[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES IN EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 16, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
LUKE MESSER, Indiana WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Joseph Y. Yun, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State............ 5
The Honorable Nisha Biswal, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development................ 16
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Joseph Y. Yun: Prepared statement............................ 7
The Honorable Nisha Biswal: Prepared statement................... 18
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 40
Hearing minutes.................................................. 41
ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES IN EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
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THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come to order.
I would like to welcome and thank everyone for attending
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific's hearing this
afternoon.
Mr. Bera will be sitting in for the ranking member, Eni
Faleomavaega, who could not be with us here today. Mr. Bera and
I will make opening statements, and other members will be
recognized for 1 minute to make a statement if they wish to do
so.
We want to start this on time because we are going to have
votes shortly. We will vote and then come back, but we can get
in as much as possible before that.
This hearing was called to further assess the Fiscal Year
2014 State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development, USAID, budget request for the East Asia and the
Pacific region. It follows Secretary of State Kerry's and USAID
Administrator Shah's testimony received at the full committee
last month.
The Asia-Pacific region is receiving the largest proposed
budget increase of any other region, which makes it critical
that we focus on this portion of the budget request and hear
from State Department and USAID about how the additional funds
for this region will fulfill U.S. priorities and national
security objectives. Of particular interest are those nations
receiving a significant increase in foreign assistance, notably
Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
I believe all of us in this room today know how important
Asia is politically, militarily, and economically. The
administration refers to a foreign policy rebalance. Congress
has also recognized Asia's importance. In the last 2\1/2\
years, three Presidents or Prime Ministers have addressed a
joint session of Congress. All three have been from the Asia-
Pacific region, including South Korea's President Park, who
spoke in the Capitol just last week. But while we all note the
region's geopolitical significance, such a substantial increase
in foreign assistance funding must be justified as providing an
equally substantial return on the taxpayer investment.
The Asia-Pacific is a region which faces many challenges,
among them: Nuclear proliferation, human trafficking,
terrorism, widespread corruption, natural disasters, poverty,
and complex security threats, all of which have bilateral and
multilateral implications. Today we have come face-to-face with
what will undoubtedly be one of our greatest challenges in
Asia, North Korea's belligerence and nuclear ambitions. We also
have major concerns about China's growing political and
economic influence throughout the region and its aggression in
the South and East China Seas. In the face of such challenges,
no single one-track approach to ensuring U.S. national security
interests and priorities will suffice, but it must be
multipronged. I hope the witnesses here today will elaborate on
the administration's plans for confronting these threats.
The administration seeks a $53.3 million budget increase
for the Asia-Pacific region. It proposes expanding foreign
assistance, with the goals of strengthening regional security,
enhancing economic integration, developing the Lower Mekong
region, supporting democratic developments, and addressing war
legacies.
In today's fiscal environment, as we face our own nearly
$16.8 trillion national debt, this $53.3 million is not chump
change. The entire Asia-Pacific budget of $1.2 billion must be
thoroughly examined. For example, the administration is
proposing providing Burma with an additional $28.8 million.
While we have seen tremendous progress over the course of only
2 years, Burma is fraught with ongoing violence in the ethnic
areas, which, in many cases, is being perpetrated by the
Burmese military. There are few signs reconciliation is
forthcoming, and reforms have yet to benefit Burma's diverse
communities. Our U.S. Embassy staff on the ground cannot travel
outside specified zones, and there have been roughly 1,300
additional people unlawfully detained in the ethnic areas.
I think President Thein Sein's visit to the White House
next week is perhaps a bit premature. While we have seen
advances, it is too early, in my view, to proclaim a new day in
Burma. In addition, I am aware that the administration is
considering providing military assistance to Burma. Frankly, I
believe, with the slow-moving reform process and numerous human
rights issues remaining in Burma, considering providing
military aid is probably premature and may face considerable
opposition in this Congress.
Similarly, the increase in military assistance to Cambodia,
I believe, may very well be unwarranted. I hope today's
witnesses will explain the reasoning behind this request.
There are many other areas of concern that I am sure my
colleagues will address this afternoon--one of them is the
continuing and unjustified assistance to Beijing that is aimed
at promoting job growth in China. When many Americans are still
struggling to make ends meet and find jobs, we should not be
using American tax dollars to subsidize a country that owns
$1.2 trillion of U.S. debt, steals our technologies, and puts
U.S. companies out of business and American workers oftentimes
out of work.
I welcome increased U.S. attention and engagement in Asia
because our economic security and political development depends
on the success of each other. At the same time, our strategy
needs to be judicious and discerning. We should not be funding
projects just because we can. The truth is, we can't afford to
take that approach anymore.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses
this afternoon.
I now yield to Mr. Bera for his opening remarks, if he can
make them in 5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. Absolutely.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Excellent. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
And thank you, Mr. Yun, Ms. Biswal, for being here.
U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific reflects the growing
importance of the Pacific Rim to our own country's prosperity.
The region is home to two-thirds of the world's population and
many of the world's fastest-growing economies.
The rapid growth of this region presents both
opportunities, but it also presents challenges for our
strategic interests. Robust engagement there is necessary
because it promotes U.S. economic interests as well as regional
and global peace and stability.
As the region rapidly grows and transforms, a sustained and
visible U.S. commitment is increasingly essential. Our
country's future prosperity and security will be defined by
events and developments in this important region. The State
Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
rebalances our country's relationship across the Asia-Pacific,
strengthens multilateral engagement, enhances security
cooperation, supports democracy and human rights, and taps into
the regional markets which are key to U.S. economic growth.
At $1.2 billion, a 7 percent increase over Fiscal Year 2012
levels for the Asia-Pacific region, EAP's Fiscal Year 2014
budget request supports the Obama administration's rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific. This funding will help support democratic
reform in key countries and will assist in shaping the region's
emerging security landscape.
U.S. assistance will also focus on renewing our leadership
in this region, deepening economic ties, promoting democratic
values, strengthening diplomatic engagement, and broadening the
U.S. security presence.
I am also pleased that the administration plans to
strengthen regional organizations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and the East Asia Summit. Stronger
multilateral institutions in Asia are necessary to promote
stability and act as a counterweight to China's rapid
expansion.
