwe's 13 million people as a whole and
those few powerful, self-interested individuals who are
degrading the country's future.
There are those who argue that we should revisit our
sanctions policy because President Mugabe has sought to use
U.S. policy as a propaganda tool. We will not be swayed by
attempts of President Mugabe and his party to blame Zimbabwe's
economic misfortunes and disastrous economic mismanagement on
the United States and other governments that maintain targeted
sanctions on a select group of individuals and entities.
We do, however, want to communicate our message clearly,
and those who benefit most from the status quo--influential
officials within the Zimbabwean Government and the defense and
security sectors--will no doubt remain the most vocal critics
of U.S. and other Western countries, and they will continue to
rely on state domination of the media to perpetuate
misperceptions about our policy.
With the end of the unity government and the relative
stability it had brought to Zimbabwe's economy, their looms the
real possibility of substantial economic decline, which
President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party may seek to blame on
sanctions.
We and Zimbabwe's neighbors alike need to be prepared for
the possible humanitarian cost of ZANU-PF's proposed policies.
We also need to examine, while maintaining our targeted
sanctions, opportunities for engagement with the private sector
that are consistent with our values, policies, and interests.
In addition to helping to stave off economic hardship for
the people of Zimbabwe, such engagement will also provide a
powerful counterargument to the false sanctions narrative that
ZANU-PF seeks to waive. We must also remain supportive of civil
society groups that advocate for strong democratic
institutions, the rule of law, and human rights. And we will
look for opportunities to work with elements of Parliament and
local government as a means of strengthening democratic
governance going forward.
As my USAID colleague will discuss, we also need to
continue our assistance at a humanitarian-plus level. We can
and we should be proud of our ongoing support for Zimbabwe's
progress in the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, in
improving the lives of small holder farmers, and creating
opportunities for sustainable livelihoods.
Zimbabwe's human and economic potential is enormous, and
that makes the events of recent years and the lost
opportunities of this election all the more tragic. U.S. policy
remains dedicated to helping the people of Zimbabwe achieve the
democratic, peaceful, and prosperous future that they deserve.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with your committee,
and I welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Smith follows:]
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Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Dr. Smith.
Mr. Amani.
STATEMENT OF MR. TODD AMANI, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Amani. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members
of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today. I appreciate your
continued commitment to helping the people of Zimbabwe build a
peaceful, stable, and prosperous democracy. And I would also
like to thank my colleagues at the State Department for their
active leadership on these issues as well.
Since the political and economic crisis of 2008, Zimbabwe
has been in the process of a protracted and difficult
transition toward economic normalcy and greater democracy. But
the nation's intermittent progress has often been matched by
setbacks which you have noted.
While the economy has stabilized, the recent deeply flawed
elections represent a disturbing political and democratic
departure from the cautious optimism we had after the last
elections which resulted in the formation of the government of
national unity, and the overwhelming endorsement by the
Zimbabwean people of a new constitution.
I would note in response to Chairman Royce's comments about
our support for SADC that we ended up not financing SADC
observation effort; another donor supported that. We focused
our attention on domestic observation and mobilizing voters.
And it is that domestic observation that made it clear that
this year's elections were neither credible nor free nor fair.
And they raise concerns about how the United States should
continue to support democratic and economic development in
Zimbabwe.
However, our commitment to the well-being of the Zimbabwean
people has not changed. Even if opportunities to pursue broad
economic and political reform recede, it is in the interest of
the United States to maintain our commitment to helping the
Zimbabwean people avert crises and live healthier lives.
As a new government is formed, the United States is
strategically looking to build on the strong platform of the
new constitution and identify opportunities to enhance
transparency, to open democratic spaces, and to support
Zimbabweans with goodwill, both inside and outside of its
institutions, including the nation's next generation of
democratic leaders.
At the same time, USAID will watch for signs of economic
and political backsliding, political repression, and policies
that could lead to the types of interrelated shocks and crises
that have engulfed Zimbabwe in the past and could pose a threat
to regional stability.
Going forward, our assistance will focus primarily on
humanitarian-plus approaches that address key concerns such as
food security, nutrition, economic resilience, and health,
while helping to promote good governance and economic growth.
Through these same channels, USAID will seek out and act upon
opportunities to influence policy formation and help develop
regulatory systems to support Zimbabweans in their quest for
economic prosperity and democratic governance.
As Zimbabwe transitions to a new administration in the
aftermath of the flawed elections, USAID will closely monitor
how its leaders address the challenges facing Zimbabwe, and
whether they turn their campaign pledges into concrete
policies, and which priorities will be addressed first.
We will follow how the market responds to political
developments, signs of political repression, and indication of
the politicization of humanitarian assistance. These are all
factors that could influence our approach to assistance. They
will not, however, affect our commitment to stand by the
Zimbabwean people, and through our assistance programs offer
support to those Zimbabweans who are committed to a more
democratic and prosperous Zimbabwe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Bass, and other
members of the subcommittee for your continued commitment that
you have shown to the people of Zimbabwe, and your support for
reform within their government.
I welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Amani follows:]
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Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Mr. Amani.
Let me begin, Dr. Smith, with you, if I could. The
administration decided to loosen the sanctions on the two
Zimbabwean financial institutions as a means of encouraging
government reforms, and sadly that has not happened. Do you
propose to reinstate and reinstitute those sanctions against
those institutions?
Ms. Smith. We are certainly in the midst of a review of our
sanctions policy.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay.
Ms. Smith. In light of the licenses that were granted to
the two institutions, including the agricultural bank, the goal
there was to try and promote access of Zimbabwean small farmers
and others to credit and other issues, other forms of support.
We don't think that--at the moment we are not planning to
impose or remove those licenses, thinking that the objectives
there are still constant, that we still want to support rural
livelihoods and other factors.
But I would note that the biggest inhibitor to raising
capital and to economic progress in general are much more sort
of the policies and pronouncements of ZANU-PF than any of our
sanctions.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. You described or suggested that
you clearly communicated international warnings of continued or
even expanded sanctions if the July 31 elections were not
deemed free and fair. How did those admonitions get conveyed,
and how did Mugabe react at the time? And, obviously, I think
we know how he reacted since.
