[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-15]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
THE POSTURE OF THE
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,
AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 6, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-856 WASHINGTON : 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer
Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or
866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 6, 2013, The Posture of the U.S. Central
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 6, 2013......................................... 39
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2013
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Fraser, Gen William M., III, USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 6
Mattis, Gen James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command...... 3
McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Fraser, Gen William M., III.................................. 94
Mattis, Gen James N.......................................... 47
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 43
McRaven, ADM William H....................................... 77
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 123
Mr. Scott.................................................... 123
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Andrews.................................................. 133
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 145
Mr. Langevin................................................. 133
Mr. LoBiondo................................................. 133
Mr. McKeon................................................... 127
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 142
Mr. Runyan................................................... 139
Ms. Shea-Porter.............................................. 136
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 135
Mr. Turner................................................... 134
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 6, 2013.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order. Good morning,
ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets
to receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Central, Special
Ops, and Transportation Commands. Today we have with us General
James Mattis, Admiral William McRaven, General William Fraser.
Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us here today.
General Mattis, this is your last time. What a wonderful
opportunity to say whatever you want.
The CENTCOM [Central Command] area of responsibility
remains a critical focus of the U.S. military. Over the next
year in Afghanistan, the United States will be withdrawing
34,000 troops, and the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces]
will be fully in the lead across Afghanistan for the first
time. These major changes to the security context in
Afghanistan, all of which will be occurring during the same
time period, could present new forms of risk to U.S. interests
in Afghanistan and in the region.
Likewise, the broader challenges within the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, including the conflict in Syria, the nuclear
ambitions of Iran, and the uncertain political transition in
Egypt, continue to pose strategic risks to U.S. interests.
However, in my view, among the greatest strategic risks within
the Middle East remains the ongoing ambiguity associated with
U.S. commitment to our regional allies and the region itself.
Additionally, I remain concerned about the threats posed by
transnational terrorism. The threat from Al Qaeda is real; it
is global, networked, and clandestine. U.S. Special Operations
Command and our Special Operations Forces play a critical role
in counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and countering
weapons of mass destruction.
SOCOM [Special Operations Command] has achieved
extraordinary integration with each of the Services, the U.S.
Interagency, and our international partners. However, an
emphasis on direct action during the last 11 years of combat
may have left our Special Operations Forces out of balance for
a future that will increasingly require building partnership
capacity and advisory and assistance efforts.
Looking forward, our Special Operations Forces must remain
flexible enough to counter the transnational terrorist threat
with decisive force when warranted, but at the same time
globally postured to prevent transnational terrorism from
manifesting into operational and strategic threats, through
international partnerships and regional alliances.
Finally, TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] continues to
execute the logistical requirements for ongoing U.S. military
efforts across the globe. The challenges that TRANSCOM faces
continue to grow. As our military prepares to redeploy from
Afghanistan, and as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, we must
remain ready to respond to contingencies elsewhere in the
Middle East and Africa. These operational necessities come as
the military is being forced to shed force structure, curtail
flying hours, and return ships to port, reducing the
availability of the very lift capacity upon which TRANSCOM
relies. This committee has taken steps to mitigate these
shortfalls, but much remains to be done.
In short, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM are executing vital
military missions across the globe. We are extremely grateful
for your service to our country, and we look forward to your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our witnesses
as well, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, General Fraser. We
thank you for your service and your great leadership in your
three very important commands. It is appropriate that we have
the three of you together because you have to work very, very
closely together.
As the chairman mentioned, CENTCOM continues to be our most
important command facing the greatest challenges, number one,
of course, being Afghanistan, where we still have troops in
battle. And the transition over the course of the next couple
of years is going to be critical. Look forward to hearing more
from General Mattis, from all three of you, actually, about how
that transition will go.
But there are other threats in the CENTCOM region.
Obviously, the instability in the Middle East remains, and the
threat from Iran is also something that will continue to be a
challenge, and we are curious any thoughts you have on how to
contain that and what come out of the Syrian civil war as well.
Admiral McRaven, we greatly appreciate everything the
Special Operations Command has done. And, obviously, we are
very aware of the work that has been done in Iraq and
Afghanistan over the course of the last decade. Less well known
is your presence in many other places trying to contain
insurgencies, in many cases before they start.
The relatively small footprint that you offer yields a huge
return in a number of places to great success. In the
Philippines, helping contain insurgencies there; our work with
AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia] in the Somalia area,
working with partners in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and
Burundi, as well, has proven that a small-force, building-
partner capacity working with the local population can make an
enormous difference for a very small cost. Of course, you also
have to include diplomacy and development pieces to make that
work, but I think the partnerships that have been formed there
have been incredibly valuable.
Now, going forward, certainly, as the chairman mentioned,
as we are drawing down in Afghanistan, as we have drawn down in
Iraq, how do we reposition SOF [Special Operations Forces] to
best meet the threat environment that is out there?
And, General Fraser, the Transportation Command is
absolutely critical. It is all about logistics. It is the part
of fighting a battle and preparing for battle that most people
don't know that much about, but it just doesn't happen if we
don't get the troops and the equipment to where they need to
go. It is a very complicated process. You do an excellent job;
certainly have been, you know, very, very helpful in
Afghanistan. And the challenge now as we transition out is you
are the guy who has got to get all that stuff out of there in a
logical way. So we are anxious to hear about that.
Of course, overall, as the chairman mentioned up front, you
all face, you know, budget challenges. You know, we had fairly
substantial cuts in what we were expected to spend starting
2011. Now we have sequestration kicking into to roughly double
those cuts and to do so in a very unhelpful way, across the
board, mindlessly, in a way that makes it very difficult to
plan. In addition, we have the challenge of operating under a
CR [Continuing Resolution] instead of with an appropriations
bill. All of those things are going to make it that much more
difficult to get the job done. We are anxious to hear about how
you are meeting those challenges and what, hopefully, we can do
to reduce them.
So I thank the chairman. Look forward to your testimony.
Appreciate your being here, and appreciate your great service
for to our country.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, your full statements that you have given to us
will be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.
General Mattis.
STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. It
is my privilege to appear alongside a stalwart shipmate, a true
friend, and a comrade in arms, Admiral Bill McRaven, and our
tremendously supportive TRANSCOM Commander, General Will
Fraser, whose outstanding team provides 100 percent of our
critical strategic mobility and does so superbly.
In the Middle East, we confront what is a significant risk
to our interests in the region: a perceived lack of an enduring
U.S. commitment. To counter this misperception, we must clearly
communicate our intent and demonstrate our support through
tangible actions.
In Afghanistan, we are conducting a steady and deliberate
transition. U.S. leadership among 50 nations fighting together
in the largest wartime coalition in modern history provides
continued support of the Afghan Security Forces to set
conditions for their long-term success.
Iran remains the single most significant regional threat to
stability and prosperity in the region. Reckless behavior and
bellicose rhetoric characterize a leadership that cannot win
the affection of its own people or the respect of any
responsible nation in the region.
Iran's continued support to the murderous Assad regime in
Syria, coupled with its maligned activities in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Gaza, and globally in
Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Thailand, India, Georgia, Bulgaria,
Nigeria, and even here in Washington, D.C., in the attempt to
kill the Saudi Ambassador, and elsewhere, as well as in the
cyber domain raise the risk of Iranian miscalculation that
could spark a disastrous conflict.
As we address the very real challenges we collectively
face, I am confident U.S. Central Command will continue working
by, with, and through our regional partners to ensure a measure
of stability in the region.
Our military-to-military engagements, security cooperation
efforts, exercise programs, and information operations will
continue to need your support, including innovative and
flexible authorities and the necessary funds so we can continue
doing what is required to protect U.S. national security
interests.
As our Nation confronts a period of fiscal austerity, our
ability to adapt our ways and means to continue to meet our
operational objectives would be enhanced with three key
factors. One is budget certainty; a second is time so we can
adapt our changed budget levels, and we can execute them
smartly; and third is the flexibility to determine where to
shift available funds in a manner that reduces risk and is
consistent with the intent of Congress.
With your support, and with the continued devotion to duty
of our troops, and the commitment of our military families, we
will stand by our friends and maintain a measure of regional
stability in defense of our values and our interests.
I look forward to answering your questions, Chairman. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral McRaven. Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to address the committee today and talk about the
magnificent work being accomplished around the globe by the men
and women of the U.S. Special Operations Command.
It is always good to be joined by my friend Will Fraser,
and I am particularly pleased to be joining Jim Mattis in his
last testimony before he retires later this month after 41
years of service to this great Nation.
I have known Jim Mattis for many years, and everyone who
has ever served with him by his side feels honored and
privileged to have done so, and I count myself in that group.
Jim Mattis has been particularly supportive of the men and
women of the U.S. Special Operations Command. And, Jim, on
behalf of all those great warriors and Americans everywhere, I
want to thank you for your incredible leadership, for all your
personal sacrifice, and for your unmatched sense of duty,
honor, and country. Good luck in retirement, Jim.
Mr. Chairman, this is my second opportunity to address this
committee since I took command in the summer of 2011. Since
that time I am proud to say that we have continued the great
work initiated by my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson. At the
same time we have adapted to the changing strategic and fiscal
environment to keep SOF relevant now and in the future. In
Afghanistan, we established a new Special Operations command
structure, which brought the various NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] and U.S. SOF elements into alignment under
a two-star headquarters. This has allowed us to have a common
view of the enemy, and has also helped synchronize our Special
Operations Forces to achieve a common end state. It has made
SOF even more effective than ever before.
Partnered with our Afghan Special Operations Forces, we
have continued to attrit the enemy leadership, while at the
same time building and training Afghan Security Forces so they
can stand on their own against this determined threat.
In addition to our work in Afghanistan, SOF is in
approximately 78 countries around the world helping to build
partner capacity so that the host nation can deal with their
own security problems. In the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance,
then-Secretary Panetta wrote, ``We are shaping a joint force
for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be
agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. It will
be led by the highest-quality battle-tested professionals. It
will have a global presence, strengthening alliances and
partnerships across the regions.''
I firmly believe that the Secretary's words speak to the
core capabilities of SOF, and therefore SOCOM is working with
the Joint Chiefs and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
to ensure we are postured now and into the future to meet the
objectives of this strategy.
Finally, I have made caring for our force and families my
top priority. In the past year my command sergeant major and I
have met with the soldiers and their families from around the
SOCOM enterprise. We have listened to their concerns and, with
the support of the Services, we are aggressively implementing
programs and plans to help with the physical, mental, and
spiritual well-being of the force. We have a professional and
moral obligation to take care of our warriors and their
families, and we greatly appreciate the support of your
committee and other Members on the Hill in our efforts to take
care of these men and women.
Thank you again, sir, for your commitment to the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of the Department of
Defense, and specifically to those great warriors who make up
the Special Operations Command. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in
the Appendix on page 77.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Fraser.
STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Fraser. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and
distinguished members of this committee, it is indeed an honor
and a privilege to be with you here today representing the men
and women of United States Transportation Command.
Our total force team of over 150,000 men and women,
military and civilian, are dedicated. They are proven to be
reliable every single day. They offer seamless logistical
support to our warfighters and their families all around the
entire globe. I am proud to report to you before you today that
I am honored to be with you, but also representing them as they
have met the mission every single day.
I would also like to say that I am proud to be here with
two of my teammates, Admiral McRaven and General Mattis.
General Mattis, I want to take this opportunity on behalf
of all the men and women in the United States Transportation
Command to also offer my thanks, our thanks, for the many years
of service that you have provided our Nation, for your personal
sacrifices. We thank you for your leadership, but I personally
want to thank you for your friendship for the many years that I
have known you, and I want to wish you all the best in
retirement. Thank you very much, sir.
You know, our Active Duty members, National Guard,
Reserves, civil servants, merchant mariners, commercial
partners have met the challenges of the past year while
maintaining a high operations tempo supporting combat
operations, sustainment efforts, humanitarian relief, and
crisis action responses. These efforts, from supporting folks
who were in need after Superstorm Sandy to developing
innovative ways to maximize our throughput into and out of
Afghanistan, to meeting the directed 68,000 troop reduction
level by the 30th of September 2012, were made possible by the
United States TRANSCOM team of dedicated professionals
committed to ensuring our joint force maintains global logistic
superiority.
Our Component and Subordinate Command Team, comprised of
Air Mobility Command, led by General Paul Selva; Military
Sealift Command, led by Rear Admiral Mark Buzby; Surface
Deployment Distribution Command, led by Major General Tom
Richardson; the Joint Naval and Capabilities Command, led by
Rear Admiral Scott Stearney; and the Joint Transportation
Reserve Unit, led by Major General Dave Post, continued their
flawless execution of our command's mission. I have had the
opportunity to observe firsthand during my travels throughout
Europe, Central Asia, and the Pacific and all around the globe
the support these world-class professionals provide and can
tell you they are doing the Nation's business magnificently,
without fanfare, and often under stressful conditions. I could
not be prouder of this total team.
As we continue to sustain our forces abroad, we also are
working towards our goal of becoming the Government's
transportation and enabling capabilities provider of choice. To
meet that goal we embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative
5-year strategic plan, which will tackle the challenges. It
will also take advantage of the opportunities for continuing to
project national power and influence. This strategic plan
positions us to respond effectively and efficiently to our
rapidly changing operating environment, while accounting for
the dynamic fiscal environment which we now face. We continue
to work with our customers and the lift providers to pursue
smart transportation solutions to reduce the costs of
operations.
Strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and
leaner, while at the same time we must continue to be agile,
flexible, and ready. As the global distribution synchronizer
and distribution process owner, USTRANSCOM is committed to
working with the military services, our component commands,
other governmental agencies, allies and commercial partners to
synchronize distribution planning and synchronize distribution
initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure we deliver
scalable and resilient global distribution network from the
point of origin to the point of employment. We will meet the
needs of the operating environment.
As we look towards the future, we are also assessing the
mission impact of funding reductions for this year and
potentially beyond. Since USTRANSCOM requirements are driven by
our customer workload and readiness needs, as their demand
signals decline, so will our workload. While the impacts of
these reductions will not occur immediately, long-term results
will likely affect the business base of our commercial partners
and, therefore, our ability to support other combatant commands
in the same manner as we do today.
In the coming months we will continue to work closely with
the military services, our commercial partners to mitigate
second- and third-order effects of these reductions on our
sealift, on our airlift, and surface capabilities, and we will
keep you informed of our progress. Preserving our readiness
remains critical to maintaining our capability to project power
and provide support to our joint forces around the world.
Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, all the members of this
committee, I, too, want to thank you for your continued support
of USTRANSCOM and all of our men and women, military and
civilian. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in
the Appendix on page 94.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Mattis, I said in my opening statement that I
remain concerned that the ambiguity associated with our U.S.
commitment to CENTCOM region is one the greatest strategic
risks to U.S. interests, if not the greatest. You also touched
on this issue in your posture statement. Could you provide
specific examples in which the changing, ambiguous, or lacking
commitments from the United States within the CENTCOM area of
responsibility are putting U.S. interests as risk?
General Mattis. Chairman, the drawdown of our forces can be
misinterpreted as a lack of attention, a lack of commitment to
the region. Obviously that is a misinterpretation of what we
are doing. Those forces were sent there for missions that are
going away. But what we have to do through exercises, through
our mil-to-mil contacts by having their officers attend our
schools is show an unwavering interest in this critical part of
the world.
I would also add, sir, that the budget ambiguity right now
is probably the single greatest factor. I am asked about it
everywhere I go in the region, by the regional leaders to
national leaders there. And I think we are at a point that
Senator Kaine made yesterday in the hearing in front of the
SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] where he stated that
budget ambiguity is now starting to drive our strategy.
And so what we could use most is some degree of budget
predictability, like any household or business in America needs
to run an operation. We need some time to make those cuts
right. And we need a certain amount of flexibility for the
Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations,
Commandant of the Coast Guard so that they can take the cuts in
a way that has the least risk associated with it. Combined with
that and a continuing straight message that we are committed, I
think we can weather this current situation, and reassure our
friends, and make certain none of our adversaries think this is
an opportunity.
The Chairman. I am hopeful that today we will pass with a
good vote the CR, which contains also the appropriations bill
for the DOD [Department of Defense].
That would give certainty, at least for the next 6 months,
to the Department, which I think is very crucial at this time.
So hopefully we can get that done. In fact, I understand we are
going to have a vote within an hour on the rule as they try to
expedite this process.
General, you are retiring at the end of this month. The
Nation owes you a great debt of gratitude for your 41 years of
service, and this has been iterated by your colleagues there
next to you. We understand that we owe that debt, and thank
you. Thank you very much for all you have done to help the
Marine Corps, and this Nation, and the people that have served
with you and under you during this time.
Reflecting back on your tenure as CENTCOM Commander, if you
were giving advice to a future commander, what are the key
policy decisions you believe the United States must make in
order to ensure our warfighters can conduct robust planning to
respond to contingencies in the Middle East?
General Mattis. Chairman, I think the most important point
is that we keep open communications with our regional partners,
our allies out there. And they want to carry their share of the
burden in many cases, they are eager to do so, and by good
intelligence sharing, by good cross-component training with our
various components and their components, we can put ourselves
in a position where we are not carrying this entire burden
ourselves. And I think that is critical right now, and it means
we are going to have to look afresh at a region that is going
through change, and we are going to have to make certain we are
open to the opportunities that are presented to us as well as
recognizing the very real challenges that are coming with the
turmoil there.
I think, too, the recognition that Iran's role is extremely
unhelpful is simply part of dealing with reality. I know there
are some very good efforts under way with diplomatic
initiatives and economic sanctions, and I completely support
those. At the same time we have to recognize that so far they
have not backed off on enriching plutonium beyond any plausible
peaceful purpose. And that is a reality, too, that I think we
see with the P5-plus-1 negotiations, the European Union
position. I think there is a broadening international
commitment to stopping what is going on there, and we should do
everything possible to reinforce the current policies of our
President and of the international organizations that are
trying to stop this.
Part of this, frankly, we are going to have to recognize
Iran's legitimate security interests so we can preclude them
going for illegitimate means as a way to protect themselves. So
it is going to be a balancing act, and I think we are on the
right track right now, but so far we are not having the
traction we need to throw the nuclear program into neutral. It
is still progressing, sir.
The Chairman. Thanks very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first echo
the comments in thanking General Mattis for his service and
congratulating him on his impending retirement. I understand
you are planning on retiring back to the State of Washington.
So we welcome you back, and thank you very much for your great
service. And, personally, it has been great to work with you
during my time on this committee and your time in command. You
have always been very open and very helpful in keeping me
informed and doing, you know, a great job for all of us. So I
very much appreciate that.
On the spending, I just want to make a quick editorial
comment, then I just have one question. Certainly we do need an
appropriations bill, but, you know, I realize we have reached
the point where the sequestration numbers have simply been
accepted, it seems. I don't think that is acceptable, it is not
the number we should be at, and I think as a Congress we should
not forget that we still have a very strong obligation to
address revenue and to address mandatory spending. And our
complete inability to address those two issues is placing an
enormous amount of pressure on the discretionary budget.
I care about aspects of the discretionary budget that
aren't just defense, so certainly they should be noted. But
here in the Armed Services Committee, we should take a look and
then listen to the generals that we have all been talking to
about the decisions that are having to be made because we
cannot address taxes and mandatory spending. It all falls on
the discretionary budget and is doing great damage, I think, to
this country. So I hope that wherever we are now, however
stalemated it appears, there is a commitment at least on this
committee to keep looking for ways to get above those
sequestration numbers, and the sooner the better.
The only question I have, I have had the opportunity to
speak with all three of you gentlemen before the hearing, and
there is something I wanted to ask Admiral McRaven about. It is
an obscure issue, but the Leahy amendment and how it impacts
your job.
This amendment was passed a couple years ago that places
restrictions on our ability to do train-and-equip missions with
certain nations if they don't meet certain human rights levels.