With regards to specific countries, the budget request for
Burma is a substantial increase above the Fiscal Year 2012
level. The additional funds will support the country's
democratic gains following the dramatic political gains of the
past 2 years. The funding will also address humanitarian needs
both within and across Burma's borders, as well as promote
national reconciliation, a vital issue given the ongoing ethnic
conflicts.
The Philippines is another country that will see a
significant budget increase. Specifically, the Fiscal Year 2014
budget requests additional funding to help the Philippines, a
treaty ally of ours, build their maritime security
capabilities. Given the ongoing disputes and security
challenges in the region, it is important that we deepen our
traditional security ties to promote a stable and peaceful
Asia-Pacific.
And, last, foreign assistance to countries in the Asia-
Pacific is not a gift. The United States provides foreign aid
because it serves our interests--security, economic, and
political interests--and because it reflects our values. U.S.
assistance is also a vital sign of our country's deep
commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing,
and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Bera.
At this time, we are going into recess to vote. We will be
back in probably 30 minutes or so. We are in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Chabot. The committee will come back to order.
I would now like to recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Sherman, for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Virtually all my statements will be
about our trade deficit and our trade agreements, because
virtually all of our trade deficit is attributable to the
region we are focused on.
We have a huge trade deficit. It is as big a problem as our
budget deficit; it just receives far less attention. Those who
believe that we should always blame America first will argue
that we have a big trade deficit because we have a Federal
budget deficit. But we had a budget surplus in the latter part
of the last century, and we still had a huge trade deficit.
Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Am I limited to 1 minute?
Mr. Chabot. Yeah.
Mr. Sherman. Ah.
Mr. Chabot. We will make it 2 minutes, in your case.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Mr. Chabot. So the gentleman is recognized for an
additional 1 minute, plus the 20 seconds that he still has on
the first minute.
Mr. Sherman. Good.
Mr. Chabot. It was really good, by the way.
Mr. Sherman. Oh, okay.
And so the real question, why are we running a huge trade
deficit, it is either because our workers and entrepreneurs are
worse or our Government is worse, at least worse than our
trading partners, at promoting U.S. exports and deterring
imports and working for a better trade deficit.
And this is consistent with what I see in the Foreign
Service of the United States and other countries. I talk to the
Foreign Service of other countries. Promoting trade and exports
is the most prestigious thing they can do. Then I talk to those
in the State Department, and I have seen just egregious
mistakes made by very intelligent people, which only happens
when it is a matter they don't really care about, but they are
trying to seem like they care when they are talking to a
Congressman.
We see China not allowing our movies in, except in limited
numbers, and yet we allow an unlimited number of Chinese tennis
shoes in. And we have never threatened one with the other.
And we see Japan not only engaging in quantitative easing
but also intervening in the currency markets. And all they are
greeted with from the United States is sympathy that they have
a bad economic situation. Well, by God, we have a bad economic
situation, and currency manipulation is something that ought to
be at the highest levels of the State Department. And it will
at least be a part of this hearing.
I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel here
this afternoon.
We will begin with the Acting Assistant Secretary Joseph
Yun of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the
Department of State. He previously held the position of
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. After joining the Foreign
Service in 1985, he has held overseas postings in the Republic
of Korea, Thailand, France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. Before
joining the Foreign Service, Mr. Yun was a senior economist for
Data Resources, Inc., in Lexington, Massachusetts.
We welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Yun.
I would also like to introduce Nisha Biswal, who has served
as USAID's Assistant Administrator for Asia since September
20th, 2010. Prior to her appointment, she served as the
majority clerk for the State Department and Foreign Operations
Subcommittee on the Committee on Appropriations in the U.S.
House of Representatives. She has also served as the director
of policy and advocacy at InterAction and as a professional
staff on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where she was
responsible for South and Central Asia policy. Ms. Biswal has
also worked with the American Red Cross, both in their
Washington headquarters and overseas as an international
delegate in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
We welcome you both here this afternoon.
I know you are familiar with our rules. We have the 5-
minute rule for witnesses and ourselves. The yellow light will
come on when you have a minute to wrap up. When the red light
comes on we would appreciate it if you would complete your
statements.
You are recognized for 5 minutes, Mr. Yun. Thank you for
being here.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH Y. YUN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Yun. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bera, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for----
Mr. Chabot. You might want to pull the mic a little bit
closer so everybody in the back can hear, too. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Yun. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
to testify on the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
budget request for Fiscal Year 2014.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make
brief remarks and submit a more detailed written testimony for
the record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Yun. At the outset of this administration, the
President made a strategic decision to increase focus on the
Asia-Pacific region. The President's approach recognizes that
the United States is a Pacific power whose people, economy, and
interests are increasingly linked with Asia's economic security
and political development.
The Fiscal Year 2014 budget reflects this strategic
priority. Our budget request was crafted in full recognition of
our current budgetary constraints, as well as the expectations
of the American people to use their tax dollars wisely.
I am grateful for the opportunity to come before you, along
with my good friend Nisha Biswal, to discuss what is at stake
in a region with over half the world's population and nearly
half of the world's global trade.
First, these efforts create and sustain American jobs.
Economic vitality in the United States depends on the ability
of U.S. firms to tap the growing base of the demand for goods
and services in the Asia-Pacific region. Our diplomatic and
development resources in the region support U.S. jobs by
promoting open markets, protecting intellectual property, and
helping U.S. Firms compete for foreign contracts.
U.S. exports to Asia-Pacific reached almost $400 billion in
2012, up 26 percent in 4 years. Through expanded engagement
with China on investment, the value of Chinese greenfield
investment and acquisitions in the United States has risen
dramatically, from less than $500 million annually prior to
2009 to $6.5 billion by 2012. These inflows of capital support
more American jobs.
Public diplomacy and consular operations throughout the
Asia-Pacific bring millions of tourists and foreign students to
the United States each year, with students from East Asia
contributing, we estimate, $9 billion annually to the U.S.
economy.
Second, our funding resources make the United States more
secure. In cooperation with the Defense Department and other
agencies, our security assistance programs help maintain peace
and security across the Asia-Pacific, including efforts to deal
with North Korea, stem proliferation, maintain freedom of
navigation, and promote transparency and human rights.
