[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-35]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING
ON
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. NAVAL AND U.S.
AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 24, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 24, 2013, Oversight of U.S. Naval and U.S. Air
Force Acquisition Programs in the Fiscal Year 2014 National
Defense Authorization Budget Request........................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 24, 2013........................................ 45
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2013
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. NAVAL AND U.S. AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS IN THE
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 3
WITNESSES
Allardice, Lt Gen Robert R., USAF, Air Mobility Command Vice
Commander (AMC/CV), U.S. Air Force; and Lt Gen Charles R.
Davis, USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force............... 7
Stackley, Hon. Sean, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition; VADM Allen G. Myers,
USN, Deputy Chief Naval Operations for Integration of
Capabilities and Resources (N8), U.S. Navy; and LtGen Richard
P. Mills, USMC, Deputy Commander for Combat Development and
Integration, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, U.S.
Marine Corps................................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Allardice, Lt Gen Robert R................................... 79
Davis, Lt Gen Charles R...................................... 94
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 49
Stackley, Hon. Sean, joint with VADM Allen G. Myers and LtGen
Richard P. Mills........................................... 52
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Data Tables from Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range
Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2014, Submitted by Hon. Sean Stackley...................... 109
Estimates of Annual Shipbuilding Costs Under the Navy's 2013
Plan, by the Congressional Budget Office................... 115
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 119
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 122
Mr. Langevin................................................. 120
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 125
Mr. Langevin................................................. 125
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. NAVAL AND U.S. AIR FORCE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS IN THE
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 24, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. First of all, I want to welcome all of our
members and our distinguished panel of experts to today's
hearing that will focus on the Administration's fiscal year
2014 budget request. In the decade ahead, I believe we will
increasingly lean on our seapower and projection forces to
underpin our national security strategy.
Our naval forces are deployed around the world, protecting
the world's sea lanes and operating forward to deter conflict.
Our projection forces are uniquely ready to support a wide
range of mobility, strike, and strategic deterrence missions
around the globe.
While I am pleased at the capabilities provided by our
forces today, the long-term outlook of our defense posture is
being challenged. Naval forces embarked on carrier strike
groups and amphibious readiness groups routinely deploy 7 to 8
months.
Because of the Navy's sustained surge, our nuclear aircraft
carriers are depleting their nuclear reactor propulsion units
at accelerating rates. Our bomber fleet averages 37 years old,
and our venerable tanker fleet averages an even older 48 years.
While we are meeting the minimal requirements of our ever-
retreating national strategy, it is painfully obvious that our
future readiness is being leveraged to pay for our current
requirements.
The most recent example of the Administration's direction
is the 30-year shipbuilding plan that was partially submitted
on Monday. The Administration, once again, proposes the early
retirement of seven cruisers and two amphibious ships in fiscal
year 2015, well before the end of their service lives.
With 31 ships being retired over just the next 2 years, we
are headed towards a fleet size of 270 battle force ships by
fiscal year 2015. Decline is a choice, and I believe this new
plan willingly chooses to continue the slow, painful decline of
robust American seapower.
The plan also includes a significant increase to the
overall ship construction budget to accommodate the Ohio class
ballistic missile submarine replacement. At over $5 billion,
these strategic investments in our nuclear triad are essential.
Our main concern, that during the procurement and
construction of the Ohio class replacement, the shipbuilding
budget will demand an average of $19 billion per year. To fund
both this new boat and the battle force it will take, either a
substantial increase in the shipbuilding account or an effort
to fund the Ohio class replacement from outside this account.
I look forward to continuing to work with the Department of
the Navy to address this funding shortfall. During the Navy
Posture Hearing earlier this month, military leaders indicated
that they were pleased at the investment in the ship
construction accounts and highlighted the dearth of ships in
construction when they took office.
To arrest this decline, this Administration embraced the
plan that includes an aggressive strategy to build a moderately
capable surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship, that
adds over 50 ships over the term of the plan. But
unfortunately, the mission modules that are integral to support
this 20-year seaframe are still in research and development,
complicating the Navy's ability to respond to basic mine
countermeasures missions and antisubmarine missions.
Just as the fleet is shrinking from the retirement and
procurement of less major surface combatants and amphibious
ships, we are filling these shortfalls with smaller surface
combatants and support vessels.
We need to take steps to arrest the decline of our battle
force fleet. As to the Air Force projection forces, I am
pleased that we may be initiating the semblance of a credible
recapitalization plan.
With the support of an investment in the KC-46 Tanker
Program and strategic emphasis on the Long Range Strike Bomber,
I believe that the Air Force is on the right path with the
right platforms for our Nation's future.
I look forward to supporting these continued investments in
our mobility and projection forces capabilities.
As to the Marine Corps, I understand the amphibious combat
vehicle is the Marine Corps' top priority for ground force
modernization, and the Marines have completed the required
analysis of
alternatives.
We need to get this program right for the future of the
Marine Corps, and I look forward to receiving an update on this
critical program. I would be remiss if I also did not recognize
the Navy in providing a credible long-term acquisition strategy
that uses block buy on multiyear procurements to secure steep
reductions in overall Naval pricing.
Not only is this a good strategy for our Nation's
taxpayers, it provides the long-term surety to our industrial
base, that will allow them to make critical investments for
their long-term health.
My friends, we are at a strategic inflexion point in terms
of our defense policy. Concurrent with the new strategy being
contemplated by this Administration, my fear is that the
overall capabilities of our military will continue to atrophy,
and our inability to be able to operate forward and project
power, will embolden regional instability.
In the end, future defense reductions will be paid for in
the lives of our service members. I refuse to accept this
premise and will do everything in my power to arrest further
decline from modernizing and growing our capabilities.
Joining us today to discuss the fiscal year 2014 budget
request, are five distinguished and patriot gentlemen.
The Honorable Sean Stackley, United States Navy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition.
Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers, U.S. Navy. He is the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Integration Capabilities and
Resources.
We have Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills, U.S. Marine
Corps Deputy Commander for Combat Development and Integration.
We also have Lieutenant General Charles Davis. He is the
Military Assistant of the Air Force for Acquisition.
And, Lieutenant General Robert R. Allardice, Vice Commander
of the Air Mobility Command.
General, we thank you all for being here, and one thing I
would like to emphasis at the beginning is, I understand two of
you are going to make actual opening comments and then respond
to
questions.
This is probably, if not the most bipartisan committee, it
is probably one of the most bipartisan committees in Congress.
We share a common goal in making sure that we are reaching the
desired strength that we have for our military. We appreciate
all of your Services here.
There is no attempt to embarrass any of you with any
questions. We understand you are speaking for the Department in
your respective Services, but it is also our goal to try to
make sure we are asking the tough questions, so we are putting
all the facts on the table and moving forward with the kind of
oversight we need.
Our members will try to do that today, but in the end, I
want to make sure I am going to give each of you an
opportunity. If you have left anything out or felt you need to
change anything or you need additional time, I am going to give
it to you, so that you can make sure you get that on the
record.
And with that, I want to recognize now my good friend and
ranking member, Mike McIntyre, from North Carolina, with any
remarks he might have.
Mike?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to all of
you for your service to our country, and thanks to your
families for their sacrifice in the great work that you do.
We know this is a critical time for both the Department of
the Navy and the Department of the Air Force, and with the
combination of prior cuts and implementation of sequestration,
the Navy and Air Force are being forced to make tough
decisions.
For the Navy, the budget request, $14.1 billion for
shipbuilding for eight new construction battle force ships. I
was pleased to see the Navy was able to include a second
Virginia class submarine in the budget request because we know
maintaining a 2-ship buy per year Virginia class submarines is
an important part of the Navy's effort to mitigate the
submarine shortfall that is predicted in the coming years.
It is our understanding that the Navy is still trying to
decide whether the next multiyear procurement for destroyers
will be a 9-ship or 10-ship buy due to the impacts of
sequestration. We need to hear from the witnesses as to how
this subcommittee could be of assistance in obtaining that
additional ship.
For the Marine Corps, I know that the development and
fielding of a new amphibious combat vehicle is one of its top
priorities, and this budget includes $137 million towards that
effort.
Our subcommittee will be interested in hearing how the
Marine Corps plans to field this important capability while
also avoiding the cost growth that led to the cancellation of
the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.
This budget continues the development of two high-priority
initiatives for the Air Force, the new Long Range Strike Bomber
and the new aerial refueling tank or aircraft. The current age,
the average age of the bomber fleet being 37, and the average
age of the current tanker fleet being 48, we know it is
critical that these platforms deliver on-time, and also, in an
affordable manner.
We are concerned very much about sequestration. We
certainly hope that the witnesses can explain how these cuts
are affecting your respective Services so that our subcommittee
can understand the short-term and the long-term impacts, and
how we can be of the absolute help we want to be to the Navy,
to the Marine Corps and to the Air Force.
God bless all of you all for your commitment and sacrifice,
and thank you for being with us today.
Mr. Forbes. Mike, thank you for those comments, and Mr.
Secretary, I think you are going to lead off for us, and again,
we thank you and your office for your responsiveness to this
committee and you have done great work in trying to get us the
questions we have asked. We appreciate that cooperation, and we
look forward to your remarks this morning.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION; VADM ALLEN G.
MYERS, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF
CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES (N8), U.S. NAVY; AND LTGEN RICHARD
P. MILLS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND
INTEGRATION, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
Secretary Stackley. Thank you, sir. Chairman Forbes,
Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, could you use that mike closer
to your mouth. They can be a little sensitive sometimes.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today, to address the Department of the
Navy acquisition programs and, with the permission of the
subcommittee, I propose to provide a brief statement and submit
a separate formal statement for the record.
Your Navy and Marine Corps team is this Nation's
expeditionary force in readiness, a balanced naval, air, and
ground force forward-deployed, forward-engaged, on the ground
in Afghanistan; performing maritime security along the world's
vital sea lanes; missile defense in Mediterranean and Sea of
Japan; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance where
needed, as needed; persistence of presence at sea with an
embarked Marine force ready to move ashore.
They're conducting antipiracy patrols, global partnership
stations, humanitarian assistance in a quietly, reliably on
patrol providing strategic deterrence, and all the while,
training for the next deployment, the next operation, the next
crisis, the next contingency.
The Department of the Navy's 2014 budget request provides
the resources needed to meet this full range of missions, and
it provides the investment required to execute tomorrow's
mission against the future threat.
But before discussing the 2014 budget request, it is
important to mark where we are in 2013. The 2013 budget request
reshaped our shipbuilding, aviation, and tactical vehicle plans
to reflect the priorities of the new defense strategy.
And Congress strongly supported that request. In fact,
funding was increased for additional ships and aircraft, as
well as for operations and modernization of the in-service
fleet. Too, the Authorization Act provided multiyear authority
for submarines, destroyers, and MV-22 [Osprey tiltrotor]
aircraft and, with that, stability for the industrial base and
near $5 billion in savings for the taxpayer.
However, sequestration more than offset these gains, and we
are about $11 billion out of balance across operations,
maintenance and investment. And given the method of applying
sequestration and our limited ability to reprogram funds to
resolve fiscal year 2013 issues, we need to identify
workarounds to each line of the budget in order to execute the
planned program as best as possible.
In the end, there will be impacts. Reductions to operations
and maintenance funding is directly impacting our near-term
forward presence and our depot maintenance and training, which
will affect future operational rotations, and the readiness of
our nondeployed forces will be reduced.
In our investment accounts which provide for future
readiness, we are weighing alternatives to mitigate quantity
reductions, scheduled delays and the cost impacts due to each
of our ship, aircraft, and weapons systems programs.
We will work with your staff as these details unfold,
particularly as they affect the 2014 budget deliberations.
The 2014 budget request balances capability and readiness
in support of the defense strategy while maintaining focus on
affordability and the industrial base. Our shipbuilding program
is stable as we continue to build towards a 300-ship force as
defined by the Navy's force structure assessment.
Submarine, destroyer, Littoral Combat Ship, and mobile
landing platform construction performance is strong, and these
program savings have been reinvested to uphold our shipbuilding
rates despite downward pressure on the budget.
In fact, we increased construction in the near term, with
the addition of a second Virginia class submarine in 2014
towards that program's 10-built multiyear, and we will work
closely with your subcommittee to determine how to best
overcome the impact of sequestration to likewise award the
additional tenth DDG 51 [Arleigh Burke class guided missile
destroyer] as part of that program's multiyear.
Two years ago, we reported cost growth on the lead ship of
the Ford class aircraft carrier program, stemming from
development of new systems and delays in design and material,
all impacting
production.
Our efforts to improve on this performance has stemmed cost
growth on the lead ship but not reversed it. Accordingly, we
are requesting cost cap relief and funding to complete CVN 78
[USS Gerald R. Ford supercarrier] in accordance with our
previously reported estimate.
We are attacking these issues on the next carrier, CVN 79
[Ford class supercarrier USS John F. Kennedy] and are working
with the shipbuilder to replan materiel ordering, work flow on
fellow ships, and needed facility improvements in order to
reduce costs of our future carriers.
Performance in amphibious ship construction is much
improved. LHA 6 [Landing Helicopter Assault] lessons are
rolling into LHA 7 construction, and the recently delivered LPD
23 [amphibious transport dock ship] and LPD 24 are entering the
fleet at high levels of quality and completion, and we look for
this trend to continue as we complete the remaining ships in
that class.
Looking ahead, we are conducting design studies and
analysis of alternatives for future amphibious and auxiliary
ships. LHA 8, the future LX(R) to replace the LSD [Landing
Ship, Dock] 41/49 class and the future oiler T-AO(X), as we
consider the workload at our shipyards and the vendor base, it
is critical that we press forward with these ships' design in
order to find opportunities to pool work forward affordably as
necessary to sustain this critical sector of our industrial
base.
I would like to briefly address the Ohio replacement
program. Requirements are stable and development and early
design are on schedule to support procurement in 2021.
Affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding program during the
period of the SSBN construction remains a priority however.
And while design for affordability is a central tenet of
our Ohio replacement strategy, meeting our cost objectives will
not alone bring our shipbuilding, topline, within reach during
that program.
Like our shipbuilding program, the stability in aviation
programs is provided by mature programs being procured under
multiyear contracts, the Super Hornet, the MH-60 helicopter,
and the MV-22 Osprey. To this list, we are requesting authority
for multiyear procurement of the E-2D [Advanced Hawkeye early
warning and control] aircraft commencing in 2014.
When the leading edge of modernization of our maritime
patrol fleet, our ability to leverage commercial production of
the 737 aircraft for the P-8A [Poseidon multimission maritime
aircraft] has reduced costs and risks for this aircraft which
is preparing for its first deployment later this year.
Likewise, the Navy's MQ-4 Triton aircraft, which is making
progress towards its first flight later this spring, leverages
Global Hawk development to provide high-altitude, long-
endurance unmanned capability to complement the P-8A.
The third leg of our balanced new war ground force, Marine
Corps tactical vehicles, is at the front-end of much needed
recapitalization. We brief this committee on our strategy to
replace the HMMWV [High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle]
with a more capable, survivable, joint, light, tactical vehicle
being procured jointly with the Army.
And with the termination of the expeditionary fighting
vehicle, to replace the aging amphibious assault vehicle, with
a more capable, more survivable, amphibious combat vehicle that
meets thresholds set for affordability.
The JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] program remains on
track with the 2014 budget request, continuing development and
support of procurement commencing in 2015.
We are continuing to review, with the Army, the impacts of
sequestration on that schedule and we will advise the results
upon completion of this review.
The amphibious combat vehicle is as the commandant stated
in testimony, top Marine Corps priority. In order to ensure we
get this right, we are conducting a combined requirements
definition feasibility study spanning the best of Government
and industry requirements, design and cost experts.
Our intent is to bring the best talent and best information
together to build on the tremendous body of knowledge we
possess across all of our vehicle programs and determine how to
deliver the capability needed by the Marine Corps with high
confidence and the affordability of the defined requirements.
