[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-33]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 17, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-762 WASHINGTON : 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DUNCAN HUNTER, California DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York DEREK KILMER, Washington
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 17, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for U.S. Special Operations
Command and U.S. Special Operations Forces..................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 17, 2013........................................ 21
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1
WITNESSES
McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, United States Special
Operations Command............................................. 4
Sheehan, Hon. Michael A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Office of the
Secretary of Defense........................................... 1
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 25
McRaven, ADM William H....................................... 38
Sheehan, Hon. Michael A...................................... 26
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 57
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 60
FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and
Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 17, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thornberry. A congressional hearing actually started
one minute early. That doesn't happen very often, but I
appreciate our witnesses being here. Mr. Langevin is on the
floor dealing with the cyber bill, and we are going to have
votes on that bill in about an hour. So we are going to move
things along and cover what we need to cover, but once we have
votes, we are going to be away for quite a while, and so I want
to move along.
I will ask unanimous consent that any opening statements of
Mr. Langevin and I be included in the record at this point.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thanks to both our distinguished witnesses
for being here. We have heard from both of you many times
before, and with that I want to turn it to you to--and without
objection, your complete written statement will be made a part
of the record. I want to turn to you to summarize in whatever
comments you would like to make, and then we will be able to
ask questions for the time we have available.
Thank you both for being here. I don't know who goes first,
but Mr. Sheehan, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Sheehan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
will be very brief, as you have a copy of my extended remarks
for the record. I first want to thank you and the members of
the committee and your staff for the support you have provided
to the special operations community so that we can help
implement the defense strategy to achieve our national security
objectives. We very much appreciate it, and I will be specific
about some of that support at the end of my remarks.
First of all, as I have spoken before here, talked about
our new defense strategy, talked about innovative small
footprint, low-cost solutions to achieve our defense goals, and
of course the special operations community is ideally tailored,
structured, and trained for that mission. I want to talk a
little bit about the threat and a couple, how we--how I look at
how the construct of our strategy, and end with a few comments
about the authorities and funding that will enable us to
execute that strategy in the months and years ahead.
First of all, on the threat, Mr. Chairman, we talked about
this several times before. I always like to reiterate on the
threat that the threat to the homeland, in my view, continues
to emanate primarily from the AfPak [Afghanistan-Pakistan]
region and Yemen, the two traditional strongholds of Al Qaeda,
and from those two areas, even as we look around the world
where Al Qaeda pops its head or we see terrorism even in our
home streets in Boston, that those two traditional strongholds
remain a constant concern for our community, continue to pound
Al Qaeda's capability where they have demonstrated both the
capability and intent to conduct the strategic attacks from
those two areas.
Of course we have evolving new areas of concern of Al
Qaeda, particularly in Africa, we have known about Somalia for
several years, but now since the collapse of northern Mali and
the intervention there by AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb] with the Tuareg rebellion, we have a new threat there
that is compounded by the instability of the Arab Spring, the
instability in Libya after the fall of Gadhafi, and the flow of
weapons that create a confluence of factors in northern Mali of
great concern, and as you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the French
are leading an effort there to try to put that situation back
on track. I will talk a little bit about, more about that in my
remarks on our strategy.
In Syria, of course, we are also very concerned about the
strengthening of al-Nusrah Front and its clear links as an Al
Qaeda affiliate, its clear links to other Al Qaeda
organizations, and its potential as an ominous threat to the
homeland is of major concern to our community.
Let me talk a little bit about the construct of how I look
at the strategy. I don't know whether it is because I am an
infantryman or my Jesuit training, I always look at things in
threes. Three aspects of it. One is the direct-action and
lethal-action aspect of our counterterrorism strategy, and that
is, I am talking about the U.S., unilateral direct-action
capability. The second has to do with building partner capacity
so that our partner nations can take action to take down
terrorist individuals themselves, and the third aspect of it
has to do with denying sanctuary to terrorists.
Each of these come together to form a cohesive
counterterrorism strategy in different parts of the world. For
instance, in Yemen we conduct action there to take down Al
Qaeda leadership, we also work with the host country to build
their capacity so they can conduct the job within their
territory. We also work with them to deny space for Al Qaeda.
All three aspects of the strategy has come together in Yemen,
and, quite frankly, been very successful in the last year and a
half, particularly with the Hadi, new Hadi regime.
In Somalia we also see a U.S. unilateral action there,
building capacity among partners in the region to take action
and also in the third category of denying space, we are using
United Nations with African peacekeeping forces to deny space
for Al Qaeda sanctuary. That model is particularly important
because we are going to have aspects of that model of the
strategy as we look at Mali. A combination of the lead direct
action being done by the French, with us in support, training,
advising, assisting partner nations so that they can take
action, and, thirdly, working with the United Nations so that
they can move in behind the French, occupy key towns, and deny
the space to Al Qaeda. If we can pull all three aspects of this
strategy together, our own support for the French with direct
action, supporting with 1208 and other programs the capacity of
our partners, and finally bringing in--rather than us having to
occupy space with U.S. conventional forces, using multilateral
forces like the U.N. and other nations, and building their
capacity enables them to deny space to Al Qaeda and allows us
to do the higher end action to go after HQ nodes and high-value
targets. That is how I look at the construct of the strategy.
In terms of executing that strategy, I would like to
conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, that we could not execute
this strategy effectively without the authorities that have
been provided to the Department of Defense since 9/11, in my
view, because I have experience in dealing with the pre-9/11
authorities for DOD [Department of Defense] which were scarce;
post-9/11, the 1206, 1207 N, GSCF [Global Security Contingency
Fund], which is still evolving but showing some promise, 1208
and other authorities that are provided the Department of
Defense enable us to build the capacity of our partners so that
we can execute the strategies, coupled with our ability to
support U.N. and other nation-states provide security, we have
the piece of the strategy. It is not perfect, and I would
like--I hope that we can consider, the executive branch and the
Congress working together, as we have over the last 10 years,
can continue to improve those authorities, hopefully make them
permanent, hopefully have a steady stream of funding, and also
we have some proposals to fix a few of the gaps that still
exist in those authorities, particularly regarding providing
support to MOI [Maintenance Operating Instruction], to provide
minor MILCON [Military Construction], to provide multiyear
funding, and a little bit more flexibility in order to have the
types of relationships that Admiral McRaven has articulated so
well, the SOF [Special Operations Forces] partnerships and the
partnerships with the countries around the world that enable us
to execute this counterterrorism strategy consistent with the
new defense strategy of the low footprint coalition approach,
and we really believe that if we can get these authorities
right and continue to modify them and fine-tune them it will
enable us to be even more effective in the years ahead and
continuing to crush Al Qaeda capability around the world like
we have been successfully done for the last 11 years, hopefully
we will be able to do it for the next 11 years because I think
we are going to be at it for a while.
Mr. Chairman, I will conclude right now, as I know we are
short on time. I will turn it over to Admiral McRaven with your
permission and look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Sheehan can be found
in the Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral McRaven. Thank you. Chairman Thornberry,
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to come here today and speak about the magnificent
work being done by the men and women of the U.S. Special
Operations Command, and I am pleased to be joined by my
colleague ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] Mike Sheehan.
Mike has been an absolutely fabulous partner as we have kind of
gone through this experience together over the last year, 18
months, and he has just provided me invaluable support to the
SOF enterprise. Mike, thanks very much.
Sir, since taking command I am proud to say that we have
continued the great work that was initiated by Admiral Eric
Olson, but at the same time we have adapted to the changing
strategic and fiscal environment to keep SOF relevant now and
in the future. In Afghanistan we established a new Special
Operations Forces command structure which brought the various
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and U.S. SOF elements
into alignment under two star headquarters. This has allowed us
to kind of have a common view of the enemy and synchronize our
SOF to achieve a common end state. This change has made SOF
even more effective than ever before. Partnered with our Afghan
SOF, we have continued to attrite the enemy leadership while at
the same time building and training Afghan security forces so
they can stand on their own against this very determined
threat.
Globally SOF is in approximately 78 countries around the
world, helping to build partner capacity so that the host
nation can deal with their own security problems. I recently
returned from Colombia and the Philippines, where our long-term
investment with their SOF has helped dramatically change the
security situation in those countries. I believe that these
efforts; that is, building allied SOF capacity and capability,
represent the best approach to dealing with some of the world's
more complex security problems.
In support of the Secretary's Defense Strategic Guidance,
SOCOM [Special Operations Command] is working to strengthen
these international partnerships and to build lasting networks,
both formally and informally, so that we or our allies can
create a secure environment in unstable areas and, if
necessary, react to emerging crises rapidly and effectively. In
all cases, those Special Operations Forces deployed to foreign
lands are working for the geographic combatant commander with
the approval of the chief of mission and always in support of
U.S. policy goals.
Finally, I have made caring for our force and their
families my top priority. In the past year my command sergeant
major and I have met with soldiers and their families from
around the SOCOM enterprise. We have listened to their
concerns, and with the support of the services, we are
aggressively implementing programs and plans to help with the
physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of the force. We
have a professional and moral obligation to take care of our
warriors and their families, and we greatly appreciate the
support of your committee and other members on the Hill in our
efforts to take care of these men and women.
Thank you again for your commitment to the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines, and the civilians of the
Department of Defense, and specifically to those great warriors
who make up the U.S. Special Operations Command, and sir, I
look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in
the Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, and thank you both, and
certainly one of the issues I am primarily interested in is the
authorities issues that Mr. Sheehan raised, and we want to
pursue that with you. But let me turn the first 5 minutes over
to Chairman Kline for any questions he would like.