Ms. Smith. Earlier this summer, former Ambassador Andrew
Young had traveled to Zimbabwe. He had met with President
Mugabe, and he had conveyed to him the idea that the
opportunity was before them for a new relationship if they
chose to seize it by having a free and fair election. That
message was conveyed very consistently.
We conveyed the same message publicly and privately to
members of SADC, to other countries with interest in Zimbabwe,
and to the government itself through our Embassy and through
other officials.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you.
Mr. Amani, you did partly I think answer the chairman's
question, Chairman Royce. But has there been any reassessment
given to SADC funding in other areas based on their performance
here? What is our sense of that organization now as a result of
this?
Mr. Amani. Shannon can probably help answer some of that in
terms of our relationship with SADC in a broader sense.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay.
Mr. Amani. As I mentioned, we ended up not using U.S.
taxpayer money to fund the SADC observation effort. I think we
feel that SADC, in the future, is an important institution for
many reasons, including economic reasons and their efforts at
economic integration. It looks like we have some work to do in
terms of their observation efforts, and we'd be happy to work
with them to improve that.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay.
Ms. Smith. I would just echo Todd's comments. I don't think
we pulled any punches in expressing our disappointment about
either the elections themselves or the evaluation of them. At
the same time, SADC is an important institution, and we all
have a very strong vested interest in economic stability and
political freedom in Zimbabwe, and we hope that we all engage
in that.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Mr. Amani, you state that the
USAID intends to continue to ensure access to basic health
care. This is the same government that in '05 shut down HIV/
AIDS clinics in so-called squatter communities, turning
patients into refugees in other countries with HIV/AIDS that
could no longer be treated with the usual drug therapy. And I
am wondering, are there any signs that the government will
allow that kind of intervention by USAID?
Mr. Amani. We are going to be watching for signs of those
kinds of things. We have been working----
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. But nothing so far, right?
Mr. Amani. Nothing that we have seen so far. We have been
working with technically competent people within the Ministry
of Health for many years across the administrations. We expect
that we will be able to continue working with those technocrats
who are well educated and very competent in the future.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Let me ask you just a question--
one of our witnesses later on will be Imani Countess from the
Solidarity Center on behalf of the AFL-CIO. And in that
testimony, it is pointed out that the ZCTU is comprised of 30
affiliates, over 150 workers. Are any modest union rights that
have been achieved in Zimbabwe at risk with Mugabe now getting
a fresh--what he will perceive to be--mandate?
Mr. Amani. I will have to get back to you on more
information about unions. This is the kind of thing that we
will be monitoring as we move forward in our programming to see
what happens. At this point, it is very early in the
administration.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Do you have any idea when the
reassessment of the--and, Dr. Smith, I guess this would be to
you--when that policy may be forthcoming?
Ms. Smith. It is an ongoing conversation, and I would also
note that the list of specially designated nationals--it is a
living document. It is intended to reflect the realities on the
ground and to be aimed at those who are undermining democracy
in Zimbabwe. So it is a living organism, if you will.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. What is the reaction, and what is
the status now of the faith community, the churches, the
believes, the clerics? Are they at risk? Are they critical of
Mugabe? Or are they trying to find some way to preserve what
human rights they currently possess, for them and for the
people?
Ms. Smith. I think both the faith-based community and civil
society more broadly certainly have expressed concerns. At the
same time, you know, these are people of remarkable courage and
fortitude that they have demonstrated over the years.
From the perspective of the U.S. Government, I know these
are people with whom our Embassy and our representatives here
in Washington want to engage with very closely, and we will
rely on, you know, sort of them but also this is a measure of
accountability for the government. What happens with political
space, what happens with freedom of religion, what happens with
members of the faith-based community, that is the measure of
the government as it moves forward.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Are there any bills or pieces of
legislation that you see or decrees that you know of that might
be a further restriction of religious freedom?
Ms. Smith. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. Let me just ask one final
question. I remember Andy Natsios once telling me how appalling
it was that Mugabe could take what is a bread basket country
that was exporting to its neighbors, and turn it into a food-
deprived country in need of imports of foreign aid that happens
to be food.
Are there any indications that you see, any early warning
signs--Mr. Amani, this might be to you--that might suggest, you
know, there is any crisis on the horizon, food-wise?
Mr. Amani. There has been a recent vulnerability assessment
that has been undertaken in Zimbabwe that indicates that the
number of people who will be in need of humanitarian assistance
over the next year, over the next--the hunger period, which
runs from about now through March, is going to be significantly
higher than it was a year ago.
About a year ago we thought that 1.6 million people were
going to be in need of humanitarian assistance. It looks like
2.2 million will now be in need of humanitarian assistance.
Some of that is due to climatic conditions in drought, some of
it is due to poor performance of the agricultural sector, and
some of it has to do with the fact that Zimbabwe has used up
many of its reserves in responding to previous problems. So it
does look like it is getting worse in the short term.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Sure. How will that be met? Will
the international community rally, including ourselves, to meet
that humanitarian need? And is there anything specific,
tangible, that you can convey to us, so that we have a sense of
what our responsibility should be in the Congress?
Mr. Amani. Right. We are prepared--we are providing
assistance through our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance--
--
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Right.
Mr. Amani [continuing]. And through our Food for Peace
programming. So we have already offered $15 million in
assistance. We have ongoing programs in the areas affected by
the drought to improve economic resilience, and we will be
looking at further assistance down the line.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. How much do we provide--food
aid?
Mr. Amani. We have a $20 million Food for Peace Program. We
have offered $15 million in more immediate humanitarian
assistance. And we have our ongoing agricultural promotion Feed
the Future kinds of activities.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Now, the 1.6 million to 2.2
million, when will they get the 2.2 million people at risk or--
--
Mr. Amani. This is the hunger period when the stocks are
low for families and they are waiting for the new harvest. So
this is a period, as I said, starting about now, that runs
through March.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. March.
Mr. Amani. And this is the period that we need to be
active. We are working very closely with other entities,
including the World Food Program, and other international
organizations, NGOs, and with other donors to respond to it.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Does the World Food Program have a
specific appeal out on behalf of the----
Mr. Amani. Yes.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey.--600,000?
Mr. Amani. Yes.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. When did that go out?
Mr. Amani. I am not sure.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you
very much.