And at first blush, you know, that makes perfect sense. You
know, that is where we want to get those countries to. We want
to make sure that their security forces are respecting human
rights. In fact, I know, Admiral McRaven, you would tell us
that is one of the first things you do. I was very impressed,
for instance, in the Philippines that that is--you know, since
it is an internal issue, training the security forces on how to
work with and respect the local populations is a cornerstone of
what you do.
The irony of the Leahy amendment is it forces you out at a
time when perhaps you are needed most, when there isn't respect
for human rights amongst the security forces. Certainly this
was a difficulty in Mali, when you weren't allowed to, you
know, train as much as you would have liked because of those
continuing concerns.
I support the human rights concerns. I just think that
SOCOM being able to go in and do train-and-equip missions is a
way to improve human rights, and I am wondering if you could
just talk a little bit more about that.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you. And I think you hit the
nail on the head here. We absolutely want to ensure that the
forces we are working with understand and appreciate their
requirement to maintain appropriate human rights. We go in and
we try to teach them what we think ``right'' looks like in
terms of everything militarily, from good order and discipline,
to civilian rule in the military, to human rights.
So when we have a circumstance where you have an
individual, for example, that is in the unit, we have now what
is called a policy of ``poison person, poison unit.'' So if the
individual has committed a human rights violation, then by
default we have to go back and relook the entire unit,
potentially step away from that unit at a time when, frankly,
as you said, we are kind of getting forced out at a time when
we probably need to engage them more than ever before.
And I want to make absolutely clear, Congressman, we are
all about making sure that there are appropriate human rights
vetting, and that we are doing this according to the law and
the policy. Unfortunately it has restricted us in a number of
countries across the globe in our ability to train units that
we think need to be trained, that the U.S. Ambassador in many
cases thinks need to be trained, that the host nation thinks
needs to be trained, and yet because of some of the
restrictions of the Leahy amendment, we are prohibited from
doing that.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. That is something I think this
committee should look at during the authorization process.
That is all I have. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would
prefer that we not have military funded at the lower
sequestration level. On the other hand I know that we have an
opportunity before us in just an hour or two to alleviate some
of the damage that comes from having a CR and a sequestration
together. And I hope that, like the chairman, we can have a
strong vote to make sure that happens, because I am afraid we
have a narrow window to get a defense appropriation bill done,
and then we will end up with the worst of both.
Thank you all for being here. I appreciate very much your
service. And if I may make a brief editorial comment, it seems
to me essential to our country's security to have those who
serve us in the Armed Forces to be able to and to be encouraged
to offer their best professional military advice on the key
issues we face even if it makes political leaders
uncomfortable. I think that is a form of courage that is just
as valuable to the country and just as admirable as the
physical sort of courage that we all admire in those who serve.
And I just say, General Mattis, in addition to your
intellect and other qualities, that courage that you have
displayed throughout your career and integrity is one of the
reasons you are so admired on this side of the table as well as
with your colleagues there.
Moving to the weeds for just a second, General Mattis, we
had a hearing a week or two ago on building partnership
capacity; looking at the different authorities and whether
there are improvements, adjustments, modifications, updates
that can or should be made to the range of authorities we have
to help other security forces.
Given your experience and area of responsibility, I would
be interested in any comments you have on that topic,
suggestions you may have, especially looking forward. And then
I would appreciate it if Admiral McRaven could make a comment
on that as well.
General Mattis. Thank you, sir.
I won't reiterate what Admiral McRaven already said about
Leahy, but that is at times stopping us perhaps more broadly
than was the congressional intent, where one person does
something, and now we have a large unit that is tainted and we
are unable to work with.
The other point I would make is, sir, that many of the
organizations that conduct border security or paramilitary
activities against terrorists in particular are in the Ministry
of Interior Forces. And if we could get some flexibility that
if an ambassador says, this organization in the Ministry of
Interior is working in a de facto military realm and could use
U.S. military guidance, support, training, we need the
authority, I think, to also work with them.
Sometimes we have this arbitrary line drawn originally for
a very good purpose, but probably because other organizations
do not organize the same way, other nations don't organize the
same way we do, we get somewhat circumscribed in what we can
do. That would be the one that leaps out at me.
I actually have the authority to do training both here at
home, if they want to come to Nellis Air Force base or to Fort
Irwin. I have got the authority to do training with them
overseas. I am in pretty good shape on the authorities right
now, sir, absent those two points.
Mr. Thornberry. Admiral.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. Thank you.
In terms of Special Operations Forces and how we train and
build partner capacity, as was mentioned in the opening
comments by the chairman and the ranking member, our direction
here as we push towards a vision for SOF 2020 really is a lot
about building partner capacity. We have a number of
authorities out there that enable us to do that. We have 1206
authorities, 1208. We have our Joint Capabilities NECC [Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command] Sizes and Training program, our
JSET [Joint Systems Engineering Team] program.
Unfortunately, all of those have their limitations. Most of
them are 1-year money authorities. So as you begin to build a
partner's capacity, you really want to be able to come in and
say, look, we have got a 5-year plan or a 10-year plan, because
it takes time to build capacity if you want to do it right.
It was mentioned earlier about Colombia. We have had
tremendous success in Colombia as we began really around 2002
in helping the Colombians deal with the FARC [Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia]. Same thing in the Philippines, where
we have great success in working with our Filipino
counterparts. But in both of those cases, which have had
dramatic effects on the end of it, it has taken us almost 10
years to get there.
So we are looking for an authority that is not just 1 year,
so that we can sit down and actually develop a plan that allows
us to have multiyear funding, that allows us in the Special
Operations community to be able to deal not only with the
Minister of Defense, but in many cases with the Minister of the
Interior, because many of their counterterrorism forces rest in
the Interior vice Defense. We are looking for some minor MILCON
[military construction] so that we can build small shoot houses
and maybe a small barracks complex, things like that that we
think will give us some ability to again build the capacity
with a longer-range plane rather than how we are having to do
it now, which is year by year.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, General Mattis, congratulations on your career. And
like Mr. Smith said, I look forward to having you back in
Washington State.
First question as well is for you and has to do with
Afghanistan itself and the idea of the commitment the U.S. has
to Afghanistan. But it just seems that short of a long-term,
very heavy presence in Afghanistan, folks in the region believe
the U.S. won't have a commitment to Afghanistan. And I disagree
with that.
But you mentioned a few things. But can you give, you know,
what are three specific steps the U.S. can take to show that,
yes, this is a long-term--we have a long-term commitment to
Afghanistan that is different than the one we had, but is still
a commitment to Afghanistan?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. The first point I would make is
that the way we are drawing down right now with the President's
plan allows us to keep our troop strength in the field for the
next year. That sends a message in itself. And we will then
draw down after this fighting season.
Further, we are going to maintain about half the troops we
have there now through the election. That shows a commitment to
an election that will get the country on the right path, I
think, in terms of showing a sustained commitment to democracy
and solving their problems through the democratic process
rather than picking up AK-47s.
The third point is there will be an enduring force there. I
am confident there will be. The President has not made up his
mind on what it will be, but both the President of the United
States and the Secretary General of NATO, both at Lisbon and at
Chicago, have said there will be a continued presence, enough
to buttress the Afghan Security Forces and keep them strong and
on the right track as they continue to mature.
Further, I believe the Tokyo Donors Conference shows an
international commitment, it is not all coming out of the
pocketbooks of the American taxpayer, for a longer-term
economic support as this country tries to get its agricultural
sector back aligned, get their mining sector started up, that
sort of thing. So I think it is a combination of international
donors and a strong support for the Afghan Security Forces. So
there is a positive future that the countries in the region can
see there.
Mr. Larsen. Can you remind us of the date of the election,
presidential election?
General Mattis. I don't think the specific date has been
set. It is April or May of 2014.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. Thanks.
General Fraser, I don't want you to feel left out, so I
have some questions for you on logistics.
In the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 2013, we
put some specific authorities related to sealift readiness, you
mentioned page 15 of your testimony. Can you help us understand
how you plan to use them?
General Fraser. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
The fact that as we look forward to the future, one of the
things that we are, one, first most appreciative this last year
is the recommitment to the Maritime Security Program. This
Maritime Security Program is critical for us as we look forward
to the future in maintaining U.S. flagships, U.S. mariners. And
that fleet of 60 ships is very important for us. It gives us a
capability, gives us a capacity which we can draw upon as we
move forward in the future.
It is also important as we look at the entire reserve fleet
that we make sure that we maintain that in a state in which we
could call upon should there be a need for it. But also, we are
going to have to work together with our maritime partners to
make sure we maintain the right balance. As we continue to see
a drawdown of forces out of Afghanistan, as we saw in Iraq, we
have seen the business come down. So our business partners are
seeing less business in the maritime industry as well as the
aviation industry. And so as we go forward in the future, how
do we maintain that right balance?
And so we are working with our partners through executive
working groups in both the ground, the air, and the sea lanes
there to make sure that we have that right balance, and they
adjust their business plans for the future. So it is a
collaborative effort, working with industry really across all
the various modes of transportation right now. And so that is
where that is.
Mr. Larsen. Does that relate as well to your comments on
page 17 about railcar capacity?
General Fraser. Yes, sir, it does. As we look at the
capacity that is needed for the Army, and to get to the ports,
we are in need of flat railcars; in fact, the requirement is
over 5,000 flat railcars are needed. The Army owns----
Mr. Larsen. Just for the Army?
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Not TRANSCOM as a whole, but just the Army.
General Fraser. This is TRANSCOM as a whole, what we need
to get to the ports, from the forts to the ports. So we partner
with the commercial industry, with the rail industry to utilize
their flat railcars. And so we are working with industry on
different ways in which either we could purchase more railcars,
or we could service-life-extend railcars, maintain that
capacity.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, in these posture hearings we never want to miss
an opportunity to, one, thank you for your service, but also
thank you for the professionalism you have brought to each of
your roles in this very unstable time.
We also don't want to miss an opportunity in thanking the
chairman for trying to bring some stability to a very unstable
military funding situation. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
continuing to do that.
We learn so much from you. Yesterday Admiral Locklear was
here, and he told us something that we could extrapolate to our
jobs. He said when it comes to the Pacific area, we can't
always make China and some other countries do the right things,
the things we would like for them to do. So we have three
roles. One is to deter them from bad acts; secondly, to assure
our allies and our friends that we haven't abandoned our
principles; and, third, to try to prevent them when they do bad
acts from having more harm than otherwise it would.
Well, our roles are pretty much the same way. We try to
deter bad acts from Congress and from the Administration, and
sometimes we fail. We knew, many of us in here, when we passed
a very expensive trillion-dollar healthcare bill that it would
come off the back of defense and out of our budget. We tried to
deter that; we failed. We knew when we passed the stimulus
bill, those $825 billion and $347 billion of interest, exactly
the amount we have cut out of defense, we knew where it was
coming, we tried to stop it and deter it; we failed. We knew
when the Administration took $800 billion of cuts over the last
4 years--by the way, 19 times the amount of cuts that are going
to come from sequestration this year--it was a bad policy. We
tried to deter it, and we failed. And many of us believed when
sequestration was proposed by the Administration, it was a bad
policy. We tried to stop it, and we failed.
Having done all that and failed, we want you to know and
assure you that we haven't abandoned our principles, and we are
not going to accept the substitution of budget analysis for
strategic analysis.
The other thing we are going do is what the chairman said.
Having had those bad acts, we are going to try to prevent them
from having more harm than necessary. And the way we are going
to do that is with that CR today, which starts us down the path
to give you more predictability. But we are not going to stop
there. We are going to work very, very hard in the budget
process to get the dollars bumped back up to where they need to
be in national defense.
And my question to you today is this: We are looking today,
we talked a lot about Afghanistan, we talk a lot about other
areas, but one of the things we are hearing a lot about is
Iran. And I would appreciate you describing your impression of
Iran's A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area-Denial] capabilities and
specifically to the U.S. Navy's role in keeping open vital
waterways like the Straits of Hormuz. Do you feel CENTCOM has
sufficient Navy resources to adequately counter Iran's A2/AD
challenges? And if not, what does this committee need to do to
try to help you?
General Mattis. Mr. Forbes, the area access denial effort
of Iran is pronounced. It is improving in both numbers and
accuracy, capability.
There are basically five threats out of Iran. One is the
latent nuclear. One is the MOIS [Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security] Quds Force, the people and their
surrogates like Lebanese Hezbollah. One is the ballistic
missile force. Another is their cyber efforts. And then you
have--let me think. There is a fifth one there. Well, that is
all five, right there.
The anti-access is best addressed by a joint force. It is
not just the U.S. Navy's capability. I do have what I need. I
have requested the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast
Guard assets. I have them, or I have them on alert in your
State, sir. And we are in a position that should Iran try to
take advantage of this current situation, we could make it
their longest day and their worst day with what I have there.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, gentlemen.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Fraser, it is good to see you again. We had a great
conversation yesterday, and I very much enjoyed what we spoke
about. One of the things I learned was we spent a lot of time
talking about merchant marines, and it was interesting to be
talking to an Air Force general about surface fleets.
Could you speak a little bit here what you said to me in my
offices about what would happen to the surge capacity should we
have to lay off the merchant marine fleet and we have to move
those ships from the readiness level they are at to the point
where we actually have to lay off those crews, and what that
would do to your ability to surge as needed by DOD.
General Fraser. Thank you, ma'am, very much. I, too,
appreciated the time yesterday.
And if I might, just briefly, is the fact that we rely on
commercial partners to meet our requirements as far as a surge
capability goes. This is also not only in that area, but it is
also through other maritime assets. And what I am talking about
there is because we have to work with other agencies, speaking
specifically now about the Maritime Administration, we
coordinate work with the Maritime Administration as they work
with the National Defense Sealift Fund.
As we look at the CRs, we look at the sequestration,
everybody is going to get hit by this, and the unintended
consequence and second- and third-order effect of this may
result--and the reason I say ``may result,'' because decisions
have not been made--that they have to move some ships that are
in the Ready Reserve Fleet to a less-ready operating status. So
those ships that are in a reduced operating status of, say, 5
or 10 days right now actually come with crews, and they are
able to surge when there is a requirement. And so those crews,
those merchant mariners are ready to go, and they are going to
be able to move forward. If they have to find the necessary
savings, and if a decision is made to move them from the Ready
Reserve Fleet to the National Defense Reserve Fleet, that moves
them to a further reduced operating status of upwards of 30 to
maybe 120 days. Those ships then are really not readily
available.
The other thing, unintended consequence, that comes with
that, they lose the crews. They lose the merchant mariners that
are then assigned to them. So we could upwards see loss of jobs
and merchant mariners if they move to further reduced operating
status. And that is what we spoke about.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, General.
One of the other things we chatted about was some of the
cost-saving measures you have already implemented in your
command. For example, you talked about lessons learned from
commercial aviation with how you choose to carry or not carry
fuel in your aircraft and the cost savings that come from that.
General Fraser. Thank you.
The command has been looking forward. We have gone through
a strategic review this last year. We are also doing a cost-
conscious look at everything that we do. We are developing some
tools which will allow us to make better decisions from a cost
perspective.
The one that you briefly spoke about there has to do with
tankering fuel. We have worked with Air Mobility Command,
because in the past, as aviators, and we discussed we always
thought you wanted to carry the minimum amount of fuel on an
aircraft so as to accomplish the mission, and then refuel once
you arrive at a location.
Through a best-business practice in industry, what we have
actually learned, and we have now developed a matrix, is where
can we buy fuel at a less price. And it actually shows us that
when we fill up in other locations or do tech stops and fill up
there and carrier heavier into, say, Afghanistan and not have
to refuel in Afghanistan, we actually wind up and save millions
of dollars. So using that best practice on our organic aircraft
is resulting in some significant savings.
There are other areas that we have looked to better load
out our aircraft. That is a pilot bill that has gone into a
training program. We are assembling individuals at common
locations so that we can fill up our aircraft that are carrying
passengers through TransViz, a new tool that we have or have
had out there for some time period, to fill up the aircraft.
The other thing that we are doing is with our containers is
mandating in our contracts they be filled to a minimum of 80
percent full, which reduces the number of containers that we
have to move.
So there are a number of other initiatives that we are
instituting in the command that are resulting in significant
savings.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
And I would like to close by saying, General Mattis, on
behalf of my father, who was a marine who landed on Iwo Jima,
thank you for your many, many decades of service and devotion
to this Nation. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, I am going to ask you a question about the
drug trade in Afghanistan. As we look to the trends on the
production of poppy, it appears that it is on the way up while
we are on our way out. But I am going to submit that question
for the record, and I am going to yield my time to Brad
Wenstrup, who, being down in front, usually has to wait a long
time to ask a question. So I yield the remainder of my time to
Brad.
The Chairman. Gentleman is recognized.
Dr. Wenstrup. I thank you, Mr. Turner, for yielding your
time.
And thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, I want to express my gratitude and admiration
for your lifetime of service to our country.
We all have a concern, always, about our personnel and
readiness and deterrence, and our abilities in those areas,
both short-term and long-term. And certainly those burdens
weigh upon your shoulders, and what comes with that is our
budget concerns. And, hopefully, we will be relieving some of
those for you on behalf of defending our Nation.
But you know your needs very well, and putting budget
aside, what would you say are your top one or two priorities or
needs as we go about completing our missions over the course of
the next year?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I will start, if you don't mind.
We have done an extensive study. My predecessor, Admiral
Eric Olson, took a look at the Special Operations community, of
which there are about 66,000 men and women in the community and
their spouses, to take a look at the health of the force, and
he conducted this about 2 years ago. The report landed on my
desk after I took command in the summer of 2011. And he
determined at the time that the force was fraying. And as I
have said before, in the 18 months that I have been in command,
frankly, the force has continued to fray at a fairly rapid
pace.
But one area where I think we need to focus our attention,
we do pretty well by our service members, but it is in terms of
some of the family support programs and the resiliency
programs. This is where I am working with the Services, and I
am working with Capitol Hill, and I am working with OSD to
figure out can we continue to support our families, because I
have made the families a readiness issue.
The Services do a magnificent job of taking care of our
families in terms of health care and support to the families,
but in these trying times, if you are not going above and
beyond to take care of the spouses and the kids, then that
directly affects the readiness of the service members. So we
are trying to find out what is the right balance between taking
care of the member himself, which, again, I think we do a
pretty good job of, and then supporting the family members.
General Mattis. Dr. Wenstrup, right now probably my biggest
needs are ballistic missile defense because of the growing
ballistic missile threat in the region. That would help
reassure our allies as well, who are also improving their
defenses.
The second one, I would say, is naval forces. It is going
to be a more naval theater in the future than it has been in
the past. And so by having embarked troops, by having ballistic
missile defense at sea, mine-sweep capability, strike
capability, cruisers and destroyers for escort, we send a
stabilizing message throughout the region.
For example, you remember you used to hear a lot about
mining the waters, mining the Straits of Hormuz by one nation
out there. We ran an international mine-sweeping exercise back
last September, and you haven't heard anything since. I hoped
to get 12 nations out there; we ended up with 35 nations from 5
continents. I was even looking for a penguin from Antarctica so
I could get them all.
But my point is after that point of 35 nations coming out,
including nations like Canada, Estonia, Japan, Singapore,
Djibouti, all across the world it just quieted things down.
So right now, thanks to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast
Guard, Marine Corps, I have what I need at this point. But
those would be my top needs.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir.
First and foremost for me is taking care of our people.
They are the ones that are making the decisions in the defense
transportation system and assuring that they have the right
tools, they have the right education to be able to make those
cost-conscious decisions. So ensuring that we are taking care
of them and building that capability and capacity as we move
into the future, because we have already seen some of the great
things they can do with--you term them loose with innovation.
The second thing I would say is budget certainty. And the
lack of budget certainty right now is going to have an
unintended consequence on our command. Our command is
comprised, as I have said before, of organic and commercial
capabilities, and without budget certainty, and without the
ability to build a plan for the future, then it makes it very
difficult upon the Services to build a solid plan.
