[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TURKEY AT A CROSSROADS: WHAT DO THE
GEZI PARK PROTESTS MEAN FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE REGION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 26, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-38
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Beyer family fellow, director, Turkish
Research Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 5
The Honorable James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz distinguished
visiting fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
(former American Ambassador to Turkey)......................... 12
Kadir Ustun, Ph.D., research director, Foundation for Political,
Economic, and Social Research (SETA)........................... 17
Hillel Fradkin, Ph.D., director, Center on Islam, Democracy and
the Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute............... 27
Mr. Kadri Gursel, contributing writer to Al-Monitor.............. 35
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 9
The Honorable James F. Jeffrey: Prepared statement............... 14
Kadir Ustun, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 19
Hillel Fradkin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 29
Mr. Kadri Gursel: Prepared statement............................. 38
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 62
TURKEY AT A CROSSROADS: WHAT DO THE
GEZI PARK PROTESTS MEAN FOR
DEMOCRACY IN THE REGION?
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana
Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I call to order this hearing of the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging
Threats. Today's topic is ``Turkey at the Crossroads.'' What do
these protests mean for democracy in the region and what does
it mean for Turkey?
After I and the ranking member Keating each take 5 minutes
to make opening statements. Each member present will have 1
minute for opening remarks, alternating between majority and
minority members. And, without objection, all members will have
5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous material
for the record subject to length and limitation rules. Hearing
no objection, so ordered.
Turkey is a NATO ally whose strategic and geographic
location is as important as ever. And I remember during the
Cold War when Turkey was absolutely essential to the security
of the United States and, yes, the peace of the world.
Over the past decade, the orientation of Turkish foreign
policy under Prime Minister Erdogan has been troubling. Its
shift in alignment away from our friends in the Middle East and
toward Syria and Iran has increased tensions in the region. The
policy, called ``No Troubles With Neighbors,'' has been applied
to the new engagements with Syria and Iran, but the opposite
has taken place with Israel.
Erdogan embraces Hamas leadership, for example, for its
seizure of power in Gaza and the Iranian leadership for its
``right to a nuclear program.'' He has supported the infamous
Gaza flotilla that tried to rum supplies to the Hamas
terrorists. The Syrian civil war has caused Prime Minister
Erdogan to move backwards toward the West and face the menace
of an Iranian Hezbollah intervention.
As requested, the U.S. and NATO have deployed Patriot air
defense systems in Turkey. So all of this is having its impact.
The Turks are Sunni Muslims and have a natural sympathy for the
Sunni rebels in Syria who are fighting a dictatorship rooted in
a minority cult associated with Shia Islam. Yet, sympathy has
not kept Erdogan's policy of supported the rebels and accepting
refugees from being controversial at home at least.
If the Obama administration is serious about increasing
U.S. aid to the rebels, it will have to work with Turkey, as it
has been doing. But who exactly are the Turks supporting in
this? What type of people are we talking about? Are the people
that are being helped by Turkey in the Syrian conflict people
who--do they hate the United States? And how reliable a partner
do we have now in Turkey if they are indeed allying themselves
with these anti-American elements?
Mass protests over local issues have shaken the Erdogan
administration. And its resort to a harsh crackdown on
dissidents helps spread popular anger. And let us note that up
until now, we have seen and I have personally seen Turkey as an
example of what I would say moderate Islam in a changing world.
And some of the crackdown that we have seen and, of course,
this situation in Syria and some of these other alliances
leaves some serious questions, which is the reason why we are
having this hearing today.
Of course, cracking down on demonstrators leads to worse
situations, as we have found out in the West. And Prime
Minister Erdogan's loyalists have, of course, unfortunately--
this is not true of the Prime Minister himself, I am sure--
resorted to wild conspiracy theories, blaming the Jewish lobby
and the American Enterprise Institute for the demonstrations
taking place in their own country. The Prime Minister himself
has referred to the interest rates lobby, which is or at least
can be easily translated as a slur against Jews. Such tactics
call into question the character of the ruling party of Turkey.
And when I say ``call into question,'' it doesn't answer it,
but it calls into questions. And that is why we are having this
hearing today, to explore some of those questions and find out,
maybe calm some of the fears or perhaps maybe reconfirm from
some of the other fears that we have had.
There have been reports that anti-semitic textbooks have
been adopted in public schools in the last 10 years and that
Hitler's ``Mein Kampf'' has become some kind of a best seller.
This is not a sign of a healthy democracy. And yesterday it was
reported that in the capital of Ankara, police raised some 30
residential addresses to arrest protestors at home, going well
beyond just confronting demonstrators in the streets in order
to maintain public order.
The European Union has postponed talks on Turkey's request
for membership until at least October because of the concerns.
And, most strongly, these concerns are being voiced by Germany.
And they will, of course, when these talks resume, at that
point, the situation could have calmed down in Turkey. And we
would be able to find out the true nature of what is happening.
Our hearing will look at whether Turkey can meet the
challenges that face it at home and abroad and are what
challenges are being faced by the Erdogan Government itself and
what are the potential impacts on these challenges in the way
they are met on the interests and values of the people of the
United States.
To help us answer these questions, we have a distinguished
panel, including a veteran diplomat, experts on Turkish society
and history and on Islam, and a journalist who has been
covering the protests on the ground. What we do not have is
anyone from the State Department. And we requested that State
send someone. But their response was that the Department wanted
to ``keep its public powder dry.'' So maybe they are trying to
assess the situation as well. And so what the Obama
administration thinks of events and how it will react will
remain a mystery, perhaps to them as well as us.
And let me just close by saying this. This hearing is not
intended to be a ``beat up Turkey'' hearing. We actually have
some very serious questions and concerns about what is going
on, the direction of the country. As I say, in the not-so-
distant past, I looked at Turkey as perhaps a great example of
modern Islamic Government and how it could do good things and
can be relied on to promote progress and peace and stability.
Now, after the events and what has been going on, what are
some of the things that have been disclosed, where there are
serious questions. And today I hope to have those questions
answered.
And now I would turn to our ranking member for whatever
opening statement you would like to make for as long as you
would like to make it.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these
hearings today.
Turkey has been a U.S. ally in an incredibly rough
neighborhood for many decades now. For this reason, the
political stability and economic strength of Turkey is a matter
of importance to many American policymakers, analysts, and
business people. The membership of Turkey in the Group of 20
along with its growing trade partnerships throughout the region
are positive developments, not only for Turkey but also for
U.S. national interests.
Further, the recent news of enhanced prospects for
normalization of relationships between Israel and Turkey as
well as the long overdue peace accord with the Kurds is
welcomed. However, it is domestic politics that have now taken
center stage in Turkey. The electoral dominance of Prime
Minister Erdogan's AK Party for more than a decade has led to
the emergence of a seemingly one-party state. Other parties
have little-to-no ability to influence decision-making, and
that has left many Turks feeling threatened, frustrated, and
powerless. These feelings are exacerbated by the Prime
Minister's self-acknowledged majoritarian philosophy, namely
that a government elected with a parliamentary majority has no
post-election obligation to consult the governed.
However what most caught the eye of this subcommittee and
the world has been the Prime Minister's seeming sanctioning of
brute force by the police against peaceful protesters. In the
last few weeks, five people have died. Some 4,900-plus
protesters have been detained and 4,000 people were injured.
There are countless reports of arrests of doctors treating
injured bystanders, young adults using social media to express
their frustrations, and lawyers attempting to defend the
fragile rule of law. Further, the rhetoric of the Turkish
Government has inflamed the situation, as the Prime Minister
publicly praises the police and repeatedly distinguishes
between those that support him and those who do not.
For this reason, I am pleased that President Obama, Vice
President Biden, and Secretary Kerry have made responsible
statements calling the Turkish Government to account, and I
commend them for that. I will speak for myself when I say that
following years of mostly astute governance in Turkey, the
Turkish Government's response to the recent protests came not
only as a disappointment but as a surprise, frankly.
As we sit here today, the protests continue on, with the
Turkish Interior Ministry reporting at least 2.5 million
protesters over the past 3-plus weeks. In fact, these numbers
and the sheer diversity of the protesters represent hope for
the emergence of a vibrant, politically engaged generation of
Turks that embrace pluralism. If so, the energy of these
demonstrations could well become the basis for a re-
invigorated, dynamic democracy. That is not a development Mr.
Erdogan should fear but, rather, he should welcome.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' perspectives on
this developing situation and thank especially those who have
traveled from Turkey to share their views here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back my time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And Mr. Duncan has an
opening statement as well.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, as a friend of
Turkey, I appreciate you holding these hearings on what the
protests mean for democracy in the region.
I remember just 2 short years ago, you and I were in Turkey
observing the parliamentary elections in June 2011 if my memory
serves me correctly. So watching the political dynamics going
on in Turkey right now is something that is interesting to me.
And I enjoyed a conversation I had this morning about these
very issues. And I look forward to a follow-up on that.
