[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-38]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 25, 2013
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Catherine Sendak, Professional Staff Member
Doug Bush, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, April 25, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Army... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, April 25, 2013......................................... 57
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
McHugh, Hon. John, Secretary of the Army......................... 3
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.......... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McHugh, Hon. John, joint with GEN Raymond T. Odierno......... 64
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 61
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 62
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Army Reserve Component Supporting Statement.................. 89
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Barber................................................... 109
Mr. Forbes................................................... 109
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 110
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 109
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 125
Ms. Duckworth................................................ 122
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 117
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 115
Mr. Miller................................................... 115
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 123
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 124
Mr. Runyan................................................... 121
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 116
Mrs. Walorski................................................ 126
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 25, 2013.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. The committee will come to
order.
Good morning.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
President's fiscal year 2014 budget request for the Department
of the Army.
I am pleased to welcome Secretary John McHugh and General
Ray Odierno. It is great to see both of you again. Thank you
for being here.
Our Nation is very fortunate to have the two of you leading
our army during these challenging times.
I note that in your written testimony, you state that
America's Army is the best-trained, best-equipped, best-led
fighting force in the world providing a credible and capable
instrument of national power. I absolutely agree with you.
But what we need your help with is understanding the risks
associated with the Army's continued ability to meet the
national security needs of this Nation and the critical
assumptions behind these risks. For example, we hope to learn
more about the Army's plan to reduce the size of its force.
With last year's budget request based on the Budget Control
Act, the Army announced that it would reduce end strength to
490,000 Active Duty soldiers, the minimum required to
accomplish national security requirements.
The drawdown would require the Army to go from 45 Active
Duty Brigade Combat Teams to 37. To date of the eight BCTs
[Brigade Combat Team] will be deactivated, we have been told
that two of the eight will be armored BCTs. We have also been
told that the Army plans on adding a third maneuver battalion
into each Active Component Army and infantry BCT.
It is our understanding that as a result of adding a third
maneuver battalion, the total number of Active Component BCTs
will go to some number below the 37. However, it is a year
later, and we still do not know how many BCTs the Army plans on
drawing down to or where the Army will take the BCTs from.
Equally important, we do not know what type of BCTs the
Army thinks it needs. This includes armor, infantry, and
Stryker. I know that we are in difficult times and that hard
choices must be made. I also know that you don't know from week
to week what kind of money you are going to be having from the
Congress, but I--it is tough, but I hope that your testimony
today will highlight the areas of greatest risk and help this
committee and others in Congress make the right choices.
Again, thank you both for your continued service to our
nation. And I look forward to your testimonies.
Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 61.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to echo the chairman's comments and thanks to both
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno for their outstanding
leadership of the Army, and to the--all of those who serve in
the Army. It is an amazing force doing amazing things all over
the world, and we thank them for their service and sacrifice.
And look forward to hearing today more about the
President's budget. I think it is a realistic look at the next
5--sorry--at fiscal year 2014, and then planning beyond. I am
sure there are questions. The Chairman raised some good ones,
and there will be more about the specifics of how that is
implemented, and we will look forward to hearing about that.
But, of course, all of that is based on the assumption that
sequestration magically goes away some time, you know,
between--at a minimum between now and when fiscal year 2014
starts. So we would also like to hear from you about how you
deal--continue to deal with the reality of fiscal year 2013
sequestration, but then also, you know, looking forward. It is
the gift that keeps on giving: fiscal year 2013, 2014, 2015,
2016, 2017. Until we turn it off, it is always going to be
there, first, lurking in the back of your mind as you attempt
to plan, and then, second, right there up front as something
that you have to deal with, as you are dealing with it right
now for fiscal year 2013.
You know, I will emphasize again that, you know, the best
thing Congress could do right now is one way or the other turn
off sequestration. You know, if we can get a budget deal to get
there, great. But this notion that somehow torturing the
discretionary budget and torturing the defense budget in
particular to force us to get a budget deal is ridiculous.
Clearly, it is not working; it is not forcing that to happen.
And second, it is doing great damage while we are waiting for
it to happen. So want to hear more about that.
And then lastly, would like to hear more about the sexual
assault issue.
And I want to commend--I was at a dinner with General
Odierno awhile back where he brought in some of the leaders in
Congress who are concerned about this issue, had a very frank,
very direct discussion about what had gone wrong, what was
going to be done to get right. And I personally am very
confident of the seriousness of the Army and of the Pentagon
writ large to try to address this problem.
But it is still a large and vexing problem. And one of the
big issues that I would love to hear you talk about is the push
to change the way the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]
works and to take away the commanders' authority over these--
over sexual assault and sexual harassment cases. There has
been, you know, the most recent case in the Air Force of a
decision being overturned by a commander that has generated a
lot of attention.
I know the military in particular--or the military in
general and the Army in particular doesn't want to see that
change, because the command structure is the command structure.
But there is going to be increasing pressure to separate that
legal process from the command if there is not visible progress
made on protecting our men and women from sexual assault and
sexual harassment.
So I would love to hear more comments from you about your
concerns about that particular change and what we might be able
to do to address the issue short of doing that.
Thank you again for being here. Thank you for your service.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary McHugh. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Distinguished Ranking Member Smith and equally
distinguished members of the committee, fourth time back. It is
always a special opportunity; brings back a lot of very fond
memories, most of which don't involve me sitting at this table,
but it is always good to be with you.
And to talk a bit about the extraordinary work of America's
Army this past year, talk about its current state, and of
course the vital requirements that are necessary to sustain our
combat power today and tomorrow and beyond.
Honestly, I wish I had better news to share, but today we
find our Army at a very dangerous crossroads which, if we as a
nation choose the wrong path, may severely damage our force,
further reduce our readiness, and hamper our national security
for years to come.
As you know, over the last 12 years, this Nation has built
the most combat-ready, capable, and lethal fighting force the
world has ever known. From Iraq and Afghanistan to the Horn of
Africa and Korea, we have fought America's enemies. We have
supported our allies and deterred would-be aggressors with
unprecedented skill, determination, and quite frankly, results.
Over the past year, we have seen great success in
operations ranging from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
to homeland security and disaster response. Soldiers and
civilians from all the Components--Active, Guard, and Reserve--
have repeatedly risked their lives to defend our freedom, save
the lives of others, and to support our citizens in recovering
from hurricanes, wildfires, and even droughts. There has been
no foreign enemy, natural disaster, or threat to our homeland
that your Army has not been prepared to decisively engage.
Unfortunately, today we face an unparalleled threat to our
readiness capabilities in soldier and family programs, and that
danger comes from the uncertainty caused by continued
sequestration funding, through repeated continuing resolutions,
and significant shortfalls in overseas contingency accounts.
In fiscal year 2013, the blunt axe known as sequestration,
which as you know struck in the last half of this year, on top
of the $487 billion in Departmentwide cuts already imposed by
the Budget Control Act, forced us to take extraordinary
measures just to ensure that our warfighters have the support
needed for the current fight. We made those hard decisions, but
at a heavy price to our civilian employees, to our training
needs, maintenance requirements, readiness levels, and to a
myriad of other and vital programs necessary to sustain our
force and develop it for the future.
For the Army, sequestration canceled and created an
estimated shortfall of $7.6 billion for the remaining 6 months
of fiscal year 2013. This includes nearly $5.5 billion in the
operations and maintenance accounts alone. The impact of this
drastic decline over such a short period will directly affect
and significantly impact the readiness of our total force.
We have reduced flying hours, frozen hiring, and released
hundreds of temporary and term workers. We were forced to
cancel initial entry training for more than 2,300 military
intelligence soldiers, reduce training to the squad level for
all our nondeploying units, and we had to cancel all but 2 of
the remaining brigade decisive action rotations at our national
training center. And this is on top of drastic impacts to our
depot, vehicle facility maintenance programs, and others.
Unavoidably, these negative effects will cascade well into
next year and beyond. Simply put, to continue sequestration
into 2014 and for the years following would not only be
irresponsible and devastating to the force, but it would also
directly hamper our ability to provide sufficiently trained and
ready forces to protect our national interests.
Moreover, full implementation, as the ranking member noted,
through fiscal year 2021 will require even greater force
reductions that will dramatically increase our strategic risk.
And I will give you an example. Just to maintain balance, we
may have to reduce over 100,000 additional personnel across all
three components. And when you couple those cuts that--with the
cuts already driven by the Budget Control Act, your Army could
lose up to 200,000 soldiers over the next 10 years alone.
As such, to mitigate against the continued impacts of such
indiscriminate reductions, the President's fiscal year 2014
budget request, as in the House and Senate resolutions, does
not reflect further sequestration cuts. Rather, we attempt to
protect some of our most vital capabilities which were
developed over nearly a dozen years of war, and to hedge
against even further reductions in readiness.
We hope that if additional funding reductions are required,
they are properly backloaded into later fiscal years so that we
are provided the time and the flexibility necessary to
implement them as responsibly as possible.
For all its challenges, continued sequestration is only
part of the danger we face. Since fiscal year 2010, the Army
has experienced funding through some 15 differing continuing
resolutions. This has caused repeated disruptions in our
modernization efforts, uncertainty in our contracts, and
unpredictability for our industrial base. Each continuing
resolution prevents new starts for needed programs and creates
inefficiencies that often result in wasteful spending for
things we no longer need and can no longer afford. As you know,
this year it was 6 months into the fiscal year before we had an
appropriation. And for all of that, there is more. While we
remain at war with a determined enemy in Afghanistan, while
simultaneously conducting retrograde operations, we must
remember that OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] funding is
absolutely essential. Unfortunately, your Army currently faces
up to a $7.8 billion deficit in overseas contingency funding
for this year.
Although as noted earlier, we will not allow our
warfighters to suffer, OCO shortfalls disrupt our ability to
repair and reset equipment, and directly impact our organic and
commercial industrial bases. Continued budget uncertainty
jeopardizes our ability to have the right forces with the right
training and the right equipment in the right place to defend
our Nation. Our readiness has suffered. Our equipment has
suffered. And if we are not careful, our people may suffer as
well.
Accordingly, more than ever, we need you, our strategic
partners, to help us ensure that America's Army has the
resources, tools, and force structure necessary to meet our
requirements at home and abroad. The Army's fiscal year 2014
budget request is designed to do just that. As you will see,
the fiscal year 2014 submission meets our current operational
requirements, while allowing us to build an Army to meet future
challenges through prudently aligning force structure,
readiness, and modernization against strategic risk.
First, it helps us balance readiness across the total
force--Active, National Guard, and Reserve. It allows us to
refocus training toward core competencies and supports a steady
and sensible transition to a smaller force. Second, it
reinforces the Army's central role in the defense strategy by
allowing us to strengthen our global engagements with
regionally aligned forces, and ensures that we remain a
linchpin of the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific theater.
Third, it provides for vital reset and replacement of
battle-damaged equipment, helps to support our industrial base,
and funds key modernization priorities focused on soldier squad
systems and network and enhanced mobility.
Most importantly, it sustains our commitment to soldiers,
civilians, and their family members, many of whom continue to
deal with the wounds and illnesses and stresses of war. From
suicide prevention and wounded warrior programs to resiliency
training and sexual assault prevention and prosecution, this
budget is designed to strengthen, protect, and preserve our
Army family using those programs that are efficient, effective,
and comprehensive.
We have, as I know all on this committee agree, a sacred
covenant with those who serve and with all of those who support
them and we must not break it.
Nevertheless, we recognize our Nation's fiscal realities.
And as such, our budget proposal will further these vital goals
with a 4-percent reduction from fiscal year 2013's base budget
achieved through prudent, well-planned reductions, not
indiscriminate slashing. So in conclusion, on behalf of the men
and women of your Army, let me thank you again for your
thoughtful oversight, unwavering commitment, and proud
partnership. With your support, as this committee I know
firsthand has all so effectively done over so many years, the
Army has become the finest land force in history. Now, as in
the past, we need your help to protect the hard-fought
capabilities developed over years of war and to ensure that we
have the resources needed to meet the unforeseen challenges
that lie ahead.
Our soldiers, civilians, and family members are second to
none, as you know so well. They are patriots working tirelessly
every day to support and to defend freedom. America's Army has
succeeded in Iraq, is making progress in Afghanistan, and as
this budget demonstrates, is focused on completing the current
fight as we transform into a leaner, more adaptable force.
To do so, we need flexibility, predictability, and the
funding necessary to ensure we have highly trained and ready
forces to meet the mission. As we face these crossroads
together, it is critical that we choose the right path for our
soldiers, our Army, and our Nation.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
committee's questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and
General Odierno can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S.
ARMY
General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member
Smith, and all the other distinguished members of the
committee.
First, I want to thank you for your continued commitment to
all our soldiers and families, especially over the past 12
years, where the partnership has enabled us to properly support
them, ensuring they have what they need to be successful during
their deployments.
Second, I want to thank the Congress for its hard work in
passing the fiscal year 2013 Consolidated Appropriations and
Further Continued Appropriations Act. We very much appreciate
your help, which alleviated nearly $6 billion of the $18
billion shortfall to the Army's operation and maintenance
accounts in fiscal year 2013.
I am humbled to be sitting here representing the 1.1
million soldiers, 255,000 Department of the Army civilians, and
1.4 million family members of the United States Army. I am
extremely proud of the competence, their character and
commitment of our soldiers and civilians, their sacrifice, and
their incredible accomplishments.
I remind everyone as we sit here today, the U.S. Army has
nearly 80,000 soldiers deployed and more than 91,000 forward-
stationed in 150 countries, including almost 60,000 in
Afghanistan, thousands of others in Kuwait, Korea, new
deployments, with command-and-control capability to Jordan,
Patriots to Turkey, THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]
batteries to Guam, and many other places around the world.
Our forces in Afghanistan continue to conduct a successful
transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan national
security forces, who increasingly demonstrate the self-
reliance, confidence, and capability to protect their
population and secure a more stable political future.
Today the Army's primary purpose remains steadfast, to
fight and win the Nation's wars. We will continue to be ready
to do that, even as we do our part to help the country solve
our fiscal problems.
But the timing, magnitude, and method of implementing
budget reductions will be critical. In fiscal year 2013 the
Army still faces more than $13 billion operations and
maintenance shortfalls, which includes a $5.5 billion reduction
to the Army's base budget and a $7.8 billion shortfall to
overseas contingency operations accounts.
As a result, we have taken drastic actions to curb spending
in the final 6 months of the year. We have curtailed training
for 80 percent of the force, canceled 6 brigade maneuver combat
training center rotations, cut 37,000 flying hours, initiated
termination of 3,100 temporary employees, and canceled third-
and fourth-quarter depot maintenance, and are planning to
furlough our valued civilian workforce for 14 days in fiscal
year 2013.
The cost of these actions is clear. We are sacrificing
readiness to achieve reductions inside the short period of the
fiscal year. And readiness cannot be bought back, not quickly
and not cheaply.
So I am concerned that the problems created by the over-$13
billion shortfall will push into fiscal year 2014 and beyond.
The Army's fiscal year 2014 base budget submission of
$129.7 billion enables us to support the 2012 defense strategy
in fiscal year 2013, but does not account for the decay in
readiness that will impact the Army as a result of these fiscal
year 2013 problems.
In addition to this base budget, the Army will continue to
require OCO funding for operations in Afghanistan and to
continue to reset our force. The Army has submitted a separate
request for fiscal year 2014 OCO. It is critical that this
request be fully funded.
I would implore all of us to work together so that we
receive a fiscal year 2014 national defense authorization and
fiscal year 2014 budget on time. This will allow us to properly
plan for and mitigate the risk associated with declining
defense budgets.
It is imperative that we gain predictability in our budget
process. If we don't, we will be unable to officially and
effectively manage our resources, and it will be impossible to
make informed decisions about the future of the Army.
I also think that it is in the best interest of our Army,
the Department of Defense, and our national security to avert
sequestration. The size and steepness of cuts required by
sequestration make it impossible to downsize the force in a
deliberate, logical manner that allows us to sustain an
appropriate balance of readiness, modernization, and end
strength.
The cuts are simply too steep. We just cannot move enough
people out of the Army quickly enough to produce the level of
savings needed to comply with sequester, and, therefore, will
need to take disproportionate cuts in modernization and
readiness.
Let me explain: Under sequestration the Army would need to
again absorb immediate cuts in fiscal year 2014. This would
likely force us to cut personnel accounts, reductions that
could equate to tens of thousands of soldiers. But by the time
we paid separation benefits for these soldiers, the cost to
separate them would exceed the savings garnered.
The maximum we could reduce the force without breaking
readiness and inducing excessive separation costs is about
20,000 soldiers per year. But this would only save us about $2
billion a year.
So right now, almost the full weight of the sequester will
again fall on modernization and readiness accounts, where such
drastic cuts will take years to overcome. The net result will
be units that are overmanned, unready, and unmodernized.
The steepness of the cuts of sequestration forces us to be
hollow.
Even though I think the level of sequestration cuts are too
large, if we backload them into the later years of sequester
period, it would allow us the opportunity to properly plan and
to sustain the balance we need in these uncertain times.
In spite of fiscal unpredictability and the impacts of
sequestration, it is our responsibility to take action now to
reshape the Army for the future.
As you look to fiscal year 2014 and beyond, our foremost
priority is to ensure that our soldiers deployed on our
operational commitments are trained, ready, and able to execute
their missions. Simultaneously, we will continue to draw down
the force. We are on schedule to remove 89,000 soldiers from
the Army by fiscal year 2017 due to budget reductions levied by
the 2011 Budget Control Act.
So far, most of these cuts have come from overseas
formations, specifically in Europe.
In fiscal year 2014, future force reductions will affect
almost every Army and joint installation across the United
States. We will release our plans for these reductions in June.
The key to the current drawdown is to maintain the right
balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization, so
that we are properly sized and ready for whatever the country
needs done.
Such an evenhanded approach is the only acceptable way,
one, while the world remains such an unstable place, the most
unstable I have seen in my nearly 37 years of service.
Full sequestration will dangerously steepen that drawdown
ramp. It will require us to reduce a minimum of another 100,000
soldiers from the total Army, on top of the 89,000 soldiers
already being reduced.
This will result in a 14-percent reduction of Army end
strength and an almost 40-percent reduction in our Brigade
Combat Teams.
In addition, these reductions will degrade support to
combatant commanders in critical areas such as missile defense,
special operations, cyber, logistics, intelligence, and
communication.
And cuts of this magnitude will leave us with an excess
infrastructure, making a future round of BRAC [Base Closure and
Realignment] essential.
Sequestration will degrade our ability to take care of our
soldiers and families that have fought so hard and sacrificed
so much over the last 12 years, both those who are leaving the
Army and those who choose to stay in the Army.
Sequestration will make it impossible to execute a
responsible drawdown, and it will challenge our ability to
support the 2012 defense strategic guidance.
Looking to the future, we are reposturing our force to be
globally responsive and regionally engaged.
We are aligning forces to geographic combatant commanders
to provide mission-tailored, sized and scaled organizations for
operational missions, exercises and theater-security
cooperation activities.
For times of crisis, we will maintain a global response
force, capable of conducting forced entry on short notice. We
will reinvest in our expeditionary capabilities to deploy
forces quickly and efficiently anywhere in the world. And we
are refining the integration of our conventional special
operations forces and cyber capabilities to ensure we can
handle a broad range of emerging threats.
In this uncertain world, we need an Army that conducts many
missions at many speeds, at many sizes, and under many
conditions. Going forward, the Army will evolve into a force
that can deploy and sustain capabilities across the range of
military operations anywhere in the world, on short notice. It
will have increased flexibility and agility in both its
formations and hopefully its acquisition systems.
Our modernization strategy will center on the Army's
strength, the soldier, making him the most discriminately
lethal weapon in the U.S. military.
We will provide our soldiers with the network connections
to give them unparalleled access to information and
intelligence, so that they can make timely decisions all over
the world.
And we will provide our soldiers with tactical mobility,
survivability, and lethality to take decisive action, no matter
what the mission might be.
As we prepare to operate in an increasingly complex and
uncertain environment, our number one priority is to invest in
our leaders. This spring we will roll out a brand-new leader
development strategy which will invest in our soldiers'
training, education, and development. It will fundamentally
change the way we train, educate and assign, assess and promote
our leaders. It will be the foundation of our future Army.
We will continue our efforts to take care of our soldiers.
Twelve years of war has taught us the importance of building
and sustaining the resiliency of our soldiers, civilians, and
our family members.
Just this year, we rolled out the Army Ready and Resilient
campaign. This holistic effort to build the emotional, mental,
physical, and spiritual health of our soldiers will pay
dividends in all three components.
Caring for wounded warriors and keeping faith with veterans
is essential to honoring their service. Our Soldier for Life
campaign will ensure that our soldiers transition successfully
into civilian life and enrich our American society with their
Army experience.
With the support of Congress, we will maintain a military
pay and benefits package, including affordable, high-quality
health care, that acknowledges the burdens and sacrifice of
service, while remaining responsive to the fiscal environment.
Manpower costs make up 44 percent of the Army's fiscal year
2014 budget. We need to work together to slow the rate of
growth, while meeting our soldiers' needs.
We are at a strategic point in the future of the U.S. Army
and our military. We must strike the right balance of
capabilities both within the Army and across the joint force.
Our history tells us that if we get out of balance, our
enemies will seek to take advantage.
Our soldiers are the finest men and women our country has
to offer. Since 2001, more than 1.5 million soldiers have
deployed, and more than half-a-million have deployed two,
three, four, or more times.
More than 35,000 soldiers have been wounded, and over 4,800
have made the ultimate sacrifice to defend this great nation.
It is our responsibility to ensure that we will never send
soldiers into harm's way that are not trained, equipped, well-
led, and ready for any contingency, to include war.
It is our responsibility to honor their service and the
sacrifice of our veterans, whether they remain in uniform or
transition back to civilian life.
The strength of our Nation is our Army. The strength of our
Army is our soldiers. The strength of our soldiers is our
families, and that is what makes us ``Army Strong.''
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very much for
allowing me to testify here today. I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I noticed that last year's budget documents referenced a
rebalancing to the Pacific, while this year's references a
rebalancing to both the Pacific and the Middle East.
It is unclear if that nuance is significant in your ongoing
analysis. I raise the point because I am particularly concerned
that the Army might sacrifice the full-spectrum capability of
armored BCTs, since they are more expensive to equip and
maintain.