And that has that unintended consequence to our commercial
partners. Those businesses that are out there making those
decisions whether they are going to be with us or not as a part
of the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] program, or if they are
going to be a part of the VISA program, the Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement. These types of things create that
uncertainty.
The lack of budget certainty also affects me in a working
capital fund. I think this is an unintended consequence a lot
of people don't realize with a working capital fund. And so
when I don't have my 7 to 10 days of working capital cash, and
I draw down on that because I am not generating revenue, then
what happens is that creates an uncertainty, is going to draw
down my readiness my ability to respond. And so the drawdown on
that and the lack of budget certainty is one of the things that
is going to, I think, increase our risk in the future to
respond in a very timely matter.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Barber.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the
witnesses for their excellent testimony and for their
leadership and patriotism.
And to you, General Mattis, I join with my colleagues and a
very grateful Nation to thank you for your many years of
service. Your leadership will be missed, and we wish you well
in retirement.
I do have a couple of questions for you, General,
specifically with regard to a couple of options we have for
continuing to support our mission even as we withdraw
particularly from Afghanistan, and that has to do with the need
for counterintelligence and human intelligence as a bedrock for
our future military posture in the region.
I am very fortunate. In my district we have Fort Huachuca,
where a lot of the training in human intelligence takes place,
an outstanding facility and training. As we transition,
General, from Afghanistan, where do you see the need for
American human intelligence capacities in the region, and how
can we build our partners' capabilities on human intelligence
in the region after the planned drawdown from Afghanistan?
General Mattis. First of all, sir, I would just reinforce
your judgment on this. The kind of enemies we fight today, sir,
you can't just count their tanks from outer space with a
satellite; you need human intelligence, you need people who
understand the culture of those areas and can really get into
what is driving people to certain decisions, certain actions.
We have found, for example, in Afghanistan, under the
threat of the insider attack, that this was the way to address
it, and we have stood up and built up the Afghans' internal
capability. It is too early to say why the attacks have dropped
so dramatically, but I am fairly confident that it was the
emphasis here that has helped drive that number down
significantly.
I would say, too, that working with the other nations--and
this is where we need the authorities to be able to work not
just with their ministries of defense, because sometimes the
people that they organize to carry out the counterintelligence
mission are not in their ministry of defense--I need the
authority to work with them, bring them to Fort Huachuca, in
many cases, and give them the kind of training that we use,
which allows us to adapt to the changing character of the
threat in the area.
But I think it is mostly a matter of training, because this
is something you cannot mass produce. You have got to turn out
skillful people on this and people who are imbued with an
ethical approach to how they do this duty.
So that is the direction I would take on it, sir, is
working through the training effort, both at home and away, to
help them on this.
Mr. Barber. Totally on the same page, General.
Second question for you has to do with yet another way in
which we are seeking out the enemy and taking the enemy out,
and that has to do with our unmanned aerial systems.
Again, I am pleased to say that two installations in my
district are instrumental in this, Fort Huachuca and Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base. They have been critical in the
counterterrorism efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. But
I am concerned about our ability and our allies' ability to
target terrorists such as the Haqqani network along the
Afghanistan and Pakistani border.
Is there a long-term plan for American unmanned
reconnaissance after the planned drawdown of our forces, and
what capacity does the Afghan National Security Force have for
unmanned aerial platforms to target terrorist networks?
General Mattis. Sir, the Afghans do not have that
capability yet. It is one of the enablers that we are trying to
build into them before we leave. I can only speak to the use of
these unmanned assets inside Afghanistan where my forces use
them.
The long-term view is that we will continue this so long as
we are there. We will transition this capability, standing it
up inside the Afghan forces so when they leave, they have the
ability to keep an eye on that border area. I have operated
many years around the world, and I have never had more
difficult military terrain to operate in than along that
border.
So what you are pointing out is critical. We will have to
see what level the President decides to leave as far as our
forces there, and what level of coaching, of mentoring we can
give to the Afghans. But there is a number of ways that we can
get this capability stood up with the Afghans from a more
rudimentary level to the more sophisticated level, and we will
just have to work on it, sir.
Mr. Barber. General, just a final point. There is no plan
at this stage to continue our use of those unmanned vehicles to
take out targets after we leave?
The Chairman. Sir, the gentleman's time has expired.
General Mattis. That decision has not been made yet by the
President, sir.
Mr. Barber. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Let me share with the gentlemen, thank you for
being here this morning, and, General Mattis, a heartfelt,
sincere thank you for your dedicated service, and Godspeed on
whatever new chapters you open in the days ahead of you.
Yesterday in talking to the Senate committee, you talked
about a potential collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and
that you were working with regional partners to try to see what
the responses might be.
You also mentioned the idea of arming the opposition or the
rebels, that you have not been tasked with knowing who to arm
and who not to arm. Can you fill in the blanks, kind of the
gaps there, as to how you would deal with a collapsed Assad
regime, but not know who those folks are yet that are still in
place to fight?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. Well, we are not operating inside
Syria, of course, right now, and so the organizations that are,
which are a pretty wide range of organizations, as you know, I
don't have that kind of fidelity on them right now.
We are working with regional powers, so we are getting a
pretty good idea of what is going on inside the country, and
there are, of course, some regional states that are supplying
weapons, and we believe that their weapons by and large are
getting to the right people, and they are not--in other words,
they are not going to the wrong people.
The planning that I am doing has to do with countries that
are concerned about what is going to be there the day after
Assad is gone, and what we can do working with them and other
regional powers that would come in to help as we deal with the
day after; in other words, the sectarian and the ethnic
divisions that are probably going to be rife at that point. But
right now I have not been tasked with providing weapons or
other resupply to opposition forces, so I have not moved those
kind of forces into the region there to get that situational
awareness. Does that answer your question?
Mr. Conaway. It does. There are no easy, good answers in
Syria. No one is obviously doing that. But knowing that some
planning is in place to try to know who, because that is going
to be the big deal, and also, you said yesterday that you think
that the Iranians will be particularly mischievous and opposed
to Assad regime as well with respect to the militias, and those
are the same people that we are thinking about helping.
Admiral McRaven, in your statement you talk about--and I
will have to read some of this--a joint urgent operational
needs statement that you use to source an ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] platform or ISR something.
And kind of a multipart question with respect to that. SOCOM
has its own quick response kind of ways to buy things. Can you
walk us through why you use the DOD version, how did it get
paid for, why is that--you also sound like you relied more on
the DOD-level joint operational statements versus your own
authorities.
Can you walk the committee through, and what was the
overwhelming requirement behind the--or that we need for the
requirement that you took this tack on?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. The Joint Urgent Operational
Needs Statement, or JUONS, as we refer to it, is normally
initiated from somebody in the operational unit, so if there is
a demand signal that comes from an operational unit in the
Special Operations meeting around the world, that gets to us.
We actually have a very short time frame, a couple of days,
where we have to take a look at that JUONS. We got to validate
that to determine whether or not that operational need is, in
fact, an urgent operational need, and we have a couple of
avenues by which we can begin to put money against a particular
operational need.
We can go through the joint service system, as you pointed
out, or internal with SOCOM within some acquisition parameters
if it is a small purchase, and we can rapidly field it and get
it into the battlefield quickly. We have the capability to do
that. If it is a larger requirement that, in fact, requires an
acquisition program, then, sir, we have to go through the
standard acquisition process.
But SOCOM does have an accelerated means of taking an
operational need from a soldier, sailor, airman, marine in the
field and turning that pretty quickly, producing an object, and
getting it back; the capability of getting it back to that
soldier's hands as quickly as possible.
Mr. Conaway. In that regard are there things about that
dual-approach system that we need to fine-tune? In other words,
are there flexibilities that you need to decide which way you
go? And how does the funding work on the particular way you
pick to source it?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I will tell you, I think the process
works pretty well for us right now, having the option to do it
internally or to go through the Services, and sometimes if it
is a larger acquisition program, or the demand, we think, might
be a broader Service requirement after it is a SOCOM
requirement or a SOF requirement, then, frankly, we will work
through the Service systems.
So, I am pretty happy with the flexibility we have right
now in dealing with the urgent operational requirements coming
from the field.
Mr. Conaway. All right.
Sorry, General Fraser, I ran out of time.
Yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for your service to the Nation,
and we are very proud of the distinguished careers that you all
have led. Thank you very much.
I would like to know, General Mattis, what are America's
core enduring interests in Afghanistan, and how would you
prioritize those?
General Mattis. Sir, if we go back to 9/11 and we look at
the situation we confronted, our enduring interests are that
Afghanistan be able to govern its own country, and the kind of
people that set up shop there to attack our country are not
allowed to again in the future. That is the core enduring
interest.
It means that we have got to help Afghanistan get on its
feet as a country. We are going that right now both in a
security realm and, more broadly, through the State Department
programs.
I think that the priority would be initially, as it has
been, the security effort so that we can protect the Afghan
people from this enemy and allow them to set up a country again
after the trauma they have been through for decades now. But I
think once we get to a point where Afghanistan is under Afghans
who are responsible, who do not have the medieval view of the
world that some of the Taliban and people they allowed to come
in, Al Qaeda, then I think that we have got it on the right
track, sir. But the priority, I would say, is the security and
then the economic and social and governance things that can
follow.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
The Afghan security forces, of course, are key to ensuring
the kind of stability that you just indicated. By what metrics
are we measuring the effectiveness of the ANSF?
General Mattis. First of all, we have training metrics,
recruiting and training. So we organize them, we equip them, we
train them, and then we put them out, we graduate them. That is
one set of metrics.
We try to bring them up with an ethical understanding of
the use of force, but also that the tactical skills be better
than what they are going to confront against the enemy.
Once in the field we rate them operationally, and there we
evaluate their ability to operate on their own. Of course, it
takes a little while to stand up an army in the middle of a
war. We remember that from our Revolutionary War days when the
French were the regulars, and we were the irregulars, and they
had their advisors helping us stand up. Not much has changed,
frankly, sir. It is still how do you mentor them, coach them,
build their capability, but more importantly their confidence.
Let me just give you a quick statistic that will show you a
measure. Since the first of January, I have lost four of our
wonderful troops killed in action there; 2 months, going into a
third, four troops.
The Afghan security forces have lost 198 killed. Nothing
can more graphically and perhaps grimly show that the Afghan
boys are taking the bulk of the fighting now, and I would just
point out that this is a continuing trend; this is not just a
snapshot. We have seen this coming for some time as they step
up to do the fighting, sir.
Mr. Johnson. Well, that is indeed encouraging news, and I
think it is just human nature that when folks are assisted as
they stand up, they end up standing up strong and doing--they
make do with what they have. But I know they have been asking
us for things like F-16s, armor, and other forms of advanced
weaponry.
Do you see that they are ready for that at this time or
will be ready for that at some point in the near future before
we cease our combat operations?
General Mattis. Well, sir, as you know, we are shifting
from combat operations to advise-and-assist operations
literally right now, and you see that in the statistics.
We would have to look at what the threat is to them, what
they need to defend their country. The initial threat right now
is really an insurgent enemy, and we are building up some air
transport capability so they can move troops around the
country. That is under way. We are building up some turboprop
aircraft that will allow them to use air support against an
insurgent enemy, and we would have to evaluate the requirement
before we went to that next level that you are pointing out. I
have not gone to that level yet, but I am aware that there is
interest, sir.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, General, and enjoy your retirement
as well.
Mr. Thornberry. [Presiding.] Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to first thank General Mattis for your
leadership. I have had sons over in Iraq and Afghanistan, so I
truly do appreciate your leadership as relates to CENTCOM.
And to our other distinguished panelists, Admiral McRaven
and General Fraser, I really want to thank you for your service
to this country.
But to General McRaven--I am sorry, Admiral McRaven. My
apologies. Underseas mobility programs have had a troubled
history, but I believe the capability to insert a SEAL [Sea,
Air, Land] team undetected anywhere connected to an ocean is
absolutely worth overcoming any issues that we may have had.
Overcoming the engineering and political challenges, you know,
SOCOM, I know, needs to replace the Mark 8 SEAL Delivery
Vehicle, the wet, and with a new wet submersible, but also
supplement that capacity with a dry submersible variant that
can deploy underwater.
I would like to know, if you would, talk about some of the
obstacles impeding those various undersea mobility programs and
what has caused the delay of initial operational activity or
capability of the wet submersible; and then also, if you would,
then go to the dry submersible vehicles, both of which I would
think would give you added options in regards to inserting our
SOF guys where they need to be without being noticed.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you very much.
As you point out, really over the last decade or so as we
have--we, the naval special warfare community--has folks on the
fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we put a lot more of our
emphasis in there, we had to kind of deemphasize our support
and our look in the undersea mobility. That is now changing.
Again, my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, put a fair
amount of emphasis into this, and I am following on in that
regard. And we have two programs, as you mentioned. The wet
submersible that will replace the Mark 8, my understanding is
we now have a prototype under contract, so that is good for us
to take a hard look at whether or not the prototype will, in
fact, meet the requirements of the SEALs and the SEAL Delivery
Vehicle teams. And we have two prototypes that we are working
with some foreign countries to take a look at our dry
submersible.
We will essentially take a look at both of those, make a
good business case, a business analysis as well as an
operational analysis of the requirements of one or both of
those, and then figure out where we go from there.
So actually I am pretty comfortable with the track that we
are on now in terms of both our wet and dry submersible
capability.
Mr. Nugent. What support do you need from this committee or
Congress to make sure that those two capabilities happen?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think, as always, having the
congressional oversight is important to us. Frankly, it makes
sure that we stay focused on meeting our timeline for bringing
a product to the fleet and making sure that, frankly, our
business partners also are doing their bit to ensure that
happens. So having congressional oversight and making sure that
we are kept on task, I think, is important.
Right now I have the funding I need, for the most part, to
do both of those programs, and certainly if we are short of
that, we will come back and talk to the folks on the Hill. But
right now, sir, I am, again, comfortable with where we are in
regards to both those programs.
Mr. Nugent. And I certainly understand the position that we
had to do, I mean, where we had to be and shifting focus, but I
am glad to see the focus is coming back on a well-rounded
capability for us to insert troops.
And lastly, for General Fraser. The Mobility Command is so
important to us now and in the future. Having had sons fly back
and forth to Afghanistan and Iraq, I certainly appreciate it,
but more importantly, providing the support and supplies that
they need to have. I want to make sure that you have the proper
resources to make sure that--we don't know where we are going
to be next, and that we have the proper resources to meet that
challenge.
General Fraser. Thank you, sir. And I, too, am confident
that we have what we need right now.
But, however, I am not sure, as I look forward into the
future, with the uncertainty and with some of the lack of
flexibility with the budget process, that we will be able to
maintain that same level of readiness as we move into the
future. So we are going to have to continue to work together
with all the Services and with other agencies to make sure that
we maintain that capability and capacity at the right readiness
level, because we don't know when that next call is going to
come, whether it is in response to a crisis somewhere or
actually to a humanitarian aid requirement. But we will
continue to work with you, but we are okay right this minute.
Mr. Nugent. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank all of you
again for your service, and particularly our neighbors down to
the south in Tampa, where I am just north of, so we want to
appreciate your service. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for your testimony today
and, as always, your extraordinary service to our Nation, and
particularly to General Mattis. You have a long and
distinguished career and a lot to be proud of, General, and I
wish you all the best as you enter this new chapter in your
life
Admiral McRaven, if I can start with you. In terms of
resourcing and training and equipping a global-style
capability, can you talk about the impact that our commitments
in Afghanistan have and your ability to provide forces to other
geographic combatant commanders?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you.
As General Mattis is wont to say frequently, most of the
Department of Defense resources over the last 12 years have
headed to CENTCOM. That is true of my Special Operations Forces
as well.
About 85 percent of my deployed Special Operations Forces
are currently in the Central Command AO [Area of Operations].
As we begin to draw down in Afghanistan, and depending upon
what those numbers look like--and that is a kind of a constant
dialogue between myself, General Mattis, General Dunford, and
obviously the Joint Chiefs, and the OSD and the President in
terms of what that requirement might be--but my expectation is
in either case, or however it unfolds, we will have additional
capacity in terms of Special Operations capability.
Right now, as I look at building the SOCOM strategy to
support the Defense Strategic Guidance that was signed out by
Secretary Panetta in 2012, it is about building partner
capacity globally, and this is about strengthening our
alliances, building a network, and therefore, my expectation is
I will be able take some of that capacity coming out of
Afghanistan and be able to push that capacity to other
combatant commanders.
Sir, as you know, I am a support team commander. My job
really is to provide the resources to the geographic combatant
commanders. They are the ones who actually have the operational
control of the forces once they are in theater.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, can you talk more specifically, too,
about your planned commitment of U.S. SOF's mission in
Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond. You just touched on it
broadly but----
Admiral McRaven. Sir, last year we brought the three
components of U.S. Special--or Special Operations in
Afghanistan together under two-star headquarters, and this is
really a watershed event for us. So we took the what we call
the CFSOCC-A [Combined Forces Special Operations Component
Command in Afghanistan], the Green Berets, if you will, that
were building the Afghan SOF Security Forces, we took our
direct action element, and then with the support of our NATO
SOF brothers, we pulled all those together under what is called
the Special Operations Joint Task Force, or SOJTF. That SOJTF
is in place, as I mentioned in my opening remarks. It has been
incredibly effective in taking a look at the common threat and
then making sure that we have a SOF response to that threat in
Afghanistan
As we move forward, we clearly think that we will be
focused on the counterterrorism threat, and as General Mattis
mentioned earlier, we will continue to do the training of our
Afghan local police, of our Afghan commandos, and of our Afghan
Special Forces. So the counterterrorism piece and training
piece will remain enduring for us through 2014, sir
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
General Mattis, if I could turn to you. I continue to be
concerned about the capabilities of our bases to withstand a
cyber attack directed against outside supporting
infrastructure, such as the electric grid, which you are
dependent on, but don't have the responsibility to or the
capability really to protect.
Last year you testified that you assessed both the more
modern enduring bases as well as the tactical ones to ensure
that they could continue to operate, and that you were
satisfied that the proper mitigation networks and generators
were available if needed. But can you update us on the progress
that has been made in evaluating the ability of our bases to
withstand--of our bases within USCENTCOM to operate and recover
in the event of such an attack based on the increased advanced
persistent threat environment, and also specifically focused on
the linkages and integration of USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command]
to support your cyber efforts under your command.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. It is a great question. Over the
last year we have got a much tighter bond with CYBERCOM. They
have matured capabilities and embedded some of them inside my
command. We are constantly reviewing the vulnerability.
I would like to take part of your question for the record
and answer you with some of the classified information that
shows the resilience that we have put into the various networks
and the workarounds we have. We anticipate that it is a
worsening and increasing threat, frankly, and where you cannot
get complacent about it.
I would even go so far as to say that where last year I
told you I thought we were in pretty good shape, I think we
have to do more work now, and we are doing that. We have got
some very capable help from Cyber Command. And I will give you
a more complete answer, including the classified details that
will give you a better picture of what we are doing so, sir.
Mr. Langevin. I would appreciate that.
Again, General, thank you for your service, and, gentlemen,
thank you for your testimony and your service as well.
Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I think we are just about to have three
votes, and the chairman's plan is to recess during those votes
and reconvene as soon as possible when the last vote starts. It
could be two, it could be three votes, but just to give Members
a heads up, I think the chairman wants to begin as soon as
possible when the last vote starts.
But in the meantime I recognize Mr. Scott for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, thank you for your service, and I will tell
you, you mentioned the issue in Syria, and one of my concerns
is how we stop--when Assad is gone, how we stop the attacks on
people from his particular sect, if that is the proper way to
put it.
And, Admiral, thank you for your service.
I want to focus, General Fraser, if I can, because I
represent Georgia Robins Air Force Base, and I have Moody Air
Force Base as well. And my questions revolve around lift
capacity. I know that one of the last questions you answered,
you said that you were confident that you had the lift capacity
that you need right now. Did I understand that correctly?
