[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
CHINA'S RAPID POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ADVANCES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND
RUSSIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 16, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-22
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Rensselaer Lee, Ph.D., senior fellow, Foreign Policy Research
Institute...................................................... 4
Mr. John Tkacik, Jr., director and senior fellow, Future Asia
Project, International Assessment and Strategy Center.......... 12
Dmitry Shlapentokh, Ph.D., associate professor, Indiana
University South Bend.......................................... 22
Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., research professor of national security
affairs, U.S. Army War College................................. 29
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Rensselaer Lee, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 7
Mr. John Tkacik, Jr.: Prepared statement......................... 15
Dmitry Shlapentokh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 24
Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 58
Hearing minutes.................................................. 59
The Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Material submitted for the record 60
CHINA'S RAPID POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ADVANCES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND
RUSSIA
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana
Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The committee will come to order.
Writing 10 years ago, the head of research at a Moscow bank
suggested that China should just buy the Russian Far East
because ``if the Earth's territory were divvied up according to
demographic need and by potential for economic development,
China would play Pac-Man at the expense of the Russian Far
East.'' This has not, however, been the view of either the
Russian Government or the Russian people. China, though, finds
the prospect appealing and much of what was on President Xi's
agenda when he met with President Putin last month involved
using China's new wealth to take control of the resource rich
Russian eastern territories in Eurasia.
Beijing's economic, political and demographic integration
with foreign lands follows a specific pattern. First, Chinese
workers as well as managers, technicians and merchants
accompany Chinese capital. Second, investments expand to
control the entire supply chain for both exports and imports.
Control of agricultural lands, raw materials, energy resources,
local manufacturing, and retail business freeze out local firms
and workers. Third, the areas of investment are directed by the
Beijing regime through state-owned banks, sovereign wealth
funds and state enterprises. They become an extension of the
Communist Party and China itself. And finally, control of
large, strategic segments of overseas economies gives Beijing
dominate political influence over local governments. Corruption
makes sovereignty a paper illusion, and if demographic shifts
like those which could take place along China's border follow,
the borders themselves can change.
While this Chinese model has been most evident and
successful in Africa, where local governments are weak, it can
be seen elsewhere as well. The advantages it confers on Beijing
make it the preferred way of doing business. It is not in the
national security interests of the United States for this to
happen. For China to gain direct control of the resources of
Russian Far East would tip the balance of power not only in
Asia but worldwide. America and its allies need to strengthen
their economic relationship with Russia and provide a viable
alternative to China for the development of the Far East. The
Russian people and their leaders see the danger of falling into
a neocolonial dependency on China, but if they cannot find
other business partners, they will be drawn into the Chinese
orbit because Beijing has the money, the power and the will to
entrap them.
Finding common ground with Russia in the Far East could
also lead to a wider strategic rapprochement. During the Cold
War I was an implacable enemy of the Soviet Union; but I was
never an enemy of the Russian people. The Cold War is long
over, and we won it. Moscow is no longer the home of a
Communist dictatorship. But there is still a Communist
dictatorship in China. Curtailing the growth of its power
should now be our prime concern; and we should work with other
countries that come to see the same danger.
I would hope our panel today can provide some suggestions
how we can add Russia to our alignment, or at least keep it out
of China's clutches.
With that said, I know the ranking member Keating has an
opening statement of his own, and you may proceed.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding today's timely hearing. I would like to note I not only
speak for myself, but for the other members here, that is we
are here today, our hearts and prayers are with the Boston
Marathon victims and families today. And this meeting,
attendant to that that I apologize. I'll be leaving this
hearing.
Both China and Russia have a long history within Central
Asia. This history can both be viewed through at times, an
adversarial relationship, more recently, through the framework
of an opportune partnership. In fact, the seeming success of
the recent China-Russia Summit highlights the dynamic nature of
the modern Sino-Russian relationship, which has both domestic
and international implications for both countries.
On the international stage, Beijing and Moscow have been
actively leveraging their partnership to expand their influence
over global affairs, particularly on the United Nations
Security Council, where both Nations vetoed resolutions
condemning the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. Further,
the two countries have been working to coordinate their efforts
on the establishment of a new international lending institution
to serve as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. At home, the Chinese benefit from the
domestic perception that they are recognized and respected by a
major player like Russia while also expanding their outside
energy sources.
In turn, the Chinese selected Russia for Xi Jinping's first
visit abroad to grant credibility to an increasingly
belligerent Russian leadership whose relationship with the West
has deteriorated since the re-election of President Putin. At
its foundation, energy and security agreements have drawn these
two regional powers into what seems to be a relatively positive
working relationship. In this way, their role in Central Asia
is not only based on proximity, but on a natural need to ensure
the stability of their neighborhood, given that the Central
Asian States only established their sovereignty after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. For this reason, despite
differences between Russia, China and the United States, it is
in the best interest of all three countries to work together.
Although both the Chinese and Russians have strong
historical, security and trade links to Central Asia, the
United States can also provide a stabilizing influence through
increased trade and democracy-building initiatives to ensure
the durability of future of those investments and bringing the
influence to the rule of law. Kicking out foreign NGOs that
work on rule of law and democratization has been an unfortunate
trend in the region and does not necessarily bode well for U.S.
business interests. Without the basic foundations of government
being taught and exercised, the region will be prone to greater
instability and chaos. This being said, Russia and China must
display their own willingness to provide more freedoms,
services and information to their people.
Finally, this subcommittee has been examining the potential
for and the uncertainty surrounding the rise of extremism in
Central Asia following the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan.
The U.S., China and Russia have been working together on
security matters since 9/11, and I believe that this
cooperation should be maintained in a manner that is consistent
with our own values in the United States. This includes
cooperation on other transnational challenges such as
narcotics, HIV prevention, and trafficking in persons.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that this is a dynamic
region that holds great potential, but this potential can only
be harnessed through a willingness to work with the United
States and moreover, the West.
I look forward to circling back with you, Mr. Chairman, on
this subject and in the meantime, will turn to Congressman
Lowenthal who has graciously agreed to act as the ranking
member for the remainder of the hearing. I want to thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Lowenthal.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We appreciate your thoughtful statement
and any questions you might have to submit to our witnesses you
can do so within 10 days. And we will transfer them on and they
will be made a part of this record.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Cook, do you have any opening
statement? Mr. Lowenthal? All right. I will introduce all of
the witnesses and then how we will proceed, each witness will
give an opening statement hopefully around 5 minutes, although
the rest of your opening statement will be made part of the
record and then we will go to a question and answer session.