And, with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for that opening
statement. And let us just note that 2 years ago, there was
that election. We were there. And everyone was deeply impressed
that Turkey was having an honest and open and free election and
how people were engaged and involved. And that was a very
impressive sight for those of us who knew what turmoil was
going on in the rest of the area. And now, of course, today we
have a different vision of what is happening in Turkey. So that
is why we need to discuss it.
We have five very knowledgeable witnesses with us today
that can help us in this discussion. James Jeffrey served as
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2008 to 2010. Prior to that
appointment, he had served as deputy chief of mission from 2004
to 2005 in Iraq. And he returned and served as Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice's special adviser in Iraq. And so what
we have with Mr. Jeffrey is a very--you know, how do you say?--
very experienced man. And, also, I seem to remember that you
were in Iraq when I got kicked out of Iraq that last time. I
will let that sit.
We also have Dr. Hillel Fradkin.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Chairman, if I may add, I was with you on
that trip. And we were kicked out of Iraq, too, Ambassador.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Chairman, may I say I was not with you?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Dr. Hillel Fradkin, a senior
fellow at the Hudson Institute and directs its Center on Islam,
Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World. He cofounded and
co-edits the Journal on current trends in Islamic Etiology, the
leading journal devoted to the study of contemporary Islam. And
we appreciate him being with us today.
We have with us Kadir Ustun. He is the research director of
the SETA Foundation here in Washington and assistant editor of
Insight Turkey, the foundation's academic journal. Mr. Ustun
holds a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African
Studies from Columbia University, where he was also taught at
that university.
Kadri Gursel is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor's
Turkey Pulse and has written a column for the Turkish Daily
Milliyet. And he has done that since 2007. He focuses primarily
on Turkish foreign policy, the Kurdish question, and Turkey's
evolving political Islam. He has joined the Milliyet Publishing
Group in 1997 after working as a correspondent.
And since 1995, he was kidnapped by the Kurdish PKK
insurgents. And I am sure that that is a tale he has recounted
in a book. We should all maybe take a look at that. It sounds
like an exciting adventure in your life, perhaps one that you
don't think back on quite fondly. And the name of his book is,
``Those of the Mountains.''
We also have with us Soner--and I am going to see if I can
pronounce this. Could you help me with that?
Mr. Cagaptay. Cagaptay.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Cagaptay. And he is the Beyer family
fellow and director of Turkish Research Program at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He earned his Ph.D.
in history from Yale University and has taught courses on the
Middle East at Yale, Princeton, Georgetown, and Smith College.
And he has also served as chair of the Turkey Advanced Area
Studies Program for the State Department's Foreign Service
Institute.
Thank you all for being with us. Did I miss somebody? Okay.
And you will be our first witness. Thank you, Bill, for getting
me straight on that. So we will start there. And then each of
you would be given a 5-minutes to present some testimony. We
would appreciate if you would keep it around 5 minutes. And
then we will follow up by questions. And I would appreciate, as
I say, appreciate keeping it to about 5 minutes.
If you have more extensive remarks in that, they will be
placed into the record at this point in the hearing. Thank you
very much. And you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., BEYER FAMILY FELLOW,
DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify today on
the recent protests in Turkey, what they mean for democracy in
Turkey, the country's neighborhood, and for U.S. policy. The
following is a summary of my prepared remarks, which I will
submit for the written record.
Turkey, as you said, is an important country. It is a NATO
member state. It is a key ally for the United States. Situated
between Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, Europe,
and the Middle East, it is vital to U.S. interests across those
regions. Take for instance, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey is
the only country that borders these three nations and is vital
for U.S. policy toward these countries. That is why I think it
is important for us to look at the recent domestic developments
in Turkey because, according to some analysts, the recent
protests that have rocked Istanbul and other cities for almost
a month represent what is probably the biggest challenge that
the governing Justice and Development Party in Ankara has faced
since it came to government in 2002. So what do these protests
mean for Turkey's stability, for democracy in Turkey, for
Turkey's region and the Middle East, and obviously for U.S.
policy?
I will start with Turkey's dramatic transformation under
the AKP. Since this party came to power in 2002, Turkey has
become, thanks to AKP's sound economic policies, a wealthy
country with a majority middle class society. This is a first
in Turkish history.
As a result of this transformation, Turkey has joined the
prestigious members of G-20 club of nations. And it has also
become a powerhouse in the Middle East. As a result of this
dramatic transformation, the country, as I said earlier, has
become a majority middle class society. And, ironically I
think, the protests show that the AKP is perhaps a victim of
its own success.
The middle class that the party's policies have created is
now committed to individual freedoms and is taking issue with
the governing party's style of governance and its attempts at
political domination.
This suggests that the often-cited modernization theory
that as countries develop and become more prosperous, they
become better democracies, is being validated in Turkey. We are
seeing the rise of a middle class that demands respect for
individual freedoms, freedoms of expression, assembly, media,
and association, as well as minority and individual rights. I
think, in a nutshell, this is what encapsulates the
developments in Turkey.
Allow me now to look at, Mr. Chairman, what I think the
developments do not constitute. I don't think the developments
constitute yet another episode of the Arab Spring. Turkey did
not experience the proverbial winter, political winter. The
country was and is a democracy. So the Arab Spring analogy does
not quite apply.
Nor do the protests suggest a significant weakening of the
AKP. By most measures, about half of the country's population
still supports the governing party. The protests are also not
about a manifestation of the secularist Islamist divide that
has for so long dominated Turkish politics. Although most of
the protestors are secular, their demands are not about
secularism, per se. They are about the quality of democracy and
demand for liberal values.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that these demonstrations present a
new dynamic in Turkish politics. The members of the protest
movement, roughly representing one half of the Turkish
electorate, have found strength in numbers. They have also
found out that they can continue and sustain their
demonstrations, thanks to the organizing force of social media
technologies. These are indeed new. This is indeed a new
dynamic in Turkish politics in the sense that the protests
represent Turkey's first massive, grassroots political movement
that is likely to sustain itself.
This new form of political force in Turkish politics could
obviously complicate Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's political
agenda. Among those issues I would like to cite is Turkey's
Syria policy, which you have looked at, Mr. Chairman. Although
most Turks do not support Bashar al-Assad, many are also
unnerved by Ankara's policy, which they think has exposed
Turkey to increased risks and costs.
Take, for instance, a recent attack, a error attack,
unfortunate attack, on the Turkish town of Reyhanli that killed
51 people that took place in May. This is the worst attack
Turkey has suffered in modern history. Accordingly, I think
this persistent opposition is likely to move Ankara to a
position of leading from behind in Syria.
Turkey's relationship with the U.S., I don't think, will
suffer much from the unrest. Ankara values its relationship
with Washington. And I think that the rapport Prime Minister
Erdogan shares with President Obama is going to help resolve
any wrinkles that will arise from Washington's criticism of
Ankara's conduct. Still the issue remains. Turkey is divided
deeply between the supporters and opponents of the governing
party. And the recent protests may have deepened this chasm
further.
Secular, middle class, liberal Turks are demanding respect
for freedom of the press, expression, association, and assembly
as well as a voice on environmental policy and urban space. I
think the Turkish leadership should take comfort in the fact
that the demonstrations are not directly against AKP. Rather,
they are for individual rights and better democracy.
The leadership should also avoid giving credit to
widespread conspiracy theories that the demonstrations are
driven by ``outside forces.'' Millions of people have
demonstrated in over 78 Turkish cities over the course of the
month. This is clearly an indigenous Turkish movement, and the
country's government would be better served to listen to it,
embracing democracy. In this regard, I think Brazil is a case
in point.
Mr. Chairman, I think at this point, at this juncture, the
way forward for Turkey overlaps with U.S. policy and U.S.
interests in the Middle East. Turkey has become an economic
power in the region. It has become a soft power nation. And it
wants to be a leader in the Middle East. And Ankara wants
Washington to treat it as such. I would say that as far as U.S.
policymakers are concerned, Turkey can become a leader in the
Middle East only if it shines as an example of liberal
democracy.
To this end, the Turkish Government and people would be
well-served to embrace broad individual liberties, including
freedoms of assembly, association, media, and expression. At
the moment, Turkey is attempting to draft its first civilian-
made constitution. And this presents Ankara and all the Turks
with a unique opportunity to do so, recognize those liberties,
and doing so without restrictions.
What is good for Turkey is also good for the Middle East
and the United States, Mr. Chairman. Turkey can overcome its
political tensions by adopting a constitution that respects
individual freedoms and recognizes its diversity. This would
also mark an important milestone for the country's desire to
become a source of inspiration for other Muslim-majority
countries in the Middle East. Only if Turkey seizes the
opportunity, it can become a partner Washington can be proud to
have in the region.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the take-away of today's
conversation and our message to our ally, Turkey, the country's
citizens, and its neighbors should be the following. Democracy
is not just about the right to be equal. It is also about
protecting the right to be different.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much for that very
thoughtful testimony.
And I would like to now turn to Ambassador Jeffrey for some
thoughts from him. The last witness was fairly optimistic for
the long run. And we are very interested in your views on this.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES F. JEFFREY, PHILIP SOLONDZ
DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY (FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY)
Ambassador Jeffrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Keating. It is a pleasure to be here today. I will submit my
longer statement for the record and just summarize a certain
number of points.