General Fraser. Yes, sir
Mr. Scott. Do we currently lease lift capacity from other
countries?
General Fraser. Sir, with respect to our strategic CRAF
partners, we contract directly with them. There are some
foreign companies that they subcontract to. We also maintain
and retain the ability to do some foreign contracts. When the
U.S. does not present the capacity or the capability in certain
areas, such as short takeoff and landing, we have done with
foreign carriers. We have also done some with some helicopter
capacity where the U.S. didn't have it within the CRAF piece.
But we do retain that ability to do it.
Mr. Scott. Which countries do we lease that capacity from?
General Fraser. Sir, I would like to take that one for the
record, and we will get you a more thorough list.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 123.]
Mr. Scott. That is fine. Can I ask it in this way: Do we
lease any lift capacity from Russia at this stage?
General Fraser. Sir, we have, through some of these
subcontractors. They have utilized the Antonov, the 124s, for
some oversized/outsized, and that was the--as I recall looking
at one of the last contracts that we had, it was directly with
one of our CRAF carriers, who then subcontracted for that
capacity and that capability.
Mr. Scott. Okay. I will appreciate that response and more
detail on that. I guess one of my concerns is that when we do
the analysis, if we are counting on the ability to lease
capacity from somebody who might very well be on the other side
of the conflict next time, obviously that ability goes away. I
don't think they would lease it to us if we were fighting them.
General Fraser. We do the analysis. It is organic, and
those who are our CRAF partners is who we build the analysis
around and the million-ton miles per day that are needed.
Mr. Scott. I know a lot of your equipment will be coming
back into the Savannah port when it comes in from overseas, and
if there is anything that we can do, as somebody who represents
that area, to help you out, I hope you will stay in touch with
our office.
And my men and women at Robins Air Force Base do a great
job of rebuilding the C-5s [Galaxy strategic airlifter] and the
C-17s [Globemaster III strategic airlifter]. I respect all of
you. I think it was a mistake to stop the C-17 buy. I think
that is one of the best aircrafts we have ever had, and it
didn't cost a whole lot of money to keep buying just a few of
them and have that line up and running if we needed more of
them.
My concern is that when we do things like that, we end up
with a situation like we are in with the F-22 [Raptor fighter
jet] and the F-35 [Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter], where we
cancel one before the other one is ready to go, and who knows
when we will be manufacturing an F-35 and putting them into use
in this country.
So, thank you for your service. I look forward to the
answer on the other.
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
I think we have time for Mr. Garamendi to ask questions?
No? You prefer to wait and come back. Okay.
We will recess and reconvene as soon as possible after the
last vote in the next series starts.
[Recess.]
Mr. Thornberry. We will reconvene the House Committee on
Armed Services, and our next Member to pursue questioning is
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I hope you were able to get a cup
of coffee or at least take a break, repast from all of this.
Thank you for your service. There are many, many questions.
Most of them revolve around the budget issues. I suspect you
know that we are presumably going to vote on a sequestration
and CR bill here in the next couple of hours. Apparently it
deals with the military, but I am not sure it goes in every
piece of it. And this question deals with the Transportation
Command.
Assuming the appropriation level that was agreed to between
the House and the Senate but never passed in November of 2012
goes into place, how will that affect the maritime portions of
your command, General?
General Fraser. Sir, thank you very much. And not knowing
the specifics of what is in the bill, of course we are
responsive to the Services' requirements to transport items.
And so I would imagine this would help them with respect to
their budgets, and hopefully that that would allow them to then
communicate with us what level of funding they have, and give
us then more predictability as we do planning with both organic
and commercial capabilities, and that would be both across
whether it is land, air, or maritime.
And so the other piece tied to that, though, is what it
does to other agencies and the unintended consequences of other
agencies that take cuts. As we look and work with the Maritime
Administration, as we work with Military Sealift Command, it is
necessary that we maintain the right balance, and so I will
have to take a holistic look and work with the Services as to
what that impact would be.
Mr. Garamendi. If you could report back, I am on the
maritime committee and the transportation/infrastructure
committee, and so we cross over there. So if you could do that,
that would be good.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 123.]
Mr. Garamendi. We will probably know this afternoon at
least what the House is going to do. As to what the Senate
ultimately does remains to be seen.
General Mattis, in response to Representative--a question
about Afghanistan, you indicated that there was a drawdown that
will occur this year and then more next year. You did not give
specific numbers to that or even a range of numbers. Could you
do so?
General Mattis. Yes, sir, I can. It will be approximately a
34,000-person drawdown between now and February of 2014. So
that will keep the bulk of our troops there through the
fighting season this year. Then there will be another drawdown
that will probably commence after the election in April or May
to help them get through their election in April/May of 2014,
and they would draw it down to whatever the President and
Secretary General determine is the enduring or post-2014 force,
sir.
Mr. Garamendi. So, in looking at the force structure, then
you would have 65,000 in place until next February.
General Mattis. About that number. We may draw it down
slightly if we find forces we don't need during this fighting
season, sir. That is basically correct.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So there was some, I guess, discussion
that there would be a steady drawdown throughout 2013. That is
not likely to be the case.
General Mattis. Well, I think there will be some drawdown.
I don't think it will be commensurate each month having the
same percentage going down, but we will probably start shortly
as fighting season closes out to start drawing down. So it
would start out probably in the October timeframe, not waiting
until January. They would be out by February, however.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Now, the CR that we are taking up here
in another hour or two would provide about $87 billion for the
Overseas Contingency Fund. Do you need that much, considering
the drawdown of troops?
General Mattis. We anticipate we do need that much right
now. We will look at it every month. We are not going to spend
any more than we need to, but right now that is our best
estimate that we need.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you.
I yield back my time. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wittman. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
On the schedule, I am next for questioning, so I will
pursue that prerogative, and, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven,
and General Fraser, thank you so much for joining us today, and
thank all of you for your service to our Nation. We deeply
appreciate that.
General Mattis, thank you for your stellar career and
service to our Nation, and we wish you all the best in your
months and years to come. So I know it will be a time when you
can look in the past with a smile on your face, and so will we.
Admiral McRaven, I wanted to go to you and ask you
specifically about our special operators, and obviously they
are there pursuing some pretty challenging missions there with
village stabilization operations in Afghanistan. In light of
the drawdown and in light of the sequester, will our special
operators have what they need both in direct resources, but
also in combat support as they pursue these missions there in
theater?
My concern has always been is that as we begin that
drawdown, if it is not done strategically, it could place our
special operators, who are going to continue to pursue these
very difficult in missions, it could affect them. So two
questions: How will it affect them, and will the mission change
because of that?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, right now, in working with General
Mattis and General Dunford downrange, we have got a good plan.
As the larger conventional forces draw down, the SOF forces
will draw down at a commensurate level, making sure that we are
still focused on our primary missions, which are
counterterrorism and then training the Afghan National Security
Forces.
I am very comfortable with the current plan we have,
recognizing what our mission set will be in 2013 and 2014. So,
to your first question, sir, we do have the resources we need.
I am very comfortable with the plan.
Tactically, as General Dunford looks at how he is going to
kind of collapse the conventional forces as we begin to draw
down, we will, again, have a kind of a commensurate drawdown of
the Special Operations Forces so that we are always in a
position to take advantage of the enablers that are out there.
As you know, sir, our biggest concern is always the
availability of MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] or CASEVAC
[casualty evacuation]. We like to make sure we are within, as
we refer to, the golden hour, being able to get the helicopter
support in to evacuate a wounded soldier and get him back to a
combat hospital. And so each and every time we look at our
combat outpost and our forward operating bases, we make sure we
are within that golden hour.
The other enablers that are out there, ISR, route clearance
packages, all of that are part and parcel to the ISAC
[Information Sharing Analysis Center] plan for drawdown to make
sure that not only are we taking care of our conventional
forces, but certainly our Special Operations Forces are well
taken care of as well.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Admiral.
To General Mattis and General Fraser, I want to get your
perspective on where you see the challenges of the difficulties
in getting both equipment and personnel out of Afghanistan
through the drawdown in face of the sequester and the pending
CR that hopefully gets taken up today. So I wanted to get your
perspective on where you see the challenges and what you are
going to be facing with that in the months to come.
General Mattis. Chairman, I would defer to General Fraser
on the Working Capital Fund and whether or not that is going to
be impacted here, but from our perspective, as the operational
force in the field, it is a matter of concentrating the gear,
getting it cleaned up to the right amount of cleanliness, and
then getting it out either using air-to-sea ports, or using the
northern distribution network, or going over the Pakistan
ground lines of communication.
We have just completed the proofs of principle on the
latter through Pakistan, and I think we will see the velocity
pick up there. We do have a plan to get the gear out. There is
the possibility, I don't forecast it yet, there is the
possibility we will get the troops out by the end of 2014.
There could still be some equipment there still being in the
process of being shipped, and I would defer the rest to General
Fraser.
Mr. Wittman. General Fraser.
General Fraser. Thank you very much.
And as we look at sequestration and the potential hit that
that has to the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] budget,
it is certainly a concern. However, there has been direction by
the Department to ensure that the resources are there which
should cover the retrograde that we are talking about.
I further expand on what General Mattis has said is that we
have built a very robust network that gives us a number of
different lanes by which we can retrograde cargo, so we can go
out in many different directions. I am encouraged, based on my
visit to Pakistan last month, in the opening of the Pakistan
border. We have run proofs of principle that have been very
productive, and through my discussions and working with the
theater, we are going to continue to ramp up that velocity in
moving more through.
The other thing is that we have given booking notice to our
commercial partners, because there is foreign military sales
that we need to move some equipment in, and this is going to
help the Afghan Security Forces because they are in need of
this equipment as they further their capacity and capability,
and so we are looking forward to that. But everything seems to
be moving in the right direction with lots of different lanes,
so the capacity is there, and it appears right now that we do
have the resources.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Gentlemen, thank you.
We go now to Mr. Runyan.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Chairman and gentlemen. Again, thank
you all for your service. And, General Mattis, I am sure you
are going to--knowing how most of us are wired, you are going
to continue to serve either your community or this country in
your own special way. So good luck with that.
General Fraser, I think you know where I am probably going
to talk about some CRAF stuff and, you know, dealing with our
C-5s and C-17s. As you know, you responded to me in a 4 January
letter saying that the C-5s were overflown their program or
record by 29 percent, and the 17s by 21 percent. And I know in
the letter and where we are in kind of the operations, some of
that cargo doesn't quite fit this back in to where the area of
conflict. You can't get those aircraft in there.
But the point was raised also that in your letter you said
there was some people unwilling or unable to execute the
request for admissions. Do you have any specific examples of
that?
General Fraser. Sir, the request for the flying hour
program, as we understand and have worked with the Services, is
certainly built upon maintaining readiness. So when there are
other calls for response in other areas, and understanding the
threat situation, the types of loads that we are lifting, the
CRAF partners are not able to either accept that threat area or
be able to carry that type of load. Maybe it is outsized/
oversized-type cargo. And so, therefore, if the flying hour
program is built upon readiness levels, doesn't take into
account other crisis or other types of response, we are going
to overfly those hours. So that is where we see some of that
increase, but every opportunity that we can, we are ensuring
that we make sure that we partner with our strategic CRAF
partners and give them the contracts.
Mr. Runyan. Because we keep pushing that, because I can say
since 2001, we have had 13 of those partners fall off the face
of actually executing that stuff, whether bankruptcy or just
quit doing business. I mean, and whether you are talking about
the merchant mariners and/or the CRAF program, that is a
strategic asset that if we don't utilize it, it is not going to
be there when we need it, and, again, costing us even more
money to fly the gray tails and maintain them even longer down
the road.
That being said, if the type of aircraft that our CRAF
partners have is a limiting factor, are there commercial
aircraft out there that maybe we can have a discussion to kind
of try to solve a little bit of this in the future, or is it
just not in the commercial stockpile?
General Fraser. Sir, based on a review of the threat areas
in particular, they do not have defensive systems on them, and
I would not be willing to put them at risk based on the threat.
We do a thorough analysis, and in coordination with the theater
in various locations that we are flying in, we have continued
to expand bases. As the threat decreased, we opened up other
airfields where we are now actually flying in commercial
aircraft because of the security situation changing. It is in a
positive direction, and therefore we have opened it up.
We have not opened up passenger aircraft into Afghanistan,
into the airfields, but cargo aircraft we are, and we continue
to watch that very closely and in coordination with our CRAF
partners.
With respect to the business and it coming down, I would
comment that we are working with the Executive Working Group
and the CRAF partners. We have an ongoing study called CRAF II.
There was a meeting last Friday with them as we laid out
looking forward to the future what the business is looking like
as we have come out of Iraq. We have seen changes. As we now
come out of Afghanistan, we have seen that change. And so how
do we posture ourselves to have the right balance of organic
and commercial capabilities in the future? We will work that in
partnership with them.
Mr. Runyan. So in kind of in summary, it is more of a
security issue than it is a cargo capacity issue?
General Fraser. It has been a combination of security and
oversized/outsized, sir. They don't have that capacity in the
commercial fleet for oversized/outsized. That is where we have
to use the C-5s and the C-17s.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you very much.
Yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Runyan.
We will go to Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, General Fraser, if you wouldn't mind copying me on
the correspondence between you and Mr. Scott and Mr. Runyan on
the CRAF stuff, I am interested in that, too. I think DOD spent
about $244 million lately in foreign carriers as opposed to
U.S. carriers.
So, with that being said, just please keep me in the loop
if you don't mind. CC me.
General Fraser. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Please. Thank you.
General Mattis, it is an honor to be on this side of the
table from you. You will always be my general. You were there
in Fallujah. I remember sitting outside of the city with 2nd
Battalion, 1st Marines, and we saw this lone LAV [Light Armored
Vehicle], and we were like, who the hell is that guy? That is
``Chaos.'' That was his call sign in Iraq. It was ``Chaos.''
And even sitting over here, if you told me to, I would go do
bad things to bad people.
So I just want to say thank you for your service. It is an
honor to even be sitting here talking with you, and you will
always have a special place in Marine Corps lore and Marine
Corps history, and a true representative of what it means to be
a Marine warfighting general. And we all thank you. And you
saved a lot of lives, and you killed a lot of bad people, and
we thank you for that.
So, with that being said, I understand in the next few days
we are going to release our high-value detainees from our
Afghan jails to the Afghan justice system, and I just wanted to
hear your thoughts on that, and if that is a wise move, if you
recommended that, and what you think that means for the
warfighter that is still there, still fighting every day.
General Mattis. Thank you, Congressman.
In this case I fully support it. Two reasons. First, Ashraf
Ghani, who is in charge of that portfolio for the Afghan
Government, very trusted, very knowledgeable, has identified
clearly the legal authority they have to hold people in what
you and I would call admin detention. They have a different
term for it. Bottom line is they don't get released.
There is also a process, dual key I would call it, where if
they decide to release someone, and we think it is an enduring
threat, then obviously we can go in and stop that. In other
words, we work together, and it takes both eventually at the
highest level, both sides, in this effort to hold on to them or
to release them.
So, I know they will not become a force protection threat
because we will be able to keep them in, and they have got the
legal authority to do so. So based on those two premises, I do
support this. And that is a change from if I had been up here
even as short as 2 months ago, where we were not certain we had
the legal authority, and we had to work out the process to make
certain that there was a reclama if they were going to release
someone that we did not want released.
That said, we released a number of these people back to
their village elders. They signed for them, it is a ceremony,
and so far we are doing very, very well, surprisingly well. But
it is different category you are referring to, and I recognize
that.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Thank you. That is reassuring.
Lastly, let's just talk IEDs [improvised explosive device]
for the next minute and 40 seconds. It is still an enduring
threat. It is still the number one threat. We simply haven't
been able to get our hands around how to fight, you know,
fertilizer turned explosive. And I guess that is just how it
is. We spend billions of dollars, have Ph.D.s working on this
day and night. Our marines and soldiers and sailors are trained
to go fight this, and yet it is still the number one threat.
What do you think? What are the mistakes that we have made,
what are we doing right, and what do we need to keep doing?
General Mattis. It is a multifaceted campaign, as you know
so well, of training, of technology, of scientists. I have
talked to as many scientists as I can find. The electromagnetic
spectrum is a big part of the problem, and it is so enormous,
as you know, for ways to trigger one of these.
We have ongoing efforts, improving efforts, I might add,
with the Pakistanis here recently over the last 2 months. But
ultimately I will tell you, sir, what we are going to have to
do is find a way to prematurely detonate these so the time and
place of detonation is no longer determined by the enemy. That
is ultimately going to be our way that we turn this weapon
against the enemy. It will not win the war for us, but you know
what the casualty rate has been, and as much as it has
declined, it is still the number one casualty inducer on us.
So I think that getting the premature detonation is where
we have to go, and we have got DARPA [Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency], we have got the Navy folks down at Dahlgren,
again, every lab we can insight to get involved with this. We
are working with it.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you very much, Admiral, Generals. Thank
you for your service
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Mattis, it seems a real concern I have on
Afghanistan is the level of corruption and how I think it
compromises, you know, not only the ability for the Afghan
Government to have any type of capacity in terms of, you know,
establishing governance over the country, but the military as
well. I mean, all the institutions, it seems that corruption is
so pervasive. In your view, are we making any gains on this
problem?
General Mattis. Sir, I know we are making gains. Whether
those are transient, and whether those are sufficient, I don't
know.
It is a reciprocity-type society, and that is okay. We can
deal with that. It is, as you pointed out, when it interrupts
or prevents the provision of government services, when bribery
is such a way of life that the poor people basically see that
these chips are stacked against them.
I would just say that it is really the strategic, biggest
Achilles' heel we have. So we are working it. We have got a
task force working it. We have got active measures under way.
The officers are told, if you suspect someone is corrupt, you
do not have to work with them. There is no requirement to work
with someone that you find corrupt in the field. Get the word
back up the chain of command. At one time, something as simple
as that, they didn't realize they could just break off from
that person.
But you are dealing with a society, sir, that for decades
has had no belief in tomorrow. And when you don't believe in
tomorrow, you do whatever you can today to get your family
ahead. And until we create more of an environment where there
is hope for tomorrow, where there are jobs and government
services are provided in a manner that you don't have to go the
corrupt route, it is going to be a generational change, I
think, sir.
Mr. Coffman. The green-on-blue violence, Afghan soldiers
killing U.S. military personnel and the coalition partners,
ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] personnel, are
those incidents--well, I assume they are down now because we
have pulled back, it seems, in our interaction with the Afghan
Security Forces. But it is critical for us to have that
interaction in order to be able to move them forward. Can you
comment on where we are on the green-on-blue violence?
General Mattis. I can, sir. Thank you for that question. It
goes to the very heart of trust.
So far this year, one attack. Now, I did not get
complacent. I think I know why it has gone down. It has to do
with training, has to do with counterintelligence training we
have given to the Afghans so they have ferreted out some of
these people inside the ranks and caught them. And we have very
good techniques for doing that.
But I would tell you, if you went over there today and
contrast it to when you were over there 2 years ago, you would
probably find very little difference in what you saw as far as
our troops interacting with their troops. We are very much
involved with them, integrated with them. We are obviously
taking what you would consider prudent measures in the field to
protect ourselves. But at the same time they have lost more of
their boys in green-on-green than we have lost on green-on-
blue. So we have had wholehearted support from the Afghan
leadership in addressing this problem, and it appears to be
paying off.
Mr. Coffman. In terms of our drawdown--and maybe, General
Fraser, this may be to you too. In terms of our drawdown as to
the equipment, what equipment are we leaving behind? And out of
the equipment that we are leaving behind, what will go to the
Afghan military? And are we, in fact, categorically looking at
equipment that will, in fact, be destroyed, weapons or
equipment? General Mattis?