Our first witness is John Tkacik, senior fellow and
director of Future Asia Project at the International Assessment
and Strategy Center. He spent 3 or 4 years in the United States
State Department as a Foreign Service Officer with almost 20
years of that working in China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. Before
assuming his current position, he was a research fellow for
China, Taiwan, and Mongolian Policy at the Heritage Foundation
and holds a master's degree from Harvard University's Kennedy
School of Government.
Next, we have Dr. Rensselaer Lee. He's a research fellow at
the Foreign Policy Research Institute and president of the
Global Advisory Services in McLean, Virginia. Dr. Lee has
performed overseas contract assignments for the State
Department, the Department of Energy as well, the World Bank,
the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy and
other agencies. He has worked as an analyst for the
Congressional Research Service and he is author, among other
things, of ``Smuggling Armageddon, the Nuclear Black Market in
the Former Soviet Union and Europe,'' and he holds a Ph.D. from
Stanford University.
Next we have Dmitry and I'm going to get this one, too,
Shlapentokh, is that right? Okay, got it. He is an associate
professor of history at Indiana University at South Bend. He
holds master's degrees from Moscow State University and
Michigan State University and received his Ph.D. from the
University of Chicago. He was born in the USSR which no longer
exists and emigrated to the United States in 1979. He has
written monographs for the U.S. Army's Strategic Study Center
and his new book, ``Global Russia, Eurasianism, Putin and the
New Right,'' will be published later this year.
Finally, we have Dr. Stephen Blank. He's a research
professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Army War
College where he also works with the Strategic Studies
Institute. He has written on Russia's prospects in Asia as well
as on other aspects of Russian policy. Dr. Blank holds a B.A.
in history from the University of Pennsylvania, an M.A. and a
Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago.
So with that said, we will start off with Dr. Lee and work
our way this way and why don't you start. And then as I said,
if the witnesses could keep their remarks to about 5 minutes
and put the rest in the record, it will give us more of a
chance to have a dialogue. And let me just say, when I say
dialogue, if you want to ask questions of other members of the
panel, we are going to encourage that type of interaction.
So with that said, Dr. Lee, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF RENSSELAER LEE, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN
POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Mr. Lee. I think my remarks follow very closely the
sentiments you expressed in your opening statement.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's just note that when you're speaking
with the microphone on, we are using energy. So all of a sudden
we are using electricity, not using oil or natural gas.
Mr. Lee. Let me start with a few introductory remarks about
the Russian Far East and where it figures in this dialogue. The
Russian Far East is a land of contradictions, rich in resources
and economic potential. It's also seriously under developed and
demographically challenged. It makes up 36 percent of Russia's
national territory, equivalent to about two-thirds the size of
the United States but it only has 4 to 5 percent of Russia's
total population. It accounts for just 5 to 6 percent of its
national GDP. It's also a very vulnerable territory
geographically. And you must consider that Vladivostok is five
times closer to Beijing and almost six times closer to Tokyo
than it is Moscow. And for these various reasons the Far East
has traditionally been difficult to administer from Moscow, a
pain in the neck to administer from Moscow as a matter of fact,
and a perennial opportunity for Russia's Asian neighbors.
Now to go back in time a little bit, Japan was the main
threat to Russian sovereignty of the Far East, most
conspicuously at the time of the Russian civil war when
Imperial Japanese troops occupied parts of the region. Today,
the main perceived threat, not a specifically military threat,
but a much more subtle threat, comes from an increasingly
powerful and regionally assertive China. China has made
important economic and demographic inroads into the Russian Far
East, as it has elsewhere along its long, Asian periphery.
Among other things, China wants to secure a land accessible
base of raw materials as a hedge against a military conflict
that could severe China's maritime lines of communication. What
else China wants is a matter of speculation and controversy.
But a sphere of influence, a sphere of Chinese influence in the
Russian Far East if this is, in fact, in China's sights, could
certainly compromise Russia's territorial sovereignty in an
economic sense and perhaps politically as well.
Now political factors such as Moscow's strategic
partnership with Beijing have contributed to China's evolving
special relationship with Russia's Far East. The relationship
also reflects factors on the ground such as the country's long
3600 kilometer common border and historical associations of the
peoples and China's dynamically growing economy.
China dominates trade with Russia's border provinces
supplying vital food stuffs and consumer goods to their
populations. Migrant Chinese labor provides essential services
in areas such as construction, agriculture, trade, forestry,
and mining. The valuable energy and raw material endowments of
Siberia and the Far East are increasingly being programmed to
serve China's industrial requirements, especially in China's
northeast, that is Manchuria.
Now as economic integration continues apace, the Russian
Far East could become less a part of Russia's periphery and
more a part of Asia's periphery or in the words of some Russian
commentators, ``a resource appendage of North East China.''
I submit that this trend could have broader strategic
implications. Even partial or indirect Chinese control over
that vital region could increase China's overall geopolitical
weight and even reshape the regional balance of power in North
East Asia to China's advantage.
This won't happen overnight. And China isn't the only
foreign power that has interests in the Russian Far East. And
China's economic penetration is more advanced in the RFE
provinces that adjoin the Sino-Russian border than in the
provinces that are farther away. But given the regional
dynamics of China's rise, its relentless quest for natural
resources and uncertainty about its future ambitions, there is
certainly no cause for complacency.
America and its Pacific allies need to be more engaged and
proactive in Russia's Far East economically, politically, and
otherwise. This is not for outright containment of China which
would be impractical in any case and risky. But it just makes
good sense as a balancing strategy. Russia needs large-scale
financing and technical assistance to maximize the economic
potential of Siberia and the Far East. And Russia's democratic
partners should be prepared to assume a role in this
transformation.