Mr. Kline. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
gentlemen for being here, your testimony, your service,
outstanding successes that the Special Operations Forces have
had around the world.
I want to talk about authorities as well, but in a little
different context. I think it has always been a little bit
confusing--and I know you can reassure me, but I guess I am
looking for that reassurance--in how relationships work, and
let's use an example because we talked about Mali and the
threat of AQIM, and that is a much larger area than Mali, and
we have an AFRICOM [Africa Command], and we have Special
Operations Command, and we have various chiefs of mission,
ambassadors around. In Mali particularly we have an interesting
situation of the French. Who is reporting to whom and how and
why? How is that working with your command and these other
entities? Let's just use that Mali as an example so I can get
the players in place in my head.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I will take it from the military kind
of chain of command, and then I will ask Secretary Sheehan to
address maybe the broader context. Sir, as the U.S. Special
Operations Command, we are really a supporting commander to the
geographic combatant commander, whoever that happens to be. In
the case of your analogy, U.S. Africa Command, currently
General Dave Rodriguez. So my job is to provide him forces to
carry out the missions that Africa Command gets assigned. At
the end of the day the chief of mission is the President's
representative, U.S. representative to that country. So as I
mentioned in my opening comments, nothing that I do in support
of AFRICOM or that AFRICOM does in support of whatever the
chief of mission decides in Mali, it is all done through the
chief of mission and with the chief of mission's approval. So
the chain of command actually from our standpoint is pretty
elegant. So my role is easy. I am a supporting commander.
AFRICOM and the chief of missions of all the various nations in
Africa, they work together very, very closely, and so while
from the outside it may appear to be a little convoluted, I
think those of us that work in it day in and day out realize,
frankly, it is pretty elegant and pretty effective.
Mr. Kline. Who is responsible for the coordination with the
French?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think on the military front again--
yes, sir, on the military front, so AFRICOM would be in charge
of coordinating with the French within that region. Again, on
the policy side, the chief of mission would work with their
French counterparts to work the policy piece there. So before a
U.S. entity could come into Mali, for example, we would have to
have the U.S. chief of mission's approval to have country
clearance to come in, and then once that is done then again the
coordination with the chief of mission and their country team
with the U.S. Africa Command, and then if Africa Command needs
resources General Rodriguez----
Mr. Kline. Which presumably they do since they don't have
any.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Kline. So you are the resources, your forces are there,
and are you then constantly working back through somebody in
Africa Command to work with the French or is there sort of
direct communications, and how does that work?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir, so there is--I would say there
is both formal and informal communications. So the formal
communications--well, both formal and informal--come from
Africa Command to their French counterparts. So I don't do
anything that circumvents the U.S. Africa Command chain of
command and their linkages with the French. What I do receive
on an informal basis because we have great relationships with
the French Special Operations Forces is we dialogue with them
routinely, and they discuss, you know, where they are in the
fight and how things are going, and then it gives us an
opportunity to work with Africa Command as well and say, hey,
here is what we are hearing from our French counterparts, but
at the end of the day the decisions regarding military forces
in Mali are all worked through the U.S. Africa Command.
Mr. Kline. Okay. It seems to me that might be a little
awkward when you have French special operating forces taking
action and presumably some of your forces taking action.
Admiral McRaven. Sure.
Mr. Kline. And somebody in Europe is trying to sort this
out. It just looks to me like there should be direct
coordination, and I am--frankly I am assuming there has to be--
--
Admiral McRaven. Yes.
Mr. Kline. There is. Otherwise you are going to be shooting
each other.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. There is very close coordination
on the ground. So if I--maybe I didn't portray that correctly.
Tactically, of course, the U.S. forces and the French forces
and the African forces that are there in Mali on the ground,
there are tactical communications going on day in and day out
so that we deconflict any movement or--and, again, any
operational----
Mr. Kline. But you don't have the equivalent of a joint
operations center to deconflict this, it is just talking to
each other?
Admiral McRaven. Well, sir, I would prefer to take that
offline. Suffice it to say, our coordination is very good at
all levels, tactical through strategic.
Mr. Kline. Okay. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven. Sure.
Mr. Kline. I appreciate that, and I don't know maybe, I
don't know if we are going to get to offline today or not,
depending upon--yeah. But at some point I do want to have that
discussion about how that actually works.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kline. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Sheehan, do you have anything you want
to add on this topic while we are one it?
Secretary Sheehan. Yes, sir, I think on the interagency
level, the planning is coordinated at the White House and the
National Security Council staff, the NSS, the national security
staff, where those policies are brought together and consensus
is built, and then that policy is directed down to the
ambassador as the head of mission, and that ambassador makes
sure that all the key players, the defense players, the
Intelligence Community, State work together in the same
direction, and when there is conflicts, they will be resolved
in the interagency process, and it works fairly well. But in
each country it is a different construct.
In Somalia, for instance, there is a U.N. [United Nations]
operation that we embed with that operation, and we provide, we
can help support and facilitate that, we help the nation-states
that are--we help train and equip them, and we assist the U.N.
operation to function. That keeps it all closely wired.
In Yemen, another key theater, we work directly with the
host country, and again the country team, the ambassador pulls
together the different elements of the interagency, the
intelligence, primarily intelligence, State, and defense, and
makes sure they are all working together in a common objective.
So in each country it is a little bit different depending on
the actors involved and who is really the lead on the security
front. In Yemen it is the host country, in Somalia it is the
U.N., and in Mali right now it is the French, but they will try
to transition over to the U.N., and ultimately everywhere you
go you want to hand it back over to the host country but when
they are able to do it.
Mr. Kline. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Filling in for Mr. Langevin, and I
appreciate it, the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have a statement
here that I will just submit for the record. Thank you all so
much for being here. Good to see you, Admiral, Mr. Sheehan.
In just thinking about the size of the Special Operations
Forces, and the fact that it has pretty much doubled since 9/
11, I also noticed that in terms of funding, the O&M
[Operations and Maintenance] budgets have increased, but
actually in terms of the RDT&E [Research, Development, Testing
& Evaluation] request that that is $29.3 million less than
2013. I know, you know, we are in--we are trying to be more
efficient in terms of our budgets, but I am also wondering in
terms of the doubling and then we are moving up certainly by
2015-17, how does that mesh? Are we, you know, really not
thinking ahead as well as we should?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, I would tell you I think it is
a little out of balance, and this is something my staff and I
talk about quite often is how do we get the research and
development funding line kind of in balance with our broader
procurement line, and of course with our O&M, and candidly, you
know, the last 12 years we have been so focused on readiness as
a function of our combat force that our research into kind of
future technology has waned a little bit, but I will tell you,
we recognize that, and my staff and I have these conversations
a lot. We are trying to figure out how to make that more in
balance, and I think we are getting there, and as we move
forward in the next couple of years hopefully we will bring
that more into balance because it is about making sure that we
have an advantage, if you will, a technological advantage over
our, both our enemies, and frankly there is an expectation that
our technology is above the conventional force, the general
purpose force because they want special technology to be
applied in special cases. So----
Mrs. Davis. Does DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency] pick that up for you in this case?
Admiral McRaven. I am sorry, ma'am?
Mrs. Davis. I mean, are you able to utilize through DARPA--
--
Admiral McRaven. Oh, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. So that----
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, absolutely.
Mrs. Davis [continuing]. Maybe it doesn't all have to come
out of SOF's budget?
Admiral McRaven. Well, absolutely. We are all about other
people's money as my comptroller so oft is wanting to say,
trying to figure out where there are other pots of money, and
DARPA has been a great partner with us. But as you know, DARPA
is kind of an early phase----
Mrs. Davis. Right.
Admiral McRaven [continuing]. Kind of blue sky approach in
terms of looking at the highest and the toughest problem sets.
But we have some pretty tough problem sets, and they have been
very supportive of them.
Mrs. Davis. I wanted to just commend you as well, I know
that you are focused on families.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. And recognizing the unique lives that the men
and women have.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. As you think forward for that, I know that you
are feeling that the services offered by the Navy, Marines,
that they are not quite adequate, and in what specific way do
you feel that you need to enhance the services for the men, and
for the families really?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. Well, I am a product of my
experience. I came in in 1977, and most of the SEALs [Sea, Air,
Land] that raised me were Vietnam veterans, and candidly we
didn't do as good a job by them and their families as I think
we should have, and I am committed, and frankly I know the
service chiefs are absolutely committed to taking care of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and the DOD civilians that
have been supporting us. I think it is--I would characterize it
a little differently. I will tell you, the services are doing a
marvelous job, but it is a function of scale. The scale of my
population base is smaller, and therefore with a little bit of
extra funding I can potentially help out the families and the
service members a little bit more, but I rely very, very much
on the service support, the Army Strong Bonds program, the Navy
Safe Harbor program, the Marines Wounded Warriors program, all
those sorts of things we tap into, and we are very much a part
of, and the services have been very, very supportive. So we are
just finding, though, that as our deployments continue into
Afghanistan, and of course that really hasn't changed for us as
the conventional forces draw down, and we assume of course we
will draw down as well, but our percentage of the population
base of our deployed forces is still fairly large over there,
so--and, frankly, I expect that after Afghanistan we will still
continue to be deployed at a very high rate, so I am looking to
the future to make sure we are postured well to take care of
those soldiers and their families.
Mrs. Davis. Can you comment very briefly on the role of
women in joining your ranks?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. Happy to do so. One, the first
comment I will make is they are just right now performing
magnificently across the board, and I don't think that comes--
certainly it doesn't come as a surprise to you or anybody else.