I would like to yield to Ms. Bass.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
This is a general question for both of you. Given our
relationship with Zimbabwe, I just wonder how you function
there, you know, and specifically for you, Dr. Smith, I am
wondering if the President's initiative around young leaders,
if there are leaders that we are engaging with in Zimbabwe,
and, if so, how?
And then, you know what I mean? In other words, the
conditions in which they must function? And then in terms of
USAID, the same question in terms of, how are you able to
function in what I imagine would be a rather hostile
environment?
Ms. Smith. I will leave the operational side more to Todd,
but, I mean, Zimbabwe, as you know, like much of Southern
Africa, has an enormous youth population. It is a very vibrant
society. It is an increasingly technologically wired up
society.
And Ambassador Wharton there is doing a terrific job of
reaching out to youth and to Zimbabweans in general through a
variety of communications.
Ms. Bass. He hasn't blocked the Internet?
Ms. Smith. No. We still have communications there, and it
is--you know, as I believe Todd said in his opening statement,
it is the next generation of democratic leaders, too, that we
very much want to nurture. It is not an easy political
environment, but it is--that makes the work even more
important.
Ms. Bass. Why do you think he allows that? I mean, why do
you think he allows the Internet and hasn't taken steps?
Ms. Smith. I don't think I could speculate on the motives
there.
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Mr. Amani. I will note that when I visited Zimbabwe in
March I sat in on what we call a listening session with young
leaders in Zimbabwe, and I must say it was one of the most
moving experiences I have had was to hear from them, all of
whom had faced at some point some sort of an issue, whether
they were dealing with HIV/AIDS or had experienced repression
based on their political activism, or for whatever reason.
But they had responded to that by joining or forming an
organization that addressed those issues, and joining with
other young Zimbabweans to speak out and be clear about what
they were facing and what they--their vision for Zimbabwe in
the future. So we owe them our support over time, and we are
hopeful that through President Obama's Young African Leaders
Initiative we can provide support to youth.
As Shannon mentioned, it is not an easy place to work when
it is difficult to work with some institutions or we don't--we
see--don't see the responsiveness to important information.
One of the things we have been trying to do on the
macroeconomic side, for example, is provide very solid data on
what is happening in the economy, so that it can serve as a
solid basis for decision-making by economic policymakers. And
we are hopeful that that kind of good data can be used by the
current government as well.
Ms. Bass. Do you know if those young leaders that we are
working with, are they at risk? Do they experience harassment,
or does it fly under the radar?
Mr. Amani. Some of them have received--have been victims of
harassment. Most of them have had some difficulty in operating
like you would like to. But as I said, they seem to have been
able to rise above that and continue their work and engage more
broadly with other youth in trying to improve the conditions in
Zimbabwe.
Ms. Bass. And do you see him, from his point of view,
having a group of younger leaders that he is grooming? I mean,
he is 89. He is, you know, at some point----
Mr. Amani. I couldn't comment on that. I don't know.
Ms. Bass. What did you say?
Mr. Amani. I couldn't comment on that. I don't know.
Ms. Bass. You don't know?
Mr. Amani. No.
Ms. Smith. I would note that cabinet appointments did not
necessarily reflect a youth movement, but----
Ms. Bass. He appointed his peers? Okay. Thank you.
You mentioned the food program, Mr. Amani, and I was
wondering if you could describe a little more about that. Is
this food that we export? Is it from the United States? Do we
buy locally and provide it in Zimbabwe? Or what are the
specifics?
Mr. Amani. I am not sure exactly how we do it in Zimbabwe.
I believe that some of the support was for local purchase
rather than U.S. food that was shipped there. We can do either
in our programs.
Much of our program is also focused on building resiliency
in families and helping to make sure that the food they have is
used so that they get the maximum nutritional benefit from it.
So we have found that even though sometimes families have
access to food they don't get the full nutrition out of it that
they could. So there is a lot of effort to focus on helping
families use the food that is available in the most nutritious
ways, and also to just help them build their own stocks, build
their own capacity to withstand these kinds of shocks that can
happen cyclically at times.
Ms. Bass. Is that part of Feed the Future? Or does Feed the
Future function programmatically in Zimbabwe?
Mr. Amani. Feed the Future does function programmatically.
What I was describing is more related to our Food for Peace
programs that focus on really the poorest and most at need
populations in the country. Feed the Future is focused more on
sort of the policy environment for future growth in the
agricultural sector.
It is focused on some key value chains that have the
potential to increase in a significant way the availability of
food and to help Zimbabwe be, as Chairman Smith mentioned, the
bread basket--future bread basket--of Southern Africa.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Just two very quick questions. It
is my understanding that some $700,000 was put into SADC for an
election observation. What did they do with it? Did they give
it back? Did it get used in some other way?
Mr. Amani. We sent up----
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Is it in escrow?
Mr. Amani. We sent up a congressional notification for
that, but ultimately, as I said, we didn't provide that money
to SADC.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. It never went.
Mr. Amani. Yes.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. That is good. And, secondly,
we are going to be hearing from Arthur Gwagwa from the Zimbabwe
Human Rights NGO Forum, which I know you are very familiar
with. How treacherous is it for human rights organizations and
researchers and advocates to operate in Zimbabwe today, as of
right now?
Mr. Amani. It has been a difficult situation for them to
work in, and we could provide more information in a separate
opportunity. But this is--it is a difficult situation.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Could you provide that for the
record at least? And is that a fear of being arrested,
harassed, beaten? You know, I know of what has happened, and I
just want to know right now, snapshot today, if I am a human
rights researcher, what are my risks in Zimbabwe?
Ms. Smith. The snapshot today is uncertain, and I suspect
your next witness can probably give you the best read out of
all in answer to that question. But it is certainly something
we would be happy to follow up with you and your staff on.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I appreciate that very much. And
thank you for your patience in the lateness in starting, and
thank you for your insights today.
I would like to now ask our--unless you have anything you
would like to add----
Ms. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Amani. Thank you.
Ms. Smith [continuing]. Ranking Member Bass.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I would like to now invite to the
witness table our next two panelists, beginning first with Mr.
Arthur Gwagwa, who works as an international advocacy
coordinator with the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a human
rights coalition of 19 members and the first organization in
Zimbabwe to also have presence in the global north.