First of all, my colleague at the Washington Institute,
Soner Cagaptay, has laid out, I think, a very accurate and
optimistic but, again, realistic view of how we should go
forward and how Turkey will probably go forward. I will just
touch on a few domestic issues that I would like to highlight
and then get to what the U.S. should do and some of the
implications for the region.
First of all, I do think that this does demonstrate that
there is a large fissure in Turkish society between two
relatively large groups. And this is being fought out on
various levels. But that is okay because that is how democratic
countries evolve. And we have seen this in East Asia. We have
seen this in central and Southern America. Many of you have
gone on visits to these countries as they are moving forward.
And they do this step by step. This is what is happening in
Turkey.
The concern that we all have with the reaction of the
government is, first of all, as came out in a statement from
the White House just yesterday after President Obama called
Prime Minister Erdogan, is the concern about the violence of
the reaction of the authorities against the demonstrators and
the concern about freedom of expression, freedom of
demonstration, and freedom of media. All of these have been
called into question to one or another degree by some of the
statements and actions by the government. And that is of
concern. But, in particular, the polarization of those people
who are opposed to the government is troubling.
From our standpoint, looking from the outside, first of
all, Mr. Chairman, this is not going to lead to the overthrow
or the fall of the Erdogan Government, certainly not before the
elections of 2015. And I think the government is still
maintaining probably a majority. But what it does portend is
trouble for a country that is integrated ever more into the
advanced world with its trade, with its diplomatic and military
relationships and NATO with the European Union and so forth,
and a country that needs good relations with the outside, be it
tourism, be it again its trade.
Some of that has already suffered because of the
demonstrations. There are other aspects of that, including the
recent decisions by the Federal Reserve, but the stock market
did fall dramatically. The lira has also fallen against the
dollar. And there is some indication that tourism in foreign
direct investment may be challenged.
But, more importantly, the majority can rule in Turkey,
like in any other country. It can issue orders to the police.
It can pass laws. But it cannot control the minority. And in
the end, there has to be some kind of relationship between
those people who are not part of the governing coalition and
the governing coalition to have stability in any country. We
dealt with this in our own constitutional process in the
Eighteenth Century between those in favor of a majority rule
and those in favor of minority rights. Turkey is going to have
to go through this.
It is a democracy. For the moment, I think we can trust in
the Turkish people to work their way through this. But
meanwhile what should we do? And what is the attitude of the
U.S. Government?
Obviously, coming from a diplomatic background, I like to
do diplomatic talks private, rather than in public, but there
is a role for public discourse as well, both from the
government and from institutions like the Congress, speaking
out about our values when we see them being challenged. But,
nonetheless, where the United States can help the most because
we do have a good relationship with the Erdogan Government is
in private conversations. And that is apparently exactly what
President Obama did yesterday in his conversation: Coach the
Turks on our view of why continued clashes in Turkey are not
good for Turkey's future, are not good for Turkey's economy,
and are not good for Turkey's role in the region.
And that is the thing I want to leave with, Mr. Chairman.
This region is in a worse condition than I have seen it in many
decades for many reasons, including some decisions we perhaps
made. But at the end of the day, if we are going to find a way
forward with Syria, with Iraq, and with Iran, as my colleague
and as you people have pointed out, we are going to have to use
our good relations with Turkey. We are going to have to
cooperate and coordinate fully with Turkey. And that requires
some kind of relationship with this government. That means that
we have to be cautious in what we say publicly. We can be more
open privately. And we will be more effective.
I think that is the way the administration is going, but I
hope it continues on this, not ignoring the problems but
putting them in the context of an extremely dangerous and big
agenda that we have in the region right now, sir.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
And I think we would go to Mr. Ustun now.
STATEMENT OF KADIR USTUN, PH.D., RESEARCH DIRECTOR, FOUNDATION
FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL RESEARCH (SETA)
Mr. Ustun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for inviting me to speak at this hearing. I have
already submitted my testimony. And I will only highlight some
of the points discussed there in detail.
Today, what we see in Turkey is the growing pains of
democracy. The crux of the issue is somewhat paradoxical. We
have the most successful and reformist political party in power
for more than a decade. However, there are certain segments of
the society who are frustrated with some policies but cannot
express their discontent through the regular channels of formal
politics because of the absence of a viable opposition.
The basic dynamics of the protests are fundamentally
different from the Arab revolutions where there was no
meaningful representation of the popular will. The challenge
will be for Turkey to accommodate the legitimate demands and
aspirations of many Turkish youths. If it succeeds, Turkish
democracy will be even stronger in the years ahead and serve as
a democratic inspiration for the broader region.
The protests can be likened to Occupy Wall Street movement,
rather than the Arab revolutions. The disproportionate use of
force by the police against a small group of protestors
occupying the Gezi Park quickly snowballed into much larger
protests. Protests are much more similar to those in the West
and in the U.S.
Three major groups have participated in these protests. The
biggest one has been the middle and upper class urbanites angry
about the Gezi Park redevelopment project and certain policies.
These policies resulted in the divisive controversies similar
to those over stem cell research, abortion, and gun control in
the U.S. and Europe.
The second most significant group is the young CHP
supporters and the ultranationalist wing of the party. Young
people are increasingly disenchanted by the political system as
they see no hope of challenging the dominant ruling party in
the absence of a strong leadership. The CHP is split on how to
approach the government's initiative to resolve the Kurdish
question. Discontent created by the lack of representation and
the Kurdish settlement process as well as the Syria policy is a
major motivator for this group of demonstrators.
The last group is the marginal leftist groups, some of
which are illegal organizations implicated in various terrorist
attacks, including the bombing attack on the U.S. Embassy in
Ankara in February. The government tried to make a distinction
among these three groups. We can discuss how successful that
was. And it promised to listen to the legitimate demands of the
protestors about the Gezi Park. But the Prime Minister's
harshest words were directed against the third group, which
engaged in violence and vandalism.
The Prime Minister met the protestors in person, at a long,
4-hour, meeting and announced that the government would respect
the current court injunction blocking the project. If the court
decides to remove the injunction, the government will sold a
referendum. However, the protestors announced that they would
continue to occupy the park and hold demonstrations, resulting
in further police action.
As its efforts to reach out and provide an apology to
peaceful protestors proved insufficient, the government viewed
the continuation of protests as ill-intentioned. The government
argues that the marginal groups and CHP members are
orchestrating a campaign to undermine the democratically
elected government by taking to the streets, hence the
government's repeated references to the ballot box as the
ultimate jury. It doesn't refer to a majoritarian understanding
of democracy but, rather, a past where extrapolitical powers
could wield influence over the elected governments.
The protests have resulted in a lively debate throughout
the political spectrum about basic rights and freedoms and what
an advanced democracy should look like. Turkey's takeoff over
the past decade created a new generation of young people, who
are much more educated, economically comfortable, and
increasingly globalized. Their aspirations, frustrations, and
discontent cannot fully be expressed in the political scene
through the existing opposition parties. The AK Party will need
to engage this segment of the protestors.
The same goes for the CHP. The struggle between the hard-
line ultranationalists and the moderates is pulling the party
apart. The CHP will have to transform itself into a center-left
party or it will find itself fighting the wars of a bygone era.
The U.S.-Turkey relationship is important, not only for
bilateral relations, but also for stability and peace in the
broader Middle East. Turkey has a critical relevance for the
U.S. foreign policy issues, including withdrawal from
Afghanistan, stability in Iraq, resolving the Iranian nuclear
issue, and ending the Syrian conflict, as well as achieving
peace between Israel and Palestine.
Turkey has proven time and again it is a dynamic democracy
with a vibrant civil society, despite its flaws and
imperfections. The debate today is not on whether to have
democracy but on how to create a better one that embraces all
segments of the society. That is testament to the country's
commitment to democratic ideals and the rule of law.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ustun follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you for that very thoughtful
testimony.
And, Mr. Fradkin, please?
STATEMENT OF HILLEL FRADKIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER ON ISLAM,
DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Mr. Fradkin. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Keating,
honorable members, let me begin by thanking you for the
opportunity to testify today. The topic, ``Turkey at a
Crossroads: What Do the Gezi Park Protests Mean for Democracy
in the Region?'' is a most important one. And I am, therefore,
very honored to have been invited to offer a response to this
and the related questions cited in the invitation.
The latter largely focus on the meaning of these events for
the prospects of Turkish democracy itself. And all of these
questions are indeed related because it has been hoped that the
fact of Turkish democracy and its successful operation would
serve as a model for democratic development in other parts of
the Middle East region. This has been especially true since the
advent of the so-called Arab Spring and the overthrow of
authoritarian regimes. It has also been especially true since
the rise to rule of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and
his AKP party for the latter, as I think both the chairman and
the ranking member indicated, appear to offer a model for the
successful navigation of the tensions between democracy and
Islam.
I have submitted more extensive and formal remarks, but
what follows is a summary.