But in our case we are putting them in harm's way every single
night. As you know, they are not assigned to our infantry
units, but they are tasked to them, so particularly our
cultural support teams where we have young ladies that will go
with our Rangers and our SEALs out on a target so that they can
talk to the women and the children, we just find that
relationship is much stronger, much more important, but as we
go forward, and I have been given the task, and I have to
report back to the Secretary of Defense in May on my plan to be
able to incorporate women, bring women into the historically
male-only military operation specialties, so the Rangers, the
SEALs, the Special Forces, those sorts of things. So I am
building a plan to do that. We are going to go through the
whole, you know, what we call the DOTMLPF [Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel and Facilities], the whole doctrine and the
operations and the training and the deployment of the forces to
take a look at can we, in fact, do that. We are going to have a
plan, we are going to build a plan to do that, but then I have
got to find out whether or not we can actually pull it off, but
I am committed to doing that because I have seen the value of
it.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Heck.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both of
you for the incredible service that you have rendered to our
Nation over the years. You know, I think it was back in the
2009 House version of the NDAA there was some discussion about
whether or not the 12 statutory core activities of the SOF
community should have been reevaluated to see whether or not
they match with what the current missions were, whether or not
they were outdated, and it was dropped, it didn't make it
through all the way, but I am curious now going on 4 or 5 years
later, are the 12 statutory SOF activities representative of
the missions that the SOF community is executing, and does that
list of 12 in any way hamper your ability to do activities or
missions that you think you should be doing but aren't
covering?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think not surprisingly the wisdom
of the original 12 has kind of proved out. I don't see any need
to change the 12 core missions. Now maybe--you know, maybe it
is a self-fulfilling prophecy. We obviously, we do the civil
affairs and we do the information operations and obviously the
direct action and the strategic reconnaissance and all of those
components of the 12 mission sets, we do them, and we do them
exceedingly well, and I think it really does a nice job of
framing today's requirements for Special Operations Forces. So
when we talk about building partner capacity, and this is an
area where we know that the Special Forces piece, the indirect
approach is important, but you begin that by building partner
capacity, and sometimes building that partner capacity requires
putting civil affairs folks on the ground so that they can
build the relationships, they can dig wells so that we can have
fresh water so that, again, we begin to build the
relationships, and from the relationships you begin to build
the security, and then from the security you begin to expand
that out, and before long you have brought down the extremism
because you have created a good environment within whatever
area you were operating in. So they are very mutually
supportive between, again, the indirect approach and the civil
affairs and the information operations, and then of course if
you have to make that transition to going kinetic, then the
direct action and the strategic reconnaissance and those sort
of things make again for both a nice continuum, and I think
they frame SOF very well.
Dr. Heck. Mr. Sheehan, anything to add?
Secretary Sheehan. Yes, sir, I agree with the Admiral that
the 12 do stand the test of time. However, within that there is
a never-ending evolution of thinking within the special
operations community since its inception in the 1950s and the
Army in the 1960s and the Navy and more recently with the
Marine Corps as well. Always revising, rethinking the missions
and the emphasis. The emphasis changes over time based on the
mission set that is handed the force. So over the last 10 years
focus on the activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was an
emphasis on certain types of activities, and now as we shift to
a different defense strategy and are being asked to do
different things, there is always a relooking at those
missions, and I know within the Special Forces community at
Fort Bragg they are relooking the irregular warfare, the
unconventional warfare aspects of it and how they retool to do
that for a capacity that is global, and the SEALs and Air Force
are looking at that as well.
So in the Special Operations community, what makes us
special, I always like to think of it in two areas. One is a
very high, intense ability to do military action and
particularly in denied areas, whether that be over air or land
or sea, you have the special capability. But the other part of
it that Admiral McRaven alluded to is also the capability, the
language and cultural capability to work with partners in order
to execute that mission, and again that goes back to the
original creation of U.S. Army Special Forces, their ability to
jump behind Soviet lines to organize resistance. So I think
there is always this evolution within those major constructs,
and it is healthy, and we are always trying to adjust to stay
ahead of the curve, and right now there is a renewed focus on
the unconventional warfare aspects of it, getting back to those
fundamentals, and regionally realigning ourselves as we shift
away from the enormous demands put on the force for the two
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Dr. Heck. And then just quickly my last few remaining
seconds, Admiral, do you know, is SOCOM still on track to issue
its contract selection for the ground mobility vehicle in May?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir, we are.
Dr. Heck. Thank you. Thank you both. Yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Thornberry. Getting back, you all kind of talked around
it a little bit. I noticed there has been some press stories,
defense budget going down, withdrawing from Afghanistan, yet
funding for special operations is going up. Can you explain to,
you know, kind of on a high level why funding for special
operations needs to go up when these other things are
happening? And is the--I think this kind of gets to what you
were talking about, Mr. Sheehan, is the composition of special
operations funding shifting from more emphasis in one area to
less emphasis in another?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, on the funding side, obviously we
will participate in the budget drills as the Services do. So
while right now with the current President's budget we are very
well taken care of, and obviously we strongly support the
current President's budget, but it remains to be seen whether
or not as we go through the next several years and how
sequestration will affect us, whether or not we will take some
cuts. My expectation is we will take some cuts. Again that
remains to be seen what that will look like right now.
Having said that, I think we make a pretty good argument
for the value of Special Operations Forces, and I go back to
the Defense Strategic Guidance that was issued under Secretary
Panetta and that we are now relooking under Secretary Hagel,
but in either case I think the value of a, you know, small
force with a light footprint that is culturally attuned, that
is partnered, that has a great network is going to meet a lot
of the challenges out there for the Nation, and therefore your
investment and your return on that investment is pretty good.
If you look at the Department of Defense budget now,
special operations is about 1.7 percent of the Department of
Defense budget, so when I have an opportunity to make my case
to the Chairman and to the Secretary about the return on that
1.7 percent being in 78 countries around the world, building
partner capacity where we can allow other nations to take care
of their problems so that then we don't have to expend more
U.S. dollars going in to solve those problems, then that makes
for, again, a pretty powerful argument, and therefore I think
there is a willingness to invest in SOF as we look forward to
the challenges of the future.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral, when you were here before the full
committee on March 6th, you mentioned some problems with the
Leahy human rights amendment, and I was wondering if you could
just elaborate on some of the challenges that that has
presented to you and your folks as you try to do these things
in various parts of the world.
Admiral McRaven. Well, sir, first, thanks for raising that
issue on March 6th because it has created some momentum and
some positive momentum forward. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense is working closely with State Department to figure out
how we can improve the process, and a lot of these, as I said
on March 6th, we are very supportive of the tenets of the Leahy
amendment. We understand, we don't want to be working with
units that have committed gross violations, which is the
language in the Leahy amendment.
Our concerns about the language and the spirit of the Leahy
amendment and the process has to do with a couple things.
First, the amendment itself has kind of the, kind of poison
person/poison unit problem, so one, if an allegation, and it is
an allegation, it is not a finding of wrong, and it is not a
standard that would hold up in a court of law, but it is an
allegation against an individual, then you have to vet that
individual, but then you are also required to vet the unit. So
if there is an allegation against one individual in the unit,
then basically you kind of have to stand down that unit for a
while as you are trying to find out whether or not you can
conduct training with that unit. So that becomes one of the
problems.
There is also not a sunset clause, if you will. So once a
unit is determined several years ago to have been, to have had
gross violation of human rights, how long before now they are
clean and you can begin to stand them up again, so this is--or
begin to work with them again. We are working through all of
those issues, and again I am confident right now based on,
again, some of the discussions that that generated on March 6th
that we have a process for moving forward with that, and so we
appreciate this committee and the full committee's interest in
moving the Leahy amendment to an area where it will be
representative of the basic tenets of the Leahy amendment but
also give us the ability to move quickly to train our
counterparts.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Sheehan, expanding out from that just a
little bit, I am kind of reminded of the debates we had in the
1980s about dealing with authoritative governments against the
Soviets. If we are thinking about your strategy, building
partnership capacity, some of the people we want to build
partnership capacity on may not, you know, be our ideal sort of
folks. And so as you are weighing that, how does that work,
going ahead?
Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We by
definition in the special operations world are almost
exclusively going into areas that are torn by wars, internal
conflicts, breakdowns of society, and those types of tensions
that we enter into almost always affect the security and
political institutions of the countries we are working with. So
you are exactly right, we deal, we are dealing with broken
institutions most of the time, and they don't have great
records.
My experience, my personal experience in the 1980s with
some of these forces as a young Special Forces officer was that
our relationship with them dramatically and steadily always
moved in the direction of improving their respect for human
rights and respect for rule of law and the democratic
institutions which are political, the framework of our strategy
was always a part of. So as Admiral McRaven said, it is always
in our interest to, when we work with partners, we want those
people to share the same values that we have.
Having said that, we need to have flexibility, we need to
have speed of action so that we can continue to advance the
U.S. defense interests while we move forward in countries that
are broken, and have the confidence in the operators we have on
the ground that we are going to ensure that we are working with
the best possible partners we have because in the long term it
is those units and forces that respect the rule of law and
human rights are going to be ultimately more successful, but we
do need to make sure that we understand the realities we are
working in, and some of the countries where we have some very,
very important national security interests evolving right now
have some of the worst records, and I will mention one right
now to bring focus to it, and that is Nigeria. Nigeria has a
very checkered--that is a generous term--record in this regard.
However, we have some very important interests in Nigeria, not
only oil, but as one of the most important countries on the
continent, we have got to find a way to work with the Nigerians
and move them forward in a proper way to address those
interests, strategic interests that we share.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I think so, and/or back to Chairman
Kline's point, Mali is a messy situation, you know. It is a
little hard to figure out who to build partnership capacity
with, but we are not going to make things better by standing
off and doing nothing until they get their act together, if you
will.