He conducts research and advocates on the human rights
situation in Zimbabwe in that role. He works closely with EU
structures, the UNHRC, and of course our own Government. He is
a lawyer by background, dually admitted to practice in both
Zimbabwe and in England. Mr. Gwagwa is based in London, but
frequently travels to Zimbabwe.
Welcome, and thank you for making the trip here.
We will then hear from Ms. Imani Countess, who is the
Africa region program director for the American Center for
International Labor Solidarity for the AFL-CIO. She is
responsible for the overall programmatic and financial
management of the program, which includes activities in 15
African countries.
Prior to this position, she served as the Zimbabwe country
director for the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs with responsibility for program
development, oversight, implementation of democracy
strengthening programs, donor relations, and representation.
Ms. Countess has previously held positions with the
TransAfrica Forum, the American Friends Service Committee,
Shared Interest, the Africa Policy Information Center, and the
U.S. African Development Foundation.
Thank you, both. Mr. Gwagwa.
STATEMENT OF MR. ARTHUR GWAGWA, INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY
COORDINATOR, ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM
Mr. Gwagwa. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass,
and other committee members, for granting me this opportunity
to testify before this House.
I would request the committee to admit my written
testimony, together with all of the annexes, as part of the
record.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Without objection, all testimony,
any attachments, will be made a part of the record.
Mr. Gwagwa. Thank you. I frequently visit Zimbabwe, and I
was in Zimbabwe last week. I traveled extensively around the
country. I met all civil society leaders, and I had interviews
with members of the diplomatic community, including the United
States, Canada, Norway, and SADC diplomats as well.
In writing this statement, I adopted an evidence, you know,
based approach. I did not really express my own opinion, but
collected evidence from Zimbabweans about what, you know, they
are thinking about the situation.
So I have clearly set out the views in support of, you
know, the current measures by the United States of America on
Zimbabwe, and I have also clearly set out the views of those
Zimbabweans who say, you know, that sanctions, you know, should
be removed. And I have also clearly set out what I call the
middle ground of, you know, those who are saying, yes, you
know, the sanctions should go, but not immediately.
In terms of, you know, our approach, you know, those who
have instructed me to represent Zimbabwe civil society
organizations today, we do not really have a very clear
position to say, ``Well, U.S.A. should take this stance or
should take that stance.'' It is up to the Government of
America to make, you know, that decision, based on the evidence
that we collected from, you know, the Zimbabweans.
But my own assessment of the situation when I went, you
know, to Zimbabwe recently in 2012 and 2011 is that currently
it is a country that is, you know, going through a very
difficult time where people are whispering their aspirations
and expectations, and their disappointment with what happened,
but they do not really have the freedom to talk about such
issues in public for fear of persecution.
I should commend, you know, the government, you know, for
holding a violent-free election. You know, that is a huge
credit, because not many people were killed, not many people
were injured, and not many people were maimed in comparison
with previous elections, particularly the 2008 Presidential
runoff. That is a positive.
But the credibility of an election cannot be assessed just
on the basis of, you know, lack of violence, but other factors
that are outlined in my statement. And one of the issues is
outlined on page 3 of my testimony. That is, you know, the
state of compliance with and breach of obligations under the
national law, treaties, and conventions, that Zimbabwe is party
to.
Although cases of politically motivated matters,
abductions, disappearances, torture, and intimidation have gone
down in comparison to 2008, the situation is still worrying.
The military is looming large. And people were not given a
chance to express, you know, their democratic right to choose a
government of their own choice, the widespread violations and
separation of the right of freedom of association, assembly,
movement, exercise of profession, including politically
motivated reprisals.
I interviewed the barristers, who are called advocates in
Zimbabwe. And they were actually afraid that maybe the library
where we are holding the interview was bugged. They could--if
top lawyers in a country cannot freely express themselves, I
think it is really worrying, because I am a lawyer myself who
practiced in Zimbabwe for close to 10 years, and I am a
barrister in the U.K., and I know how worrying it can be if
lawyers are being dragged or being referred to the prosecuting
authority by a judge of the High Court simply because they are
exercising their right to practice their profession.
And some of these young lawyers who are now leading the
chambers, I trained them, you know, before I left Zimbabwe in
2001. And it is really worrying to see an attack on lawyers
that is an advocate--Beatrice Mtetwa, and other human rights
defenders, including Jestina Mukoko, Abel Chikomo, who is
another--the executive director of the Forum.
Abel Chikomo next week is going to be in court being
accused of running an illegal organization when in fact the law
in Zimbabwe actually allows an organization to run on the basis
of being a common law entity. It doesn't have to be registered
under the Private Organizations Act.
At the moment, there are fears that the government might
resurrect the NGO bill. That might impair and maim, you know,
the work that we are doing in trying to promote political
pluralism. There is widespread violation of freedom of
expression, access to information, as seen particularly during
the past election where the MDC requested for--in order for
them to assess their rights in the electoral court, but that
right was denied.
There are violations of property rights, and the government
continues to make provocative statements that are leading to
capital flight, and it is my submission before this committee
that if the Government of Zimbabwe is serious about, you know,
reengagement, it should stop--and I say categorically, stop
making provocative statements that are leading the country on a
downhill path, and they should stop insults, you know,
targeted, you know, toward the diplomatic community.
So in terms of the options that are open to the U.S.A., I
would--there is a dossier of reasons why, you know, the
sanctions--people are saying the sanctions should be removed.
But the main reason being that, you know, the sanctions have
actually given the regime, you know, choose to keep on, you
know, tormenting its people.
I spoke to the Embassy leaders. You know, they are holding,
you know, the same argument. But my view is that when the world
is retreating in fear, countries like the United States of
America should not cower but should hold onto its principles
and ideals that makes, you know, this nation great. It should
stand as a moral leader to fill that particular vacuum that
other people of, you know, weak spine are afraid, you know, to
fill.
So in terms of, you know, my own take, I would go for
Secretary Clinton's action for action principle that--action
for action, because we send a very wrong signal, not only to
Zimbabwe but to the region and to the world, particularly in
the current, you know, climate of instability, if were to
reward intransigence.