So what does Gezi Park mean? Alas, from the perspective of
both Turkish democracy and broader regional hopes, the events
surrounding Gezi Park are discouraging. This is because Gezi
Park has brought to a head a crisis in the course of Turkish
democracy. This crisis has been brewing for some time and has
entailed a variety of particular issues and disputes. But the
crisis is broader and deeper because it is about democracy as
such, what it is and what it should be.
Gezi Park reveals that Turkey has not resolved this dispute
for itself, at least not yet. And, for that reason, it is
hardly in a position to serve as a model for others. Still less
is this is the case since the position of Prime Minister
Erdogan, his party, and his government concerning the meaning
of democracy, at least as enunciated recently, is a defective
one, both from the point of view of Turkey and other states in
the region.
This has become clear in the aftermath of Gezi Park through
both the words and actions of Prime Minister Erdogan, his
colleagues, and supporters. In brief, he has insisted on what
one may call--and I think the chairman already did call--a
majoritarian understanding of democracy.
Erdogan claims no more than a majority of 51 percent, a
figure derived from the last elections. Still, he claims that
this gives him the right to do as he pleases. For him, this is
true for the additional reason that he claims to have made a
great success of Turkey over the past decade and, therefore,
knows what is best for Turkey now and in the future. All the
more should he be free to do as he thinks best, but what about
the large number of the Turkish public who apparently did not
vote for him nor support him? Since Gezi Park, Erdogan has
given a very large number of speeches, which provide his
understanding of them. They are, according to him, terrorists
and traitors in league with foreign enemies. ``Their malevolent
intent is to hold Turkey down and back''--these are direct
quotes--from the still greater Turkish future Erdogan intends
to build. He has promised in meaning tones to uncover these
alleged plots and punish all of those responsible, employing
the full powers of the state. If that violates the strict rule
of law, so be it.
And I want to stress the rhetoric of Prime Minister Erdogan
has been really ferocious. Gezi Park was from the beginning an
instance of this view. Much has been made of the force and
violence used to suppress the original small band of tree-
loving demonstrators. And this is important. It was what
prompted many more people to come to Taksim Square, which led
to still more force and violence.
But it is also important to note that the original
demonstrators were attempting to block what was, in fact, an
illegal act. The question of Gezi Park was actually in
litigation. And a Turkish court had issued a stay on all work
there. Still, Erdogan went ahead.
In part, the Gezi Park protests were in objection to this
kind of high-handed and lawless behavior, which has become all
too frequent in recent years. But Erdogan is, in part, right.
The protestors also object to his vision of the Turkish future.
And they think they should at least have a say in the matter.
This is hardly surprising for it appears that what Erdogan has
in mind is a kind of refounding of the Turkish republic.
He is very attached to the year 2023, when it will
celebrate its 100th anniversary, a refounding which entails,
somehow or other, a revival of its pre-republican past,
morally, religiously and politically. This pre-republican
past--it is obviously Ottoman past--was not notably democrat
but, rather, was based on the will of the rulers. Thus, to many
I think people in Turkey, Erdogan's behavior and vision appear
to be all of peace.
Let me turn to the questions external to domestic, Turkey's
domestic, politics, the regional questions, and end with that.
Concerning the region, it is easy to see that the implications
are not promising. The region and especially the Arab countries
have an altogether too rich and deep experience of the politics
of will, of an authoritarian will.
What it needs, what it has needed, what it still needs is
some model of consensual democratic politics with some due
accommodation of religious sensibilities. For a while, it
seemed and was hoped that Turkey could provide that, but that
is hardly the case today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of the
committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fradkin follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you for that testimony.
And, Mr. Gursel?
STATEMENT OF MR. KADRI GURSEL, CONTRIBUTING WRITER TO AL-
MONITOR
Mr. Gursel. Respected members of the U.S. House of
Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe,
Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, I thank you for the opportunity
to share my observations and thoughts on the meaning of the
protest movement that started as a reaction to a police action
on May 31.
So my observations go a bit beyond those of a veteran
journalist. They are also personal as I live very close to the
epicenter of the protests at Taksim Square. I myself suffered
from the gas that police used so generously on the
demonstrators.
The first question that must be answered here is what
actually happened in Istanbul on May 31 and June and how to
explain it. The shortest way to define it would be that it was
a social eruption or social explosion.
The excessively harsh police intervention against a few
hundred protesters in the early hours of May 31 was the final
move that led to this explosion.
How did the events swell and reach the point of an
explosion? And here is a short list of factors that contributed
to the eruption. First of all, the inability of the mainstream
media, which was under stiff government pressure to carry out
its basic mission of informing the public and keeping tabs on
the government; on the other hand, working on the line, the
growing importance of the internet media and especially that of
al-monitor.com, where I am a contributing writer, to contest
this unabashed censorship by providing Turkish writers of
different perspectives a forum to share their views in both
Turkish and English.
The independence of the judiciary has been discarded as a
result of the accumulation of power never before seen during
periods of civilian rule in Turkey, which is the second factor.
Most of the public feels the judiciary has been politicized and
that ways to seek justice has been blocked.
The third one, arbitrary and prolonged political detentions
further decreased confidence in the justice system.
The fourth is the role of religion in basic education has
greatly increased, particularly in the last year, alienating
many of Turkey's Alawites and secular citizens.
The fifth is over the last few months, authorities became
intolerant of even minor protests and resorted to police
violence to disperse them systematically.
The sixth is Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's
advice to women at every opportunity, it seems, on how many
children they should have and how they should give birth has
fostered the perception of interference in personal lives.
Finally, the government imposed alcohol bans in May under
the label of ``regulating alcohol,'' causing a sizable part of
society to feel that the government was intervening in their
lifestyles and freedoms.
To keep this short list, which is a very short list, we
must also add the Prime Minister's habit of using offensive
language to denigrate the cultures and lifestyles of those who
are not counted as his constituents.
It was Prime Minister Erdogan's policies and the pressure
he brought to bear on the public with his narratives that led
to this social explosion.
How then to analyze the sociopolitical chemistry of this
explosion? The uprising was a spontaneous popular movement
without an organization and leadership. The lead actor in this
movement is the well-educated, urbanized young generation
labeled by the Turkish media as ``the '90s generation.'' Most
of these young people place themselves outside of established
politics. According to polls, they cite restrictions on their
freedoms, Erdogan's authoritarianism, and police brutality as
the main reasons behind their taking to streets. What they
demand most is their freedoms and ending the violations of
their rights.
To sum up, this is a new secular urban middle class'
rebellion against Erdogan's rule. In sum, the social movement
that began at Gezi Park discussed finding ways to defend their
freedoms politically, now actually. This discussion is
continuing in various formats today.
Since June 17, activists have been engaged in standstill
protests in acts of passive disobedience. Every evening they
organize synchronized forums in various Istanbul parks where
free debate takes place.
The enrichment of the culture of democracy and spreading it
to the masses where it will take root is a priceless and never-
before-seen civil society movement. For civil society to take
its due place as a key actor in the struggle for democracy is a
sign of maturity and a healthy society.
Naturally, as I tried to explain at the beginning, this
civil-social movement is a reaction of anger and resentment
against Erdogan Government's Islamic conservatism, its policies
that are sidestepping democratic freedoms in Turkey.
Prime Minister Erdogan's policies of societal polarization
did not cost anything until May 31. But from now on, Mr.
Erdogan will pay something for his policies of polarization.
That price will be instability.
The social explosion in Turkey and government pressures
that followed simply washed out the paradigm of the Turkey
model based on the rule of the Justice and Development Party.
This was advocated as a model for the Middle East and was
accompanied by the term ``Muslim democracy,'' even though it
was not applicable.
AKP rule now has two roads to choose from. It has come to a
junction.
It can finally take the steps needed for Turkey to become a
real libertarian, pluralist, participatory and secular
democracy and, as such, redefine the Turkey model, but
correctly this time, or it can continue to drag Turkey toward
an Islamic, authoritarian and oppressive regime. If AKP
officials opt for the latter, they can't advance their cause
without suppressing civil society. A more oppressive and more
authoritarian regime cannot maintain stability in Turkey.
To finalize, it is impossible to give an unequivocal answer
to a question frequently asked nowadays, whether a military
coup is among the risks to be face should Turkey destabilize
even further. With the purges of 2010-2012, the ability of the
military to stage coups has been made extraordinarily
difficult. The military has been totally excluded from
politics.
Thank you for your attention. And thank you for this
opportunity, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gursel follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for your thoughtful
testimony and for the testimony of all of our witnesses today.
I am going to take a little poll. Maybe you could just tell me.
Before this upheaval happened and this violence started in the
park, before the police weighed in with their billy clubs and
ignited something, did you believe that there was a tension and
a seething underneath the surface in Turkey that was of the
magnitude that we have seen manifest itself since that ignition
point? Did you think that this could happen? Just give me a yes
or no. Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fradkin. Yes.
Mr. Cagaptay. Not the timing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What is that now?
Mr. Cagaptay. Yes, but not the timing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Go ahead.
Mr. Gursel. Yes for the resentment, no for the timing.