We have engaged your staff on the front end of this process
and will remain engaged as we press to future milestone
decisions.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley,
Admiral Myers, and General Mills can be found in the Appendix
on page 52.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
And General, I understand that you are going to make our
other presentation, and we appreciate your service to our
country, and thank you for taking time to help us this morning,
and I turn the floor over to you.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN ROBERT R. ALLARDICE, USAF, AIR MOBILITY
COMMAND VICE COMMANDER (AMC/CV), U.S. AIR FORCE; AND LT GEN
CHARLES R. DAVIS, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR
FORCE
General Allardice. Thank you. Chairman Forbes, Ranking
Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
with your permission, sir, I will make some brief opening
comments and ask that our full written statements be placed in
the record.
Sir, thank you for your steadfast support of our airmen as
they go about the Nation's work around the world. General Davis
and I are honored to be joined today by the distinguished
members of this panel.
We recognize that we are at our finest when we operate as a
true joint team and our willingness to work together towards
solutions to future challenges is absolutely critical.
It is humbling to be here representing the 134,000 airmen
from the Active Duty, Air Force Reserve and the Air National
Guard today. Included in that number is nearly 10,000 dedicated
civilians without whom we could not accomplish our mission.
When combined with the commercial industry and industry
partners, these teams round out our national air transportation
capability. We are grateful for the support that this committee
provides our entire team as we execute our global mission every
day.
The remarkable thing about our air mobility forces, our
fellow citizens don't often hear about what they do. We go
about quietly accomplishing our mission behind the scenes
without the Nation understanding how dependent they are on
rapid power projection.
Rapid global ability gives us strategic options that no
other nation in the world enjoys today. We have seen this play
out time and again across the full spectrum of operations from
humanitarian to combat.
Our fellow U.S. citizens in the Northeast saw this in play
last fall when a total force team transported utility trucks
from California to an Air Reserve base outside of Boston, where
they were desperately needed in the aftermath of the Superstorm
Sandy.
Halfway around the world, the continuous bomber presence in
the Pacific, which has proven invaluable in expressing this
Nation's will is impossible to happen without the support of
the air refueling capability that your mobility airmen provide.
We work very closely with our combatant command, the United
States Transportation Command to ensure that we are ready to
provide forces that meet geographic combatant commander
requirements.
Although we inform how those requirements are derived, we
ultimately don't establish them. The fiscal year 2013 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] directed a mobility
capabilities and requirement study, and we fully support that
endeavor.
We support the President's fiscal year 2014 budget request.
This budget fully funds the Air Force's number 1 acquisition
program, the KC-46A. We are excited about the future of this
program as it remains on time and on budget.
This summer when the assembly of the first aircraft is
scheduled to begin, we will be another step along the path
replacing the
KC-135 [Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft] fleet which you
have indicated, Mr. Chairman, as 54 years old at this time.
The fiscal year 2014 request includes funding for the final
11 kits to convert our C-5A [Galaxy strategic airlifter] into
modern C-5Ms [Super Galaxy], resulting in a final fleet of 52
C-5Ms. The 10
C-5Ms we currently have supporting our global engagement are
performing absolutely magnificently, and they are a true force
multiplier.
We also to continue to recapitalize the C-130 [Hercules
tactical airlifter] fleet, funding six additional C-130Js, and
perhaps, most importantly, the fiscal year 2014 request
provides a path forward to the readiness challenges we are
facing as we absorb sequestration into our fiscal year 2013
flying hours and weapons systems sustainment.
Our airmen have responded to sequestration, as they always
do, with dedication and innovation. We are doing some of the
easy commonsense things like giving back Blackberries and
turning in staff cars.
We are also having to cut our own staffs, and now we are
getting down to the absolute bone of readiness and
sustainability.
Last year at this time, we were before you with a request
to significantly adjust our force structure. We wanted to thank
the committee for your willingness to work with the Air Force,
and believe, that the total force proposal included in the
fiscal year 2013 NDAA showed our willingness to listen to every
stakeholder in the air mobility family.
We know these changes aren't just something we talk about
here. They affect communities that support our airmen, and they
affect our airmen themselves.
Although today's focus will be on the tools we use, it is
our airmen that power all these tools. They say goodbye to
their families and always find a way to get others to the next
day.
Whether it is a combat air drop in Afghanistan,
humanitarian food and water deliveries in Haiti, or holding the
hand of one of our injured soldiers from the battlefield during
an air medical evacuation flight, your air mobility airmen
always answer the Nation's call.
Again, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today, and we look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Allardice can be found
in the Appendix on page 79.]
[The prepared statement of General Davis can be found in
the Appendix on page 94.]
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you. And to all of you, we
appreciate you being here. The questions that we are going to
ask you, we need very much to do the oversight that we have to
do and to prepare the NDAA markup that is coming our way.
I am going to ask just an initial question or so to lay a
foundation of where we are going, then I am going to defer most
of my questions until the end of questions, and we just need to
be able to do the kind of hearing that we need to do to make
sure we got the record necessary for that markup.
You have got tremendous expertise on this panel, and I am
looking forward to their questions as we go forward.
This is not an examination for any of you so feel free if
you need to talk to your staffs or coordinate with one another
if I am asking the wrong person the question, please someone
else chime in. And also, if the question is unfair. Just tell
me that, and I will try to rephrase it.
And what I want to start with is, kind of a take-off where
the general just left us. We talked about all the cuts that are
taking place now with Blackberries and staff and everything
that is there, but I want to put sequestration on the shelf for
just a moment.
And I want to look at the fact that, according to our
numbers and everything our staff can show before sequestration,
we had about $800 billion of cuts the Administration has made
over the last 4 years to our projected 10-year spending.
Admiral, are our figures right, is that the right figure
that took place before sequestration? Was it a cut of about
$800 billion over the last 4 years in projected figure and, if
not, what is the correct figure?
Admiral Myers. Chairman, I think you are referring to the
PB 12 [President's Budget 2012] efficiencies that was under
Secretary Gates, and that was the $487 billion----
Mr. Forbes. But according to our staff, the actual cuts
that we have had over projected spending for the next 10 years,
that the Department of Defense has had, has been $800 billion
in that
4-year period of time.
What is the total amount of cuts that were taken prior to
sequestration, over a projected reduction in spending, that
would take place over the next 10-year period of time. Do you
know that figure or can you get that figure for us?
Admiral Myers. That was part of the PB 12 initiative and
submission and for the Navy that represented $48 billion.
Mr. Forbes. But for the whole Department of Defense,
because I am going to ask everybody that question, do you any
of you know what that figure--and this is an open book then,
$800 billion is what our staff has come up with. That is what
HASC [House Armed Services Committee] says it is, do any of you
know what that figure actually was before sequestration?
And so, let me just go down the line then.
Admiral, what do you think that figure was?
Admiral Myers. The PB 12 submission, we were on record
talking about $487 billion.
Mr. Forbes. So you think that the total amount of cuts that
the Administration has taken to national defense reduction and
spending has been $487 billion?
Admiral Myers. That was the Department of Defense number.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. The $487 that Admiral Myers
cited there is also an initiative to identify efficiencies
within our budget anticipating further pressure on the topline
of about $100 billion, but with the intention of create those
efficiencies and plow them back into investments.
Mr. Forbes. But as you and I both know, because that is
what the Secretary said when he had his press conference, but
they didn't go back into reinvestment, did they? Didn't they
come out----
Secretary Stackley. Over time, they got eclipsed by the
$487, and then subsequently, sequestration.
Mr. Forbes. So the total figure before sequestration that
you believe it was would have been----
Secretary Stackley. Four eighty-seven, and I really want to
come back to you on the record to----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 119.]
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Secretary Stackley [continuing]. Verify that number.
Mr. Forbes. General, what does the Marine Corps think it
was?
General Mills. I am going to take that question for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 119.]
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Either general for the Air Force?
General Davis. Sir let me--the $487 figure is the one we
have been working with. I do know also that, as Secretary
Stackley mentioned, the Air Force went through its own drill as
well with a $30 billion efficiency wedge across the FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program] that we had to go find, so we
need to get it for the record, but I have no doubt that there
was other things that may have added up to get to that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 120.]
General Allardice. Sir----
Mr. Forbes. Pardon me?
General Allardice. I will have to take it for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 119.]
Mr. Forbes. What I would love for you to do is have your
staffs work with our staffs so we finally get that figure, and
one of the things that concerns me is, right now, we don't even
know what the figure is.
And that ought to be frightening to us, and the second
thing, I am going down the line on you, too. Admiral, do you
have any knowledge that of that $487 or $587, or if it is $800
billion as we think it was, during any of that time, did the
Navy ever say, ``Too many cuts, we shouldn't be taking this,''
to your knowledge?
Before sequestration?
Admiral Myers. I think the Navy was on record when we
submitted the PB 12, reflecting exactly where those cuts were
coming from and where they were taken and the pressure it was
putting on the Department of the Navy.
And part of that pressure was reflected in the shipbuilding
plan where we intended to retire the seven cruisers and the two
LSDs. So I think the that Navy was very forthright in showing
where the pain was.
Mr. Forbes. Did you submit any statements that you know of
or is there any statement--and I don't expect you to have that
information now, but I would like for you to get that back to
us because I have sat through a lot of hearings, and I never
heard the Navy make those comments.
And I could have missed them, but if you would get that
back for me, I would just love to have that in my hand of where
they objected.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 119.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, do you recall the Navy having
objected on that $487 or the $800 billion, the total figure,
whatever it comes down, anything other than sequestration that
the Navy ever said, ``This is too much. We shouldn't have these
cuts.''
Publicly.
Secretary Stackley. Publicly. Honestly, sir, what we do is
we take our requirements, we take the budget and we balance,
and when our requirements and the budget are out of balance,
what we do is inform the system of what the impacts are and
what the risk is.
Mr. Forbes. Did you ever know that the Navy ever informed
the system of what those impacts would be, outside of
sequestration, because again, as I have sat through hearing
after hearing, we have asked that same question.
And what we were always told was this, ``These are
acceptable risks. We are okay with these cuts.''
Do you recall that time when the Navy ever said, ``Too
much. We shouldn't have these cuts.''
Secretary Stackley. I can't cite a point where the Navy
said, ``This breaks us.''
Mr. Forbes. Would you do as I asked the admiral and try to
find that and come back and let us know if there are any such
statements that you can put your hand on?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Good. General, Marine Corps, same thing.
General Mills. Sir, I would say that, in various statements
before the various congressional committees, the Marine Corps,
over the past couple of years, has been clear that the
reduction in budget was going to affect our manpower numbers,
for instance. That is----
Mr. Forbes. But did they not say, ``These are acceptable
risks, we can take them.''
General Mills. As far as I know, yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And if you--if I have missed any, General, if
you would get back to me on any statements outside of the
sequestration, of the cuts the Administration has. When you
come back with that final number, let me know where the Marine
Corps said, ``This is too much.''
General Mills. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And, General Davis and Allardice, either one.
General Davis. Sir, I do think there was statements made in
the previous posture hearings that our Chief and Secretary said
that that presents risks.
Mr. Forbes. Before the sequestration?
General Davis. Yes, sir, on the previous budget, and I will
caveat that with, as we are looking at it now, if we get the
ability to take the force structure in the areas where we felt
we could take the risks, much of that did not materialize and
was reversed, and so that created a new and unique situation
for the Air Force.
The one thing I will say, having work acquisition programs,
we have some flexibility to try to cover capabilities when we
know what a cut is. And I will just add for the record, as we
look in the outyears, the uncertainty of what 2015 and 2016 and
beyond looks like, probably creates a much greater risk than
having a known number.
Mr. Forbes. And granted the unknown is always there, but at
some point in time, the sheer numbers, and we will talk about
in just a second, create a problem because that means we turn
in Blackberries and we turn in staff, and we do all those
kinds----
General, anything that you remember the Air Force, outside
of sequestration, of those cuts, when we ultimately determine
what the number is?
General Allardice. No sir. To the best of my knowledge, we
articulate it in terms of risk and how much risks we are
incurring but----
Mr. Forbes. And let me just tell y'all, every hearing I sat
through, here is what I was told, ``It is acceptable risk.'' No
one ever told us, ``No, no. This is hitting in the wrong----''
Now here is why I want to ask this, and I am going to
finish with this question and then go to somebody else and come
back with you.
As I look at the shipbuilding plan that we are talking
about now, one, we have reduced the number of ships that we
have, overall, and a lot of those ships were 2038 before we
actually see the ships go into our fleet.
Mr. Secretary or Admiral, you both know, we live by our
accountants, you live by your accountants, and the
Congressional Budget Office is who we have to rely on a lot of
times to do our analysis.
Regardless of whether we take the Congressional Budget
Office or we take your figures, over the life expectancy of
this shipbuilding plan, if we take your figures, we are looking
at about $16.8 billion average shipbuilding costs, and that
doesn't count the refueling. If you add that in, which normally
comes out of the shipbuilding account, I think, that is about
$18 billion to $19 billion. Is that a fair statement?
Secretary Stackley. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Forbes. CBO [Congressional Budget Office], of course,
would differ with your numbers. They would say about $22
billion, but regardless, let's take your figure.
The average amount that we have had for shipbuilding in our
budget, for the last 30 years, and there is no big spikes in
this. As you know, it has been less $15 billion.
My question for both of you in making these assumptions,
can you present to me any evidence at all, a scintilla of
evidence, that would suggest that we will have those increases
in budgets, as we move down the road.
In other words, if you have been getting less than $15
billion for 30 years, if our curve lines on cuts that y'all
just talked about are heading down like this, and if our
shipbuilding plan is going to depend on us having a huge spike-
up in dollars that come in the shipbuilding plan. And that is
what we are basing it on.
Give me the evidence that would suggest to you that we will
have any additional dollars at all from a fiscal point of view,
from Congress, to make the shipbuilding plan work.
Secretary Stackley. Sir, let me break this down in a couple
of parts.
First, the way we outline the long range shipbuilding plan,
we break it up into phases or periods. We talk about the near
term, mid term and long term. And clearly, when you get out to
the mid term and long term, those projections are--they get
more ambiguous because we haven't defined, exactly, what those
platforms will be and the capabilities.
So we don't place a lot of fidelity on the long term. The
near term, we believe we have a lot of fidelity in the FYDP
plus right beyond the FYDP, and so, in terms of our budget
projections in the FYDP what we see today, we think that is
solid, sequestration aside.
The most significant issue in that plan, which I touched on
in my opening statement regards the impact of recapitalizing
our strategic deterrence capability. And clearly--clearly that
program which in then-year dollars when you consider the R&D
[Research and Development] investment and the procurement
dollars, we are talking about $100 million, roughly, over about
a 12- to 15-year
period.
That dominates the affordability discussion during that
period, and it doesn't place a lot of weight, overall, on the
30-year period. So that is the most significant--most
daunting--challenge that we are staring at in terms of our
shipbuilding program.
It is our--as I have stated, while we are focused on
affordability, we have stabilized the requirements. We are
making the progress we need to make today. All of our efforts
to improve affordability of that boat and that programs will
not be sufficient to bring our shipbuilding requirement during
that period down to within our historical budget.
So I cannot point towards evidence. I would have to point
back to the build-up of the 600 ship Navy, during the 80s, when
we last saw those levels of shipbuilding investment.
Mr. Forbes. So then, Mr. Secretary--and I appreciate your
candor in this and before I go to Mr. Courtney, I just want to
make clear that, while we do not have a lot of confidence in
the long range projections of our fiscal forecasting, of doing
that.
That fiscal forecasting is what will determine whether we
get the number of ships we need in the Navy. So if we don't
have a lot of credibility in that, we also don't have a lot of
credibility that we are going to get that number of ships.
Fair?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Can't get the ships unless you get the dollars.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. We have the near term, the
mid term, which is where the high replacement takes place----
Mr. Forbes. There is a chart, and again, I know you have
probably seen it, this is a CBO chart, but when we are talking
about those spike-ups in spending, the spike-ups come after the
Administration leaves office essentially for most of these.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. So what we are saying is to make these
projections, we are talking about a reality, we are going to
have a significant turnaround in the dollars that will have to
go into ship construction and shipbuilding. Fair?