What the United States of America, you know, should do is
to balance--to do a balancing act in terms of which they
distinguish the state from the nation, safeguarding the
economic interests of the nation of Zimbabwe and the people of
Zimbabwe, but taking measures I think against those who are
making, you know, their country of Zimbabwe, you know, to
continue suffering.
I have outlined, you know, the principles that I believe
would actually be very, very relevant in elaborating on the
action and action principle. In terms of the areas that I think
the United States of America should focus on in terms of, you
know, supporting Zimbabwe, economic recovery and resilience for
the small holder farmers, but also ensuring that Zimbabwe
diamonds are traded openly on the market in terms of, you know,
the Kimberley Process, political pluralism, healing and
reconciliation, rule of law and justice, citizenship
participation, institutional reform, and access to services,
including access to justice, culture, arts, and information
technology.
We have seen across the world how information technology
can be an impetus in social change, democracy, and advancement
of human rights. But we have also seen how information
technology can be used by repressive governments in surveilling
and oppressing, you know, people's rights. So information
technology is a very crucial role that I think the United
States of America can support.
And, finally, the issue of culture. Ambassador Bruce
Wharton is doing a fantastic job in that regard. He started,
you know, the bicycle diplomacy. I actually happen to be an
expert on cultural diplomacy, spoken a lot at the Institute of
Culture and Diplomacy in Germany, and I want to see, you know,
culture-to-culture interaction with the United States of
America and Zimbabwe. We used to have Loyola University
students coming to Zimbabwe. I think more of that, so that we
have got an exchange of ideas and principles, that would make
for a very strong world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gwagwa follows:]
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----------
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much for your
testimony.
Ms. Countess.
STATEMENT OF MS. IMANI COUNTESS, REGIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR
AFRICA, THE SOLIDARITY CENTER
Ms. Countess. Good afternoon. Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Bass, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
Solidarity Center Board of Trustees and staff, thank you for
inviting us to testify today. I will give brief remarks on the
subject and ask that my written testimony and annexes be
submitted.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Countess. Thank you. For over a decade, the Solidarity
Center has worked with trade unions in Zimbabwe to strengthen
their capacity to defend worker rights and advocate for
sustainable economic policies and human rights protections.
We, along with unions in Southern Africa, the AFL-CIO, and
its allied organizations here in the U.S., are deeply concerned
about the situation in Zimbabwe, and we welcome this
opportunity to provide our perspective as a part of this
hearing.
Since the results of the July 31 elections were released,
criticism, including that of our union partners, the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions, the ZCTU, and the Labor and Economic
Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe, LEDRIZ, has
centered primarily on the deeply flawed electoral process. Yet
in the midst of an unclear and highly polarized political
environment, it is very easy to lose sight of the dramatic
changes that have occurred in the country over the past 5
years, including economic stabilization, largely peaceful
elections, and a new constitution that has been endorsed by
voters.
Affairs have significantly improved from 5 or even 10 years
ago, and building on the current strengths can lead to
continued improvements in the economy as well as democracy and
governance. So while the path ahead may seem troubled,
objectively it is somewhat clear: There is a need for continued
support for democratic institutions that are independent and
that have integrity.
Despite what may be seen as a step backward politically,
organizations and groups are creating space for independent
action and dialogue with an eye toward addressing the yawning
social and economic needs of the country. Any analysis of
Zimbabwe's way forward has to involve a discussion about how
the country is to revive its once strong and diverse economy.
And while there is no clear and obvious way forward, there are
basic principles and steps that should be beyond dispute.
First, the country is blessed with a wealth of strategic
minerals, diamonds, and other commodities. However, the wealth
generated by them is being utilized in inefficient and corrupt
ways. The country's once strong manufacturing and agricultural
sectors have steadily withered, and mining is not realizing its
job creation potential or helping rebuild the foundation for a
stable working class in the country.
Zimbabwe has an opportunity to learn from the resource
curves from which so many countries have suffered, and to work
toward an open, transparent government where any citizen can
see where and how income derived from natural resources is
spent. Yet today Zimbabwe has no governmental institutions that
promote transparency around the use of funds generated by
natural resource mining.
Zimbabwe clearly needs an economic plan and a trade plan
that prioritize investments and industrialization and job
creation. Africa's trade unions have emphasized the need for
accelerating industrialization in Africa. They recognize that
the current model, based largely on the export of raw extracted
minerals, fosters dependency on Western and Asian markets,
which leaves the continent exposed to numerous economic shocks
and perpetuates the pattern of jobless growth, leaving Africa
less stable and less secure.
Last April, I met with the workers at the RioZim Empress
Nickel Refinery in Kadoma, a town located about 100 kilometers
south of Zimbabwe's capital city, Harare. There workers
emphasized the need to add value to the country's natural
resources. One said to me, ``If Zimbabwe only exported the raw
mat'' or material ``from which nickel, copper, and cobalt is
extracted, the 600 workers at our refinery would be jobless.''
Those jobs pay between $200 and $1,700 per month and are
highly coveted, given Zimbabwe's 80 percent unemployment. The
refinery manager is also a strong proponent of
industrialization. He is certain that industrialization is the
only way to increase local employment. In fact, he says of the
current refining process, ``We should go further. We should
produce parts. We have nickel, iron ore, all the minerals one
needs to produce alloys required to make parts. That is what we
need to do.''
Today the refinery produces nickel and copper sheets that
are exported to South Africa and Western Europe. In October,
the International Labor Organization, ILO, will send a high-
level technical team to Zimbabwe to implement recommendations
made by a Commission of Inquiry on respect for freedom of
association and the right to bargain collectively, because of
the country's ongoing and systematic failure to respect freedom
of association.
Those failures led to the country's inclusion in the June
2013 hearings at the ILO's Committee on Application of
Standards as one of the 25 worst countries regarding labor
rights violations because it has failed to uphold international
labor standards and even failed to ensure compliance with its
own national laws.
In addition to issues of anti-union discrimination by
companies, including state-controlled enterprises, violations
include unfair dismissals, non-payment of wages, underpayment
of wages, as well as worker harassment and intimidation.
Hopefully, the Government of Zimbabwe will finally act on
the ILO recommendations and demonstrate a willingness to uphold
the rule of law, or it can continue to be seen as a major
violator of worker rights by the international labor community.
