[Senate Hearing 112-745]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-745
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
112TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN; LTG THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA; HON. FRANK
KENDALL III; HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR.; HON. ERIN C. CONATON; MRS.
JESSICA L. WRIGHT; MRS. KATHARINA G. McFARLAND; MS. HEIDI SHYU; DR.
KATHLEEN H. HICKS; MR. DEREK H. CHOLLET; GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF;
LT.GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, USMC; LTG FRANK J. GRASS, ARNG; AND GEN. JOSEPH
F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC
----------
FEBRUARY 9; MARCH 29; APRIL 26; JULY 19; NOVEMBER 15, 2012
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
112TH CONGRESS
S. Hrg. 112-745
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
112TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN; LTG THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA; HON. FRANK
KENDALL III; HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR.; HON. ERIN C. CONATON; MRS.
JESSICA L. WRIGHT; MRS. KATHARINA G. McFARLAND; MS. HEIDI SHYU; DR.
KATHLEEN H. HICKS; MR. DEREK H. CHOLLET; GEN. MARK A. WELSH III, USAF;
LT.GEN. JOHN F. KELLY, USMC; LTG FRANK J. GRASS, ARNG; AND GEN. JOSEPH
F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC
__________
FEBRUARY 9; MARCH 29; APRIL 26; JULY 19; NOVEMBER 15, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Page
february 9, 2012
Nominations of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, for Reappointment
to the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command; and LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/
Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers............... 1
Statements of:
Locklear, ADM Samuel J., III, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade
of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command........... 4
Bostick, LTG Thomas P., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/Commanding
General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.......................... 4
march 29, 2012
Nominations of Hon. Frank Kendall III to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Hon. James
N. Miller, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
Hon. Erin C. Conaton to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness; Mrs. Jessica L. Wright to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; Mrs. Katharina G.
Mcfarland to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition;
and Ms. Heidi Shyu to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology......................... 111
Statements of:
Hoyer, Hon. Steny H., U.S. Representative from the State of
Maryland....................................................... 116
Reed, Hon. Jack, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island..... 117
Kendall, Hon. Frank, III, to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 120
Miller, Hon. James N., Jr. to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy......................................................... 121
Conaton, Hon. Erin C., to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness........................................ 123
Wright, Mrs. Jessica L., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs................................................ 124
McFarland, Mrs. Katharina G., to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition........................................ 125
Shyu, Ms. Heidi, to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology......................... 126
april 26, 2012
Nominations of Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Mr. Derek H. Chollet to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs........................................................ 319
iii
Statements of:
Hicks, Dr. Kathleen H., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy............................................. 332
Chollet, Mr. Derek H., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs................................. 333
july 19, 2012
Nominations of Gen. Mark A. Welsh III, USAF, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force;
Lt.Gen. John F. Kelly, USMC, to be General and Commander, U.S.
Southern Command; and LTG Frank J. Grass, ARNG, to be General
and Chief, National Guard Bureau............................... 421
Statement of:
Welsh, Gen. Mark A., III, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force............... 426
Kelly, Lt. Gen. John F., USMC, to be General and Commander, U.S.
Southern Command............................................... 427
Grass, LTG Frank J., ARNG, to be General and Chief, National
Guard Bureau................................................... 428
november 15, 2012
Nomination of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander,
International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan.................................................... 573
Statement of:
Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commander, International Security
Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan............ 577
APPENDIX......................................................... 651
NOMINATIONS OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND; AND LTG
THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT
GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Webb, McCaskill, Begich, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain,
Inhofe, Chambliss, Ayotte, Graham, and Vitter.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell,
professional staff member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; and
Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.
Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak,
research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd, Mariah K.
McNamara, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeff Greene,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Maria Mahler-Haug,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to
Senator Begich; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen;
Kathryn Parker, assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon,
assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham; and Joshua
Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
This morning the committee meets to consider military
nominations for two critical and challenging command
assignments.
We welcome Admiral Samuel Locklear, U.S. Navy, who is
nominated to be Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),
and Lieutenant General Tom Bostick, U.S. Army, nominated to be
the Army's Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Thank you both for your many
years of service to our Nation, for your willingness to
continue to serve in these positions of great responsibility.
I would also like to welcome and thank your family members,
some of whom are here this morning. The committee is keenly
aware of the importance of our military families to the overall
success and well-being of our Armed Forces, and we appreciate
greatly their unwavering support and their many sacrifices,
particularly during the course of long military careers. In
this regard and as a tradition of this committee, I invite both
of our witnesses during your opening remarks to introduce the
family members or others who are here with you this morning.
One of the main components of the President's recently
announced defense strategic guidance is to rebalance force
structure and investments toward the Asia-Pacific. The
nomination of Admiral Locklear to be the senior-most U.S.
military commander in the Asia-Pacific region is most timely.
Stability and security in the Asia-Pacific is indeed in the
United States' national interest, and we must maintain and
support a strategy that recognizes and protects that interest
and works with allies and partners to address regional
challenges. These regional challenges include some of the
following:
The abrupt leadership change in North Korea, occasioned by
the recent death of long-time dictator Kim Jong Il, opens new
questions about possible future threats from a regime that has
shown little interest in cooperating with the international
community and little concern for the well-being of its people;
China's continued rise as a regional and global power,
coupled with its pursuit of military technology and capability,
and its increasing propensity for challenging the territorial
and maritime claims of other countries, particularly in the
South China Sea and the East China Sea, has had an unsettling
effect in the region and increased the prospects for
miscalculation; and
Other parts of the region continue to struggle with
transnational violent extremism, insurgent groups, illegal
narcotics, and humanitarian crises.
These challenges, and others, underscore the need for the
United States to remain engaged and active in this vital
region. But as we renew our commitment to the Asia-Pacific, we
must also look for creative and new ways of thinking about U.S.
military presence overseas, particularly in a constrained
budget environment. For example, realignment plans for U.S.
forces in Korea, Okinawa, and Guam rely on the old paradigm of
large, elaborate overseas bases to accommodate permanent force
structure for long periods of time.
While these plans might have fulfilled some specific needs
and purposes when originally designed, it now appears that
regional strategic requirements may be better served by looking
at these realignments in the context of the needs of the
broader Asia-Pacific and by rebalancing the U.S. military
presence throughout the region. Senators McCain, Webb, and I
have advocated for changes to these plans in ways that support
the strategic goals of U.S. military posture and presence
throughout the region while avoiding excessive and
unsustainable costs associated with large and elaborate new
bases.
The current Okinawa-Guam realignment plan is unworkable,
unrealistic, and unaffordable. Our alliance with Japan is
important for many reasons, we need to get this right. The
United States and Japan have recently announced that they are
considering adjustments to the plan. It is important that there
be adjustments and that there be changes that are jointly
agreed upon and jointly announced and that a more viable and
sustainable U.S. presence in Japan and on Guam results.
Admiral, we look forward to learning more about how you
would approach these various challenges and how the U.S.
military can best remain present and active in this important
region during the upcoming period of budget constraints.
Before the committee today also is Lieutenant General
Bostick, a career Army engineer, who has been nominated to be
the Army's next Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of
the Army Corps of Engineers.
Flooding in Louisiana caused by Hurricane Katrina and the
relentless flood waters that poured over the banks of the
Mississippi River last year vividly dramatize the importance of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but these high-profile events
are by no means the only challenges that confront the Army
Corps. The Army's Chief of Engineers and Commanding General is
responsible for both military and civilian programs and the
associated planning, engineering, construction, and maintenance
of a wide range of infrastructure requirements.
The responsibilities also include projects dealing with
navigable waterways, flood control, environmental restoration,
and disaster response. Under its broad national charter, the
Army Corps deals with difficult and important issues in
virtually every State in the union, including my home State of
Michigan, which is inextricably tied to the vast navigable
water systems of the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes shoreline is
the Nation's largest. The system connects manufacturing
facilities, agricultural markets of the Midwest with trading
partners throughout the world and provides the most efficient
means of transportation, which is vital to our economic
competitiveness. Yet, our harbors need dredging. Some are
threatened with closure to commercial shipping or require ships
to lighten their loads in order to enter some of our Great
Lakes ports.
The Army Corps of Engineers for far too long has paid
inadequate attention to the Great Lakes. General, we are
interested in hearing your views on the various challenges
facing the Army Corps and how you would, if confirmed,
prioritize efforts to deal with those challenges. As co-chair
with Senator Kirk of the Great Lakes Task Force, I would be
particularly interested in your thoughts on the Great Lakes
navigation system.
By the way, Senator Kirk is doing well. He had surgery
yesterday, and we are all gratified to hear yesterday afternoon
and this morning that he is in fact recovering very well.
It is against the backdrop of these various challenges,
both foreign and domestic, that we again welcome both of you
here today. We look forward to your testimony.
Senator McCain I know is coming but he is going to be late,
and I think we will wait for his opening remarks when he gets
here.
We are going to call on you, Admiral Locklear, for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ADM SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC
COMMAND
Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, honorable
committee members. Good morning. Thank you for scheduling this
hearing.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank President
Obama and Secretary Panetta for this nomination. I am deeply
honored and humbled, and I do appreciate their confidence that
they have in my ability to lead the outstanding men and women
of PACOM.
I would also like to thank this committee for your enduring
support of our servicemembers and their families. They see it.
They appreciate it as well.
Now, I would not be here today without the love and support
of my family. My wife of 33 years Pam, my two daughters, Jenny
and Jillian, are here with me this morning. It gives me great
pride and pleasure to introduce them to you. Now, these special
women--they embody the strength and the courage of our military
community, and they have been my inspiration to serve with
honor and integrity for almost 4 decades. Jenny and Jill, my
daughters, have blessed Pam and me with three grandsons who are
well on their way to becoming fine citizens of our great Nation
and we hope one day they will carry on our family's tradition
of service and leadership.
If confirmed, I look very much forward to working with the
committee to solve our Nation's security challenges in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Again, thank you for this opportunity and for your support
of our uniformed servicemembers and their families.
Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to take your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral, very much.
General Bostick.
STATEMENT OF LTG THOMAS P. BOSTICK, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS/
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
General Bostick. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
am honored to appear before you today in support of my
nomination as the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. I thank President Obama,
Secretary Panetta, Secretary McHugh, and General Odierno for
the opportunity to continue serving this great Nation.
It has been my privilege to serve our country in uniform
for over 33 years. My wife Renee, who is here today, is a
principal of Randolph Elementary School in Arlington Public
Schools. Renee and I have been married for over 30 years, and
she has managed to support our Army, our communities, her many
different schools, 26 in total, and our family. Our son Joshua,
who has moved with us 14 of our 19 moves, is a student at
Stanford University and could not be here today.
We often say that we enlist the soldier, commission an
officer, but we retain a family. I am here today still serving
because of Renee and Joshua, my extended family, friends, and
our great soldiers and civilians. I deeply appreciate their
love and support. My father was an Army master sergeant, and
Renee's father was a Marine Corps sergeant major. We have been
in the military our entire lives, and we are very proud and
honored to continue serving.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress, the
administration, the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as
other national, State, local government, and nongovernmental
organizations to continue executing the Corps' important
mission of providing vital engineering services in peace and
war to strengthen our Nation's security, energize our economy,
and reduce the risk of disasters. The significant role of the
Corps of Engineers was highlighted again during last year's
flooding throughout the Nation, the enormous work related to
base realignment and closure (BRAC) and the global
repositioning of our Armed Forces, and during the operational
support in Iraq, Afghanistan, and locations around the world.
If confirmed, I will ensure the Corps works closely with
national, State, and local leaders to address the many
challenges ahead. I will focus on maintaining trust in the
Corps of Engineers through consistent and clear communications
with all stakeholders to achieve a common vision, and will
continue developing the professional teams that must
collaborate within and outside the Corps.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a key member of the
Nation's team that must collectively address complex
engineering and changing defense requirements with the precious
resources provided by Congress and the American people.
I embrace the challenges ahead and, if confirmed, look
forward to leading the Corps of Engineers.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. We thank you very much, General. Again, we
are delighted that your and the Admiral's family are with us
here today, except those who could not be with us. We are very
much honored to have them here just as you are honored to have
their presence and how much their support has meant to you
throughout your careers.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
courtesy. I was testifying at another committee meeting.
Let me join you in welcoming Admiral Locklear and General
Bostick and congratulating them on their nominations and in
thanking them for their many years of distinguished service to
our Nation.
Before this week, the last time I saw Admiral Locklear was
in Naples, Italy where he helped to lead the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Libya. Despite the
restrictions placed on him and despite lacking the ability to
employ the full weight of U.S. air power to defend the Libyan
people, I must say that Admiral Locklear excelled in managing
that complex coalition operation which ultimately succeeded in
helping the Libyan people to liberate their country. We owe him
our thanks for that achievement.
If confirmed to be Commander of PACOM, Admiral Locklear,
you will oversee the rebalancing of our defense strategy toward
the Asia-Pacific region. This is the right mission, though talk
of it as a pivot is misguided. For 7 decades, the United States
has maintained a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region
that fosters political and economic liberty. We will continue
to do so and that requires the sustainment of U.S. military
power to secure our vital interests, from the defense of our
treaty allies, to freedom of navigation through international
waters, to the preservation of a regional order that enables
sovereign countries to resolve their differences peacefully
free from intimidation and coercion.
To maintain this commitment, we need a more effective and
sustainable military posture in the region. Our current plans
to realign bases in Japan, Guam, and Korea are all grossly over
budget, and Congress will not pay that bill. This committee led
Congress in putting a pause on the entire enterprise and
included a provision in the recently enacted National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) that requires an independent
assessment and alternative recommendations on how to proceed.
I want to point out that the administration is free to move
forward with a revised force posture, but this committee and
the Pentagon must wait for the findings of our congressionally
mandated independent assessment before authorizing funding for
any regional posture arrangements. It is essential that the
U.S. military maintain its active and stabilizing presence in
the Asia-Pacific region, but we need to get these important
decisions right. Frankly, the Pentagon does not have a good
record on this issue as the costs have escalated from around $6
billion to at least $16 billion.
At the same time, for our prioritization of the Asia-
Pacific region to be meaningful, we must avoid catastrophic
cuts to our defense budget, especially sequestration. It
should, therefore, be of concern to us all that the Navy
remains short of its goal of 313 ships. That goal will be
impeded further by the administration's recently announced plan
to retire seven cruisers earlier than planned, to retire two
major amphibious lift ships needed by the Marine Corps, and to
delay buying one large-deck amphibious ship, one Virginia-class
attack submarine, two littoral combat ships, and eight high-
speed transport vessels. It is well and good to maintain 11
aircraft carriers, but cuts to our naval capabilities such as
these, without a plan to compensate for them, only put our
goals in the Asia-Pacific region at greater risk.
General Bostick comes before this committee with a long
record of distinguished service, 33 years, and carries forward
his family's proud legacy of military service to our country.
General Bostick, if confirmed, you will be responsible for the
performance of 38,000 civilians and soldiers who provide
engineering services to more than 90 countries worldwide. We
look to the Corps of Engineers to provide vital engineering
services in peace and war, to strengthen our security, energize
our economy, and reduce the risks from disasters. In other
words, this is a critical post.
At a time when our Government faces daunting fiscal
challenges, we will have to make tough decisions about
investments in our critical infrastructure. In a prior
Congress, then-Senator Russ Feingold and I repeatedly attempted
to put in place a procedure for the Army Corps to provide to
Congress clear, objective analysis of national priorities for
our water infrastructure projects. Unfortunately, many Members
of Congress would rather maintain the current system of
selecting projects based on seniority and the individual
Member's influence over the committee process. I believe this
earmarking of Army Corps projects puts lives at risk. We must
be informed by the capable expertise and objective analysis of
the Corps of Engineers, and we will continue to work to ensure
these priorities are provided to Congress in order to ensure
that taxpayer funds are spent wisely, efficiently, and
effectively.
I thank and congratulate both of our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Let us try a 7-minute round for questions. We have a lot of
Senators here, and we can have a second round.
Admiral, yesterday's announcement describing negotiations
between the United States and Japan is welcome news because it
demonstrates a willingness to address issues about the level of
our troop presence on Okinawa without conditioning the movement
of marines off of Okinawa to progress on the Futenma
replacement facility. However, the new thinking is not yet
going far enough. For instance, there appears to be no
intention of reconsidering yet the plan to build the Futenma
replacement facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa, nor does there
appear that the Air Force bases in the region are being
considered as part of the solution.
We want to make it clear that the requirements in the
statute that are contained in the fiscal year 2012 defense
authorization bill must still be met before any funds,
including funds provided by the Government of Japan, may be
obligated or expended to implement realignment.
Some of the requirements are the following: submission by
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the
PACOM Commander of his preferred force laydown; a master plan
for the construction of the facilities and infrastructure
necessary to implement the Commandant's preferred force
laydown; a plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies
detailing how the Federal Government will satisfy the off-post
requirements associated with the buildup on Guam; and the
Secretary of Defense submits an independent assessment of the
U.S. force posture in East Asia and the Pacific region as
detailed in our NDAA.
Admiral, first, are you familiar with these requirements,
and if so, will you make sure that those requirements are met
before there is any obligation of funds for those purposes?
Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed the
concerns of the committee, the various communications that have
been presented to the leadership of DOD. I am aware of the
release of the communique that discusses the ongoing
discussions between the Government of Japan and the potential
that may come out of those.
I am prepared to support the leadership of DOD, if I am
confirmed, to give them my best military advice as they go
forward with this process.
Chairman Levin. All right. To the extent that you are not
yet familiar with our statute's requirements, including for
that independent assessment before funds are obligated or
expended to implement the realignment which we discussed, will
you do so and will you abide by them?
Admiral Locklear. I will abide by them.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
As I alluded to in my opening remarks, much of the interest
in China's continued rise as a global power involves its
pursuit of military technology and capability and what that
means in terms of regional stability.
Admiral, give us your assessment, if you would, of the
situation in the South China Sea, particularly with respect to
the competing maritime and territorial claims of the countries
bordering that area?
Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, there
are competing claims in the South China Sea between many
competing interests in that area, in particular between the
Chinese and a number of our allies and our partners in that
region. My impression is that we need to ensure that we move
forward with a security environment that allows those
determinations to be realized through proper rule of law,
proper international law, and that they do that in a
multilateral fashion following the norms of international law
based on the territorial land masses that then relate into
maritime claims.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
Can you tell us whether you support the United States
joining the United Nations (U.N.) Treaty on the Law of the Sea?
Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, I do support the United
States joining the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Chairman Levin. Why is that?
Admiral Locklear. It has been my observation as a naval
officer for many years that as this subject has been debated
that having this tool, us being a member of this important
United Nations initiative, will provide a better framework
globally for us as there are competing interests globally
particularly as economic zones are discussed, as we start
looking at resources that are on the sea bed. It allows us a
better mechanism to be able to have a legal discussion that
prevents us from having miscalculated events. It overall
provides us a framework for better future security.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, let me ask you now about some of the Corps of
Engineers' expenditures and how they are determined.
One of the issues which strikes me as a Great Lakes Senator
is that the maintenance of our Great Lakes navigational system
is funded entirely through the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund,
which is financed through fees which are charged on the value
of shipments that arrive at these federally maintained ports.
In contrast, only a portion of other waterway systems are
maintained through user fees and other systems get general fund
contributions.
Will you, first of all, explain to us why it is that we
have fees supporting our harbors in the Great Lakes but other
activities are supplemented by general funds for other harbors
and other waterway systems? Why is that the case, if you know?
General Bostick. Mr. Chairman, I do not have the history on
why the funds were set up in that fashion. I do know that the
Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund contains about $6 billion and
collects about $1.5 billion each year, and the Corps of
Engineers plans about $750 million of construction and
maintenance using those funds annually.
We have a lot of work to do, and if confirmed, I am
committed to working with the Corps, Congress, and the
administration to ensure we do the best with the monies that we
are provided.
Chairman Levin. Just to follow up on that question, we feel
that we have been short-changed in the Great Lakes for a long
time even though we have the longest shoreline of any of the
areas of our country. Will you review, when you are confirmed,
the benefits of various navigational systems, including the
Great Lakes, compared to the budget which is allocated to those
systems and tell us whether or not in your judgment, after you
are confirmed, there is a fair relationship between the
benefits that are received by those various systems or
allocated to those various systems and how those benefits
compare to the financial expenditures which the Corps makes?
Will you make that assessment after you are confirmed?
General Bostick. Mr. Chairman, you have my commitment that
I will make that assessment. I will visit the Great Lakes and I
will make sure that I understand how the performance-based
budgeting priorities are set by the Corps and how that takes
into consideration both the large systems such as the
Mississippi and the smaller systems. In the Great Lakes, it is
not a complete system in terms of how it is considered. I will
take a look at that, if confirmed.
Chairman Levin. We thank you very much, General.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I thank the witnesses.
Admiral, the plans the administration has announced to
retire seven cruisers earlier than planned, retire two major
amphibious lift ships, delay buying one large-deck amphibious
ship, one Virginia-class attack submarine, two littoral combat
ships, and eight high-speed transport vessels--does this
increase our risks in the Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, I would say that any number of
ships less than what we state is the requirement does require
combatant commanders and, if confirmed, will require me to
manage those risks. It is always difficult, particularly from a
Navy perspective, for us to see those type of decisions that
have been made and will ultimately be made in budget decisions.
But we will have to manage with the resources that the American
people give us, that you authorize us. If I am confirmed, I
will have to be frank with you about the decisions that are
made because of the resources available and the risk that
requires me to assume.
Senator McCain. We will look forward to that because I
understand flexibility and I understand a lot of the arguments
the administration is making, but as you well know, presence is
something that can only be achieved by numbers. The goal of 313
ships is obviously not going to be met.
I just want to repeat what the chairman said. We have
looked at this issue of Okinawa and Guam and the basing issue.
Senator Webb has been heavily involved in it. We did come to
the conclusion that we needed an outside look at it, and we did
not come to that conclusion just because it was an idea we had.
We came to that conclusion because we have seen the costs go up
from $6 billion to $16 billion or more, and there was not a
coherent plan. We continue to get visits from Japanese members
of the Diet saying, ``what are we going to do?'' We really
believed that an outside look was important. It will not take a
long period of time. But I would like for you to participate in
helping conduct that study and provide the assessment team that
they need. Can I have that commitment from you, Admiral?
Admiral Locklear. You have my commitment, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
General, the omnibus appropriations bill for fiscal year
2012 included a slush fund totaling $507 million for the Corps
to spend on various construction, maintenance, and other
projects that were not included in the President's budget. The
funds were financed by reducing money for projects included in
the President's budget request and adding $375 million to the
Army Corps of Engineers' budget. The funds added by the
appropriators were not a part of the text of the omnibus bill
but were listed in a joint report that accompanies the spending
bill, which is the new way for Congress to circumvent the
earmark moratorium. As such, they should not have the force of
law.
Despite a crushing budget deficit and significant
reductions to Government spending, including over $20 billion
less for DOD, the appropriators actually added more to the
Corps budget than the administration had requested.
I note in your written answers to questions posed by the
committee that you recognize in a constrained Federal budget
that, ``with an aging population, therefore more entitlement
spending, we can expect less to be available for discretionary
programs. The Corps will have to prioritize projects and
programs with rigorous analysis to ensure the greatest value
for taxpayer funds.''
If confirmed, will you spend these excess funds that were
not requested by the President, General?
General Bostick. Senator, the Corps executes projects that
are authorized and appropriated by Congress. We do not make a
decision in terms of whether we expend those funds or not, but
if authorized and appropriated by Congress, then we will
execute the mission to the greatest degree possible.
Senator McCain. So you believe that the joint report that
accompanies a spending bill has the force of law?
General Bostick. Sir, I have not been privy to the joint
report. If confirmed, I am willing to go back and take a look
at that in detail. What I can say is we would execute what is
authorized and appropriated by Congress.
Senator McCain. General, I am going to need your assessment
on that before I move that the committee move forward with your
nomination. I think it is outrageous that the appropriators
should put into a ``joint report'' earmarked projects that are
not authorized or requested. I am going to have to know your
view as to whether you are required to spend those funds or
not. I hope that you will provide us an answer to that question
as soon as possible. Okay?
General Bostick. Senator, I will.
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Senator McCain. Admiral, how concerned are you about the
fact that we may have a serious North Korean provocation or
miscalculation this year?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, I am very much concerned about
the stability of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It is
in our best interests to ensure that we maintain a strong
deterrent there. I have not had discussions with General
Thurman yet, but if confirmed, I will, to get his immediate
assessment.
But we have had a transition of leadership there. Day by
day, so far, so good. It is yet to be determined how this will
play out in the mid- to long-term.
There has been a shift over the last couple of decades in
my observation of the North Koreans' ability in the military
area. We have seen them through some provocation activity over
the last several years using more asymmetric tactics such as
small submarines, and certainly their proliferation of delivery
vehicles for short-, medium-, and eventually longer-range
ballistic missiles is a great concern.
I am very much concerned and we should certainly stay
vigilant, and if confirmed, I will assure you it will be one of
my highest priorities.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. General, relative to the question which
Senator McCain has very properly asked you about whether you
are required to spend certain funds, you may submit a legal
opinion on that question, if you so desire. I just talked to
Senator McCain as to whether that would be satisfactory and he
indicated it would be. If that is a legal question, you may
submit a legal opinion rather than your own personal opinion.
We do need an answer to that question. Thank you.
General Bostick. Mr. Chairman, I will do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Locklear, General Bostick, thanks very much for
your extraordinary service to our country. I think the
President has acted wisely in nominating both of you and I look
forward to supporting your nominations.
Admiral Locklear, we are naturally focused, as we have been
for quite a while, on the alignment of forces in Okinawa. But I
want to state my own opinion and ask you for your reaction.
Regardless of what developments occur regarding the alignment
of our forces, it is essential that all parties in the region
and particularly the people of Japan know that America's
commitment to their security is strong and unbreakable. Do you
agree with that?
Admiral Locklear. Absolutely, sir. Our alliance with Japan
is the cornerstone of our strategy in the Pacific, of our
friendships, of our future in the Pacific, and if I am
confirmed, it will remain a priority and remain the
cornerstone.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you for that answer. I agree with
you. This is another classic case of how you sometimes run the
risk of taking your best friends for granted when things are
happening elsewhere or you are making new friends. But in fact,
over the last decade, the United States and Japan have reached
a number of very significant agreements to develop our
bilateral security relationship and to share missions and
capabilities within the alliance, including areas such as air
and missile defense.
I wonder if you would take just a moment to give your
opinion on the importance of those agreements as you assume
command of PACOM?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. Those agreements are very
important. I am quite proud of the relationship we have with
Japan particularly in relation to the exposure I have had to
the area of ballistic missile defense developments and their
participation, their partnership that will allow us to more
rapidly move into the future with capabilities that are
critical not only to this region but globally.
Senator Lieberman. Let me move briefly to the South China
Sea, which you have already been asked about and also the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea. I wanted specifically to ask
you, because you have said you support ratification of the
convention, to relate the convention to the competing claims
that are now being made for various rights on and under the
South China Sea.
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. In general, my understanding is
that we as a Nation, we as a military, we conform to the basic
premises that are inside the Law of the Sea today. However,
because we have not ratified it, when we approach a region such
as the South China Sea, which has the potential for
miscalculation, if the responsible parties here do not go
through the normal rule of law to solve these kind of
frictions, that if we are not a signatory, to some degree it
lessens our credibility as we try to help them work through
this. This is not only in the South China Sea but I think it
will become increasingly important globally as people look for
resources and competing claims in oceans around the world.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I appreciate that answer.
I want to talk for a moment about the so-called ``pivot''
to the Asia-Pacific, which is a term I do not like because it
suggests we have not been in the Asia-Pacific and we are going
to turn our back presumably on the Middle East where we have
been. We cannot turn our back on either. Of course, we have
been in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the World War II, and
the security that we have provided has, in my opinion, been the
foundation or the underpinning of the extraordinary economic
growth that has occurred there and, in some sense, the
development of nations that we now focus on as we think about
the security relationship or arrangements there.
This gets specifically to China. I wanted to invite you to
talk about your opinion about what is the current status of our
relationship with China and where do you hope to bring it in
your time at PACOM? In other words, is China a hostile power to
us? Is it a competitor? Is it a partner? What is it and what do
you hope it will be?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, Senator. First, I fully agree that
since World War II, our security posture in that part of the
world has underpinned much of the progress that has been made
not only in the military area but in all areas of progress with
our allies, our partners, and in some ways, China.
Today I would say that our partnership with China, which we
should have a partnership--and we do in many, many areas, not
just militarily--I would categorize as cooperative but
competitive. We are an Asian power. We are a Pacific power. We
are a global power. We have interest in that part of the world.
I believe that the Chinese and other people in that part of the
world need to recognize that we do have U.S. national interests
there and we have the interests of strong allies there. I would
call it cooperative but competitive.
In the area of military-to-military, which I think is
important that we continue to pursue productive military-to-
military relationships between our military and the Chinese
military. That is so we can gain greater clarity and greater
transparency as the world evolves, as the region evolves. If I
am confirmed, it will be my plan to, in every way possible,
improve our military-to-military relationships with a
recognition that there are things we will not agree on. That
greater transparency is for the good of all of us to avoid
miscalculation. But in the end, the objective is a secure,
stable environment that allows our allies, our partners, and
China, which should be a partner, to have the best security
environment to allow us to grow economically, socially together
into a better world.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks again for that answer.
Incidentally, when I talk about the American security
presence in the Asia-Pacific region underpinning the economic
growth that has occurred there in the last several decades, it
is important to state also that we have benefitted tremendously
from that economic growth. Do not hold me to it, but I believe
I saw a number just recently that said that $1.2 trillion of
American commerce travels through the South China Sea every
year. So you get some sense of the benefit here and the
extraordinary impact it has on our economy and on jobs here as
well.
My time is up. I thank you very much, and I look forward to
working with both of you in the time ahead.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me thank both of you for the personal
time you gave me, and we had a chance to go over almost
everything that I would ask you today except for one thing,
which I will get to in just a moment.
General Bostick, the Army Corps has done a pretty good job
on the 404 permits under the Clean Water Act. I would ask you
if you would continue to try to expedite those permits as well
as you can.
General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, I will certainly
look at the permits that are associated with the Clean Water
Act and ensure that the Corps works as effectively and
efficiently as possible.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
Also, Senator Levin talked about the Great Lakes and we
have talked about all these waterways. Will you not forget the
Nation's most inland waterway that goes into Oklahoma, the
Kerr-McClellan waterway?
General Bostick. Senator, as we have discussed, once
confirmed, I will make a trip out there and make sure that I
understand the issues surrounding that particular project.
Senator Inhofe. I would appreciate that. I am not asking
for that commitment, but I would like to have you become
familiar with that.
Right now we are considering the reauthorization of the
highway bill. It comes from part of that. At least the highway
title comes in my committee where I am the ranking member
[Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works]. But we also
have jurisdiction over the Water Resources Development Act
(WRDA). Do you have any idea when we might get something from
the administration on a WRDA bill?
General Bostick. Senator, I do not have any knowledge of
when a WRDA bill might come out.
Senator Inhofe. We can talk about that later.
Now, Admiral Locklear, I enjoyed very much meeting your
beautiful wife and 2 beautiful daughters, and if you guys are
going to reach my number of 20 grandchildren, you are going to
have to get very busy, as we discussed.
First of all, I understand the way this goes. You were
nominated by the President. You are going to have to assume the
President, who is the Commander in Chief--his line. This always
happens. It has happened ever since I have been on here. I do
not know where you really are personally and I do not want to
know. I do not want you to answer.
But as far as the Law of the Sea Treaty is concerned, there
are a lot of us against it. I have been fighting that since the
Reagan administration. It has not really changed any. To have
the United Nations pay an international body, which sometimes
they deny it, but it is the United Nations, gets royalties from
offshore drilling, a body that we would have 1 vote out of 160
and distribute funds as it sees fit to the Nations it chooses.
I often wonder whatever happened to sovereignty. I can tell you
right now the idea of handing over our offshore technology to
other countries, any country who wants it, I think is
unreasonable. There is going to be opposition to that.
Now, having said that, let me get to a friendlier issue
here.
I remember so well back in 1998--that was during the
Clinton administration--when they were talking about the
capability, at that time, of North Korea in terms of when they
would have something that would be a threat to the United
States. I remember at that time General Shelton was in charge,
and I wrote a letter to President Clinton and to General
Shelton. How long would it be until the North Koreans have the
capability of a multiple stage rocket that they would be able
to use against the United States? The answer at that time was--
we had two letters. One said 3 years; the other said 5 years.
Seven days later on August 31, 1998, they fired one. It was a
three-stage rocket. Only two of them worked, but nonetheless,
that happened.
I could take a long time and talk about how we have guessed
it wrong with them over a long period of time.
How confident are you in the intelligence that we are
getting right now, considering that all of a sudden there is a
wake-up call and the American people realize there is a threat
out there? How confident are you with our intel into North
Korea in terms of their capabilities?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, again, I will consult, if I am
confirmed, with General Thurman about this important issue. I
believe I understand that he has and his predecessors have said
for some time that there is a need for more intelligence and
surveillance assets to be able to understand and to shape what
may be the future on that critical part of the Asia-Pacific.
As far as the Intelligence Community, my sense is that we
have a better understanding than we probably did in 1998 of
their emerging capabilities. But it is a very closed society
and it is one that we need to work very carefully with, and I
will do that, if I am confirmed, with all of the intelligence
agencies that can bring capabilities to bear to help me
understand so that I can help you understand where the
shortfalls are.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Let us stay on top of that one.
In the last minute and a half of my time here, I would like
to renew, as I always do at these confirmation hearings, my
four favorite programs, and we would like to get your opinion.
Actually five. That would be the 1206, 1207, 1208 programs,
train and equip, the State Partnership Program (SPP). More
important than the rest of them or as important is the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
Would you comment on each of those five programs relative to
your support for those programs?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. The ones that were related,
1206, 1207, 1208, and IMET, I fully support. I know that from
my introduction thus far into what is happening in PACOM today,
1206 is a critical aspect of our ability to help train and
prepare our allies and partners for the counterterrorism
operations which are critical to not only their security, but
our security.
I can tell you that from the job I am in now in Europe and
Africa where I spend a lot of time visiting our U.S.
ambassadors, the IMET program is essential from their
perspective. It has been over my experience one of the most
powerful tools where it allows us to bring officers and other
leaders from these other countries into our training systems
and to socialize with them and to bring them into our value
system and have them understand how we operate. Critical to the
future and I believe, for the amount of money, a great return
on investment.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I do too. In your current position
where you have the naval operations over U.S. Africa Command,
certainly those countries down there--I am glad we are beyond
the point where we thought we were doing a favor to these
countries out there who are participating in this program. In
fact, they are doing us a favor because I think we need to get
into the record and understand--and I am sure you agree--that
if we do not develop those relationships that are enduring
through the IMET program, China will do it. Other countries
will do it. I think it has been very successful not just in
Africa. I am the ranking member on the East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I
am concerned about continuing that program in your new
assignment.
I look forward to supporting both of your nominations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha to the two outstanding leaders we have before us
today and also to your families.
First, I would like to thank you each for your many years
of dedicated service to our country and what you have done
already with our country.
Admiral Locklear, it was nice meeting with you earlier this
week, and I appreciated hearing your thoughts on the tremendous
responsibilities you will assume, should you be confirmed as
the next PACOM commander. You have shown outstanding leadership
throughout your career, including significant time in the
Pacific theater. I would like to congratulate you, your wife,
and your family because your family does support you, and
welcome also Pam and Jenny and Jillian to our hearing today.
I also want to welcome General Bostick. As a former member
of the Corps, I appreciate the efforts of the men and women who
serve in this very important organization. Of course, I want to
welcome your wife Renee and aloha to your son Joshua as well.
Admiral Locklear, piracy is one of the problems out there.
With the President's new strategy, the Navy will be deploying
four ships to Singapore, I understand. The Strait of Malacca is
one of the world's most important shipping lanes, accounting
for a third of the world's trade and half of the petroleum
imports of Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and China. The strait is also
one of the world's most dangerous maritime chokepoints and a
hot spot for transnational crime.
My question to you, Admiral, is how do you see our forces
working to secure this critical region?
Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Senator. I have transited the
Straits of Malacca on Navy ships many times in my career, and
your assessment is exactly right. It can be an exciting
transit. It is a critical chokepoint and it can be highly
vulnerable to such things as piracy.
We have seen, obviously, over the past number of years the
impact that piracy can have in many areas of the world and that
it is not just located off the Horn of Africa. It is actually
spreading north and have seen it spread north into the Indian
Ocean. We have seen some instances of it in the South China
Sea.
If you take a look at the rebalancing strategy, I believe
that it starts to help us address this in a better way. First
of all, it starts to recognize that we do have security
interests that are not just in the north of Asia and that we
have to be aware of. It allows us to partner with our allies
and our partners in that region to be able to better coordinate
together to give us better maritime domain awareness.
You alluded to the possibility of putting some U.S. ships
in and out of Changi in Singapore. Singapore is a tremendous
partner with the United States and has worked very closely with
us--as has other of our countries and allies in that region to
be able to provide us collectively the ability to have a better
maritime lane awareness and a better response capability for
anti-piracy activities. I hope to see that continue and to grow
as we move forward with a rebalancing strategy.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Bostick, there is a critical need in Hawaii and the
U.S. Pacific territories for public infrastructure to support
the waterborne commerce these islands rely upon to protect
vulnerable coastal communities and to preserve unique
environmental resources. Therefore, I am concerned by the
Honolulu district's challenges in competing for Army Corps
construction funds. Under current Army Corps policy, projects
are favored that support large population bases and are not
subject to the high construction costs.
If confirmed, would you be willing to look into this issue
and possibly identify a more equitable policy which addresses
the needs of these insular areas?
General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, you have my
commitment to look at that. As I understand the Corps' process
in setting priorities, it is performance-based, and performance
is based on a number of things. They have nine different
business lines, including navigation, coastal restoration, risk
management, and other areas. I will look into that with the
Corps. I will discuss it with the Honolulu district and ensure
that all that we do is fair and equitable and done in a cost
efficient and effective manner.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Admiral Locklear, the U.S. relationships with Japan and
South Korea help to form the basis for regional stability in
the Asia-Pacific region. I know that you have touched on it in
response to Senator Lieberman, but should you be confirmed,
what would you like to accomplish with respect to these key
allies?
Admiral Locklear. First of all, if I am confirmed, I would
like for them to understand that I realize the importance of
our alliance and the criticality of our partnerships in that
alliance and the importance of it to the security of the Asia-
Pacific region.
Second of all, I would like to make sure that as we look at
this rebalancing strategy that I can properly articulate what
we are doing, how we are doing it, and the benefits of it as it
relates to our alliances with those two critical allies.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, thank you, General, for your service
and all that you do for us.
Admiral Locklear, I wanted to ask what is your assessment
of the Virginia-class submarine program, how has this Virginia-
class submarine performed, and also what sort of capability
will the littoral combat ship provide you as PACOM Commander,
and how important are both capabilities to our national
security interests in the Asia-Pacific and around the world?
Admiral Locklear. Thank you, Senator.
The Virginia-class submarine is the backbone of our attack
submarine force today. It provides us worldwide coverage in
covert ways. It is a critical element of any combatant
commander's higher-end campaigns or campaign planning, whatever
that might be. I think it has performed well and we should all
be very proud of the crews and the men and, at some point in
time, the women who will serve in those submarines.
The littoral combat ship is just now coming on-line, and
that ship will bring to the combatant commander and, if
confirmed, hopefully to the PACOM Commander a high-speed, very
versatile ship that has minimum draft, which means we can get
into more shallow areas, more littoral areas, with
reconfigurable mission bays that allow us to more quickly
address a variety of mission sets than perhaps other ships that
we have built over the decades. It is an important aspect, and
I think that they are particularly well suited to the littoral
areas particularly around the straits and in the South China
Sea area.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you so much for your assessment of
the Virginia-class submarine and littoral combat ships.
I share your assessment of those ships and appreciate your
sharing that with us.
DOD has repeatedly said that strategy is driving the budget
guidance and not just a pure numbers exercise because we have
seen in the past where we just do a pure numbers exercise and
we are not driven by strategy. We really put our national
security at stake when we do that. I hope that is the case this
time, but I am concerned about what I see as a mismatch between
our stated national security objectives and a portion of the
Pentagon budget proposal.
You talked about the importance of, for example, the
Virginia-class submarine as a backbone and a critical element
to our national security, and also the importance of the
littoral combat ship. You also described the importance of this
in the Future Year Defense Plan.
I would ask you why would the Navy postpone the acquisition
of one Virginia-class submarine given the importance of it,
particularly with our focus on the Asia-Pacific? Also why would
the Navy reduce the purchase of two littoral combat ships? What
is the strategic rationale for these reductions?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, in my current position, I have
not been part of the budget deliberations, and I cannot tell
you that I know exactly what is in the President's budget as it
will be delivered.
But in my previous roles, I have done programming for the
Navy and strategy development for the Navy, and we always start
with a strategy-based approach, which is the right thing to do
to see what it is that we would all like to have. Then we
recognize pragmatically that the American people will only be
able to afford so much. Then there are decisions made that
force us to have to manage risk. If I am confirmed, I will
assure you that I will identify to you where I think, when
those decisions are made, that I have identified where the
risks are unacceptable for me.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Admiral. I obviously hope that
we are not taking on additional risk as a result of these
decisions in terms of our national security, and I hope when
you get in the position--and I do expect you to be confirmed
and appreciate your wonderful credentials and service--that you
will consult back with us and provide me with a more detailed
answer on how you think the reduction in the production of the
Virginia-class submarine or postponement of it and the littoral
combat ships affects our national security and what your
assessment is of the risk of this portion of the Pentagon
budget. I hope you could circle back with me on that.
Admiral Locklear. If I am confirmed, I will, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate
that.
Admiral, I certainly was pleased to see in your responses
in the advance policy questions your testimony about the Joint
Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Accounting Command
(JPAC). This is, obviously, a very important issue. I recently
had the opportunity to meet with Major General Stephen Tom, the
Commander of JPAC, in January. The recovery operations in North
Korea are set to resume later this year, and I applaud that
development. Most Korean War veterans and their spouses are now
in their 80s, and the Veterans Administration has said that
close to 1,000 Korean War veterans who served during the
conflict, unfortunately, leave us every day. We cannot wait any
longer to resume this critical work.
JPAC is identifying and recovering the remains of 80 to 90
Americans per year. In the 2010 NDAA, it requires the Secretary
of Defense to ensure sufficient resources are allotted to
increase the recovery rate to 200 a year. I appreciate that
there are many factors that will go into determining how to
reach the goal of 200 recoveries a year. Will you commit to
fully supporting the work of the Joint POW/MIA Accountability
Command and doing all you can to ensure that we can meet that
goal and, obviously, supporting General Tom in his efforts?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, if I am confirmed, I fully
commit to supporting that critical program.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. Thank you very much. I see that
my time is up.
I also wanted to just say to General Bostick--in Hanover,
New Hampshire, we have the Cold Regions Research and
Engineering Lab. The New England district and the Cold Regions
Research Engineering Lab have done great work. Please let me
know, as you go forward, what I can do to support their
excellent efforts and your efforts in that regard. Thank you,
General.
General Bostick. If confirmed, I will. That is a positive
movement for the Corps.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly do not want to diminish PACOM in any way, but
we have a lot of floods in Missouri. So I hope you will forgive
me, Admiral, if I direct my questions during this time to
General Bostick because his job is very important to thousands
of Missouri families that live along our greatest rivers in
this country.
Let me start, General Bostick, about the Missouri River
Recovery Program currently in the budget. Let me just start
with this question, do you agree that the number one priority
for the Army Corps of Engineers is flood management?
General Bostick. Senator, I would say the number one
priority is the protection of life and some of that will be in
flood management. Some of it will be in other areas. But
protection of life, safety, and risk management are the number
one priority.
Senator McCaskill. I am not aware of where there is a
significant risk to life in terms of the Army Corps'
responsibilities aside from flooding, which is obviously very
important to my State and all of the people who live along the
Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. Obviously, protection of
property comes in behind protection of life.
Maybe this is something you can explain, and if you cannot
today, I will look forward to a follow-up. Right now in the
Missouri River Recovery Program budget, there is $5 million for
flood management and north of $70 million for habitat. That
disparity in terms of the priorities of the Army Corps is like
fingernails on a blackboard to most Missouri families,
particularly those who live and have land along our great
rivers. I would like you to comment on that and if you believe
that is an appropriate disparity between flood management and
habitat or whether you think that is out of whack because I
guarantee you that is what most of the folks I work for think.
General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, I would have to
follow up with you on the details of the flood management and
how that varies with the habitat.
What I will say is that the Corps has done extensive
studies into what happened this last year with the floods,
particularly along the Missouri River. There was a lot of
damage that was done, and Congress appropriated $1.7 billion in
the supplemental. I do not know how much of that will break
down in terms of repairing the systems on the Missouri, but I
know that the Corps is committed to repairing those as quickly
as possible. If confirmed, I will look into the specifics of
the issue that you brought up here today.
Senator McCaskill. I am confident that you will be
confirmed, and I will look forward to some time with you to
talk about that discrepancy. I can assure you that the members
of the Missouri delegation that represent our State here, along
with the other Senators along the Missouri River--and by the
way, the interesting thing along the Missouri River--I do not
know what it is about the water of the Missouri, but almost
every State in the Missouri River basin has one Republican and
one Democrat representing them in the U.S. Senate. It is a very
bipartisan group, this Missouri River Working Group, that
Senator Blunt and I, along with Senator Conrad and Hoeven, have
gotten started. Now, rather than working north versus south,
which as you may know, the historic fight has been recreation
and irrigation up north versus navigation down south. We are
now singing Kumbaya. We have joined hands and are united for
flood control. I think you will hit a real brick wall if there
continues to be that kind of discrepancy in terms of the
priority of funding going forward.
The Birds Point levee was blown. Now we have switched over
to the Mississippi River. It was very controversial. All of us
opposed the blowing of Birds Point. It was at 62.5 feet before
it was blown. So far, the Army Corps has only rebuilt it to 55
feet. I need a commitment from you today, General, or as soon
as you can give it to me, if you are not comfortable giving it
today, that it will get rebuilt to 62 feet.
General Bostick. Senator, if confirmed, you have my
commitment that I will work with the Corps of Engineers and
ensure that they work as quickly as possible using the funds
appropriated by Congress to do the repairs that are necessary.
Senator McCaskill. That is a great answer except it was not
the answer I was looking for. I need to know from you--and I
need to know before my vote on you--whether or not you will
make the commitment that what the Army Corps blew up they will
put back to the way it was before they blew it up. That will be
one I will not be able to wait until your confirmation on. I
need to know before your confirmation your feelings about that
levee being built back up to the place it was before the Army
Corps decided to blow it. That will be important to me, just so
you know.
[The information referred to follows:]
Please see the attached documents.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator McCaskill. Finally, I want to briefly talk with
you, General. There seems to be a sense that if we are not
earmarking in the U.S. Senate, the Army Corps will be ill-
equipped to address the priorities of flood control and
management along all of our great waterways in this country.
Let us assume for purposes of this discussion--let me give you
a hypothetical.
If individual Members of Congress were not injecting their
priorities within the priorities that the engineers had
determined were the best cost-benefit analysis for all of the
uses of the rivers and the most important in terms of
protection of property and protection of life, would the Army
Corps be able to prioritize the funds given to them in a way
that would address the most urgent needs of our waterways as
opposed to who sits on the Appropriations Committee deciding
that their State deserved more just because they were senior
ranking member or the chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy
and Water Department?
General Bostick. Senator, in my view, the Corps works for
the American people who express their views through Congress.
The Corps works for the National Command Authority, the
Secretary of Defense, and the President. The Corps has to do
that work for those two bodies under the laws that are written.
While doing so, the Corps can prioritize projects through
performance-based analysis, but I think each one of those
bodies and our law have responsibilities to ensure that when
those priorities are set by the Corps of Engineers, they fit
within the expressed desires of the people through Congress and
the National Command Authority.
Senator McCaskill. Since you all make priorities based on
performance-based measurement, on engineering studies, on
safety and flood control and you have those priorities, would
you not agree, General, that just because a Member happens to
be the senior on a subcommittee of appropriations does not mean
that their priority should substitute for a performance
evaluation throughout the whole country?
General Bostick. Senator, as I had stated earlier, the
Corps can only execute what is authorized and appropriated by
Congress. Determining which Member and whether they are senior
or not--that is really not what the Corps is responsible to
make decisions on. At this point, I cannot make a personal
decision one way or the other on your question. But I can say
that the Corps will execute what Congress authorizes and
appropriates.
Senator McCaskill. I think this is a delicate problem you
face and I put you on the spot here and I apologize. I have
done it more than once in these questions. I know that I have.
I will continue to follow up with you.
Just when I examine the water budgets that have been done
around this place--my State has a lot of water. We have the two
mightiest rivers and the confluence of those rivers. The
management of those rivers is very important. It is as
important as rural airports are to my friend from Alaska. But
if our State is not fortunate enough to have a member on the
right appropriations committee, then frankly we get to the back
of the bus, not based on merit, not based on need, but just
based on who is on what committee and how long they have been
here and what party they belong to. It seems to me a very
backwards way to prioritize the resources of managing our
rivers in this country, and I wanted to make that point while I
had the chance.
Thank you both very much for your service, and thank you
for your patience, General Bostick, and my very pointed
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. General Bostick, are you sure you want this
job? [Laughter.]
General Bostick. Senator, I am sure.
Senator Graham. What Senator McCaskill is saying has a lot
of truth to it, that we need to spend taxpayer dollars wisely
with some kind of plan. But I have been here for about an hour
and you have been asked about 35 specific things that people
would like you to do before you get confirmed, which makes me
believe that we seem to know our States better than maybe other
people do because I do not know about this thing you blew up.
She wants you to build it back. I assume she knows what she is
talking about, and I would support it. Is that an earmark to
rebuild something you blew up?
Senator McCaskill. No. To fix what was blown up by them is
not an earmark especially when they made a commitment to do so
when they blew it up.
Senator Graham. All right. The point is that we are trying
to fix an old problem with a new way of doing business, and I
just feel for you.
The Panama Canal is going to be widened in 2014. Is that
correct, General Bostick?
General Bostick. Sir, I understand that it will be widened
in 2014.
Senator Graham. The ships on the sea today are going to be
replaced by ships almost three times their size. Is that
correct?
General Bostick. I understand that to be true, Senator.
Senator Graham. So if you widen the Panama Canal and these
super cargo ships can come directly to the east coast, that
means we have to look at our infrastructure on the east coast
anew. Is that correct?
General Bostick. Senator, I would say we have to look at
our infrastructure across the country.
Senator Graham. Do we have a plan to deal with the widening
of the Panama Canal and how it would affect infrastructure in
the Nation to make sure we can export our products to the
market? Is there a national vision to deal with the changes in
shipping? Is there an administration plan or congressional plan
that you know of?
General Bostick. Sir, I cannot answer whether there is or
is not a plan.
Senator Graham. I can tell you there is not, and that
reflects badly on us all.
To my colleagues, shipping as we know it is about to
change. Earmarking is a very parochial endeavor that does not
allow you to look beyond your local interest. But if you just
withdraw from the game and your port like Charleston gets no
money in the budget and you think it should be considered based
on a merit-based system, what do you do?
I would just say you have been beat up a lot, but I am
going to beat up myself and my colleagues. We have absolutely
no vision as a Nation as to how to deal with the change in
shipping, and that is just one infrastructure change.
I would suggest that we all sit down with this
administration and come up with a game plan and say what does
it mean if the ships are going to be three times the size they
are today coming through the Panama Canal. What does it mean to
the Mississippi River? Do you have to widen the Mississippi
River because you are going to have more barge traffic? Can
every port on the east coast go to 50 feet, which is the
minimum requirement to service these ships 24/7? If every port
cannot, who says no? If you are not lucky enough to get in the
President's budget, what are you supposed to do? Go home to
your people and say sorry, we just lost, cannot help you. I
just do not think these are good responses to real problems.
The Great Lakes. If it is the largest shoreline in the
Nation, how do you deal with the largest shoreline in the
Nation? How does it fit into the change in export opportunity?
The President says he wants to double exports in the next 5
years. Count me in. How the hell do you get your products to
the market? What do you do when shipping changes? Does it
affect transportation? Does it mean you have to have more roads
for trucks?
There is no vision in this country, and I pledge to you,
General Bostick, not just to complain but to sit down and work
with you to come up with a merit-based system that would allow
Congress and the administration in a collaborative fashion to
get ahead of what is going to be a major change in our economy.
Rather than just talking about how bad earmarks are and how
dirty Congress is, I want to do a little more than that. I want
to actually bring a solution.
If you do not like earmarking and you think it is
corrupting--and there is a case to be made--what have you done
to fix it? What have you done to solve the problem of a world
changing and America being left behind?
Have you ever been to the Shanghai port, General Bostick?
General Bostick. Senator, I have not.
Senator Graham. You need to go and visit our ports and see
the difference.
So I enjoyed talking to you. [Laughter.]
To be continued.
Now, the Charleston port--you are familiar with that.
Right?
General Bostick. Senator, I am.
Senator Graham. They tell me it is going to take until 2024
to get the harbor deepened to accept these new cargo ships if
funding stays the same. Is that okay with you?
General Bostick. Senator, I have not seen the plan, but it
seems like an awfully long time.
Senator Graham. You know why I think it is an awfully long
time to go from 45 to 50 feet? It is three times longer than it
took to build the Panama Canal itself. We built the Panama
Canal shorter than it would take us to go from 45 to 50 feet in
the Port of Charleston.
We have a lot to talk about in the Port of Charleston. You
have been great to help us get into the work plan. It is just
not the Port of Charleston. It is the Port of Savannah. We are
going to sit down and talk about a merit-based system, and I
need your input and I need my colleagues to do more than
complain about the old system. If you want merit-based
decisions, we need to come up with a system that gets us there.
I am willing to help anybody to get there, Republican,
Democratic, Libertarian, vegetarian.
Now, Admiral, are you familiar with sequestration plans of
Congress?
Admiral Locklear. I am generally familiar with the law and
what it would entail.
Senator Graham. How do you feel about it?
Admiral Locklear. I believe the Secretary of Defense has
properly articulated it would be devastating.
Senator Graham. Devastating, dumb. We would be shooting
ourselves in the head. It would be a Navy without ships,
without sailors, brigades without bullets, air wings without
trained pilots. Do you agree with that assessment?
Admiral Locklear. I agree with that assessment.
Senator Graham. Do you have any idea why we continue to
want to go down that road? I mean, I do not. I am just asking
you.
Admiral Locklear. I do not have an opinion on that.
Senator Graham. You are going to be the head of PACOM, and
you are telling the members of this committee that if we
execute sequestration on top of the $487 billion that we are
already trying to cut, we will be devastating the U.S. Navy's
capability to defend this Nation?
Admiral Locklear. I would say it is not just the Navy but
across all the Services.
Senator Graham. So we would be devastating our military.
Thank you for your candid testimony because I could not agree
with you more.
Now, China. That is your theater of operations, right? Is
China engaged in a sustained effort of cyber attacks against
this country's defense infrastructure? Is the People's
Liberation Army engaged in cyber attacks against this country?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, I do not have direct knowledge
that I would share in this forum about that.
Senator Graham. It is widely believed they are.
Would you agree with this? This will be my last question.
If the People's Liberation Army of China is engaged in cyber
attacks against this country to steal our defense
infrastructure, our trade secrets, our national security
information, would you consider such activity, if it did occur,
a hostile act against the United States? Would it be legitimate
for us under the law of war to respond in kind?
Admiral Locklear. I would only be speculating to give you a
legal opinion at this point in time.
Senator Graham. Forget about that. From a military
commander's point of view, if our Nation is being attacked in a
cyber fashion against our defense infrastructure, do you
consider that a hostile act as a military commander?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, certainly an act against the
best interests of our----
Senator Graham. Can you get with me about whether or not
you consider it a hostile act and whether or not we have the
right to respond in kind and whether or not we should?
Admiral Locklear. Senator, I would say certainly the
activity is hostile. Whether it fits in the category of an
exact hostile act, I need to give you a legal opinion on that
because there are legalities in warfare that we would have to
categorize that. But certainly it tends in that direction.
Senator Graham. You can get back with me.
[The information referred to follows:]
Currently, the precise definition of a cyber attack is evolving.
Over the past decade, the term computer network attack was defined in
Joint Publication 1-02 as ``actions taken in or through the use of
computer networks to disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy information
resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers and
networks themselves.'' This definition includes a broad range of
activities from those that cause no noticeable effect and fall far
below a use of force, to those that cause destruction equivalent to a
kinetic attack. Efforts are ongoing to ensure the Joint Publication's
definition is not overly broad and properly aligns with international
law.
For the purposes of defining rights and responsibilities under
international law, U.S. Cyber Command defines cyber attack ``as actions
in cyberspace whose foreseeable results include damage or destruction
of property or death or injury to persons. A cyber attack, defined as
such, is a use of forces, equivalent to an `armed attack,' and may be
responded to in self-defense.''
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It has actually been somewhat enlightening, this process
and testimony so far. I want to say to both the General and
Admiral thank you very much for your willingness to participate
in what I am learning here. I am making a list of every demand
that members have of you or they will not give you your
confirmation. The problem is if you are not confirmed, those
demands cannot happen. Maybe there is a disconnect, but also
that is the old way, in my view, of doing business around this
place.
I have questions. I want you to get in the service of the
positions that you are being nominated for because we want to
work with you to make things happen.
But I made this shopping list that everyone has requested
of you or demanded of you, which I think is somewhat amazing.
I want to just make a comment, and I hope maybe the
chairman and we could consider something in the future, on the
Law of the Sea because there was a comment from my good friend
from Oklahoma earlier. We do a lot of work on issues together.
He comes from an oil and gas State like I do. But there is a
lot of misinformation out there on the Law of the Sea. The fact
is there are only four countries that have not signed on: North
Korea, Libya, Iran, and us. Now, maybe I am confused, but I do
not think so. Those are people I do not want to hang out with.
I think the Law of the Sea from where it affects the country
the most, Alaska, is an important part of our long-term
national security, national economic opportunities, and a huge
undiscovered resource up there in a variety of ways.
I appreciate our conversation, Admiral, regarding your
understanding of the importance of it from a national security
perspective, and I hope maybe we could have a further
discussion because it is a national security issue if we are
not part of the equation. To be frank with you, I am not real
interested in hanging out with North Korea, Iran, and Libya in
regards to our not signing on.
It is more of a comment, but I think there is a lot of
misinformation up there in regards to how the revenue streams
would work, what our sovereignty is, and the rule of law that
we would be able to operate under. So it is more of a comment.
I again want to thank you for your comment in support of that.
Admiral, let me touch on the pivot to the Asia-Pacific
priority or at least an enhanced priority, I should say, for
the area and for PACOM and the importance at least from my
perspective, Alaska and Hawaii. These are strategic if we are
upping our ante in the Asia-Pacific area. Can you give me your
comments on the importance of these somewhat forward-basing but
also some of the critical pieces of missile defense from
Alaska's perspective?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir, I can. I had the privilege in a
previous command of serving as the 3rd Fleet Commander, which
is in command of all the naval forces that are in the eastern
Pacific. So I am quite familiar with the implications of
Hawaii, of the west coast of the United States, the Pacific
Northwest, as well as Alaska.
First of all, as a mariner, you look at the globe and you
look at it as a globe and you see the world in great circles
not in straight lines. If you take a look at the geography of
where you are when you are in Alaska, you really are very close
and very significantly positioned geographically on the
northern periphery of the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR).
It is critical not only from a ballistic missile defense
perspective but also for the strategic positioning of forces to
be able to have forces that are well supported inside the
United States but at the same time are close enough to be able
to be relevant in a short-term, quick-reaction requirement that
we could have if our security interests are threatened in the
Asia-Pacific.
I had some time on the east coast, and if you look at the
Atlantic, it takes you about the same time to go from
Charleston, SC, on a ship to Portsmouth, England as it does to
go from San Diego to Hawaii. You start to see this strategic
position of that island chain and our other island chains that
we deal with as we move forward.
All of these are critical to the overall rebalancing
strategy, and I look forward, if I am confirmed, to making sure
that is well articulated.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
The other one I would like to ask you--I know we talked a
little bit about it. It is the Joint Pacific-Alaska Range
Complex, which is an important training facility. It has the
largest air space and ground domain that anyone in the country
can train in. Can you give me your thoughts of how that may
play into PACOM and the work you are doing?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, sir. That range, as do all of our
ranges, are critical to our military's ability to be ready when
we go forward. Protection of those ranges from encroachment,
ensuring that we are allowed to access them for the type of
training we need and training that we do in a responsible,
environmentally respectful way--we can do that as a military,
but that is very important for us as we send young men and
women forward with these very well built, very sophisticated
systems that we need to counter the type of threats we might
have. We have to have places where they can rehearse. Some can
be done synthetically but the range systems are very important
to our overall national security strategy.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
General, thank you. My late father-in-law, who passed away
recently, was a colonel in the Corps. I hear all the stories
and heard all the stories. I thank you for your service.
In Alaska, we love the Corps. You have your own Alaska
district up there because of the size. When my friend from
Missouri talked about water, we understand water. We are not
the State of 10,000 Lakes. We are the State of a million lakes.
Three-quarters of the coastline of this country is Alaska, and
we have the Arctic which the Corps is now working on which is
an amazing part of the equation.
Let me ask you a couple questions. One, this whole
prioritization, which I understand how you have to dice the
answer because if you do not have the money, you cannot do it,
if you are not authorized. The big debate here is earmarks.
That is why the water bill is where it is because some people
think because we nominate projects in the water bill, it is an
earmark. We are in this quandary of how to move that bill
forward. But that is your authorizing bill to do your projects.
Other than that, it is then just the presidential list. So we
are kind of in this stalemate.
I am very interested in what Senator Graham said in setting
the metrics and trying to figure it out, because you have
multiple layers. You have flood control. You have habitat. In
my State, flood control is important to a certain extent.
Habitat, I can tell you, is very important when 60 percent of
the fishing industry of this country in the sense of live catch
is from Alaska, a huge business, also a huge employer. The
Corps plays a role in that to ensure that we have a viable
fishing industry in this country. It is a very careful balance.
I would be interested, because my time is limited here, to
get your thoughts at a later time, of how you see us building
some metrics that we can restrain ourselves but also do what is
right for this country but also giving the input that we are
hearing from our own constituents on needs in port development.
For example, in my State, with the Arctic, we are going to need
a deep water port up there. There is no question about it. If
we are not careful, we will be in dire straights not having
that up there for a variety of reasons. But can you just give
me a quick comment? I know my time has expired.
General Bostick. I agree, Senator, with many of the points
both you and Senator Graham raised on the national priorities
and how do we get at a national set of priorities. I think it
is going to take governmental, nongovernmental, the
administration, and State and local leaders working together to
come to a consensus and a common vision on a way to move
forward. I look forward, if confirmed, to being part of that
team and helping to serve as a catalyst to bring our team
together with the other teams in order to address this issue.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. I look forward to
seeing you both, if possible, in Alaska. General, I will follow
up in a written question--we have about 300 used defense sites.
I am curious where they fit and the priorities. We can talk
offline on that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Begich. We may
have a slightly different definition of coastline since we
think we have either the longest or second longest coastline in
the Great Lakes. But nonetheless----
Senator Begich. We will measure it.
Chairman Levin. You are either number one or number two.
Senator Begich. We like to consider ourselves number one.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. In any event, thank you, Senator Begich,
for your contribution.
I agree with you, by the way, about the confirmation. These
two gentlemen hopefully will be not only confirmed but promptly
confirmed and the answers that they will be offering to
questions for the record are, I hope, in terms of their coming
in, will be the only thing that will be between them and
confirmation. Not so much the substance of it, I hope, but just
the speed with which you can get us the answers because I think
your answers will be satisfactory and believe they will be.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pick up where both Senator Graham and Senator
Begich left off with respect to this issue, General Bostick, of
trying to make sure that the President's Executive Order number
13534 issued back in 2010 does come to reality. In that
executive order, he said we need to have a national strategy
for doubling U.S. exports by 2015. If we do not get our act
together at our ports, then not only are we not going to double
our exports, we are going to have a hard time receiving imports
with the ships that are going to be coming through the expanded
Panama Canal at the end of 2014.
We have been working on the deepening project at Savannah
Harbor for 10 years. For 10 years we have been jumping through
all of the hoops that we have to jump through, some dictated by
the Corps, some by environmental requirements and whatnot. I am
not saying whether all of that is necessary or not. But I know
what is necessary, and what is necessary is getting to the end
of the day and getting the port at Savannah--and I am very
supportive of the port at Charleston and Jacksonville and all
of our ports around the country--to have the capability of
receiving those Panamax ships.
It is going to be extremely difficult under the process
they have now, and the reason it is going to be difficult is
because history dictates to us that every major Corps project
is an earmark. That is the way it has always been. We are
having to change the process now in this post-earmark world. I
am not sure what the answer is either.
But Senator Graham and I have had this debate and
conversation time and time again about how we do go forward and
represent our respective parts of the country. In fairness to
the ports at Mobile, and Jacksonville, and wherever, we have to
come up with a better solution than earmarks and, at the same
time, we have to recognize that priorities are going to have to
be set.
At Savannah, we are now ready. You and I have talked a
little bit earlier today. We have a small tranche of Federal
money that is going to be joined up with a commitment that has
been made by our State, and a major commitment that has been
made by our State, to hopefully begin the process at Savannah.
We are the fastest growing container port in the Nation. Last
year, 12.5 percent of all containers that came in the United
States came through Savannah. If we are not ready by 2014 for
these Panamax ships, not only is the port at Savannah going to
suffer, but retailers throughout the whole east coast and
manufacturers throughout the whole eastern part of the United
States are going to suffer. It is of critical importance that
we address this issue, General Bostick, in the short term.
You said in response to your advance policy questions the
Nation must be prepared to take advantage of the opportunities
with completion of the Panama Canal in 2014. Now, as Chief of
Engineers, what will you do to ensure that projects of national
significance such as the Savannah Harbor project are not
subject to unnecessary delays and are completed in the
timeliest manner as is possible?
General Bostick. Senator, I would agree with you and the
other Senators that have talked about the urgency of the work
that we have ahead of us. We do need a national strategy in a
number of different areas, whether it is navigation,
hydropower, economic, ecosystem revitalization, some of the
aging infrastructure that we are dealing with. All of that
requires priorities, and some of those priorities are going to
be important at the national level and some will be very
important at the local level. I believe it is important for us
to work as a team to sort out those priorities.
I think we have demonstrated throughout our history many
times in the past that when we have a common vision, when we
have all parties pulling together, when we have the funding,
and when we change our business processes accordingly, and then
work within the laws and regulations that bind us, that we can
move things faster than we currently are. I am committed to
being part of the team that moves this forward.
Senator Chambliss. We look forward to working with you on
this. Obviously, I think all of us are concerned about it, but
we do not have the answers. We need the Corps to be forward-
thinking with respect to how we deal with this post-earmark
world.
Admiral Locklear, the F-35 program was designed to replace
the F-16, the A-10, the F/A-18 fighter planes as a new fifth
generation, multi-role fighter. The U.S. military's current
top-of-the-line fighter is the F-22, the world's only fully
operational fifth generation fighter. There have been less than
200 F-22s produced for the Air Force, and as you and I talked
yesterday, 40 of those are in the PACOM AOR. According to
recent defense strategic guidance, DOD is further slowing the
acquisition and delivery of F-35s, and this issue of budget
reduction and the potential for sequestration makes that very
difficult.
Now, both China and Russia are developing fifth generation
fighters: the J-20 and the Sukhoi PAK FA. Both these aircraft
will be challengers and in some facets may be superior to U.S.
fighters. There is also a strong possibility that these new
fighters will not only be used by China and Russia but may be
sold to other countries elsewhere in the Pacific theater. The
J-20 and the Sukhoi PAK FA are likely to start entering service
in significant numbers by the end of the decade, and both
countries are capable of accelerating this acquisition
timeframe by settling for alternative engines or a little
lesser capability. The presence of these aircraft and our delay
in modernizing our tactical aviation forces in the Pacific
could possibly alter the balance of power in the PACOM region.
Admiral, assuming you are confirmed, this will be your AOR
and your airspace. I know that the J-20 is a new airplane and
we have little data on it at this point in time, but it does
concern me personally that it flew its first flight test
earlier than expected and that the U.S. Intelligence Community
is predicting its initial operational capability date may be at
least 2 years earlier than originally predicted.
What I see happening at some point in the future is that
options the United States currently has in terms of defending
U.S. interests and providing deterrence to U.S. allies in the
Pacific region may not be available. When those options are no
longer available, it will fundamentally change the balance of
power in your AOR.
I would appreciate your thoughts on this issue and your
thoughts on what the United States needs to do to preserve its
options and ability to defend U.S. interests in the region
specifically in relation to maintaining air dominance.
Admiral Locklear. Senator, a critical aspect of our ability
to ensure our national interests and the interests of our
allies and partners are well protected in this critical region
is our ability to stay forward, just to be there. As any other
nation or nations pursue anti-access, area denial capabilities,
which are some of the ones you are alluding to, it is critical
that we do a couple things. One is that we understand what they
are doing. Two is that we keep the systems that we have already
invested in as well prepared to address those, and I think that
we are doing that at this point in time. Then we have to look
longer term are we pacing the threat not only in the air domain
but in all other domains.
The F-22 you mentioned are critical to our ability at this
point in time to stay forward. The F-35 will be a great
addition to that. Certainly any slow-down of that forces the
combatant commanders to have to take additional risk in their
planning as we look forward. So it is important that if I am
confirmed, that I help this committee and the leadership in DOD
to stay focused on what we may be giving up if we do not
proceed properly.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks to both of you for your
leadership and your service to our country. Thanks to your
families for their commitment. We look forward to your
confirmation and look forward to working with both of you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Locklear, Lieutenant General Bostick, thank you
both very much for being here and congratulations on your
nominations. I share Senator Chambliss' hope that we will see
very swift confirmations.
Admiral Locklear, I know that you are looking forward to
your future command in the Pacific, and we had a chance to talk
earlier this week a little bit about that.
But as subcommittee chair of the European Affairs
Subcommittee on the Foreign Relations Committee, we have been
looking with great interest towards what is going to happen at
the NATO summit in Chicago. As you and I discussed, one of the
potential topics for discussion will be what happened in Libya
and the lessons learned. Given your recent post at NATO, I
wonder if you could talk a little bit about what you think some
of those lessons learned from the Libyan effort are.
Admiral Locklear. First, even as we rebalance our strategy
and we start to articulate the Asia-Pacific--our national
interests there and our military priorities there, I think from
my perspective it is important for us to recognize that our
alliance in the NATO alliance is, first of all, a very strong
alliance, a mature alliance. It is a large alliance and it has
a lot of capability when you put it together and you put it
together in a way where it comes together in a meaningful way.
In the case of the Libya operation, it was the first
opportunity for NATO to be able to accomplish an alliance
operation of that size in a very short period of time. It was a
matter of days when they could take the operation from a U.S.-
led coalition to a NATO-led coalition, and it is something that
really has not been done in the history of NATO. I think it
started to show the flexibility of that alliance.
I think it has pointed out some areas where defense
spending within the alliance needs to be expanded, and some of
the areas that they found that there were shortfalls where we
had to rely maybe too heavily on one partner or one member of
the alliance. But I think it was also an opportunity for those
countries--because Libya was in the back yard of the NATO
alliance, it was important for the leadership of key countries
to step forward and to take responsibility, and they did that.
Overall, I think we gave the Libyan people a chance.
Senator Shaheen. As we are recognizing that every situation
is different, every country is different, but do you think this
provides one of the models that we ought to be looking at in
the future as we face other threats to NATO?
Admiral Locklear. I am always hesitant to plan on the last
event because it never proves right to do that. But I think it
had elements of it that could help us forecast in the future. I
think it does demonstrate the benefits of partners and building
partner capacity which I think is critical to the long-term
security of an increasingly globalized world. The more friends,
allies, and partners that we can have that we can understand,
that we can interoperate with, that we have systems that have
somewhat compatibility--but there were some amazing instances
where we had countries in the NATO alliance that, when I was
born, would have never spoken to each other, that came together
and were able to interoperate and to do some really, I think,
quite significant things in the area of warfare in a very
responsible and effective way. From that regard, it can be a
model.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I know that the issue of the slowing of the building of
Virginia-class subs has been raised already, but I wonder if
you could talk about the unique capabilities that submarines
provide in the Pacific region both in terms of traditional
warfare and asymmetric warfare. As I think I probably
mentioned, I represent the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where they
do a lot of work on Virginia-class subs. We are following very
closely what is going on with this issue.
Admiral Locklear. Globally our attack submarine force
provide basically a critical element of our defense strategy
both from their ability to operate forward for sustained
periods, their ability to operate somewhat covertly for
sustained periods, and their ability to bring significant
combat power to bear, as well as their ability to bring
significant intelligence and reconnaissance. I think they are a
key element of our joint force.
Certainly in the Asia-Pacific area because of the vastness
of the area, the tyranny of distance, the size of the oceans,
the size of the littorals--half the people in the world live in
the Asia-Pacific. Most of the emerging economies are there, as
we have already heard, most of the trade, the globalization of
trade. In the Navy, we are commonly heard to say 90 percent of
everything that moves in the world moves in the oceans and
through the littorals. What we do not say very often is in the
last couple of decades that 90 percent has increased fourfold.
It is 90 percent of four times what it was a couple decades. So
that is an indication and we are talking about the Panama Canal
being expanded. Being able to have an effective understanding
of what happens in that globalized environment I think is
critical, and our submarines are a big part of that.
Senator Shaheen. Can you talk at all about the trajectory
of our submarine capabilities versus Russia and China over the
next 10 years? Do we have a sense of how we will compare?
Admiral Locklear. We build the best submarines in the
world.
Senator Shaheen. I had no doubt about that.
Are they developing any technology that may rival ours?
Admiral Locklear. I think that what has concerned me most
over time is the proliferation of very quiet diesel or diesel-
electric submarines and the proliferation of those around the
world. I think today there are well over 300 of those types of
submarines that are in the various parts of the world, some
with friends, allies, and partners, but some places where they
are not. The proliferation of those assets, even though they
are locally distributed--I mean, they are not far-reaching and
they don't leave generally the coastal areas of those
countries--they become area denial weapons, asymmetric area
denial weapons, which as we have seen in North Korea where they
used a mini-sub that was able to accomplish an attack there.
So that does concern us and it concerns us not only as it
relates to our own submarines' ability to counter that, but
also the rest of our technology that has to be developed,
whether it is our airborne sensors, whether it is our surface-
borne sensors, whether it is our intelligence community to be
able to keep track of what is happening inside these nations
that are proliferating. Those are the things that concern me.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I am out of time, but I wonder if I could ask Lieutenant
General Bostick just one question. I know my colleague from New
Hampshire, Senator Ayotte, raised the importance of the Cold
Regions Lab up in Hanover which does such great work, so I just
want to echo that.
But one of the things that I have been very concerned about
and I know that our military is also very concerned about is
the number of engineers, science and technology professionals,
that we are losing. By 2020, about 50 percent of them will be
eligible for retirement. Can you talk a little bit about how
you see being able to rebuild that science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) capacity within the Army?
As you think about the challenges facing the work that you will
be taking on in our labs and other technical areas, how are we
going to attract the engineers and the STEM professionals that
we need for the future?
General Bostick. Senator, I think this is a very important
point for the country. I sit on the advisory board up at West
Point for the civil engineering department and for the systems
engineering department. Even at the institution that was the
first engineering school in the country, we have concerns about
growing engineers.
But it really starts at a very young level. I mentioned
that my wife is an elementary school teacher, and each time
during the year I try to go to speak to the youngsters about
the importance of engineering. I think that is where it starts.
Our education in America must focus on science, technology,
engineering, and math in a greater degree than we may be now,
and to galvanize that interest in the young men and women so
that we have a population to choose from to encourage them to
study in this important area. We are going to need STEM
specialists in every part of the country, and the Corps of
Engineers will be part of the team that helps develop them.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I could not agree more with
your comments, especially when it applies to early childhood
education.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both
of you for your dedication, for your lifetime of military and
public service. We all appreciate that.
General Bostick, because of the enormous importance of the
Corps to Louisiana, I will focus the conversation with you. I
also want to thank publicly the many, many fine men and women
in the Corps, very talented, very dedicated, and very bright.
But I also want to focus on a problem which is that the
Corps, as a bureaucracy, as an organization, is really broken
in fundamental ways, is really dysfunctional in fundamental
ways. The average Corps project that gets done takes 20 years
to get done. It is studied for 8-plus years, and that has grown
over time. The Corps seems to be best at studying things, and
over time, of course, costs go up, so limited resources never
quite keep up. It is like a dog running after its tail. Those
issues have only gotten worse in the last decade within the
Corps in terms of that dysfunction and those problems.
What would be the top three specific reforms you would make
if confirmed to fix that?
General Bostick. Senator, first, thanks for the compliments
about the Corps employees. I think they are hard-working,
dedicated professionals, and I have served with them in peace
and combat. I deployed with the 1st Calvary Division and then
helped lead the Gulf Region Division, and I saw Corps military
and civilian employees do things side by side with our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I am very proud of
them.
As I look at the Corps--first, I talked about trust and
building trust and understanding each of our issues and each of
our concerns, whether it is national, local, State, government
or nongovernmental, is bringing the team together. I think the
Corps' team has to come together, and I think they have a solid
team, but making sure that the issues of all the teammates are
understood.
I think we have to transform the Corps in terms of our
programs, both military and civil. The Corps is working on
that. I think they have to be aligned to the national
priorities of this country. I believe we have a huge issue with
aging infrastructure. Many of our hydropower plants are over 34
years old. The infrastructure along our levees and our dams is
also very old and aging. Our navigation channels. We have over
900 that we are responsible for: 250 are maintained at any
level, and of that 59 are top priorities that 90 percent of
commercial traffic flow against. Of those 59, they are going to
dredge to the depths and widths that they are authorized only
35 percent of the time. The other issue is to focus on funding
and how do we take the precious resources that we have and
align them to the national priorities and achieve energy goals.
Achieving the energy goals is very important.
Finally, I think about our business processes. Sir, I think
you saw in Louisiana that the Corps adjusted its business
processes in addressing the issues after Katrina. I think what
happened there also is that the Nation had a common vision. It
went after the post-Katrina problems with immediate funding, a
common vision on what had to be done, and the Corps adjusted
its business processes to make things happen. So it can be
done, and I am convinced that it can be done, and I look
forward to working with you on that.
Senator Vitter. General, right after Katrina, the Corps did
adjust in part because of extraordinary authority and funding.
I am here to tell you that the Corps has completely adjusted
back. That phase, unfortunately, is done and the Corps has
completely adjusted back to pre-Katrina organizational
responses.
My question was about specific organizational reforms. What
are your thoughts about your top three specific organizational
reforms that you would implement to help fix this?
General Bostick. First, I would look directly at the
business processes in military programs and civil works. I
think with BRAC and what we have seen with BRAC and what has
happened on the military side to move BRAC 2005 along from
design, bid, build processes to design, build has taken the
contractor and brought them forward and moved things quickly. I
think those lessons learned and the lessons learned in Katrina
that allowed for the rapid funding, allowed for some of the
accommodations of the National Environmental Policy Act, and
allowed for the team to work together in a common vision--I
think a business process from those two examples is what we
need to do throughout the Corps with the agreement of Congress,
the administration, and the American people.
I think energy goals remain important in this day and age.
I am going to look at the energy security and energy
sustainment and ensure that we are meeting the requirements of
the American people and the Nation. Finally, looking at the
aging infrastructure, as I talked about before, and
prioritizing that to national priorities.
Senator Vitter. General, in the written questions that were
submitted and answered before the hearing, one of the questions
goes directly to this. In your view, does the Army Corps of
Engineers need to make any changes in the way it operates, and
if so, what changes would you recommend? Your answer was
basically, if confirmed, you would consult with a lot of people
and we could determine what, if any, changes are needed.
Are you really unsure that significant changes are needed
as you answered in your written response?
General Bostick. I believe changes are needed, and I
believe some of them are significant.
Senator Vitter. Okay. So you would amend this written
response in that regard.
General Bostick. I have had time to think about this since
I provided that response some time ago, and I believe that
based on the things that we have seen and the time that I have
been able to review this, that there are significant changes.
Some changes require changes well outside the Corps. There are
issues with funding. There are issues with the amount of risks
we are willing to take, the amount of lawsuits that occur, the
environmental requirements that are required by law. I think
all of that has to be taken into consideration and changes in
those areas, just as we were allowed to do post-Katrina, are
the kind of changes I think that are necessary to move all of
us along with a common vision.
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Just one additional question for you, Admiral, relating to
our strong alliance with South Korea. There has been in the
past a number of times when we said we were going to transfer
the wartime situation that we were in, to transfer the wartime
operational control (OPCON), from the United States to South
Korea. That has been delayed again. It is scheduled now for
December 2015.
Would you agree that it is appropriate that the Republic of
Korea assume OPCON of its own forces during time of war?
Admiral Locklear. Mr. Chairman, I would agree and I would
agree that the 2015 timeline appears to be moving in that
direction from everything I have been told and that we seem to
be on track for that. I would support staying on track for that
transition date.
Chairman Levin. I think it is important that we stick to
that when we should have stuck to the earlier one, but that is
now water over the dam. The 2015 date is now one that ought to
be kept. I am glad to hear your answer that it is your
intention that we keep on that track.
Okay. We have come to the end of Senators' questions, and
now let me ask you the standard questions which we ask of our
nominees, which usually come before all of your other answers,
but this time come afterward. These are the standard questions
and you can answer together.
First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Locklear. I have.
General Bostick. I have.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
personal views, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
Admiral Locklear. I do.
General Bostick. I will.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Locklear. No, sir.
General Bostick. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Admiral Locklear. I will.
General Bostick. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Locklear. I will.
General Bostick. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Locklear. They will.
General Bostick. They will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Admiral Locklear. I do.
General Bostick. I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Locklear. I will.
General Bostick. I do.
Chairman Levin. We thank you. We thank again your families.
We are delighted to see them here and know how important they
are in your lives and in the security of this country. We look
forward to a prompt confirmation and hope that you can get your
answers for the record in promptly so we can proceed to vote on
your confirmation here as soon as possible. Thank you both.
Congratulations on your nominations.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Samuel J. Locklear
III, USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. No, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need for any
modifications.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)?
Answer. The Commander, PACOM, is responsible for deterring attacks
against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases,
to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that
deterrence fails, to win its Nation's wars. The commander is also
responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies,
partners, and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe my 35 years of military experience, culminating
in command of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa, and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Joint Force Command
Naples, Italy have prepared me for assuming command of PACOM.
Operationally, I have gained valuable experience and insights
planning and leading extensive joint and coalition operations at both
the tactical and operational levels. In my current position, I
commanded both the U.S. and NATO-led Libya operations, Odyssey Dawn and
Unified Protector. As Commander, U.S. Third Fleet in San Diego, CA, I
was responsible for the training and certification of all Pacific
rotational naval forces, for the planning and execution of the bi-
annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational exercise, and served
as the alternate Joint Maritime Component Commander for key Pacific
Operational Plans. As the Commander of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group,
also in San Diego, CA, I operated throughout the PACOM and CENTCOM
areas of responsibility (AOR) and commanded naval forces in the
planning and execution of the initial combat phase of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Additionally, I was privileged to command the destroyer, USS
Leftwich (DD984), homeported in Pearl Harbor, HI.
Ashore, as a member of the Joint Staff, J-5, Plans and Policy
Directorate, and three times as a flag officer assigned to the Navy
staff, including serving as the Director of the Navy Staff, I gained
valuable insights into the resourcing and administrative processes that
underpin an effective Department of Defense (DOD), including a deep
appreciation for the interagency and the importance of the whole-of-
government approach.
Finally, Pam, my wife of 33 years, embodies today's military spouse
and family, and is a superb representative of our U.S. Armed Forces. We
are a great team and she adds significantly to my qualifications.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
PACOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to take every opportunity to enhance
my knowledge of and relationships with our allies and partners across
the Pacific. I look forward to engaging with senior leaders within DOD,
the Department of State, regional security experts, leading think tanks
and universities, and military and civilian leaders throughout the
Asia-Pacific in order to improve my understanding of U.S. interests in
the region.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander, PACOM, performs his duties under the
authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is
directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the
command to carry out its missions.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed
by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary in his
absence. The Commander, PACOM, ensures the Deputy has the information
necessary to perform these duties and coordinates with him on major
issues.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. Under Secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands'
requirements. The Commander, PACOM, coordinates and exchanges
information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic
and regional security issues involving the Asia-Pacific theater.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. The Commander, PACOM, coordinates and exchanges information
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set
and meet the command's intelligence requirements.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and
control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits
communications between the National Command Authority and the PACOM
Commander and oversees the activities of the PACOM Commander as
directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor
to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key
conduit between the combatant commander, interagency, and Service
Chiefs.