Secretary Stackley. We need a steady increase, and we have
to separately or distinctly, address the cost impact associated
with recapitalizing----
Mr. Forbes. But yet, what we have seen is a constant
reduction that has taken place in our overall spending for--
that is of the last 4 years.
Secretary Stackley. Not in shipbuilding. You can't relate
that----
Mr. Forbes. We haven't seen an increase, have we?
Secretary Stackley. In the last 4 to 5 years, there has
been an overall increase to our shipbuilding investments.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. I will come back to that.
Mr. Courtney, I would like to recognize you for 5.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
of the witnesses for being here.
Before I begin, I would actually like to step back for a
moment and just recognize one of our staff who is leaving us
after today's hearing. Lieutenant Commander Phil MacNaughton
who is sitting behind me and has been with this staff for, I
think around 5 years or so, has provided amazing advice and
expertise to all of us because his lead has been on the
Seapower Committee.
He is leaving to serve his country. He is heading to the
Middle East and, you know, which just shows what kind of person
he is in terms of his commitment to public service.
As a staff member, he is probably one of the few guys who
has actually piloted some of us in terms of our trips to
various places, which is about as good as it gets, and again, I
would just ask my colleagues to recognize Phil's great work
that he has done for the committee and wish him safe travels
and safe work as he, again, steps up his commitment and
sacrifice for our country.
[Applause.]
Thank you. Mr. Secretary, again, I just wanted to maybe
sort of bring some of the discussion down to some of the, you
know, nitty-gritty of the last year or so, again,
congratulations to both of you and Admiral Myers, and all of
the witnesses for sort of trying to get through this incredibly
tumultuous budget environment where, I mean, literally, from
day-to-day it has been hard to predict what this place was
going to do.
And again, this committee, I think, subcommittee, certainly
tried to work with you last year, particularly, with the DDG
and the Virginia class language that came out in the Defense
Authorization Bill, which again, tried to provide some
flexibility for the block contracts that, again, are very
close.
Can you give us an update in terms of where you see the
Virginia class block contract negotiations and, you know, maybe
what we can expect in terms of, you know, some type of
announcement or agreement?
Secretary Stackley. Well first, sir, I make it a point to
not discuss negotiations, particularly at a public hearing.
But, you know, the program is building on success, so the
nature of the negotiations is twofold.
One is, how do we continue to achieve the savings that
Virginia has accomplished, literally, through the series of
block buys going into this multiyear, in order to hit the full
savings that we reported to Congress, and I have no doubt that
we are going to get there.
And we are going to get there in a timely manner. One of
the challenges that we have, it is sequestration related, was,
we did lose some advance procurement funding, which is in a
separate line, that we are working with the shipbuilder to
figure out how do we compensate for that loss of AEP because it
is critical to our schedules, and our schedule execution in the
multiyear is critical to hitting our savings.
So that is a detail that we are working. I have no doubt
that we will pull through that, but there will be some dollars
that need to be backfilled in 2014, that we will discuss with
your staff in that regard, and I think they can anticipate that
coming.
So the bottom line is, you know, we are going to plow
through the details, to get to the 10-boat multiyear. There is
some repair work to do as a result of sequestration, and we are
going to work closely with the shipbuilder to minimize the
impact of that speed bump on the execution.
Mr. Courtney. Well, again, and I know you well, I mean,
just certainly keep us informed about where the problem is. I
mean, Majority Leader Reid and Senator Schumer place were both
on the floor talking about trying to come up with a package to
mitigate sequestration.
So, it seems like there some stirring go around, and
frankly, the more we can get examples of the harm that it is
causing to, again, a very promising development in terms of
getting an affordable contract, that just adds fuel to the
argument about why, you know, we need to come together in this
place and fix this.
The other question I just wanted to ask, and again, I know
a lot of other members are bursting here, is LCS [Littoral
Combat Ship], you know, obviously, if you look at the
shipbuilding plan, that is a big piece of where the numbers
are.
And I just wondered if you could give us a sort of update,
in terms of, and obviously there are press reports swirling
around this, and any information you can share with us this
morning, I would appreciate.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. And I will probably split
part of this with Admiral Myers. Let me talk first about the
shipbuilding side and have Admiral Myers discuss the
operational side.
The shipbuilding, as I discussed in my opening statement,
the construction is going well. We signed up for the block buy.
We are midway through the block buy. We are seeing performance
at both shipyards within our budget projections.
We are using delivery schedules on that program to balance
with costs. In other words, we are not going to put a lot of
pressure on delivery schedule if it creates any cost challenges
on the program, but overall, between both the LCS 1 version and
the LCS 2 version, we are seeing a steady rate of improvement
in terms of cost performance, operating within our budget, and
again, that budget was sized to achieve the $2.9 billion
savings across the 20 ships of the block buy.
So that part of the program is stable. Again, there is a
sequestration impact that we have got to work through. Every
line item was hit by sequestration. So in the case of LCS
execution, sequestration has added risks on the budget side,
because we had to pull money out of everywhere we could without
impacting the overall program, but when you do that, you add
risks, and some of that we might be needing to come back to you
all to address backfilling.
The mission module side is in development, and we have
three mission modules in development. The first one that is
going forward, its initial operational capability is the mine
countermeasure mission module, and that is scheduled for its
IOC [Initial Operational Capability] in 2014.
The elements of the mine countermeasure mission module are
each doing well. The remote minehunting vehicle, which is
central to the mission module, went through the reliability
growth program. It is far exceeding what the targets were for
reliability.
The sensors that are associated with that mission package
are performing in accordance with their requirements with one
exception where we are at 90 percent of the threshold trying to
get the rest of way there.
And then we have a neutralizing system that is meeting its
requirement in testing, and we are trying to expand that to
address other parts of the water column.
The bottom line to all that is, the mine countermeasure
mission package is moving smartly through its development
schedule; however, IOC in 2014 is now at risk because of
sequestration in 2013, so the reduction in the Research and
Development funds to complete that development and testing,
might bump that IOC.
We are trying to hold onto it, but I can't give you
confidence when you take that much of the funding away in the
year of execution prior to ROC [Required Operational
Capability] that we can gracefully recover.
So that is at risk measured in months, but we see that
getting across the finish line in the course of 2014 or early
2015. The ships and mission packages are timed well in terms of
the mix delivering to the fleet, and I think I will turn it
over at this point, and have Admiral Myers address the
operational side.
Admiral Myers. Thank you for the question. The--we are
pleased with our LCS, and just to give you a kind of a rundown
on where we are with the ships. The Freedom, the Independence,
LCS 2, and the Forth Worth, they are are all conducting either
testing, maintenance or routine crew proficiency training
throughout 2012.
Freedom operated off the coast of Southern California
throughout that year, and basically, got herself ready for her
deployment to Singapore, and I will talk about that in just a
second, what we hope to gain from that.
The Independence, we have tested the sea frame and the MCM
[Mine Countermeasure Module] mission package requirements, and
she sailed around from the East Coast and is now homeported in
San Diego.
The Forth Worth, that is the LCS 3, she has been placed in
commission after successful completion of the builders and
acceptance trials and is currently homeported in San Diego as
well, and she will be the combat systems ship qualification
trials best ship.
The PCU [Pre-Commissioning Unit] Coronado, LCS 4, continues
training in preparation for her mid-2013 planned delivery to
the Navy.
Now, in terms of Freedom, her arrival at Singapore
represents the beginning of a proof-of-concept deployment. This
is going to demonstrate LCS capabilities that are going to
allow us to assess crew rotation and our maintenance plans.
The Freedom will conduct maritime security operations,
she'll participate in international exhibitions and exercises
to highlight the U.S. strategic intent in the Southeast Asia
region. This will also help to reassure our partners, our
bilateral and multilateral partners, of our commitment in our
pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.
The Navy is going to get valuable insight into the unique
capabilities of LCS and what this ship is going to bring to the
fleet, into their joint military operations and, based on this
deployment and insights from the proof of concepts that we are
going to gain from this 8-month deployment, we are going to
take that and roll that into our lessons learned, and also,
continue with the testing and the certification of the Freedom
and the rest of the LCS class in the Navy.
Like all first of class ships, we continue to assess the
ships' performance. We implement lessons learned, and we make
corrections where necessary, so we are very pleased and happy
to talk about the mission packages separately if you want me to
do that.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney, thank you for your questions and
your expertise in this area. And thank you for recognizing Phil
and his good service to our committee and to our country.
I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the Readiness
Subcommittee, an expert on these matters, Congressman Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary
Stackley, and Vice Admiral Myers, Lieutenant General Mills,
Lieutenant General Davis and Lieutenant General Allardice,
thank you all so much for joining us today. We appreciate your
service to our Nation and what you do for our sailors, for our
marines, and for our airmen. We deeply appreciate that.
I will begin with you, General Mills. You heard both the
Chairman and Secretary Stackley mention the amphibious combat
vehicle. I wanted to get your focus on where are we with the
ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle].
I wanted to get your perspective, too, on why does the
Nation need to invest in the ACV, especially based on the
austere times that we face.
Also, how is the Marine Corps going to be able to purchase
both the joint light tactical vehicle and the amphibious combat
vehicle, again, facing these budget challenges.
And can you tell me, too, specifically about the target
date for the IOC, for the ACV? I am very concerned in that
looking at the past experience with the EFV [Expeditionary
Fighting Vehicle] and the timeframe that was well, expired
through that process, and with it taking nearly 15 years with
an old amphibious assault vehicle with the AAV [Assault
Amphibious Vehicle] there, timing this with this, I think is
critical.
So if you can give us your perspective on those elements of
the ACV, that would be great.
General Mills. Sir, thank you for that question. Thank you
for the support that you provide the Marines, and the Marines
at Quantico, in particular, sir, I appreciate it very much.
I will divide the question up into a couple of parts and I
would ask Secretary Stackley if he would like to get in on the
actual procurement procedure. I think both the JLTV and the ACV
are success stories.
I will start with JLTV and that we have partnered with the
Army in developing a vehicle which meets both of our needs, and
both of us have compromised to a bit, but at the end, that
produced a vehicle that we can afford and that will be
successful on the battlefield and give more protection and more
mobility to our forces as they move around that battlefield
based on the current dangers.
We also feel that we have developed a strategy, a
procurement strategy which would allow us to buy the JLTV, when
it is ready to go to the fleet and sufficient numbers to meet
our immediate needs.
And then take a break in order to purchase the ACV and then
come back and finish up our body of JLTVs later on in the
program after the Army is done there.
So we feel there is a good strategy there, and we are
pushing ahead with that very good success story. I have driven
in all of the--all of the demo models that have been provided
to us by industry, and each one of them is--really is quite a
vehicle and gives you quite capability on the battlefield.
Regards to the ACV has been testified to numerous places on
numerous times. The ACV is, in fact, the Marines' number 1
ground priority, and we are pushing forward to that. And that
is also a success story.
Drawing on lessons learned, I think, from the EFV
experience, we have been able to incorporate that both into our
capabilities documents as we have produced those, and again,
into our acquisition strategy as we develop that.
The ACV, of course, is going to cover down on the
developing gap in our capability--our core capability of
projecting power ashore from our amphibious ships, and that is
the initial wave of troops going ashore, that they have a self-
deployer that provides them once they hit the, you know, the
water line, the ability to maintain the momentum moving ashore
to the objective, conduct operations on the objective in a
protected armored environment and then withdraw to the ships,
again, in a timely manner.
We feel that plays to our core capability, the unique
capability of being able to project combat power ashore from
our forward-deployed amphibious forces at a time and place of
our own choosing.
The ACV has been developed over the past 18 months when the
capability, of course, was determined, we went through and done
an AoA [Analysis of Alternatives] and that was completed last
summer. Subsequent to that AoA and the JROC [Joint Requirements
Oversight Council] approval to move forward with the program,
we look at the ability to also add to the capabilities by
adding high water speeds.
We have gone back to take a look at the feasibility of a
self-deployer that could achieve higher water speed in the A2/
AD [Anti-Access/Area-Denial] environment. We have reopened
parts of the AoA, if you will, just to ensure that the high
water speed capability is used in that.
And we are moving along by establishing a work force down
at Quantico focused on the ACV, a unique work force that I will
let Mr. Stackley talk to here in a moment. We think that we
have a real blend of industry, the Department of the Navy
personnel and the Marines at Quantico, in putting together a
team that will give us what we need, what we can afford, when
we need it.
The last point that I will make is your discussion point
about the IOC of the ACV. We are also concerned about that, of
course, we don't want a gap to develop for our capability to
lesson, so we have an AAV sustainability program that is well-
funded, in the budget, that we will maintain and improve about
400 of our AAVs, which will--while they won't extend the life
of those vehicles, they will give us more survivability for the
Marines inside the vehicles on the battlefield.
We will improve the seating in the back. We are going to
improve the power train, and we are going to put protection on
the floor which will protect those Marines from the threat of
the IEDs [improvised explosive device] which have developed on
today's battlefield.
With that, I will ask Mr. Stackley if he has any comments
regarding the unique acquisition strategy.
Secretary Stackley. Let me simply add to what General Mills
described that, typically, or historically what we have done is
we would do an AOA. We would develop requirements. They get
tossed over the fence. We might get a parametric type of
estimate accomplished.
Eventually, we roll that forward and, at some point in
time, downstream industry gets closely involved, and we are out
there dealing with proposals and get the proposals back and,
quite often, we end up with a mismatch between what the
requirement was, what the real cost is, and what the schedule
is.
And what we are trying to do different here, is do the
front end of requirements' definition since we know so much
about the AAV, the EFV, other combat vehicles, bring industry
into the process and tighten up the loop between the
requirement, the design, and the cost.
So in near real time, you can look at trades between
capability, affordability and what that might mean in terms of
schedule for the overall program. We are placing great emphasis
on cost realism which means getting a mature model.
It also means using mature technology so we don't have this
lengthy, drawn-out development phase for the program.
So we think we have this exactly right, from MARCORSYSCOM
[Marine Corps Systems Command], Quantico, PEO [Program
Executive Office] land systems all involved, but also, Navy
warfare centers and Army personnel are joining the mix. And we
brought industry in--we brought in the big defense contractors,
but we are also opening up third-party participation in this
requirements' definition, feasibility, and cost estimating
phase of the program.
Our intent is to get this put into shape for the 2015
budget as it comes over so it has the definition that you all
need, and in the interim, to open up the door so you all have
insight into the how--the progress that we are making and how
we are going about this acquisition.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Now Mr. Kilmer and other valuable members of
the subcommittee. The gentleman from Washington, I yield 5
minutes.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
being here. I guess my first question is, and I am not sure if
I should address it to Admiral Myers or to Secretary Stackley,
my question is around the impacts of sequestration and how it
affects life-cycle costing of our vessels.
I was out at our Naval shipyard--our Puget Sound Naval
shipyard in my neck of the woods and heard questions around
deferred maintenance and how furloughs and the laying off of
temporary employees might affect, also, the amount of time that
maintenance happens.
Someone said, and I don't know if this is accurate, but the
amount of time for maintenance--the length of time for
maintenance Stennis [USS John C. Stennis] might increase by 4
to 6 months.
I am just wondering how, if at all, does that impact
acquisition strategy and how you look at ongoing costs within
the vessel program?
Admiral Myers. Okay. I will take the first stab at this,
and if I can address the impact of our shipyard workers and
furloughs, the second part of your question and then roll that
into the impacts of lifecycle and acquisition and turn that
over to Mr. Stackley.
Well first, furloughing of our civilians does impact our
ability to generate our carriers and submarines in fiscal year
2014, because this is the workforce that is actually doing the
maintenance, both in our ship and aircraft depot maintenance
facilities.
So the lost work that you refer to, Congressman, it creates
a domino effect to our maintenance schedules that it is going
to take us a couple of years to dig out of. The Department of
Navy is exploring options to minimize these impacts, but when
you look across 2013, 2014 and 2015, just the impacts of this
year, when you focus on our carrier readiness, it is going to
delay getting carriers out of the yards.