Third, our budget promotes democracy, human dignity, and
the rule of law. For example, in Burma, the United States is
supporting a historic political and economic transition through
targeted assistance to promote the rule of law, respect for
human rights, a robust civil society, and the development of a
transparent, accountable government that is responsive to the
needs of the people.
The overall Fiscal Year 2014 budget requests for the State
Department and USAID to provide $1.2 billion in funding for
East Asia and the Pacific, which reflects a 7.1 increase from
Fiscal Year 2012 in support of the East Asia rebalance. This is
the largest percentage increase of any region.
The request expands foreign assistance funding to the Asia-
Pacific region to $768 million from $715 million in Fiscal Year
2012.
On the State operations request, the budget provides an
additional $25.9 million for program and supporting costs,
including funding to add 24 new positions to fill needs at our
Embassies and our regional bureau offices.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, U.S. leadership in the Asia-
Pacific region will pay dividends for our security and
prosperity well into this century, just as our post-World War
II commitment to Europe created a similar transatlantic network
of institutions and relationships.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify today,
and I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Yun.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yun follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Ms. Biswal, you are recognized for 5 minutes
also.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NISHA BISWAL, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Biswal. Thank you, Chairman Chabot and Congressman Bera
and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on the President's Fiscal Year 2014 budget
request for East Asia and the Pacific.
In the interest of time, I, too, will summarize my
statement and ask that the full statement be entered into the
record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Biswal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me begin by thanking you, sir, for your leadership,
and this committee for laying the bipartisan foundation of
support for increased U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region.
As my esteemed colleague Joe Yun has articulated, the
rebalance of the Asia-Pacific region is a key economic and
national security priority. Deepening our engagement is
sensible and strategic in a region that is home to two-thirds
of the world's population and some of the fastest-growing
economies, but one that also encompasses nearly 30 percent of
the world's poor.
We know that Asia faces serious development challenges,
such as inequitable growth, poverty and malnutrition, the
threat of pandemic diseases, environmental degradation, and
natural disasters, just to name a few. President Obama has
noted that Asia will largely define whether the coming century
will be marked by conflict or cooperation, by needless
suffering or human progress.
USAID's role is to provide the platform for partnership and
technical cooperation with the countries of the region to
ensure that we are advancing human progress and cooperation. To
that end, the President's budget requests $768.3 million for
international assistance programs for East Asia and the
Pacific, and as Joe noted, an increase of 7.5 percent compared
to Fiscal Year 2012.
Our programs in the region are focused on supporting
bilateral and regional efforts to address these challenges by
investing in health and human capacity, by strengthening food
security, and helping the region address the impacts of global
climate change.
At the same time, we recognize that a critical constraint
to inclusive and efficient growth is persistent and pervasive
corruption, weak systems of governance, and continuing
challenges to human rights. So much of our assistance also
focuses on these priorities.
Across the region, we will devote 33 percent of the request
to improving health outcomes. Four countries--Cambodia,
Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam--are the priority or focus
countries for the Global Health Initiative. And our support has
helped improve maternal and child health and reduced the spread
of infectious diseases such as HIV, avian influenza, malaria,
and tuberculosis.
Asia is also home to 62 percent of the world's hungry and
70 percent of undernourished children. The President's Feed the
Future initiative is increasing agricultural productivity and
food security through a comprehensive approach that invests in
the entire agricultural value chain.
But sustainable economic growth and agricultural
development require effective stewardship of the region's
natural resources and biodiversity. And so we direct 17 percent
of the 2014 request to share best practices, tools, and
technologies for conserving forests, coral reefs, and
fisheries, promoting clean energy, supporting climate change
adaptation, and combatting illegal wildlife trafficking.
And in a region that experiences over 60 percent of global
natural disasters, we are helping improve disaster response
capabilities across the region so that countries in the region
can handle these disasters when they happen. As we speak, our
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance personnel are on the
ground in Burma and Bangladesh working with local partners and
the United Nations to help prepare for and respond to Cyclone
Mahasen.
The budget request prioritizes support for political and
economic transition in Burma, the Partnership for Growth in the
Philippines, and the Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia,
as well as resources to consolidate democratic gains in
Mongolia.
Finally, we also address issues of strengthening regional
institutions, such as the ASEAN Secretariat, and our work with
the Lower Mekong countries to address transnational issues and
promote regional integration.
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that to do all that I have laid
out we cannot be business as usual. And so as part of the USAID
reforms, we are changing the way we do business in three major
ways: A greater emphasis on local partnerships to ensure
sustainable solutions; a focus on science, technology, and
innovation to ensure that we are bringing the latest, most
efficient tools; and a focus on partnerships that leverage
private-sector and other donor resources. We think that this is
critical to advancing our interests in the region and advancing
prosperity for the countries of Asia.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome
your questions.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Biswal follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. We appreciate the testimony of both witnesses
here this afternoon.
Now we have 5 minutes to ask questions, and we will stay
within our 5 minutes as much as possible. I will begin by
recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Yun, I will begin with you. I would like to start with
something that the ranking member, Eni Faleomavaega, and I feel
very strongly about, and are very concerned about. That is the
recent attack on the Taiwanese fishing vessel by a Philippine
Government ship that resulted in the death of a Taiwanese
national.
I hope you will take just a moment to address this issue
and advise us as to any discussions that the administration
might be having with Philippine Government officials regarding,
for example, an official apology to Taiwan or compensation to
the victim's families or any other action that might be
contemplated at this time.
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On this very tragic incident, number one, we would very
much like to convey our condolence to the family for the loss
of life.
I think there have been a number of discussions between
Manila and Taipei, and, of course, we would like those
discussions to go on to an end that is acceptable to both
sides.
I think, at this point, sir, we really don't know what
happened. I understand an investigation is going on. But we are
keeping in very close contact both with Taipei and Manila on
this incident. It is very unfortunate because, as you well
know, these are two of our closest friends and partners in the
region, and so we just feel awful.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We would appreciate the
Department keeping this committee up to date on what is
happening there. Ranking Member Faleomavaega and I just came
back from Korea, Japan and Taiwan a couple of weeks ago. As you
indicated, both of these countries are very close and important
allies to the United States and you hate to see something like
this happen between friends.
Moving on, the U.S. has provided an extraordinary amount of
assistance to Cambodia since 2007, roughly $70 million a year.