The PACOM Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant
issues regarding the PACOM Area of Responsibility. The Commander
communicates directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
a regular basis.
Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command.
Answer. The PACOM and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) share a border
between their respective AORs. The Commander, PACOM, maintains a close
relationship and communicates directly with the Commander, CENTCOM, on
issues of mutual interest that affect both of their AORs so that
respective strategies, policies and operations are coordinated and
mutually supportive. India-Pakistan issues have heightened the
importance of close cross-combatant command coordination.
Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
Answer. As a subordinate unified command of PACOM, Special
Operations Command Pacific and its component units deploy throughout
the Pacific, supporting Commander, PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation
Program, deliberate plans, and real world contingencies. The Commander,
PACOM, maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with
the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command on issues of mutual
interest. PACOM coordinates requirements and operations of Special
Operations Forces within the PACOM AOR through Commander, Special
Operations Command, Pacific.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Commander, PACOM, shares borders with and maintains close
relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships
are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy and are
characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive
exchanges of information on key issues.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. The Service Secretaries are responsible for the
administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands.
The Commander, PACOM, coordinates with the Secretaries to ensure that
requirements to organize, train, and equip PACOM forces are met.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. The Commander, PACOM, communicates and exchanges
information with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for
organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of
PACOM's mission responsibilities requires coordination with the Service
Chiefs. Like the Chairman, the Service Chiefs are valuable sources of
judgment and advice for the combatant commanders.
Question. Commander United Nations/Combined Forces Command/U.S.
Forces Korea.
Answer. As a subordinate unified commander, the Commander, U.S.
Forces Korea receives missions and functions from Commander, PACOM. I
recognize his role as Commander, Combined Forces Command and will fully
support his actions in that sensitive and demanding role.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of
War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) Personnel.
Answer. The Commander, PACOM, coordinates and exchanges information
with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing
Personnel Affairs on strategic policy issues involving the POW/MIA
accounting mission worldwide and Personnel Recovery requirements in the
Asia-Pacific Region.
Question. The Chief of Naval Research.
Answer. The Office of Naval Research is a valuable source for
technologies that help the Commander, PACOM, counter developing threats
in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will maintain a close
relationship with the Chief of Naval Research as well as the other
service research organizations and national laboratories to ensure the
requirements for developing technologies for PACOM are understood.
challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander of PACOM?
Answer. As our Nation globally rebalances toward the Asia-Pacific
region, I will focus on three main challenges in the PACOM AOR. First,
North Korea's conventional military, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and proliferation activities coupled with the ongoing Kim regime
transition create threats to regional security and stability. Second,
the stability, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific will depend
on strong relationships with our Asia-Pacific treaty allies and
partners to ensure that we are able to maintain regional access to and
use of the global commons. Finally, China's rise as a regional and
global power, including its substantial military modernization and
buildup, is a source of strategic uncertainty and potential friction.
The China/U.S. relationship has been an area of in-depth study and
analysis by the current Commander and Staff of PACOM. I look forward to
closely reading and broadening my understanding of this very dynamic
relationship that cuts across all facets of our Government.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. PACOM will support the administration's whole-of-government
approaches to achieve a peaceful, secure and prosperous future security
environment on the Korean Peninsula. Our forward military presence
reassures our treaty allies and deters aggression by North Korea. While
the ongoing leadership transition creates a period of uncertainty, it
may also present opportunities for the Peninsula to advance to a
greater level of stability and security.
We will continue our commitments to modernizing and strengthening
our treaty alliances and partnerships in the region. These critical
relationships will be enhanced by maintaining interoperable military
capabilities that deter regional aggression and build partner security
capacity.
We will remain steadfast in our efforts to mature the military-to-
military relationship with China. Both China and the United States have
a strong stake in the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
Building a cooperative bilateral relationship will reduce the
likelihood of a miscalculation, increase the clarity of Chinese
strategic intentions and encourage mutual engagement in areas of common
concern.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed?
Answer. My first priority will be to continue to maintain a
credible deterrent posture and reassuring military presence in the
Asia-Pacific.
Next, we must both deter North Korean aggression and counter their
proliferation activities. To do so we will work through DOD to
collaborate with other elements of U.S. Government and our allies to
maintain peace on the Peninsula and dissuade North Korea from actively
pursuing a nuclear weapons program. With regard to China, actively
pursuing steady and measured military-to-military engagement will be
one of my top priorities.
Lastly, while supporting our Nation's strategic focus on the Asia-
Pacific and sustaining the realignment and transformation processes
already underway, we must also carefully shepherd and repeatedly assess
progress toward desired force posture, ensuring we remain cognizant of
evolving budgetary realities. These efforts will receive my prioritized
attention as we work to build on and strengthen bilateral relationships
with our regional allies and partners.
defense strategic guidance and pacom force posture
Question. The Defense Strategic Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense'', announced by
President Obama on January 5, 2012, includes, among other things, the
intention of the administration and the Pentagon to ``rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific region''. In his associated remarks, Secretary Panetta
explained that the ``U.S. military will increase its institutional
weight and focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence
in Asia-Pacific.'' Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the
region are already planned over the next several years, including
movement of marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S.
forces within South Korea. There are also discussions about increasing
presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including countries
like Australia and Singapore, and developing more comprehensive
engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region.
These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for
increasingly constrained funding.
What is your understanding of the plan for the Asia-Pacific region
as contemplated in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance?
Answer. My understanding is that we will emphasize our existing
alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security.
We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners
throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and
capacity for securing common interests. Additionally, we look to invest
in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability
to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the
broader Indian Ocean region. Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the
Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional
states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea, which
is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and
of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an
underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over the long
term, China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to
affect U.S. economic and security interests in a variety of ways. Our
two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia
and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship.
However, the growth of China's military power must be accompanied by
greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to reduce the
prospects for regional instability. The United States will continue to
make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional
access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty
obligations and with international law. Working closely with our
network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-
based international order that ensures underlying stability and
encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and
constructive defense cooperation.
Question. In your view, what should the United States do to
``increase its institutional weight and focus'' in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. In keeping with our national-level strategic guidance, I
believe it is essential that the United States maintain an enduring
military presence that reassures countries in the region that the
United States is committed to Asia-Pacific security, economic
development, and rules and norms necessary to the region's success. My
understanding is that the strategic guidance seeks to maintain a robust
force presence in Northeast Asia and to distribute U.S. forces
geographically better throughout the region to address the significant
security challenges we face across the entirety of the region. This
affords the United States the capability to strengthen regional
security and better perform the types of missions our forces are likely
to face in the future such as combating terrorism, responding to
natural disasters, and counter proliferation.
Question. As you understand it, what does this strategy guidance
mean in terms of changes to the numbers and types of operational units
assigned within the PACOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and his staff
and my counterparts across the Department to assess the potential
global tradeoffs, risks, and budgetary implications associated with any
changes in U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific. Consulting
closely with our allies and partners, and tailoring defense posture
appropriately will allow the United States to respond more effectively
to the wide range of challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region.
Question. What are your views on the current number and types of
ships forward-stationed in the Asia-Pacific region? Are they sufficient
to support the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, as you
understand it, or would you foresee the need to increase or change that
naval force structure in the AOR?
Answer. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance places an
emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will
review levels of assigned forces in the Asia-Pacific region and if
there are shortfalls, I will advocate for additional resources required
to support the President's and Secretary's priorities.
Question. What do you believe should be the United States' force
posture priorities in the Asia-Pacific and what strategic criteria, if
any, should guide the posture of U.S. forces in the region to best
support those priorities at acceptable risk levels?
Answer. I believe the United States should prioritize an enduring
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that demonstrates our
commitment to Asia's security and the protection of American interests.
I agree with the assessment that U.S. force posture in the region
must be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and
politically sustainable.
Question. How important is a forward-basing strategy to the ability
of PACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency
plans?
Answer. I believe the United States' forward-based forces are our
most visible sign of our commitment to regional peace and stability.
Forward based forces are not only the first responders in any
contingency, they also serve to assure allies and partners and deter
potential adversaries and are vital for day-to-day engagement where we
train and exercise together to enhance capabilities and capacities
across the region.
Based on the above thoughts and because of the wide expanse of the
theater, I believe forward-based forces are critical to PACOM's day-to-
day operations as well as operational contingency plans.
Question. How, if at all, do the methods of forward-basing,
rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and
logistics activities throughout the region contribute to forward
presence?
Answer. DOD views posture as a combination of three elements:
forces, footprint, and agreements. ``Forces'' are U.S. military
capabilities, equipment, and commands, assigned or deployed.
``Footprint'' describes our infrastructure, facilities, land, and
prepositioned equipment. ``Agreements'' are treaties, as well as
access, transit, support, and status of forces (SOFA) agreements with
allies and partners.
Together, these enable the United States to maintain a forward
presence to achieve our national security objectives and demonstrate
our commitment to the region.
Question. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the
planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam for the U.S.
commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general?
Answer. As the President has made very clear, we are steadfast in
our commitment to the defense of Japan and the Republic of Korea. I
understand that as the Department considers posture changes in the
Asia-Pacific region, the goal is to fulfill our treaty obligations in
Northeast Asia, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia, and
ensuring our posture is geographically distributed, operationally
resilient, and politically sustainable.
Question. How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from
Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in the region?
Answer. Our commitment to the security of Japan is unshakeable. I
understand the planned changes in the Asia-Pacific region will result
in force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally
resilient, and politically sustainable. Guam's strategic location
supports our ability to operate forces from a forward location.
Planned posture shifts result in greater geographic distribution of
our forces in the region, enhancing our ability to respond to
contingencies and meet treaty obligations in Asia. It demonstrates our
commitment to allies and to fulfilling our agreements with allies and
partners.
Question. How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the
Korean Peninsula improve security?
Answer. Our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is
unshakeable. I understand that as with planning for Japan, Guam, and
Australia, the planned posture changes in Korea will result in force
posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient,
and politically sustainable. The changes appear to address host nation
concerns and simultaneously improve our mutual defense infrastructure.
I support the posture changes on the Peninsula consistent with the
joint vision for the alliance laid out by our Presidents and further
developed by the Secretary of Defense and his Republic of Korea
counterpart.
Question. What is your understanding of the plans for rotational
deployments of U.S. marines to Australia and how, in your view, will
such a presence advance U.S. security interests?
Answer. In November 2010, the Department established a Force
Posture Working Group with our ally, Australia to develop options to
align our countries' force postures in complementary ways to benefit
the national security of both nations. During the September 2011
Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, Secretaries Clinton
and Panetta discussed with their counterparts several of the Working
Group's recommendations. When the President visited Australia this past
November, he and Australian Prime Minister Gillard announced two new
force posture initiatives--one to phase in a rotational deployment of
up to 2,500 marines near Darwin, and another to expand U.S. access to
Northern Australian airfields.
As I understand it, the initiatives will enhance our engagement
with Australia and with regional partners. They will also enable the
military forces of both our Nations to better--and possibly
cooperatively--respond to contingencies, including humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief.
These initiatives--developed in cooperation with a key ally--
demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Australia Alliance and its ability
to enhance regional stability and security. If confirmed, I will
continue the close defense cooperation with Australia.
Question. In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and
military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate
to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic
interests in the region?
Answer. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance places an
emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will
review levels of funding, manning, and military-to-military engagement
in the Asia-Pacific region and--if there are shortfalls in existing
resources--I will advocate for additional resources required to support
the President's priorities.
engagement policy
Question. One of the central pillars of our national security
strategy has been military engagement as a means of building
relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint
combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises,
humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to
achieve this goal.
If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of
the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S.
military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?
Answer. A regular program of military engagement is essential to
sustaining existing relationships and nurturing emerging ones. I would
support a sustainable pace of operations that whenever possible
includes innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to
achieve national security objectives. Military-to-military contacts at
both senior and junior levels, bilateral and multilateral exercises,
humanitarian assistance operations and similar activities are important
elements of this engagement. With the current budget environment,
careful choices will need to be made that focus resources where they
provide the most value and return. Whenever possible, we will develop
innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve Pacific
theater security objectives.
Question. In your opinion, how do these activities contribute to
U.S. national security?
Answer. Military engagement activities strengthen the network of
alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific reinforcing deterrence,
helping to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and
partner forces which in turn advances common interests, addresses
shared threats, and facilitates freedom of movement and access to the
region. Military engagement builds partnership capacity which remains
important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global
leadership and postures the United States as the security partner of
choice.
building partner capacity
Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
nations, including the global train and equip authority (``section
1206'') and Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).
What is your understanding of the purpose of the section 1206
global train and equip authority and GSCF?
Answer.
1206
Congress approved section 1206 global train and equip authority in
2006 in part to give the State Department and DOD a more flexible
capacity building authority to address urgent and emergent threats
before the threats destabilize theater partners or threaten the
Homeland. Later in 2009, the scope expanded to assist coalition
partners as they prepare for deployment. I understand this rapid
funding tool currently is PACOM's most agile mechanism to address
counterterrorism capability gaps in partner nations.
Global Security Contingency Fund
The GSCF is a new initiative to pool the resources of State and
DOD, as well as the expertise of other departments, to provide security
sector assistance for emergent challenges and opportunities.
The GSCF has no appropriated funding, rather State and DOD can
transfer funds from other fiscal year 2012 appropriations into the
GSCF. DOD can transfer up to $200 million from defense-wide Operations
and Maintenance and State can transfer up to a combined $50 million
from Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability
Fund. Once transferred, funds remain available until September 20,
2015.
The GSCF can provide assistance: (1) to national military and
security forces, as well as the Government agencies responsible for
overseeing these forces; and (2) for the justice sector when civilian
agencies are challenged (including law enforcement and prisons), rule
of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country.
As I understand it, the GSCF will be run by a small staff composed
of both State and DOD employees, as well as employees from other
departments and agencies in some cases. Exact reporting structures and
procedures for implementation are being developed to address the
specifics of the legislation granted by Congress.
Question. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in
building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific
region?
Answer. The United States' primary objective in building the
capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop
effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for
their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and
multilateral responses to shared threats and instability. Maintaining
and strengthening our alliances and partnerships are critical to the
stability in the region. Capacity building provides opportunities to
build defense relationships and promotes both interoperability between
our forces and access to the region during peacetime and contingency
operations. Lastly, building this capacity in our allies and partners
lessens the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats
outside the United States.
china
Question. China's defense spending has had double-digit increases
annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of
military expansion is to be expected for a country experiencing the
kind of economic growth that China has over about that same period, the
types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been
interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of
movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at
increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric
and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's
intentions in the region. The Defense Strategic Guidance, announced on
January 5, refers to China as one of the countries that ``will continue
to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection
capabilities''.
How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with
China?
Answer. In January 2010, President Obama and Chinese President Hu
Jintao affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive
U.S.-China relationship. I would describe the relationship as
simultaneously possessing elements of cooperation and competition. The
United States, including DOD, continues to pursue opportunities to
cooperate where there is a mutual benefit, while having frank
discussions of areas where we may have differences.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program?
Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its
near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies
involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny effective intervention in a
cross-strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access
and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing
attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and
China's immediate periphery. Beijing's growing focus on military
missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat
evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is
strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike
capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is
improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space, counterspace,
and computer network operations.
Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese
military growth and modernization?
Answer. I believe the United States should continue to monitor
developments in China's military concepts and capabilities while
encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and
security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the
pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve
the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The United
States' response to China's military modernization should be flexible
and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in
the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and
access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as
countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our
alliances and partnerships.
Question. What do you believe are the Chinese political-military
goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?
Answer. The overriding objectives of China's leaders appear to be
to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue
China's economic development, maintain the country's domestic political
stability, defend China's national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and secure China's influence and status. Within this
context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence is
a key part of Beijing's strategy. Within each dimension there lies a
mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States
that will continue to deserve priority attention.
Question. What effect is China's military growth having on other
countries in the region?
Answer. In terms of regional security, China's economic growth has
increased China's international profile and influence, and has enabled
China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive
transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China's
military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise
many questions, both within the United States and in the region as a
whole, about China's future.
Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of
China's military, and how its military acts. China's military is
working through the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense
Ministers Plus structure to enhance regional cooperation on
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, there
have been worrisome incidents in disputed waters in China's neighboring
seas that have caused concern in nations such as the Philippines and
Vietnam. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have
contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, such as ASEAN, where
issues may be addressed multilaterally; such security concerns have
also led to stronger and more welcoming relations with the United
States as a security partner of choice.
Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship
between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on
either side?
Answer. Both China and Taiwan have made significant strides to
reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be
encouraged and we welcome progress made by both sides. I believe the
United States can help contribute to cross-strait stability by
continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the one-
China policy, three joint U.S.-China Communiques, and the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), including making available to Taiwan ``defense
articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability''. We are
committed to our one-China policy and would oppose unilateral changes,
by either side, to the status quo.
Question. How do China's efforts to establish a strategic presence
in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to seaports in
various South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-
military posture and influence in the region?
Answer. China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of
strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to
resources, trade, and investment. With regard to South and Southeast
Asian seaports, the important question is how China intends to use its
presence. As China increases deployments to the region, including
ongoing participation in counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden,
China will require greater forward logistical capabilities to sustain
operations in that region. Yet in order to establish access to various
seaports, China will encounter the same political issues the United
States faces in maintaining our overseas access. This will require
improving ties with states along the Indian Ocean littoral, closer
cooperation with other regional navies, and will expose them to more
nontraditional security challenges such as terrorism and piracy. The
United States retains strong relationships in South and Southeast Asia
and should continue to monitor China's growing presence in the region.
Question. What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China's
nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons in the region?
Answer. The Obama administration has reiterated that preventing the
proliferation of WMD and delivery systems, along with related
technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I
believe that DOD should work in the interagency process to ensure that
any proliferation concerns relating to China are expressed to the
Chinese Government in appropriate forums.
Question. Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese
military have been modest, at best, and can be accurately described as
``on again, off again.'' One thing that has hobbled U.S.-China military
relations in recent years has been China's propensity for canceling or
postponing military-to-military engagements in response to U.S. arm
sales to Taiwan.
What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China
military-to-military relations?
Answer. As President Obama stated in January 2011, the United
States seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship
with China. We continue to pursue opportunities to cooperate where
there is mutual benefit while discussing areas where we may have
differences in a frank and candid manner. Such dialogue can be
especially important during periods of friction and turbulence.
I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China
as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security
of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive
role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United
States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security
challenges.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any
changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with
China? If so, what changes and why?
Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be
valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open
and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen
and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to
encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.
Question. What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy
of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections
and criticism from China?
Answer. U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979
TRA, which provides that the United States will make available to
Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability. The Act also states that the President and Congress shall
determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services
based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That policy
has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30
years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China's
possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when
making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services
to Taiwan?
Answer. Our decisions about arms sales to Taiwan are based solely
on our assessment of Taiwan's defense needs. The TRA states the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its
claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and
space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in
particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its
excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. In one such incident,
Chinese-flagged ships harassed the USNS Impeccable, a U.S. military
ship conducting ocean surveillance in the international waters of the
South China Sea. That incident underscored the nature of Chinese
maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy
operations in these areas.
What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime
disputes in the South China Sea?
Answer. As the President stated clearly during his trip to Asia
last November and as Secretary Panetta affirmed when he met with
representatives from the ASEAN Defense Ministers meeting in October of
last year, the United States is a Pacific nation with a national
interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime
domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce,
and respect for international law, including in the South China Sea.
The United States does not take a position on the competing
territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea, and I
believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful
means and in accordance with customary international law, without
resorting to the threat or use of force.
At the same time, the United States should continue to call upon
all parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms
consistent with international law. Consistent with international law,
claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived
solely from legitimate claims to land features.
Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China
Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an
increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or
destabilize the situation?
Answer. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence
that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the
South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to
maintain its presence and assert its freedom of navigation and over
flight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary
international law.
Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend
largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military
forces conduct operations to prevent excessive maritime claims asserted
by coastal states from limiting our national interest in freedom of
navigation. In the South China Sea, we have expressed our freedom of
navigation interest for many decades, through diplomatic protests and
operational assertions against excessive maritime claims asserted by
several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive maritime claims
asserted by any nation, including claims by allies and partners. Our
military presence in the South China Sea includes Freedom of Navigation
Operations, Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations, Special Mission Ship
operations, and other routine military transits, operations, and
exercises. The United States should sustain our military presence in
international waters and uphold its commitments to its allies and
partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.
Question. What should the United States do to help prevent
dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?
Answer. To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I
believe the United States should continue to support initiatives and
confidence building measures that will help claimant States reach
agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
Additionally, the United States should continue serving as a positive
example of a nation that adheres to the international norms of safe
conduct, through policy implementation, effective training, and proper
accountability. The United States also continues to robustly exercise
the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement with China as a positive
bilateral mechanism to address operational safety issues in the
maritime domain.
These include the international ``rules of the road'', such as the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and other
established international safety and communication procedures, such as
the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea. The United States should also
encourage all South China Sea claimants to abide by these norms of safe
conduct to ensure greater operational safety and reduce the risk of
dangerous incidents at sea.
Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and
military applications and also represents a potentially substantial
vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing
cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of
U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict
situation.
What is your understanding of China's efforts to develop and deploy
cyber warfare capabilities?
Answer. As with the United States and many other countries around
the world, China fully understands the critical importance of cyber as
an element of modern warfare. Chinese military writing clearly shows
that China views itself at a disadvantage in any potential conflict
with a modern high-tech military, such as that of the United States. To
overcome this disadvantage, China is developing organizations and
capabilities that are designed to reduce the perceived technological
gap. This is done by increasing China's own military technological
capability, and by building capability to target U.S. military space-
based assets and computer networks using network and electronic
warfare. The development of these wartime capabilities are the
motivation for China's efforts at peacetime penetration of U.S.
Government and industry computer systems. The theft of U.S. information
and intellectual property is attractive as a low-cost research and
development tool for China's defense industry, and provides insight
into potential U.S. vulnerabilities. Overall, China's development in
the cyber realm, combined with its other anti-access/area denial
capabilities, imposes significant potential risk on U.S. military
activities.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our
military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a
cyber attack?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be sure to work with other parts of
DOD and interagency partners to include the Departments of State,
Homeland Security, and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach
to cyber threats, not only from China, but from any potential
adversary. While an increased cyber defensive posture is important, it
is not enough for us to build thicker walls and continue to absorb
daily cyber attacks. Defense in itself will not deter our Nation's
adversaries. We must work together as a government to not only defend,
but also to impose costs on our adversaries to deter future
exploitation and attack. These costs we impose cannot simply be
symmetrical cyber activities; a cyber versus cyber fight is not
sustainable in the long-term. As the President stated in his
International Strategy for Cyberspace, we Reserve the right to use all
necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--as
appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order
to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests
against hostile acts on cyberspace. In so doing, we will exhaust all
options before military force whenever we can.
Question. In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit
and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test
creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the
international community. Since then, China has continued its active
pursuit of missile and satellite technology.
What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these
capabilities?
Answer. In my view, this test was just one element of China's
military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military
technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as
for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States' goal is to
promote the responsible use of space.
Question. What do you see as the long-term implications of such
developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for
U.S. interests in space?
Answer. Space systems are vital to our national security and our
economy. In this regard, the United States should seek ways to protect
our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs should be
informed by China's space and counter space capabilities, which have
contributed to today's challenging space environment. I believe we need
to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded
environment. At the same time, the United States should seek to engage
China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of
space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country,
but on the range of actors that add to the increasingly congested,
contested, and competitive environment in space.
Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization
of space and the international agreements to prevent space
weaponization?
Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and
use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act
responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and
mistrust.
Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and
partners. I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the
right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the
right of free passage through space, and the right to protect our
forces and our Nation from those that would use space for hostile
purposes.
taiwan
Question. Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has
involved the readiness and capacity of Taiwan's defensive military
capabilities and the U.S. commitment to do what is ``necessary to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability'' as
required by the TRA. In particular, much of the debate about how best
to enhance Taiwan's current defensive capabilities has revolved around
fighter aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and
appropriate under the circumstances.
What is your view of U.S.-Taiwan security relations?
Answer. Our relations are guided by the TRA stipulation that we
will make available to Taiwan defensive articles and services as
necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
To that end we maintain military-to-military engagement with Taiwan.
Question. What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S.
military assistance to Taiwan?
Answer. We closely monitor the shifting balance in the Taiwan
Strait and Taiwan's defense needs. Given the rapid pace of PRC military
modernization, I believe our priorities should include assisting Taiwan
with its joint operations capabilities and training, streamlining, and
integrating its existing defense programs to be more effective, and
seeking innovative solutions to complement its traditional military
capabilities.
Question. What is your opinion of the TRA? Enacted 33 years ago
this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current
state of affairs in the region? If so, how?
Answer. The TRA, which guides our unofficial relations with Taiwan,
has been in force now for over 30 years and plays a valuable and
important role in our approach to the Asia-Pacific region. As called
for in the TRA, our longstanding policy to assist Taiwan with
maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability helps ensure security
and stability in the region. I would not recommend any changes to the
law.
Question. Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan
Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its
defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage
Taiwan to invest more in its military?
Answer. Taiwan must ensure that it adequately resources its defense
programs and defense transformation, to include looking at increasing
its defense budget. I believe the best way to encourage Taiwan to
invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages
from the U.S. Government to Taiwan.
Question. What military capabilities do you believe would be most
effective in improving Taiwan's self-defense capability over the next 5
to 10 years?
Answer. Capabilities that deter the PRC or increase the Taiwan
military's survivability are critical. No less important, non-materiel
solutions such as improved jointness, training, integration and
innovative solutions will improve Taiwan's defense capability. Finally,
one of the most cost effective solutions Taiwan can adapt from the U.S.
military is to continue developing their NCOs and junior officers--an
invaluable element of our past and future success.
Question. Do you think the United States should sell new F-16 C/D
aircraft to Taiwan?
Answer. The recently announced F-16 A/B upgrades are similar in
capability to new F-16 C/Ds and are an important and much needed
contribution to the capabilities of Taiwan's Air Force. As Taiwan
recapitalizes its air force, it must ensure its future air force is
made more effective by being integrated into a joint construct, by
ensuring that its air defense capability is survivable, and by seeking
other innovative solutions to complement its traditional military
capability.
If confirmed, this is an issue I will continue to evaluate in
coordination with the rest of DOD.
north korea
Question. Despite the death of long-time leader Kim Jong-Il, North
Korea remains one of the greatest near term challenges to security and
stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula
remains a top priority. In fact, with the uncertainties associated with
the ongoing leadership transition, upcoming challenges on the Peninsula
may be even greater.
With the unexpected change in leadership in North Korea, what is
your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean
peninsula?
Answer. Following the death of Kim Jong Il, North Korea so far
appears to be managing the leadership transition from father to son. On
the surface, North Korea appears stable, and Kim Jong Un and his
leadership is primarily focused on domestic matters. However, enduring
U.S. and allied concerns--North Korea's past provocative behavior,
large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of
asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and WMD programs
(including uranium enrichment)--present a serious threat to the United
States, our allies and partners in the region, and the international
community. The change in leadership in North Korea adds to our concerns
as new variables have been added to North Korea's decision-making
process.
Question. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the
United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's potential use of WMD presents a serious
threat. We must ensure our forces are prepared to respond and that
North Korea is deterred from using WMD. North Korea has an ambitious
ballistic missile program that poses a significant threat to the
Pacific region. As witnessed in 2006 and 2009, North Korea continues to
flight-test theater ballistic missiles--demonstrating the capability to
target South Korea and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the
Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space
launch configuration but could also reach the United States if
developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Furthermore,
North Korea continues to develop newer systems--including a solid
propellant short-range ballistic missile and intermediate-range
ballistic missile.
Question. What is your estimate of North Korea's threat of nuclear
proliferation?
Answer. North Korea's continued proliferation efforts pose a
significant threat to the Pacific region and beyond. It is a proven
proliferator of ballistic missiles and associated technologies to
countries like Iran--creating a serious and growing capability to
target U.S. forces and our allies in the Middle East and assisted Syria
in building a covert reactor in the early 2000s, which would have been
capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, we
continue to work with our allies and partners to build a regional
capability to combat WMD.
Question. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if
confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?
Answer. North Korea maintains a large, offensively postured
conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic
missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons, and engages in the
proliferation of ballistic missiles against international norms and
law. North Korea has also conducted provocative attacks against the
Republic of Korea. Most concerning about this range of threats is that
they come from a single state standing on the outside of the
international community. If confirmed as Commander, PACOM, I will drive
intelligence to refine forecasts and warnings, sustain and advance our
military readiness and coordination with allies and partners, and
whether in lead or support, will both seek and welcome opportunities to
apply all means of national power to affect North Korean behavior.
Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report
established a policy and program priority for defending against near-
term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased
Adaptive Approach (PAA) to regional missile defense, including to
defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats.
Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities
established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region
to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats?
Answer. Yes, the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review provides the
PACOM region with an integrated effort to strengthen regional
deterrence architectures against North Korea. It aligns our defensive
strategy, policies and capabilities to the strategic environment. The
implementation of a PAA will strengthen defenses against North Korean
missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners.
PAA will enable regional allies to do more to defend themselves against
a growing North Korean ballistic missile threat. It must be built on
the foundation of strong cooperative relationships with allies and
appropriate burden sharing. Finally, it reinforces the defense of the
Homeland.
republic of korea
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the
U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
Answer. In my view, the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance remains one
of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is
as strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently
reaffirmed by the Secretary during participation in the Security
Consultative Meeting in Seoul on October 28, 2011. Our security
relationship is based on mutual commitment to common interests, shared
values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning, ensuring a
comprehensive strategic alliance.
Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
improve this security relationship?
Answer. As I understand it, DOD and the Republic of Korea continue
to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and to prepare
for the transition of wartime operational control to the Republic of
Korea by December 2015. If confirmed, I would support this continued
realignment and the return of facilities that our forces no longer
require. The United States is also working toward developing new
command and control relationships with Korea, which will ensure that
contingency plans remain appropriate to changing circumstances.
Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean
publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived
from this alliance, and that the United States effectively works with
the Republic of Korea as it plays an increasing role in regional and
global security issues commensurate with the Republic of Korea's
economic status and influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to
maintain close contact with Republic of Korea military leadership and
to build upon the solid foundation developed to date to improve and
transform this important security relationship.
Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of
wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now
planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this
transition takes place as planned?
Answer. I understand that the United States and the Republic of
Korea have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime
operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will work with
Republic of Korea military leadership to complete this process under
the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework, ensuring the transition is
implemented methodically that the combined defense posture remains
strong and seamless.
Question. Do you support increasing the tour lengths of U.S.
personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea to 2- or 3-year tours of
duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel
authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer
assignments? If so, how would you purport to implement such an increase
in accompanied tours?
Answer. I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to
further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and
family members. It was to be implemented on an ``as affordable'' basis
and not according to any specific timeline. However, as Secretary
Panetta has said, DOD is closely evaluating all spending. If confirmed,
I will continue to thoroughly assess the cost of implementation and our
proposed force posture to determine the best way forward.
Question. Are the costs associated with this policy change
affordable in the current fiscal environment?
Answer. In the January 2012 Priorities for 21st Century Defense,
the President announced a necessary rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region. He also emphasized the importance of our existing alliances as
providing a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. If confirmed, I
will continue to assess the costs associated with this policy change
and how they fit into our current fiscal environment.
Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South
Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or
should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or
global deployments?
Answer. In accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of Korea, U.S. presence on the Korean
Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile
actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of
Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further war on the
Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia
region. The U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance is transforming to ensure a
capable and relevant forward presence for the future security
environment. For U.S. forces in Korea, it is my understanding that the
Strategic Alliance 2015 annex on Force Management agreed at the 42nd
Security Consultative Meeting in 2010 provides us flexibility for
regional and global deployments, while assuring we will continue to
meet our commitments to the safety and security of Korea. As Republic
of Korea military forces have served and will continue to serve with
the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan,
and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance
will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.
Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the
force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the
Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change
the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?
Answer. The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces
from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations
south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The
movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River
improves force protection and survivability, placing the majority of
personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of
North Korean artillery. In addition, the move to a central location
outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to
the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves
military readiness on the Korean Peninsula.
Question. Is the relocation plan affordable?
Answer. The majority of costs associated with the Yongsan
Relocation Plan will be paid by the Republic of Korea. Costs associated
with the Land Partnership Plan will be shared between the Republic of
Korea and U.S. and is affordable.
Question. Since the North Korean attacks last year--the sinking of
the South Korea Navy ship Cheonan and the artillery attack on the South
Korean island--South Korea has been adamant that it will responded
``firmly'' to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent
U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly
the Joint Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean
provocations.
What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of
an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances
do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage
North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?
Answer. My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty,
when the political independence or security of South Korea or the
United States are threatened by external armed attack, the United
States and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate
means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of
North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult
closely so that responses are effective.
japan
Question. How would you characterize the current U.S.-Japan
security relationship?
Answer. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security
in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and
prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the
turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and at
times contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised as a truly
global alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a
complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance
Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions,
and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability,
and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. In terms
of our military-to-military relationship, the shared experience of U.S.
and Japanese forces, working should-to-shoulder in response to the
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis of last spring validated our
continuing close cooperation and mutual respect.
Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional
neighbors, mainly China, North Korea, and South Korea influence the
U.S.-Japan relationship?
Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to continue to maintain
and further develop constructive relations with all of its neighbors.
Japan and other East Asian nations can and should increase their
security cooperation. Working with other U.S. allies and partners in
the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and
prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and
essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important
regional security architectures. Progress made to bolster trilateral
security dialogues in Northeast Asia effectively links Japan, U.S., and
South Korean approaches.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to
become a more active partner in security activities with the United
States and in the international security arena?
Answer. Japan is already a strong security partner with the United
States, and is increasingly contributing to international security
activities; however, the changing security environment in Asia will
present new challenges. The United States needs to continue to work
with Japan to deal with these challenges, including greater
interoperability between our Armed Forces at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would encourage
Japan's development of joint doctrine and organizations that will
enhance Japan's ability to undertake complex missions to build security
in East Asia. I would also encourage trilateral security cooperation
with the Republic of Korea and with Australia, as these kinds of
activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the
emerging regional security architecture. Regarding international
security activity, Japan has actively participated in combined
counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, is participating in the
United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and has been a significant donor
to ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction. I believe participation in such
international security operations are very positive developments, and
would encourage future Japanese participation in such missions.
Question. What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint
development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense
interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the
United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?
Answer. Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a
success story for the alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of
both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our
most important ballistic missile defense partners and U.S.-Japan
bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important
role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM3
Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a
significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.
Question. Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United
States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air
Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. marines from Okinawa to
Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp
Schwab on Okinawa. The plan to build the FRF has run into difficulties
and, as a result, the closure of Futenma and the movement of marines
remain uncertain.
What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful
construction of the FRF at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?
Answer. I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S.
Government, remains committed to the principles of the 2006 Realignment
Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the FRF
will not be constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears
to be incremental but positive movement towards the construction of a
replacement facility at Camp Schwab. The GOJ submission of the
environmental impact statement to the prefectural Government of Okinawa
in December 2011 was a necessary and politically significant step
forward. The U.S. Government is committed to working with the GOJ in
taking the next step prior to the start of construction, securing the
Governor's approval for the landfill permit.
Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States
and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam
and to cover the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S.
forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?
Answer. I believe the cost-sharing arrangements with the GOJ to be
among the best we have. Under the terms of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap
and the 2009 Guam International Agreement, Japan committed to providing
up to $6.09 billion (in fiscal year 2008 dollars) for the relocation of
marines to Guam. For the GOJ this was an unprecedented step, funding
the construction of facilities for the use of U.S. Forces on U.S.
sovereign territory. To date, the GOJ has provided $834 million towards
fulfillment of that commitment. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ
is paying the lion's share of the costs to develop new facilities. In
April 2011, we entered into a new, 5-year host nation support agreement
with Japan that maintained the overall level of support we receive from
Japan for labor and utilities, while for the first time putting a floor
on the amount the GOJ provides for facilities construction.
Question. How, in your view, does building a new airfield on
Okinawa, one that is opposed by a large segment of the population on
Okinawa and could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least
$3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and
the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?
Answer. The Government of Japan and the United States agreed to
construct a FRF at Camp Schwab, in conjunction with reducing the number
of U.S. Forces on Okinawa and consolidating U.S. basing on the island.
FRF will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, which
is located in a very densely populated portion of Okinawa. At the same
time, the plan preserves U.S. Forces' ability to meet our security
commitments to Japan, in accordance with the Mutual Security Treaty.
Thus, when fully executed, this new force posture will improve U.S.-
Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in
particular.
india
Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India
security relations?
Answer. A close, continuing, and expanding security relationship
with India will be important for security and stability in Asia and for
effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the 21st century. The
United States and India have a range of common security interests that
include maritime security, counterterrorism, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a
rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was
once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has evolved into
a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent security powers
in Asia. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing,
including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense
trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. Efforts over the
past 10 years have focused on relationship-building and establishing
the foundation for a long-term partnership. The strong ties between our
two militaries reflect this. The United States remains committed to a
broad defense trade relationship that enables transfers of some of our
most advanced technologies to assist India's military with its
modernization efforts. Having said this, India has a long history of
non alignment and is firmly committed to its policy of strategic
autonomy. The continued growth of our partnership should be focused on
working closely on common interests in a true partnership, rather than
attempting to build a U.S.-India bilateral alliance in the traditional
sense.
Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. India is essential to achieving long-term U.S. goals for
regional economic development, security and stability, and wide-ranging
cooperation to counter extremism and radicalization. If confirmed, I
believe our priorities for this relationship should focus on increasing
maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military
relationship, and deepening cooperation on defense trade and
production. I believe there is potential for cooperating on
counterproliferation, collaborating on humanitarian assistance and
disaster response, countering piracy, cooperating on counterterrorism,
greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards
stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.
Question. What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if
any, of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?
Answer. The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark
agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral
relationship. The agreement deepened the level of trust between the
United States and India and will have positive effects on DOD interests
leading to greater military-to-military cooperation and increased
defense trade. Successful implementation of this agreement will serve
to deepen U.S.-India ties.
Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India
and China and how does that relationship impact the security and
stability of the region?
Answer. The current relationship between the region's two fastest
growing powers, India and China, is complicated by a trust deficit
stemming from China's longstanding relationship with Pakistan, India's
defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and increasing competition for
resources. The ongoing border dispute, trade imbalances and competition
for influence across South and Southeast Asia complicate efforts to
reduce the mistrust. Regional states exploit the competitive Sino-
Indian relationship, seeking favorable aid packages from New Delhi and
Beijing to enable their own development. New Delhi and Beijing do find
common ground and cooperate in international forums such as BRICS, the
G20, and in Climate Change Conferences where both countries leverage
their convergent interests to shape international trade rules to ensure
their continued domestic development and economic growth.
Question. What do you believe the United States should do to assist
the Indian Government in the prevention of and response to terrorist
events in India?
Answer. As the world's largest democracy, I believe India is a
critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the
United States share a strong interest in preventing terrorism. The
United States can continue to work with the Government of Pakistan to
take effective action against groups based in Pakistan that advocate
and actively participate in attacks against India. As to capacity
building, counterterrorism efforts in India are primarily a Ministry of
Home Affairs responsibility that employs domestic intelligence assets
in conjunction with police and paramilitary forces. Therefore,
counterterrorism cooperation with India is through a whole-of-
government approach led by the Departments of State (via the
Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative) and Homeland Security (via the
Homeland Security Dialogue), with support from the Department of
Justice and DOD. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense in support of this whole-of-government approach to
address counterterrorism efforts with India in the areas they request
support or seek to expand the relationship.
Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship
between India and Pakistan?
Answer. India and Pakistan have a long and complex history
characterized by animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Support by elements
of Pakistan's military and intelligence services for violent extremist
organizations targeting India strains the relationship; this support
has the potential to result in military confrontation which could
rapidly escalate to a nuclear exchange. Current efforts at dialogue
have yielded few concrete results on the core security issues,
especially regarding the resolution of territorial disputes; however,
the efforts have provided each side greater insight into the other's
positions. While progress is slow, the trajectory is positive and
offers the promise of increased confidence-building measures.
Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between
Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia
generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?
Answer. India's actions in South and Central Asia generally align
with U.S. goals--increasing economic growth and political stability
through strengthened democratic institutions, and developmental
assistance to help prevent radicalization. Regional stability depends
on cooperation among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Transparency in
the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relationships
is critical to reduce misunderstanding and mistrust between India and
Pakistan. The ongoing transition of lead responsibility for security in
Afghanistan to Afghan forces and the strategic partnerships Afghanistan
has been negotiating with the United States and other international
partners are important steps toward demonstrating long-term commitment
of the international community, addressing conditions that create
uncertainty, and stabilizing the region.
republic of the philippines
Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine
military relations?
Answer. The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty
allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing
regional challenges characteristic of current geostrategic realities.
Our alliance is strong and is the foundation of our security
partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the
Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security
forces (military, coast guard, and police) to better address security
needs as evident by enhanced counterterrorism performance, expanded
maritime security activities, increased multilateral engagement, and
effective participation in UN Peacekeeping operations.
Question. What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the
Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?
Answer. The primary goal of the United States should be to
strengthen the alliance with the Philippines and assist them in
building and maintaining the capabilities of their security forces. Our
alliances in the Pacific, such as what we have with the Philippines,
are the bedrock of U.S. security strategy within the region as we face
common threats. A Philippines that is capable of mitigating terrorist
threats, providing a secure maritime environment that ensures freedom
of navigation within its sub-region, and leading multilateral
approaches towards regional peace and stability will enable it to
fulfill its treaty obligations to the United States, directly benefit
U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to regional
security and stability.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. military efforts in the
Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being provided
to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?
Answer. U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines are
in support of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to which both
sides are committed. The United States, however, does not assist the
Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups, e.g. the New
People's Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The Philippines
was the first country in Asia to support the United States after
September 11 in fighting terrorism. In this regard, U.S. military
assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by
assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than
those needed to adequately help and protect its civilian populations.
It is the Philippine Government's prerogative to assert its
capabilities and resources where needed in conducting its internal
security operations.
Question. Do you anticipate a reduced U.S. military footprint or
change in mission for U.S. military forces in the Philippines in the
near- to mid-term?
Answer. The United States and the Philippines are discussing
arrangements that will allow greater flexibility for U.S. and
Philippine security forces to train and work together. This may, on a
rotational basis, increase U.S. military engagement with the
Philippines in the near to mid-term.
Question. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if
confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in
combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?
Answer. Current U.S. guidelines in place for the conduct of U.S.
forces in the Philippines adequately address the roles and
responsibilities of our military forces. All U.S. military personnel
are in the Philippines under the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces
Agreement and operate under the auspices of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual
Defense Board and Security Engagement Board.
Their activities, which will always be in consultation with, and
agreement by, the Philippine Government, are limited to conducting
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response; assisting Philippine
security forces improve their capacity and capability including
training and upgrading equipment; and supporting Philippine
counterterrorism operations through activities such as intelligence
fusion, and sustainment support. Additionally, U.S. forces are
prohibited from engaging in combat without prejudice to their right of
self defense.
indonesia
Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim
country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on
opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where
possible. In July 2010, Secretary Gates announced that DOD intended to
resume working with elements of the Indonesian Special Forces, known as
Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than
a decade because of past human rights violations by some of its
members.
What is your view of the current state of military-to-military
relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?
Answer. In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the
U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad
partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with
Indonesia--a pivotal country to U.S. national interests--is managed
through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through
several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with
Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with over 140
theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal year.
These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of
activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, Maritime Security
and continued professionalization/reform of the Indonesian Defense
Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of military-to-military
relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and evolved
from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex
bilateral and multilateral activities.
In addressing the current state of military-to-military relations
with the Indonesian Army Special Forces (known as Kopassus), it is
worth noting that this unit has undergone a near-complete
transformation over the past decade and is at the forefront of TNI
professionalization and adherence to human rights standards. Following
a 12-year hiatus in bilateral activities, at the direction of then
Secretary Gates, PACOM established a measured and gradual program of
security cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security
cooperation activities have consisted of key leader engagements and
small-scale subject matter expert exchanges in areas such as military
decision making, medical planning, law of war, and safeguarding human
rights. I expect future activities of this type to continue and
gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress
in TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform
efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders
to then Secretary Gates in 2010 to continue to safeguard human rights
and accountability throughout the Indonesian military through the
unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those military personnel
accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from
Military Service.
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the
Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the war
on terrorism?
Answer. Based on my current understanding, the Government of
Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the United States
and our partners in combating global terrorist networks in the region.
The Government of Indonesia has shown tremendous success in arresting
and convicting terrorists. Additionally, Indonesia has leveraged its
leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) by electing to co-chair the Executive Working Group on
Counterterrorism with the United States in the ASEAN Defense Ministers
Meeting Plus forum. This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional
counterterrorism cooperation, reinforce military support to civil
authorities, build capacity and collectively address regional security
issues in an open consultative forum.
Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-
military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-
military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership,
guided by close consultation with the Departments of State and Defense,
and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I believe close
military-to-military relations with Indonesia are integral to achieving
numerous stated U.S. national interests in the region. I also believe
that one of the most effective methods for encouraging reform is
through interaction between Indonesian and U.S. servicemembers.
Regardless of their mission, any interactions with U.S. servicemembers
reinforce professional military practices, to include respect for human
rights and the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater
understanding and reinforce professional values.
Question. What is your understanding of the factors that informed
the decision to re-engage with Kopassus members?
Answer. It is my understanding that the decision to begin a
measured and gradual re-engagement with Kopassus within the limits of
U.S. law was intended to acknowledge the significant progress made by
the TNI over the past decade and encourage continued reform within the
TNI. Essential to this decision to move ahead with Kopassus were the
commitments made by the Government of Indonesia to protect human rights
and advance TNI accountability.
Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian
military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces,
adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and
cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute
those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?
Answer. Indonesian defense reform progressed at a rapid pace after
the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, with the separation of
the police from the military, the elimination of formal political roles
for the TNI, increased accountability, and the establishment of
widespread human rights training initiatives. While reform efforts
appear to have slowed, they have notably not reversed. According to
several public opinion polls, the TNI enjoys the respect of the
majority of the Indonesian populace. In fact, TNI often is the most
respected of government institutions. This is a concrete indicator of
progress. Continued reforms that the United States should continue to
encourage include accountability for past human rights abuses,
strengthening civilian control and oversight of the military, and
continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for
human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support TNI's continued progress by
encouraging senior Indonesian leaders to fulfill their stated
commitments with particular emphasis on accountability, transparency
and respect for human rights. We can accomplish this through bilateral
security discussions, joint training, military assistance, including
military training programs. I view U.S. interaction with TNI
counterparts as an effective, indeed essential, method to encourage
professionalism and continued reform within the Indonesian military.
burma
Question. Recent developments in Burma suggest that the government
may be willing to take steps toward meaningful reform.
What is your understanding of the current security situation in
Burma and, if confirmed, what would be your approach toward Burma?
Answer. While there have been very encouraging signs of reform and
positive government intentions, Burma still faces many challenges in
its road to reform, and there are still many obstacles in the U.S.-
Burma relationship that must be overcome. The Department of State
remains the lead agency in all U.S. engagement with Burma.
operational access and freedom of action
Question. Much has been made in recent years of the development of
anti-access/area denial capabilities of certain countries, and the
impact such capabilities might have on the United States' freedom of
action and ability to project power.
What is your understanding of the emerging challenges associated
with anti-access and area denial strategies in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. As discussed in the Defense Strategic Guidance released in
January, ``China will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter
our power projection capabilities.'' This would include PRC pursuit of
anti-access/area denial strategies. The United States maintains robust
regional and global power projection capabilities that provide a full
range of options to succeed in defense of national interests and of our
allies. To this end, if confirmed, I will work closely with OSD and the
Services in support of policy and programmatic inputs based on assessed
operational risk, to ensure we have the ability to project power
throughout the theater and preserve the capabilities necessary to
maneuver within it.
Question. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) released on
January 17 this year broadly describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff's intent for how joint forces will respond to the operational
challenges associated with potential adversaries' anti-access and area
denial capabilities.
What, in your view, is the JOAC's contribution to better
understanding and dealing with the challenges of military operations in
the PACOM AOR?
Answer. The JOAC's primary contributions are illuminating the
variety of challenges for which U.S. forces must be prepared across an
increasingly diverse and rapidly evolving set of domains--air, sea,
land, space, and cyber--and identifying Cross-Domain Synergy as the
central tenet for addressing these challenges in order to assure
operational access.
Question. The JOAC identifies 33 capabilities required for its
implementation, but this list of capabilities is not exhaustive nor is
it prioritized.
In view of the PACOM mission, how would you prioritize the required
capabilities listed in the JOAC and what capabilities, if any, would
you add?
Answer. Because achieving unity of effort at all echelons within
the U.S. Armed Forces is central to Cross-Domain Synergy, I would
prioritize capabilities required for situational awareness and command
and control, especially across domains. I would add the capability to
develop, exercise, and validate potential lines of operation across the
Government as a whole during pre-, post- and ongoing hostility phases
in a manner that complements military activities.
Question. What new technologies would you suggest DOD pursue in
order to develop or improve these capabilities?
Answer. In general, I would suggest pursuit of technologies that
improve situational awareness, command and control, and interagency
coordination.
Question. With respect to air, sea and land capabilities, some
proponents of the ``air-sea battle'' concept appear to de-emphasize
ground combat forces.
Answer. This concept looks at ways to improve our inter-Service
coordination and ability to counter developing challenges but it does
not discount the contribution of ground forces.
There are numerous potential operations in the PACOM AOR that could
require ground forces. Decisiveness in an operation or campaign still
requires the credible threat of land combat forces that can physically
threaten an adversary, seize and/or hold ground.
Question. What are your views on the requirement for land forces
before, during, and after operations to gain and maintain assured
access?
Answer. Land forces are necessary for all phases of an operation,
including peacetime, steady-state. Most notably, in Phase 0 Shaping,
land forces are critical to tangibly demonstrating U.S. commitment to
allies and partners as well as resolve to potential adversaries. Land
forces, as an integrated part of the joint force, engage with allies
and partners in the region to influence, train with, and improve the
capabilities and integration of those capabilities enabling allies and
partners to better defend themselves against aggression. Ground forces
allow rapid and effective response, not only to conflict, but also to
natural disasters and humanitarian crises. A recurring theme in U.S.
military engagement is that, while our peer competitors may provide
money in an attempt to buy influence, most militaries identify with and
attempt to emulate the United States in doctrine, professionalism, and
values. This is principally due to the one-on-one contact and influence
that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen have
with their counterparts of all ranks in exercises and training events
throughout the year.
During conflict, we must be able to credibly project ground forces
in a maritime environment consisting of numerous islands,
archipelagoes, and littoral population centers. Expeditionary land
forces provide indispensible capabilities which complement our navy and
air forces in the region. Land force headquarters and staffs also
provide a Joint Task Force command and control capability that is
necessary to pursue multiple operations simultaneously, a necessity for
a region that spans 51 percent of the globe. If conflict arises, these
same ground forces would be called on to not only make gains but
consolidate those gains in the aftermath.
Question. What, in your view, are the required size and
capabilities for ground combat forces in the Pacific region, and what
capabilities, if any, may be needed to improve their effectiveness?
Answer. The President's new Strategic Guidelines now clearly
establish the Asia-Pacific as the strategic focus. As we assess our
increased commitment to the region, the Department will more precisely
determine the required size and capabilities necessary for ground
combat, and other forces.
Broadly speaking, however, we can categorize potential needed
improvements in basing, mobility, and technologies.
Traditionally, basing focused on threats in Northeast
Asia. Adequate basing throughout Asia is necessary to address
the whole of the region.
The vastness of the Asia-Pacific means that forces
throughout the region must have adequate mobility in the form
of sealift and air transportation to allow them to engage,
train, and respond to disasters in Phase 0, as well as to fight
during contingencies.
Given the vastness of the region, deployment of
technologies in the form of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets that allow timely and continuous
situational awareness are required. This enables the rapid and
focused application of limited resources to the point of
necessity. Movement of men, weapons, and equipment is measured
in days and weeks in the Pacific theater. Area denial systems
and tactics make that even more difficult without the
technologies to observe and accurately assess the actions of
potential adversaries.
high altitude transition plan
Question. DOD, under the High Altitude Transition (HAT) Plan,
intends to retire the U-2 ISR fleet in the middle of this decade and
replace these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ-4. Under the HAT Plan,
the RQ-4s will apparently be a PACOM-wide asset, flying missions
throughout the region, whereas the U-2s have been dedicated to
supporting U.S. and Korean forces on the Korean peninsula. The United
States and Republic of Korea have been considering a Republic of Korea
purchase of the Global Hawk aircraft through the Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) process. If this FMS case were to proceed, much but not all of
the impact of U-2 retirement would be mitigated, but either way the
level of airborne ISR available on a day-to-day basis in Korea may well
be diminished.
In your assessment, is the possibility that the level of airborne
ISR available on a day-to-day basis will be diminished a concern, or
are there other means to compensate for the retirement of the U-2?
Answer. The possibility of diminished ISR capacity in PACOM is a
concern. As the Defense Strategic Guidance shifts focus toward the
Asia-Pacific region, I expect that PACOM ISR requirements will grow.
While we depend on our allies and partners to contribute to our ISR in
the region, the U-2 is a unique platform with capabilities that cannot
currently be duplicated by other collection platforms.
Question. If the sale does not go through, how would you propose
that the United States sustain required levels of airborne ISR support
on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. If the FMS process were curtailed, if confirmed, I would
closely consider recommendations keeping the U-2 on the Korean
peninsula until a similar capability is fully operational. The U-2
provides USFK a deep look multi-intelligence collection capability that
supports both U.S. and Republic of Korea daily intelligence
requirements. However, without FMS to the Republic of Korea, PACOM's
strategic flexibility to respond to requirements outside the Korean
peninsula may be limited.
Question. What will happen if Global Hawk is cancelled or curtailed
as part of the budget process?
Answer. If Global Hawk is divested, I am concerned about how the
impact of losing these platforms translates into an overall reduction
of available ISR worldwide. The removal of these assets would likely
result in a rebalancing of global assets that could translate into a
decrease of ISR capacity in the Pacific Theater. Furthermore, the
second order effect from such a decision has the potential to impact
critical strategic relationships with our allies and partners. Given
the Defense Strategic Guidance's increased focus toward the Asia-
Pacific, any potential reduction of ISR capacity warrants detailed
assessment.
united nations peacekeeping operations
Question. A number of the Nations in the PACOM AOR contribute large
numbers of police and troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations.
What role, if any, do you believe PACOM should play with regard to
engaging the troops from Asia-Pacific nations which contribute to
peacekeeping missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue engagement with Asia-Pacific
nations in regards to peacekeeping contributions. This is another venue
for military-to-military cooperation that allows us to increase partner
capacity in military capability, professionalism, and increased
awareness of human rights issues such as the protection of civilians in
a U.N. mission area. It is in our best interest that countries
contributing peacekeepers provide quality troops that are capable,
respected, and have the requisite tactical and technical ability, and
will enforce the U.N. mandate of that particular mission.
counterpiracy operations
Question. Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the
waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the
international coalition engaged in counterpiracy operations. Even
before our engagement off the coast of Somalia, DOD worked with our
Asian partners to address piracy in Southeast Asia, including the
Strait of Malacca.
What is your understanding of the current threat of piracy in the
Asia-Pacific region?
Answer. Piracy in the PACOM AOR exists in the Strait of Malacca and
South China Sea. Somali-based piracy also migrates eastward to the
PACOM AOR across the Indian Ocean to the vicinity of India and the
Maldives.
Question. What role, if any, should PACOM play in countering piracy
in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. Continued PACOM focus on enabling Asian partners to be
successful in counterpiracy efforts through education, training, and
exercises is vitally important. Current efforts are focused on
employing resources via partner nation engagement to increase the
effectiveness ally and partner nation forces as well as continuing
development of information sharing to locate, isolate, and defeat
piracy as it surfaces within the AOR. This process of developing the
capabilities of our Asian partners proved very effective in reversing
the piracy threat within the Strait of Malacca.
combating terrorism
Question. Last year, the administration released its National
Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups
``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
Asia.''
If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to
counter terrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, PACOM will continue highly successful ``by,
with, and through'' approaches to counterterrorism that have produced
measurable success in the Asia-Pacific region. These efforts rely on a
capacity, capability, and network building approach that emphasizes
working together with regional host nation partners, other U.S.
Government agencies, and key allies, such as the Australians, to deny
al Qaeda, adherents, affiliates, and associated forces the ability to
operate in the region.
Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda
and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?
Answer. The threat of attack by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and like-
minded groups and individuals against U.S. and partner nation interests
in the PACOM AOR is still a serious concern. The possible re-emergence
of other terrorist organizations, like Jamaah Islamia and the Abu
Sayaaf Group, that have been weakened but not defeated by the
counterterror efforts of our allies and partners could quickly affect
the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Other
decentralized groups and individuals ideologically linked to al Qaeda,
as well as organizations based primarily outside the PACOM AOR like
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, desire to support their agendas by conducting
destabilizing attacks inside the region. Additionally, al Qaeda
affiliated groups operate in the PACOM AOR using facilitation networks
that support threats to U.S. interests throughout the world.
Question. Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal
networks in the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. Yes, there is a nexus and it is a serious impediment to
regional stability. Transnational crime and terrorism thrive on common
enablers such as illicit transportation networks, weapons trafficking,
corruption, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and movement of
money to support nefarious activities. These threats impact political,
social, and economic systems by eroding the rule of law and undermining
the legitimacy of governments and institutions.
Question. In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and
Indonesia, U.S. engagement with partner nations has helped combat
violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of
operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building,
development, and information support operations has dramatically
reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.
What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat
the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?
Answer. The United States should sustain current engagements with
individual nations in the region and continually look for opportunities
to assist with ally and partner efforts. Additionally, we should foster
multilateral efforts, specifically through organizations like the
Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), to build regional
networks that deny transnational violent extremist and global terrorist
facilitation networks the ability to operate within or through
Southeast Asia.
Question. Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the
fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United
States do to enhance relations with those countries?
Answer. Even though Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines
have seen tremendous counterterrorism successes, they remain vulnerable
to violent extremism through radicalization and recruitment and are
potential terrorist safe havens. Additionally, Malaysia and Thailand
have been used as facilitation hubs by violent extremist organizations
that operate across the region. On behalf of the U.S. effort, PACOM
should maintain its robust presence and continue its ``by, with, and
through'' engagement strategy in Southeast Asia.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support
(including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces,
irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military
operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this
authority?
Answer. It is my understanding that section 1208 funding is most
effective in the CENTCOM AOR, and currently limited in its application
in PACOM. I understand it is an extremely effective authority and if
confirmed, I will work with DOD to identify any potential requirements
appropriate for using 1208 authority.
department of defense counternarcotics activities
Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the
capacity of certain foreign governments in Asia and around the globe,
and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.
What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?
Answer. DOD Counternarcotics and Global Threats program is a
capabilities-based, mission-focused, fully integrated effort that
provides a comprehensive structure to support U.S. Government agencies
principally responsible for securing the health and safety of U.S.
citizens. These agencies strive to effectively disrupt and degrade
national security threats posed by drug trafficking, transnational
organized crime, threat finance networks, piracy, and any potential
nexus among these activities.
Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are
multidimensional threats. In addition to the impact on our Nation's
public health and economy, drug trafficking, and other forms of
transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists
and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and
contribute to international instability.
Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West) executes PACOM's CN
program. Funded with approximately $30.4 million out of the CN budget,
JIATF West focuses their efforts on Asian, Iranian, Eurasian and other
transnational criminal organizations that operate within the PACOM AOR
while also conducting detection and monitoring of illicitly trafficked
Asian-sourced precursor chemicals used for the production of
methamphetamine, particularly precursor chemical shipments to the
Western Hemisphere.
Question. What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics
industry in Asia?
Answer. Methamphetamine produced using diverted precursor
chemicals, heroin trans-shipment through Asia, poppy cultivation, and
potential narco-terrorist funding remain the principle drug threats to
the United States from the Asia-Pacific region.
Methamphetamine precursors produced in Asia are the primary source
of required chemicals used to produce methamphetamine trafficked to the
U.S. Southwest Border violence is fueled by the Mexican Cartel's battle
to control this market.
South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly attractive as
bases for drug trafficking organizations' production and smuggling
operations. Several Asian and Pacific nations have experienced an
increase in the production, trans-shipment, trafficking, and
consumption of narcotics in recent years.
JIATF West's detection and monitoring efforts support U.S. and
partner nations' law enforcement agencies in combating this threat. In
fiscal year 2011, their interagency collaborative efforts resulted in
the seizure of over 1,000 metric tons of meth precursor chemicals bound
for the Western Hemisphere and were critical in interrupting
distribution to U.S. markets while contributing to the disruption of
Asian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Conservatively, 1,000
metric tons of precursors equate to approximately 220 metric tons of
methamphetamine with a street value of $23.2 billion.
Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering--either
directly or and with our Asian partners--the illegal narcotics industry
in Asia?
Answer. I believe the current DOD role is appropriate. The
Department serves as the single lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking of illicit drugs flowing
toward the United States. In addition, DOD plays a critical role in
supporting U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for
counterdrug and drug-related activities, primarily through information
sharing and building partner nation security capacity. In cooperation
with the U.S. interagency and foreign partners, DOD conducts activities
to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in
Asia and the Pacific.
law of the sea
Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea? If so, why?
Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
It is in the enduring interests of the United States to be at the
forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's
oceans. U.S. accession to the Convention would send an additional,
clear signal to the world that we remain committed to advancing the
rule of law at sea. Additionally, under the Convention, the United
States would have the firmest possible legal foundation for the rights,
freedoms, and uses of the sea needed to project power, reassure allies
and partners, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed
combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication that
underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.
Question. Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific
region? If so, how?
Answer. U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would
benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region by
enabling the United States to reinforce and assert the Convention's
rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea, including the right of innocent
passage of U.S. warships through the territorial seas of other nations,
the right of transit passage of U.S. warships and aircraft in strategic
straits, and the freedom of U.S. forces to conduct a wide range of
military activities beyond the territorial seas of any coastal state.
In addition, becoming a party to the Convention would support combined
operations with regional partners and demonstrate our commitment to
conduct Proliferation Security Initiative activities consistent with
international law; establish undisputed title to our extended
continental shelf areas; strengthen our position in bilateral
discussions with the People's Republic of China; and bolster our
leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession
would also improve the United States' position and add to our
credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where
Law of the Sea matters are discussed.
It is important to note that the United States was one of the
leaders of the Conventions' negotiations and our national interests--as
both a coastal nation and maritime nation--are reflected in its
provisions. Consequently, accession by the United States would send a
powerful and affirmative message to the international community that
the United States believes the legal regime reflected in the Convention
is worth supporting and upholding against any nation that might seek to
manipulate the ordinary and intended meaning of certain provisions in
its self-interest. In short, ratification would enhance stability for
international maritime rules and the freedom of access for U.S. forces
in the PACOM AOR to execute assigned missions.
pow/mia accounting efforts
Question. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the
recovery and identification of remains of missing military members.
Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the
Korean War, and the Vietnam war continues to be a high priority.
Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 requires that the Secretary of Defense ensure that sufficient
resources, personnel, and funds are provided to attain at least 200
identifications per year by fiscal year 2015.
What is your view of the Department's and the POW/MIA community's
ability to achieve this goal?
Answer. While Department leaders have made a significant increase
in resources available to meet the requirement, the goal of reaching
200 identifications a year remains a challenge. JPAC has been funded to
hire an additional 253 personnel (civilians and military). I understand
the JPAC Commander and his team are working to increase efficiencies
and find new scientific ways of making identifications. DOD, in its
review of its budget requirements for fiscal years 2012-2016, fully
resourced JPAC's requirements in its efforts to reach 200
identifications by 2015. However, real world events and current budget
deliberations could alter actual funding received affect attainment of
JPAC's mandated goal.
Question. On October 20, 2011, DOD announced an agreement with
North Korea that will allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to
resume recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers missing from the
Korean War. Recovery operations in North Korea were suspended in 2005.
What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume
recovery operations in North Korea?
Answer. During the first quarter of fiscal year 2012, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel
Office negotiated an arrangement with North Korea to conduct joint
operations in 2012 to recover the remains of American personnel. JPAC
had previously conducted operations in North Korea; however operations
were suspended in 2005 due to rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
JPAC has committed to conduct its mission in North Korea and is
currently preparing to conduct four Joint Field Activities in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea during this calendar year.
Question. How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North
Korea impact the future of the Six Party talks or the stability on the
Korean Peninsula?
Answer. The resumption of recovery operations in North Korea is not
linked to the future of the Six Party talks or to stability on the
Korean Peninsula.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the PACOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, the JPAC Commander and his team will have my
full support. The noble mission of JPAC and the U.S. Government's
commitment to accounting for missing servicemembers from past conflicts
are a powerful signal to our Nation's military and their families that
we believe strongly in the return of our fallen heroes. Proper
resourcing for JPAC missions and force protection for personnel
participating in recovery efforts will be a personal priority.
In the context of maintaining and improving PACOM's engagement
strategy, and fully recognizing the POW/MIA effort as humanitarian, I
will establish an environment to encourage full cooperation in host
nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce
U.S. Government priorities as I meet and talk with national leaders.
Because JPAC's mission is worldwide, I will work to ensure JPAC's
resources and accounting efforts are available and focused not only in
PACOM's AOR but as globally as appropriate.
foreign language policy
Question. In 2005, DOD approved the Defense Language Transformation
Roadmap to improve the Department's foreign language capability and
regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working
toward implementing that roadmap.
Does PACOM have access to enough foreign language experts to ensure
good intelligence assessments?
Answer. While there are shortages in some languages, overall there
are sufficient linguists for non-crisis intelligence assessments.
During a significant crisis, existing foreign language resources will
be hard pressed to maintain the current level of quality intelligence
collection and assessments.
Question. In your view, how should the United States expand the
foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to
improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the
Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?
Answer. Greater emphasis and incentives should be placed on
recruiting both civilian and military personnel with existing language
capability and regional expertise. Improvements to machine translation
tools should be resourced so that they can be used routinely to provide
first draft translations/interpretations to increase productivity of
the linguist workforce.
counterthreat finance
Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
Community have called for investing significantly more resources in
identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist
networks and illicit trafficking.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counterthreat finance
activities?
Answer. DOD has tremendous ISR assets that are invaluable in
identifying and defining threat finance networks and characterizing
those networks critical vulnerabilities. This information can then
support and enable our interagency partners' counterthreat finance
actions, be shared with partner nations to allow them to defeat threat
finance activities within their own borders, and help drive bilateral
and multi-lateral engagement strategies. We have unique access and
placement through our military-to-military engagements that allow us to
work closely in collaboration with the interagency to provide training
and advice to partner nations on counterthreat finance and to bolster
their capabilities. These and other DOD capabilities will ensure, in
close coordination with other U.S. Government departments and agencies,
that threat finance networks do not threaten our national security.
Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to
other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
threat finance activities?
Answer. With the understanding that an enemy's financial capability
is the linchpin to their operational capability, I believe we should
expand our support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies.
As we continue to further detect and define the various and numerous
threat finance networks that support adversaries around the globe, a
whole-of-government approach is the only way to contain and defeat
these threats to national security. Different U.S. Government
departments and agencies each have authorities to attack these networks
from different directions. DOD, can be a major enabler and supporter of
these agencies in the execution of their authorities.
Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a
debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern
their nations and provide opportunities for their people.
Do you think expanding counterthreat finance activities in the
Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role--if any--
should DOD play in those activities?
Answer. Within the Asia-Pacific region, the threat finance
environment is extremely complex, diverse and growing, encompassing
terrorism, proliferation, narcotics trafficking, transnational
organized criminal groups, and other threat finance networks which
threaten the security and stability of the region. Countering these
threat finance activities is critical and we should examine the
potential expansion of counterthreat finance capabilities in the
region.
quality of life
Question. Combatant commanders have an interest in the quality of
life of military personnel and their families assigned within their
AOR.
In your view, what is the role and responsibility of combatant
commanders for the quality of life of personnel assigned to their AOR?
Answer. The combatant commander is a strong advocate for programs
which will ensure the needs of our servicemembers and their families
continue to be met, even during an era of fiscal constraint. The
commander advocates for sustainment of critical quality of life
programs and for improvement where needed in the quality of life (QoL)
of assigned personnel. The commander ensures that QoL issues are
articulated to community leaders, military installation commanders, DOD
policymakers, and Members of Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to enhance quality of
life programs for military members and their families within the PACOM
AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make QoL for the servicemembers and
families of PACOM a top priority; our servicemembers and their families
deserve nothing less. People are our most important resource and
constant focus on QoL initiatives is vital to effectively implementing
a ``partnership, readiness, and presence'' strategy in the region.
Tailored and effective QoL programs and services demonstrate our
commitment to our personnel, both at home and deployed, by
appropriately supporting their service and providing for their
families. Our fighting forces deserve exceptional access to such QoL
programs and services; I stand committed to ensuring they get them.
Question. What is your view of the challenges associated with
global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in
the PACOM AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD
schools)?
Answer. The biggest challenge will be preserving the QoL for our
servicemembers and their families while we realign our forces in
theater. Throughout the transition process, we should focus efforts on
maintaining quality housing, DOD schools, commissary and exchange
services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life,
family and community support programs for our people. We should sustain
current levels of service during the transformation and ensure to the
greatest extent possible that these systems are in place before
families arrive in an area.
joint professional military education
Question. What is your assessment of the value of and current
requirements for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) for
military officers? What changes, if any, would you recommend in this
regard?
Answer. I believe that the last 10 years of conflict have proven
the value of JPME for our military officer corps. Our joint forces have
made huge strides in synchronizing their efforts and capabilities to
bring about desired effects on the battlefield. I believe that the
incorporation of JPMEII into the Senior Service College curriculum was
a good decision, and recommend we continue to look for opportunities to
identify efficient ways to prepare our officers for the joint and
interagency challenges ahead.
preventing and responding to sexual assaults
Question. What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure
that military forces assigned to PACOM comply with DOD policies aimed
at preventing and responding adequately to sexual assaults and the
recent changes announced by Secretary of Defense Panetta?
Answer. Sexual assault is criminal conduct punishable under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and must be taken very
seriously. If confirmed, my commitment is to zero tolerance of sexual
assault or related behaviors within the PACOM AOR. To ensure this, I
will establish clear policies and procedures for my leaders, at all
levels, to take action to prevent sexual assault, protect and support
victims, hold offenders accountable, and to ensure a safe and healthy
environment for those in their charge. As is the case in most major
commands, subordinate commanders in PACOM are required to immediately
notify the combatant commander of any sexual assault incidents. In line
with Secretary Panetta's recent changes, I will ensure all personnel
(military and civilians) at every level are fully aware, trained, and
committed to eradicating sexual assault.
Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging
the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and
responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate
and intend to implement as Commander, PACOM?
Answer. I will ensure commanders comply with all requirements in
accordance with DOD Directive 6495.0 and other established Department
policies. Additionally, I will require commanders provide me
assessments of their prevention efforts as well as their responsiveness
to incidents. From these assessments, I will monitor trends and provide
further guidance and direction as necessary. I will emphasize the
importance of commanders monitoring their command climate with respect
to sexual assault and ensuring sexual assault response capabilities be
available at all locations in my AOR. I will demand victims be treated
with fairness and respect and that sexual assault incidents be given
the highest priority and treated as emergency cases. I will not allow
sexual assault to injure our personnel, our friends, our families,
destroy our professional values, or compromise readiness.
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
Question. What should be the role for the U.S. military in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region?
Answer. PACOM continues to provide Foreign Disaster Relief in the
PACOM AOR on an ``as needed'' basis. When countries request assistance,
PACOM either provides immediate assistance within the initial 72-hours
of a disaster based on life and limb or after U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) validates the country request against
an urgent and unique capability that PACOM can provide. PACOM continues
to assist Asia-Pacific nations with their disaster preparations by
engaging in multinational forums to share best practices, participating
in various bi/multilateral HA/DR exercises, as well as partnering with
the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance and USAID in country resiliency training. Overall, PACOM
should be viewed as a quick response force for countries in dire need
with an ability to respond rapidly, for short duration, and to provide
assistance when requested.
Additionally, steady-state Humanitarian Assistance activities are
an important part of PACOM's Theater Campaign Plan. PACOM provides
humanitarian assistance annually to countries within its AOR. These HA
activities are low cost, non-obtrusive, but highly effective efforts
that improve DOD access, visibility and influence in a partner nation
or region, generate positive public relations and goodwill for DOD, and
build collaborative relationships with the partner nations' civil
society.
Question. Are the resources necessary to fulfill this role
currently available to the PACOM commander? If not, what additional
resources are necessary?
Answer. Yes, PACOM receives adequate funding from the Overseas
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation, under title 10
U.S.C. 2561 for humanitarian assistance activities, and title 10 U.S.C.
404 to respond to disasters within the PACOM AOR.
science and technology
Question. As with other combatant commands, a Science and
Technology (S&T) advisor is assigned to support PACOM.
If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the PACOM S&T
advisor?
Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on my S&T Advisor to support our
strategic mission with three priorities:
(1) Discover, develop, and demonstrate solutions to warfighter
challenges;
(2) Avoid surprise by adversary technology; and
(3) Build defense partnerships with regional allies and partners.
To accomplish these priorities, I will direct my S&T Advisor to
continue to expand PACOM's S&T collaboration with the national research
enterprise composed of service, DOD, and Department of Energy
laboratories, and international partners, and to provide expert advice
to my staff on new and emerging capabilities that can aid us in meeting
theater objectives.
Question. DOD has, in recent years, put greater emphasis on
research and development of persistent ISR capabilities.
In your view, how can persistent ISR improve operations in the
Pacific theater, and how would you utilize new platform and sensor
technologies?
Answer. Persistent ISR has proven an enduring challenge globally,
and is especially difficult considering the ``tyranny of distance''
faced in the vast Asia/Pacific region. Technology continues to play a
critical enabling role in addressing this challenge. I am following
with keen interest developments in several technologies that promise to
mitigate ISR challenges. In all the warfighting domains, advances in
unattended sensors and autonomous systems promise to revolutionize how
we conduct ISR, especially in environments where risk mitigation and
cost-benefit analysis favors their implementation. Finally, I will
continue to promote the principle of working by, with and through our
allies and partners in areas such as shared regional maritime domain
awareness.
Question. Do you believe that airship platforms can be effectively
employed in the Pacific theater?
Answer. I see a need for a broad spectrum of platforms to
effectively conduct ISR in the Asia/Pacific. Airship-based platforms
have shown promising capabilities to fill part of this need, especially
in permissive environments, in support of missions such as air and
surface domain awareness. Furthermore, airships of sufficient scale
also offer a promising capability to conduct mobility operations
independent of traditional aerial or seaport facilities; a useful
capability for missions such as disaster response.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, PACOM?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
30-year shipbuilding plan
1. Senator Wicker. Admiral Locklear, the Navy's current 30-Year
Shipbuilding Plan indicates that we will be building ships at minimum
sustaining rates. Many observe that this could pose challenges to
fulfilling the amphibious force requirement and possibly give rise to a
sea-lift capability gap and an aviation-lift gap in 2015. Let's set
aside the operational implications of those issues for a moment. Many
worry that the relatively low orders for new ships proposed in the 2013
Plan may jeopardize the administration's plans to support the
shipbuilding industrial base over the intermediate- to long-term. The
reductions in vendors to provide equipment for the shipbuilding
industry may also make it difficult to realize desired efficiencies.
With a ``pivot'' to the Asia-Pacific region and given the vast maritime
size of the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility (AOR), and the Navy's
inability to meet its own requirement of 313 ships, currently at 284
ships, how will this affect your ability to protect America's security
interests?
Admiral Locklear. The Navy's shipbuilding plan reflects the new
strategic guidance and evolving operational plan requirements. From a
Pacific Command perspective, it is more important how we manage those
ships globally and whether or not the Asia Pacific area of
responsibility is adequately serviced. That is, having the right number
and types of ships present. To date, the Navy has met that
responsibility.
korea f-16 radars
2. Senator Wicker. Admiral Locklear, the Republic of Korea (ROK)
Air Force has been asking for advanced F-16 Radars for several years. A
major element of the upgrade would be the addition of active
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar to ROK Air Force F-16s--known
as the KF-16 in Korean service. Replacing the F-16's mechanically
scanned array radar with an AESA will provide not only performance but
reliability and maintenance improvements. Do you support the
expeditious Korean procurement of existing defense technology if such
technology meets their operational requirements?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, I strongly support the expeditious Korean
procurement of the AESA radar for the ROK Air Force KF-16 aircraft. Our
combined operational readiness on the Korean Peninsula is key to
maintaining an effective deterrence against the North Korean threat.
3. Senator Wicker. Admiral Locklear, do you agree that the U.S.
Government should fully support the ROK Air Force's requirements and
acquisition process timeline for a U.S. export-compliant AESA radar
acquired via the foreign military sales (FMS) process?
Admiral Locklear. Yes, I do feel the U.S. Government should support
the ROK Air Force's requirements and acquisition process timelines,
within our own established and legal foreign military sales standards.
The ROK Government and Air Force have asked for our assurances that
they will be able to select the same radar our own Air Force will
select, and be able to acquire it in their requested acquisition
timeline with assurances of cost savings. I believe this is a
reasonable request and that the U.S. Government should be able to offer
these assurances to a strong ally who must be interoperable with our
own Air Force on the Korean Peninsula.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
sensor-fuzed weapon
4. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, there are a number of
constituents in my State who are involved in the manufacture and
assembly of the Air Force's Sensor-Fuzed Weapon (SFW).
As you may know, the 2010 Oslo Convention to eliminate legacy
cluster munitions has led some global activists to target the SFW and
its supply chain, despite the fact that this system is not a legacy
cluster munition but instead the Department of Defense's (DOD) solution
to the humanitarian problem caused by those munitions. While the
weapons that the Oslo Convention seeks to ban are responsible for
unexploded ordnance injuring civilians long after a conflict has ended,
the SFW leaves virtually none of these remnants due to its advance
design and safety features. Regardless, my constituents and I expect
the Air Force is concerned about campaigns to undermine the industrial
base for this system.
Given this situation, I would appreciate your informing me about
the role the SFW has in operational planning for the U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM), and in particular, our mission to help defend the ROK.
Specifically, does a massive tank incursion by North Korean forces
remain a threat that our warfighters plan for?
Admiral Locklear. A preponderance of North Korea's large and
capable military is in its ground conventional forces, which include
significant armor and mechanized capability. Given this capability,
current plans must consider the threat to security that conventional
forces, including tanks and armored personnel carriers, pose to the
Alliance. North Korean tanks could play a significant role in their
offensive strategy as part of Infantry Divisions, Mechanized Brigades,
and Armor Corps. Consequently, sensor-fuzed weapons are one of the key
munitions considered in countering North Korean aggression.
5. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what is the role of area versus
unitary munitions in addressing this threat?
Admiral Locklear. The Sensor-Fuzed Weapon (SFW) in PACOM's
inventory is the CBU-105, which is a type of cluster munitions. The
advantages of ``cluster munitions'' versus unitary munitions are
clearly delineated in U.S. policy and included in PACOM internal
doctrine (PACOM Instruction 0601.10), specifically: ``Use of cluster
munitions provide the ability to engage area targets that include
massed formations of enemy forces, individual targets dispersed over a
defined area, targets whose precise locations are not known, and time-
sensitive or moving targets.''
6. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what capability does the SFW
provide that other munitions in the U.S. inventory cannot in this
environment?
Admiral Locklear. Each individual SFW includes 10 submunitions,
with the capability to sense and engage 4 separate targets. The
effective coverage area can be several acres in size. When used in a
target-rich environment, as would be represented by either staged or
advancing troops and armor, there are no other single alternatives that
favorably compare. To reach the same levels of effectiveness with
unitary weapons, far greater numbers of weapons and weapons systems,
combined with higher explosive yields would be necessary.
7. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, how does it address the
humanitarian concerns that have been raised about the use of other
munitions?
Admiral Locklear. The United States complies with the law of armed
conflict during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and in all other military operations. Under that body of
international law, the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring
the enemy is not unlimited.
Per DOD and Service guidance, all weapons, weapon systems, and
munitions must be reviewed by the Judge Advocate Generals of the
respective Services or the DOD General Counsel for legality under the
law of armed conflict. This review occurs before the award of the
engineering and manufacturing development contract and again before the
award of the initial production contract. The weapons review process of
the United States allows commanders, including myself as Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command, and all other personnel to reasonably assume that
any weapon or munition contained in the U.S. military inventory and
issued to military personnel is lawful. For specific details on how
humanitarian concerns are addressed in the development of any weapon,
weapon system, or munition in the U.S. inventory, I respectfully
encourage you to raise this question to the Judge Advocate Generals and
the DOD General Counsel.
At the same time, I have a responsibility to ensure that all
weapons and munitions under my cognizance are employed in a lawful
manner. This includes employing weapons against only lawful targets,
and minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury. I can assure
you that I take this responsibility seriously.
8. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what type of consequences would
you foresee if U.S. forces could rely only on unitary systems to defend
against a North Korean ground attack?
Admiral Locklear. Based upon a formidable North Korean threat that
includes conventional and asymmetric capabilities, during the initial
stages of aggression, limiting Alliance defense to unitary systems will
increase operational risk. It is important to maximize U.S. and
Alliance capabilities to quickly defeat North Korean aggression,
minimize military and civilian casualties, and maintain security and
stability on the peninsula and the NE Asia region.
9. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, what costs would be incurred in
terms of protecting friendly forces, materiel, and dollars?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Brown. Admiral Locklear, in terms of deterrence, what
value do you put on area weapons in deterring enemy forces from
considering massing forces to attack our allied forces?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
chinese cyber attacks
11. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, it is now widely believed
that China, and particularly the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is
engaged in sustained cyber attacks upon the United States to steal
information on our defense and trade infrastructures. Evidence exists,
for example, of China's involvement in cyber attacks at the U.S.
Department of State, Lockheed Martin, Google, and the NASDAQ, all
within the last year. If China engages in a cyber attack upon the
United States, do you consider such an attack to be a hostile act
against the United States?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, if China engages in a cyber
attack upon the United States, do you believe it is legitimate under
the Law of War for the United States to respond in kind?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, if China engages in a cyber
attack upon the United States, do you believe it is legitimate under
the Law of War for the United States to act offensively to counter any
perceived cyber attack upon the United States?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Graham. Admiral Locklear, if China engages in a cyber
attack upon the United States, do you believe that the United States
should respond to such an attack?
Admiral Locklear. That would depend greatly on the target of that
attack. Cyber threats to our national security go well beyond only
military targets and affect all aspects of society. Given the
integrated nature of cyberspace, computer-induced failures of power
grids, transportation networks, or financial systems could cause
massive physical damage and economic disruption. Our military and our
society as a whole are dependent on this critical infrastructure, and I
believe an attack on that infrastructure would warrant a response if we
could accurately and confidently determine the origin of that attack.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
taiwan
15. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your advance policy
question (APQ) responses, you acknowledge that two of the three main
challenges in the PACOM AOR are preserving strong relationships with
our Asia-Pacific allies and partners, while dealing with China's
substantial military modernization and buildup. You note that one of
the key means to addressing these challenges is by continuing our
``commitments to modernizing and strengthening our treaty alliances and
partnerships in the region,'' relationships that ``will be enhanced by
maintaining interoperable military capabilities that deter regional
aggression and build partner security capacity.'' You also maintain
that the ``United States' primary objective in building the capacity of
foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective
and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their
countries' internal security.'' I welcome these statements, and can
think of no greater example of the importance of these facts than the
United States' relationship with Taiwan. What is your assessment of the
value of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and of the strategic value of
building Taiwan's capacity to defend itself?