Mrs. Davis, do you have other questions?
Mrs. Davis. Just to follow up briefly because I think in
talking about the capacity building and I know that there is,
you are requesting more dollars in terms of the joint combined
training, I know how immensely proud you are of the men and
women who are part of special operations and the tremendous
skill sets that they have, but I wonder if you think out a few
years with the importance of language skills and the diplomatic
skills, all that is combined with that, are we putting enough
emphasis on that as people move into that ability set because I
think that you might find people who have the great physical
skills but perhaps have not had the opportunity, especially
with the tempo that we have been dealing with, to go to
language school and to be able to develop so that their
language skills are not just that they can read or speak, you
know, in a limited way, but they actually get the nuance, and
how are we doing that? Where are we in that effort, and think
ahead 5 years, are we going to have a lot of people ready to do
that?
Admiral McRaven. Well, I will take the first shot at that,
ma'am. First, we are putting a tremendous amount of emphasis on
our language skills. The Army Green Berets, of course, have
always had that as one of their core competencies, but as we
look forward across the special operations community, we find
that Navy SEALs need that if they are working in the Pacific
area or down in AFRICOM as well, the Air Force 6th Special
Operations Squadron who goes down to train other air forces
need to have those skills. So, frankly, across the community if
we are going to be that small, light, agile force that is
networked that has both the language skills and the cultural
skills, and this is a big part of it as well, so we are
teaching, particularly in our JFK school but also in some of
our schools, our Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force schools, we
are teaching broad cultural language skill sets that allow all
of our SOF operators to go down range and do this. So I do
think we are putting a--well, I know we are putting a large
emphasis on this, and part of this gets back, as Secretary
Sheehan said at the beginning, we are really trying to change a
little bit of the narrative about who Special Operations Forces
are. I would tell you today, and really for the last, you know,
12 years in this fight, you have almost said SOF equals CT
[Counterterrorism], counterterrorism, and frankly SOF has a
much, much broader portfolio and mandate than counterterrorism.
We are very proud of our counterterrorism skills. We think we
are the best in the world, and we will continue to be the best
in the world, and I am committed to that, but at the end of the
day, we want to get to the point where we are not having to go
out and capture and kill a high-value target because we have
put the nation where the extremism was rising, we have put them
in a position where they can deal with their own problems, and
that really is about building that partner capacity, but before
you can do that you have to speak the language, you have to
understand their cultural values, you have to be aware of that,
and it is not only that, you talked about the diplomatic aspect
of this. We do find that, you know, there are the strategic
corporals, if you will, down range, and so part of what we
teach our young soldiers is you need to understand how to work
with the U.S. country team, you need to understand that as an
E5 or an E7 or an O3, a young captain or Navy lieutenant, you
will be called up to the chief of mission, she is going to want
to know or he is going to want to know what is going on in the
country, and you have got to be able to answer that in a very
professional manner. So the SOF operators of the future--in
other words, I would say the SOF operators now, but the ones we
are building for the future, they have got to be able to talk
to the flag and general officers and the heads of state, and at
the same time be down talking to the young NCOs [Non-
Commissioned Officer] of whatever country they are working
with, and that ought to be an expectation of your special
operations force, and we are working hard to make that a
reality.
Mrs. Davis. Mr. Sheehan, did you want to----
Secretary Sheehan. Congresswoman Davis, yes, I would like
to add that, you know, when I joined the Special Forces in
1979, there was a lot of lip service to languages that, quite
frankly, was weaker than it should have been, and quite frankly
in the early days of Special Forces, they relied on second or
native speakers to provide the language skills for the
community, and as I said, there was a lot of lip service to it.
Over the last 10 years, and sitting behind me my military
assistant in my current job is former commander of 5th Special
Forces Group. He made an enormous personal commitment and
supported by the Special Forces community to train people in
his case in Arabic and other languages, and of course as 5th
Special Forces Groups understand is they were the ones who went
into Afghanistan right after 9/11 and had to link up on
horseback often with indigenous forces, and the ability to
speak the language is absolutely fundamental to establishing
the relationship that then enables the special operator to
conduct the type of missions that we need executed in our
national defense. So I consider the language training to be as
important as being able to shoot an M4 [carbine assault rifle]
in a tight shot group, and I think the commitment by Admiral
McRaven and his staff is extraordinarily real, which has not
always been the case, quite frankly.
Mrs. Davis. Yeah, thank you. I appreciate that. I know that
San Diego State University has had a program that I think has
been well tested.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. The difficulty as we have with many other
programs is we have got to fight every year for that, and I
think that, you know, there is a point at which we need to say,
hey, you know, we have already taken a look at this and we have
got to put it in the budget, so----
Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, you will appreciate this. I was at
a get-together just the other day, and the father of a young
SEAL who just graduated from BUDS [Basic Underwater Demolition/
SEAL] training was there telling me about his young son who is
going to one of the West Coast SEAL teams, and I said, Well,
let me give him a call, and of course nothing like getting a
call from a four star admiral when you are, you know, a brand
new SEAL on the teams, and as I called him, he was studying his
Farsi because he is in Farsi language training, and he was a
little surprised to get the call from me.
Mrs. Davis. I bet he was. Keep that up, sir.
Admiral McRaven. I am sure you will appreciate that. I will
leave his name out of this so it doesn't get in the record.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Kline, further questions?
Mr. Kline. No.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Heck.
Dr. Heck. Thanks, Mr. Chair, for the second round. Just one
follow-up question to the question asked by my colleague from
California, Mrs. Davis, regarding the integration of women into
Special Operations. Admiral, it sounded like you said you were
going to develop a plan to integrate them.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
Dr. Heck. And then determine whether or not you can do it.
I am just curious about the cart and the horse there. Isn't,
you know, the idea, can we integrate women, and then if we can,
develop the plan to do it effectively?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. And what I don't want to imply
is that this is going to be easy. Part of it is, I need to have
a plan that looks at the DOTMLPF of this, so the doctrine, the
manning, the training, all of those sorts of things that can
get us to implementation of women in those particular units. So
I am going to build the plan, the framework of the plan, if you
will, to okay now I have got to look at the doctrine, now I
have got to look at the training, now I have got to look at
kind of the business case, now I have got to look at the
standards, and the biggest issue for me are the standards. I
get asked frequently, well, can you have gender neutral
standards? And I said, Well, this is easy for me because I have
never had other genders, there is only one standard. So we need
to find out, are those the appropriate standards. Because we
have built standards over the years, and now we have got to
test the value of those standards. So my point is, I will
provide the Secretary a plan for determining how we are going
to get women into those MOSs [Military Occupational Specialty],
but frankly then I have to test the hypothesis, if you will, by
going through and seeing whether or not we can actually make
that happen. And I will be perfectly honest, it is a little bit
of a cart and horse at the same time because I just don't know
yet until we start to really flesh this thing out in detail.
Dr. Heck. Great. Thank you for the clarification. Thanks,
Mr. Chair. Yield back.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. No.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, apologize for being late.
I appreciate the panelists, their strong leadership, sacrifice
for our country.
Admiral, about the organization, your vision for the
organization, how that is coming along in relation to the
language last year and also, you know, if there is anything
else that you might need in terms of effectuating your vision,
I would like to hear on that. Thank you.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you very much. I am very
pleased that with the support of OSD [Office of the Secretary
of Defense] and with the Joint Staff we are moving the vision
along quite well, and just to kind of frame this again, this is
about building the or enhancing, I should say, the global SOF
network. As I mentioned at the beginning, we have SOF forces in
about--we say 78 countries. Actually as of I think today we are
in about 92 countries around the world. Sometimes that is one
person, sometimes that is thousands of people, as we have in
Afghanistan, but what I found in my time as the Commander of
the Joint Special Operations Command was really the power of
the network, and the network is an understanding that the
better you connect people together, the more powerful that
network will be, and sometimes it defies, you know, science
because there is a little bit of art to it, but if you start
connecting people at embassies and you start connecting people
on the ground and you start connecting people in Tampa and in
Washington, D.C., and you allow those people to communicate,
and you give them the tools to communicate, and you give them
the power to make decisions within the scope of what they can
make decisions in, it is amazing what happens, and I saw it
firsthand in my 6 years in the Joint Special Operations
Command, and it is very powerful. So as we begin to build out
and enhance the global SOF network, what I am trying to do is
use the Theater Special Operations Commands, and this was a key
component of it, Congressman, I think you are referring to, was
use the Theater Special Operations Command as our entry point.
As I mentioned earlier on, we are a supporting command, so the
first thing I want to do is make the Theater Special Operations
Commands the gold standard, if you will, for Special Operations
Force. They are under the operational control of the geographic
combatant commander, they are now under my combatant command,
but the operational day-to-day operation is with the geographic
combatant commander, so I am going to beef up the Theater
Special Operations Commands, and then you begin to see how they
partner with their respective partners in the region. So I
think a great case in point is the Special Operations Command
Europe and again our NATO SOF headquarters. I tell the story
about when we established the NATO SOF headquarters, there were
about 18 folks in it, 17 Americans and one Norwegian. That
force now has about 220 folks and a brand new building there at
the SHAPE compound. We had 300 NATO SOF warriors down range in
Afghanistan in 2007. We now have 2,200 NATO SOF operators down
range doing arguably one of the most important jobs around,
building the provincial response companies. That is a function
of networking with our partners. So if you begin to take those
partners and you link them with other partners around the
world, and we look at the Colombians, for example, you know. We
have had a long-standing relationship with the Colombians. Now
the Colombians are interested in how do they export their
security, and it really does get back to what former Secretary
Clinton talked about in terms of smart power, I mean, how are
we doing that? Well, the Special Operations community through
our Theater Special Operations Commands, through some of the
regional, the SOF coordination centers that we are helping to
establish out there, through that network of partners and
allies, it becomes very, very powerful, and then we have a
command and control, the C4I [Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence] network that kind of links them
together both on the unclass and the secure side, and so that
is the vision and, sir, I have had great support from the
geographic combatant commanders, great support from the Joint
Staff, great support from OSD, and I am pleased to say we are
moving in the right direction.