General Mattis. Sir, if we have excess equipment, we will
certainly look at leaving that behind. But if the Army or the
Marines, the two Services with most of the gear over there, if
they need it brought back, it is coming back. So it has got to
be really excess if we leave it.
But we are also, as you know, standing up the Afghan forces
with equipment that is bought specifically for them. For
example, the Light Armored Vehicle is one that is low-
maintenance-intensive; it is easy to maintain. So we are not
going to leave them a complex system that becomes more of a
burden.
So we will outfit them. We will leave behind some gear. We
will bring most of it home. And we would probably destroy or
demilitarize those things just not worth bringing home.
Will?
General Fraser. Sir, just briefly, we are working very
closely with the materiel recovery element that is on the
ground. They have a deliberate process that General Mattis is
talking about where they actually categorize that equipment.
Once we have disposition orders, then we will either turn it
over to the DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] to be destroyed, or
it will be transferred, as General Mattis said, to the Afghans.
It could be declared as excess defense articles. There is a
separate process by which that would go through in coordination
with State and countries who are looking for excess defense
articles. And then there is the rest of that that we will be
bringing home.
So the processes, the procedures are in place, and we are
confident that we have all the guidance we need.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.
General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, General Fraser, thank you
again so much for joining us today. General Mattis, we wish you
Godspeed.
And with no further business before the committee, the
House Committee on Armed Services stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
?
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 6, 2013
=======================================================================
?
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 6, 2013
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Posture of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special
Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command
March 6, 2013
The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive
testimony on the posture of U.S. Central, Special Operations,
and Transportation Commands. Today, we have with us General
James Mattis, Admiral William McRaven, and General William
Fraser. Thank you for joining us today.
The CENTCOM area of responsibility remains a critical focus
of the U.S. military. Over the next year in Afghanistan, the
United States will be withdrawing 34,000 troops, and the ANSF
will be fully in the lead across Afghanistan for the first
time. These major changes to the security context in
Afghanistan--all of which will be occurring during the same
time period--could present new forms of risk to U.S. interests
in Afghanistan and the region. Likewise, the broader challenges
within the CENTCOM area of responsibility--including the
conflict in Syria, the nuclear ambitions of Iran, and the
uncertain political transition in Egypt--continue to pose
strategic risk to U.S. interests. However, in my view, among
the greatest strategic risks within the Middle East remains the
ongoing ambiguity associated with U.S. commitment to our
regional allies--and the region itself.
Additionally, I remain concerned about the threats posed by
transnational terrorism. The threat from Al Qaeda is real. It
is global, networked, and clandestine. U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) and our Special Operations Forces play a
critical role in counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and
countering weapons of mass destruction. SOCOM has achieved
extraordinary integration with each of the Services, the U.S.
interagency, and our international partners. However, an
emphasis on direct action during the last 11 years of combat
may have left our Special Operations Forces out of balance for
a future that will increasingly require building partnership
capacity and advisory and assistance efforts. Looking forward,
our Special Operations Forces must remain flexible enough to
counter the transnational terrorist threat with decisive force
when warranted--but, at the same time, globally postured to
prevent transnational terrorism from manifesting into
operational and strategic threats--through international
partnerships and regional alliances.
Finally, TRANSCOM continues to execute the logistical
requirements for ongoing U.S. military efforts across the
globe. The challenges TRANSCOM faces continue to grow. As our
military prepares to redeploy from Afghanistan and as we
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, we must remain ready to respond
to contingencies elsewhere in the Middle East--and Africa.
These operational necessities come as themilitary is being
forced to shed force structure, curtail flying hours, and
return ships to port--reducing the availability of the very
lift capacity upon which TRANSCOM relies. This Committee has
taken steps to mitigate these shortfalls, but much remains to
be done.
In short, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM are executing vital
military missions across the globe. We are extremely grateful
for your service to our country. I look forward to your
testimony.
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Posture of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special
Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command
March 6, 2013
I welcome our witnesses, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven,
General Fraser. We thank you for your service and your great
leadership in your three very important commands. It is
appropriate that we have the three of you together because you
have to work very, very closely together.
As the chairman mentioned, CENTCOM continues to be our most
important command facing the greatest challenges, number one,
of course, being Afghanistan, where we still have troops in
battle. And the transition over the course of the next couple
of years is going to be critical. Look forward to hearing more
from General Mattis, from all three of you, actually, about how
that transition will go.
But there are other threats in the CENTCOM region.
Obviously, the instability in the Middle East remains, and the
threat from Iran is also something that will continue to be a
challenge, and we are curious any thoughts you have on how to
contain that and what come out of the Syrian civil war as well.
Admiral McRaven, we greatly appreciate everything the
Special Operations Command has done. And, obviously, we are
very aware of the work that has been done in Iraq and
Afghanistan over the course of the last decade. Less well known
is your presence in many other places trying to contain
insurgencies, in many cases before they start.
The relatively small footprint that you offer yields a huge
return in a number of places to great success. In the
Philippines, helping contain insurgencies there; our work with
AMISOM in the Somalia area, working with partners in Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Uganda, and Burundi, as well, has proven that a
small-force, building-partner capacity working with the local
population can make an enormous difference for a very small
cost. Of course, you also have to include diplomacy and
development pieces to make that work, but I think the
partnerships that have been formed there have been incredibly
valuable.
Now, going forward, certainly, as the chairman mentioned,
as we are drawing down in Afghanistan, as we have drawn down in
Iraq, how do we reposition SOF to best meet the threat
environment that is out there?
And, General Fraser, the Transportation Command is
absolutely critical. It is all about logistics. It is the part
of fighting a battle and preparing for battle that most people
don't know that much about, but it just doesn't happen if we
don't get the troops and the equipment to where they need to
go. It is a very complicated process. You do an excellent job;
certainly have been, you know, very, very helpful in
Afghanistan. And the challenge now as we transition out is you
are the guy who has got to get all that stuff out of there in a
logical way. So we are anxious to hear about that.
Of course, overall, as the chairman mentioned up front, you
all face, you know, budget challenges. You know, we had fairly
substantial cuts in what we were expected to spend starting
2011. Now we have sequestration kicking into to roughly double
those cuts and to do so in a very unhelpful way, across the
board, mindlessly, in a way that makes it very difficult to
plan. In addition, we have the challenge of operating under a
CR instead of with an appropriations bill. All of those things
are going to make it that much more difficult to get the job
done. We are anxious to hear about how you are meeting those
challenges and what, hopefully, we can do to reduce them.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9956.073
?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 6, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
General Fraser. The passage of the ``Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013'' since the March 06, 2013 hearing
has removed a portion of the uncertainties we are facing from
continuously working under Continuing Resolutions and pending
sequestration cuts. The National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) was funded
to the FY2013 budget request and until recently was facing a
sequestration reduction. We are pleased that Office of Secretary of
Defense and the Navy had the flexibility to eliminate the NDSF cut, as
it would have caused a reduction in the readiness and responsiveness of
our organic fleet.
Additionally, the Maritime Security Program (MSP), which falls
under the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, ensures
the Department of Defense has access to militarily useful U.S. flagged
merchant vessels to support the transportation of supplies to support
our deployed forces. Under the recent budget resolution for FY2013, MSP
is funded at the FY2012 appropriated level of $174 million, $12 million
less than the authorized level, and will be reduced further by a 7.8%
sequestration cut. The Maritime Administration will be unable to fully
fund this program.
The impact of the funding reductions to the commercial portion of
our fleets could decrease the capability of USTRANSCOM to respond to
the requirements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. [See page 29.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
General Fraser. Afghanistan Helicopter (Rotary Wing) Program,
contracted directly with the foreign carrier: Canadian Helicopters,
Canada. CHC Global Operations, Canada. Vertical De Aviacion, Columbia.
Thule Airlift (Fixed Wing Aircraft), contracted directly with the
foreign carrier: Air Greenland, Greenland.
International Airlift Subcontracted through CRAF Carriers: Volga
Dnepr, Russia (subcontracted through Atlas Air). Polet, Russia
(subcontracted through UPS). Silk Way, Azerbaijan (subcontracted
through World Airways Inc.). [See page 28.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 6, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
Mr. McKeon. During the SASC posture hearing on 5 March 2013, you
stated that you want 13,600 troops to remain in Afghanistan following
the end of the NATO mission on December 31, 2014. What would you
envision should be the associated mission sets for a 13,600 troops
presence in Afghanistan?
General Mattis. During his State of the Union address, President
Obama outlined two specific missions for U.S. forces in post-2014
Afghanistan. First, the training and equipping of Afghan forces so that
Afghanistan does not again slip into chaos; and secondly, a
counterterrorism effort that allows us to pursue the remnants of Al
Qaeda and its affiliates. I also consider our support of other U.S.
Government agency efforts in Afghanistan an inherent and critical
mission.
Mr. McKeon. What value do you put on area weapons, such as the
Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW), in deterring enemy forces from considering
massing military assets to attack our allied forces?
General Mattis. Area weapons allow us to engage a large number of
enemy assets assembled in one area with a limited number of munitions.
This should provide some form of deterrent to an enemy planning to mass
forces. Therefore, area weapons such as the SFW are valuable in
deterring enemy forces from massing military assets.
Mr. McKeon. Is it anticipated that area weapons would contribute in
defending against hostile action by Iranian land and/or maritime forces
should deterrence fail?
General Mattis. Yes. Area weapons are effective against fielded
forces including military personnel and armored vehicles. They would be
one of the available options to defend against hostile actions. They
would be less effective against maritime forces at sea but could be
used against maritime forces in port.
Mr. McKeon. Can you outline the current threats posed by the
Haqqani network to our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
region? How do we expect that threat to morph as we withdraw our
forces? How best can we mitigate this threat?
General Mattis. The Haqqani Network, proportionately, remains the
most lethal and cohesive insurgent group operating in Afghanistan. Its
areas of operation and influence continue to expand outside of its
traditionally defined operating areas, affecting the Transition and
Afghan stability.
As our retrograde in Afghanistan proceeds, we anticipate the
Haqqani Network will attempt to exploit security vulnerabilities,
particularly in Eastern Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) and other targets perceived as vulnerable could fall
victim to attacks; however, Kabul will be the primary operational
effort. Absent sustained pressure and international enforcement of
United Nations sanctions, the Haqqani Network will remain resilient in
its Pakistani sanctuary. The Haqqani Network clearly understands the
value of high-profile attacks that garner significant media attention,
and will attempt to increase the frequency and lethality of attacks in
key population centers as we draw down our forces. This network is
directly linked to the majority of high-profile attacks in Kabul and
eastern Afghanistan and responsible for numerous U.S casualties. The
Haqqani Network has the closest relationship with Al Qaeda of any other
militant group operating in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
We are maintaining pressure on the Haqqani Network through the
combination of persistent Combined Team operations and interagency and
international partnerships, challenging the Haqqani Network's command
and control and operational effectiveness. A security environment that
is manageable by the Government of Afghanistan and its security forces
will limit the ability of terrorists to use Afghan territory to plot,
resource, and conduct terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, our
interests, and the interests of our allies worldwide. Aggressive
targeting and international partnerships are essential to limit the
travel of senior leaders to the Gulf States for fundraising purposes.
Mr. McKeon. What is the role of area versus unitary munitions in
addressing this threat?
General Mattis. Unitary munitions give precision deployment
capability against a single point target. Area munitions allow the
engagement of multiple targets across a defined area. This can include
denying or disrupting the enemy's use of that area or destruction of
enemy fielded forces and armored vehicles.
Mr. McKeon. What capability does the SFW provide that other
munitions in the U.S. inventory cannot in this environment? How does
the SFW address the humanitarian concerns that have been raised about
the use of other munitions?
General Mattis. The SFW provides the ability to disable multiple
armored vehicles with a limited number of aircraft sorties. In
comparison, multiple missions with unitary weapons would be required to
disable the same number of armored vehicles. Sensor Fuzed Weapons would
address concerns regarding collateral damage or unnecessary human
suffering by more directly targeting enemy vehicles versus personnel.
Because the weapon is designed to disable a vehicle's motor, it is less
likely to cause undue suffering to personnel in the open vs.
indiscriminant use of cluster munitions or unitary munitions that miss
their targets.
Mr. McKeon. What type of consequences would you foresee if U.S.
forces could rely only on unitary systems to defend against an Iranian
ground or maritime attack? What costs in terms of protecting friendly
forces, materiel, and dollars would be incurred?
General Mattis. The consequences would be felt in three primary
areas by U.S. forces. First, aircraft that attack from high altitude
would be required to fly more missions across the target area because
they would be unable to target as many enemy forces per mission as they
would with cluster munitions. Second, aircraft that work in the low-
altitude environment, such as the A-10, which can carry large numbers
of unitary munitions, would be exposed to the threat environment for a
longer period of time. Finally, it would take longer to prepare the
battle space in advance of U.S. backed ground forces taking the field
of battle. Additionally, the ability to rapidly repel an advancing
enemy ground force would be reduced in a troops-in-contact scenario.
The exact cost would be difficult to pinpoint, but the primary
factors involved would be the increased risk to U.S. aircraft,
potentially high battlefield losses of U.S. troops, and a loss of
popular support for an operation incurring high loss rates. While
unitary munitions are extremely useful against a variety of targets,
cluster munitions exists as a viable option to reduce battle losses.
Mr. McKeon. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated
to remove by 2018 munitions available to the Central Command that are
prohibited by the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm
to Civilians?
General Mattis. We do not anticipate any difficulties meeting the
requirements of the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended
Harm to Civilians. Cluster munitions are not identified as primary
targeting weapon solutions in any of our plans although we do not rule
out their use in a dynamic environment where they might be the most
appropriate weapon for the target. A comprehensive search of our
munitions database records indicates that only seven types of munitions
out of a total of 44 covered by the policy are currently located within
the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and our Service components
will schedule retrograde of select munitions from theater as their
parent military service priorities dictate.
Mr. McKeon. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated
to procure capabilities to mitigate shortfalls resulting from
implementation of the 2008 policy? What further steps would be required
if legislation were enacted requiring implementation of the 2008 policy
prior to 2018?
General Mattis. CENTCOM does not manage munitions acquisition. As
capability documents are staffed for review, we follow the 2008 policy
in providing input to the comment matrix, however the Service
components drive procurement and would be in a better position to
answer this question.
Mr. McKeon. What is the expected impact on the Central Command's
theater objectives and operational plans if these shortfalls are not
mitigated?
General Mattis. Failure to mitigate resourcing shortfalls would
force us to accept a higher level of risk to the successful
accomplishment of our objectives and missions. We will continue to
prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we
balance our approach to work by, with and through our partners. While
the effects of these shortfalls would negatively impact all of the
Services and combatant commanders, it will arguably have the greatest
operational impact in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) due to
geography, the pace of ongoing combat operations and the likelihood of
numerous contingencies. Certainly we can expect that those units
required to address these emerging challenges will be less ready than
in the past or will have less capability due to reduced readiness
levels in training and equipping.
Mr. McKeon. What are CENTCOM's current highest priority
intelligence requirements? How well are these requirements being
addressed? What is the current division of labor between theater-level
assets and national-level assets? Please describe for both collection
requirements as well as analytical support.
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. McKeon. What are CENTCOM's key intelligence gaps?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. McKeon. How do you assess national intelligence support to
CENTCOM? Please specifically discuss support from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, as well
as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you have any
recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies?
General Mattis. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the rest of the
Intelligence Community provide excellent support to CENTCOM. The
majority of my Intelligence staff civilians are DIA employees and DIA
provides a host of training environments for specialty areas of
Intelligence, including Intelligence Collection Management,
Intelligence Analysis and tailored courses for utilizing software tools
developed by DIA. DIA also provides the Intelligence Collection Manager
interface for CENTCOM with the Joint Staff and with elements of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
NGA and NRO have highly proficient liaison officers embedded within
my staff, with in-depth geospatial intelligence knowledge and advanced
technical skills. Their ability to reach back to their parent
organizations and rapidly support CENTCOM requirements has been a major
asset in maintaining situational awareness across our region. Both
organizations have proven very agile over the last five years in
providing personnel that directly support my staff and forward elements
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
NSA support has also been excellent, with embedded liaison officers
that rapidly turn our needs and requirements into collection. They are
essential in providing exceptionally precise indications of potential
hostile intent and Indications and Warning for our toughest problem
sets in Iran, Syria and Afghanistan.
Mr. McKeon. Please describe CENTCOM's current ISR needs and your
most recent request for ISR allocation.
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. McKeon. Please describe the value of HUMINT to CENTCOM
General Mattis. HUMINT is a critical enabler. It plays a key role
in ascertaining information in support of CENTCOM requirements and
mission objectives. The ability of HUMINT to penetrate hard targets and
access denied areas within the CENTCOM AOR and answer intelligence
requirements (particularly those related to plans and intentions) are
vital to the CENTCOM mission. HUMINT is uniquely valuable to CENTCOM in
validating and complementing intelligence from other disciplines by
providing information that is beyond the capabilities of technical
sensors, and often incorporates the values and qualitative judgments of
the source. HUMINT includes non-tangible information such as insights
into adversary plans and intentions, deliberations and decisions,
research and development goals and strategies, doctrine and leadership,
and morale. HUMINT assets collect information that is not communicated
electronically, such as troop movements conducted under radio silence;
or equipment and facilities concealed or shielded from overhead or
airborne imagery systems. This dedicated capability has been
instrumental in the success of numerous CENTCOM operations.
Mr. McKeon. Have CENTCOM's needs been fully incorporated and
integrated into planning for the Defense Clandestine Service?
General Mattis. Yes. CENTCOM requirements for Defense Clandestine
Service (DCS) capabilities are fully captured in tasks to The Defense
Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Directorate of Operations within the HUMINT
Appendices to CENTCOM approved plans and orders. Defense HUMINT
Enterprise councils and boards (of which DCS is a core member) also
sufficiently detail combatant command HUMINT requirements.
Mr. McKeon. What are SOCOM's current highest priority intelligence
requirements? How well are these requirements being addressed? What is
the current division of labor between theater-level assets and
national-level assets? Please describe for both collection requirements
as well as analytical support.
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM has four enduring priority intelligence
requirements that directly support the commander's top strategic global
security concerns, including 1) countering transnational violent
extremist organizations, 2) regional instability and state aggression,
3) threats to sovereignty that may threaten the stability of our
interests and/or partner nations, and 4) WMD counterproliferation. In
addition, USSOCOM supports the GCC's SOF-specific priority intelligence
requirements in their respective theaters of operations, including
countering violent extremist organizations, setting conditions for
long-term stability, developing regional access, and building security
force assistance capacity through partner-nation security initiatives.
USSOCOM collection requirements are submitted at the national-
level. Our collection requirements are received from our component
commands and from the commander's priority intelligence requirements.
We do not task theater-level CCMDs assets. USSOCOM relies heavily on
its deployed subcomponents, the other GCCs, and the greater IC to
fulfill our collection needs. Therefore, requirements in theaters where
greater theater and national collection resources are available are
more likely to be addressed. USSOCOM as force provider does not have
theater-level collection assets under its control. We provide SOF
assets to the GCCs and the GCCs then allocate assets in theater to the
TSOCs based on the commander's priorities.
Analysis of collection done by USSOCOM intelligence professionals
is focused on providing unique SOF-specific assessments. SOCOM depends
heavily on GCC and national level analytic resources for all non SOF-
specific analysis.
Mr. McKeon. What are SOCOM's key intelligence gaps?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM intelligence gaps are captured under the
DIA intelligence requirements process through multiple mission
management boards conducted on a monthly basis. Additionally, SOCOM
contributes to the DNI annual intelligence collection gaps discussions
to address current and projected intelligence gaps and requirements. To
fulfill its Intelligence Requirements, USSOCOM would greatly benefit
from greater authorities in applying SOF intelligence assets against
specific targets, networks, organizations, and entities; increased
priority of USSOCOM requirements within the IC; and expanded/enhanced
IC partner capabilities.
Mr. McKeon. How do you assess national intelligence support to
SOCOM? Please specifically discuss support from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, as well
as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you have any
recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies?