Right now, America doesn't have much of a presence in the
region. Our trade with the Russian Far East was just 2.2
percent of its total external trade in 2011. U.S. investment
there has declined to near zero in recent years. U.S.
development assistance for Russia's regions is less than what
it was in the 1990s. U.S. policy makers don't seem to consider
Russia as a serious Pacific partner in economic and security
terms. In fact, our overall relationship with Russia is adrift
right now. And maybe partnering with Russia and developing its
remote Far Eastern territory would be a way to put the
relationship back on track and reinforce America's Pacific
security posture at the same time. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for those thoughtful
remarks and you've made some very significant points that we
will come back to during the question and answer and dialogue
part of this. I just note, I would have to say that just for
the record, Russia needs to wake up. They need to wake up. Who
is really and what is really the greatest threat to the
security and the economic well-being of their own people? For
some reason, they have been treating the United States as if we
fit into their hostile category and enemy category and that the
Chinese who are really their greatest threat to their security
and their prosperity are in some way their friends. And I'm
very anxious to hear about the opinion of the other witnesses
as well on that. But thank you very much, Dr. Lee, for your
testimony.
Now let me get this, Tkacik.
Mr. Tkacik. Tkacik.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I'm sorry, pardon me.
Mr. Tkacik. The first K is silent.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know, I'll tell you, with a name like
Rohrabacher, I actually can get other people's name wrong.
You may proceed, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN TKACIK, JR., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,
FUTURE ASIA PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY
CENTER
Mr. Tkacik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members.
I thank you for giving me this opportunity to appear today.
Chinese's rapid rise as Eurasia's preeminent power is of the
greatest strategic importance to the United States. And I say
this because as one top America specialist in Beijing says,
``In the world today, virtually all of America's adversaries
are China's friends.'' When you think about that, indeed, that
is the case.
Future Asia will not look like today's Asia. Eurasia in 10
years in 2023 will be a Chinese dominion and China is now being
helped along by a strategic alignment with the Russian
Federation. Why does Russia side with China in a relationship
that makes little geopolitical sense in the year 2013? Might it
be a prudent strategy for the United States to tip the scales
in the Russia-China relationship once again, as we did 44 years
ago to prevent the emergence of a new hegemon in Eurasia.
Now remember in 1969, 44 years ago, Russia and China were
the bitterest enemies on earth. Now I don't have much of a
sense of humor and neither did Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin,
but Chairman Mao apparently had a sense of humor, so let me
tell you a humorous anecdote about Russia, China, and nuclear
war. Russia almost launched a nuclear strike on China in 1969
after a summer of unrelenting Chinese provocations. And on
September 11, 1969, following the funeral of North Vietnamese
leader Ho Chi Minh, Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin, seething
about China's attacks, suddenly diverted his plane from Hanoi
to Peking's capital airport where he was met by Mao Zedong
himself. Kosygin warned Mao to his face that the USSR's
patience was at an end and he alluded to a nuclear strike. Mao
Zedong replied to Kosygin and I quote, ``I have always said
that the struggle between China and the Soviet Union will last
for 10,000 years. But on the merit of your coming to see me in
person, Premier Kosygin, I will cut that down to 9,000 years.''
Kosygin was not amused. Five days later, Moscow's top
journalist in Europe wrote an authoritative commentary
predicting a Soviet nuclear strike on China and alluding to the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the year before, he reminded
the world that ``the Soviet Union adheres to the doctrine that
socialist countries have the right to interfere in other's
affairs in the interest of socialism.'' The Soviets had already
approached the Nixon administration secretly about just such an
attack. Nixon's reaction was explained in Kissinger's memoirs
and this is Nixon's reaction:
``A Soviet attack on China could not be ignored by us.
It would upset the global balance of power. It would
create around the world an impression of approaching
Soviet dominance. Soviets may be using us to generate
an impression in China and in the world that we are
being consulted in secret and that we would look with
equanimity on Soviet military actions.''
It was then a tenet of America's 20th century foreign
policy that no power should achieve hegemony in Eurasia. And
for 20 years after Nixon's visit in China in 1972, U.S.
strategy successfully balanced Soviet dominance in Eurasia by a
counter alignment with Communist China. Since 1972, however, it
has been the grave misfortune of the United States that neither
its political leaders nor its professional diplomats
appreciated the substance of that strategy. The Soviet Union
abruptly gone and China not yet then coalesced into an economic
super power that was more politically repressive than the
Soviets were in the years before its collapse.
China did not have to struggle for Mao's 9,000 years for
its victory over the Soviet Union. In the two decades since the
Soviet Union's collapse, since the collapse of China's
democracy movement in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist
Party has implemented a single-minded strategy by any means
necessary to reincarnate the communist state in China's ancient
dominance of Eurasia.
Today, the United States confronts Eurasia's new hegemon.
Island Asia, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, most of Southeast
Asia and most importantly Vietnam and Indonesia and India now
look to the United States' pivot to the Pacific to organize a
new Asia Pacific order to balance China. But for Russia, the
key factor is--but for us, the key factor is Russia in this
equation. India still relies on Russia for weapons systems to
deter China. Central Asian Mongolia hope the Russian influence
can balance China's tightening grip on their economies and
resources. They hope that America can mitigate both Russian and
Chinese pressures. And even our old enemy, Vietnam, was
heartened last month by renewed Russian interest in a maritime
presence in the South China Sea.
The new Russian state, its own legitimacy in tatters, seeks
to legitimize its oligarchy by rebuilding influence over its
lost Eurasian empire. It rationalizes political repression at
home by rebuilding its Eurasian military power and it enhances
its global prestige by leveraging its resource exports, oil,
natural gas, metals, minerals, lumber and energy for political
acceptance among the democracies. And I have an lengthy
analysis of Russia's relationship to China in my written
submission and I think my colleagues here beside me will
already address the details in their own presentation.
But let me conclude with the observation that Russia's
relationship with China is not one of unalloyed affection. Just
in the past few weeks we've seen tension between Russia and
China on a matter of vital importance to Moscow, the gas
pipeline in the Far East. For several years, we've seen the
Russians insulate their border with Manchuria keeping out
Chinese investment, controlling as they can Chinese immigration
and legislating against Chinese domination of the small retail
industry throughout Russia. I think we've seen a renewed
Russian naval interest in the South China Sea and in the
Pacific seemingly to show China and India, not just America,
that Russia is still a global player. Russia also faces vast
demographic, resource and environmental challenges from a self-
centered China. But Russia has yet to recover from its collapse
of 1992. It must rebuild its own agriculture, its own
industrial, scientific and resources infrastructure. It must
rebuild its atrophying population and it must rebuilt its
defenses before it can afford to challenge China's hegemony in
Eurasia.