Mr. Gibson. And just to follow up--thank you, that was very
clear. With regard to the institution itself, SOCOM, there was
talk at one point possibly an academy or some kind of within
SOCOM. Is that still thinking or would there be any more ideas
and changes in that regard?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we do have a Joint Special Operations
University. That university does smaller duration courses, but
some of the courses--in fact, Congresswoman Davis' point about
the cultural awareness, we do a lot of that at the Joint
Special Operations University. We are trying to get JSOU [Joint
Special Operations University] accredited so that actually we
can make it a degree-providing institution, and that is going
to require a little additional support and help, but the Joint
Special Operations University teaches our enlisted academy,
which is just a fabulous curriculum for our E8s and E9s trying
to become sergeant majors and command master chiefs and a whole
host of other curriculum.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral, do you have the authorities to
establish these regional SOF coordination centers in other
parts of the world? I mean, I have been to the NATO one several
times. That is under the NATO alliance.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. But what about in these other parts of the
world?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, it is--I would tell you, I am not
sure it requires, and I may be going out on a limb here in
terms of an authority. For example, we have, without opening
this too much in a public forum because the host nation I think
wants to unveil it, but we have one Latin American country that
has become very, very interested in this. They want to host it
as a kind of an academic forum, with one of their war colleges,
so the point of these regional SOF coordination centers is
really just to have any forum, any forum that happens to bring
other SOF operators together. So I have deferred to the
geographic combatant commanders and the host nations that are
willing to support it. So the NATO was clearly an unusual one
because there was a NATO charter and those NATO folks are
deploying downrange. The other two institutions that we are
looking at really are kind of a loosely formed alliance of the
willing that want to come, that want to have, again, academic
forums, but by bringing SOF operators in they will start to
talk, they will build those relationships, and of course as you
know, they will start off as young lieutenants or captains and
then 10 years, 20 years from now they are generals and they are
chairmen of their Joint Chiefs, and that relationship I think
is incredibly important to continuing to enhance our network.
Mr. Thornberry. Absolutely. And State Department is okay
with pursuing these things, I mean, has that been--the
interagency, I should say, has that been a challenge?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have had discussions with State
obviously as we move forward with this, the Latin American
country, I was down talking to the U.S. ambassador, they are
very excited about it because their country is supporting this,
very aggressively supporting this, but, again, sir, we don't do
anything that doesn't have the support and approval of the
State Department obviously.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Mr. Sheehan, let me find my turned
down page, your predecessor, Mr. Vickers, testified that he
spent about 95 percent of his time on operations issues and the
rest of his time on programmatic policy and budget oversight
roles. Would you say this is true for you, too? I was surprised
by that, so I have got to ask.
Secretary Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it is 95
percent. I remember that issue came up during my confirmation,
and I committed to not doing that. I have been less than
successful. The term they use in the Pentagon, a demand signal,
which basically what you are being asked to do, I understand
why Mr. Vickers was being asked by his boss, the Secretary of
Defense, to do policy and operations. It is a day-to-day grind
of policy deliberation within the interagency that really sucks
up the tremendous energy of our office.
Now, I was around as a young captain when this office was
created, and part of its original intent from Goldwater-Nichols
and Nunn-Cohen was to have this oversight responsibility with
SOCOM and, quite frankly, not only oversight of SOCOM but to
make sure that special operations community was protected
within the interagency process. So that role of SOLIC [Special
Operations & Low Intensity Conflict] I have tried to put more
emphasis on and have, so I would not say 95 percent, it is much
less, but still I would say that my ability to do that part of
my job has been less than I hoped to 18 months ago. Part of it
is also a function of the staff shift within my office that the
staffing function for the oversight part of our office is very
diminished from what it was even 10 years ago, and that, we are
very small. The SOCOM staff has increased almost
logarithmically since 9/11, whereas SOLIC is the same size it
was on 9/11, about 140 people. SOCOM staff grows by more than
that every year, so there is a little ability of my office to
do all those functions because I only have a handful of people
doing it, but what we do try to do is have a close relationship
with the SOCOM staff so we can provide a value add to that
function, but, quite frankly, the initial vision of SOLIC
having a service Secretary-like function, we are just simply
not resourced to do it, and with the demand signal as a part of
the OSD policy formula, the demand signal to do policy
dominates my day.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, part of the reason you made me think
of it is your discussion about CT strategy. It is one of my
biases that we don't do strategy very well in the United States
Government. Have you--this is a really unfair question, but I
will ask it anyway. Have you had the chance to read Max Boot's
book about Invisible Armies: A History of Guerrilla Warfare
[Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from
Ancient Times to the Present]?
Secretary Sheehan. I am very familiar with it. I think I
read both reviews in the New York Times and Washington Post,
and it is on one of my piles in my office at home. I haven't
got to it yet.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, it strikes me that your strategy is
very consistent with the lessons he draws from, you know,
hundreds of years of guerrilla warfare and what it takes to be
successful against them, so it sounded familiar to me.
Anybody else have questions? Speakers? Thank you all very
much for being here. We are going to have votes in 5 minutes,
and that works out well. Appreciate it. The hearing is
adjourned.
Admiral McRaven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 17, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 17, 2013
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Statement of Hon. James R. Langevin
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats
and Capabilities
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request for U.S. Special Operations Command
and U.S. Special Operations Forces
April 17, 2013
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for
appearing before us today. Our Special Operations Forces are
some of the most capable personnel in our military, and they
are in high demand across the globe. In the last few years, we
have seen a remarkable growth in the size and scope of those
forces. In large part, that's a reflection of the strenuous
demands two wars have put on them, but it is also an
acknowledgement of how their highly specialized capabilities
are so important today and into the future.
I believe it is reasonable to assume that our requirement
for highly trained and superbly equipped Special Operations
Forces is not going to decrease any time soon, even as we're
faced with declining defense budgets. While the high-profile,
direct-action missions SOF undertakes are well known, we must
make sure that they are equally ready to address their broader
set of missions, ranging from unconventional warfare and
foreign internal defense to civil affairs, information
operations, and counterproliferation, among others. Given the
increasingly complex and interconnected world we live and
operate in, I believe the need for such capable forces across
the full spectrum of operations will only increase in the days
ahead. Today, I look forward to exploring both how we're going
to meet the challenge of providing our commanders with the SOF
resources they need to provide for our national security, as
well as the hard choices we will need to make to get there.
Most importantly, we need to take care of these
extraordinary men and women--and their families. They have
given everything we have asked of them for more than a decade
of war, and they have paid an enormous cost. I understand that
Special Operations Command has some specific proposals on how
to help ease their burden, and I look forward to hearing about
them today.
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?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 17, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. A great deal has been written and said about the
relationship between SOF and the CIA. How should Special Operators and
CIA share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given that their
respective strengths and weaknesses are distinctively different? Do we
need to look at additional deconfliction, and do you feel the current
command structure allows for that?
Admiral McRaven. Although SOF and CIA maintain different
perspectives regarding operational and security activities, there is
also considerable common ground shared on a variety of issues,
especially in the counterterrorism (CT) arena. Utilizing the inherent
strengths and authorities of both organizations allows for a more
effective application of USG capabilities worldwide. SOF maintains a
consistent and productive working relationship with CIA on multiple
levels, resulting in a complementary and effective partnership. This
close relationship is manifested through the successful conduct of
global planning and operations, and highlights the strengths of both
organizations while limiting redundancy and duplication of effort.
Mr. Langevin. What are some of the more difficult advanced
technology requirements that SOF need to maintain an edge on the
battlefield? As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the
need for nonlethal weapons and directed energy weapons increase? How
are you managing your research and development investments as budgets
decline?
Admiral McRaven. a. In no particular order (to remain unclassified)
they are: Comprehensive Signature Management; Human Performance;
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) detection and render safe
technologies; technologies that improve Small Unit Dominance; First
pass accuracy and enhanced lethality weapons, Scalable Effects Weapons
(SEW), and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW); political/social/cultural
assessment and response prediction tools; Vastly improved situational
awareness equipment and displays, enhanced sensors and Clandestine
Tagging, Tracking, and Locating technologies; Leap ahead power and
energy; Revolutionary Command, Control, Communications and Computers
capabilities; and improved Sensitive Site Exploitation.
b. Yes. SOF will increasingly need the ability to precisely apply
exact weapons effects on specific targets with near-zero collateral
damage. SEW can be used in specific instances to stop vehicles/vessels,
incapacitate personnel, or precisely on targets not intended to cause
death or catastrophic damage to equipment or infrastructure.
c. Through the use of our Special Operations Advanced Technology
Collaborative Process, we seek to cooperatively develop technology to
reduce or remove the capability gaps in the high priority areas
detailed above. This process allows better synchronization of SOF-
related technology initiatives occurring with the Department of Defense
and across other Government agencies. It also enables increased
collaboration with external stakeholders such as industry and academia.
Mr. Langevin. How do you maintain language and cultural capability
when deployments are focused more on combat operations and less on
global engagement in security assistance operations? Do you feel your
forces are adequately postured and trained to pivot to increasing needs
outside of the CENTCOM AOR?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM is concerned about the impact of iterative
rotations to the CENTCOM AOR of SOF units and individuals that are
regionally aligned to other AORs. This has degraded global language and
cultural capability in several ways.