Admiral McRaven. National intelligence support to USSOCOM has been
superb, and provides the commander with daily, relevant intelligence
that informs the command of ongoing threats, regional instability,
counterproliferation, and WMD issues. These assessments help shape the
commander's critical decisions pertaining to SOF employment,
deployment, and global activities. DIA, NGA, and NSA have full-time
embedded analysts in the J2 who provide daily intelligence support to
the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). Additionally, the CIA, NRO, NGA,
and NSA have dedicated senior representatives who provide valuable
reach back to their parent organizations in support of SOF activities.
Mr. McKeon. The present authorized funding ceiling for Section 1208
CT authorities is $50 million. In your testimony you say that this
authority, ``remains critical to Special Operations,'' and that,
``demand for 1208 authority has increased.''
a. How much of this authority have you used this year?
b. Is the present amount of $50 million sufficient?
c. Given today's tight fiscal environment, is it too much? How
would a reduction in this funding impact your operations?
Admiral McRaven. BLUF: $50 million is adequate to cover anticipated
FY2013 requirements. USSOCOM continues to assess the need for an
increase beyond the current $50 million authority. Discussion: As of 22
Mar 2013, USSOCOM has $43.5 million committed to support ongoing
operations. Additional requirements currently in staffing to support
one ongoing operation and two emerging operations will bring the total
amount committed to $47.9 million . A separate additional operational
requirement is under development, and if approved during FY2013, is
anticipated to fully commit the remainder of the $50 million authority.
While most or all of the FY2013 $50 million authority is likely to be
committed, historical execution trends indicate that USSOCOM will only
expend roughly 82% of that amount. Since 1208's inception in 2005,
USSOCOM's execution shows a year-over-year upward trend as the program
and authority matures. Operational planning that spans up to 14
distinct operations requires some flexibility in authority versus
actual execution. USSOCOM, in conjunction with the GCCs, TSOCs and Task
Forces is assessing: a) whether or not the ongoing FY2013 operations
are expected to continue into FY2014 and beyond at their current level,
and b) the potential for additional emerging future requirements. The
preliminary assessment is that $50 million is required (not too much
authority), and that an increase (amount TBD) would be prudent to avoid
the potential to negatively impact future operations.
Historical Authority, Programs and Execution of 1208 since
inception in 2005.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
($M) FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority $25.0 $25.0 $25.0 $25.0 $35.0 $40.0 $45.0 $50.0 $50.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved $ 0.4 $19.4 $22.6 $19.6 $24.7 $38.6 $34.6 $43.6 $50.0
Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obligations $ 0.3 $ 7.5 $19.6 $11.5 $15.1 $27.1 $24.6 $33.1 $41.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of 1 8 10 11 11 12 10 10 14
Operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. McKeon. We understand that SOCOM has been working to have its
own Special Operations security force assistance authority--in addition
to those SFA authorities that are already available to your forces.
a. Can you provide us with more detail on this requirement? Why are
current authorities NOT satisfying your needs? What are the legal
limitations that constrain you?
b. What is the State Department's opinion of this initiative?
c. What do the Geographic Combatant Commanders say about this
initiative?
d. Do you expect to have OSD and OMB support for this initiative?
Admiral McRaven. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. McKeon. What changes if any would you recommend to Title 10
Section 167--the foundational statutory authority for U.S. Special
Operations Command?
a. Are there areas that require our attention more so than others?
Perhaps personnel issues, such as the management of Professional
Military Education for Special Operations Forces? Do you require
modifications to your personnel authorities so that you are more
Service-like, as an example, so that you have more of a say in the
careers of our Special Operations Forces?
Admiral McRaven. At this time we do not intend to recommend any
revisions to 10 USC 167.
Mr. McKeon. Can you outline the current threats posed by the
Haqqani network to our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
region? How do we expect that threat to morph as we withdraw our
forces? How best can we mitigate this threat?
Admiral McRaven. The Haqqani Network's (HQN) goal is to degrade
security and the effectiveness of GIRoA through harassing and
persistent attacks in Southeastern Afghanistan, and to use these
corridors to project violence into Kabul by launching spectacular
attacks there. The HQN hopes to translate successful attacks into
continued support that draws money, materials and manpower from the
Taliban and the international jihadist community. The loss of their
operations chief, Baddruddin Haqqani, and increased security in Kabul
have diminished the number and frequency of successful spectacular
attacks conducted by the network. However, their intent and resources
remain intact.
As the U.S. withdraws forces, HQN may benefit from degraded GIRoA/
Coalition security in the HQN dominated areas of Paktika, Paktya, and
Khowst as well as areas where they have expanded influence such as
Logar and Wardak. Continuing to disrupt HQN leadership such as Haji
Mali Khan, who could augment the network's capabilities, will help
mitigate the threat.
Mr. McKeon. Your forces just like all of our military forces are
beholden to the Leahy Amendment that prohibits U.S. military assistance
to foreign military units that violate human rights.
a. What changes to this human rights policy would you propose?
Admiral McRaven. While I certainly appreciate the opportunity to
answer this question directly to members of the HASC, I want to
emphasize that I am only one of the seven Combatant Commanders who must
operate on a regular basis in accordance with the Leahy vetting laws.
Within the Department we are looking ways to make human rights vetting
more effective and more consistent with the goals of the legislation.
The Department has assembled a working group to accomplish this task
and all the Global Combatant Commanders and the Special Operations
Command support this effort.
With that being said, I want to underscore several important
points:
1. I fully concur with the decision that there must be
appropriate human rights vetting for our engagement activities
and that we are doing this according to the law and the policy.
2. In my opinion, the concept of ``poison-person-poison-
unit'' may unnecessarily restrict U.S. Forces from engaging
with units that are beneficial to U.S. interests.
3. In my opinion, Ambassadors ought to have significant input
in the decision on whether or not to engage with a particular
unit.
4. Allowing limited human rights and rule-of-law training for
units and personnel considered trained due to violations of
human rights, particularly when there is the political will
within the country's leadership to change, could be a positive
first step in improving conditions in that country.
Mr. McKeon. Women have been very active in U.S. Special Operations
Command and across the globe--working on the ground in Afghanistan as
part of Cultural Engagement Teams, filling critical Civil-Military
roles in Africa and the Pacific area, even flying Air Force Special
Operations aircraft.
a. Can you outline how the new Department of Defense policy will
impact your force? What concerns do you have?
b. How will you ensure that standards are not lowered?
c. Will there be a cultural challenge within your force?
d. Do you expect to seek any waivers or exceptions to the policy?
Admiral McRaven. a) The new Department of Defense policy will
enable SOF elements to be more effective in conducting operations
worldwide. We regularly augment tactical action units with women in a
wide spectrum of operations and I foresee a continuing need to employ
women in our missions. In order to properly incorporate women, USSOCOM
will conduct an in-depth analysis on the impacts of integrating women
to include ensuring all personnel, men and women, are provided the
opportunities to succeed while still maintaining the high standards
that are bedrock to our success.
b) We will continue to maintain the highest standards by ensuring
our occupational standards are related directly to operational
requirements. We believe the standards are currently well-linked to
requirements and will validate them with a detailed analysis throughout
the SOF enterprise. In addition, we are commissioning an un-biased,
third party to review to ensure they remain gender-neutral and reflect
operational requirements.
c) Women have served and continue to perform a vital role in SOF.
USSOCOM will address any lingering cultural challenges as part of the
independent study by analyzing the impacts of the psycho-social-
behavioral effects of women incorporated into small teams. We have the
highest expectations for our Force and I'll ensure they uphold the
requirement to treat any women as professional, skilled, co-equal
teammates.
d) We will not make any decisions until the completion of the
detailed studies. Once we have gathered the data and are certain of the
facts, we will develop a course of action and inform the relevant
parties.
Mr. McKeon. As a component of the Northern Distribution Network
(NDN), Azerbaijan provides ground and naval transit for roughly 40
percent of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
coalition's supplies bound for Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has extended
important over-flight clearance, landing and refueling operations for
U.S. and NATO flights to support ISAF. In 2012, more than 150
aeromedical evacuation flights of U.S. Air Mobility Command were flown
over Azerbaijan, rushing more than 2,200 patients to a higher level of
medical care. How do you assess current U.S.-Azerbaijan military-to-
military relations, specifically in terms of supporting our troops in
Afghanistan? Given that NDN passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia is
more secure and stable route in comparison with Pakistan route do you
plan to use it for retrograding U.S. troops and equipment from
Afghanistan as we move towards 2014?
General Fraser. The U.S.-Azerbaijan defense relationship is
strong--but still has room to grow. USTRANSCOM continues to build on
existing cooperation and engage in regular consultations at high levels
with Azerbaijani counterparts to identify areas where we can strengthen
our cooperation and partnership. Azerbaijan is part of a key transit
corridor which TRANSCOM is incorporating into its retrograde
operations. Azerbaijan's willingness to build wash racks and make other
infrastructure improvements to support multimodal operations in Baku is
illustrative of the level of cooperation that Azerbaijan and TRANSCOM
enjoy. Since April 2012, approximately 600 short tons of cargo have
retrograded through Azerbaijan bound for locations in Europe and 540
short tons of cargo has returned to the U.S.. Azerbaijan is a stable,
reliable partner and TRANSCOM will continue to partner with Azerbaijan
until 2014 and beyond. There are no plans to move troops through
Azerbaijan.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS
Mr. Andrews. TRANSCOM manages the Transportation Working Capital
Fund, which supports airlift services. Each of the Services and
agencies bear some of the costs to fly missions and support the Air
Mobility Command's budgeted flying hour program. Working Capital Fund
policies require the Services to transfer funds about 2 years before
the actual missions are flown. When TRANSCOM overflies its flying hour
program--which it has for the past several years--what happens to the
excess funds paid by the Services and the agencies? Who in TRANSCOM
controls the operational tempo of Air Mobility Command aircraft in this
instance?
General Fraser. Working Capital Fund rates are set 2 years in
advance of actual execution. USTRANSCOM bills Services and Agencies
(customers) for missions as they are flown. The Working Capital Fund
policy dictates that any operational gains/losses are returned to
customers in the form of lower/higher rates two years out. In the case
of Air Mobility Command (AMC), these gains/losses are put toward the
Airlift Readiness Account.
The Services and Agencies and world events drive the operational
tempo at AMC.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LoBiondo. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet augments military
aircraft, creating a larger transport network that we can call on as
needed. The CRAF program has been activated during two major
contingency operations and has provided critical supplemental airlift
services to the Department of Defense. Even when CRAF is not activated,
its members provide direct support to the U.S. military in day-to-day
operations.
In light of a shrinking defense budget and withdrawal from
Afghanistan under way, what is TRANSCOM's plan to keep the CRAF program
viable?
General Fraser. The Air Mobility Command is in the final phase of a
two-phase post Operation ENDURING FREEDOM CRAF study. This expansive
body of work will assess the near-term health and future viability of
the CRAF program. Upon the study's conclusion, we will have formulated
the recommendations for the most effective methodology for
restructuring policy, practices, and procedures that most accurately
reflect the changing business environment. We have integrated our
industry partners throughout this process to fully vet their concerns,
ensuring we maintain a collaborative approach. Furthermore, we've been
proactive by providing our industry partners requirements and forecasts
of the drawdown period via semi-annual Executive Working Groups.
Finally, with the creation of the Enterprise Readiness Center, we seek
to leverage new business for the future health of the Defense
Transportation System.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. General, I continue to be concerned about the
capabilities of our bases to withstand a cyberattack directed against
outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. Last
year you testified that you assessed both the more modern enduring
bases as well as the tactical ones to ensure they could continue to
operate and that you were satisfied that the proper mitigation networks
and generators were available if needed. Can you update us on the
progress that has been made in evaluating the ability of our bases
within USCENTCOM to operate and recover in the event of such an attack,
based on the increased advanced persistent threat environment, and also
specifically focus on the linkages and integration of USCYBERCOM to
support your cyber efforts under your command?
General Mattis. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Langevin. General, is operational energy a priority? If so,
why? And, can you please describe what actions you are taking in
CENTCOM to reduce overall energy consumption in order to extend combat
capability?
General Mattis. Yes. Forces currently operating in the CENTCOM Area
of Responsibility (AOR) consume over 3 million gallons of fuel per day
with recent consumption as high as 5 million gallons of fuel per day.
Satisfying that demand has required immense logistical support,
susceptible to attack. It is the CENTCOM policy to shape its use of
operational energy effectively as a strategic advantage, improving our
operational capability and effectiveness by increasing operational
energy performance and efficiency. To date, we have made great strides
ensuring increased efficiencies and improved combat effectiveness by
focusing on the development of policies, process improvements, and
incorporation of energy efficient technologies in camp facilities,
ground vehicles, and ground and aviation operations.
Mr. Langevin. General, does a requirement for persistent
surveillance and integrated fire control still persist in the CENTCOM
Area of Responsibility (AOR)?
General Mattis. Yes. CENTCOM forces and coalition partners will
have only minimal time to react to missile launches in the Arabian
Gulf. Rapid identification, verification, geolocation, and kinetic
targeting of such threats are a must.
Mr. Langevin. General, what would the addition of a persistent
surveillance and integrated fire control orbit add to CENTCOM's ability
to address cruise missile and surface moving threats to the Fifth Fleet
and missile defense assets in the region?
General Mattis. Persistent surveillance systems such as the Joint
Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS),
specifically designed for missile detection and tracking, would help to
counter threats such as those posed to U.S. Forces in the Gulf.
However, JLENS is not currently a program of record and is still in
testing. If this system does become available for worldwide operational
use, JLENS will offer persistent and multi-sensor capabilities
optimized for point area defense. The fact that JLENS is tethered will
prove a limitation requiring substantial planning and de-confliction to
overcome the impact to air navigation, especially in nations who only
grant the U.S. limited use of their airspace.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, you have commented on the need to create a
globally networked force of international partners and allies that
could rapidly respond to and address regional challenges. Your command
is promoting a concept of regional SOF coordination centers designed to
promote regional SOF partnering, similar to the NATO SOF Headquarters
in Mons, Belgium. Can you comment on this proposal, and HOW you intend
to accomplish this? Given such a strong regional emphasis would require
engagements and commitments with other countries broader than U.S.
Special Operations Command, how has the Department of State reacted to
your proposals? How have the Geographic Combatant Commanders reacted?
And how would you propose paying for such a commitment?
Admiral McRaven. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Langevin. General, the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication
(PAK GLOC), when open, remains the quickest and most cost-effective
route (i.e. cheapest) for surface transportation into Afghanistan. As
we are all aware ground transportation through Pakistan was curtailed
in November 2011, and then in early July 2012 the PAK GLOC was reopened
after extensive negotiations. The reliability of the PAK GLOC to remain
open is questionable and linked to any potential future disagreements
with the U.S. or NATO. Can you speak to the importance of Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) and how USTRANSCOM is posturing to support
operations as we bring our forces home after many years of war?
General Fraser. The NDN is an instrumental piece of the Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) Distribution Enterprise. During the closure of
the PAKGLOC and subsequent negotiations of its reopening, the NDN was a
critical means of getting supplies and equipment into Afghanistan.
Because of these routes, as well as multimodal and air-direct options,
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) saw no operational impact resulting
from the closure of the PAKGLOC. Maintaining a balance among our
various distribution routes continues to be a focus of USTRANSCOM,
reducing risk and increasing flexibility in our support of the
warfighter.
As the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSCOM will be a part of all
planning efforts in conjunction with USCENTCOM to redeploy personnel
and equipment from OEF to ensure transportation feasibility.
Maintaining a balanced distribution network ensures continuity of the
transportation enterprise and avoids any single point of failure,
enabling the redeployment of OEF forces and the retrograde of OEF
materiel within the prescribed timelines.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. In 2006 General James Jones (then the Supreme Allied
Commander of Europe) stated that ``the Achilles' heel of Afghanistan is
the narcotics problem. The uncontrolled rise of the spread of
narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates
is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, anything
to bring chaos and disorder.'' When discussed in previous hearings, you
indicated that ``DOD supports capacity building within the
Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan and specialized units such as the
DEA-sponsored National Interdiction and Special Investigative Units.''
This 2012 UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime)
report shows that the past 5 years have produced the largest crops in
decades. According to the study, the dropoff in 2010 is largely
attributed to plant blight that reduced the annual yield.
Given the fact that narcotics production actually increased during
our surge of forces, do you believe that the Afghan Army will be able
to effectively conduct counternarcotic operations? What do you expect
to happen when we further reduce our forces? Can we truly claim success
if we leave the nation in this condition?
General Mattis. I agree that the illicit narcotics problem remains
one of the greatest challenges to our future success in Afghanistan.
Secretary Panetta, just prior to leaving as Secretary of Defense,
endorsed a Commander ISAF request to identify counternarcotics as a
Department of Defense enduring priority for Afghanistan after the 2014
transition.
In response to your concerns, the Afghan Army does not have a
counternarcotics mission. Afghan drug laws are enforced by the
Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, a component of the Ministry of
Interior. In the past, the Afghan Army has occasionally provided
security for counternarcotics police operations. As we further reduce
military forces, our U.S. Government law enforcement partners will lose
much of the security umbrella U.S. and Coalition military forces
provide and will have less freedom of movement within Afghanistan. This
will restrict U.S. law enforcement partnered activities with the Afghan
counternarcotics police.
Success in Afghanistan is ultimately an Afghan responsibility. We
have trained, equipped, and mentored their forces to a level which we
assess can provide the environment for a secure and stable Afghanistan.
They must have the resolve to do so.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. Air Mobility Command maintains a list of about 136
companies that are approved to transport military cargo. However, only
about 30 companies on this list are CRAF participants; the rest are
freight forwarders and non-CRAF carriers. Despite stated and well-known
polices and regulations to use CRAF carriers, TRANSCOM has repeatedly
allowed DOD to contract with these other companies
Please explain the list of Approved Air Carriers. Who are these
companies? How do they get on this list? How do you use this list?
How can TRANSCOM ignore stated policy--from a Department of Defense
Instruction and United States Code--to assign missions that transport
military cargo to non-CRAF carriers?
General Fraser. The referenced list, Approved Air Carriers, is
comprised of transportation service providers which provide
transportation partly or wholly via air. Air tenders and Air
Transportation Service Provider Rules (Section F of the Military
Freight Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP-1)) are managed by
AMC. Companies apply for ``DOD-Approved Status'' through a process
outlined in the MFTURP-1. As long as companies meet the requirements of
the MFTURP-1, air transportation providers may include air freight
forwarders and air taxis as well as conventional air freight carriers
operating under Federal Aviation Administration rules. Once approved,
these domestic air carriers are given access to the Global Freight
Management (GFM) system where they can submit tenders (rates) based on
their approved service category (air carrier, motor carrier, rail,
etc).
The process outlined in the MFTURP-1 is used to determine which
transportation service providers are certified and governs the
validation process by which transportation service providers become
DOD-approved air carriers listed in the GFM system. Transportation
officers use the GFM system to choose the transportation service
providers for their domestic tender requirements. Business conducted
through the GFM system is not subject to the requirements of the Fly
America and Fly CRAF acts. Therefore, customers are able to utilize the
additional non-CRAF transportation service providers for air delivery
services.
Air Mobility Command manages the movement of DOD airlift missions
using a combination of organic and commercial airlift. Commercial
airlift missions are acquired through Federal Acquisition Regulation
based contracts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
Ms. Shea-Porter. It has been said that Al Qaeda's strategy is to
draw the United States into an extended global conflict that validates
the narrative that the United States is permanently at war with Islam.
What are we doing to counter this dangerous narrative against the
United States and our allies? Are we making any progress in this area
and if so, how are you measuring success? Do you have sufficient tools
and authorities to wage this battle of the narrative?
General Mattis. We are working hard with our interagency and
international partners to counter this very dangerous narrative.