Over the course of the last few years, however, we have seen
assistance yield arguably few results, and Cambodia is no more
closely tied to the United States than it was back in 2007.
According to our U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Ambassador
Todd, the relationship, according to him, has actually soured
quite a bit following President Obama's visit to Cambodia last
year. I am not inferring it is because of that, but since then
it apparently has worsened. In addition, Hun Sen's party, the
Cambodia People's Party, CPP, controls almost every aspect of
governance and civil life in Cambodia, including the military
and police forces, which are all members of the standing
committee of Hun Sen's CPP and its Politburo. Every single top
military commander also sits on the CPP's central committee.
Additionally, many of these CPP-dominated military units
are involved in gross human rights abuses, like violent land
seizures for economic concessions. We just met with some
Cambodians about land seizures last week. Economic concessions
to timber and rubber and palm oil companies and a whole range
of things.
Would you comment on that, Mr. Yun?
Mr. Yun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we absolutely share your concerns. There is no
question about that.
I think the high level of our assistance really does
reflect the tragic history that Cambodia has gone through and
really our effort to help overcome past legacies. Having said
that, you are very much on the right, same thinking as us.
Their abuse of human rights and lack of political freedom is
very much of concern.
As you noted, President Obama was in Cambodia last November
for multilateral meetings, East Asia Summit and other meetings.
And he did have a meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen, and at
that meeting he had a very good discussion and conveyed our
very strong views on human rights.
There will be Cambodian elections coming up in July. And,
again, we have been telling the Cambodians to please be
inclusive and also have openings so that political opposition
can legitimately represent themselves. And these discussions
are going on, and I expect these elections will be a crucial
indicator of----
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. If I could stop you there just for a
second because I am almost out of time, but you mentioned the
national elections in July.
Let me ask you, if they are determined not to be free or
fair, which a lot of observers think is quite likely, how will
the administration adjust, for example, its assistance levels
to Cambodia to reflect our disapproval with how Hun Sen is
ruling the country and how the elections went, if they don't go
the way they should? And when I say ``should,'' not judging
which way an election should go, but just that it is fair.
Mr. Yun. We will, of course, have to digest what happens in
the election, but I would imagine it will be a very important
factor in the way we go with our assistance.
Mr. Chabot. All right. I would strongly urge that is a
factor. It ought to be a factor in whether we are taking
American taxpayer dollars and aiding a country, if their
elections are deemed to be fair and open to both sides or all
sides.
Mr. Yun. Yes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
I would now like to recognize the current ranking member
for the day, Mr. Bera, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, thank you, Mr. Yun and Ms. Biswal, for your
opening statements.
Obviously, the strategic rebalance to the region is very
important and something that I think this committee and many of
us in the House support. There is huge opportunity in the Asia-
Pacific region, but there are also, obviously, significant
challenges, particularly when we look at East Asia, when we
look at the Pacific and the South China Sea region.
If you were to think about, you know, one or two key
challenges to this region, would either one of you--you know,
feel free to articulate what you think our biggest challenges
are to the U.S. strategic interests in this region.
Ms. Biswal. Sure. I would be happy to talk about what I
think are some of the critical development challenges that bear
into our interests in the region. Because, as you see the fast-
growing economies, they are having some major impacts within
the region--the issues of urbanization, competition over
natural resources; the impacts on health, with the emergence of
pandemic diseases. As you know, Southeast Asia is the crucible
of the pandemic threats that have been emerging over the past
decade or so. And global climate change and the impact of
environmental degradation on the world's resources and,
frankly, on pollution that we experience on our own shores.
And so these are important challenges not only for the
region, but they are important for us. And so, increasingly,
our programs are looking at how we address the way Asia grows,
the way Southeast Asia experiences growth, to push for more
sustainable and inclusive growth that takes into account
managing and mitigating for these particular developmental
challenges.
Mr. Bera. And would it be accurate to say that the
budgetary requests that are being made for the coming fiscal-
year budget helps us build critical infrastructure to address
these challenges and lays out those priorities?
Ms. Biswal. Absolutely. While we don't invest in hard
infrastructure, the soft infrastructure of governance that is
fundamental to how the region grows is where we put a lot of
resources.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Yun?
Mr. Yun. I would say our biggest opportunity and biggest
challenge is in the economic area. Very much think there is
enormous growing market there; how we take advantage of that.
And how we deal with problems associated with unfair trade, not
level playing field, and these include thefts of intellectual
property rights, cybersecurity.
So I think those are the issues that are of critical
interest to Americans, and we need to deal with them.
Mr. Bera. Great.
And in my remaining time, you know, I was recently reading
that USAID has been working with the country of India to help
them develop their own aid institutions to help other nations.
Ms. Biswal, what do you think India's role is in helping
these emerging economies in the region? And how best can we
work with India?
Ms. Biswal. Sure. So we are increasingly working with and
talking to India about the development programs that it
supports within the Asia region. We have a trilateral dialogue,
U.S., India, Japan, that focuses on the East Asia theater. And
India is investing very heavily in Burma in many of the same
areas in which we are providing support. And so I think there
is an opportunity for us to work together to maximize the
impact of the resources that we bring to bear.
When President Obama went to India in 2000, he talked about
the local-global cooperation. And he launched, along with Prime
Minister Singh, the Partnership for an Evergreen Revolution,
which talks about the partnership between the United States and
India in the African context.
Increasingly, we are looking at how to partner in sub-
Saharan Africa, and in Afghanistan, in South Asia, and in East
Asia.
Mr. Bera. Great. Yeah, thank you.
Mr. Yun, do you have anything that you would like to add?
Mr. Yun. I don't think I have much to add to that.
Mr. Bera. Okay. Great.
With that, I will yield back my time.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
I think the gentleman has left that we were going to turn
to next. The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for being here today with us.
You have mentioned, both of you, in different parts of your
testimony about our country's focus and rebalance toward Asia
and the Pacific and, without a doubt, the importance that we
focus on the broad range of challenges and opportunities that
we face, which include the security and prosperity of the Asia-
Pacific region.
I represent the Second District in Hawaii. And the regional
instability created by the recent North Korean provocations, as
well as the slow-boiling territorial disagreements around the
Senkakus and South China Seas, are something that affect us in
a very personal way but also affect us as we look at this
rebalance and the region as a whole. And I think it underscores
the growing need that we strengthen our Nation's military and
diplomatic presence in the region, where we have economic and
national security interests that are inextricably linked.