Predeployment preparation for OEF includes instruction in the
languages and cultures of Afghanistan because most SOF missions entail
close work with Afghan partners. This is beneficial for SOF regionally
oriented to CENTCOM but greatly reduces the time, classroom space, and
funding available for non-CENTCOM AOR oriented SOF to sustain and
enhance language and culture capabilities for their assigned AORs. The
net result is that too much of SOF language capability remains at the
lower proficiency levels (less than level 2). USSOCOM's goal is for at
least 33% of the force with Level 1 proficiency, and another 33% at
Level 2 proficiency.
The SOF schoolhouses continue to refine and improve the language
and culture instruction provided within the initial SOF qualifying
pipelines. Three of these schools now include Defense Language
Institute detachments, to ensure a constant flow of basic and some
intermediate language and cultural capability into SOF units, but
capacity for higher proficiency is limited.
Other areas of concern remain with Service resources and policies
that indirectly support and affect SOF language and cultural
capability, as all DOD agencies evaluate their priorities and fiscal
constraints. Initiatives aiming to gain language and cultural
capability through targeted recruiting (e.g., the Military Accessions
Vital to the National Interest pilot program) are a cost effective
means of increasing advanced capability and must continue to be
supported by all Services.
Mr. Langevin. Can you outline for the committee what additional
security force assistance authorities (SFA) may be needed? How are
present authorities not able to meet SOF-peculiar needs, and what
examples can you give where additional--or adjusted--authorities would
improve the ability for the U.S. to provide security assistance and
thereby enable stability in an important region?
Admiral McRaven. Since my testimony on April 17, I have had
numerous meaningful engagements with colleagues throughout the State
Department. Together, we are relooking the Global Security Contingency
Fund (GSCF) and attempting to identify broader authorities in that fund
that will help meet SOF requirements. State has been very responsive
and it is my hope that we can move forward together.
However, the following reflects my position prior to the recent
meetings with State officials on the question of deficiencies in
existing security force assistance authorities.
Both Section 1206 and Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) were
purpose-built to respond to emerging opportunities and threats.
Therefore, they leave TSOCs without reliable authority and/or resources
to implement their Chief of Mission-approved regional engagement plans.
TSOCs require a comprehensive authority that will help national
security decision-makers detect and potentially mitigate emerging
threats and instability before they require the use of more reactive
authorities like 1206 or GSCF.
Additionally, the current slate of foreign military assistance
authorities leaves TSOCs unable to plan or implement their unique
strategies for theater SOF engagement with any budgetary certainty.
Accordingly, as they develop their plans for partner engagement
activities, TSOCs are left to patch together several authorities
(almost universally intended for different purposes), resulting in
limited effectiveness due to legal, policy and regulatory constraints.
Mr. Langevin. A great deal has been written and said about the
relationship between SOF and the CIA. How should Special Operators and
CIA share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given that their
respective strengths and weaknesses are distinctively different? Do we
need to look at additional deconfliction, and do you feel the current
command structure allows for that?
Secretary Sheehan. Existing commands and organizations provide the
structure by which we apply both DOD and CIA strengths toward our
counterterrorism goals. I believe that the current structure
facilitates appropriate de-confliction of responsibilities and
activities.
Mr. Langevin. What are some of the more difficult advanced
technology requirements that SOF need to maintain an edge on the
battlefield? As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the
need for nonlethal weapons and directed energy weapons increase? How
are you managing your research and development investments as budgets
decline?
Secretary Sheehan. The technology areas that we find most
challenging are in the areas of signature reduction, nanotechnology,
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors. Much
of this is reflective of how fast technology in the private sector is
changing. DOD is also continuing to push the development of Tag, Track,
and Locate (TTL), alternative power systems, increased operator
protection (lightweight armor and material), special communications,
and operational architecture for coalition-centric Special Operations
Forces (SOF) communications networks. Finally, DOD is exploring
aviation, undersea, and ground mobility modification improvements to
increase our capability to get to the target and protect operators.
Non-lethal directed energy and kinetic capabilities have the
potential to play a significant and increasing role in supporting U.S.
force reductions in Afghanistan, such as in securing operating sites
with reduced numbers of personnel. These nonlethal systems are also
relevant to building partner forces' capability to respond responsibly
and lawfully to situations such as civil unrest.
When added to a growing number of nonlethal ocular interruption
devices and traditional nonlethal weapons used by the force for
checkpoint, convoy and area security missions, these capabilities serve
as a ``force multiplier,'' enabling smaller, reduced U.S. security
forces or enabling host nation security forces to secure sizeable areas
such as, but not limited to, forward operating bases (FOBs), air bases,
and port facilities. Additionally, a growing array of blunt impact and
directed energy nonlethal weapons, devices, and munitions offer U.S.
forces with a significant ``building partner capacity'' and ``rule of
law'' mentoring tool when working with coalition and host nation
forces. We plan for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to
continue to leverage and collaborate with the Military Departments/
Services and DOD agencies on a number initiatives that will provide SOF
the ability to invest in comparative SOF advantage in the future. This
is an area that both the Commander, USSOCOM and I are continuing to
review in this budget and future budgets.
Mr. Langevin. How do you maintain language and cultural capability
when deployments are focused more on combat operations and less on
global engagement in security assistance operations? Do you feel your
forces are adequately postured and trained to pivot to increasing needs
outside of the CENTCOM AOR?
Secretary Sheehan. Rotational deployments of Special Operations
Forces (SOF) units not regionally aligned to the U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) area of responsibility have indeed taken a toll on the
language, regional expertise, and culture capabilities of those units
for their aligned regions. Operating tempo (OPTEMPO) limits the ability
to retain and retrain SOF for primary areas of responsibility while
still preparing for the next USCENTCOM deployment. This is being
addressed to a degree by USSOCOM force structure growth; however, that
growth also places increased stress on SOF training resources.
OPTEMPO reduces opportunities to send mid- and senior-grade
operators to advanced regional education and professional development
programs such as Foreign Professional Military Education and the
Regional Centers program. SOF leverages these programs to improve
specific regional language skills and cultural understanding.
Over the last year, USSOCOM was successful in sending more
operators to Regional Centers; however, during the previous two years
these slots were filled primarily by senior-grade USSOCOM Headquarters
staff officers due to operational units executing rotational
deployments. The returns on these investments were
limited.
I support recent USSOCOM initiatives to implement higher language
capability requirements and improved training processes for its
components. In conjunction with USSOCOM, we will continue to pursue
native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional capabilities
in selections and promotions, language testing and incentives,
maintaining Defense Language Institute detachments at some of our
components, adding SOF-specific school billets and funding from the
Services for foreign education, and encouraging the Services to award
Intermediate Level Education and Senior Level Education equivalency for
Foreign Professional Military Education programs.
Mr. Langevin. Can you outline for the committee what additional
security force assistance authorities (SFA) may be needed? How are
present authorities not able to meet SOF-peculiar needs, and what
examples can you give where additional--or adjusted--authorities would
improve the ability for the U.S. to provide security assistance and
thereby enable stability in an important region?
Secretary Sheehan. The current patchwork and temporary nature of
authorities hinders the Department's ability to establish mature
management processes and ensure coherent, complementary security
assistance efforts. As an example, although Section 1206 Global Train
and Equip authority is a key authority for DOD, its temporary nature
and single-year funds inhibit the overall effectiveness of capacity-
building efforts. Security forces assistance authorities for Special
Operations Forces (SOF) should reflect the Nation's strategic shift
toward strengthening partnerships and further developing low-cost,
small-footprint solutions to achieve national security objectives.
Through authorities that foster persistent engagement, U.S. SOF will be
able to develop and maintain lasting relationships with key partners.
These lasting relationships are essential to build the capabilities
needed to address a range of contingencies that may result from the
increasingly diffuse nature of threats, such as those in North and West
Africa, the Horn of Africa, and potentially Syria. Supporting and
partnering with Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces
would also greatly enhance security assistance efforts by allowing U.S.
SOF to engage the most relevant forces in the partner nation. The
establishment of and demonstrated commitment to these relationships
will be paramount in ensuring that U.S. SOF can adequately conduct
counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and irregular warfare
missions with the support of or alongside foreign SOF.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. What SOF core mission areas and activities remain
of critical importance to U.S. national security? In other words, given
fiscal constraints, what should remain off the chopping block?
Admiral McRaven. Title X, Section 167 describes USSOCOM's core
Special Operations activities as direct action, strategic
reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil
affairs, and psychological operations, now called Military Information
Support Operations (MISO). The Secretary of Defense holds me
responsible to organize, train, and equip SOF for those activities, and
adds counterterrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction to the SOF core mission list.
The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) calls for a future joint force
that is ``agile, flexible, and ready'' and possessing the global reach
necessary to ``capitalize on networks and inter-dependency to maximize
effectiveness in deterrence and evolving war.'' Given this broad
guidance and the asymmetric nature of many of our future security
challenges, all special operations core missions and activities remain
of critical importance to U.S. national security. Each Geographic
Combatant Commander has unique requirements, and I would not want to
put their requirements at risk by eliminating capabilities.
After ten years of conflict, during which the focus was largely on
direct action and counterterrorism, my intent is to rebalance SOF
toward more ``indirect'' activities, such as foreign internal defense.
This will help support the DSG's emphasis maintaining strategic
partnerships as an essential element of national security.
Mr. Thornberry. Nearly 12 years after 9/11--what can we improve
upon in the near and the long term?