And Moscow's leadership must rebuild its own legitimacy on
the foundation of popular support among Russia's jaded and
disillusioned citizens, so clearly that will have to wait for a
new core leadership. Until then, Russia will try to accommodate
China without jeopardizing its own future and until then, the
United States must be hyper vigilant of the balance of power in
Eurasia. Russia is now entering a period of instability that
America has insufficient resources to moderate. As the new
Chinese super power demonstrates, the United States has few
permanent friends or enemies in Eurasia, but it does have
permanent interests in preventing any one power from dominating
the land mass. And we must, at all costs, avoid the appearance
of collusion with China in the Asia Pacific as we do that.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tkacik follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much and next we have Dr.
Shlapentokh.
You may proceed, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTH BEND
Mr. Shlapentokh. Thank you very much for giving me the
opportunity to discuss these matters. My point is that--good.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And we just had a hearing on cyber-
attacks.
Mr. Shlapentokh. That's right, that's right, that's right.
Vigilance, vigilance, vigilance.
So the point of my presentation given the Russian
dimensions of the relationship with China and my point is that
Far East could well be a test for China because of the invasion
of horde of Chinese or military stuff, but because as threats
proceed, the Russians themselves from Far East could choose
China, geopolitical domination over Moscow.
The reason for this is as following: The Far East prospered
during the Soviet era mostly because of heavy investment from
the center. Now all of this is gone. Moreover, most of their
resources exploited by the Moscow-centered companies go back to
Moscow, the money goes to Moscow, nothing left for the Far
East.
In addition, the Moscow prevents the Far Easterners to
engage in profitable trade with nearby countries like Japan.
And this led to very serious resentment. In 2008, Moscow
imposed heavy tariffs on the used cars brought from Japan which
bring considerable benefits to the locals. There was a big
demonstration in Vladivostok, the local police were not able or
willing to deal with this demonstration and brought riot police
from center, from Moscow, which beat up people relentlessly.
There was extremely high level of anger and internet was full
of remarks that we need to blow up the pipelines because of
action in Moscow.
In 2010, a group of youngsters in the Far East called
partisans, guerrillas, engaged in systematic killing of law
enforcement in Far East. The interesting element of this story
was that majority of the locals supported them completely, that
law enforcement should be killed. So if at the same time where
there is hatred to Moscow increases or there is fragmentation
of the Russian nation conscience increasing regionalism as more
people of the Far East represent part of the Russian
Confederation.
At the same time they are increasingly rich and prosperous
China became an attractive magnet for an increasing number of
the Russians. There was quite a few tourists. People would go
to China for trade. People who buy property over there or even
plan a retirement which is absolutely extraordinary because you
could hardly mention any Russia from Far East or from any part
of Russia going not just to Central Asia, but even to the
Russian Caucuses. Moreover, most of the Russian-speaking folk
in Central Asia or Russian Confederation Caucuses tried to run
away from those places. So some of them are planning to go
retire in China indicates a considerable level of security and
sort of ability to lead among the Chinese.
Of course, everything is predicated on the trends of China
who has more and more reach, but if it proceeds in this
direction and China will be seen by the locals as sort of big
Japan, sort of Eastern-West. Located in the West, but have the
amenities and high living standard of the East, or the West,
and in case if Moscow would not be able to control the area in
case of big political crisis, the Far East could be attached to
China. By the way, during the 2008 demonstration in Vladivostok
some locals carried slogans, ``Give Vladivostok to Japan.'' So
this is what could happen. Of course, any prediction is hard,
but with the strength to proceed, it could be done.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shlapentokh follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Dr. Blank, and then we'll have some questions and dialogue.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. BLANK, PH.D., RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Mr. Blank. Thank you. It's a great honor to appear before
this subcommittee again and I wish to point out that my remarks
do not reflect the views of the Army, the Defense Department or
the U.S. Government. Since 2008, Russia has reoriented its
foreign policy to try and recover what was once the Soviet and
Czarist status of Russia in Asia, namely that of a great
independent power that had to be consulted about any major
change in security and development in North East Asia.
The precondition for success there is the reconstruction
and development of the Russian Far East, RFE. Thanks to factors
that are both natural, such as climate and cost of labor and
absence--and demographic decline, as well as to systematic
misrule by Russian Governments for years, this is an area that
was quite literally depressed. And it's still not preforming at
the same standard as European Russia. What that means is that
unless the Russian Government comes up with a coherent
development plan for the area, it will not be able to develop
the region on its own. By 2009, it had already come to the
conclusion that it could not do so on its own and it has been
soliciting foreign partners. The main foreign partners that it
solicits in the Russian Far East are, of course, China, Japan,
South Korea, and the United States.
As Congressman Rohrabacher pointed out, the United States
has not been particularly interested in seeing Russia as a
Pacific power. I wrote an article calling for this 2 years ago.
I got no response. So we're aligned in that respect.
Japanese business sees Russia in a very negative light, not
just because of the unresolved Kurile Islands although efforts
are now being made to solve that problem, but because Russia is
a lousy place to invest. Your investment is not safe. You are
subjected to confiscatory expropriation, taxation, corruption,
criminality, unjustified sudden environmental penalties and the
like. And the cost of doing business there are not conducive to
investment, when you can invest elsewhere and get much more for
your money. And that's not only in terms of oil and gas, but in
terms of power stations, infrastructure, all the things that
the Far East needs.
Russia's dream of building a railroad connection the Trans-
Siberian Railroad to the Korean Peninsula, going through North
Korea and then South Korea goes back to 1890, but it's still a
dream. It's not a reality. And the idea of building a Trans-
Korean pipeline that would bring gas to South Korea from Russia
and give North Korea tariff payments, as well as access to gas,
is obviously not going anywhere given the present conditions
there. So by default, the only major investor in the Russian
Far East is China and the Chinese are taking advantage of this
opportunity to obtain what you might call points of pressure or
pressure points, points of leverage, key nodes in the energy
infrastructure and other key industries in the Far East.
The Chinese threats to the independence and sovereignty of
Russia and the Far East are not Chinese migration. As a matter
of fact, according to Russian scholars, Chinese migration has
declined every year since the beginning of 2000. What is the
real point or tip of the spear is Chinese investment and trade.