We had Secretary Kerry here before us in the committee last
month, and he touched very briefly on the fact that we need to
do things differently going forward, specifically as it relates
to North Korea.
And, Mr. Yun, I know you have a lot of background in this
area, and I would love to hear your thoughts in more detail
than we had before on exactly what are some examples of
different diplomatic steps that we can take toward North Korea
in order to stop this endless cycle that we have been under for
so long and, specifically, the tactic that we have proposed
legislation on and has been tried before in 2005, with the
sanctions on hard currency for North Korea.
Mr. Yun. Thank you very much.
This is a tough one, the North Korean challenge.
Specifically, their nuclear weapons program has been there, as
you know, since the late 1960s, so this is a problem we have
had to deal with for decades. And, of course, as they test more
nuclear devices and as they test more missiles, their
capabilities increase, which is very worrisome.
I had an opportunity to accompany Secretary Kerry on his
trip to Northeast Asia some 6 weeks ago. And, clearly, there is
awareness among our two key allies, which is Japan and South
Korea, and they are working very closely with us.
I would say, really, the important party with leverage and
influence over North Korea is China. And, on this occasion,
Secretary Kerry had a really lengthy engagement with Chinese
leadership, including President Xi Jinping, Prime Minister Li
Keqiang, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. We are continuing that
dialogue, and very soon afterwards we had a visit by their six-
party chairman, Wu Dawei. And, of course, this will go into
next month and thereafter, with important meetings between our
side and Chinese side.
So we are putting a lot of emphasis on that front, Ms.
Gabbard. But it is something we dealt with, and I think, quite
frankly, while many people will criticize that it has not been
successful, at the same time I think the problem that we have
so far is, I would say, you know, considering it is a 30-, 40-,
50-year-old problem, we will continue to deal with through
strength, especially with our allies, and build up our
defenses, especially around Hawaii and Alaska.
Ms. Gabbard. I think one of the issues that concerns many
of us, though, however, is that while the cycle continues and
people say we go back to status quo every time, the bar of what
status quo is continues to be raised as North Korea continues
to develop more nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
Specifically, if you could touch again, quickly, on the
hard currency sanctions, as the chairman of this committee as
well as many of my colleagues and I have introduced legislation
to bring back these hard currency sanctions on North Korea.
China's role in allowing that success that we saw in 2005
to happen--we saw that it worked, but, unfortunately, the
program was pulled back too quickly back in 2005, and
apparently because of China.
Now, when things have changed, we would like to hear your
thoughts on how that could be continued in a more successful
way.
Mr. Yun. As you know, we have had a number of sanctions
imposed against North Korea. And I believe these have been
multilateral as well as unilateral. And, most lately, China has
also sanctioned some North Korean entities, specifically
Foreign Trade Bank (FTB).
And these are discussions we are going to have as new
information comes in. Ms. Gabbard, we would like to give you a
classified briefing on steps we have taken and we have asked
our partners to take on this issue.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. I look forward to continuing the
conversation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I have another hearing going on at
the same time.
Mr. Yun, you said in your testimony that our exports to
your region has gone up to $400 billion. What are our imports
from that region? And is there a reason why only one was
mentioned in your testimony?
Mr. Yun. I don't have the import figure, sir, but I would
imagine they also have gone up. And I fully----
Mr. Sherman. Wait a minute. You are our chief diplomat for
East Asia, and nowhere in your notes or with your staff behind
you do you know what our imports are from the region?
Mr. Yun. I don't have the exact figure. I will be happy to
provide them to you, sir.
Mr. Sherman. Do you happen to know it within $100 billion?
Mr. Yun. I think probably it would be, since we have a
deficit, it would be way larger than the export figure.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
You talk about the new security concerns. The concern I
have is that, since we are pulling out of Afghanistan, our
military-industrial complex needs a new focus and that fighting
China over the South China Sea provides that.
One of the major focuses of our national security
deployment is to help Japan defend some islands that it claims.
What percentage of its GDP does Japan spend on its defense,
compared to what we do?
Mr. Yun. Again, I would be happy to provide you figures,
sir.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Have you made any efforts to push the Japanese to say,
look, if you want to go eyeball-to-eyeball militarily with
China, would you mind doing that to some extent with your own
expenditures, rather than ask the American defense budget to
deploy additional forces to East Asia? Has that been an
objective of our policy?
Mr. Yun. We have frequent discussions with the Japanese on
these issues, and, of course, the Japanese provide host-nation
support for our troops and our bases----
Mr. Sherman. So they allow us, at our expense, to defend
their territory from their territory and have invited us to
devote our resources to defending their disputed islands, but
they have made no promises to you to increase their military
expenditures as their national security situation worsens. They
feel that that should be handled by the U.S. taxpayer.
Is there any part of that characterization that is
demonstrably false?
Mr. Yun. I think, as we speak, the Japanese, including led
by the government, are reviewing the issue of whether they
should change their constitution----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. So we spend, they review, and there is
no--now, China restricts the import of U.S. movies, when they
are not pirating them to begin with.
Have you taken any action to focus Chinese attention on not
allowing American movies to be shown on all their screens? And
have we threatened any restriction on their access to U.S.
markets in order to open theirs?
Mr. Yun. Every year, we have had strategic and economic
dialogue in which intellectual property rights form the core of
our----
Mr. Sherman. This was not a question about intellectual
property rights. The question was access to screens, where they
say they have quotas on how much of our import they will
accept. We have no quotas on how much they can send to us in
fabrics or tennis shoes or whatever.
Isn't it outrageous that, running this huge trade surplus
with us, that they would restrict our imports to their country
while having unlimited access to our market? Is that an outrage
that you share and have expressed to the Chinese?
Mr. Yun. We do share these views. And, again, we----
Mr. Sherman. Let me get you pinned down. Is it outrageous
that our movies do not have free access to the Chinese market?
Mr. Yun. Our movies should have free access.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
You talked about that there were a lot of jobs from
exports. I do want the record to reflect that the U.S. Policy
Institute has calculated that our imports from China, since we
gave it MFN status, have displaced 2.8 million U.S. jobs. And I
think that dwarfs the figure that you put forward as to the
export jobs to China or even the entire region.