I believe that it is critical for this committee to
understand the assumptions underlying the force structure
changes that the Army has been considering for over a year. As
you know, our full committee markup is the first week of June.
General Odierno, as you consider the pending force
structure and force-mix changes I discussed in my opening
statement, are you equally weighting an Asia-Pacific or Middle
East scenario? Is one seen as more or less likely?
And Mr. Secretary, how do we fulfill our constitutional
oversight responsibilities if we do not have the timely insight
as to what these changes are? When do you intend to announce
the pending force structure changes, and the bases that will be
impacted by these changes?
General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
First, as we continue to rebalance towards the Pacific, the
next priority is maintaining a capability in the Middle East,
and that is as per the defense strategy. And we are staying
very true to that statement.
As we look around and look at how we have done significant
analysis of the type and capability of the units that we will
need to score at both the Pacific and the Middle East. For
example, there is a need for a combination of light infantry
armor and medium capability on the Korean peninsula. There is a
need for the combination of medium armor and light infantry in
the Middle East.
So as we come forward with our force structure, you will
see that we sustained a right balance between the three. We
believe that is the unique capability that the Army brings. And
we are able to task-organize ourselves in order to meet
whatever the needs are, whether it be a combination of light,
medium or heavy, or heavy, or light depending on the
environment that they have to operate in.
So you will see us maintain a level of balance between
those capabilities as we move forward. Although the size will
be smaller.
Secretary McHugh. Mr. Chairman.
As you and I talked previously, if I were still a member of
this committee and representing a base as I did for 17 years I
would be interested very much in the questions that you are
asking. And I want to assure you we deeply appreciate that. We
want to provide you the information as it is available that
allows this committee and the Congress to do its appropriate
oversight responsibilities.
As you know, and contrary to what some believe, the
exercise we are currently involved in is really in reaction to
the Budget Control Act that calls for us to reduce force
strength down to 490,000. It really has nothing at the moment
to do with sequestration.
And under Federal law there are processes by which we have
to follow those kinds of objectives, and most principally under
the National Environmental Protection Act, NEPA, to assess the
requirement of a possible full environmental impact statement.
We pursued that through what we call the PEA, Programmatic
Environmental Assessment.
We looked at 21 facilities. Determined those sites based on
the likelihood of a certain maximum gain of soldiers versus a
certain maximum loss, 1,000 soldiers in either case. And that
has been recently completed. The net effect was that none of
the locations was there determined to be a significant
environmental impact that would require a follow-on full
environmental impact statement.
At the moment in part at the request from a good number of
members of this committee, we are conducting public listening
sessions across more than 30 communities and locations to
provide the opportunity for citizen and civic organizations to
come forward to share their perspective, to provide any
information that they think would be of value to the Army as we
go forward and make these final decisions.
I hope, and I expect, we will have that information back in
the month of May, probably mid-to-later May, and then give it,
its appropriate analysis. And I expect we will have a final
basing decision to be announced by mid-June--I am shooting at
mid-June for the latest.
We have attempted--and I make a commitment to you, Mr.
Chairman, the Ranking Member, all the members of this committee
to share with you all of the input information we possibly can
as we go forward. We have certain set criteria by which we make
these evaluations, geographic distribution, military value, and
cost of investment necessary, et cetera.
Those are available--I believe we have, but if we have not
as yet briefed the PSMs [Professional Staff Members] who can
carry that information to you I promise you we will do that as
soon as we possibly can.
The second piece of the analysis of course is to weighting
of each one of those factors. Those decisions have not been
met. I believe the--paperwork is with the Chief. He is
reviewing. He will thereafter make his recommendations to me.
He and I will go forward with that. And when we have those
weighting factors again we will share them with the PSMs. We
won't wait for the final analysis.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Secretary McHugh. Sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to echo the Chairman's comments a little bit. No
matter how these decisions come out, it is going to be hell. I
don't want to tell you that if you like follow the right
process and you are perfectly transparent then everything will
be fine. It is not. I will say that it would be worse, I mean,
the Air Force went through this with, you know, the Guard stuff
of course last year. And by their own admission did a very poor
job of working with the impacted states and impacted
communities and made it much worse.
So transparency doesn't, you know, buy us necessarily a
pain free experience, but I think it makes it work better. So
the more you can keep us informed, and keep the impacted States
informed of what is going on the better off you are going to
be.
I just want to follow up on my opening comment on the UCMJ
and the sexual assault situation, specifically your thoughts on
taking the commander out of those criminal cases and
essentially turning it over straight to the JAG [Judge Advocate
General].
And tell us a little bit about, you know, how that impacts
the culture, the concerns you would have in terms of how that
would impact the command and whether or not that is a doable
solution as a way to confront, you know, the very, very great
sexual assault, sexual harassment problem that impacts by the
way, not just women, but men as well who have been victims of
these assaults.
Is that a realistic approach?
What are the limitations of it?
Is there a halfway step towards it that could be helpful?
General Odierno. Congressman, I would say, first off, we
understand why we have to continually review this, to make sure
that all the procedures are in place. And I believe that we
have to work together on this and build some mutual trust with
the importance of the UCMJ and the impacts it might have on
sexual assaults, specifically.
Couple things I would just say having been working with the
military justice system for a very long time it really is
essential to commander's authority. And, you know, the
commander is responsible for the good order of discipline and
health of the force, and what the UCMJ provides him is ability
to punish quickly, locally, and visibly. And we can't ever lose
that capability.
So, what I think we have to do is take a deliberate
approach to this to review what is the best way for us to give
that--leave that flexibility with the commanders and make sure
we are meeting with the intent of ensuring that those who
deserve to be prosecuted for any incident, but specifically
sexual assault, is taken into account.
You know, we clearly believe we have to protect the
victims. We have to do justice and deter the crime of sexual
assault. We believe we have to preserve the good in our system.
We talk a lot about trust between soldiers, and until we are
able to prove that we are going to--we will not tolerate sexual
assault, sexual harassment, it is hard for us to build complete
trust with the female members of our----
So I truly believe that UCMJ is critical to this. I think
we have to be very careful about changes that we make. I
suggest we do it in a very deliberate manner, working together
to ensure that we understand all of the impacts.
Mr. Smith. If I may, on that, I understand the point you
are making on the front end, because, you know, as someone who
used to prosecute domestic violence cases, a lot of times, you
know, the evidence--there is no case to be made. The UCMJ gives
the commander flexibility and time for the JAG probably
couldn't do anything.
General Odierno. That is correct.
Mr. Smith. I mean, from a legal standpoint, they couldn't
get there. And I get that.
Where you run into problems is with this Air Force case,
where essentially the commander made himself a jury of one and
said, ``Well, okay the jury reached that conclusion, but I have
looked at the evidence, I have look at the rulings that the
judge made, I think he is wrong and I am going to overturn
it.''
That is very, very problematic, you know, because once you
set up the JAG--the system is the system, I mean, you know some
average person watching ``Court TV,'' you know, or you see it
could reach a different conclusion, but the reason we set up
the legal system we set up within the UCMJ is because the jury
system is there.
So that is--there is some way to walk our way between that.
I think taking it completely away from the commander will
eliminate some--would hurt that flexibility, but that example
of the commander just saying, ``Nope, jury nullification I
don't agree.'' That is a problem.
General Odierno. I would just say that I think we have
worked very carefully, the Joint Chiefs have worked very
carefully on this issue. And we gave a recommendation to the
Secretary which talked about taking a look at this. And we
believe for felony offenses that in the adjudication phase that
we recommend we take the commander out of that, but you keep
lower level findings and move forward.
I think that was a very good recommendation.
What I worry about is, there has been some discussion on
getting in the front end of UCMJ. And that is problematic. And
so I want to make sure that we go about this in a very
deliberate manner. There is--so what we don't want to do is
take the capability of the commander to use UCMJ as you pointed
out, that gives us a range of options to sustain discipline.
And we don't want to lose that capability. There has been some
discussion of taking it all away, and we have to be very
careful about that.
Mr. Smith. Secretary McHugh, I am sorry.
Secretary McHugh. Yes, thank you, Mr. Smith.
I would just add to what the Chief said, and I think all of
his points were important ones. Secretary Hagel has received
the input--the official Army position is, ``We support the
initiative to amend the process by which the case at Aviano
unfolded to take the commander out as the sole adjudicatory
authority.''
And I think it is fair to say Secretary Hagel has committed
himself to that, although the language is still being worked.
The other piece just to fill in the total blank, you know,
wisely this Congress has asked that the Secretary appoint a
special commission to look at the entire application of the
UCMJ particularly in these kinds of cases, although in a more
broad sense. That will probably begin to happen this summer and
I think it would have value to receive the input of that before
we take a particularly broad amendment process that changes, as
you and the chief discussed, from start to finish.
Mr. Smith. The final----
Secretary McHugh. The 60-piece, we fully support an
amendment to that.
Mr. Smith. Final quick point that I would make is if that
is going to be the approach, one of the other big issues here
is that the victims do not trust their commanders in far too
many instances. So even on the front end, even when, yes, you
want that adjudi--the authority to basically implement things
short of a criminal procedure if you can't get there. If the
men and women in service think, ``Gosh, if I go to the
commander, this is more likely to be a negative for me than it
is for me to get any justice.'' That is a big thing to wrestle
with, even if you are short of the felony and short of all
that, just the basic openness of it is going to have to be a
major cultural restructure so the men and women trust that that
commander isn't going to look at them as a pain that is causing
problems for the unit, but as someone to be protected.
Secretary McHugh. Well----
Mr. Smith. And that is a big motivation for a lot of
those--desire for bigger changes.
Secretary McHugh. Could not agree more. And one of the
things we have tried to do to respond to that is lift the
convening authority in those kinds of cases to a higher level
so that there is some space between the immediate commander and
the alleged victim.
One of the big problems I think we have throughout society,
and it certainly exists in these----
Mr. Smith. Absolutely.
Secretary McHugh [continuing]. Circumstances is the victim
fearing being victimized again by the system.
Mr. Smith. And that is not peculiar.
Secretary McHugh. And we----
Mr. Smith. Not peculiar to the military by any means, I
understand it is a problem in a lot settings.
I thank you, gentlemen very much.
Secretary McHugh. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno, I want to ask about regionally aligned
brigades. And in y'all's statement, you talk about that will be
a feature of the Army in the future with investments and
language skills, regional expertise, cultural training.
My basic question is, how are you going to change the
personnel system to make that work? Because if you put the
investment in somebody to learn the language, et cetera, but
then they rotate ever so often among different units that are
aligned with different parts of the world, that initial
investment isn't going to work. So explain the personnel
changes that would be necessary for this.
General Odierno. A couple of things, Congressman. Our
studies and our analysis, as we looked at this over the last
several years, tells us a couple of things. Although language
is important, it is not the key piece. It is understanding
culture. It is understanding the underlying social-economic
factors that affect the countries they are involved with.
So we are focusing on that with language. Now, I am not--
but the language would be a much lower level. And we have
capabilities now where units are training on language that we
are finding to be very effective as they go to Afghanistan. So
what we will do is, we will align forces at division and core
level be--habitual brigades will rotate. Because people rotate
between brigades, as well. And we will--as they train up, they
will train up through these social-economic cultural facets,
and that will prepare them to be then aligned. We will continue
to assess this over time to see if we think we have to have
brigades habitually associated or can we rotate them. And part
of this gets to the mix, frankly. Because we want to have a mix
of brigades, and that mix might change over time based on the
threats that we see in a Pacific area. So we might have to
adjust them. And so, we have to be prepared to move them
between regions as we go forward.
So, I think, with the system we have in place, what we are
doing in our schools, whether it be advanced course, basic
course for officers, our NCO [non-commissioned officer]
training courses, and then in the unit training, that will give
them the basis and backbone for them to understand the socio-
economic and cultural issues associated. And we think we can do
that within the training time we have allocated to do it.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I guess I still don't completely
understand. And the issue has been brought up. Do you have
enough time in the training to get into that deep culture? And
I am very persuaded by General Flynn and others who argue that
has really been the key in Afghanistan is understanding that
culture is a prerequisites for success.
But--just kind of on the basic level, currently, a soldier
obviously could be in 1st Infantry Division, get transferred to
82nd Airborne--they could be aligned with completely different
regions of the world. So will that rotation end? And once you
are assigned to a particular organization, you will stay there.
General Odierno. It is hard to do that for a number of
reasons. First is professional development and getting the
right positions for the right people. And so, we have to be
careful of saying that is how we are going to do this.
We will try to do that as much as we can as we go forward.
But we are not going to lock ourselves to this as we do today
in Afghanistan. You know, you will have a 10-to 12-month train-
up period. Part of that will be doing a military skills. Part
of that will be doing the culture and other training. We think
that is enough time to get them to understand this.
And as we do it time after time, that will increase their
ability to understand this. And so, I think we can move people
around. I don't want to commit to saying we are just going to
lock people into certain regions.
I also believe our young leaders want to be involved in
more than one region. I think one of the--as we want to keep
our best leaders, I think one of the real selling points to
them is that they could potentially go to the Pacific this
time. They could go to Middle East over here. That is exciting
to them, to go and do different parts of the world. And I think
within our training program, we can accommodate that where they
are successful with the cultural and socio-economic
understanding of the areas. And I think we can do that in our
schools as we go forward.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I appreciate it. I think this is--as
you know, in a variety of forums, there is a heightened
controversy about the personnel system, especially the Army
because the Army is kind of the leader of that. Our--books
coming out, suggesting better alternatives in something.
I think as we have tight budgets, figuring out reforms in
the personnel system, as well as reforms----
General Odierno. Yes.
Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. In acquisition and so forth is
that something we need to----
General Odierno. I agree. And Congressman, I didn't give
you any specifics. I will come back and do that. But I am going
to release a leader development strategy here in about a month.
And that it is going to touch on exactly what you are talking
about, on how we are going to manage people differently. And
part of gaining this expertise is the broadening assignments
that we plan on giving them, which will help them to increase
their expertise as well. And we will lay that out for you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and commitment.
I have two or three questions I want to try to get in.
General, in the report, it says here that there will be
reductions, as you have indicated, from 562,000 to 490,000
soldiers. Recently, there was a public meeting at Fort Bragg to
discuss the effect of these reductions throughout the Army.
As you know, there is an extremely strong relationship--
supportive relationship in the community there between
Fayetteville and Fort Bragg and the surrounding 11 counties
that are impacted by Fort Bragg and the new forces command
headquarters and Army Reserve command headquarters that have
been built recently there.
What are the guidelines that are being used for determining
the number of soldiers that may stay at a particular location?
General Odierno. Well, there is several things that we look
at. We look at the infrastructure. We look at family programs.
We look at how we spread them--we want to make sure we have our
forces spread widely--distributed around the country.
There are training facilities that are assessed. There is
access for strategic deployment that is assessed. These are a
few of them. There is more than that, but those are a few of
the ones that we are looking at. And we can give you the
detailed list of what those are.
Mr. McIntyre. All right, and that is very helpful and very
important. I know, for Fort Bragg. And speaking of that, also,
as you know, JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] is located
at Fort Bragg. In the budget request this year, it includes
continued growth for U.S. special operation forces, including
U.S. Army Special Operations Command and Army special
operations forces.
How do you plan to manage the challenges that you see in
the coming years as special forces grow, but we know there will
be a reduction in conventional--the use of conventional forces
and conventional budgets.
General Odierno. So we have almost completed the growth of
our operational--special operations forces. What we are now
doing is, adding the enabler piece to support the special
operations forces. And that is the increase that we will work
over the next couple of years.
As we have looked at this, obviously we recruit special
operators out of the conventional force.
Mr. McIntyre. Right.
General Odierno. And so, we have done the analysis that we
believe--at 490,000, there is--that gives us the right pool in
order to continue to fill the special operations forces with
the capabilities that they need. And we will have to
continually assess that as we reduce the size--if we have to
reduce the size of the conventional force below 490,000 and
what the impact will be on our ability to provide the proper
amount of special operations forces.
Mr. McIntyre. All right, and then finally, what role--if
you can expand a little bit on the role you see for the Army in
this pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. I know you talked about,
in the report, about the U.S. Pacific Command and making it a
three-star headquarters for that. What would you say is the
Army's role in the air-sea battle concept for that region?
General Odierno. Well, first, Asia-Pacific is much bigger
than air-sea battle. Air-sea battle is a operational technique.
It is one of many. So it--as--first of all, as you gain access
through air-sea battle, you gain access for reason, usually, to
put ground forces on the ground. So we are working forced entry
capabilities and how we contribute to that--looking, how we
contribute air-missile defense capabilities through that in the
Asia-Pacific.
But in addition to that, I point out that seven out of the
10 largest land armies in the world are in the Asia-Pacific.
They major--in each one of the countries in the Pacific, the
dominant Service is the Army. And so, we want to continue to
engage, train, gain access through relationships to many of
these countries, and build relationships. So it is important
that the Army has the ability to do that in the Asia-Pacific
region.
And there is many other things we want to do with them,
building humanitarian assistance disaster relief contributions,
which enables us--and we--which would enable us to work
together and build relationships. And I think we bring a lot of
capability in that area. And we also have the Korean peninsula,
obviously, that requires significant ground capability in order
to reinforce what is going on in the Asia-Pacific.
So we have 66,000 soldiers assigned to U.S. Army Pacific.
And that is quite a significant number, and we will continue to
support that number as we move forward.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, very much. Having been with our
soldiers in Korea and also seeing the Army's presence in the
Pacific Command and Hawaii, it is amazing the great work you
can continue to do. And we hope--want to support you in what
you need to do as we pivot to that area.
So thank you very much, and thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you again.
General, great respect for you and all of our men and women
in uniform who have served this Nation and are serving.
Recently, and I want to pick up on a comment you made,
General, that obviously, you probably--not you personally, but
the Services are under probably the most enormous stress they
have seen in years. The failure of Congress to balance the
budget, so therefore you have got to help us do that. You have
acknowledged that, certainly. The Secretary has been here
before.
I went over to Walter Reed a couple of weeks ago, and a
young man from my district, Corporal Greg Hedrick, United
States Army, lost a leg and fingers, and just impressed me so
much that I am going to be thrilled to bring him over here and
take him to lunch in the Members' dining room. I really cannot
wait. His attitude is like all of them that I have ever met. No
matter what they lost physically or mentally, they just have
the greatest attitude.
My concern is that I have Camp Lejeune down in the district
I represent. I have one of the best staffers in America, Jason
Lowry. We have dealt with so many cases, with Active Duty
marines and also marines who are in the process of waiting for
the medical review board before they can be discharged. And
many times in that wait, they seem to self-medicate, which
presents a problem.
In the last 6 months--and I want to thank Secretary McHugh
and his aide, Colonel Bowman, have been extremely helpful--we
have had two cases that quite frankly, not from the district,
but because of my staffer who has built somewhat of a national
reputation of getting in there and trying to help, we have had
a situation involving two.
And I won't say any more than this, but two in the United
States Army that were in that period of time. They served our
Nation in Afghanistan and Iraq. They have done everything they
could do. But waiting for that medical review board, they
seemed to have gotten themselves into a situation that is not
acceptable to the United States Army, or would be to the Marine
Corps and Air Force, any of them. Now, I will get to the point
I am trying to make, with hopefully a response from you and
maybe even the Secretary of the Army. You mentioned--and one of
my biggest passions, quite frankly, is those like yourselves
who have done something I did not do--those who come back that
are wounded, both physically and mentally.
I would like to get your assessment of the wounded warrior
program in the United States Army under the stress of this
budget situation. And is it becoming more and more of a problem
of those who are coming back from Afghanistan, primarily now,
waiting to be discharged, but having to wait to a point that
they seem to get themselves in trouble, even though they are
still under doctors' care.
I am not sure if I am asking that well enough, but you do
understand what I am trying to ask. If I could get you to
respond and the Secretary, please.
General Odierno. So, one of the things that--we have a very
strong wounded warrior program that is across all our
installations. We have our warrior training brigades that are
specifically set up to assist these soldiers as they are
waiting. So as they leave Walter Reed or SAMMC [San Antonio
Military Medical Center] down in San Antonio and go back to
their installation, they are able to sign into these warrior
brigades which track them on a quite regular basis through this
process.
But I will tell you, sir, your point is a good one, is
that, you know, we are working hard to reduce this time that
they have, this idle time. Now, we try to keep them busy, give
them missions they can do. But we also want to speed up the
processing time. We have made actually quite significant
progress over the last year in reducing the times waiting on
the evaluation boards.
And in fact, we now have significant numbers waiting for
now the final VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] adjudication
because we have been able to get through our process. And in
fact, the reason the number--our end-strength numbers are a bit
lower than they were projected this year is because we were
able to get more people through the system faster than we
expected. So we are working this very hard.
So we try to get them through the system faster, but we try
to use these warrior transition brigades and battalions that
are located to track these young men and women to make sure
that they are getting the care they need and if necessary,
behavioral health care, which has also increased over the last
couple of years in terms of our ability to provide that
capability at each one of our installations.
So, we acknowledge the problem. We are trying to get after
it by decreasing the period, by getting them in these warrior
transition units, and then trying to get the behavioral health
capability there to help them. We also started several years
ago a pain reduction program, where we try to not use
medication as much as we were before. And we are trying to come
up with other methods that they can use instead of medication,
so they don't run into this. So it is a combination of all
those programs.
We have not solved it yet, Congressman, and we have got to
continue to work hard.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary McHugh. Congressman Jones, first of all, I deeply
appreciate the advocacy that you and your staff bring to these
troubled soldiers in the Army's case. I signed a letter with
respect to one of those cases to you last evening. Please
review it and we can get back together if you choose to.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
Secretary McHugh. This is a troubling issue for us, because
for all of the problems that a man or woman in uniform has
coming back with either physical or mental wounds, to add to it
artificially by a bureaucratic process and creating more
frustration is not what we want to do. We want to be a source
of relief and help and recovery.
As the chief noted, we have been working as an Army very,
very diligently on the MEB [Medical Evaluation Board]/PEB
[Physical Evaluation Board], the medical board and the physical
evaluation board process, which is totally under Army control.
The Secretary of Defense has set a 120-day target by which he
wants all of those cases to process through. In our case, of
course, the Army, for the last 4 months we have actually done
better than that 120 days, down around 105 or so.