And here, we see China utilizing the same kinds of tactics it
has used elsewhere to obtain key economic and political
leverage. The giant firm, Rosneft, has borrowed something like
$27 billion from China in order to sell it oil and the Chinese
are going to demand that that oil be sold at less than market
price.
China is now getting access into the gas industry and into
Russia's Arctic energy developments as well and the Arctic
energy is the great hope of the Russian energy sector for the
future so China is already there. What we see, therefore, is a
systematic Chinese economic penetration to investment and trade
which will give it the political leverage over key sectors of
the Russian economy in the years to come. And in the absence of
any competitors this could create major security issues for the
rest of Asia and the United States. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blank follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank all of you for your very thoughtful
testimony.
We are also joined with our good friends, Steve Stockman
from Texas, and the Colonel is leaving now, but has no
questions right now.
Mr. Cook. I wish I did. I have another commitment.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right, thank you, Colonel.
Mr. Cook. Great testimony.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Tom, do you have an opening statement or
would you like to ask some questions?
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity say a couple of things or ask some questions. I
travel a little bit and when I was in Venezuela, I was in the
American Building built by American Airlines and they had a lot
of Chinese folks there. I went to Republic of Congo and in the
hotel, they had a lot of Chinese folks there. Wherever I
travel, I see that the outreach is phenomenal in breadth. And
one of my African leader friends said that they are now the new
colonial masters of Africa.
I'm wondering if, any of you can comment on this, if you
were in the position of making decisions for the United States
and what would you recommend to counterbalance the ever-growing
presence around the world to the garnering and gathering of key
resources and minerals and oil, what would you recommend we do?
Dr. Blank?
Mr. Blank. That question, you have to go region by region,
but in the Russian Far East and in Central Asia, first of all,
we'd have to restore American growth at home in order to be
able to compete economically in a more robust way.
In the Far East, as I wrote 2 years ago, what is necessary,
I believe, is to organize with Japan and South Korea a
consortium that could actually come to the Russia Government
and say that we are prepared to invest in selected projects in
the Far East, energy, power transmission, infrastructure,
etcetera in return for essentially the right to do so in a
rational economic manner. As I put in the article, one of the
preconditions is no more Magnitskys. Basically, that people can
invest in Russia with the expectation that they get their money
out safely, that profits can be made, that they're not
subjected to extraordinary corruption and criminality.
Unfortunately, that has not happened, one of the reasons why
American investment generally, not just the Far East has
slipped.
In Central Asia, it's even more imperative, another region
because over there, to be honest with you and I wrote a big
paper about this last year, we talk a lot about the Silk Road,
but there's nothing concrete. It's talk. It's not actuality.
President Karimov, I'm told, laughs every time he hears it
because he knows it's not a reality. So if the United States
wants to compete with China, it needs to be able to compete
economically by demonstrating a capacity and willingness to
invest and sustain big investments in major projects in areas
that are critical to our national interests. If we don't take
that first step, everything becomes much more difficult.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Dr. Lee?
Mr. Lee. Yes, I would really second all of Steve's remarks.
What I've been toying with is the idea of a U.S. partnership
with our treaty allies in East Asia, Japan, and Korea, to come
to the Russians and say look, we've got a lot of money we want
to invest. We want to upgrade your railroads, your roads, your
maritime facilities, your air traffic, all of this and
meanwhile invest in the fabled resources of Siberia and the Far
East, but you've got to make some changes at your end. And the
changes have to be made that are going to improve the business
environment.
We're talking about things like protection, physical,
intellectual property. We're talking about transparency and
procurement. We don't want to get the feeling that the Chinese
have some kind of an edge getting early information about
projects that are going out to bid. I mean we want to be in a
position to be able to take advantage of all of the commercial
opportunities that are available.
But I think at the same time, there should also be
encouragement from the U.S. Government. It's not just a
commercial issue here. We're not going into Russia here, the
Far East, just for commercial reasons. There are big
strategic--there's a big strategic stake here. We have to look
upon the Russian Far East as kind of a gigantic buffer between
China and North America. I think that we have to, in a sense,
take a position there, increase our engagement and presence in
the region, not just to make money, but also for our strategic
well-being as a country.
Mr. Tkacik. If I could just add, when I was in the Foreign
Service in my earlier days, it was at the last two decades of
the Soviet Union. The State Department had a Soviet Affairs
Officer in just about every office of the State Department,
whether it was Oceans Environment, whether it was Visas,
whether it was any geographic area, and everybody was tasked to
write and report on how the Soviets were engaging in whatever
sector they were in. We don't have that with China these days.
And if we're going to deal with the growing Chinese
presence, you really have to know what you're dealing with. You
have to have a Treasury Department that's focused on China. You
have to have an Agriculture Department that has China people
that are--whose task is to report on how China is competing
with the United States. We don't--we really don't have that.
And I think the first thing that should be done is some kind of
perhaps mandatory requirement, a mandate on the State
Department on all government agencies to report on China policy
as it affects their missions. Until we have that, we don't even
know what the size of the problem is unless, of course, a
congressman shows up in Venezuela and he's overrun with 200
Chinese and he doesn't know what they're doing. And he goes to
Africa and he sees the same thing.
If I could just be indulged 1 more minute, one of the
places where I think we are facing the biggest challenge from
China's sort of invisible hegemony is in the Pacific. The
Pacific has been our sphere of influence for the last 60, 70
years. But now I think we're watching our Pacific foreign
policy be outsourced to Australia and New Zealand, both of whom
have completely different interests from us. And we're seeing
China basically take over each individual Pacific island state
one by one in a very subtle, but very effective way. And
there's no American presence to counter balance that.
Mr. Marino. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to point out that this
morning on NPR they had a former President Obama official
stating that very thing, that he feels we're abdicating and
this his policy maker, abdicating the Middle East and much of
the area. And that's not coming from a conservative or a
Republican official. It's coming from a former Obama official.
And I'd like to, if I may, Chairman, if we can get it and
submit it into the record, I think it's critical because while
these hearings are vital, I think the overall problem is not a
lot of people are aware of the dangers.
When I was a young man, my father was very much involved in
international relations. That's how I got involved in politics.