I see my time has expired. And I hope that we will be more
aggressive in seeking to open up the Chinese market. And I
haven't even had a chance to talk about Japanese currency
manipulation or Chinese currency manipulation, but maybe we
will do another round.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. We are going to do another round.
I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I have to note that my Democratic colleague was scoring
such great points with respect to our Democratic
administration, but I want to at least throw out some
assistance relative to the Japanese issue.
Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Yun, but it is my
understanding that after World War II one of our principal
concerns with Japan was their aggression, and all their
neighbors were, as well. They had a history there. And so, by
their constitution, which we helped them write, their ability
to act militarily was, shall we say, greatly constrained to
what it was prior to World War II. Is that accurate?
Mr. Yun. I think that would be very accurate, sir.
Mr. Chabot. As you attempted to answer, having just been
over there and having discussed this with both the Japanese and
the Koreans and others in the region, they are in the process
of overhauling their constitution. One issue, in particular, is
in the area of defense and how they can act.
They are now one of our strongest allies in the region; is
that correct?
Mr. Yun. Yes, I would say they are most definitely one of
our strongest allies in the region.
And just to go a little bit further, they do want to change
the constitution so they can help outside Japan, as well,
including, for example, by sending peacekeeping forces outside.
Mr. Chabot. It is in our interests in order to encourage
that ability for them to act militarily more in conjunction
with the United States than in the past. That is our goal, and
we are trying to encourage them to do that, correct?
Mr. Yun. We are trying to encourage them to do that. And,
however, as you mentioned earlier, this is a very sensitive
issue----
Mr. Chabot. And that is what I wanted to get at. One of the
problems is some of their neighbors, like South Korea, for
example, that have an experience, and you have the comfort-
women issue and a whole range of things in the region that
gives a lot of folks a lot of heartburn whenever you get into
this stuff. But it is a pretty complicated issue.
I agree with many of the points that my colleague from
California made, but I think it is just a bigger story. I hated
seeing the administration squirm. Unlike yesterday, when I was
in the Judiciary Committee where we had Eric Holder as our
witness, and I was one of the questioners, I felt that I should
defend the administration here a little bit, although maybe it
goes against my natural instincts.
But let me get off of Japan for just a minute, which I
hadn't even intended to go into at this point. But let me ask,
the State Department has requested $10.3 million to add 21 new
positions, 8 of which will be in Washington. Then I think in
your testimony, rather than 21, it is up to 24 new positions,
and 10 of those will be here in Washington. Would you explain
this discrepancy? Also, why are nearly half of the new
positions located in Washington? In this time of fiscal
constraints and budget austerity, shouldn't these roles be
handled by staff currently in Washington rather than putting
new folks here? It seems, based on your testimony and the
documents reviewed before this hearing, that the demand for
sustaining a U.S. presence in Asia is actually having a U.S.
presence in Asia, not here in Washington. Could you talk about
the additional people and why so many of them are here rather
than overseas?
Mr. Yun. Yes. I think, number one, I would like to clarify,
of course, $10.3 million is increasing in our operations
budget. That is not all going to go to new positions. Some will
go to improving facilities and overall costs.
The reason why we believe we need to split between
Washington and our field offices, our Embassies, shall we say,
is because our bureau has been so understaffed for a long time.
And it is probably, of the regional bureaus, the smallest
bureau in the State Department. And we have undertaken a lot of
initiatives from Washington, you know, for example, on
multilateral affairs as well as in a lot of trade affairs and
economic affairs that Mr. Sherman alluded to. So there is a lot
of work to be done in Washington, where we do instructions,
where we issue assessments. And so that is why we feel that
there is a need.
I do take your point that, on balance, we ought to prefer
having positions overseas. And that is reflected in our overall
numbers. And we feel that in Washington we have been
understaffed.
Mr. Chabot. All right. Thank you.
My time has expired. I will recognize the gentlelady from
Hawaii.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just also to follow up on some of the staffing, additional
staffing positions that you have, the one in particular that
you have assigned in South Korea to assist with defense policy
coordination and the planning of transferring wartime
operational control of forces to Korea, if you could expand
specifically on what this individual's role is, as well as if
there is a greater section to address both of those areas.
Mr. Yun. As you know, the current plan is to transfer
wartime operation control to South Korea by the end of 2015.
There is a lot of work that needs to be done. I would say among
the most important work is the South Korean capability for
intelligence, as well as having interoperable equipment.
So, in fact, a lot of it will be related to exporting
defense equipment and getting together with the South Korean
side and the USFK side to make sure that once the opcon is
transferred there is a safe environment for that.
Ms. Gabbard. And do you feel that that timeline is on
track?
Mr. Yun. Again, the timeline is, of course, we expect it to
be on track, but, at the end of the day, we have to be sure it
is safe and it is secure to transfer that. It is going to be
based on facts on the ground.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
I have a question for Ms. Biswal with regards to
transforming the traditional donor-recipient model of
development with India.
As we collectively in a partnership look to tackle those
development challenges, can you expand on how USAID is doing
this and if you foresee a point in time when India will become
a donor rather than a recipient of aid, and at what point?
Ms. Biswal. Sure. Thank you, Congresswoman.
First of all, I would note that India has long been a donor
country. For example, I believe their commitment to Afghanistan
is in the $2 billion annual range. So that is certainly not a
new undertaking for that country.
What we talk about when we say transforming the
partnership, the relationship from donor/recipient to one of
true partnership, is we recognize that India is a country that
has represented both tremendous progress and faces continuing
challenges. Those challenges are going to be met, by and large,
through the resources that are galvanized from within India.
And yet the technical collaboration between American
institutions, American private sector, American academic and
research institutions, and Indian institutions to co-create
solutions, innovations, frugal innovations that are emerging in
India, has tremendous promise to bring more cost-effective and
relevant and impactful solutions that can be scaled with Indian
resources within India but also can inform and transform the
way that we are addressing development challenges globally.
And if I could just give you a couple of cases in point.
India has pioneered agricultural extensions for small-holder
farmers in a way that is unseen in other parts of the world.