When you talk about submarine readiness, it is also going
to impact delays. It is going to extend the duration of--
upwards of three SSBNs, 3 to 4 months. We have the data that
shows, by ship, what kind of delays that furloughing these
workers would create.
And there are also impacts to our aviation readiness,
upwards of 60 aircraft and 150 engines would SLEP [undergo
Service Life Extension Program] from 2013 into fiscal year
2014. So these are going to create readiness challenges for the
Department of the Navy that we are going to have to reconcile
in 2014, 2015, and 2016.
And we are going to need the President's Budget, 2014
submission, which doesn't account for these kinds of readiness
impacts, but we are going to need that budget in order to have
an approach to have the funding levels, and the resources
required, to try to reconcile this.
Secretary Stackley. I don't know if I can improve much upon
Admiral Myers' statement other than to describe that, while we
are doing what we can within the dollars we have and the
authority we have to reprogram, we are doing what we can to
restore the funding that we had programmed for maintenance.
We are going to be limited, and so there will be a deferral
of maintenance that rolls into the outyears, that will have an
impact. That is on the maintenance side.
On the investment side, we are faced with shortages in
every investment line, and so we are having to go line by line
to determine how do we absorb that shortage, and we are trying
to balance between the near-term costs, the outyear impacts,
the likelihood of being able to restore the funding in the
outyears to arrive at what is the right answer for total costs
and total capability.
And it is not the same in each case. In certain cases, we
are holding onto the procurement tightly because if we let that
slip, the impacts to jobs, the impact to costs in those
programs, will be so high that fixing that later will be out of
balance.
And in those cases, we might look at deferring some support
costs, some spare costs, because that is a dollar-for-dollar
restoration.
In other cases, where we might be on the edge in terms of
readiness, we are being very careful to not defer anything
associated--that might impact on readiness when it comes to
support costs and spares. And there, we might be taking a hit
in terms of the quantity that we procure.
There definitely will be an impact. It is very difficult to
quantify today. In our process, we are trying to balance near-
term and far-term to arrive at the, you know, the right least-
cost impact and least impact to the total capability and force.
Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Kilmer, thank you for that line of
question.
Now I recognize the distinguished gentleman from Georgia,
Mr. Johnson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the Middle
East eruption a couple of years ago, the Arab Spring, touched
many nations in the area of your--or in the Gulf Region.
And one of the nations that has been impacted by that has
been the island nation of Bahrain, and Bahrain has served as
the headquarters for the Fifth Fleet.
With the disturbance there, civil demonstrations and more
people being involved, just a great percentage of the
population involved in the demonstrations, and the kingdom--the
king--cracking down on that kind of activity, and the residents
becoming more and more agitated and violence is, perhaps, on
the horizon, lots of human rights violations going on, some
say.
What do you see as the future for our activities in
Bahrain, stationing of the Fifth Fleet there, and have there
been any contingency plans put into place or at least developed
in the event that the situation gets out of hand in Bahrain.
Admiral Myers. Congressman, thank you for the question. The
Navy's role is to meet our responsibilities to operate forward
where it matters and be ready when it matters. Having a
headquarters in Bahrain for our Fifth Fleet, a Naval Central
Command Component Commander, is important for the Navy.
To get to the specifics of your question, in terms of,
contingencies with relationships that we have with the nation
of Bahrain, I would need to take that for the record and get
back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 122.]
Mr. Johnson. So what you are saying is that, you cannot
answer the question as to whether or not there are--there is
any contingency planning that is taking place at this time?
Admiral Myers. Congressman, I would prefer to take--I can
answer the question, but not in this forum.
Mr. Johnson. All right.
Admiral Myers. And I would prefer to take it into a more
appropriate forum.
Mr. Johnson. All right. I understand.
News reports indicate that the Littoral Combat Ship, which
relies heavily on electronic systems, is vulnerable to hacking.
Can you elaborate on the issue and tell the committee what you
are doing to ensure that all of our systems, including LCS, are
secure?
Admiral Myers. Yes, sir. I also heard--got the same report,
and this is part of a vulnerability assessment that we look at
our platforms to make sure that we are confident that they
aren't vulnerable, and if we find any issues or
vulnerabilities, then they are reported, assessed, and then
ultimately, rectified.
This vulnerability assessment has been reviewed by the
Government industry team, so we are assessing it right now, and
where there is differences exist from the previously--anything
that was self-identified--or things that were from the Navy's
or industry's expertise or input.
What we intend to do is get the Government and the Navy
team together and put together an implementation team to
understand what we need to do to mitigate it. Our information
assurance threats continue to evolve, and so we need to evolve,
to counter them.
The specifics of what is in that report is classified, and
again, that would be something that we would take to a
different forum to talk about in more detail.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
I believe Mr. Wittman had one short followup question, and
I will yield to him at this time and come back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask
Secretary Stackley, if you can briefly describe the plan that
the Navy has for the replacement of the T-AO [Tanker] class and
LSD class ships. I think that is a concern going forward,
making sure that we are looking at that. Can you give us a
little focus on what that plan might be?
And secondly, is there any plan to use some common hull
forms to look at the hulls that are currently in the inventory
using that, as well as, systems that are currently on ships to
make sure that we can maybe gain some time and some
efficiencies with using those particular elements in design in
replacement of the T-AO and the LSD class of ships.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. I
will break it up into two parts, T-AO(X) and then discuss
LX(R), but there is a lot of common theme here.
First, a T-AO(X), the Navy is going in this budget, FYDP
the Navy is proceeding with procuring the T-AO(X) what we would
call, ``ahead of need.'' In other words, there is certainly
more service life on the in-service fleet oilers; however, we
have two issues that we are addressing when we go after the T-
AO(X).
First, we are outside of MARPOL regs [Marine Pollution
regulations]. We do have an exemption in support of--for
national security, but we just view as the responsible thing to
do to proceed with a more modern fleet oiler and get within
MARPOL regs, which frankly will improve the T-AO(X)'s access to
foreign ports.
So we have moved that program into a 2016 start and, at
this point in time, we are doing design studies leading up to
the ultimate competition for procurement in 2016. We are, in
fact, doing everything we can to just leverage mature
technologies.
There is no invention or breakthrough required for T-AO(X).
We want to leverage commercial design to the extent practical,
and we are working through those details right now, inside the
building, inside the process and with industry.
So I believe that is well on track. I mentioned two points.
One was to address the MARPOL regs concern, but the other is--I
described in my opening statement--industrial-based concerns
across our amphibious and auxiliary shipbuilding sector, and T-
AO(X) fits in nicely to address that concern. So we see that as
a win-win.
The other program you described was the LX(R) which is the
replacement for the LSD 41/49 class. That class retires in
numbers in the mid 2020s. Right now, she is scheduled for
procurement in 2000--the LX(R) is scheduled for procurement in
2019, which would notionally give her the lead ships' delivery
date about the 2020 to 2025 timeframe.
We have advanced procurement that lays in 2018 timeframe,
and today we are conducting the analysis of alternatives to
determine exactly what will the LX(R)--what will the--between
the requirements and capabilities--what will the LX(R) be?
In that analysis of alternatives, we are looking at
everything ranging from clean sheet new design to a modified
repeat on the existing LSD 41/49 class to foreign design
concepts that could fit the bill, and also, specifically back
to your question, leveraging current shipbuilding programs,
specifically the LPD 17 class design, but modifying it for the
lift fingerprint required by the LSD 41/49 replacement.
So the AoA is going through that work today. The ship
procurement is out at the end of the FYDP, and in between, we
do have a concern regarding that sector of our industrial base.
So the Navy's press is to keep those design activities on
schedule and look for opportunities to try to bridge that gap
in the industrial base and hit the affordability numbers that
we need for both of those programs.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Congressman Wittman.
If I could pick up now and thank you so much for your
patience in being here. I have a series of questions we need to
get on our record before we conclude the hearing, and I want to
pick back up with where I left, and Keith, if you could pass
out this chart, please. I just want to show you where we get
our numbers, so when you are back and doing your research, this
is from the HASC committee staff which do a very good job. We
depend on them to help us write our legislation.
And based on their numbers, what we have, Mr. Secretary and
Admiral, particularly, you can look over here, the $291 billion
figure is essentially what the cost extrapolated out to be when
that money wasn't reinvested back, but according to the HASC
figures, we have $291 billion plus $487 billion.
So that comes up to about $778 billion of cuts from
spending that the Administration took long before
sequestration. Now, if that figure is inaccurate, we will hold
the record open until you get back to us.
But until we get something from you guys or from your
staffs, we have to work on the assumption that our staff is
correct. So, we had $778 billion of cuts that took place long
before sequestration.
To the knowledge of this subcommittee and our staffs, we
heard nothing about these cuts being too much from the Navy,
the Marine Corps or the Air Force. If I am wrong on that, we
will hold the record open until you can get us documentation
that shows where that was.
The way that would normally come back over is if it wasn't
expressed in an open hearing like this, you would give us an
unfunded requirement list. So Admiral, the first question I
have for you is, based on this $778 billion figure, or whatever
the figure ultimately comes back to, we have received no
unfunded requirement list from the Navy.
To your knowledge, did the Navy submit one to us or
Secretary Stackley, that we just missed somehow and did not get
it?
Admiral Myers. To my knowledge, there has been no
submission, and before I get into that, I want to make sure
that I reaffirm that the approach that we are taking with the
sequestration that is, you know, has already been on record,
was focusing on the must-pay bills, reconciling----
Mr. Forbes. And all this was the figures before
sequestration.
Admiral Myers [continuing]. Right. So to my knowledge,
there has not yet been a submission for an unfunded----
Mr. Forbes. And there hasn't been one in the last several
years that you know of, is that correct?
Admiral Myers. I would have to get back to you----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 119.]
Mr. Forbes. If you would, if you don't mind doing that, and
I don't want to take up more time than necessary, but I would
just ask, General, if both--all three generals, if you would do
the same thing. If I have missed one, if you would get it for
us.
And then, Mr. Secretary, based on the numbers that we have,
whether we took your numbers or CBO's numbers, it will require
us to have a significant uptick in our shipbuilding accounts if
we are going to meet these numbers by at least 20 percent or
more over the next several years, if we are going to reach the
goals that we have in our shipbuilding plan.
Would that be a fair assessment?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Our report that we submitted
last year, and you will get the update this year, it shows the
funding required for a shipbuilding plan, and it is very clear
that our funding goes up markedly, beyond the FYDP.
Mr. Forbes. And I thank you for your work in doing that.
Can I ask you to address, now, the Ohio replacement program
and, particularly, you were kind enough to submit--or Admiral
Myers actually, that Secretary Stackley submitted an interim
update to the 30-year shipbuilding plan 2 days ago that
indicated a significant increase to the ship construction
account to support the Ohio class replacement.
And Mr. Secretary, we thank you for your efforts in trying
to get that to us so that we could have it in a timely manner,
but if you look, even in the fiscal year 2014 budget request,
the public requires over a billion dollars and is expected to
ramp up until we purchase our first boat in fiscal year 2021,
at the cost of over $5.5 billion.
And I support, most people on this subcommittee, support
what you are doing and they support the Ohio class replacement,
but considering that requirement and to associate it with the
Nuclear Posture Review, to your knowledge, has the Secretary or
your staff provided any support for the program as a strategic
investment over and above the Navy's topline.
In other words, what are we going to do when we have that
huge amount of money. Is it going to all come out of the
shipbuilding account, or is there some argument that it might
come outside that shipbuilding account?
Admiral Myers. Mr. Chairman, there is no question that,
when you look at the mid-term of our 30-year shipbuilding plan
that, just looking at the numbers and the number of ships, half
of our resources are SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy],
if you will, in a typical year goes to one ship.
So it is an understatement to say that that is going to
challenge us. It challenges our shipbuilding account and it
challenges us on--when you look at that timeframe.
Now, my leadership has been on the record acknowledging
this resource challenge that is outside the FYDP, largely due
to investment and the requirements associated with the SSBN-X
program.
But when you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan as a
whole, and the area that we can--we are most confident about,
which is the near term, and you look at the FYDP, the next 5
years with the delivery of 47 ships and retiring 42 ships, I
think that the Navy and the shipbuilding plan puts us on a
trajectory that takes us to 300 in fiscal year 2019, and keeps
us around 300 in the 2020s.
Mr. Forbes. And I am going to suspend my questions and
recognize Congressman Runyan for any questions he might have
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Chairman. My question is for General
Allardice, specifically, I know I have brought this up a few
times, but dealing with the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet]
program. We know--we spend about $244 million shipping cargo on
foreign carriers, but as a result of what I think most people
would say, overflying our grey tails, if you would, C-5s, C-17s
[Globemaster III strategic airlifter].
The Air Force has had to reprogram 136 million last year to
repair the engines in that fleet. First of all, I understand
that there is a mission readiness that you have to have to, you
know, maintain your readiness with that fleet, but there is
also--our duty here is to make sure that--I think you would
agree--that the CRAF program is a national security asset.
But as we don't use them, we have seen them fall off their
ability to do their mission because we are not using them and
spending, also money, on other foreign CRAF services.
So my question here is really, do we need a legislative fix
and would AMC [Air Mobility Command] be in the conversation of
having a legislative fix to make sure stuff like this--we are
doing it right to the best and not having kind of an ambiguous
kind of, maybe we will, maybe we won't kind of decision at AMC.
General Allardice. Sure. Thank you and thank you for your
support. First off, we obviously depend heavily on the CRAF. It
is part of our total force projecting capability and, in order
to execute any war plan, we need both the passenger capability
and the cargo capability that civil reserve air fleet
represents.
So we recognize that our objective today, and we agree with
the community, we had a meeting last week. We agree that our
number 1 objective is to have a grey tail organic fleet and a
civil fleet that is capable of meeting the national needs in
the time of
emergency.
So we have that common objective. We understand and agree
with the community that in order to achieve that objective, we
have to have a healthy civil fleet. The CRAF fleet, in
particular, it to parse out the civil augmentation. It is not
part of the CRAF.
So there are objectives that we need to understand
collectively that exist in the civil side. Honestly, the last
10 years, the civil side has enjoyed a significant amount of
revenue, and our numbers are a little bit higher than what you
read. It is somewhere north of $2 billion over the last 10
years. It went to the civil augmentation fleet, not just the
CRAF, but civil carriers in general. So a substantial number.
Where the challenge comes is as you draw down out of
Afghanistan, the business goes down, you come to our line--
readiness line, you know, how do we train and age the organic
fleet, how then do we also ensure that we have a ready CRAF.
As you know, sir, we have completed phase one of the CRAF
study. We are into phase two of the CRAF study right now which,
we believe, will inform the future CRAF from our perspective
and, as that comes out, we would obviously share with Congress
and discuss that.
With respect to a legislation in the meeting last week, we
agreed that--both--that we should working with industry to--it
is premature today--to say that legislation is required because
we don't know what the CRAF study will show as we look forward
to CRAF, what the readiness line and the requirements are for
the CRAF, and what that looks like.
We did agree that we will work with the carriers to--in a
collaborative environment--to ensure that we understand, if the
policy can fix it, we will use policy. If it is a parallel path
to have legislation, we will work with them to have the right
from our perspective, the right legislation.
And that is where we are today, is a common agreement that
it is possible, but we think it is premature today to say that
it is absolutely necessary.
Mr. Runyan. Well I think the one thing, and I know
Congressman Hunter also has been all over this, the one big
thing is the number I brought up, you have obviously our CRAF
fleet, but we have $244 million going to foreign carriers.
I mean, that is what I think you are going to get a lot of
pushback, you know, from this committee, can we legislatively
fix that to make sure this doesn't happen, you do have to allow
some wiggle room because, obviously, you know, time and all
that and availability, sometimes come into play.
But I think that is one thing that we are going to have
to--we are going to have to have that discussion because it is
our taxpayer dollars, you know, and this program is, obviously,
as you said it, a national security asset, and we want to make
sure that we are bringing as much of that money back home as
possible.