And not it's not popular to talk about anything beyond our
borders. As people remember 9/11 and other times, it's a very
grave danger to ignore the storms that are formulating outside
our borders. And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Shlapentokh, did you have something to
add to that?
Mr. Shlapentokh. My point is the U.S. needs to invest in
the Far East, but in order to attract the people of the Far
East to the United States is this money should have some
implication for them. It should be good jobs. It should be
housing. It should be something that goes in their pocket, not
just to the pockets of the big American company and its Russian
partners.
In this case, they will go along the way of the money. The
good way would be, of course, unite their efforts with the
Japanese and South Koreans, but once again to be sure that
money benefits go to Far East, not to Moscow.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. Just to back up Mr. Tkacik's
point about State Department not paying attention, we could not
get the State Department to send anyone here today, for
example, just to have a discussion, a dialogue with us about
the subject. And to say that they're not interested is an
understatement.
Mr. Lowenthal, would you like to proceed?
Mr. Lowenthal. First, I find the conversation very
fascinating and obviously maybe it's an oversimplification what
you all are saying, but obviously the increasing role of China
in both Central Asia and throughout the world is cause of
concern. The question I have are there any positive signs in
this that we could work with and what is going to be the
impact, not just between Russia and China, but on the emerging
of the new Central Asian republics. Can you talk a little bit
about the impacts of China on the--that used to be part of the
Soviet Union that are now independent countries and where do
they fit in? I believe that the Soviet Union wants to--how are
they--what is to their advantage, the Soviet Union wanting them
to come, to return Mr. Putin to kind of more under the
relationship of the Soviet Union. What role is China playing
actually in these Central Asian republics themselves and what
role should we be playing with them?
Mr. Blank. China is playing the role of investor and trade.
It is now the number one investor and trade partner for Central
Asia is also increasingly the place where they go to raise
money on international capital markets.
Now Central Asian governments, all of them each in their
own way, pursue what they call a multivector policy. They try
to balance off all of the great powers, U.S., China, Russia,
and keep them each at arm's length so that nobody can exercise
a disproportionate influence. The problem is that we have a
symmetry of means of influence in them. China's means of
influencing them is this enormous economic power and in
reserve, although it has never been used and China doesn't show
any interest in it, is the possibility of military power.
Russia's economic power of Central Asia is steadily
declining because of the fact that the Russians simply cannot
compete with the Chinese capital, so they have tried to build a
number of institutions, the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, CSTO which is essentially an attempt to create a
military organization to defend them against terrorism or
invasion and to keep them in the Russian military orbit. Now
they have set up a Customs Union, one purpose of which is to
keep Chinese goods out. If you have a Customs Union, goods
produced inside become much cheaper than those produced
outside. You have a visible Chinese and Russian economic
rivalry, but both of them see us as a potential threat because
of our supposed desire to maintain a military presence in
Central Asia after 2014 and of course, because they're all
opposed, including Central Asian governments to democracy.
What the U.S. needs to do here is first of all come to a
decision whether or not Central Asia is a strategically
important area for the United States. That has not been done.
There is no discernible strategy. Some talk of maintaining
military bases or troops in Afghanistan of certain advisory
level after 2014, but we're getting out of there militarily.
Economically, we're not investing anything like what would be
required to sustain a viable American presence. And instead,
we're relying on Uzbekistan which is essentially a government
whose security and legitimacy depends on the health of a 74-
year-old dictator.
So what I'm saying is there's no U.S. strategy for that
area. That answers your question about Central Asia.
Mr. Tkacik. I'd add that a dozen years ago, the Chinese
finally pulled together a Central Asian-Russian alliance in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And I think the Chinese
intent of this was to cement their influence in Central Asia as
the Russian influence was receding.
I have to say in the intervening 12 years, the Russians
have been very adept at moving in and sort of making sure that
the SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is mostly about
Russian-Chinese cooperation and that the Central Asians wind up
being sort of junior partners in this.
The problem, of course, is that the United States is far
removed. We can't--we don't have a geographic border there. We
have no way of getting our influence in. We have no way of
getting either military or economic power into Central Asia
without going through Russia or China or Pakistan or Iran. And
it's very difficult, I think, for us to break that
stranglehold. Central Asians, of course, as Steve mentioned,
are desperate to try to play off both Russia and China and hope
that the United States can come in and sort of tip the balance
one way or the other.
Mongolia, in particular, I mean is the only democracy in
the region, Mongolians are terrified of their future. They only
have two land borders. They have Russia on the top north and
China on the bottom. They're desperate to get the United States
and Canada and Europe and Japan investing in there so at least
they have a stake, but if push comes to shove, it's going to be
difficult for the United States to make its influence felt in
any way other than that before the United Nations. But I mean
if this, I thought I would--pass on, as China is usually the
SCO to crystallize its security leadership in that region.
Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. The chair will ask a
few questions and see if there's any final last minute
statements by members of the panel. I guess what we're talking
about is a major change in history in terms of who dominates
certain areas and is there any question among the panel that
let's say 70 years ago or 50 years ago that Russia, which was
then the Soviet Union dominated Central Asia in that part of
the world? Is there any question about that?
And is there any question among the panelists that 50 years
from now China will play that same dominant role or at least be
that dominant--maybe not as Dr. Blank suggested, they won't
have Chinese troops occupying the various or even Chinese
immigrants dominating the scene, but the decision making and
economic--how do you say--dominance, thus the political
dominance will be on the part of China 50 years from now, so
we'll see that shift away. Does anyone disagree with that?
Go right ahead, Dr. Blank.
Mr. Blank. I would be very hesitant about predicting first
of all, that far out because 35 years ago people in our
profession didn't think the Soviet Union was going to collapse,
let alone peacefully.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I did.
Mr. Blank. Well, you are in a minority. And as Yogi Berra
said ``Prediction is difficult, especially about the future.''
The Central Asians don't want to be subservient to anyone.
They want to be independent. That's why they strive for these
balancing policies. Second, I think we've all seen in Iraq and
Afghanistan just how difficult it is to subjugate people who
don't want to be ruled by foreign governments and therefore the
age of direct empire and maybe even of indirect empire is
becoming much more unlikely. The prospect of this could become
much more costly to anybody.