Mr. Ustun. Yes with some objections.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, my gosh. All right. Thank you for
that. I will have to tell you I didn't. So you guys are a lot
smarter over there than those of us are up here. That is why we
are having you testify.
I really saw--perhaps it was an illusion, and perhaps it
was not. It seemed to me that we had a demonstration of Islamic
democratic government that was reasonable and could again serve
as a model and was reaching out to its own people in the
democratic process.
I always looked at, for example, the fact that women
before--and correct me if I am wrong--were not permitted to
wear head scarves when the old military, pro military, regime
was in. And freedom is when a woman has the right to wear a
head scarf but also the right not to wear a head scarf. And if
the new government or if the Erdogan Government would then move
to the point that it was mandating that, well, then it would
begin, as you were mentioning, traipsing on the fundamental
freedoms of the people.
Was this alcohol restriction--I have heard one example of
that. Were there other restrictions that I have missed that
were being again over the line where you would say that freedom
aligned that the Erdogan administration was having other than
restricting alcohol is because of someone's religious beliefs,
that Islam does not believe in that? So were there other
restrictions that we are causing the people to be upset,
whoever has an answer for that? Mr. Ambassador, any----
Ambassador Jeffrey. Simply to say in our own country, sir,
as you know, we prohibited alcohol for many years. As an
imbiber of alcohol, I am personally not in favor of that, but I
just want to show how complicated democracy is as it rubs up
against what people see as their personal freedoms. And, thus,
I would segregate this from religion in general or the specific
religion of Islam and simply state that this struggle between
authoritarian thought processes, even with a majority
government and minority rights, we have seen all over the world
in many different kinds of countries as countries, including
many of our allies, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, evolved. And that
is what we are seeing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, did we see, in this regime, for the
last 10 years, was there a violation of people's freedom of
speech, for example? Mr. Ustun, why don't we go with----
Mr. Ustun. Yes. There are no laws that were passed about
restricting freedom of speech in Turkey. And there is a very
harsh criticism of the government in newspapers and TVs and
everywhere. There have been concerns about media issues, but
there are structural problems that date back to the '90s and
before where the relationship between sort of big media
conglomerates and businesses, those kinds of relationships make
the media, sort of journalists' lives a little more difficult
because they have to kind of sort of go along with what the
bosses want. In the past, they would call on the military to
intervene. But today they are doing other things.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Does anyone else have an observation about
freedom of speech under this administration? Yes, sir? And then
we will go with you.
Mr. Ustun. Let me defer to the Turkish journalist.
Mr. Gursel. Okay. Well, let me give you an example on that.
Since 2008, I don't remember having read any news story
covering government corruption in the mainstream media, since
2008.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. No, because they have
eliminated all government corruption there?
Mr. Gursel. So does it mean that in Turkey, there is no
corruption? I don't believe. I don't think so. And then the
main instinct replaced the instinct of news in the desk, news
desk, is the censorship. And it was proven on the night of May
31, when there was the events in Istanbul's streets. A few
hundred meters away, TV channels were broadcasting. One TV
channel was broadcasting a live debate about schizophrenia. And
the other one was, well, broadcasting a serial document on
England----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's just note for the record that----
Mr. Gursel [continuing]. Dropping the formal----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note for the record I did ask
for some recommendations from the Turkish Embassy. And they
were very gracious in recommending at least one witness for us
today. And I appreciate that very much, who they thought would
be adding to the discussion. And that witness has added to the
discussion.
Are there journalists in jail right now? And then I will
have one more question and then go to my ranking member. Are
there journalists in jail right now in Turkey? Yes?
Mr. Gursel. May I again answer this question, please,
because I am IPI National Committee chairman, and I am a press
freedom activist also?
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
Mr. Gursel. There are more than 60 journalists now in jail
in Turkey.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Say that again.
Mr. Gursel. Sixty journalists.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Sixty?
Mr. Gursel. More than 60. And they are mostly pro Kurdish
journalists. They are mostly pro Kurdish journalists. And there
is a discussion on them. Maybe Mr. Ustun can answer. I don't
know. But there are, according to OECD and other international
organizations defending freedom of the press, more than 60
journalists.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Dr. Ustun?
Mr. Ustun. I had this in my testimony as well. We have
enacted an anti-terror law in Turkey. Because of the terror
environment, we have a law that makes it difficult to further
democratization. The judicial system is so archaic. And this
anti-terror law, basically if you are praising the PKK
organization, then you could be subject to detention and jail
time.
But this was changed very recently. The reform package
passed in the Parliament, which basically makes the praising of
the PKK organization not a crime. So, going forward, that is
going to help. But, as Gursel was saying, there are a lot of
small-time journalists.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am going over my time here.
Mr. Ustun. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Ambassador, do you have something very
quickly to answer to that?
Ambassador Jeffrey. No. As our colleagues have said, it has
been a tension. There is a great deal of information out there
in Turkey that is available to the citizens. And there have
been restrictions. Many of these restrictions date well before
the AKP, as we have heard. The AKP has eliminated some of them
and has, particularly recently, raised new questions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we have to put it in an historical
perspective.
I will now turn to my ranking member. I am sorry I am over
but as many questions as long as you want.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to ask each of you, each of you
individually, to comment on this. I want you to cite for me, if
you could, specific, specific instances of outside influence
with the demonstrations at Gezi Park. And I will start with
Ambassador Jeffrey and maybe go right across there. I want to
see if this collective group here, so knowledgeable on these
issues, can cite one specific example of that outside influence
and who they are.
Ambassador Jeffrey. By my definition of outside influence,
there was none. By the definition of some----
Mr. Keating. But yours.
Ambassador Jeffrey. I will stop there.
Mr. Fradkin. None, Congressman.
Mr. Cagaptay. Absolutely none whatsoever.
Mr. Gursel. I repeat. Absolutely not.
Mr. Ustun. Yes. The third group I talked about, DHKP-C,
involved in the attack on the U.S. Embassy, involved in the
Reyhanli attack, these are connected to the Assad regime in
Syria.
Mr. Keating. And they were active participants in the----
Mr. Ustun. Yes.
Mr. Keating. Yes, Mr. Gursel?
Mr. Gursel. Thank you.
I have to object because every day I have been on the
place, on the square, in the square, Taksim Square. I observed
very closely the tension of the political groups existing in
the resistance. I think the hard core of the resistance is the
uncoordinated, unorganized middle class new generation of the
secular modern urban middle class.
Mr. Keating. Dr. Ustun?
Mr. Gursel. The second group, you know, are the members of
some organizations.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Thank you.
Dr. Ustun----
Mr. Ustun. PKK was there.
Mr. Keating. Yes. Okay.
Mr. Ustun. Other socialist groups were there. But
personally I didn't notice any banner or----
Mr. Keating. I just wanted to go back for a second----
Mr. Ustun [continuing]. Anything representing DHKP-C.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. If I could. Doctor, that group
you said, they are domestic, aren't they? So when you say they
are----
Mr. Gursel. They have historically been supported by the
Syrian regime, just like the PKK in the past. But their big,
huge banner was on the Ataturk Cultural Center while CNN was
broadcasting live. And in the background, you could see DHKP-
C's and Abdullah Ocalan's pictures up there.
Technically PKK and the government are talking, but PKK is
still technically an illegal organization in Turkey.
Mr. Keating. A domestic group?
Mr. Ustun. Yes.
Mr. Keating. Okay. That is what I wanted to know. Thank
you.
Mr. Ustun. With foreign ties.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
I have another question, just to get a little more sense of
Gezi Park and what happened there. I would like to ask Mr.
Gursel just to describe, if he could, who are the protestors
who were there. Were they diverse ethnic groups? Did they have
different political backgrounds? Were they mostly men or women?
Are they violent or harassing toward those who didn't support
their views?
We just saw here what we saw on television. I just wanted
to get a sense from you as someone firsthand. You know, could
you describe, who are those people?
Mr. Gursel. Well, at the hard core of the resistance, at
Gezi Park, those people were the youngsters coming out from
their homes to protest and to resist what was going on for
their liberties and for their future, for themselves. And it is
typically a middle class movement, but others, there were some
other groups which in the past have used violence as a
political tool, such as PKK, maybe other groups. But there were
also many, many groups that were in unease with the government,
like, for example, feminists, like anarchists, like anti-
capitalists, Muslims, or environmentalists, who opposed
staunchly the policies of government.
But in Gezi Park, there weren't any incidents reported. I
didn't hear anything happened between those groups. There was a
growing dialogue between them. And it still continues, and even
the Kemalists. There were Kemalists with the heavy burden of
the Kemalist Republican past. There also they have engaged
political dialogue with other groups. And they have also
accepted the existence of Mr. Erdogan's posters on the square--
--
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Mr. Gursel [continuing]. At the end of the day.
Mr. Keating. Answer this if you want when I ask the group
just another question, if I could. There were some reports that
the Turkish Government response to the protests were not
completely uniform and some voices within the AK Party were
encouraging cooperation and calm. And, at least according to
some preliminary statements, however, once the Prime Minister
returned from his travels, he used force against those
protestors. Does this represent like a miscommunication within
the party, a misreporting, or was there indeed, to your
knowledge, some difference of opinion as to how to approach
this within the party itself?