Admiral McRaven. In the 12 years since 9/11, Special Operations
Forces (SOF) have become known for and have excelled at direct-action
mission sets. Interagency processes to support these capture/kill/
rescue missions have also become finely tuned. However, as security
challenges are increasingly networked across geopolitical borders, it
is time to turn our emphasis back toward the indirect approach as a
critical component in the effort to deter, disrupt, and deny sanctuary
to our adversaries. USSOCOM will continue to ensure our Nation has the
best precision strike force in the world. Through the indirect
approach, SOF can also act to preempt conflict by strengthening
relationships with our international partners through building partner
capacity, improving information sharing platforms and agreements,
providing assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key
international populations. Indirect efforts increase partner
capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address
local needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of
violent extremism.
The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance directed the Department
of Defense to build strategic partnerships through persistent
engagement with the interagency and partner nations. Under the premise
that ``you can't surge trust'' in times of crisis, USSOCOM's vision is
focused on a global SOF network of U.S. SOF, interagency, allies and
partners. Thickening these relationships builds trust and increases
security options in the near and long term. Through the indirect
approach, SOF is able to amplify our partners' capabilities,
exemplifying the claim by the Secretary of Defense that ``building
capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the
cost and responsibilities of global leadership.''
To support this renewed focus on indirect action, the U.S.
Government requires a coordinated interagency vetting process for
indirect-action missions that is as streamlined as the process for
direct-action mission sets. This would improve Department of Defense's
responsiveness in the face of emerging opportunities and requirements.
The need for a clear process for indirect-action mission sets has
emerged as a critical challenge.
Mr. Thornberry. There has been a great deal of press about very
sensitive special operations activities over the past few years,
culminating with the raid to kill Osama bin Laden. Are there concerns
that SOF and the classified Special Mission Units have been perhaps too
much in the limelight? Are there any concerns with leaks of classified
information to the press from the special operations community, and
what is being done about this? Are there any ongoing investigations?
Admiral McRaven. I have been very concerned about the volume and
types of information put forth recently in books, newspapers and
magazine articles. The publication of sensitive information, especially
classified information that discloses Special Operations Forces
tactics, techniques and procedures; provides details about past
classified missions or other operational activity; or identifies
operators from Special Mission Units potentially puts future
operational missions, activities and personnel at risk for compromise.
Potential compromise could lead to loss of life, loss of critical
information and equipment, or negate operational advantages that we
require to successfully conduct our missions.
To that end, I have reemphasized the principles underlying
operational security and ``need to know.'' Commanders at all echelons
have recommunicated those ideas to their units, with the understanding
that when it comes to disclosing classified information our people are
subject to legal and UCMJ disciplinary action. We cannot afford to pay
the consequences of not properly safeguarding that which is entrusted
to us. We must reclaim the era of the Quiet Professional, when SOF
activities were not broadcast for all to see and hear.
At this time, we are not aware of any DOD media leak
investigations.
Mr. Thornberry. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we
withdraw forces, and then beyond 2014? Can you outline for the
committee what commitment will be required and how this will impact the
rebalancing of SOF across the globe?
Admiral McRaven. The role of SOF in Afghanistan throughout the
withdrawal of forces and post 2014 is to provide a scalable force in a
unified US/NATO command structure focused on providing operational
level train, advise, and assistance to the broad array of Afghan
Security Institutions and Afghan Special Forces. Additionally, SOF will
conduct counter terrorism operations to deny designated trans-national
terrorist groups sanctuary in any part of Afghanistan.
The overall commitment of SOF to achieve our Nation's post 2014
goals in Afghanistan remains predecisional. However, I am confident
that U.S. Special Operations Command is prepared to resource our post
2014 efforts with whatever force disposition is required with no impact
of rebalancing SOF across the globe.
Mr. Thornberry. How have ten years of repetitive combat deployments
impacted the force and what challenges remain?
Admiral McRaven. Across the board we have noted increases in key
indicators of stress on the force over the past ten years. These trends
have continuously increased over the past decade. The treatment rates
for a host of mental health issues have increased, suicides have
increased and the force has told us, unequivocally, that the pace of
operations and the nature of those operations are taking a toll. Beyond
what is reported in the medical system, SOCOM has collected data from
the force directly through face-to-face meetings and surveys that tells
us that there are unmet needs in terms of taking care of the
psychological, physical and social needs of the force. As an
enterprise, we have stepped out aggressively to address the acute needs
of the force and their families in these areas. As these initiatives
come to fruition, we will keep this committee apprised of their
impacts.
Equally important to addressing those acute challenges that our
forces and families are confronting, we are institutionalizing systems
of support that will prepare our forces for the strategic challenges of
the future. By embedding trusted and skilled professionals within our
tactical formations and leveraging state-of-the-art practices, programs
and equipment, we hope to optimize the performance of our force and
reinforce the wellbeing of their families. We foresee these initiatives
becoming an integral part our approach to human capital development and
preservation and ask for your continued support in these areas.
Mr. Thornberry. What changes should be considered to the Joint
Special Operations Command in the coming years? Can you provide us with
more detail during the closed session?
Admiral McRaven. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Thornberry. How are the roles of women in SOF changing?
Admiral McRaven. Women have served alongside SOF for years. In
order to meet operational requirements, we have employed exceptions to
policy restricting women in combat. We are now looking to formalize the
process and give operational leaders the ability to meet their missions
with the most qualified and able personnel, regardless of gender.
My staff is currently examining the implications of opening all SOF
specialties and career fields to women. We will make the recommendation
to the SecDef based on the outcome of the studies of my staff in
keeping with my responsibility as the SOF force provider. I am
committed to providing this Nation with the most capable Special
Operations Force while providing opportunities for all SOF personnel to
succeed.
Mr. Thornberry. What challenges remain with SOF integration with
conventional or general purpose forces?
Admiral McRaven. After 12 years of continuous combat in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other areas around the globe, SOF and general purpose
forces (GPF) have never been more integrated than we are today. SOF has
had up to battalion sized GPF forces assigned to its Task Forces and
multiple operations have been conducted without any major command and
control, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) miscues.
Everyday on the battlefield GPF units support SOF operations and vice
versa. SOF units participate with GPF forces in predeployment training
and conduct multiple mission rehearsal exercises to insure trust,
confidence, and understanding on the battlefield. In addition to
predeployment training, SOF units routinely participate with GPF forces
during National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center
rotations to increase transparency and understanding of SOF TTPs.
Everyday SOFs and GPFs operate side by side all over the globe to keep
pressure on violent extremist organizations, train partner nation
forces, and conduct humanitarian assistance operations. Again, SOF and
GPF have never been more synchronized and mutually supported than they
are today.
Mr. Thornberry. Concerns have been raised about the pace of growth
within the command and the stress that growth places on the standards
and training of the force. What are your concerns regarding the quality
of the forces amidst such rapid and notable growth?
Admiral McRaven. As a result of continued Congressional support of
Special Operations Forces (SOF), the increased growth has not
diminished the quality of the forces. Since the events of Sept 11 2001,
SOF has grown at 3-5% per year rate. This growth was adequately
planned, resourced, and measured to ensure the high quality of the
force was sustained. Subordinate SOF Component Commander's monthly
readiness reports continue to maintain a positive assessment on their
readiness standards and their ability to execute missions. While this
growth has placed some additional demands on institutional training,
the standards have not waivered. To ensure these standards are
maintained, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) publishes and
updates SOF Baseline Interoperable Standards for various SOF
competencies. These institutions are periodically visited by a Joint
SOF Assessment Team (JSAT) made up of subject matter experts to ensure
these standards are maintained.
Mr. Thornberry. Can you outline any changes you are considering to
SOCOM's acquisition framework and authorities?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM has proposed an acquisition-related
legislative proposals for the FY14 legislative cycle which if enacted
would provide more robust support to the Special Operations Forces
(SOF) warfighter or enhance our ability to deal with excess property.
The proposal would amend section 1903(a) of title 41 to expand the
circumstances under which the special emergency procurement thresholds
and authorities contained within that statute may be utilized.
Currently, the statute applies an elevated simplified acquisition
threshold and micropurchase threshold to acquisitions that are either
in support of a contingency operation or that facilitate the defense
against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
attack against the United States. USSOCOM's proposed amendment would
apply these same elevated thresholds to acquisitions in support of an
operation both covered by an execute order (EXORD) and involves
USSOCOM. The concept is that as we move away from declared
contingencies, USSOCOM still needs the ability to employ the same
acquisition thresholds that were available in those contingency
settings to the nondeclared contingency environment in order to
properly support the deployed SOF operator. I have been advised that
this proposal was formally transmitted to Congress and request your
support. Our contracting officers are stretched thin and anything we
can do to alleviate their workload will directly translate into better
support to my operators.
Mr. Thornberry. Please update the committee on SOCOM's
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements. What
manned and unmanned systems are you investing in, and how do you
coordinate with the Services in this critical area?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM maintains a variety of persistent ISR
capability requirements. Special Operations Forces (SOF) should be able
to detect, identify, and locate individual and groups of terrorists,
terrorist facilities, equipment, weapons, financial and information
resources, without reciprocal detection. SOF must monitor and track
individual and groups of terrorists, terrorist facilities, equipment,
weapons, financial and information resources, without reciprocal
detection, from initial contact through a desired end state, including
destruction, capture, or exploitation, and monitor and exploit
terrorist communications and surveillance methods and equipment,
without reciprocal detection. Coalition and interagency leaders,
collectors, analysts, planners, and execution elements must be linked
within a collaborative environment in order to support this enterprise.
SOCOM continues to require a mix of manned and unmanned as well as
remote ISR, all-weather, day and night platforms, with long on-station
loiter, multi-sensor modularity and ability to support emerging
capabilities. Capabilities should be rapidly expeditionary, able to
operate from unimproved sites and afloat, and maintain suppressed
signature (noise and visual).