So, we are doing much better. As the chief noted, we are
clearing out backlogs. That is helpful to those soldiers who
have been queued up, but it is also, frankly, helpful to the
Army readiness ratings as well. But the problem continues,
where the joint process of IDES [Integrated Disability
Evaluation System] between the Department of Defense and all
the Services and the VA. And as Secretary Hagel and Secretary
Shinseki have said repeatedly, we are putting all resources in
an effort against that, to try to get that out of the way as
well.
The other problem of the issue that you have raised is
really that of medical and pharmaceutical abuse. We as an Army
are doing much better amongst all of our soldiers, wounded and
others, in terms of abuse of illegal drugs like marijuana and
such, but prescription drug abuse is on the rise. And it lends
itself into those medical care environments.
And the challenge we face is not just controlling it in the
WTBs [Warrior Transition Battalion] and while they are under
direct medical care at places like Walter Reed, but rather
after they have made some recovery and can go into communities
and to pharmacies and procure it outside the medical system of
the armed services.
So, this is something we have to work on. We want to be
very fair. And the point of the cases you have brought to me,
that we are not victimizing someone again who is reacting in
ways just trying to cope with the problems they have brought
home with them. And I can't tell you we will get it perfectly
right every time, but I can tell you we will try as hard as we
can every time.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, gentlemen.
I thank the chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General for the great work
that you and the men and women you represent are doing for our
country. Thank you very, very much.
Secretary McHugh, welcome home. In your testimony, you made
reference, I believe, to 2,300 soldiers not being able to get
some intelligence training because of the sequestration. Could
you tell us what that means in practical terms?
Secretary McHugh. Well, as America has witnessed in recent
weeks, intelligence processes, whether on the battlefield or in
other settings, is very, very important. That is certainly true
for the United States Army. Our ability to provide accurate and
timely intelligence to our commanders and to our soldiers,
whether they are in theater or some other environment, is very,
very important.
And we rely upon military intelligence specialists that
receive, as you know from your time in this Congress, very
specific training on methods, collection, et cetera. And those
2,300 are the--is the estimate that we just won't be able--
seats we won't be able to fill.
I wish that was the only example. I could tick off for you,
and in fact the chief mentioned in his opening comments other
seats we won't be able to fill like 500-plus seats at Fort
Rucker in our Army Center of Excellence for Aviation, and on
and on and on. And those are holes that, as I mentioned
previously, are not just filled overnight. They will create
gaps for years to come.
Mr. Andrews. I want to thank the chairman and Mr. Smith for
long before this sequestration became a reality, they were
sounding the sentinel about what it would mean. This committee
is not late to this process. But I would ask my colleagues to
make a joint effort to get to the floor something that would
end this problem.
You know, General Odierno, Secretary McHugh, the people
they represent, make decisions every single day. And we have
obviated our responsibility to make decisions about this
problem. It really boils down to a couple of basic questions.
Do you think the sequestration should cover the military
cuts we have seen? I think everybody here says no. Then you
have to say: Well, should it cover cancer research at the NIH
[National Institutes of Health] or kids enrolling in Head Start
or air travelers across the country stuck in airports? I think
we should pull the plug on the whole sequestration.
The second question we have to ask ourselves is: Well,
should we cancel it for the whole 10 years or just for a
limited period of time? I think you have heard today we have to
cancel it for the whole 10 years or you can't plan, you can't
decide, you can't think.
The third question we have got to confront is if we cancel
it out for 10 years, how do we come up with deficit reduction
money to take its place? It is pretty simple, ladies and
gentlemen, that it can't all come out of discretionary. That is
what got us to this mess.
So people on our side have got to be honest about what they
would do with Social Security and Medicare and other
entitlements, and people on the other side have got to be
honest about what they would do with revenue.
We can do this. This is not some natural disaster or
international threat that is upon us. This is a totally self-
imposed disaster.
And I just think it requires us, on both sides, to be
willing to stand up, make some decisions, take some votes that
won't be particularly popular, but get it done.
We have sat here, colleagues, for a year and a half,
warning that these kind of things would happen. Well, they are
now happening every single day.
And, look, I give bipartisan credit for the fact the
committee has worked on this problem. But I have to be specific
and say that there is a one-sided problem here, that nothing is
getting to the floor.
We have been here since January 3rd in this Congress. We
are voting on a helium bill this week. And we have not spent
any time, not one debate, not one bill, not one vote, on ending
this sequester.
I don't think that anybody has got an obligation to choose
my way of ending the sequester. Again, there are various
variations how this could be done.
But I think both of us, on both sides, have got to go to
the leadership and say, ``put on the floor various proposals
that would end this sequestration and let us do our job, make a
decision and take a vote.''
It is one more hearing today where we are hearing about the
wreckage of sequestration. But it is also one more day when we
are doing absolutely nothing about it. And I think we owe it to
the men and women who General Odierno and Secretary McHugh lead
to break that pattern, to do our jobs, to take some votes and
make some decisions. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Chairman, thank you.
And just to clarify the record, we have not only had on the
floor once, but twice, bills that would have taken
sequestration off from the military that we passed and sent
over to the Senate. The chairman----
Mr. Andrews. Would my friend yield for just a moment?
Mr. Forbes. I only have 5 minutes, and I just can't----
Mr. Andrews. Okay. That was the last Congress, and I just--
--
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary and General, we--you have earned
and deserve the respect of this committee and the country, and
we offer you that today.
And, Mr. Secretary, it is always great to just see you back
here, and thank you for your service.
General, it is also a pleasure to see you. And one of the
things we want to do, as you had mentioned, to make informed
decisions about the Army. We need to sometime just kind of feel
the components back, and one of the things that we certainly
agree with you on, I do, on sequestration, I voted against it,
fought against it.
We think it was a bad idea then, think it is a bad idea
today.
But I want to also come back to something the Secretary
mentioned and pointed out I think very clearly. According to
the HASC [House Armed Services Committee] committee staff, we--
the Administration has supported $778 billion of cuts to
national defense, prior to sequestration, even before
sequestration.
If we look at the efficiencies that--you presided over many
of them in cutting down the Joint Forces Command, and we have
given the Department those charts and asked them to refute them
if they were wrong. And so far they haven't been able to.
But as for that $778 billion, which counts for the 106,000
soldiers and civilian positions that were going to be cut down,
it would be fair to say, I think, that you supported all of
those cuts. Is that not correct?
General Odierno. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Forbes. And the Army, at least to my knowledge,
submitted nothing to this committee for an unfunded
requirements list. Why was that the case? Why not submit that
list?
General Odierno. Under last year's budget, we did not
submit a unfunded requirements list. As I reviewed it, I felt
that none of them raised to the level that we should ask for
additional requirements last year.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. And I hope you can just appreciate how
some of us have a difficult time--the stress we are talking
about in the Army didn't just pop up in the last few months.
This has been over a series of years. Yet, we have these huge
cuts and the Army basically saying this is okay and not giving
us any of the unfunded requirements list.
Let me ask you this question, though, going back to
sequestration, it has raised the level of concern about the
ability to maintain an Operational Reserve Component.
The effects are already beginning to impact the equipping,
maintaining, and training of Reserve units, which, of course,
is a critical concern to the logistics community, due to the
fact that nearly 80 percent of our current sustainment forces
are comprised of Reserve Component units.
Could you speak to this issue further and explain your
perception of the impact these negative budgetary forces are
having on the Army's sustainment forces?
General Odierno. First, the initial impacts it is having is
our ability to do reset, this year, in 2013. That has to do
with the shortfall in OCO that is causing that, as well as the
sequestration. So as we have to slow down reset, that will slow
down the ability for us to return the combat service support
assets to all three components.
And so, as we look at their readiness and equipment on
hand, it will take us a bit longer to get them the equipment
they need to be prepared. And as we continue to go forward and
continually have to push this to the right, the further that
will get pushed to the right, so it will impact readiness
actually of all three components, but specifically in CSSs
[Combat Service Support], as you point out, the National Guard
and U.S. Army Reserve.
Mr. Forbes. And we have heard a number of people raise
issues about your programmatic environmental assessment. And
some concerns are that that is just a way of obviating a BRAC
assessment.
Can you tell us what inefficiencies will be created without
using the BRAC process to reduce the force structure?
General Odierno. Well, I think, first, you know, we are
required to do the programmatic assessment, and we are required
to do that by law, and that is what we have done.
I think the reductions that we are taking, based on my
understanding, do not reach the thresholds of BRAC. So we are
able to do this. And that is why we have to do this
environmental assessment, to make sure, in fact, it does not
reach a threshold or problematic case that would cause us to go
into BRAC-like situations, as we look at how we cut our force
structure.
But, that said, as we go forward with these cuts of 80,000,
but even if we have to take more cuts based on sequestration,
we are going to have to do a BRAC of some type.
Because of the amount of soldiers coming out of all three
components, it is going to require us to relook whether our
infrastructure supports the force that we are going to have,
once we are finished with these reductions.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Secretary McHugh. And may I just add a word, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, would you please respond for
the record? His time has expired.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
Secretary McHugh. Of course. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, thank you for your
testimony and for your service to our Nation.
My first question is for either one of you, and has to do
about maintaining the Army National Guard as well as the Army
Reserve as an Operational Reserve.
I am informed that the Army is substituting Active
Component units for Reserve Component formations with many
upcoming deployments. Now, I certainly appreciate the
challenges that faces the Army, given sequestration, but these
decisions have significant impact on unit readiness and the
ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] model.
If this continues, where would the Reserve Component
element fall in the ARFORGEN? Does the unit or individuals go
back to beginning of the model and reset, or are they
completely taken out of the model?
If we are taking these units out, we risk relegating the
Reserve Component back to a Strategic Reserve and not an
Operational Reserve as is indicated in your statement.
So can you comment on these points?
Secretary.
Secretary McHugh. Well, I will start and then the Chief can
certainly fill in. Actually, what we are doing is, I believe,
the cases you have raised are not substituting Reserve for
Active, they are rather Active for Reserve. We just offramped
two Indiana Guard units. And it was a decision that we came to
with great angst. It is not something we want to do.
However, it was a direct result of the economic and fiscal
realities we are facing. That particular offramp saved the
Army, the bottom-line budget, just over $80 million.
And, as you noted, there unfortunately will probably be
further offramping of R.C. [Reserve Component] Guard units,
particularly into the future, although those decisions have not
been finalized.
We want to do those as sparingly as possible. Providing
disruption to planned deployments brings great hardship and
challenge to those citizen-soldiers, there is no question about
it.
But we have attempted to manage those as best we can. As
has been noted in both the Chief and my other comments, we are
doing some pretty dramatic things on the Active side as well.
And the training means everybody goes back to square one. That
is the challenge that I think we are facing.
And cancellation of BCT training rotations at the national
training center, it is not something that they go the following
week or the next month. It is that they go back to the back of
the line.
And that is why we are very concerned about not having
predictable, sufficient funding. That may be reduced funding,
but at least predictable and timely funding, so that we can do
less of those kinds of things, rather than more.
We remain fully committed to an operationalized Reserve,
and----
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I have limited time, and I have one more
question.
General, would you care----
General Odierno. I was just going to say, this has nothing
to do with taking the National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve out
of the ARFORGEN process. This has to do with our fiscal year
2013 budget disaster that we have, where we have a $7.8 billion
shortfall in OCO, and sequestration, and we have to do
everything we can to save money.
And, unfortunately, one of the ways to save money was to
substitute Active units for Reserve units, because it would
cost us less money. And that is the only reason.
We are committed to the ARFORGEN process and we remain
committed to it with all components as we go forward.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. Thank you.
Now, my second question, I guess maybe the general would be
able to answer this. I am pleased with the Joint Chiefs'
decision to deploy a THAAD missile defense battery to Guam to
address the North Korean missile threat situation.
It was encouraging, especially to my constituents, to have
the added defense capability.
I recognize there will be an evaluation of the THAAD
deployment in about 90 days, but I wanted to learn more about
the Army's effort to source the force structure and equipment
for a more permanent land-based missile defense on Guam.
The old EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] from 2009
calls for a permanent THAAD and Patriot missile defense task
force on Guam. So where is the Army in planning for the
resourcing of the force structure for this task force?
General Odierno. We are in the process of building five
THAAD batteries.
We have one built right now, the one that is deployed. The
second one should be finished being built this--in the next
couple of months. And then we will continue to build three
more. So that will help us to develop a capability. So as we
make decisions based on--in the joint staff, we will then have
the structure to support the decisions that are made to
operationally deploy these units forward. So that will help us.
Now, currently today we have 60 percent of our Patriot
batteries deployed around the world. And so we--it is very
difficult for us to maintain that OPTEMPO [operational tempo].
There is no program now to increase the number of Patriots, but
we are increasing our THAAD batteries, and we are building them
as we go.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Forbes. [Presiding.] Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Wilson is, recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank both of you for being here. And
Secretary McHugh, I want to assure you that Congresswoman Davis
and I are maintaining the high standards of the military
personnel subcommittee that you established----
Secretary McHugh. I am sure you are exceeding it.
Mr. Wilson. No, no, no. No hey--it was terrific on behalf
of the service members, military families, and veterans. So
thank you for your service.
And General Odierno, I will always cherish my visit--the
briefing you gave in Baghdad, which clearly indicated that
the--our military forces were making such a difference in
reducing violence in that country against the people of Iraq,
against the military forces. It was just extraordinary to see a
reduction of almost 90 percent from the height.
So thank you for your extraordinary service.
And indeed for both of you my faith in you is that I have
three sons currently serving with the Army National Guard, my
wife has trained them well. Roxanne gets the credit, but we are
really proud of your service.
With that, I am very concerned about the reduction in
forces, General Odierno, and you were--indicated that there
could be an additional reduction of 100,000 personnel.
In light of what happened last week in Boston, I sincerely
believe that we are in a global war on terrorism, facing
international Islamic jihadists, we should be prepared. And you
just indicated that we have the most unstable world in 37 years
of your service.
In light of that, how in the world is our country going to
face the challenges ahead? We have currently planned 80,000
reduction in personnel, and you now say there could be 100,000.
How can we assure the American people that our military will be
capable to respond?
General Odierno. Congressman, I think first of all, the
Secretary and I will ensure whatever forces we have no matter
what the number is, we will ensure they are ready and prepared
to go. And that is, that balance that we want to achieve.
However, where it will be different is the type and number
and size of the contingency we would be able to respond to. At
490,000 we believe we can do one major contingency, and a one
that is somewhat smaller than that around the world. If we go
below that with another 100,000 it will put into question what
size of one major contingency would we be able to do.
And so that will be something we will have to continue to
study as we reduce this--continue to reduce the size of the
Army. So that is concerning about our ability to deter bad
decisions if we get too small. And that is one of the things we
are very concerned about as we look ahead to potential full
sequestration.
Mr. Wilson. And I share a concern of Ms. Bordallo, and that
is the situation with the--our Guard/ Reserve Active forces. If
there was an additional reduction of 100,000 personnel, how
steeply would that affect our Guard and Reserve?
General Odierno. Well, we would have to take a look at it
and it depends on how many dollars we would have to get out.
The--again these are--I don't want to pin myself down, but at
least 50,000 of that--50,000 to 60,000 would come out of the
Active Component, and then the rest of it would come out of a
combination of the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard. So you
would see another significant reduction in the Active
Component, and then a smaller reduction in the National Guard/
U.S. Army Reserve. And for me it is problematic on both sides
that we take that reduction.
I worry about having the readiness and crisis response
capability we need in our Active Component, and I worry about
the reduction and whittling away of the depth that we need in
our Operational Reserve to support us across the variety of
mission if we have to reduce our Army Reserve and National
Guard.
Mr. Wilson. And I am equally concerned about the domestic
natural disasters that we need to be prepared for so that our
Guard is prepared along working with our Governors.
Secretary McHugh, can you please provide us with an update
on the Army individual carbine replacement program?
Secretary McHugh. Yes sir. As I believe you are aware, we
have been conducting a dual track trying to do what is
absolutely necessary based on input from Afghanistan to improve
the product improvement, PIP [Product Improvement Program],
program for the current M4 [carbine assault rifle], while at
the same time trying to test amongst the various private sector
competitors to determine whether or not we should purchase a
new next-generation carbine to make sure that the technologies
and the advancements would be worth the investment.
We are kind of midstream in that activity. There has been
some input recently out of the Department of Defense as to the
Army's requirement or lack thereof, we are trying to go through
those findings to make a determination. We have funding in both
the budget and the Future Years Defense Plan to go forward
should we decide to purchase a new individual carbine, but that
decision is yet to be made.
I would hope we would have some further updates on that
certainly by the beginning of the summer.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, both of you.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank you.
Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks to both of you for your service and for your
testimony today. Both of you are very much aware that the Army
organic industrial base--our arsenals, depots, ammunition
plants--really that is key to the Army's ability to respond, as
you know, to a national security emergency, and make sure that
our soldiers have the equipment that they need in the event of
another contingency going forward.
You also know I think, Secretary McHugh, that I am proud to
represent two critical organic base facilities, not only the
Rock Island Arsenal, but the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant also in
the Burlington area, Middletown specifically.
I think we have seen the importance of both these and other
arsenals and depots over the course of the last decade. As a
military parent. I am also glad that we have hardworking men
and women at our arsenals, and at the depots and at the plants
working every day to make sure that our troops have the
equipment that they need, but I do share the concerns that both
of you highlight in your joint testimony.
And on page 16 specifically, and I quote, ``The current
fiscal environment threatening the retention of critical skill
sets in our depots, arsenals, and ammunition plants.''
And of course I am very concerned about the proposed
furloughs of the civilian workforce, including the furloughing
of the working capital funded employees. I am worried that,
that is going to further undermine the retention of our
critical skills and our Army readiness.
So, Secretary McHugh, if you could, what is the Army's
specific plan to reverse the very concerns that you mention on
page 16 of the joint testimony regarding the retention of
critical skills and how does the 2014 budget support those
efforts? And specifically, how will the Army ensure that the
critical manufacturing capabilities that those facilities
posses and the workforce needed for those facilities are
preserved within the organic industrial base?
Secretary McHugh. We are deeply concerned about this issue.
And there is a challenge that is inescapable and that is you
come out of two theaters of war and I think it is natural to
assume you are just not going to have to buy and manufacturing
the same levels of platforms and pieces of equipment that you
did previously, but it is a challenge that is compounded by--as
you noted--we comment upon in the posture statement as well as
our opening remarks. The challenges of the current fiscal
environment; $7.8 billion shortage in overseas contingency
monies.
We have to have the funding to get those products some $21
billion worth of equipment that the Army wishes to return to
our units back from Afghanistan back into the depots. back into
the arsenals. Or have the products come out of the arsenals for
a reset of that equipment. That is about--if you consider the
transportation costs about $11 billion plus of work and
expenditures that we would like to be able to make, but we have
to have help on those OCO funding aspects.
What we are trying to do programmatically is really at two
levels. The first is work with the Department of Defense--I
believe I have mentioned before what is called the S2T2
[Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier], the sector-by-sector, tier-
by-tier analysis that the Department is leading that we are
very active in trying to identify principally in the private
sector, but also in the public sector and the military organic
industrial base, where our failure points are, what kinds of
inputs, where those highly skilled jobs are and how sensitive
are they to throughput in terms of, you know, how many products
are we moving through.
That effort is about a year old. They began last May, in
2012. They are now refining the data, and we expect those data
to provide us very important information at least where we have
to concentrate our resources and give us early red flags where
necessary.
The other thing is more Army-centric. We are looking at our
organic industrial base in a single study. And that is being
complemented by a study by AT Tierney, very, I think, well-
known prominent national firm that does industrial analysis,
looking particularly at our ground combat fleet to again
identify those especially single points of failure to give us
the information so we can--whatever the resources we have what
we can make those resource investments most wisely.
Mr. Loebsack. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And very quickly, and I think what I will do probably is
submit another question for the record to General Odierno. Just
to follow up on my colleagues here, Ms. Bordallo and Mr.
Wilson, on the Guard and the Reserve. I have a lot of concerns
about that moving forward, and particularly how the Army is
leveraging the cost effectiveness of the Guard and Reserve, and
how specifically the Army is maintaining--planning to maintain
the Guard and Reserve as an Operational Reserve over the long
term. But, thinking about it in terms of cost effectiveness.
My time is run out. I will submit that for the record.
Thanks to both of you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your leadership.
General Odierno, I have got a question for you that relates
to the impacts of sequestration. Part of the problem that we
have in trying to set aside sequestration is that, you know,
the Department of Defense was restrained really by the
Administration from giving us information about the effects
because the Department of Defense was restrained from beginning
planning. Until you began the process of implementing
sequestration, no one was clear as to what the effects of
sequestration would be. We could project. We could assume. We
could try to imagine, but now that we are in the period of
sequestration, you are actually putting pen to paper and able
to give us an answer.
And, I think, that is really something that we need to
focus on, is what are the effects of sequestration so that
hopefully we can come to a period where there is the grand
bargain and the setting aside of sequestration, not just for
its effects this year, but also in the future.
We hear of, you know, FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]
and plane delays, but when we get to the issue of national
security, the effects are much more critical, because they go
to our capabilities and certainly then as we look to the
threats that we are facing.
We had previously always had a national security strategy
that required that we be able to be successful in two
conflicts, being able to fight two wars. And that was, of
course, because we knew that if we were engaged in one and we
didn't have the capability to do two, that someone else might
be, you know, interested in undertaking mischief while they
believed that we were--incapable of responding.
So the concept of always being able to respond to two has
been one that has kept us as a standard, safe and understanding
that our adversaries would know that we could respond.
When the President and his strategic guidance has now begun
to say that he has five major tenets, and one of those is that
we would only be able to defeat a major adversary in one
theater, conceding the two conflicts capability.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, when he was at the 2012
Munich Security Conference, in front of our major allies, said,
``We will ensure that we can quickly confront and defeat
aggression from any adversary anytime, any place. It is
essential that we have the capability to deal with more than
one adversary at a time. We believe we have shaped a force that
will give us that capability.'' So a conflict between what
Panetta is saying of our capability and what the President is
now saying is our national strategy would be going down to one.
My concern is, is that with sequestration that we can't
even meet the President's goal of one. We had the Marine Corps
in front of us that--Marine Corps--Commandant of the Marines,
General Amos stated that if the budget drops that much, meaning
sequestration goes into place, or about 10 percent more, then
the number of Marine Corps infantry battalions would dip from
planned 23 into the teens. As a result, the Marine Corps would
be very, very strained to fight even one major combat
operation. And, General, again, trying to get grapple with the
effects of sequestration so that we can get this set aside. I
understand that when Congressman Wilson was speaking to you,
you were saying that the new budgetary numbers would have you
dropping to an area, perhaps, around 490,000 soldiers and that
that may be sufficient for one major combat operation.