Admiral Locklear. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship provides valuable
contributions to Taiwan's self-defense capability. In turn, Taiwan's
self-defense capability enhances stability across the Strait and
enables its dialogue with the Mainland. This contributes to stability
in the region.
16. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, your APQ responses also
highlight China's military modernization program and its near-term
focus, which ``appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies
involving Taiwan.'' According to DOD's 2011 report, ``Military and
Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (PRC)'',
the ``balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities
continues to shift in the mainland's favor.'' As you rightly said,
under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States is statutorily
obligated to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services ``as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.'' In your opinion, how could this
cross-strait balance have shifted in favor of the PRC, if the United
States has been upholding our obligations under the TRA?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
17. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, I also appreciate your
acknowledgment that the TRA states that the President and Congress
shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles ``based
solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan.'' You further state
that you ``would not recommend any changes to the law.'' It is my
opinion--and that of a bipartisan group of colleagues who joined me in
cosponsoring the Taiwan Airpower Modernization Act--that Taiwan would
benefit from the sale of new F-16 C/Ds. However, the current
administration continues to refuse to sell these aircraft to Taiwan. In
your opinion, should China be allowed to dictate or substantially
influence what military equipment the United States does or does not
sell to Taiwan?
Admiral Locklear. No. Whether to go forward with arms sales to
Taiwan is determined by the President and Congress based solely upon
their judgment.
18. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, when asked if you believe the
United States should sell new F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan, you
responded that ``the recently announced F-16 A/B upgrades are similar
in capability to new F-16 C/Ds.'' Yet, this misses the larger problem,
which is Taiwan's looming fighter shortfall, as much of its fleet
reaches the end of its lifespan. Wu Jin-lin, Secretary General to
President Ma of Taiwan, notified me in a letter dated October 14, 2011,
that ``the main purpose for purchasing new F-16 C/D fighters is to
replace our aging fleet of some 65 F-5 fighters, which is obviously a
different matter from the acquisition of the F-16 A/B retrofit
packages.'' As a result, Taiwan continues to ask to be allowed to
purchase new F-16 C/D fighters, even after the announced sale of the A/
B upgrades. Furthermore, according to DOD's 2011 report, the PRC has a
total of approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft. In contrast,
Taiwan has a total of 388 aircraft. The sale of F-16 A/B upgrades does
nothing to attempt to restore any quantitative balance. In light of
these facts, please elaborate on your response, and do you believe the
United States should sell new F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, you state that ``capabilities
that deter the PRC or increase the Taiwan military's survivability are
critical.'' What is your assessment of Taiwan's current need to build
its air defense capacity?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your opinion, would the
sale of new F-16 C/Ds serve as a deterrent to the PRC? Would they
increase Taiwan's military survivability?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
21. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your APQ responses, you
said that Taiwan must ensure that it adequately resources its defense
program, to include looking at increasing its defense budget,
maintaining that you believe ``the best way to encourage Taiwan to
invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages
from the U.S. Government to Taiwan.'' What message do you believe the
current administration's failure to approve the sale of 66 new F-16 C/D
fighters sends to the Government of Taiwan? Does this message encourage
Taiwan to continue investing in its military?
Admiral Locklear. The Taiwan authorities understand the foreign
military sales process and what it entails. The President and Congress
make the determination based upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan
and the U.S. military supports this assessment.
Regardless, Taiwan must continue to invest in its military,
particularly in the area of joint operations. Taiwan's commitment to
its own defense contributes to its ability to deter PRC aggression.
22. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, in your opinion, would 66 new
F-16s C/Ds bolster Taiwan's ability to conduct maritime interdiction in
a blockade scenario?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, if the administration
continues to stall on Taiwan's pending request, and Taiwan becomes
unable to purchase new F-16s, what are the potential impacts on
Taiwan's ability to defend its own skies?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, what would be the impact on
U.S. interests in the region?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, according to DOD, in 2011 the
PLA Navy had the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and
amphibious warships in Asia. This fleet includes 49 diesel attack
submarines and 5 nuclear attack submarines. In contrast, Taiwan
currently has four diesel attack submarines and zero nuclear attack
submarines. What is your assessment of the current status of Taiwan's
submarine fleet and the ability of Taiwan's navy to defend against an
amphibious attack?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, what is your assessment of
how long it will be before Taiwan's current submarines must be
replaced?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, should the United States be
looking for ways to help Taiwan replace its current submarines, and
even grow its submarine fleet, in the near future?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, do you believe the United
States has met its obligations under the TRA to ensure that Taiwan has
the opportunity to upgrade its submarine fleet?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, what risks would the United
States face if Taiwan cannot protect itself?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, if hostilities were to break
out between China and Taiwan, is the United States currently able to
provide an air deterrent over Taiwan, if Taiwan proves unable to
protect itself?
Admiral Locklear. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, you note that, ``with the
current budget environment, careful choices will need to be made that
focus resources where they provide the most value and return.'' As you
correctly state, building partner capacity ``in our allies and partners
lessens the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats
outside the United States.'' In light of the current fiscal crisis and
the drastic budget constraints DOD is currently facing, do you agree
that a Taiwanese air force that possesses the capacity to deter Chinese
aggression is in the best interest of the United States?
Admiral Locklear. I agree, and I would expand that statement to
cover the entire Taiwan military. Taiwan must continue to focus its
efforts on improving joint operations capabilities, streamlining
defense programs to be less costly and more effective, and seeking
innovative solutions to complement its traditional military
capabilities.
32. Senator Cornyn. Admiral Locklear, do you agree that a capable
Taiwan air force would lessen the burden on U.S. forces in the region,
reducing the risk that U.S. forces would potentially have to respond to
Chinese military aggression against Taiwan?
Admiral Locklear. Taiwan's overall military capability, to include
its air force, contributes to Taiwan's overall ability to deter
conflict.
______
[The nomination reference of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III,
USN, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 23, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the
grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be Admiral
ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, 1250.
______
[The biographical sketch of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III,
USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Transcript of Naval Service for ADM Samuel Jones Locklear III, USN
28 Oct. 1954........................ Born in Macon, GA
08 June 1977........................ Ensign
08 June 1979........................ Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1981........................ Lieutenant
01 Dec. 1986........................ Lieutenant Commander
01 Sep. 1990........................ Commander
01 Sep. 1995........................ Captain
01 Sep. 2001........................ Rear Admiral (lower half)
01 Apr. 2005........................ Rear Admiral
03 May 2007......................... Vice Admiral
06 Oct. 2010........................ Admiral, Service continuous
to date
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments and duties From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Naval Academy (Executive Assistant to June 1977 Sep. 1977
OIC, Fourth Class Regiment)..................
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Sep. 1977 Apr. 1978
Newport, RI (DUINS)..........................
USS William V. Pratt (DDG 44) (Fire Control Apr. 1978 Mar. 1981
Officer).....................................
U.S. Naval Academy (Company Officer).......... Mar. 1981 July 1983
Naval Nuclear Power School, Naval Training July 1983 Feb. 1984
Center, Orlando, FL (DUINS)..................
Nuclear Power Training Unit, Ballston Spa, NY Feb. 1984 Aug. 1984
(DUINS)......................................
USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) (Electrical Officer). Aug. 1984 Jan. 1987
Surface Warfare Officers School Command Jan. 1987 July 1987
Newport, RI (DUINS)..........................
USS Callaghan (DDG 994) (Operations Officer).. July 1987 June 1989
Surface Warfare Officers School Command June 1989 Aug. 1989
Newport, RI (DUINS)..........................
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Aug. 1989 Oct. 1989
Fleet (Nuclear Propulsion MIT Division)......
XO, USS Truxtun (CGN 35)...................... Oct. 1989 July 1991
Industrial College of the Armed Forces July 1991 Aug. 1992
(Student)....................................
CO, USS Leftwich (DO 984)..................... Aug. 1992 Dec. 1994
Joint Staff (Branch Chief, Regional Engagement Dec. 1994 Feb. 1997
and Presence Joint Warfighting Capabilities
Assessment Branch) (J-5).....................
Commander, Destroyer Squadron Two............. Feb. 1997 Dec. 1998
Office of the CNO (Executive Assistant to the Dec. 1998 Dec. 1999
Vice Chief of Naval Operations) (N09A).......
Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy.. Dec. 1999 Jan. 2002
Office of the CNO (Deputy Director for Jan. 2002 Oct. 2002
Requirements Assessment, N81D/Director, CINC
Liaison Division, N83).......................
Commander. Cruiser Destroyer Group Five....... Oct. 2002 Jan. 2004
Office of the CNO (Deputy Director, Surface Jan. 2004 Oct. 2004
Warfare Division) (N76B).....................
Office of the CNO (Director, Assessment Oct. 2004 Oct. 2005
Division) (N81)..............................
Office of the CNO (Director, Programming Oct. 2005 May 2007
Division) (N80)..............................
Commander. Third Fleet........................ May 2007 July 2009
Office of the CNO (Director, Navy Staff) July 2009 Sep. 2010
(N09B).......................................
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe/ Oct. 2010 To date
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa/
Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command,
Naples.......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medals and awards:
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with four Gold Stars
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with one Gold Star
Navy Unit Commendation
Navy ``E'' Ribbon
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star
Kuwait Liberation (Kuwait)
Special qualifications:
BS (Operations Research) U.S. Naval Academy, 1977
MA (Public Administration) George Washington University, 1992
Designated Surface Warfare Officer, 1978
Graduate of Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1998
Capstone, 2005-1
Personal data:
Wife: Pamela Ann Nichols of Peabody, MA
Children: Jennifer N. Locklear (Daughter) Born: 14 December 1980.
Jillian L. Locklear (Daughter) Born: 16 February 1984.
Summary of joint duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Staff (Branch Chief, Regional Dec. 94-Feb. 97....... CDR/CAPT
Engagement and Presence Joint
Warfighting Capabilities
Assessment Branch) (J-5).
Commander, Allied Joint Forces Oct. 10-To Date....... ADM
Command, Naples.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Samuel J.
Locklear III, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Samuel J. Locklear III.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.
3. Date of nomination:
23 January 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
28 October 1954; Macon, GA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Pamela Ann Locklear (Nichols).
7. Names and ages of children:
Jennifer Nichols Loustanunau (Locklear), age 30.
Jillian Leigh Bauersfeld (Locklear), age 27.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed above.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association-Member.
Surface Navy Association-Member.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN.
This 5th day of December, 2011.
[The nomination of ADM Samuel J. Locklear III, USN was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 17, 2012,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 17, 2012.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Thomas P. Bostick,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No. The goals of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are as
important today as when the act passed 30 years ago. I continue to
support these reforms and will be guided by the objectives of this
important legislation, which promote the effectiveness of military
operations, strengthen civilian control, provide for more efficient and
effective use of defense resources, and improve the management and
administration of the Department of the Army and Department of Defense
(DOD).
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Not applicable, in view of my previous answer.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Chief of Engineers to the following offices (for the purpose of
these questions, the term ``Chief of Engineers'' should be read to
include Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers):
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full
authority, direction, and control over all its elements. The Secretary
exercises this power over the Corps of Engineers through the Secretary
of the Army, whose responsibility for, and authority to conduct all
affairs of the Army is subject to the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with
the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling the Nation's national defense
priorities and efficiently administering the Corps of Engineers in
accordance with the policies established by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman,
with assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility of
providing for the strategic direction, strategic planning, and
contingency planning; advising the Secretary of Defense on
requirements, programs, and budgets identified by the commanders of the
unified and specified combatant commands; developing doctrine for the
joint employment of the Armed Forces; providing for representation of
the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United
Nations; furnishing certain reports to the Secretary of Defense; and
performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the
President or the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate
fully with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance
of his responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. As head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the
Army is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs
of the Department of the Army, subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army may
assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers
appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army, as well as the
Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and require officers of the Army to
report to these officials on any matter. If confirmed, I will support
the Secretary in the performance of the Secretary's important duties. I
will strive, to establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with the Secretary of the Army, based on full and candid
communication with the Secretary on all matters assigned to me.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works is
principally responsible for the overall supervision of the Army's
functions relating to programs for conservation and development of the
national water resources, including flood control, navigation, shore
protection, and related purposes. Carrying out the Army's civil works
program is a principal mission of the Corps of Engineers and the
complex issues that arise in this area demand a close, professional
relationship between the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works and the Chief of Engineers, based on mutual respect, trust,
cooperation, and full communication. If confirmed, I am committed to
establishing and maintaining such a relationship.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel of the Army is the chief legal officer
of the Army. The General Counsel serves as counsel to the Secretary of
the Army and other Secretariat officials and is responsible for
determining the position of the Department of the Army on any legal
question or procedure. If confirmed, I will ensure that my Chief
Counsel maintains a close and professional relationship with the
General Counsel and actively seeks the General Counsel's guidance in
order to ensure that Army Corps of Engineers policies and practices are
in strict accordance with the law and the highest principles of ethical
conduct.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs the Chief of
Staff's duties under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The
Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed by law as a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Army Staff assists the Secretary of the Army in carrying out
the Secretary's responsibilities, by furnishing professional advice and
operations expertise to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the
Assistant Secretaries of the Army and to the Chief of Staff of the
Army. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
the Army, the Army Staff prepares for and assists in executing any
power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Staff;
investigates and reports on the Army's efficiency and preparedness to
support military operations; supervises the execution of approved
plans; and coordinates the action of Army organizations, as directed by
the Secretary or Chief of Staff. As a statutory member of the Army
Staff, the Chief of Engineers assists the Secretary in carrying out the
Secretary's responsibilities and furnishes necessary professional
assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
Secretaries of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Specifically, the Chief of Engineers is the principal adviser to the
Army Staff on engineering and construction matters. In discharging
these responsibilities, the Chief of Engineers must develop positive,
professional relationships with the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of
Staff, the Deputy and Assistant Chief of Staff, The Surgeon General,
the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Chaplains and the Chief of the
Army Reserve, in order to ensure that the Army Staff works harmoniously
and effectively in assisting the Army Secretariat. If confirmed, I am
committed to establishing and maintaining such relationship with the
members of the Army Staff.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to the President
and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions
assigned to the commands by the President or by the Secretary with the
approval of the President. Subject to the direction of the President,
the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and a redirectly
responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the commands to
carry out their assigned missions. These missions include providing
humanitarian and civil assistance, training the force, conducting joint
exercises, contingency activities, and other selected operations. If
confirmed, I will support the combatant commanders in the performance
of these important duties by providing any necessary engineering and
construction services required from the Corps of Engineers to the
combatant commanders' component commands.
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Answer. The Corps of Engineers has provided a broad array of
engineering and construction related services in Iraq generally to
either the Commander, U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I), the State Department,
or the Government of Iraq. As the size and the scope of the military's
mission has reduced, so has the size and the scope of the Corps of
Engineers' mission. Despite the reduced mission and reduced number of
deployed personnel, the Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support
the Commander USF-I, the State Department, or the Government of Iraq as
needed either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based engineering
services, or through a temporary surge of personnel. In all cases, the
primary representative in providing all required support is the
Transatlantic Division Commander.
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. The Corps of Engineers continues to provide an array of
engineering and construction related services in Afghanistan generally
to either the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or the State Department.
The Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support the Commander and
the State Department either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based
engineering services, or through a temporary surge of personnel, as
required. In all cases, the primary representative in providing all
required support is the Transatlantic Division Commander.
Question. Commander, U.S. Forces Iraq.
Answer. The Corps of Engineers has provided a broad array of
engineering and construction related services in Iraq generally to
either the Commander, U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I), the State Department,
or the Government of Iraq. As the size and the scope of the military's
mission has reduced, so has the size and the scope of the Corps of
Engineers' mission. Despite the reduced mission and reduced number of
deployed personnel, the Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support
the Commander USF-I, the State Department, or the Government of Iraq as
needed either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based engineering
services, or through a temporary surge of personnel. In all cases, the
primary representative in providing all required support is the
Transatlantic Division Commander.
Question. Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/International Security
Assistance Force.
Answer. The Corps of Engineers continues to provide an array of
engineering and construction related services in Afghanistan generally
to either the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)/
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or the State Department.
The Corps of Engineers remains prepared to support the Commander and
the State Department either by leveraging reachback to U.S.-based
engineering services, or through a temporary surge of personnel; as
required. In all cases, the primary representative in providing all
required support is the Transatlantic Division Commander.
Question. The State Governors.
Answer. The execution of the Corps of Engineers civil and military
missions often demands a balancing of diverse interests. The proper
reconciliation of these interests requires an understanding of the
Corps' authorities and legal responsibilities and open communication
among all parties. If confirmed, I am committed to working
cooperatively with the Governors of the States for the public interest
and pledge to establish and maintain a full dialogue with the Governors
of the States on all issues we must cooperatively address.
chain of command
Question. Please describe your understanding of the chain of
command for the Chief of Engineers on: (a) military matters; (b) civil
works matters; (c) operational matters; and (d) any other matters for
which the Chief of Engineers may be responsible.
Answer.
(a) Military matters
The Chief of Staff presides over the Army Staff and assists the
Secretary of the Army in carrying out the Secretary's responsibilities.
The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties with respect to
the Army Staff as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Army, may prescribe for him. As a statutory member of
the Army Staff, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Chief of Staff,
through the Vice Chief of Staff, with respect to military matters.
(b) Civil Works matters
The supervisory duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civil Works extends to all functions of the Army relating to programs
for conservation and development of the national water resources--in
other words, for all of what is known as the civil works program. The
Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civil Works on civil works functions.
(c) Operational matters
The Chief of Engineers serves as a member of the Army Staff and as
Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In this latter capacity,
the Chief of Engineers commands nine engineer divisions and one
engineer battalion. When employed in support of military contingency
operations, these engineer assets fall under the command and control of
the combatant commander designated for the particular operation.
(d) Any other matters for which the Chief of Engineers may be
responsible:
The Chief of Engineers reports to each of the Assistant Secretaries
within their areas of functional responsibility. For example, in the
areas of installation and real estate management, the Chief of
Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations, Environment, and Energy. Similarly, the Chief of
Engineers reports on procurement matters to the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.
Question. Who is responsible for providing direction and
supervision to the Chief of Engineers in each of the four areas listed
above?
Answer. In each of these areas, the Chief of Engineers acts under
the overall authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the
Army. With respect to military matters, the Secretary has assigned to
the Chief of Staff, the authority to preside over and supervise the
Army Staff, including the Chief of Engineers. With respect to civil
works functions, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. In operational contexts, command
and control of engineer assets is exercised by the combatant commanders
designated for the particular operation.
Question. In your view, are there any areas of responsibility where
it would be inappropriate for the Chief of Engineers to provide
information to the Secretary of the Army or the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Civil Works? If so, what areas and why?
Answer. No. Certain information may require protection from
disclosure, as in the case of certain procurement sensitive
information, however, even this information may be shared if
appropriate steps are taken to protect sensitive and proprietary
aspects of the information. The relationships between the Secretary of
the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and
the Chief of Engineers must be founded upon information sharing, and
full and open communication about all matters. If confirmed, I will
ensure that all Secretariat officials are informed about issues and
provided with all information pertinent to their functional areas of
responsibility.
Question. What is your view of the relative authority of the Chief
of Engineers, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, the
Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of
Defense with regard to the civil works functions of the Army Corps of
Engineers?
Answer. As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full
authority, direction, and control over all elements within DOD.
Similarly, as head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the
Army has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the
Department of the Army. Therefore, either Secretary could personally
intervene in an issue involving the civil functions of the Corps of
Engineers. However, the principal responsibility for overall
supervision of the Corps civil works functions has been assigned to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works by statute and various
directives. Generally speaking, this supervisory responsibility
includes the responsibility for setting program policies and for
coordinating with the Department of the Army, DOD, Office of Management
and Budget, and other executive branch officials on the Corps budget,
legislative program, and other matters of program interest involving
the Corps civil functions. In general, the Chief of Engineers is the
engineering and construction expert responsible for carrying out the
civil functions of the Corps and for conducting the various program,
project, or study activities that comprise the civil works program.
Typically, the Chief of Engineers does not interact with the Chief of
Staff of the Army on a regular basis with respect to matters involving
the Corps civil functions.
Question. The work of the Chief of Engineers often involves issues
of great significance to the States and localities and their elected
officials in Congress.
If confirmed, what would be your role in addressing such matters
with Congress?
Answer. I agree this work often does involve issues of great
significance to the States and localities and their elected officials
in Congress. In fulfilling its statutory requirements, the Corps must
interact positively to define an appropriate Federal role in addressing
these issues that recognizes fiscal realities, environmental, and other
societal considerations. The challenges the Corps faces are complex,
and there are many difficult decisions to be made. It is important that
all interests be brought to the table and that they be given a voice in
the development of solutions to our Nation's problems. The Corps must
be responsive to these interests and must engage in an open,
constructive, and cooperative dialogue with the States, localities, and
elected officials to ensure issues are resolved in a manner that
maximizes the public interest.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the civilian
and military leadership of the Army Corps of Engineers in developing
goals for Army Corps of Engineers programs and presenting these goals
to the legislative branch?
Answer. The civilian and military leadership of the Corps of
Engineers plays an important role in developing goals for Corps
programs and in presenting these goals to the legislative branch. These
goals are guided by the leaders' technical knowledge and understanding
of Corps capabilities and by information gleaned from a variety of
sources inside and outside the Corps of Engineers. The leaders' goals
must promote the public interest, be affordable, and comport with
existing law. Ultimately, the leadership's goals will set the direction
and tone for the execution of the Corps missions, if embraced by the
administration and Congress. Military and civilian leaders within the
Corps play a pivotal role in shaping these goals, and in ensuring that
the goals are supported by the executive branch and Congress. These
leaders may be asked by Congress to give testimony on the goals or to
answer questions about the goals. They must be prepared to enter into a
full and constructive dialogue with Congress to ensure that the goals
are understood by and endorsed by Congress as promoting the public
interest.
qualifications
Sections 3031, 3032, and 3036 of title 10, U.S.C. prescribe some of
the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Engineers. Other civil
works related responsibilities are described in title 33, U.S.C.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer.
Background:
Undergraduate - Bachelor of Science Degree with
concentration in Engineering from West Point (majors not
offered at that time)
Graduate - Masters Degree in Mechanical Engineering;
Masters Degree in Civil Engineering (Structures); both from
Stanford University
Registered Professional Engineer in State of Virginia
(License #18133)
Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering at West
Point
Experience:
Commander, B Company, 54th Engineer Battalion,
Wildflecken Germany (Completed numerous construction projects;
Recognized by Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff as
DA level Maintenance Company of the Year;)
Executive Officer to Chief of Engineers 1993-1994
(supported the Chief of Engineers through many challenging
issues including The Great Mississippi and Missouri Rivers
Flood of 1993)
White House Fellow, 1989-1990, Department of Veterans
Affairs, Special Assistant to Secretary of Veteran Affairs
(conducted review and concept development for Joint DOD-VA
hospitals)
U.S. Army Europe, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Engineer. Significant contribution to the Concept Plan to
drawdown Europe. Prepared leadership and participated in
engagements with key staffers on Congress.
Commander, 1st Engineer Battalion (led Task Force
working with Government and State officials in fighting the
1994 Idaho Fires)
Commander, Engineer Brigade, 1st Armored Division.
Deployed to Bosnia and served as the Senior Engineer
responsible for de-mining operation and the construction
mission (interagency, joint, and combined work with over a
dozen international partners; projects included building a
hospital, barracks and cafeterias, a strategic airfield, water
projects; port, bridge, road, rail preparations to bring 1st
Cavalry Division into an unused Port of Rijeka, Croatia);
deployed elements of the brigade in support of operations in
Kosovo and provide engineering expertise to the leadership on
the ground.
Executive Officer to Chief of Staff of the Army, 1999-
2001 (supported the chief in joint, interagency, congressional,
media, and numerous other engagements)
Deputy Director for Operations, J-3, The Pentagon,
2001-2002 (served on watch team working through the events of
11 September 2001, and the initiation of hostilities in
Afghanistan)
Assistant Division Commander for Support, and
Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 1st Cavalry
Division. Planned and executed the deployment of over 25,000
soldiers and equipment into theater)
Gulf Region Division, Iraq, 2004-2005 (responsible for
$18 billion of construction projects including water, sewage,
transportation, electricity, oil, security, hospitals, schools,
and several other areas)
Commander, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, 2005-2009
(recruited the Grow the Army Force, during some of the most
challenging times for the All-Volunteer Force; worked with
local and national government officials, Congress, media,
businesses, and education. Participated in the development of
the ``Army Strong'' Campaign)
Deputy Chief of Staff, G1 (managed the personnel
policies and program to support 1.1 million soldiers, over
300,000 civilians and their families)
major challenges and problems
Question. The Army Corps of Engineers is facing a major, current
challenge in the rising Mississippi River and the devastating toll it
is taking on the people and property in the path of the flood waters.
There are various other challenges that require the attention of the
Army Corps of Engineers.
In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next
Chief of Engineers?
Answer. If confirmed, my first priority would be to meet with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Corps Leaders, Army,
DOD and administration leadership, as well as Members of Congress to
seek their input into the major challenges confronting the next Chief.
In my view, the next Chief--and probably the next several Chiefs--
must be concerned with the following issues.
Maintaining the technical competence and professionalism of the
Corps. The Corps must build and maintain a skilled, agile, and
disciplined workforce, equipped with the necessary resources, tools,
and processes to serve the Army, DOD, and the Nation across the
spectrum of engineering and infrastructure requirements. Additionally,
the Corps must constantly evaluate and improve its business processes
in order to become more efficient and effective in the execution of its
missions.
Meeting the Army's infrastructure requirements in the post-BRAC
era, as we operate in a more budget constrained environment. As the
historic BRAC and MILCON workload declines, the Corps will adapt
knowledge, skills, and capability from that high-volume new
construction program to an integrated suite of infrastructure solutions
to installations. That will include adapting new or existing facilities
to current operational standards, applying technologies for achieving
energy and sustainability goals, and leveraging the Corps' strong
capabilities to provide environmental services.
Sustaining the Corps' expeditionary capability to support overseas
contingency missions. Since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Corps has provided critical support for military and
stability operations through both deployed and reach-back capabilities
for delivery of facilities and infrastructure, command and control of
engineer assets, training and deployment of technical teams,
engineering reach-back services, and Army geospatial services for the
warfighter.
Aging infrastructure. The Nation's water resource infrastructure
constitutes an immense accumulation of assets requiring continual
maintenance and periodic upgrades. Much of this infrastructure has
reached or exceeded its design life and will require more extensive
maintenance and/or rehabilitation in the near future. Unscheduled
outages due to mechanical breakdowns have been increasing. Recently,
the American Society of Civil Engineers gave the U.S. infrastructure an
overall grade of ``D'' in 2011.
Constrained Federal budget. With an aging population and therefore
more entitlement spending, we can expect less to be available for
discretionary programs. The Corps will have to prioritize projects and
programs with rigorous analysis to ensure the greatest value for
taxpayer funds.
Energy and Sustainability. Developing the Nation's water resources
in a sustainable way is one of the greatest challenges the Corps faces.
This will require a cultural shift and lifestyle changes as well as
technical innovation. An outgrowth of sustainable energy which is
impacting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a renewed interest in
hydropower.
Vulnerability to natural and manmade disasters. The current
flooding in the Missouri, Ohio and Mississippi River systems is a
reminder of the power of these huge natural systems, and the difficult
trade-offs which are required in their management.
Flood risk management. Since floods cannot be fully controlled, nor
can all damages be prevented, the Corps' ``flood control'' mission is
shifting into one of ``flood risk management''. Flood risks increase
with the strong attraction of people to water. Many regions near water
continue to grow in population and economic development in low lying
areas is expanding. Flood risk management is also challenging because
it is a shared responsibility with State and local governments, and
individuals.
Increasing competition for water. A major driver of increasing
demand for water is population, and the U.S. population of 308 million
in 2010 is expected to reach 440 million by 2050. Energy production and
manufacturing are also large users of water, and global climate change
may impact water supply and demand in ways that are not yet well
understood.
Governance. Since the responsibility for water resources is shared
among multiple Federal agencies, States, local governments, tribes,
interstate organizations, and the private sector, it is a challenge to
coordinate roles and eliminate gaps in jurisdiction.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would establish priorities based on my
assessment of the challenges and consultations with key Army and DOD
leadership, Members of Congress, Corps leaders, and other stakeholders.
I would seek broad input and be open to new strategies to successfully
accomplish the Corps mission and achieve its goals. Competing water
uses must be balanced to provide multiple benefits such as economic
security, environmental health, social well-being, and public safety.
Strategies for addressing the challenges outlined above will clearly be
among the highest priorities.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Engineers?
Answer. Many of the Corps' missions require balancing disparate
interests. The Corps must further the public interest while executing
the assigned missions.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. As previously discussed, if confirmed, my first priority
will be to meet with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works, Corps leaders, Army and DOD leadership, others in the
administration, as well as with Members of Congress to seek their input
in preparation for developing a plan to meet the various challenges. As
an enterprise, the Corps must continue to evolve and improve its
business processes in order to become more efficient and effective in
the execution of its missions. I would go to the most critical areas
with the greatest challenges to make a personal and thorough assessment
of the needs and to meet with stakeholders and officials.
Question. In your view, does the USACE need to make any changes in
the way it operates and, if so, what changes would you recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, assessing the need for changes would be a top
priority. Typically there are opportunities for improvements in any
organization. I am confident that, in consultation with Congress, Corps
partners and others within the administration, we could determine what,
if any, changes are needed. Historically, the Nation's rich and
abundant water, and related land resources provided the foundation for
our successful development and rapid achievement of preeminence within
the international community. Since the beginning of our Nation, the
USACE has been a great asset, providing engineering support to the
military, developing our Nation's water resources, and restoring and
protecting our environment. The Corps must continue to be flexible and
continue to evolve if it is to continue to make important contributions
to the Nation and respond to today's and future challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities will you set for the USACE?
Answer. If confirmed, I would establish priorities based on my
assessment of the challenges and consultations with key Army and DOD
leadership, Members of Congress, Corps leaders, and other stakeholders.
Strategies for addressing the challenges outlined above will clearly be
among the highest priorities.
iraq reconstruction
Question. What do you see as the major lessons learned for the
USACE from reconstruction contracting in Iraq?
Answer. I believe an overall lesson learned by the Corps from the
Iraq reconstruction mission is the need for a permanent organization to
oversee the contingency missions, assess and implement the lessons
learned, and to develop and sustain business practices for current and
future contingencies. To address this need, the Corps established the
Transatlantic Division (TAD) to provide direct engineering support in
the U.S. Central Command area of operations.
Some of the more specific lessons learned in terms of program
management include: the importance to develop well-defined
requirements; the significance of the involvement and support from
local officials; the importance to plan projects suited to local
culture, requirements and capacity; the importance of capacity
development to sustainments of projects; the necessity for a range of
acquisition strategies for the diverse and evolving needs of the
mission; the importance of use of established USACE business processes;
and finally, the importance of planning to address security and
logistics.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the USACE
should make to improve its processes for reconstruction contracting in
future contingencies?
Answer. Contractor oversight and requirements definition are
inherent challenges in contingency operations. The Corps must ensure
that the many valuable lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan are
institutionalized to improve ongoing activity and are ready for future
overseas missions.
afghanistan reconstruction
Question. In 2010, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducted an audit of Afghan National Police
facilities in Helmand Province and Kandahar that found deficiencies in
USACE implementation of quality assurance and quality control plans.
SIGAR is also examining whether the USACE received security services
from Global Strategies Group, Inc., at a reasonable cost and whether
oversight of the contract was in accordance with Federal Acquisition
Regulations and other applicable requirements.
What is your assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of
contract oversight by the USACE in Afghanistan?
Answer. Overall, I understand that the Corps recognized the need to
increase the level of oversight of projects in Afghanistan. The Corps
established a second District in Afghanistan in September 2009 and has
increased its total staff. The Corps is also expanding the use of
Afghan Quality Assurance Representatives to help to provide an
experienced eye on construction projects at remote sites while also
reducing costs and its security footprint.
It is my understanding that the SIGAR report on the Afghan National
Police Headquarters recognized that oversight of the contracts was
severely hampered by the security situation in Kandahar and Helmand
provinces. I understand that the Corps has been working very closely
with the contractor to correct deficiencies and complete the facilities
at no additional cost to the government.
Question. What steps, if any, would you take if confirmed to
improve contract oversight in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Corps is using all
available procurement oversight and management assets and tools to the
greatest extent possible. This would include ensuring the Corps is
filling the necessary positions in theater with the right people,
ensuring deploying qualified personnel are receiving the necessary
training and support, maximizing the use of Afghan Quality Assurance
Representatives, and employing technology such as remote sensing where
possible.
afghanistan infrastructure program
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011 established the Afghanistan Infrastructure Program, under which
the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State are authorized to
develop jointly high-priority, large-scale infrastructure projects in
support of the civil-military campaign plan in Afghanistan, including
water, power and transportation projects. Up to $400 million in DOD
funding is authorized in support of these projects. Projects will be
implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
and the USACE.
What do you see as the major challenges in implementing large-scale
infrastructure projects under the Afghanistan Infrastructure Program?
Answer. USAID is the lead agency for the Afghanistan Infrastructure
Program and the Corps provides engineering and construction support as
requested. I would expect key challenges to include making sure that
Afghan officials are involved closely in the process from the local to
the ministerial level. Attention will need to be given to selecting
projects suited to local, cultural needs and capacity. Another
challenge will be the security environment and associated risks.
Project planning and execution will also need to be coordinated with
other projects and initiatives being undertaken in the theater. It is
also important that projects support a master plan that has a high
probability of support through changing Afghan leadership.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, will you take to ensure
coordination in the implementation of these projects between USAID and
the USACE?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps maintains a
close working relationship with USAID and provides transparency at all
stages of the process. The Corps has a colonel serving as the Chief of
Staff to the USAID mission in Afghanistan and a liaison officer at the
USAID headquarters in Washington. There are also Corps of Engineers
personnel currently working for USAID in Afghanistan to provide subject
matter expertise. I will make sure that these arrangements between the
two organizations continue so that we continue our close coordination.
I will also reinforce the need for a well coordinated team that
provides any engineering and construction support that USAID requires.
navigation mission
Question. The USACE has built and maintains an intracoastal and
inland network of commercial navigation channels, locks and dams for
navigation. The Corps also maintains 300 commercial harbors and more
than 600 smaller harbors.
What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the USACE with
respect to the execution of its navigation mission?
Answer. I expect one of the greatest challenges with the execution
of the navigation mission to be the maintenance and modernization of
the Nation's aging infrastructure. Maintaining our ports and waterways
is critical to our economic well-being. An equally significant
challenge to the navigation mission is the management of hundreds of
millions of cubic yards of dredged material removed from our Nation's
marine transportation harbors and waterways. My understanding is that
the Corps is continually working to make dredging and placement of
dredged material environmentally safe and acceptable. I believe that
the Corps should continue these efforts and look for innovative ways to
increase harmony between need for navigation improvements and our
precious aquatic environment.
Question. What do you see as the most significant navigation
projects planned for the next 10 years by the USACE?
Answer. I understand that many ports, gateways to domestic and
international trade and overseas military operations, are operating at
the margin in terms of channel depths. For coastal navigation, I see
one of the greatest challenges to be working with the administration,
Congress, other Federal transportation agencies, and navigation
stakeholders to prioritize and pursue capital investments to prepare
the Nation to maximize the opportunities for freight movement
efficiencies associated with opening the new deeper Panama Canal locks
in 2014. Clearly we must sustain the efficiency of our major ports to
assure our competitiveness in world trade. In addition, segments of the
inland waterways system are congested and are in need of
recapitalization or rehabilitation. The Corps must work with the
administration, Congress, and inland waterways stakeholders to find
solutions to the shortage in the Inland Waterways Trust Fund to allow
the needed capital investments to move forward.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the approval or
disapproval of navigation industry groups should play in decisions made
by the USACE about specific projects?
Answer. Decisions regarding Corps of Engineers projects are the
responsibility of officials in the executive and legislative branches.
For its part, the Corps should listen to its non-Federal sponsors,
stakeholders, and other interested parties, and fully integrate
economic, environmental, and social values. The Water Resources
Development Act of 1986 established the Inland Waterways User Board and
charged this board to report to the President and Congress on
priorities for investment in the inland waterways system.
Question. In November 2000, the Army Inspector General found that
three USACE officials had manipulated data in a cost-benefit analysis
in order to justify a $1 billion project.
What is your understanding of the steps that the USACE has taken
since 2000 to ensure that projects are appropriately analyzed and
justified?
Answer. My understanding is that the Corps has made substantial
changes to assure that projects are appropriately analyzed and
justified. The Corps has strengthened its procedures for internal peer
review and has adopted procedures for independent external peer review
under guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget and
consistent with direction provided in the Water Resources Development
Act of 2007. The Directorate of Civil Works now houses an Office of
Water Project Review that is separate from project development
functions. It is my understanding that a significant program of
planning improvement continues to be undertaken, including
strengthening planner capability, certifying planning models, utilizing
national centers of planning expertise, and engaging decisionmakers
throughout the planning process.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
technical analyses conducted by and for the USACE are independent and
sound?
Answer. If confirmed, I would evaluate the current process and be
guided by the principle that Corps technical analyses be absolutely
sound and the project evaluation process be transparent. The Chief of
Engineers provides technical expertise on water resources issues
throughout the Nation. Additionally, independent external reviews have
contributed to reducing risk, and to improving, informing and
reinforcing the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers. I would work
to assure that these external reviews continue to be effectively
integrated into the project development process, not added on at the
end of the process. Integration of independent external review improves
projects and will continue to assist the Corps in meeting the Nation's
urgent water resources needs.
national levee safety program
Question. The USACE has been criticized for its failure to do more
to protect New Orleans from catastrophic hurricane damage. The alleged
failures of the Army Corps include: (1) the construction of a shipping
channel that acted as a ``superhighway'' funneling the storm surge from
Katrina directly into New Orleans; (2) the failure to properly evaluate
the soil structure under the New Orleans levees; (3) the failure to
adequately maintain the levees; and (4) the failure to construct levees
sufficient to protect the city in the event of a direct hit by a strong
hurricane.
What is your view of these criticisms?
Answer. The lessons of Hurricane Katrina and the resulting
widespread failure and breaching of the levees has been a wake-up call
for not only the Corps but everyone involved with the management of
risks associated with levee systems. I understand that the Corps of
Engineers initiated several analyses and studies of the potential
causes and effects of the hurricane and the status of the hurricane
storm damage reduction projects in the New Orleans area. As a result of
these studies, the Corps also has developed and is in the final stages
of constructing billions of dollars of improvements to the system that
will provide the New Orleans area with risk reduction from the 1
percent event. I understand and appreciate the importance of continuing
to study this issue and, if confirmed, will immediately learn more
about the past, present and future work and the issues associated with
the Corps' ongoing efforts in the New Orleans area and the Nation. In
addition, the Corps has implemented a new policy of independent
external peer review that follows the guidelines of the National
Academies of Science for all studies, design, and construction of
projects that have the potential for public safety concerns and
significant economic damage. A full and complete understanding of what
happened in both the technical and decisionmaking arenas is an
essential component of assuring it does not happen again.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the structure,
processes, or priorities of the USACE as a result of the events in New
Orleans?
Answer. I believe the tragedy of the events in New Orleans has
caused some positive changes to the Corps over the last several years.
Since Katrina, I understand that the Corps has implemented a strategic
campaign to examine and improve all the major facets of how it delivers
value to the Nation in the Civil Works and Military Programs missions.
The Corps efforts have included the integration of concepts of risk,
systems, and resiliency into policies, programs, and procedures and the
assessment of its workforce competencies and plans for building a
technically competent workforce to implement these practices. If
confirmed, I plan to continue these efforts to assess whether any other
changes may be needed.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the USACE is
taking in the reconstruction of the New Orleans levees to protect the
city from a recurrence of the tragic events of August 2005?
Answer. I know that the Corps of Engineers is involved in many
ongoing reconstruction efforts in the New Orleans area, including
improvements to the hurricane storm damage reduction projects. I know
that the Corps is working towards designing and building an integrated
system that will provide protection from a 100-year storm event. If
confirmed, I will make it a priority to learn more about all ongoing
efforts in this area.
Question. The USACE recently completed a nationwide river levee
inspection process and identified numerous unacceptably maintained
levees. Media reports quoted Corps of Engineers officials as
acknowledging that past inspections were not documented adequately and
that a shortage of inspectors has made it difficult for periodic
inspections to be performed. The operation and maintenance of levee
systems is a shared responsibility of State and local sponsors,
however, there is enormous dependence on the USACE for inspection,
identification of problems, risk assessment, and where required,
rehabilitation.
What is your opinion of what the USACE and Federal, State, and
local authorities need to accomplish in order to ensure that existing
deficiencies in the national system of levees are addressed?
Answer. The Corps Levee Safety Program works continuously and
periodically to systematically evaluate and communicate the risks
associated with levees in its program authorities. I recognize that it
is important that the Corps conduct its activities in concert with
sponsors and stakeholders and share information obtained from the
evaluation of levees. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps'
evaluation activities are transparent to the public and coordinated
with sponsors.
The management of risks associated with the Nation's levees is a
shared responsibility among local, State, and Federal Government and
the individuals that live and work behind them. My understanding is
that the national scope of levees greatly exceeds the (approximately
15,000 miles) levees for which the Corps has authorities. The National
Committee on Levee Safety (which the Corps of Engineers chairs but is a
primarily non-Federal committee) has estimated that there may be as
many as 100,000 miles of levees in the United States that are outside
the current authorities of the Corps. If confirmed, I am committed to
learning more of the details of these programs and how the Corps can
continue to assist in this very important area.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
those levees representing the highest risk of failure and loss of life
and property are rehabilitated?
Answer. Holding public safety paramount is the key principle for
the Corps Civil Works mission. The Corps has developed a levee safety
program that uses state-of-the-art practices in inspection, risk
assessment and portfolio management to consistently identify,
communicate, prioritize, and, where appropriate, reduce the risks for
(approximately 2,000) levee systems within its authorities. Because
these processes involve shared responsibilities, the Corps works
closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, States, local
governments and other stakeholders to coordinate our policies and
programs, and ensure a common understanding of risks and comprehensive
solutions that best address the need to improve system performance and
reduce future flood risks. If confirmed, I will learn more about the
results of the Corps' levee inspections and risk assessments and will
work with all parties to determine best courses of actions as the
Nation moves forward to addressing these issues.
hurricane katrina relief and reconstruction contracting
Question. The USACE played a major role in contracting for
reconstruction and relief in the wake of the major hurricanes of 2005.
What is your understanding of the major successes of the USACE in
relief and reconstruction contracting?
Answer. The Corps of Engineers has a long tradition of providing
disaster response assistance. The Corps was a major player in the
Federal response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. In addition to
deploying over 8,000 Corps employees to provide disaster support, it
leveraged the expertise, capacity, and capabilities of the private
sector to provide relief assistance. It is my understanding that a
major contracting success is that of the Corps' program which utilizes
``Pre-Awarded'' contracts. This initiative provides the Corps with the
ability to rapidly and effectively respond in order to execute major
relief missions. After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps employed this
initiative to rapidly provide emergency services. These contracts
allowed the Corps to provide the initial assistance, while follow on
contracts could be competitively awarded to provide additional
capabilities and capacity.
Question. What is your understanding of the major failures?
Answer. I am not aware of any specific major failures; however, if
confirmed, I will look into the lessons learned from this event, and
other emergencies, and look for ways to improve the Corps' processes.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the USACE
should make to improve its processes for reconstruction and relief
contracting?
Answer. From my experience with the Corps of Engineers, it is an
organization that is constantly looking for ways to improve. I believe
it is important that the Corps work closely with the Department of
Homeland Security (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)), and
other Federal and non-Federal partners, to improve the collective
abilities to deliver required commodities and services in a timely,
efficient, and cost-effective manner. The work that the Corps performed
during Hurricane Katrina has been and will continue to be extensively
audited and, if confirmed, I would look forward to continue to work
with these agencies to implement collective actions and improvements to
the Corps' processes.
Question. Press articles have described a process in which work was
passed down from the USACE to a prime contractor, then to a
subcontractor, then to another subcontractor--with each company
charging the government for profit and overhead--before finally
reaching the company that would actually do the work. In one such case,
the USACE reportedly paid a prime contractor $1.75 per square foot to
nail plastic tarps onto damaged roofs in Louisiana. The prime
contractor paid another company 75 cents per square foot to do the
work; that subcontractor paid a third company 35 cents per square foot
to do the work; and that subcontractor paid yet another company 10
cents per square foot to do the work. In a second such case, the USACE
reportedly paid prime contractors $28 to $30 per cubic yard to remove
debris. The companies that actually performed the work were paid only
$6 to $10 per cubic yard.
What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the
USACE does not pay excessive ``pass-through'' charges of this kind on
future contracts?
Answer. While I am not personally familiar with these particular
contracts, it is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers entered
into competitive firm fixed price contracts in order to complete its
mission. Existing procurement regulations address excessive ``pass-
through'' charges. These regulations were not in effect at the time of
the Katrina response. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that these
regulations are complied with.
Question. Federal agencies, including the USACE, have been
criticized for awarding sole-source contracts on the basis of ``urgent
and compelling circumstances'' in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, even
though some of these contracts were awarded long after the Hurricane
took place or extended long beyond what could be justified on the basis
of that disaster.
Would you agree that the ``urgent and compelling'' exception to
competition requirements should be used to award a contract only on the
basis of an event, or series of events, that is reasonably proximate in
time to the contract award? Would you agree that the term of a contract
awarded on the basis of the urgent and compelling exception to
competition requirements should not ordinarily exceed the period of
time the agency reasonably believes to be necessary to award a follow-
on contract?
Answer. Yes, in general I believe that the ``urgent and
compelling'' exception should be used only in the immediate wake of the
disaster. I understand that the law requires competition except in very
limited circumstances and believe that competition is vitally
important. I also agree that the term of a contract awarded on the
basis of the urgent and compelling exception should not ordinarily
exceed a reasonable period to award a follow on contract. However, any
determination regarding the specific use of an ``urgent and
compelling'' exception to competition should be looked at on a case-by-
case basis. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps judiciously
uses the ``urgent and compelling'' exception in compliance with the
applicable statutes and regulations.
competition in the contract management of military programs
Question. The USACE has historically been designated as the primary
contracting agent for military construction (MILCON) projects carried
out by the Department of the Air Force. However, in recent years, due
to the perception of excessive overhead costs associated with the
USACE, the Air Force sought to establish an organic contracting agency
through the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in San
Antonio, TX.
What is your view of whether the Air Force should be allowed to
carry out a larger percentage of MILCON contracts?
Answer. The Corps of Engineers executes its military construction
responsibilities in compliance with title 10 U.S.C. 2851, subsection
(a), which provides that ``Each contract entered into by the United
States in connection with a military construction project or a military
family housing project shall be carried out under the direction and
supervision of the Secretary of the Army (acting through the Chief of
Engineers), the Secretary of the Navy (acting through the Commander of
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command), or such other department or
Government agency as the Secretary of Defense approves to assure the
most efficient, expeditious, and cost-effective completion of the
project.'' DOD Directive 4270.5 establishes policies and
responsibilities for the military construction program and the use of
DOD construction agents in the design or construction of military
construction program facilities.
The Corps of Engineers has successfully provided the Air Force
military design and construction mission since the Air Force was
established. I do not have an opinion on this specific issue at this
time. If I am confirmed, I will review the matter and will work with
DOD, the administration, and Congress to develop a position on this
matter.
Question. In your opinion, what would the impact be to the USACE by
allowing the Air Force to serve as their own contracting agent without
limitations?
Answer. Congress passed a law in the early 1950s that designated
the Army and the Navy as the DOD construction agents and specific
certain assessments that needed to be completed prior to allowing
another agent to execute the DOD-construction mission. If I am
confirmed, I will review the matter and will work with DOD, the
administration, and Congress to develop a position on this matter.
efficient management practices in the army corps of engineers
Question. In a report to Congress dated February 1, 2007 and
entitled ``U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response to Senate Report 109-
254, Management of Military Programs in the United States Corps of
Engineers, January 2007'', the Commander of the U.S. Corps of Engineers
stated that ``through MILCON Transformation, USACE will gain economic
efficiencies through design standardization of Army facility types,
centralization of design activities in USACE Centers of
Standardization, and focused business line contracting with regional
acquisition strategies.'' The report also forecasted that savings from
these efficiencies would be experienced by customers in later years
after full implementation of transformation initiatives, possibly
affecting rates charged by the Corps for supervision, inspection, and
overhead.
Do you support the goals of the USACEs' plan for MILCON
Transformation?
Answer. Yes. The goals of implementing a MILCON business process
that seeks to reduce design and construction costs and delivery time
and to build efficiencies through standardization of facilities and
processes remain extremely important and relevant. The cycle of
building, learning, adapting best practices and feeding this
information back into the programming phase has resulted in more
efficient and effective program execution.
Question. How do you assess the success of this program?
Answer. Based on what I know so far, the initiative to implement a
transformed Army MILCON Business Process was extremely successful. Like
any new process, there were lessons learned. Although a 2010 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report faulted the Army for not
establishing clear baseline for measuring achievement of goals for cost
and time savings, the report concluded that the Army did reduce the
estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened
building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. Perhaps the
greatest benefits resulted from more consistent solicitations and
delivery of a high volume of standard facilities during this period.
The MILCON Transformation initiative was a key factor enabling the
successful execution and delivery of an unprecedented MILCON program
during a period of very volatile market conditions. If confirmed, I
will learn more about the program and strive to continue to build on
its success. The transformed MILCON process provides a strong
foundation for continued adaptation and refinement of facilities
delivery processes to satisfy current and future program requirements.
Question. Are you aware of any customer concerns that you would
want to address, if confirmed?
Answer. It is my understanding that Army installation customers
have expressed a desire for more flexibility to accommodate local
installation preferences that may conflict with Army facilities
standards or standard designs. In an era of constrained staffing and
resources, installations are also interested in an integrated system
that results in delivery of a complete (ready to occupy) facility
including furniture and information technology systems. I understand
that the Corps is working with the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Installation Management and the Installation Management Command to
streamline processes for consideration of waivers to standards and
standard designs. If confirmed, I will learn more about customer
concerns and try to address them as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes or
improvements?
Answer. I believe that the Corps must continuously assess its
facilities delivery processes and seek improvements to better satisfy
program requirements and customer expectations. I believe that the
Corps should produce more energy efficient designs to support Army
objectives for compliance with energy mandates and reduced operating
costs. I would give priority to ensuring that Corps design and
construction techniques support energy mandates. Energy efficiency best
practices are specific to the site (climate zone) and facility type.
For instance, some areas of the country can take advantage of solar
energy while wind energy might be more efficient in another area.
Question. Have the Corps' customers seen any benefits of MILCON
transformation in terms of decreased costs for supervision, inspection,
and overhead and improved delivery times for construction products?
Answer. I believe that customers have benefited from reduced
supervision and administration costs to the. extent that contract cost
savings have been achieved. This is because the Corps operates within a
flat rate for supervision and administration (S&A) of MILCON projects
based on a fixed percentage of the contract amount. This system
provides for predictability and consistency for programming of
projects. I also understand there has been a savings in design costs
based on the use of standard designs and expanded use of design-build
acquisitions. I understand that resources are tight and demands for
them are high and, if confirmed, I commit to continue these
transformation efforts to improving services while trying to maximize
efficiencies.
Question. If not, when do you expect they will begin to see such
benefits?
Answer. I believe the Army has realized savings as discussed above.
bundling of contracts by the corps of engineers
Question. The USACE is faced with the significant challenge of
carrying out construction requirements imposed by force structure
changes due to Army modularity, wrapping up the 2005 round of Base
Realignments and Closures, the implementation of the Integrated Global
Presence and Basing Strategy, and most recently, the Army's initiative
to grow the force. In response, the Corps plans to allow construction
contractors to propose alternate types of construction, including pre-
manufactured and modular buildings, to bundle projects for multiple
buildings into one delivery order, and to rely on design-build
acquisitions, which requires one contractor to provide both design and
construction services. The net effect of these proposals will be to
reduce the pool of qualified contractors able to bid on such large and
complicated projects.
In your view, what benefits, if any would be gained by these
initiatives?
Answer. The shift from the legacy practice of defining prescriptive
requirements to performance based requirements and criteria allows the
market to drive the solution that provides the most efficient and cost-
effective means to comply with the facility requirements and criteria.
Allowing a broad range of construction types allows contractors to
adapt to changing market conditions and materials costs by proposing
the systems that they can deliver most efficiently. During fiscal year
2008-2009 when the Corps construction program peaked, the construction
market (both labor and material) was very volatile as a result of
rising diesel fuel prices. Steel prices were up in one region, down in
another, with similar conditions for concrete and wood. Flexibility in
design allowed more contractors to participate and offer their unique
solutions based on the sector of the market where they had a
competitive advantage.
Question. What are the risks to increasing the size and range of
services required by these contracts?
Answer. The risks of combining multiple facilities into single
large contracts include reducing the number of contractors that have
the capability to perform the work, and reducing opportunities for
small- and medium-sized businesses to compete as prime contractors. If
confirmed, I will help the Corps continue to choose acquisition
strategies designed to efficiently execute projects, provide
competitive opportunities for industry, and achieve the small business
goals. Packaging one or more facilities together in one delivery order
is not a standard business practice, but may be appropriate for a very
tight construction site or to satisfy unique phasing requirements.
Question. In your opinion, how can the Corps of Engineers ensure a
healthy bid climate that allows for a full range of small- and mid-
range businesses to compete for construction contracts?
Answer. I believe that proper acquisition planning that includes a
level of market research commensurate with the requirements will
identify qualified businesses interested in the specific procurements
and the available competition in the market. Careful analysis of this
information ensures the maximum level of competition by all qualified
businesses and the ability to provide maximum opportunities for small
business.
Question. In your opinion, what are the benefits and costs
resulting from the Corps of Engineers' decision to accept a less
permanent type of construction?
Answer. There has been no change to required facility service life
for MILCON projects. The Corps' solicitations require a 50-year
structure life, with a 25-year cycle for renovation or repurposing of
facilities. When properly designed and maintained, all types of
construction (wood, steel, concrete, or masonry) can achieve or exceed
the 50-year target facility service life. The use of alternative
construction types does not compromise the durability of the facility,
but does permit facilities designs to be as cost effective and
efficient as possible while complying with all applicable codes, life-
safety standards and other requirements. The Corps has reviewed the
issue of durability of alternative building systems and determined that
design of a structure to building codes for service loads, wind,
seismic forces, force protection and progressive collapse results in a
very robust structure. A 2010 GAO report recommended DOD conduct
additional study and analysis to assess the merits and long-term costs
resulting from the use of alternative building materials and methods.
If confirmed, I will work with DOD and the Corps to further assess this
issue.
construction services acquisition methods for the corps of engineers
Question. In response to urgent requirements to complete military
construction projects related to the 2005 round of Base Realignments
and Closures (BRAC), the Corps adopted an integrated design bid build
process with early contractor involvement. Various Corps districts used
different versions of this process with disparate levels of success
depending on the steps written in the contract to negotiate firm, fixed
prices after contract award and during actual construction. In the case
of the construction of a new hospital at Fort Belvoir, VA, costing more
than $1 billion, the committee was notified in December 2010 that DOD
was required to pay the contractor an additional $160 million as a
payment for ``firm-fixed price contract definitization'' even though
the facility was 80 percent construction complete and the cost was in
excess to the amount that had been authorized by Congress.
Representatives from the Corps briefed this committee in January 2011
that this process is being used in at least 19 other construction
contracts.
Are you familiar with this process?
Answer. Yes, I am generally familiar with the use of Fixed Price
Incentive Successive Targets (FPIS) contracts in general, and with the
Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) methodologies developed by the
Corps.
Question. Do you believe that it was beneficial to the Government
to award military construction projects without a clear firm-fixed
price at contract award? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. Considering the size, technical complexity, and time
constraints for delivery of the Fort Belvoir Community Hospital and
other large and complex facilities required to support implementation
of BRAC 2005, the delivery timelines could not have been achieved while
satisfying the functional and operational requirements using any
traditional acquisition method. As the committee notes, the Corps has
used the Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) method for only about 20
MILCON projects. ECI is a specialized tool appropriate in unique
circumstances. FPIS uses target and ceiling pricing, and a series of
incentives, to determine a final price. This delivery method known as
ECI has been used successfully to complete a number of quality projects
with an expedited delivery schedule and includes a guaranteed maximum
price that could increase if contractually appropriate scope changes
arise. The hospital at Fort Belvoir was one of the pilot ECI projects
awarded by the Corps and, I understand, a number of lessons learned
have been identified as process improvements since that time and
internal policies and procedures have been updated and continue to be
updated.
Question. In your opinion, given the risk to the Government, should
the Corps establish guidelines and standards for the use of this
acquisition process?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps has been gathering
lessons learned from its initial ECI experiences and is refining its
processes and guidance. I also understand that management controls are
in place that require each project proposing to utilize the ECI
delivery method to be approved by the Headquarters, with subsequent
approval of an acquisition plan by the Principal Assistant Responsible
for Contracting. The Corps is also working with Defense Contract Audit
Agency and Defense Contract Management Agency as part of its continuous
learning and sharing.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure this process, if used,
is managed in a way that does not expose the Government to a contract
liability for amounts that have not been authorized by Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue the work which the Corps
has begun to capture lessons learned from the ECI contracts which have
been awarded; and to refine criteria and improve the guidance for the
application of ECI. In addition, I will seek to increase outreach to
other DOD elements and industry, to explore ways to refine our
management and contract administration practices to limit cost growth
when using this acquisition method.
energy savings and sustainable design
Question. DOD has goals for the reduction of energy consumption in
facilities as well as the adoption of sustainable design standards. As
the largest design and construction agent for the Department for the
execution of military construction contracts, the Corps will be
responsible for a qualitative response to the needs of military
customers to meet those goals.
How do you assess the expertise and professional education of the
engineers in the Corps to be able to incorporate the latest technology
and practices for energy consumption reductions and sustainable design
in each military construction project?
Answer. The Corps has demonstrated great capability in achieving
energy savings in design and construction with infusion of new
technologies. In that regard, I believe that the Corps is on par with
industry as our society learns how to build energy efficient and
sustainable facilities. The Corps is actively engaged with the Army,
the Department of Energy, and other partners to learn how to
incorporate new technologies and design methods into our standard
business processes. It is also training its staff in energy efficient
design, sustainable and high performing building at all levels and in
all disciplines.
Question. In your opinion, should this aspect of project design be
subject to the request of the customer or established as a design
standard for all Corps projects?
Answer. In my view, customers have the flexibility to define the
requirements for their facilities within the constraints of applicable
codes, Federal mandates, and DOD policy requirements. The Corps is
seeking to standardize the best business practices and to define the
types of technologies and design features that will optimize energy
efficiency for the climate zone and facility type being provided. For
example, the Corps is working to implement new processes to conduct
energy savings modeling for every project at the planning or early
design phase. They are also working toward performing a full building
life cycle cost analysis of the energy efficiency options that make
sense and are available to the customer. This will allow the customer
to make an informed decision regarding initial investment cost and the
total cost of ownership over the facility life cycle.
Question. In your opinion, how aggressive is the Corps in testing
new technologies and products and then adjusting military
specifications to be able to incorporate those technologies and
products into facility designs?
Answer. There are many great examples of new technologies going
into projects daily, however I believe the Corps can be more aggressive
to institutionalize or make these technologies wide spread. The Corps
has identified development of a knowledge management capability as one
of its Campaign Plan objectives, which will help improve the sharing of
best practices.
preference for design-build contracts for military construction
projects
Question. Over the past 10 years, the Corps of Engineers has
adopted the design-build (DB) process as the preferred contracting
vehicle for the acquisition of facility construction, as opposed to
traditional methods of design-bid-build (DBB) and in-house design.
While DB contracts offer the opportunity for a designer and a
construction contractor to work together earlier in the contract, thus
reducing claims and change orders, the risk of user-requested changes
increases and the role of Corps engineers in the design phase as well
as contract oversight are diminished. In addition, the proliferation of
contracted designs has greatly reduced the amount of in-house design
performed by Corps engineers.
What is your view on the appropriate balance of DB, DBB, and in-
house design work accomplished by the Corps?
Answer. In my view, it is important to carefully assess and make
decisions regarding the acquisition strategy for each project in
coordination with the customer early in the project development
process. It is important to maintain an appropriate balance between DB
and DBB methods in order to offer contractors a wide and varied
opportunity to compete. Similarly, the Corps must balance the need to
retain in-house design work to sustain technical competency with the
need to provide design opportunities for the private architect-engineer
community. These decisions are not driven by numbers of projects, but
by the nature of the projects, the objectives of our customers, and the
need to maintain a technically competent staff. Only through in-house
design experiences can the Corps be prepared to provide the required
technical and engineering skills required by its diverse missions.
Question. In your opinion, on what factors should the design and
acquisition process recommended by the Corps to its customers be based
on for each military construction project?
Answer. In my opinion, selection of the design and acquisition
method should be based on the best tool available, considering the
specific requirements of the projects and the objectives of the
customer. For example, the need to define unique or specialized
facility requirements during the design phase may make DBB the most
appropriate tool. Renovation projects are often executed using the DBB
method in order to reduce risk related to unknown as-built conditions.
DB may be more attractive when the customer has well-defined functional
requirements and criteria, or requires construction to fast track or
start early--due to seasonal weather.
Question. Are you concerned about the impact of the amount of in-
house design work on the capabilities of the engineering corps?
Answer. I am concerned that the Corps maintains the right balance
of work to remain technically competent. I know the Corps has placed a
great deal of focus on this issue as reflected in its Campaign Plan,
and I will continue to maintain a focus on technical competency if I am
confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes in the
process and guidelines used by the Corps to determine the acquisition
method for each military construction project?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek consistency in acquisition
processes and solicitations among Corps districts, in order to assist
industry to better understand project requirements and improve the
quality and pricing of their proposals. I would also place a priority
on ensuring selection of appropriate design and contracting strategies
to facilitate compliance with energy and sustainability requirements.
environmental issues
Question. If confirmed, you will take charge of the largest
construction program in the country. Virtually every major civil works
project of the USACE raises environmental concerns.
What is your view of the appropriate balance between the missions
and projects of the USACE and the National Environmental Policy Act and
other environmental statutes?
Answer. I believe that the Corps can and must carry out its
missions in an environmentally responsible manner. The Corps has a long
record of coordinating its missions and planning its projects in
compliance with the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
and numerous other environmental statutes, consistent with the Corps'
Environmental Operating Principals. Strong collaboration with other
agencies and subject matter experts has led to better and more
environmentally sensitive projects. If confirmed, I am committed to
ensuring that Corps projects are planned, constructed, operated, and
maintained in such a manner as to avoid or minimize adverse
environmental effects.
Question. The USACE is responsible for environmental restoration
projects at Department of Defense Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS)
and at Department of Energy Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action
Program (FUSRAP) sites.
What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the USACE with
respect to the execution of its environmental restoration mission?
Answer. It is my understanding that continuing to execute the vital
cleanup mission, adapting new technologies to gain efficiencies, while
always protecting the health and safety of the public and workers is
perhaps the biggest challenge for the FUDS and FUSRAP programs. The
Corps must continue to apply good science, adopt innovative effective
technology, and apply good management practices that will increase
remediation safety and efficiency and meet commitments to stakeholders.
Effective interim risk management and public education programs are
important to the process.
Question. Do you believe that goals established for environmental
cleanup (including cleanup of unexploded ordnance) under these programs
are realistic and achievable?
Answer. The Corps has aggressive goals for these programs and
meeting those goals will be a challenge. Much of this work is conducted
on private property and involves numerous stakeholders, many with
conflicting agendas. If confirmed, I will continue to press for ways to
perform the mission in the most efficient and effective manner
possible.
Question. In the past, the USACE has not always been required to
meet States' water quality standards in constructing and operating its
water resources projects.
Do you believe that the USACE should be required to meet State
water quality standards in constructing and operating USACE projects?
Answer. Yes. I believe that the Corps should be a leader in the
environmental arena and, in most circumstances, should meet State water
quality requirements.
Question. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires landowners or
developers to obtain USACE permits to carry out activities involving
disposal of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the
United States, including wetlands. For almost 2 decades, the stated
goal of the Federal Government has been ``no net loss of wetlands''.
Do you support the goal of ``no net loss of wetlands''?
Answer. Yes, I support the national no net loss goal. Wetlands are
important to human health, the environment and the economy.
Question. Do you believe that we are currently meeting that goal?
Answer. I understand that the Corps is contributing to the national
goal by requiring compensatory mitigation for unavoidable wetland
impacts.
Question. What specific steps do you believe that the USACE should
take to move us closer to the goal of ``no net loss of wetlands''?
Answer. I understand that the Corps' Regulatory Program continues
to use the best available science and information to ensure the
ecological success of compensatory mitigation required to offset
unavoidable impacts to waters and wetlands. Two of the Corps'
regulatory performance metrics emphasize the need to ensure that
compensatory mitigation for authorized impacts to aquatic resources is
accomplished. Additionally, I understand that the Corps does have a
database in order to trace wetland impacts and mitigation. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps continues to successfully
operate its Regulatory Program towards the goal of ``no net loss of
wetlands''.
recruiting and retention of army engineers
Question. In recent years, competition among employers for the
services of highly qualified engineers has greatly increased.
What is your understanding of the Army's success in recruiting and
retaining for careers sufficient numbers of highly-qualified officers
and civilian employees for service in the USACE?
Answer. From what I understand, the Corps is very successful at
filling civilian positions and usually has multiple highly qualified
candidates for each position announced. Recruiting the right talent to
meet the challenges and projected workload is critical to the success
of the Corps. Although the current economy has contributed to recent
recruitment successes, the Corps must be ready to recruit from a
projected shrinking talent pool. One of the objectives in the Corps
Campaign Plan is to establish tools and systems to get the right people
in the right jobs, and then develop and retain this highly-skilled
workforce. In order to accomplish these objectives, the Corps has
trained a civilian recruitment cadre to interact with job seekers and
market the Corps of Engineers as an employer of choice. It is also my
understanding that the Corps of Engineers generally does very well in
helping to recruit and retain military officers. More officers are
interested in branching Engineer and serving with the Corps of
Engineers than the Army has authorizations to fill. Over the past
several years, the Army has made significant progress to increase the
percentage of incoming Engineer officers with engineering and other
technical degrees. Many Engineer officers later earn Masters' degrees
in engineering or related fields as well as professional certifications
such as Professional Engineer (PE) and Project Management Professional.
Question. What do you view as the Corps of Engineers greatest
challenge in meeting its manpower and training and education
requirements?
Answer. The Corps has been successful in recruiting and retaining
needed manpower. I believe that the greatest challenge will come as the
economy improves and private industry begins to actively hire
engineers, scientists, and other professionals. Many Corps employees
are project funded; paying salaries during training periods has been a
challenge and limits the amount of time employees can spend in a
training status. However, I recognize the vital importance of
continuing to identify competency strengths and gaps and then
determining the training, education, experience, and resources to close
those gaps.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the
Army improves its attractiveness to highly qualified individuals for
service in both the Active and Reserve components and in the civilian
workforce?
Answer. In addition to the programs previously mentioned, I would
definitely support the Office of Personnel Management, DOD, and
Department of Army in their efforts to streamline and shorten the
Federal hiring process. Speed of hiring talent at all levels is
important in order not to lose the best candidates to other employers.
Also important is having an efficient and painless ``on-boarding''
process for new employees. The way new personnel are welcomed into the
organization plays a significant role in whether they stay with the
organization. Since Public Law 109-163, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Department has had the
mandate to assess existing and future competencies needed to accomplish
its missions. The Army is doing that through use of the Competency
Management System.
The Corps of Engineer uses the Cadet District Engineer Program to
bring Reserve Officers' Training Corps and U.S. Military Academy cadets
into the Corps between their junior and senior years. This program
introduces the cadets to engineering projects and gives them 3 weeks of
hands-on experience. Approximately 40-50 cadets participate each
summer. As stated previously, the Engineer branch vigorously recruits
cadets with technical degrees and other appropriate qualifications for
commissioning as Engineer officers. After commissioning, most Engineer
officers serve with troop units through company command. The Human
Resources Command places highly-qualified and competitive officers to
serve with the Corps in various capacities. With over 75 percent of
Engineer units in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard, there
is a tremendous reservoir of talented Engineer officers in the Reserve
components. The Army could not meet all Engineer manning requirements
without them. These Reserve component officers serve in a variety of
critical positions alongside Active component military and civilian
personnel. If confirmed, I would continue to support these great
recruitment efforts and look for additional ways to improve the Corps
military and civilian workforce.
human capital planning for the civilian workforce
Question. DOD is developing a comprehensive human capital strategic
plan for its Federal civilian workforce which is intended to identify
critical skills and competencies needed in the future civilian employee
workforce, as well as a plan of action for developing and reshaping the
Federal civilian workforce.
If confirmed, how would you approach the task of identifying gaps
in needed skills in the USACE workforce and ensuring that adequate
resources, training, and professional developments efforts are
undertaken to achieve the Corps' workforce goals?
Answer. If confirmed I would serve as the Army Functional Chief for
over 106 Army Civilian Engineering and Science occupations covering
professional, blue collar, non-appropriated fund, and foreign national
employees and would be responsible for instituting holistic life-cycle
career management. I would continue the work the Corps has done to
identify competencies for mission critical occupations, assess
competencies and institute strategies to close competency gaps. I would
continue refinement of professional development maps for all assigned
occupations and will utilize the Corps Leader Development Program that
incorporates the Army's Civilian Education System to promote an
environment of continuous learning and leader development.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Engineers?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
corps' spending budget
1. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Bostick, we all know there
is a large backlog of projects that are not being carried out by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) due to lack of funding, and
that was true even before our current budget crisis. Now that we will
likely see cuts across many programs, how will the Army Corps determine
which projects to fund?
General Bostick. I am aware of the significant construction backlog
that exists within the Civil Works program. I am also aware of the
current budgetary constraints that face this great nation. If
confirmed, I will work within the administration and with Congress to
ensure that the process used by the Corps of Engineers will continue to
be performance based, making the best overall use of available funds by
prioritizing projects that provide the greatest return on investment to
the Nation.
2. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Bostick, many ports and
harbors in my State are small by comparison, but act as the lifeline to
the community, allowing our shellfishermen to head out every day, and
our recreational boating industry to attract summer tourists. Without
Congress' ability to provide suggestions through the traditional
appropriations process, I fear that the Army Corps will continue to
focus on dredging our large ports, and our small ports and harbors will
be neglected. How will you balance the needs of the large industrial
ports with the needs of the small industrial, recreational, and fishing
harbors?
General Bostick. I am aware of the ongoing discussions that are
taking place throughout the country on the need for safe and reliable
waterborne transportation systems for the movement of commercial goods
and for national security needs. If confirmed, I will work within the
administration and with Congress to ensure the maintenance of those
inland and intracoastal waterways, coastal channels and the ports and
harbors for which the Corps of Engineers has responsibility to
maintain, will be accomplished in a manner that best supports the
Nation's economy.
supplemental environmental impact statement
3. Senator Lieberman. Lieutenant General Bostick, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has so far failed to proceed with a
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for eastern Long
Island Sound's dredged material disposal options. This is of grave
concern to the maritime industry in Connecticut, as well as Submarine
Base New London, since failure to complete an SEIS would have
effectively shuttered our two existing dredged material disposal sites.
Thankfully, after working with Army Corps officials from the New
England District, I was able to have legislative language passed that
would keep those two sites open an additional 5 years. What will you do
to try to ensure that the SEIS proceeds as was promised a decade ago,
so that the eastern half of Connecticut will not lose the ability to
dredge its ports and harbors in a cost effective manner?
General Bostick. It is my understanding that the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has the only authority to designate a long-term
ocean dredged material placement site under section 103(b) of the
Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act. It is also my
understanding that the Corps of Engineers continues to coordinate with
EPA in this matter and has provided information to EPA to assist. I
understand the importance of adequate dredged material disposal sites
in Long Island Sound and, if confirmed, will ensure that the Corps
continues to do all it can to appropriately assist EPA in its
requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
environmental mission challenges
4. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, there are over 300
formerly used defense sites (FUDS) and service sites in Alaska. Much of
the environmental contamination impacts Alaska Natives and their
villages, like those on Saint Lawrence Island. Environmental
restoration at many of these sites will not be completed for years. In
your view, what is the greatest challenge facing the Army Corps with
respect to the execution of its environmental mission?
General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers' environmental mission
involves multiple programs supporting the Department of Defense (DOD),
the Department of the Army and non-DOD customers. For example, these
programs include not only FUDS, but the Army Environmental Restoration
Program, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Program,
the Army Civil Works Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program,
the Native American Lands Environmental Mitigation Program (NALEMP)
which has the vast majority of its projects in Alaska. Each
environmental program presents its own unique challenges with support
tailored to each customer's requirements. Overall, I see the greatest
challenge is to efficiently and effectively mitigate the risks to human
health and the environment, to communicate well with the public and to
engage strategically with environmental regulators and stakeholders,
while working within the resources made available to each program.
The NALEMP program is a DOD program administered by the Corps which
provides funding to local Native American communities to address
environmental issues which are a result of DOD activities impacting
Native American lands. The majority of the program has been focused on
FUDS properties in Alaska and has assisted in the characterization and
removal of environmental concerns while promoting Native American
entities winning and executing projects using DOD funds provided
through Cooperative Agreements.
Concerning the FUDS program, the Army Corps currently executes the
program on behalf of DOD and Army. DOD budgets for the program. The
FUDS program has approximately 7,000 properties with an estimated 1,800
sites remaining to be completed with a current cost to complete of
approximately $14 billion. There are many challenges working with
property no longer under DOD control but, if confirmed, I will ensure
that the Corps continues to work with stakeholders to meet those
challenges.
5. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, if confirmed, what
recommendations would you have for addressing those challenges?
General Bostick. In addressing these challenges, I would recommend
that the Corps of Engineers strives to continually improve execution,
first by applying experiences gained via lessons learned throughout all
environmental programs, second by utilizing innovative and greener
solutions and concurrently engaging industry, and lastly by
incorporating regular feedback that is continually being sought from
the public, customers and stakeholders. For instance, in the cleanup of
unexploded ordnance, a particular need is better site characterization
technology, more effective interim risk management and public education
programs until such time that all lands impacted by unexploded ordnance
can be remediated, all of which are being addressed by FUDS program
personnel.
6. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, are the goals set
for environmental cleanup realistic?
General Bostick. I believe the Corps of Engineers has aggressive
goals for conducting environmental cleanup set in conjunction with the
Army, DOD and non-DOD customers. While meeting those goals will be a
challenge, I believe they are achievable if adequate resources are made
available on a timely basis. Much of the Corps environmental work is
conducted on private property that may not have been used by the
Federal Government for decades and involves numerous stakeholders, many
with conflicting priorities, some of whom may be potentially
responsible parties. If confirmed, I will continue to press for ways to
perform the mission in the most efficient and effective manner
possible.
small business contracting
7. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Bostick, in recent years
Congress has encouraged the agencies, particularly DOD, to increase
competition for contracts. However, there is still an obligation of the
agencies to utilize small businesses. In your opinion, how can the Army
Corps ensure a bid climate that allows small- to mid-range businesses
the opportunity for contracts?
General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers must continue to ensure a
bid climate that allows small businesses the opportunity to compete to
the maximum extent possible. Market research and industry responses to
sources sought synopses are the key to discovering small businesses'
capabilities and the best way to structure procurements for
construction, supplies and services. Information gained from industry
during the sources sought process allows the Corps to develop
acquisition strategies that consider small business participation as
both prime contractors and subcontractors. While there is not a
specific category for set aside of procurement actions for mid-range
businesses, the Corps works to be as inclusive of all business sizes as
possible, whether as a prime contractor or a subcontractor. If
confirmed, I am committed to creating opportunities for small business
participation in Corps projects. I will ensure that this continues to
be a focus for the organization as a whole.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
delivery of projects of regional importance and national security
8. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, how do you plan
to handle projects of undisputed regional significance which have
opposition from an individual State for political purposes?
General Bostick. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Corps of
Engineers would work with the leadership of the affected states to
attempt to resolve any differences or issues. If a mutual resolution
could not be reached, the Corps would continue to evaluate the project
on its own merits to determine if it is in the Federal interest to
pursue the project.
tri-state litigation on apalachicola-chattahoochee-flint river system
9. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, the 11th Circuit
opinion overruling the 2009 Magnuson decision remanded to the Army
Corps the decision on whether [after having the breadth of its
statutory authority under the 1946 Rivers and Harbors Act (P.L. 79-525)
and the Water Supply Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-500)] the Army Corps will be
able to grant Georgia's 2000 water supply request. We have been told
that work is on track for completion by late June 2012. Do you expect
that the Army Corps will be able to meet this deadline?
General Bostick. Yes, my understanding is that the Corps of
Engineers intends to complete the analysis that the Court of Appeals
has directed by the end of June 2012.
10. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, what do you
believe is the extent of Army Corps authority to allocate storage for
water supply in light of the 11th Circuit's ruling?
General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of the 11th
Circuit's ruling or the legal authorities at issue. I understand that
the Corps of Engineers is currently evaluating the extent of its
authority to operate Lake Lanier for water supply, and intends to
complete its analysis and provide its answer in accordance with the
Court of Appeals ruling by June 2012.
11. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, as part of this
analysis, do you believe that the Army Corps will make the decision to
credit return flows?
General Bostick. I am unaware of the Corps of Engineers' existing
policies on return flows. My understanding is that the Corps' analysis
is focused on the specific instructions provided in the 11th Circuit's
ruling. I do not know whether that analysis, once it is completed, will
include any legal or policy determinations regarding return flows.
12. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, in your opinion,
how much direction do you feel that the 11th Circuit decision has given
the Army Corps?
General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of the 11th
Circuit's decision. I understand that the Court of Appeals has remanded
the matter to the Corps to make certain determinations that are within
the Corps of Engineers' discretion, and has given the Corps specific
instructions as to the issues it should address.
13. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, what is the
degree to which you feel that individual States will have influence
over the Army Corps as it prepares its decision on this matter?
General Bostick. My understanding is that the Court of Appeals has
remanded the matter to the Corps of Engineers to make certain
determinations that are within the Corps' discretion, according to the
Corps' interpretation of applicable law. I also understand that after
the Corps determines the extent of its authority, prior to making any
final decisions on how to operate the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
system, the Corps will involve the States and the public as
appropriate. I expect that the Corps will take into account the views
of all affected States in that decisionmaking process
permitting new water supply reservoirs
14. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, we have received
word that the EPA may be urging the Army Corps to do an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) on all new reservoirs due to the cumulative
effects of reservoirs as they are put into use. An EIS on all new
reservoirs is, of course, costly in terms of both time and money. Do
you feel that an EIS for all new non-Federal reservoirs is necessary?
General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of any current
permit applications for new water supply reservoirs, or the
environmental reviews that may be associated with those permits.
Moreover, I do not know what advice U.S. Environmental Agency may have
given on this matter. I do expect that the Corps of Engineers will
comply with all applicable legal requirements in any permitting
process.
15. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Bostick, how do you
foresee the Army Corps handling this issue?
General Bostick. I am not familiar with the details of any current
permit applications for new water supply reservoirs. I expect the Corps
of Engineers to comply with all applicable legal requirements in any
permitting process.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
corps of engineers prioritization
16. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, historically, most
Army Corps civil projects have been carried out through congressional
direction, primarily through authorizations made in the Water Resources
Development Act. In 2010, Congress refrained from authorizing directed
spending for specific projects. This moratorium on directed spending
will likely remain for the foreseeable future. Under these
circumstances, how will the Army Corps prioritize funding for projects
across the country?
General Bostick. If confirmed, I will work within the
administration and with Congress to ensure that the process used by the
Corps of Engineers will continue to be performance based, making the
best overall use of available funds by prioritizing projects that
provide the greatest return on investment to the Nation.
17. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, do certain regions
have a higher priority compared to others?
General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers does not place higher
priority on different regions of the country. If confirmed, I will work
within the administration and with Congress to ensure the emphasis in
development of the Civil Works program will be on investments in the
Nation's infrastructure that funds constructing, maintaining and
operating critically important water infrastructure in every state of
the Nation that contributes to the Nation's economy and quality of
life. I will support management, restoration, and protection of the
Nation's water, wetlands, and related resources.
18. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, how will the Army
Corps prioritize support for projects that serve a national purpose,
such as repairing and maintaining the Mississippi River and Tributaries
(MR&T) Project?
General Bostick. I am aware of the great flood of 2011 and the
extensive damages that occurred throughout the middle and northeast
areas of our country. I am also aware that the infrastructure operated
and maintained by the Corps of Engineers prevented damages in excess of
$110 billion in the Mississippi River watershed alone. If confirmed, I
will work within the administration and with Congress to ensure that
the funding made available to the Corps, including the MR&T, for the
repairs and recovery from this historic event, will be executed as
quickly as possible, especially those critical repairs to protect life
and public safety.
harbor maintenance trust fund
19. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, ensuring the safety
and uninterrupted operation in our Nation's ports is essential to
commerce, trade, and America's economic prosperity. However, many of
our country's ports face critical maintenance needs for which the Army
Corps claims it has insufficient funding. This includes the requirement
for congressionally-mandated routine dredging to maintain our ports at
their authorized depths. Could funds made available from the Harbor
Maintenance Trust Fund be a viable option to address the shortfall of
Federal funding to carry out critical dredging needed by our Nation's
ports?
General Bostick. I am aware that our Nation's ports, harbors, and
waterways are vital components of the Nation's transportation system. I
am also aware of the current budgetary constraints that face this great
nation. Since spending from the Harbor Maintenance Trust is dependent
on congressional appropriations, Congress would have to appropriate the
additional funds and provide a corresponding increase in the Corps'
Civil Works budget, or offsetting reductions would have to be taken
from other Civil Works mission areas. If confirmed, I will work within
the administration and with Congress to ensure the Corps of Engineers
civil works projects are prioritized based on maximum benefits to the
Nation for all its missions within the limitations of the overall
budgetary constraints.
20. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, do you believe
utilizing funds deposited into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund each
year to dredge and maintain ports would impact the financial solvency
of the Fund?
General Bostick. I understand that the Harbor Maintenance Trust
Fund is made up of receipts collected in the form of an ad valorum tax
on imports and interest earned on the balance in the Trust Fund. These
revenues then reimburse the Corps of Engineers for expenditures on
eligible navigation projects. I am not familiar with the specific
details or the inner workings of this fund. I am told that utilization
of the HMTF balance is being discussed within the administration. If
confirmed, I will work within the administration and with Congress on
this issue of critical importance to the Nation.
leadership in energy and environmental design
21. Senator Wicker. Lieutenant General Bostick, the recent practice
of DOD to require construction of green buildings to meet certain
standards of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) has
discriminated against various U.S. products and may have harmed
competitiveness. How will the Army Corps ensure its Federal
construction of any green building will allow all green rating systems
to be considered when adopting green building standards?
General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers is committed to achieving
full and open competition in design and construction services and it is
never the Corps' intent to implement any policy that would discriminate
against various U.S. products or harm competitiveness. In making a
decision on what certification standard to apply, I believe it is
important that it achieves a high performance and sustainable building,
identified by a minimum standard of performance, a certification that
is widely accepted and recognized by industry. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the Corps continues working with its Federal partners, as
well as its customers, to influence and implement sustainable building
requirements that support full and open competition.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
confined disposal facilities
22. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, in the Great
Lakes, certainly in Lake Erie, dredged material has traditionally been
placed in Confined Disposal Facilities (CDFs). Projected costs for new
CDFs make it substantially unlikely that new CDFs would be the
preferred option. In Ohio, substantial work has been done to develop
new upland uses for sediment, yet current Army Corps procedures seem to
favor short-term disposal costs versus life-cycle asset growth and
utilization. Can you please share your views on how the Army Corps can
best support local efforts to develop alternatives to costly CDFs?
General Bostick. It is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers
seeks to accomplish its navigation mission through the Federal
Standard, which is defined as the least costly, environmentally
acceptable dredged material placement method. I would expect periodic
testing and discussions with environmental resource agencies to assure
the Federal Standard is maintained and placement costs are minimized.
If confirmed, I would support the Corps continuing to work with non-
Federal sponsors and interested parties to explore all methods to best
accomplish the mission within the law.
23. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, would you support
the Army Corps' reliance on locally developed engineering solutions for
sediment management?