General Allardice. Sir, we understand that, and we share
the patriotic tone of that. What is always of great concern is,
in the crisis, when, you know, time is everything and we must
get something to the fight to support the warfighter, and very
often, the equipment that you are describing that carried on
the non-U.S. flight carriers, is equipment that is outsized,
that, you know, we can't--we are tapped so we can't get to it
with organic at the time.
Or we would push to our civil fleet, but they can't carry
it for a variety of reasons, they can't carry the outsized
cargo or because it is going into a field where they can't go
into because our risks.
So that is--we recognize what you are saying--we share with
our partners in the industry, the interest to get there, to get
there with policy, and we will come forward with our solution.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you for those questions, and I would like
to recognize my good friend from Rhode Island, but Jim, before
I do that, if you don't mind, I would like to recognize another
member of our staff that is going to be leaving, Tom MacKenzie.
Tom has just given us great service. He retired from the
Navy and Tom served on the Senate Armed Services Committee
before he moved up to the House, and Tom, we just thank you for
that service and all you have done for this committee and for
our country.
And with that, Jim, I recognize you for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to
thank all of our witnesses for appearing today and for your
great work on behalf of our Nation. We certainly appreciate the
benefit of your testimony and as we work to ensure that our
forces have the platforms and capabilities that we need to
handle the complex environments of the future.
Let me say from the outset, along with several others on
this subcommittee, I have been a staunch supporter of the Model
Acquisition Program, a national asset that is the Virginia
class submarine program, and we certainly appreciate the Navy's
working with our offices to enable the inclusion of a second
submarine in the fiscal year 2014.
And I am certainly pleased that there has been strong
support for the program and its budget, and I look forward to
working with all of you to ensure the health of the program
into the future.
Let me first, if I could, start with you Secretary
Stackley, and Vice Admiral Myers. I am particularly interested
in how you are planning to now, to have the capability to
integrate very high energy intensive weapons systems, such as,
directed energy weapons, high-powered microwaves and electronic
warfare systems and rail guns in your surface combatants.
Can you speak to the Navy's plan to ensure that the ships
that we are planning for and procuring now, as well as in the
future, are capable of accepting the power, including loads of
such systems in the future?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Two parts here. First, there
are a number of directed energy developments ongoing. You
mentioned rail gun. There are various laser projects that we
have in place, and step one is to mature the technology, and
that is two part--actually, it is three parts.
One is the basic technology has moved far along, so that is
going well. The second part is to weaponize it. And that is
probably the hard part right now, and that is to take--if you
were to visit our lab at Dahlgren and take a look at the
systems that are in development for these directed energy
weapons.
We are making progress on the laboratory floor, but we have
got to make the leap now to weaponizing them. A simple example
with the rail gun. The focus right now--we have demonstrated
the technology, now what we have got to do is, you have to
develop a round, you know, that has relative utility for the
rail gun. So that development is ongoing now. We have to size
the weapon that it would accommodate our platforms, so that is
ongoing now. So we are many years away, in the case of the rail
gun, from actually installing one on board ship, but we are
trying to keep--we are trying to pace that vision to the
ability to mature the technology.
Lasers--we are a little bit further along. You have
probably seen the videos of the demonstrations that we have
done in terms of actually taking out small targets with a
relatively small scale laser. So then the challenge becomes,
how do we scale up that capability and, right now, we have got
a demonstrator, effectively a demonstrator, on board the Ponce
[USS Ponce amphibious transport dock ship] on deployment, so it
is beyond technology demonstration. Now we are getting it in
the hands of the fleet to figure out how do we best employ
that.
So that is kind of the state of where we are today. To get
to the rest of your question, which is, how do we ultimately
get it to be a weapons system out in the fleet, and how do we
accommodate that on our platform. So that is the next
challenge.
This technology is a--places a high demand on power systems
for our platforms, and we have--power is precious onboard all
of our ships and, with the introduction of integrated power
systems, first on the surface side with the DDG 1000 [Zumwalt
class guided missile destroyer], we start to see a technology
on the platform side that then accommodates the demand of the
directed energy.
So we do not have a clear point in time or program plan
that we can say, ``On this platform, at this point in time, we
will have rail gun or laser system that will be fleet ready.''
But, we are marching these all along and parallel to get there.
So what I would invite is a question for the record where
we come back and lay out something that represents a roadmap
for these technologies, how we mature the technologies and
then, what that means for our platform to host them.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page ?.]
Mr. Langevin. That would be helpful. Admiral, do you want
to comment?
Admiral Myers. To complement Secretary Stackley, in order
to understand and inform what the future requirements need to
be for our ships and for our warfighting, the Under Secretary
of the Navy established Navy directed energy steering group.
And this steering group is going to develop a roadmap, and
they are going to have near-term over the next 5 years; mid
term, over the next 5 to 10 years; and then a far-term plan so
that that can inform our resource decisions, and the way that
we approach weapons and weaponizing our ships.
Also, although this directed energy working group is
ongoing, as Mr. Stackley pointed out, we are not waiting for
the results. We have done lots of testing when it comes to
lasers, and that goes back to 2008, with the assistance of
congressional adds [add-ons], I might add.
And then in 2012, the USS Dewey was able to demonstrate the
utility of a laser weapons systems in terms of what the impacts
would be against a threat representative of an unmanned aerial
vehicle.
So we are continuing the development, but we also need to
be guided by a steering group and a roadmap that will tell us
what we think we need and what is in the realm of the possible
over the next 5, 10 to 15 years.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, my time has expired. You
have other questions that I will submit to the record, and if
you could respond to those as expeditiously as possible, I
would appreciate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. And if I could follow up on the gentleman from
Rhode Island's question with you, Secretary Stackley.
Obviously, to have the roadmap, you have got to have the
platforms to put them on, and what is the risk of essentially
stopping the bill to the DDG flight to be.
You know, that has been the most successful powerful and
capable warship afloat in favor of fielding the new AMDR [Air
and Missile Defense Radar] radar in the Flight III destroyer.
And we are looking at these power systems, you know, we know we
can do it and put the radar on there, but it kind of limits us
down the road if we want to do what the congressman was talking
about.
This ship will be procured to 2029, and we know it is going
to be in service through the 2060s, have we considered putting
this radar on the LPD 17 or the DDG 1000 hull, and give us the
explanations there if you would.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Back in 2009 timeframe, we
accomplished what we referred to as, ``hull radar study,''
which went after the need to increase our integrated air and
missile defense
capability.
At that time, some of the competing concepts were the DDG
1000 as the platform, the DDG 51 and other platforms, such as,
LPD 17. What we were trying to get at is a total force solution
that would look at platforms, but not platforms alone, also,
netting links and integrating across platforms, radar resource
capability plus the kinetic, you know, the weapon, the SM-3
[Standard Missile 3].
The results of that study were a couple. First, AMDR was
the right technology to invest in for the radar upgrade, and
that has proved itself, that development is going very well.
Second, to determine how much radar capability do you need
at the platform level in order to bring the total ballistic
missile defense capability up against the threat that was sized
in that study. And that threat was based on intel
[intelligence] reports, and it is worth the staff getting an
update on that study in those reports, to put this in the right
context.
But suffice to say that, the complexity of that threat, and
the--I call it the ``ray density and the size,'' was such that
we need to go more than an order of magnitude beyond what we
have today in the SPY-1D(V) [S-band Aegis littoral warfare]
radar.
So we measure that radar capability in terms of dBs
[decibels] above SPY. And the range of capability that we
needed at the platform level, was SPY plus 15 dB to SPY plus 30
dB.
And what that means in terms of size is a SPY plus 15 dB
radar, is larger than what we have today on the DDG 51. But
much of that increased capability comes through the AMDR
technology. So it is slightly larger than what we have today.
SPY plus 30, in fact, would challenge LPD 17. It is a
significant-sized aperture.
So what we settled on was, we know the DDG 51 is going to
be central to the BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] role. We know
we need integrated air missile defense, so we need the AAW
[Anti-Air Warfare] capability of the 51, and we need it in
conjunction with the carrier battle groups that it is
protecting.
And we settled on a size that would give us something
greater than SPY plus 15 capability on the 51 Flight IIIs, for
the radar. To do that, we have to upgrade the power plant.
So, we have got the studies going on today, looking at, we
have got a power plant selected, and now we are looking at the
design impacts associated with the machinery spaces. It is
all--it is engineering work, it is not new discovery.
So those--to studies are going on the platform to support a
downstream decision for the 2016 Flight III ship, so we will
see the--we will get through a milestone decision on the radar
that says it is ready for production.
A milestone decision on the ship side that says that the
upgrades for power and cooling are ready for production, and
then we will be coming back with the budget to the Defense
committees so that you all see exactly what the approach is in
terms of managing the risks, managing the costs, and meeting
the requirements on that platform.
Mr. Forbes. And thank you for your analysis as to how you
are doing that, and our staffs will continue to work your
staffs on making sure we understand the direction you want to
go with that.
Just a couple more questions that we need to finish up
with. Cruisers, I know this is a very sensitive issue. We know,
also, that the Navy is still assessing the feasibility of the
Port Royal, but Congress was pretty clear in the fiscal year
2013 NDAA Defense Appropriations Bill, that it believes it is
essential to maintain our Naval fleet through the expected
service life of the cruisers.
We included the appropriate funding for the modernization
of those assets. A couple questions here, and I don't mean to
be facetious on this: Do we need to do anything else,
legislatively, to make clear our intent of what Congress wanted
to do with the cruisers, or do you feel that the Navy at least
understands the congressional intent of wanting to modernize
and put those monies toward the modernization of the cruisers?
Admiral Myers. Mr. Chairman, first of all, we appreciate
Congress' support in the $2.4 billion that was added in the
ships' modernization and operations and sustainment fund--SMOSF
[Ship Modernization, Operations, and Sustainment Fund]--that
enabled the Navy to retain the seven cruisers and the two LSDs
for fiscal years 2013 and 2014.
Those funds, they expire at the end of the fiscal year
2014.
The Navy originally had those funds--or had those ships
slated to retire because of not being able to afford them.
Congress gave us the money for 2 years, and the Navy intends to
operate those ships for 2 years and then, in the beginning of
fiscal year 2015, our intent is to retire those ships.
Mr. Forbes. So with the money that Congress appropriated to
modernize them, does the Navy plan to spend that money on
modernizing those ships as Congress directed it?
Admiral Myers. The plan that the Navy brought to Congress
was essentially a FYDP plan, a 5-year plan. And in that plan,
the Navy broke up all the different elements that would be
required to sustain and modernize those ships. The people, the
HM&E [Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical], the modernization.
So with 18 months since the appropriations act, until the
time that those funds retire, there isn't enough time to do the
planning or to procure the modernization that would be
required, much less the time to install the upgrades, to use
that portion of the SMOSF funds.
Mr. Forbes. So, it would be fair to say that, right now,
the Navy does not intend to use those monies as a appropriated
by Congress for the modernization of the cruisers?
Admiral Myers. The Navy is assessing, but it is challenging
to----
Mr. Forbes. But you have no intention of doing that right
now, is that correct?
Admiral Myers. We do not. It does not appear that we have
the time to do the planning to procure the parts and then to do
the installation, but we are assessing that, and that is
something that I would like to take for record and get back to
you.
Mr. Forbes. But you haven't forwarded any long-term lead
materials or anything like that and don't plan to do that in
the near future. Is that correct?
Secretary Stackley. That is correct, sir. Let me kind of
summarize. First, Congress' intent was very clear, all four
defense committees came out strongly with regards to the Navy's
plan to early retire the seven cruisers and the LSDs.
And the Secretary, and as you know, we are also consistent
in the testimony last year, and thus far, in the posture
hearings that, we would like to hold onto these ships. This
came down to a difficult budget choices and where to task
risks, but the Department of the Navy would like to hold on to
both the cruisers and the LSDs were it not for the total cost
of operating plus modernizing.
The add by Congress in 2013 as Admiral Myers described, it
arrived halfway through the year. The dollars effectively
expire at the end of 2014, and in this window of time, to put
$2.4 billion to work without the long-term vision in terms of
continuing to sustain and, actually, accomplish modernization,
we can't get there quickly enough.
Mr. Forbes. And I appreciate that analysis. It is fair
analysis that may differ with the outcome, but it is a fair
analysis. I just want you to understand our frustration, which
I know you do, when you then say these are difficult budget
choices, we wanted the cruisers, but we see the fact that we
were cutting $778 billion, and nobody from the Navy said,
``Wait a minute. We really don't want to cut $778 billion. We
might want to use some of this to keep our cruisers.''
That is what is frustrating, Admiral.
Admiral Myers. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add, the Navy
does intend to operate these ships, maintain and operate these
ships, so it is not that we are not using any of the $2.4
billion. I want to make that clear. It is just the
modernization portion that challenges us because the timeframe
that we have to use that money.
Mr. Forbes. And basically, we are foregoing 10 or 12 years
of service life for the cruisers, fair?
Admiral Myers. Yes, that is a fair statement.
Mr. Forbes. Secretary, just a couple of--air force, wind
force, and then we will be wrapped up.
The Ford class carrier. You and I have talked about this,
everybody is doing good jobs. We know it is hard work. But the
estimated costs of CVN 78 has grown 22.3 percent, at least the
numbers that we have since the submission of the fiscal year
2008 budget and 4.1 percent since the submission of fiscal year
2013 budget.
It has been reported that the Administration is considering
a legislative proposal to increase the cost cap of CVN 78 that
was enacted in the fiscal year 2008 NDAA to $12.8 billion. It
is essential that we provide better cost controls on the
program.
We have talked about that, I know both sides are trying to
work on that. Can you just explain to us what steps have been
taken to better control the costs on the Ford class carrier and
what, if anything, we need to do to support you in helping to
do that.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. To understand what is being
done, the controller costs, it is probably best to first
understand what has been driving the costs.
CVN 78 is a near-100-percent redesign of the Nimitz class.
Not just a design but actually the technology and the systems
that are incorporated in that platform. So there were a large
number of development efforts that were ongoing in parallel
with the ships' design phase.
And we have a matter of concurrency of development efforts
that were delayed, design efforts that were delayed, all that
rolling into material procurement that was delayed. All of that
going into production of the carrier and accumulating into a
significant cost growth during the production phase of the
carrier.
So the efforts to contain this are manyfold. One is the
design contract itself was rewritten to do a couple of things.
One to go after things that we could do at that stage of design
to reduce costs, and also, change the type of contract to drive
to a completion contract.
Government-furnished equipment, there is cost growth
associated with Government-furnished equipment. A significant
part associated with the electronic magnetic--electromagnetic
aircraft launching system, and the advanced arresting gear.
To contain costs on that, we basically put that system into
a firm fixed price contract by the vendor, and we put--in fact,
we assigned penalties if the delivery of that system is late.
And since that point in time, that program has been performing
well.
We are installing a dual-band radar on the carrier which
that development, the intent of the CVN 78 was, it would
leverage the development of the dual-band radar from the DDG
1000 program, but when the DDG 1000 program was truncated, and
a part of the effort to reduce the costs on the DDG 1000, the
dual-band radar was reduced on the 1000 to just single-band,
multifunction radar and, therefore, the CVN 78 picked up those
development and integration costs on that program.
So about half of the cost growth on the carrier is
associated with those development efforts earlier on. The--
another part of the previous adjustment to the cost on the
carrier simply associated with inflation.
That contract was awarded in 2008, delivers in 2015, the
cost cap was set early on, and there was an allowance made
for--to account for inflation and, in fact, we exercised that
allowance in the cost cap for inflation, which then brings you
to the last piece, which is production, which we are wrestling
with today.
It is too late to undo the impact associated with
development, and we are suffering through the impacts that have
trickled into the impacts on material procurement, so a lot of
cost growth in production of the CVN 78 is disruption caused by
late material.
The shipbuilder has been turning the industrial base upside
down to do a couple of things. One to get through all of the
first nautical testing as required for these new systems as
quickly as possible.
But second is to find alternative sources where it makes
sense to improve upon delivery to a shipyard. Those are bearing
some fruit, but in the end, not enough to overcome the early
cost trends.
So that is why we have predicted, projected about 2 years
ago, what our estimate of completion would be updated for these
impacts.