But looking at the effects of sequestration, if this is not
set aside and we--and recognizing this is a 10-year program, my
expectation would be that you would drop below a number even
below that, and I would like your answer as to whether or not
that would, as the Marine Corps has indicated, affect your
ability to fight in even one major combat operation
successfully.
General Odierno. I think under the current strategy we
have, we are able to defeat one and then deter another. I think
that is the language we are using. And that is the capability
we have today.
If we go to full sequestration, we will--you know, we--2
years ago, we were 45 brigades. We are going to go somewhere
between 32 and 37 brigades here in the next--based on the
initial cut--now, if we cut again in the Active Component, we
will go down something less than that. And we would have
significant issues meeting anything more than one contingency
if we can meet one contingency.
And then we would have to figure out how we are able to use
our National Guard brigades much quicker than we can now. And
that requires, not just the money investment, the issue with
the National Guard is always time. Because they don't have the
time to train because they are a part-time force. And so, it
would be very difficult for us to meet anything above one
contingency. And we would probably have difficulty meeting one
contingency.
Mr. Turner. I really appreciate that answer because
although we always want to say that we have, you know, full and
great strength against any adversary, and although we know our
military would always rise to the challenge, recognizing that
sequestration effect ties one of your hands behind your back. I
appreciate you being honest and indicated that, yes, it would
affect your ability to do one major combat operation.
With that, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Several of your comments when I was here--and my apologies
for having to leave--but--dealt with the overseas contingency
funds and the--as of this moment, we don't have the details on
that. I think that is the case.
General Odierno. I think we provided those. But we
certainly can provide that to you.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay.
My question----
Secretary McHugh. We haven't provided 2014----
Mr. Garamendi. That is what I was----
General Odierno. I am sorry.
Mr. Garamendi. Going forward and also the way in which
sequestration plays into it, and that is in the details. Given
that, my question really goes to the issue of how is the--what
money is available, how will it be spent? What are your
shortfalls, some $7 billion just to return the equipment back
to the United States. Could you go into that in a little more
detail and when we might be able to have the details so that we
can review it?
Secretary McHugh. Well, I certainly will defer to the Chief
for his comments. But the $7.8 billion in OCO shortfall that we
both referenced are--with respect to this fiscal year, fiscal
year 2013. And that is for virtually every aspect of the
warfight. I mentioned that we have a redeployment and return
and reset challenge of getting some $21 billion worth of
equipment out of Afghanistan back to the depots for reset. That
will cost through the end of 2014, the projected end of
hostilities, along with second destination transportation and
the reset costs themselves, about $11 billion. But that is not
just tightly aligned with the $7.8 billion.
The $7.8 billion is just to do the warfight for this year.
And that is why we are challenged. The 2014 OCO budget is being
formulated now. I expect it will be sent, of course, with the
approval of OMB [Office of Management and Budget], the
Administration by the Department, I would assume, fairly soon.
And it will contain those details. But we are really more
focused on this year because of the $7.8 billion deficit we are
facing.
Mr. Garamendi. I thought that the sequestration did not
affect the OCO funding?
Secretary McHugh. It doesn't. I mean, I am not talking
about sequestration. That is another $7.6 billion the Army
faces.
Mr. Garamendi. And how is it that you came up short $7.8
billion? What is the----
Secretary McHugh. Well, we believe, as an Army, we started
with a deficit going into the year. The other is, as you begin
to reset, costs go up. And this has been a high burn-rate
season. In other words, we are entering--we have had some tough
fight, and there is always fudge factors. We are not so much
concerned about not being 100-percent accurate. We are
concerned about not having the funding stream to make up that
deficit, which has not been the case in the past.
Mr. Garamendi. I think--well, I am confused. I thought----
General Odierno. If I----
Mr. Garamendi. Yes?
General Odierno [continuing]. If I could try, yes. So for
this year, we didn't get quite what we asked for our OCO budget
for 2013 initially because of the closure of the Pak [Pakistan]
LOCs [Line of Control], it significantly increased the cost of
moving equipment. Fuel costs have gone up. So all of these
things have challenged us now that we have a $7.8 billion
problem. And what--and in order to pay for that, we were taking
out of our base budget.
So because we have to take out of our base budgets--because
we are never going to allow it to go unfunded in Afghanistan--
we now have to pay in our readiness of our units that are being
prepared to deploy next or preparing for another contingency.
And that is why it is causing us so much problem this year. And
we will then--and then we will push it into 2014 as well
because we have not been able to spend the dollars on our
training that we thought was necessary.
Mr. Garamendi. I assume that the detail that goes with your
discussion here is available to the committee. And--look
forward--if it is already here, then I look forward to reading
it. If it is not here, I look forward to seeing it.
Thank you very much--yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary McHugh,
General Odierno, thank you so much for joining us today, and
thank you for what you are doing for our Nation.
I wanted to drill down a little bit from Mr. Turner's
question and some previous questions about where we are from a
readiness standpoint. As you pointed out, the Army has arrived
at about a 490,000 end-strength number in its reduction. I
wanted to get your thoughts on what are the strategic risks
associated with that as far as our posture and our ability to
respond with a smaller force? And, as you heard, we live in a
more dangerous world today, and, General Odierno, just as you
point out.
And what are the assumptions being made with that reduction
in force? And, again, it goes back to the strategy. So what
assumptions are being made with that? And I wanted to ask a
perspective question.
If you go back to September 10th, of 2001, can you give us
your perspective on where we were at that particular point
going in with where we were with force posture and with end
strength, and how we were able to then pursue two wars on two
different fronts. And did we have the proper training and
readiness going in to 2001? So I just want to try--kind of get
that perspective. Where are we today with this reduction? Where
were we going into--to September 11th?
General Odierno. So, Congressman, let me start with where
we were going into September 11th. We were at about 482,000 in
the Active Component, about the same as we are today in the
National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. We had high readiness
rates. We would invested in our readiness so all our Active
force was ready. We had not quite invested what we wanted to in
our National Guards. They weren't quite at the right readiness
levels that we needed them at that time.
And so, we immediately consumed that readiness as we went
into Iraq. And what happened is, as we opened up the Iraq and
Afghan wars, and as they went on longer, we had to then grow
the Army because the Army was not big enough to fight two major
contingencies, which tells me that, at 480,000, we were not
able--capable of actually doing two major contingencies.
Because we had to grow the Army in order to do that. And we had
to significantly depend on our National Guard to buy us time so
we could grow the Active Component.
So now, as we look ahead, the decisions behind going back
now down to about the same level we were prior to 9/11, 490,000
was that we are now out of Iraq. We are out of Afghanistan. The
growth was because of the long-term stability operations that
we are involved in with both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Since we are no longer involved with those, it is--we
thought it was moderate risk to reduce the size of the Active
Component back to close to what it was between 9/11 and now.
Although it is the same number, it is a different Army. It is
one that I think is better organized, more special operations
forces, more aviation, more capacity in our ground combat
forces, more capability in our logistics structure. So I think
it is a much better Army than it was in 2001.
The problem now is we are not as ready now as were in 2001.
We have now used our readiness. We have to buy back that
readiness. And the problem we are having now is because we
don't have the dollars, our readiness is starting to slip
further. And I worry that we are going to move towards a more
hollow Army because we don't have the dollars to sustain our
readiness levels in order for us to respond to unknown
contingencies.
And that is the challenge that we face right now. And that
is my concern.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Secretary McHugh, would you like to make a comment on that?
Secretary McHugh. No, I think the Chief covered it very
well. We feel that within the new strategy at 490,000, we have
acceptable risk across the board. But clearly, our near-term
challenge is that of readiness, based on the phenomena we have
discussed here of having to use more and more money out of our
base to fund the warfight, that has caused us to take out MTC
[Mission Training Center] rotations, empty pilot training
seats, et cetera, et cetera.
And that is a particularly problematic thing in terms of
our ability to immediately respond to some unforeseen threat.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask you as a follow-up to that, how
will the utilization of these regionally aligned forces going
forward allow you to meet the new strategic guidance? Where
would the dollars come from for that? And is this construct
viable under sequestration? And what is the Guard and the
Reserve role in that?
General Odierno. So as we have developed this regional
aligned force concept, we are--we have this Army force
generation concept where we go to reset, train, and available.
So, you will go through a reset process. You will train up to a
standard we think is necessary. And then you are available to
be used against some combatant command. And both the Reserve
Component and Active Component go through that.
The Active Component has a 24-month cycle. The Reserve
Component has a 60-month cycle that they go through. And so we
will utilize those forces as they become available. We are
funding that based on our base budget submission. We can fund
that. And then there are funds that are available from the
combatant commands and others to help us to provide support to
them.
We have to--we are just beginning this, so we will have to
better work through the costs and the funding and do we have it
right or now. But we will continue to make adjustments as we go
forward.
The most important thing that we get out of this is now
combatant commanders know who the unit is. They can focus on
that area. They can conduct operations for that on a more
regular basis. And to me, it is a much more efficient use of
our capability, both in the U.S. Army Reserves, National Guard,
and the Active Component.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Barber.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, for your
service.
We had a listening session that the Army conducted in Fort
Huachuca recently and I just want to thank you, first of all,
for conducting these sessions. It allows you to assess the kind
of support that the Army has from the civilian community. And I
would say that it was a packed room and not one comment was
anything but positive. We have a very supportive community, as
you probably well know, in that--in Sierra Vista, which is
adjoining or next to Fort Huachuca.
General Odierno, I want to ask a question about Fort
Huachuca and the capabilities that it has. As you know, it
provides the Army and the joint force with a highly capable
intelligence-gathering process and analysis and UAV [Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle] pilot training. And I am very proud of the work
that they do there.
I would be interested in your thoughts as we look to the
future of ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance]
as we draw down in Afghanistan. It is a capability that I know
has been very valuable to our commanders in theater. In his
testimony on the defense budget, General Dempsey noted that the
growth and evolution of ISR has been a bedrock in our efforts
to meet these challenges and threats. And over the course of
the last decade, nearly every combatant commander has requested
increased ISR assets, given the evolving nature of the
conflict.
You have spoken today, and we have been hearing questions
regarding our ability to fight future wars. It looks like we
might be down to one capability, hopefully no less. So, I would
like to ask a question about how we can hold onto the ISR
capability, given that we are drawing down, obviously, in
Afghanistan? And how, given the current financial or fiscal
constraints and challenges, how does the Army's budget going
forward support the COCOM [Combatant Commander] requests and
continue the work such as is being done at Fort Huachuca to
help our commanders and our troops in theater?
General Odierno. So, what is a little bit different is our
unmanned aerial vehicle strategy is one that is built inside of
our units that we have. So, for example, we have unmanned
aerial vehicles in our battalions, in our Brigade Combat Teams,
and we now have them within our division headquarters. So they
are inherent in our organizations and our ISR support is used
to support Army intelligence, Army reconnaissance, and we are
now building manned/unmanned aviation brigades that will have a
combination of armed aerial reconnaissance with unmanned aerial
capability together.
So, ours is absolutely essential to the future because we
have built it as part of our strategy as to how we deploy our
combat elements. And the UAV is central to that. So that will
not change. And we will provide that with--internal to our
organizations.
The Air Force provides UAVs that are external to the
organization, specifically to support combatant commanders.
Ours comes with the units. So as we dedicate units to combatant
commanders, the UAV capability comes with it and it is totally
integrated into all our operations.
So, it is critical to the future and the way ahead for us.
And so, it continues to be very important for us to have the
center out at Fort Huachuca, as well as working with our intel
community out there as we continue to work and look ahead to
how we want to increase our foundry program, which is a
keystone of our intelligence collection program, to get--garner
expertise across the different regions of the world as we move
forward.
Mr. Barber. Well, as you know, General, I hope we will be
able to have you come out and take a look personally. It is an
extraordinary facility, with capability that is second to none.
I want to ask a second question. We may not have enough
time, but I will submit it for the record. Going back to what
Congressman Jones was talking about earlier in regard to how we
are serving our men and women in uniform who come back from
theater. I just will leave you with this story, which I hope is
an anomaly, maybe more widespread.
I was traveling back to Washington to Tucson, and I met a
sergeant who was stationed at Fort Huachuca. He told me this
story. He came back from his third deployment in Iraq,
obviously an extended deployment in each case. He had his
physical and then he asked for some--an opportunity to talk
about mental health issues. He was given 30 minutes with a
psychologist who declared that he was fine. Nine months later,
when he got to Fort Huachuca, or after he was at Fort Huachuca,
he had a diagnosis of traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and a hearing loss--none of which had been
picked up in that initial medical exam. As I say, I hope this
is an anomaly, but to me it is a very troubling story if it
indicates a larger issue of catching these issues at the front
end when they most seriously could be treated and helped.
So if you could perhaps for the record respond to that, and
what we are doing generally speaking.
Thank you so much. I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 109.]
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service. Thank you for all
that you have done for the country and for the Army, and the
men and women that serve under you.
We have talked in the past, Mr. Secretary and General,
about I think of the Distributed Common Ground System, the
Army's intelligence-gathering software product that is out
there. I appreciated, General, that you sent the vice chief
yesterday. We had a great talk with him about the Distributed
Common Ground System.
My question, though, comes--not really a question. I have
got some information that 3rd ID [Infantry Division], contrary
to what I have been told by the Army, still doesn't have the
commercial off-the-shelf product that they are using in
Afghanistan, back at Fort Stewart.
In fact, I have it right in front of me that the G3
directed a hold on the 3rd ID operational needs statement for
Fort Stewart for the reach-back from Afghanistan, so they can
train the people that are going to take their place there, and
also use their analysts in CONUS [continental United States]
helping them in Afghanistan. So, you still have units that are
requesting the off-the-shelf product that are not getting it.
That is number one.
Number two, I can't wait, and I look forward to working
with you, and like I talked with the vice chief yesterday, on a
way forward to work out how we can leverage and use the
innovation and the ingenuity that exists in the open market in
places like Silicon Valley and the northeast, where you have
great commercial products, you have really smart people doing
things that the Army is doing.
When the Army creates its own cloud--Google did their cloud
a few years ago and it is fairly successful. DCGSs [Distributed
Common Ground System] cloud isn't working yet, but it is soon
to be there. Apple created a cloud a few years ago. It is
working fantastically. That is what I use on my phone right
now. You have a lot of products and a lot of commercial
software out there, and in this time of extreme budget cuts--we
have already spent almost $3 billion on DCGS. You asked for
another, I think, $270 million this year. Life cycle costs
going up--upwards towards $8 billion or $9 billion going into
the future here on an internal DOD, in-the-Beltway, trying to
recreate systems that already exist in real life and are used
by big business every single day; that are used by the CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency], the DEA [Drug Enforcement
Agency], the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], all the
special operations forces. They use some of these off-the-shelf
products.
And I just look forward to working with you to fix this.
Because what we want is the best for the warfighter in the most
economic way possible, the most efficient and least
bureaucratic way forward to get into the warfighter's hand what
they need. And like I said, the 3rd ID still had their
operational needs statement turned down.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Secretary McHugh. May we respond? I think I heard a
question.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary McHugh. Well, I don't want to respond if the
gentleman is going to leave. Would you care to hear a brief
response?
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Secretary, we have been talking about this
for about a year and a half. And this 20-day-old e-mail where
the 3rd ID still doesn't have reach-back to the off-the-shelf
system, we can talk all we want to. It is not going anywhere.
So that is--I am happy to stay here and hear a response----
General Odierno. First off, I object to this. I am tired of
somebody telling me I don't care about our soldiers and we
don't respond.
Mr. Hunter. General----
General Odierno. Everybody on my staff cares about it, and
they do all they can to help. So if you want to bring up an
anecdotal incident, let's sit down, talk about it, and we will
give it a response.
My guess, if I go back to my staff, we will tell you it in
fact was responded to and they will tell you they don't need it
or they said they have since not requested it and said they
don't need it anymore.
We have been going back and forth with this for months. And
I am tired of the anecdotal----
Mr. Hunter. You know, if you don't----
General Odierno. Let me answer this.
Mr. Hunter. You have a very powerful personality, but that
doesn't refute the facts that you have gaps in the capability
and the----
General Odierno. We have more capability today in our
intelligence than we have ever had. When I was a division
commander in 2003, a company commander today with DCGS-A [DCGS-
Army] has 20 times the capability I had as a division commander
in 2003.
Our intel organization has moved forward greatly.
Now, let me go back to the statistics. It is $10.2 billion
over 30 years. That is the DCGS-A program. From 2005 to 2038.
Let's be careful about the statistics here. Okay? So I want
to have a conversation about this, and I want you to get
briefed on DCGS-A. DCGS-A is much more than what we are talking
about here. It is link analysis and visualization. It is a
capability that allows us to link intelligence from the
national level all the way down----
Mr. Hunter. General, I am with you----
General Odierno [continuing]. To the individual level.
Mr. Hunter. I understand.
General Odierno. And I could go to 30 places that tell me
it is working tremendously.
Is it perfect? No. Will we have iterative processes that
can inject more technology? Absolutely.
Mr. Hunter. General, I am sorry----
General Odierno. And I want to work with you on that as we
go forward.
Mr. Hunter. If you don't let me say anything, we can't have
a conversation.
General Odierno. Well, you weren't going to let us say
anything.
Mr. Hunter. Well, you are right, but I have that
prerogative when I am sitting up here.
General Odierno. Well, I have a prerogative too, and that
is to answer a question or an accusation when it is made.
Mr. Hunter. Number one, I was not accusatory. Number two,
there was no question made. With that I yield back the balance
of my time again, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, I am aware of this problem that we
have had. And the reason I wanted to let the general respond.
We made progress, I thought, yesterday on this, and I want to
have that meeting that we set up. And we will move forward on
this.
But I think that we will get this resolved, but I wanted to
let the general respond.
And you have both had your word on this now. And we will
follow up with these meetings. We will get to the bottom of
this.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I need you to help me to have a greater
confidence in the commitment to maintaining the National Guard
and Reserve operational forces.
In your response to my colleague from Guam, the gentlelady
from Guam, you said that, in fact, you were not substituting
Active units for National Guard units in--but that you were
offramping--in the short term, due to sequestration and the
Budget Control Act, it is a short-term cost-savings measure.
Yet, General Odierno's response, as well as that April 18th
letter, actually says that we are substituting Active Duty
forces for National Guard and Reserve forces.
And are you going to--is this something that is happening
solely under the Budget Control Act and sequestration, or is
this a long-term plan to remove the Guard from traditional
Guard missions, such as Kosovo, Sinai, Horn of Africa, as well
as the offramping of the Indiana Guard units?
Secretary McHugh. Yes. When the Guard--the two Indiana
Guard units were offramped, they were replaced by Active. If I
wasn't clear on that, I apologize. So to the extent that we are
using in that one or two instances Active to replace Guard, it
is true. But it was specific to the one rotation, or the
upcoming rotation for those units into Afghanistan. And it was
strictly a budgetary-driven, near-term decision that saved the
United States Army over $80 million, which, frankly, we felt we
could better expend.
It was in no way intended to indicate a long-term process.
It has nothing to do with any of the other assignments of
either Active or Guard units to Kosovo or the Sinai, to the
joint task force in Honduras, wherever, but rather a near-term
budgetary reality.
As we have said repeatedly, because of the fact that we
don't have sufficient funds in our overseas contingency
accounts, we have to deal with this $7.8 billion shortfall.
We can't let those troops go into harm's way without
everything they need. And that $80-plus million savings was
just a requirement that had to be done.
But we certainly hope this is a short-term challenge, and
we are fully committed to the Operational Reserve.
I would tell you, as we go down to 490 [490,000], with very
few exceptions, virtually all of the cuts will come out of the
Active Component, not the Reserve Component. So we have
increased equipment on hand in both the Guard and Reserve to
historic levels. If we have sufficient funding for reset, we
will actually take those historic levels even higher.
The Guard and Reserve has been an irreplaceable part of our
operational force, and we not just want it in the future, we
need it in the future.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
You have to understand my confusion here, because I agree
with you and I support you in what you are saying about the
short-term stressors that you are under. I just need to be
reassured that there is a long-term commitment.
In the discussion with the gentleman from Texas on a
regionally aligned brigade, at no point, General, did you
mention the work of the State partnership programs and the
long-term relationships that are built, not just language, but
joint training, mentoring, all of that, that these Guard units
have been doing for over 20 years.
And, in fact, the outgoing commander, Admiral Stavridis and
General Ham of AFRICOM [Africa Command] command and European
Command both said that the State partnership program is one of
the best tools that they had in their arsenals.
U.S. Pacific Command, PACOM, uses Hawaii National Guard on
a regular basis because of the large percentage of Filipino and
Asian members of those Guard units.
So I hope that this is a short-term thing, but I am nervous
that we are looking at a long-term trend to push the Guard and
Reserve back into a Strategic Reserve.
General Odierno. Sure, and I understand everybody's concern
here, as we go through this large transition.
I mean, you know, we went from a time of having almost
300,000 soldiers deployed in 2005, and that is slowly coming
down, so we have to adjust.
And that is what we are trying to do, adjust over time.
The state partnership program has been fully funded. It was
fully funded last year, it is fully funded in this budget, it
will continue to be fully funded.
So, you know, I don't even consider that part of regional--
force because it is a funded program that we have that is
separate for that, although it contributes greatly, as you just
pointed out. It is a great program that will--in fact, we have
actually asked the Guard to expand the program in the Pacific
as we go forward, because we think it is such a program that
brings us so much benefit as we execute it.
So I would just say, as we go forward here, we are
rebalancing--you know, offramping Active units too, by the way.
You know, so everybody is being offramped because requirements
are going down.
And so, what we have to do is we are trying to rebalance
how we do this best, using the skills of the Active and the
Guard and Reserve.
For us to be a great Army that we have proven over the last
12 years, we have to have the right balance between the Active,
Guard and Reserve. We need all three. They are all critically
important to our success.
And we are dedicated to making sure we keep that right
balance as we go forward, both from a size perspective, from a
investment perspective, and a use perspective.
And these are just very difficult times right now, as we
come out of this. And we are very transparent with the Guard
and Army Reserve on how we do this. They are in every meeting
with us. We talk very extensively about them.