General Bostick. I would expect the Corps of Engineers to cooperate
and collaborate with non-Federal sponsors and third party engineering
firms experienced in sediment management to ensure that dredged
material placement is accomplished in accordance with all applicable
laws and environmental regulations and in the least costly manner to
the U.S. taxpayer.
army corps procedures
24. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, concerns have been
raised in a variety of venues regarding the pace and complexity of Army
Corps procedures. The widely held perception is that the Army Corps is
more focused on its process and procedures and narrow application of
its rules than it is to actually achieving useful, effective outcomes
in a timely manner. Can you please share your views about what plans,
if any, you may bring to reform and streamline Army Corps procedures?
General Bostick. I understand that the Corps of Engineers has been
criticized for taking too long and costing too much to deliver
essential services to the Nation. I believe that Corps leadership
clearly understands that past strategies for planning, designing,
constructing, operating, maintaining, repairing, replacing, and
rehabilitating our infrastructure must be adapted to become leaner and
more responsive to meet present needs. It is my understanding that the
Corps currently has initiatives underway to improve project and program
delivery. If confirmed, I will actively support the ongoing efforts and
initiatives as well as others to make the Corps more efficient and
effective.
25. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, there is also a
sense that, when challenged, the Army Corps tends to adopt a highly
self-protecting, defensive posture--preferring to protect its own
policies and institution rather than accommodate and positively respond
or adapt to concerns. Do you think the Army Corps needs to reform
itself to become more accommodating, adaptable, and responsive to local
concerns?
General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers understands the need to
consider local concerns and to be responsive to those concerns. In the
recently published Civil Works Strategic Plan, one of the six
strategies highlighted is Collaboration and Partnering-Building and
sustaining collaboration and partnerships at all levels to leverage
funding, talent, data, and research from multiple agencies and
organizations to be more responsive to the public. Partnerships among
Federal agencies, tribes, local entities, and private not-for-profit
create efficiencies when scarce resources are combined toward common
aims. If confirmed, I will support all efforts to ensure that the Corps
is appropriately responsive to local concerns.
26. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, do you think the
Army Corps is as efficient and cost-effective as it can be with
shrinking fiscal resources?
General Bostick. Any large organization can become more efficient
and effective. If confirmed, I will make every effort to continuously
improve and make the Corps of Engineers as efficient and effective as
possible.
27. Senator Portman. Lieutenant General Bostick, if confirmed as
Commanding General, what plans, if any, would you have to make the Army
Corps more efficient, with a modern business model?
General Bostick. The current Corps of Engineers' business model is
quite flexible. By leveraging private sector architect-engineer
resources and private sector construction firms, while keeping a
relatively small cadre of Federal employees, I understand that the
Corps was able to accomplish a tripling of workload over the past 5
years with virtually no increase in the number of Federal employees.
But this business model can be improved. If confirmed, I will reexamine
the Corps' business model and make every effort to employ modern
business practices to make it as efficient and effective as possible.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
national export initiative
28. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, what benefits to
this Nation does the Army Corps provide as we grow our economy through
a resurgence of manufacturing, a modernization of the country's
infrastructure, and the doubling of exports as described in President
Obama's National Export Initiative?
General Bostick. I believe that the Corps of Engineers continues to
provide safe, reliable, cost-effective and environmentally sustainable
transportation on its inland waterways and coastal channels and harbors
in order to move commerce between the Nation's agricultural and
manufacturing centers and its coastal ports to facilitate exports and
imports of goods.
modernization of ports
29. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, how specifically
can the Army Corps modernize our port infrastructure by reengineering
our feasibility study process to be more responsive to global trends in
shipping and trade that allow bigger ships to call upon our terminals
either through the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal?
General Bostick. I believe that the Corps of Engineers must be as
efficient as possible in order to address the needs of the Nation. It
is my understanding that the Corps has undertaken a number of recent
initiatives to modernize its feasibility study process and strengthen
its analyses of modernizing ports. This will result in shorter study
timeframes and more responsive feasibility reports.
To strengthen its analyses of ports, the Corps is improving its
analytic procedures, methods of production, and understanding of the
evolving global environment. Because navigation economic analysis is
such a specialized field, the Corps established the National Deep Draft
Navigation Planning Center of Expertise as a mandatory center for the
production of all deep draft navigation related economic analyses. If
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the Corps is utilizing all
possible tools to ensure consistent treatment across all studies
nationally, which ultimately helps the Corps maintain the critical mass
of expertise needed for conducting deep draft navigation economic
studies in the most streamlined manner.
30. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, if confirmed as
Chief of Engineers, you will oversee Federal aspects of domestic port
operations. Do you view the Army Corps as the agency with the requisite
expertise and obligation to recommend a port modernization strategy to
the administration and to Congress?
General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers is a premier public
engineering organization, and I believe the Corps has the expertise,
working in collaboration with other Federal agencies, to develop a port
modernization strategy and to follow through with improvements and
maintenance of its coastal ports and channels and inland waterways. The
Corps is also taking a leadership role in the committee on the Marine
Transportation System, which is enhancing Federal collaboration.
31. Senator Graham. Lieutenant General Bostick, as DOD's budget
shrinks in response to austerity measures, how would you prioritize
which ports to invest in absent a comprehensive modernization strategy
or a merit-based system of allocated funds?
General Bostick. The Corps of Engineers develops its Civil Works
budget by placing priority for funding to those projects with the
highest economic and environmental return to the Nation. In the absence
of a comprehensive modernization strategy, the Corps would continue to
fund those projects which provide the greatest potential economic and
environmental return to the Nation.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 6, 2011.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of
Engineers/Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and
appointment to the grade indicated in the U.S. Army while assigned to a
position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C.,
sections 601 and 3036:
To be Lieutenant General
LTG Thomas P. Bostick, 3680.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA,,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA
Educational degrees:
U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Stanford University - MS - Civil Engineering
Stanford University - MS - Mechanical Engineering
Military schools attended:
Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
U.S. Army War College
Foreign language(s): Portuguese.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promotions Date of Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 7 Jun 78
1LT....................................... 7 Jun 80
CPT....................................... 1 Jan 82
MAJ....................................... 1 Jul 89
LTC....................................... 1 Jul 93
COL....................................... 1 Aug 97
BG........................................ 1 May 02
MG........................................ 15 Jul 05
LTG....................................... 2 Feb 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 75.......................... May 76............ Platoon Leader, A
Company, 54th
Engineer
Battalion, V
Corps, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
May 80.......................... Mar 81............ Battalion
Maintenance
Officer, 54th
Engineer
Battalion, V
Corps, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Mar 81.......................... Jul 81............ Executive Officer,
C Company, 54th
Engineer
Battalion, V
Corps, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jul 81.......................... Dec 82............ Commander, B
Company, 54th
Engineer
Battalion, V
Corps, U.S. Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jan 83.......................... Jul 83............ Student, Engineer
Officer Advanced
Course, U.S. Army
Engineer School,
Fort Belvoir, VA
Sep 83.......................... Jun 85............ Student, Stanford
University,
Stanford, CA
Jun 85.......................... Jun 88............ Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
Mechanics, U.S.
Military Academy,
West Point, NY
Jul 88.......................... Jun 89............ Student, U.S. Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS
Aug 89.......................... Aug 90............ White House
Fellow,
Department of
Veterans Affairs,
Washington, DC
Jun 90.......................... Jun 91............ Engineer
Operations Staff
Officer, Office
of the Deputy
Chief of Staff
for Engineers,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 91.......................... Jun 92............ S-3 (Operations),
40th Engineer
Battalion. 1st
Armored Division,
U.S. Army Europe
and Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 92.......................... Jun 93............ S-3 (Operations),
Engineer Brigade,
1st Armored
Division, U.S.
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany
Jun 93.......................... Jun 94............ Executive Officer
to the Chief of
Engineers, U.S.
Army Corps of
Engineers,
Washington, DC
Jun 94.......................... Jul 96............ Commander, 1st
Engineer
Battalion, 1st
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Riley, KS
Aug 96.......................... Jun 97............ Student, U.S. Army
War College,
Carlisle
Barracks, PA
Jul 97.......................... Jun 99............ Commander,
Engineer Brigade,
1st Armored
Division, U.S.
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operation Joint
Forge, Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Jun 99.......................... May 01............ Executive Officer
to the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
May 01.......................... Aug 02............ Deputy Director
for Operations,
National Military
Command Center, J-
3, The Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC
Aug 02.......................... Jun 04............ Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), later
Assistant
Division
Commander
(Support), 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX,
and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Kuwait
Jun 04.......................... Jul 05............ Director of
Military
Programs, U.S.
Army Corps of
Engineers with
duty as
Commander, Gulf
Region Division,
Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Iraq
Oct 05.......................... May 09............ Commanding
General, U.S.
Army Recruiting
Command, Fort
Knox, KY
May 09.......................... Feb 10............ Special Assistant
to the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army,
Washington, DC
Feb 10.......................... Present........... Deputy Chief of
Staff, G-1, U.S.
Army, Washington,
DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Director for Operations, May O1-Aug 02 Brigadier General
National Military Command Center,
J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington,
DC................................
Director of Military Programs, U.S. Jun 04-Jul 05 Brigadier General
Army Corps of Engineers with duty
as Commander, Gulf Region
Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of operations assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments Date Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander. Engineer Brigade, 1st Jul 97-Jun 99 Lieutenant Colonel/
Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe Colonel
and Seventh Army, Germany and
Operation Joint Forge, Bosnia-
Herzegovina.......................
Assistant Division Commander Mar 04-May 04 Brigadier General
(Support), 1st Cavalry Division,
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait...
Director of Military Programs, U.S. Jun 04-Jul 05 Brigadier General
Army Corps of Engineers with duty
as Commander, Gulf Region
Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritotious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Combat Action Badge
Parachutist Badge
Recruiter Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Thomas P.
Bostick, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Thomas P. Bostick.
2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers.
3. Date of nomination:
6 April 2011.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
23 September 1956; Fukuoka, Japan.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Renee Yvonne Bostick (Maiden Name: Coyle).
7. Names and ages of children:
Joshua Jameson Bostick, age 27.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Society of American Military Engineers, Life Member
Association of U.S. Army, Life Member
Military Officers Association of America, Life Member
ROCKs, Washington, DC, Local Member
Pan Pacific American Leaders and Mentors Organization (PPALM)
Association of Graduates, Advisor, Jan.-Dec. 2008.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Dean's List and Superintendent's at West Point, 1978
Graduated 1st in Class in Language (Portuguese), 1978
Captain of Sprint Football Team at West Point, 1978
George C. Bass Award for Outstanding Leadership, 1978
Best Maintenance Company in the Army, 1982
Member of All-Army Power-lifter Team, 1983
Community Mayor at Stewart Field, West Point, 1985
Selected to present paper at American Society of Engineering
Educators, 1986
Honor Graduate, Engineer Officer Advance Course, 1983
Selected for School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988
White House Fellow, Department of Veterans Affairs, 1988-1989
Who's Who in Science and Engineers in America, 1992
Recognized by Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for actions in
National Military Command Center on September 11, 2001
Rock of the Year, 2008
NAACP 2010 Roy Wilkins Renown Service Award for recent work as the
commanding general, U.S. Army Recruiting Command.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA.
This 15th day of July, 2011.
[The nomination of LTG Thomas P. Bostick, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 22, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on April 26, 2012.]
NOMINATIONS OF HON. FRANK KENDALL III TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR.
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY; HON. ERIN C. CONATON TO BE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS; MRS. JESSICA L.
WRIGHT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS; MRS.
KATHARINA G. McFARLAND TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION; AND MS. HEIDI SHYU TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Begich, Blumenthal, McCain, Brown, Ayotte, and Cornyn.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald
J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W.
Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Robie I.
Samanta Roy, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
Pablo E. Carrillo, minority general counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV,
professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael
J. Sistak, research assistant; Diana G. Tabler, professional
staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and
Mariah K. McNamara.
Committee members' assistants present: Jeffrey Ratner,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brent
Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman; Brad Bowman, assistant
to Senator Ayotte; and Dave Hanke and Grace Smitham, assistants
to Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets today to consider the nominations of
Frank Kendall III to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; James Miller to be
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Erin Conaton to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Jessica
Wright to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs; Katharina McFarland to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition; and Heidi Shyu to be Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology.
We welcome all of our nominees, their families, and friends
to today's hearing. We appreciate the long hours and the other
sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve our
country. Their families also deserve our thanks for the support
that they provide which is so essential to the success of these
officials.
The positions to which today's witnesses have been
nominated are among the most critical positions in the
Department of Defense (DOD).
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics is the senior DOD official responsible for the
oversight and management of an acquisition system that spends
roughly $400 billion a year to buy everything from planes and
ships, to scientific research and food services. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is a new position
established 2 years ago to assist the Under Secretary in these
important responsibilities.
If confirmed for these positions, Mr. Kendall and Mrs.
McFarland will play the critical role in the Department's
efforts to rein in costs and cost overruns in its acquisition
programs. There are too many acquisition programs which are
hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars over budget.
We passed the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act a few
years ago to bring to an end poorly planned programs, excessive
concurrency in development and production, inadequate
acquisition planning, and failure to perform important contract
oversight and management functions necessary to protect our
Nation's taxpayers. We will expect strong leadership from Mr.
Kendall and Mrs. McFarland to hold both DOD officials and
contractors accountable for failures of performance on defense
acquisition programs.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the senior
civilian DOD official responsible for advising the Secretary of
Defense on matters of policy, including oversight of war plans
and the planning and execution of the Department's activities
in combating terrorism. If confirmed for this position, Dr.
Miller will play a critical role in issues ranging from
managing the transition of security lead to Afghan forces and
the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, to countering the
Iranian threat, to helping formulate the U.S. response to the
Syrian regime's brutality against its own people.
The next Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will also
put into effect the Department's recent Strategic Guidance
which establishes the goal of a joint force that is smaller and
leaner but that still meets the Department's global challenges.
This includes rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region and
the Middle East, including preventing Iranian efforts to
destabilize the region, countering violent extremism,
maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent, addressing the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, protecting our operations in cyberspace and space,
and building partnerships with allies and friendly nations.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
is the senior DOD official responsible for total force
management and military personnel policy, including military
family programs, health care, compensation, DOD civilian
personnel policy, and many other related activities. If
confirmed for this position, Ms. Conaton will play a critical
role in the Department's efforts to address difficult issues
ranging from reductions in end strength, transition assistance
for separating servicemembers, retirement reform, the rising
costs of military health care, sexual assault, and changes in
assignment policies relating to women in the Armed Forces, to
name but a few. We will also expect Ms. Conaton to take steps
to achieve an appropriate balance among the military, civilian,
and contractor workforces of DOD while ensuring that this
workforce is appropriate to meet the Department's needs.
I would note that we have had an opportunity to work
closely with Ms. Conaton when she served as staff director of
the House Armed Services Committee. We know her to be honest,
thoughtful, and extremely capable in everything that she does.
I am delighted that her former boss and a dear friend of ours--
all of ours as a matter of fact--Congressman Ike Skelton and
his wife Patty are here--I see you right there. They are here.
I did not have a chance to greet you before, but by God, they
are here and they are able to be with us for today's hearing. I
know how proud they are of you, Ms. Conaton.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs is
responsible for overall supervision of matters which involve
the Reserve components. If confirmed for this position, Mrs.
Wright will play a key role in ensuring access to and
appropriate use of the operational reserve and the appropriate
balance between the Active and Reserve components.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology is the senior Army official
responsible for oversight and management of the Army
acquisition system. Just last year, the Decker-Wagner report on
Army acquisition found that since 2004 the Army has spent more
than $3 billion a year, or more than a third of its budget for
the development of major weapons systems on programs that
failed and were ultimately canceled. If confirmed, Ms. Shyu
will be responsible for the Army's efforts to address these
failures and develop a stable, achievable, and affordable
modernization strategy ensuring that the Army remains well
equipped and maintained even as end strength and force
structure are reduced. She will also be the official primarily
responsible for mitigating risks to the industrial base
resulting from program cancelations, delays, and restructuring
arising out of upcoming budget reductions.
Each of our nominees is well qualified for the position to
which he or she has been nominated. I look forward to the
testimony of our nominees.
I call on Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join the chairman in welcoming our nominees and their
families today, and I congratulate them on their nominations.
I also would like to join you in welcoming our dear and
beloved friend, Ike Skelton, back before the committee who you
and I had the great honor and privilege of working with for
many years on behalf of the defense of this Nation.
I have found several instances which have been very
troubling to me of DOD not complying with the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) that we passed last December. I spoke
to the Secretary of Defense about it, and until I get further
clarification--hopefully we can get it done during the 2-week
recess--I will not vote to approve these or any other
nominations until I am satisfied that there is the proper
compliance with laws that are passed by the Congress of the
United States by the Secretary of Defense. For example, the
study about Guam which for 3 months there was not even an
effort made to begin the outside study. Clearly the
administration and DOD feels it necessary just to move forward
without the input of the outside study that we had mandated
after long debate and discussion. That is just one example of
the concerns that I have.
I think we have a role to play, a constitutional
obligation, and I think some of those obligations and roles
that we are playing are being ignored by the Secretary of
Defense. I will not vote to approve these or any another DOD
civilian nominations until the Secretary of Defense convinces
me that they are in compliance with and observance of laws that
we pass here in Congress and signed by the President of the
United States.
Mr. Kendall, you have been the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology for the
last 2 years. I applaud you for your contributions to bringing
the right tools and processes to bear on some of DOD's poorest
performing programs. The Department has a long, long way to go.
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the
cost of the Department's major defense acquisition programs has
increased by $135 billion since 2008. In the last 15 years,
about one-third of the Department's major weapons procurement
programs have had cost overruns of as much as 50 percent over
original projections. I would like to hear from you what you
will do to improve the Department's future acquisition
performance. I would also ask you to comment on the potential
effects of sequestration if imposed on the Department's largest
programs.
Ms. Shyu, you have served since November 2010 as the
Principal Deputy of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. Over the past decade,
the Army has been particularly unsuccessful in managing major
acquisition programs, and the Future Combat System and the
recently restructured Joint Tactical Radio System are egregious
and costly examples of how not to meet a weapons system
requirement. Taxpayers have a right to be frustrated and
skeptical about the Army's ability to effectively develop and
field major weapons systems. You have impressive credentials
and I look forward to hearing how you will work to correct
deficiencies and improve Army acquisition. As Senator Levin
pointed out, the cost estimates for the Future Combat System,
according to GAO, grew to $300 billion of the taxpayers' money,
a scandal of proportions that if most taxpayers knew about it,
they would share the outrage that a lot of us feel.
Mrs. McFarland, you currently are serving as the President
of the Defense Acquisition University and have been Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition since October
2011. How will you, if confirmed, help minimize excessive cost
growth and schedule delays in DOD programs and how will you
identify lessons learned and apply them to future acquisitions?
Future instances of what Mr. Kendall has labeled ``acquisition
malpractice'' are unaffordable and unacceptable especially with
the budget cuts that we are facing.
Just a year ago, Dr. Miller, the Senate of the United
States ratified the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START). At that time, the President also committed to
modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. That commitment
has been undercut in the fiscal year 2013 budget request which
seriously underfunds the weapons complex modernization plan. I
would like to hear an explanation of the administration's
position on a failure to fund, as had been committed in the
past, the national nuclear security issue.
Ms. Conaton, the position you have been nominated to fill
has been vacant for over 5 months, and the Inspector General of
DOD continues to investigate whistleblower allegations against
your predecessor. Much valuable experience and expertise in the
personnel and readiness office has departed. While I give Dr.
Rooney as Acting Under Secretary credit for her interim
efforts, you will be taking over an office that is sorely in
need of forceful, effective leadership. Such leadership has
been lacking in articulating the policies that will enable the
Services fairly and without sacrificing readiness to achieve a
drawdown of over 100,000 Active and Reserve troops. Leadership
is needed that will result in critically needed changes in the
defense health program and the inefficient disability
evaluation system and in the unaffordable trajectory of
military and civilian personnel costs.
Ms. Conaton and Mrs. Wright, in your roles as civilian
overseers of policies affecting the Reserve and Guard, it is
essential that you help the Services and help Congress to
achieve consensus about the future role in resourcing of the
Reserve and National Guard.
I thank the witnesses for their willingness to serve.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Congressman Hoyer has joined us. He is going to be
introducing Ms. Conaton. I know that you have a very tough
schedule, so we are going to go out of order here in order to
accommodate you, Representative Hoyer.
Senator McCain. I do not want to accommodate him.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. We will have a roll call vote on this.
[Laughter.]
We are being inundated by House Members and former House
Members. You are sitting in front of a dear friend of ours, Ike
Skelton, who we previously have introduced. Now we will
introduce you, Steny, so that you can introduce Ms. Conaton,
and then we will excuse you if you wish to go, and then go back
to the regular order.
STATEMENT OF HON. STENY H. HOYER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE
STATE OF MARYLAND
Mr. Hoyer. Thank you very much, Senator Levin and Senator
McCain. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman, Senator Reed,
Senator Akaka, Senator Ayotte. Good to be with you all. Thank
you for giving me this opportunity.
First of all, let me start with the transparent admission.
I am not objective with respect to this nominee. What you are
going to hear from me is totally subjective. I am a huge,
unrestrained fan of Ms. Conaton. She is absolutely excellent.
I want to thank you for this opportunity to introduce the
President's nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to all of you, realizing full well that
you need no introduction.
I have had the privilege of serving in the House, as all of
you know, for a long time and, very frankly, with many of you
in the House. I have met many intelligent, capable, and
talented men and women who came to work on Capitol Hill to
serve their country. Erin Conaton stands out from this group as
a proven leader who has been especially adept at helping bring
the Pentagon and Congress together on important issues.
To that extent, particularly in her last role on Capitol
Hill, she complemented the extraordinary leader, Ike Skelton,
as chairman and ranking member of the House Armed Services
Committee. She reflected his personality, his bipartisanship,
his commitment to America, and his patriotism. As Minority
Staff Director of the House Armed Services Committee, Erin was
the right hand of then Ranking Member Ike Skelton, as I have
said. In that capacity, she worked closely with her Republican
counterpart to ensure that measures benefitting the readiness
of our military branches could advance through the committee
without delay.
When Democrats regained the majority in 2007, Erin became
the staff director for the full committee overseeing every
piece of legislation affecting military readiness, acquisition,
and personnel. During that time, I had the privilege of serving
as Majority Leader, and my staff and I worked closely with her,
and I was constantly impressed by her effective, professional,
insightful, responsive, and thoughtful approach to the job she
undertook. Moreover, she has earned the respect of her
colleagues on the committee and at the Pentagon where women
have traditionally, as we know, been under-represented in the
ranks of leadership.
Her leadership of the committee staff during a period of
two overseas military conflicts and increasing global demands
on our Service branches made her eminently qualified when
President Obama nominated her to serve as Under Secretary for
the Air Force in 2009. Erin has served in that capacity with
distinction, ensuring that the Air Force and Congress have been
working closely together to make certain it has the tools
required to carry out our missions.
Prior to her career in the House, of course, Erin served as
the Research Staff Director at the Hart-Rudman Commission for a
National Security Strategy and as a financial analyst at
Salomon Brothers.
She holds a bachelor's degree in foreign service from
Georgetown University and earned a master's degree and
doctorate in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at
Tufts. During her post-graduate years, Erin completed
fellowships at the Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency.
I cannot imagine a more qualified nominee, Mr. Chairman and
Senator McCain, for this position. I am confident that, if
confirmed, Erin will do an outstanding job as Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I strongly recommend
her to you for confirmation.
I thank you for this opportunity to speak on her behalf
and, indeed, on behalf of our Nation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Congressman Hoyer. I
know how much she appreciates your being here and we all
appreciate your being here as well. Again, you are free to go
if you need to, as I am sure you do, because of your schedule.
Mr. Hoyer. Thank you. I am going to return to the House and
see if we can pass the Senate's transportation bill.
Chairman Levin. Good luck to you.
Next we are going to call on Senator Jack Reed who is going
to introduce two of our nominees.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
RHODE ISLAND
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me also recognize Steny Hoyer and Chairman Ike Skelton.
I had the privilege of serving with both. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here. It means a lot, I am sure, to the nominees.
But my duty today, which is more than a duty--it is a
privilege and pleasure--is to introduce Frank Kendall and Jim
Miller.
I have had the great privilege of knowing Frank Kendall for
over 40 years. We were classmates at West Point. In that time,
I have come to know him as a man of great character, of great
intellect, great talent, and great dedication to his country.
Today Frank is joined by his wife Beth, by his brother Ron,
and his sister-in-law Francoise, and they share with me great
pride in his accomplishments.
Frank, after being commissioned, served 10 years in the
U.S. Army and led troops in Germany. Then he went on to a
distinguished career in business in the defense industry as
Vice President of Raytheon Corporation.
He also has an extraordinary educational preparation for
this job. He has a master's degree in aeronautical engineering
from Cal Tech. He has a master's of business administration
from Pace, and he has a law degree from Georgetown University.
I do not know anyone who is better prepared to deal with the
complex issues of acquisition and military policy than Frank
Kendall.
In the last few years, he has been the principal deputy to
Secretary Ash Carter. He has been there working with Ash to
develop the Better Buying Power initiative. He was
instrumental, as Senator McCain alluded to, in deploying the
improvements made by Senator McCain and Senator Levin in their
Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. We all
recognize there is a long way to go, but Frank, I believe, is
the individual to get us there.
Again, it is a distinct pleasure to recognize someone who I
admire, respect, and I hope will be speedily confirmed.
Dr. Jim Miller has, as we know, been serving as the
principal deputy to Secretary Michele Flournoy. He has done an
extraordinary job. Dr. Miller is here today with his wife Adele
and with his children Zoe, Collin, Lucas, and Adrienne. Allison
is away at college. Having to pay college tuition, I think we
should give this guy a job and keep him working.
Jim just last week was here with General Allen. I think we
were all thoughtfully impressed with his testimony, with his
understanding of the issues. As Chairman Levin alluded to, he
has a huge range of critical issues as the Under Secretary
charged with policy from the Iranian nuclear ambitions to
developing our response to evolving conditions in North Korea
to the crisis in Syria. Again, I cannot think of anyone better
prepared than Jim Miller to do this.
He worked actively in the Quadrennial Defense Review,
Nuclear Posture Review, and he has been literally, as I said,
next to, standing beside and behind Secretary Flournoy when she
has done all of her good work.
He comes with extraordinary preparation, a graduate of
Stanford and with a master's and doctorate from the Kennedy
School at Harvard University.
Again, I urge speedy consideration of this extraordinarily
talented gentleman who has already demonstrated he can do the
job.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
We are now going to ask the standard questions of our
nominees, and you can all answer at one time.
Congressman Skelton, did you want to say a word? I did not
have you on the list here to speak, but we clearly wanted to
give you that opportunity.
We are all set. Okay. Thank you. Senator McCain very
properly asked whether or not you might want to speak, and it
is always great to see you and to have you and your wife here.
Standard questions for our nominees, and you can all answer
at one time.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Conaton. Yes.
Mrs. Wright. Yes.
Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
Ms. Shyu. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Kendall. No
Dr. Miller. No.
Ms. Conaton. No.
Mrs. Wright. No.
Mrs. McFarland. No.
Ms. Shyu. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you assure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Conaton. Yes.
Mrs. Wright. Yes.
Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
Ms. Shyu. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Conaton. Yes.
Mrs. Wright. Yes.
Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
Ms. Shyu. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Conaton. Yes.
Mrs. Wright. Yes.
Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
Ms. Shyu. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Conaton. Yes.
Mrs. Wright. Yes.
Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
Ms. Shyu. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Conaton. Yes.
Mrs. Wright. Yes.
Mrs. McFarland. Yes.
Ms. Shyu. Yes.
Chairman Levin. It is a long question, but the answer is
yes, which I heard from each of you.
Okay. Now we are going to start with Frank Kendall, then go
to Jim Miller, then to Erin Conaton, then to Jessica Wright,
then to Katharina McFarland, and then to Heidi Shyu. That will
be the order that I will call on you. As I do call on you, you
should feel free to introduce any family or friends that are
with you. Let me start with you, Mr. Kendall.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL III TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin,
Ranking Member McCain, members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
committee today.
I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama has
shown in me by nominating me to be the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
I want to thank Secretary Panetta and Deputy Secretary
Carter for their support of my nomination.
If confirmed, I will be deeply honored to serve.
I would also like to thank my classmate from West Point,
Senator Reed, for his support and his very kind introduction
today. Senator Reed and I just attended our 40th reunion at
West Point. Neither one of us can understand how all those
other guys got so old so fast.
I also want to acknowledge Senator Reed is from Rhode
Island, and I noticed an article this morning about a
specialist, Dennis Weichel, who was killed in Afghanistan. He
is a native of Rhode Island and he was killed saving the life
of a small girl in Afghanistan. That kind of dedication,
courage, and commitment is what all of us that are here before
you today believe in and are trying to support. I wanted to
acknowledge that loss and how much we all share that loss with
Rhode Island.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for doing that.
Mr. Kendall. Finally, I would like to thank my family for
their support. My wife Elizabeth, Beth, is here with me today,
as are my brother Ron and his wife Francoise, as Senator Reed
mentioned.
I want to offer Beth my special thanks and appreciation. In
October of 2009 at my first confirmation hearing, I thanked
Beth for her support. After my 2 years in the Pentagon, first
as Principal Deputy to Dr. Carter for a year and a half and for
the last 6 months as Acting Under Secretary, Beth knows now
exactly what she has gotten herself into, and I am deeply
appreciative of her continuing love and support.
When I sat before this committee in October 2009, I said
that I too knew what I was getting myself into. That is even
more true today. I said then that I believe that DOD could do
much better at equipping and sustaining our forces. I said that
my background in operational units, defense research and
development organizations, the Secretary of Defense's Office,
and the defense industry had all prepared me to make a
contribution to achieving the goal of obtaining more value for
the investments our country makes in equipping and supporting
its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I believe today
that I have much more to do and can do to contribute to this
goal, and I would deeply appreciate the opportunity to do so.
If the Senate confirms me in this position, I will make
every effort to live up to the confidence that will have been
placed in me.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Kendall.
Dr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, JR. TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Miller. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the
committee--and Senator Reed, thank you for that kind
introduction.
Three years ago this month, I testified to this committee
in a confirmation hearing for my current position as Principal
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy. I thank the committee for
the trust you placed in me by confirming me for that position.
It has been a great privilege to serve in that position for the
past 3 years.
I am deeply honored to appear here today as the nominee for
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I thank President Obama
for the confidence he has placed in me as Principal Deputy and
now as the nominee for Under Secretary for Policy. I also thank
Secretary Panetta and former Secretary Gates for their
confidence in me and for their outstanding leadership of DOD. I
also want to thank the dedicated team of civilian and military
personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
Policy office and throughout DOD, particularly those in harm's
way today for all that they do for national security.
I want to especially thank our previous Under Secretary for
Policy, Michele Flournoy, for her extraordinary service to our
country. If I have the honor of being confirmed as Michele
Flournoy's successor, I will hold her example of integrity and
professionalism as my ultimate benchmark.
My deepest debt of gratitude is to my family, to my wife
Adele, and to my children Allison, Zoe, Collin, Lucas, and
Adrienne. Adele's and our kids' love and strong support has
made my service in Government possible. For the past 3 years,
they have put up with an often absentee husband and dad. I
cannot thank them enough for their support. With the consent of
the Senate, Adele and I and the kids are ready to sign up for
another tour.
As I have watched my kids grow up, one of the thoughts that
motivates me to stay in Government is that the choices that we
make as a Nation will shape their future. We all want to hand
our kids and their generation a better world. I believe that
this includes ensuring that the United States succeeds in
ongoing operations and ensuring that the United States retains
the strongest military the world has ever seen.
Much has happened in the 3 years since I first appeared
before this committee. President Obama said that we would bring
the Iraq war to a responsible end and we did.
As I had the opportunity to testify to this committee last
week with General Allen, we are making progress in Afghanistan.
We have had a difficult few weeks and no doubt more challenges
are ahead, but our strategy is working. It is not time for plan
B. It is time to continue the hard work of plan A and complete
the transition to the full Afghan responsibility for their
security by the end of 2014.
If I am confirmed by the Senate as Under Secretary, I will
do all in my power to help the United States, our coalition,
and the Afghans succeed to ensure that Afghanistan never again
becomes a source of attacks on the United States.
If confirmed, I will also focus on other immediate
priorities, denying, degrading, and defeating al Qaeda,
stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon--as President
Obama has said, containment is not an option--preparing for the
fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and more broadly posturing
the United States to cope and take advantage of the
transformations brought about by the Arab Spring.
If I am confirmed, another top priority will be carrying
out the Strategic Guidance that President Obama announced at
the Pentagon earlier this year. Even as we deal with current
operations in Afghanistan and across the globe, we are building
the joint force of the future. The fiscal year 2013 DOD budget
submission reflects a strategy-driven approach intended to
provide a force that, as Secretary Panetta said and as Chairman
Levin referred to, is smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible,
ready, and technologically advanced.
Consistent with our new Strategic Guidance, if confirmed as
Under Secretary, I will work to continue to strengthen our
posture in the Asia-Pacific. This includes addressing the
challenges posed by the new regime in North Korea and
continuing to work closely with our allies and partners in the
Pacific.
If confirmed, I will also continue to ensure that our
Nation and our military are on a firm footing to meet the
challenges of tomorrow, including improving our Nation's
posture in space and cyberspace, responsibly growing our
Special Operations Forces, reforming our systems of export
controls which is a burden on industry and slows down our
efforts to build partner capacity, advancing our missile
defense posture to deal with the real threats from Iran and
North Korea, and ensuring that we retain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons
exist.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee,
thank you for considering my nomination for Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing
to work with Congress to ensure that we succeed in Afghanistan,
to advance our national interests by maintaining a strong
global posture, and continuing to strengthen our alliances and
partnerships across the globe, and to preserve and strengthen
our military so that the United States is on a firm footing to
meet the challenges of the future.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Miller.
Ms. Conaton is next.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIN C. CONATON TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
Ms. Conaton. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members
of the committee, and your staffs, thanks for the opportunity
to again be before you and thanks for the confidence that you
have placed in me in my current position as Under Secretary of
the Air Force.
Like my colleagues, I would like to start by thanking
President Obama, Secretary Panetta, and Deputy Secretary Carter
for the opportunity to continue serving, if you all see fit to
confirm me.
I am deeply honored that Mr. Hoyer would take the time to
come over and spend a few minutes with us, and I never want to
correct the distinguished Minority Whip, but I did not actually
finish my doctoral dissertation. Maybe that will be a post-
Government project to be finished.
To Ike Skelton, sir, truly you are my mentor, and all that
I know about the personnel and readiness challenges facing our
military I learned from you. But it seems perfectly fitting to
me that you and Patty are sitting as part of my family.
I am also honored to have my parents, Pat and Dan, my
siblings, Sean and Meghan, and my sister-in-law, the other Erin
Conaton. But I would particularly like to single out my 7-year-
old nephew William, my 4\1/2\-year-old niece Nora, and my 2-
year-old niece Cathleen. The oldest two of them are going to be
giving a report at school tomorrow on what they learned today,
so I know that they are paying close attention.
I would also like to welcome three tremendous young women I
have had the opportunity to get to know from McKinley High
School, Vinecia, Taahiva, and Brooke. They are fast approaching
graduation, and I know each of them has an incredibly bright
future ahead of them.
I have been blessed to serve under a great Air Force
leadership team in Secretary Mike Donley and Chief Norty
Schwartz. I have learned so much serving with them, as well as
with two outstanding partners in my current Vice Chief General
Phil Breedlove, as well as his predecessor, General Howie
Chandler. These great leaders are a model of service and
leadership. It has been an honor to serve with them.
My eternal thanks, too, to the team who has supported me in
the Air Force for over 2 years and to the OSD team led so ably
by Dr. Jo Ann Rooney. They have been great in helping me to
start to get smart on these issues.
There would be no greater honor than to represent our
outstanding servicemembers, Active, Guard, Reserve, and
civilians, and their families. It would be a privilege to be
their advocate and to continue to advocate for the strength of
the All-Volunteer Force and its readiness. As Chairman Levin
and Senator McCain pointed out in their opening statements,
there are many challenging issues before the Department in this
area. If confirmed, I would look forward to the opportunity to
work with my DOD partners and with this committee to address
these challenges.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be before you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Ms. Conaton.
Now Mrs. Wright.
STATEMENT OF MRS. JESSICA L. WRIGHT TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS
Mrs. Wright. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, honorable
committee members, good morning. I am humbled and honored to be
sitting before you this morning.
I thoroughly appreciate the confidence that President Obama
has expressed in nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs. I am grateful to Secretary Panetta
for supporting that nomination.
It has been my great honor and privilege to serve our
Nation in uniform for 35 years and as a civilian these past 16
months.
My career in public service would not have happened without
the love and support of my family. My husband Chuck, who is
here with me today, is my most avid supporter and champion. He
is a combat-tested Army veteran who retired as a lieutenant
colonel with 24 years of service. Our son Mike is in college
and not able to attend this hearing, though I know he is here
in spirit. He will graduate in May from Kings College with a
degree in accounting and a commission in infantry, 2nd
lieutenant, following in his dad's footsteps.
I would also like to thank my parents, John and Cass
Garfola, who live in South Carolina and are not able to attend
this hearing. They instilled in my brothers and me the
importance of public service. My dad served in the China-Burma-
India theater in World War II and spent a lifetime in steel
mills. My mom started in the Army nursing program and served a
49-year career as a civilian nurse.
Throughout my career, I have seen enormous changes in our
military. I enlisted as a member of the women's Army Corps and
it culminated as the Adjutant General of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. I have worked my entire career promoting the
Reserve components. These men and women number in the hundreds
of thousands and carry the proud title of citizen warrior. As
you certainly know, they have put their lives on the line and
their careers on hold through this past decade of war, and they
have performed with honor and dignity.
Over the last decade, our Reserve components and the
National Guard have transformed from a strategic reserve to an
operational component. They fight and they serve alongside the
Active component each and every day. If confirmed, it would be
my privilege as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs to build on their success, to work hard to support the
men and women who proudly serve our Nation as members of our
Reserve components.
I am grateful to all Members of Congress and this
distinguished committee for the energy and support that they
have given our servicemen and women and their families. If the
Senate confirms me in this position, I pledge to you that I
will work diligently for the men and women of the seven Reserve
components, their families, and their employers. I am deeply
honored to have been nominated and to serve.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mrs. Wright.
Next Mrs. McFarland.
STATEMENT OF MRS. KATHARINA G. McFARLAND TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
Mrs. McFarland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before your committee today.
I am also grateful for the confidence that President Obama
has shown in me by nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition.
I personally want to thank Secretary Panetta, Deputy
Secretary Carter, and Acting Under Secretary of Defense
Kendall's support for my nomination. If confirmed, I will be
truly honored to serve and will work to serve in the highest
accord with the highest traditions of office and integrity.
I am blessed with having some of my family and friends here
and would like to thank them for their guidance and support
that they have given me. My mother and father, Sonya and
Wilbert Wahl, who are still working full-time and contributing
to society and economy. My husband, former Marine Corps
colonel, with 34 years of service, inclusive of two tours in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and one in Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF), Ron McFarland, and my son Jacob Brown.
As my mother was witness and victim to the horrors of World
War II on the eastern side of Germany, her stories, rarely
told, stay with me and led me to work for DOD. My family was
always tight for money. My dad took me everywhere, and every
moment he was trying to find another way to stretch his poor
dollar as far as it could go. If I am confirmed, you can be
assured that his lessons will continue to guide me.
I passionately believe in the high priority that this
committee, Congress, the President, and the Secretary of
Defense have placed on improving the results achieved by the
defense acquisition system. We need to maintain the best
equipped military to support the policies of national security
for this country and the new Strategic Guidance that the
Secretary and the President recently announced. In order to do
that, we must have a better trained workforce, a more efficient
process that focuses on content and product, and the ability to
measure how we, the Government, and industry are performing. We
must improve our ability to extract every bit of value from the
public funds we are entrusted with.
I consider this a monumental task, especially in this
economic climate and with the continuing and emerging threats
to our security. If the Senate confirms me, I will do
everything in my power to live up to the confidence that has
been placed in me.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mrs. McFarland.
Ms. Shyu.
STATEMENT OF MS. HEIDI SHYU TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
Ms. Shyu. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of this
esteemed committee, it is a great honor for me to appear before
you as President Obama's nominee to serve as the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology. I am very grateful for this nomination, for
Secretary McHugh's support, and the opportunity to be here
today.
I would like to take a moment to thank my family for their
constant love, encouragement, and support. My 102-year-old
grandmother in Taiwan is unable to be here today, but she is
absolutely here in spirit with me.
Chairman Levin. Why did she not fly in for this?
[Laughter.]
Ms. Shyu. If she could fly, I can guarantee you she will be
here.
Chairman Levin. Give her our greetings.
Ms. Shyu. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Tell her we miss her too.
Ms. Shyu. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I seek the committee's consent to serve as
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology. It has been my distinct privilege to serve in
this position in the acting capacity in the last 9 months. It
is an appointment that has resulted from my job as the
principal deputy since November 2010. This service, along with
my prior experience, has given me firsthand knowledge and
valuable insight into areas of opportunities to fundamentally
change the way that the Army acquires weapons systems for our
soldiers.
Efforts to reform the acquisition systems have been ongoing
for decades. The current fiscal environment has given these
efforts a new sense of urgency. While I believe that the Army
is heading in the right direction since the cancelation of the
Future Combat System, I pledge my dedicated efforts to this
present task. If confirmed, I will prioritize affordability,
competition, challenging unrealistic requirements, and
emphasize sound management. More must be done to ensure that
the current and future modernization efforts are built on the
best possible foundation for success.
For more than 30 years, I have held a number of leadership
positions within the defense industry that took me from entry
level engineer to corporate vice president. I have direct
experience in turning a vision into a system that is fielded to
the hands of our warfighters. This experience will assist me in
meeting challenges in performing this role.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I am honored by this nomination. I
believe that I possess the background, the experience,
commitment, the ethical discipline taught to me by my 102-year-
old grandmother, and the judgment that is necessary to perform
this important job.
I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ms. Shyu.
I think we have a vote at 11:30, and we are going to work
right through that vote, as I mentioned. We will have a 7-
minute first round of questions.
I want to start by reading from an e-mail that a friend of
mine received from his son in Afghanistan from a forward
operating base in Afghanistan. Mr. Kendall, you made reference
to the loss of another American hero, and that kind of
triggered my decision just to read a few paragraphs of this e-
mail to his folks.
``While the news certainly and rightly has paid a lot of
attention to a few horrible incidents of Afghan army and police
turning on their American counterparts, including a fairly
horrific incident in our sister battalion resulting in the
first two casualties of our deployment, I can say I have been
nothing but amazed by the strength of the bonds that have been
formed between American troops and the Afghan National Army
(ANA). The reaction of our ANA counterparts to the insider
attack on my sister battalion's company outpost was truly
telling. Their first reaction was fear. They were deeply
concerned that we would abandon them over this, that we would
blame them for the actions of a few who turned their weapons
not only on Americans but also on their ANA brothers who, I
should mention, played an important role in counterattacking
their traitorous comrades and bringing those involved to
justice.
``When we had a similar potential threat revealed in our
area of operations, it turned out that the ANA was already
working internally to stop it. A couple of their soldiers who
were at first erroneously suspected of being complicit were
actually the proactive individuals who stopped anything well
before it could happen. The ANA were in tears over the fact
that they believed that we would never trust them again and
suspect them always of being Taliban, people they literally
risk their lives constantly to fight and honestly hate. I can
say that I have truly never felt unsafe around any of my Afghan
counterparts.''
Dr. Miller, let me ask you a question about the Afghan
security forces. They are on track to reach a goal of 352,000
personnel by later this year. Building on the capabilities of
the Afghan security forces is key to transitioning the security
lead to Afghanistan. As General Allen testified last week,
``transition is the linchpin of our strategy, not merely the
way out''.
Now, given the importance of developing capable Afghan
security forces for our transition strategy, I frankly was
surprised and concerned about news accounts of a U.S. proposal
to reduce the size of the Afghan forces by a third after 2013
apparently based on concerns about the affordability of a
larger force. General Allen assured us that the option of
reducing the size of the Afghan security forces after 2014 to
the level of 230,000 was based on a current projection of
possible options and certain possible scenarios, but that no
decision had yet been taken. I hope not. In my view, it would
be unwise and unfortunate if we were to risk the hard-fought
gains that we, our coalition partners, and the Afghans have
achieved by deciding in advance that we are not going to
support an Afghan security force that is right-sized to provide
security to the Afghan people and to prevent a Taliban return
to power.
Do you agree, Dr. Miller, that first of all, we have not
made a decision and that whether or not that we should have a
350,000-sized Afghan security force or whether or not that
ought to be reduced to some number lower than that should be,
number one, conditions-based and the affordability concerns
predicted now for years from now should not be, at this point
at least, the factor which controls that decision?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, yes, I agree. As we indicated in
testimony with General Allen, the surge force of 352,000 should
be sustained beyond 2013 and quite likely beyond 2014.
Chairman Levin. You also stated in answer to a prehearing
question, Dr. Miller, that you support a, ``responsible
drawdown as called for by the President''. Last June, the
President announced his plan for drawing down the surge force
in Afghanistan and said that after the initial reduction, which
would be completed by this year, that the withdrawal of our
forces would continue, ``at a steady pace''. That would be
between the summer of this year and 2014 when most all of our
combat forces would be removed under current plans from
Afghanistan.
My question, Dr. Miller, do you support the President's
plan for U.S. troop reductions to continue at a steady pace
after September of this year?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, yes, I do, and we have not yet
defined what the steady pace will mean in terms of numbers.
Sir, General Allen intends to conduct an assessment at the end
of September as we have drawn the force down to about 68,000
Americans, have a hard look at any al Qaeda presence, at the
strength of insurgency, and critically importantly, at the
strength of the Afghan National Security Forces and then make a
recommendation up the chain of command to the President. That
would be a timeline for a recommendation and a decision this
fall.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let me now ask Mr. Kendall about our industrial base, and I
will ask Ms. Shyu as well. I have a real concern about the
industrial base including our second- and our third-tier
suppliers, particularly for the ground combat and tactical
vehicles that we know are going to be coming into our inventory
and are going to be developed and produced. I want to know what
steps you plan to take to address the potential loss of
industrial capability or capacity associated with reductions at
the same time that we need to prepare for the next generation.
Mr. Kendall. Mr. Chairman, we are watching the industrial
base probably more closely now than any other time since
perhaps the end of the Cold War. We are taking account of it as
we make budget decisions in particular because we are no longer
in a period of growth in the budget. This year, as we went
through the budget preparation process, we had meetings at the
very senior level specifically to look at industrial base
issues, and we did take some steps because of them.
We are concerned about the tiers below the prime level. We
have undertaken an in-depth analysis of that. We are building a
database to help us completely understand each sector and each
tier so that we are aware of and can respond perhaps
proactively, as much proactively as possible, when problems
arise. The database that we are building is well underway and
it is allowing us to identify some things and perhaps intervene
earlier than we might be able to otherwise.
We are going to be limited in our resources. Any
intervention in the industrial base is going to have to be on a
case-by-case basis and probably fairly rare. But if there are
niche capabilities that are critical to us, we may well
intervene, and there may be cases where just to keep
competition for critical components we do the same.
We are watching the industrial base very carefully. We are
going through a difficult period. There is going to be,
obviously, less money available to the industrial base. As we
stretch out production and delay programs in some cases, there
are going to be smaller companies in particular that are
impacted.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Ms. Shyu, do you have anything to add to that?
Ms. Shyu. Senator, I absolutely am equally concerned about
our industrial base, in particular the impacts to our second-,
third-, and fourth-tier companies. My sister is a small
business owner, so I absolutely understand the challenges in
terms of running a small business. We are working aggressively
with our prime contractors to identify Foreign Military Sales
opportunities to fill in the bathtub. We are working very
closely with OSD on the sector-by-sector and tier-by-tier
database. As a matter of fact, just yesterday I spent a solid
hour discussing issues in regards to our small companies. We
are in the process of also working and assessing across our
entire portfolio to look for opportunities for our small
businesses. I think that is a huge area we can explore. If
confirmed, I dedicate my efforts to take a look at the
industrial base.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
If you would, Mr. Kendall particularly, give us a status
report by, say, May 10, if you would, on your assessment of the
issue which you have addressed, particularly the second-,
third-, and fourth-tiers Ms. Shyu made reference to, suppliers
in those areas. If you could give us the status report so we
can consider that situation in our own markup, we would
appreciate that.
Mr. Kendall. We can do that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Ayotte? Senator McCain is not yet back.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
I want to thank all of you for being here and for your
dedicated service to our country and all of your families and
friends for the support you have given all of our distinguished
witnesses today.
I wanted to follow up on the chairman's question. Mr.
Kendall, Ms. Shyu, what happens to the defense industrial base,
particularly our second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers if
sequestration happens?
Mr. Kendall. Senator McCain mentioned sequestration also.
In a word, it will be devastating. We have already taken $500
billion a year, roughly, out of the defense budget. If we have
to take roughly another $500 billion, that is $100 billion a
year out of the budget, a lot of that would fall onto industry.
There is a provision under the Budget Control Act which
would allow the President to exempt military personnel. There
is a good chance that he would do that because that would be a
devastating impact on our people. That would increase the
burden that would fall on the investment accounts, research and
development, and production. It would be fairly deep cuts. They
would also have to be applied very indiscriminately. We would
not be allowed to prioritize and they would fall on unobligated
balances. We would have a devastating impact.
A lot of the work that we have done over the last couple of
years to try to make more efficient acquisition decisions and
get better contract structures would be broken. The tanker, for
example, which the Air Force went through a very laborious and
difficult process to get under contract on a sound acquisition
strategy. We would break that fixed-price contract.
Senator Ayotte. You are talking about the KC-46A?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Yes, it would jeopardize that contract?
Mr. Kendall. We would jeopardize that.
Senator Ayotte. If sequestration goes forward?
Mr. Kendall. We would jeopardize a number of contracts
where we would have to take cuts that would break the contract
from our side. Then we would have to go renegotiate. You are
essentially opening it up and you have to go get another price.
Once we are in a situation--and we did a competition, for
example, for the tanker. That was very effective in getting the
price down. Once you do not have a competitive environment,
then it is much more difficult for us to negotiate a lower
price.
The littoral combat ship is another one where we have good
prices out over the next few years. We would break that deal as
well.
Across the Department, there are places where a devastating
impact would occur. Of course, that ripples down to all tiers
in the industrial base.
Industry is already very concerned about this. Some of the
major firms have approached me about their concerns about
having to provide notice of potential layoffs because there is
a provision in the law that requires them to do that just in
pending sequestration.
It has been described by various people in various ways.
Secretary Lynn talked about sequestration as being something
that was so crazy--it was intended to be so crazy that nobody
would ever do it. The people have done a very good job of
making it that crazy.
Senator Ayotte. So crazy that nobody would ever do it.
Mr. Kendall. So crazy nobody would do it and they did a
really good job of that.
My boss, Secretary Panetta, who is sometimes very frank in
his language, has called it, I think, goofy and a meat axe
approach. In private conversations, he has used much stronger
language than that.
Senator Ayotte. Probably not good for this room.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Kendall. I will refrain from that.
But sequestration, in a word, would be devastating to the
Department.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Ms. Shyu?
Ms. Shyu. Senator, I absolutely concur. If sequestration
occurs, it would absolutely have a devastating impact on
modernization. The bulk of the Army's budget is in the manning
area, and that is not going to go down quickly. The
modernization account, namely the procurement accounts,
research and development accounts, which impacts our primes,
our second-, third-, fourth-tier companies are going to be
significantly impacted. Everything we have judiciously worked
last year to identify affordability, cost savings, cost
avoidances will be gone.
Senator Ayotte. Just to be clear so everyone understands
and those that are watching this hearing, when we are talking
about particularly second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers,
sometimes when those businesses go away, they do not come back.
We are talking about small businesses that if they are put out
of business by sequestration, then it is difficult often to
bring that capability back. That is why we are concerned about
our defense industrial base. Those are real jobs in this
country, are they not, at stake?
Mr. Kendall. That is correct. There would be hundreds of
thousands of jobs impacted.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that.
One thing I wanted to follow up when we look at where we
are with the $487 billion in reductions over the next 10 years
as a result of the Budget Control Act, Secretary Conaton and
Dr. Miller in particular, we are asking for a 72,000 reduction
in the end strength of our Army. How did we get to that number,
meaning is this a number that the Army recommended in terms of
end strength reductions?
The other important question that I would like to get at is
how many involuntary terminations will we have to give to our
soldiers in order to accommodate the 72,000 in reductions
because it is really hard to think about those who have gone
and done multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and handing
them an involuntary termination.
First, how did we get to the number and, second, what does
this mean in terms of involuntary terminations?
Ms. Conaton. Thank you, Senator. Given that I have been
working in the Air Force for the last couple of years, I will
defer to Dr. Miller, if he has insight as to how the exact
number was chosen. It is my understanding, though, that the
Army leadership had a great voice, as did the Marine Corps
leadership, in looking at not only the numbers, but the ramp
and how quickly folks are coming out of the force.
I share your deep concern that we ensure that we do this in
a way that minimizes the number of folks who are involuntarily
removed from the rolls. I know Secretary Panetta's commitment,
and if confirmed, it would be my commitment to work with the
Services to make sure we do everything possible before we
involuntarily remove folks and also strengthen the transition
assistance program so that folks who are leaving our military
have the best opportunity to gain follow-on employment, or
education, or start a small business.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that.
Dr. Miller, can you help us, how did we get to the number?
Here is where I look at it is that we were withdrawing from
Iraq. We were certainly drawing down in Afghanistan. There was
going to be some reduction. Would you be recommending to us
72,000 but for the Budget Control Act, and how did we get to
that number?
Dr. Miller. Senator, let me first confirm what Ms. Conaton
said and that is that the Army was very much involved in the
discussions about both the size of the force that would result
by the end of fiscal year 2017 and the ramp in terms of the
reductions. That ramp was designed specifically to minimize the
impact and to minimize the likelihood that anyone would have to
be involuntarily separated.
In terms of the overall size of the force, that reduction
will take it to about the level that it was at September 11.
Senator Ayotte. Pre-September 11, right? Before September
11.
Dr. Miller. Just before September 11.
Senator Ayotte. The world has changed since then, has it
not, Doctor?
Dr. Miller. The world has changed.
The reductions that will be phased in will leave an Army
that is, between the Active and Reserve Force, still capable of
conducting the full range of missions, capable of conducting
stability operations, but not stability operations on the scale
that we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. If we find that
we are in a situation again where that scale of operations is
required, either the force will have to be grown back, and we
know that we can do that and we need to build in that capacity
or we will have to tap into the Reserves more or for a period
of time more strain would be put on the force. The number was
selected at a level that still retains the full spectrum
mission and the ability to conduct substantial stability
operations and understanding that the force would have to grow
in the future if we return to a scale of operations that we saw
in OIF and OEF combined.
Senator Ayotte. My time is expiring. But one of the issues
that I would like to know about is was this a number that was
recommended by our Army commanders, the 72,000? Is that the
number that they gave the Secretary?
Dr. Miller. Senator, this was a number that came out of
discussions that deeply involved the Army leadership and
obviously involved the Secretary of Defense and the leadership
of the Joint Staff and which the combatant commanders were
consulted on as well.
Senator Ayotte. One thing that I would appreciate your
taking to let us understand is if sequestration goes forward,
what happens to the end strength of our Army as well. I think
that is important for people to understand.
[The information referred to follows:]
As Secretary Panetta has said on several occasions, sequestration
would have a devastating effect on the Defense Department overall,
coming on top of the more than $450 billion that is already being cut
from DOD accounts. The specific effect on Army end strength is
unknowable until the Department understands the process and formula to
be prescribed by Congress in applying sequestration. These additional
cuts would clearly force a reassessment of our defense strategy and
security commitments globally, likely leading to a scale back of
current levels of defense activity, prompting hard choices about the
challenges we can afford to confront, and incurring additional risks to
our force and our ability to execute assigned missions.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate all of the witnesses being
here today, and I may submit some additional questions for the
record. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the six of you for your willingness to serve. You
are really an extraordinarily impressive group in my opinion. I
am struck by the gender imbalance in the six of you, which
shows that this was obviously a merit selection process by
which you come before us.
Dr. Miller, let me focus on you. The position you are
coming into as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a
really important position, and I have every confidence that you
are ready, more than ready, to fill it. I have been really
impressed by the opportunities we have had to work together
most recently. Just by your testimony last week alongside
General Allen about Afghanistan, I thought you were very
straightforward and very helpful to the committee.
In some sense now you join the Secretary and Deputy as
responsible for the security of just about the entire world. Do
not let that give you sleepless nights.
But let me focus first on two areas of obvious concern. The
first is Iran. Obviously, one of the contingencies to which the
Pentagon has been devoting a lot of time and consideration is
Iran. I wanted to ask you about your thinking about the threat
posed by Iran, how do you see it evolving, and what do you hope
we do to get ready to meet the threat that Iran poses?
Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, thank you for your kind
words.
The threat posed by Iran includes, as they have talked
about, the possibility that they would attempt to close the
Strait of Hormuz and interrupt international shipping,
including the transportation of oil. With respect to that,
Secretary Panetta and others have made clear that is a red line
for the United States. We have had a number of ships, including
carriers, transit through the Strait of Hormuz since a rather
inflammatory statement was made by the Iranians, and they will
continue to conduct that transit.
Iran poses a significant threat in the region because of
its activity in support of insurgency and terrorist tactics.
This is something that has been the case for some time and
something that we are working with our allies and partners in
the region to contain.
The most significant threat that Iran poses is its pursuit
of a nuclear weapons capability. As I said earlier, the
President has made clear that prevention is our policy and that
containment is not an option.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you to what extent concern
about the threat posed by Iran informed the defense Strategic
Guidance first and then the fiscal year 2013 budget request? In
other words, have specific policies been arrived at and
authorization/appropriations been asked for to meet that
threat?
Dr. Miller. Senator, Iran was certainly taken into account
in both the Strategic Guidance and the fiscal year 2013 budget
request. The guidance talked about the importance of both the
Asia-Pacific and the Mideast and sustaining and in fact
strengthening our posture there, and we have continued to do
so. Iran also poses a potential threat to U.S. forces and
coalition forces because of its anti-access and area denial
capabilities, things like their small boats, cruise missiles,
and so forth. As we look at the capabilities that DOD is
developing to counter those threats, Iran is certainly a
consideration.
Senator Lieberman. Let me move now to Syria. Obviously, the
killings by the Assad Government of its own people continues, I
do not know whether a document was signed by Syria to agree to
the Annan plan. If it was, history will show that it is not
really worth even the paper the signature is on. The reports
since the announcement of Syria's agreement to the Annan plan
indicate that the government continues to brutally slaughter
its own people.
In this context, there will clearly be growing
international pressure and domestic pressure, including from
some of us up here, for some kind of external assistance to the
Free Syrian Army and to the Syrian opposition. As Under
Secretary for Policy, you will be in a key position to develop
options to support that kind of intervention if the President
decides to order it and to determine what is feasible and what
is not. I wanted to ask you what you are thinking about that
challenge now, including particularly a topic we took up
earlier with Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, what we
might be able to do that would allow us to disrupt Assad's
command and control over his own forces.
Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, the Assad regime, as you
have said, has continued to conduct activities within Syria
that are reprehensible and that reinforce in my mind and in our
mind the fact that this regime needs to go and that it is in
the interests of the Syrian people and of the international
community that the Assad regime leave power.
We have provided nonlethal assistance at this point.
Senator Lieberman. Just define that a bit about what we
have provided thus far. I noticed the President made a
statement with Prime Minister Erdogan in Seoul earlier in the
week that they were both interested in continuing that. Tell us
what we have done so far and what we are thinking of doing in
terms of nonlethal assistance.
Dr. Miller. Sir, the nonlethal assistance to date has been
materials such as food and tents and so forth, as you would
expect for humanitarian assistance, and we will continue to
look at additional opportunities to provide that assistance as
part of an international effort.
At this point, a key challenge associated with considering
lethal assistance is the reality that the Free Syrian Army and
other groups do not have, at this point, a high degree of
coherence, and so one needs to consider to whom that would be
provided and what would be the ultimate disposition of any
equipment. The answer to that question could evolve depending
on what happens on the ground, and frankly, the viability of
any additional aid depends to a degree on the ability of the
opposition groups within the country to come together. Sir,
this administration has undertaken an effort to try to
facilitate that.
Senator Lieberman. Let me just ask one quick follow-up
question because my time is up.
My impression from the reports from Seoul from the
President and Prime Minister Erdogan was that the nonlethal
assistance now would go beyond food and tents for, I presume,
refugees and would include, for instance, communications
equipment. Is that right?
Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, I am not certain that a
final decision has been taken on that. What I would like to do
is get back to you with an answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary of State Clinton will be making an announcement regarding
the topic of nonlethal assistance during the Friends of Syria meeting
in Istanbul on April 1. I would refer you to her speech and subsequent
press briefings.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Obviously, I hope it does. Thank
you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, I will not comment on your
response to Senator Lieberman except to say thank you for the
food and tents. I am sure the people who are being slaughtered
in the streets of Homs, Hamas, Idlib, and other places are very
grateful for the food and tents.
The administration, I understand, has proposed that North
Korea be provided with 240,000 metric tons of food aid. My
understanding is that is about $200 million worth of
foodstuffs. Is that correct?
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, the amount of food is correct
and the dollar figure sounds right to me as well.
Senator McCain. Now, meanwhile the North Koreans apparently
are planning on testing another missile. Is it your personal
view that if they test that missile, that we should continue to
provide them with the $200 million worth of food?
Dr. Miller. My view is that we should not.
Senator McCain. Do you know what the administration's view
is?
Dr. Miller. Senator, the view is that if North Korea goes
forward with this test, we will stop this aid and stop the
other steps that we have intended to take and have to have a
complete reconsideration of where we go in the future.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Kendall, you and I have had numerous conversations
about cost overruns. I had an interesting exchange with the
Secretary of the Navy when I pointed out that now with the
carrier USS Gerald R. Ford there is a billion dollar overrun,
he said, ``well, the next carrier we will do a lot better on.''
Is it not true that the Joint Strike Fighter has been about
$150 billion in cost overruns? Is that about correct, Mr.
Kendall?
Mr. Kendall. I think that number is approximately correct,
yes.
Senator McCain. Do you anticipate further cost overruns in
the Joint Strike Fighter besides the $150 billion that has
already been accumulated?
Mr. Kendall. We are doing everything we can to drive down
the cost of the Joint Strike Fighter. I do not anticipate any
cost growth anything near the scale that you just described. We
are still about----
Senator McCain. Maybe only $10 billion?
Mr. Kendall. I hope much less than that.
We are still about 20 percent of the way through the test
program. We are finding design issues as we go through the test
program that we have to correct. There are some cost
adjustments associated with that.
Senator McCain. Would you provide for the record what you
think will be the additional cost overruns associated with the
development of this aircraft?
Mr. Kendall. I will, Senator McCain.
[The information referred to follows:]
Historical and Current Cost Estimates:
The $150 billion cost overrun referenced is the increase in the
total acquisition cost estimate from the original estimate in 2001
($226 billion) to the estimate in the December 2010 Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) ($379 billion)--an increase of $153 billion.
The current total acquisition cost estimate in the December 2011 SAR is
$396 billion, which is an increase of $170 billion over the original
estimate in 2001.
The increase in the total acquisition cost estimate from the start
of the development program in 2001 to the current estimate is primarily
the result of unrealistic baseline estimates at the beginning of the
program. Total acquisition costs are comprised of the development and
procurement costs. The development cost estimate has increased from $34
billion in 2001 to $55 billion in 2012, which is significant and
primarily the result of unrealistic baseline development and test
schedule estimates. The development estimate remained essentially
unchanged from last year's 2010 SAR to the 2011 SAR.
Accordingly, the bulk of the cost increase from the original total
acquisition cost estimate to the current cost estimate is contained in
the procurement costs. The procurement cost estimate in 2001 was $192
billion while the current procurement estimate in the December 2011 SAR
is $336 billion. The $336 billion procurement cost estimate is a $12
billion increase over the procurement estimate contained in the
December 2010 SAR. This was primarily driven by increased unit costs
due to the reduced near term procurement profile, incorporation of
development in parallel to limited rate production concurrency
modifications, and the inflationary effects of stretching the
completion of planned procurement from 2035 to 2037.
Additionally, the estimate for Military Construction (MILCON) costs
increased from $0.5 billion in the December 2010 SAR to $4.8 billion in
the December 2011 SAR. This increase was due to my decision to use the
MILCON estimate from the Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) as the basis
for the new Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and SAR.
Risk of Additional Cost Increases:
A specific projection of any future cost increases would be highly
speculative and the Department's current estimate is its best estimate.
If confirmed I will continue to make every effort to control and reduce
costs. While the recently submitted SAR contains the Department's
current best estimate of program costs, there are risks that could
drive cost increases during the remainder of the program. The risks
include that: the F-35 program has not completed development,
particularly software development, that design changes may be greater
than anticipated as a result of discovery of problems during the
roughly 80 percent of the flight test program that remains, partner
production plans may change lowering expected economies of scale,
future DOD budget levels that could force the Department to follow a
less efficient production profile, and finally that sustainment costs
may be higher than predicted. The keys to controlling and avoiding
additional cost increases will be to successfully complete the test
program, stabilize the design, ramp up production to higher and more
efficient rates as soon as possible, and to aggressively manage the
sustainment costs.
Potential Development Cost Increases:
There are two principal sources of potential increases in the
development costs, which is being conducted on a cost plus contract;
software and design changes that may result from discovery during the
balance of the test program. The Department has programmed funds to
account for the costs associated with these risks, but there is no
guarantee that current estimates will not be exceeded.
The software development program has not been executing to schedule
and this area is always a source of risk, particularly in a large
software centric program like the Joint Strike Fighter. The mission
systems software and the Autonomic Logistics Information System are
both sources of concern.
Based on historical experience in similar programs the Department
expects a certain level of design changes over the balance of the test
program and has budgeted to cover those changes. Nevertheless there is
the potential for higher than expected discovery or a major design flaw
that could lead to costs associated with design changes. The remaining
flight testing (particularly high performance flight near the edges of
the envelope and weapons testing) and structural life testing are
sources of risk. The Quick Look Review which I commissioned last fall
also noted several specific areas in which development risk still
exists.
Potential Production Cost Increases:
The production costs have been roughly following the CAPE estimated
learning curves. I do not anticipate a significant increase in
production costs. In 2010, the Department began the transition to
fixed-price contracting which will transfer responsibility for
production cost to the supplier. In 2011, the Department also
negotiated an agreement with Lockheed Martin whereby Lockheed would
assume shared responsibility for costs associated with design changes
resulting from problems found during testing. This concurrency risk
will continue to exist for the next few years but decline as the test
program is completed. The Department has budgeted funds to cover the
anticipated costs of changes associated with concurrency, but there is
some risk that these contingency funds will not be adequate.
Sustainment Cost Increases:
Projected sustainment costs are too high and the Department must do
everything it can to bring them down. The SAR submission is based on
the Department's best estimate at this time. However, I have set an
affordability target for sustainment that challenges the Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps and the Joint Program Office to achieve lower
costs than the current estimates by a significant margin.
I would like to be able to say that there will be no further cost
increases, however, that would be unrealistic and naive. There are many
factors that could result in changes that could affect the current
estimates. If I am confirmed, I will continue to do everything I can to
control the costs of the program, and if any of those changes occur, I
will be clear and transparent in communicating to Congress the
magnitude, reasons, and effects on the program.
Mr. Kendall. We have estimates of the changes that we could
expect through the test program. We can give you that. But
there is some risk, of course, even associated with that.
I do think that the Strike Fighter is getting under
control. I would like to say just a couple of words about that,
if I may.
We are attacking the production costs by putting strong
incentives on the contractor to control costs and to get the
changes that have to be made cut in quickly. We are focusing
increasingly on the sustainment costs which are larger actually
than the production costs. We have made some progress there
this year in some areas but we slipped a little bit in some
areas as well. That is where we think the greatest potential
is. Dr. Carter testified a year ago about getting large
fractions of that cost down, and I think we could approach
that. I have set a goal for us to accomplish that.
Senator McCain. As far as the Gerald R. Ford is concerned,
also would you tell us how much more in cost overruns we expect
on that particular product. Okay?
[The information referred to follows:]
Historical and Current Cost Estimates:
The current total acquisition cost estimate in the December 2011
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the three ship CVN-78 program, in
base year 2000 dollars, is $27.8 billion, which is a decrease of $0.9
billion from the original baseline estimate of $28.7 billion in 2000.
Relative to the updated baseline established in 2004 at $27.2 billion,
the current estimate represents an increase of $0.6 billion. In then-
year dollars, the current estimate of $42.5 billion is $6.5 billion
over the 2004 baseline estimate of $36.0 billion for the three ships.
Much of this increase in then-year costs is due to budget moves, which
delayed award of the construction contract for the CVN 79 from fiscal
year 2012 to fiscal year 2013 and for CVN 80 from fiscal year 2016 to
fiscal year 2018, and stretched the construction period for each by
about 2 years.
Costs for the CVN-78, Gerald R. Ford, have risen from an original
estimate of $10.5 billion to a current estimate of $12.3 billion as
submitted with the President's budget for fiscal year 2013 (PB-13), an
increase of $1.8 billion.
The increase in the total acquisition cost estimate from the start
of the development program in 2004 to the current estimate is
attributed to $680 million in design cost for the lead ship, $955
million in Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), $273 million in the
government share of the basic construction of the ship by the
shipbuilder, and $67 million increase in shore based spares for the
ship. There are also reductions in the program that lowered the
estimates by $141 million.
Increases in the GFE costs were attributed to growth in development
of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System (EMALS) by $538
million, modifications to and additional testing requirements for the
Dual Band Radar (DBR) amounting to $293 million, growth in the Advanced
Arresting Gear (AAG) development by $43 million, and other combat
system equipment growth totaling $81 million. Risk of further growth in
EMALS and AAG production is mitigated by the fact that both systems are
being procured under a firm fixed-price contract.
Growth in the design and engineering products was attributed to the
extent of concurrent design and major system development, the existence
of a new ship specification, and a significant change from the prior
Nimitz-class ship specification under which the shipbuilder had built
the past 11 carriers. The Navy recently converted the design contract
from a level of effort cost type contract with fixed fee to a
completion type cost contract with incentive fee. Risk of continued
growth in design is limited, as the design is now over 90 percent
complete.
Shipbuilder cost growth on actual construction has been affected by
material cost increases, late material orders and deliveries, and
resolution of some first-of-class construction issues. The primary
construction issue was the use of a different alloy steel than in
previous carriers for many of the decks and bulkheads. This allowed for
thinner plating to save weight, however, the shipbuilder did not
adequately plan to maintain flatness standards, requiring more
extensive use of temporary bracing and rigging, and additional labor
hours to eventually resolve.
Risk of Additional Cost Increases:
Specific projections of any future cost increases would be
speculative and the Department's current estimate is its best estimate.
If confirmed, I will continue to make every effort to control and
reduce costs. While the above discussion represents the Department's
current best estimate of program costs, there are risks that could
drive cost increases during the remainder of the program. If the
Program Manager's current most likely estimate at completion for the
shipbuilding contract is realized, the CVN-78 will require an
additional $417 million beyond that provided in PB-13. The primary risk
area is that the shipboard testing program, which will integrate and
test many new systems not found on any existing aircraft carriers could
lead to discovery of unknown technical issues, either in hardware or
software. Other known risk areas include: integration of the DBR into
the topside design and completion of DBR testing; late component
deliveries for the AAG, which could require the shipyard to implement
workarounds against the build plan; completion of AAG software to
support shipboard testing; integration of the power system for EMALS,
which by necessity will first occur once all four catapults are
installed in the ship, and which could not be fully tested at the land
based test site; and completion of the machinery control and monitoring
system software to support shipboard testing, which also affects
powering the EMALS for testing.
I would like to be able to say that there will be no further cost
increases, however, that would be unrealistic and naive. Until the ship
delivers, there remain risks that could affect the current estimates.
If I am confirmed I will continue to do everything I can to control the
costs of the program, and if any of those changes occur, I will be
clear and transparent in communicating to Congress the magnitude,
reasons, and effects on the program.
Senator McCain. Right now I understand it has been $1
billion cost overrun. Is that correct?
Mr. Kendall. When you take all the cost overrun, I think it
is actually more than that, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Ms. Shyu, you served as senior director for
Raytheon's participation in the Joint Strike Fighter program?
Ms. Shyu. Senator, I was on the losing side, unfortunately.
Senator McCain. What does that mean?
Ms. Shyu. That means our team, the radar system, everything
we let, was on the Boeing team.
Senator McCain. I see. But you did observe the progress or
lack of progress of this aircraft?
Ms. Shyu. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Your conclusion was?
Ms. Shyu. My conclusion is too much concurrency in the
design development of the program.
Senator McCain. Yet, Mr. Kendall, we are seeing concurrency
practiced on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the
Ground Combat Vehicle. Are they practicing concurrency?
Mr. Kendall. The problem with concurrency, Senator McCain,
is the degree of concurrency. Most programs start production
before they have completely finished their developmental tests.
The question is how much. In the case of the Joint Strike
Fighter, which is an extreme example of concurrency, production
was started more than a year before the first flight test.
In the programs that you mentioned, we will go somewhere
into developmental test where we have prototypes that are
fairly production representative and we will have confidence in
the stability of the design. What we are doing now is we are
setting up exit criteria so that we do not make that production
commitment until we are confident that the design is reasonably
stable.
Senator McCain. Are you confident that both of those
programs, the JLTV and the Ground Combat Vehicle, will not
experience overruns?
Mr. Kendall. I am not confident that any defense program
will not experience an overrun. That would be quite a statement
after the last 50 years of history.
Senator McCain. Can you tell us what you estimate the cost
overruns will be on these programs?
Mr. Kendall. We are going to do everything we can to not
have a cost overrun. I do not have an estimate that would
suggest that there would be one. It is a self-fulfilling
prophecy. We are funding our programs to the independent cost
estimates, and we are going to try to cap our programs there.
One of the things that we are doing now is setting
affordability targets early for programs and forcing them to do
the tradeoffs that have to be made so that they get under the
cost that they initially put as a cap on the program. There has
been a reluctance to do that in the past, and I think that will
have a dramatic impact on the new starts that you talked about,
both the JLTV and the Ground Combat Vehicle.
Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, one of the concerns that I had
that I relayed to Secretary Panetta concerns the study that we
asked for concerning the base realignment from Okinawa and
Guam. One of the reasons why Senator Levin and I and the
committee unanimously asked for this study is because the costs
have gone from previous estimates of some $6 billion to now $16
billion with frankly no really hard numbers in sight.
We asked for an outside assessment as to what plans should
be for this much needed base realignment, and that bill was
passed by the Congress of the United States in December and
signed into law in December. Now, 3 months later, they still
had not let the contract.
I understand the contract for an outside study was awarded
just a few days ago. But we asked for that study so that it
would be part of the deliberations in developing the plans for
the base realignment. Instead, you waited 3 months. I do not
know why it would take 3 months to ask for an outside study.
Now Senator Levin and I are being briefed this afternoon on the
plans for base realignment. An outside observer, casual
observer, would view that as a complete disregard of the
instructions of the NDAA of 2011.
Maybe you can explain to me why it would take 3 months to
ask--there are many outside groups--to conduct a study. By the
way, we asked for that study to be completed by the 1st of
March so that as we deliberate on the defense authorization act
for this year, that that would be part of our deliberations. Do
you understand my frustrations, Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, I do. I am going to come back
over and meet with you, Senator Levin, and Senator Webb and
walk through what happened with this contract. There is no
excuse for taking this long to get something on contract, and I
will not make an excuse for it, sir. But we will have a
proposal to show you and Senators Levin and Webb on how we can
still make good use of the work that you have proposed from
this outside group. They have already begun working and we
believe we have a good plan, sir.
Senator McCain. I thank you for that, Doctor, but I hope
also that you understand to some degree the frustration that we
feel. Senator Webb traveled throughout the region. Senator
Levin traveled with him. We have had briefings. We have had
conversations with not only American leaders and officials but
foreign leaders and officials on this issue, Japanese
delegations. Then we make an input and it is if not willfully
ignored, certainly not pursued to fulfill the will of Congress
and the legislation passed by Congress and signed by the
President of the United States.
We look forward to meeting with you and others on this
issue and the other issues such as the Medium Extended Air
Defense System (MEADS) and other concerns that I have raised.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. I join
Senator McCain in the expression of frustration with not
complying with the congressional intent--it is not just intent.
It is the language of the law. I share very much in that
frustration and look forward to that meeting this afternoon.
Senator Begich is next.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on those comments, but also the
discussion that went back and forth with Senator Ayotte in
regards to what sequestration would do. I think the word I
heard--and I do not know if it was the word of the day--was
devastating.
But I also think what you just heard is also devastating.
That is billions that for years--let me give you an example.
Last year, this committee unanimously agreed to get rid of the
funding for MEADS, but you have now presented again in your
budget to fund it, almost a half a billion dollars. It makes no
sense.
Now, I know you will tell me the contract says this. Every
contract ever let by any department of any Federal Government,
State government, local government is subject to appropriation.
Subject to appropriation. Now, I know people say, well, we
never really exercise that. Well, too bad. Contractors sign
that. I was a mayor. That is how it works. You sign it. You
understand if we do not give you the money because we do not
appropriate it, then you are out of business. We do not do the
contract.
I understand and I know what is going on because people
want to make the case later down the road a couple months from
now we will try to delete the Defense Department out of the
sequestration and then take it out of the hide of everyone
else. Everyone is on the table until we resolve this because is
it not more devastating than if we do not solve the deficit
problem, sequestration is pocket change compared to what will
happen if the economy crashes because we cannot deal with the
deficit.
Who would like to dare to throw something on the table and
answer that? Am I mistaken? I think some of the folks in the
military, DOD, have said the debt is the biggest security risk
to this country. Did I miss that?
Mr. Kendall. Senator, I cannot comment on the broader
issue, but I would like to say a word about MEADS, if I could.
MEADS is not just a contract. It is an agreement with two
of our most closest international partners.
Senator Begich. I understand that.
Yes, and we pay 75 percent of it for a system we are not
really going to use fully. I understand that. I have had this
debate in my office with folks from not your shop specifically,
but from everyone from the Pentagon to the contractor because
they get a little freaked out when we start talking about
canceling a program. We passed in the defense authorization
bill do not do this program, and you present the budget for
$400 million more.
I understand all this international relationship activity,
but we are paying the tab. Two of the countries, Germany--and I
think it is Italy, the other one. Italy has no money. They are
in their own problem. Germany questions this but I know the
machinery has been busy to make sure we have letters from folks
to say they are there.
I understand the word of the day is devastating. I will use
that word. It is devastating to hear all these cost overruns
and lack of recognition and I cannot remember how you exactly
said it, but you said you will always have cost overruns.
Mr. Kendall. Senator, what I said was that I cannot
guarantee we will not. I am going to do everything in my power,
if confirmed, to eliminate them and actually save us money on
our programs to come in below the budget. That is what we are
challenging all of our people to do.
Senator Begich. That is good.
Mr. Kendall. But the history suggests that is going to be a
very difficult task.
Senator Begich. It would be pretty much like almost 100
percent of the history. A high number.
Mr. Kendall. We rarely have a program that does not have
overruns, at least somewhat.
Senator Begich. That tells you the system is broken.
Mr. Kendall. It tells me, after 40 years of experience in
the system, that we have a lot of forces for optimism and that
we make mistakes about what we can do and how long it will take
and what it will cost routinely for a variety of reasons.
Senator Begich. I would say this. As a former mayor, if I
had my purchasing department have a record like that, a high
percentage of them would not be working there. There would be a
different deck because obviously they are incapable of the
long-term determination of what these values are. I will tell
you, you can do projects if you design and change it, and let
me give you one example.
When we built the convention center in Anchorage, $100
million plus everyone feared it would go over budget. We did
something that government never does. First off, we made a
guaranteed maximum price based on a 35 percent design, and then
we made sure the contractors, the people that actually owned
the companies, personally guaranteed any cost overruns. None of
this garbage about their corporations because that is phony
baloney stuff. But suddenly when you get the chief executive
officer (CEO) to have to sign a $2 million personal guarantee,
just like every bank does for them--we are the best bank, the
Federal Government.
I would encourage you for every contractor that does
business with us that has a record of cost overruns, you tell
the CEO and the chief financial officer (CFO) we have a new
arrangement because they make a lot of money. When I look at
these contractors, these CEOs make a lot of money. Put their
name on the dotted line, and I guarantee you--just like we have
here, if our budgets and our operations, our personal offices
go over budget, guess what. I have to write a check for all the
employees that work for me here in the Senate. If I go over
budget, I have to write a personal check. So change the deck
and get a little more responsible.
This was not my line of questioning. I just got a little
agitated here when I heard the word of the day is devastating.
Somehow we are to blame for it. We are all in this mess. The
lack of oversight over the years of the Defense Department and
the cost overruns that you just heard cited, the lack of
following through on things we pass here and tell you to do,
you do not do. Let me stop my rant and get to my questions. I
apologize. But you understand my point.
Mr. Kendall. I do, Senator, and I agree with you completely
we have to get better business deals. That is the essence of
what we need to do. We need very strong incentives for our
contractors to give them a very good reason, a very good
financial reason, to do better. That is what they will respond
to.
Senator Begich. Yes. Have the CEOs and CFOs sign on the
dotted line personally.
I will tell you what happened on that project. Guess what,
we got it done right on schedule; and guess what, below the
budget. It was amazing, an amazing thing. We got more for the
money we spent because they got innovative. I am just giving
you a thought here. Now, of course, the contractors did not
like it, but guess what. They are still doing business in our
city because they became a very good qualified, and they use
that now as an example to get business around the country of
what they can do. They can use it.
Let me put you on hold for a second, if I can.
Secretary Conaton, let me ask you. I am sure you were aware
that I was going to do this to you on Eielson Air Force Base.
It goes to the same thing. Here we are in the process of the
Air Force determining that Eielson should have a reduction
within the F-16s and shift them. They have estimated around 600
military personnel, undetermined civilian personnel. For some
reason, they cannot figure that out. But they have already
identified the exact potential savings they are going to have
because they presented it through the budget process. The end
result is they have calculated that in and everyone signed off
on it. So it is all good.
But now they are sending a team up--will not even be there
until mid-April--to determine what the savings are. Help me
here. It seems a little backwards. I think usually you send a
team in, do an analysis, and not just on the Air Force but the
secondary impacts. For example, they have no clue if Elmendorf,
where they want to shift these, will have the capacity to house
these new facilities, as well as the personnel to go along with
it, and the air space that is a lot more crowded than ever
before. We are the fourth largest cargo hub in the world. That
is not the case it was 20 years ago when they used that as an
example. Now they think they can save money. So help me here.
Ms. Conaton. Sure, Senator. I know this has been a topic of
conversation between you and Secretary Donley and General
Schwartz. I understand that you still have some outstanding
questions that you have not gotten complete answers to. Let me,
on their behalf, promise to go back and follow up.
In terms of the timing, the simple reality was because of
the need to achieve the savings that you referred to earlier in
terms of meeting the Budget Control Act targets, we had to make
a series of decisions in the time frame of the budget cycle
inside DOD. Part of the reason that we do not have that change
at Eielson kicking in until fiscal year 2015 is in order to do
some additional work. I definitely understand your frustration
about the order in which this has been undertaken.
Senator Begich. I will just end as my time is up. They said
in the hearing we had--or not hearing but public meeting that
families will be started to be moved or troops in 2013. That is
not far away. I am very nervous about the uncertainty they are
sitting with in that community because they have been told in
the next 7 months or so, 2013, this starts moving. We are very
nervous about the lack of understanding of the costs. If you
could respond back to us.
Everyone who comes here gets this question. If you have Air
Force tagged on you, you are going to get the question.
Ms. Conaton. I appreciate that, Senator, and I do promise
to get back to you with some additional information on behalf
of Secretary Donley and General Schwartz.
[The information reffered to follows:]
The fiscal year 2013 Force Structure Announcement included a net
impact of ^668 positions which includes the fiscal year 2013 move of
the Aggressor Squadron (19 F-16s) to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson
(JBER). Breakout for the fiscal year 2013 manpower reductions are: ^623
Active Duty military associated with Aggressor move from Eielson to
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, ^41 civilians that were previously
announced in fiscal year 2012, +8 Active Duty military for medical, and
^12 Active Duty military for other actions. There are no changes to the
Air National Guard refueling unit (8 KC-135s) in this or other years.