Two years later, we are continuing to work on changing that
trend, but there is not enough progress to change the estimate,
and so, we have to come forward with requests for cost cap to
relieve the associated funding to go towards completion of the
carrier. And we have to keep the press on in terms of the
remaining production and test activities.
Mr. Forbes. Well, we thank you for the good work you have
done in doing that, and the contractor. We may have to be
talking about what kind of milestones we can just get to make
sure we are assuring that those costs are being contained so
that we can justify that to our other members who have to vote
on these dollars.
But thank you for that effort. One last question for the
Navy. The LCS, I know both of you are familiar with that, we
have talked about it, I think overall, the development program
is doing well. Admiral, I understand you have got to do the
deployment to see exactly what utilization you are going to
have for these vessels.
But here is the one conceptual question that I have to ask
both of you to get on the record. We are looking at the fact
that this is a little bit different because of the modular
mission packages, and normally when we have a ship that is
ready to deploy, and it goes and does what it is supposed to
do.
Some of those module mission packages, we are not going to
have the complete package for probably 5 years down the road.
And, at that time, we are going to probably have about 25 of
the 52 vessels already intact, and if they have got a 20-year
hull life on them we are talking about using, a sizable portion
of that hull life before we have to fully, the modular mission
packages, fully ready to go.
Can you just kind of deal with that issue, and if you have
thought through that and what we need to explain that to our
members.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. First, I would argue that the
modular approach to the LCS mission package is the strength of
the program. And you are correct that the full operational
capability associated with the three mission packages across
the two versions of the LCS, doesn't--that full operational
capability doesn't come until late in the FYDP.
But the incremental approach that we have outlined for that
capability is ensuring that as the ships are delivered to the
fleet, that we are able to marry up the increments of the
mission packages as the ships are ready for fleet operations.
So for example, I described at the mine countermeasure
mission package, IOC, currently scheduled for late 2014, we
will work through the funding issues, to try to hold on to that
schedule.
But what we are going to field then, will be increment one.
And increment one will provide a level of capability, equal to
or greater than, what we have in the fleet today. So it gives
us confidence that, when we get increment one out there, we can
start to deploy mine-countermeasure-capable LCSs in the 2015
timeframe.
But the full capability associated with that mission
package we will continue to follow in subsequent increments,
and that full capability includes filling gaps that we cannot
fill today.
So, rather than hold the program, waiting for the full
capability of the mission package, we are going to go ahead and
field the first increment when we got a level of capability
equal to or greater than what we have today, and as the follow-
on technologies are ready, we will introduce those in such a
fashion it doesn't disrupt the platform or the mission package,
which is the way it was
designed.
So it is really a strength that we don't have to go in, rip
anything out, but as the separate technologies complete their
separate testing, they get to be integrated in with the mission
package.
That is the mine countermeasures and following suit on that
is surface warfare. In fact, the Freedom is deployed today with
the version of the surface warfare mission package, and we
continue to improve upon that with subsequent increments, so
she is able to deploy today, but then, by the 2017/2018
timeframe that you refer to, she will, in fact, be further
capable in what we are deploying today.
And then the third mission package is the ASW [Anti-
Submarine Warfare] which probably, rightfully is--we try to
array these in accordance with need, and that mission package
is under development today, but we are using mature
technologies in that case. And the issue then becomes
integrating them onto the LCS
platform.
Mr. Forbes. Good. One question for the Air Force and either
both of you take this. We are concerned, as you are, with
sequestration and its impacts. As to sequestration impacts and
the fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 budget assumptions by
the Department, that sequestration will somehow be undone, the
subcommittee is concerned about the impacts of funding
shortfalls related to high priority programs, such as, the KC-
46 refueling tanker, and the new Long Range Strike Bomber.
How will you prioritize these programs within your Service,
and more importantly, what impact will our national security
incur if these critical capabilities are delayed?
General Davis. Sir, thank you. Those two programs make up
three of the top priority programs in the United States Air
Force, and they comprise about 27 percent of our budget, the
bomber, the tanker, and the F-35 [Lightning II Joint Strike
Fighter] program.
And so, these are clearly priorities within our budget as
we look to meet, you know, the new defense strategy which has
us looking about how we fly in denied areas and into anti-
access areas, notably in the Pacific.
We were grateful for the fact that H.R. 933 [Consolidated
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013] actually
funded the required level we needed to protect the very
valuable fixed-price contract on the KC-46, so we see, as
General Allardice mentioned in his statement, that program
going quite well.
As we looked at the sequestration impacts to the very early
phases of the Long Range Strike Bomber, the team was able to
handle that 9 percent or so cut within it is development by
kind of working around certain issues and being able to
structure the program just a little differently in the very
early phases.
So they had some flexibility to preserve that. As it moves
into some of its more important phases in the next year, so
that flexibility for another levy somewhere out there, would
all but be gone, so I think you can understand, that since
those are our top three programs, those are critical that we
protect those in the outyears.
Mr. Forbes. And I think the programs are going well. You
are kind enough to give us some good briefings on those, but
can you--what can you tell us for the record if those programs
were delayed, how would it impact our national security?
So we can make sure they are not delayed.
General Davis. Sir, I am going to let--I will let General
Allardice talk about specifically the tanker, which is in his
portfolio. Let me talk about the bombers. Every one of you who
had mentioned something about the age of our bomber fleet was
approaching 37-plus years.
Our B-2 [Spirit stealth bomber], which is our newest
airplane, is already on the verges of 30 years old. I was there
when I saw that first airplane fly, and that just seems like
decades ago. We have money, a lot of money, scattered through
the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] to be able to maintain
both--or all of the B-1 [Lancer strategic bomber], the B-52
[Stratofortress strategic bomber], the B-2, throughout what we
hope will be 2040 and
beyond.
But it is money that doesn't provide a new capability. It
really, if you will, treads water just trying to match the new
threat that appears on the horizon every day.
We are reacting to every threat that those bombers are
going to have to penetrate. We are not leading the fight in
that, if you will. We are not bringing in the new capability
that the threat has to react to. We are just surviving
diminishing parts. We are surviving new threat radar modes. We
are surviving new missile technologies, and so, I don't know
how we do that for another three decades.
So that is why the Long Range Strike Bomber is absolutely
critical to that.
Mr. Forbes. And how about the tanker?
General Allardice. Sir, thank you, and as you indicate, our
program is going well today. As a reminder, 54 years, average
age, today. The tanker the KC-46 will show up in 2017 to start.
And we will field that over a number of years, and when we end
the fielding of the KC-46, the KC-135 will be 80 years old.
As a pilot, flown the 135, loved it to death, the first one
I flew is the same age as I am. I hope I am alive to fly it
when it is 80 years old. It is hard for me to comprehend,
particularly in light, as General Davis said, a requirement to
go into anti-access/area-denial areas.
So delaying the program today, which is a firm fixed price,
we believe we have a very good deal with the contractor. Any
delays puts that at risk, drives the cost up, per unit cost, up
to a level that I doubt we would save anything, and we would
just be putting our force at risk.
Mr. Forbes. I think Mr. Langevin had a final question, sir?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Stackley
and Admiral Myers, given the importance and increasing
complexity of cyber-related issues, as our system is getting
increasingly complex, interconnected, and interdependent, how
are you procuring to ensure that systems are able to function
in warfighting environments, where our data links may be
degraded or denied or where the networks may be under
significant strain from cyber attacks. That is one question.
The other question I had is, given the potential
capabilities of unmanned, under sea vehicles promised to
provide, will you please give us a brief update on the Navy's
plans for these systems?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start with your second
question, unmanned vehicles. Clearly, one of the priorities for
the Secretary of the Navy has been to expand our employment of
unmanned vehicles, both the surface and underwater as well as
air.
We have got a number of developments that are ongoing, a
number of prototypes that are in operation and, in fact, we
have accelerated the deployment of certain capabilities. So for
example, we employed an underwater surveillance system, its
acronym was PLUS [Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance],
persistent long range underwater surveillance, to demonstrate
not just the ability of technology to capture data, at sea,
over long periods of time, but actually to employ that in an
operationally relevant environment.
And that has led to continued emphasis for that capability.
Separately, I described on the discussion on the LCS
efforts that are going into the mine countermeasure mission
package, a central element of the MCM mission package, is the
remote mine hunting system which is a semisubmersible unmanned
vehicle, and that is, perhaps, our most mature surface or
subsurface unmanned vehicle.
But then, coming around to the submarine program, we are
looking at large displacement UUVs [Unmanned Underwater
Vehicle] and the ability to deploy the LDUUV [Large Diameter
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle] with the payloads that it would
bring to extend the reach and the capability of the submarine.
So these are three quick snapshots. Double that number in
terms of what is going on the air side, to bring the maturity
to the fight in as rapid a fashion as we can through a
combination of development and, in certain cases, we are
leveraging urgent needs to accelerate the fielding of those
capabilities.
Admiral Myers. Thank you. And just to complement what
Secretary Stackley said, and I will start with the protecting
the infrastructure first with cyber and then finish up with our
unmanned programs.
Developing a cyber workforce is very important for the
Navy. And taking that workforce and that approach into our
ships and protecting our ships, so one example that is in our
President's Budget 2014 submit, is the consolidated afloat
network and enterprise services gains that is going to be on
our next--on our ships and with our next-generation network
ashore.
So if this is going to reduce the number of Navy networks
and applications and it continues to expand the inspection of
cyber hygiene with improved results. So we think that at least
with the training of the people and the backbone that we are
going to have on our shifts, and the way we are approaching our
shore establishments that, we are on the right track.
When it comes to unmanned systems, we have a number of
activities and, as Mr. Stackley correctly highlighted, in a
number of different areas. I mean, it goes all the way from the
X-47B, the UCAS [Unmanned Combat Air System] demonstration
which goes to the USS Bush.
She has already completed the sea trials when she was on
the USS Harry S. Truman, and this spring, we will take it to
the next level. We have the UCLASS program which is by fiscal
year 2020. We are going to have enhanced reach and persistence
that will come off of our interior strike groups, and Mr.
Stackley already highlighted undersea, the large diameter UUV,
what we are doing there.
So we continue across the spectrum to advance our unmanned
systems.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you for your time----
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time
today. As we mentioned at the outset, this is the transcript
that we have to use to do our portion of the defense
authorization markup, so it is very crucial to us, and we thank
you for your time. And as I said at the beginning, I want to
take just a moment now and Admiral Myers and Secretary
Stackley, I want to begin with you.
Is there anything that you believe we have mischaracterized
today or any question that you didn't to fully respond to, or
is there something that you think is important to get on the
record that we need to have on there before we do the markup.
And Admiral, we will start with you.
Admiral Myers. Well, thank you, Chairman. There were a
couple of questions that were addressed to both Secretary
Stackley and myself, and Secretary Stackley did a marvelous job
of responding, but I also wanted to make sure that, as you went
to the next question, that I had a chance to----
Mr. Forbes. Sure.
Admiral Myers [continuing]. Since it was addressed to both
of us. The first one has to do with the LCS and the mission
packages, and I concur with everything Secretary Stackley said,
but I just want to reinforce that, the Navy feels like we have
LCS in the mission package procurement and development right.
When you look at the three different mission packages, the
surface, the antisubmarine and combined countermeasure mission
packages, they each have an initial operations or operable date
that we intend to field them in the fleet. And with the surface
package, that is in fiscal year 2014, we intend to procure 24
of those.
With the ASW package, that is going to IOC in 2016, with
16--and eventually we will have 16 packages and then with the
mine countermeasure, it is again in fiscal year 2014, with 24
packages and is a program objective.
Now just looking at the MCM packages, again, like Secretary
Stackley said, this is an improvement over what we have today.
So we already--we procured four MCM packages in the increment
one. Two of them have been delivered, and we are expecting the
other two later this year.
This improvement will be succeeded as we develop increased
capability that we can modularize and put in eventual increment
two, increment three and increment four in the future, so we
will have more and more capable MCM mission packages on our
Littoral Combat Ships.
When you look at the procurement rate of the ships and the
way that we are developing these packages, we think we have it
about right.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. Mr. Secretary, thank you
again, and anything----
Secretary Stackley. Sir, I just want to first thank you for
your support, the committee's support throughout the past
rather difficult budget year. I mean, not too long ago we were
staring at the prospects of a yearlong continuing resolution,
and thankfully, that is behind us.
And as we work through the impact associated with
sequestration, you have our commitment to work closely with
your staff because, realistically, our adjustments associated
with sequestration, will directly affect your deliberations on
the 2014 budget, and we both need to keep those closely coupled
so that we end up on the backside with the right results.
Your questions regarding what has happened to the
projection of the topline over the next decade, we will get
back to you on that. But the specific question regarding
whether or not the Services have raised their hand to say we
can't get there from here.
As you well know, we do balance requirements and budget,
and one of the things that we have got do under all
circumstances is articulate what impacts are and what the risks
are. And that is what we attempt to do year in, year out, as
the budget cycle turns, first inside the building and then as
the budget comes over the Hill with the committees, so that you
all can do your job, not just in terms of oversight, but just
like your placard states, just like the Constitution states to
provide and maintain a Navy, you need those insights with
regards to what is the impact on national security at this
budget level, with this program that you have brought forward
and that is our commitment to you.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, we thank you.
Nobody knows the long hours all of you pull outside of
these hearings and we appreciate them and respect you all for
it and want to work closely with you on that.
Admiral--I am sorry?
Admiral Myers. Is this an opportunity for closing or?
Mr. Forbes. I tell you what let----
Admiral Myers. Or are you going----
Mr. Forbes. No, you go right ahead and do that as part of
this as we go down the line, so Admiral----
Admiral Myers. Okay, I want to make sure I didn't miss an
opportunity.
Mr. Forbes. No, no, this is yours.
Admiral Myers. Okay, well thanks.
I want to thank Congress for the fiscal year 2013 National
Defense Authorization Act and the 2013 Defense Appropriations
Bill.
Based on our strategies and policies, we are using these
funds to pay our civilian personnel, must-pay bills, reconcile
our fiscal year 2013 readiness and sustain the operations and
maintain those ships and airplanes that are priority for forces
that are going to deploy for fiscal year 2013 for the rest of
the year and prepare for the fiscal year 2014 Global Forces
Management Allocation Plan, the GFMAP.
We are also using those funds to restore critical base
operations and renovations. Now, we are still working through
the impacts of fiscal year 2013 sequestration and we know that
sequestration is going to impact our fleet and bases in a way
that is going to make them less ready than we planned for.
So the funding that has impacted us across the Navy has
been about 8 percent. This will likely result, when you look at
the procurement side, in fewer weapons and aircraft and it is
going to increase our ship construction costs and manifest
itself in time to complete or later initial operating dates.
I ask for your support for the fiscal year 2014 budget
request and thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf
of the 613,000 Navy sailors and civilians operating around the
world.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Secretary, anything else that you have?
General, you have anchored both of these two groups today.
We thank you for the great job the Marine Corps always does.
You are always great leaders and you have done such an
admirable job for us for so many years, thank you for being
here.
Same question to you, anything we need to get on the record
for the Marine Corps that you think is important as we go into
this markup?
General Mills. Mr. Chairman, just let me add to the thanks
on behalf of all your marines for the support that you give and
the support the entire committee gives to what the Marines do
today and what we are--have to be doing in the future.
And just once again, to reemphasize the criticality of the
ACV program to us and to our core competencies and to the
effort that we are putting into it to ensure that we meet the
affordability options but also to maintain that capability for
this Nation in a time of crisis.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you. Thank you.
General Mills. Thank you for the opportunity.
Mr. Forbes. It is important that we get that on the record
so we can make sure we are letting our members know that.
General Davis, once again, thank you and General Allardice
for all; you have done. My question to you, the same thing, is
there anything we mischaracterized today that you want to
correct or any questions that we left out that you think is
important to say and this is your time to get it on the record.
General Davis. Sir, just a couple of things.