And I believe they understand where we are heading with
this.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
I just want to note that a recent report from the Reserve
Forces Policy Board found that the life-cycle cost of a
National Guardsman is less than one-third of his Active Duty
counterpart, because you are not providing for such things as
dependents' housing, schooling, health care, once they complete
their rotation.
I will be submitting a question for the record on the
modernization of the Guard and Reserve forces, especially as an
example the pushing to the right of the modernization of Black
Hawk fleet and other military equipment as well.
I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for your service to
our country. And I certainly don't envy you in this very
difficult fiscal environment that we are in.
As you recall, I represent District 4 of Louisiana. Fort
Polk is our Army base there, very important and vital to the
Army.
And, General Odierno, you made a--you gave a response, and
I appreciate your response, in the Senate this week regarding
colocation.
And, as you recall, we have a BCT, as I understand it that
is separate its main division. And so, we have, I guess two
countervailing issues going on. One is that there is a value to
the Army to colocate the BCTs, but at the same time to do so
would create additional costs, whereas keeping that BCT at Fort
Polk, we have a tremendous investment in MILCON [Military
Construction] there, and in fact can actually, from my
understanding from the environmental report, can actually
accept 1,000 more soldiers than what we have today.
Can you expand on this colocation, how important, how much
weight you are going to put on that, versus all the additional
costs we may run into?
General Odierno. I think the question was colocation with
division headquarters. And I think in our weighting, that is
not part of the weighting criteria. We would align them to a
division one way or another.
What I would say, what I caveat that with, though, is one
of the lessons we have learned over the last 10, 12 years, if
we want training and readiness oversight from a higher
headquarters, it is important that we have that available. It
is not absolutely necessary it be colocated with them.
And so that is not an overriding factor as we consider
this.
So as we look at the criteria, that is not one of the major
criteria we look at. I guess I would just leave it there.
Dr. Fleming. Okay, so if I understand you correctly, that
is not even weighted. You are just saying it is a desirable
factor, but not a strong factor in the decisionmaking then?
Okay, great.
And, Secretary McHugh, I think you are privy to recent
hearings that we had in the Fort Polk area. You know, Fort Polk
was where General Patton set up the original training
facilities before World War II. And historically the people of
that area have undergone tremendous sacrifice to ensure the
success of Army.
And even through the years, and even today, undergoing
tremendous sacrifice, but they have done it with 110-percent
commitment and love to the Army and to the U.S. military. And I
think you saw evidence of this, people turning out in the
streets with signs and in support. They are all in for the
Army, sir, as you know.
I would love to hear your response and what you observed.
Secretary McHugh. Well, we like being where we are liked.
And there is no question we are liked and more at Fort Polk and
the broader Louisiana State. It is a great facility. I have
been there. The training that it provides is world-class. It
has opportunities for expansion, which, you know, I think will
be an important part of the evaluation process as we go
forward.
So I just want to assure the good folks of the Fort Polk
region that, you know, we are going to take their great
support, not just at the public listening meeting, which I
understand was almost historic in turn out, but also for their
support over the years. And, as I said, we want to be--we like
to be where we are liked.
But we do have a military value analysis that we are
required to go through in waiting and such. And as I commented
earlier, you know, we want to provide that information to the
committee so that you can see it. I am--we are in the process
right now in part. We are still conducting the listening
sessions, but in part, taking the comments from those meetings
like at Fort Polk and making sure we are giving full and fair
consideration to every reasonable input.
Dr. Fleming. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. And, again, we
know that it is the only Army base that is actively undergoing
land acquisition, money that had been programmed years ago,
ongoing MILCON, some that is already completed, some that is
actually under construction. We are building a school--local
community has a tremendous bond issue. They went out in order
to rebuild a school that was out in the community, the public
works, the infrastructure, all this we are gearing up, even
highways to go to Alexandria where we have an airport that is--
a support facility for the Army.
So, again, we just thank you for your consideration. Again,
we are pumped up. We are all ready for whatever the Army asks
us to do. We salute you.
And thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to you, Mr.
Secretary and General Odierno to your extraordinary service. I
want to thank you for your stark testimony today because I
think you--you brought in in better contrast the choices that
we have before us and the way that we can really see the
seriousness today of the majority and of the Congress is to
move--to appoint conferees so we can actually deal with these
choices before us. And that is something that, I think, we
should be able to do as a result of this testimony today.
I wanted to ask you--you commented earlier about this--the
issues of sexual assault, and I appreciate that. And I think
that we need to separate the convening authority from other
lines of command. But I also think we have to recognize that,
you know, what we have had isn't working. And so, we can try
and address these issues in multiple ways, and I think there is
a very, very serious application of that going on right now.
And I greatly appreciate it.
But I think we also have to question why it hasn't been
effective in the past. And so, you know, looking at all those
issues together, I hope we can come up with a much better way
of approaching it.
On the issue of suicide, I know how seriously you take this
as well. The National Institute of Mental Health is joining
with you, I believe, in a number of studies. And I think if you
could speak to what you think will come out of that, that will
be helpful to the Army.
But I also know that, you know, we are relying on a lot of
our civilian personnel to help us in working with the men and
women of the Army and all of our Services. How do you see them
also being affected by the sequestration? And is it making a
difference in terms of the ability for us to really have an
opportunity to see everybody who needs to be seen, whether they
even initially volunteer or not, to try and have plans so that
everybody has a chance to engage on the problems that they may
be facing?
Secretary McHugh. Great questions, Congresswoman. Let me
start with the STARRS [Army Study To Assess Risk and Resilience
in Servicemembers] program and the National Institute of Mental
Health program. The chief and I were just briefed on the latest
update. This was a 5-year longitudinal study. We are actually
entering the last year of it now. And this is the point when
all of the years and the--actually, millions of data input that
has been gathered and collated and fed into the system begin to
show us what we hope will be some positive ways forward.
The most likely outcomes, and of course we are waiting for
the final determination--the most likely outcomes will be tools
by which we can identify earlier the types of people who need
particular help, where we can direct commanders' attention to
maybe just pay a little bit more attention to a particular
soldier--not to harm or to label that soldier, but to really
get ahead of the curve, left of the bang, as we say.
And this scientist, the private sector scientists from the
various institutes of higher learning that are working with the
NIMH [National Institute of Mental Health] are all very, very
excited about where this study and its analysis may ultimately
take us. We are, as well. So we are still awaiting the final
outcomes, but it is starting to take final shape.
I am deeply concerned about sequestration and furloughs on
our behavioral health professionals. For the first time in
nearly 4 years that I have been Secretary, we have finally
actually surpassed the assessed requirement for behavioral
health specialists. Those numbers are absolutely critical to
make sure that soldiers can get help in a timely fashion, that
we have enough of a cadre to conduct the five touch points on
behavioral health--pre-, during, post-deployments--that we feel
are important.
But, as it stands right now, those civilians will be
subjected to the furlough requirements such as, they may be put
into place. We have made a request that they be exempted, but
that request has not been granted or refused to this point. But
if we do have to furlough them, then we are furloughing some
extremely important people. I am concerned about the impact of
that.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
And, General Odierno, I believe you mentioned that you were
putting together the study of paper about how to manage
personnel differently? And so, I am looking forward to that. I
hope that you will work with us, with Mr. Wilson and myself.
And you certainly have a partner in the Secretary, having
served on this--as subcommittee chair, as well. That could be
very significant.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Heck.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Likewise, I want to
thank both you, Mr. Secretary, and General for your service to
our troops and our Nation, but I also want to thank the
officers that are sitting behind you, and just as importantly
if not more importantly, the specialists and staff sergeants
sitting off to my left, your right, for their service.
Yes, I don't necessarily share the concerns about moving
the Reserve and Guard back to a strategic force. I think when
you look at the fact that 85 percent of transportation assets,
75 percent of medical assets, 70 percent of civil affairs and
60 percent of info ops [Information Operations] residing COMPO
[Component] 2 and 3 [Army National Guard and Army Reserve,
respectively], ``Big Army'' isn't going to war without us.
So my concern is not us reverting back to an operational
force. My concern is, how we do we maintain COMPO 2 and 3 as an
operational force? And so, we have built an incredible
operational force based on over a decade of real-world
experience and rotating into the field of battle, incredible
training and expanded opportunities, primarily funded through
OCO monies.
And so, as we see a welcome drawdown in hostilities, a
precipitous falloff in OCO money, obviously already short just
this fiscal year, and the swap, no matter how short-term of
A.C. [Active Component] units for R.C. units in some rotational
deployments, how are we going to maintain that operational
capability?
So the Reserve fiscal year 2014--Army Reserve fiscal year
2014 budget request is relatively flat. It is around the area
of about $5 million increase. But yet, in a surge situation,
the requirement for apportioned units within the first 60 days,
precludes, really, predeployment training to achieve their T-2
operational readiness and deploy.
How are we going to mitigate the risk? That is my question.
How do we mitigate the risk? And I know that while the ARFORGEN
cycle is supposed to get them from their, you know, reset to
training to their ready year, but having lived through the
ARFORGEN cycle, it doesn't always work. So how are we going to
mitigate the risk so that we maintain this incredible
operational capability we built in compo two and three?
General Odierno. Well, first, in the units that you
outlined there is absolutely correct--the type of units that
will be required to report quite quickly. And we have picked
those units for a very specific reason because those are much
easier to train and maintain capability for a number of reasons
in the Guard and Reserve, because a lot of them, their normal
jobs they have, equate very quickly to these jobs. And they
require specific skills that aren't necessarily complex unit
integration skills.
So what we are doing is, we are ensuring that they have the
money to train to the level necessary. We work with both the
Chief of Army Reserve and the Chief of the Army National Guard
to ensure that they have the funding necessary to keep them to
the T-2 level, which is what we are aiming for.
So as we build our budgets, we do that in the sense. When
we run into more difficult problems, is when you talk about the
Brigade Combat Teams, because it takes longer and more money to
prepare them. So what we do, is we lead with our Active Brigade
Combat Teams and then follow so we give the Reserve and the
National Guard brigades more time to train.
And so, that process, I think, is a successful one. And
that is the one we want to continue to move forward with as we
go. And I think the way we have this organized, that we believe
we are able to fund them at a level that will allow them to
sustain a T-2 as they rotate through this ARFORGEN process. And
we are changing it. And we are reviewing it to make the
ARFORGEN process more applicable to a more peacetime set or a
set to respond to unknown contingencies. And so, we will work
our way through that. As they have, say, flatlined the dollars
for the Active--the Active Component has actually gone down. So
we actually have invested more in them by keeping them on a
flatline of capability where the money we are spending to train
the Active Components have actually come down in this budget a
little bit. That is one--and so, we--that is how we recognize
the importance of trying to sustain a level of capability in
the Reserve and National Guard in these areas.
Dr. Heck. And I appreciate that, General. I really do. But
I can tell you, being in the--from units that are in that Tier
3 because of training, because we are supposedly able to go to
war faster, i.e. medical units, you know, on the TDA [Table of
Distributions and Allowances] side, my combat medics aren't
medics in their day job. And with the increasing requirements
to do all of the mandatory trainings on BTA [Battle Training
Assembly] weekend, it leaves very little time to get them their
medical training and maintain their skills. And with the
drawdown on available AT [annual training] days because of
budgets, even though it is a Tier 3, I still have concerns that
when the balloon goes up my combat medics are going to be able
to go out the door and meet that 60-day requirement.
Just to put it on the record.
Thank you again.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, I am following up on what the Chair
actually brought up and that is this balance--the rebalance to
Asia-Pacific and how we are also going to maintain your
commitment to partner in and around the Middle East.
Now, having said that, on page 10 of your testimony, you
also are talking about U.S. Army Pacific elevating to a four-
star general headquarters in 2013. And I just would like to
say, thank you, because as you probably are very well aware,
Senator Inouye--from Hawaii--always wanted a four-star general
presence. And it was because irrespective of the air-and-sea
comment earlier, general, it is because our allies in the
Pacific, our Army and having the same level of command was
something of respect for the senator.
And having thanked you for that, my question, though, is,
what do you expect by having a four-star general in the
Pacific?
How does that change your posture or what are we in Hawaii
to expect from having a four-star general there?
Secretary McHugh. I will start and then the Chief can fill
in the operational realities a little bit better. And first of
all, we deeply mourn and miss the good senator. He was a great
American, obviously, going back to his sacrifices in World War
II, was also a great supporter of all the men and women in
uniform. And, you know, he gave us so much. So if this
elevation honors him that is cherry on the cake. And so we miss
him as I said.
As you noted, Congresswoman, the main objective is to
provide our relationships with our 21 of the 27 heads of
military structure in the Pacific nations that our Army, the
CHODs [Chief of Defense], the chairmen and the highest military
officials an equal to talk to in the Army relationships.
Everyone talks about land-sea battle, and there is a lot--or
air-sea battle, and there is a lot of air and a lot of sea, but
there is a lot of land as well.
And one of the objectives of our strategy is not to have to
go to war, not to have to encounter conflict, and we think the
Army particularly plays an important role in those kinds of
activities. We have 24 major engagements throughout the Pacific
region. We, unlike some of the other Services, have not cut
back on any of those engagements.
And we think given the prevalence of Army forces throughout
the Pacific we are going to have a very, as I said in my
opening comments, the status as a linchpin in that Pacific--and
I can tell you the PACOM commander, Admiral Locklear, is very
excited about having Army units return from theater and having
them available through our region aligned force and through our
State partnership program. For example, Alaska and Mongolia--
Alaska National Guard.
So, we think although it may not change and add a lot of
buildings and a lot of staff at least in the beginning, you
know, it is an important step symbolically to deal with other
armies on an equal basis.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
General Odierno. Yes, I would just say we have done some
reorganization as well. So 8th Army, which has been in Korea,
now comes under the U.S. Army Pacific Commander, our forces in
Japan. It is a broad responsibility. So we thought it was very
important to have a four-star general in there and I just would
reemphasize what the Secretary said, the importance of having a
four-star general that can regularly meet and build
relationships with our key allies and partners throughout the
Asia-Pacific is incredibly important.
So we are very happy about this, and on 2 July General
Brooks will take over, and we are looking forward to that day.
Ms. Hanabusa. Yes, thank you very much again.
And--I--and you may have to respond in writing to the next
question. You know, also as part of your written testimony on
page 8 you talk about the future, and you talk about how the
mission is going to be able to respond quickly. We have been
discussing, really the efficiencies, because of the cut in the
budget. So now, my question is, how are you going to prepare
for really two major theaters, Asia-Pacific as well as the
Middle East?
And, do you believe that the training and-or the ability to
be flexible which is paramount in all of your statements, are
you going to be able to do that in two very distinct, and in my
opinion, separate theaters?
And I am going to be out of time, and so if we could, can
we take that for the record?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 110.]
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much, and thank you again for
the four-star position.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to Mr. Secretary and General Odierno, thank you so much
on behalf of my family for your service to our country and the
sacrifices that both you and your family make.
And General Odierno I just want to--my ``Thank You'' note
is in the mail although I am seeing you before you have
received it. Thank you so much for coming to Fort Rucker and
spending time with our soldiers and their families. It really,
really made a deep impression that you were willing to take the
time, particularly in light of the fiscal uncertainties that we
are facing right now to be with them. So it was a pleasure to
see you in Alabama, and feel free to come back any time.
I do want though based on your testimony both on February
13 and in light of us attaching the appropriations bill to the
Continuing Resolution and then some of the testimony today out
Army aviation--Army-wide to get a better clarification about
the impact that, that will have on Fort Rucker this year with
their current student load.
Army-wide we keep hearing this number 37,000 and 500, I
just want to get clarification from you for the current student
load at Rucker this year.
General Odierno. Yes, it is going to affect about 500 less
pilots coming through Fort Rucker this year than we originally
had planned. So we will have to slow down the amount of
training that goes on there.
We have mitigated some--it was supposed to actually be
higher. We were able to mitigate some of that, but we have had
to slow that down. What we don't want to do is back--have them
go there and sit there. So we will have to push that to next
fiscal year. And so we are going to have to figure out ways to
catch up, which is going to be very difficult over time.
Mrs. Roby. But does that--just so I understand--does that
mean that their student load for this year will be funded and
you are going to push it off into the next year?
General Odierno. There will be some reduction in this year
of the student load.
Mrs. Roby. But not as much as you initially----
General Odierno. Yes, but it is still significant. I mean,
it is still about 500 pilots short of what we originally
planned.
Mrs. Roby. Okay, well help me understand, because I guess
this is where I am confused a little bit. I mean, our intent in
attaching that Continuing Resolution was to give you the
flexibility to prioritize and, you know, based on what we know
in our current mission, training these combat aviators is
definitely a priority and you and I have discussed this on many
occasions.
And so if you don't have the flexibility you need, what do
we need to do to get you that flexibility?
General Odierno. Well, what has happened is we have used
all the authority we have. So DOD [Department of Defense] was
given the ability to move $7.5 billion. So that is between all
the Services. So our portion of that helped us a little bit,
but it was not enough to allow us to transfer money in order to
help and help to do all the training we had planned for this
year. So we are still short about $12 billion in our own end
funds.
So in order to pay for Afghanistan, and to make up for
sequestration we still had to make some changes and reductions
in our training program, canceling CTC [Combat Training Center]
rotations and reducing flying hours, and part of that is
sending initial pilots through Rucker.
Now, we hope to get it back up to full speed by next year
again. That is the hope, and then try to catch up, but that
will depend on what our budget looks like next year.
Mrs. Roby. Okay, I just want to--and thank you for helping
me with that. Yesterday, the Army Times reported that the Army
is suspending the aviation branch transfer panels indefinitely.
Can you just talk about what that means as it relates to
readiness?
General Odierno. Yes, I think it is for the rest of this
year.
So--again, we don't want to just send people--so a lot of
these are ones who are going to be aviators and we don't want
to just send them there without a seat. So we are delaying it
is really what is going to happen. So we are not going to do it
this year. We will--we should be able to implement it again
next year where we will start moving them back into aviation if
they want to go.
Mrs. Roby. Okay----
Secretary McHugh. Yes, could I just--could I add just--you
asked, and thank you for asking, what you might do. Obviously
to get the 2014 budget on time would be critical to help take a
step back to normalcy in all our training. I have been to Fort
Rucker as well and great facility. Obviously our Army Center of
Aviation Excellence.
The second thing is we will be sending--the Department will
be sending a request over for additional reprogramming, more
flexibility. So while that may not solve all our problems
either, it would certainly be very, very helpful in allowing us
not to take new money, not to add to the deficit or the budget,
but rather to move money again and fill some of those gaps that
the first passage of H.R. 113 just didn't take us far enough.
Mrs. Roby. Okay, all right.
Well thank you both again.
And, Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here today.
I appreciate, very much, your--all the work you are doing
to help protect our soldiers and our country as we confront
very challenging times across the globe and here at home with
all the fiscal constraints that we have to deal with.
I know you have heard this from a number of members, I just
wanted to touch again upon the issue of sexual assault in the
military. I appreciate very much the work the Army has done
especially around the special victims units where really
cutting-edge approach is being taken to how one investigates
and moves forward with these crimes, and so I want to thank you
for that.
But, General Odierno, you also mentioned and I think
Secretary McHugh too, that the Army is a profession that is
built on the element of trust, and what I have learned as I
have spoken with so many victims is that there is a break in
that trust on a number of fronts.
So when the crime occurs in the first place, it is a deep
affront to the survivors of this. The second affront comes when
the commander does not respond appropriately as survivors come
forward. The third affront is when those who do come forward
sustain professional retaliation, often end up leaving the
service, a profession they sought out and hoped to spend their
life in, or at least a good number of years, and find
themselves leaving.
And then the fourth affront is when the Uniform Code of
Military Justice is not seen as dealing fairly with the process
of moving forward.
And then the final affront, really, is how the VA deals
with this. We are all working on this. I don't really want to
go into it anymore, but just to say I have realized it comes at
us in a lot of different ways, and there are a lot of different
efforts to deal with it, these different pieces of it.
We have a lot of work to do, and I think, as you heard from
our ranking member and others, that this is something we just
need to stay on top of. And I look forward to continuing to
work with you and the other Services as well.
I also want to thank you, General Odierno, for last year
coming to join an annual event that I host on Capitol Hill. It
was a real honor for my constituents to hear from you. And I
have heard back from them how much they appreciated your
remarks and continue to appreciate your leadership.
One of the items you raised in your speech, though, remains
quite relevant to an issue we have today.
I really continue to be impressed by the efforts that the
Army is investing towards energy efficiency. The costs of our
dependence on legacy energy sources are very real, and are
quite broad.
For example, the Army is still the largest facility energy
consumer in the Federal Government, costing billions of dollars
each year. Liquid fuel costs alone rose by $1 billion from
fiscal year 2010 to 2011, in part because of the threats posed
in the Khyber Pass, which necessitated a costly rerouting of
resupply routes into Afghanistan.
I have a question that really touches on a local base. I
believe you are both aware of the important work that is being
done at the base camp systems integration lab at Fort Devens in
my native Massachusetts.
I actually had an opportunity to visit and see how they are
partnering with some Natick Soldier Systems, as things are
developed at Natick, they are then tested out at Devens.
The important work that is being done there is expected to
reduce base camp fuel requirements by 20 percent or more, and
water demands by up to 75 percent. It is really impressive to
see what is being put in place.
So this facility was established less than 2 years ago.
Obviously performing very important work, which gets at the
core of force protection and fiscal imperatives, as we strive
to attain greater energy efficiency.
I have a simple question: If--can I count on your
continuing support for these kinds of vital efforts in a time
of fiscal austerity, given the cost savings that are generated
as a result of them?
General Odierno. You can. And it is not just cost savings
that is important, as important as that is. And I have been to
Natick as well. It is just amazing work.
But it is also soldier's lives. The less power we have to
transport into a theater, the fewer times we have to mount a
convoy to bring water and fuel around, those are saved American
lives.
And so, we view it from both an economic but as well as a
soldier-safety perspective, and we think it just makes good
fiscal as well as good administrative sense.
Ms. Tsongas. And you lead the way for the country in a lot
of different ways, in terms of just the kinds of things you
develop as a result of this investment.
General Odierno. We like doing that too. Absolutely.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I certainly want to thank the Secretary and the general
for taking so much time out of their day to be here. We
appreciate it.
And, General, I really want to thank you for your service
and for your leadership. I will tell you that my sons and their
units refer to you as ``General O,'' with great respect and
honor.