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget also adds 43 Base Operating
Support Military positions required to support the Aggressors at JBER.
In fiscal year 2015, right-sizing the operations and support for the
remaining missions at Eielson has an additional projected impact of
^928 billets in fiscal year 2015 (^583 military and ^345 civilians).
The fiscal year 2015 numbers will be further refined as we conduct Site
Activation Task Force visits to guide implementation. The estimated net
savings associated with these actions is $3.5 million in fiscal year
2013 and $169.5 million over the Future Years Defense Plan.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions I will just
submit for the record on rare earth issues and some other
issues, and I will just submit them for the record. Thank you
very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Begich.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Wright, I just had a question regarding the cuts in
the Air Force--proposed cuts. When the Air Force decided to
propose what I viewed as lopsided cuts to the Air Guard, it
gave me pause, and the reason is that I think there may be a
better way, a way that preserves the readiness at a fraction of
the cost, and I believe we could do this by leveraging the
expertise, skill, and combat experience in the Guard and
Reserve.
My question is the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 directed that
the Department provide Congress with a report on the difference
in costs between the Active and Reserve components. Would you
agree that we should wait until we have the most up-to-date and
accurate information before imposing those cuts to the Guard
and Reserve?
Mrs. Wright. Sir, I will tell you all that the Services,
along with the Air Force, had a very difficult decision to make
with this last budget. I believe they put their best effort
forward managing capacity and capability, and they made
responsible choices.
Senator Brown. Yes, but do you think we should wait for the
report for the most up-to-date information before we go
cutting? I can think of Westover Air Reserve Base where we have
C-5s that are basically 80 percent battle-ready versus Active
components at 40 percent, give or take, and yet we are going to
be shifting and cutting and moving. I have to be honest with
you. It does not make a heck of a lot sense when you have 80
versus 40, you have battle-ready versus not, and you have teams
that have worked together forever and they are potentially
going to be dismantled or moved. How does that make sense?
Would that report not help determine where the cost/benefit
analysis is before we do something that we may not be able to
recover from?
Mrs. Wright. Sir, I do understand the issue, and I do know
that there are four different cost/benefit analyses going on
within the Department. One was directed by Congress. I believe
that the Air Force has really looked at a lot of different cost
methodologies when making the decisions that they have recently
made.
Senator Brown. So you are saying we should or we should not
wait? It is just simply should we wait or should we not?
Mrs. Wright. I believe the Air Force has already paid
attention to the cost/benefit analysis that they have used for
this particular budget.
Senator Brown. The fact that we directed that they do a
report and the difference really is irrelevant then. Is that
what you are saying?
Mrs. Wright. No, sir. I believe that they clearly will be
paying attention to these upcoming reports also when making
further decisions.
Senator Brown. Ms. Conaton, what do you think?
Ms. Conaton. Senator, I know you had an opportunity to have
this discussion with Secretary Donley and General Schwartz.
My answer, I guess, is similar to what I said to Senator
Begich, which was the nature of the timeline we were on in
terms of having to achieve the reductions in the budget under
the Budget Control Act forced a very intensive period of
analysis leading up to the budget. I know Secretary Donley and
General Schwartz have explained to you that their thinking and
Secretary Panetta's thinking is that with the new strategy and
with the operational demand they see going forward, that is
what led them to be more comfortable with the cuts that you
have seen as part of the budget. I definitely appreciate your
perspective. This was----
Senator Brown. It is not just mine. It is quite a few
members of the committee.
Ms. Conaton. Yes, sir. No. I understand. This was, I think,
one of the most difficult decisions that was made certainly
within the United States Air Force and I definitely respect
your opinion on that.
Senator Brown. I have to tell you. The Army, I think, has
struck a very solid balance between Active, Reserve, and Guard.
I have to tell you the Air Force, on the other hand--I think I
can speak for a lot of folks here. It is like they are taking
all their toys and say, oh, we got them now, and then the
Reserve and Air Guard are getting the short end of the stick.
I would like to maybe just shift gears for a minute on what
you think the role of women in combat is. Do you think it is
appropriate? Do you think that by removing the barriers for
those women servicemembers, rising on the ranks based on their
talents and capabilities regardless of gender is appropriate?
Ms. Conaton. Yes, sir. I agree with the recent report that
the Department put forward which would open up some additional
14,000 positions that had been previously closed to female
servicemembers. I also agree with Secretary Panetta that this
opportunity to expand those positions will give us lessons
learned for where we take next steps. I know the Department is
committed to trying to look at making positions available based
on women's qualifications and physical abilities rather than on
gender per se.
Senator Brown. I think, quite frankly, they need to go a
little bit further than that. I know personally our military
fellow was a Kiowa pilot commander of men and was in Iraq and
Afghanistan. If that is not the front lines, flying Kiowa
missions and shooting people and weaponry and the like and
targets, I do not know what is. I would actually encourage you
in your position to advocate to, if qualified--if qualified--
they should have the ability to serve like men. I have been in
32 years. I see them serving and I have served with them
regularly. As I said, if they are qualified, they should have
the same opportunities because there is that inability to rise
up. There is a reason we do not have many four-star female
generals and that is because of the barriers that have been
placed.
On TRICARE, I might as well stick with you. TRICARE is
something I feel that was a contract between the men and women
who have served as part of their effort to serve and serve
well. I understand that there are budgetary pressures, and I
agree with former Secretary Gates when he said health care
costs are eating the Department alive. I understand that. But I
will tell you I believe it is wrong and I think there are
others--this very specific benefit that we promised to a very
small group of people in this country, and I think it is wrong
to tell those who signed on the dotted line--those who had a
very clear understanding of the contract that they signed and
listening to your contract is now changing. In the last year,
we had to increase your premiums, and guess what? We are going
to increase them again.
To what extent have TRICARE managers executed best
practices from the private sector to better manage health care
costs so those costs are not going to be as high as maybe
proposed?
Ms. Conaton. Senator, I am not yet in the position, so I do
not have great detailed knowledge on what has occurred up to
date.
Senator Brown. I thought you were running the whole thing.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Conaton. But, sir, what I do know is that the effort to
deal with health care costs--and as you point out, I think
Secretary Panetta is on the record before this committee saying
that in this year alone it will be close to $50 billion in
health care costs.
But those costs have to be gone after in a couple of
different ways. Obviously, you have highlighted the TRICARE fee
increase, but there has also been a number of efforts to get at
the cost of provider care and also making DOD's own TRICARE
management more efficient. This is an area that I would intend
to spend a great deal on, if confirmed. I appreciate the
concern.
Senator Brown. Thank you and good luck to everybody, all of
the witnesses. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to add my aloha to this esteemed group of nominees that we
have before us today. I would like to begin by thanking you for
your public service over the years that you have given our
country and your desire to continue to serve our Nation in
these very important roles.
I also want to thank your families and also your friends
who are here who have supported and will continue to support
you.
I want to say a special aloha to my good friend and
brother, Ike Skelton, who is here. There are so many memories
that we have had on the House side. They are great memories.
If confirmed, each of you will face significant
challenges--and you know this--in your new positions. But
looking at your background and experiences, I feel confident
that you will be very able to handle the tasks that are before
you.
Secretary Conaton, foreign language skills and cultural
understanding are critical in carrying out the Department's
mission. However, our Nation has a shortage of employees with
these skills. Often we compete with the private sector for
individuals with these abilities. What steps will you take to
ensure the Department has the language and cultural skills that
it needs?
Ms. Conaton. Senator, thank you very much. I completely
agree with you that language and foreign culture knowledge has
not only been critical over the last 10 years, but I think it
is a set of skills that our military needs to maintain. If
confirmed, sir, I would first go and look at the whole range of
programs that we have currently underway to see where they are
successful and where they perhaps have room for improvement and
where we might find additional sources of recruiting folks with
resident language capability, as well as those who have an
affinity for language and could pick it up more quickly. But,
sir, if confirmed, I would love to come, sit, and talk and get
your perspective before I get underway in that work.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Dr. Stanley and I have been in contact and we have talked
and in this particular case about a replacement commissary at
Barbers Point on the island of Oahu. I understand that the
commissary also recommended building this replacement
commissary in light of the ever-growing demand for this benefit
in West Oahu. If confirmed, I hope you will keep me informed on
the progress of this project.
Ms. Conaton. Senator, yes, if confirmed, I would be happy
to get up to speed on where that stands and come back and visit
with you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much.
Ms. Conaton. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Kendall, last year the Department
named a new director of Pentagon pricing. In this budgetary
environment, we must continue to do everything we can to
improve the procurement process and efficiently use our
taxpayers' money. In my opinion, this includes realistic
requirements making sure that we get good cost and pricing data
from potential vendors, and that the Department has a skilled
and capable acquisition workforce to analyze proposals to
manage the acquisition projects. My question to you is how does
the Department ensure it has reliable cost and pricing data and
is developing the skilled workforce needed to manage our major
acquisitions?
Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Senator Akaka. The two questions
are closely related. The skilled workforce is the basis by
which we are able to assess the pricing data that we receive
from industry, and we do that as we examine our contracts. We
have increased our use of that for some of our contracts in
order to ensure that we are getting fair, reasonable prices
from our vendors.
The workforce has been under a great deal of attention both
for Dr. Carter and myself and with tremendous support from
first Secretary Gates and now Secretary Panetta. There was a
recognition a few years ago--and I want to compliment the
committee in particular for their Defense Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund (DAWDF) initiative, which came from this
committee, which has given us the resources to increase the
size of the acquisition workforce and to bring on key skills
like pricing you mentioned, but program management, system
engineering, and particularly contracting so that we have a
better sized workforce relative to the workload. There was a
tremendous drawdown in the 1990s.
I am focusing my attention much more now--and I would, if
confirmed--on the quality of that workforce and its capacity to
do its job, the training it receives, the mentoring it receives
from people who are retiring out of the system, capture those
skills before they leave. We have a ways to go in terms of
building up the capacity within the workforce. Given the
drawdowns that we are having in the overall budget, it is going
to be hard to sustain the growth that we have had, but we want
to hang onto what we have under DAWDF, perhaps get a little bit
more, and then turn increasingly to the skill set of the
workforce.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Dr. Miller, with respect to Afghanistan, many believe that
the U.S. and its partners need to work with Pakistan and other
neighboring states to reach a political settlement even if such
a settlement might be favorable to the Taliban. Dr. Miller, can
you discuss your view of a potential political settlement?
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
First of all, our work with Pakistan is extremely important
both in our own bilateral relationship and in ensuring that we
are able to succeed in Afghanistan. We currently have in
Pakistan sanctuaries in which Taliban fighters have been able
to operate and come across the border, and although Pakistan
has done much more in recent years to deal with them, we
continue to work with them to try to do yet more.
With respect to a political settlement in Afghanistan, this
is the so-called conversations on reconciliation and at a lower
level fighters on reintegration. We have seen about 3,800
former Taliban fighters come off the field--3,800 or so in the
last couple of years through reintegration and expect that that
effort will continue. That is led by the Afghan Government.
With respect to reconciliation and the potential
conversations with the leadership of the Taliban, first of all,
those are essentially on hold at the present. But the objective
is to structure a process in which Afghans talk to Afghans
about the future of Afghanistan. If the Taliban are to come
into that political process, they have to meet the criteria
that have been established, including renouncing ties with al
Qaeda, including entering into a political process, and
honoring the Afghan constitution. The requirements for the
Taliban to be able to participate as an outcome have been laid
out very clearly by Secretary Clinton and by others in the
administration. That door is open to them to come in, come off
the battlefield, and legitimately participate should they be
prepared to do so.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
I wish you all well and thank you for your responses.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
I am now going to turn the gavel over to Senator Reed who
will recognize Senator Cornyn right away. The vote is on but
they are holding it until 11:45 a.m., so you will be able to
get your questions in.
I will leave with this request of you, Mrs. Wright. You
made reference, I believe, to a number of studies that are
looking at cost/benefit methodologies relative to those
proposed cuts in the Air Guard. I have real problems with those
cuts. They are totally disproportionate to the reductions in
the Active-Duty Force, and my staff is going to be in touch
with you to get those studies to us so that we can see what it
is that went into that decision because I agree with what
Senator Brown said. They just appear totally disproportionate
to me.
Ms. Conaton, I hope your nieces and nephew got enough
material here today to write their reports.
I will recognize Senator Cornyn and give the gavel to
Senator Reed.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope they will
share that report with us. Maybe we will learn something in the
process. [Laughter.]
Dr. Miller, this will not come as a surprise to us, but
thank you for meeting with Senator Kyl, myself, and Senator
Alexander about this topic. What I would like to do is get some
of the substance of our discussion off the record, on the
record. Of course, that has to do with the shortfall for the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) weapons
activities.
Using the 1251 modernization plan which was the basis upon
which, I think it is fair to say, a number of Senators voted
for the New START treaty as the baseline, the fiscal year 2013
request falls $372 million short and funding between fiscal
year 2012 and 2017 could fall $4 billion short of the 1251
commitment.
What I would like to get from you and Mr. Kendall is your
commitment to work with this committee and to work with
Congress to identify efficiencies within the national
laboratories or NNSA that could free up funding for the
important weapons life extension programs and perhaps even fund
the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement Nuclear Facility, the plutonium producing
capability, on its original schedule. $300 million is needed in
fiscal year 2013 and $1.8 billion over the next 5 years.
Will you give me your commitment, give the committee your
commitment to work with us to try to find that money to keep
that original program on track?
Dr. Miller. Senator, you have my commitment to do so and to
work with this committee, with Congress, and with the NNSA.
Since we have met, I have had an opportunity to talk with the
Administrator, Tom D'Agostino, and I can reassure you, as we
discussed privately, that he is committed to doing everything
possible to find efficiencies in his program. We will continue
to provide support from DOD including through our cost analysis
and program evaluation study that is underway today.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kendall. I am going to make the same commitment,
Senator Cornyn. We are actively working this issue with the
NNSA.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much for that.
Mr. Kendall, you testified in front of the House Armed
Services Committee about the Joint Strike Fighter and indicated
that it made strong progress in 2011. I share Senator McCain's
frustrations--I am sure you have some--for the cost overruns.
But I wonder whether all of us fully appreciate when you have a
high degree of concurrency built into a cutting-edge program
like this, just how accurate the original cost estimates can be
because you are essentially developing this technology as you
are building it and it makes things very challenging.
My question is a little more specific about the time it is
taking the Department to get F-35 production lots on contract.
The fiscal year 2011 airplanes, lot 5, for which money was
appropriated a year ago, are still not on contract. The delay
in finalizing that contract could potentially put the fiscal
year 2013 funding for this program at risk. The reason I say
that is because the appropriators in 2011 cut planes last year
and cited the principal reason as the Department's delay in
getting the fiscal year 2010 aircraft on contract. I would urge
you to expeditiously finalize the contract and would be glad to
hear any comment you would care to make on that topic.
Mr. Kendall. We are in negotiations for lot 5 now, as I
think you are aware, Senator Cornyn. We have an undefinitized
contract. The production is proceeding, but we have to
negotiate a final price. I cannot really talk about the details
of that negotiation, obviously.
We appreciate the concern. We would like to have moved from
where we seem to be doing undefinitized contracts each year,
then taking a long time to finally definitize to a situation in
which we can get a definitized contract earlier. We are hopeful
as we transition to lot 6, then to lot 7, that we will be able
to do that. As we get experience, obviously, and we get a
better understanding of the cost, it should be much easier to
negotiate these contracts as we go forward.
Senator Cornyn. This always seems like a very mysterious
and arcane subject, which I think the lack of clarity that we
all have makes it more likely that there will be cost overruns
in the future. I would welcome the opportunity to work with you
and the Department, as I know we all would, to try to bring
greater clarity to the process so we can, hopefully, keep this
essential program on track. Since we put all of our eggs in the
F-35 basket, as the saying goes, we better take care of the
basket.
Mr. Kendall. I agree with that, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. I would like to ask one last line of
questioning for Dr. Miller and Mr. Kendall. This has to do with
the subject I have discussed with Secretary Panetta and also
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This regards a
contract that DOD has with a Russian arms exporter,
Rosonboronexport, to provide 21 dual-use Mi-17 helicopters to
the Afghan military. The reason why this has become so
important is because, of course, this is the same arms merchant
that has sold weapons to the Syrian Government used to kill
innocent Syrians who are protesting the tyranny of the Assad
Government.
Specifically what I wanted to ask you about is the original
contract calls for $375 million for the purchase of 21 Mi-17
helicopters and spare parts. But reportedly there is an option
to purchase for an additional $555 million which would raise
the total value of the contract to $1 billion. I know I am not
alone in being concerned that DOD would enter into a no-bid
contract to purchase Russian helicopters when there are
American-made helicopters that surely must be available to meet
that requirement. Unfortunately, I think the contract
undermines our goal for national security and is at odds with
the U.S. policy toward the Assad regime.
I would just like to ask, Mr. Kendall, Dr. Miller, do you
share my concerns about DOD's ongoing business dealings with
Rosonboronexport? I wonder whether you can add any comments
that would give us some assurance that we are not doing
business with the very same people who are aiding in the
killing of innocent civilians in Syria.
Dr. Miller. Senator, first of all, I want to say explicitly
that we have had and have ongoing discussions with the Russians
about any support to the Assad regime in Syria, and we will
continue to do so.
The issue with the Mi-17 in Afghanistan comes down to one
that it is an aircraft that is first well-suited, extremely
well-suited in fact, to the altitude and rugged terrain of
Afghanistan, and it is one that the relatively small number of
Afghan pilots that are currently in place and that we are
continuing to try to train have an understanding of how to
operate. The challenge that we have is that there is not
another aircraft in the world that has the same combination of
capabilities to be able to operate in Afghanistan, nor that the
Afghan air forces will be able to train and fly on.
Understanding the concerns that you raise about working
with Rosonboronexport, we are continuing the effort that
started a couple of years ago to have an explicit transition
plan over time so that we do not find ourselves in this
position in the future. That is for the rotary-wing support. We
are looking to be able to transition over time. Sir, because
the transition is so important in Afghanistan and because, as I
said, this aircraft is well-suited and the people that we have
and are training the Afghan air force to fly it are capable of
operating this, I just think it makes tremendous sense for us
to continue with the Mi-17 and to have that be the critical
part of how we transition in Afghanistan. As we talked about
previously, we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Afghans, but
we are shifting the weight increasingly onto their shoulders.
We need an aircraft that can allow them to be able to conduct
these operations.
Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, you strike me as a very decent
human being and a good man, no doubt a great patriot, and I
know you must be troubled. I know you are doing your job and
trying to deal with a tough situation. But it just strikes me
as completely unacceptable for us not to continue to look for
an alternative to purchasing these helicopters for the Afghan
army, and if we need to help them with training for a different
helicopter, they can be purchased from another source. That
would strike me as a good thing, and I bet you would agree.
Dr. Miller. Senator, I fully agree. At the same time, I do
not see a viable alternative today or within at least the next
year. I have, for the last couple of years, looked into--and to
say encouraged would be an understatement--our work to find
alternative platforms, and I will continue to do so. I think it
is possible Mr. Kendall wants to comment as well. This is an
important effort from a policy perspective, but it is one where
we have to get an acquisition of rotary wing capabilities that
provides this set of capabilities that we can then have not
just Afghans but others that we can sell to around the world
for our own operations and for foreign military sales that
could be used.
Senator Cornyn. It strikes me, Mr. Kendall, as strange that
the Russians can build a helicopter that meets Afghan
requirements but U.S. manufacturers cannot. Is that your
understanding?
Mr. Kendall. The situation is they have a helicopter in
existence that meets those requirements. We could certainly
build a similar one if we had the time. It is relatively simple
to operate and to maintain, and it operates well in the
environment of Afghanistan.
Part of the history of this is that we attempted to acquire
Mi-17s through other sources originally, and Russia controls
the export of them fairly carefully through Rosonboronexport
that you mentioned. We were forced to go through that vehicle.
Unfortunately, we would be depriving the Afghan military
something they desperately need if we were to follow the line
that you suggested, and I agree with Dr. Miller on that.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Cornyn.
Before I recognize Senator Blumenthal, let me take my
questions.
First, let me thank Secretary Kendall for remembering
Sergeant Dennis Weichel, and his service and sacrifice, as you
said, Mr. Secretary, personifies the American soldier, sailor,
marine, and airman and all they do every day. Thank you for
that.
I think you also very eloquently stated that the decisions
we make here, not just in DOD, but on this side of the dais
ultimately are carried out by young men and women like Sergeant
Weichel, and we have to be very conscious of that in everything
we do. I think this group of nominees feels that intensely.
General Wright, you have served and so many have served in
different ways. Thank you very much for that.
Secretary Kendall, one of the issues that we have talked
about is the nuclear infrastructure to create and maintain
nuclear devices. There is another big part of that. That is the
delivery platforms. Where you are facing a significant set of
challenges, the lead procurement item is the Ohio-class
replacement submarine, but the Air Force is talking about the
need ultimately to replace their fleet. You have to make, I
presume, improvements in ground-based systems.
When the Services look individually at the cost--and I have
more fidelity with respect to the Navy--these are very
expensive platforms. They crowd out spending for other
necessary ships in the Navy's case. I think there is a very
compelling case because this is a strategic issue that the
Services alone should not fundamentally share the burden, that
in fact there has to be some DOD defense money because of the
strategic nature committed to help the Services. I think the
most immediate situation is in the Navy.
Can you reflect on that and share your views?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, Senator Reed. The Department basically
builds its budget as a budget for the entire Department, and we
do make tradeoffs that sometimes cut across the Services' lines
in order to do that. Last fall, what we went through was a
period where we formulated the strategy, the Strategic Guidance
that we published, and that was used to guide the budget
process. That was all done with regard to priorities to support
the strategy. It was not about the Service portfolio
specifically. At the end, we came to a decision about the best
mix of systems to do that, and we tried to take into account
the long-term issues that you alluded to which include the 30-
year shipbuilding plan which we just sent over which does show
that the Ohio replacement does add substantially to that
account. We are going to have to find some other way besides
the shipbuilding account to pay that bill.
We have put cost caps on both the SSBN-X, the Ohio
replacement, and on the new bomber in order to try to control
the costs and keep them within an affordable range. But there
is going to be a challenge to us to do this, and it has to be
done on a defense-wide DOD basis.
Senator Reed. Part of your approach to this--and I know you
have thought carefully about it--is not just in terms of
capping systems but sort of the sequencing of when you build
these systems. I thought General Kehler's testimony in response
to Senator Blumenthal--the U.S. Strategic Command Commander--
about the most survivable element in the triad is the
submarine. General Kehler is an Air Force officer. I think that
is a double endorsement.
Is that factor being considered too in terms of sequencing
and funding in terms of what is the most survivable part that,
if you extend, will give us more protections?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. That factor is being taken into account.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Miller, you made it very clear that the policy of
the President to prevent the Iranian Government from obtaining
nuclear weapons--and that is a policy that I agree with and
concur with. The President, as we are all aware, is pursuing
some of the most aggressive diplomacy that we have ever seen
with respect to the Iranian situation. I do not think a year or
2 ago I would have said that the Europeans are prepared at the
end of June to eliminate their importation of Iranian oil.
There is some perhaps traction here. But this is a very
difficult issue.
There are those that are talking about an immediate or very
close-on preemptive strike on the facilities. It seems to me
that, as I look at their analysis, they are assuming a worst
case on behalf of the Iranians, which is probably prudent to do
in terms of their nuclear aspirations and what they would do
with a nuclear device, but then a best case in terms of
retaliation if such an attack was taking place. It just strikes
me that that type of analysis is not the best. You have to
assume, I think, a worst case for their aspirations and a worst
case for their retaliation.
Do you want to comment on that approach and your thoughts?
Dr. Miller. Senator Reed, this administration believes
there is time for diplomacy to work, and as we have increased
the pressure through sanctions and through other steps, we
think that the incentives for the Iranians to come to the table
and to take the steps needed to come into compliance--those
incentives are increasing and the impact of sanctions is
increasing. At the same time, as you indicated, all options are
on the table at present and all options will remain on the
table.
I guess I would add, Senator, that with respect to planning
for scenarios, this is something--a potential conflict--I
mentioned the Strait of Hormuz previously. DOD and the military
is conducting planning across the full range of potential
scenarios and will be as prepared as possible.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
Thank you all for not only your willingness to serve but,
in each and every case, your demonstrated service to the Nation
already. We appreciate it very much.
Again, I will echo my classmate. I have been doing this for
40-plus years. Ultimately it is all about those young sergeants
and boatswain's mates and crew chiefs that are out there
protecting us.
With that, let me recognize Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you all for your service already and your service-to-
be and to your families as well.
Ms. Conaton, I am concerned about the adequacy of the
criminal justice system in the military in dealing with sexual
assault. I accept and commend your commitment to ending sexual
assault and holding accountable anybody who commits it. I know
that Secretary Panetta is as well. Yet, fewer than 21 percent
of assault cases now go to trial and about 6 percent of the
accused are discharged or allowed to resign in lieu of court
martial. Only half of the cases prosecuted result in
convictions. I wonder what is being done to improve that
record.
Ms. Conaton. Senator, thank you and thanks for the
leadership not only that you have demonstrated on this issue
but the committee as well.
I completely agree with Secretary Panetta that not only is
one sexual assault too many, but it is completely antithetical
to who we are as a military and completely contrary to the
values that the military espouses.
I think leadership remains critical on this issue. The fact
that both Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, as well as
many in Congress, have taken up this issue I think is
appropriately shining a spotlight on this, and we need to keep
up that pressure.
There are definitely issues that go to how our commanders
impose standards of behavior within their units and the
training for those who would both investigate and prosecute.
Secretary Panetta has a very near-term evaluation underway as
to the adequacy of the training both at the commander level, at
the investigator level, and for servicemembers at large. If
confirmed, I would look very much forward to working with him
and with the committee to see where we go next in terms of next
steps.
Senator Blumenthal. I know that he is about to propose or
in the process of proposing some reforms and changes, and I
would be very eager to work with you on improving the military
justice system in dealing with these issues because I think a
lot more and a lot better can be done.
Ms. Conaton. Thank you, Senator. It is my understanding
that the Department is preparing a package of legislative
proposals to come forward. As I am not yet in that position, I
have not had an opportunity to review them but would look
forward to working with you on that.
Senator Blumenthal. I was very interested and thankful to
see the part of your testimony dealing with medical research
programs, particularly psychological health, traumatic brain
injury, and post-traumatic stress. We have facilities in
Connecticut, the Eastern Blind Rehabilitation Center, that deal
with visual injuries. I wonder if you could comment further on
what will be done assuming that you are confirmed.
Ms. Conaton. Yes, Senator. You highlighted the research
aspect of this. As we know that these injuries of the conflict
of the last 10 years are going to be with us for some time to
come, I think maintaining the focus on medical research in the
areas of traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress will
be absolutely essential.
But I think everything that the Department does for our
wounded warriors, we have to keep in mind the fact that it is
from their service that they are dealing with these injuries.
Again, these are things that will be with them and their
families over an extended period of time. If confirmed, I
imagine these issues and wounded warrior issues more generally
would be something that I would spend a great deal of time on
and something I am personally very committed to.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Secretary Miller, the issue of human trafficking in
contracting and contracts on our bases overseas, a security
threat--maybe I should address this question as well to
Secretary Kendall. I have introduced a bill. It has bipartisan
support here and in the House to try to impose stronger
criminal penalties on contractors who engage in this practice,
stronger preventive measures, and providing better remedies. I
hope that you will support such efforts to combat human
trafficking not only because of the threat to the integrity of
our contracts and the cost to taxpayers, but also because it is
a security issue since many of those brought to these bases can
pose a threat to our troops. I wonder if you could comment,
either you or Secretary Kendall, on that issue.
Dr. Miller. Senator, I will comment briefly.
I agree absolutely that it is unacceptable and it is
something that we have to deal with. I have not had the
opportunity to review your legislation. I will do so and work
with my colleagues as they operate in acting capacity.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Mr. Kendall. Senator Blumenthal, it was not mentioned but
my background includes work as a human rights activist, and I
am very interested in this subject.
We are doing some things already. I would be very
interested in things that would strengthen what we are doing as
far as contracting is concerned. I would be happy to work with
you on that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Let me conclude by saying that I share the concerns that
have been raised about helicopters sold by the Russians to the
Afghanistan forces. Perhaps you can tell me as simply and
concisely as possible why we cannot substitute our own
helicopters. In other testimony before this committee, the
Russian helicopter was described in its sophistication as a
flying refrigerator. I am just wondering why the great American
industrial base cannot provide a substitute for that product.
Mr. Kendall. The problem is the immediacy of the need and
the fact that we do not have a product that we can substitute
immediately.
Senator Blumenthal. A product that can be flown by the
Afghans?
Mr. Kendall. That has the same characteristics as the Mi-
17.
Basically there are a lot of people in Afghanistan who have
already had experience with the helicopter, which helps. That
gives us a head start in terms of training and so on. It is
suitable for the environment. It is relatively simple to
operate. It is relatively simple to maintain. So with an Afghan
force that we are trying to build, it seems to be the right
platform. We do not have a ready substitute that we could use
that is a U.S. product.
Senator Blumenthal. I hesitate to repeat what you have
already said, but is there an effort underway to develop such a
substitute?
Dr. Miller. Senator, yes, there is. A couple of years ago,
a rotary wing support office was created. The challenge is that
we do not have available a platform that could meet the needs
in the very near term. I agree that this is a place that we
should not find ourselves in the future, but this is where we
are at least for the next year and perhaps for the next couple
of years.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
One more question relating to the Joint Strike Fighter. Are
you concerned that some of the supposed overrun is due to
projections of inflation that seem to be at best somewhat
speculative and therefore may not reflect accurately the real
cost of the program?
Mr. Kendall. Part of the increase that we are reporting
today actually includes some inflation indices adjustments.
There is a substantial piece of it that is that.
I think we tend to get a little too fixated on some of
these numbers. I am trying to attack the costs. I am trying to
look at the things that I can do something about and drive them
down. The aircraft is at an affordable level now I think as far
as production is concerned, but we can do better and we need to
make it better so we can afford more of them.
The sustainment costs are too high. Dr. Carter testified
about that a year ago, and we need to drive those down. I have
set a target that I think is a cap on what we can do, and we
have tried to drive to at least that, which is lower than the
current estimate. Then we are going to try to drive it even
lower. That will be the subject of an awful lot of activity
over the next coming year.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. Again, thank you
all for your service and good luck. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your testimony and
your service.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Frank Kendall III by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I do not see the need for modifications to Goldwater-
Nichols Act provisions at this time. I believe the current allocation
of responsibility for acquisition-related matters in title 10, U.S.C.,
appropriately assigns responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and that the
law also appropriately identifies the acquisition-related functions of
the Military Department Secretaries. I will continue to consider this
issue and will make proposals for modifications if and when required.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.
duties
Question. Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties and
responsibilities of the USD(AT&L).
Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties do you expect
that the Secretary of Defense will prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign duties and
functions commensurate with the USD(AT&L)'s function and expertise as
he deems appropriate.
Question. Do you recommend any changes to the provisions of section
133 of title 10, U.S.C., with respect to the duties of the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense (DOD) has
effectively implemented a streamlined chain of command for acquisition
programs, as envisioned by the Packard Commission?
Answer. I believe that the Department has implemented a strong
acquisition chain of command, built upon an effective management
structure that meets the current acquisition requirements and outcomes.
I am concerned, however, that some program managers have been given
responsibility for too many programs. If confirmed, I will continue to
examine this structure and oversight to ensure continued success in
leadership.
Question. Do you see the need for modifications in that chain of
command, or in the duties and authorities of any of the officials in
that chain of command?
Answer. No, not at this time. I believe the statutory reporting
chain providing USD(AT&L) directive authority concerning Military
Department acquisition programs via the Military Department Secretaries
is a crucial authority that must be maintained. If confirmed, I will
evaluate the current chain of command and will recommend adjustments
should any be needed to ensure continued success.
qualifications
Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for managing an
acquisition system pursuant to which DOD spends roughly $400 billion
each year. Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., provides for the Under
Secretary to be appointed from among persons who have an extensive
management background in the public or private sector.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have over 40 years experience in the areas of national
security, defense, and acquisition. My education includes degrees in
engineering, business and law. I served on active duty in the Army for
over 10 years including in operational units and research and
development (R&D) commands. As a civil servant, I worked as a systems
engineer and systems analyst. I spent over 8 years in the Pentagon on
the Under Secretary for Acquisition's staff first as Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary for Strategic Systems (Defense Systems) and then as
Director, Tactical Warfare Programs. Outside of government I have been
the Vice President of Engineering for Raytheon Company and a consultant
on national security and acquisition related matters, principally
program management, technology assessment, and strategic planning, for
a variety of defense companies, think tanks, and government
laboratories or R&D organizations. I re-entered the government in March
2010 after confirmation by the Senate to be the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Since
October 2011, I have served as the acting Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. During the past 2 years, I have served the Defense
Department in the Office of the USD(AT&L). For a year and a half as the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics), and from October 2011 to the present as the
acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. In both positions, I played a central role overseeing and
directing major weapons systems on behalf of the Department. In my
previous Pentagon positions, I served in the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition's office from 1986 to 1994. During this period I had
oversight responsibility, first for all strategic defense programs, and
then for all tactical warfare programs. During my period as Director of
Tactical Warfare Programs from 1989 to 1994, I chaired the Conventional
Systems Committee, now called the Overarching Integrated Product Team,
which was responsible for preparing for Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
decisions for the Under Secretary for Acquisition. In this capacity, I
was responsible to the Under Secretary for approximately 100 DAB
reviews covering systems from all three Military Departments that
spanned the spectrum of major weapon systems. After I left government
service in 1994, I was involved with a number of major weapons systems
programs in my capacity as Vice President of Engineering at Raytheon.
As an independent consultant, I spent several years providing technical
management and program management consulting to the Lead System
Integrator for the Future Combat Systems program. During the period
1997 to 2008, I was also involved in reviews of a number of major
acquisition programs, either as an independent consultant or as a
member of a government advisory board.
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, what would be your
relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will be the principal staff advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on matters concerning acquisition, including on
the procurement of goods and services, R&D, developmental testing, and
contract administration. I will also be the principal staff advisor to
the Secretary on matters concerning logistics, maintenance and
sustainment support, installations and environment, operational energy,
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the defense industrial
base.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will be the principal staff advisor to the
Deputy Secretary in the same manner as to the Secretary.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. There are many actions that require coordination among the
Under Secretaries of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with the other
Under Secretaries to serve the priorities of the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The DOD General Counsel.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the General Counsel's office
to ensure all actions are legal, ethical, and within regulatory
guidelines.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation to ensure the Department has appropriate
operational test and evaluation of defense acquisition programs.
Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation to ensure that the Department has
independent cost analysis for defense acquisition programs and
appropriate resource assessments for other programs within my
responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to maintain the
technological edge of the Armed Forces, ensure the Department has
continued ability to acquire innovative capabilities, and to reduce the
cost and risk of our major defense acquisition programs.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Developmental Testing.
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing to ensure
there is strong involvement early in program formulation, that
comprehensive, independent developmental testing assessments of program
maturity and performance are available to inform acquisition decisions,
and that the developmental test community within the acquisition
workforce is appropriately staffed and qualified.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for System
Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for System Engineering to ensure the
application of sound systems engineering principles to major defense
acquisition programs and to ensure that the systems engineering
community within the acquisition workforce is appropriately staffed and
qualified.
Question. The Director of Program Assessment and Root Cause
Analysis.
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the work of the Director of
Program Assessment and Root Cause Analysis to ensure that the
performance of the defense acquisition system is carefully evaluated
and to ensure that all relevant lessons learned are captured from
programs which experience unacceptable cost growth and that performance
measurement for DOD programs and institutions is effectively
implemented.
Question. The Acquisition Executives in the Military Departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I will make communication and coordination
with the Service Acquisition Executives a top priority. I will work
with the Acquisition Executives to ensure effective oversight, through
the Secretaries of the Military Departments, of acquisition programs in
their areas, support transparency in sharing information about program
status, take appropriate remedial actions to rectify problems, actively
engage in departmental processes to improve acquisition outcomes, and
support the policies and practices of the Department. I will also
expect them to champion best practices and share ideas and concerns
with me, with each other and with appropriate stakeholders.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Vice Chairman in his role
with respect to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and
would support and encourage his active role as a member of the DAB. I
will also seek to ensure the requirements and acquisition processes
work effectively together in terms of stabilizing requirements, and
ensuring requirements established for acquisition programs are
achievable within appropriate cost, schedule, and technical risk.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. My principle challenge will be to support the Department's
recently announced Military Strategy Guidance within the available
resources. My priorities as the acting USD(AT&L), and the priorities I
would emphasize if confirmed, are tightly aligned with that challenge
and with the principles the Secretary of Defense has expressed--
maintain the best military in the world, avoid a hollow force, take a
balanced approach to achieving efficiencies, and keep faith with our
men and women in uniform.
My priorities and the major challenges I expect to face if
confirmed as USD(AT&L) are: (1) providing effective support to current
operations; (2) achieving affordable acquisition programs; (3)
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department's
acquisition of both products and services; (4) strengthening the
industrial base during a period of lower than expected budgets; (5)
strengthening the acquisition workforce in order to achieve better
acquisition outcomes; and (6) ensuring that despite limited resources
the Department protecting the capabilities the Department will need in
the future to equip and sustain the force and conduct operations.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. The following is a very brief summary of some of the plans
that I have to address the challenges I see:
To support the warfighter, if confirmed, I will continue to
prioritize and institutionalize rapid acquisition to meet urgent needs,
timely and reliable logistics support, effective contingency
contracting, and more efficient operational energy solutions.
To achieve affordable programs, if confirmed, I will continue to
work with the requirements and resource communities and the acquisition
community to ensure the programs the Department starts have firm cost
goals in place for both production and sustainment, that appropriate
priorities are set, and that the necessary tradeoffs are made to keep
defense programs within affordable limits.
To improve efficiency, if confirmed, I will continue to refine and
evolve the Better Buying Power initiative. I will continue the
continuous improvement management approach that Dr. Carter and I
initiated to control and reduce costs while acquiring products and
services that provide the highest possible value to the warfighters.
To strengthen the industrial base, if confirmed, I will continue to
focus on executing contracts with industry that include appropriate
incentives to higher productivity and drive fair business deals to
protect the taxpayers' interest, while providing industry with
reasonable profit opportunities and without putting industry at
unacceptable risk. I will also continue to ensure critical skills and
capabilities in the industrial base are identified, and intervene where
necessary to see that needed capabilities are preserved. If confirmed,
I will keep strong two way lines of communication to industry open at
all levels so that industry and government truly understand each
other's perspectives and concerns.
To strengthen the acquisition workforce, if confirmed, I will
continue to work to increase the capability of the workforce. As budget
reality reduces the capacity to increase the size of the workforce, I
will turn greater attention to the capability within the workforce,
particularly the development of key acquisition leaders in program
management, engineering, contracting, and product support. This
includes increased skills and leadership training. It also means
setting high standards, recognizing good performance, and holding
people accountable for poor performance.
To protect the future, if confirmed, I will continue to advocate
for sound investments in the next generation of technologies to
maintain U.S. military superiority. This means protecting essential
capabilities in the industrial base, such as design teams that would
take a generation or more to replace. It means retaining a contingency
contracting capability that can be expanded when needed for future
operations. It means developing and nurturing small businesses,
maintaining our installations, and ensuring the safety and security of
our nuclear deterrent. Most of all, it means maintaining the very best
military in the world, not just today, but for the long term.
acquisition organization
Question. Do you believe that the office of the USD(AT&L) is
appropriately structured to execute its management and oversight
responsibilities?
Answer. Yes. I have made a number of minor adjustments in the AT&L
structure since I joined the organization in March 2010. As I evaluate
the impact of these changes other adjustments are possible, but overall
I believe the structure is appropriate.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the relationship
between the USD(AT&L) and senior acquisition officials in the Military
Departments?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you see the need for any additional processes or
mechanisms to ensure coordination between the budget, acquisition, and
requirements systems of the DOD and ensure that appropriate trade-offs
are made between cost, schedule, and performance requirements early in
the acquisition process?
Answer. I believe the correct mechanisms are in place at the DAB
and the JROC, and in the process for performing analyses of
alternatives, to ensure that appropriate trade-offs are made between
cost, schedule, and performance requirements on major defense
acquisition programs. Dr. Carter and I initiated the use of
affordability production and sustainment cost requirements or caps
early in program life cycles and, if confirmed, I will continue the use
of this management tool to force trade-offs early in the system design
process. If confirmed, I will also continue to examine whether there is
a need for additional processes or mechanisms for ensuring appropriate
trade-offs before program requirements are finalized.
Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the
Service Chiefs in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation process?
Answer. The acquisition process does not exist in isolation and the
Service Chiefs play a major role as a result of their deep involvement
in the budget and requirements processes, and because they are
responsible for the health of the acquisition workforce of their
respective Military Departments, particularly the officer corps. The
acquisition process functions properly only when the Service's
uniformed leadership is actively involved and takes responsibility for
the success of the acquisition system. I believe the chain of
professional acquisition authority--normally the program manager,
program executive officer, component acquisition executive and/or
milestone decision authority--is appropriate for acquisition decisions,
but that these people cannot be successful without the involvement and
active support of Service senior uniformed leadership.
Question. What do you see as the potential advantages and
disadvantages to giving the Service Chiefs authority and responsibility
for the management and execution of acquisition programs?
Answer. The Service Chiefs are usually not acquisition
professionals, and in general, I believe that the management and
execution of acquisition programs should be done by people who have the
professional experience and qualifications to direct large scale
complex programs. I also believe that the Service Chiefs already have
significant responsibility for the success of acquisition programs, and
that there is much they can and should do within their current
authority to improve acquisition outcomes. The steps the Service Chiefs
can take include: (1) making sure their personnel systems are doing
everything they can to create a more capable and professional
acquisition workforce (particularly key leaders including program
managers, chief engineers, contracting officers, and product support
managers); (2) recognizing the importance and unique skills of those
key leaders and making it career enhancing to go into the acquisition
field; (3) ensuring that realistic requirements are set and that there
is a cooperative relationship between the acquisition community and the
requirements community in which requirements trade-offs and informed
decisions can be made efficiently; (4) creating a command environment
where acquisition professionals are listened to and encouraged to bring
realistic assessments forward to senior requirements and budget
decision makers and where sound business practices that will save money
and provide more value are supported; and (5) including the acquisition
professionals in the cultural mainstream of their Service.
Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the
combatant commanders in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation processes?
Answer. Combatant commanders advise on capability needs, priorities
and allocation of resources consistent with those needs. I am
particularly sensitive to the need for the acquisition system to
address urgent needs of the combatant commanders in support of wartime
operations and changing threats. In those exceptional cases where a
combatant commander holds special acquisition authorities such as the
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, AT&L has responsibilities
to foster their success through mentorship and positive process
oversight. If confirmed, I will continue to respect and encourage their
advice and solicit their input on meeting their needs effectively.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the structure or
operations of the JROC?
Answer. I support the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs'
initiatives to emphasize cost-informed decisions in the military needs
validation process and to streamline the JROC process. The current
construct encourages direct and open discussion between senior military
needs officials and acquisition leaders. Our staffs work continuously
to evolve these processes to provide capability more effectively. The
VCJCS and I have been working closely to streamline and coordinate
requirements and acquisition, and if I am confirmed, I will continue
this practice. I have been regularly attending JROC meetings to provide
the acquisition perspective and if confirmed I will continue this
practice.
Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe are needed in
the lines of authority and accountability for the procurement of major
weapon systems?
Answer. I believe in clear lines of authority and accountability
for the procurement of major weapon systems. They go from the Defense
Acquisition Executive through the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to the Service Acquisition Executives and the Program
Executive Officers and Program Managers. I see no need for changes to
that structure. If confirmed, I will continuously review this to see if
changes might be needed.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to empower
program managers to execute major defense acquisition programs and hold
them accountable for how well their programs perform?
Answer. Section 853 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007 required the Department
to develop a strategy to enhance the role of DOD program managers in
developing and carrying out defense acquisition programs. The
Department developed the strategy and has implemented many of the
initiatives identified in its report to Congress to include more
focused education and training, program manager forums, and
institutionalized assist teams. Tenure agreements, program manager
agreements, and configuration steering boards increase leadership
stability while enhancing management accountability. The foundation of
accountability is competency and experience. I am currently reviewing
the Department's approach to developing and empowering program managers
as well as the approach to holding them accountable for their
performance. I regard leaving stronger, more effective acquisition
leaders as the single most important legacy I could leave the
Department and if confirmed that will continue to be one of my highest
priorities.
major weapon system acquisition
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given decreasing defense budgets, the
historic cost growth trends for major systems, and the continuing costs
of ongoing contingency operations?
Answer. I believe the current investment budget for major systems
is affordable if properly managed, but that it will be a challenge to
achieve this. The President's fiscal year 2013 Defense Budget provides
a balanced approach to reducing force structure and procurement over
the Future Years Defense Program. Cost growth in acquisition programs
will have to be controlled if the Department is to execute this budget
successfully. Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter foresaw the need for
greater efficiency and effective execution and started the Better
Buying Power initiative in 2010 to ensure that the performance of the
defense acquisition system was everything that the warfighter and
taxpayers have a right to expect. If the Department continues to
experience over the next 10 years the same levels of cost growth and
failed programs that occurred in the decade preceding this initiative,
it will be extremely challenging to meet our minimum needs for
recapitalization and modernization.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make cost control an over-
riding priority. As the USD(AT&L), I would continue to advise the
Secretary on a sustainable and affordable investment strategy for the
Department. As the acting Under Secretary, I have included formal
affordability requirements as a critical element of the defense
acquisition system. If confirmed, I will continue to work to control
potential cost growth for existing programs and to work to improve the
Department's requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes to
ensure investment decisions are informed by sound affordability
constraints.
Question. What would be the impact of a decision by the Department
to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?
Answer. Over the long term, the Department must balance force
structure with operating costs, capital investments, and modernization.
I believe that ultimately reductions in our recapitalization and
modernization rates could jeopardize our ability to keep up with pacing
threats, reduce production efficiency, increase sustainment costs for
the existing force structure, and affect the health of the industrial
base. In the short term, some reductions are manageable and
affordability constraints cannot be ignored.
Question. Nearly half of DOD's major defense acquisition programs
have exceeded the so-called ``Nunn-McCurdy'' cost growth standards
established in section 2433 of title 10, U.S.C., to identify seriously
troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 (WSARA) tightened the standards for addressing such
programs.
What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address the out-
of-control cost growth on DOD's major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe the Department must continue to take steps such
as those included in the Better Buying Power initiatives that Dr.
Carter and I started. These initiatives are part of a process of
continuous improvement in the acquisition system aimed at controlling
costs in all acquisition activities, including major programs. First of
all the Department's planning must be realistic and fully resourced.
This means setting requirements that are affordable and achievable
within the time and resources available. Affordability caps for both
production and sustainment are now being applied early in program life
cycles and their use must continue so that sound requirements trades
are made as early as possible. In order to ensure more effective
program execution, primarily by industry, acquisition strategies that
emphasize sustaining a competitive environment and providing strong
incentives to cost control must be implemented consistently. Continuous
efforts to identify sources of cost reduction through ``should cost''
management should be used during all program phases. If confirmed, I
will continue to implement these measures and work to identify
additional steps that can be taken to control cost growth.
Question. What steps if any do you believe that the Department
should consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition
programs that exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in
the ``Nunn-McCurdy'' provision?
Answer. I believe DOD has full authority to take appropriate
measures, including major restructuring or termination of poor
performing programs. While terminations have rarely occurred in the
past, one of my first acts as acting Under Secretary was to terminate
the Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio program after a
Nunn-McCurdy breach. I believe that the current budget environment will
make it more likely that program terminations will occur after critical
Nunn-McCurdy level cost breaches due to our overall affordability
constraints. Also the Department will be more aggressive in taking
action before Nunn-McCurdy thresholds are reached. As Principal Deputy
USD(AT&L), I also instituted a practice of conducting Nunn-McCurdy-like
reviews as soon as cost growth became apparent even if breaches had not
occurred yet so that this mechanism is applied proactively instead of
reactively. If confirmed, I will continue this practice.
Question. Do you believe that the office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as currently
structured, has the organization and resources necessary to effectively
oversee the management of these major defense acquisition programs? If
not, how would you address this problem?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy
provision, as revised by section 206?
Answer. No.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to
recommend terminating a program that has experienced critical cost
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. If confirmed, the five certification elements listed in the
law will continue to guide me.
operating and support costs
Question. The Department estimates that operating and support (O&S)
costs account for up to 70 percent of the acquisition costs of major
weapon systems. Section 832 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires
the Department to take a series of steps to improve its processes for
estimating, managing, and reducing such costs.
What is the current status of the Department's efforts to implement
the requirements of section 832?
Answer. Several organizations within the Department, to include
AT&L and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE), are
currently addressing implementation of the requirements outlined in
Section 832. The section 832 requirements will be implemented in a
major revision of the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02,
which includes an extensive restructure of the document, as well as
``Fact of Life Changes'' and the incorporation of other NDAA directed
requirements, including those of sections 805, 815, and 837.
Question. What steps remain to be taken to implement section 832,
and what is the Department's schedule for taking these steps?
Answer. The planned completion date for these efforts is December
2012. If confirmed, I will supplement the update to DODI 5000.02 with
guidance, training, mentorship and oversight. If confirmed, I would
expect to gain insight into the effectiveness of these efforts through
Defense Acquisition Executive Reviews and incorporate the lessons
learned into future policy refinements.
Question. What steps, if any, are needed to ensure that the
requirements and acquisition communities fully and effectively
collaborate to understand and control the O&S costs prior to and early
in product development, when it is possible to have the most
significant impact on those costs?
Answer. The Department recognizes that alignment and partnership
among the operational requirements, development, and sustainment
communities are essential to optimizing warfighter operating and
support strategies at a minimal cost. Identifying, maintaining and
understanding program impacts to O&S costs are critical during a
program's early requirements definition, and technology development
phases, and remains a priority during the Weapon System's entire life
cycle.
I recently elevated the importance of Life Cycle Product Support by
making the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) a stand-alone program
management tool required for all programs prior to entering the
Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase. The LCSP will
capture the requirements for product support that include both
Readiness and O&S cost objectives.
Additionally, I am addressing the role/influence of reliability,
availability, and maintainability (RAM) engineering during acquisition
reviews. During the quarterly Defense Acquisition Executive Summary
(DAES) assessments, I focus on reliability and availability as well as
actual O&S cost performance against pre-determined objectives. These
assessments act as a trigger for further in-depth reviews of programs
between major milestones and during Post-IOC reviews.
Operational energy costs are also an important target for O&S cost
reduction. The Department recently published an operational energy
strategy and implementation plan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
that this plan is successfully executed.
If confirmed, I will continue to explore and implement these and
other management tools to reduce support costs.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
Department needs to take to bring O&S costs under control?
Answer. I believe the Department should continue execution of the
steps Dr. Carter and I put in place under the Better Buying Power
initiatives and should seek other ways of controlling O&S costs.
Specifically, if confirmed, I will continue and enforce the
implementation of sustainment affordability constraints as programs
conduct technology demonstration and enter engineering and
manufacturing development. Sustainment cost constraints are intended to
force programs to analyze sustainment costs and take steps to control
them during product development, but these constraints must be
enforced. If confirmed, I will ensure that this occurs.
Under Better Buying Power, the Department also initiated a ``Should
Cost'' management process that requires our managers to drive costs,
including sustainment costs, down. Program Managers must develop clear
cost objectives that are lower than the Independent Cost Estimate
(ICE), or ``Will Cost,'' derived from historical data. These ``Should
Cost'' targets are not arbitrary numbers. Rather, each target must be
grounded in some form of a tangible, best practice and/or innovative
business approach designed to improve upon historical performance.
The Department also needs to continue the effort to align the
incentives of the Government and its sustainment contractors to produce
better results. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage use of
Performance-Based Sustainment strategies to drive O&S costs down by
providing competitive and financial incentives to both industry and
Government. The data from the Department's use of performance-based
sustainment demonstrates that properly structured and executed
performance-based sustainment strategies produce better performance
results at less cost than traditional, transactional sustainment
approaches. Performance-based strategies can be applied to activities
performed by both public and private sustainment providers.
If confirmed, I will continue to explore and implement other
management tools to reduce O&S costs.
systems engineering
Question. One of the premises for WSARA was that the best way to
improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a
sounder footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in
the early phases of the acquisition process. The Defense Science Board
Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation reported in May 2008
that ``the single most important step necessary'' to address high rates
of failure on defense acquisition programs is ``to ensure programs are
formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the
beginning.''
Do you believe that DOD has the systems engineering and
developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed
to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements,
acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition
programs?
Answer. Since the passage of WSARA, the Department has worked to
build the systems engineering expertise required for effective
acquisition. While much progress has been made, the Department still
has work to do in building its capacity for professional systems
engineering. The Department has increased the numbers of system
engineers, but the work force has a demographics issue with a senior
workforce nearing retirement and a number of relatively inexperienced
junior people who will need more experience to become proficient. If
confirmed, I will continue to identify and implement creative measures
to address this problem.
Question. What is your assessment of the implementation to date of
section 102 of WSARA, regarding systems engineering?
Answer. I believe the Department has faithfully implemented section
102 by establishing the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Developmental Test and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Systems Engineering offices, by staffing these offices with highly
qualified teams, and by providing guidance and oversight to the systems
engineering capabilities in the Military Services.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
implement this provision?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Acquisition
Executives to ensure the effective implementation of recently approved
systems engineering policy and guidance and the adequacy of the
competency, capacity, and authority of the systems engineering
workforce as critical components in support of successful acquisition
system performance.
Question. Do you believe that the Nation as a whole is producing
enough systems engineers and designers and giving them sufficient
experience working on engineering and design projects to ensure that
DOD can access an experienced and technically trained systems
engineering and design workforce? If not, what do you recommend should
be done to address the shortfall?
Answer. I am not satisfied that the Nation is currently producing
enough systems engineers and engineers in other disciplines to meet the
Department's complex engineering challenges. The Department has ongoing
efforts to promote engineering education in kindergarten through 12th
grade and college curricula, and, if confirmed, I will continue to
support those efforts to promote engineering as an important field of
study with our national educational system. I will also promote
engineering excellence within the acquisition work force as a core
value.
Question. Last year, the chairman and ranking member of the Armed
Services Committee expressed concern that the annual report to Congress
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (SE) and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing failed to
meet applicable statutory requirements.
What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that future
reports on developmental testing and systems engineering fully comply
with applicable statutory requirements?
Answer. In response to the expressed concerns of the chairman and
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the Department has
increased the detail and extent of our reporting in the fiscal year
2011 DT&E and SE Annual Report to Congress. If confirmed, this will
continue to be a matter of priority for me.
technological maturity
Question. Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone
Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to certify
that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of
maturity before Milestone B approval.
What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
DOD complies with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, as chair of the DAB and Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) for major defense acquisition programs, I will continue
to use technology readiness assessments (TRAs) to ensure compliance
with section 2366b. I am concerned however, that reliance on formal
technology readiness levels (TRLs) has become a substitute for a deeper
understanding of the state of risk prior to entering development. I
commissioned a study of recent decisions to enter engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD), which concluded that TRLs in many
cases were not being used effectively to assess the risk of entering
EMD. The TRL labels used in TRAs are a useful benchmark, but they alone
are not enough.
Question. What steps if any will you take to ensure that the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E))
is adequately staffed and resourced to support decisionmakers in
complying with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work with ASD(R&E) and
other members of the OSD and Military Department staffs to ensure the
adequacy of resources available to meet the challenges of complying
with the requirements of section 2366b.
Question. Are you satisfied that TRAs adequately address systems
integration and engineering issues, which are the cause of many cost
overruns and schedule delays in acquisition programs?
Answer. I am not satisfied that TRAs are, by themselves, adequate
for addressing systems integration and engineering risks. They are
necessary but not fully sufficient to determine technical risk. A
recent Department case study on technology development and prototyping
found very little correlation between TRAs and program success in
development. TRAs are, however, necessary for identifying and maturing
the Critical Technology Elements enabling the key performance
characteristics of advanced systems. They form an essential part of
program managers' risk management strategies, planning, and execution.
In May 2011, I directed the Department to revise its approach for
conducting and independently verifying TRAs for Program Inception
(Milestone B) in order to make program managers more responsible and
accountable for understanding and managing program risks. It is too
early to tell how effective these changes have been. If confirmed, I
will continue to make improving risk management of technology,
engineering, and integration risks a high priority.
Question. Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in
acquisition programs, what other steps should the Department take to
increase accountability and discipline in the acquisition process?
Answer. There are a great number of factors that contribute to the
failure of programs to meet their cost, schedule, and performance
objectives and many are associated with discipline and accountability.
By instituting and enforcing affordability constraints on programs, I
have begun to discipline the acquisition system to constrain
requirements to affordable levels. Industry should also be held
accountable for its performance, and I believe this is best
accomplished through the incentives integrated into our contracts and
through the actions taken when programs are not performing acceptably.
Government institutional performance matters also, and I am beginning
to implement new institutional performance measurement required by
section 2548 of title 10, U.S.C. When this system is in place, it will
allow the Department to compare institutional performance and identify
best practices. If confirmed, I will aggressively continue this
initiative. There are also perverse incentives in our budget execution
system that encourages the workforce to obligate money, whether it
makes sense to do so or not. The Department should not provide
incentives that prioritize putting funds on contract over negotiating a
contract that is in the Department and the American taxpayer's best
interest. If confirmed, I will continue the effort to instill a culture
of cost consciousness and stewardship of the taxpayer's dollars
throughout the defense acquisition system. My emphasis is on taking
steps to improve the quality and professionalism of the acquisition
workforce that plans and manages the execution of the Department's
programs. Program managers and other leaders who do not perform to
standards have been removed from their positions, but I expect this to
be infrequent. The Department (particularly the Military Departments)
has the duty to ensure that the people entrusted with the
responsibility for managing major programs have the qualifications and
the professional development they need to assume this responsibility.
If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure that this is the case.
requirements process
Question. What is your assessment of recent revisions made by the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Capabilities
and Integration Development System (JCIDS)?
Answer. I believe these revisions will allow JCIDS execution to
align more closely with the Department's new strategic guidance and to
take account of cost and technological maturity factors. Additionally,
I understand that the process makes permanent several important
initiatives that enable more rapidly delivered and affordable
capabilities to the warfighter. The updated policy addresses combatant
commanders' Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and Joint Emergent
Operational Needs (JEONs), improving the Department's agility and
efficiency in meeting the most urgent warfighter needs in current and
future contingency operations. JROC review of analysis of alternatives
results prior to Milestone A, and of Capabilities Development Documents
(CDDs) prior to Milestone B, facilitate contracting activities before
Technology Development and Engineering and Manufacturing Development
acquisition phases. Lastly, new JCIDS limitations on length of Initial,
Development, and Production Capability Documents reduce the often
redundant administrative burden on program managers that has lengthened
process timelines of systems acquisition and focuses the JROC on the
most important requirements for a program.
Question. In your view, has the JROC been effectively drawing and
using input from the systems engineering, cost analysis and program
planning, and budgeting communities as warranted, in its deliberations
regarding requirements associated with major systems acquisitions?
Answer. The updates to the JCIDS and JROC Charter place increased
emphasis on how the JROC executes its responsibilities to consider
cost, schedule, and performance of programs and identified
alternatives. The AT&L staff has been working to help lay the
groundwork for active collaboration among Joint Staff, Military
Departments, combatant commanders (COCOMs), Cost Analysis and Program
Evaluation (CAPE), and AT&L in analysis of how requirements
alternatives drive cost, schedule, and performance. Some of these
process changes are newly implemented, but I believe they provide a
framework for success if effectively executed. I have also increased my
personal participation in the JROC process in order to ensure that
these considerations are taken into account during the deliberations
over requirements. I believe this is having a significant impact. If
confirmed, I will continue this practice.
concurrency
Question. Some of the Department's largest and most troubled
acquisition programs appear to have suffered significantly from
excessive concurrency--the effort to produce a weapon system, even as
it is still being designed.
What impact do you believe that such excessive concurrency has on
our efforts to produce major weapon systems on schedule and on budget?
Answer. Excessive concurrency can drive cost growth and result in
major schedule disruptions that produce further inefficiency. The
acceptable degree of concurrency between development and production
depends on a range of factors including the risk associated with the
development phase, the urgency of the need, and the likely impact on
cost and schedule of realizing that risk. A careful balance must be
struck on every program, taking all these factors and others into
account. If confirmed I will continue to work to ensure that balance is
carefully assessed and properly managed.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address this
issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that the risk/benefit of
any given degree of concurrent production and development is carefully
assessed before program plans are approved and before production
decisions are made. I will ensure that major weapons systems program
plans have clearly articulated and justified framing assumptions
underlying concurrency risks and track progress against these
assumptions. I will continue to require programs to reassess levels of
planned concurrent production as necessary if these underlying
assumptions change.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that it
is useful and appropriate to require prime contractors on major defense
acquisition programs share in concurrency costs?
Answer. In most circumstances, the Government will bear the bulk of
concurrency risk. When the Government initiates production before
development is complete, the Government can use cost plus contracts
that cover concurrency risk or a fixed-price vehicle that excludes
concurrency costs from the contracted deliverable. The first four lots
of JSF, an example of an unusually highly concurrent program, used
these approaches so that the government bore almost all concurrency
costs. In general, I believe that industry should not be asked to bear
excessive risk. At some point, however, the concurrency risk in a
program should be reduced to the extent that industry can reasonably
bear a portion or all of that risk, as is the case with JSF Lot 5. If
industry is then unwilling to accept this risk as a reasonable part of
doing business, then the risk may be too excessive to contract for
continued production. In a well-structured program this situation
should not occur.
Question. In your view, would a requirement for such cost sharing
reduce the likelihood of excessive concurrency in the development and
production of major weapon systems?
Answer. The Government usually controls the structure of the
program and determines when to start production. If the concurrency
risk is excessive, then the Government should usually wait until it is
reduced before starting production. If the urgency of acquiring the
product dictates accepting high concurrency risk, then in general the
Government should bear it. Cost sharing arrangements do not change the
existence of the risk, however if industry is unwilling to accept some
concurrency risk as a condition of a production contract, this would be
an indication that the risk may still be high.
joint strike fighter
Question. You were recently quoted as saying that it was
``acquisition malpractice'' to place the Joint Strike Fighter into
production years before the first flight test.
Does this quote accurately reflect your views?
Answer. Yes. The context of this remark was specifically in
reference to the decision made to enter into production of the Joint
Strike Fighter prior to the initiation of flight test. This decision
was a clear departure from well-established principles of sound program
management. It is important to note that this judgment does not extend
to the JSF program as a whole. The Department remains committed to the
JSF program and I believe the program, if appropriately managed, will
allow the Department to acquire a critical capability at an acceptable
cost. My comment was also not an indictment of any individual, but of
the systemic problem of allowing optimism and the presence of funding
in the budget to over-rule sound program management practices.
Question. What steps if any do you believe that we can take now to
address any problems or deficiencies that may have developed as a
result of excessive concurrency on the Joint Strike Fighter program?
Answer. I believe that the Department has taken appropriate steps
to address concurrency risk on the F-35 program by maintaining
production at a fixed rate for the next 2 years as the design
stabilizes and is validated by flight testing. The most recently
awarded production contract is structured to ensure Lockheed Martin
shares the cost of concurrency risk and incentivizes Lockheed Martin to
quickly identify and implement solutions to deficiencies identified
during testing. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate concurrency
risk to ensure that there is a prudent balance between concurrency risk
and efficient production.
Question. What steps if any do you believe we should take to avoid
similar problems in future acquisition programs?
Answer. It is my understanding that the level of concurrency in the
JSF program was established based on an expectation that our modeling
and simulation capabilities would allow us to reduce the amount of
discovery in flight test compared to our historical experience with
similar programs. This assumption proved unrealistic, and I believe our
experience on the JSF program should lead us to pursue acquisition
strategies based on sounder program management practices. There is a
bias toward optimism in our program planning that needs to be
counteracted by experienced professional leadership. This can be a
difficult balance, however as too much risk aversion can also lead to
problems including extended schedules and increased cost in programs.
Question. The Department recently completed a special ``quick
look'' study on the progress of the Joint Strike Fighter program.
What is your understanding of the key findings of the ``quick
look'' study?
Answer. I chartered the F-35 Quick-Look Review to determine if
there was sufficient confidence in the stability of the basic F-35
design to justify additional concurrent procurement. The review team,
comprised of technical and program management experts from the AT&L
staff, did not find any fundamental design risks sufficient to preclude
further production. The team did identify several sources of design
risk that warranted reexamining production plans and carefully
monitoring of program progress going forward.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take on the Joint Strike Fighter program to address the findings of the
study?
Answer. The Department has already taken the appropriate steps to
address the findings of this study. Maintaining production at lower
than planned rates as the design stabilizes and is validated by
developmental flight testing avoids excessive concurrency costs. There
are now financial incentives to Lockheed Martin to rapidly identify
effective solutions to design discrepancies discovered during flight
test and to shorten the timelines for implementation of needed changes
during production. The Department is moving to an event-based
relationship between production and progress on the development
program. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor the program closely
and will intervene if the program does not execute to plan.
Question. What lessons from this study, if any, do you believe that
the Department should learn and apply to other programs?
Answer. The Department learned that while engineering design tools
have advanced remarkably in the information age, they have not replaced
the need for careful developmental testing of complex military systems.
Authorizing production before sufficient progress had been made in
flight-testing to provide confidence in the design incurred excessive
concurrency risk for the program as design deficiencies were identified
after production aircraft had been ordered and delivered. A more
general lesson, and a systemic problem, is the bias toward spending
appropriated funds whether it is a sound management and business
decision to do so or not.
Question. Do you believe that the ``quick look'' approach is a
model that should be repeated for other programs, or should the
Department's established processes be sufficient to identify problems
and opportunities in ongoing programs without the need for such special
reviews?
Answer. Yes, I believe the Quick-Look approach can and should be
repeated on other programs. The F-35 Quick-Look Review relied on the
technical expertise and engineering judgment of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Systems Engineering, the DASD for
Developmental Test and Evaluation, and the Director for Strategic and
Tactical Systems, supplemented by other subject-matter experts from the
Service Technical Centers and the OSD staff. Their programmatic
expertise and authority on the F-35 program derived directly from their
oversight roles within the Department's established processes. Although
the Department frequently requests technical advice and assistance from
external subject matter experts, conducting timely, focused internal
reviews of critical acquisition issues does provide the Department a
valuable tool for responsively analyzing and resolving rapidly emerging
programmatic issues. I do not regard this mechanism as a deviation from
established processes, but as an adjunct to those processes. It was
triggered in part by a report from the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, which was a part of the Department's normal processes.
fixed price-type contracts
Question. Recent congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to
reduce technical and performance risks associated with developing and
producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use
of cost-reimbursable contracts.
Do you think that the Department should move towards more fixed
price-type contracting in developing or procuring major defense
acquisition programs? Why or why not?
Answer. While I think greater use of fixed-price vehicles,
particularly in early production, is warranted, I do not believe that
the Department should be restricted in the available contract types
because of the wide variety of situations faced by the Department. In
general, I believe that the move to increased use of fixed-price
contracting that Dr. Carter and I initiated in the Better Buying Power
initiatives was a sound decision. Increased use of fixed price
incentive fee contracting in early production has particularly high
potential to improve outcomes. I am less enthusiastic about fixed price
development because of my experiences with this approach in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, there are instances when fixed
price development is the best approach. The AF tanker program is a good
example. In this case the guidelines I would use for fixed price
development were all present: (1) the requirements were firm; (2) the
technical risk was low; (3) the expected bidders had the expertise and
experience to bid rationally and to execute successfully; (4) the
expected bidders had the financial capacity to absorb any reasonable
overruns; and (5) they had a business case that would motivate them to
do so. If any of these elements were not present, I would seriously
consider whether a cost plus development approach was the best option.
Many of our development programs do entail cost risk that may exceed
industry's capacity and willingness to absorb losses. In many cases,
the Department is reaching for unprecedented levels of performance in
advanced designs. No amount of risk reduction can completely remove all
the risk from next generation designs and the government may need
flexibility to work closely with the contractor to adjust requirements
as knowledge increases during development. In some cases, operational
urgency makes long risk reduction programs prior to development for
production unacceptable. The bottom-line is that there is a range of
contract types for good reasons.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the Department to use a cost-type contract for the
production of a major weapon system?
Answer. I believe those circumstances should be limited, but they
will sometimes occur. For the production of a major weapon system, I
would consider a cost type contract in those circumstances where the
system design and/or the state of production has not yet matured to the
point where reliable cost outcomes can be projected. This situation can
occur, for example, in production of new design first articles in
commodities like satellites and ships. It can also occur when there is
great schedule urgency, due to an operational situation or an
intelligence surprise, which precludes taking time for risk reduction
and design maturation. In these cases, higher degrees of risk and
concurrency are warranted with concomitant risk in production costs and
even feasibility that it may not be reasonable to ask industry to
assume. Most production, certainly the production beyond low rate
initial production, should be contracted for on a fixed price basis. I
have continued to support the emphasis that Dr. Carter and I placed on
the use of fixed price incentive fee contracts during low rate
production. These vehicles cap the government's liability, while
allowing some flexibility for cost uncertainty and providing a strong
incentive for industry to control costs. They also provide the
government with good visibility into contractor actual costs.
Question. In a recent presentation at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, you were quoted as stating that ``The data says
it doesn't make much difference'' whether the Department uses fixed-
price or cost-plus contracts for low-rate initial production contracts.
Does this quote accurately reflect your views?
Answer. I was not expressing a view. The quote reflects what the
data suggests. The data is incomplete and needs greater study. I was
making the point that our acquisition policies need to be data driven
whenever possible, not just intuitive. I have seen several swings of
the pendulum with regard to perceived best practices in acquisition.
Usually the current conventional wisdom is based more on intuition and
what seems to have not worked recently, than on an analysis of the
historic data on program outcomes.
Question. What data were you relying on in making this statement?
Answer. This statement was based on an examination of earned-value
data on the actual performance of 440 historical, large, early-stage
production contracts for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).
These data were reported between January 1970 and December 2011. They
are available in the Defense Acquisition Management Information
Retrieval system (DAMIR) and its predecessor, the Consolidated
Acquisition Reporting System (CARS).
Question. What conclusions if any have you reached about the way
the Department should contract for low-rate initial production of major
weapon systems?
Answer. No single contract type works best in all cases for low-
rate initial production of major weapon systems and each situation has
to be carefully evaluated to determine the best approach for that
situation. In cases where risk has not been or cannot be adequately
reduced (due to urgency or the technical feasibility of reducing risk
without building a production asset) a cost plus vehicle may be
appropriate. A fixed-price incentive firm (FPIF) or cost-reimbursable
contract may also be appropriate when the incentive structure is
properly designed and tied to desired performance over the anticipated
risk range. Alternatively, firm-fixed price (FFP) contracts may be
appropriate for low-rate initial production in cases where there is
little risk and the production processes and costs are well understood.
technology transition
Question. The Department continues to struggle with the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with
moving technologies from DOD programs or other sources rapidly into the
hands of operational users.
What impediments to technology transition do you see within the
Department?
Answer. The impediments I see include the formality and rigidity
associated with Programs of Record, inflexibility in the requirements
process, the length of time it takes to obtain programmed funds, the
difficulties associated with reprogramming funds, and the difficulties
small businesses and non-defense companies have in doing business under
Federal Acquisition Regulation they may not be familiar with.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance
the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?
Answer. There are a number of activities under way in the
Department to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition. If
confirmed I will continue to support these initiatives and look for
other opportunities to enhance technology transition. The rapid
acquisition programs that the Department has initiated to support
ongoing operations have been very successful at acquiring new
technologies and fielding them quickly. The Department needs to
institutionalize this process so that future urgent needs can also be
met effectively. DOD is in the process of expanding the rapid
acquisition of Joint Urgent Operational Needs from primarily off the
shelf technology to those that require some limited development time
and may not be directly associated with ongoing operations. The
Department is expanding it's out-reach to small businesses, including,
with Congress' support, reinvigorating the mentor protege program which
aligns traditional defense firms with small businesses trying to break
into the defense markets. Under the Better Buying Power initiatives,
the Department has taken steps to improve communication between
government and industry about both government funded R&D priorities and
company funded internal research and development (IR&D). The Army has
initiated a program that allows firms to demonstrate their networking
technologies and qualify for competitive awards. The Air Force is
taking steps to allow advanced technology space launch firms to compete
with traditional firms. All the Services are emphasizing open systems
and open architectures as a means of permitting new technologies to be
inserted into existing programs. These are just examples of the types
of steps the Department needs to take to improve technology transition.
Question. What can be done from a budget, policy, and
organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies
from science and technology programs and other sources, including small
businesses, venture capital funded companies, and other non-traditional
defense contractors, into acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that it is important that the Department tap into
as great a range of sources of technology as possible. This includes
commercial technology, small business, and traditional defense
companies. By adopting open standards that keep pace with technology,
the Department can tap into commercial technology, particularly in
information systems. Small businesses, including non-traditional
defense contractors are a critical source of innovation. Initiatives to
increase small business participation in defense programs include
reinvigorating the mentor protege program; lowering barriers to
participation in the Small Business Innovation Research program such as
restrictions on venture capital ownership; and expansion of some small
business size restrictions. The Department has increased its efforts to
stimulate and leverage independent research and development (IR&D) with
new practices to improve communication with industry on Department
priorities and ensuring Department science and technology and
acquisition program managers are aware of the technology developments
in IR&D projects. If confirmed, I will continue and expand the
Departments efforts to reach out to and support all of these sources of
technology and find ways to reduce barriers to entry for the sources of
new technology.
Where Congress has seen fit to provide funds for innovation beyond
the level that the Department requested, the Department has acted
promptly to execute those funds and if confirmed I will continue that
practice. For example, the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 and
the Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Appropriations Act included provisions for
the establishment of the Defense Research and Development Rapid
Innovation Fund (RIF). This program emphasizes rapid, responsive
acquisition and engagement of small, innovative businesses in solving
defense problems using a fully merit-based, competitive proposal
process. The Department is in the process of awarding the initial
contracts under the Rapid Innovation Fund.
Our Office of Small Business Programs is also working with the
Small Business Administration to implement the fiscal year 2012
reauthorization of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and
Small Business Technology Transfer programs. Two provisions within this
reauthorization will facilitate transition of technology. The first is
the Commercialization Readiness Program for DOD that directs DOD to
establish goals for increasing transition of SBIR developed technology
into fielded programs or programs of record, and provides for the use
of incentives for program managers and prime contractors to meet these
goals. The second is the provision to allow limited participation by
small business firms that are owned in majority part by multiple
venture operating companies, hedge funds or private equity firms. This
action is intended to induce additional venture capital, hedge fund, or
private equity firm funding of small business innovation.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's science and
technology organizations have the ability and the resources to carry
technologies to higher levels of maturity before handing them off to
acquisition programs?
Answer. In general, I believe that the Department's S&T (Budget
Activities 1-3) organizations collectively have the ability and
adequate resources to carry technologies forward to the pre-production
prototyping stage at Budget Activity 4, which may or may not be a
formal acquisition program. Technological superiority underpins the
Department's strategy and if confirmed, I will continue to monitor the
balance of S&T and R&D investments to ensure a proper balance and that
the S&T activities have adequate capacity and resources.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take to ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce
technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be
demonstrated at the appropriate time?
Answer. As I have stated in previous testimony, I believe
technologies (that are necessary or desirable to meet proposed
acquisition program needs) should be identified early and that specific
maturation programs should be defined and agreed to by the S&T and
development communities. Technology maturation programs should also be
collaboratively managed. Within specific programs, this is based in
part on the Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) process, which
assesses the technological maturity of critical technology elements
enabling systems performance, and the program manager's technology
maturation strategies. The Milestone decision process ensures these
strategies are adequately funded and determines exit criteria for
demonstrating technical progress before the commitment to investments
in development or production.
Question. What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and
Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Department's efforts
to enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in
acquisition programs?
Answer. Technology and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (TRLs and
MRLs) are tools for gauging the maturity of technologies that might be
adopted by an acquisition program to meet cost or performance goals or
to achieve desired production capabilities. They provide an indicator
of the degree of risk remaining in a program. I believe they are
valuable benchmarks against which to assess program risk, but I also
believe that TRLs and MRLs alone are not conclusive about whether a
program should proceed to development and production or not. One has to
look behind these labels to understand the actual risk associated with
a technology and the steps that could be taken to mitigate that risk.
If confirmed, I will continue to use TRLs and MRLs, but I will also
continue to insist on thorough professional assessments of risk that go
beyond the use of these benchmarks.
Question. Section 253 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 required the
Department to report to Congress by no later than October 1, 2009, on
the feasibility and advisability of various approaches to technology
transition. The Department has not yet complied with this requirement.
When can the committee expect to receive the report required by
section 209?
Answer. It will be delivered by April 6, 2012.
Question. Section 1073 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 established
a competitive, merit-based rapid innovation fund to accelerate the
fielding of technologies developed pursuant to SBIR projects,
technologies developed by the defense laboratories, and other
innovative technologies.
What is your view of the rapid innovation fund established by
section 1073?
Answer. In September 2011, the Department issued solicitations for
Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) proposals and received over 3,500
responses. I anticipate that approximately 160-180 of the responses
will receive contract awards. My view is it is too early to determine
the RIF's overall impact. Our implementation processes were successful
in obtaining proposals, primarily from small businesses. However,
contract awards should not be the sole criteria for success. I believe
it will take at least 2 or 3 years before one can objectively assess
the effectiveness of RIF in achieving the goal of accelerating the
transition of innovative capabilities into Department programs.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's plans for
the funds previously authorized and appropriated to the fund, but not
yet expended?
Answer. The fiscal year 2011 program value for the RIF is $496.1
million of which $436.4 million are RDT&E funds, and $59.7 million are
procurement funds. My understanding is that the Department is on track
to obligate all of the $436.4 million RDT&E funds prior to September
30, 2012 for contract awards to proposals.
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations
Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance
expectations. Section 201 of WSARA seeks to address this problem by
promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs.
Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition,
budget and requirements communities in DOD can help ensure more
realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure such communication?
Answer. I have, and if confirmed will continue to stress the need
for earlier communication among the requirements, budget and
acquisition communities to enable more informed decisions on cost,
schedule, and performance trades from the beginning of requirements
development throughout the acquisition lifecycle. If confirmed, I will
continue to take steps to forge closer ties between military needs and
acquisition solution development in the services and in the Department
overall. I regularly participate in the JROC where cost-informed and
technologically sound decisions can yield savings in time and resources
for acquisition programs. I have directed AT&L staff elements to engage
with the Joint Staff early in the process of validating joint
requirements to assist with assessment of candidate needs against
existing capability portfolios. I strongly support Configuration
Steering Boards and other forums in which requirements, budgeting, and
acquisition communities work together to reach better solutions to our
warfighters needs.
Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition
and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule,
and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.
Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development
can help improve the performance of the Department's major acquisition
programs?
Answer. Yes. While not a silver bullet, incremental development can
play a significant role in the development of major acquisition
programs. The Department applies the term ``incremental'' to both the
incremental and spiral acquisition approaches. In particular, an
incremental approach could be the right strategy when the program
manager is faced with an evolving requirement, an evolving threat, or
where an investment in an immature technology is needed to achieve a
longer-term advantage. In this last case, fielding a capable, call it
an ``80 percent solution'' now, with an eye to incorporating the new
technology when it is ready later, is a good strategy. In all these
instances, getting a capability into the warfighters' hands sooner,
then upgrading to a more capable system can be a smart business
approach, and better serve our troops.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's use of
incremental acquisition and spiral development?
Answer. If implemented correctly, there is little additional
technical risk to using an incremental strategy. There are upfront
costs associated with an open design that can accommodate incremental
upgrades. Part of the trade off for lowering the initial technical risk
is the necessity in such a strategy to incorporate an intentional plan
that allows for upgrading early deliveries to the final configuration
or cutting changes into the production line. The additional cost and
complexity for these upgrades is an important consideration that must
be factored into the overall plan for an incremental approach. Smart
use of open architecture and commercial standards, careful management
of intellectual property rights, and well defined form, fit, and
function interfaces are important to being able to upgrade systems more
easily at a reasonable cost.
Question. In your view, has the Department's approach to
incremental acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or
why not?
Answer. The department applies the term ``incremental'' to both the
incremental and spiral acquisition approaches. The Department's success
has been mixed. I believe the Department has been more successful in
producing open designs that can accommodate uncertain new technology
than in preplanned future spirals. Success depends upon the degree of
technical risk or requirements instability and whether the program
management and oversight structures are responsive to the needs of
these strategies. No approach to acquisition is right for all
circumstances but incremental acquisition strategies that enable
multiple block upgrades can provide the Department with a useful
flexibility and efficient improvements in capability.
Question. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure
that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can
accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?
Answer. I do not believe that additional steps are required. Under
our current acquisition policy, each increment of capability requires
approved/achievable requirements, full funding for the increment and a
test plan designed to assess the capability the increment is expected
to provide. Affordability constraints are being implemented, and I
believe that these constraints will discipline the requirements process
to realistic initial capabilities that may be improved in future
increments. In short, the Department's policies are designed to support
an incremental acquisition approach in those cases where it is the most
appropriate strategy.
Question. How should the Department ensure that the incremental
acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines
against which to measure performance?
Answer. Current department acquisition policy requires each program
increment to have an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) that specifies
the cost, schedule, and performance against which the program increment
will be measured. The APB is approved by the Milestone Decision
Authority (MDA) and cannot be altered without MDA approval. In a multi-
increment program, each increment must have its own MDA-approved
baseline.
major shipbuilding programs
Question. Recent estimates indicate that the new nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) will cost over $12 billion,
exceeding the legislatively-imposed cost-cap by as much as a $500
million. It appears that cost growth in this ship is attributable to,
among other things, inaccurate assumptions in the cost of materials
made when much of the ship's design was immature and unforeseen labor
issues encountered with new design features.
How confident are you that the Navy can effectively control the
cost to build the CVN-78 in particular and other major shipbuilding
programs in general?
Answer. The Navy has worked aggressively with the contractor to get
CVN-78 costs under control. I believe the Navy currently has a solid
understanding of CVN-78 costs; however, the Navy will not be able to
complete the ship within the cost cap. Although there has been
substantial cost growth, there are reasons to be hopeful that costs are
now under control:
The ship design is now more than 90 percent complete
and the design is fully on contract;
Shipbuilder cost performance on current work is
improving;
Material cost estimates are mature; and
The Navy is implementing should cost targets
throughout the supply chain including for government furnished
material.
In general, I see activities in the Navy that focus on cost-
consciousness at all levels, government and industry, including major
shipbuilding programs.
Question. What do you see as the major factors contributing to the
Navy's continuing difficulty in effectively managing the cost of
building its largest ships?
Answer. At this point, I see the following three major factors
contributing to cost growth:
CVN-78 is a lead ship, and as a consequence, there was
greater uncertainty about cost than with established programs;
CVN-78 had an incomplete design at contract award; and
The program involved concurrent development of major
ship systems such as the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching
System, the Advanced Arresting Gear, and the Dual Band Radar.
In summary, the scope and complexity of the program were
underestimated.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address these
causal factors?
Answer. For CVN-78 and follow-on Ford-class ships, achieving full
design maturity for the ship and its major systems is the key to
addressing the causal factors of cost growth. In addition, aggressive
should cost management of the ship and subsystem contracts is required
to identify and eliminate unnecessary cost in the transition to follow-
on ships.
funding and requirements stability
Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition
programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and
requirements. In the past, DOD has attempted to provide greater funding
stability through the use of multiyear contracts. More recently, the
Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting
Configuration Steering Boards to exercise control over any changes to
requirements that would increase program costs.
Do you support the use of Configuration Steering Boards to increase
requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I support activities such as Configuration Steering Boards
that provide Service leadership a forum to review proposed changes to
program requirements or system configuration and preclude adverse
impact on program cost and/or schedule. Configuration Steering Boards
are entirely consistent with the Better Buying Power initiatives that
seek to target affordability and control cost growth. If confirmed, I
will continue to emphasize the importance of Configuration Steering
Boards and ensure they are contributing to requirements stability and
cost control as intended.