The Chinese are certainly trying to gain economic and
political leverage all across their periphery from Russia to
Far East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and into the South
Pacific and so on. That doesn't mean their dominance is simply
a foregone conclusion. It depends on what we do with the
opportunities that we have and what other states do if the
capabilities and resources and opportunities they have and the
fact of the matter is that the aggressive Chinese policies of
the last 4 or 5 years, have brought into being a pretty robust
coalition that is becoming ever closer to the U.S., South
Korea, Japan, Australia, key states in Southeast Asia like
Vietnam and Indonesia and India who are making it clear that
they are going to resist efforts by China to bring about a
tributary or hegemonic Chinese system. I would not be nearly as
confident that China is going to succeed in establish hegemony,
although they may well try and that may lead to major crisis.
But I think we have to leave the door open for countervailing
actions by other actors.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you for that very optimistic answer.
Let us just say the future is in our hands. There's nothing
pre-ordained, but the trends seem to be going and the dominance
that we were talking about again was not a dominance of that
part of the world by occupation and I think perhaps one of the
things that as most come out of this hearing from me is the
idea that in the past when I had spoken to our Russian friends,
I've talked about the potential of millions of Chinese
migrating into territory which is their territory and that
perhaps that will not be the methodology which creates Chinese
power in those areas. That instead, people coming slowly, but
carrying lots of money and buying all of the natural resources
of an area and becoming the only employer in the area may well
be just as powerful an influence as having large numbers of
Chinese people moving there.
And that strategy, as you're pointing out, Dr. Blank, is a
fascinating strategy and it does have its weaknesses as we've
seen in Burma. Burma, for the last 30 years has been, 40 years,
has been at least 30 years has been really under the major
influence of China, that's not the domination of China, but now
the Burmese regime is actually trying to break lose and head
more toward the West.
Also let me note that the Russians, another factor that we
put into this equation is that--and obviously, this is
stereotyping, but the Russians seem to be people who have a
creative genius about them. When it comes to science--I'm also
on the Science Committee, Science, Space, and Technology
Committee that we've always admired the fact that the Russians
have been the power on this earth that has developed so much
space technology and so much other technologies that were very
innovative in pushing humankind, although they were not good at
implementing those and commercializing them and put into
practice. They were very good at the creative part.
The Chinese, on the other hand, have been very good at
taking the creations of the West and building them and mass
producing them at a cheaper price. I would think the genius is
a very valuable asset that the Russians have. And also, I might
add, as the United States is now finding that the Chinese are
stealing our intellectual property by the boat load or by
whatever megaload it is. The Russians will find that as well.
Just something about U.S. policy and Russia, are we--just
very quickly with the panel. In the last, since the fall of the
Soviet Union, have we pushed Russia into a good relationship
with China? And should we have not been as tough on Russia in
certain ways that we were? Just very quickly. We'll start over
here with Dr. Lee.
Mr. Lee. Yes, I certainly have the feeling that we have
missed out on many opportunities to make more of our
relationship with Russia. And a lot of this in a sense is water
over the dam. We can't do anything about some of the more
controversial acts, the Magnitsky bill, NATO enlargement,
arguments over Iran, over Syria, over a number of different
issues. I don't think that we can do that much about these
problems. These are sort of fixed in our relationship, at least
for the time being. But I do think that if we can develop a
relationship in the Pacific between what I call Pacific Russia
and Pacific America, this relationship, which would affect the
Russian Far East could certainly spill over into other areas of
the U.S.-Russia relationship and create possibilities for a
broader, overall improvement.
In the Pacific, we don't really have many outstanding
differences between us and Russia. I think there's the question
of the demarcation of the Bering Strait. My understanding is
that that's being negotiated, but it's between Atlantic Russia
and European Russia where we have a lot of the problems. Let's
try to build the relationship on the Pacific side and see if it
might not have a positive effect on the U.S.-Russia
relationship overall.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That was a very good answer to that
question. Thank you. And I want to come back with a follow up
after we go through the----
Mr. Tkacik. Did we push Russia into China's hands? I don't
think so. I think what happened is that we didn't--the United
States was not sufficiently vigilant as Russia was
transitioning from a Soviet dictatorship into a democracy and
then into something else. And when--by the time Putin took over
it seems to me that he was basing his legitimacy not on the
consent of the governed, but more of how he would bring Russia
back into the world as a global power again. And that if you
were against Putin that you were against Russia. That's not to
me us pushing Russia into China's hands. What we were doing was
basically saying wait a minute, this is a dictatorship, this is
not something that we can countenance. In the meantime, the
Chinese said, oh, that's all right, we're dictators, too. We
get along quite well.
I think this sense in Moscow that the United States
championing democracy and human rights is an attack on the
legitimacy of the Putin government is probably at bottom the
real reason why we have this conflict with them. So if we're
going to resolve the issue, I think one has to start, I think,
there. A democratic Russia, to me, is a far better player in
the world stage than non.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Doctor.
Mr. Shlapentokh. Here, I think we need to see two types of
approach. Approach with a Moscow central government. Here, of
course, there is a strong imperial feeling and of course, did
start with the expansion of the NATO and especially after the
Serbian war. It was sort of watershed. The liberals became look
at the United States with the eyes of so-called red to brown
Eurasianists and similar other folk.
The rise of dimension is Far East. In this case we will,
the United States could, of course, played the same regionalism
as China, but in this case the Far East would look at the
United States much better than Chinese. The Russian preferences
for masses would be in the peck order, Europe mostly, Germany,
France, ideal. Second in the peck order would be United States.
China, only if China became East and West, rich, property
rights, more economically political, personal liberties.
Russians would not mind to see tough Chinese dealings with
bureaucracy. They would say yes, it's nice to shoot, we would
like to see most of our bureaucracy be shot. But Russia would
like to have some kind of property rights, some kind of
personal liberties. They could travel abroad, no one
interfering with this or that. So if United States will
approach the Far East in the way that Far East would benefit
personally with jobs, maybe scholarships or whatever, some
material benefits, not words, hard cash, they would play the
game both with China and with Japan and the United States.
If the United States tried to play with Moscow, the central
government, it is a another story.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And finally, Dr. Blank.