As the newly elected government in Zimbabwe has choices, so,
too, does the United States, which is of course the reason for
this hearing.
In terms of policy, the U.S. Government has a variety of
tools at its disposal that can be used to support rule of law
and worker rights in Zimbabwe and to encourage the Government
of Zimbabwe to do the same. These investments in Zimbabwe
citizens and their institutions have and can continue to
produce positive outcomes by leveling the playing field in ways
that can lead to a more stable economy and one that ultimately
provides benefits to all.
Specifically, the U.S. Government should continue to
actively support civil society institutions that move the
dialogue in Zimbabwe and proactively focus on democratic
reform, human rights, and absolutely vital economic reforms.
Zimbabwe's labor movement and its allies will continue to push
for the creation of greater political dialogue on economic
reform and discussions among labor, business, and government,
to move policy actions.
It is too early to see if this dialogue will continue in
the current economic environment. However, what is clear is
that organizations and institutions that are moving these
debates in terms of economic reform clearly need continued
support.
I thank you and welcome your comments.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Countess follows:]
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Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you, Ms. Countess. Let me
ask you, with regards to the ILO team that is going in October,
who do they expect to meet with? Is there a sense that they
will be well received, or is this going to be, you know, a very
difficult uphill battle for them?
And along those same lines, Mr. Gwagwa, you might recall
back in 2005 the African Union sent a human rights observer. He
got to the airport and that's about as far as he got. He was
sent back. Although a U.N. researcher, rapporteur for want of a
better word, was sent on the housing issue and that report was
devastating, and it did have an impact in at least exposing
what Mugabe was doing when he was just literally leveling whole
stretches of housing.
So if you could, the ILO, what are the realistic
expectations? Do you know who is heading it for the ILO?
Ms. Countess. Unfortunately, I don't know who is heading
the delegation. I did speak actually earlier this week with ILO
representatives who made it very clear that it is their
intention to travel in October.
It is unclear at this point in time how they will be
received. I would speculate, though, I will sort of go out a
little bit on a limb, and say that the government will receive
them. The government challenged vigorously earlier this summer
their inclusion in the current case and made it very clear that
they would like to see things differently. And so I don't have
the sense that they would refuse entry to the ILO.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Now, when labor leaders----
Ms. Countess. Yes.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey [continuing]. Meet with the ILO in
country, what risk does that entail? You testified that there
are some 150 workers that are part of organized----
Ms. Countess. 150,000.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey.--150,000, I am sorry, representing
30 affiliates. Has there been growth in union membership, or
decline? Is it static? And what happens to those who are
already part of the union? You mentioned dismissal wages, but
is that, you know, for people who are aspiring to become
organized and part of the labor union, or people who are
currently in a union?
Ms. Countess. The union membership in Zimbabwe has declined
significantly. It has declined because of the virtual collapse
of the economy. There has been incredible loss in terms of
every sector of the economy--textiles, agricultural production,
mining, and so forth. And many of the areas that have seen
growth--for example, mining--those workers for the most part
are not unionized, and the level of violation of basic worker
rights is extremely high.
In terms of the level of risk, trade unionist, particularly
trade union leaders, do experience a high level of risk,
without a doubt. They are aware of that risk, and they assume
the responsibility for representing workers, and they embrace
that responsibility. So they don't run from the risk. In fact,
one of our partners said they assume that one in five of their
staff is a part of the security sector, and there to inform.
And so there is a level of maturity, a level of awareness,
but overall a high level of commitment to advancing the cause
of worker rights in the country.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Can I just ask you, because I know
the South African trade unions have been a great ally of the
trade unions in Zimbabwe, has that influenced the South African
Government to be more robust in its protestations?
Ms. Countess. There are very clear examples in the past of
COSATU in particular being able to use its power, its muscle,
to change or nudge changes in the policy of the South African
Government. I think that given the current situation that we
are in with the election in Zimbabwe and the response of the
South African Government, we clearly are at a point in time
where there needs to be an intensification of the dialogue
between the trade unions of South Africa and Zimbabwe.
One of the things that the trade union regional groupings
took--was able to organize prior to the elections was its own
observation mission that included over 20 trade union leaders
from about 13 countries. They came, they observed, in
partnership with the ZCTU, and they came out with a report that
was extremely critical and they applauded the country for the
peaceful elections but noted that there was no possibility for
free and fair elections and that the elections were not
credible.
So you have got the trade unions in the region who are of
an opinion that the election was not credible, and they have
communicated by and large their views to their governments and
will continue to do so.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Let me ask you, Mr. Gwagwa, in
your testimony you say, ``Now is not the time for the U.S.A. to
cower or whisper on Zimbabwe or hide Zimbabwe behind the Syrian
agenda,'' which I think is a very important point. Very often
we fail to multi-task the way we should, and next thing you
know very important abuses and deteriorations in other
countries don't get the focus that they ought to.
One of the reasons why we are having this hearing today is
to keep our focus as a committee and to, you know, dialogue
with our executive branch but also to ask your input.
But let me--have we made Zimbabwe a sufficient priority in
our foreign policy? You did speak very well of our Ambassador,
and I am sure he will be glad to hear that. But if you could
elaborate on the overall policy. Is it as robust as you would
like it to be?
Secondly, if you could comment, as I mentioned a moment ago
about, is it time for the AU? You know, in 2005, the human
rights officer tried to get in, didn't get in, to resend, you
know, a person to observe human rights. It might have a
chilling effect even on any deterioration, just like I do
believe the ILO mission will have nothing but positive impact
going forward.
And you did speak of flight post-election. Are those
properties then confiscated by the government when people
leave? And how widespread is that? Are people really uprooting
and leaving out of fear? If you could.
Mr. Gwagwa. In terms of the U.S. policy, while I think, you
know, the U.S. has really been doing enough, because there are
other fishes to fry. And we can't expect--you know, the U.S.
cannot be putting all of its focus on Zimbabwe when there are
people dying in Syria, in Egypt, and other nations of the
world.
But the overall impression is that, you know, Zimbabwe is a
slow-burning situation, which is why it is on the back burner
of, you know, many countries', you know, foreign policies,
because you can't compare Zimbabwe to Syria. You can't compare
it to Egypt, because you don't see people dying in the streets,
you don't see a lot of people being--because, you know, there
are factors or--the situation--the factors in Syria, Egypt, and
Zimbabwe are totally different, because Zimbabweans are peace-
loving people.