And do you see these--if there are, indeed, those
differences, what would be the implications going forward? I
would throw it open to anyone. Ambassador Jeffrey?
Ambassador Jeffrey. There certainly was. For example, both
President Gul and Deputy Prime Minister Arinc at one point came
out, apologized, and urged restraint on the part of the
authorities toward the demonstrators and some understanding of
them. But it goes further than that.
Even Prime Minister Erdogan when he returned, his original
position was to take a moderate stance. He invited in and spent
hours talking to representatives of the demonstrators. He then
announced that he would adhere to the decision of the court to
stay the tearing down of Gezi Park and that if in the end, the
court decided the state could go forward with it, he would not
do so until there would be a referendum on that.
This was on Friday, a week ago Friday. And then the next
day, he had a change in position. And he used force against the
demonstrators, not only in Taksim Square, which is a major
vehicle artery, but also in Gezi Park itself.
So I think that there is a back and forth within the
government that I find in some perverse way encouraging because
it shows that people are trying to figure out, how do we deal
with at least a large minority that disagrees with us on
fundamental issues. And this is how democracies stumble
forward.
Mr. Keating. Anyone else? Dr. Ustun?
Mr. Ustun. The first couple of days, there was definitely a
management, crisis management, issue. But, Ambassador, what he
is mentioning is correct. What happened on Sunday, however,
when the police left the square, Taksim Square, and moved out
of that area, moved to Dolma Bagche, where the Prime Minister's
office is there. These organized illegal groups tried to storm
this office as well as they tried to do it simultaneously in
Ankara. Once that was done, the Prime Minister decided these
people are not there for the park, but they are organizing sort
of uprising or what--they're trying to inflame the situation
and hijack the protests. So that's why you saw a hard-line
attitude afterwards.
And there was a lot of disinformation, incredible amount of
disinformation about people being hurt, getting killed.
According to one journalist's Twitter account, you could count
20 people dead in the first day. So there was a lot of
inflammatory information flow. And the main news channels
reported it around the clock, but they did not do live
broadcasts from the area.
But by the second day, things were out of control. And then
later on, the things really grew. People reacted to this. And
there are all these different diverse groups that Gursel was
talking about.
Mr. Keating. Yes. My time is over, too. So if one of the
remaining panelists could just answer that same question, that
would be----
Mr. Fradkin. I certainly agree with Ambassador Jeffrey that
there was this kind of tension and disagreement. The difficulty
it seems to me now is that since Prime Minister Erdogan came
back, changed his position, since that time, he has done
everything he can to reassert his view of things in this very
large number of speeches he is giving and to insist on a very
perverse interpretation of the events which took place.
One example that struck me, during the events in Taksim,
people naturally sought help for their injuries or for having
been gassed. A group went into a mosque solely for the purpose
of finding a secure place to be treated.
Prime Minister Erdogan has described this as essentially an
assault on the mosque. He claims that people ran in there with
beers to desecrate the mosque. He claims that they bothered
female worshippers, that they walked in there with shoes. The
imam of the mosque has declared this to be absolutely false
publicly. But Prime Minister Erdogan returns to this over and
over again in his speeches about in a way----
Mr. Keating. If I could interrupt? The purpose of the
hearing is not to litigate those individual issues but----
Mr. Fradkin. No, no. I meant----
Mr. Keating. I wanted to thank all of you. I am just way
over my time.
Mr. Fradkin. Okay.
Mr. Keating. But I did get the sense of all of you. And I
do think this kind of discussion is helpful. It has been
helpful to the U.S. in their history to look back at themselves
and have an open discourse about these things.
And you are such an important ally, Turkey is, that, you
know, I hope that kind of introspective view, painful as it can
be at times, is helpful.
And I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Lowenthal, I believe, is next.
Mr. Lowenthal. Well, thank you for educating us. I am
wondering, you know, a little bit more about the balance that
is going on in Turkey between secularism and more Islamic
beliefs and what that dynamic is like and especially within the
AKP Party itself.
Can you explain to us just where--for our interpretation,
it seems to have been drifted more away from a secular. And,
yet, I would like to understand, what is going on within the
AKP Party itself. Are they experiencing this? And are there
forces to pull it in both directions within the party itself?
Yes?
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman Lowenthal. I think it
is a great question. It allows us to delve into the current
polarization of Turkish society along this----
Mr. Lowenthal. Yes.
Mr. Cagaptay [continuing]. Dividing line. Let me take the
government's alcohol policy, on which there was a question
earlier from the chairman as well. Turkey is a Muslim-majority
country. And consumption of alcohol is considered a sin by some
Muslims. So the regulation of consumption and sale of alcohol,
therefore, blurs the lines between government and religion in a
Muslim-majority country. It is not just a health care or social
policy issue. It is an issue about the separation of religion
and government.
Therefore, the limitation of sale of alcohol, denial of
alcohol licenses to stores and businesses I think represents a
blurring of that line. I think for many Turks who would not
consider the consumption of alcohol as a sin or do not care
that it is a sin, this is a government legislating what should
be considered a sin by some into what should be a crime.
And I think that is a dividing line that has been,
unfortunately, activated in the last few years because of some
of the legislation passed by the government.
Mr. Lowenthal. Others? This is for all the panel.
Mr. Ustun. The party is a conservative democratic party. So
it pursues a conservative agenda. There is no doubt about that.
If secularism moved away from something, it moved away from
the French style toward more U.S. style, where you tolerate all
sorts of religions and religious beliefs. The party is a very
diverse party. It received 50 percent of the votes of
countries. So this is a very diverse country. There is a
discussion within the party. There is no doubt about that.
When it comes to alcohol regulations, though, the
restrictions are based on World Health Organization
suggestions. They didn't come up with them themselves. And they
are actually less restrictive than those implied in this
country, in the United States.
And it basically regulates the--you used to be able to send
your teenage son to buy alcohol for yourself. And they would
sell alcohol in the night hours. So there are regulations
adopted on those issues, but they didn't come up with those
regulations themselves. They are based on E.U. and World Health
Organization guidelines.
Mr. Lowenthal. Mr. Gursel?
Mr. Gursel. Thank you.
Well, according to OECD figures, in Turkey, the pure
alcohol consumption per person, per adult person, per year is
only 1.5 liters. And Turkey is the least alcohol-consuming
country in the OECD while the average is 10.5. And these
measures are really overstretching measures. And then it colors
the perception of advancing of an Islamic agenda by an
important person of the public.
And then also the Prime Minister defended the so-called
alcohol regulation by Islamic references also one time. And
then according to the transformation of the political Islam,
well, I adopted--this party is neo-Islamist, but now to be a
neoist, in my opinion, you should preserve the secular system
while being against the secularization of the society. But now
the system is becoming more or less under the heavy pressure of
an Islamic or Islamist agenda coming under the pressure for
about 1 year or more under the heavy-handed approaches of Mr.
Erdogan.
Mr. Lowenthal. Dr. Fradkin?
Mr. Fradkin. I think some of these things appear from
outside as relatively small impositions or restrictions, as was
talked about earlier. And, in fact, they are, partly for the
reason that was just mentioned. Very few Turks are drinkers.
But there seems to be a desire on the part of the
government and the party to make a particular point of this and
express itself in other points as well; for example, lately a
campaign directed against couples kissing in public.
So the sense is that there is kind of a censoriousness
about some of the regulations and some of the rhetoric that
associates with them.
And the other part of it is a large building program that
has been undertaken by the government, especially to build more
and more mosques and especially a giant mosque, which will be
on the Asian side of the Bosphorus.
Mr. Lowenthal. Ambassador?
Ambassador Jeffrey. It is a very, very good question, Mr.
Congressman. It is also one that gets us all on thin ice. And,
as you can see, we have gotten different views here, all of
which I agree with, even though in some respects, they are
contradictory because the subject is contradictory. I will try,
without getting into, I hope, trouble, to explain this very
quickly but in a little bit of context.
The United States view of secularism is a very interesting
one because we are, by and large, a religious country that has
very strong barriers, usually not crossed, about keeping
religion out of the political system for a variety of reasons,
including the many different kinds of religions we have.
In Turkey, there is a from both sides--the secular side
took a very--it was mentioned earlier, but it is an important
point. The French form of laicite, or secularism, which is
quite aggressive, in France against the Catholic Church 200
years ago with the revolution--and some of these ideas have
passed won. In Turkey, this is manifest by the head scarf ban
that was in effect for many years. And we are seeing a sort of
mirror image of this with some of the actions by the current
government.
In both cases, what is seemingly missing is respect for the
private sphere of people, be they religious or be they non-
religious, be they followers of religious precepts or be they
not too concerned about them.