So saying that--and I have three sons that currently serve,
two Active Duty and one in the Army National Guard as a pilot,
just recently graduated last week from Fort Rucker.
But I am concerned, obviously, as we reshape our Army,
particularly as we have just fought, you know, an irregular
warfare, and now we have challenges out there, obviously, on
the regular side too.
And as we have more emphasis placed on our SOF [Special
Operations Forces] units, how is that going to affect our
ability in general to respond to those issues, like South Korea
versus North Korea?
General Odierno. What we have done is--I am very pleased
with the innovation we have shown in developing what we call
our decisive action rotations and capability that we are going
to develop in the future.
We have developed a very complex scenario, both the JRTC
[Joint Readiness Training Center] at Fort Polk and NTC
[National Training Center], in California, that will outline
what I think is the future environment, which will be a
combination of counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, as well as
combined arms high-end maneuver.
We think that is the environment that we are going to be
asked to deal with.
So it is a complex scenario that will cause our leaders at
all levels to deal with how they maneuver, how they conduct
combined arms, but also have to do it in a environment that
would require some stability operations and counterinsurgency
work as well. And that is how we see the future.
So we have developed our rotations in this way. So our home
station training will start to get focused--as we get more
units coming out of Afghanistan, our home station training will
focus here. Then when they go to their training center
rotations to be certified, they will be focused in these areas.
And that will enable them to have the capability that is
necessary to fight, whether it is in South Korea or somewhere
in the Middle East or somewhere else around the world.
Because we think it will be a very complex environment. And
I am very pleased with how we develop these scenarios.
We have done three or four of these rotations so far, and
they have been very eye-opening for us, in terms of that we
have to get back to some of our basic combined-arms skills, but
also the complexity of the environment that the commander has
got to operate in.
So I think we have got that about right. We will continue
to adjust it as we go. And that will be the basis of us
developing this capability. That is why it is so disappointing
for us that we had to cancel these rotations this year, because
they were going to be the beginning of us rebuilding some of
this capability that we think we are going to have in the
future.
And because we had to cancel these rotations, we have lost
an opportunity to begin this adjustment and really regenerating
our readiness.
Mr. Nugent. Having a son that just returned from NTC about
a month or so ago, you--I think it would be great for members
of Congress to actually go there to see the training cycle,
but, more importantly, our equipment.
You know, after 10 years, 12 years of war, our equipment
has obviously taken a beating. And I know that your position in
regards to making sure--and both you and the Secretary--making
sure that our kids have the equipment and the training
necessary to survive any position that we put them in as a
nation to defend this country, are we learning--and I
appreciate what you just said about the combined arms aspect,
because one of them is a field artillery unit, with the heavy
brigade, with the 1st Infantry.
But as we put our equipment through the paces, are we
seeing that, you know, the effects of this lengthy, lengthy
combat that we have involved in on our equipment, particularly
the readiness of that equipment?
General Odierno. That is why the reset is so important.
Every piece of equipment that has been either in Iraq or
Afghanistan is going through a complete reset program, which
ensures that it is at the level necessary for us to take it
forward and use it and modernize it.
So I feel comfortable, as long as we are able to get all
this equipment through this reset program.
Mr. Nugent. Have we been able to do that?
General Odierno. Up until now, we have. And so, the concern
is that we have to delay that a bit, and that is why we need to
have continued OCO funding about three years after we come out
of Afghanistan, to ensure we can reset the final pieces of
equipment that are coming out of Afghanistan.
Mr. Nugent. Well, my time is just about to expire.
And I once again want to thank both of you for your service
and particularly to our Army. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask either
gentleman that is here today about the helicopters. One of the
things that sort of spurred my interest in Army helicopters is
reading more about how more when we went into Vietnam in 1965
and I guess shortly after that you all introduced the Kiowa
Warrior, and wanted to know about where that is at right now.
I know there have been many extensions and planned
replacements of the Comanche and the armed reconnaissance
helicopters, and that some of them have been even delayed and
canceled.
I didn't know if you can just give me an update on the
Army's modernization and upgrade plans for the Kiowa that is
served really as the workhorse for the Army for quite some time
now.
Secretary McHugh. Yes, the Kiowa Warrior has been an
amazing workhorse. And we are deeply fortunate to have had it
to help our soldiers in theater.
The fact of the matter is, though, it is a 40-plus year
platform and it really is reaching the limits of its life
extension capabilities.
We are currently going through an analysis for
consideration of the development of a new Armed Aerial Scout.
We recently had a volunteer flight demonstration program, where
I believe five manufacturers provided airframes which Army
pilots tested to try to see if the capability extensions were
extant in those platforms, so that, you know, we could take the
next step in the development of a new Armed Aerial Scout.
The early assessments on that volunteer flight
demonstration was that, you know, insufficient and
generational-type progress was just not there in those frames.
So in the interim, as we continue to pursue the potential
paths for the development of an AAS [Armed Aerial Scout], we
are going through a continued upgrade, called a CASUP [Cockpit
and Sensor Upgrade Program], the cockpit and instrumentation
upgrades for the Kiowa. That will bring it really to pretty
much the life extension of its usefulness.
But we will keep it relevant to the fight into the 2030s,
but we continue to be very interested in developing that next
Armed Aerial Scout platform.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
General Odierno. If I could just add, we learned at the end
of--as we used in Afghanistan, very successful, but we are
starting to see some of the limitations that we have with the
Kiowa in terms of power, in terms of its digital capability,
which is what the Secretary just talked about, in terms of
upgrading the cockpit.
So the decision we are going to have to make here is do we
think technology is far enough along that it can really provide
us a generational change in the Kiowa or do we have to reinvest
in the Kiowa and wait for the technology that can result as a
generational change in the Armed Aerial Scout?
And that is the decision we are going to have to make here
pretty soon, as we go forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno and Secretary McHugh, thank you so much,
both of you, for your service to our country.
My first question--well, a statement, and that is that I
hope you continue the practice of keeping our wounded warriors
on Active Duty for their rehabilitation. I think that is a very
significant change. My father was a career soldier. I was in
the Army. And I volunteered as a teenager during the Vietnam
War in an Army hospital.
And it--the morale was bad. Once they were stabilized
there, they were sent to the VA facilities. And unfortunately,
they were often substandard, and felt that they were abandoned
by the Army. And I think now when I go to Bethesda and I meet
with our wounded warriors, and I am glad to say also that the
casualty rate is down. But the--in terms of rehabilitation, the
numbers are still strong, but they are receiving great care.
And I am a subcommittee chairman in Veterans' Affairs and I
clearly want to improve the quality of the care there. But it
is not where it is where I am confident that they are going to
get the same quality of care that they do right now at Bethesda
and other facilities across this country. So, obviously, I want
to see you continue that particular policy.
The second issue is that the base realignment closure
commission--I wondered if you could tell me what you think the
savings are to that; if you feel that we have surplus capacity
in terms of facilities inside the continental United States. I
wondered if you could answer that?
Secretary McHugh. Well, we have not done any current
analysis, and previous NDAAs [National Defense Authorization
Act] have precluded us from using funds to do that. And, you
know, we have respected that. But if you go back to the last
known assessment of excess capacity in the Army, I believe it
is 2004, it shows us to have about 20-percent excess capacity.
I think it is fair to assume in those ensuing 8-plus years
that that excess capacity has grown. And it is certainly from
our view going to grow even more as we come down to 490,000 end
strength within the Active Component. So, I think the judgment
that we have is that, believe me, having sat through three BRAC
rounds on this committee for 17 years, not something that is
easy to do, but in these particularly challenging times, it is
important for us to the next BRAC round--this budget asks for
one in 2015--earlier, rather than later so we can begin to
receive savings as quickly as possible. But that is pretty much
where we are at this moment.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Well, my last issue is--concerns that
fact that we are inevitably shifting our Guard and Reserve from
an Operational to a Strategic Reserve. I think that will simply
happen over time. We have drawn down in Iraq. We are drawing
down in Afghanistan.
And my concern--I served in both the Army and the Marine
Corps and their respective Reserve Components--as that--as time
elapses, that the readiness declines in the Guard and Reserve.
And it may take--we may need to rethink the model that we have
for the Guard and Reserve right now in terms of training
requirements. Instead of going back--if we go back to that 2
weeks a year or one weekend a month, that may not do it.
And so--and I look back at the First Gulf War where we had
units reporting in in the Guard and the Reserve that were not
ready to be deployed. And we can never be in that situation
again. I think that they are at a razor's edge right now in
terms of capability, given all the deployments in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but I am worried that we may lose that over time.
And maybe, General Odierno, I am wondering if you could
address that?
General Odierno. Well, Congressman, unfortunately, I mean,
I agree with everything you have said. And it is going to
degrade to some extent. There is no way that we can keep it at
the level that it is been just because of the number of
deployments. But we have got to come up with ways to do it
better than we did before.
And I think we have to look at different ways. Maybe there
are different ways to look at how we divide up that 39 days a
year that they have available for them to train. And so we will
work with the National Guard to take a look at that, because we
have to figure this out. And we are trying to do it through
this Army force generation process. During certain times, we
will increase the number of days for certain years. We are
committed to that.
I am not sure that is enough. So we will continue to work
with the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve to come up with
unique ways to try to figure out how we best utilize those 39
days. It is so hard within that short period of time to
maintain the level of readiness. And we have just got to figure
out how we best utilize and most efficiently utilize that time
we are given.
Because one thing I tell everybody, in the last 12 years we
have proven why exactly we need a National Guard and U.S. Army
Reserve. They are critical to everything that we do. This
balance of Active, Guard, Reserve is critical to us as we move
forward, and that will not change. And this is not about one or
the other. It is about having that full range of capability
that we need.
So, we are committed to that and we have got to come up
with the right solutions as we go forward. And we look forward
to working with you on that as we go forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for your service. And I personally want
to thank both of you for taking the time to come down to
Anniston Army Depot.
Mr. Secretary, I was glad I could work it out to be there
with you when you came.
And General, I am sorry I was up here tending to this
business when you visited, but it was great for you all to do
that. It means a lot to those folks when you come by and look
at what great work they do.
A couple of weeks ago when the Secretary of Defense was
here, I asked him about the furloughs, if they would apply to
the Anniston Army Depot, given that the fund that pays for that
work is fully funded. And they just--they didn't know at that
time.
Are you all any further along at knowing as to whether or
not there are going to be furloughs at the depot?
Secretary McHugh. To my knowledge, a final decision has not
been made. Now, they are funded through a----
Mr. Rogers. Working Capital Fund.
Secretary McHugh. But the comptroller--OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] Comptroller Bob Hale has said that there
is a requirement that that stay fully funded, so they are not
sure right now how that would be assessed. If they have
actually made a final determination, I am not aware of it as I
sit here.
General Odierno. Yes, I think there is a combination of
both. You have some that are funded by Working Capital Fund.
You have some that are funded by other means. So it is unclear
yet what the status of working capital--we are still waiting on
an interpretation of that, frankly. So I guess we can't give
you a better answer than what they gave you.
Mr. Rogers. If they were to have to experience furloughs,
what would that do to your readiness?
General Odierno. Well, it is going to decrease our
equipment on-hand readiness because it is going to delay
equipment getting sent back to the units. And so it is
problematic for us.
Mr. Rogers. Well, shifting gears, I have spoken to both of
you all over the last couple of years about my support for the
double v-hull Stryker and the work out there. And I am very
proud that you all supported the procurement of a 3rd Brigade
in your budget request.
What about the balance of the Strykers that we have got?
Are you looking at putting double v-hulls on them?
General Odierno. I think initially we believe we have a
requirement for three brigades. I think as we move forward, if
we have the dollars and how we plan on using the Stryker in the
future, we will certainly take a look at whether we want to do
it across the entire fleet. It has proven to be pretty
successful as we have used it in Afghanistan.
Right now, we think our requirement is three, but we will
always continue to assess that as we go forward. The Stryker is
going to maintain itself as a pretty significant part of our
capability as we go forward.
Secretary McHugh. Could I?
Mr. Rogers. Certainly.
Secretary McHugh. Just to the effectiveness of the Stryker,
and I came across these datapoints. We have had just about
between 100 and 120 significant events in Afghanistan with a
double v-hull Stryker. And the vast, vast, vast majority of
soldiers have walked away safely because of the capabilities
that upgrade has brought.
So, it has been a tremendous success and it has been a real
lifesaver for us.
Mr. Rogers. I agree.
Lastly, I want to talk to you about the Abrams tank. The
powertrain has been identified by the Army as one of the
critical upgrades required for the life-extension of the Abrams
tank to 2045. Two years ago, Mr. Secretary, you testified that
60 percent of the maintenance cost for the Abrams tank is
related to the engine and transmission, and by improving that
powertrain, the Army would achieve 17 percent improvement in
fuel efficiency.
In fiscal year 2012, this committee supported a $47.8
million reprogramming request from the Army that adopted
commercial base improvements to insert a new dual configurable
compressor that would be integrated within the Total Engine
Revitalization Program. The committee understands this upgrade
provides the Army with $1.6 billion in maintenance and fuel
savings, as well as will drive additional workload in the
Anniston Army Depot.
What is the funding status of this program for fiscal year
2013 enacted budget and for the 2014 proposed budget?
Secretary McHugh. The FEI [Fuel Efficiency Initiative] has
not been funded in the 2014. And the current funds are,
frankly, unexecutable against the original program because we
are using it to pay off our funding shortages. That was a very
hard decision. The comments I made for the record 2 years ago
were actually correct, and this was a program we wanted to
follow up, but we find it impossible under the current fiscal
conditions.
I will say with regard to Anniston in the PB [President's
Budget] 2014, we have got just under $8 million for part of the
Tiger program, the engine upgrades that will be done at
Anniston, and about $178 million total in modernization. So we
are not abandoning Anniston in terms of the Abrams, but the FEI
program looks under some duress.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you both for your service.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
That concludes the questioning.
Thank you, again, gentlemen, for your service. Thank you
for being here today.
And that will conclude this session. This hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 25, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 25, 2013
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Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Army
April 25, 2013
Good morning. The committee meets today to receive
testimony on the President's Fiscal Year 2014 budget request
for the Department of the Army. I am pleased to welcome
Secretary John McHugh and General Ray Odierno. It's great to
see you both again and thank you for your continued service.
Our Nation is very fortunate to have you two leading our Army
during these challenging times.
I note that in your written testimony you state that
``America's Army is the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-
led fighting force in the world, providing a credible and
capable instrument of national power.'' I absolutely agree with
you, but what we need your help with is understanding the risks
associated with the Army's continued ability to meet the
national security needs of this Nation, and the critical
assumptions behind these risks.
For example, we hope to learn more about the Army's plans
to reduce the size of its force. With last year's budget
request, based on the Budget Control Act, the Army announced
that it would reduce end strength to 490,000 Active Duty
soldiers, the minimum required to accomplish national security
requirements. The drawdown would require the Army to go from 45
Active Duty Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to 37. To date, of the
8 BCTs that will be deactivated, we have been told that 2 of
the 8 will be Armor BCTs. We have also been told that the Army
plans on adding a 3rd maneuver battalion to each Active
Component Armor and Infantry BCT. It is our understanding that
as a result of adding a 3rd maneuver battalion, the total
number of Active Component BCTs will go to some number below 37
BCTs.
However, it is a year later and we still do not know how
many BCTs the Army plans on drawing down to or where the Army
will take the BCTs from. Equally important, we do not know what
types of BCTs the Army thinks it needs. This includes Armor,
Infantry, and Stryker BCTs. I know that we are in difficult
times and that hard choices must be made. I hope that your
testimony today will highlight areas of greatest risk and help
this committee and others in Congress make the right choices.
Again, thank you both for your continued service to our Nation.
I look forward to your
testimony.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Army
April 25, 2013
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to join you in welcoming
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno.
The President's budget proposal represents a responsible
attempt to forge a grand bargain on the budget. The President
proposed an ``all of the above'' deficit reduction strategy,
dealing with revenues, entitlements, and discretionary
spending, including defense spending, to deal with our fiscal
problems. As a member who, with many others around here, has
long supported a comprehensive, balanced approach, I am pleased
that the President adopted this course of action. Everyone
here, I am sure, hopes that a budget deal can be reached,
eliminating the damaging effects of sequestration on critical
national interests and, especially in the context of today's
hearing, national security.
Some on this committee have attacked the President's
proposal to reduce the defense budget by roughly $119 billion
between fiscal years 2017 and 2023. As we discuss potential
solutions to our budgetary problems, it is important to keep a
few things in mind. First, the proposed defense spending
reductions would be far less painful than what the Department
would absorb under sequestration. The President's budget would
allow future Congresses and Administrations to determine where
the cuts come from and how they would be implemented, rather
than deal with indiscriminate cuts through sequestration.
Moreover, the proposed $119 billion is roughly a quarter of the
amount that would be sequestered from the defense budget
through fiscal year 2021. Many on this committee voted for the
Budget Control Act, which created sequestration, and this
committee must play an active role in removing the
indiscriminate cuts.
The Continuing Resolution and then sequestration have
caused and are causing real damage to the Army this year. So
far this year, the Army has had to cancel seven training events
at the National Training Center and the Joint National Training
Center. These training events are vital to the effort to return
the Army to full-spectrum combat capability after a decade of
conducting counterinsurgency operations. I am sure our
witnesses can highlight other cases. We need to be perfectly
clear with ourselves and the American people; standing down
these capabilities causes real damage to our readiness and will
cost more to recreate in the future than it will save in the
short term. We owe it to our brave men and women in uniform,
our civilian Government workers, the American people, and
ourselves to fix sequestration this year and reach a budget
agreement.
While I hope we can reach an agreement that provides
stability for the U.S. budget in the future and in particular
the defense budget, I don't think we can fool ourselves that
the overall defense budget is going up. Under any scenario, we
are not going to be spending as much on defense as was planned
2 or 3 years ago. While some members of this committee like to
talk about defense strategies unconstrained by resources, that
option is off the table; the Budget Control Act, which many on
this committee voted for, capped resources. Our challenge now
is to make those hard choices, in strategy, in support costs,
in shared sacrifices, that allow us to live within our means.
We are all going to have to look broadly to save enough
money and position ourselves for the future--we in Congress, in
conjunction with our witnesses here, should be considering how
to reduce bureaucracy, how to further reform acquisition
processes, and where we can stop spending on legacy programs
that provide little useful capability at high costs. The
Department has asked to close excess infrastructure, and we
should listen. We have gotten used to nearly unlimited
resources to fight the wars of the last ten years, but that
time is over. Funding cuts are painful, but they also provide
the opportunity for us to set up the Army for the future and to
bring some rationality to the defense budget.
I look forward to working with the two witnesses here
today, and with the other members of this Committee, on exactly
these issues in the coming years.
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April 25, 2013
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 25, 2013
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
General Odierno. Army Leader Development Strategy ensures broadly
experienced leaders with a range of cultural and regional expertise:
The Army's leader development strategy provides for enhancements to
personnel management that capture and catalog more detailed knowledge
of individual leader talent profiles, and enable a better match between
those talents and emerging missions and regionally aligned
requirements. This type of talent management is a systemic process that
better accounts for the individual traits of an officer, non-
commissioned officer, or Army civilian--his or her experiences,
aptitudes, and potential. The Army develops and employs well-rounded
leaders based on proficiencies derived from operational experience,
broadening assignments, higher civilian and professional military
education, and demonstrated individual interests and acquired skills.
The Army's re-structured professional development timelines provide a
strong foundation in a specific basic branch military skill followed by
periodic opportunities for a broader set of experiences in academic,
joint, interagency, and multinational settings. By providing our
leaders with this range of experiences, we enable them to rapidly
acquire the socioeconomic and cultural nuances of specific areas of
operations during mission-specific training for an assignment or
deployment. This approach prepares leaders to exercise mission command
doctrine effectively whether conducting unified land operations in
complex and uncertain operational environments as part of a regionally
aligned force, or supporting sustainment functions across the Army's
generating force.
Managing individual talent and cultivating expertise through
experiential opportunities, advanced military education, advanced
civilian fellowships or graduate degree programs, and cross-cultural
developmental programs spanning a full career ensures that the Army
builds leaders with the ability to adapt quickly to any regional focus
as they are assigned at every level of responsibility. [See page 16.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Secretary McHugh. When the Army force structure is reduced, we must
lower our facility overhead, infrastructure and civilian support staff
to ensure that our investments in equipment, training, and maintenance
do not become distorted. Otherwise, we may be required to unnecessarily
divert scarce resources away from readiness. As we move forward with
such reductions, we hope to conduct a capacity analysis to determine
the level of excess infrastructure created by these changes, which
could support a future BRAC round. [See page 24.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
General Odierno. During Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn,
the DOD implemented and refined key screening policies to help identify
medical concerns and ensure those returning home receive continued
medical care for deployment-related conditions to include behavioral
health, traumatic brain injury, and hearing-loss.
In order to minimize stigma and to engage Soldiers early in the
development of Behavioral Health concerns, the Army utilizes enhanced
standardized person-to-person Behavioral Health screening at touch
points synchronized with the Army Force Generation Cycle in accordance
with National Defense Authorization Act of 2012. The Army conducts
Behavioral Health screening for all Soldiers before deployment, while
in theater, post deployment, at 4 to 6 months post deployment, and
annually, regardless of deployment status, with the periodic health
assessment. The results are recorded in the electronic health record,
as well as in the military operational database.
The Behavioral Health screening considers the Soldier's relevant
health records related to previous deployment(s), life stressors,
substance use, suicidal or homicidal ideation, and symptoms of Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression. Many factors influence
the assessment: the differences in the way Soldiers report their
symptoms over time to different providers; the evolution of symptoms
over time due to the natural progression of the healthcare conditions;
and differences in the way providers interpret the reported symptoms.
Screening providers incorporate all available information and clinical
judgment to make any indicated referrals for health services. Soldiers
may request a Behavioral Health referral at any time during this
process, and they may also decline a recommended Behavioral Health
referral if there are no urgent safety concerns or occupational or
performance problems that require a duty limitation.
Many combat related behavioral health conditions may not manifest
until several months post deployment, so it is common for Soldiers to
present with few symptoms immediately post deployment. Regularly
scheduled Post-Deployment Health Assessments (PDHA) at four to six
months and Post Deployment Health Reassessments (PDHRAs) at 18 and 30
months, with the additional exams required by NDAA 2010, provide
opportunities to identify latent onset healthcare conditions.