I want to say first of all, you personally have reached out
to many of us to ask our inputs on some situations that are
going on and I want to thank you for that and the committee's
support as been mentioned here today. That kind of dialogue is
invaluable and as Secretary Stackley mentioned, we don't get
through 2014, 2015 and 2016 and out unless we can continue that
open dialogue with you and your committee and I appreciate that
opportunity.
We will get back to you as directed on these funding
issues. The only thing I will add is that in the Air Force, we
have seen that as we have the ability to use the expert airmen
we have to try to build a structure to meet whatever number we
are given, we believe we have the capability to manage a lot.
It is when that capability to shape our force structure with
the consent and advice of Congress gets taken out of our hands,
we have an issue and so, I--we need to come back to you with
how we have dealt with and how our leadership has answered
that.
I also want to thank you through the questions and through
the answers the very intricate and detailed and exquisite
master class I had on shipbuilding here today and it gives me
great confidence that as we expand our CONOPS [concept of
operations] with the Navy and the Marine Corps and the other
Services on air-sea battle that we are going to have some great
and capable partners as we go through this.
I do want to mention though that United States Air Force
has the daunting requirement to be able to move anything around
the world at any time as General Allardice mentioned and in
addition to be able to strike any spot on the world at any time
and we do that through the great support aircraft we have,
through the mobility aircraft tankers and also through the
long-range bombers that are a very key element of power
projection which did not get much notice here today.
And I want to mention the fact that we struggle with
keeping that fleet, as you had noted a couple of times, viable
as parts of that fleet will reach 80 years old or more before
it is replaced, we are worried about what the outyear numbers
of our budgets will do to that and we are going to do
everything we can to continue to modernize not only the B-2 but
the B-1 and the B-52.
We have significant amounts of our Air Force TOA [Table of
Allowance] going into our budgets throughout the FYDP. And as
you mentioned, the Long Range Strike Bomber has about $380
million this year and about $8.8 billion across the FYDP. We
are putting in excess of around $500 million in the B-52 just
to be able to bring it into the 20th century so to speak with
digital weapons as well as data links that can command it and
control it in any spot of the globe beyond line of sight and
that is something that is well overdue for that venerable
platform.
Even the B-1, which has proven to be a quite capable, even
close air support airframe over in Afghanistan which will now
turn its eyes, if you will, further west, is going to have
about $608 million put into it over the FYDP to be able to
bring integrated capabilities to and including data links and
improved situation for the pilots.
But the B-2 again, as I said, just to be able to get it to
match the threat across the FYDP is going to require about $5
billion. That will just bring the capabilities so it can
recognize the threats that exist out in the denied and anti-
access areas. It will give it some capability to communicate
back and it will give it better capability to receive nuclear
command and control messages and that is going to be important.
But as I look at our bomber fleet, we have to remember
that, again, we put that fleet any place in the world at any
time and it probably would be worth imagining what went through
the minds of the North Koreans as those airplanes were over
their country and they couldn't do a dadgum thing about it.
And so, that is why there is so much of the Air Force
budget going into these airplanes. But I say again, all we have
been able to do is react to what the threat is and as a student
of air power and of having been involved in this situation, the
last thing you want to be as an airman is predictable because
that makes you just a target.
And so, that brings us back to the long range strike bomber
which constantly receives questions about why another bomber if
these airplanes are going to be around for 40-plus years? That
airplane is going to be the beneficiary of 20-plus years of
technology development on other airframes and other classified
programs and avionics that exist on F-22s [Raptor fighter jet]
and F-35s. And that will get us to these areas of the world
where we can't necessarily survive for lengthy periods of time
today. It will make us be the one that is driving the threat
reaction, not driving our budget to fit whatever is going on in
that part of the world.
So I appreciate the support your committee's giving for
that. I do see that as being a very key cornerstone of the
United States Air Force in the future since it is our core
mission to strike anywhere in the world at any time. So I
appreciate the support for that.
And I thank you for the chance to get in a few comments.
Mr. Forbes. General, I thank you for those.
And one of the things I want you to know too is how much we
respect your Department, it is ability to give us a lot of
these detailed questions that we have been doing on
shipbuilding, we have been doing with you guys but y'all been
giving it to us in classified settings, you know. But we
appreciate that.
The second thing is if anything history has taught us in
the last few years, it is so important to have partnerships
when we see these budget cuts and the sequestration, we can
scream about it and yell about it but unless we hear you guys
coming in here giving us that picture to give to these
policymakers, we will continue to see these lines. That is why
we push so hard to get those pictures of what those risks
really are so that we can paint them.
But thank you for the great work that the Air Force is
doing and that you personally do.
General Allardice. Thank you, Chairman, I am honored.
One point of clarification to follow up with Congressman
Runyan that the--one of the points with working with the CRAF
as we consider legislation or policy is to maintain decision
space for the combatant commander. We don't want to put that at
risk and that is really a point to reinforce.
Thank you.
I really appreciate my brother's articulation about holding
the target at risk anywhere in the world. Halfway around the
world is about 12,500 miles; that is, for the average person,
that is like flying coast to coast in the United States four
times nonstop. That is really hard to do. When we put a B-2 out
to fly over Korea and say hey take off out of the United States
and from the United States and go perform that mission. The
capability that brings to bear is a pretty impressive
capability.
Behind the scenes there are at least four air refuelings
one way. In order to execute that, we have to have an en-route
structure, something we don't hear very much about, little
parts around the world where we can place our tanker force so
that we can deliver that capability and then we also have in
the airlift business our contingency response force which are
the men and women that go right after and air--seizure to allow
us to accelerate the flow of the logistics movement.
My point here is that as we draw down and we start to
reposture our force because of the new strategy, something we
have to really be attuned to is that in order to hold targets
at risk anywhere in the world, we have to have a balanced force
throughout the world in order to be able to fly 12,500 miles
unrefueled to either deliver a bomb or a hope package.
Thank you for your time, sir.
Mr. Forbes. General Allardice, we thank you for your
service and let me just tell you, we don't want you to be
predictable and we want you to be cutting-edge, we don't want
to lie on our laurels and the other thing we all want to be
committed to making sure of is that our budgets are not driving
our strategy but our strategy is driving our budget and we all
work together, we can get that as a nation.
And with that, I thank you all and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 24, 2013
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=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 24, 2013
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces
Hearing on
Oversight of U.S. Naval and U.S. Air Force
Acquisition Programs in the Fiscal Year 2014
National Defense Authorization Budget Request
April 24, 2013
I want to welcome all our members and our distinguished
panel of experts to today's hearing that will focus on the
Administration's Fiscal Year 2014 budget request.
In the decade ahead I believe we will increasingly lean on
our Seapower and Projection forces to underpin our national
security strategy. Our naval forces are deployed around the
world, protecting the world's sea lanes and operating forward
to deter conflict. Our projection forces are uniquely ready to
support a wide range of mobility, strike, and strategic
deterrence missions around the globe.
While I am pleased at the capabilities provided by our
forces today, the long-term outlook of our defense posture is
being challenged. Naval forces embarked on Carrier Strike
Groups and Amphibious Readiness Groups routinely deploy 7 to 8
months. Because of the Navy's sustained surge, our nuclear
aircraft carriers are depleting their nuclear reactor
propulsion units at accelerating rates. Our bomber fleet
averages 37 years old and our venerable tanker fleet averages
an even older 48 years.
While we are meeting the minimum requirements of our ever-
retreating national strategy, it is painfully obvious that our
future readiness is being leveraged to pay for our current
requirements. The most recent example of the Administration's
direction is the 30-year shipbuilding plan that was partially
submitted on Monday. The Administration once again proposes the
early retirement of seven cruisers and two amphibious ships in
fiscal year 2015, well before the end of their service lives.
With 31 ships being retired over just the next 2 years, we are
headed towards a fleet size of 270 battle force ships by FY15.
Decline is a choice, and I believe this new plan willingly
chooses to continue the slow, painful decline of robust
American Seapower.
The plan also includes a significant increase to the
overall ship construction budget to accommodate the Ohio class
ballistic missile submarine replacement. At over $5 billion,
these strategic investments in our nuclear triad are essential.
I remain concerned that during the procurement and construction
of the Ohio class replacement the shipbuilding budget will
demand an average of $19 billion per year. To fund both this
new boat and the battle force it will take either a substantial
increase in the shipbuilding account or an effort to fund the
Ohio class replacement from outside this account. I look
forward to continuing to work with the Department and the Navy
to address this funding shortfall.
During the Navy posture hearing earlier this month,
military leaders indicated that they were pleased at the
investment in the ship construction accounts and highlighted
the dearth of ships in construction when they took office. To
arrest this decline, this Administration embraced a plan that
includes an aggressive strategy to build a moderately capable
surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship that adds
over 50 ships over the term of the plan. But unfortunately, the
mission modules that are integral to support this 20-year
seaframe are still in the research and development,
complicating the Navy's ability to respond to basic mine
countermeasure missions and antisubmarine missions. Just as the
fleet is shrinking from the retirement and procurement of less
major surface combatants and amphibious ships, we are filling
these shortfalls with smaller surface combatants and support
vessels. We need to take steps to arrest the decline of our
battle force fleet.
As to the Air Force projection forces, I am pleased that we
may be initiating the semblance of a credible recapitalization
plan. With the support of an investment in the KC-46 tanker
program and strategic emphasis on the Long Range Strike Bomber,
I believe that the Air Force is on the right path with the
right platforms for our Nation's future. I look forward to
supporting these continued investments in our mobility and
projection forces capabilities.
As to the Marine Corps, I understand the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle is the Marine Corps top priority for ground force
modernization and the Marines have completed the required
analysis of alternatives. We need to get this program right for
the future of the Marine Corps and I look forward to receiving
an update on this critical program.
I would be remiss if I also did not recognize the Navy in
providing a credible long-term acquisition strategy that uses
block-buy and multiyear procurements to secure steep reductions
in overall naval pricing. Not only is this a good strategy for
our Nation's taxpayers, it provides the long-term surety to our
industrial base that will allow them to make critical
investments for their long-term health.
My friends, we are at a strategic inflection point in terms
of our defense policy. Concurrent with the new strategy being
contemplated by this Administration, my fear is that the
overall capabilities of our military will continue to atrophy
and our inability to be able to operate forward and project
power will embolden regional instability. In the end, further
defense reductions will be paid for in the lives of our service
members. I refuse to accept this premise and will do everything
in my power to arrest further decline by modernizing and
growing our capabilities.
Joining us today to discuss the fiscal year 2014 budget
request are five distinguished and patriot gentlemen:
LHonorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition;
LVice Admiral Allen G. Myers, USN, Deputy
Chief Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources;
LLieutenant General Richard P. Mills, USMC,
Deputy Commander for Combat Development and
Integration;
LLieutenant General Charles Davis, USAF,
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition; and
LLieutenant General Robert R. Allardice, USAF,
Vice Commander of the Air Mobility Command.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here.
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?
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 24, 2013
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 24, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Secretary Stackley. The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011
established caps for discretionary spending and reduced funding using
two methods.
The first method immediately reduced discretionary spending by $900
billion across the 10-year period from FY 2012 to FY2021. This
reduction was divided between ``security'' and ``non-security''
functions. The Department of Defense (DOD) share was $487 billion. This
reduction was included in the President's Budget submission for FY
2013.
The second method reduces discretionary spending by $1.2 trillion
over 10 years. The first step was the creation of a Joint Committee to
recommend legislation to meet the reduction goal. In the event the
Joint Committee did not propose legislation, or Congress failed to pass
the recommended legislation, a sequester would take place to reduce
``defense'' and ``non-defense'' discretionary spending. This reduction
is being implemented in the FY 2013 budget, but is not included in the
President's Budget submission for FY 2014. [See page 10.]
Admiral Myers. To my knowledge, Navy leaders have not said ``Too
many cuts, we shouldn't be taking this.'' We have been consistent in
describing how senior DOD leaders conducted an assessment of the
ability of our force to implement the new Defense Strategic Guidance
(DSG). The Navy also assessed the capabilities, training, and the
number and type of ships and aircraft required to execute the strategy.
We determined the force supported by the FY13 and FY14 President's
budget submissions was able to execute the strategy with acceptable
risk. [See page 11.]
Admiral Myers. The Navy submitted an unfunded requirements list for
FY12 to the HASC that included $367 million for depot-maintenance work
on surface ships and $317 million rotary and fixed-wing aircraft spare
parts. An unfunded requirements list was not submitted for FY13 because
the Navy's FY13 budget request was balanced to requirements and aligned
with the new Defense Strategic Guidance. [See page 25.]
General Mills. On 6 June 2013, the Secretary of Defense submitted
the Services' unfunded priorities in a letter to Chairman McKeon;
enclosed was a letter from General Amos to Chairman McKeon describing
the Marine Corps' unfunded priorities. These unfunded requirements
would enable the Marine Corps to meet FY2014 emergent, priority mission
requirements should additional funds above those already requested in
the FY2014 President's Budget be made available.
The Marine Corps' unfunded requirements list is composed of four
programs: Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force--Crisis Response
(SPMAGTF-CR), the Marine Security Guard (MSG) program, Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), and Marine-Forces Cyber. SPMAGTF-CR is a new, regionally
based Marine Air Ground Task Force that provides immediate crisis
response capability in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders,
portions of which have already been deployed to Libya. The expansion of
the MSG program follows the need for, and Congressional direction to
provide, expanded support to U.S. State Department diplomatic missions
abroad. Restoral of funding for the JSF would buy-back one F-35B
aircraft lost as a result of sequestration in FY2013 and return the
program to pre-sequestration procurement levels in FY2014. Additional
funding for Marine Forces Cyber would allow the Marine Corps to fully
support mandated requirements for U.S. Cyber Command in FY2014.
While each of these programs is crucial to the Nation's defense, it
must be reiterated that additional funds for these emergent FY2014
requirements and critical capabilities cannot come at the expense of
programs and capabilities resourced through the FY2014 President's
Budget Submission. Any changes to that submission would adversely
impact operational capability and readiness. [See page 11.]
General Allardice. Chairman, during the Fiscal Year 2013 Air Force
Posture Hearings, the Service supported the Fiscal Year 2013
Presidential Budget which included cuts mandated by the Budget Control
Act of 2011. This act reduced Department of Defense funding by $487
billion over 10 years. As part of those hearings we highlighted the
Budget Control Act cuts came with increased risk and any further cuts
or reductions would challenge our ability to maintain readiness and
long-term modernization requirements. [See page 11.]
General Davis. During the FY13 AF Posture Hearings, the Service
supported the FY13PB which included cuts mandated by the Budget Control
Act of 2011 which reduced DOD funding by $487B over 10 years. We
highlighted the BCA cuts came with increased risk and any further cuts
or reductions would challenge our ability to maintain readiness and
long-term modernization requirements. [See page 11.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Secretary Stackley. The development and ship integration of energy-
intensive systems such as directed energy weapons (DEW) (e.g. high-
energy lasers (HEL) and High Powered Radio Frequency (HPRF)) and
Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG) weapons require careful engineering
considerations. Naval shipboard integration considerations include
space, weight, services (e.g., power, cooling) and stability effects as
well as impacts on the combat systems and fire control capabilities and
interfaces. Continued technical maturity and future shipboard
integration will be accomplished through a measured approach to the
allocation or upgrade of shipboard services and integration of weapon
capabilities with interfacing shipboard
systems.
The Navy's near-term focus is on the solid state laser quick
reaction capability (SSL-QRC) program, which will field a pre-
production combat prototype based on the Laser Weapon System (LaWS),
and the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) program. SSL-
QRC (LaWS) is planned to deploy to the Persian Gulf in 2014 onboard the
USS PONCE to demonstrate the ability to meet operational gaps in ship
self defense missions against armed small boats and unmanned aerial
vehicle threats. Long-term (beyond the current FYDP) Navy DE plans
include the development of weaponized HPRF systems operating in the
radio frequency spectrum and development of the Free Electron Laser
(FEL) that has the potential for operations at much higher power
levels.