There has been a consistent trend, regardless of the
government, over a long period of time to challenge the right
of people to do this. We see this now. We saw it 20 years ago.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And we now turn to
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Mr. Chairman, thank you and to Ranking Member
Keating. Let me first say that I actually come to this hearing
today with democracy very heavy on my mind. I talk about the
democracy here in the United States. I will admit outright that
it is from this prism of democracy that I know best and its
evolution and that I approach the question of this hearing
post, is Turkey at a crossroads, what do recent protests mean
for democracy in the region, the democracy, our democracy, here
in the United States after more than 200 years is still working
toward perfection.
Yesterday the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling
that gutted one of our Nation's landmark civil rights: The
Voting Rights Act. That ruling was devastating to communities
in this country who have been fighting attempts to suppress
their right to vote.
Discouraging pain of the past and present de jure and de
facto racism came rushing at those of us who lived through it
and fight for it now. Sadly, that is and was the America that I
have known. On the other hand, today the Supreme Court issued
rulings that bring our Nation significantly closer to our
aspirations of equality and our society. The point is we are
indeed still an evolving country.
This hearing about Turkey, the legacy of our evolution is
instructive here, I believe. Contrary to what some have
suggested, I believe that the protests in Turkey are a sign of
the strengthening of the democratic engagement of civil
society. Protestors have power. And they are demonstrating that
they know how to use it.
It is my hope for Turkey, as it is for America, that we are
judged by our positive steps toward a better society, rather
than the mistakes we have made along the way, for, surely, the
United States has made mistakes also.
I don't want to be judged as a country by those mistakes. I
want to be judged by the positiveness. It is also my hope that
my colleagues encourage the Government of Turkey to embrace
positive deepening of its democracy, as were most evident in
the early steps of the current governing party. Those early
steps should not be overlooked, nor forgotten by this committee
or members of the United States Congress, a balancing of power
of the military and major economic reforms toward advancing to
E.U. accession talks, in my estimation, with no small fear.
The future of the E.U. accession talks have already been
affected by the ongoing protests. But I believe both Turkey and
the E.U. would lose if the accession talks remained blocked.
So I have great hopes for the future of Turkey. With that,
I want to just focus on that for a second and ask questions, I
guess, to Dr. Ustun and to both Mr. Gursel and I will hear from
the Ambassadors also. And I don't mind if everybody peeks in.
The success of the U.S. administration's--and many Members of
Congress have long supported Turkey's accession to the E.U. And
at times, however, the United States pressure on E.U. actors
regarding Turkey's membership prospects have generated tension.
How important is Turkey's potential accession and
continuing the accession process amid current difficulties in
Turkey and E.U. relationships? And what, if anything, can and
should the United States do to continue to promote Turkey's
E.U. accession?
Mr. Ustun. I think Turkey is very grateful to the U.S. for
the support it gives on E.U. membership. And it has proceeded
strongly. And many reforms passed in Turkey, thanks to your
E.U. support and funds and everything like that.
But E.U.'s internal problems and internal questioning of
whether Islam is sort of--Turkey as an Islamic country could
actually be in the E.U., has raised questions. That question is
now much bigger for the E.U. And E.U.'s internal economic
problems now created sort of several E.U.'s, if you will. So
those kinds of problems are preventing progress on that front,
but Turkey still considers it as a strategic goal. The
President mentioned that, the Prime Minister, and all of that.
Yesterday's news about the opening of the regional policy
chapter was very good news on that front. And Germany has
criticized the handling of these protests. But I think we will
move forward there. So I am more hopeful that there have been
serious problems because the E.U. stalled Turkey on those
accounts.
Mr. Meeks. Let's just go across. And then I will be done.
Mr. Gursel. The recent events, incidents in Istanbul and
all over Turkey proved again that the E.U., that for Turkey,
there is no alternative to E.U. perspective. The E.U.
perspective is still the anchor for a sustainable democracy to
establish the creative sustainable democracy for Turkey, even
though there was no E.U. flag during the protest, et cetera.
But that doesn't change the reality. The stalemate must be
overcome. And to overcome the stalemate, maybe the U.S. can
play a facilitating role beginning from the Cyprus question,
which blocks our way, our E.U. perspective. And the pressure
over the government from the society and from other actors to
pursue. And to stick with the E.U. perspective is very
important at the moment.
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman Meeks. I also think
that Turkey's E.U. accession is of incredible value to Turks
and also to the United States. And I think U.S. support for
Turkey's accession has made that process possible. If not for
that, Turkey would not be where it is today.
I don't think Turkey's need for the E.U. is any more on the
economic front. The country has grown in leaps and bounds in
the last decade. And Europe has not. And the Turks don't any
more feel that Europe is the gauge of prosperity. But Europe is
the gate to liberal democracy and I think for the following
reason: Turkey has, roughly speaking, two disparate halves.
As Ambassador Jeffrey stated, the country's model of
secularism has switched from one to the other. Turkey used to
subscribe to the European model of secularism, which basically
meant freedom from religion in government and education. Now
they move to the American model, which is freedom of religion
in government and education.
For many countries, I think one or other model works. For
Turkey, you need both. This country has people of different
religious persuasions and convictions and practices, although
it is mostly Muslim. At the same time, I think Turkey needs,
for instance, a constitution. That would provide freedom of
religion and freedom from religion so that secular,
conservative, liberal Turks would all feel welcome in this new
country. And the only way it can get there is through the
anchor of the European Union, which would be the soft power
force to push for political liberalization so that the
country's two disparate halves could feel that they could live
together. And the road to that goes through a new constitution.
And the path of that goes through the country's prized goal of
European Union accession. So I think E.U. is the anchor of
political liberalization in Turkey.
Mr. Fradkin. Like my colleagues, I think that it would be a
very good idea. It was a good idea in the past. And it would be
a good idea at present. And if the United States can move that
forward, that would be all to the good. But it seems extremely
unlikely under the present circumstances.
On the one hand, what happened in Turkey has given those
opponents of accession in the E.U. an excuse for denying,
stopping the process, which has now stopped until October. And,
on the other hand, it has created for premise for everyone
Europe a kind of a punching bag, which he has been using
regularly in order to appeal to his supporters.
So neither side looks like they want to actually get
together at the moment. And it is hard to see how they would be
brought, that would be brought forward under the present
circumstances. Maybe if things calm down or the other
possibility is it seems to me what was mentioned earlier, that
the eruption of Gezi Park is the eruption to which you
referred, the eruption of civil society.
And if that civil society becomes stronger and if, as
appears to be the case, it really does yearn for the kinds of
political forums that are characteristic of the E.U., then it
is more likely that it would go forward. But then it would have
a clear base within Turkish politics and perhaps overcome
European objections.
Ambassador Jeffrey. First, the E.U. accession process
itself and eventually entry is a very good thing for Turkey.
Secondly, as someone who has lived even longer in Europe than
in Turkey, it is a good thing for European. Turkey
geographically, at least part of the country, by the ethnic
composition of much of its population, by its history, is part
of the European realm. It is economically now a powerhouse that
would help the European Union in many respects. So what is the
problem?
And certainly it isn't that Turkey is all that different.
It has a very strong orientation toward Europe. There are
millions of Turks in Germany and so forth. I think this is a
very important process. The American Government supports it. We
get in trouble all the time with the Europeans by making these
recommendations.
I think we earned the right from 1941 to 1989 and beyond to
give advice to our friends and allies. They can not listen to
us if they want.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And we ask unanimous consent Mr. Connolly
be given the rights as a ex-officio member of the committee to
proceed with his 5 minutes of questions. Hearing no objection,
so ordered. Mr. Connolly, you may proceed.
Mr. Connolly. Thank goodness Mr. Meeks couldn't hear that
last part there about objections. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I wanted to be here today as the co-chairman of the
Congressional Caucus of Turkey. And I really thank you and the
ranking member for your graciousness in allowing me to
participate.
First of all, Ambassador Jeffrey, I hear a fellow New
Englander. Where are you from?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Saugus, Mass.
Mr. Connolly. Saugus? Okay.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Just north of Boston.
Mr. Connolly. I can talk that way, too, if I have to.
[Laughter.]
But I don't normally.
To make a point, I think, to follow up on some of the
points you were making, Mr. Ambassador, if one looked at the
United States from 1965 through, say, 1968, very turbulent
period in this country, there were riots in most major urban
areas of America during that time period, were there not? You
may want to verbally acknowledge, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Jeffrey. There were.
Mr. Connolly. And in 1968, was there not a major
conflagration in the City of Chicago during the pendency of a
major party convention to try to determine the next President
of the United States to have a state that subsequently was
referred to by a formal commission as a police riot? Is that
not true?
Ambassador Jeffrey. That is true.
Mr. Connolly. Could one construe fairly that with those
turbulent years and those very difficult and in some cases
terrible events, that somehow that proved that America was not
up to its democratic ideals or, indeed, its democratic
institutions were false?
Ambassador Jeffrey. As one who was very involved in that
period, I would say it proved that, a) there were great
fissures in American society at that time and that we worked
through them in different ways that proceeded on through the
'70s and that we emerged from it a stronger democracy.
Mr. Connolly. I think you have just put your finger right
on it. I think that is the question, not that there are
difficulties in a country, not that there are in some cases
sometimes violent demonstrations in a democracy, though they
are to be avoided if we can.