The PDHA mission is twofold: to document adverse occurrences and
exposures (as stated in the DOD directive) and to identify and treat
current deployment-related conditions. Although there is an extensive
network of medical care in the deployed and non-deployed environments,
the PDHA and the PDHRA are additional screening mechanisms to discuss
health-related concerns.
With respect to Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), the DOD implemented a
proactive screening policy in June 2010 ``Policy Guidance for
management of concussion/Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) in the
Deployed Setting,'' which mandates a set of actions for any Service
Member involved in potentially concussive events (such as being within
50 meters of a blast, sustaining a direct blow to the head, being in a
vehicle collision, etc.). DOD policy mandates a minimum 24-hour
downtime, medical clearance before returning to duty, and a report of
the event in an electronic system for any Service member involved in a
potentially concussive event. Commanders may waive the minimum 24-hour
downtime for safety and other battlefield considerations. The minimum
recovery period is extended to 7 days following symptoms resolution for
multiple concussions within the past 12 months. When Soldiers redeploy,
medical providers have access to the data reported in the electronic
system, so they know which Soldiers have been involved in potentially
concussive events (regardless of whether the external force resulted in
a concussion diagnosis). TBI screening questions were added to the PDHA
in 2008.
These same health assessments ask about blast exposure and
traumatic brain injury and concussion to permit timely referral for
evaluation and treatment at our TBI services at most of our
installations. All of these conditions may present several months post
deployment.
Hearing loss should be captured during the post-deployment
assessment. Hearing loss and ringing in the ears from exposure to high
levels of noise are frequently identified upon return from combat
deployments. All Soldiers receive a screening hearing evaluation at the
time of their post-deployment medical processing to determine if their
post-deployment hearing status is different than their pre-deployment
status. If a change in hearing is identified, the Soldier is referred
to an audiologist for a detailed diagnostic hearing evaluation,
typically several weeks after the post-deployment hearing check. At
installations, like Ft. Huachuca, where there is no audiologist on the
installation, diagnostic hearing evaluations are referred to off-
installation network providers.
All Soldiers may raise health concerns at any time, not just during
their military health assessments. We are confident in the services we
provide our returning Warfighters, and we are available to review the
specific concerns of the Fort Huachuca Non-Commissioned Officer you
referenced. [See page 36.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
General Odierno. As a foundation to the U.S. Defense Strategy to
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility, the Army must
maintain our global engagements and strong relationships with our Key
Partners, while cultivating new relationships with nations that share
our common values.
Our defense efforts in the Middle East will continue to be aimed at
countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as
upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. Our Strategic
Guidance highlights that the United States places a premium on U.S. and
allied military presence in--and support of--partner nations in and
around the Middle East. As we reset units withdrawn from Iraq and
reduce force structure in Afghanistan, we will maintain both a presence
on the ground in the Middle East and Brigade Combat Teams in our Global
Response Force available to react to near-term conflicts there.
Our rebalance to the Asia Pacific is part of a Whole-of-Government
effort. The military Rebalance focuses on a regional alignment of
forces that applies Army capabilities more efficiently to fulfill
existing, funded requirements and contingency demand.
Our most important focus area in the Pacific is building
partnership capacity to preserve influence and access, an example of
which is our expansive exercise program to include 24 large-scale
exercises in FY14 involving 14 nations in the region. The level and
specificity of this type of engagement is endangered by sequestration.
Key to maintaining the Army's ability to respond to different
regions of the world is the concept of Regionally Aligned Forces. All
Army units train on their Mission Essential Task List (METL) for Full
Spectrum Operations (i.e., offense, defense, counterinsurgency,
stability operations, humanitarian assistance and civil support
operations)--that are applicable to military operations in any region
of the world--as they move through the progressive readiness cycle
known as Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Concurrently, Regionally
Aligned Forces will be trained on the social-economic and cultural
aspects of the region to which they are aligned. If there is a sudden
need to deploy forces to a specific region, the units that are aligned
to that region, and are also in their available year for deployment,
will be the first units that are deployed for that contingency. Other
units that are not aligned to that region may also be deployed to
support as needed. Additionally, ARFORGEN may be flexed to deploy units
sooner (in order to meet an emergent requirement) or later (i.e., to
allow for more region-specific training). [See page 46.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 25, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. Miller. Last March you both testified that you expected to make
a decision on the armed scout program by either the end of FY12, or
beginning of FY13. We know that all the analysis from last year's RFI
and voluntary flight demonstration has been completed for several
months. The delayed decision is negatively impacting industry as they
continue to expend resources refining potential solutions.
What steps are left for you to make an Armed Scout material
decision and when can I expect an announcement on that decision? Is the
decision delayed by budget and requirements considerations? If so, can
the Army inform industry whether your analysis indicates the preferred
course of action is to compete for a new platform?
In March, we received a briefing that focused on the flight
demonstration, but lacked any of the critical study data such as return
on invest and cost benefit analysis. When can the Congress and industry
expect to receive the complete briefing on this program?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has not made a final
decision regarding the armed scout. Results from the voluntary flight
demonstration indicate that no aircraft exists today with integrated
technologies necessary to satisfy AAS requirements. This needed
technology integration and qualification effort will require
significant cost, engineering and manufacturing development in order to
meet threshold capabilities. These threshold capabilities would likely
produce a scout platform whose performance is at best only commensurate
with the performance of attack and cargo platforms currently in
fielding. The goal is to have a defined way ahead by 3rd Qtr FY13. The
business case analysis that includes the return on investment and cost
benefit analysis is in progress but not yet completed. The Army is
preparing an affordability assessment that will impact the business
case analysis. Because the Army must establish budget assumptions prior
to revising the affordability assessment, it would be premature to
release results dealing with the business case or return on investment.
The Army anticipates approving the business case analysis by 4th Qtr
FY13.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. The JTRS HMS program is utilizing a dual
manufacturing strategy which requires two qualified vendors to build
identical open-architecture radios, using only Government-owned
waveforms, during the initial stages of full-rate production. Since
this strategy ensures that competition and flexibility are built into
the HMS program, which maximizes the long-term affordability of the
program and allows the Army to leverage the significant investment it
has already made, does the Army plan to continue with this dual
sourcing manufacturing strategy? If not, why?
Secretary McHugh. The Army strategy is to conduct full and open
competition among all potential industry vendors to award a full rate
production contract using Government-provided performance
specifications. Language in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) directed the Army to conduct full and open competition among all
industry providers. As a result, the Army revised the acquisition
strategy from competing initial full-rate production between the two
qualified vendors to opening it up to all of industry. The acquisition
strategy and request for proposals to comply with the 2013 NDAA are
currently under review in both the Department of the Army and
Department of Defense.
Mr. Loebsack. The FY 2014 budget request for JTRS HMS radios is
significantly less than previous years requests for this program. Given
the stated importance that the Army has placed on network
modernization, what is the reasoning behind this budget request?
Secretary McHugh. The Army made the decision to reduce the number
of Capability Sets fielded in Fiscal Year 2014 and beyond due to
budgetary constraints and availability of forces. The reduction in
requested funding aligns with the Army's plan to field a minimum of
four Capability Set Brigade Combat Teams per year.
Mr. Loebsack. How will the Army leverage the unprecedented
experience within the National Guard and Reserve as well as the cost
effectiveness of the Reserve Components in determining the right force
structure mix? What factors will be considered in determining the
future force structure mix? How specifically will the Army maintain the
Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Prevailing in today's
conflicts requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational
capacity--available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine
deployments. The Army will maintain the Reserve Components as an
Operational Reserve in accordance with the 60-month Army Force
Generation Model, through a structured progression of unit readiness
over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for
operational deployment in support of the combatant commander and other
Army commitments worldwide. Additionally, Reserve Component units are
resourced with additional training days to meet requisite readiness
rates for units that have been allocated or apportioned. Active
Component/Reserve Component Mix (AC/RC Mix) is determined through the
two-phase Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to identify the correct mix
of unit types to provide a balanced and affordable force. TAA results
in a cost informed force, based on Department of Defense priorities,
budgetary constraints, authorized end strength, and senior leader
guidance. Generally, the Active Component possesses those capabilities
best suited for: (1) unpredictable and frequent deployments; (2)
rapidly responding to complex operational events; and, (3) dealing with
unexpected contingencies. Generally, the Reserve Component possesses
those capabilities best suited for: (1) dealing with predictable
deployments; (2) providing Title 10 and Title 32 support to local,
state, and federal authorities; and, (3) providing operation and
strategic depth.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. I am concerned with the Army's request relating to
unmanned systems, both on the procurement side and the research and
development side. As you know, there have been more than 5,000 robots
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003, and by all accounts, these
systems have protected soldiers and saved lives. While I understand
that with the drawing down of action in these two countries, the need
to send these systems may not be as great, but the Army budget request
seems to reflect the idea that we will never need these systems again.
I say this because of the drastic cuts and flatout elimination of many
important aspects of military robotics. What is the Army's plan for
investing in next-generation unmanned systems and for maintaining and
enhancing the systems that have already been purchased?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army's plan for investing
in next generation Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) is to develop programs
of record that address emerging requirements, leverage commercial
technology, and improve cross-Service effectiveness and efficiency
through commonality. Priorities for UGS include protecting the force,
persistently monitoring the environment, lightening the Warfighter's
physical and cognitive workloads, sustaining the force, and
facilitating maneuver. The Army and Marine Corps are developing a joint
requirement for the individual class of UGS, that seeks to provide a
lighter, more capable, and less expensive individual transportable
robot than the recently terminated Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(SUGV). The Army also plans to invest in robotics applique that will
facilitate semi-autonomous operation of ground vehicle platforms and
provide Soldiers with increased standoff from threats.
The Army's plan for maintaining and enhancing the systems that have
already been purchased (over $730 million) includes retaining and
resetting 2,700 of 5,100 fielded unmanned ground systems upon return
from theater. These systems will serve as bridging solutions for
training and contingencies until programs of record systems are
developed and fielded. The Army will divest 2,400 robots that are no
longer sustainable due to obsolescence.
The Army's FY14 President's Budget request includes funding for
unmanned ground systems, which include the Man Transportable Robotic
System (MTRS) Increment II--a vehicle transportable robot; the Advanced
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robotic System (AEODRS)--an individual
transportable Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) robot; and the Route
Clearance Interrogation System (RCIS)--a semi-autonomous applique
capability that provides standoff while interrogating, classifying, and
excavating deep buried explosive hazards.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Last week, your office issued a memo to Members
outlining a change in policy for National Guard and Reserve soldiers
that proposed canceling FY14 deployments in historically Guard-led
missions such as Kosovo, the Sinai, and the Horn of Africa. 1. We all
know that deployments mean readiness and if they can't deploy, their
readiness will atrophy. Given the recent Secretary of Defense's Reserve
Forces Policy Board findings showing the Reserve Component costing one-
third that of the Active Component, please explain your reasoning, and
provide me a detailed costed-out business case, for maintaining an
Operational National Guard and Reserve while at the same time reducing
their historical mission deployments.
Secretary McHugh. The Budget Control Act of 2011 and a shortfall in
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, combined with the need
to ensure the highest readiness of our forces deployed or preparing for
deployment to Afghanistan, forward stationed in Korea, and the Global
Response Force, are forcing the Army to make a number of necessary but
undesirable decisions such as replacing select Reserve Component (RC)
units with Active Component (AC) units. Moreover, as a result of our
ongoing mission analysis, requirement changes and fiscal constraints,
worldwide deployments for 57 AC units have been cancelled this fiscal
year alone, while more are being considered in the future.
Additionally, as Afghanistan transitions to its directed force
management levels, the need to maintain operational flexibility will
produce evolving decisions relative to both AC and RC units. These
decisions will not be based on cost alone and cannot be determined with
a typical business--case analysis. Along with cost we must also
consider capabilities and requirements, which differ among the Active
and Reserve components.
Working closely with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, the
Army identified RC units that will be replaced by AC units to support
operational requirements in Fiscal Year 2014. The Army views these
measures as temporary and will continue to program RC units for
employment where possible under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 12304(b) after this
period of fiscal constraint passes. With respect to the missions in
Kosovo, the Sinai, and Horn of Africia, we estimate we will save $84.8
million by using AC forces.
The Army requires all of its components in order to address its
full range of missions and contingency responsibilities outlined in the
defense strategic guidance and in accordance with Army Total Force
policy. Cost, readiness, responsiveness, and availability are all
essential components in the decision to employ an Army capability to
meet a valid requirement. Generally, AC formations and select RC units
are maintained at a high state of readiness to be available to respond
to war plans and contingencies; most RC elements are available to
respond quickly in the homeland, and select numbers of these RC units
are managed in a progressive readiness model in support of pre-planned
combatant command requirements.
Mr. Garamendi. Secretary McHugh, in your testimony two days ago in
front of the Senate Armed Services Committee you stated that ``because
of the amount of deployments that the Reserve Component has had, their
unemployment rate is very high.'' Where are you getting this
information from and how are you calculating it? When I talk to my
Adjutant General they say their biggest complaint is that there aren't
enough planned deployments and that more would help our National
Guardsmen at home as well as for their operational readiness. Can you
please submit to me your analysis of why you feel deployments hinder
our National Guard and Reserve soldiers?
Secretary McHugh. The National Guard Bureau in 2012 reported the
unemployment rate for the Army National Guard to be greater than 20
percent, much higher than the national average. We must remember that
the Reserve Component (RC) is comprised of citizen-soldiers and we need
to ensure that we don't use them so often that that they cannot
maintain a job. Many of these citizen-soldiers have lost or had to quit
jobs and that is not what we want our RC to have to do, even as an
Operational Reserve.
So, we are working to assist the Reserve Components' civilian
employers, by providing our RC Soldiers with predictable deployment
cycle schedules.
In addition, the Army, in concert with Department of Labor and
Veterans' Affairs, has revamped the transition program to ensure
Soldiers are ``employment ready'' as they leave Active Duty. We are
partnering with trade groups to directly certify skill sets taught in
the military translate into officially recognized employable skills.
Mr. Garamendi. Why would you remove the Army National Guard from
historically Guard-led missions in Kosovo, the Sinai, and the Horn of
Africa, where trust and partnership has already been established? How
do you justify your commitment to the Total Force Policy if you intend
on restricting or eliminating the Army National Guard's rotation in
overseas operations?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Due to the immediate budget
shortfalls in FY13 and FY14 resulting from sequestration and cuts to
Operational Contingency (OCO) and base funding, the Army had to make
some tough choices. The total cost savings in pay and allowances for
all-Active Component sourcing for these 3 missions is estimated at
$84.8 million for FY13 and FY14 combined. Additionally, as Army forces
draw down from Afghanistan there are sufficient Active Component forces
to perform the missions in support of Kosovo, the Sinai and the Horn of
Africa.
While the National Guard has performed in an exemplary manner in
the missions in support of Kosovo, the Sinai and the Horn of Africa,
these missions have not always been sourced by the National Guard. The
Army began using National Guard forces for these missions in 2003 to
meet our global requirements. The historical record shows that for
years the Multinational Observer Force (MFO) mission to Sinai was
performed by 82nd Airborne Division. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission
began as an Active Component mission then transitioned to the Reserve
Components and recently has been split with \2/3\ of the requirements
filled by Active Component units and \1/3\ filled by Reserve Component
Units. The Horn of Africa mission began during the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and has been primarily completed by Reserve Component
forces.
The Army will continue to ensure the highest possible readiness for
Reserve Component Soldiers through the 5-year progressive readiness
model. This model ensures that units achieve combat readiness (i.e.,
trained, manned and equipped) by the 5th year of their cycle. The units
are staggered in the cycles so that the Army always has pool of ready
and available Reserve Units to draw from. The 5-year cycle also
provides the Soldiers (and their families and employers) with
predictability in their deployments.
Mr. Garamendi. With defense budgets shrinking, it's important to
evaluate if our current Active Component and Reserve Component force
mix is appropriate for future engagements. We should ask ourselves if
we need a very large standing Army with our current defense shift
toward PACOM or would a larger, ``pay-as-you-go'' flexible National
Guard allow us to maintain capabilities and continue to meet every
challenge. Has the Army discussed ways that the Army Guard could be
used more to save money and maintain some of your capabilities, since
they train and perform to the same standards, can perform any mission,
and cost \1/3\ of an Active Army soldier? A recent report from the
Reserve Forces Policy Board has concluded that the fully burdened life-
cycle cost of a National Guardsman is less than \1/3\ that of his
Active Duty counterpart. Considering that once National Guardsmen have
concluded their deployment tour and no longer incur expenses such as
dependent housing, schooling, and health care, how do you see this as
an effective long-term cost-savings measure for the Army?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army requires all of its
components in order to address its full range of missions and
contingency responsibilities outlined in the defense strategic guidance
and in accordance with Army Total Force policy. Cost, readiness,
responsiveness, capability, availability and our requirements are all
essential components in the decision to employ an Army capability in
support of the full range of national security needs. Generally, Active
Component formations and select Reserve Component units are maintained
at a high state of readiness to be available to respond to war plans
and contingencies; most Reserve Component elements are available to
respond in the homeland, and are managed in a progressive readiness
model in support of pre-planned combatant command requirements.
Understanding fully-burdened life cycle costs by component is an
important factor in deciding the appropriate component for a mission,
as is readiness, responsiveness, and availability. The Reserve Forces
Policy Board estimate was limited in its scope in that it did not
address institutional overhead such as schools, training facilities,
maintenance, and transportation in preparation for an operational
deployment. Additionally, the life cycle costs for Reserve Components
increases as they are used in an Operational Reserve role and cost
basically the same as the Active Component when mobilized.
Mr. Garamendi. In your budget, you request $321M in MILCON funding
for the Army National Guard, a significant reduction of almost 48% from
FY13 funding. My understanding is that the justification is based on
the Active Army's facility health, which has improved greatly over the
last decade, and the assumption that the Guard is in similarly good
shape. However, over 46% of Army Guard Readiness Centers are 50 years
old and older, and many are not suitable to put soldiers in. The
decrease in facility investment will lead to lasting negative impacts
on the National Guard ability to effectively serving the Nation and
communities during crises. Can you discuss how the Army came to these
decisions to decrease much-needed MILCON funding for the ARNG over the
next several years?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army remains committed to
providing military construction (MILCON) funding to all components in
support of their most urgent facility modernization and
recapitalization requirements. Fiscal constraints resulting from the
2011 Budget Control Act triggered funding reductions in Army investment
accounts, including MILCON. In the face of these across-the-board
reductions, the Army has established a funding allocation among the
components that is proportional to the components footprint and to
component's recapitalization and deficit requirements.
The Budget Control Act across-the-board reductions resulted in a
60% reduction to the Active Component MILCON funding for the FY13 and
FY14 budget years as compared to funding levels in the FY12-16
President's Budget Future years Defense Plan. By comparison, the
National Guard received a 17% reduction in funding. Additionally, as
compared to FY12-16 funding levels, the Active Component went from 82%
of the total FY13 and FY14 MILCON funding to 68% while the National
Guard increased from 12% to 21%.
Mr. Garamendi. What are the details behind your discussion as to
how you came up $7.8 billion short for war funding?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Army has experienced
higher Operation and Maintenance (OMA) Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) costs than initially projected over the course of the fiscal
year. These shortfalls initially approached nearly $10 billion and Army
has worked diligently to reduce the shortfall, which currently stands
at $8.3 billion. Continuous reviews with ARCENT update the status of
requirements as the year progresses. The reason for the increase from
$7.8 billion to $8.3 billion is primarily due to Strategic Lift
requirements internal to the ARCENT Theater of Operations. Components
of the unfunded requirements are:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity Current UFR ($K)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOGCAP $1,483,725
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stock Fund $1,607,835
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Stock Fund $1,498,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In-Theater Maintenance (ITM) $791,675
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsistence for Civilians $145,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Premium Transportation $234,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TACSWACAA $200,558
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
160th Signal BDE $43,973
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second Destination Transportation $1,385,920
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal $7,390,686
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLS ISR BA4 Capability Support $285,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal $7,676,186
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRATLIFT $600,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OMA OCO Total $8,276,186
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of:
6 May 2013
Activity Details.
a. Theater Operations. (LOGCAP, Stock Fund, Non-Stock Fund, In-
Theater Maintenance) Fuel, repair parts, and other supplies for units
continue to be consumed at a high rate, in correlation with Active
combat operations. While USFOR-A has closed a considerable number of
FOBs and COBs; a significant number remains, including the large hubs
in Kabul and Kandahar which account for the majority of the LOGCAP and
local service contract costs.
b. Subsistence and Premium Transportation. Army is responsible to
fund subsistence and the transportation of subsistence items for all
service members, DOD Civilians and Contract personnel in Theater. The
number of civilians and contractors currently in Theater exceeds the
projected PB13 level developed last year.
c. Total Army Communications Southwest Asia, Central Asia
(TACSWACAA)/160th Signal BDE In-Theater Support. These programs provide
a robust strategic communications capability in the Central Command
Area of Responsibility (AOR). 160th Signal BDE In-Theater Support
provides all combat and combat support forces communication
engineering/logistics/security support. TACSWACAA provides the tactical
ability to perform C2, requisition of repair parts/supplies, and
transportation operations in-theater. These programs rely on
contractors to reduce the deployment (potentially a brigade-size
element) of Signal Soldiers.
d. Second Destination Transportation (SDT). While the PAK GLOC is
open, it has yet to achieve its pre-closure rates. 20% of the export
cargo shipped for the month of April flowed along the PAK GLOC. As it
continues to mature, we anticipate approximately 55% of export cargo
will move on it. The remaining export cargo will flow along the other
three routes, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), multimodal and
direct air, which will balance the goals of cost avoidance and risk
reduction by maintaining viable retrograde options. The PAK GLOC is
fragile in terms of opening/closing due to political and military
events. If it is closed again for some reason, or does not achieve the
desired level of throughput the Army will have to increase its use of
the other more expensive routes.
e. Contract Logistics Support (CLS) ISR, PGSS/VADER. Persistent
Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) is a stand-alone tethered aerostat
well-suited for small to medium-sized sites. PGSS provides radar
systems to cue aerostat payloads providing near real-time eyes on
target. PGSS also provides a communications platform for EPLRS/
SINCGARS. Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) allows
accurate Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data and Synthetic
Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery readily available to ground commanders.