SOCOM continues to optimize organic SOF ISR capabilities, including
communications systems and architectures, Processing, Exploitation, and
Dissemination (PED) of networked information, ground, air, maritime
sensor capacities, and better utilization and synchronization of SOF
human sensor activities. SOF requirements for ISR far exceed organic
resources, and we continual pursue support from the Services. We engage
Joint Staff for geographic component command-requested ISR assets in
support of SOF to provide needed communications architecture/bandwidth
to support SOF ISR needs, manpower to support ISR platforms (aircrew,
PED), and accelerated fielding of service-programmed ISR to SOF. We
also continue to develop allied relationship and pursue partnerships to
improve regional capabilities--i.e. sensors, platforms and personnel,
and tailored enhancement of partner nation/host nation capabilities
through train, equip, and advise activities
Mr. Thornberry. Can you outline your approach to update the current
outdated fleet of SEAL underwater delivery vehicles (SEAL SDVs)? Are
you concerned that we do not have a capable long-range mini-submarine
to deliver SEALs to denied maritime environments?
Admiral McRaven. The SDV Mk 8 Mod 1 will be phase-replaced by the
Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) Block 1. The SWCS, a wet combat
submersible, will deliver improved performance in terms of range,
speed, payload, operating depth and communications. The SWCS is
scheduled for initial operational capability in FY2015. SWCS will
provide theater commanders with the operational capability to conduct
SOF undersea operations in the 2015-2032 timeframe.
In the interim, we have been modernizing the in-service Mk 8 Mod 1
SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) through a series of upgrades. Recent
efforts include enhanced computer upgrade (new operating system), a
sonar replacement, increased navigation accuracy for more precise
situational awareness, improved communications in various spectrums and
diver thermal protection. The sonar systems and improved technologies
will be transferred to SWCS as SDVs reach end of service life and are
retired from the fleet.
The Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) advanced technology development
strategy is currently developing prototypes of dry, one atmosphere,
diver lockout submersibles, overcoming the thermal protection issues of
the SDV and SWCS and increasing range. These prototypes are using
international commercial design, construction, testing and
classification standards and processes. Two contracts, awarded June and
December 2012, for the rapid design, construction, build and test of
the prototypes are scheduled for delivery in the August 2014 and
December 2014 timeframes. Testing, evaluation and lessons learned from
the prototype efforts will support a goal of establishing a competitive
Dry Combat Submersible development program in 2016 with a planned
initial operational capability in 2018.
The success of both the SWCS and DCS programs are critical for our
future maritime mobility capabilities.
Mr. Thornberry. What SOF core mission areas and activities remain
of critical importance to U.S. national security? In other words, given
fiscal constraints, what should remain off the chopping block?
Secretary Sheehan. I believe the full range of special operations
activities, as listed under Title 10, United States Code, continue to
prove necessary and mutually supportive. When taking into consideration
the current Defense Strategic Guidance, Special Operations Forces (SOF)
are uniquely capable of meeting many of the primary missions of our
U.S. armed forces. The SOF core mission areas underpin the skills and
capabilities required to conduct effective counterterrorism and
irregular warfare activities, build partner capacity, and deny safe
haven to threat networks--among other specific mission areas in which
SOF remain the force of choice.
At this time I would not advocate any changes to USSOCOM's
statutory responsibilities.
Mr. Thornberry. Nearly 12 years after 9/11--what can we improve
upon in the near and the long term?
Secretary Sheehan. A decade of war and a consistently high demand
signal for Special Operations Forces (SOF) have resulted in a physical
and emotional stress on our force and families. I support the U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Preservation of the Force and
Families initiatives that focus on enhancing readiness through
innovative and interactive approaches designed to prepare our SOF
personnel more effectively for the current fight as well as our future
security challenges. These efforts build on existing service
initiatives but also recognize the unique demands placed upon SOF
personnel. They seek to improve predictability in the training and
deployment cycles of units and individuals to provide a more
sustainable balance with training and deployment as well as family
reintegration. In addition, USSOCOM is developing programs to enhance
the physical and psychological readiness of our force through dedicated
resources at the unit level that will integrate injury prevention,
resiliency, and rehabilitative services throughout the entire SOF
readiness/deployment cycle.
Additionally, I am encouraged by the improvements over the past
decade in the establishment and expansion of DOD authorities aimed at
building partner capacity and executing the defense strategy to defeat,
deter, and deny terrorist threat networks. Post 9/11, the authorities
enacted in Section 1206 and Section 1203 (formerly subsection 1207(n))
have proven effective in National strategic efforts to build the
capacity of foreign partners. Further, authority enacted in Section
1208 has been a critical tool for Geographic Combatant Commanders to
employ partner forces to support U.S. SOF operations. I believe there
is still room for improvement as we continue to fine-tune these
authorities to address a wider range of security challenges.
Specifically, I would like to look at methods to improve the
flexibility of these authorities to provide for more persistent,
multiyear engagements with key foreign partners. I believe this is a
key area of consideration to enhance our effectiveness in creating
preventive approaches to counterterrorism and countering threat
networks in support of the new defense strategy.
Mr. Thornberry. There has been a great deal of press about very
sensitive special operations activities over the past few years,
culminating with the raid to kill Osama bin Laden. Are there concerns
that SOF and the classified Special Mission Units have been perhaps too
much in the limelight? Are there any concerns with leaks of classified
information to the press from the special operations community, and
what is being done about this? Are there any ongoing investigations?
Secretary Sheehan. Yes, there are concerns within the Special
Operations Forces (SOF) community that very sensitive special
operations activities are increasingly subject to media coverage. I am
particularly concerned that unauthorized disclosures related to the
techniques, tactics, and procedures used against Al Qaeda will
eventually cost lives.
I do not, however, believe that unauthorized disclosures are
endemic among the SOF community. The overwhelming majority of the SOF
community operates at an extremely high tempo for extended periods in
relative obscurity. Our operators desire no more than the respect and
admiration of their peers, and rarely seek the public spotlight.
Admiral McRaven has been very proactive in addressing unauthorized
disclosures with the force, and he has my full support.
Mr. Thornberry. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we
withdraw forces, and then beyond 2014? Can you outline for the
committee what commitment will be required and how this will impact the
rebalancing of SOF across the globe?
Secretary Sheehan. Although the specific roles that Special
Operations Forces (SOF) will play in post-2014 Afghanistan remain to be
determined, denying Al Qaeda safe-haven in both Afghanistan and the
Pakistan border region remains a national priority for both the United
States and Afghanistan. U.S. SOF are uniquely qualified not only to
train, advise, and assist Afghan National Security Forces' efforts to
deny Al Qaeda sanctuary within Afghanistan, but also to ensure that the
Taliban, Haqqani network, and other terrorist facilitators pose no
threat to Afghan sovereignty post-2014.
As Al Qaeda threats emerge in Syria, the Sahel, and elsewhere, the
drawdown of conventional forces and SOF in Afghanistan will provide
additional options by which we can rebalance against those other
threats.
Mr. Thornberry. The previous Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/
LIC, Mike Vickers, commented to the press that he spent about 95% of
his time on operations issues and the rest of his time on programmatic,
policy, and budgetary oversight roles. Do spend the same amount of time
on operations? With so much time being spent on operational issues is
there concern that you are missing the larger planning, policy, and
budgetary roles?
Secretary Sheehan. The planning, policy, and budgetary issues
facing the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community are all intimately
tied to operational issues. In the policy realm, we are closely
involved in developing, coordinating, and approving operational
concepts and overseeing their execution. For this reason, my time ratio
spent on one area or another is difficult to define quantitatively. The
consistently high demand signal for SOF, coupled with the nature of
operations that we are asking SOF to accomplish certainly factors
significantly into the time that I and my staff must dedicate to
operational issues. I believe we are effectively accomplishing my
statutory responsibilities to oversee special operations activities and
to advise the Secretary of Defense on all SOF-related matters.
Mr. Thornberry. A recent report on Special Operations Forces by the
Council on Foreign Relations suggested that, ``the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict has
difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of U.S. Special
Operations Command's policy and resources as directed by law.'' Do you
agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how your
office conducts oversight of policy and resources?
Secretary Sheehan. I, along with my staff, exercise the policy and
resource oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) through
multiple processes and forums.
In the policy realm, we are intimately involved in developing,
coordinating, and approving operational concepts and overseeing their
execution. Although it is true that USSOCOM has devoted significant
resources to developing operational plans and coordinating specific
activities in support of those plans, ultimately, I am the principal
civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for special operations and
am responsible for recommending approval or disapproval of
modifications to those plans. In addition, my office routinely
represents the Department of Defense in numerous interagency forums
that shape strategies for employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
and approval of specific activities and operations. Although the volume
of USSOCOM efforts is important for implementation and may appear
overwhelming in nature, I am confident that I and my staff provide
meaningful oversight and make appropriate recommendations both to the
Secretary of Defense and to other senior Administration officials.
In the resourcing area, we are constantly engaged in the
prioritization and decision-making processes that affect the funding,
equipping, and resourcing of SOF. As a sitting member of the governing
resourcing bodies both within USSOCOM and DOD, I and my staff provide
the requisite civilian oversight over often complex and difficult
trade-off decisions for SOF resources. Again, the ultimate decisions on
SOF resourcing are made by the Secretary of Defense with substantial
input from me, as provided by law. Even in those few areas that
USSOCOM, by law, may exercise the functions of a head of an agency, I
have significant input and routinely provide advice, including through
my staff, to USSOCOM.
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