Because it has very small-holder and disaggregated farming
systems, it uses mobile systems, mobile phones, to provide
extension services to these farmers at very, very low cost. And
they are connected to their agricultural institutions, such as
IIIT in Hyderabad, and so farmers are able to take pictures of
their crops that have diseases and beam them directly into
these research institutions and get realtime data on what could
be done to advance or address these challenges. Now, we are
working with Indian institutions to see how we can apply those
kinds of techniques in African systems.
And so there is tremendous opportunity for partnership,
where we are not doing service-delivery-type interventions in
India because that is really not where we bring value, but we
focus on the kind of partnerships that allow us to take it to
the next level and have global impact.
Ms. Gabbard. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. The gentlewoman yields back.
The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
We appreciate India's role as a donor country, but its aid
to Afghanistan is not an unmitigated benefit. It has scared the
hell out of the Pakistanis. Rationally or irrationally, they
feel themselves caught between two potentially hostile
territories, and the Pakistani reaction has certainly cost us
far more than $2 billion.
Mr. Chairman, it is in my nature to ask tough questions, as
you have seen over the decades of administrations of any
political party and of a foreign policy establishment that I do
not think has well-served American working families.
But I will defend the State Department on one thing, and
that was your concern as to whether we base people here or
overseas.
With security costs, with housing allowances, with
dependants allowances, the cost of a Foreign Service officer is
at least double or triple the cost of having somebody in the
civil service here in Washington. And then, of course, when
Foreign Service officers return, they feel that they should be
rewarded for their foreign service. They get a particularly
good desk for a while before they go overseas again.
As to Japan's peace constitution, Mr. Yun, I assume there
is nothing in that constitution that prohibits Japan from
defending its own territory, which it claims these disputed
islands to be, and there is nothing in the Japanese
constitution that prohibits them from writing us a check for
the costs of our deployments in support of their national
security.
Am I right on those two items of the Japanese constitution?
Mr. Yun. I am not an expert on the Japanese constitution,
sir, but I would imagine there is no precedent for a country
paying for service outside their immediate defense, in terms
of, number one, how would you cost out that service? And then--
--
Mr. Sherman. I am not saying they would pay the full cost.
There is much international precedent for a country helping an
ally with its defense costs. We help many of our allies with
their defense costs. And there is nothing in the Japanese
constitution or a lack of international precedent that would
prevent them from helping us. They just don't want to.
Mr. Yun. They do provide host-nation support, as I----
Mr. Sherman. Do they provide that for free, or do we pay
anything for our bases in Japan?
Mr. Yun. They provide utilities. They also provide for
our----
Mr. Sherman. Do we have to pay any rent?
Mr. Yun. Do we have to pay anything to Japan? No, we don't
pay anything.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. So, unlike bases in other countries, at
least the use of the land it is for free. The costs of
defending Japan are in the hundreds of billions, and I doubt
their free utilities for us approach that.
You have mentioned that you have focused with China on
intellectual property. Have you given them any reason to
believe that they would lose any access to the U.S. market if
they just smile and nod and keep having discussions with you
about intellectual property but simply don't do anything?
What is the penalty to China for not dealing with
intellectual property, other than they will have another
meeting with you and those who report to you?
Mr. Yun. Congressman Sherman, we have had, as I have
described, lengthy meetings with them. And we do have tools--I
really don't want to go into it at this place--including CFIUS,
our restrictions on exports of technology. So to characterize
it as one way----
Mr. Sherman. What penalty has been imposed on China for its
disregard of our intellectual property?
Mr. Yun. I don't think we do business in terms of quid pro
quo. We treat our trade and investment and we have discussions
with them. Among them, we have discussions on investment
issues----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. So we have discussions. And, as far as
they know, they have not lost a dollar due to their
mistreatment of intellectual property rights.
Why has the administration not designated China as a
currency manipulator?
Mr. Yun. I think if you were to ask any Chinese whether
there have been consequences as a result of trade friction, I
doubt any one of them would say they have not lost a dollar in
investment or trade, sir.
Mr. Sherman. Well, with regard to intellectual property, I
don't think they have lost. But why have we not declared China
to be a currency manipulator?
Mr. Yun. I would like to ask my Treasury colleagues to get
back to you on that question.
Mr. Sherman. They won't answer the question either, but
thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Yun, obviously, safety is a paramount issue,
particularly in the aftermath of violent and often deadly
attacks on our U.S. Facilities and personnel around the world.
So, you know, this committee and this body continue to be very
worried about the safety of our personnel. This is especially
true in East Asia, which, you know, we have uncovered several
plots against U.S. installations and have fortunately been able
to foil them in recent years.
Can you explain what steps the State Department and USAID,
also, are taking to secure our facilities and protect our
citizens?
Mr. Yun. In terms of facilities, we have expended a
considerable amount of money and efforts, of course, in
building new facilities that will be safe. And I would say they
have had a very good effect.
And a number of facilities, including those in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and elsewhere, we will be rebuilding into a new
compound.
And we have done a lot of work on this issue for over the
past 10 years or more. And among them, for American citizens,
to have the quality of information that we have, so when we
give warning to--when we have information, we share them widely
and broadly. So in our area and throughout the world,
information is rapidly disseminated.
Mr. Bera. Great.
Is there anything that you would like to add, Ms. Biswal?
Ms. Biswal. Only that USAID staff fall under chief-of-
mission authority. Our security offices coordinate very closely
with the State Department Diplomatic Security, and our
facilities' resources are very closely coordinated with OBO to
look at those needs.
We are right now going through a process of examining any
facilities where we are not co-located with our Embassies to
ensure that, in the short term, that the security needs are
being adequately addressed and, in the long term, looking at
and exploring ways to make sure that we can be co-located where
it is warranted.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
And then in my remaining time, obviously, there has been a
rapid transformation of the Burmese leadership and so forth and
their thought process. Could either one of you offer any
insight into what is happening with the Burmese leadership,
what their motivations are, and where they are right now?
Mr. Yun. My own belief is that the Burmese have changed.
They have changed and they have opened up for, really, two
fundamental reasons.
One of them is the economic backwardness of Burma. And they
have realized that they have completely missed the boat on
economic prosperity that has taken place around them.
The second reason is really decades of isolation, political
isolation. And with a change in leadership, they, too, have
again decided that they no longer want to be isolated.
So, in the end, I think it is these two factors that have
led to change in decisions.