SSL-TM will help determine the load capacity and most effective
means to integrate a HEL on other naval surface combatants, such as
DDG-51 and the Littoral Combat Ship. The SSL-TM goal is to demonstrate
a one hundred to one-hundred and fifty (100-150) kilowatt Advanced
Development Model (ADM) prototype with much greater ranges of
effectiveness/lethality suitable for long-term shipboard installation
by 2016. The SSL-TM program is expected to address key technical
challenges in ruggedized laser subsystems, optics suitable for long-
term maritime environmental exposure, and the capability to repeatedly
propagate lethal power levels to viable targets through difficult
maritime atmospheric conditions. The SSL-TM prototype will include
sufficient maturity to commence an acquisition program of record.
Concurrent with SSL-TM, The Navy will conduct an Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) in FY14 on the feasibility and utility of developing
a laser-based DEW system. This analysis will provide benchmarks for
cost, schedule and performance requirements including shipboard
integration issues of a shipboard laser weapon system. The AoA will
also analyze various laser weapon options and assess those options
against current kinetic weapons for effectiveness, engagement cost, and
system life-cycle costs. Laser options will be based on the projected
capability of ONR's SSL-TM program and lethality data derived from the
SSL-QRC (LaWS) deployment on USS PONCE. Based on the results of the
AoA, Capability Development Documents will be written for systems
selected for transition to an Acquisition program for development,
testing and then to be installed in the Fleet.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) initiated the EMRG Innovative
Naval Prototype (INP) in FY05 to explore maturation of electromagnetic
technologies. INP Phase 1 demonstrated the technical feasibility of the
launcher barrel life, industry manufacturing of prototypes, single-shot
pulsed power and projectile components at a relevant energy level to
32MJ. INP Phase 2 (FY12-FY17) will validate the repetition-rate
capability of 10 rounds per minute for the barrel and pulsed power
including the thermal management and auto loader. INP Phase 2 will
produce the tactical barrel and repetition rate pulsed power matured to
a Technical Readiness Level (TRL) of 6, consistent with size, weight
and volume required for navy ship
applications.
DEWs and electric weapons (e.g. EMRG) generally demand significant
electric power from the ship's distribution system. Energy storage
systems, including batteries, limit the impact of these large transient
loads and provide temporary electrical power beyond the ship's
generating capacity. These energy intensive systems also represent
significant thermal loads that must be mitigated by the ship's cooling
systems. Some current fleet platforms can support these electric
weapons, but none without at least some modification. The scope of the
modification depends on the desired muzzle energy (EMRG) or optical
output power (HEL) and operational concept for the weapon (repetition
rate, engagement timeline).
As a result of its current technological progress, the potential to
contribute to multiple warfighting gaps, and projected shift of cost
curve in favor of U.S. defense against adversaries, our warfighting
analysis justifies continued pursuit of EMRG. However, due to the
current state of EMRG technology the Navy is still developing a roadmap
for integrating EMRG for use aboard surface ship combatants. ONR, Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) staffs have explored potential ship and weapon
system integration options for EMRG. As a result of these ship studies,
Navy is focusing on the most viable options, DDG-51 and DDG-1000, due
to their greater available space, weight and services growth margins.
Follow-on studies will concentrate on ship configuration; required
power and cooling; and the combat systems interface. Platform
integration challenges include the power requirements of a 32MJ EMRG,
as well as adequate space and/or weight allowance for batteries and
capacitors.
While very energy-intensive weapons systems are not currently
mature enough for fielding today on U.S. naval combatants, continued
progress on the technologies covered in the Naval DE Roadmap efforts
(i.e. HEL, HPRF), and the EMRG effort are projected to result in
capabilities that can meet future formal requirements. As part of the
Navy's Two-Pass Six-Gate review process for major defense acquisition
programs, a Gate 6 Configuration Steering Board (CSB) is conducted
annually for each ship Class. Once a DEW has reached a sufficient level
of maturity, the CSB could review the candidate technology along with
the relevant requirements and cost information to determine if
transitioning the capability to an acquisition program and
incorporation into the ship class is warranted. If inclusion is
warranted, the CSB would also determine on which hull the candidate
technology would be incorporated. For technology that provides
significant capability increase but also presents a significant
installation impact to a ship, the capability benefits and costs will
have to be weighed with installation occurring during new ship
construction to minimize cost, if pursued. If the installation impact
is less, the technology could be included as part of a back fit or post
delivery installation.
On April 29, 2013 the Commander NAVSEA signed the Naval Power
Systems (NPS) Technology Development Roadmap (TDR). The NPS TDR aligns
electric power system developments with warfighter needs, including
support for DEWs and other energy-intensive weapons and sensors for
shipboard use, to ensure that future Navy ships are capable of
accepting the power and cooling loads of such systems as they are
developed. This roadmap addresses both new construction integration and
back fit of technologies into ships already in service. While specific
in its recommendations, the NPS TDR is designed to adapt to evolving
technical requirements from weapons and sensors system developments as
well as changes in the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. The NPS TDR
will be updated approximately every 2 years. The NPS TDR \1\ represents
a roadmap for these ship power technologies, how we plan to mature the
technologies and then, how these technologies can support fielding of
energy-intensive systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The NPS TDR is retained in the committee files and can be
viewed upon request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To incorporate DEWs and other high powered weapons and sensors into
ship platforms, the NPS TDR has introduced the concept of an Energy
Magazine to provide the interface and the required power from the
ship's electrical system to the high powered weapons and sensors. The
Energy Magazine will initially support near-term applications such as a
HEL on a legacy platform with a 450VAC ship's power interface. As new
mission systems become available for ship integration, the Energy
Magazine can be expanded to accommodate multiple loads by providing the
appropriate power conversion and energy storage. A standard set of load
interface definitions for future weapons and sensors will enable a
competitive open architecture approach for a multifunctional Energy
Magazine.
The Under Secretary of the Navy approved Naval Directed Energy
Steering Group is currently drafting a near-term (2-5 years) Naval DE
roadmap based on the approved Naval DE Vision and DE Strategy to
establish strategic goals, guiding principles, mission area priorities,
roles and responsibilities, and overarching objectives regarding the
acquisition and fielding of DEWs across the Navy and Marine Corps. This
roadmap will also address the way ahead for the platform requirements
(power and cooling) necessary to support these systems. This roadmap is
scheduled for approval in the fall 2013. [See page 29.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Admiral Myers. Fifth Fleet/U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
(NAVCENT) has a robust Continuity of Operations (COOP) program in place
to address contingencies in Bahrain. COOP contingencies may be
triggered by natural disaster, civil unrest, terrorist activity,
technological degradation, belligerent action, pandemic events or any
other condition that seriously degrades security or the ability to
conduct operations. NAVCENT's COOP Operation Order (OPORD) is designed
to provide the capability to continue mission essential functions
without unacceptable interruptions during an emergency or disruption.
The COOP OPORD includes dispersal of the NAVCENT staff with afloat and
ashore options and capabilities. NAVCENT routinely exercises the COOP
plan to validate and refine pre-programmed responses and identify gaps
in planning and capabilities. [See page 22.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 24, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. The subcommittee understands that the Navy has changed
the test program for UCAS in fiscal year 2014 and does not plan to
conduct unmanned autonomous aerial refueling with the UCAS aircraft.
Given this change to the UCAS test program, what kind of implications
could this have for the follow-on UCLASS program if UCAS does not
perform autonomous aerial refueling and what kind of risk does this add
to the UCLASS program?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Myers. [The information was not
available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Forbes. In fiscal year 2014, the Air Force included funds to
restart the B-52 CONECT program, but only for 28 of 76 total B-52
aircraft. What are Air Force plans to modify the remaining fleet of 48
B-52 aircraft in order to maintain a common configuration capability
among the fleet as required by law contained in the fiscal years 2007
and 2008 NDAAs?
General Allardice and General Davis. The Fiscal Year 2014
President's Budget reinstates the original B-52 CONECT program for a
total of 30 B-52s. This includes modification of two test aircraft
which were funded with prior year funds. The Air Force plans to address
the remaining 46 aircraft (for a total of 76 aircraft) in future
budgets.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I'm particularly interested in how you are planning
now to have the capability to integrate very energy-intensive weapons
systems, such as directed energy weapons, high-power microwave and
electronic warfare systems, and railguns into surface combatants. Can
you provide the Navy's plan to ensure that the ships we are planning
for and procuring now are capable of accepting the power and cooling
loads of such systems in the future? During the hearing, you outlined a
roadmap structure for the technologies which will show how the Navy is
maturing the technologies and then what that means to Naval Platforms.
To this end, please provide that roadmap.
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Myers. The development and ship
integration of energy-intensive systems such as directed energy weapons
(DEW) (e.g. high-energy lasers (HEL) and High Powered Radio Frequency
(HPRF)) and Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG) weapons require careful
engineering considerations. Naval shipboard integration considerations
include space, weight, services (e.g., power, cooling) and stability
effects as well as impacts on the combat systems and fire control
capabilities and interfaces. Continued technical maturity and future
shipboard integration will be accomplished through a measured approach
to the allocation or upgrade of shipboard services and integration of
weapon capabilities with interfacing shipboard systems.
DEWs and electric weapons (e.g. EMRG) generally demand significant
electric power from the ship's distribution system. Energy storage
systems, including batteries, limit the impact of these large transient
loads and provide temporary electrical power beyond the ship's
generating capacity. These energy intensive systems also represent
significant thermal loads that must be mitigated by the ship's cooling
systems. Some current fleet platforms can support these electric
weapons, but none without at least some modification. The scope of the
modification depends on the desired muzzle energy (EMRG) or optical
output power (HEL) and operational concept for the weapon (repetition
rate, engagement timeline).
On April 29, 2013 the Commander NAVSEA signed the Naval Power
Systems (NPS) Technology Development Roadmap (TDR). The NPS TDR aligns
electric power system developments with warfighter needs, including
support for DEWs and other energy-intensive weapons and sensors for
shipboard use, to ensure that future Navy ships are capable of
accepting the power and cooling loads of such systems as they are
developed. This roadmap addresses both new construction integration and
back fit of technologies into ships already in service. While specific
in its recommendations, the NPS TDR is designed to adapt to evolving
technical requirements from weapons and sensors system developments as
well as changes in the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. The NPS TDR
will be updated approximately every 2 years. The NPS TDR, attached,
represents a roadmap for these ship power technologies, how we plan to
mature the technologies and then, how these technologies can support
fielding of energy-intensive systems.
To incorporate DEWs and other high powered weapons and sensors into
ship platforms, the NPS TDR has introduced the concept of an Energy
Magazine to provide the interface and the required power from the
ship's electrical system to the high powered weapons and sensors. The
Energy Magazine will initially support near-term applications, such as
a HEL on a legacy platform with a 450VAC ship's power interface. As new
mission systems become available for ship integration, the Energy
Magazine can be expanded to accommodate multiple loads by providing the
appropriate power conversion and energy storage. A standard set of load
interface definitions for future weapons and sensors will enable a
competitive open architecture approach for a multifunctional Energy
Magazine.
While very energy-intensive weapons systems are not currently
mature enough for fielding today on U.S. naval combatants, continued
progress on the technologies covered in the Naval DE Roadmap efforts
(i.e. HEL, HPRF), and the EMRG effort are projected to result in
capabilities that can meet future formal requirements. As part of the
Navy's Two-Pass Six-Gate review process for major defense acquisition
programs, a Gate 6 Configuration Steering Board (CSB) is conducted
annually for each ship Class. Once a DEW has reached a sufficient level
of maturity, the CSB could review the candidate technology along with
the relevant requirements and cost information to determine if
transitioning the capability to an acquisition program and
incorporation into the ship class is warranted. If inclusion is
warranted, the CSB would also determine on which hull the candidate
technology would be incorporated. For technology that provides
significant capability increase but also presents a significant
installation impact to a ship, the capability benefits and costs will
have to be weighed with installation occurring during new ship
construction to minimize cost, if pursued. If the installation impact
is less, the technology could be included as part of a back fit or post
delivery installation.
The Under Secretary of the Navy approved Naval Directed Energy
Steering Group is currently drafting a near-term (2-5 years) Naval DE
roadmap based on the approved Naval DE Vision and DE Strategy to
establish strategic goals, guiding principles, mission area priorities,
roles and responsibilities, and overarching objectives regarding the
acquisition and fielding of DEWs across the Navy and Marine Corps. This
roadmap will also address the way ahead for the platform requirements
(power and cooling) necessary to support these systems. This roadmap is
scheduled for approval in the fall 2013.
Mr. Langevin. As our systems get increasingly complex,
interconnected, and interdependent, how are you procuring to ensure
that systems are able to function in warfighting environments where
datalinks may be degraded or denied, or where networks may be under
significant strain from cyberattacks?
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Myers. The Navy currently trains to
operate in a communications denied environment. As adversary tactics
and capabilities have increased in this area, the Navy has adapted its
training and acquisition strategies to defeat them.
The Navy incorporates realistic communications denied conditions
into major exercises and Fleet training in order to develop
capabilities and refine warfighting skills and tactics for sustained
operations in a communications denied environment. Information
Dominance (ID) training, to include cyber, Operational Security
(OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Command and Control in a
Denied or Degraded Environment (C2D2E) is being integrated into the
Fleet Training Continuum (FTC) as well as the Fleet Response Training
Plan (FRTP).
The Department has pursued a resourcing and acquisition strategy to
equip the Fleet with protected communications to fight through
adversary efforts to inhibit Fleet communications. The ability to
operate in Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) environments, where an
adversary seeks to prevent U.S. operations in a specific geographic
area using broad-based deterrence via electronic or other means, has
been a pillar of the Navy Strategic Plan for the past several budget
cycles.
Our investments in the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise
Services (CANES), Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT), Advanced Digital
Networking System (ADNS) Increment III, Split IP satellite
communications, Battle Force Tactical Network-Enhanced (BFTN(e)), Joint
Aerial Layer Network (JALN), Advanced Tactical Data Links such as Link
16 concurrent multinetting and Tactical Targeting Network Technology
(TTNT)--and among others--are enhancing our abilities to operate in
these environments today. These programs are critical to our capability
to operate in the contested battlespace of the future as adversary
capabilities advance and proliferate.
Mr. Langevin. Given the potential capabilities that unmanned
undersea vehicles promise to provide, please give us a brief update on
the Navy's plans for these
systems.
Secretary Stackley and Admiral Myers. Navy is producing a family of
capable, effective, and interoperable unmanned systems that integrate
with manned platforms to provide situational awareness and warfighting
advantage to commanders at all levels. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles
(UUVs) are a critical component of the future Navy Force and contribute
to dominance in the undersea domain. Mission areas/vehicle systems
include:
Mine Warfare
MK18 Mod2: Man-portable system based on a REMUS UUV
which collects change detection data to operationally detect,
classify, and identify bottomed, buried, and volume mines
Surface Mine Countermeasure UUV/Knifefish: LCS-based
vehicle provides previously unavailable capability employing
Low Frequency Broadband (LFBB) synthetic aperture sonar for
operations against bottomed and buried mines in high-clutter
environments
Oceanography
Littoral Battlespace Sensing (LBS) Autonomous
Undersea Vehicle (AUV): powered vehicles characterizing ocean,
bathymetric, and hydrographic properties supporting undersea
warfare and safe navigation
LBS Gliders gather wave column and ocean data
supporting high resolution predictive ocean and weather models
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance (PLUS)
System
Effective, adaptive and persistent surveillance
of multiple quiet targets over large littoral areas
Composed of a networked system of UUVs
consisting of multiple REMUSs with sensors, SeaGliders,
and a Command and Control (C2) station. The C2 station
can be located anywhere around the globe. PLUS in-water
components can be launched and recovered from a variety
of vessels
Multi-mission Future Vehicles
Large Displacement UUV:
Reconfigurable for multiple missions via modular
payloads
Will leverage advanced energy sources for very
long (>60 day) missions and robust autonomy
Initial increment of capability (Increment 1)
contributes to intelligence and anti-submarine warfare
missions
Analysis of Alternatives complete to bound
capability selection
Leveraging innovative prototypes for early fleet
utility demos begin in FY16
Increment 1 to IOC in the 2020 timeframe.
Inventory objective being
determined
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