CENTCOM is conducting ground-breaking, online activities to undermine
Al Qaeda's narrative throughout our Area of Responsibility (AOR) in
order to reduce recruiting, fund-raising, and the spread of its
ideology. The idea that the West is at War with Islam is a complicated
milieu of supporting narratives that effectively draw regional
audiences to the conclusion that U.S. policy toward the region serves
only Western interests. Deconstructing and defeating this multi-faceted
narrative requires a multi-faceted approach which the USG must address
holistically. CENTCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
activities designed to counter the Al Qaeda narrative have established
a digital footprint in the AORs Internet information environment to
provide focused credible information that counters and undermines Al
Qaeda's violent jihad ideology and calls to violence. CENTCOM also has
programs that find, fix, and degrade the credibility of Al Qaeda
operatives that are promoting Al Qaeda in the mainstream Internet
environment. Additionally, CENTCOM is working in close collaboration
with the Center for Strategic Counterterror Communications, Department
of State's Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Bureau, and
Other Governmental Organizations to synchronize and coordinate these
messaging activities.
We assess that we are making progress, albeit slowly, to degrade
the core tenets of Al-Qaeda's narrative. We assess that we are seeing a
steady degradation in popular acceptance of the Al Qaeda brand and
violent jihad ideology. Programmatically, we apply industry best
practice to measure the effectiveness of each of our programs and then
look to larger-scale assessments to determine their holistic
effectiveness. On a program-by-program basis, we assess monthly changes
in sentiment toward key topics within the Internet information
environment in our AOR as well as other metrics such as growth of
viewership, audience interaction, viral spread of our online content
and qualitative assessments of our online interactions where we have a
digital footprint.
We have the tools sufficient for the task but they are
underdeveloped and limited in breadth. These types of operations are
habitually underfunded, slowing their maturation and growth
dramatically. As our military footprint within the AOR continues to
shrink, programs like these become more and more important to CENTCOM
to meet these and similar tasks. With your support, we can continue to
develop and mature our counterterror programs and more effectively
fight this battle of the narrative with our partners.
Ms. Shea-Porter. How do we ensure ANA/ANP forces can counter the
Taliban forces without ISAF assistance, when only one in 23 ANA kandaks
(battalions) can currently operate independently?
General Mattis. The operational effectiveness of the ANSF continues
a general upward trend and they are performing well. They have fought
hard and are holding their own. Afghan forces are increasingly
partnering and leading offensive operations. The ANSF are now
unilaterally conducting over 80% of the total operations and are
leading roughly 85% of total operations. Over 87% of the population is
now under Afghan security. Sizewise, the ANSF has reached their object
level of 352,000. The focus of the training mission now is on the
quality of the force, developing the right balance of seniority,
skills, and specializations that are vital to their long-term
sustainability and success. Although ANSF resources will be challenged
once U.S. and Coalition forces have withdrawn, I do believe they will
be sufficient to defeat the Taliban.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Is operational energy a priority? If so, why? And,
can you please describe what actions you are taking in CENTCOM to
reduce overall energy consumption in order to extend combat capability?
How do you incentivize the military to reduce energy consumption?
And, what renewable energy technologies have been effectively employed
in CENTCOM and what is the return on investment?
What achievements have you made in the CENTCOM AOR to reduce
operational energy? What is your biggest energy challenge? And, how do
you define energy security in the context of the COCOM?
General Mattis. Yes. Forces currently operating in the CENTCOM Area
of Responsibility (AOR) consume over 3 million gallons of fuel per day
(1.4 million gallons of fuel per day in Afghanistan). Our operational
energy policy and efforts fully nest with our Theater Campaign Plan by
enabling the conduct of operations necessary to achieve our
intermediate military objectives, thus establishing the conditions for
regional security, stability, and prosperity.
I have challenged commanders at all levels throughout the CENTCOM
AOR to develop and implement operational energy programs focused on
reducing energy demand while maintaining or increasing operational
effectiveness. I have also charged commanders to push for the rapid
fielding of emerging technologies that have proven methods to reduce
energy demand, to include proven alternative energy technologies.
CENTCOM has employed several renewable technologies in the AOR such as
solar powered light carts and street lighting along with the Ground
Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System--a portable hybrid
photovoltaic/rechargeable battery power system capable of providing up
to 300 watts of continuous power.
Current operational energy includes centralizing power plants on
bases, insulating tents with energy-saving liners and the replacement
of metal halide light fixtures with light emitting diode fixtures in
gyms, just to name a few. Our biggest energy challenge remains
harnessed to fuel which is our most valued commodity and is the most
difficult to move, store, and distribute. In particular, getting energy
to our forward operating bases places an incredible demand on our
forces. And finally, energy security means a reliable, secure, and
affordable supply of energy for CENTCOM's missions, today and in the
future.
Ms. Shea-Porter. How do we encourage Pakistani involvement in
efforts to deter Taliban aggression and encourage diplomatic solutions?
General Mattis. We continue to encourage Pakistan to deter Taliban
aggression by providing much needed security assistance to their
military forces. This security assistance has played a critical role in
enhancing the Pakistan military's ability to develop more effective
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities. Diplomatic
solutions are hampered though because the Pakistanis are under extreme
pressure by the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that continue to
target government entities and citizens within their borders. They've
had devastating losses of life in VEO attacks that occur almost daily.
However, Pakistan understands the importance of regional security and
thus, the importance of working with the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the United States.
Through this tri-lateral relationship, there's been some success in
finding diplomatic solutions toward ending the reign of terror that is
being prosecuted by the numerous VEOs along the borders of Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders have publicly called on the Taliban to
participate in peace negotiations. In addition, Pakistan also
participates in the U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan Core Group and two sub-
working groups to facilitate a reconciliation process. We must continue
to encourage Pakistan to engage with us and GIRoA in order to further
advance diplomatic solutions.
Ms. Shea-Porter. How do we ensure ANA/ANP forces can counter the
Taliban forces without ISAF assistance, when only one in 23 ANA kandaks
(battalions) can currently operate independently?
Admiral McRaven. Certainly challenges remain for both the Afghan
government and its supporting security architecture. However, building
an effective security apparatus requires time and enduring advisory and
financial support. GEN Dunford has implemented a sound plan to ensure a
smooth security transition in 2014. One supporting aspect of this plan,
designed to provide time for the ANA and ANP to evolve leverages Afghan
Special Operations Forces and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program.
This covering force approach maintains pressure on insurgent networks
and simultaneously enables local communities to address their unique
security concerns.
This covering force approach is working; improving security for an
estimated 17% of the Afghan population (5 million). Today ALP are
21,346 strong and projected to continue growing after transition to an
Afghan Government goal of 45K. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
have been successful in defending their communities against insurgent
attacks 88% of the time. The layered support of Afghan special
operations elements, time and space combined with the efforts of the
ANA and ANP will continue to evolve, enabling relative stability in the
post-transitional environment.
Ms. Shea-Porter. It has been said that Al Qaeda's strategy is to
draw the United States into an extended global conflict that validates
the narrative that the United States is permanently at war with Islam.
What are we doing to counter this dangerous narrative against the
United States and our allies? Are we making any progress in this area
and if so, how are you measuring success? Do you have sufficient tools
and authorities to wage this battle of the narrative?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM, in conjunction with the Geographic
Combatant Commands (GCC) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC)
has a variety of influence programs to counter Al Qaeda's narrative.
The Trans-Regional MISO Program (TRMP) is one of SOCOM's priority
influence programs to counter violent extremist (CVE) ideology around
the globe. The TRMP is nested with the objectives in Campaign Plan
7500, DOD's global plan to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The
program provides guidance and authorities to GCCs to execute MISO in
support of their CT operations in their AORs, as well as support
partner nation MISO activities that align with U.S. objectives. Our
primary technique in countering this narrative is not to directly
address it (and thus give it credibility), but rather to isolate and
discredit Al Qaeda in the eyes of their intended audience, thus
nullifying their message. At the same time, SOCOM's trans-regional MISO
efforts emphasize the host nation/partner nation counter-AQ efforts to
divide AQ out as the real enemy. We also highlight host nation/partner
nation efforts which address underlying conditions and contributors to
extremism.
Additionally, USSOCOM deploys Military Information Support Teams
(MIST) in over 20 nations globally. MISTs work with U.S. Embassy
Country Teams and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) to counter
violent extremist messaging, among other issues, using the full
spectrum of inform and influence activities. Additionally, MISTs often
address the upstream factors leading to violent extremism through
partnership with our allies. Building partner capacity, persistent
engagement, and working by, with, and through our allies is crucial in
long-term success in countering AQ's narrative that the U.S. is at war
with Islam.
Complementary to the MISTs, USSOCOM continues to operate two
enterprise capabilities which provide a globally synchronized and
mutually supporting network: the Trans-Regional Web Initiative (TRWI)
and the Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI). These two MISO
programs provide the GCC Commanders with the ability to conduct U.S.
unilateral MISO supporting CT and GCC Theater Security Cooperation
objectives.
TRWI currently operates 10 Web sites across 6 geographic regions,
providing a global network of influence Web sites. These Web sites
publish factual content 6 days/week, 24 hours per day, in 23 languages.
Such content undermines and indirectly counters the Al Qaeda narrative
that the U.S. is at war with Islam, while maintaining a focus on the
pragmatic aspects of regional and local economic and social
improvements. TRWI Web sites also leverage various social media
outlets, greatly expanding the reach and influence of the messaging.
SOCOM's Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI), is designed to
develop, synchronize, and coordinate senior military-to-military
information and influence message in support of SOCOM and GCC
objectives. The program supports all six GCC contingency operations and
theater security cooperation objectives through the publication of
influence products that reach more than 90,000 senior military leaders
and defense official in 12 languages across 171 countries worldwide.
The magazines serve as a tool to not only counter AQ propaganda, but to
promote stability and security and build support for U.S. Government
activities. Through the use of these magazines, SOCOM achieved an
economy of force solution for a small ``boot-print,'' high-yield
engagement in the ongoing war of ideas.
We are making progress as indicated by the House Appropriations
Committee-Defense decision in FY13 appropriations to move TRWI funding
from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to USSOCOMs baseline
budget. The MISO community has worked over recent years to better
assess the effectiveness of influence operations. Per guidance in DOD
Appropriations Acts 2010 and 2012, DOD reports quarterly to Congress of
the effectiveness of MISO activities. While measuring behavioral change
in humans is a complex effort, SOCOM has been working closely with the
Joint Staff, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC),
and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to continue to
improve our efforts of assessment.
MISO inherently includes an assessment phase as part of the
influence process, and MIST teams incorporate polling, surveys and
assessments in the execution of their operations to determine program
effectiveness. Additionally, SOCOM's Global Assessment Program (GAP)
explicitly measures the extent to which Al Qaeda's narrative resonates
with populations of interest through the use of large-scale
quantitative surveys as well as multiple qualitative focus groups. GAP
has completed baseline assessments in Yemen, Algeria, Nigeria,
Bangladesh, Kenya, and Maldives as well as follow-up studies in Yemen
and Bangladesh. SOCOM uses these baseline assessments with
reassessments to gauge the effectiveness of our efforts at a strategic
level.
TRWI Web sites have also provided us the ability to gauge our
success in changing attitudes and perceptions. Using both quantitative
methods (article reads and unique site visitors) along with qualitative
methods (reader comments, online surveys and polls), we're able to
measure performance and behavioral data on a daily, monthly and
quarterly basis to determine messaging effectiveness. The sites content
and performance data is shared with Department of State in order to
compare behavioral changes with target audiences in each region.
TRMI uses target audience member feedback to assess the level of
influence in countering AQ. TRMI receives numerous submissions for
publication of reader developed content, as well as requests to use the
magazines in numerous training events and conferences. In addition,
SOCOM completed a quantitative and qualitative assessment study in 2011
which researchers used to compare the effectiveness of one magazine's
impact on a control group across a 2-year exposure. Researchers found
significant changes in attitude regarding reader support of their
country's cooperation with the UN, EU, NATO, and UN Peacekeeping
missions as a direct result of readership. These are all indicators of
TRMIs credibility and effectiveness with the target audience.
USSOCOM has sufficient authorities to counter the Al Qaeda and
violent extremist narrative. However, compliance requirements are in
some cases overly cumbersome and impact the responsiveness and
flexibility necessary to gain the advantage and exploit the OPTEMPO of
digital discourse.
Reduced funding for MISO is also limiting our ability to counter
the enemy's narrative. The recent defense strategy outlining the future
move towards low-cost and small-footprint options for global,
persistent engagement should include a reliance on MISO to accomplish
U.S. DOD objectives. However, SOCOM MISO funding in the FY13
appropriation remains largely in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
line. This funding strategy places at risk long-term sustainment for
enduring MISO programs. Additionally, Resource Management Decision
(RMD) 700a eliminated all funding for the Trans Regional Magazine
Initiative, and imposed a 20% reduction on funding for the Trans
Regional Web Initiative. At little cost, both programs have global
reach, targeting large and diverse audiences, and require no U.S.
presence on the ground.
Since 2008, SOCOM has refocused the priority to the indirect
approach and in the use of non-kinetic operations as critical to
achieving long-term objectives. While the need for non-lethal influence
operations has risen since this shift, budgets for MISO and influence
operations have been decreasing. When compared to other DOD
capabilities, MISO is a low-cost, small footprint, persistent Special
Operations Forces (SOF) capability that when combined with other
capabilities can achieve lasting effects.
Ms. Shea-Porter. As it relates to the planned Air Mobility Command
airlift force structure, what is your greatest concern in providing
airlift capabilities to support the National Military Strategy and
contingency operations to other combatant commanders? And, can you
please highlight the potential impacts to organic fleet readiness and
ability to respond to contingencies in light of a possible yearlong CR
and sequestration?
General Fraser. Our greatest concern in providing airlift
capabilities remains retaining the ability to support combatant
commanders with timely deliveries of their requirements at acceptable
levels of risk as we go forward. Organic fleet readiness may be
impacted by sequestration reductions in weapon system support accounts
designed to ensure availability of those aircraft in the Active, guard,
and Reserve force structure.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN
Mr. Runyan. General Fraser, listening to your answer to the
question from my colleague, Mr. Scott, regarding use of foreign
carriers, I have some concerns.
It is my understanding that TRANSCOM has contracted for at least
$244M in 2012 for Russian AN-124 aircraft (as listed in the COINS
system), albeit as subcontracts to CRAF carriers. Is that accurate?
I also understand you use these aircraft for what is referred to as
``outsize/oversize'' cargo that may not fit onto a CRAF carrier.
However, I'm concerned you may not be maximizing the use of our own C-5
fleet for outsize/oversize and then putting pallets and smaller
equipment on CRAF carriers. Does that make sense?
Can you explain what systems you have in place to ensure we're
maximizing the use of C-5s for outsize/oversize, then putting pallets
on our CRAF carriers?
Further, I understand you may be flying CRAF carriers into Baku,
Azerbaijan, instead of flying CRAF all the way into Afghanistan, even
though CRAF is cleared to do so. Isn't it true that uploading CRAF
cargo to these IL-76s costs 3x the price of CRAF carrier and supports a
foreign carrier? Why would you do that? Do you feel you have the
authority to make this decision to not use CRAF? Does that comply with
the Fly CRAF Act?
General Fraser. When organic capability is not available and
commercial support is required, we utilize Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) carriers to the maximum extent possible. All DOD commercial
missions are conducted in compliance with the Fly America and Fly CRAF
Acts. For outsized, oversized, or battle-damaged cargo, occasional use
of contract AN-124 and IL-76 aircraft is required to augment our C-5
fleet. DOD assigns those missions to foreign carriers only when the
missions cannot be performed by a U.S. commercial carrier. As a matter
of policy, the contracts for these aircraft are through CRAF carriers
who subsequently use foreign carrier subcontractors. Additionally,
Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84; 123 Stat. 2399), provides authority to
acquire products and services (to include airlift services) produced in
countries along a major route of supply to Afghanistan. This authority
is used in the case of IL-76 aircraft flying from Baku, Azerbaijan. The
business provided through these aircraft contributes to our continued
access of Baku and the rest of Azerbaijan.
Mr. Runyan. I understand that TRANSCOM can use multimodal contracts
to accomplish door-to-door transportation solutions using all
commercial assets. For example, cargo imported into Afghanistan is
sealifted to the UAE and then transported by air to its final
destination. Instead of using multimodal contracts, however, I
understand TRANSCOM has been shipping cargo through the Northern
Distribution Network which costs 2\1/2\ times more than if TRANSCOM
shipped cargo through the Pakistani transportation network. Shipping
cargo through the NDN also burns more fuel. The Army has said
unexpectedly high transportation costs have partly caused its $5-7
billion shortfall in the fiscal year 2013 budget. Since the UAE is the
closest multimodal country to Afghanistan, why hasn't TRANSCOM
considered shipping more military cargo on commercial carriers through
these multimodal contracts? How does TRANSCOM plan its flight routes to
most effectively transport cargo into and out of Afghanistan?
In the coming months, which countries does TRANSCOM plan to
transport cargo through on C-5s, C-17s, and C-130s? How does TRANSCOM
decide whether to fly cargo on military aircraft or use commercial
aircraft under existing multimodal contracts? Approximately how many
hours does TRANSCOM waste flying military aircraft, when commercial
aircraft could more quickly and efficiently fly cargo through the UAE?
General Fraser. As the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSOM, in
concert with the DOD, interagency, and our partner nations, is
responsible for setting the global logistics enterprise to ensure
reliable and redundant lines of communication (LOCs) for strategic
cargo and passenger transport in support of combatant commands
worldwide. In our role as the supporting command to U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM) for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), we have
deliberately established multiple routes and modes to deploy, sustain,
and redeploy/retrograde U.S. and coalition partners (Lift & Sustain
nations) to meet warfighter requirements, while ensuring system
efficiencies to the maximum extent possible. Thus, as the
transportation provider supporting USCENTCOM and its components, we
continually assess and refine our enterprise processes to realize cost
avoidances in our commitment to make the best use of taxpayer dollars.
Most importantly, this must be accomplished while effectively enabling
USCENTCOM operations by providing multiple lanes of transportation,
ensuring our mission will not fail due to loss of one or more routes.
Over the past year, approximately 75% of our Defense Transportation
System cargo moving to and from Afghanistan in support of OEF has moved
via our commercial partners in the Commercial Multimodal system (CMM).
The other 25% moved through other routes that we've established over
time and continue to modify, including organic/commercial air direct
delivery and the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Due to cost,
USCENTCOM prefers ground routing over CMM or air direct. Of the ground
LOCs supporting OEF, the Pakistan Ground LOC (PAKGLOC) is the least
expensive. Use of the PAKGLOC at its fullest capacity has been
interrupted by its recent closure and subsequent reopening. While
technically reopened in July 2012, new cargo bookings were held pending
intergovernmental negotiations on the specific Memorandum of
Understanding and Terms of Reference. These were approved 31 Jul 12 and
1 Nov 12 respectively. In the interim between the reopening in July
2012 and the conclusion of negotiations in November 2012, cargo that
had been stranded along the route and in the port was being cleared. We
recently completed proofs of principle with new cargo bookings to
ensure smooth cargo flow under the new procedures. Because the rates
are preferable to other available routes, we expect the PAKGLOC to
reach higher, sustainable volumes and become the primary logistic LOC
supporting OEF by the summer of 2013.
While the PAKGLOC was closed we relied heavily on our commercial
partners and the CMM system, along with the NDN, to move cargo into
theater. While USTRANSCOM is responsible for establishing and
monitoring LOC capacity and capability to meet OEF delivery
requirements, USCENTCOM, as the supported command, in coordination with
force providers (services and other combatant commands), issues
guidance to subordinate commands for LOC selection when moving cargo to
and from Afghanistan, with the primary goal of effective operational
execution. USCENTCOM's guidance to its subordinate commands for
strategic movement includes directives on LOC selection and mode
selection (i.e. air direct, CMM, NDN, etc.). Once the requirement is
given to USTRANSCOM, we source and execute the specified transportation
solution to meet these USCENTCOM requirements, while advising them on
low-cost options for cargo delivery that will meet their operational
needs if applicable.