Mr. Blank. I believe that we've undoubtedly made mistakes
in our foreign policy in the last 20, 25 years, but I would not
want to eliminate the fact that the Russian turn to China
begins in 1992 and I think is very much connected with the fact
that the Russian Government already in 1992 was turning away
from democracy. I'm one of those people who does not think that
Yeltsin built a democracy. He certainly in many ways is more
appealing a character than Putin is, but it was by no means
democracy. It was what the Russians would call bezobrazie, sort
of anarchy and lack of form. No limits. But the fact of the
matter is that what drives Russian foreign policy back then and
even now is the determination of the Russian elite to rule
Russia in traditional autocratic authoritarian way and that
Russia must be a great power, i.e., an imperial or at least
neo-imperial presence and they can only get that by being
friends with China.
To the extent that the United States is Russia's partner,
the Russians would feel their regime under pressure because we
represent the greatest threat to the security of the Russian
federation, namely democracy, not military power, but
democratic governance and they have said so in many different
ways over many times.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Interesting point.
Mr. Lowenthal. Yes, I'm struck with this balancing again,
from the point of view of the Central Asian republics. One, how
it is really to their advantage that the United States be part
of this balancing act. I hear you saying in terms of their
survival, you know, yet there's a lack of U.S. policy toward
Central Asia in general. We spent a lot of time talking about
Russia and China and I understand that, but I don't hear a lot
how we can support or can we both the understanding of Central
Asia, how we promote investment in Central Asia, in terms of
the new Central Asia republics. Is that possible? Should we be
doing that? Should that be part of a strategy? Should our
strategy be less concern about where Russia or China is at this
moment, but what role we can play in Central Asia? And how
Americans do not even understand where Central Asia is or know
anything about Central Asia and what can we do about that?
Mr. Blank. As I said earlier, there needs to be a
determination by the government in power at any given time in
the United States, whether it's a Democratic or a Republican
administration, whether or not we consider Central Asia to be
strategically important. We are there essentially because we
were attacked, but economic interests was actually growing
before 2001.
There is talk of a Silk Road, but there's no follow
through. To give you an example, in 2011-12, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee published a major study calling for the
building of the Silk Road and for the investment. This was done
under then Senator Kerry's leadership. The State Department has
done nothing with it. There is no real funding for it. They
simply cobbled together existing programs. We know that
bureaucratic game. There is no vision or strategy as to what we
want to see in Central Asia after we leave Afghanistan and what
instruments we have for influencing it and whether or not we
even think it's important.
Mr. Lowenthal. Right.
Mr. Blank. Now if you can't answer those questions, all the
questions you've posed become unanswerable because you're
completely adrift. You don't have a lever in which to move the
situation. If you feel Central Asia is important and you
educate the public to understand why we think it's important
and you develop the instruments of policy primarily economic
ones to advance that interest, then you can actually get a
hearing for what the United States wants to do. But without
that essentially our Central Asia policy is--well, now it's
essentially arranging for the departure of our troops from
Afghanistan and what happens afterwards nobody knows.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I'd like to thank the witnesses and did
you have another follow up? I just have one closing statement
which is my prerogative, thank you. We don't live in a world
that really looks anywhere like the world when I was a kid. And
my dad was a Marine and he flew spy missions on the China
coast. We lived in Japan. And anyway, of course, it was Russia
and the Soviet Union and China then and then, of course, later
that whole relationship with China supposedly changed. Whatever
the reality is today we know that we can--it is not out of our
control. One thing, one point that's been made over and again
in this hearing is that we're not paying attention to this and
we are not trying to control the events and not trying to have
the influence that the United States should have in this part
of the world and if we don't, things are going to turn out
differently than might turn out in a way that we don't like.
And so it is essential that we become players in that part of
the world. And from the various elements that have also been
talked about today, we've heard that America's involvement with
Russia on its Pacific side is vitally important to how things
will shape up in the world.
I would suggest then that perhaps one country that we
haven't talked about much in this hearing can play and should
play a major role because it is already a partner with the
United States. I'm talking about Japan. If the influence that
we have heard outlined today by China and how they are
exercising their expansion of influence, what other country can
really have a balance to that? And I think it's the Japanese.
And the Japanese working with the United States can balance off
exactly the threat that you have been talking about today which
is expansion of Chinese influence based on their economic
invasion rather than an invasion of troops or an invasion of
migrants.
The Japanese are very capable of this and we should be
working with them on it. I see a world in which Russia, the
United States, Japan and India will play a major role in
shaping the world and the reason I'm not including China is
that China is ruled by tyrants who are the world's worst human
rights abuser. But perhaps the coalition that I just mentioned,
if we could establish that and not drive Putin away by trying
to suggest or hold him to some sort of standard, by the way,
you mentioned Dr. Blank early on that China is much more
authoritarian and totalitarian now than the Soviet Union was
when it was the Soviet Union. Did you not say that?
Mr. Tkacik. No, I said that.
Mr. Shlapentokh. Much brutish.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It was Tkacik who said that and I happen
to agree with that point.
Mr. Shlapentokh. Much brutish.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And today we have China that there is no
opposition party in China. There is an opposition party in
Russia. There are several opposition parties in Russia. You go
to Russia, there are things that you can buy on the streets
that are printed in Russia that oppose the Putin regime. You
don't see this anywhere in China. And you don't see--and in
Russia, there are talk radio show hosts that actually criticize
their government. You certainly don't see that in China. And
China is a country and the expansion of the influence of that
dictatorship, that clique that runs China I suggest is a threat
to the well-being of certainly Central Asia and Russia, but
also to the rest of us in the world who again, going back to
the purpose of the hearing hold that the dominance of Central
Asia will have an impact on the equilibrium of freedom and
liberty and security and stability throughout the rest of the
planet. And if you have a small clique in China who feel that
they have a cartel by the bribes that they've offered
throughout the world, that is just as great a threat as if they
controlled these countries via an occupation army. So we must
be vigilant and committed to building, to creating a future and
I would suggest focusing and what I've got out of this hearing
today is let's try to focus with Russia on their Pacific role
and see where that leads us and see where that leads Japan and
the United States and I think that would be a very positive
thing.
Now with that said, I thank our witnesses. Thank you for
the discussion.
Mr. Lowenthal, thank you very much. You're adding a lot to
the depth of this hearing. Let me note that Congressman
Lowenthal represents the ports in the United States in which
perhaps a majority of all the trade from that part of the world
coming into the United States comes right through his district.
I know, it used to be my district. And he's doing a great job
in joining us today and thank all of you for your testimony.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Tom Marino, a
Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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