We are long-suffering, and we know that happened between
1965 and 1980. We are not a fighting country, but it does not
mean that we are not angry. So because of that, it is a slow-
burning situation. Sometimes, you know, people say, ``Well,
there are better countries to be focusing on.''
But in terms of, you know, regional stability and in terms
of within the region, I actually think, you know, they should
be more focused on Zimbabwe because I have seen the reactive
foreign policies where we--governments want to go and wage wars
instead of, you know, taking preventative measures so that, you
know, such atrocities, you know, do not take place in the first
place. So, yes, the U.S. has been doing, but it could do better
in terms of engagement.
And, number two, the issue of, you know, sending another
representative, Zimbabwe has been notoriously known, even at
the United Nations Human Rights Council for ignoring requests
for visits, special rapporteurs.
In 2010, you know, Manfred Nowak, who was, you know,
deported at the airport, and we worked with special
rapporteurs. Most of them have been ignored, and I actually
think it is high time we had special rapporteur, for example,
on independence of judges and employers to visit, you know, the
country.
And then, third question on the human rights violations,
there was serious escalation from August 2012 to about, you
know, June, May/June. But the reason why there was a little or
sort of like a retreat by the government in terms of their
attack on human rights defenders was that they switched their
attention from attacking human rights defenders to electoral
manipulation.
We begin to see central intimidation, judicial complicity,
where if a judge attacks you you can't say anything in public
because you will be down for contempt of court. So it became
more central because it is the truth of trade that, you know,
the government--they employed new tools. But now we see a rise
in attacks again.
And I could talk of maybe the MDC's organizing secretary,
Morgan Komichi, whose crime was simply that he picked a ballot
paper and he gave it to the Election Commission. He is
languishing in detention. Jestina Mukoko--the organization is
facing, you know, delisting. Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum is
facing attacks. Even Morgan Tsvangirai himself last week at the
funeral of Enos Nkala in Bulawayo, the leader of the war
veterans said Tsvangirai should not return to his rural home.
That's really scary.
So in terms of the attacks, there is a lot of intimidation.
And it is likely to increase unless, you know, something is
done.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Has any request been made to the
U.N. to investigate this intimidation of lawyers and judges?
Because, you know, we could do that here as a committee, and
certainly join you. That is something we could do--you know,
collaborate with you.
Mr. Gwagwa. In the past, because our organization was
actually responsible for--well, was part of that team that
lobbied Minister Patrick Chinamasa, you know, now planning to
visit Zimbabwe in May 2014 as part of the negotiations. But we
have requested--what we have done is because the government
rejects the applications, you know, for country visits, so what
we end up doing is we invite the special rapporteurs to attend
our annual events, particularly the introduction of human
rights day on 10 December.
But the downside to that is that if they are invited for a
working arrangement because they haven't been invited by the
government, they cannot comment on the situation in the
country. They can only make anecdotal, you know, references.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I see.
Mr. Gwagwa. So I think, you know, there is actually--if the
government is saying--is committed to reforms, what are they
afraid of? I actually think, you know, the special rapporteur,
independent of judges and lawyers, should come into the
country. And then also, Frank LaRue, the Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom at
Expression and Opinion, which is the mandate that also covers
elections and access to information.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. One last question before yielding
to Ms. Bass. When is Zimbabwe's periodic review at the Human
Rights Council? Is that coming up anytime soon?
Mr. Gwagwa. I actually happen to be part of their civil
society team, you know, that does that. Zimbabwe was reviewed
in October 2011, and the report was adopted on the 12th of
March last year, 2012. So the midterm review is going to be in
March of next year.
So the government is preparing for that, and we are
preparing for that. And thank goodness we have been working
quite well with the government on that, in terms of the UPR,
because the UPR doesn't threaten, you know, the government. You
know, Minister Patrick Chinamasa has been doing a fantastic
job. We will wait to see how Emmerson Mnangagwa is going to
cooperate with, you know, civil society.
But I am going to be having a Skype interview with the
United Nations next week on maybe strategic areas, where we
think we need support. So I couldn't go to the Human Rights
Council session, which is undergoing as we speak, because of
this commitment. But we have a Skype interview to discuss
strategy in terms of where the country goes from now.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. I just have a couple of questions. I
wanted to know your opinion, both of you, about the African
Union and the African Union's emphasis and discussion about
governance, supporting, promoting, good governance. And also
maybe a new tenure in the AU where they in the past had wanted
to have real hands-off on governance.
And I am wondering, do you see the role being any different
in Zimbabwe? I understand that the AU accepted the results of
the elections, but I mean more in terms of supporting the
development of better governance in Zimbabwe.
Ms. Countess. It is a really difficult question, because
what we all saw in terms of both the AU, in SADC, and South
Africa's response to the elections, is that these bodies, and
South Africa as a country, have prioritized peace in terms of
an absence of violence.
And it is very difficult moving forward to see to what
extent these international bodies and countries can be
encouraged to prioritize accountability. Already, within just a
matter of weeks, I do know that some civil society
organizations and trade unions in Southern Africa have
organized a new network, a network that is designed to pressure
SADC to be more accountable to the will of the majority of the
peoples of the region.
It is called ``The SADC We Want,'' and it is new, and it is
just rolling out its agenda. And it is unclear what impact it
will have.
But what I do believe, and it is echoed in my comments, is
that the only way in which we can see an increased
accountability of AU, SADC, South Africa, and other governments
is through citizen engagement and citizen power, including
worker power. And until we get more of that----
Ms. Bass. Right.
Ms. Countess [continuing]. It is not clear.
Ms. Bass. Got it.
Mr. Gwagwa. Just briefly, I support what she is saying,
because I think particularly the subject places relationships
above principles. Although there have been changes of--a change
in government in different countries, but, you know, the issue
of liberation, war, solidarity still looms large in the region.
And also, the culture--patriarchy, where you cannot be seen
to disrespect your elders, even us I think within civil society
we face the same issue. You meet Zimbabwean diplomats across
the world. They say, ``Young man, who do you think you are?''
But the world is changing.