The antenna is designed to support multiple missions, including the
capability to detect dismounts and facilitate the exploitation of this
data.
f. Strategic Lift (STRATLIFT). STRATLIFT supports deployment and
redeployment of Soldiers and Equipment to the CENTCOM AOR, including
the intra-theater movement and shipments associated with MRAP shipments
to Theater.
Mr. Garamendi. In your testimony 2 days ago in front of the Senate
Armed Services Committee you stated that the National Guard needs ``Two
years' notice for deployments.'' First, I'm curious from where did you
come up with that number, since my Adjutant General tells me that his
units can be mobilized with no notice and be ready to train? And
moreover, even if your assertion is correct, with the Army Force
Generation model, don't you have a certain percentage of the National
Guard force ready to go in any given year? If this model has worked so
well, why then, are you abandoning it now?
General Odierno. Thirty-nine (39) days a year is the statutory
number of days in a fiscal year for a Guard unit to train and includes
1 weekend per month (24 days on Inactive Duty status) and 15 days of
Annual Training on Active Duty status. In support of operational
deployments, Guard units are given additional pay/training resources to
complete a 5-year rotational model divided into 1-year periods, with
the unit being available for mobilization and deployment in the fifth
year. In the first two years, Guard units have 39 days each year for
training. In the third year, National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
have 48.5 days for training. Other units have 39 days. In the fourth
year, BCTs have 54 to 60 days for training. Other units have 48.5
training days (National Guard) or 45 training days (Army Reserve). In
year 5 the unit is available for mobilization and deployment
(consisting of 270 days deployed and 90 days for leave and
demobilization training). Upon completion of the deployment or
completion of the available year without a deployment, the unit returns
to the Reset phase of their next 5-year cycle.
The progressive readiness model has been effective and efficient to
meet the demands of persistent conflict, while also balancing the needs
of National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers, their employers, and their
families with respect to predictability of training requirements and
deployments. Fiscal restraints and reduction in demand for forces post
OEF will influence the Army's end strength and force structure.
In contrast, Active units in the Train/Ready period can train for
218 days prior to deployment. Because of their higher state of
readiness, Active Component units can be deployed more rapidly than
Reserve Component forces in response to a no notice or short notice
crisis. Reserve Component units require additional time to mobilize,
train, equip, and deploy. Analysis of Contingency Plan requirements
indicates that there are timelines the National Guard/Reserve cannot
meet due to the mobilization process. The Army constantly examines our
force structure to ensure we have the right force properly manned,
trained, and equipped to accomplish the missions outlined in the
Defense Strategic Guidance.
Mr. Garamendi. In your testimony two days ago in front of the
Senate Armed Services Committee you stated that National Guardsmen
train ``39 days a year.'' And that ``Active Component trains over 250
days a year.'' Where are you getting these numbers from and can you
please provide me the documentation that backs up this statement? You
also stated that utilizing more National Guardsmen in place of Active
Component solders would mean ``if you decide to go that way, you're
taking significant risk in being able to respond to unknown
contingencies.'' General, isn't that your job to have these soldiers
ready? Please explain why you would be unable to maintain a ready force
if the Reserve Component is utilized more?
General Odierno. Thirty-nine (39) days a year is the statutory
number of days in a fiscal year for a Guard unit to train and includes
1 weekend per month (24 days on Inactive Duty status) and 15 days of
Annual Training on Active Duty status. In support of operational
deployments, Guard units are given additional pay/training resources to
complete a 5-year rotational model divided into 1-year periods, with
the unit being available for mobilization and deployment in the fifth
year. In the first two years, Guard units have 39 days each year for
training. In the third year, National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
have 48.5 days for training. Other units have 39 days. In the fourth
year, BCTs have 54 to 60 days for training. Other units have 48.5
training days (National Guard) or 45 training days (Army Reserve). In
year 5 the unit is available for mobilization and deployment
(consisting of 270 days deployed and 90 days for leave and
demobilization training). Upon completion of the deployment or
completion of the available year without a deployment, the unit returns
to the Reset phase of their next 5-year cycle.
The progressive readiness model has been effective and efficient to
meet the demands of persistent conflict, while also balancing the needs
of National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers, their employers, and their
families with respect to predictability of training requirements and
deployments. Fiscal restraints and reduction in demand for forces post
OEF will influence the Army's end strength and force structure.
In contrast, Active units in the Train/Ready period can train for
218 days prior to deployment. Because of their higher state of
readiness, Active Component units can be deployed more rapidly than
Reserve Component forces in response to a no notice or short notice
crisis. Reserve Component units require additional time to mobilize,
train, equip, and deploy. Analysis of Contingency Plan requirements
indicates that there are timelines the National Guard/Reserve cannot
meet due to the mobilization process. The Army constantly examines our
force structure to ensure we have the right force properly manned,
trained, and equipped to accomplish the missions outlined in the
Defense Strategic Guidance.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN
Mr. Runyan. The M1 Abrams engine fuel efficiency initiative is one
of the critical upgrades required to extend the life of the tank to
2045. Previously, the Army testified that 60% of the maintenance costs
for the Abrams is related to the engine and transmission, and that by
improving the power train, the Army would achieve 17% improvement in
fuel efficiency. HASC also understands this pending upgrade will
provide $1.6 billion in savings. What is the funding status of this
engine upgrade program?
General Odierno. The Abrams Fuel Efficiency Initiative (FEI) is an
effort that leverages existing improvements in turbine engine and
transmission technology to reduce the amount of fuel consumed. This
initiative will reduce the number of component parts in the powertrain
(engine and transmission) to lower operational and support costs. The
Product Manager for the Abrams Tank is actively supporting an Army
Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) led cost benefit analysis (CBA)
for a more fuel efficient Abrams powertrain. The alternatives being
considered are: Transmission FEI only; Full Turbine Powertrain (engine
& transmission) FEI; GDLS diesel powertrain (for potential Ground
Combat Vehicle (GCV) commonality); BAE Hybrid Electric Diesel (for
potential GCV commonality); L3 1790 Diesel; and the Common Aviation
Turbine program. The CBA is expected to be completed in 4QFY13.
The Abrams FEI initiative is not currently an approved or funded
program, but could become a core Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)
effort in a future Abrams ECP-2 modernization effort. The Army is
keenly aware of the benefits of an Abrams FEI effort and will review
opportunities to pursue an executable FEI program once the ARCIC CBA is
complete.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH
Ms. Duckworth. In the Army's FY2014 request for Procurement
programs, you requested $592.2 million in research and development for
the Ground Combat Vehicle program. Are you concerned about the
programmatic risk we are assuming by essentially letting one contractor
run the timeline for research and development? I as much as any of my
fellow Members on the Committee want our soldiers to have modernized
and effective equipment that is worthy of the best military in the
world, but can you speak to the need of this vehicle that current
assets cannot provide? Do you believe that those functionalities are 1)
attainable and 2) worth the cost and potential program overruns we
might incur? Are the functions of having a higher seating capacity
worth the $24 billion? How do you respond to criticisms that we would
be spending $28 billion (a conservative estimate that assumes all goes
according to plan) on a Ground Combat Vehicle on a major weapons system
that is uncertain to have utility in future conflicts?
Secretary McHugh. 1. The Army understands the programmatic risk
associated with carrying one vendor into the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. However, in light of the current
fiscal environment and after a careful assessment, the Army believes
the cost to carry a second vendor at approximately $2.5B into the EMD
phase would not, with any degree of certainty, yield a corresponding
significant programmatic savings or risk reduction. We believe, based
on the use of mature technologies and the progress made in the
Technology Development (TD) phase, that the current strategy is low-
moderate risk and achievable.
2. Current vehicles do not provide the necessary combination of
force protection, lethality, mobility, and growth potential to pace
future threats in both the Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area
Security (WAS) environments. Ten years of adapting the current Infantry
Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to an ever-changing threat has quickly reduced
the space available on the IFV to adjust to future threats. The Ground
Combat Vehicle (GCV) will allow us to protect our Soldiers to the
anticipated level of threat, as well as have the potential to grow
capabilities (protection, lethality, network, etc . . . ) in the
future. In Operation Iraqi Freedom the IFV was particularly vulnerable
to IEDs, continually putting the mounted infantry squad at high risk.
Making the IFV more survivable against IEDs resulted in an IFV that is
still under-protected, under powered, and challenged to house the full
suite of network equipment required to leverage our communications
technology advantages over the enemy.
3. The functionalities are both attainable and worth the
investment. The GCV program is based on the use of mature technologies
to mitigate the risk of potential program overruns. The requirements,
as laid out in the current Draft Capabilities Development Document
(CDD), are achievable. Supporting technologies such as armor,
propulsion systems (engine and transmissions), and weapons are mature
and ready to enter the EMD phase. Our focus will continue to be on
integrating key components and subsystems. In fact, during the TD phase
the Army adjusted the requirements to reduce technology-related risks
and better align with achievable technologies and reduce unit cost. The
Army will continue to use an Independent Review Team for identifying
technology risks and to adjust the appropriate requirements as
necessary.
4. The $24 billion purchases protection, lethality, adaptability,
mobility, and space, weight, power & cooling (SWaP-C). Adequate
protection and the ability to adapt that protection cause the need for
a new hull; the current hull is unable to provide both the protection
and adaptability. In designing a new hull, the Army addressed Manpower
and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) considerations to inform a new
hull design, one of which was squad integrity. The ability to carry the
entire squad increased mission effectiveness and reduced casualties
because it enabled squad deployment with unit integrity, providing
immediate, coherent combat power on the ground. The added cost of
increasing seating capacity is estimated at $200 thousand per vehicle,
or approximately $375 million for the 1,874 vehicles. Approximately
$375 million is the cost of adding the additional seating capacity of
two Soldiers and gaining squad integrity.
5. The GCV investment provides the Army a combination of increased
force protection, lethality, mobility and growth potential to defeat
threats in both the CAM and WAS environments. The Army must equip its
forces across the range of military operations to ensure that it can
deter and defeat future threats. The Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
is the tactical force element that is designed purposefully to defeat
those state adversary capabilities that could threaten allies,
proliferate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or hold vital interests
at risk. The GCV closes the gaps of the current IFV. The GCV is
designed to be effective in both CAM and WAS to include being adaptable
to the uncertainty of future conflict requirements. The IFV mission is
a critical piece of the Army role to counter WMD, to project power
despite Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD), and to defeat and deter
aggression.
Ms. Duckworth. Last week, your office issued a concerning memo to
Members of Congress advising us of a change in policy regarding
deployments of Army National Guard and the Army Reserve where you
propose canceling some or all future deployments for the Army National
Guard beginning in FY14. The memo stated that cost savings was one of
the reasons for this drastic and seemingly counterintuitive change. I
as much as anybody want to make sure we are spending less, not more;
and smarter. How much do you estimate would be saved by replacing
Guardsmen with Active Duty personnel on overseas deployments? Have you
factored into account the long-term costs Active Duty personnel would
have, rather than the short-term savings for FY14? A recent report from
The Reserve Forces Policy Board found that the life-cycle cost of one
National Guardsman is less than one third that of his Active Duty
counterpart. Considering that guardsmen train and perform to the same
standards; can perform any mission as activity duty; and no longer
incur expenses such as dependent housing, schooling, and health care
once they complete their deployment, how do you see this as an
effective long-term cost-savings measure for the Army? Why would you
remove the Army National Guard from historically Guard-led missions in
Kosovo, the Sinai, and the Horn of Africa, where trust and partnership
have already been established? Would removing the Army National Guard
from overseas deployments cause a significant drop in the high levels
of readiness that the Guard has attained through over a decade of
overseas operations? Wouldn't this drop in readiness incur additional
long-term costs in order to return to readiness levels sufficient for
future threats? How do you justify your commitment to the Total Force
Policy if you intend on restricting or eliminating the Army National
Guard's rotation in overseas operations?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. In FY13, the Army still faces
a more than $13 billion Operation and Maintenance account shortfall.
This includes the $5.5 billion reduction due to sequestration and an
$8.3 billion shortfall in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) account. The emergency
reprogramming action being considered by Congress would restore $5
billion of the $8.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall. However, without any
additional transfer authority or supplemental, the Army would be forced
to fund the remaining $3.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall from its already
reduced Base OMA account. We need to save money and find every dollar
we can. This has also forced us to make some tough choices, and the
decision to change the sourcing for the Kosovo, Sinai, and Horn of
Africa missions from Reserve Component to Active Component (AC) units
is one of those decisions. We estimate it will allow us to save $84.8
million dollars. It is important to note that RC units are not alone in
being impacted by the current fiscal environment. The fiscal
constraints, combined with ongoing mission analysis and requirement
changes, have resulted in the cancellation of worldwide deployments for
57 AC units this fiscal year alone, and more are being considered in
the future.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Mr. Palazzo. Last week it came to my attention that the Army is
taking away some Guard missions under the guise of cost savings.
According to a memo released last week, beginning in FY14 the Army will
substitute Active Component Units for Reserve Components where cost
savings are possible. My biggest concern is that taking away these
Guard deployments will marginalize the force and potentially take it
back to pre-9/11 Strategic Reserve status. Congress has put a
tremendous amount of effort and tens of billions of dollars into making
the Army National Guard an operational force over a decade of conflict.
I am all for cutting the budget and doing it smartly, but gentlemen
this is just another step too far. If the point is to save money, it
should be noted that a National Guard member costs about one-third of
his Active Duty counterpart, and nearly $2.6 billion could be saved for
every 10,000 positions shifted from the full-time AC to the part-time
Guard. It's time to relook at the savings that can be found in
rebalancing the force.
This proposal is counter to the Army's promise of keeping the Guard
and Reserve operational and represents what amounts to a reduction in
mission for the National Guard. The Army National Guard of 2013 is the
best-manned, best-trained, best-equipped, and most experienced force in
its long history. Ceasing overseas deployments of National Guard troops
will cause a domino effect ultimately resulting in a diminishment of
the great investment Congress has made in the Guard over the last
decade.
If you have anything to add about this issue, I welcome your
thoughts.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. In FY13, the Army faces the
combined effects of a sequestered budget and an increase in theater
demand. These two have put a $13 billion pressure on the Army's
Operation and Maintenance accounts. This includes the $4.6 billion
Operation and Maintenance Army (OMA) reduction due to sequestration and
an $8.3 billion theater activities level higher than the FY13
President's Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request. The
emergency reprogramming action being considered by Congress would
restore $5 billion of the $8.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall. However,
without any additional transfer authority or supplemental, the Army
would be forced to fund the remaining $3.3 billion OCO OMA shortfall
from its already reduced base OMA account. We need to save money and
find every dollar we can. This has forced us to make some tough
choices, and the decision to change the sourcing for the Kosovo, Sinai,
and Horn of Africa missions from Reserve Component to Active Component
units is one of those decisions. We estimate it will allow us to save
$84.8 million across FY13 and FY14. It is important to note that RC
units are not alone in being impacted by the current fiscal
environment. The fiscal constraints, combined with ongoing mission
analysis and requirement changes, have resulted in the cancellation of
worldwide deployments for 57 AC units this fiscal year alone, and more
are being considered in the future.
Understanding fully-burdened life cycle costs by component is an
important factor in deciding the appropriate component for a mission,
as is readiness, responsiveness, and availability. The Armed Forces
Policy Board estimate was limited in its scope in that it did not
address institutional overhead such as schools, training facilities,
maintenance, and transportation in preparation for an operational
deployment. Additionally, the life cycle costs for Reserve Components
increases as they are used in an Operational Reserve role and cost
basically the same as the Active Component when mobilized.
The Army will continue to train, man and equip the RC through the
progressive readiness model for preplanned missions. The RC provides
unique capabilities to meet geographic combatant command requirements;
currently we have over 39K deployed worldwide.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. As I understand the Budget Request, our Army has a
substantial problem of underfunded Operations and Maintenance accounts,
which has forced you to make hard decisions. As a general statement,
the O&M problem is forcing you to use your Procurement Accounts as a
bill payer to cover the O&M shortfall.
Given this O&M challenge, would you agree that when this Committee
considers decisions for the FY14 bill, we can help you best by
carefully considering the O&M impacts on the Army?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Committee can best help
the Army by carefully considering the O&M budget submission and help us
buy back the readiness we will lose due to the impacts of sequestration
in FY13. The Army will outline the buyback of readiness in the Notice
to Congress on Unfunded Priorities (Section 1003 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013).
Mrs. Roby. The National Guard continues to benefit greatly from the
multimission capability of the Lakota helicopter. Its versatility, low
cost of maintenance, and reliability continue to greatly assist the
National Guard in their role of supporting civil authorities with a
wide range of missions. Moreover, the increasing need for helicopters
to assist the Border Patrol and State law enforcement agencies in
keeping our borders safe is a crucial component of any immigration
reform.
As the Army continues to look for the Guard as more of an
Operational versus a Strategic Reserve, are we ensuring that NORTHCOM
is proactively working with the TAGS to leverage National Guard
aviation units' unique ability to work with Federal and State
authorities in providing critical rotary-wing capacity for border
security?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The United States Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security are working
hand-in-hand with the National Guard Bureau to ensure that their
mission requirements are resourced adequately. The current employment
of the 11 UH-72A Lakotas on the southern border to help reinforce the
Customs and Border Protection's Office of Air and Marine fleet of
nearly 300 aircraft is just one of many examples. While the UH-72A is a
very capable aircraft in a permissive environment like the border
mission, it is only one of many aircraft the National Guard has at its
disposal to execute that particular mission.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
Mr. Bridenstine. I am interested in the Regionally Aligned Brigade
concept. I think language and cultural training will makes our general
purpose forces more effective. How will this concept work in practice?
Will a brigade assigned to, say, Africa Command remain tied to that
COCOM? How will sequestration impact the deployment of Regionally
Aligned Brigades?
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. The Regionally Aligned Forces
(RAF) concept is an organizing principle for the provision of Army
forces to the geographic and functional Combatant Commands (CCMDs). RAF
are drawn from the Army Total Force, which includes the Active Army,
Army National Guard and Army Reserve components. Regional alignment of
the Army Total Force enables the Army to support the CCMD with more
versatility, greater responsiveness, consistent availability and
focused commitment. As part of the concept, Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
will be allocated to CCMDs in support of all Theater Campaign Plan
requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and
multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation
activities. Most forces are based in CONUS but aligned to CCMDs for
planning, coordination, and engagement.
Army Forces will achieve a baseline of training that focuses on
combined arms maneuver and wide area security, while developing the
language, regional expertise and cultural training necessary to support
CCMD-directed requirements. Through active engagement in various
missions and activities, ranging from ongoing operations and exercises
to small-scale security cooperation activities, soldiers and units will
build their individual and institutional knowledge of the culture and
potential operating environment. This will energize our leaders and
soldiers, facilitate an expeditionary mindset, and better prepare them
for future operations should the need to respond to conflict arise.
Habitual alignment will occur at Echelon above Brigade (Corps and
Division level); although full implementation of habitual alignment
will not be possible before FY17. While it is highly desirable to
maintain habitual alignment at BCT level, the practicalities of current
defense missions and the mix of BCT capabilities makes this a goal that
may not be fully met.
The cost to implement the RAF concept will be drawn entirely from
the current Army O&M budget. While RAF implementation is viable under
sequestration, the ability for the concept to reach full potential in
supporting CCMD requirements will be delayed across additional budget
years. This is mainly due to decreased funding for CCMD programs,
exercises, Department of State (DOS) Title 22 programs, and decisive
action training for units in FY13. Regional alignment does not create
new, unfunded requirements for training, equipping, or employing the
Army Force, nor does it create new programs for overseas employment. It
better organizes and prepares the Army to fulfill existing, funded
requirements.
Mr. Bridenstine. The Paladin Integrated Management system will be
built in my home state of Oklahoma at Fort Sill. Can you talk about the
status of testing and evaluation? Please describe why PIM is so
important to the warfighter.
Secretary McHugh and General Odierno. Testing and evaluation of the
Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) system remains on schedule. The
system has fired over 5,000 test rounds, been driven over 7,000 miles,
and is meeting the program requirements. A Limited User Test of six
days of Operational Testing was successfully completed in November
2012. Soldier feedback on system performance has been favorable. PIM's
new chassis provides additional size, weight, and power capacity to
support add-on armor for improved force protection and the ability to
accommodate current and future Army network requirements. PIM shares a
common power train with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle enabling this
system to maneuver with the Armored Brigade Combat Team combat
vehicles, while reducing the logistical footprint. The Army's current
self-propelled howitzer, the M109A6 Paladin, does not provide
sufficient force protection for Soldiers on today's battlefield and
cannot support key technology integration such as the Network and the
Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station. Without the PIM program, the
Army would be required to maintain the current M109A6 howitzers with
chassis built in the 1960s that are 12,750 pounds over the design
specifications. Additionally, the engines have already been overhauled
2-3 times each and the M109A6 has no ability to stay with the Abrams
and Bradley in mobile warfare.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI
Mrs. Walorski. Last year sixteen Adjutants General requested
funding to modernize the aging HMMWV fleet. Over 60% of our vehicle
inventory is more than 20 years old, rendering them unable to
accommodate the necessary enhancements through the RECAP process that
result in the payload, power, fuel efficiency and systems required to
meet the missions of tomorrow. In the recently approved FY2013
Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and
Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, a $100 million fund to begin a
multiyear program to modernize our rapidly aging HMMWV fleet was
approved. What are your plans relative to this issue, and what priority
do you attach to it relative to your modernization programs?
General Odierno. The Army supports the use of the $100M to continue
the highly successful Recapitalization (RECAP) program at Red River
Army Depot while divesting excess High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs). The Army considers this program the most cost
effective means to improve overall readiness, but is placing less
priority on RECAP and more emphasis on divestiture. The Army HMMWV
inventory on hand (149K) exceeds both current (134K) and projected
Light Tactical Vehicles requirements (all projected to be significantly
lower than 134K). Army data shows that the Light Tactical fleet for the
Army National Guard (ARNG) will be 7.9 years old after they divest
their excess HMMWVs which account for the majority of the vehicles over
20 years old. The ARNG supports the Army's equipment modernization
strategy to modernize Light Tactical Vehicles by recapitalizing
existing Up-Armor HMMWVs. During the RECAP process, HMMWVs are
disassembled, rebuilt with parts support from AM General, and returned
to units in the latest configuration with ``zero miles, zero hours.''
The Army's current approved requirement to procure new vehicles is the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and we have prioritized our resources to
provide this much needed capability.
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