Question. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to
increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that it is incumbent on the acquisition community
to work with the requirements and resource communities to ensure
programs have clear, achievable requirements and realistic funding
profiles. The acquisition community must bring its technical expertise
to the discussion of requirements and funding throughout the
acquisition progress to enable requirements and funding profiles that
are inherently stable because they are realistic and affordable.
time-certain development
Question. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA)
panel recommended in 2006 that the Department set fixed durations for
program phases, including a requirement for the delivery of the first
unit of a major weapon system to operational forces within 6 years of
the Milestone A decision. The DAPA panel believed that durations for
program phases could be limited by ensuring appropriate levels of
technological maturity, defined risk-reduction horizons, and program
execution criteria, while allowing for the use of spiral development or
block upgrades for enhancements in capability or increased requirements
over time. Proponents of this approach, called time-certain
development, have highlighted its potential for helping ensure that
evolutionary (or knowledge-based) acquisition strategies are used to
develop major systems by forcing more manageable commitments to
discrete increments of capability and stabilize funding by making costs
and schedules more predictable.
What is your view of the DAPA panel's recommendation?
Answer. The DAPA panel identified several key ways to improve the
DOD acquisition process. Many of these findings--knowledge based
acquisition, reducing non-value added oversight, improving coordination
with the requirements process - have been incorporated into the Better
Buying Power initiatives put in place in 2010. The Department is seeing
positive results from these efforts.
Question. What is your view of time-certain development as an
acquisition strategy for major weapons systems development programs?
Answer. Time really is money, and prolonged extended development
schedules that span multiple technology refresh cycles are inherently
inefficient. This is not a silver bullet, however, and I believe
placing arbitrary time limits on programs as a general approach would
not be a smart strategy. I have worked, and if confirmed would continue
to work to establish realistic program timelines and make sure thorough
planning has been done upfront. Where it makes sense, I have also
continued to emphasize the need to deliver the ``80 percent solution''
to the warfighter more quickly in less-risky and more cost effective
ways, using an approach based on open systems and open architectures to
meet the evolving requirements over time. In the more general case,
program managers who do good up-front planning have a thorough
understanding of the requirements, the technology, and industry
capability can create an acquisition strategy that is both achievable
in a reasonable time and affordable. The idea behind time-certain
development programs is to force programs to adopt proven, lower-risk
technologies, shorter engineering development, and less replanning and
rework after a program starts. Sometimes this is the right approach.
The purpose of a program, however, is to deliver a fielded capability
that meets the user's needs. The best way to control program duration
is to control the requirements, both initially and over the development
cycle. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
requirements community, particularly the JROC, to ensure that
requirements can be met in a reasonable time, are technically feasible,
and are affordable.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
implement time-certain development strategies in the future acquisition
programs?
Answer. I agree that program duration should be controlled, but the
best approach to doing so is to limit requirements to those that can be
achieved in a reasonable timeframe, where this makes sense. Once
requirements are set, a development program should be structured to be
as efficient as possible in preparing the product that meets those
requirements to enter production. The emphasis during development
should also be on controlling the costs of production and sustainment,
which are the real drivers of most program's life cycle costs. Software
intensive programs including business systems, command and control
systems, and large scale embedded software programs for weapons systems
should be structured in relatively short (nominally 1 year) increments
as a way of forcing detailed planning, manageable work packages, and
disciplined development.
military space procurement policy
Question. DOD, the Intelligence Community, NASA, and other
Government agencies rely on commercial domestic launch service
providers to place spacecraft and satellites into and beyond orbit. The
Government plans to spend at least $15 billion on launch services from
fiscal year 2013 through 2017, and launch costs are expected to rise.
The Department is in the midst of implementing a revised launch vehicle
acquisition strategy.
What steps do you believe the Department should take to:
Answer.
a. Keep launch costs from continuing to spiral upwards?
I believe that introducing more competition for launch as soon as
feasible is the key to controlling launch costs. The Air Force is
taking steps to determine and understand the root causes behind the
upward spiral of costs and to attack the high overhead costs the
Department is currently paying. The current efforts take the form of a
dual prong approach that: (1) implements a block-buy acquisition
strategy to purchase economic order quantities; and (2) provides a path
to qualification of new entrants into the National Security Space (NSS)
launch market. As required in the 2012 NDAA, I have acted to reinstate
the evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) as a major defense
acquisition program (MDAP) not in sustainment so that there will be
greater visibility into the programs status. If confirmed I will work
with the Air Force to ensure that reduction of launch costs is a high
priority and that these initiatives are carried out.
b. Introduce new entrants, where they are available, to the launch
industry while maintaining the Nation's unprecedented high level of
launch successes?
Competition will be a key component to reducing and promoting
reduced launch costs and the key to creating competition is allowing
new entrants into the market without sacrificing safety and
reliability. Implementing the recently developed AF-NRO-NASA
coordinated strategy for certifying new entrants and the subsequent AF
New Entrant Certification Guide, which provides a risk-managed approach
for introducing new-entrant launch companies to the NSS market for
EELV-class missions, are important next steps. However, throughout the
process of introducing new entrants, the Department can not sacrifice
safety and must continue to maintain mission success rates.
c. Enable the U.S. launch industry to be more competitive on the
world market?
I believe several steps could be taken to promote U.S. competition
in the world market. First, there is a need to consider possible
reclassification of selected launch capabilities under the
International Trafficking in Arms Regulation (ITAR). The Department
should also explore developing and implementing policy to make it
easier for commercial space enterprises to use DOD launch bases/ranges
for commercial missions. This would make domestic launch providers more
competitive commercially, because they would be able to employ existing
capital infrastructure at our DOD launch facilities and ranges. Of
course, this would require the Department to determine ways for these
commercial companies to pay their fair share of the cost of
modernizing, operating, and maintaining these facilities. Such a
partnership could be a win-win situation, but would have to be designed
and executed on a non-interference basis with national security
missions.
Question. GAO has found that there is a continuing, severe
disconnect between satellite development programs and the development
of ground control systems and receivers. For example, new Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellites are expected to be in orbit nearly
a decade without the ships, aircraft, and other weapon systems being
able to take full advantage of them. Given that some satellites now
cost well over $1 billion each to develop and launch, the implications
of insufficiently aligning the Department's space and ground
requirements are very significant.
Do you agree with GAO's assessment of this issue?
Answer. I agree with the GAO that there are timing disconnects in
some of our space acquisitions between the satellites, ground control,
and user equipment.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
address this disconnect?
Answer. Most of the situations the Department faces today with
satellite, ground control, and user system disconnects leave the
Department with little flexibility. These situations came about largely
because one element of the system was delayed due to technical
difficulties or funding shortfalls and got out of synchronization with
the others. Disconnects can occur with any of the system elements, but
the most frequent situation is for satellites to be ready before user
equipment is ready. This problem exists with the mobile user objective
system (MUOS) and the family of advanced beyond line-of-sight terminals
(FAB-T), and with GPS III, depending on how the user equipment
progresses. The only solution to the problem is to set up realistic
coordinated schedules at the outset, design in as much flexibility as
possible, and then monitor progress closely and make adjustments early
before the disconnects grow out of control. For the programs that are
well under way and in which these disconnects already exist, I have
taken action on a case-by-case basis to address the situation. On MUOS,
I have worked with industry and the two program offices involved (JTRS
and MUOS) to achieve improved execution performance. I have insisted on
a single end-to-end lead, the Navy, for the entire MUOS effort and the
integrated Navy/JTRS team is being assessed on a regular basis to
insure the product set and delivery time are optimized. For FAB-T, I
have directed the initiation of an alternative source for the most
critical terminals. I am reviewing the three GPS program segments as an
enterprise with all three segments, GPS III, OCX, and MGUE being
addressed simultaneously. If confirmed, I will continue these practices
and work to anticipate any emerging disconnects and address them as
early as possible.
multiyear contracts
Question. The statement of managers accompanying section 811 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major
defense systems under multiyear contracts as follows: ``The conferees
agree that `substantial savings' under section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10,
U.S.C., means savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of
carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that
multiyear contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at
less than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department
presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other
requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The conferees agree with
a Government Accountability Office finding that any major system that
is at the end of its production line is unlikely to meet these
standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multiyear
procurement contract.''
If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you anticipate
that you would support a multiyear contract with expected savings of
less than 10 percent?
Answer. The complexity of each situation makes a general answer
difficult. I believe that multiyear contracting can provide substantial
cost savings, and therefore it should be considered as an option to
serve best the warfighter and taxpayer. The total magnitude of the
savings that could be achieved and the firmness of the procurement plan
would be key considerations. I recently certified two multiyears for
shipbuilding programs that might not reach the 10 percent savings
threshold depending on how the baseline is calculated and how
successful the contract negotiations are. The circumstances that
motivated me to do so were my confidence in the Navy management team's
ability to negotiate the best possible price for the Department, the
certainty that the ships would be acquired, and the knowledge that if
an acceptable price could not be negotiated that the Department would
not execute a multiyear.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you
support a multiyear contract for a major system at the end of its
production line?
Answer. It may be appropriate in some circumstances to consider a
program for multiyear procurement when it is nearing the end of
production. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular
procurement. The total magnitude of the savings that could be achieved
and the firmness of the procurement plan would be key considerations.
Analysis and careful review of all information should be completed
whenever a multiyear contract is being considered.
Question. What are your views on multiyear procurements? Under what
circumstances do you believe they should be used?
Answer. In general, I favor multiyear procurement strategies if
they provide substantial savings and if there is a firm commitment to
the planned procurement. I believe that multiyear procurements can
offer substantial savings through improved economies in production
processes, better use of industrial facilities, and a reduction in the
administrative burden in the placement and administration of contracts.
The potential for multiyear procurement can be a powerful incentive to
suppliers to reduce cost and negotiated price but it also has the
disadvantage of reducing the Government's flexibility during the years
the strategy is being executed. There are a number of criteria to
consider in deciding whether a program should be considered for
multiyear procurement. Among them are: savings when compared to the
annual contracting methods; validity and stability of the mission need;
stability of the funding; stability of the configuration; associated
technical risks; degree of confidence in estimates of both contract
costs and anticipated savings; and promotion of national security.
Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that
constitute ``substantial savings'' for purposes of the defense
multiyear procurement statute, title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. There has been much debate over the threshold on the level
of cost savings that constitutes ``substantial savings.'' In my view,
the 10 percent figure cited in the conference manager's statement is a
reasonable benchmark, but it should not be an absolute criteria. The
Department needs to ensure that the savings achieved from multiyear
contracts are substantial, not only in terms of the relative difference
in price that the Department would otherwise pay for an annual
procurement, but also in terms of the total dollars saved. But I also
understand that placing an absolute minimum threshold on substantial
savings could unnecessarily limit the contracting options available.
The merits of any single multiyear procurement should be evaluated
based upon the circumstances of each particular proposed program being
considered for multiyear procurement.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a
multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that
have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost,
scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply
with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute,
title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. Multiyears should be pursued when they are in the best
interest of the government. However, in the circumstances set out in
the question, the degree of scrutiny should be greater than in other
cases. Additional analysis and careful review of all information should
be completed whenever a multiyear contract is being considered for use
in procuring weapon systems that have shown unsatisfactory program
histories, but which otherwise comply with the statutory requirements.
It is particularly important in a situation like this that the reasons
for unsatisfactory history are understood and that those reasons have
been addressed. If a supplier were deemed to have a high likelihood of
failure to perform and default due to overruns, then a multiyear would
not be in the Government's interest.
Question. How would you analyze and evaluate proposals for
multiyear procurement for such programs?
Answer. The Department would need to examine all risk factors in
conjunction with the potential for cost savings to determine if
multiyear procurement would be appropriate for a program with an
unsatisfactory history. If confirmed, I will ensure analysis and
evaluation of proposals for multiyear procurements are in accordance
with all statutory and regulatory requirements, and I will ensure that
the Department fully understands the benefit to the warfighter and
taxpayer to proceed with a multiyear procurement for a program that has
an unsatisfactory history.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in
determining whether procuring such a system under a multiyear contract,
is appropriate and should be proposed to Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all of the regulatory and
statutory requirements are met before proceeding with any multiyear
procurement. I would also ensure that all risk factors had been
carefully analyzed and considered.
Question. What is the impact of the Department's current budget
situation, in your view, on the feasibility and advisability of
additional multiyear procurement contracts for major weapon systems?
Answer. I believe that the current budget environment increases the
inherent value that the stability of multiyear procurement contracts
provides to industry, giving the Department the opportunity to enter
into such agreements on favorable terms. However, this opportunity must
be balanced against the fact that multiyear contracts encumber
budgetary resources over multiple years and with our current budget
constraints, the Department must be judicious in the extent to which it
enters into such contracts. Above all, there must be a firm commitment
to the entirety of the multiyear so that even if additional budget
reductions are necessary the products being procured under multiyear
arrangements will have a higher funding priority than other programs
that would have to be reduced.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a
multiyear procurement?
Answer. If the Department has done its job properly and industry
has proposed responsibly, the cancellation of a multiyear contract
should be all but unheard of. There are very rare circumstances when it
could occur. One such event would be in the case of extremely deep and
unanticipated budget reductions that forced a fundamental reshaping of
Department priorities. Another possibility would be the surprise
emergence of a threat that rendered the program under contract
instantly obsolete. In these circumstances, cancellation or
renegotiation of a multiyear procurement could be appropriate or even
required. Finally, if a contractor were to default and be totally
unable to perform than the contract might have to be terminated so that
another supplier could be arranged for.
continuing competition and organizational conflicts of interest
Question. Section 202 of WSARA requires DOD to take steps to
promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition)
throughout the life of major defense acquisition programs.
What is your view on the utility of continuing competition as a
tool to achieve long-term innovation and cost savings on major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. In my view, there is no more effective tool to reduce
prices than competition. The Department should use direct competitive
acquisition strategies whenever possible. Utilizing competition in the
marketplace allows the Department to leverage innovation, S&T, design,
and drive efficiency through a program's lifecycle providing a stronger
return on investment. For this reason, the Department should strive to
use this model as much as possible in its programs. Under the Better
Buying Power initiatives, I have stressed the need for creating a
``competitive environment'' to the greatest extent possible in all our
programs. This can be done any number of ways, including component
breakout, initiation of a next generation concept or a program to
upgrade an existing alternative. In recent speeches, I have emphasized
that with ongoing budget reductions there is a competition within the
budget for funding in which poorly performing programs will not do
well. If confirmed, I will continue to stress creating a competitive
environment as one of the most effective ways the Department has of
controlling cost.
Question. Do you believe that such continuing competition is a
viable option on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that competition at both the prime and
subcontract level are the most powerful tools available to the
department to drive productivity and control cost. To ensure that
competition is emphasized during every phase of the acquisition
process, the Department has issued policy requiring our Program
Managers to present a competition strategy for their programs at each
program milestone. I personally review these strategies and would
continue to do so, if confirmed, for Major Defense Acquisition Programs
and would require Component Acquisition Executives to do the same for
programs under their cognizance.
Question. In your view, has the consolidation of the defense
industrial base gone too far and undermined competition for defense
contracts?
Answer. I believe that the consolidation witnessed throughout the
1990s has left us with a limited number of prime contractors for major
programs and that further consolidation at that level is probably not
in the Department's or the taxpayer's interest. I have said so publicly
on multiple occasions, as I believe it is important for industry to
understand the Department's views so that they can be taken into
account. That said, if confirmed, I would certainly review any proposed
business deal objectively on its merits. At the lower tiers, however, I
would expect to see an increased amount of activity in mergers and
acquisitions, and even consolidations to further streamline
capabilities and respond in a market-driven manner to the reduced
budgets anticipated over the coming decade. The Department will examine
these transactions carefully on a case-by-case basis to preserve
competition and facilitate the most efficient and effective industrial
base possible.
Question. If so, what steps if any can and should DOD take to
address this issue?
Answer. It is the Department's policy to allow market forces to
shape the market, but to oppose transactions that eliminate competition
and are not ultimately in the best interest of the Department and
taxpayer. The Department continues to discourage mergers and
acquisitions among defense materiel suppliers that are anti-competitive
or injurious to national security. Ultimately, however, the Department
is not an antitrust regulator and the ability for the DOJ and FTC to
intervene must meet statutory criteria. The Department has long-
established procedures to provide information and the support needed by
the antitrust regulators for their merger reviews. In areas where
consolidation has resulted in a loss of competition, the Department has
in the past encouraged new entrants or explored the use of alternative
capabilities.
Question. Section 203 of WSARA requires the use of competitive
prototypes for major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of
producing such prototypes would exceed the lifecycle benefits of
improved performance and increased technological and design maturity
that prototypes would achieve.
Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes, I support the use of competitive prototyping for major
defense acquisition programs. This can be an effective mechanism for
maturing technology, refining performance requirements, and improving
our understanding of how those requirements can drive systems
acquisition costs.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of
competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial?
Answer. This depends on the maturity of candidate technologies for
meeting the Department's requirements and in particular on the degree
of risk associated with integrating those technologies into a viable
product. When planned or proposed technology has implementation risk,
particularly in an integrated product, and has not been demonstrated
adequately, competitive prototyping during the technology development
phase works well as an element of a comprehensive technical risk
management process. Like all other risk reduction techniques,
competitive prototyping has to be considered on a case-by-case basis
and it has to reduce the risk of entering Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD). Competitive pre-EMD prototyping requires resources
and increases schedules. In short, there are costs and benefits to be
considered. Overall, however, it can reduce risk, sustain competition
further into the design process, reduce total program cost, and lead to
better products for our warfighters. This is particularly true in the
technology demonstration phase. The cost of competitive engineering and
manufacturing development phases is usually prohibitive.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such
prototypes is likely to outweigh the potential benefits?
Answer. In cases where the material solution is based on mature,
well understood technologies and demonstrated designs with little
integration risk, the additional costs of competitive prototyping are
unlikely to offset the potential reduction of system lifecycle costs.
Prototypes requiring very high investments with limited production runs
are also unlikely to meet this test; competitive prototyping of ships
and satellites is frequently cost-prohibitive, both in a technology
demonstration phase and in engineering and manufacturing development
phase. However, competitive prototyping of major subsystems can still
provide opportunities for reducing risk and driving down production and
sustainment costs.
Question. Section 207 of WSARA required the Department to
promulgate new regulations to address organizational conflicts of
interest on major defense acquisition programs.
What is your understanding of the steps the Department has taken to
implement section 207?
Answer. Section 207 of the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA) of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-23) required the Secretary of Defense to
revise the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(DFARS) to provide uniform guidance and tighten existing requirements
for organizational conflicts of interest by contractors in major
defense acquisition programs. The DFARS rule implementing WSARA was
published on December 29, 2010. This rule provided uniform guidance and
tightened existing requirements for organizational conflicts of
interest for DOD contracts. On April 26, 2011, a proposed change to FAR
subpart 9.5 relating to organizational conflicts of interest was
published, but this rule has not yet been finalized.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe DOD should
take to address organizational conflicts of interest in major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. The Department has already taken a number of steps, but at
this point in time the Department is working with other Federal
organizations on a final FAR rule that would guide the Department. The
Department and the other Federal agencies determined that, in general,
the coverage on organizational conflicts of interest included in the
Federal Acquisition Regulations needed broadening and a proposed rule
was published on April 26, 2011. The public comment period is now
closed and the FAR Acquisition Ethics and International Law Team,
including DOD membership, is evaluating public comments and developing
the final rule.
Furthermore, the Department's Panel on Contracting Integrity has
also reviewed the area of post-employment restrictions pursuant to
section 833 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84. The
purpose of the review was ``to determine if such policies adequately
protect the public interest without unreasonably limiting future
employment options of former DOD personnel'' in developing the revised
regulation. A matter the Panel considered was the extent that post-
employment restrictions ``protect the public interest by preventing
personal conflicts of interest and preventing former DOD officials from
exercising undue or inappropriate influence.'' The Panel completed its
report in December 2010 and as directed by section 833, the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) performed an independent
assessment of the Panel's report. NAPA completed its review in February
2012 and provided additional recommendations for post award
restrictions. The Panel will review the NAPA recommendations in 2012
and recommend the way forward.
I strongly support the Department's activities to remedy
organizational conflict of interest (OCI) issues in major weapons
systems to ensure that OCI issues are adequately reviewed and addressed
in developing acquisition strategies and source selections and defense-
related mergers.
Question. What are your views on the use of system engineering and
technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense
contractors to provide ``independent'' advice to the Department on the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. I believe that Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance
(SETA) support contractors are currently providing critical support to
the Department's acquisition workforce. However, I believe these
contractors must not be used to perform inherently governmental
functions and they must not be used in a situation where a conflict of
interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest would exist. At
this point, I do not believe that it would be wise, as some have
suggested, to create two totally separate classes of contractors
separated by a bright line; those that provide support to government
functions and those that provide products. Some of the Department's
support contractors need the experience, knowledge and perspective that
come from working on actual products. If mitigation does not prove
effective, I would consider implementing more stringent constraints,
but at this point, I believe that mitigation is still the preferred
approach.
Question. What lines do you believe the Department should draw
between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently
governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?
Answer. When it comes to the performance of functions that support
our acquisition responsibilities, I believe that a clear line does
exist between activities that may or may not be performed by
contractors. An important feature for inherently governmental functions
lies in the answer to the question whether the activity involves the
exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority, or the
making of value judgments in decisions that obligate government funds
and commit the government contractually. Acquisition functions might be
categorized in three phases, all of which are or involve inherently
governmental functions: acquisition planning, source selection, and
contract administration. In planning, certainly the task of determining
or approving requirements falls on the inherently governmental side of
the line. In source selection, inherently governmental functions
include awarding of contracts, serving on a source selection board and
making a determination about whether or not a price to be paid to an
officer is reasonable. During contract performance, the Department must
not have contractors participate on performance evaluation boards or
determine whether contract costs are reasonable. I recognize that many
of the tasks for which the Department acquires contracted support in
the acquisition arena involve functions that are or may be closely
associated with inherently governmental functions. As such, the
Department has a responsibility to employ an enhanced degree of
management oversight to ensure independent contract support and advice
does not evolve into the performance of inherently governmental
functions or the provision of impermissible government or proprietary
information to contractors.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and
proprietary information of DOD and other defense contractors?
Answer. In my view, the rules that govern unauthorized disclosure
of sensitive and proprietary information are adequate and must be
followed. If I am confirmed, I will continue to support strong
adherence to the applicable rules.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for
subcontracts in a manner that would disadvantage the government or
potential competitors in the private sector?
Answer. I believe that competition at both the prime and
subcontract level is essential to the Department's ability to control
cost and provide opportunities for the insertion of new technology. If
confirmed, I will continue the policy of requiring program managers to
include a strategy to maximize the use of competition, at all levels,
in program planning and execution. I will continue to enforce this
policy rigorously.
implementation of the weapon systems acquisition reform act of 2009
(wsara)
Question. Several new major weapons programs have been started
since the WSARA was enacted. Examples include the Ohio-Class Submarine
Replacement Program, the KC-46 Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement
Program, the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program, and the
Ground Combat Vehicle Program.
In your view, how effectively have such ``new start'' major defense
acquisition programs abided by the tenets, and implemented the
requirements, of the WSARA, particularly those that address ``starting
programs off right'' by requiring that early investment decisions be
informed by realistic cost estimates, sound systems engineering
knowledge and reliable technological risk assessments?
Answer. Based on my experience since I returned to the Department
in March 2010, I can state that the Department has abided by the tenets
and implemented the requirements of WSARA in each of its ``new start''
programs begun since the enactment of WSARA. This includes the examples
cited in the question. The certifications required by WSARA provide a
means to enforce each program's implementation. Each of these programs
is notable for the careful attention paid to developing realistic
requirements and a focus on affordability. I completely agree with the
premise that the key to successful program execution is sound and
realistic planning at program inception.
Question. Where do you think there might be room for improvement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to review the performance of
``new start'' programs that have implemented WSARA to determine what
the Department's implementation could do to improve a program's
probability of successfully delivering affordable capability on time. I
do not believe at this point that major policy changes are required. If
confirmed, my focus will primarily be on effective implementation of
the policies that have been put in place by WSARA and other
initiatives. However, I strongly believe in a doctrine of continuous
improvement throughout the acquisition system and if confirmed I will
continue to seek opportunities for constructive change on the margins.
The Better Buying Power initiative that Dr. Carter and I started is
based on the premise that the Department can learn from experience and
continuously improve. If confirmed, I will work to identify and
implement continuous improvements to the acquisition system. There is
plenty of room for improvement.
the better buying power initiative
Question. DOD's Better Buying Power initiative provides acquisition
professionals with important guidance on how to achieve greater
efficiency, enhanced productivity and affordability in how the
Department procures goods and services.
If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to follow-through on
this guidance and ensure that it is implemented as intended?
Answer. I worked closely with then Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Dr. Ashton B. Carter on the
development and initial implementation of the Better Buying Power
initiative. If confirmed, I will follow-through on implementation of
the initiative and carefully consider additional steps consistent with
the principles and objectives of the initiative.
Question. In particular, what steps will you take to ensure the
implementation of the following elements of the better buying power
initiative?
a. Sharing the benefits of cash flow
b. Targeting non-value-added costs
c. Mandating affordability as a requirement
d. Eliminating redundancy within warfighting portfolios
Answer.
a. The cash flow initiative is being initiated by some buying
commands with success, but the Department has not collected data on its
effectiveness in general. Industry, through the Aerospace Industries
Association, has raised some concerns with this initiative and I have
agreed to meet to discuss its implications. Industry is concerned about
accounting and cash flow implications and at this point, I do not fully
understand the basis for these concerns, but I'm happy to listen to
their perspective. Where I have received feedback from government
contracting officials, they have indicated some success with the
initiative. The premise of sharing the benefits of cash flow was that
the government could receive a reduced price in return for accelerated
cash flow to industry. This should be a mutually beneficial win-win
prospect for both parties and where it has been implemented that seems
to be the result, but I would like to Reserve judgment on this
initiative until I understand industry's concerns more fully and until
more data on its implementation can be accumulated.
b. Targeting non-value added costs is a continuous challenge. It
involves identifying candidate costs, determining if they really are
non-value added, and then working to eliminate them if that is the
case. In the most obvious cases this involves duplicative efforts and
requirements or regulations that have no beneficial impact. Some
oversight and quality control measures may be non-value added and
should be eliminated, but the perspective on the value of these
measures is often not consistent. Management at all levels needs to be
actively engaged in identifying and eliminating non-value added
activities and requirements, and again this is a continuous process.
The implementation of ``should cost'' analysis as a management tool is
one way in which if confirmed, I will continue to attack non-value
added requirements. One minor reform I have initiated within the
Milestone review process is to streamline many of the planning
documents required for these reviews, while increasing the substantive
information present in them. If confirmed, this effort will have my
attention in every aspect of the acquisition system.
c. Affordabilty as a requirement has been implemented for major
programs, particularly new starts. The basic premise is that the
Department should be smart enough to avoid starting programs that will
ultimately be canceled because they are not affordable. Determining
what affordability cap to put on production and sustainment costs is
simply a matter of analyzing the expected long term funding that will
be available for the portfolio of products that contains the product
under consideration. The next challenge will be twofold: first to flow
this type of analysis down to non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs,
and second to enforce it for the major programs for which affordability
constraints are in place. If confirmed, I intend to meet that
management challenge.
d. The effort to eliminate redundancy across portfolios is a work
in progress. It demands vigilance and constant attention to the
possibilities for efficiencies by all parties. Three examples from my
experience of the last 2 years are the Air Force Space Fence and Navy
AMDR programs, the USMD Gator radar and the Air Force 3DLR program, and
the Marine Corps and Army light tactical vehicle programs. In each
case, I have initiated or supported efforts to eliminate redundancy at
system or component levels. This is largely a matter of consistent and
continuous management attention, particularly as new programs and
projects are proposed for initiation. If confirmed, I will continue the
effort to identify opportunities for commonality within and across
portfolios and I will insist that the Services do the same.
Question. Are there any elements of the Better Buying Power
initiative with which you disagree and which you intend to modify
materially or discontinue?
Answer. The short answer is no, however the Better Buying Power
initiatives are not static. They are under continuous review and will
be modified and added to as the Department learns more from its
experience with the initiatives. I recently conducted a review of the
progress on the original initiatives at the Business Senior Integration
Group, the body I chair that oversees and reviews the Department's
progress improving the acquisition systems performance overall. While
at this time I do not intend to materially modify or discontinue parts
of Better Buying Power, I am committed to reviewing all aspects of the
initiative to determine if they are working as intended or not. This is
a results oriented initiative and if confirmed, I will discontinue
efforts if I determine they are not adding value or if the management
resources needed for implementation can be used more effectively
elsewhere.
contracting for services
Question. By most estimates, the Department now spends more for the
purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon
systems). After a decade of rapid growth, section 808 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012 placed a cap on DOD spending for contract services.
Do you believe that DOD can do more to reduce spending on contract
services?
Answer. Yes. I am working aggressively to improve our tradecraft in
services acquisition and will continue to examine our requirements for
services and the ways services are acquired to ensure that the
Department acquires only what is truly needed and does so as
efficiently as possible.
Question. Do you believe that the current balance between
government employees (military and civilian) and contractor employees
is in the best interests of DOD?
Answer. I believe the balance is roughly in alignment, but that
there is likely room for improvement, particularly on a local level.
The Department greatly values the contributions made by private sector
firms and recognizes that the private sector is, and will continue to
be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and support to the
Department's Total Force. However, I believe the Department must
constantly assess the mix and ensure that our utilization of contracted
support is appropriate given the nature of the mission and work, the
risks associated with contractor performance and reliance, and the need
to ensure continuity of operations.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
control the Department's spending on contract services and ensure that
the Department complies with the requirements of section 808?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Department's
senior leadership to manage the Department's spending on contract
services. It is my understanding that the Department is refining the
control mechanisms and procedural guidance to ensure compliance with
the requirements of section 808 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, which
limits the amount of funds the Department may obligate for contract
services in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The directed reductions in
staff augmentation contracts in section 808 are consistent with the
actions initiated by then Secretary Gates in 2010 and are underway. The
requirement in section 808 to reduce by 10 percent funding for
contracts for functions that are closely associated with inherently
governmental functions presents challenges because most of the
Department's components have not historically created a record of the
amount of funding allocated to contracts for functions that are closely
associated with inherently governmental functions. Therefore, these
components do not have an accurate baseline amount from which to
project the targeted reduction. If confirmed, I will work with all
components to manage this work appropriately.
Question. Section 812 of the NDAA for 2007 required DOD to develop
a management structure for the procurement of contract services.
Sections 807 and 808 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (subsequently
codified in section 2330a of title 10, U.S.C.) require DOD to develop
inventories and conduct management reviews of contracts for services.
Do you believe the Department is providing appropriate stewardship
over service contracts?
Answer. I believe that the Department is improving the quality of
the stewardship it maintains over service contracts but there remains
room for further improvement. One of the principal focuses of the
Better Buying Power initiatives Dr. Carter and I initiated is to
improve the Department's tradecraft in managing service contracts. I
have been working to increase the effort in this area, and recently
reviewed the efforts underway in each Military Department. Progress is
being made, but much more can be done. I believe that effective
stewardship requires proactive engagement from senior leaders at
operational and strategic levels of the Department to manage these
contracts and if confirmed I will continue to work to provide that
leadership at my level.
Question. Do you believe that the Department has appropriate
management structures in place to oversee the expenditure of more than
$150 billion a year for contract services?
Answer. In general yes, but I also believe they can be strengthened
and expanded upon. Under Dr. Carter and my direction, each Military
Department was required to appoint a senior manager responsible for
oversight of all contracted services. This structure is now being
expanded to cover each of the major types of services the Department
acquires. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward an enterprise-
wide, structured program to enable sound business practices and
decisions about how to fulfill service contract requirements.
Foundational to the success of these structures will be the
effectiveness of the front-end process to review and validate
requirements for services (as required by section 863 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011).
Question. Do you support the use of management reviews, or peer
reviews, of major service contracts to identify ``best practices'' and
develop lessons learned?
Answer. Yes. I fully support the use of peer reviews on major
service contracts to identify best practices and lessons learned. The
practice of conducting peer reviews on the Department's major service
contracts is well engrained in our process and the Department has
derived significant benefit from this initiative. The requirement to
conduct peer reviews has been institutionalized in Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.02. Recently, I have directed my staff to
develop a stand-alone DOD instruction to govern the acquisition of
services. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize best practices in
the management of contracted services.
Question. If confirmed, will you fully comply with the requirement
of section 2330a, to develop an inventory of services performed by
contractors comparable to the inventories of services performed by
Federal employees that are already prepared pursuant to the Federal
Acquisition Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act?
Answer. Yes. The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness and
the staff in AT&L will compile inventories prepared by the Military
Departments and defense agencies and publish the Department's fourth
inventory of contracts for services later this year. Following the
inventory submission, each department and agency will complete a review
of its inventory within 90 days in accordance with the considerations
at paragraph (e), section 2330a of title 10.
Question. Section 863 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD
to establish a process for identifying, assessing, reviewing, and
validating requirements for the acquisition of contract services.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 863?
Answer. Over the past several months, the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy has been engaged with the Senior
Service Managers from the Military Departments and the defense agencies
to understand optimal approaches to implementing this requirement. The
Department has issued guidance to the Military Departments and the
defense agencies that reiterates the requirements of section 863 and
requires them to submit their processes and initial implementation
plans to the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy,
not later than 30 days after receipt of the memorandum.
Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the
Department established for taking these steps?
Answer. Once the required plans are provided to the Director of
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy on the AT&L staff by the
Military Departments and components, the AT&L staff will work with them
to ensure that these plans are effective and are implemented. The
Department at this point is taking a somewhat decentralized approach to
implementing section 863 because of the substantial differences in
Military Department and component structures and information management
tools. If confirmed, I will review the effectiveness of the initial
implementation of this requirement to determine whether or not stronger
mechanisms should be put in place.
Question. What additional steps if any would you take, if
confirmed, to improve the Department's management of its contracts for
services?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make the improved
management of contract services a high priority. Recently, I convened a
2-day meeting of a select group of senior leaders, including the
acquisition executives from the Military Departments. The purpose of
the meeting was to flesh out required actions to support our objectives
for the current calendar year. One of the eight areas discussed in
depth was the need to improve our proactive management of services.
Specific actions coming out of this session included: deployment of
tools to generate quality contract performance work statements that
clearly articulate requirements for services, deployment of tools to
facilitate meaningful market research tailored for service
requirements, establishment of a functional integrated product team
unique for services to address the training needs of personnel (within
or outside the defense acquisition workforce) who are tasked to manage
and oversee individual service contracts, and a decision to formalize
the program management function in the services arena. If confirmed, I
will work to implement these steps and continue to look for additional
ways to improve the Department's performance in managing contracts for
services.
contractor performance of critical governmental functions
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by Government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support
the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. Not in general, but I believe this is an area that requires
continuous attention, particularly in a time of declining budgets. The
appropriate balance between organic government performance and reliance
on contractors is something that must be assessed function by function.
Many functions are appropriate for contractor support; however, some
functions, such as conducting military operations, establishing
government requirements, determining acquisition strategies, conducting
source selection, and program management, are more appropriately
performed by government personnel because they are inherently
governmental or close to inherently governmental and should not be
performed by contractors. One area where the government's organic
capacity had been allowed to decline so that needed work was either not
performed or shifted to contractor support is the area of acquisition
management. Over the last few years, the Department has been able to
make significant gains in in-sourcing more of this work, particularly
in engineering and program management. As a result, and with the
committee's assistance, the Department has significantly strengthened
the acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the
issue of appropriate use of contractors across the Department to
determine whether and where DOD's reliance on contractors may have
become excessive.
Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
services contracts is in the best interest of DOD?
Answer. I believe the personal services contracts the Department
has established in accordance with the applicable statutes to acquire,
for example, medical providers are in the best interest of the
Department. I am however concerned about the risk and potential that
some of our non-personal contracts may inappropriately evolve into
personal service arrangements, particularly those that utilize
contractors to perform work that is closely associated with inherently
governmental functions. Last year, the DFARS was amended to provide
guidance that enables Department officials to more effectively
distinguish between personal services and non-personal services and to
ensure that procedures are adopted to prevent contracts from being
awarded or administered as unauthorized personal services contracts. If
confirmed, I will continue to enforce the limits on use of personal
service contracts.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of
personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements
to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those
performed by Government employees?
Answer. In my opinion, contractor employees who directly support
Government employees, and may have access to similar business sensitive
or source selection sensitive information, should be subject to similar
ethical standards as the Government employees they support. It is
important that such contractor employees not be allowed to profit
personally from the information that may be available to them because
of their performance under a DOD contract.
Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S.
military operations. According to widely published reports, the number
of U.S. contractor employees in Afghanistan is roughly equal to the
number of U.S. military deployed in that country.
Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor
support for military operations?
Answer. Not at this point. In the long-term counter-insurgency
environments in which the Department has used them so extensively,
contractors have been necessary to performance of the mission. The
Department has gone through a painful multiyear process of learning how
to manage contractors effectively in the area of operations. This
process isn't over yet, but a great deal of progress has been made.
Contractors provide a broad range of supplies, services, and critical
logistics support. They serve as force multipliers, performing non-
inherently governmental functions and allowing limited military
resources to focus on what they are trained to do. The Department
continually assesses implications with respect to force size and mix,
contract support integration, planning, and resourcing.
Based on our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe the
Department should continue to improve and evolve our strategy regarding
the use and management of contractors. At this time, I do not believe
the Department is too dependent on contractors, but I believe there is
still room for improvement in our management of contractors supporting
ongoing operations.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
should take to mitigate such risk?
Answer. I believe the risks associated with a large reliance on
contractor support include: possible loss of those services for future
contingencies and in changed operational environments, the performance
of inherently governmental functions by contractors, the Department
losing critical core knowledge and capability, and the risk of losing
the expertise and structure for contingency contract management that
was created over the last several years. The Department continues to
conduct assessments of the risks associated with reliance on contracted
support in contingency operations and is working to ensure they are
mitigated. The Department mitigates that risk by ensuring contractor
support estimates are integrated into existing planning processes and
procedures, and through consideration of operational contract support
requirements in force planning scenario development and joint force
assessments.
Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. In general yes, but as in other areas there is room for
improvement. At the start of our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Department was not properly organized and staffed to manage contractors
in the ongoing contingency operations effectively. This isn't
surprising, as neither the long conflicts nor the need to rely on
contractors were anticipated. A number of corrective actions have been
taken over the last several years. The Department has matured these
capabilities and now has in place a functioning governance body that
synchronizes efforts with the Joint Staff, the Services, and other
Department staff and agencies to ensure processes and policy are in
place to oversee contracted support in contingency operations
effectively. The Department continues to revise policies to incorporate
lessons learned and emerging legislative requirements, assess planning
capability requirements, and update business systems to improve
capabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to oversee ongoing efforts
to improve the Department's performance and to ensure DOD
institutionalizes its contingency contracting and operational contract
support capabilities and applies lessons learned from our experiences
in Iraq and Afghanistan to future conflicts.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. For ongoing operations, I believe work must continue to
implement and enforce the policies that have been put in place over the
last few years and to strengthen them where needed. One area that needs
strengthening is the enforcement of anti-corruption measures and of the
ability to prevent contract funds from ending up in the hands of our
enemies. I support the efforts of Congress and members of the SASC to
add to the tools available to the Department in this area. Looking
ahead to a time when the current contingency has ended, the Department
needs to ensure: (1) training and contingency plans account
realistically for the role of contractors on the battlefield; (2)
adequate numbers of contracting officers, contracting officer
representatives, and other skilled personnel will be available to
manage contractors; (3) transparency of contractor and subcontractor
performance is provided for; (4) measures remain in place for the
prevention of waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption; and (5) continued
effective coordination with other Departments and agencies.
wartime contracting
Question. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the
Department to establish procedures to ensure that rapid acquisition
processes are not misused for the acquisition of systems and
capabilities that are not urgent and would be more appropriately
acquired in accordance with normal acquisition procedures.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 804?
Answer. Pursuant to section 804 of the 2011 NDAA, the Department
conducted a review of the Department's rapid processes and is
developing policy in response to its findings and recommendations.
Primary among these was the need for improved management oversight of
the Department's urgent needs processes. The Secretary therefore issued
Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-006, ``Establishment of the Senior
Integration Group (SIG) for the Resolution of Joint Urgent Operational
Needs (JUONs),'' June 14, 2011, which defined the responsibilities of
the many DOD components to include the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and other
components. In January, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
issued CJCSI 3170.01H, ``Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System'' which established processes for identifying, assessing,
validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements,
including Urgent Operational Needs (UONs), Joint Urgent Operational
Needs (JUONs), and Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs). Additional
policy is under development to address the remaining findings to
include the requirement to discriminate clearly those urgent
requirements appropriate to be resolved through our rapid acquisition
processes rather than the traditional acquisition process. This policy
will be included in a revision to the DOD Instruction 5000.02
``Operation of the Defense Acquisition System'' which is currently in
staffing.
Question. Do you agree that rapid acquisition procedures are not
generally suited to the acquisition of complex systems that require
substantial development effort, are based on technologies that are
unproven, and are too risky to be acquired under fixed-price contracts?
Answer. In general, yes. There may be rare cases however, such as
when technological surprise is achieved by a potential adversary, that
the risks associated with rapid acquisition procedures are justified
for complex systems that require substantial development. In my earlier
experience during the Cold War, this did occur on at least two
occasions. Also, there are cases when the fulfillment of an urgent need
associated with an ongoing conflict can only be met by pursuing a
complex new technology that entails significant risk. Even if the time
needed to develop and field the needed solution exceeds the expected
duration of the conflict, it may still be the right decision to proceed
with a rapid acquisition process. Wars often do not end on one side's
schedule. In both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom, the department fielded solutions ranging from airborne ISR and
communications relays to ground based mine rollers to satisfy urgent
needs across the spectrum of complexity and technical maturity.
Contracting strategies for our rapid acquisition efforts are guided by
the existing Federal Acquisition Regulation, which encourages our
acquisition officials to use the contract type that represents the best
value, in terms of both risk and schedule, to the benefit of the
government. In all cases, the decision to embark upon a rapid
acquisition effort should be based on the determination by the decision
authority that the strategy represents an appropriate balance of risk
between operational and acquisition considerations.
Question. Section 848 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 and section
820 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 establish planning requirements
for contractor logistics support.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 848 and section 820?
Answer. Section 848 provisions in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
provided the necessary charter for a Defense Science Board Study on DOD
organization, doctrine, training, and planning for contractor logistics
support of contingency operations. I am establishing a task force to
meet all of the requisite elements identified in the NDAA language
pertaining to this matter. My intent is for the task force to cover all
aspects of the contractor logistics support to contingency operations
throughout the Department, to include reviewing previous findings and
recommendations related to legislative or policy guidance.
Implementation of this task force was delayed because some of the
questions the task force was required to address had serious conflict
of interest implications that had to be mitigated and this took longer
than expected. With respect to our implementation of Section 820 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, I have worked closely with The Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff to incorporate
requirements determination and Operational Contract Support (OCS) into
the Department's strategic planning documents. If confirmed, I will
continue to support inclusion of OCS as strategic guidance is revised.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to improve its planning processes for the use of contractors in
contingency operations?
Answer. I believe that it is critical to ensure adequate and
appropriate planning for contractor support in all planning for
contingency operations. The Department is integrating contractor
support estimates into existing planning processes and procedures, and
ensuring that Operational Contract Support requirements are considered
in force planning scenario development and joint force assessments. If
confirmed, I will continue to monitor these initiatives closely to
ensure they are carried out.
Question. What is the status of the Department's efforts to
implement the requirements of sections 841 and 842?
Answer. The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Director
implemented Sections 841 and 842 on January 26, 2012 via the Class
Deviation (No. 2012-O0005). Effective immediately, this Class Deviation
mandates contracting officers to incorporate this provision in all
contracts that will be awarded on or before December 31, 2014 and to
modify existing contracts to the maximum extent practicable.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to avoid contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department primarily needs to continue the forceful
implementation and enforcement of the measures it has already put in
place or is considering. The Department has instituted many initiatives
to improve accountability and oversight of contracts awarded to local
firms in Afghanistan and to prevent flow of U.S. funds to the enemy.
One such initiative is the U.S. Central Command's ``Vendor Vetting''
process of all non-U.S. vendors prior to contract award to ensure U.S.
funds do not support or finance insurgent, foreign intelligence
capabilities and to reduce the risk of insider threats to the U.S.
Forces. Another such initiative is at General Petraeus' request to
establish the U.S. Government Acquisition Accountability Office for
Afghanistan (AAOA). The impetus of this initiative is the threat posed
by corruption to the ISAF/Embassy/NATO mission that can alter the
social and political dynamics and fuel local powerbrokers. If
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of avoiding
contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan.
Question. Does the Department need additional tools for this
purpose?
Answer. I believe sections 841 and 842 have provided the Department
the statutory authority needed to prevent flow of U.S. funds to the
enemy. If I am confirmed, I will continue the effort to identify and to
pursue other tools that will assist in preventing flow of U.S. funds to
the enemy in Afghanistan.
Question. In August 2011, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in
Iraq and Afghanistan issued its final report. The report included
numerous recommendations, including recommendations for reducing the
Government's over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations;
making organizational changes to provide greater focus on contingency
contracting; providing additional staffing and resources for
contingency contracting; and tightening contracting policies to address
deficiencies in past performance databases, suspension and debarment
procedures, government access to contractor records.
What is your view of the Commission's recommendations?
Answer. In general, I agree with the Commission's recommendations,
particularly those that apply to DOD. The Department worked closely
with the Commission throughout its existence and benefited from its
interim and final recommendations. I appreciate and welcome the
Commission's efforts to assist the Department in eliminating waste,
fraud and abuse in wartime contracting. In March 2010, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics created
a permanent board to provide strategic leadership to the multiple
stakeholders working to institutionalize operational contract support
and to track accepted Commission recommendations to completion. As a
result of these steps, a great majority of the Commission's final
recommendations have already been acted upon. If confirmed, I will
continue this office's focus on implementing these improvements.
Question. Are there any of the Commission's recommendations which
you believe DOD should not implement? If so, why not?
Answer. I agree in principle with all 11 of the DOD-specific
recommendations. But I am concerned about the Commission's tactical
approach in one area: Recommendation 6 suggested changes within the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
regarding civilian officials responsible for contingency contracting. I
believe two separate organizations for two key functional communities
(contracting and logistics), rather than a single organization as the
Commission envisioned, best supports the AT&L mission. Those two
organizations are Program Support under our Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness, and the Contingency
Contracting Office under our Director for Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with
both organizations to ensure accountability and leadership focus on
operational contract support and contingency contracting.
Question. Section 844 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires DOD
to implement a commission recommendation by establishing annual
competition goals for contingency contracts.
Do you agree that sole-source contracting, while it may be
necessary in the early stages of a contingency operation, should be
phased out as quickly as possible thereafter?
Answer. Yes. I believe promoting competition is an important
Departmental focus area. Competition in a mature military operation
such as Operation Enduring Freedom is a key means of obtaining the best
business deal for the warfighter. But the long-held flexibility
provided by statutory exceptions to competition is instrumental in
assisting the forces, particularly in obtaining urgent requirements as
they begin military operation. I believe it is in the best interest of
the government to compete requirements as soon as practicable. If
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of competition
in getting the best business deals for our taxpayers.
Question. What is the status of the Department's efforts to
implement the requirements of section 844?
Answer. The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Director
established the contingency competition goals required by section 844
on February 17, 2012. In addition, this event was used as an
opportunity to improve transparency into contingency competition data.
If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize transparency and competition
in contracting.
Question. Are there additional steps that the Department should
take to reduce its reliance on sole-source contracts in contingency
operations?
Answer. Although the competition rate in Iraq and Afghanistan has
generally been well over 80 percent, I believe the Department should
look for opportunities to do even better. With the recent initiative to
improve transparency into contingency competition data through a unique
code in the Federal Procurement Data System for Operation Enduring
Freedom, the Department expects to gain additional insights into
opportunities for increased competition. If confirmed, I intend to
monitor this area closely to ensure competitive procedures are
effectively implemented and used whenever possible.
Question. Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires DOD
to implement a commission recommendation to improve the operation of
its past performance databases.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 806?
Answer. I believe that more effective use of past performance data
bases is needed in general, not just in contingency contracting. There
are actually two ongoing efforts to implement section 806, ``Inclusion
of Data on Contractor Performance in Past Performance Databases for
source selection decisions.'' The first is a DOD, GSA, and NASA
proposed change to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to provide
Government-wide standardized past performance evaluation factors and
performance rating categories and require that all past performance
information be entered into the Contractor Performance Assessment
Reporting System (CPARS). The proposed rule responds to the
requirements of section 806 to: (1) establish standards for the
timeliness and completeness of past performance submissions; and (2)
assign responsibility and management accountability for the
completeness of past performance submissions for such purposes. At the
present time, the proposed rule is in final drafting. The second is a
Defense Acquisition Regulation Council proposed rule currently in
drafting that will address the requirements of section 806 with regard
to the statutory notification and transfer requirements to send the
contractor assessment to the Past Performance Information and Retrieval
System (PPIRS) after the 14 day period established.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
improve the Department's use of past performance data in the award of
new contracts?
Answer. I believe that it is critical that the Department have up-
to-date and accurate information about defense contractors in source
selections for new awards. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
already requires that a contractor's past performance be evaluated in
all source selections for negotiated competitive acquisitions expected
to exceed the simplified acquisition threshold. It has been a challenge
to ensure that past performance data is entered into the Contractor
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). I recently wrote to
all the defense components stressing the importance of not only
completing assessments in a timely manner but also including quality
supporting narratives with the ratings. These assessments are a shared
responsibility between the program manager team and the contracting
officer and the acquisition chain of command must continue the effort
to ensure compliance. If confirmed I will continue to emphasize the
importance of past performance and to hold the chain of command
responsible.
private security contractors
Question. In 2010, the Armed Services Committee reviewed DOD's use
of private security contractors in Afghanistan and identified numerous
problems, including a lack of oversight, failure to comply with
existing statutory and regulatory requirements, and improper
qualification and vetting of security contractor personnel. Section 831
of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 established new oversight and
accountability requirements for contractors performing private security
functions in an area of combat operations. Section 833 of that Act
required the establishment of standards and certification requirements
for private security contractors. In 2011, the Commission on Wartime
Contracting recommended that DOD and other Federal agencies
significantly reduce their reliance on private security contractors.
What is your view of the recommendations of the Commission on
Wartime Contracting regarding the use of private security contractors?
Answer. I generally agree with the observations and recommendations
of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, including those on private
security contracting. The Department recognized many of these problem
areas independently of the Commission's work and began Department-level
regulatory initiatives to address them as soon as the Department was
aware of them. These initiatives include revisions to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and the Defense supplement to that regulation,
the publication of a new rule governing private security contractors
under title 32 of the U.S.C., and implementation instructions for
operational contractor support and for Private Security Contractors
(PSC) in particular. These efforts establish clear policy for the use
of PSCs in contingencies and similar operations and address issues such
as background screening and vetting, registration, reporting, and
determining those situations when PSCs may and may not be used.
Following the legislative guidance provided by Congress in the 2008 and
2011 NDAAs, these rules apply to all U.S. Government agencies
contracting for security services in areas of combat or other
significant military operations, not just to Defense Department
contracts, and are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
The standards and certification requirements for PSCs, developed
pursuant to section 833 of the 2011 NDAA, will provide additional
controls and accountability over private security contractors. Since
this will be a commercial standard, it can be used by the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) implementing partners, other
governments, and private sector users of PSC services, and therefore
offers the potential to raise the level of performance of all security
contractors, not just those of DOD.
Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should
reduce their reliance on contractors to perform security functions that
may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly
hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?
Answer. I believe that any use of PSCs must be carefully considered
against the risk of becoming involved in combat operations, of causing
inadvertent harm to the civilian population, and of damaging the
performance of the mission. In counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations, without clear lines of battle or safe areas, the military
troops or police that might be needed to protect all of the logistics,
installation and personnel needing protection (including relief,
recovery, and development activities that are conducted simultaneously
with combat operations) can easily be prohibitive. PSCs may be the only
practical solution. When it is appropriate and necessary to use PSCs,
these security contractors must be properly regulated and supervised to
ensure that the services are being performed competently and within
well-defined limitations. Under these circumstances, I believe that the
use of security contractors in contingency operations is acceptable and
I believe that current levels are consistent with this approach.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an
area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with
U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the efforts
already begun within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in the Military Services, and
in the combatant commands and with other agencies and internationally.
These efforts include development of Department-level policy,
coordinating this policy with the Departments of State and Justice and
other Government agencies, and engaging the international community to
provide a common framework for the proper roles and oversight of
private security contractors and the enforcement of those policies
during overseas operations by the appropriate authorities. I will
continue the work to implement fully the recently published provision
in title 32 of the U.S.C. that applies to private security contractors
working for all Federal agencies operating in overseas operations,
consistent with DODI 3020.50. I believe that additional work remains to
be done to ensure that DOD instructions and combatant commander
guidance and orders remain current, clear, and aligned with U.S.
defense and foreign policy objectives. The imminent publication of the
business and operational standards required by section 833 of the 2011
NDAA will improve the standards of performance for all PSCs. These
standards will be available for use by other U.S. Government agencies
and anyone who contracts for PSC services. Collaboration among DOD, the
Department of State, and other governmental agencies must continue.
This will ensure consistent policy is developed across the Federal
Government with potential coalition partners and host nations,
promoting a common interagency and international understanding of
responsible use and oversight of private security services. Collective
collaboration will also result in the use of binding and enforceable
standards for private security contractors.
socom acquisition authorities
Question. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is unique within
DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and
funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed
commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive.
Would you recommend any changes to SOCOM's current acquisition
authorities?
Answer. No. I believe that SOCOM currently has appropriate
acquisition authorities. If confirmed, I will continue to meet
periodically with the Commander, SOCOM and the SOCOM Acquisition
Executive to discuss opportunities to improve acquisition efficiency
and effectiveness.
Question. What role do you believe SOCOM's development and
acquisition activities should play in broader Service and DOD efforts?
Answer. I believe that SOCOM's activities should continue to be
coordinated with those of the broader Department acquisition system to
achieve synergies, avoid duplication, control cost, and identify best
practices that can be used more widely. The Department should always
seek the broadest benefit and application of its development and
acquisition activities, including those activities sponsored or led by
SOCOM.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that special
operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall
DOD research, development, and acquisition programs?
Answer. Approximately 18 months ago, Dr. Carter and I instituted a
``SOCOM Acquisition Summit'' that meets every 6 months to coordinate
and integrate SOCOM's activities with the rest of the Department. These
meetings have been very beneficial to both SOCOM and the Department,
and if confirmed I will continue to hold them and use them as a
catalyst to improve the Department's efficiency and effectiveness and
to ensure SOCOM's acquisition needs are understood and are being met.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with SOCOM, the Services, and
defense agencies to improve their collaboration efforts in order to
achieve the most efficient allocation of the Department's research,
development, and acquisition resources.
contracting methods
Question. In recent years, DOD has relied heavily on time-and-
materials contracts for the acquisition of services. Under such a
contract, the Department pays a set rate per hour for contractor
services, rather than paying for specific tasks to be performed. In
some cases, contractors have substituted less expensive labor under
time-and-materials contracts, while continuing to charge Federal
agencies the same hourly rates, resulting in effective contractor
profits of 25 percent or more.
What is your view of the appropriate use of time-and-materials
contracts by DOD?
Answer. I believe that time-and-materials (T&M) contracts are the
least desirable contract type because they provide no positive
incentive for cost control or labor efficiency. There are circumstances
when the use of T&M contracts is appropriate such as situations
requiring emergency repairs or immediate disaster response, but when
used, the conditions that supported the decision to use them must be
documented. A T&M contract might be appropriate when commercial
services that are commonly provided in this way are not reasonably
available by other contracting approaches. Legal services could fall
into this category, for example. The Better Buying Power memorandum of
September 14, 2010 includes direction to move away from T&M contracts
for services and move toward Cost Plus Fixed Fee or Cost Plus Incentive
arrangements when robust competition or recent competitive pricing
history does not exist to provide the ability to firm fix price the
effort.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
take to minimize the abuse of time-and-materials contracts?
Answer. The Department has already taken steps to minimize the use
of T&M contracts. Their use is questioned in all peer reviews and
during the review of service acquisition strategies. T&M awards within
the Department have decreased by 49 percent since 2009, down from 5,505
in 2009 to 2,836 in 2011, a reflection of the direction in the Better
Buying Power memorandum of 2010. As recently as early February, the
Federal Acquisition Regulation was revised to ensure that T&M contracts
are used to acquire commercial services only when no other contract
type is suitable and to instill discipline in the determination of
contract type with the view toward managing risk to the Government.
Question. Section 852 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007
requires DOD to promulgate regulations prohibiting excessive ``pass-
through'' charges on DOD contracts. Pass-through charges are charges
added by a contractor for overhead and profit on work performed by one
of its subcontractors, to which the contractor provided no added value.
In some cases, pass-through charges have more than doubled the cost of
services provided to DOD.
What is your view of the regulations promulgated by DOD to
implement the requirements of section 852?
Answer. The Department has made several changes to the FAR and
DFARS to implement the requirements of section 852 in the last few
years. FAR 52.215-22--Limitations on Pass-Through Charges--
Identification of Subcontract Effort (Oct. 2009) requires contracting
officers to review contractor proposals, before agreeing to a price, to
verify that the contractor's efforts add value where there is
significant subcontracting and to ensure there are no excessive pass-
through charges. After contract award, contracting officers can recover
excessive pass-through charges and reduce the contract price. FAR
52.215-23--Limitations on Pass-Through Charges (Oct. 2009) requires
contractors to notify the Contracting officer if 70 percent of the
total cost of work to be performed is intended to be subcontracted or
reaches this level during the performance of the contract. The
contractor must then provide documentation to describe their value
added, indirect costs and profit/fee applicable to the work performed
by the subcontractor(s). This requirement flows-down to the lower-tier
subcontractors as well. Additional changes include FAR 31.2 which
entitles the government to a price reduction for excessive pass through
charges and FAR 52.215-2 provides the right for the government to
examine the contractor's records. I believe these regulations are an
important step in addressing pass-through charges, but they will only
be effective if they are implemented by experienced program and
contract management professionals.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the
Department should take to address the problem of excessive pass-through
charges?
Answer. In addition to implementing the requirements of section
852, the Department is taking steps through two Better Buying Power
initiatives to address this issue. If confirmed, I will continue to
implement those steps. The first is to address the issue of excessive
pass-through charges as an element of to be considered in determining
pricing arrangements in contracting, particularly sole-source
contracting. Effective supply chain management is one of the services
the Department expects from its prime contractors and the Department
should structure its business arrangements to reward superior
performance, particularly price reduction, in this area. Conversely,
where a prime contractor is not providing value added, as in the
acquisition of a commodity, the premium the Department pays for supply
chain management should be very limited. This is an element of the
Department's peer reviews of pending acquisitions. Pre-award peer
reviews of non-competitive actions have placed special emphasis on the
need to align contractor profitability to performance and avoid blanket
profit levels. The second Better Buying Power initiative that applies
here is the use of ``should cost'' review. These reviews are conducted
by Program Managers to identify opportunities for cost reduction and
can result in changes to acquisition strategies including break out of
components from primes for direct acquisition by the government and
more effective negotiations of total price. Another step that the
Department is in the process of taking is to implement a final DFARS
rule on the use of a Proposal Adequacy Checklist, which will also
provide guidance in the review of proposals to prevent excessive-pass
through charges.
interagency contracting
Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits
associated with DOD's continued extensive use of interagency contracts?
Answer. The decision to utilize interagency contracts to meet
Department requirements is essentially a business decision that should
take many factors into account. When done properly, interagency
contracts can be an efficient and effective method of meeting important
requirements. While often convenient, however, interagency contracts
can be used to avoid oversight and the control mechanisms associated
with sound management. I believe the practice does have utility, but
must be carefully monitored to ensure it is not abused.
Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are
needed to hold DOD or other agency personnel accountable for their use
of interagency contracts?
Answer. I do not have any information that would suggest that
existing statute, regulation, and policy are insufficient with regard
to accountability and the proper use of interagency contracts if
properly implemented. If confirmed, I would be open to considering such
measures if the need became apparent.
Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for
assuring that the work requested by DOD personnel is within the scope
of their contract?
Answer. Yes, however the primary responsibility for ensuring work
is within the scope of a particular contract rests with the contracting
officer. If the contractor believes the DOD work is outside the scope
of the other agency's contract, he has a responsibility to discuss it
with the other agency contracting officer.
Question. Do you believe that DOD's continued heavy reliance on
outside agencies to award and manage contracts on its behalf is a sign
that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own acquisition
system?
Answer. I do not believe that the use of non-DOD agencies to award
and manage contracts on behalf of the Department is generally a
reflection that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own
acquisition needs. Interagency acquisition can support the whole of
Government approach to strategic sourcing and leveraging the buying
power of the Federal Government. The Department should continue to
utilize the expertise of non-DOD agencies as authorized by Congress,
when it is done properly, efficiently and effectively, and is a cost
effective alternative to direct DOD management.
alaska native corporations
Question. Over the last few years, there have been a number of
reported abuses involving defense contracts awarded to Alaska Native
Corporations (ANCs) under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.
Section 811 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 required that sole-source
awards to ANCs in excess of $20 million be subject to the same
``justification and approval'' applicable to other large sole-source
contracts.
What is your understanding of the status of the Department's
implementation of section 811?
Answer. DOD implemented the interim rule regarding section 811,
immediately upon its publication on March 16, 2011 and provided
guidance to the DOD acquisition community.
Question. If you are confirmed, what additional steps if any would
you take to address abuses of the 8(a) program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that the
acquisition community monitors 8(a) acquisitions for potential abuses
and that DOD addresses reported abuses as they arise.
Question. In one reported case, Army Corps of Engineers officials
allegedly conspired with a subcontractor allegedly to rig a bid by
stacking the source selection board to favor a particular bidder.
Are you comfortable that the Department has effective controls in
place to prevent the ``stacking'' or manipulation of source selection
boards?
Answer. On the whole, I believe this type of activity is
exceedingly rare, but it can occur and must be vigorously guarded
against. I believe that even the perception that activities like this
may have occurred is extremely damaging to the credibility of the
acquisition system. When conducting competitively negotiated source
selections within the Department, compliance with statutory and
regulatory requirements is absolutely required. Those requirements
include fairness and objectivity in source selection as a fundamental
value that is central to an effective system. I believe there are
adequate controls in place, but that constant reinforcement of the
importance of following the rules with regard to fair and objective
source selection is a continuing responsibility of every individual
working in the acquisition system.
Question. Are you comfortable that effective controls are currently
in place to prevent the ``stacking'' or manipulation of source
selection boards on acquisitions with a total estimated value of less
than $100,000,000, where the Procurement Contracting Officer may also
serve as the Source Selection Authority, responsible for appointing the
chairperson of the Source Selection Evaluation Board?
Answer. Yes, the Services and agencies have strong warranting
programs and require annual ethics training. I am aware, however, of a
recent allegation that a contracting officer may have ``stacked'' a
source selection panel.
Question. If not, what additional controls would you, if you are
confirmed, put in place to help ensure that source selection boards
cannot be ``stacked'' or otherwise manipulated to favor a particular
bidder, especially on low-profile contracts of relatively small value?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the section 813 panel review
the procedures for establishing source selection panels, especially
those where the contracting officer will be the source selection
authority, to ensure the existing procedures are sound.
acquisition of information technology
Question. Most of the Department's Major Automated Information
System acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind schedule.
In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated difficulties
with virtually every new business system it has tried to field in the
last 10 years. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 required
DOD to establish a new acquisition process for information technology.
Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of business
systems require different acquisition strategies or approaches?
Answer. Yes, I believe there are unique characteristics associated
with the acquisition of information systems that call for the use of
acquisition approaches different from those normally used by the
Department for acquiring weapon systems. All acquisitions should be
tailored to the nature of the product being acquired. As a class,
business systems are products having characteristics that tend to
dictate a specific type of program structure. They can be generally
characterized as products that are based on commercial information
technology infrastructure and commercial software that has to be
adapted, often extensively, to meet Defense Department requirements.
The Department has already begun to adapt to the unique challenges of
business information system acquisition through the implementation of
the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL), an acquisition approach for
defense business systems that emphasizes well defined increments of
capability that are developed, tested, and often fielded in increments
structured around 1 to 2 year software builds. This structure will also
be incorporated as one of the acquisition approaches covered by the new
DODI 5000.02 which is currently in staffing.
Question. What steps if any do you believe DOD should take to
address these problems?
Answer. The issuance of the June 23, 2011, directive requiring the
use of the BCL for the acquisition process for business systems and the
updates being made to the DODI 5000.02 for BCL policies and procedures
are important steps forward in improving the acquisition processes. The
Department has been implementing the BCL model on a case-by-case basis
for approximately 2 years. It is the Department's intent that each new
defense business system will begin its lifecycle under the BCL model.
If confirmed I will continue to engage and direct the incremental
acquisition approach to delivering capabilities, as well as engage the
Department to look for opportunities whenever possible to tailor the
acquisition process to further improve outcomes. If confirmed, I will
also monitor the effectiveness of this approach to acquiring business
systems to determine if further changes are needed.
Question. What steps has the Department taken to implement the
requirements of section 804? What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. The Department has made steady progress in implementing
several of the key approaches outlined in section 804, specifically in
the areas of Acquisition, Requirements, Testing and Certification and
Human Capital. On June 23, 2011, a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) on
BCL was signed and issued by USD(AT&L). The BCL provides a framework
for implementing a more flexible and streamlined process for the
acquisition of these business information systems. I recently launched
efforts to update DODI 5000.02 in part in order to implement some key
IT acquisition reform efforts indentified in the 804 report. The
departments testing community has been working in collaboration with
USD(AT&L) to incorporate an integrated testing, evaluation, and
certification approach into the DODI 5000.02, to reduce redundancies in
system testing activities and improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of testing the Department's information systems. The Joint Staff has
also initiated efforts to include more streamlined requirements
management and approval process for acquisition of information systems.
A comprehensive review of IT acquisition competencies is also currently
being conducted by the Department's Chief Information Officer (CIO).
This review will update the IT acquisition competencies to better
define DOD critical skill sets and assist in the update of curricula at
the Defense Acquisition University and the Information Resources
Management College. We are working directly with ongoing and new start
acquisition programs to drive many of the IT reform principles
identified in section 804. Implementation of Business Capabilities
Lifecycle (BCL) is a current focus area. The Department will use the
experience and lessons learned from the ``pilots/early adopters'' to
inform and shape the ongoing improvements and updates to policy and
guidance.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the CIO of DOD to
take these steps?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the DOD
CIO, and I will ensure the OUSD(AT&L) staff and the DOD CIO staff work
collaboratively to identify and take any steps needed to improve the
acquisition of information technology based capabilities. This is an
important area for the Department to achieve more consistent and better
outcomes given the continuing evolution of technology.
Question. Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 gives DOD
new tools to address supply chain risk in the acquisition of
information technology.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 806?
Answer. Section 806 provides pilot authority for the Department to
deny award to a vendor if USD(AT&L) determines, based on intelligence
provided by the DOD CIO, that the vendor is a threat. The authorities
provided by section 806 have the potential to significantly reduce
risks associated with those who may have intentions to damage our
systems and capabilities through the supply chain. The challenge is to
exercise these authorities effectively; particularly the potential
changes to source selection, debriefing and protest procedures. The DOD
components and AT&L General Counsel are discussing the potential for
rulemaking. Three procurement pilots have been identified.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to address supply chain risk?
Answer. The Department's approach to addressing supply chain risk
encompasses a number of efforts including use of the specific
authorities of Section 806 and more recently enacted legislation. I
believe the Department needs a comprehensive approach to supply chain
risk. If confirmed, this will remain a high priority for me and I will
work to identify additional steps to address this risk.
Question. Section 818 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 establishes
new requirements for DOD and its contractors to detect and avoid the
use of counterfeit electronic parts.
What steps has the Department taken to implement the requirements
of section 818?
Answer. I have recently signed out a memorandum providing
overarching guidance to the Services and Agencies. The memorandum
directs specific actions, including using risk assessment for the
impact of a counterfeit part, directing the purchase of mission
critical items from the manufacturer's distribution chain, reporting
all counterfeit incidents within the Department's supply chain to the
Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP), and directing the
use of existing DFAR clauses to address counterfeiting while the
Department coordinates a broader anti-counterfeit DFAR case. This
memorandum covers items that could potentially affect mission
performance and warfighter safety, in addition to electronics parts.
Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the
Department established for taking these steps?
Answer. In addition to efforts to strengthen contracting clauses,
establish central reporting of counterfeit incidents, and collaborate
with industry on the development of counterfeit standards, the
Department is taking steps to define requirements and processes for the
purchase of critical items from ``Trusted Suppliers''. The Department
is also working closely with the Department of Homeland Security on
anti-counterfeit inspections, and defining rules for the reimbursement
of counterfeit costs. This will lead to revisions in policies, such as
the DOD Instruction 4140, the Supply Chain Materiel Management
Regulations, and the development of changes to procurement regulations,
including the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. While
the definitive schedule will be based on the assessment mandated by the
legislation, the Department continues its ongoing efforts to address
counterfeit material in its supply chain. If confirmed, I will ensure
that section 818 is implemented as expeditiously as possible.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to address the problem of counterfeit electronic parts?
Answer. I believe the Department should explore expanded use of
technology to assist in combating this threat. This includes developing
tools to provide greater traceability and validation of authenticity
over the components lifecycle, such as, DNA marking, unique identifiers
inserted at time of manufacturing, and software methods. These steps
could have a significant impact on the problem of counterfeit
electronic parts, and if successful, greatly decrease the probability
of counterfeit items in the DOD supply chain in the future.
Question. Some have argued that the current test and evaluation
process does not appropriately address the unique circumstances
applicable to the acquisition of information technology systems.
What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to
improve the test and evaluation process for information technology
systems, including their vulnerabilities in the face of a growing
cybersecurity threat environment?
Answer. Information technology systems are ubiquitous but occur in
several very distinct types of products: they are embedded in weapon
systems, found in specialized command and control systems, and are the
basis for the Department's business systems. The Department should
continue to explore more efficient and effective test regimes for each
of these situations. To support iterative, incremental software
development, I believe the Department should move toward a more
continuous integration and test approach that integrates developmental
test, operational test, and certification and accreditation activities
to the greatest extent practical. This approach will rely more heavily
on early user involvement, use of automated testing, and continuous
monitoring of deployed capabilities. An essential element of this
approach is a robust pre-production cyber test environment that permits
us to better understand and characterize the cyber threat, and take
corrective actions prior to fielding systems. I believe that the
Department still has a considerable amount of work to do in maturing
this capability, building on the test-beds and laboratories that have
already been established. The Report on the Acquisition and Oversight
of Department of Defense Cyberspace Operations Capabilities that I
recently submitted to Congress provides more detail on the steps that
need to be and are being taken.
cyberspace-related procurement policy
Question. DOD's new strategic guidance highlights the increasing
importance of cyber operations with respect to both defensive and
offensive capabilities. As a result, this is one of the few areas in
which the Department is proposing to increase its investments.
What acquisition challenges do you foresee that are unique to the
procurement of cyber-related capabilities?
Answer. There are a number of challenges in this area, but the
greatest one is time and the need for agility. I recently submitted a
report to Congress that describes the Department's new cyber
acquisition management approach, which I am just beginning to
implement. Cyber offense and defense products are usually far smaller
in dollars than the major programs that undergo Department level
oversight, but they are critical to the Department's capabilities.
Cyber related products must often be developed, tested and fielded on
very short timelines that keep pace with both the threat and the
agility with which new technologies are created and enter the market
place. The implementation challenges to acquiring cyber capabilities at
the pace needed will be: (1) streamlining the acquisition framework to
manage risk and accommodate the rapid timelines of information
technology modernization and cyberspace operations; (2) evaluating
operational performance and risk while maintaining speed of execution;
(3) establishing a robust infrastructure for developing and testing
cyber capabilities quickly and effectively prior to implementation; and
(4) enabling timely collaboration across the Department, across the
Government, and with industry to address a ubiquitous problem that will
require strong collective action. If confirmed, I will continue to
implement and refine this approach.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to address
these unique challenges?
Answer. Section 933 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
directed the Department to provide a strategy for the rapid acquisition
of tools, applications, and other capabilities for cyber warfare. The
Department's response to Congress, which I recently submitted,
addressed many of the challenges I have described. If confirmed, I will
actively oversee the Department's cyber acquisition investments in
cooperation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief Information Officer,
the Commanders of STRATCOM and CYBERCOM, and the Services. I will also
work with other agencies and with industry to address the challenge of
cyber offense and defense acquisition.
acquisition workforce
Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established
an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address
shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund provides a
continuing source of funds for this purpose.
Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is
still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with
the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes. The fund supports continued strengthening of the
acquisition workforce. The quality and capability of this workforce is
critical to improved acquisition outcomes and achieving efficiencies.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the
money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in
a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition
workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with senior
acquisition leaders and the leadership of the Military Departments to
ensure that only sufficient levels of funding are used and that the
funding is employed to meet the Department's highest priority needs. I
have directed the Military Departments to reevaluate the balance of the
various acquisition professional career fields in their workforces
funded through DAWDF, and if confirmed I will work to ensure the
Department has an appropriate balance.
the defense industrial base
Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.
defense industry?
Answer. In concise terms; capable and healthy, but understandably
nervous and cautious. The industrial base greatly is concerned about
the unthinkable possibility of sequestration and the near certainty of
defense budgets that will be essentially flat at best. This is a major
change from the first decade of this century, and something everyone is
adjusting to. The changes currently taking place, including the
reduction of nearly half a trillion dollars from the planned defense
budget over 10 years, with more possible even if sequestration is
avoided, is of great concern to the defense industry and skilled
workers that support our national defense. I believe that defense
industry is a vital component of our total force structure and as such,
its health is essential to our national security. The industrial base
today is increasingly global, commercial, and financially complex, with
significant differences in the business environment faced in different
sectors and at different tiers of the supply chain. Demand for many
products has been very strong in recent years, other parts of the
industrial base faced low demand even during the up-cycle of defense
spending. Overall, our industry produces systems that offer an
unsurpassed technological advantage to our warfighters, but I believe
the industrial base could significantly improve the efficiency with
which it produces these products and the Department must be prepared to
assist them in doing so. If confirmed, I will carefully monitor the
industrial base and adapt policies and make necessary investments when
warranted to minimize risk to our technological advantage for future
warfighters.
Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense
industry?
Answer. As far as merger and acquisition activity at the major
prime level, I do not believe that further consolidated at that level
is likely to be in the interest of either the warfighter or the
taxpayer. I believe the Department should preserve as much competition
as possible at every tier. Below the top tier, I believe it is a
reasonable expectation that there will be some further transaction
activity as industry repositions in response to the current budget
environment and the new strategy. That is normal and healthy, and I
believe it should be driven by market forces and industry, not by the
government. The Department will certainly fulfill our commitments to
seriously and judiciously review all proposed mergers and acquisitions
on a case-by-case basis to ensure they are consistent with the
preservation of competition and the continued health of the industrial
base.
Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense sector?
Answer. Foreign investment can provide benefits to the Department
and the economy, but each investment must be considered on its own
merits. I am generally supportive of investment in the defense sector
including foreign investment if appropriate national security concerns
have been resolved and such investments do not compromise the
department's critical technology supply chain. As Acting Under
Secretary, I have the lead role in DOD's participation in the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) which conducts
national security reviews of foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms. I
support a leading role for DOD and a strong presence on CFIUS. I also
support robust DOD participation in implementation of the export
control laws to help ensure that defense-relevant U.S. technologies
resident in foreign-owned or controlled firms with DOD contracts are
not inappropriately transferred overseas or to foreign nationals.
Question. What steps if any do you believe DOD should take to
ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. I believe one of the most important steps the Department
can take to ensure the continued health of the industry is to engage
our industrial partners directly and be open with industry about
Department plans and intentions. The Department must also continue and
enhance our efforts to be receptive to industry concerns and address
legitimate issues as quickly and efficiently as possible. The
Department must also take all responsible steps to ensure that the
defense industry can support our warfighters' needs, now and in the
future. For some product and technologies, the Department is the only
customer, so the Government's budget and program choices have
significant influence on the financial health of the providing
companies. The Department's primary mechanism for supporting the
industrial base is through the programs that buy the defense industry's
products. In exceptional cases, when an acquisition program will not
support the minimum volume that a niche supplier needs to remain
viable, I believe the Department should consider the use of various
strategies to ensure the continued health of segments of the defense
industry that are deemed vital to our future capabilities. The Defense
Production Act title III authority, the Industrial Base Innovation
Fund, and the Manufacturing Technology Program are three such resources
to support critical capabilities that are at risk. These interventions
should only in exceptional cases, which I believe will be rare.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of the
Department's ongoing Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) analysis of
the defense industrial base?
Answer. The S2T2 project is making solid progress, but it is a
process, not a singular effort, so its status is, and will remain,
ongoing. The Department has used several techniques to collect a broad
baseline of data across the sectors and down the tiers of the
industrial base, and that data has already proven useful in considering
the industrial base implications of some proposed program adjustments.
The Department integrated initial S2T2 analysis into the process of
developing the Department's fiscal year 2013 budget proposal, and if
confirmed, one of my priorities will be to institutionalize the process
to evaluate the impact of acquisition decisions on the industrial base.
S2T2 is also making strong progress in fulfilling its mission to serve
as the Department's central repository for industrial base data,
working with the Services and components to eliminate duplication and
fill in gaps in data collection.
Question. Has the Department taken any concrete steps to enhance
the health and status of a particular sector or tier based upon this
analysis?
Answer. In response to initial analysis of S2T2 data, the
Department adjusted some of the program schedules in the fiscal year
2013 budget proposal to smooth workflow, maintaining the health of some
critical and fragile niches in the industrial base. The Department has
also adjusted the emphasis in planning for some industrial base
investments through the Manufacturing Technology Program and the
Defense Production Act title III authority, responding to data
collected as part of the S2T2 program. Moreover, as the Department
enters deliberations on the fiscal year 2014 budget, data collected as
part of the S2T2 effort will be essential as the Department
institutionalizes the process to consider the industrial base impacts
of program decisions.
Question. Under what circumstances if any do you believe the
Department should use Defense Production Act title III authorities to
address defense industrial base needs?
Answer. I believe that the Department should use title III
authorities, consistent with section 303 of that law, which requires
two determinations submitted to Congress prior to contract execution--
(1) Such action ``is essential to the national defense; and (2) without
[such action], United States industry cannot reasonably be expected to
provide the capability for the needed industrial resource, material, or
critical technology item in a timely manner.'' Title III decisions
should be informed by thorough industrial base analysis, based largely
on activities of the Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC), as well
as the Sector-by-Sector Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) project, and Space
Industrial Base Council Critical Technology Working Group (CTWG).
Established by section 722 of the act, DPAC is composed of Department
and Agency heads from across the Federal Government. Its mandate is to
advise the President on the effective use of DPA authorities, including
title III provisions. The CTWG was chartered to assess key domestic
space industries and, when necessary, coordinate strategies (primarily
through DPA title III) for ensuring reliable access to critical space-
related products. The CTWG is composed of military, intelligence, and
civilian agency representatives. The Department should rely on these
sources of information and advice as well as other sources in
determining industrial base priorities for DPA title III investments.
Question. What is your view of current or anticipated consolidation
efforts by major defense contractors?
Answer. As far as merger and acquisition activity at the major
prime level, I do not believe that further consolidated at that level
is likely to be in the interest of either the warfighter or the
taxpayer. I believe the Department should preserve as much competition
as possible at every tier. Below the top tier, I believe it is a
reasonable expectation that there will be some further transaction
activity as industry repositions in response to the current budget
environment and the new strategy. That is normal and healthy, and I
believe it should be driven by market forces and industry, not by the
government. The Department will certainly fulfill our commitments to
seriously and judiciously review all proposed mergers and acquisitions
on a case-by-case basis to ensure they are consistent with the
preservation of competition and the continued health of the industrial
base.
Question. How does the Department evaluate the effect that such
consolidations may have on the ability of DOD to leverage competition
to obtain fair value and the best quality in the goods and services it
procures and cultivate technological and engineering innovation?
Answer. When examining a merger, the Department weighs potential
harm to competition and innovation caused by horizontal consolidation
and vertical integration against potential benefits such as reduced
overhead costs and other synergies for both existing and planned
programs and future requirements.
Question. What role, if any, should DOD have in vetting and
approving or disapproving such consolidation efforts?
Answer. The Department examines mergers and acquisitions
concurrently and in cooperation with the DOJ or FTC and provides a
unified Department position on major transactions to the appropriate
antitrust regulatory agency for consideration in determining the U.S.
Government's position. As the primary customer impacted by defense
business combinations, the Department's views are particularly
significant because of its special insight into a proposed merger's
impact on innovation, competition, national security, and the defense
industrial base. However, the regulatory agencies have the authorities
provided by the antitrust statutes and may or may not take actions
supported by the Department. In certain limited cases, the Department
has in the past unilaterally asked the parties for certain behavioral
or structural remedies to address potential issues. Where warranted,
the Department supports transactions that eliminate excess capacity;
achieve cost savings to the Department; and improve national security.
manufacturing issues
Question. Section 812 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD
to issue comprehensive guidance to improve its management of
manufacturing risk in major defense acquisition programs.
What steps has the Department taken to implement the requirements
of section 812? What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. Section 812 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required the
Department to issue guidance on the management of manufacturing risk
for the major defense acquisition programs. In July 2011, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE))
updated the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) with new guidance on
how manufacturing readiness should be assessed throughout all phases of
the acquisition process and at specific systems engineering technical
reviews. This new guidance, added to DAG Chapter 4 (Systems
Engineering), was developed based on industry best practices and prior
DOD knowledge base maintained by DAU. If confirmed, I will continue to
evaluate the impact of these steps and refine these best practices to
stay abreast of rapidly changing technologies and industrial-base
capabilities.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address continuing shortcomings in manufacturing research and
capabilities in the development and acquisition of defense systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to promote the Department's
investments in advanced manufacturing technology and the transition of
those concepts to the industrial base, through competitive incentives
and direct investment.
I also see great value in having program managers consider
manufacturing and production issues early in program planning and
source selection. Manufacturing technology should routinely be included
in the risk reduction efforts during the technology demonstration phase
of the acquisition process and through continuing engineering support.
The Department should continue to embed advanced manufacturing into
specific weapons system platforms through technology transition
agreements between the Manufacturing Technology Program and the Program
of Record.
In late 2010, DARPA launched a major initiative to create
revolutionary approaches to the design, verification and manufacturing
of complex defense systems. Though the Adaptive Vehicle Make (AVM)
portfolio, DARPA is developing design tools and manufacturing
approaches that include a richer design space with the potential to
compress development timelines dramatically. This work is maturing and,
if confirmed, I will encourage the transition of these concepts to the
industrial base.
If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of
manufacturing technology and seek creative mechanisms to advance it.
Question. Do you believe that additional incentives are needed to
enhance industry's incorporation and utilization of advanced
manufacturing processes developed under the manufacturing technology
program?
Answer. In general, I believe that existing incentives are
acceptable, but will be strengthened further by steps the Department
and administration are taking. The Department's competitive acquisition
and procurement processes incentivize offerors to pursue internal R&D
investments in manufacturing technology and to employ advanced
manufacturing processes in response to the DOD's solicitations. The
recent efforts I have sponsored to create a Department Innovation
Marketplace include manufacturing technologies. The Manufacturing
Technology (ManTech) program is a partner in the National Strategic
Plan for Advanced Manufacturing announced in February 2012 by the
administration, which states, ``advanced manufacturing is a matter of
fundamental importance to the economic strength and security of the
United States.'' This strategy lays out a robust innovation policy,
which incorporates intensive engagement among stakeholders at the
national, State, and regional levels, including the DOD ManTech
program, to promote U.S. competitiveness. If confirmed, I will seek out
additional ways to provide incentives to industry to incorporate and
utilize advanced manufacturing technologies.
Question. What is your view of the utility of the Industrial Base
Innovation Fund for advancing manufacturing technology and processes?