Organic and commercial air direct delivery to and from Afghanistan
is another critical capability utilized by USTRANSCOM to meet OEF
warfighter requirements. Validated USCENTCOM strategic airlift
requirements are allocated to either organic or commercial airlift by
USTRANSCOM's air component, Air Mobility Command (AMC). Our organic
strategic airlift aircraft (C-5 & C-17 assets) are national assets,
which are low-density platforms in continuous high-demand throughout
the globe. These aircraft are typically utilized to fly equipment that
USCENTCOM deems critical and/or sensitive, in addition to other
critical requirements that cannot be met by our commercial partners
(i.e. helicopters, secure communications equipment, etc). Thus, if AMC
does not have organic assets available for lift upon receipt of a
validated USCENTCOM requirement, our commercial partners are contracted
through USTRANSCOM to fulfill the airlift requirement appropriately. C-
130s are not utilized for strategic airlift due to capacity, velocity
and intratheater demand.
For organic assets, the missions are sourced, planned, and executed
by AMC to meet USCENTCOM directed delivery timelines. Utilizing
industry-standard flight planning software that accounts for aircraft
specifications, fuel burn, winds aloft, etc., AMC plans the mission for
the most efficient route possible, while also accounting for aircrew
duty-day limitations, diplomatic overflight clearance and international
flow-control restrictions. For OEF support, these routes can be
accomplished with either air refueling tanker support to fly cargo non-
stop to/from continental U.S. (CONUS) and Afghanistan (most expensive
option), or the more typical method of stopping at enroute locations in
Europe. International routes for these missions change daily based on a
number of other factors, but typically involve European overflight
followed by a southern arrival (via Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, and Pakistan)
or northern arrival (via Turkey and Central Asian States) into
Afghanistan proper. Nations overflown by our organic assets each have
their own diplomatic clearance procedures--some have standing
agreements with the DOD for overflight in support of OEF, while others
require specific clearances for individual missions. On rare occasions,
our organic airlift assets will be used to deploy and/or redeploy units
from bases in the western U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater, which
will move direct from the USPACOM region to Afghanistan (i.e. not
routed east over the CONUS and Europe). AMC synchronizes and manages
these overflight requirements to ensure disciplined global aircraft
movement.
With the requirement to use strategic organic airlift assets to
move specific, USCENTCOM-validated critical cargo, USTRANSCOM and AMC
continually assess aircraft utilization while meeting combatant
commanders' requirements. These efforts at efficiency consistently
result in over 80% cargo-fill utilization for our aircraft departing
Afghanistan (including unit redeployment, retrograde and intratheater
missions). This includes missions that depart Afghanistan with
suboptimal cargo loads due to operational requirements such as
intratheater repositioning, destination cargo handling capabilities,
operational retasking, etc. When these missions, as well as those with
physical cargo restraints (i.e. helicopters), are factored out of the
assessment, we consistently realize over 95% cargo utilization for
organic cargo missions moving OEF cargo. As the weight of airlift
effort shifts to a primarily redeploy/retrograde mission for OEF
drawdown, we anticipate that cargo utilization will decrease on
missions entering Afghanistan, but increase to nearly 100% as aircraft
are used to bring equipment and troops out of theater. These missions
will be used to support movement of critical items that are ineligible
for commercial ground or air lift. The vast majority of cargo is
eligible for commercial ground or air lift and will therefore be moved
via surface or multimodal options.
Our commercial partners and the capabilities they provide via the
CMM system are absolutely critical in our efforts to support the OEF
warfighter. They have moved thousands of tons of vital deployment,
sustainment, and retrograde/redeploy cargo by providing door to door
logistics solutions for the warfighter. Thus, they are and will be
critical partners to successfully fulfill continuing USCENTCOM
requirements for a successful OEF drawdown. When the PAKGLOC capacity
increases to its full utilization, we anticipate a majority of cargo
will move via this route as lift costs continue to stress service
budgets. However, we also predict that successful OEF drawdown will
require utilization of the CMM system at levels the enterprise has not
experienced thus far, which will require concerted effort from our
commercial partners to meet substantial lift requirements forecasted by
USCENTCOM. USTRANSCOM will continue to coordinate with USCENTCOM to
ensure global surface, air, and multimodal capacity exists to meet
operational requirements, while working with our commercial partners to
ensure they remain fully informed on planned global lift requirements
for their use in business modeling and commercial enterprise sizing.
Mr. Runyan. General Fraser, how do you use this Approved Air
Carrier list? How can TRANSCOM ignore stated policy--from a Department
of Defense Instruction and United States Code--to assign missions that
transport military cargo to non-CRAF carriers?
General Fraser. The process outlined in the Military Freight
Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP-1) is used to determine
which transportation service providers are certified. The MFTURP-1
governs the validation process by which transportation service
providers become DOD-approved air carriers listed in the Global Freight
Management (GFM) system. Transportation officers use the GFM system to
choose the transportation service providers for their domestic tender
requirements. Business conducted through the GFM system is not subject
to the requirements of the Fly America and Fly CRAF acts. Therefore,
customers are able to utilize the additional non-CRAF transportation
service providers for air delivery services.
Air Mobility Command manages the movement of DOD airlift missions
using a combination of organic and commercial airlift. Commercial
airlift missions are acquired through Federal Acquisition Regulation
based contracts.
Mr. Runyan. Air Mobility Command maintains a list of about 136
companies that are approved to transport military cargo. However, only
about 30 companies on this list are CRAF participants; the rest are
freight forwarders and non-CRAF carriers. Despite stated and well-known
policies and regulations to use CRAF carriers, TRANSCOM has repeatedly
allowed DOD to contract with these other companies
Please explain the list of Approved Air Carriers. Who specifically
are these companies? How do they get on this list?
General Fraser. The referenced list, Approved Air Carriers, is
comprised of transportation service providers which provide
transportation partly or wholly via air. Air tenders and Air
Transportation Service Provider Rules (Section F of the Military
Freight Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP-1)) are managed by
AMC. Companies apply for ``DOD-Approved Status'' through a process
outlined in the MFTURP-1. As long as companies meet the requirements of
the MFTURP-1, air transportation providers may include air freight
forwarders and air taxis as well as conventional air freight carriers
operating under Federal Aviation Administration rules. Once approved,
these domestic air carriers are given access to the Global Freight
Management system where they can submit tenders (rates) based on their
approved service category (air carrier, motor carrier, rail, etc).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Mr. Palazzo. I know there is talk that the (ANP) Afghan National
Police and the (ANA) Afghan National Army are going to be capable of
maintaining stability in the Area of Operation (AO). How real is this?
General Mattis. Despite the nature of the resilient insurgency in
Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with limited
support from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), continues
to improve across all levels. The ANSF capability to maintain stability
in the area of operations is real. Successful operations like KALAK
KHODE, a large-scale ANSF-led series of operations in Regional Command
South, are just one example of how the ANSF continues to make
demonstrable progress each day at the brigade, corps, and institutional
levels. Since July 2012, the ANSF has not only grown in size, but has
developed in capabilities and performance as well. Afghan security
forces are now leading 80 percent of all conventional and special
operations and, with the implementation of Tranche 4 in March 2013, the
ANSF will have security lead for approximately 87 percent of the
population. I am confident the ANSF is poised to assume the lead for
all security operations this spring commensurate with Milestone 2013 as
ISAF shifts to a supporting role. ISAF expects that Tranche 5 will be
announced concurrent with Milestone 2013. With the implementation of
this final Tranche this summer, the ANSF will have the lead for
security for 100 percent of the Afghan population.
Mr. Palazzo. The constant has been U.S. support for Afghan force in
contact, the variables are what I believe need to be addressed. One has
always been the duration that support would last, and the second is the
Taliban. In your opinion, is it a likely possibility that the forces
will regress once there is a total U.S. withdrawal?
General Mattis. No. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)
operational effectiveness continues a general upward trend as they
continue to improve and professionalize. The Afghan Army is performing
well, they have fought hard and held their own. Currently, over 87% of
the Afghan population is under Afghan control and Afghan security. The
ANSF remains on track to support transition allowing them to take the
lead for security across Afghanistan by the first half of 2013, and
have responsibility for all security by the end of December 2014, per
the Lisbon Agreement.
Mr. Palazzo. Syria and Lebanon have always been in the mix, so to
speak. There are small factions of Al Qaeda extremists, but for the
most part they have been of little concern with respect to the other
two larger threats. Is there more concern that one of these two
countries will try to follow Iran's current nuclear push?
General Mattis. With Syria currently embroiled in a full-scale
civil war, the regime is focused entirely on its survival and defeating
the insurgency. Syria is a signatory to the treaty on Non-proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and has a declared civilian nuclear research
program, and there are no indications the regime is pursuing a nuclear
program along the lines of the current Iranian ``push.'' As Syrian
state infrastructure and regime control continues to erode in the civil
war, development of a nuclear program inside Syria becomes increasingly
unlikely.
Neither the Government of Lebanon nor any entity within Lebanon
(i.e., Lebanese Hizballah) has the capability or willingness to develop
a nuclear weapons program. Lebanon struggles with its own internal
stability issues, now exacerbated by sectarian spillover from the
Syrian civil war, making nuclear development an implausible scenario.
Mr. Palazzo. What is the U.S. stance with the actions of Israel? I
know we have long since been allies with this very powerful military
presence in the region. They are aggressively advocating against the
Iranian push to nuclear power. If they were to act on the threat on
their own, will our stance be to still support such actions? With that
being said, and the looking to follow through with the ``Shift to the
Pacific,'' will we have enough of a force to redeploy to this area of
operations?
General Mattis. For the first part of this question, ``What is the
U.S. stance with the actions of Israel'' I would defer to the European
Combatant Commander and to the State Department. As for CENTCOM's
ability to defend our interests and partners in the Arabian Gulf,
CENTCOM is working closely with the Joint Staff and the Services to
ensure we retain the necessary capabilities to carry out our
responsibilities as directed by the President.
Mr. Palazzo. With the sequester under way, what in your mind is the
order of priority as far as cuts go and what drives that decision? Is
it current operations or a projection of where the SOF needs to be?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM will achieve all FY13 sequester reductions
by reducing the period of performance on several contracts. This was
the only way to achieve the savings with only 6 months remaining in the
fiscal year without impacting current capability. The Department has
not issued guidance on the sequester implementation for fiscal year
2014 and beyond so we have not been able to fully assess what
capabilities will be impacted. When we do know the impact of sequester
we will strike a balance: we must protect readiness for the operators
in the fight while we consider our future capabilities.
Lastly, but just as important, USSOCOM receives critical support
from the Services and we are already feeling the impact of sequester
with the reduction in flying hours, ISR and CJCS exercises. This will
negatively impact global operations and SOF efforts to build
partnership capacity and current counter terrorism operations.
Mr. Palazzo. A particular interest to me and my district is the
proposed procurement of a piece of real estate in South Mississippi to
facilitate the training of our elite Navy SEALs and (SBU) Small Boat
Units.
a. Do these efforts come to a standstill?
b. What do you need to ensure that your forces have the best
training facilities available to them?
c. How do we expedite this process?
Admiral McRaven. The query about ``procurement of a piece of real
estate in South Mississippi to facilitate the training of our elite
Navy SEALs and (SBU) Small Boat Units'' is referring to the planned
land acquisition adjacent to NASA's Stennis Space Center (SSC) to
support the Navy Special Operations Forces (SOF) Jungle and Riverine
Training Western Maneuver Area (WMA). The WMA land acquisition of 5,200
acres is scheduled to be completed in three phases. Phase One has been
completed with Phase Two and Three programmed for FY15.
a. The WMA land acquisition is on track as planned. Environmental
compliance was covered in a Record of Decision signed by Mr. Wayne
Arny, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (DASN) for Installations
and Facilities, on October 6, 2004. A property value assessment is
underway as required within one year of acquisition. Currently, Phase
Two and Three remain on track and approved for FY15 in our FY2014
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
b. U.S. Special Operations Command has projects planned to ensure
our forces training at SSC have the best training facilities available.
Among the projects is a Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical
Training School (NAVSCIATTS) Applied Instructor Facility to be
constructed in 2015 per the FY2014 FYDP.
While there are training improvements in the works, Naval Special
Warfare Command is investing in an assessment of NSW ranges, training
and support facility shortfalls at SSC and developing a detailed
Military Construction (MILCON) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
investment strategy to mitigate identified gaps. Provided funding is
available under sequestration, this assessment will be complete by the
end of CY2013 to help guide the efficient programming of future year
resources to ensure our forces training at SSC have the best training
facilities available.
c. U.S. Special Operations Command has a structured Strategic
Planning Process that guides the programming and expenditure of
resources to efficiently support the entire Special Operations
enterprise. Expediting the process is not warranted, provided U.S.
Special Operations Command is fully resourced to execute its deliberate
development plans.
Mr. Palazzo. How is the Air Force prioritizing the airlift
capabilities under the constraints of a limited budget. With the Asia-
Pacific shift will we have the lift capabilities here at home for
things such as rapid deployment of National Guard and Reserve assets
should they be needed?
General Fraser. Airlift capabilities are prioritized under the
strategic guidance provided by our National Defense Strategy. As
illustrated in the Mobility Capability Requirements Study-2016 and the
more recent Mobility Capabilities Assessment-2018, our anticipated
airlift capabilities are adequate to satisfy all national strategy
requirements, including the Asia-Pacific shift, as well as domestic
deployment requirements.
Mr. Palazzo. There has been a lot of talk about moving planes from
base to base over the past year under the different changes to the
total force proposal; in some cases there have been exhaustive
arguments made to discredit the moves or argue for why certain planes
should stay at certain bases. I know you have looked at all of those
and weighed those options.
How much of a factor did cost play in that analysis?
In some cases we are talking about new construction, moving
simulators and other major components that is bound to cost millions
upon millions of dollars.
In our current sequestration environment do you believe that we can
afford to move planes and crews that are accomplishing everything that
we ask of them, without cost saving being a top factor?
Under a sequester and with the possibility of another yearlong
continuing resolution is the Air Force still planning on following
through with the FY14 shift of airlift capabilities?
General Fraser. Due to the fiscal constraints mentioned, Air
Mobility Command, as the air component to USTRANSCOM, was forced to
make tough decisions to retire or divest mobility force structure as
part of their initial FY13 Program Objective Memorandum submission to
HQ U.S. Air Force. While I am not involved in the Air Force basing
decisions or budgeting decisions to support aircraft force structure, I
have previewed the results of the FY13 NDAA and determined that airlift
force structure is sufficient to meet Defense Strategy requirements.
The current fiscal environment and looming additional fiscal
pressure will impact future budget decisions. While the Air Force has
agreed to extend the C-130 floor through FY14, any necessary future
intratheater airlift force structure actions for FY15 and beyond will
be announced in conjunction with the FY15 PB.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
Mr. Bridenstine. I am concerned about Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) activities in Yemen. I believe we must have a
comprehensive strategy in Yemen and that we cannot simply kill our way
to success. Do we have a strategy for Yemen that leverages your
interagency partners?
General Mattis. Yes. The CENTCOM strategy in conjunction with other
U.S. Government (USG) agencies is to conduct regional operations,
activities, and actions to achieve regional stability. The success of
this plan depends on our ability to integrate military planning efforts
with those of the broader federal interagency (IA). Essential tasks
inherent to the Yemen Country Plan have been developed in consultation
and coordination with the Interagency Action Group (IAG) liaison
officers (LNO) representing their respective Federal agencies. These
LNOs are assigned or detailed to CENTCOM and serve as the conduit for
continued collaboration and coordinated planning between CENTCOM and
the IA community.
Mr. Bridenstine. From my understanding, the Department of Defense
supports retaining the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) authority
and other military aid programs to Pakistan. It is also my
understanding that PCF depends on the Government of Pakistan allowing
U.S. trainers in the country. Can you provide an update on the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and other military aid programs to
Pakistan?
General Mattis. The PCF and PCCF authorities have been essential in
improving Pakistan's Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Insurgency
(COIN) operations against militant groups. PCF and PCCF are the primary
funding sources for the development and modernization of Pakistan's
combat forces deployed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These units help advance U.S. interests
in Afghanistan and the region by attacking violent extremists and
limiting cross-border attacks. The acquisition of items such as night-
vision devices, radios, and medical equipment has made Pakistan
military operations more effective in targeting these violent
extremists. PCF/PCCF-funded counterinsurgency training has prepared the
Pakistan military and Frontier Scouts for the fight against insurgents
by providing courses in small-unit tactics, intelligence analysis, and
law of armed conflict. As more of the PCF/PCCF-funded major end items
are delivered to Pakistan, Pakistan's military will gain improved
capabilities to conduct close air support, night operations, and
organic intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance operations. Moving
forward, our PCF/PCCF-funded efforts to build Pakistan's CT and COIN
capabilities do not depend on Pakistan permitting U.S. trainers in
country.
Mr. Bridenstine. While much of our attention focuses on Afghanistan
and Iran, we cannot forget our continuing commitments in Iraq,
particularly our military personnel at the Office of Security
Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). What is the future of OSC-I? Does OSC-I have
the authorities it needs for ``train and assist'' missions?
General Mattis. OSC-I currently maintains necessary ``train and
advise'' authorities, but there is a concern that those authorities
will lapse in the next fiscal year. The authorities have allowed OSC-I
to provide the training and advice needed to advance U.S. interests
such as developing the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. We remain mindful
of our enduring commitments in Iraq. OSC-I is an integral component of
the U.S. Mission in Iraq and will continue to advance U.S. interests
for the foreseeable future. OSC-I's Security Assistance and Security
Cooperation activities increase U.S. leverage and access within the
nascent Iraqi government. In the near term, OSC-I is transitioning to a
model that will be uniform to other U.S. Embassies in the Middle East.
We are seeking an extension to the FY13 authorities through FY14 in
order to complete the train and advise functions.
Mr. Bridenstine. While direct-action missions--such as the Bin
Laden raid--often get the headlines, we cannot lose our capability to
conduct ``indirect'' Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. How are
you rebalancing your forces to execute these core SOF activities? Are
there any core SOF activities that could be turned over to Conventional
Forces?
Admiral McRaven. SOF direct action missions do garner the majority
of the headlines, despite the fact that the majority of SOF efforts
fall into the category of ``indirect'' or nonkinetic missions. Over the
past decade, the priority for our country (and thus SOF) shifted to
Southwest Asia. This focus on Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a
conscious decision to accept risk in other Geographic Combatant
Commanders' (GCCs') Areas of Responsibility (AORs) by retasking
previously regionally aligned SOF units to rotations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Simultaneously during this period, GCC requirements for
SOF have actually increased. With drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan,
SOF will be able to meet some of the GCCs' demand for SOF which has
been suppressed for a decade. USSOCOM's deliberate and rigorous
analysis over the past year has identified this demand, and we are
developing a plan with our GCC and Service partners to resource the
demand to the best of our ability, taking into account that the demand
exceeds the supply. This effort, combined with reinvigorated education
and training programs, comprises the core of our ``rebalance''
initiatives.
With regard to conventional forces, their assistance is absolutely
essential for SOF to conduct our core activities. However, SOF should
not divest itself of any of its core missions at this time. SOF units
and operators are unique in many aspects. Size of the unit, rank
structure, and training are some of the primary elements which
differentiate SOF from conventional forces. The required level of
training and maturity allows SOF to deploy to locations where large
conventional units cannot be supported by the host nation, and they
interact with both senior-level U.S. and foreign officials as part of
their daily missions. SOF are uniquely suited to operate in austere
and/or ambiguous environments. In short, they achieve strategic results
with tactical operations. But it is important to reiterate that
conventional forces' high-demand/low-density skills and resources, such
as aviation, logistics, and intelligence greatly improve SOF's
capabilities with only a limited footprint.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