I am same age as David Cameron, George Osborne, and even
President Obama. And so the world is changing. I think African
leaders have to change in terms of their cultural paradigm,
that you only--you need a white hair in order for you to be a
leader.
AU is still problematic as well. Mrs. Dlamini Zuma, when
she went to Zimbabwe prior to the elections, you know, she was
partisan. She was clearly pros here, because she is part of
that liberation movement.
We see what happened when the foreign affairs advisor to
Jacob Zuma wanted to be outspoken regarding what is happening
in Zimbabwe, how she was silenced and how Botswana is being
sidelined as a result of his unprincipled stance. But I see
signs of change across Africa through social change which is
being prompted by ICTs and globalization.
I see young people driving social change, so I think there
is need for investment in that regard. And there are also
structures like the African Commission for Human and People's
Rights, although some Commissioners maybe believe in their--may
be--shall I say, I see quite a diversification in terms of
Commissioners. Commissioners are really committed to human
rights.
So I think working with the African Commission, African
Court on Human and People's Rights, and other structures within
the African Union can actually help to support the calls for
good governance and democracy. But above all, we need social
change. That is investment in social change projects,
participatory democracy projects that empower citizens and
reinvigorating our democracy in Africa.
Thank you.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. And then, a final question is about
the impact of U.S. sanctions now, whether or not they--well,
one, what you think of the impact, and how you have seen the
impact on the ground; but, two, what do you think needs to be
changed? Should it be increased? Expanded? Decreased? What?
Mr. Gwagwa. Well, to be honest, my organization doesn't
have a view on sanctions. And we also do not usually want to
talk about it, I think partly because of, you know, the fear
that it can actually be banned, you know, from Zimbabwe as a
result of----
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Mr. Gwagwa [continuing]. Sanctions. So I won't say--because
we don't have a stance on the issue of sanctions, but I
provided a dossier of what Zimbabweans are saying on sanctions,
from page--it is page 19 to 21.
There is a strong view that the sanctions should go, but
not because there have been reforms in Zimbabwe, but the major
reason is that some people actually think that the sanctions
have actually helped the government to--because the issue about
the government is that they are cushioned by diamond revenues,
and their children continue to go to Western universities and
to good schools like, you know, St. George's, Prince Edward,
those top schools within the country.
So in terms of real impacts on the politicians, it has been
very minimal. But, and there are other reasons, again, that the
bureaucrats who preside over institutions like Zimbabwe
Election Commission, the High Court, and all of that, those
people were affected by sanctions, maybe not really affected
but some--sorry, some of them were affected by sanctions.
Maybe they saw their standard of living maybe going down.
So they can never forgive the West, I think on the issue of
sanctions. So the danger is that when we want to work with
them, they might say, ``Well, we don't want to work with you
because you guys you push for sanctions.''
So, in other words, the agenda for institutional reform is
going to be very difficult in the presence of sanctions,
because expecting the same people to reform institutions is not
different from expecting Emanghe to preside over an agenda to
abolish a forest. It is another way of saying, reform the
institutions, but, you know, there are sanctions.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Gwagwa. So my personal view is that maybe they should
go. It is a difficult view, but I think maybe they should go
not for--to appease the government----
Ms. Bass. No. You are saying because it is a rallying point
for the government.
Mr. Gwagwa. Yes. Because it is a rallying point for the
government.
Ms. Bass. I understand.
Ms. Countess. I would just want to echo what has just been
said. The sanctions really have very little impact when we are
talking about travel restrictions on 100 or so people and
commercial licensing restrictions on a handful of enterprises.
They don't have a significant impact on the country. They are
essentially a red herring.
They are used by the government, by the Government of
Zimbabwe, to--you know, as a real rallying point, they enable
the government to use the West as sort of like a whipping post.
The previous Ambassador used to really challenge the
Government of Zimbabwe on this question of sanctions, and he
would remind the government that during the colonial era when
Rhodesia was sanctioned, the U.S. imposed chrome sanctions and
other sanctions against the Government of Rhodesia. The
Rhodesian economy actually grew because they were forced to do
more with less. And so, again, the previous Ambassador kind of
threw that back, without much response.
I don't want to speak on behalf of the trade unions of
Zimbabwe. But having lived there for several years, what I can
certainly say, based on my personal experience, is that there
is very little impact.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much.
And, Ms. Bass, thank you.
Mr. Gwagwa, thank you, and Ms. Countess, for your very,
very enlightening, very incisive answers. Your testimony really
does help this committee, and I hope it helps all listeners,
including in the administration who, you know, benefit from
your counsel.
I won't ask you for an answer because you did give a very
elaborate answer on sanctions. I have believed for a long time
in sanctions that are even more microtargeted--I have a bill
pending right now called Jacob's Law that seeks to hold human
rights abusers accountable.
It is even more narrow if they abuse American citizens,
although the Magnitsky Act was one of those with--vis-a-vis
Russia that seeks to pick out individuals, and if they are
complicit in crimes, human rights abuse, they and they alone
are the ones, not a more blanket sanction. And I think we are
trending in human rights policy toward more of that, because
that is a more effective way of doing it.
And so but I do thank you for your testimonies. They were
extraordinary. If you have anything you wanted to add before we
conclude? Yes.
Mr. Gwagwa. Yes. All I can say is I think the issue of
sanctions is entirely up to your government to make a decision
on that. I think, as you have said, I think maybe a new
approach, we have been working with the EU on that--I think a
much more responsive approach, you know, which is based on
compassion I think for the people, because politicians all
across the world, you know, sometimes they are not--sometimes
they have got their own, you know, narrow agendas. But it is a
question of maybe, how do you look beyond politicians and have
compassion for the people, but it is a difficult balancing act.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Very good.
Mr. Gwagwa. No one could ever get it right. The EU is
struggling with the same question.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. It is a very tough question. I
have been here 33 years. I voted to impose sanctions on South
Africa. As a matter of fact, in this room when we had that
vote, I was the only Republican who voted for it, but there
were people, including the Reagan administration, who argued
that it would hurt the average South African even more. And I
didn't dismiss that argument. I thought it had some validity,
but apartheid was such an abomination that it seemed a more
blanket sanction was warranted. But they are tough calls.
So I do thank you, again, for your insights on all things
related today. And without further ado, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
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