Ms. Biswal. One of the remaining challenges, though, is
that while there is tremendous political will at the top,
political capacity for change and political will at lower
levels is still very much something that we need to
aggressively monitor and capacitate where we can capacitate it.
So it is going to be an ongoing process; it is not a done deal.
Mr. Bera. Do we have specific programs, to either one of
you, that help build that capacity at the lower levels? And can
you highlight some of those programs?
Ms. Biswal. When the President went to Burma in November,
he announced a partnership for democracy, peace, and prosperity
between the United States and Burma. And we framed it as a
partnership because it is going to require the political will
and the reform process from Burma and the provision of
technical support from the United States to help build the
capacity.
And so, right now, we are in the process of, essentially,
designing and developing programs that will address not only
capacity at the government level, which is important, but also
the capacity in civil society and institutions, nongovernmental
institutions, because it has to be both demand and supply.
We are looking at more comprehensively how we can support
reform and how we can build that capacity in that country,
whether it is through the provision of technical assistance,
whether it is through political party strengthening, judicial
reform, rule of law, et cetera.
Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The final questioner this afternoon will be the gentleman
from Georgia, Mr. Collins.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few,
and as we go along--thank you for being here.
And I can sympathize with my friends from across the aisle
that I have trouble getting answers a lot of times from
different organizations since the short time I have been here.
So I can sympathize there.
We have heard from civil society groups inside Burma, whose
work is critical, you know, the government, that they are
having difficulty assessing U.S. assistance, while they see
substantial resources and attention being focused on groups
that are closer to the government and whose work reflects the
government's priorities as well as the usual suspects, in terms
of USAID contractors.
Ms. Biswal, what is the USAID strategy for integrating its
long-term cross-border partners into its programmatic approach
in Burma?
Ms. Biswal. Thank you very much for that question.
We have maintained and will continue to maintain support to
those cross-border organizations. Our assistance on the Thai-
Burma border for organizations that are working on either side
of that border has continued unabated and will be there as long
as it is necessary.
And, at the same time, what we are trying to do is also
support Burmese civil society within Burma. We have some
challenges, because direct support to these organizations is
going to be difficult in the short term, while their own
systems and capacities to absorb direct assistance are
addressed. Because many of the civil society groups in Burma,
while they have technical capacity and resilience, don't have
the kind of management systems that our assistance requires in
terms of accountability requirements.
Nonetheless, what we are doing is trying to work through
partner organizations that can then both sub-grant to Burmese
civil society but also then build their capacity.
Mr. Collins. So, basically, your mechanism for helping them
would be using other organizations, is that what you are
saying? That they are technically able, but they have issues in
management. Is that what you are saying?
Ms. Biswal. Yes, in the short term, with the hope that we
can move toward direct support of those organizations in the
long term. And we will also test it out with doing some very
small grants to Burmese civil society organizations that allow
them to build up those systems.
Mr. Collins. Okay.
Let me ask a question for either one of you who want to
answer. There is a report stating that there is no evidence
that military-to-military relations will strengthen America's
engagement with Burma. The State Department and USAID both
emphasize that no assistance is being given to the Burmese
Government because of mistrust. And I think that is the issue.
If that is true, why are we incrementally increasing the
aid, especially as we are doing this through the government
programs that we just spoke of? Or why is that increasing
there?
Ms. Biswal. I will let my colleague talk about the military
side of it.
We are not providing any funds through the Government of
Burma, because we don't believe they have the systems right now
to provide the kind of assurances and accountability and
transparency that we would require, nor have we seen sufficient
progress at this point for us to put resources directly into
that.
But we are providing technical assistance to reform-minded
ministries in Burma to help build those transparent systems
that will enable down the road, if the situation warrants, for
us to be able to support directly.
Mr. Collins. Before you answer on the military, I want to
add something to the question. Because there has been some
release of issues of prisoners, but there is also--Burma still
maintains a relationship with North Korea. It still has aims in
its own program. Violence continues in ethnic areas; 1,300
individuals have been taken into unlawful detention; and lack
of transparency.
While some officials--you know, and there is a thought that
you use a philosophy of foreign assistance should be given in
order to stimulate social change. I don't see foreign
assistance as an entitlement. And I am concerned here about
what I am seeing. The government's attitudes to be toward
noticeable conversion and that to use incremental foreign
assistance.
If a government's allegiance to transparency and civil
order is questioned, then, again, why is there such a huge
increase here? I am trying to get the reasoning why we are
doing this, especially when we have an issue where there is so
much mistrust.
Ms. Biswal. First of all, our interest here is in
supporting the people of Burma and in addressing the very
critical development challenges within that country. The extent
to which we find reform-minded partners, we want to build the
capacity of those reformers to drive change.
Mr. Collins. Okay.
Ms. Biswal. But we are not putting money into Burma because
we are trying to reward a government. We are trying to build a
relationship with a people that we think have, you know,
important needs that we can address.
Mr. Collins. And I understand that.
And very quickly here, the concern that I have here is, the
increase that has been asked for is substantial. It is from
$28.8 million to $75.4 million. Is there enough of those
agencies that you can work with to handle that much of an
increase? Or is this, we are going to find people and give
money? Maybe that is the question.
Ms. Biswal. Yeah. So let me explain how that increase is
justified.
First of all, our prior-year funding levels in Burma were
about $35 million a year. Roughly half of that was on support
to the Thai-Burma border, and roughly half of that was on
programs inside Burma that were funding nongovernmental
organizations addressing humanitarian needs and supporting
democracy, free media, et cetera. We have continued our support
for those programs.
The additionality that comes into play with the 2014
request is to allow us to expand into areas that we previously
did not work on, expand on political reforms, including
supporting political parties, election reforms, parliamentary
strengthening, rule of law, and ethnic reconciliation.
So our programs, because of the increased request in 2014,
will enable us to be much more comprehensive. And, yes, I do
believe that there is the ability to absorb those resources in
that country.
Mr. Collins. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I know my time is over. I do have more
questions. I will submit those for the record and get answers,
because there is a lot more I want to delve into there.
Mr. Chabot. Very good. Thank you very much.
As the gentleman indicated, his time has expired.
I want to thank the panel for their testimony here this
afternoon.
Without objection, members will have 5 days to submit
questions and revise and extend their remarks.
If there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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