But what does the country do with that dissent? Does it
make it stronger or does it, in fact, force it or encourage it
to fall back on autocratic processes that hinder
democratization? It seems to me that is the existential moment
for Turkey right now. I wonder if you could enlighten us
because I have heard sort of contrary messages coming from the
Turkish Government.
Initially, Prime Minister Erdogan reacted pretty harshly to
the very fact that there were any demonstrations and called
demonstrators names. But then other members of his government,
the President himself, and I think you pointed out or somebody
pointed out a Deputy Minister--actually, there were noises
about apologies for the overreaction of police and a statement
of respect for the sincerity of the demonstrators.
There was hope after those statements that Prime Minister
Erdogan returned to Ankara, that his words might echo some of
that conciliatory rhetoric. They seem not to. I wonder,
Ambassador Jeffrey, if you could help us a little bit sort of
divine what are we to conclude from these mixed messages coming
from officials of the Turkish Government with respect to the
import of these demonstrations.
Ambassador Jeffrey. I would yield to some of the people
here who know the country better than I, but I would say that
we have another example. Just yesterday not only did President
Obama speak with the Prime Minister, but the U.S. statement
issued after it, the Prime Minister also described a situation
in Turkey. The two leaders discussed the importance of
nonviolence and of the rights to free expression of assembly
and of free press. Such statements usually, to one or another
degree, jointly not only do they reflect the truth, but they
usually reflect a certain understanding, at least, if not
agreement, before it goes out. So I would take this as another
step, moving back.
Again, we get to your first question, sir, which is this is
a very tumultuous movement, I think forward. I could be wrong,
but I would like to ask the others.
Mr. Connolly. Certainly. Do other members of the panel wish
to comment?
Mr. Fradkin. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Yes, Dr. Fradkin and Dr. Cagaptay?
Mr. Fradkin. I think that, you know, it is very useful to
draw the analogy that you did or the comparison anyway. And it
certainly could be the case that the kinds of results or
progress in democratic life will result from this explosion.
The obstacles to it, it seems to me, are a couple. One was
referred to earlier by some of my colleagues, I think, in
particular, Mr. Gursel, that we had the benefit in the '60s,
which I remember extremely well, of certain institutions and
also the rotation of the parties, which permitted people to
sort of say how they wanted to go in the future and also to
restrain the passions that are characteristic of democratic
life. The question is whether Turkey has the conditions for the
restraint of those passions or a means for expressing them in
its political life. I am not saying it doesn't, but this is
certainly new. And it is not clear that it does.
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. I agree with
my friend and colleague Ambassador Jeffrey that this is Turkey
moving forward for the following reasons. It has become in the
last decade, largely thanks to sound economic policies
implemented by the AKP Government a majority middle class
society for the first time in history.
By the end of this decade, about 80 percent of Turks will
be classified as middle class. What is more important, Turkey
is about to attain universal literacy. And this will be first
ever for a large Muslim-majority country in human history.
These two developments are irreversible. They represent a
society that has become too mature, too middle class, too
literate, too connected to the world to fit into a one-size-
fits-all straitjacket conservatism. That is why I think you are
seeing an outburst of anger on the streets, as some of my
panelists have indicated, but I think what you are seeing is
beyond that anger.
What was interesting, in Istanbul the last month is that,
first, you had a pretty significant pro-environmental movement
that tried to save a park from being converted into a shopping
mall. People care for the trees. That would not have been the
case in Turkey 10 years ago. That is a product of a decade of
growth and prosperity and middle class values: Respect for the
environment. That has been born out of the AKP success.
What is more important is that when the police cracked down
on the pro-environment sit-in, in the middle of the night, at 2
o'clock a.m. in the morning, hundreds of thousands of people
came onto the streets to defend the rights of those other
people to protest. I think that is a sign of maturity. It
indicates that people are saying, ``I may not agree with what
they are doing, but they have the right to assembly and free
speech.''
And I think that represents a way forward for the country
because the country is arriving at a point of a large middle
class which demands respect for individual freedoms, including
freedom of assembly, association, media expression, and respect
for individual space, as well as the environment.
Mr. Connolly. Before we proceed--my time is up. And it is
entirely up to the chairman whether he wishes to allow
additional comments. I thank the chair.
Mr. Gursel. Well, I think in Turkey, where there are no
real checks and balances, no effective or efficient opposition,
no free press, at the end of the day, I can say this social
explosion shakes the dynamics or the statistics of the
government, political status of the government, and shows the
government their limits. And then it must be understood.
The limits for Mr. Erdogan's power has been drawn in Taksim
on the 1st of June. And then these people, now they are
continuing to their social movement without the support of the
extremist groups in parks, at their homes, and in many parts of
the social life. They are stripped from them.
And then these people, the middle class, the urban, secular
middle class, as Mr. Cagaptay has said, they are connected to
the words. And at this age, where there is this highly
educated, the new middle class term of--I mean, I use the term
to remark that they are the wage earners. And they are very
skilled people. I mean, they are the potential owners of the
E.U. project of Turkey if the project is offered to them in a
convincing way because the project now, actually, is in the
deep freeze.
And then this is--and at this age, to finalize, social
engineering is impossible. This is one last message that this
government or Mr. Erdogan himself has to get from the social
explosion.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And, to top it off, Dr. Ustun?
Mr. Ustun. Mr. Chairman, your earlier question, did you
expect it, and I said, ``Yes, with some objections.'' The
reason was that there is a context to all of this. AK Party has
had all of these successes at the ballot box. And now it is
trying to tackle the sort of burning issues, such as the
Kurdish question and new civilian constitution. These have also
created discontent. There are people who are not happy about
the Kurdish settlement process, and they are not sure what is
happening and et cetera.
But the tension was there. So we could tell that this
tension had to come out somehow. And, also, there is discontent
about the serial policy.
But the reason the language changed over time and you hear
mixed messages is that evolution of the protests. Don't forget
the Prime Minister met with the protestors in two different
meetings. And he said that ``I understand your concerns.''
And the government issued an apology as well. But he was
directing his comments about groups who want to occupy the
park, not just protest, but occupy and then continuously
protest whenever they wanted. So there he had to draw the line
and say, ``There is the rule of law. And you have to abide by
the rules.''
Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
I think we have had some very thought-provoking testimony
today. Just a few thoughts in closing. There were some
expressions of optimism that I noted, even from the beginning,
where we talked about the development of a middle class in
Turkey that--perhaps these demonstrations reflect the
development of a middle class who--you know, I ain't going to
take it anymore or something that could lead, as we talked
about, to an actual greater demand of the population for
democratic principles and respect for their rights. And we
heard that expression from Mr. Meeks as well. And so Mr. Meeks
was sort of mirroring that testimony about a strong middle
class.
We would hope that Turkey uses this episode of turmoil as a
vehicle to move closer, rather than further away from
democratic government. And because, as Mr. Connolly pointed
out, we have had instances like this in the United States. And
some of the turmoil that we have gone through has helped us
make decisions that needed to be made. And we needed to change
direction. And so turmoil is either going to be assigned as a
growing pain, which is an indication of past progress, or it
could be seen also that past progress is in jeopardy. So we
will be watching this very closely.
And one last thought is that years ago, when I was a young
man, I found myself in Istanbul. And I was staying in a 50-
cent-a-night hotel, I might add. And it was quite an
experience. And I decided that I wanted to swim between Europe
and Asia. And, in fact, the real truth of the matter was I
decided I was going to do that because I knew it would impress
women and I needed all the leverage I could get.
What happens is I went down. I found a spot that looked
like it was the closest between the areas there between Europe
and Asia and the Bosphorus there. And I started to sort of get
my--I had my swimming suit underneath my pants there. And I
started getting ready to jump in. And I was 20 years old then.
And a young fellow about 5, 6 years older than me, a Turkish
young man, came up to me and said, ``What are you doing?''
I said, ``Well, I am going to swim between Europe and
Asia.''
And he said, ``Are you out of your mind?''
And I said, ``No.''
He says, ``You know, this is very treacherous water here.
You know,'' he says, ``I'll tell you what. My friend and I will
row beside you in our little boat.'' They had a little rowboat
there. Thank God, they did. I tell you, I would have panicked
three-fourths of the way because it is really cold. And the
water is very treacherous there. There are whirlpools and
things. And knowing that they were rowing beside me gave me the
confidence to keep going. And I actually made the journey
between Europe and Asia.
And I will just say this, that we should remember that
during the Cold War and during that experience that I had with
myself right there, it couldn't have been better a situation
than to have a strong Turkish person as my friend right next to
me. And that is the way we should look in the future as well.
We need to have the Turkish people beside us as friends. And
friends give advice to one another.
And our advice now is to try to reconcile any differences
that you have that have been brought up by this turmoil and use
the turmoil that we have experienced in Turkey as a means to
make things better, rather than as a means to attack one's
enemies. And if we do that, Turkey will end up a stronger
country for it. And the United States will be better off as
well because we will have Turks right next to us rowing the
boat to make sure that we are safe. So thank you all very much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
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