Answer. The Industrial Base Innovation Fund (IBIF) has been and I
believe will continue to be a valuable resource for addressing short
term, operational needs and issues such as surge and diminishing
manufacturing sources. The Department currently possesses the
flexibility to respond to defense industrial base or manufacturing
needs, such as those identified by the ongoing sector-by-sector tier-
by-tier (S2T2) project, through programs identified in the President's
Budget. However, in fiscal year 2012, the IBIF program is being
reoriented to address niche concerns raised through the S2T2 effort,
when current programs will not support the minimum sustaining rate that
a niche supplier needs to provide a critical product or service. The
Department is focused on ensuring the continued health of selected
essential parts of the defense industry through mechanisms like the
IBIF. Such interventions are being pursued only when the Department is
highly likely to need a product in the future, where the product would
be prohibitively difficult and expensive to obtain after a hiatus, and
where affordable and innovative mechanisms are available to work with
the producers in the interim.
foreign military sales
Question. You were recently quoted as saying that the Department
should facilitate more foreign sales of U.S. weapons to advance
numerous policy aims including achieving higher procurement rates that
would aid the U.S. military as it braces for a prolonged period of
fiscal belt-tightening. Specifically, you were quoted saying, ``we've
always been supportive of [foreign military sales] but I think we can
up our game a little bit. . . . Maybe in some cases take a look at
taking a little bit more risk than we've been willing to take in the
past.''
Does this quote accurately reflect your views?
Answer. Yes.
Question. With regard to your reference to ``taking a little bit
more risk,'' what types of increased risk would you be prepared to
accept and why?
Answer. We are using the new defense exportability features (DEF)
legislative authority provided by Congress in the NDAAs for Fiscal
Years 2011 and 2012 to invest a small amount of U.S. RDT&E funding
early in development to implement pilot program activities that we hope
will lead to earlier, more successful sales in support of our foreign
policy objectives. Our recent DEF report to Congress describes ongoing
efforts. There is risk that these investments may not result in actual
exports in the future, but we have done our best to choose pilot
programs that are stable from a U.S. acquisition perspective also have
a high probability of future export to allied and friendly nations.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe DOD
generally and the Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics directorate in
particular should take to facilitate more foreign sales of U.S. weapons
and equipment?
Answer. The Department is taking several steps in this area that
should be continued and strengthened where possible. The administration
has been working for some time to implement reforms of export controls
through the so called ``four singles.'' This work is ongoing. In
particular, the ``four singles'' effort to review and simplify the
Commerce and State Department export control lists would be
particularly helpful in facilitating foreign sales. As Principal Deputy
Under Secretary, I have also worked with USD(Policy) to streamline the
U.S. Government processes for reviewing proposed sales for technology
security and foreign disclosure issues. This work is off to a good
start but should also be completed. The Department should also continue
to encourage use of the new DEF legislative authority provided by
Congress in the NDAAs for Fiscal Year 2011 and 2012 in programs that
have a high probability of future foreign sales. The DEF legislation
provides the Department authority to invest a small amount of U.S.
RDT&E funding early in development to implement pilot program
activities that can lead to earlier, more successful sales in support
of our foreign policy objectives. Finally, I believe that the senior
Department officials, including USD(AT&L), should be directly involved
in providing information about possible sales to foreign governments
and in removing administrative barriers to foreign sales where that is
in the interest of the United States. If confirmed I will continue to
be actively engaged in these and other measures to further foreign
sales of U.S. military equipment to our friends and allies.
science and technology
Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of science and
technology programs in meeting the Department's transformation goals
and in confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive
threats?
Answer. I believe that science and technology programs play a
crucial, indeed essential, role in meeting the Department's
transformation goals and in confronting all threats to include
irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive. To maintain the
technological superiority the United States has enjoyed for several
decades, it is essential that the Department pursues a focused, high
quality, aggressive science and technology program that is responsive
to the full range of capabilities required by our Armed Forces.
Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding
funding targets and priorities for the Department's long term research
efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department's leadership
to ensure that funding for science and technology investments are set
at levels that will ensure the Department has adequate resources in
this area. The Department and the administration have placed a strong
emphasis on sustaining S&T spending. Secretary Panetta has repeatedly
indicated that technological superiority underpins the Department's
recently released Military Strategy Guidance. If confirmed I will
continue that emphasis and, subject to the Secretary's approval, set
appropriate targets and priorities, primarily through the Defense
Planning Guidance.
Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to
assess whether the Department is making adequate investments in its
basic research programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with ASD(R&E) to ensure that
adequate investments are made by the military services and agencies in
basic research. Effective management of this portfolio requires good
judgment, tight coupling to the research community, and a long-term
perspective. The key metrics that I would use to assess the adequacy
and impact of these investments include technology transitions into our
acquisition programs and the industrial base and longitudinal
assessment of publications in scientific journals, number of students
supported, patents granted, and publications in peer reviewed
conference proceedings.
Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between
and among the science and technology programs of the military services
and defense agencies?
Answer. I believe that the Department is performing reasonably well
in this area, but that there is always room for additional improvement.
The formal coordination structure is as follows: at the top, there is
an S&T EXCOM, chaired by the ASD(R&E), and attended by the S&T
Executives of the military services and defense agencies. This group
meets quarterly to discuss major science and technology policy issues.
It also meets once a year for a Strategic Overview where each Component
presents an overview of the focus of its S&T investment. There are also
the Deputies to the S&T EXCOM that meet weekly and serve as an action
group to implement decisions made by the S&T EXCOM. The Department has
established seven Priority Steering Councils consisting of scientists
and engineers from the services and agencies, whose job it is to
develop cross-cutting roadmaps for the Department's recently designated
S&T Priorities. The councils are complemented by Communities of
Interest (COIs) populated by scientist and engineers from the services
and agencies for the purpose of integrating the Departments S&T program
in specific technology areas. COIs are permanent in nature. There are
also short-term Technology Focus Teams (TFTs) that perform in-depth
analysis of specific technology issues and report their findings to the
S&T EXCOM.
Question. What is the Department's role and responsibility in
addressing national issues related to science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics (STEM) education and workforce development?
Answer. I believe that the Department should take a strong role in
supporting the development of world-class STEM capabilities within the
domains of importance to national security. With the support of
Congress, the Department engages America's students, educators and
educational communities to enrich DOD's current and future workforce
through strategic investments. These investments are designed to create
access and opportunities to work alongside DOD scientists and engineers
as well as funding cutting-edge research in areas critical to national
security. The Department is actively working with the Office of Science
and Technology Policy, the National Science Foundation and other
Federal agencies to draft the first 5-Year Federal STEM Education
Strategic Plan to coordinate its STEM investments to achieve
Government-wide efficiencies in accordance with Federal policies. If
confirmed, I will support and participate in the effort to support STEM
workforce development.
Question. What steps if any would you take to support efforts to
ensure that the Nation has the scientific and technical workforce
needed for its national security technological and industrial base?
Answer. DOD STEM education, training and outreach programs, such as
the National Defense Education Program (NDEP), including K-12, the
Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation (SMART) program,
and National Security Science and Engineering Faculty Fellows (NSSEFF)
program expand the pool and diversity of scientists and engineers
available to the DOD and the technological and industrial base. If
confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Research and Engineering) to assess the extent to which NDEP,
and other similar STEM programs, meet the Department's current and
future technical workforce needs, are effective and efficient, and are
synchronized with other Federal Government STEM initiatives. I will
also continue to support the efforts in this area that non-defense
organizations within government and industry are conducting.
Question. How would you use science and technology programs to
better reduce technical risk and therefore potentially reduce costs and
schedule problems that accrue in large acquisition programs?
Answer. Technical risk should be identified during the early
program planning and analysis phases of the acquisition process as
alternative solutions to military problems are evaluated. Once the
candidate preferred solutions and associated risks are identified, the
program and S&T communities should work together to develop technology
maturation programs and risk reduction programs that will reduce the
risk associated with a technology to a level where it can be
incorporated in an acquisition program, either for technology
demonstration or for engineering development. The S&T community and the
program community should work together to identify the most promising
and high payoff areas for investment for both initial fielding and
subsequent upgrades or increments.
Question. Do you feel that the science and technology programs of
DOD are too near-term focus and have over-emphasized technology
transition efforts over investing in revolutionary and innovative
programs?
Answer. No. The Department has sustained its investments in longer
term technologies and DARPA is appropriately funded to pursue high risk
high payoff opportunities. I am concerned about some of the trends in
the balance of investments in the various R&D accounts, however. As the
Department has increased the amount of time some programs are being
kept in the inventory the percentage of the R&D budget being used for
upgrades has grown. The accounts for basic and applied research have
been protected and for good reason; however, this has led to reductions
in the accounts funding prototypes and full scale development. If
confirmed, I will continue to monitor these trends and recommend
actions to address it if needed.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Department has a well
articulated and actionable science and technology strategic plan?
Answer. Yes. The current science and technology strategic
investment strategy is a result of coordinated strategic planning
activities that have occurred over the past 2 years. In April 2011, the
Secretary of Defense issued a memo that identified seven S&T priorities
for investment planning. The Components published S&T strategic plans
that support the priorities of both the Department and their respective
organizations' assigned missions. These plans contain actionable goals
and are available to industry, academia, and other government
organizations on the Department's web site.
Question. Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring
authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure and ethics
requirements, to ensure that the Department can recruit and retain the
highest quality scientific and technical workforce possible?
Answer. I have not seen any data that would indicate conclusively
that the Department has a major problem in the areas of hiring
authority, personnel systems, disclosure, and ethics requirements;
however, I am concerned that the Department needs to strengthen its
workforce in the engineering fields. This includes the military officer
corps. If confirmed, I will work with the service leadership to assess
this situation and determine whether any corrective action is needed.
The Department does have tools such as Interdepartmental Personnel Act
(IPA) and Highly Qualified Expert (HQE) programs to bring in additional
talent. I believe the use of these programs could be expanded and I do
believe more can and should be done to increase the capacity of the
technical workforce without changes in the administrative areas
mentioned.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (ASD(R&E)) has been designated as the Chief Technology
Officer of DOD.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Chief Technology
Officer of DOD?
Answer. The Chief Technology Officer (CTO) is the advisor to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense for
research and engineering matters. The CTO should provide technical
leadership, guidance, and oversight for the Department's R&E program to
include the identification of critical technology areas and the
adequacy of the Department's overall R&E investment and program
content.
Question. What authority should the ASD(R&E) have over the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)?
Answer. By DOD Charter the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) is established as an Agency of DOD under the direction,
authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)). DARPA
also recommends to the Secretary of Defense, through the ASD(R&E), the
assignment of research projects to DARPA. I would not recommend any
changes in these authorities and roles.
Question. What authority should the ASD(R&E) have over other
Service and agency science and technology efforts?
Answer. I believe the existing authorities are appropriate. By DOD
Charter, the ASD(R&E) is to recommend approval, modification, or
disapproval of programs and projects of the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies to eliminate unpromising or unnecessarily duplicative
programs. The ASD(R&E) is also designated to recommend the initiation
or support of promising projects or programs for the science and
technology program. These recommendations are usually provided as
resource and programmatic input to the Department's process for
developing the President's Budget Request.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in organizational
structure, workforce, or availability of resources to improve the
effectiveness of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering?
Answer. Not at this time. The Department is still in the final
stages of implementing the provisions of the fiscal year 2009 Weapons
Systems Acquisition Reform Act. To date, progress has been good, and I
will continue to review whether additional adjustments are needed.
defense laboratories
Question. What is your view on the quality and relevance of the DOD
laboratories as compared to the DOE national laboratories, Federal
laboratories, academic laboratories and other peer institutions?
Answer. During my career, I worked with many of these institutions
and in general, I have found them to be staffed with competent
scientists and engineers who are dedicated to their work and performing
important missions for the DOD or the Nation. A key issue going forward
is how to operate these Laboratories as an enterprise to meet the needs
of the Department effectively. The ASD(R&E) is working with the
Services on this assessment.
Question. What metrics will you use, if confirmed, to evaluate the
effectiveness, competitiveness, and scientific vitality of the DOD
laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the DOD labs primarily based
on their success in developing and transitioning new technologies to
warfighters, the quality of their technical workforce, and the results
of external reviews of their effectiveness and innovation. As Acting
USD(AT&L), I have begun the process of putting in place mechanisms to
assess the productivity of DOD's acquisition institutions and if
confirmed I will continue that process.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to
increase the mission effectiveness and productivity of the DOD
laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
ASD(R&E) to ensure that DOD labs operate at maximum efficiency and
productivity. As Acting USD(AT&L), I have begun the process of putting
in place mechanisms to assess the productivity of DOD's acquisition
institutions, including laboratories, and if confirmed I will continue
that process.
Question. Do you see value in enhancing the level of technical
collaboration between the DOD laboratories and academic, other Federal
and industrial scientific organizations?
Answer. Yes. Technical collaborations across the laboratory system
are essential to success. Much cooperation already exists. Together
with the ASD(R&E), I am examining additional incentives to increase
teaming and partnering such as exchange programs, joint technology
programs, and participation in cross-agency reviews. In particular, I
am working with Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Energy on areas in which cooperation can be expanded. If confirmed, I
will continue these efforts.
Question. Do you believe that past investments in research
equipment; sustainment, repair and modernization; and facility
construction at the DOD laboratories have been sufficient to maintain
their mission effectiveness and their standing as world-class science
and engineering institutions?
Answer. I am not certain of the answer to this question. The
Services are currently not reporting any deficiencies in the DOD
laboratory infrastructure necessary to carry out leading-edge research
efforts of which I am aware. However, I do have some questions about
the overall state of DOD's laboratories. Consequently, I have asked the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to conduct
a comprehensive review of DOD labs in the context of the entire
national laboratory system. This review should provide insight into the
state of the labs. If confirmed, I will use the results of this review
to determine whether additional investments are needed.
Question. In your view, have the DOD laboratories struck an
appropriate balance between investments in near-term technology
programs that are tied to current battlefield needs and investments in
longer term, higher risk, and revolutionary capability development?
Answer. Yes. DOD's laboratory system is a balance of corporate
research labs (e.g., Naval Research Lab, Army Research Lab) that
maintain basic science as their primary focus, and engineering centers
such as the Navy Warfare Centers and the Army's Research and
Engineering Development Centers that maintain the Department's in-house
development and engineering expertise. The Services align approximately
one-third of their basic science budgets to in-house programs. A recent
review of the labs' basic science program was conducted by the Defense
Science Board (DSB) and the DSB concluded that the in-house basic
research program was technically strong and healthy. While not a
laboratory per se, DARPA does focus much of its work in higher risk
high payoff technology. In general I think the Department has a
reasonable balance, however if confirmed I will continue to assess this
balance to determine if adjustments are needed.
Question. Do you believe that this balance is likely to change with
the completion of our withdrawal from Iraq and our ongoing drawdown in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I expect the balance between near-term and longer-term
research will not change dramatically as a result of these events, but
the portfolio of research topics will shift to support the Department's
recently released strategic guidance, particularly toward any emerging
threats.
Question. Section 219 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 authorizes
the directors of a defense laboratory to use up to 3 percent of the
total funds available to the laboratory to fund innovative research,
technology transition activities, and workforce development.
What is your understanding of the extent to which the Department
has implemented section 219?
Answer. Each of the Services has implemented section 219 programs.
Though the statute gives authority to lab directors to utilize up to 3
percent of all available funds for this program, the actual amount to
date has been in the 1 to 2 percent range. The Department submits a
Section 219 status report annually to Congress to detail the related
investment.
Question. Do you believe that the funding flexibility provided by
section 219 has been appropriately utilized by the Department?
Answer. Yes. So far, I believe the flexibilities provided by
section 219 have been used appropriately by the Department. Lab
directors have appropriately balanced section 219 investments with
other programs and procurements. If confirmed, I will continue to
monitor the use of this flexibility by lab directors.
Question. Do you believe that it would be feasible or appropriate
for the Department to use the authority of section 219 to adjust the
balance between investments in near-term technology programs and
longer-term, higher-payoff investments?
Answer. Yes, however, I believe that the current program
authorities and structure are adequate and are being used
appropriately, and recommend no changes at this time.
defense advanced research projects agency
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the DARPA and the ASDR&E?
Answer. By DOD Charter the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) is established as an Agency of DOD under the direction,
authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) who
reports to the Under Secretary. DARPA also recommends to the Secretary
of Defense, through the ASD(R&E), the assignment of research projects
to DARPA.
Question. In your view, has DARPA struck an appropriate balance
between investments in near-term technology programs that are tied to
current battlefield needs and investments in longer term, higher risk,
and revolutionary capability development?
Answer. Yes. The ASD(R&E) completed a comprehensive review of the
DARPA science and technology program last August and reported that the
DARPA investment appeared to be properly balanced between near-term and
long term, higher risk technology and capability development. If
confirmed, I will continue to review DARPAs balance of investments,
however one of the most important characteristics of DARPA is that it
has more independence to invest in high risk high payoff technologies
than other DOD institutions and I believe this should continue.
Question. Do you feel that DARPA has adequately invested in the
academic research community?
Answer. Yes, however this is a very subjective assessment. DARPA
basic research investment, which largely goes to academic institutions,
has more than doubled since 2007, from $150 million per year to the
current fiscal year 2013 request of $349 million. This investment has
expanded DARPA and academic interaction. If confirmed, I will continue
to monitor DARPAs investment in academic research.
Question. What are the major issues related to DARPA investments,
management and workforce, and research outcomes that you will seek to
address?
Answer. DARPA has been, and will continue to be at the center of
DOD-funded innovation, particularly for addressing difficult problems
in creative and often non-traditional ways. Areas I will focus on if
confirmed include DARPA's cyber investments and potential game-changing
technologies applicable to emerging threats. If confirmed, I will
continue to support DARPAs efforts to attract an exceptional technical
workforce.
Question. Do you feel that DARPA is adequately transitioning its
programs to the Services and Defense Agencies? If not, how will you
address that challenge?
Answer. DARPA's success in this regard has been mixed, and the
transition of technologies in some cases could be more effective. I
recently discussed this issue with the departing DARPA Director who
indicated that some relationships with the Military Departments could
be stronger. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Acquisition
Executives and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering to strengthen transition for the entire R&E enterprise,
including DARPA.
Question. Do you believe that there has been an appropriate level
of interaction between DARPA and its intelligence community analog,
IARPA, given the overlap in many research areas?
Answer. I do not have any information that would suggest otherwise,
and my belief is that there has been appropriate interaction between
DARPA and IARPA.
test and evaluation
Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these
systems are put into production.
What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of
the Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that the independence of the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is an important aspect of
ensuring the Department's acquisition programs are realistically and
adequately tested in their intended operational environment. I am aware
of concerns that testing can be perceived as creating additional cost
and delays in delivering capability, especially in the context of
pressing real world operations. If confirmed, I will continue to meet
regularly with and seek the advice of the DOT&E on testing and
evaluation issues as a partner in the acquisition process, while
allowing for the necessary independent viewpoints. I have great respect
for the professionalism, dedication, and integrity of the current
DOT&E, whom I have known for many years. If confirmed, I will continue
to welcome his insights on program performance and other issues.
DOT&E's independence is of great value in the acquisition process and
is appropriate.
Question. What are your views about the role of the Director of
Developmental Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of the
Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. The role of the DASD(DT&E) is to advise the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics on all matters relating to developmental test and
evaluation within the Department. In this role, the DASD(DT&E) mission
includes helping to improve acquisition outcomes through early and
continuous engagement with Program Offices in order to verify system
performance meets requirements and to identify the need for corrective
actions as early as possible. DT&E also provides confirmation that a
system is mature enough to proceed to IOT&E. The DASD(DT&E) provides
support to Program Offices and the DOD T&E community, assists with test
planning and data analysis, and identifies and shares best practices.
Additionally, the DASD(DT&E) provides an independent assessment to
advise milestone decision authorities and the component acquisition
executives of any risks prior to entering production or initial
operational test and evaluation. As the Milestone Decision Authority
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs, I particularly rely on the
DASD(T&E) for advice on the demonstrated maturity of designs to enter
initial production and on the adequacy of planned test programs at the
beginning of Engineering and Manufacturing Development. If confirmed, I
will continue to rely heavily on the DASD(T&E) for support to these
decisions.
Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation
conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be
tested?
Answer. I only have anecdotal evidence at this point that this is a
concern. I believe that there needs to be Government led DT&E supported
by contractor testing and that the best mix of government and
contractor testing varies from program to program based on a variety of
factors. If confirmed, I will continue to assess this balance to
determine if adjustments should be made. The ASD(DT&E) is currently
reviewing all developmental test infrastructure, both government and
contractor. If confirmed I will use the results of that assessment to
determine if changes are warranted.
Question. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the
standard testing process? If confirmed, how will you work to ensure
that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is
subject to appropriate operational testing?
Answer. The assessment process for capabilities provided in
response to the warfighter's urgent operational requirements must be
appropriately tailored to ensure that the warfighter receives critical
capabilities that are reasonably safe, perform their basic functions
successfully, and are provided on a timeline that meets the
warfighter's expectation. This generally implies initial test regimes
prior to first fielding of rapid acquisition programs that accept more
risk than the normal acquisition process. The Department is currently
revising DODI 5000.02 which governs the operation of the Defense
Acquisition System to include a provision for rapid fielding
procedures. Those procedures will provide additional guidance on the
testing required for rapid acquisition programs. If confirmed, I will
complete this effort and make adjustments as the Department learns from
its experience with testing for rapid acquisition programs.
Question. Do you believe that the operational and developmental
testing organizations in DOD and the Military Services are adequate to
ensure an appropriate level of testing, and testing oversight, on major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes, I believe there are adequate resources to ensure an
appropriate level of testing and testing oversight on major defense
acquisition programs. That said, however, I am a firm believer in
continuous improvement, and I have no doubt that the Department can
improve its performance. Problems that I have identified include the
need for earlier definition of test requirements so that program
planning and budgeting are stable, and the need to shift more emphasis
to early developmental testing to reduce the likelihood of late
discovery of design or production issues. If confirmed, I will continue
to work with the DOT&E and DASD(DT&E) to ensure the Department conducts
effective and efficient developmental and operational testing to
improve acquisition outcomes.
Question. Section 102 of the WSARA established a new Director of
Developmental Testing to help address this problem. Section 835 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 built on this provision by establishing new
organizational and management requirements for developmental testing on
major defense acquisition programs.
What steps has the Department taken to date to implement these two
provisions?
Answer. As Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, I have approved a DOD Instruction (DODI
5134.17) which assigns responsibilities and functions and prescribes
relationships and authorities for the DASD(DT&E). We are issuing
guidelines for implementing the requirements of Section 835 of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2012, and I am in the process of including those
requirements established in an update to the Defense Acquisition System
Instruction (DODI 5000.02).
Question. What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to complete the update of the DODI
5000.02 that incorporates the requirement in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012. I will work with the Services to resolve any unique issues they
have with the implementation. I will monitor the progress of the
Services in implementing this new requirement and have DASD(DT&E)
report the status in the fiscal year 2012 Annual Report to Congress.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
ensure adequate developmental testing on major weapon systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance
of having early and continuous engagement with the Program Offices. I
will work collaboratively with the Component Acquisition Executives and
Program Offices to develop adequate test programs, assist with test
planning and data analysis, and identify and share best practices to
help improve acquisition outcomes.
Question. Some have argued that testing takes too long and costs
too much. Others contest this view pointing out that testing and
evaluation is an essential tool to assist in the development of weapon
systems and ensure that they perform as intended. The Armed Services
Committee has expressed concern that problems with weapons systems have
been discovered during operational testing and evaluation that should
have been discovered during developmental testing and corrected during
subsequent development.
Do you believe that major defense acquisition programs are helped
or hurt by cutting tests budgets and reducing the time available for
developmental testing?
Answer. In general, they are more likely to be hurt. There is a
natural tendency, exacerbated by tight budgets, funding cuts, and poor
execution, to cut corners in test planning (both time and resources) to
save time and money. In my experience, this is usually a mistake that
is corrected by reality in the form of more schedule and cost overruns.
I am strongly committed to ensuring that the Department has development
programs with appropriate timelines and well resourced, realistic
testing. I believe the Department should be continuously looking for
ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our test programs
to save time and money, but the Department should not be cutting test
budgets and reducing test activities without a sound specific plan to
achieve those savings.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the program management community and the testing and evaluation
community work collaboratively and effectively in a way that maximizes
the likelihood that developmental testing and evaluation will detect
and identify problems timely in software and hardware to provide
opportunities to correct them before production and before operational
testing and evaluation begins?
Answer. My goal is to ensure that the Department discovers
deficiencies early in programs in order to take corrective action as
early in development as possible in order to minimize program
disruption and save time and money. Early identification of problems
will also increase the probability of programs being found effective
and suitable in Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). If
confirmed, I will continue my efforts to ensure that the program
management community, the systems engineering community, and the
testing and evaluation community work collaboratively and effectively
throughout the acquisition process, but particularly at the earlier
stages of program planning.
ballistic missile defense
Question. When it was created in 2002, the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) was exempted from normal acquisition rules and processes in order
to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities on an expedited
basis. That fielding has now taken place, although numerous upgrades
and corrections are being implemented. Each of the elements of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) would normally meet the
criteria for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), but none of
them has been managed as an MDAP. Furthermore, for most of MDA's
existence, all its programs were funded with Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, even for non-RDT&E activities.
Currently, BMDS acquisition programs are overseen by the Missile
Defense Executive Board (MDEB), chaired by the USD(AT&L).
What management and acquisition changes or improvements if any do
you believe are warranted for the ballistic missile defense programs?
Answer. As Acting Under Secretary I have chaired three MDEB
meetings and attended a number of others, and through the oversight and
insight developed during these meetings and the preparation for them, I
believe that the current management and acquisition approach is
reasonably effective. I would like to have more experience with this
management approach, however, before recommending any changes.
Question. Do you believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should have the same
responsibilities relative to the ballistic missile defense acquisition
programs as for all other MDAPs?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, has the same responsibilities, within the current
departmental guidance, for the ballistic missile defense programs as
for all MDAPs, with the exception that early acquisition decisions,
including entry into technology demonstration and entry into
engineering and manufacturing development, have been delegated to the
Director of the MDA. In general, I see no reason why these
responsibilities should be different than those for other MDAPs.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you plan to take to
ensure that the ballistic missile defense programs of DOD follow sound
acquisition and management practices and processes?
Answer. The MDEB has been the forum since 2007 for senior
departmental review of MDA activity. If confirmed, I will continue to
review the MDEB efforts, to maintain regular oversight of the MDA
acquisition and management practices, program progress, and issue
resolution. The MDEB includes essentially the same membership as the
DAB that oversees MDAP programs. If confirmed, I will continue to rely
on the independent advice of these staff offices, as I do for MDAPs, to
ensure sound decisions are made.
Question. For many years, DOD and Congress have agreed on the
principle that major weapon systems should be operationally effective,
suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a
credible threat. These elements are all consistent with the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review (BMDR) of February 2010.
Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we
deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable,
survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible
threat?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that the BMDS and each of its elements meet these criteria?
Answer. Rigorous and realistic testing of missile defenses is
imperative. The MDA presently is executing a plan, which includes the
use of a Development and Operational Testing approach that allows the
U.S. Strategic Command warfighter community (which includes all
combatant commanders) and all the Service Operational Test Agencies to
be integral parts of the test program. If confirmed, I will maintain
these test activities as an integral part of ballistic missile defense
program planning, and execution priorities, and review the plans and
the proposed test activities to determine whether additional steps or
other emphases are necessary or appropriate.
Question. For many years, Congress and DOD have agreed on the
principle of ``fly before you buy,'' namely demonstrating that a weapon
system will work in an operationally effective, suitable, and
survivable manner before deciding to acquire and deploy such systems.
This demonstration requires rigorous, operationally realistic testing,
including independent Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), to
provide an accurate assessment of how weapon systems will perform in
combat conditions. The DOT&E has expressed concerns that the testing of
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system has not been sufficient to
provide confidence in its operational capability.
Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be
operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and
Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations
of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to making decisions to
deploy such systems?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes adequate independent
operational test and evaluation?
Answer. The BMDS Integrated Master Test Plan serves as the
departmental contract to perform comprehensive developmental and
operational independent testing. If confirmed, I will work with the MDA
and the DOT&E to continue the evolution of BMDS testing to ensure that
adequate tests are conducted.
Question. The MDA has developed ballistic missile defense systems
and capabilities and procured the initial inventories of missile
defense element weapon systems. However, the Military Departments are
notionally intended to procure, operate, and sustain operational
missile defense systems.
What do you believe is the appropriate role for the Military
Departments in the procurement, operation, and sustainment of ballistic
missile defense systems, and at what point do you believe these systems
should be transitioned and transferred to the Military Departments?
Answer. I believe that at some point for each program,
responsibility for operation and sustainment should be transferred from
MDA to a Military Department. Production may be transferred as well,
but this will vary from system to system on a case-by-case basis. The
Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance in June 2011, providing
direction for MDA and Military Department life cycle responsibilities
and a process to define and schedule management and funding
responsibility transfer points. If confirmed, I will oversee the
execution of the guidance as the BMDS elements mature and I will review
and recommend changes as appropriate. If confirmed, I will work with
the MDA and the Military Departments to ensure processes and policies
are in place to accomplish the transition and transfer in a timely and
effective manner.
Question. The MDA and the Army have reached tentative agreement on
transferring Army ballistic missile defense programs to MDA.
What do you believe are the appropriate roles for the Army and MDA,
respectively, in the development, management, and funding of Army
ballistic missile defense programs, and what risks do you see, if any,
from transferring such programs to MDA?
Answer. Defining this relationship is still a work in progress, so
my views at this time may not be final. That said, I generally support
a model that is similar to the model used by MDA and the Navy in which
the Military Department retains responsibility for overall system
performance and is the technical authority for the total system while
MDA provides defined products for integration into the Army's system.
The two organizations must work closely together to address integration
issues and define interfaces and requirements, but I believe this
arrangement provides the most effective management approach. The
Patriot system is the only specific system for which this is an issue
to my knowledge and Aegis is the comparable Navy system that uses this
model.
nuclear weapons council
Question. If confirmed as USD(AT&L), you will chair the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC).
In your view, what are, or should be, the highest priorities of the
NWC?
Answer. In my view, the highest priorities of the NWC are to ensure
the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear
weapons stockpile and to ensure the Nation can field an effective
nuclear deterrent.
Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe should be made
to the operations of the NWC?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as well as members of the NWC, to
identify improvements, if any, that would strengthen the partnership
with the Department of Energy in ensuring a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear stockpile and a modern supporting infrastructure. As Acting
Under Secretary, I have chaired several NWC meetings and at this point,
I believe that it is functioning as intended.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
development of the Nuclear Posture Review?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the
administration's ongoing implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review.
Question. The 1251 report that accompanied the New START treaty set
forth a robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and the
triad of nuclear delivery vehicles.
Do you support that plan and agree that modernizing the nuclear
triad and replacing critical infrastructure such as the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 should be National Security
priorities and that they should be built in a timely manner?
Answer. DOD has fully supported the Department of Energy's efforts
to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile and to modernize the
supporting infrastructure. Today's austere budget environment, however,
will delay key warhead life extension programs and infrastructure
modernization relative to the timelines reflected in last year's
Section 1251 Report. Although UPF construction will proceed mostly as
planned with some changes in scope, the DOE's current plan is to defer
construction of the CMRR facility for at least 5 years as a result,
using existing facilities to meet plutonium needs. Over the coming
months, the DOD and DOE will work together to firm up cost data on key
programs, providing a basis to inform alternative approaches to
mitigate the risk of program delays and further advance the President's
commitment to safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces.
Question. Do you share DOD's view regarding the need for
establishing a capability to produce 50 to 80 pits per year as asserted
in congressional testimony by DOD and NNSA witnesses?
Answer. Given current stockpile requirements, I support the DOD
view regarding the need for the capability to produce 50-80 pits per
year.
logistics and readiness
Question. If confirmed as USD(AT&L), what steps if any would you
take to ensure that life cycle maintenance requirements and sustainment
support are considered in the acquisition process for new DOD systems?
Answer. Several steps are underway to ensure life cycle
requirements are addressed in the acquisition process for new DOD
systems, and if confirmed, I would continue those steps and look for
other opportunities to integrate life cycle cost considerations into
the acquisition process. Under the Better Buying Power initiatives,
each new program is required to establish a sustainment cost cap that
is intended to drive design trades and investment during development to
ensure the program is affordable throughout the life cycle. In
addition, core maintenance determinations are now defined at Milestone
A and refined at Milestone B to include detailed workload estimates.
These estimates are used as the basis for determining the level of
investment required to establish a viable repair capability at our
organic activities and are included in the acquisition program
baseline. Additionally, programs are now required to complete a Life
Cycle Sustainment Plan and Systems Engineering Plan in which specific
sustainment development, production, and operating resource
requirements are fully identified and reflected in the respective
Services' budget submissions. Finally, data from recent studies
indicate strongly that in many cases Performance-Based Logistics has
been effective at reducing life cycle costs and if confirmed I will
look for appropriate opportunities to expand the use of this approach.
If confirmed, I intend to continue these initiatives and to look for
additional opportunities to drive life cycle cost down.
Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 requires DOD to conduct
life-cycle cost analysis for new capabilities including the fully
burdened cost of fuel during the analysis and evaluation of
alternatives in the acquisition program design trades.
Do you believe that the fully burdened cost of fuel is an
appropriate factor for the Department to consider in the evaluation of
acquisition alternatives?
Answer. Yes. Fully Burdened Cost of Energy estimates for
acquisition programs is a useful component of the total life cycle cost
estimating process. This process helps the Department understand the
full long term expenses the Department is signing up to when it commits
to a new system. While Total Ownership Cost is a long-term estimate
based on steady-state usage, the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy is
scenario-based. The Fully Burdened Cost of Energy provides a useful
operational cost perspective and helps decisionmakers differentiate
between the fuel and logistics demands of competing system concepts DOD
is considering.
operational energy
Question. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 created the position of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs.
If confirmed as USD(AT&L), how would you work with office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs to advance the objectives of that office?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy
reports to the USD(AT&L). Energy is a fundamental enabler for the
Department's mission. I have been and will continue to take steps,
through and in support of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs, to improve the efficiency of our
use, the range of energy alternatives available to our forces, and
energy planning for our future force. This office is an important part
of the AT&L enterprise, and, if confirmed, I will continue to expand
and further its efforts.
Question. With persistent combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and around the globe, combat service support units are constantly at
risk when transporting supplies.
What role do you believe the USD(AT&L) should play in developing
strategies to reduce the logistical footprint of deployed units
operating in hostile environments?
Answer. I believe the USD(AT&L), in conjunction with U.S.
Transportation Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff,
and the Military Services, must ensure that the Department obtain the
best possible sustainability, maintainability, reliability, and fuel
efficiency for our deployed weapon systems and contingency bases, as a
way of lowering the logistical footprint needed to maintain them. If
confirmed, my office will continue to provide guidance and oversee the
development of technologies and strategies that focus on managing the
logistics footprint required to sustain the force safely in any theater
of operation. If confirmed, I will also continue to emphasize the
logistics implications of new programs as a major factor in decisions
about which programs to pursue.
Question. What is your view of the role that the USD(AT&L) should
play in developing and pursuing alternative energy sources for DOD?
Answer. I believe AT&L has a lead role to play in pursuing
alternative energy sources, both for operational forces through the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs, and for facilities energy through the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Installations and Environment.
Question. Do you foresee a significant role for the use of solar
and wind energy systems with deployed units operating in remote
environments?
Answer. As DOD builds a more agile force, the Department is finding
that improvements in our energy use, including the use of renewable
energy, can increase our combat effectiveness. In particular, studies
and deployed experience indicate that solar technology has promise for
supplying energy for deployed units, though it depends on the mission
and the environment. Solar technologies are proving most beneficial at
the tactical edge, where they can reduce re-supply needs, can integrate
with batteries, and diminish the noise and heat signature of U.S.
forces. Wind energy systems for expeditionary units have not been
deployed because of low average wind speeds in current operational
environments, but they could be useful in some remote deployment
situations, particularly as technologies for small, low-wind systems
improve.
base realignment and closure
Question. The Secretary of Defense has indicated that the
President's budget request will include a request for two future rounds
of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), one in 2013 and the other in
2015. The most recent round of BRAC has just been completed and we are
awaiting various reports outlining lessons learned and quantifying
savings. Early indications, however, are that the 2005 BRAC failed to
achieve the cost savings originally forecast.
What is your understanding of the Department's rationale for
requesting two additional rounds of BRAC?
Answer. The Department has formulated new military strategy
guidance and a fiscal year 2013 budget intended to implement that
guidance. This strategy and budget include force structure changes that
will produce excess capacity. The Department's rationale is essentially
that these changes should be accompanied by a corresponding reduction
in the supporting infrastructure including military bases that are no
longer needed and which impose wasteful costs on the Department.
Question. Are you aware of any analysis has been conducted to
justify the request for two additional rounds of BRAC?
Answer. No specific analysis has been conducted yet. With the 2013
timeline in mind, the Department has started the initial preparatory
work regarding internal governance for a BRAC process--inventorying our
property and evaluating the extent to which the Department needs to
update its analytical tools. These efforts will allow the Department to
proceed expeditiously if Congress authorizes BRAC. After congressional
authorization, the BRAC process begins with a certification that BRAC
is needed and will produce savings. Specifically, the Department
prepares a 20-year force structure plan and a comprehensive
installation inventory. Using those documents, the Department prepares
a report for Congress in which it: describes the infrastructure
necessary to support the force structure, identifies areas of excess,
conducts an economic analysis of the effect of closures and
realignments on the excess capacity, and certifies that BRAC is needed
and will generate savings. Only then is the Secretary authorized to
proceed with the commission itself.
Question. What is your view on the argument that we should close
excess installations overseas before new rounds of BRAC are authorized?
Answer. I would agree that both should be examined, and the
Department has already begun the process of reviewing its overseas
bases, particularly in Europe. This does not require a BRAC
authorization. However, in my view it makes sense to look at our
domestic and overseas bases at the same time so that the two reviews
can inform one another.
Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the BRAC
statute, if confirmed, to ensure a more efficient and effective BRAC
process?
Answer. I would not recommend any changes to the BRAC statute. BRAC
is a fair, objective, and proven process for closing and realigning
installations.
environmental security
Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for environmental
security for DOD.
What do you see as the most significant challenges facing the
Department in the area of environmental security?
Answer. The greatest challenge will be maintaining and improving
the Department's level of environmental security performance in a
difficult budget environment. If confirmed, I will continue to look for
ways to find efficiencies without undermining performance.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans, if any, do you
have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, my approach will continue to be twofold.
First, I will continue the aggressive oversight of environmental
programs, with the goal of minimizing management costs and making our
organizational structure and performance contracts as efficient and
effective as possible. Second, I will continue to emphasize the power
of strategic R&D investments to lower the costs associated with
environmental security.
Question. While the Military Departments have made considerable
progress addressing environmental contamination at military
installations, there remains a substantial amount of work to be done,
including the remediation of discarded munitions and Unexploded
Ordnance (UXO), at current and former DOD sites. The Military
Departments have managed to maintain reasonably level funding for these
cleanup programs over the past several years; however, many of these
clean-ups will take years to complete and, in the current budget
environment, the restoration accounts will come under pressure.
What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that the
DOD remediation programs receive adequate funding and make meaningful
progress, particularly in the detection and clearance of discarded
munitions and UXO?
Answer. I believe that the Department needs to continue its
existing remediation programs as requested in the fiscal year 2013
budget and that it also needs to continue the programs that are
developing technologies that have high promise of making the
remediation programs more cost effective. A decade of investment by the
Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and
the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program has yielded
technologies that can discriminate between UXO and harmless metal
objects with a high degree of reliability. This is a remarkable
achievement provides the potential to dramatically accelerate the pace
of remediation for UXO within available funds. If confirmed I will
continue to support these programs and work to ensure that they are
adequately funded and effectively executed.
Question. How might the SERDP help with the overall progress of the
Defense Environmental Restoration program, particularly in view of the
current fiscal environment?
Answer. SERDP is DOD's environmental science and technology
program; its mission is to address high priority cross-service
environmental requirements and develop solutions to the Department's
most critical environmental challenges. SERDP is an R&D program that is
aimed directly at reducing DOD operating costs. SERDP has allowed the
Department to avoid spending billions of dollars for environmental
cleanup, environmental liability and weapons system maintenance. If
confirmed, I will continue to support this high payoff investment.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
competition in procurement and acquisition
1. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, it is commonly agreed that
competition is the strongest tool for driving innovation and lower
prices in defense procurements and acquisition programs. Do you agree?
Mr. Kendall. I agree and believe that competition is a cornerstone
of the acquisition system with benefits that are well established.
Competition provides a powerful tool to drive innovation and lower
prices. Dr. Carter and I emphasized competition under the ``Better
Buying Power Initiative'' to promote real competition and obtain
greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending and if
confirmed, I would continue to do so. Even in those cases where head to
head competition isn't economically viable, the Department can create a
competitive environment as an incentive to industry.
common data link systems
2. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, industry representatives assert that
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Military Departments have
failed to follow policies created to stimulate competition for
contracts for Common Data Link (CDL) systems by relying on sole-source
contracts favoring one company's proprietary, non-standard waveforms.
Is this an accurate characterization? If so, why did DOD allow an
environment to evolve that stifles competition?
Mr. Kendall. I am familiar with the situation with regard to the
CDL and have been working with the Military Departments to address it.
It was brought to my attention by industry, and I believe there is a
legitimate concern here. The Department advocates open competition for
system acquisitions, and is currently assessing CDL system procurement
practices in several respects in an effort to improve competition. The
first is to make certain that no vendor-proprietary or undocumented
interfaces are being cited as requirements or evaluation criteria in
the Department's CDL system solicitations. The second is to ensure that
as DOD advances its CDL standards, the Department maintains a broad
industry base from which it seeks innovation. Finally when CDL systems
are procured as a subsystem within a platform, DOD should be confident
that when the prime vendor investigates suitable sources for CDL-
compliant systems these vendors are competitively selected. Industry
inputs and suggestions for improvement are being sought as part of this
assessment.
3. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, what will you do, if confirmed, to
level the playing field within DOD and the Military Departments to
ensure there are viable competitors for the CDL systems that are
mandated for transmitting intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance data?
Mr. Kendall. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure that
the Department evaluates all future CDL procurement opportunities in
the Department's plans for competition. DOD is working to ensure there
are multiple qualified vendors prior to issuing solicitations. For
example, one of the threshold requirements for many CDL procurements is
having National Security Agency (NSA) certification of vendors'
encryption solutions in their products. DOD is working with NSA to
assist vendors in achieving this Type 1 certification. Also, the
Department will identify and address any proprietary or undocumented
interfaces that could limit greater competition. If confirmed, I will
also ensure that the Department evaluates all future CDL-like
procurement opportunities for competition. I will continue to work to
ensure that procurements like CDL, which are intended to be open system
and open interface based, will in fact be acquired so that proprietary
restrictions on competition are avoided.
4. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, many CDL terminals, systems, and
platforms are said to be purchased with proprietary and undocumented
waveforms and features that create a non-CDL standard and thereby tend
toward a monopoly. How will you address this impediment to competition
that DOD has created by purchasing and fielding these proprietary
features?
Mr. Kendall. If confirmed, I will use the Department's assessment
of CDL system acquisitions to identify ways to minimize and potentially
eliminate the use of proprietary interfaces. If the functions provided
by these proprietary items are determined to be essential, a DOD
standard non-proprietary version can be developed. The Common Control
Interface effort for the terminal control interfaces is an example of
this approach. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that future CDL
procurements are based on open standards and interfaces without
proprietary restrictions. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the
Department reviews Service CDL solicitations to ensure proprietary
features are not used to unfairly limit competition.
5. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, in the past, DOD has used dual-source
mandates and second-source arrangements to spur competition and to
maintain a healthy industrial base. Can you adopt these practices for
CDL products?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, if the business case supports multiple sources.
If confirmed, I will continue to look for opportunities to reduce cost
through competitive sourcing including the use of multiple suppliers
where the procured quantities are adequate to justify multiple sources.
I will also continue to look for opportunities for commonality across
platforms that will increase the opportunities for competitive
sourcing.
6. Senator Webb. Mr. Kendall, would multiple sources not reduce
costs and increase competition?
Mr. Kendall. The use of multiple sources and competition could
reduce cost if enough CDLs are acquired so that the costs of
establishing a second source are less than the savings that can be
achieved through competitive incentives.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
domestically produced metals
7. Senator Hagan. Mr. Kendall, as you are aware, DOD in early 2008
initiated a rulemaking seeking to weaken longstanding requirements that
armor steel plate procured by DOD be melted domestically. Specifically,
DOD put forth and subsequently finalized a definition of ``produced''
that allows armor plate to be made with metals melted and rolled
outside of the United States, yet considers that armor plate domestic
if it simply goes through finishing processes in the United States.
Because the new definition disregards the most capital- and labor-
intensive portion of production, the melt stage, it puts at risk
valuable jobs and technology, jeopardizing the future ability of U.S.-
based armor plate producers to meet the demands of the military. It may
also lead to increased dependency on unreliable foreign suppliers.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011
required a review and, if necessary, revision of the existing
regulation to ensure the definition of ``produced'' is consistent with
congressional intent. In response to DOD's request for comment in the
course of its review, seven Senate colleagues and I wrote a bipartisan
letter to Secretary Panetta reaffirming our support for a return to the
longstanding requirement that specialty metals be melted in the United
States. Thirty-three of our colleagues in the House of Representatives
sent a similar bipartisan letter to DOD. Despite the fact that your
review was required to be completed by early October 2011, the review
has not been completed. Can you please tell me when DOD plans to
finalize its long-overdue review of the definition of ``produced'', as
it relates to armor plate?
Mr. Kendall. DOD is reviewing the regulatory definition of
``produced'' in accordance with section 823 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011. The Department published a Federal Register Notice
requesting public comment regarding this definition that closed in
October 2011. The Department is considering all public comments as well
as communications from Members of Congress before making a
recommendation on whether a change to the definition of ``produced'' is
required. The Department's working group will make its recommendation
by June 2012. If a revision to the definition is recommended, the
Department will submit a proposed rule for public comment.
8. Senator Hagan. Mr. Kendall, will DOD revise the definition of
``produced'' to require that armor steel plate be melted in the United
States, in light of well-documented congressional intent?
Mr. Kendall. The Department is considering all public comments and
the positions expressed by Members of Congress before making a
recommendation on whether or not a change to the definition of
``produced'' is required. If a revision to the definition is
recommended, the Department will submit a proposed rule for public
comment.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
rare earth minerals
9. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, according to the rare earth report
submitted to Congress by DOD, the United States could have the
capability to meet all of DOD's rare earth demands by 2013. It's well
known that only one company expects to have significant U.S. production
capacity in 2012 and may not produce heavy rare earths, instead sending
product to China for finalizing the finished product. Heavy rare earths
are critical for defense systems. I'm very concerned that our strategy
is to rely on heavy rare earths processed in China and these materials
will be subject to Chinese export quotas. This is especially disturbing
since the United States/Japan and the European Union are engaged in a
World Trade Organization (WTO) case against the Chinese. Please
describe your position on our reliance on production in China as a
plausible long-term strategy to meet our rare earth demand for national
security requirements. What steps is DOD taking to encourage production
of heavy rare earths here in the United States?
Mr. Kendall. DOD does not intend to rely on Chinese production of
rare earth materials as a long-term strategy to meet rare earth element
needs. As you note, the United States Government has undertaken action
at the WTO to address concerns about the availability of rare earth
materials in world markets. Market forces have also been working in
ways that significantly affect the domestic availability of rare earth
materials. Over the past 2 years, one U.S. company has established a
domestic supply chain of rare earth materials from mine to metal/
alloys, another company has begun construction of a neodymium-iron-
boron magnet facility in North Carolina, and a third company just
announced that it is pursuing the acquisition of land in Louisiana for
the purpose of producing rare earth oxides from the mine it is
developing in Canada. The Department is carefully monitoring these
developments as part of its effort to ensure the availability of rare
earth materials to the defense industrial base. I believe the
Department's plan to pursue a three-pronged approach to this important
issue is the best approach. The three prongs are: diversification of
supply, pursuit of substitutes, and a focus on reclamation.
10. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, I'm also concerned that DOD isn't
taking the rare earth issue seriously. The required report was over 8
months late and the front cover notes it cost $4,230 to provide this
five-page report. Is this a serious analysis?
Mr. Kendall. I believe that the Department's analysis of the
availability of rare earth materials was a serious analysis. Over 80
organizations and subject matter experts were contacted for information
for this report. In addition to the Military Services input, the
assessment included input and consultation with the Department of
Commerce (DOC), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and
the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as a myriad of rare earth
subject matter experts and industry organizations.
I believe that the final report should be viewed in conjunction
with the significantly longer interim report provided to Congress in
August 2011 and information provided at several related briefings to
Congress. In my view, taken together, these activities seriously
addressed the issue of assessing the rare earth material supply chain
and the availability of material versus demand from the defense
industrial base.
11. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, what were the man-hours involved
in this report over the 14 months used to produce it?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the total level of effort and
time required for the Department's review of rare earths has been
substantial and included not just the direct man-hours for preparing
the final report, which were modest, but a host of other activities
that were not considered direct costs for the preparation of the
report. The cost of those other contributing activities is not included
in the figure cited in the report.
12. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, what were the technology
requirements, data calls, analysis performed, and the outside expertise
required under contract?
Mr. Kendall. Analytic support for the Department's review of rare
earths was provided primarily by the Institute for Defense Analyses, a
Federally Funded Research and Development Center. Extensive data were
received from USGS.
Over 80 organizations and subject matter experts were contacted for
information for this report, including the Military Services, other
defense agencies, DOC, USGS, GAO, the USTR, and DOE, as well as rare
earth subject matter experts and industry organizations.
In addition, input was sought from DOD organizations, other Federal
departments and agencies, and a range of industry representatives
concerning which rare earth materials met the criteria identified in
section 843 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. These organizations were
also asked to offer recommendations as to how to mitigate
vulnerabilities for materials they identified as meeting the key
criteria.
13. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, how did you involve the China
experts, either inside DOD or outside?
Mr. Kendall. Outside of DOD, the USGS's rare earth materials expert
and its China expert were consulted regarding Chinese production and
consumption patterns, policies and trends. Also, China analysts from
the Joint Staff and from the intelligence community were directly
involved in the assessment process, including eliciting their judgments
as to which rare earths met the criteria of section 843 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011.
14. Senator Begich. Mr. Kendall, how many hours, in reality, did it
take to produce this five-page report and why was it so late?
Mr. Kendall. Sixty-seven man-hours are attributable solely to the
five-page report. This represented a small component of the
Department's overall review. The extent of that review led to the delay
in completing the full reporting requirement.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
handheld, manpack, and small form fit radios
15. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Kendall, in this constrained fiscal
environment it is always important to ensure there is a focus on
competition and innovation where it makes sense. Given that the network
is one of the Army's top priorities, can you provide insight into how
you are structuring the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld,
Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) program so you are able to include
commercially developed JTRS solutions in a competition?
Mr. Kendall. The JTRS HMS development contract was originally
competitively awarded and had a requirement to qualify two Program of
Record (POR) vendors for competition in full rate production for each
variant. As the program has proceeded, various vendors have worked on
their own to develop competitive alternatives to the PORs. These are
essentially commercially developed alternatives. Where possible, future
procurements will be conducted using full and open competition so that
these vendors can offer their products.
16. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Kendall, is the Navy's RDT&E program of
record HMS radio on target this year, such that all of the requested
funding for fiscal year 2013 will be needed?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. This funding is needed to complete Manpack radio
development, testing, evaluation and to provide a Mobile User Objective
System (MUOS) capable terminal. If HMS does not receive full RDT&E
funding in fiscal year 2013, the program will not be able to complete
MUOS development or the related MUOS testing. Without this funding
there will not be a MUOS ground terminal available for the DOD to use
with the current MUOS satellite on orbit and subsequent satellites due
to launch in the summer of 2013 and beyond.
17. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Kendall, a recent article suggests that
the Manpack Limited User Test (LUT) conducted during the summer 2011
Network Integration Evaluation did not collect adequate data about the
Manpack due to inappropriate procedures. Please tell me what the issues
were, how they will be corrected, and how this delay impacts the RDT&E
schedule for fiscal year 2012-fiscal year 2013.
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the Army Test and Evaluation
Command, Operational Test Command, conducted the Manpack Limited User
Test (Manpack LUT) from June 20-July 9, 2011 at White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico in accordance with a Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation-approved operational test plan. The Manpack LUT proved to be
adequate for assessing the effectiveness and survivability of the
Manpack, but inadequate for assessing reliability, availability, and
maintainability (RAM). I understand that the data collectors did not
ride in the vehicles with the test radios installed in accordance with
the approved test plan, so RAM calculations were based on operator
interviews instead of electronic data collection. I believe that this
data was called into question because of the data collection process.
In response, the Army implemented a revised test plan and reliability
development growth program for the Manpack radio. I understand that the
Army and program manager have made rapid adjustments to obtain the
required test data. Based on this recovery plan, no schedule delays are
currently expected.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
major weapons procurement contracting
18. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, from your responses to the
committee's advance policy questions on excessive concurrency, fixed-
price contracting, and multiyear contracting for major weapons systems,
you seem to be more confident in the ability of DOD's processes,
organizations, and people (i.e. skill-sets and core competencies) to
identify, price, and manage risk than I am. Over the last decade or so,
however, in terms of technology development, integration, and
manufacturing, DOD has not been effective or consistent in identifying,
pricing, and managing high risk in connection with its procuring major
weapons systems. For this reason, I believe that until DOD
fundamentally improves how reliably it addresses risk, it should eschew
procuring high-risk major weapons systems. Then, it could pursue
contracting strategies and methodologies conducive to procuring major
systems with more demonstrably manageable degrees of risk.
If additional capability requiring the government to accept more
risk must be procured, to the extent possible, DOD could then use a
spiral development strategy to acquire that additional capability
incrementally over a longer time horizon while delivering capability
more directly benefitting the warfighter in the interim. While there
may be some limited exceptions, like satellites and some ships, would
you not generally agree with this position? If so, how would you
affirmatively attempt to implement this view, if confirmed?
Mr. Kendall. In general, I agree that the Department can frequently
accept less exquisite, less high risk technological solutions, and that
in the current budget environment it is essential that the Department
focus on affordability in all acquisition programs. In cases where
higher risk profiles are necessary to meet a critical operational need,
incremental acquisition approaches may be appropriate. At the same
time, there will continue to be cases where it is necessary for the
Department to tackle technologically challenging problems to address
significant new threats to national security. The Department needs to
retain the flexibility to adopt the acquisition strategy most
appropriate to the specific program or product. If confirmed, I will
continue to insist that the Department realistically assess risks,
tailor its acquisition strategies to appropriately address these risks,
and support rigorous efforts to ensure the affordability and
executability of acquisition programs.
new army major weapons procurement
19. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the Army has two prominent
programs currently in the early stages of development: the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Each has
had its requirements substantially reduced to help ensure
affordability. I am concerned that as these programs move forward in
development, their requirements may change again, resulting--
predictably--in major cost overruns. What confidence do you have that
the requirements for JLTV and GCV are now stable?
Mr. Kendall. Requirements definition and stability are key focus
areas in both the JLTV and GCV programs. Both programs are well aware
of the overriding need for an agreed set of technologically achievable,
operationally relevant, sustainable, and affordable requirements. Both
programs have affordability caps for production and sustainment. Other
requirements may have to be traded away during the remainder of
technology demonstration (TD) (for GCV) and engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD) (for GCV and JLTV) to stay within those
caps.
Specifically, the JLTV program executed a technology development
phase that included competitive prototyping; The Army and the Marine
Corps learned a great deal about the feasibility of requirements and
made adjustments that are reflected in the current request for
proposals. The requirements communities from both the Army and the
Marine Corps, and supported by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, conducted trades on the requirements. In the case of force
protection, some requirement for JLTV was actually made more stringent.
If confirmed, I will conduct a final review to ensure that requirements
are stable prior to approving contract award and entry into EMD.
Similarly, the GCV program is executing a TD phase and Army will
establish firm requirements before committing to EMD. As expected for
this phase, important requirements trades are still in play. By the end
of calendar year 2012, the outputs from each of the three core TD phase
activities (AOA Dynamic Update, NDI Evaluation, and Contractor Design
Teams) should converge and inform senior leadership on the
operationally relevant requirements that are executable and affordable.
Throughout the next year, Army teams will synchronize the results of
all of these activities in a Configuration Steering Board and
validation of the Capability Development Document (CDD) in support of
the GCV Acquisition Strategy for EMD. If confirmed, I will ensure that
requirements are stable before GCV enters EMD.
20. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, will you allow production
decisions to be made prior to the prototyping and testing of these
vehicles and/or their subsystems?
Mr. Kendall. No. Production decisions will be informed by
developmental testing including preproduction prototype testing. The
JLTV program has a 33-month comprehensive EMD phase with 22 prototype
vehicles per vendor to demonstrate performance. Results from the
comprehensive test program including user evaluation, blast testing,
and proof of reliability will inform down select for production. The
GCV program is in the Technology Development phase. The program
schedule anticipates a 4 year EMD period to refine designs and build
and test prototypes before the production decision.
21. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, what confidence do you have in the
Army's ability to effectively assess the technological risks associated
with the maturity of weapons systems and GCV, in particular?
Mr. Kendall. The Department as a whole, including the Army, still
has room for improvement in assessing risk and technological maturity.
However, the Army and the Department have made progress in recent
years, and the Army does have the ability to effectively assess
technological risks. If confirmed, it would be my responsibility to
ensure that risk assessments are effectively conducted on GCV and other
programs.
late military depot report
22. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, this committee directed your
office in its report for the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 to provide to
Congress no later than March 1, 2012, your views on a study conducted
by the Logistics Management Institute on the capability of military
depots to support future national defense requirements. When will we
receive this report?
Mr. Kendall. The Department provided this report on May 8, 2012.
23. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, will the report satisfy all
requirements requested by the committee?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. The report provides a response from DOD
addressing each of the major conclusions detailed in the LMI depot
study. Specific legislative and policy changes are discussed, as well
as the Department's efforts and approach to improving the efficiency of
the organic depot maintenance enterprise. Official comments from the
Military Services are included as an attachment to the report.
starting major weapons programs off right
24. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the main focus of the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), which applies to new
programs and seeks to have major defense acquisition programs start off
right, requires that early investment decisions be informed by
realistic cost estimates, sound systems engineering knowledge, and
reliable technological risk assessments. DOD has indeed started some
new major programs since WSARA was enacted, or will do so in the near
future. I would like to review a few of them with you. Please tell me
what has been done to help ensure that they comply with these very
important aspects of WSARA or how they are being structured now (or
will be structured in the future) to minimize excessive cost-growth and
schedule-delays.
Ohio-class Ballistic-Missile Submarine Replacement
Program--SSBN(X)
Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement Program--KC-46A
Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program--VXX
Long-Range Strike--LRS (formerly called Next-
Generation Bomber--NGB)
Ground Combat Vehicle--GCV
Joint Tactical Radio System--JTRS, as restructured
Amphibious Combat Vehicle--ACV (the successor to the
cancelled Marine Corps program, Expeditionary Combat Vehicle--
ECV)
Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)
Mr. Kendall. Since WSARA was enacted, the Department has worked to
ensure all programs reviewed comply with WSARA and that investment
decisions are informed by realistic assessments of cost and risk. The
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and
Evaluation, and the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation
influence all new start programs and all major milestone decisions. The
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System incorporates
combatant commanders' inputs. Acquisition strategies address
competition strategies and prototyping considerations. The requested
information about specific programs follows:
Ohio-class Ballistic-Missile Submarine Replacement
Program--SSBN(X)
The program received MS A approval in January
2011 and the ongoing development of the program is
fully compliant with WSARA principles. The Navy is
designing to the minimum capability that will satisfy
the projected strategic requirement throughout the
projected life of this new ship class. At MS A,
affordability targets were established for average ship
end cost (Hulls 2-12) of $4.9 billion and Operation and
Sustainment cost per hull of $110 million (in CY$10,
Navy shipbuilding indices). The program has established
a dedicated Design for Affordability (DFA) group,
consisting of NAVSEA and Electric Boat representatives
to promote, review, and track DFA initiatives for Non-
Recurring Engineering, Construction, and Operations and
Sustainment. In PB13, the Navy delayed procurement of
the lead ship 2 years from fiscal year 2019 to fiscal
year 2021. The overall program cost will increase with
inflation effects, however, the Department remains
committed to meeting the affordability targets and to
accomplishing the design and construction in the most
cost-effective manner possible.
Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement Program--KC-46A
The Department has mitigated the program's
risk by structuring the competitive development
contract with both fixed price incentive (firm target)
and firm fixed price components. The KC-46 development
contract has an overall contract ceiling price of $4.9
billion. Boeing is fully responsible for any cost
growth beyond the $4.9 billion overall contract ceiling
price. For production, firm fixed-price contract
options are established for the first two low-rate
initial production lots. The remaining 11 full-rate
production options have not-to-exceed prices with
equitable price adjustments. The commercial-derivative
nature of the KC-46 also contributes to controlling
cost growth by allowing the Government to leverage
commercial processes and parts pools. Boeing is
strongly incentivized to deliver on its contract
commitments and within schedule.
Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program--VXX
The Navy has conducted an extensive Analysis
of Alternatives under guidance from Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE). Those activities have
provided data on cost estimates, systems engineering
assessments, and insights into technical risks, ways to
leverage In-Service investments to reduce risk and
minimize change for the users and operators, and
opportunities for in-house risk reduction efforts that
will result in ownership of data rights and key
interfaces for the communications suite. This analysis
will lead to a program strategy for the Presidential
Helicopter Replacement Program that is compliant with
WSARA and structured to avoid cost growth and schedule
disruption.
Long-Range Strike (LRS)
The program has incorporated cost estimation,
systems engineering, and technological risk guidance by
CAPE, and the Offices of the Deputy Assistant
Secretaries of Defense, Systems Engineering (SE) and
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E). The cost cap
of $550 million aircraft will be used to control
requirements creep and ensure an affordable design.
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
GCV was approved for MS A on August 17, 2012.
The Defense Acquisition Board considered the
requirements, resources, and schedule and established
affordability targets for the GCV Program in both the
investment and O&S phases of the Program. Additionally,
a three-prong strategy that builds towards an informed
Milestone B and Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Phase. The Department will continue to
review the AOA's cost informed trades, evaluate
potential Non-Developmental Items (including
international sources), and conclude a 24-month TD
phase with two potential GCV candidates.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
JTRS is a family of five ACAT I-D acquisition
programs established to provide software programmable,
networking radios for communication at the last
tactical mile--this includes tactical networking
communications for airborne, vehicular, maritime and
dismounted forces. The JTRS programs have struggled to
complete development and enter production, but that
process is now well underway. In some cases
requirements have been relaxed to permit lower cost
competitive products that industry has developed in
parallel with the programs of record to be considered
for production. Overall, the JTRS program is over 80
percent complete in terms of development and with two
hardware programs post-Milestone C (HMS Rifleman Radio
and MIDS JTRS). MIDS has recently been approved for
Full Production and Fielding (FP&F) and HMS is
scheduled to have an FP&F decision this year. The JPEO
JTRS organization is now following an enterprise
business model designed to increase competition. JTRS
is moving toward a non-developmental item (NDI)
acquisition strategy. The JTRS Ground Mobile Radio
(GMR) program underwent a Nunn-McCurdy breach
assessment in 2011, resulting in a decision by the
Milestone Decision Authority (Mr. Kendall) to terminate
the program of record and pursue an NDI acquisition
strategy to meet essential requirements at an
affordable cost under the auspices of the Army's Mid-
Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) Program.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
In January 2011, the Marine Corps formalized a
Systems Engineering-Operational Performance Team SE-OPT
(SE-OPT) specifically to address affordability in
accordance with WSARA principles. The SE-OPT culminated
in December 2011, when the Navy entered into the
Materiel Solution Analysis phase. The ACV program will
follow a highly tailored acquisition approach
structured to provide the most cost-effective program.
Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)
The JHSV received MS B approval in November
2008, just prior to enactment of WSARA; however, the
program is addressing all applicable (i.e., post-MS B)
WSARA principles. The JHSV program was informed by
prior high speed vessel experimentation programs (e.g.
Swift, Westpac Express) and is a modification to a non-
developmental commercially derived high speed ferry
design, thus reducing developmental risk. Although the
lead ship has experienced cost and schedule growth, the
shipbuilder's performance on the following JHSVs is
improving. Due to investment in a modular manufacturing
facility which supports efficient construction, and use
of a fixed price incentive contract, follow on JHSVs
are expected to deliver as planned at or below target
contract costs.
25. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, while the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) is, of course, not a new start, it is critical that it be
restructured to comply with WSARA's key requirements (on realistic cost
estimates, sound systems engineering, and reliable risk assessments).
In what sense has it been restructured along these lines?
Mr. Kendall. The Department fully supports the organizational and
policy changes enacted in the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA) for all DOD acquisition programs, including the F-35 JSF. The
Department's goals with respect to WSARA are the same for all
acquisition programs: implement all of the applicable acquisition
policy measures called out in WSARA and integrate WSARA organizational
changes into the oversight of the program. The majority of the actions
required to achieve these goals in the F-35 program have been
completed.
Subsequent to the passage of WSARA in May 2009, the F-35 program
was the subject of numerous reviews, culminating in a Nunn-McCurdy
critical cost breach certification review that was guided by the
acquisition reform principles founded in WSARA. The cost and schedule
assessment reviews were led by the WSARA-formed Office of the Director,
CAPE. The Nunn-McCurdy review and certification of the F-35 program was
guided by process improvements institutionalized in WSARA, to include
the participation and assessments of the Office of Performance
Assessment and Root Cause Analysis, and the Offices of the Deputy
Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Systems Engineering (SE) and
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E). Additionally, the F-35
program has instituted a renewed emphasis on sound systems engineering
principles, realistic cost and schedule estimating, a re-energized
focus on integrated test and evaluation, and implementation of tighter
cost control measures; all of which can be traced directly to WSARA
principles. Following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, and statutorily-
directed rescission of Milestone (MS) B, the F-35 program conducted a
bottoms-up Technical Baseline Review to determine a realistic cost,
schedule, and risk basis for completing the developmental phase of the
program, in which the Offices of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of
Defense, SE and DT&E, participated. These organizational and policy
changes in WSARA were instrumental in the completion of the thorough
review of the F-35 program that resulted in Nunn-McCurdy certification
on June 2, 2010.
WSARA-implemented organizational changes were leveraged in the
November 2011 F-35 Concurrency Quick Look Review (QLR), commissioned by
the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AUSD) for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (AT&L). This review was led by Performance
Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA), SE and DT&E, and found the
overall F-35 design to be sound, but that there is significant risk
remaining in the F-35 program. It is necessary to increase confidence
in the design before production rates can be increased. The Department
used the result of the QLR to inform the fiscal year 2013 Future Years
Defense Program, which holds U.S. production at 29 aircraft per year
through 2014 to permit additional progress on the test program before
increasing production.
The enactment of WSARA has directly influenced F-35 program
planning, documentation and execution that led to the AUSD(AT&L)
approval of a new MS B in March 2012. Two Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) reviews of the F-35 program were conducted in January and
February 2012 with full involvement of CAPE, PARCA, SE and DT&E. Per
WSARA, CAPE cost estimators worked closely with the program office as
they developed the Independent Cost Estimate and reviewed the program
office estimates. This culminated in concurrence from the Director,
CAPE, with the AUSD(AT&L) choice of cost estimate for the program.
PARCA has completed three semi-annual performance assessments of the F-
35 program since 2010. In accordance with WSARA, these assessments will
occur semi-annually until at least March 2013; the next assessment is
planned for July 2012.
The remaining actions to fulfill the overall goal involve continual
interaction between the WSARA-instituted organizations and the F-35
program office. To that end, I have planned for an F-35 DAB review in
September 2012, with annual reviews to follow. Additionally, I have
directed the AT&L (L&MR) and CAPE to continue to work with the Services
and the F-35 program office to identify and quantify opportunities to
reduce operating and support costs for the program's life cycle.
medium extended air defense system program
26. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, a few days ago, I sent Secretary
of Defense Panetta a letter asking him to explain DOD's position on the
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. There is ambiguity
between how I thought DOD was going to approach the program, which
would comport with the requirements under the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012, and Secretary Panetta's recently announced desire to keep our
contractual obligation with our partner nations. Please provide me with
an update on MEADS and your plans, if you are confirmed, for
negotiating with our partners in the program on a lower-cost option
that limits the program to no more than the funding appropriated in
fiscal year 2012--as directed under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
Mr. Kendall. In accordance with the requirements of section 235 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, the Department has repeatedly consulted
and attempted to negotiate with the German and Italian participants
regarding development of a plan to restructure the program to make U.S.
fiscal year 2012 funding the Department's final obligation for the
program. The Department informed the German and Italian participants
that there is significant risk that fiscal year 2013 funding may not be
made available by Congress. In response, they have informed the
Department that they remain fully committed to their MOU obligations
and expect that all three participants will provide their 2013 funding
to complete the PoC effort. The Department has provided the plan
required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012. The plan relies on the
provision in the MEADS MOU that limits partner obligations to
appropriated funding. The administration requested funding in the
fiscal year 2013 budget to complete U.S. international obligations
under the MEADS Design and Development Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), as required by the terms of the MOU, and the administration
continues to believe that fulfilling this commitment is the best course
of action.
military space procurement policy
27. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you indicated that introducing more competition for
launch as soon as feasible is the key to controlling spiraling launch
costs. Also, you cited a dual-prong approach the Air Force is taking
to: (1) implement a block-buy acquisition strategy to purchase economic
order quantities; and (2) provide a path to qualification of new
entrants into the National Security Space (NSS) launch market. As a
general proposition, how is a long-term block-buy from a sole-source
supplier consistent with the notion of qualifying new entrants?
Mr. Kendall. At this time, no new entrants have been certified to
compete for NSS launch missions, and based on market research, the
Department believes that it will be a number of years before a new
entrant will be capable of achieving certification for NSS launch
missions. During this period of time, the Department must continue to
rely on the sole certified provider, the United Launch Alliance (ULA),
to inject NSS payloads into their mission orbits. The block-buy
acquisition strategy is intended to control ULA's costs, while
potential new entrants achieve certification under the New Entrant
Certification Strategy. If any new entrants achieve certification
earlier than currently estimated, requirements above the contract
commitment will be met through a full-and-open competition among all
certified providers.
Only one potential new entrant has stated an intention to qualify
for future NSS launch missions, and based on their current DOD- and
NASA-funded launches, combined with their commercial launches and
assuming the success of these missions, the Air Force expects that firm
to achieve certification to compete for future NSS missions by 2017.
This coincides with phase 2 of the EELV acquisition strategy, during
which launch missions will be competed under existing source-selection
processes. However, in order to facilitate the certification of
potential new entrants, the Air Force has identified two opportunities
that providers may bid on--the Space Test Program (STP)-2 and the Deep
Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) missions which were funded by
Congress in fiscal year 2012. These EELV-class missions have a higher
risk tolerance and will provide an opportunity for potential new
entrants to prove their capability for certification.
28. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to what extent would DOD be
subjected to substantial termination liability should it elect to
procure launch services from new entrants during the duration of the
block-buy procurement period?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the Air Force released a
request for proposal in March 2012 requesting cost proposals that cover
a range of launch rates and term durations. The contract is structured
as a requirements contract with variable pricing that recognizes
Congress may not authorize/appropriate funds for the planned amount. If
the planned amount is funded, the Air Force must buy the launches from
United Launch Alliance. If fewer launches are authorized and
appropriated, there is no termination liability but the Air Force must
still buy the launches from United Launch Alliance. A new entrant could
be given launches in excess of the annual planned launches in the
contract. As with any contract if the quantities are reduced after
they've been funded, there is termination liability. If confirmed, I
will work with the Air Force to minimize those liabilities.
29. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to what extent could a new entrant
compete for launches that have been bought during the block-buy?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that only one potential new
entrant has stated an intention to achieve certification, and an Air
Force analysis of that firm's manifest suggests that they will likely
not achieve certification before 2017, which will be after the initial
block-buy and during the period of new-entrant competition (phase 2)
under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisition strategy. If
this potential new entrant or another achieves certification prior to
the end of the initial block-buy, they would be eligible to compete for
launch missions over those already committed to in the planned block-
buy contract.
30. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to what extent should the Air
Force contemplate off-ramps from the block-buy?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that off-ramps will be negotiated
under the initial block-buy contract. The Air Force released a request
for proposal March 23, 2012 requesting cost proposals that cover a
range of launch rates and durations. Based on that data and independent
analysis, the Department plans to award the first block-buy contract at
the rate, duration, and with termination conditions (i.e., off-ramps)
that, together, offer the most advantageous terms to the Government.
31. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if the block-buy results in excess
inventory, as has historically been the case, what specific launch
opportunities will be open to competition under those circumstances?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that analysis of satellite
readiness for launch indicates that the rate of 6-10 cores per year
over 3-5 years that is anticipated under the block-buy is insufficient
to meet the expected demand. This makes it likely that there will be
launches available for competition. Although the Department has
experienced launch delays in the past, some of the circumstances that
led to lower than expected launch rates no longer exist. The National
Security Space enterprise is entering a period where several
constellations of satellites are now in full-scale production, so a
full launch manifest is anticipated for the foreseeable future.
32. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in your responses to the advance
policy questions, you cited your decision to reinstate the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) as a major defense acquisition program
(MDAP) not in sustainment so that there will be greater visibility into
the programs status, in compliance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
Why should I not be concerned that the new acquisition program
baseline for EELV will not contemplate a large block-buy, which would
suppress the overall acquisition unit cost estimate for booster cores?
Mr. Kendall. I have taken action to reinstate EELV as required by
the NDAA. The Air Force will be required to establish a new
``original'' acquisition program baseline (APB) for EELV for a
restructured program. The new APB will be based on the restructured
program and will most likely include the block-buy approach called for
in the current Air Force EELV acquisition strategy. If confirmed, I
will ensure that the APB reflects the Department's best estimate of
program costs and is consistent with the planned acquisition strategy.
developmental testing
33. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Developmental Test and Evaluation (DASD(DT&E)) has two
distinct reporting chains. For DT&E matters the DASD(DT&E) reports to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) and for Test Resource Management
Center (TRMC) matters the DASD(DT&E) reports directly to the USD(AT&L).
This appears to be a rather cumbersome management arrangement in which
the DASD(DT&E) has two masters. Is it your view that this is efficient,
appropriate, and effectively furthers the underlying intent of WSARA?
Mr. Kendall. The Department has adopted an organizational structure
consistent with the intent of WSARA and with most efficient and
effective performance of the test and evaluation function.
The DASD(DT&E) has direct access to advise me as the Acting
USD(AT&L) on all matters relating to developmental test and evaluation
within the Department, and has acted in this capacity on numerous
occasions. This includes direct participation in all major program
milestone decisions. I particularly rely on the DASD(DT&E) for advice
on the demonstrated maturity of designs and verification that
requirements are being met prior to entering initial production and on
the adequacy of planned test programs at the beginning of Engineering
and Manufacturing Development. The reporting chain through ASD(R&E)
allows for alignment between DT&E and Systems Engineering efforts
within the Department. There are similar arrangements for other
functional leads within AT&L and after 2 years of working with this
arrangement I believe it is an effective structure.
The DASD(DT&E) adds a critical capability to AT&L allowing the
Department to ensure that developmental test programs are properly and
realistically designed to evaluate performance against requirements, as
WSARA intended. Likewise, with the dual-hatting of the DASD(DT&E) as
the Director of the Test Resource Management Center, the DASD(DT&E) has
direct access to advise me on test resourcing issues.
34. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, what actions, if
any, would you take to make management of the DASD(DT&E) office more
efficient?
Mr. Kendall. The DASD(DT&E) office is operating as an efficient
operation, including leveraging expertise from the Test Resource
Management Center (TRMC). In January 2012, I approved a reorganization
of DT&E and TRMC that formalized these efficiencies. The DT&E office
has grown substantially since WSARA was passed and I believe it is now
at an appropriate size, however, if I am confirmed I will continue to
monitor the effectiveness of this office to see if adjustments are
needed within the overall USD(AT&L) resources.
35. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, DOD has over $1,000 acquisition
programs of which approximately 300 are under DOT&E oversight and less
than 40 are currently under DASD(DT&E) oversight. The GAO has indicated
that the DASD(DT&E) requires additional staff to properly fulfill its
statutory requirements. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you
take in this time of declining budgets to ensure the DASD(DT&E) has the
resources it needs to effectively discharge its statutory
responsibilities?
Mr. Kendall. All DOD acquisition programs are in a sense under DT&E
oversight, as is the developmental test career field across the
Department. DT&E involvement in programs is highest during the planning
for an execution of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
phase, with which DT&E is most concerned. This applies to a subset of
all acquisition programs.
I believe the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request for OSD/
DT&E manpower and funding provides adequate resources to support the
responsibilities of the office. I also believe that the Department has
effectively used available resources to add capacity and bring
technical depth into the office. These resources increased the capacity
of DT&E and have enabled the office to share best practices across the
Department, particularly with Military Service test organizations and
program offices. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the
effectiveness of this office and make adjustments as necessary.
joint capabilities and integration development system
36. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in your written responses to the
advance policy questions, you refer to an updated policy for the Joint
Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS) that in part
establishes a Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON) process intended
to meet the urgent needs for future contingency operations. How do you
define a ``near-term, high-risk contingency'' that underpins the
determination for a JEON?
Mr. Kendall. The Chairman's Joint Capabilities and Integration
Development System (JCIDS) instruction that I referenced defines a JEON
as an urgent operational need ``identified by a combatant command as
inherently joint and impacting an anticipated or pending contingency
operation.'' Urgent Operational Needs are further defined as capability
requirements that if left unfulfilled, potentially result in loss of
life or critical mission failure. My understanding is that JEONs
provide the combatant commanders (COCOMs) a means of identifying
capability gaps that they view as urgent but that are not associated
with a current contingency.
37. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, how do you distinguish an
anticipated or pending contingency operation?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the most critical distinction
in regards to a JEON in comparison to a Joint Urgent Operational Need
(JUON), is that a JEON is not associated with a current contingency
operation as defined in title 10, U.S.C., section 101(a)(13), but
rather is associated with a possible future contingency. The
distinction between ``pending'' and ``anticipated'' is purely temporal,
with ``pending'' being viewed as the nearer-term possibility. I do not
consider ``anticipated'' to necessarily imply a high likelihood of
occurrence.
38. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, how is a requirement that may take
6 years to obtain considered near-term or urgent?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that the intent of the
Department's rapid acquisition processes is to deliver capabilities
needed to satisfy both JUONs and JEONs in less than 2 years. I believe
that the 5-year mark, 6 if you include the time it takes to conduct the
assessment, obtain the resources and place a contract, was intended
simply to allow for consideration of multiple near and midterm
alternatives in some possible solutions. There may be cases where the
consequences of a gap are so severe and the likelihood of the risk so
high, that the leadership of the department needs to initiate actions
outside of the normal planning, programming, budgeting and execution
cycle even if the delivery of a capability may take more than 2 years.
There are examples from my experience during the Cold War where
technological surprise was achieved by the Soviet Union that motivated
urgent development programs that took well over 2 years to fielding. In
those cases the sense of urgency was very real despite the time it took
to field capability. These instances may be rare, but in my view the
Department should have an established mechanism for dealing with them.
better buying power and lifecycle costs
39. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, section 805 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2010 regarding lifecycle management, called for product support
managers to maximize competition and make the best possible use of
available DOD and industry resources at the system, subsystem, and
component levels. This provision was implemented through DOD's
Directive-Type Memorandum on October 6, 2010. Can you provide examples
where DOD's compliance with section 805 has led to competition at
subsystem and component levels and a reduction of lifecycle costs?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
The Department of the Navy has pursued competitive strategies for
major components in restarting the DDG-51 shipbuilding program to
reduce life cycle cost. The Navy continues to pursue open architecture
initiatives to achieve design stability, mature technologies and
affordable solutions. Specifically, the Navy competed the production of
the main reduction gear for the ships in a breakout strategy. This
strategy avoided pass-through costs to the shipbuilders and established
future competitive opportunities for this major component. In addition,
the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Program is openly competing
what has historically been a sole-source program. There are four
separate contractual efforts: CEC system production; Common Array Block
(CAB) antenna production; Signal Data Processor-Sierra (SDP-S)
production; and Design Agent/Engineering Services (DA/ES). The CEC
program's current ``will cost'' reflects an additional $200 million
reduction in costs from prior years. CEC reduced the POM 13 CEC budget
by $32.4 million by transitioning from the current design to a Common
Array Block (CAB) antenna, which will be a family of common antennas
across CEC platforms.
The Army awarded a competitive 5-year/multiple-year Family of
Medium Tactical Vehicles requirements contract to Oshkosh that resulted
in an average cost savings of 28 percent over the previous sole-source
contract. In addition, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
Enterprise Business Model is predicated upon fostering and leveraging
competition in production. The Multifunctional Distribution Information
System-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS-LVT) radio program initial radios
started at $426,000 per unit. Through competition between the two
approved vendor production sources, the radios have decreased steadily
to a cost of only $181,000 per unit, which is a savings of nearly 60
percent on each radio. With over 2,600 units purchased by the
Department, the total savings is almost $500 million.
40. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if you are confirmed, how would
you leverage the private sector's investment in commercial technologies
and certifications to achieve efficiencies?
Mr. Kendall. The pace of commercial technology development in some
areas such as computing and wireless communications continues to
outpace development of military unique technology. If confirmed, I will
remain committed to implementing Modular Open Systems Architecture
approaches in major systems, enabling the insertion of commercial
technologies throughout a system's lifecycle. One key enabler in this
effort is thorough market research to determine whether the
Department's technological requirements can be met by industry, small
business, or by commercially available, off-the-shelf products. Another
key enabler is well structured acquisition strategies that provide
effective open architectures and modular systems with well defined non-
proprietary interfaces that are compatible with commercial or
commercially derived products.
excessive concurrency
41. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, a big problem with how DOD buys
major systems is this: it has tended to go all in on these procurement
programs without understanding enough about their technical or systems
engineering to assess whether developing them may have too much risk.
So, these programs struggle endlessly in development--where costs grow
and schedules slip--without needed combat capability delivered. Far too
often, DOD has tried to execute such programs under cost-plus
contracts. In my view, this has been an utter disaster. Do you agree?
If so, how would you address it?
Mr. Kendall. My view is that there is still substantial room for
improvement in the Department's management of development risk. The use
of independent technology readiness reviews has been a positive step,
however, these reviews alone do not adequately assess engineering and
integration risks. The Department should not enter into major
acquisition programs without a clear understanding of the technical
risk and degree of complexity that the program involves and a well
structured plan to manage that risk. If the risk is too great entry
into EMD should be delayed until that risk is reduced. All development
programs entail some degree of risk because by definition something is
being created that didn't exist before the program, so there are
inherent unknowns in every development program. The Department's
acquisition approach, including contract type, must be tied a realistic
assessment of the risk factors. The contract type does not by itself
change the amount of risk; it attempts to allocate the risk between the
parties. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen the Department's
technical capacity for assessing risk and managing risk through
effective program management and systems engineering and through
acquisition strategies that provide strong incentives to industry but
also equitably allocate risk between industry and the Government.
42. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, what overall
approach would you take to ensure that programs with too much
concurrency are never started?
Mr. Kendall. I firmly believe that the principal of ``fly before
you buy'' is a well established best practice. When programs are
started, I intend to ensure that the risk/benefit of any given degree
of concurrent production and development is carefully assessed before
program plans are approved and before production decisions are made. If
confirmed, I will ensure that major weapons systems' program plans have
clearly articulated criteria for entering low rate production based on
design maturity and stability as demonstrated through developmental
testing.
biofuels refineries
43. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, in March of this past year, the
President directed the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Navy
to assist the development of a sustainable commercial biofuels industry
using authorities in the Defense Production Act. The Navy has pledged
$170 million as their share of a $510 million effort to construct or
retrofit biofuel refineries in order to create a commercially viable
market. You mentioned in your answers to the advance policy questions
that ``The Defense Production Act Title III authority, the Industrial
Base Innovation Fund (IBIF), and the Manufacturing Technology Program
are three such resources to support critical capabilities that are at
risk. These interventions should only be used in exceptional cases,
which I believe will be rare.''
In your opinion, do you consider the intervention of DOD in the
biofuels refining industry to be an exceptional case? If so, please
explain why, with specificity.
Mr. Kendall. In my advanced policy question response I was
referring to interventions intended to preserve existing manufacturing
capabilities. Biofuel production is an emerging capability, putting it
in a different category. Based on initial market research, there does
appear to be a potential for biofuel projects to meet the Defense
Production Act's statutory criteria.
Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 provides the
President the authority to reduce current or projected shortfalls of
industrial resources, critical technology items, or essential materials
needed for national defense. Before any contract under this authority
can be awarded, a determination must be made that the industrial
resource, material, or critical technology item is essential to the
national defense; and that without title III assistance, United States
industry cannot reasonably be expected to provide the capability for
the needed industrial resource, material, or critical technology item
in a timely manner. The determination is required to be made 30 days
prior to a contract award.
As a large user of petroleum products, it is in DOD's long term
interest to ensure that there will be liquid fuels available for DOD
platforms, particularly for legacy fleets, which will be with the
Department for decades to come. If confirmed, I will carefully examine
biofuels proposals submitted for consideration under Defense Production
Act title III in accordance with the statutory criteria.
44. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, do you believe a biofuels refining
capability is a critical capability that is at risk? If so, please
explain why, with specificity.
Mr. Kendall. I do not believe biofuels refining capability is an
existing critical capability that is at risk. However, biofuels
options, including refining capability, are emerging capabilities that
are part of the Department's overall energy strategy. I do believe that
the success of the Department's energy strategy, which focuses on
improving energy efficiency and diversifying energy supplies, is
critical to national security. Current processes for producing advanced
drop-in biofuels are expensive, and the resulting high cost of the end
product continues to limit market growth. Military and civilian end
users of fuel have clear strategic incentives to adopt renewable drop-
in fuels, but adoption is only possible when these fuels become cost-
competitive. Proposals to improve the cost competitiveness of biofuels,
therefore, could have a critical impact on the success of the
Department's energy strategy.
45. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, would you support
the continued use of DOD funds to invest in the development of
commercial refineries for biofuels?
Mr. Kendall. If confirmed, I will carefully examine any proposed
biofuels projects in accordance with the statutory criteria contained
in the Defense Production Act of 1950, as well as other available
authorities. I would also consider the Department's energy strategy and
competing priorities before making any investment decisions.
46. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, do you support the Secretary of
the Navy's investments in the Great Green Fleet by 2016, which includes
spending over $12 million last year for 450,000 gallons of biofuels,
which equates to over $26 per gallon?
Mr. Kendall. I support investments in improved energy efficiency
and investments that would reduce the Department's dependency on
petroleum. Of the $336 million that the Navy has budgeted for
operational energy initiatives in fiscal year 2013, 86 percent is for
energy efficiency. It includes efforts such as simulator upgrades,
advanced engines, propeller coatings to reduce drag and hybrid-electric
drives for ships. The Navy's proposed investments in alternative fuels
make up 5.1 percent of their total proposed budget for operational
energy initiatives. These efforts, which I do support, will fund
research, development, demonstration, and evaluation of these fuels.
For the long term, the military will need alternatives to petroleum.
All the Military Departments have purchased or will purchase test
quantities--like last year's Navy purchase--to certify their platforms
for use with advanced alternative fuels. By doing so, the Military
Services are positioning themselves to take advantage of these fuels
when they are cost-competitive with conventional fuels.
congressional adds
47. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012
included almost $240 million for three unrequested programs--the
Defense Rapid Innovation Program, the IBIF, and the Metals
Affordability Initiative (MAI). Funding for these programs, however,
has never been requested by DOD in previous budgets. Why has DOD never
asked for funding to support any of these programs in any of its budget
requests?
Mr. Kendall. Congress established the Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF)
in section 1073 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011, and the
2011 Defense Appropriation Act appropriated $500 million ($440 million
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) funds, and $60
million procurement funds) for the program. The Department implemented
the RIF as a fully merit-based competitive program in strict accordance
with Section 1073. The Department intends to evaluate the results of
the fiscal year 2011 RIF funding before determining requirements for
future funding of this program.
My understanding is that Congress established the IBIF in fiscal
year 2008 as a partnership between the Industrial Policy (IP) office
and Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Panel, but funded
it through a broader Defense Logistics Agency program element. Without
its own program element, IP lacked infrastructure to build IBIF budget
requirements for consideration in the Department's budget review
process until ManTech and IP were realigned as MIBP in 2011. To date,
IBIF has not appeared in a budget request but the Department recently
took steps to allow for the consideration of funding in fiscal year
2014 and future years' budgets by establishing a new program element
(0607210D8Z) exclusively devoted to applied research for industrial
base sustainment.
I believe that the Air Force has requested funding for the MAI in
every fiscal year since fiscal year 1999 within a program element
titled ``Advanced Materials for Weapon Systems'' (0603112F). The funds
requested in the budget were supplemented by congressional increases
and industry matching in each of those years.
48. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, why did DOD specifically not
request funding for any of these programs in fiscal year 2013?
Mr. Kendall. The RIF is a new effort and the Department did not
have sufficient data about the program's overall effectiveness to
warrant inclusion in the President's fiscal year 2013 PBR. Beginning in
March 2013, the Department plans to conduct a comprehensive assessment
to examine two areas for the projects funded through the fiscal year
2011 appropriation--the contractors' progress in meeting the stated
cost, schedule, and technical goals; and the DOD program manager's
strategy for transition of the project's technology into an end use
product or insertion into an existing or planned acquisition program.
This assessment will yield the necessary data for the Department to
determine future funding requirements and to assess this program
relative to other priorities.
Funding for IBIF was considered in the fiscal year 2013 budget
review process, but funds were not requested because of the significant
adjustments required by the Budget Control Act of 2011. Overall,
funding for previously requested industrial base-related programs were
maintained, but not increased in this process. The administration did
include funding for related manufacturing technologies in the
President's fiscal year 2013 budget request for the interagency
National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI), which is outside
the Department's budget.
I believe that the Department did request $3.9 million for MAI in
the fiscal year 2013 budget request.
49. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if no funding is provided in
fiscal year 2013, what would be the effect on each program and on the
purposes for which these programs were originally intended?
Mr. Kendall. Concerning RIF, there would not be an effect to any
ongoing programs. RIF projects are intended to be executed within the
available funding.
Without funding in fiscal year 2013, IBIF would suspend its
reorientation to address niche concerns raised through the Department's
Sector-by-Sector Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) effort. S2T2 helps identify when
programs will not support the minimum sustaining rate that a niche
supplier needs to provide a critical product. Such an endeavor aims at
maintaining the health of selected essential parts of the defense
industry, but is pursued only when: (1) the Department is highly likely
to need a product in the future; (2) where the product would be
prohibitively difficult and expensive to obtain after a hiatus; and (3)
where affordable and innovative mechanisms are available to work with
the producers in the interim.
Concerning MAI, it is my understanding that the MAI industrial
consortium would have to stop seven metal alloy manufacturing
technology projects prior to their completion if fiscal year 2013
funding is not provided.
50. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if confirmed, would you make it a
priority to review the benefits of each of these programs?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
51. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, if you find any of the programs to
not be useful as to their intended purposes, would you inform this
committee of such a determination?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
depot provisions
52. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012
contained two controversial provisions regarding military depots. Are
you aware of the provisions?
Mr. Kendall. I believe so. The first provision is the removal of
the exception for nuclear refueling of aircraft carriers from the
definition of depot-level maintenance. The former exclusion from the
definition allowed for the exclusion of the refueling of nuclear
carriers from both the Core and 50/50 statutes. With the changes to the
law, such refueling would now fall within the scope of depot
maintenance and both Core and 50/50 statutes would apply. However, the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 also provided the Secretary of Defense waiver
authority, on the basis of economic feasibility and national security,
for the requirement in Core Law. The revised 50/50 statute sets forth
waiver authority on the basis of national security reasons.
The second provision is the removal of the exception for major
modifications in the definition of depot-level maintenance. The
statutory definition could now be improperly read to apply to the labor
associated with all software and hardware modifications and upgrades to
include those not maintenance related.
53. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, to the best of your knowledge,
what is the current status of DOD's implementation of these provisions?
Mr. Kendall. On April 5, 2012, I issued NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012
Implementation Guidance, with regard to these provisions. The purpose
of this guidance is to ensure a common interpretation and application
of the statutes across the Military Departments. This guidance was
intended to assist in avoiding significant shifts in the location of
ongoing depot activities or in the overall organic depot/industry
balance.
Relative to the nuclear refueling of aircraft carriers, the
Implementation Guidance delegated waiver authority under title 10
U.S.C. Sec. 2464 to the Secretary of the Navy and suggested that the
Navy may wish to consider pursuing a Secretary of Defense waiver of the
50/50 requirement under title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2466(b).
Additionally, the Implementation Guidance provides a Department-
wide interpretation of ``modifications'' that excludes hardware and
software modifications which are not maintenance in nature.
54. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, are you aware of the concerns
regarding the two provisions expressed by the Services and by industry?
Mr. Kendall. I believe I am aware of the concerns; the Department
has been working closely with the Services and Industry since the
enactment of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 to address concerns
associated with the revised legislation. Through this close
coordination, the resulting Implementation Guidance is intended to
ensure a common interpretation and application of the statutes across
the Services and to address their concerns.
55. Senator McCain. Mr. Kendall, what is your opinion on the
validity of these concerns?
Mr. Kendall. I share the concerns of industry and the Military
Departments with regard to the legislation. The NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012 Implementation Guidance is intended to address these concerns.
Through the conduct of depot activities consistent with the
Implementation Guidance and the execution of waivers available under
the various depot statutes there should be no significant shifts in the
location of ongoing depot activities or in the overall organic depot/
industry balance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
50/50 core
56. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, the well-known 50/50 statute is
codified in title 10, U.S.C., section 2466, and states that: ``Not more
than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a
Military Department or a defense agency for depot-level maintenance and
repair workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-
Federal Government personnel of such workload for the Military
Department or the defense agency.''
The rationale for this statute as well as the companion core
statute codified in title 10, U.S.C., section 2464, in my opinion, is
two-fold. First, the United States needs to have the organic capability
and capacity to carry out critical depot maintenance activity in order
to respond effectively to a mobilization, national defense contingency,
or other emergency requirement. Second, if the Government does not have
the organic capacity--both at the logistics management and depot
maintenance levels--the Government will not be able to be a smart buyer
when they partner with industry, and the Government will end up paying
the private sector more for depot maintenance and logistics support
because the Government will not be able to offer a competitive price.
We have seen this several times in relation to depot maintenance--where
a contractor offers a significantly lower price because the Government
threatens to bring the work back in-house. If the Government cannot
bring the work back in-house, we are very likely going to end up paying
the private sector more for that workload than we should.
What are your views of the Core and 50/50 statutes, and if
confirmed, will you be committed to retaining a robust organic
capability and capacity for depot maintenance and logistics within DOD
and the Military Services?
Mr. Kendall. I believe that it is essential that the Department
maintain an organic depot capability for both national security and
economic reasons. I am extremely cognizant of the indispensible roles
the organic maintenance facilities and their dedicated workforce play
in supporting the demanding operational requirements of the Military
Services.
f-35 operations and support costs
57. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, it seems that while the focus
of conversation has been on the $1 trillion operations and support
(O&S) cost estimate for all three variants of the F-35 over the next 55
years, there has been limited discussion on the cost of maintaining the
legacy fleet if we do not move forward with the F-35. We have heard
that an apples-to-apples cost comparison to operate the legacy aircraft
could be $3 to $4 trillion over that same period of time. How would
this estimate account for the fact that legacy aircraft will never be
as capable or survivable in a 21st century threat environment?
Mr. Kendall. I do not believe that the estimate takes that fact
into account and it would be meaningless to attempt to compare
extending the life of the current fleet 55 years to the cost of
sustaining the F-35 over the same period as this is not a realistic
option. Service life constraints will result in most of the legacy
aircraft having to retire well before the timeframe in question
elapses. While service life extensions are planned for some legacy
aircraft, it is simply not practical that their service life be
extended all the way out to the 2065 timeframe. Even if it could be,
the aircraft would not be survivable or capable enough to cope with the
threats that can be anticipated by the end of this period. The concern
with regard to F-35 sustainment costs has more to do with the
affordability of an F-35 fleet. As a much more capable and complex
aircraft, the F-35 will be more expensive to operate than some of the
aircraft it will replace. For this reason the Department is working
aggressively to control F-35 support costs and I have placed a cost cap
on F-35 sustainment that is intended to provide an incentive for
sustainment cost reductions.
58. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, what investments have been made
in the development and design of the F-35 to reduce O&S costs over the
life of the program?
Mr. Kendall. The F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) is currently
implementing an affordability strategy and the Department is developing
an Affordability Management Plan focused on: reducing the costs of
support products such as support equipment, spare parts and training
devices; base-lining requirements with the Services and leveraging
increased efficiency opportunities provided by F-35; and addressing
reliability and maintainability. The JPO is creating contract and
pricing opportunities to reduce the cost of the JSF support products by
leveraging economic order quantity buys for spare parts in conjunction
with production buys, and implementing pricing improvement curves that
leverage learning opportunities. By creating a common sustainment
baseline harnessing the F-35 support system design, the JPO is
analyzing the optimum level of infrastructure and products required to
support operations of the global fleet. By optimizing the amount of
equipment procured early, the Department can affect the through life
O&S Costs. In parallel, the program office is actively managing the
reliability and maintainability of systems/sub-systems and components;
the implementation of appropriate modifications will enable the
Department to control cost.
In 2011, the JPO implemented a number of technical changes and
affordability initiatives which resulted in an over $30 billion
reduction, in base year 2002 dollars, in the 2011 O&S estimate which
helped to offset externally-driven increases in areas such as military
and contractor labor rates. Additionally, the JPO conducted sustainment
baseline deep dives into support equipment, spares, and manpower, as
well as the initial phase of a business case analysis on supply chain
management, field operations, sustaining engineering, and fleet
management.
The 2012 efforts include a manpower review into the appropriate
labor mix and contractor rates, a review of competitive options for the
long-term provision of support equipment and spares, enterprise
software licensing, engine life improvements, reprogramming laboratory
requirements, and additional Service planning factors such as aircraft
utilization rates, contingency planning, and squadron manning
requirements.
59. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, how will you account for these
investments in future O&S cost estimates in the Selected Acquisition
Reports?
Mr. Kendall. The F-35 JPO works closely with the Office of the
Director, CAPE. Following completion of the CAPE's Independent Cost
Estimate (ICE), I directed that the CAPE's O&S estimate be used for
planning purposes in the new Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) and the
December 2011 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). As JPO cost estimates
are updated to reflect the investment made to reduce costs, that
information is provided to the CAPE and their estimate will be updated
as well. The annual SAR will continue to reflect the CAPE O&S estimate,
with updates as required.
60. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, it seems to me that DOD has
placed F-35 in a unique disadvantage when it comes to an O&S cost
estimate for the program. I am not aware of any other DOD program that
estimates its life cycle costs over a 55-year timeline. Doesn't this
vastly overstate its cost when compared to other major programs?
Mr. Kendall. The F-35 is in a unique position in terms of the
length of time that the Department plans to operate this weapon system.
The combination of a planned procurement of over 2,400 aircraft over a
25-year production run and a 30-year service life results in a life
cycle that extends out to 2065. The Department does estimate life cycle
costs for all weapons systems based on the planned life cycle of the
individual program. In terms of the F-35 O&S estimate, the inflationary
effects on the Then Year (TY) estimate on a 55-year timeline have a
major impact on the total O&S figure. I believe it is more relevant to
focus on the elements that constitute the cost per flight hour, and
result in the annual cost estimates as the appropriate metrics for O&S
affordability. As a result, I have focused the F-35 Program on a
sustainment affordability target that uses cost per flight hour.
61. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, do you have an estimate of what
the cost of 10 carriers or a fleet of submarines would cost if
estimated over 55 years?
Mr. Kendall. Not precisely. Neither carriers nor submarines are
designed for a 55 year service life. However, the December 2011 SAR for
the CVN-78 program and SSN 774 program include Operations and Support
(O&S) estimates over the life cycle of those programs and therefore
provide an indication of the requested O&S costs. For the CVN-78 Gerald
R. Ford class of aircraft carriers, the estimate is derived by taking
the annual costs to operate a planned 11 ship fleet over the projected
50 year service life. For CVN-78 the total O&S costs in TY$ are $231.3
billion. For the SSN 774 Virginia-class submarine, the estimate is
derived by taking the annual costs to operate a representative fleet of
30 submarines over a service life of 33 years per hull. For the SSN
774, the total O&S costs in TY$ are $95.6 billion.
62. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Kendall, I believe that we in Congress
need quality data and a solid methodology to serve as the basis for
making informed decisions on our major defense programs. I question the
quality of the estimate that we are currently using for the F-35
program; this overstated 55-year estimate unnecessarily scares our
allied partners and in actuality misinforms decisionmakers both in DOD
and in Congress. We need to do a better job at refining these estimates
as this program moves forward. I have been told that if you used this
new 55-year methodology and applied it to the legacy fighter fleet, it
would cost us $3 to $4 trillion just to keep flying what we have today
another 50 years--so in effect, we save money by modernizing with F-35s
which will be both more capable and survivable. Don't you agree the
cost of the alternative needs to be discussed as well?
Mr. Kendall. In general I believe that the costs of alternatives
should be discussed; however extending the legacy fighter fleet to an
additional 55 years is not a viable alternative to the F-35. The
discussion of alternatives does take place as part of the annual budget
review process. Additionally, F-35 affordability was discussed during
the recent review of the program prior to my decision to award a new
Milestone B and Acquisition Program Baseline.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
army armed aerial scout requirements
63. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, Congress funded an analysis of
alternatives (AOA) to establish an armed scout replacement program as
far back as 2009. The fiscal year 2012 budget included $15 million to
conduct an additional Request for Information (RFI) and Voluntary
Flight Demonstration (VFD) this year. Little guidance is being shared
about the Army Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) requirements and how the
request for information and demonstrations will be conducted. What are
the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) requirements for the AAS
program and have you communicated those requirements to industry?
Mr. Kendall. The July 2009 ICD does not prescribe specific
threshold and objective requirements for a material solution to achieve
but rather describes the capability gaps that exist in the mission
area. Based on open source documentation, industry appears to have
further developed technology, initially described 2 years ago in their
RFI responses, that represents a considerable increase in capability
gap mitigation. However, the Army currently has limited insight into
these potential improvements. The current approved ICD is under the
purview of the requirements community (Army Training and Doctrine
Command) and to my knowledge, has not been released to industry.
Although the ICD may have not been released to industry, the draft RFI
does describe the capability shortfalls that currently exist in terms
of responsiveness, performance margins, and lethality. Additionally,
the RFI contains a detailed description of the AAS mission sets and
outlines the specific demonstration maneuvers and tasks requested.
64. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, were they the same requirements
used in the original AOA?
Mr. Kendall. The July 2009 ICD does not prescribe specific
threshold and objective requirements for a material solution to achieve
but rather describes the capability gaps that exist in the mission
area. However, the AOA was focused on the same capability gaps
addressed in the current ICD.
65. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, will the ICD requirements be used
as the baseline for the planned AAS RFI and VFD and your materiel
solution?
Mr. Kendall. The AAS RFI and VFD seek to address the same
capability gaps in the current ICD.
flight demonstration
66. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, upgrades requested to keep to the
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter operating safely have become more
complex and costly. It is important that a final determination is made
for addressing the Army's validated AAS requirement to assure valuable
time and resources are invested on a platform that will best meet the
Army's requirements. Congress anticipates that the upcoming RFI and VFD
will be conducted with the utmost rigor, objectivity, and fairness in
order to reach a credible and conclusive AAS acquisition strategy. For
the VFDs, how will you ensure the process is fair and transparent?
Mr. Kendall. The Army intends to ensure that its market research is
conducted fairly by following the prescribed guidance in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The requested maneuvers will be executed
in accordance with standard test techniques and normalized to standard
atmospheric conditions. The Army will de-brief industry members at the
conclusion of their VFD and industry participants will have the
opportunity to update their RFI response. The VFD is not a source
selection activity; it is intended to gather information that the Army
can use to determine if an affordable and cost effective product may be
available with existing technology.
67. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, how do you plan to establish
standardized flight conditions?
Mr. Kendall. The Army will use Experimental Test Pilots that are
graduates of the Naval Test Pilot School. The pilots will execute
maneuvers that are voluntarily agreeable with the industry participant
as outlined in the request for information. These maneuvers will be
conducted in accordance with standard test techniques and normalized to
standard atmospheric conditions.
68. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, what method or trade basis will be
used to drive your materiel solution decision in regard to weapons
systems cost, schedule, and performance considerations?
Mr. Kendall. The Army will assess the results of the RFI and VFD
against the known weighted capability gaps defined in the ICD and
validated by the Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) AOA. The methodology for
determining cost, schedule, and performance trades will be similar to
the methodology used in the AAS AOA.
kiowa warrior service life extension program
69. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, the Army states that the Kiowa
Warrior Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is the basis for
comparison in the AAS evaluation. I am not aware that a SLEP has been
established or approved and there is no SLEP in the fiscal year 2013
budget request. Have you conducted, or do you intend to conduct, the
required Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) to validate your Kiowa
Warrior SLEP assumptions?
Mr. Kendall. Kiowa Warrior SLEP is referenced as RECAP in the
budget exhibits. The Kiowa Warrior (KW) fiscal year 2013 budget request
contains funding to execute the SLEP/RECAP requirement if the Army
decides against a new material solution for AAS. This funding will
support either course of action without impacting the approved Kiowa
Warrior Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP)/OH-58F.
The purpose of the Kiowa Warrior SLAP is to investigate and analyze
various approaches to enhance airframe Reliability and Maintainability
(RAM) as well as identify safety improvements that could be applied to
the fuselage structures. The SLAP program is ongoing and will identify
the specific structures requiring improvement; these changes would be
implemented via a SLEP/RECAP effort.
70. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, what are the cost, technical, and
schedule risk findings of the SLEP?
Mr. Kendall. The Army view is that the cost, technical, and
schedule risks of a SLEP/RECAP program are low. The Army has extensive
reliability and cost data on the 40+ year old OH-58 airframes, a
trained and capable workforce performing depot-level maintenance via
the Crash Battle Damage & Overhaul programs, and new cabin production
lines in the Wartime Replacement Aircraft (WRA) program. Together these
programs lower the risk involved in executing a SLEP/RECAP initiative.
Any SLEP/RECAP program would include replacing the aircraft
structures, which could occur on an already established production line
such as WRA. The CASUP/OH-58F begins production in 2015 providing a
good entry point for new metal production that aligns with the approved
CASUP production schedule.
71. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, based on the findings of the SLAP,
is the Kiowa Warrior program in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
considered to be low risk for execution? If so, by what measures?
Mr. Kendall. The initial findings of the SLAP study will be
available in late summer 2012. Kiowa Warrior has no dependencies on
SLAP data to execute fiscal year 2013 program requirements. No
additional risk impacting either fiscal year 2013 budget or program
execution is anticipated as a result of the SLAP outcomes. The Army
view is that the Kiowa Warrior program is at low risk for execution in
fiscal year 2013. The Critical Design Review was successfully completed
ahead of schedule in April 2012. The first two EMD prototype aircraft
are being modified and the critical component programs are currently
executing well.
materiel solution determination
72. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, if performance is validated during
the flight demonstration, will the Army use the validated performance
data for the comparative analysis, or will the Army make unilateral
adjustments and assumptions?
Mr. Kendall. The Army is conducting market research to determine
what technology is available from industry that may be able to
contribute to a material solution option that delivers greater
capability than the current OH-58. The Army does not intend to compare
individual results but rather assess demonstrated capability against
the weighted capability gaps from the AAS AOA.
73. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, if performance capability is not
validated by a flight demonstration, how will the claims be treated
during the evaluation?
Mr. Kendall. The Army realizes that industry RFI performance
projections could exceed what is physically demonstrated. In those
instances or in instances where industry elects not to participate in
the voluntary flight demonstration, the Army will assess the risk of an
industry member and evaluate the RFI performance projection based on
their documented technical progress including company test results,
readiness levels and technology roadmaps.
74. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, if performance is validated during
the flight demonstration, how will the claims be treated in conducting
the cost/benefit analysis (CBA) to make your materiel solution
decision?
Mr. Kendall. Validated performance data mitigates the risk of an
industry member's ability to achieve their RFI performance projection.
The Army will conduct a risk assessment on all responses, validated or
claimed. The end state is to identify an affordable, achievable,
moderate risk material solution option based on the current state of
technology in the market.
75. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, what is your methodology to
conduct your comparison?
Mr. Kendall. The Army will not compare individual industry
responses against each other. Based on open source documentation,
industry appears to have further developed technology, initially
described 2 years ago in their RFI responses, that represents a
considerable increase in capability gap mitigation. However, the Army
currently has no confirmation of these potential improvements.
Individual responses to the RFI and the demonstrated capabilities will
be analyzed to assess the performance, cost and schedule attributes
needed to procure an improved capability. The Army methodology used to
determine the capability tradeoffs is consistent with the methodology
used during the AAS AOA and validated by the AAS AOA Senior Advisory
Group. The RFI and flight demonstration are not source selection
activities; they are intended to gather information so that the Army
can determine what level of capability is attainable with available
technology.
76. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, how will the Army determine if the
AAS materiel solution is deemed unaffordable and is terminated?
Mr. Kendall. The Armed Aerial Scout program has not advanced beyond
the material alternatives analysis phase. Ongoing analysis, subsequent
to the formal Analysis of Alternatives, is further examining cost and
performance estimates. The Army will make an affordability decision as
part of the capabilities determination decision at the end of the
market research effort.
f-16 upgrade
77. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, is the F-16 upgrade being treated
as one major program (ACAT 1C) or is the avionic upgrade and SLEP a
separate ACAT program?
Mr. Kendall. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget established F-
16 Legacy SLEP and Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES)
as two distinct, separate programs. SLEP is focused on structurally
extending the life of the airframe. CAPES' purpose is to enhance
capability of the aircraft as a weapon system. The Legacy SLEP program,
which began its full-scale durability testing effort in fiscal year
2011, is a pre-Milestone B program that will be classified as an ACAT
III. CAPES, a pre-Milestone B effort initiated in fiscal year 2012, is
likely to be classified as an ACAT II.
78. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, will the avionic associate with
the F-16 SLEP, will they be treated as government-furnished equipment
(GFE), or will the prime handle the upgrade?
Mr. Kendall. The Air Force Acquisition Strategy Panel will meet
mid-May 2012 to recommend the formal acquisition strategy to the
Program Executive Officer, which will include a determination on the
prime integrator strategy. The avionics associated with the F-16 SLEP
is referred to as CAPES. CAPES is an umbrella name for four independent
hardware acquisition programs bundled together for Block 42/50/52
aircraft. The four programs are Active Electronically Scanned Array
(AESA) fire control radar, Center Display Unit (CDU), ALQ-213
Electronic Warfare (EW) system, and Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS)
receiver. Out of these four programs, three programs--CDU, ALQ-213, and
IBS--are expected to be procured as GFE via existing DOD contracts with
other Air Force organizations.
79. Senator Wicker. Mr. Kendall, I understand that the Air Force is
determining the life cycle costs for the F-16 upgrade; what is the CAPE
for the overall F-16 upgrade?
Mr. Kendall. The F-16 upgrade program is comprised of two distinct,
separate programs: Legacy SLEP and CAPES. Given that SLEP is ACAT III
and CAPES is ACAT II, CAPE cost estimates are not required for these
programs.
The fiscal year 2013 President's budget reflects the latest
estimate for the programs. However, to support the Milestone B
decisions in calendar year 2013 for each program, the F-16 Program
Office will update their estimates for both CAPES and Legacy SLEP.
Additionally, the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency will develop a Non-
Advocate Cost Assessment (NACA) estimate for both programs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
acquisition and deployment of defense systems
80. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, does the acquisition and deployment
of area defense systems remain important to U.S. defense strategy,
especially in regions where our potential adversaries possess
significant armored or maritime forces?
Mr. Kendall. Area defense systems do remain important to the U.S.
defense strategy. The Department is always reviewing current systems
against emerging technologies and threats to determine what
improvements can or should be made to existing systems and where the
Department needs to look at new acquisitions, including in regions
where potential adversaries possess significant armored or maritime
forces.
sensor-fuzed weapon
81. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, if international advocacy groups
are successful in breaking the supply chain for the Sensor-Fuzed
Weapon, what are the materiel, cost, and humanitarian implications for
U.S. contingency planning and warfighting strategy in the Korean
Peninsula and Persian Gulf regions?
Mr. Kendall. I am aware of the movement to impact the supply chain
of the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon and other weapons that are considered
cluster munitions under some definitions, however to my knowledge the
Department has not conducted an analysis of the impact this would have
in Korean Peninsula or Persian Gulf scenarios. The Department assesses
a range of future scenarios in order to evaluate the ability of
programmed forces to accomplish key missions. These assessments include
evaluations of programmed stocks of munitions. The Department's current
view is that the inventory of Sensor-Fuzed Weapons is sufficient to
meet requirements. Although the Department is not currently procuring
Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, the production line remains open in fulfillment of
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). If the supply chain were disrupted, the
Department would not be able to restock its current inventory, and if
the inventory were exhausted, the Department might be forced to use
less effective unitary weapons which could result in more collateral
damage than the use of Sensor-Fuzed Weapons.
82. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, what would the implications be for
U.S. allies that have current, pending, and prospective FMS agreements
with our Government?
Mr. Kendall. The Department has not identified any potential
alternatives for U.S. allies should the United States be unable to
produce the Sensor Fuzed Weapon.
83. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, is DOD equipped to counter such
campaigns, whether it is the current one against the Sensor-Fuzed
Weapon or a looming one against armed drones? If so, how is DOD doing
this?
Mr. Kendall. The Department is aware of campaigns which have the
potential to curtail the availability of needed warfighting
capabilities. Protecting the U.S. Government's national security
interest in retaining access to genuinely needed capabilities requires
DOD to collaborate effectively with other executive branch agencies and
Congress and to keep the public and media informed of the arguments
against well meant constraints that might in fact have negative and
even unintended consequences that are counter to the goals of the
people mounting the campaign. The Department must ensure that it
thoroughly understands potential risks and communicates those risks to
interagency partners, industry, and to the media and public.
84. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, many of DOD's current inventories
of weapons do not meet the DOD policy of less than 1 percent unexploded
ordnance. Since the policy states that non-compliant weapons will not
be employed after 2018, please explain DOD's plans and programs (to
include budget lines and funding profiles) to replace or upgrade these
weapons.
Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Department has one
current program of record to upgrade a system to comply with the DOD
Cluster Munition policy. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System
(GMLRS) Alternative Warhead (AW) is a precision-guided, area
suppression weapon system that will replace existing inventories of
dual-purpose, improved conventional munition (DPICM) rockets with a DOD
Cluster Munition policy-compliant system. The GMLRS AW will achieve an
initial operational capability in early 2017. The GMLRS AW is fully
funded with $159.6 million programmed for development and AW will be
integrated into the GMLRS rocket production line in 2016 with a
remaining $1.35 billion programmed for procurement through 2022 in
order to achieve a GMLRS Army Procurement Objective (APO) of 43,560
rockets.
The Department is examining other potential efforts including
policy-compliant replacements for 155mm DPICM projectiles and Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM)
missiles; and an upgrade to the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) program
JSOW-A variant to replace non-compliant sub-munitions with an alternate
warhead.
85. Senator Brown. Mr. Kendall, can you reaffirm the U.S. position
that the BLU-108 is the submunition of the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, because
it is a conventional munition released by a cluster munition and
functions by detonating an explosive charge before impact?
Mr. Kendall. The Department has assigned a Bomb Live Unit (BLU)
designation to the Sensor Fuzed Weapon submunition, which is the BLU-
108. The BLU designation identifies a component of a U.S. cluster
munition as a submunition. The Department has not assigned a BLU, or
similar, designation to any other component of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon.
Therefore the U.S. position is that the BLU-108 is the Sensor Fuzed
Weapon submunition.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
contracting with rosoboronexport
86. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, are you aware of Rosoboronexport's
activities in Syria and how that company, which is affiliated with the
Russian Government, has continued to arm the Assad regime and enable
that regime's murder of its own citizens?
Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that Rosoboronexport is a state
run corporation of the Russian Government and that Russian Government
policy has been to support the Assad regime. It is also my
understanding that Russia remains a top supplier of weapons to Syria.
For example, recent press articles report that several cargo ships used
by Rosoboronexport have delivered cargo to Syria. Other press reporting
indicates that Rosoboronexport signed a deal with the Syrian Government
in January to sell 36 military aircraft.
87. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, what business is DOD conducting
with Rosoboronexport?
Mr. Kendall. Rosoboronexport is a Russian Federation state-owned
enterprise which, under Russian law, has authority over export of Mi-17
aircraft that are purchased for military use. DOD has procured Mi-17
aircraft for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) including spare
parts for maintenance, and engineering support services from
Rosoboronexport. This procurement includes technical documentation
which is available only through Rosoboronexport. This procurement
supports the U.S. strategy to build the Afghan Air Force and thus
facilitate a transition to ANSF taking full responsibility for the
security of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
88. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, is it correct that DOD is
purchasing helicopters from Rosoboronexport for use in Afghanistan?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, the United States directly purchases Mi-17s
through Rosoboronexport. Under Russian law, Rosoboronexport is the
Russian Federation, state-owned, sole entity controlling export of
military use Mi-17 helicopters. The Army entered into a contract for 21
Mi-17 helicopters in May 2011. Fifteen of the 21 have been delivered to
Afghanistan compliant to all contract terms; the remainder will be
delivered in late June. The contract includes purchase of spare parts
and engineering support service and an option line for 12 attrition
replacement aircraft, if needed.
89. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, do you believe it is appropriate
to be paying taxpayers' dollars to a Russian company that is arming
Assad and enabling his murder of over 8,000 civilians?
Mr. Kendall. While I have not been involved in the administration's
deliberations over policy towards Syria, it is my understanding that
the U.S. Government has repeatedly made it clear to senior Russian
leaders that it does not support Russian arms shipments to the Assad
regime while the regime engages in violence against the Syrian people.
I believe that the contractual arrangement with the Russian company
Rosoboronexport to procure and support ANSF helicopters reflects the
Department's commitment to balance between the two national security
priorities of equipping the ANSF with the necessary equipment to
transition security responsibilities, and finding ways to isolate the
Assad regime in Damascus.
joint strike fighter
90. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, in your answers to the advance
policy questions, you state that DOD remains committed to the JSF
program, and you describe the JSF as a ``critical capability''. Why do
you believe the JSF is a critical capability?
Mr. Kendall. Dominance in the air is an essential element of U.S.
military power. Control of the air is a warfighting capability in which
the United States cannot accept parity. The fifth generation
capabilities that the F-35 will provide are essential to accomplishing
many of the primary missions identified in the National Security
Strategy. The F-35 will provide the United States with a dominant
capability in this domain for decades to come.
91. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, do you agree with the Air Force
Chief of Staff that the Russians and Chinese are working on their own
fifth generation fighter capabilities?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
92. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, for our country, is there a fifth
generation alternative to the JSF?
Mr. Kendall. No. There is no fifth generation alternative to the
JSF that provides all three Services the stealth technology, advanced
sensing, and networked engagement capabilities from flexible basing
options that the three variants of the F-35 will provide.
93. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, understanding that procurement
levels will impact unit cost, what steps are you taking to keep
international partners committed to the program?
Mr. Kendall. The Department maintains regular contact with the
international partner countries at various levels of their respective
Ministries of Defense. I am routinely in contact with my counterparts
concerning the F-35 program. The F-35 Program is structured with
governance boards at various levels that facilitate open dialogue and
information sharing. The Joint Executive Steering Board (JESB) is a
forum at the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) level where
International Partner procurement plans are reviewed and finalized on a
semi-annual basis. At the JESB, International Partners are provided
detailed and transparent insight into program health and progress
metrics. I also chair the F-35 Chief Executive Officer conference which
includes discussion and dialogue with all partners at the National
Armament Director level, as well as bi-lateral discussions with
individual partners on an as needed basis. Earlier this year the
Department provided the partners a thorough and objective assessment of
the impacts and outcomes of the revised procurement profile in the
fiscal year 2013 President's Budget. Additionally, the F-35 Program
Office is staffed with military officers from each of the partner
countries and as such is in daily communication concerning all aspects
of the program ranging from requirements, to development schedule, to
procurement plans. I believe that maintaining open lines of
communications with the partners is critical to the success of the
program and if confirmed I will make open communications with the
partners a high priority.
94. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, if the decision were made to
cancel the JSF, what would be the cost of operating and maintaining the
legacy aircraft fleet that the JSF is going to replace?
Mr. Kendall. The JSF is scheduled to replace the AV-8B, F/A-18A-D,
F-16, and A-10 for the U.S. Services. A portion of the F/A-18A-D and F-
16 fleet is already planned for service life extensions to meet force
structure requirements. If the JSF were canceled, the Services would
have to assess the possibility of additional service life extensions,
but there are practical limits to the degree to which that can even be
considered. For many of those aircraft with excessive flight hours,
extending service life would not be an option, and they would have to
be retired. If JSF were to be canceled the Department would have to
start other modernization programs to develop one or more fifth
generation aircraft and the right comparison would be those programs
and the completion of JSF. In my view, both the delay in obtaining JSF-
like capabilities and the cost of new developments would be
prohibitive. The cancelation of JSF is not under consideration.
95. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, over the same period of time, how
does this compare to the JSF operations and sustainment costs?
Mr. Kendall. Maintaining the current high performance aircraft
fleet until 2065 is not a viable option so it isn't meaningful to make
the requested comparison. While service life extensions are planned for
some legacy aircraft, it is simply not possible that their service life
could be extended out to the 2065 timeframe the F-35 is planned to
operate. Service life constraints will result in the bulk of those
aircraft having to retire before that timeframe elapses.
96. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, what investments have been made in
the development and design of the F-35 to reduce operations and
sustainment costs over the life of the program?
Mr. Kendall. From the outset, the F-35 has been designed with
supportability and affordability as major tenets of the Program; the
result of which is an overall air system designed to offer greater
availability and smaller logistics footprint. Within the air vehicle,
systems including sustainable low-observable coatings as well as a
prognostic health management system are both examples which will offer
increased maintainability and availability. Within the sustainment
system, the commonality of spares between variants and the training
system were designed to offer significant through-life costs savings.
Also, as the design continues through the System Design and Development
phase opportunities for reducing through-life costs continue to be
investigated. Of 122 current affordability initiatives being pursued
through production, there are approximately 38 that will have improved
life cycle cost impacts.
The F-35 JPO is also currently implementing an affordability
strategy for which it is developing an Affordability Management Plan
focused on: reducing the costs of support products such as support
equipment, spare parts and training devices; base-lining requirements
with the Services and leveraging increased efficiency opportunities
provided by F-35; and addressing reliability and maintainability. The
JPO is creating contract and pricing opportunities to reduce the cost
of the JSF support products by leveraging economic order quantity buys
for spare parts in conjunction with production buys, and implementing
pricing improvement curves that leverage learning opportunities. By
creating a common sustainment baseline harnessing the F-35 support
system design, the JPO is attempting to optimize the level of
infrastructure and products required to support operations of the
global fleet. By optimizing the amount of equipment procured early the
Department will be able to affect the through life O&S Costs. In
parallel, the program office is addressing the reliability and
maintainability of systems/subsystems and components; where they fall
short of meeting their design specifications, the implementation of
appropriate modifications will enable the Department to control cost
growth.
Specifically, in 2011 the JPO implemented a number of technical
changes and affordability initiatives which resulted in an over $30
billion reduction, in base year 2002 dollars, in the 2011 O&S estimate
which helped to offset externally-driven increases in areas such as
military and contractor labor rates. Additionally, the JPO conducted
sustainment baseline deep dives into support equipment, spares, and
manpower, as well as the initial phase of a business case analysis on
supply chain management, field operations, sustaining engineering, and
fleet management.
The 2012 efforts include a manpower review into the appropriate
labor mix and contractor rates, a review of competitive options for the
long-term provision of support equipment and spares, enterprise
software licensing, engine life improvements, reprogramming laboratory
requirements, and additional Service planning factors such as aircraft
utilization rates, contingency planning, and squadron manning
requirements.
cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts
97. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, I believe we should minimize using
cost-plus contracts to procure major weapons systems. In most cases, by
the time DOD is ready to produce major systems at a low rate, enough
development risk should have been burned off that contractors should be
ready to sign a fixed-price contract. Otherwise, cost-plus contracts
should be used for only those pieces where significant risk is left
over. This is the thrust of the amendment on cost-plus contracting I
offered with Senator McCain last year in connection with the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012. What is your view of this issue?
Mr. Kendall. I generally agree, but I believe the Department needs
the latitude to make exceptions when merited. The Department should
minimize the use of cost-plus arrangements under production contracts
for major weapon systems. Once a program has completed low rate initial
production the Department's contracts for major weapon systems should
be firm fixed priced.
I believe there are circumstances, however, where the Department
cannot adequately reduce the risk in the low rate initial production
phase and therefore a form of cost reimbursable contract may be
appropriate for early production. This could be the case when accepting
the risk of concurrency and early transition to production is the best
course of action due to an urgent operational need. Another
circumstance that might warrant use of a cost-type contract would be
where the Department requires the contractor to deliver a production
unit for operational evaluation as a risk reduction measure. For some
products such as first in class ships and some satellites, the first
production unit is also the first prototype unit and there is no
opportunity for the design to be verified through the testing of
developmental preproduction prototypes.
In general, however, I am inclined to use firm fixed-price
contracts for low-rate initial production when the design is stable,
performance has been demonstrated with production representative
prototypes, production processes are mature, and the costs are
reasonably predictable. I have been emphasizing the use of fixed price
incentive contracts when there is marginally more risk associated with
production processes and costs, but not risk that can efficiently be
mitigated by delaying the start of production.
Optimally structuring acquisition programs is a complicated matter
that requires sound professional judgment to balance all the competing
demands, and unfortunately there is no single approach that is
universally applicable. If confirmed, I would be happy to work with the
committee on this subject.
98. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, do you support the floor amendment
Senator McCain and I offered last year, S.A. 1249?
Mr. Kendall. I believe that decisions about the appropriate
contract type to use on a given contract should be made on a case-by-
case basis after a careful examination of the circumstances of the
program, including the nature of the system being acquired and the risk
inherent in the program. One of the key aspects of the Better Buying
Power initiative has been increasing the use of fixed-price type
contracts, where appropriate. The Department can and is doing more
fixed-price contracting throughout the acquisition system, particularly
in the early stages of production. However, I believe it is critical
that the Department retain the discretion to select the contract type
most appropriate for the work being performed. I am not personally in
favor of any provision that would completely prohibit the Department's
use of cost-type contracts for the production of all major defense
acquisition programs (MDAPs). I believe that the Department should have
the latitude to use cost-type contracts during low rate initial
production of an MDAP, or for some contracts for development of
incremental improvements to an MDAP entered into after the MDAP has
passed into the production phase of the program. If confirmed, I am
committed to working with the committee on this issue.
money flow to enemies
99. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, last year, Senator Brown and I
introduced legislation that was incorporated into section 841 of the
NDAA. The intent of this legislation was to make it easier to stop the
flow of money when it is discovered that U.S. contracting dollars are
inadvertently being diverted to our enemies. Have these new authorities
been helpful?
Mr. Kendall. DOD implemented section 841 on January 26th in Class
Deviation 2012-O0005--Prohibition on Contracting with the Enemy and
Access to Contractor and Subcontractor Records in the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Theater of Operations. This provides contracting
officers the tool to take immediate action upon the enemy
identification by the CENTCOM commander. The CENTCOM is currently
finalizing the enemy identification process. I am confident that this
authority will help the Department significantly; however the
Department has not yet exercised this authority enough to determine how
positive the impact will be.
100. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Kendall, how many companies or individuals
have been suspended or debarred since using these new authorities?
Mr. Kendall. Suspension and debarment are not remedies directly
provided in the legislation. Rather, section 841 authorizes the head of
the contracting activity to restrict the award of contracts, grants, or
cooperative agreements; to terminate for default; or to void a
contract, grant or cooperative agreement. The authorities provided are
still in the process of full implementation and they are expected to be
valuable tools to stop the flow of money to our enemies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
cyber and intelligence acquisition
101. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, recognizing the budget challenges
faced by DOD, how do you plan to further leverage base realignment and
closure (BRAC) investments in the Services' joint command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) organizations such as
Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Center Atlantic?
Mr. Kendall. BRAC enables the Department to reconfigure its
infrastructure to match the demands of leaner, more flexible forces and
to accommodate the changing strategic emphasis. It is an important tool
for the Department to use to make the tough fiscal choices necessitated
by current budget challenges.
If Congress does authorize the requested BRAC rounds, the
Department will undertake the BRAC rounds in accordance with the
statutory directive to consider all installations equally and make
decisions based on 20-year force structure plan and statutory selection
criteria which give primary consideration to military value. At this
point there are no specific closures or consolidations planned.
102. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, how would you approach the
acquisition process for rapidly changing technologies, such as cyber
and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), versus those that remain
relatively constant and mature over long periods of time such as
airplanes, ships, and automotive land vehicles?
Mr. Kendall. There are unique characteristics associated with the
efficient and effective acquisition of Cyber and C4ISR capabilities. In
order to maximize the operational benefit of the rapidly changing
technologies associated with these types of programs, the Department
must use tailored approaches. To keep pace with technology, C4ISR
programs generally use an iterative, incremental approach that can
deploy capability quickly. This approach must be based on well defined
increments of capability that are developed, tested, and often fielded
in increments structured around 1 to 2 year software builds. The
Department intends to incorporate this approach as one of the
acquisition approaches covered by the new DOD Instruction 5000.02 which
is currently in development.
Regarding cyber technologies, on March 22, the Department also
submitted a Report to Congress pursuant to section 933 of 2011 NDAA
which articulated a new strategy for acquiring cyberspace warfare
capabilities. Agility and rapidity must characterize cyber
acquisitions. The new cyber framework allows for alternative
acquisition processes, identified as ``rapid'' and ``deliberate''.
These processes will be tailored to the complexity, cost, urgency of
need and fielding timelines associated with the cyber warfare
capability being acquired. As cost increases and operational immediacy
and the tolerance for risk decreases, more disciplined acquisition
strategies will be employed.
common data link procurement
103. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, for several years, congressional
defense committees have expressed concern that proprietary terminal
control interfaces are inhibiting competition in CDL procurement, with
potential missed cost savings opportunities and foregone capabilities.
DOD has been urged to preserve options for competitive sourcing of CDL
systems and to advise program offices responsible for CDL procurement
of the need for competition. What is the status of DOD's efforts to
enhance competition in CDL acquisition?
Mr. Kendall. This problem was first brought to my attention by
industry which I believe has a valid concern. My understanding is that
the Department was not effective in implementing open CDL systems free
from proprietary constraints. At my direction, the Department is
evaluating CDL system acquisition practices with a focus on several
areas to improve competition. The first area is to have processes to
make certain that no vendor proprietary or undocumented interfaces are
being cited as requirements or included as evaluation criteria in the
Department's CDL system solicitations. The second area is to ensure
that as DOD advances its CDL standards, the Department maintains a
broad industry base from which it seeks innovations. Finally when CDL
systems are procured as a subsystem within a platform, DOD wants
confidence that when the prime vendor investigates suitable sources for
CDL compliant systems these vendors are thoroughly considering all
suppliers. Industry inputs and suggestions for improvement are being
sought as part of this evaluation.
104. Senator Graham. Mr. Kendall, since the beginning of fiscal
year 2012, have any CDL contracts been awarded which were not proceeded
by a full and open competition, and if so, why?
Mr. Kendall. My understanding is that no contracts have been
awarded since the beginning of fiscal year 2012 to acquire CDL systems,
either sole-source or competitively.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
syria and contracting with rosoboronexport
105. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that the Assad
regime has committed acts of mass murder against its own people during
the Syrian uprisings that began in March 2011?
Mr. Kendall. I am deeply concerned about the situation in Syria and
about the human rights abuses that are occurring there. The situation
is tragic for the people of Syria and for the region. I am not in a
position at this time to pass judgment on whether the acts of the Assad
regime constitute mass murder. However, I agree that the Assad regime's
actions should be strongly condemned, and that serious violations of
international law very likely have occurred.
106. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you believe these actions also
constitute crimes against humanity?
Mr. Kendall. I believe that the actions of the Assad regime are
outrageous. There is no question that violence towards the people of
Syria has been brutal and devastating. It is my view that the Assad
regime has lost its legitimacy and that Assad should go. I have to
defer, however, to the Department of State on specific judgments as to
whether these actions constitute crimes against humanity.
107. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware of
Rosoboronexport's history of arms sales to Syria?
Mr. Kendall. I am not familiar with all of the transactions between
Rosoboronexport and Syria, but I am aware that Russia is the top
supplier of weapons to Syria and that Rosoboronexport is the state run
export corporation for the Russian Government.
108. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that the U.S.
Government has sanctioned Rosoboronexport in the past for providing
illicit support to Iran's military?
Mr. Kendall. Yes, I am aware of the State Department sanctions
against Rosoboronexport that were in place until late spring 2010. The
Department's efforts to acquire and support Afghan Mi-series aircraft
were shaped to abide by the sanctions.
109. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that this firm has
continued to supply weapons to Syria during the crackdown?
Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Russian Government has
continued to supply Syria with weapons and supplies throughout the
current uprising, and that Rosoboronexport, the state-run Russian
export corporation, has facilitated these transactions.
110. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, what types and quantities of
weapons has Rosoboronexport delivered to Syria, directly or indirectly,
since the Syrian uprisings began in March 2011?
Mr. Kendall. I am not familiar with all of the transactions between
Rosoboronexport and Syria, but I am aware of press reporting on recent
Russian arms deliveries to Syria. Russia has a series of ongoing
contracts to provide Syria with advanced conventional weapons.
111. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you have concerns about DOD's
ongoing business dealings with Rosoboronexport? If so, what are those
concerns?
Mr. Kendall. In my role as Acting Under Secretary, I have been
working to ensure that the purchases of Russian-origin equipment are
carried out consistent with U.S. laws and with sound acquisition
practices. Rosoboronexport has an obligation to deliver the remaining
Mi-17 helicopters ordered for the ANSF on schedule, within the budget,
and in the mission-ready configuration as specified in the contract. I
am also concerned about Russia's provision of arms to the Assad regime
at a time when they are perpetrating brutal violence against their own
people.
112. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, which other Russian entities have
transferred weapons to Syria since the Syrian uprisings began in March
2011?
Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that Rosoboronexport, as
Russia's state-authorized exporter of military use equipment and
technology, is responsible for weapon contracts with Syria. I cannot
rule out the possibility that other Russian-connected entities have
also been involved.
113. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, what types and quantities of
weapons have these entities delivered during that time?
Mr. Kendall. I am not familiar with all of the transactions between
Rosoboronexport and Syria, or of what transactions with other Russian
entities may have occurred. I am aware of reporting in the press of
Russian transfers of air defense weapons as well as small arms to the
Syrian regime.
114. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, President Obama stated on
February 3, 2011, that: ``Assad must halt his campaign of killing and
crimes against his own people now. . . . The suffering citizens of
Syria must know: we are with you, and the Assad regime must come to an
end.'' Do you agree with President Obama's statement?
Mr. Kendall. Yes.
115. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that Russian arms
transfers to the Assad regime have been a key enabler of that regime
maintaining power in Syria?
Mr. Kendall. I believe that support for the Assad regime from
Russia and other nations has been significant in its ability to
maintain power. Any transfer of weapons to the regime from sources
outside of Syria could help the regime maintain power.
116. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that the United
States has an obligation to use all of its leverage to pressure Russia
and Russian entities to end their support of the Assad regime?
Mr. Kendall. I support the U.S. Government's decision to pressure
the Russians through diplomatic channels to help end the violence in
Syria with a view to a transition of power.
117. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that DOD has the
ability to sever all current contractual relationships with
Rosoboronexport?
Mr. Kendall. The Department always retains the right to terminate
any of its contracts. The contract with Rosoboronexport can be
terminated, however, the United States currently benefits from this
relationship in two ways. First, the Department is assured of proper
Mi-17 delivery and support to the Afghan Air Force that enables Partner
Nation Capability and a timely U.S. withdrawal. Second, the Department
will obtain accurate engineering information for this aircraft to
ensure safe air operations for the Afghans as well as for U.S. aircrews
and passengers when they are onboard these aircraft.
118. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that continuing to
do business with Rosoboronexport undermines U.S. policy regarding
Syria?
Mr. Kendall. I believe the U.S. Government must carefully balance
its national security objectives in its dealings with other nations.
DOD's business with Rosoboronexport is strictly limited to acquiring
Mi-17 helicopters and sustainment packages for the ANSF. In addition,
the United States has other interactions with the Russian Government on
a range of issues that are critical to U.S. national security and the
mission in Afghanistan.
119. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, who in the administration
directed that procurement of Mi-17 helicopters must be done using
Rosoboronexport as broker?
Mr. Kendall. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Dr. Ashton B. Carter, designated
the Army as the Lead Service for Mi-17 and other non-standard rotary
wing aircraft in January 2010. The need for these aircraft was
documented by the Combined Airpower Transition Force/438th
Expeditionary Wing to support development of an Afghan National Army
Air Corps (later renamed the Afghan Air Force) capable of sustaining
long-term security needs of Afghanistan and enabling the U.S. exit
strategy.
Prior to May 2010, U.S. efforts to provide and support Mi-17s were
constrained to purchases of civilian-variant Mi-aircraft in a world
marketplace, necessitating costly modifications and severe flight
limitations due to a lack of comprehensive engineering data that slowed
the stand-up of Afghan capability. From August to December 2010,
discussions with the Russian Government established that
Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of military-use
Mi-17 helicopters and the Russian manufacturer is the only source of
complete engineering data. Diplomatic avenues were used to confirm
these facts. This situation led USD(AT&L) to transfer procurement
responsibility for 21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems Command to the
Army in December 2010.
In compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 2304(c)(7) and the FAR
6.302-7, the Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) authorized award of
a contract for the required aircraft based on the public interest
exception to full and open competition. The Secretary's decision was
based on the need to provide a familiar aircraft to the Afghans to
support the war effort and the demonstrated capability of the Mi-17 to
meet the robust requirements of operations in Afghanistan. The
congressional defense committees were notified, consistent with the
statute, prior to contract award.
120. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, the June 1, 2011, Army contract
was a no-bid contract. What justification existed for not awarding this
contract through an open and competitive selection process?
Mr. Kendall. In compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 2304(c)(7)
and the FAR 6.302-7, the Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head)
authorized award of a contract for the required aircraft based on the
public interest exception to full and open competition. The Secretary's
decision was based on the need to provide a familiar aircraft to the
Afghans to support the war effort and the demonstrated capability of
the Mi-17 to meet the robust requirements of operations in Afghanistan.
The congressional defense committees were notified, consistent with the
statute, prior to contract award.
121. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that the Obama
administration's policy of trying to reset bilateral relations with
Russia was a major factor in the decision to award this June 1, 2011,
no-bid contract to Rosoboronexport, a state-controlled firm that is
essentially an arm of the Russian Government?
Mr. Kendall. No. The Department initiated discussions with the
Russian Federation following the lifting of sanctions in 2010 for the
primary purpose of obtaining access to authentic engineering data to
support Mi-17 airworthiness. At that time, the Navy was processing a
procurement action for additional aircraft. During discussions, the
Russian authorities raised the issue that exports of aircraft for
military use must be conducted within Russian law, an interpretation
that was potentially inconsistent with any contract action that
involved export of either civilian or military aircraft from Russia, if
the Russians judged the end use to be military. From August to December
2010, discussions with the Russian Government established that
Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of military-use
Mi-17 helicopters and the Russian manufacturer is the only source of
complete engineering data. Diplomatic avenues were used to confirm
these facts. This situation led USD(AT&L) to transfer procurement
responsibility for 21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems Command to the
Army in December 2010.
In compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 2304(c)(7) and the FAR
6.302-7, the Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) authorized award of
a contract for the required aircraft based on the public interest
exception to full and open competition. The Secretary's decision was
based on the need to provide a familiar aircraft to the Afghans to
support the war effort and the demonstrated capability of the Mi-17 to
meet the robust requirements of operations in Afghanistan. The
congressional defense committees were notified consistent with the
stature prior to contract award.
122. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that
Rosoboronexport is not the actual manufacturer of Mi-17 helicopters,
but only a broker?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. In meetings with the Russian Federal Service for
Military-Technical Cooperation, U.S. representatives were advised that
Mi-17 aircraft purchased for military end-use can only be purchased
from the Russian Federation's state-owned enterprise, Rosoboronexport.
Rosoboronexport and the prime aircraft manufacturer, Kazan,
participated in subsequent contract negotiations.
123. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, when will delivery of the initial
21 Mi-17 helicopters procured under the June 1, 2011, Army contract be
completed?
Mr. Kendall. Fifteen of the 21 aircraft have been delivered in
Afghanistan to the Afghan Air Force. The remaining six aircraft are on
schedule to be delivered at the end of June.
124. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, under the June 1, 2011, Army
contract with Rosoboronexport for the purchase of 21 Mi-17 helicopters
and spare parts, has the $550 million option for additional Mi-17s been
exercised? If so, on what date was it exercised?
Mr. Kendall. The option contract line item provides for up to 12
aircraft at a range of pre-negotiated prices that depend on the desired
delivery date. Two aircraft with initial spares, tools, and technical
publication support were ordered for $33.4 million in February to
replace two aircraft destroyed in accidents. The NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan has also identified the need for 10 aircraft to replace Mi-
17s that are nearing their life limited flight hours. The DOD
Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council, established in compliance with
congressional direction, has reviewed and approved NTM-A's request and
funding source. Exercise of the 10 aircraft option, including initial
spares, tools, and technical publications is planned for fourth quarter
fiscal year 2012 at a projected price of $184.3 million.
The $550 million cost cited in the question is the ceiling price
for the entire contract, including the 21 aircraft baseline and the 12-
aircraft option.
125. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, if the option has not been
exercised yet, does DOD/Army intend to exercise it? If so, what is the
approximate timeframe for that?
Mr. Kendall. The option contract line item provides for up to
twelve aircraft at pre-negotiated prices. Two aircraft were ordered in
February this year to replace two aircraft destroyed in accidents. The
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan identified funding for ten aircraft
to replace Mi-17s that are nearing their life limited flight hours. The
DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council, established in compliance
with congressional direction, has reviewed and approved NTM-A's
request. Exercise of the option for the 10 is planned for fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2012.
126. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, once delivery of the last of the
initial 21 aircraft to be procured under this contract is complete, how
many additional Mi-17s does DOD/Army anticipate needing to buy in order
to round out the Afghan rotary aircraft requirement?
Mr. Kendall. Delivery of the 21 aircraft meets the planned
inventory requirement for the Afghan Air Force, although 2 crash-
damaged aircraft are scheduled to be replaced. Additionally, the Afghan
Air Interdiction Unit, which is being transformed to a Special
Operations Unit, also operates 30 Mi-17 aircraft. No further purchases
are planned at this time to increase total inventory for either unit,
but procurements will be needed to sustain both inventory levels and
possibly to facilitate the new Special Operations Unit. Sustaining
inventory levels require additional aircraft procurement because Mi-17s
must be overhauled at a depot at specific flight hour limits and the
number of overhauls is limited. Replacement aircraft are, and will be
needed for aircraft that have no further flight hour availability. The
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan recently identified 10 Afghan Air
Force aircraft for funded replacement. Those 10 plus the 2 crash damage
replacements can be accommodated using the priced option on the
existing contract. NTM-A has also proposed alternatives to replace
aircraft for the Special Operations Unit that are being considered by
the DOD Afghanistan Resource Oversight Council.
127. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, do you agree that we have viable
alternative routes available to buy these same Mi-17 aircraft,
notwithstanding any Russian claims to the contrary?
Mr. Kendall. No, I do not agree that there are viable alternatives.
It is my understanding that the Department has established, with
assistance from the diplomatic community, that the Russian assertions
regarding Rosoboronexport's control over exports of Mi-17 aircraft
intended for military purposes is part of Russian law. While others may
be able to purchase Mi-17s, delivery from within the Russian Federation
could be blocked by Rosoboronexport. More importantly, the United
States needs access to the prime aircraft manufacturer, Kazan, for
accurate engineering support and data to ensure safe operations and
maintenance and airworthiness on behalf of Afghan and U.S. personnel
that operate, maintain, or are transported on these aircraft.
128. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that in 2009 the
Navy legally purchased four of these same dual-use Mi-17 helicopters
through a private U.S. broker after an open and competitive selection
process?
Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Navy purchased two Mi-
8 and two Mi-171 aircraft, which are civilian variants of the Mi-17 on
a commercial-style (FAR Part 12) contract in 2009. These aircraft were
subsequently modified to a suitable configuration at an additional cost
and are in service. The transaction was with a U.S. contractor acting
as a broker. This Navy contract was awarded prior to the assertions by
the Russians that exports of such aircraft would be in violation of
their laws and would be blocked.
129. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that these four
helicopters are still flying today, presently in service with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Air Training Command-Afghanistan
(NATC-A)?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. The Army Program Manager for Non-Standard Rotary
Wing Aircraft provides maintenance and engineering support for these
aircraft. (Please note that the command has been renamed, the NATO
Training Mission-Afghanistan).
130. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that, after the
successful 2009 procurement of Mi-17s, the Navy initiated a similar
effort to procure 21 additional Mi-17s through an open and competitive
selection process?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. The Navy was tasked to procure these aircraft
prior to the decision to establish the Non-Standard Rotary Wing
Aircraft Program as a special interest program and the Department asked
the Navy to continue that activity during the time the Non-Standard
Rotary Wing Aircraft Program was being staffed and beginning
operations. Following the May 2010 lifting of sanctions and discussions
with the Russian Federation that established Rosoboronexport's role
regarding Mi-17 exports, the USD(AT&L) directed the Navy to cease
efforts to procure the aircraft and transferred responsibility to the
Army.
131. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, are you aware that, on December
16, 2010, DOD put an end to that by transferring procurement authority
for these 21 aircraft from the Navy to the Army?
Mr. Kendall. Yes. USD(AT&L) transferred procurement responsibility
for 21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems Command to the Army in
December 2010. The basis for that decision was a determination,
confirmed through diplomatic channels, that Rosoboronexport is the sole
entity controlling export of military-use Mi-17 helicopters and the
Russian manufacturer is the only source of complete engineering data.
The planned Naval Air Systems Command contract would not be able to
resolve the need for complete engineering data.
132. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, how is a no-bid contract with
Rosoboronexport preferable to a competitively awarded contract with a
private U.S. broker?
Mr. Kendall. On balance, consideration of several criteria resulted
in contracting with Rosoboronexport. Most importantly, the Department
gains access to the manufacturer's engineering expertise and direct
support for determinations regarding the operation, maintenance, and
airworthiness of these aircraft. Airworthiness considerations for both
Afghan and U.S. personnel are an imperative consideration.
A contract with a broker not authorized by the manufacturer
delivers an airworthy platform but the broker is unable to sustain that
status lacking access to the manufacturer for the latest safety
updates. Second, the contract with Rosoboronexport delivers aircraft in
the desired configuration, modified with certain western equipment to
facilitate interoperability with U.S. platforms. Deliveries from a
broker in the past have required subsequent modifications at increased
cost. Third, the Department's experience is that the product from
Rosoboronexport is less costly than the total cost of purchases from
brokers and post-delivery modification, without considering engineering
support costs. The United States is assured that export of these
aircraft for their intended military use will not be blocked, which
could be the case when third parties are involved. Finally, the United
States was advised that under Russian law, Rosoboronexport is the
Russian Federation, state-owned, sole entity export of military use Mi-
17 helicopters.
133. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Kendall, at your confirmation hearing,
Senator Blumenthal asked Dr. Miller about DOD's efforts to find other
helicopters that could be used, specifically asking if there is ``an
effort underway in development.'' Dr. Miller responded, ``Senator, yes
there is.'' Please describe what DOD has previously done and is
currently doing to find alternatives.
Mr. Kendall. It is my understanding that the Department has briefed
key members of the congressional defense committees on a 2010 study led
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff that
examined the worldwide need for rotary wing aircraft for Security Force
Assistance, especially in the instances where Building Partner Nation
Capacity was involved. The study examined alternatives for meeting
these requirements, including U.S.-source alternatives. Since this
study was done, there have already been successes in transitioning some
Partner Nations to U.S. helicopters; Iraq stands out as an example with
the purchase of an armed variant of the Bell 407 helicopter. Several
other U.S. firms offer military helicopters that are potentially
suitable for Security Force Assistance missions.
In the case of Afghanistan, the Department has recently delivered
six MD 530F Helicopters to serve as training aircraft for Afghan forces
to begin a transition to more sophisticated rotary wing aircraft
training. But the unique situation there precludes a near-term
transition to any U.S. alternative to the Mi-17. The referenced study
did compare a wide range of alternatives; however, the Mi-17 has proven
superior not only in military and civilian operations in the high
altitudes and hot temperatures of Afghanistan, but also in terms of
lower procurement and operating cost. Furthermore, the Mi-17 is
familiar to the Afghan pilots, aircrews, and maintenance personnel.
Only a small percentage of the population is literate so recruiting and
training additional personnel is difficult and transition to a more
sophisticated western aircraft would entail a transition time that does
not meet the current strategy.
______
[The nomination reference of Hon. Frank Kendall III
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 24, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Frank Kendall III, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, vice Ashton B. Carter,
resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Hon. Frank Kendall III, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Hon. Frank Kendall III
Education:
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Sept. 1966 to June 1967
U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1967-1971, B.S., June 1971
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 1971-1973, MS,
Aerospace Engineering, 1972, Aeronautical Engineer Degree, 1974
Long Island University, C.W. Post Center, 1977-1980, MBA, June 1980
Georgetown University Law Center, 2000-2003, J.D. Feb. 2004
Employment Record:
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics)
October 2011-Present
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
March 2010-Present
Renaissance Strategic Advisors
Partner
January 2008-March 2010
Small aerospace and defense consulting firm focused in
the areas of strategic planning, merger and acquisition support
and support to start-up aerospace and defense companies
Self-Employed Attorney
Consultant (human rights issues)
Represented individual clients, almost entirely on a
pro bono basis and primarily individual asylum cases
January 2004-March 2010
Self-Employed Private Consultant
Independent Consultant
Served various defense contractors, government
organizations, and federally funded laboratories in the areas
of technical management, program management, systems
engineering, systems analysis, and strategic planning
January 1999-March 2010
Honors and Awards:
Federal Civilian Awards:
Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service
Medal
Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive
(Senior Executive Service)
Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive
(Senior Executive Service)
Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service
Military Awards, U.S. Army:
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Army Commendation Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Other Awards:
Defense Industrial Preparedness Association Gold Medal
Rodney Smith Memorial Award for Excellence in
Engineering (U.S. Military Academy)
Four-year ROTC scholarship to Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute (used 1 year of scholarship before attending West
Point)
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Frank
Kendall III in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Frank Kendall III.
2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics), Department of Defense.
3. Date of nomination:
January 24, 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
Pittsfield, MA; January 26, 1949.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Eva Elizabeth Halpern.
7. Names and ages of children:
Scott McLeod Kendall, 35.
Eric Sten Kendall, 30.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Pittsfield High School, 1963-1966, H.S. Diploma, June 1966
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Sept. 1966 to June 1967
U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1967-1971, B.S., June 1971
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 1971-1973, MS,
Aerospace Engineering, 1972, Aeronautical Engineer Degree, 1974
Long Island University, C.W. Post Center, 1977-1980, MBA, June 1980
Georgetown University Law Center, 2000-2003, J.D., Feb. 2004
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
October 2011 to Present: Acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Department of Defense,
Pentagon, Washington, DC
March 2010 to Present: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Department of Defense,
Pentagon, Washington, DC
1999 to March 2010: Private Consultant, self-employed, Falls
Church, VA. Independent consultant to various defense contractors,
government organizations, and federally-funded laboratories in the
areas of technical management, program management, systems engineering,
systems analysis, and strategic planning.
2004 to March 2010: Attorney, self-employed, Falls Church, VA.
Worked as a consultant on human rights issues and represented
individual clients, almost entirely on a pro bono basis and primarily
individual asylum cases.
January 2008 to March 2010: Managing Partner, Renaissance Strategic
Advisors, Arlington, VA. Partner in a small aerospace and defense
consulting firm. The firm's work is in the areas of strategic planning,
merger and acquisition support and support to start-up aerospace and
defense companies.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
1967-1982: Active Duty U.S. Army; left Active Duty with the rank of
Captain
1982-1999: U.S. Army Reserve; retired with the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel
1982-1986: U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command,
various civil service positions in engineering management and systems
analysis
1986-1989: Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Defense
Systems, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.
1989-1994: Director of Tactical Warfare Programs, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.
1994-2004: Member and Vice Chairman, Defense Intelligence Agency
Science Advisory Board
1995-2004: Member, Army Science Board
1995-2009: Consultant on the Defense Science Board on various
studies
1998 (approximate) Consultant on the Naval Studies Board
2010-Present: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (Acting Under Secretary from
Oct. 2011 to Present)
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Associate member, Sigma Xi, Research Society
Member, Phi Kappa Phi, Honor Society
Member, American Bar Association
Member, Virginia Bar Association
Member, New York State Bar Association
Member, Association of the U.S. Army
Member, Association of Graduates, USMA
Member, Amnesty International, USA
Member, Naval Academy Sailing Squadron
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Participated as a volunteer in the Obama campaign 2007 to 2008, no
formal affiliation or position.
Participated the Democratic Voter Protection program in 2008
election as a volunteer.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
2011:
Congress
John Douglas, $500
2010:
Senate
Russ Feingold, $250
Joseph Sestak, $250
Harry Reid, $250
Joe Manchin, $250
Alexander Giannoulias, $250
Michael Bennett, $250
Jack Conway, $250
Other
Progressives United PAC, $250
DCCC, $2,000
2008:
President
Barack Obama, General, $2,917
Senate
Kay Hagen, $1,000
James Martin, $1,000
Jeff Merkley, $1,000
Ronnie Musgrove, $1,000
Jack Reed, $1,000
Jeanne Shaheen, $1,000
Mark Warner, $1,000
Al Franken, $1,000
House
Patrick Murphy, $250
Sharen Neuhardt, $250
Other
DNC, $1,003
Democratic Party of VA, $1,000
2007
President
Barack Obama (primary), $2,300
House
Judy Feder, $250
Patrick Murphy, $250
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Military Awards, U.S. Army:
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Army Commendation Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Federal Civilian Awards:
Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal
Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive (Senior
Executive Service)
Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive (Senior Executive
Service)
Army Commander's Award for Civilian Service
Other Awards:
Defense Industrial Preparedness Association Gold Medal
Rodney Smith Memorial Award for Excellence in Engineering (U.S.
Military Academy)
Four-year ROTC scholarship to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
(used 1 year of scholarship before attending West Point)
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``The Sentry Ballistic Missile Defense System'' with Mr. Tom
Purdue, Journal of Defense Research (1982) (classified publication,
best recollection of title)
``Exploiting the Military Technical Revolution; A Concept for Joint
Warfare'', Strategic Review (Spring 1992)
``Defense Contractor and Government Relationships'', RDA Magazine
(1995) (approximate title and date)
``Drawing the Line: Three Case Studies in Procurement Ethics'',
Program Manager Magazine (July-August 1998)
``Reclaim American Values; Prisoner Treatment Hands Power to
Enemies'', with LTG (ret) Charles Otstott, Defense News (April 16,
2007)
``End Impunity for U.S. Contractors in Iraq'' Op Ed, The Topeka
Capital Journal (August 10, 2007),
Guantanamo Military Commissions Observer Blog Postings for Human
Rights First:
``Guantanamo: It All Seems So Normal'', Human Rights First
(April 9, 2008).
``They Clearly Never Met Any Military Attorneys'', Human
Rights First (April 11, 2008)
``I Will Leave in Your Hands the Camel and All That It
Carries'', Human Rights First (April 11, 2008)
``If There are Any Policies Dealing With How We Are to Treat
and Handle Minors Who Are Captured, I Don't Care What You
Think--That's Discoverable'', Human Rights First, (April 14,
2008)
``Not Quite the Thing to Do Here'', Human Rights First (July
14, 2008)
``The Sandman and Alfred Hitchcock Come to Guantanamo'',
Human Rights First (July 15, 2008)
``Doctors or Butchers, How Would I Know'', Human Rights First
(July 16, 2008)
The Constitution (chose one) Does/Does Not Apply at
Guantanamo'', Human Rights First (July 17, 2008)
``Today's Score From Guantanamo; Constitution-1, No-
Constitution 3'', Human Rights First (July 18, 2008)
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I have given approximately 40 speeches in my current position.
These have been on acquisition policy for the most part. I generally
speak from notes rather than a prepared text, however in a few cases I
have used slides. I have also testified before Congress on several
occasions, including:
October 2, 2009: PDUSD(AT&L) Confirmation Hearing, Senate
Armed Services Committee
March 2, 2011: ``U.S. Military Leaving Iraq: Is the State
Department Ready?'', Subcommittee on National Security, House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee
March 29, 2011: ``Tools to Prevent Defense Department Cost
Overruns'', Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, Federal Services and International
Security Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee
May 3, 2011: ``To receive testimony on the health and status
of the defense industrial base and its science and technology-
related elements'', Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee
October 19, 2011: ``To receive testimony on the Final Report
of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan'', Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
Support, Senate Armed Services Committee
March 20, 2012: ``Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Tactical
Aviation Programs'', Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land
Forces, House Armed Services Committee
17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Frank Kendall III.
This 23rd day of March, 2012.
[The nomination of Hon. Frank Kendall III was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 15, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 2012.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. James Miller by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. In answer to advance policy questions at the time of your
nomination to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(USD(P)), you stated that you did not see any need for modifications of
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
and the Special Operations reforms at that time. You stated that the
Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in ``dramatic improvements in the
effectiveness of the Armed Forces--from strategic decisionmaking to
operational command and control. An entire generation of military
officers now has a much improved perspective on coordinated, multi-
Service, joint training and operations.''
Taking into account your experience as Principal Deputy USD(P), is
it still your view that no modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions are needed at this time?
Answer. I continue to believe there is no need to modify the
provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. The Act was a
very significant piece of legislation that, over the course of more
than two decades, has led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness
of the Armed Forces. Based on my experience since 2009, my assessment
remains unchanged.
Question. If not, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Please see my response above.
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the USD(P) and each of the following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and
advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the
formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration
and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security
objectives. The USD(P) provides policy support to the Secretary in
interagency fora (such as National Security Staff deliberations),
engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the
Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear
Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy provides similar support to
the Deputy Secretary as described above.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the other
Under Secretaries of Defense to achieve the Secretary's objectives.
This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them
in their respective areas of responsibility. In addition, the Under
Secretary for Policy works closely with the Under Secretary of
Intelligence and other intelligence officials to ensure that policy
formulation and execution are well informed and supported by
intelligence.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The USD(P) exercises authority, direction and control over
the Principal Deputy USD(P), and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense
for International Security Affairs (ISA), Asian and Pacific Affairs
(APSA), Global Strategic Affairs (GSA), Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
Affairs (HD/ASA). This team works together to provide the Secretary
with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues
under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to
ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented
properly.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the Secretaries of the
Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including defense
strategy and policy development, force planning and other areas in
which the Military Departments are critical stakeholders.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the Service Chiefs on a broad
range of issues, including defense strategy and policy development,
force planning and other areas in which the Military Departments and
Services are critical stakeholders.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD).
Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the General Counsel on all
policy issues that involve a legal dimension. In practice, this means
significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of
Defense, the President and the National Security Council, the Chairman
has a unique and critical military role. The USD(P) works closely with
the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary in providing for the strategic direction of the
Armed Forces, and to ensure that military advice is taken into account
in an appropriate manner.
Question. The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant
Commands.
Answer. The USD(P) works closely with the Regional and Functional
Combatant Commanders to support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary, particularly in the areas of regional and functional
strategy and policy, contingency planning and policy oversight of
operations.
Question. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Answer. The USD(P) exercises authority, direction, and control over
the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The
Policy organization works closely with DSCA to provide the Secretary
with advice and recommendations on the full range of security
cooperation issues facing the Department.
duties of the usd(p):
Question. Section 134 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the USD(P)
shall assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy
guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans, and in
reviewing such plans. Additionally, subject to the authority, direction
and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have
responsibility for supervising and directing activities of DOD relating
to export controls. Further, subject to the authority, direction and
control of the Secretary of Defense, the USD(P) is responsible for
overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and
execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of
DOD for combating terrorism.
DOD Directive 5111.1 reiterates these duties and specifically notes
that the USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the
Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all
matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and
the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve
national security objectives.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
USD(P) under current regulations and practices?
Answer. If confirmed, I will perform the duties set forth in title
10 and the DOD Directive. The USD(P) serves as the principal staff
assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and
defense policy as well as the integration and oversight of DOD policy
and plans to achieve national security objectives. Specifically, the
USD(P) directly supports the Secretary of Defense in the interagency
process, dealings with foreign counterparts, developing strategy and
planning guidance for the PPBE process, providing policy oversight of
current operations, and guiding the development and review of
contingency plans. He, or she, is the Secretary's principal policy
advisor on the use of the U.S. military and its adaptation for future
missions.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the
USD(P) in combating terrorism, in particular as differentiated from
those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) functions under the authority,
direction, and control of the USD(P) in combating terrorism. More
broadly, the ASD SO/LIC is defined in title 10 as the principal
civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and
low intensity conflict matters.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties and
functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe
for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I will discuss with Secretary Panetta how the
OSD Policy organization and I can best support him, including whether
there are any duties and functions he would prescribe beyond those set
forth in section 134(b) of title 10, and the DOD Directive for USD(P).
At this time, I have not identified any such additional duties and
functions.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. During the past 3 years, I have been honored to serve as
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSDP). In
that capacity, I served as the principal staff assistant to the USD(P),
and provided advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation
of national security and defense policy, and the integration and
oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security
objectives. This work included the full scope of defense policy issues,
including both urgent operational challenges (e.g., developing policy
for Afghanistan and ways to counter Iran's nuclear program), and
setting policy to shape the force of tomorrow (e.g., crafting the
Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review, concluding the
New START treaty, developing new DOD strategic guidance, and setting
policy and prioritizing investments in new technologies including cyber
capabilities).
Prior to my position as PDUSDP, I spent 25 years working on a wide
range of defense and national security issues, both in and out of
government. I had the honor to work for the late Les Aspin for 4 years
as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee,
where I was responsible for both policy and procurement issues. I was
privileged to serve for over 3 years as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation Policy, where
my office led defense planning, oversight of war plans, and efforts to
improve the military's ability to cope with weapons of mass
destruction. During my time outside of government, I have had the
opportunity to teach and conduct research on national security issues,
to establish and lead a private sector group that provided consulting
services to DOD, and to serve in a leadership position for a then
newly-established national security think tank. In addition, I have
served on a number of studies and panels including as an advisor to the
Defense Science Board, and as an expert to the Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States. I believe that my substantive
expertise and experience would allow me to serve the country well if
confirmed as USD(P).
contingency planning:
Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase
military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and
contingency planning. The USD(P) is specifically directed to assist the
Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the
preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such
plans.
What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military
role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?
Answer. The role of civilian leadership is not only statutorily
mandated, but critical in the formulation of defense strategy and
planning. Civilian defense leadership is particularly vital in
translating broad national security policies and principles into the
strategic ends that ultimately drive military planning.
More specifically, the USD(P) supports the development of the
President's National Security Strategy, leads the development of the
defense strategy, establishes realistic objectives and guidance to form
the basis for contingency planning, and reviews DOD plans and programs
to ensure they support strategic objectives. In addition to the
provision of written guidance, an important civilian leadership role is
to review contingency plans submitted for approval by the combatant
commanders. The USD(P) is also responsible for facilitating interagency
coordination on contingency planning efforts, as necessary.
Question. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently
have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and
contingency planning?
Answer. I believe that the current level of civilian oversight of
strategy formulation and contingency planning is appropriate.
Question. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure
effective civilian control and oversight of strategy formulation and
contingency planning?
Answer. DOD should continue to fortify its capacity for strategic
thinking and strategic planning to ensure that it not only deals with
the challenges of today but is also well prepared for those of
tomorrow.
The recently released DOD strategic guidance is evidence that the
Department thinks critically about strategy formulation and its
associated resource implications--a trend that, if confirmed, I will
continue to work to reinforce. If confirmed, I would also continue to
strive to provide the best advice possible to the Secretary of Defense
in fulfilling his responsibility to provide written policy guidance and
to review contingency plans. Finally, I would coordinate closely with
the Joint Staff to develop further opportunities to collaborate on
planning guidance and reviews.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the USD(P)?
Answer. If confirmed as USD(P), I look forward to playing an
important role within the Department and the interagency process in
developing policy in a number of key areas, including: defeating al
Qaeda and countering the continuing threat of violent extremism;
transitioning security responsibility in Afghanistan in a way that
protects U.S. vital interests; preventing the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, particularly in the cases of Iran and North Korea;
strengthening alliances and partnerships globally to further strengthen
U.S. and international security; maintaining stability in Asia and
other key regions; advancing U.S. interests in the context of dramatic
changes that have unfolded and are unfolding in the Middle East and
North Africa; continuing to strengthen the U.S. defense posture
globally, as well as in cyberspace and outer space; and most
importantly, ensuring that the United States and its vital interests
are secure from attack (this requires continued effort in all of the
above-noted areas, as well as sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent,
missile defenses, and homeland defense capabilities). A key challenge
will be to support the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Government in
resolving these and other issues--and pursuing opportunities--in the
context of significant fiscal pressures.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would address these challenges by
undertaking the development and implementation of both DOD and
interagency strategies, policies and plans for key regional and
functional issues. I would continue to work closely with other
components of DOD in support of the Secretary of Defense, as well as
our interagency partners, U.S. allies and partners, and where
appropriate the private sector and non-governmental organizations. I
would seek to ensure that strategies, policies, and plans are updated
as needed to reflect new challenges and new opportunities. I would work
to support the President and Secretary's guidance to shape a Joint
Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be
flexible, agile, ready, and technologically advanced. I would work with
counterparts in other agencies and across the Department to rebalance
towards the Asia-Pacific region and place a premium on the Middle East,
while remaining the security partner of choice across the globe.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the USD(P)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DOD pursues a
strategic and balanced approach consistent with the recently-released
Defense strategic guidance. Top priorities would include addressing the
challenges listed in my answer to previous question, including
defeating al Qaeda, ensuring the success and effective transition of
the mission in Afghanistan, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon, and protecting the U.S. Homeland. Continuing to strengthen our
Alliances and partnerships, and ensuring that the United States engages
through forward presence and is the partner of choice globally, will be
a key priority. I would also ensure a strong connection between
strategy and resources--making disciplined decisions based on our
priorities--and ensure effective working relationships with both
military and civilian counterparts through the Department and with our
Federal departments and agencies.
department of defense strategic guidance
Question. The new DOD strategic guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,'' announced by
President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for
the 21st century and the key military missions for which the DOD will
prepare.
As Principal Deputy USD(P), what role did you play in the
preparation of the new DOD Strategic Guidance?
Answer. The strategic guidance was deeply informed by the
Department's most senior civilian and military leadership. As the
Principal Deputy USD(P), I provided advice and assistance to the
Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, and USD(P), and worked closely
with other civilian and military components including the Joint Staff.
More specifically, I participated actively in the conceptualization and
writing of the guidance, including the description of the projected
security environment, the key military missions for which DOD must
prepare, and prioritization of the key capabilities associated with
succeeding at those military missions.
Do you agree with the defense priorities set out in that guidance?
What changes, if any, would you recommend to those defense priorities?
Answer. I agree with the defense priorities set out in the
guidance, and would not recommend any changes at this time. Like all
strategies and guidance, I believe that it will be important to review
and update this guidance in the future.
afghanistan strategy
Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set
forth and that we are now implementing, and I believe it is the right
strategy. A focused counterinsurgency campaign, with a transition plan
that includes an enduring U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, will allow us
to help the Afghans build security forces and government capacity that
can provide the security necessary for an Afghanistan that does not
again become a safe haven for terrorists.
Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
Answer. As I have testified recently to the Senate and House Armed
Services Committee, I believe that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is
sound. I also believe that, over time, the administration should
continue to assess and adjust as necessary its implementation of the
overall strategy based on conditions on the ground, and am committed to
consulting with Congress, and with our allies and partners in this
regard.
Question. Do you support the President's decision to withdraw the
33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by the summer of this year?
Answer. Yes. I support a responsible, conditions-based drawdown as
called for by the President. We have already withdrawn the first 10,000
surge forces, and the remaining 23,000 will be home by the end of
September. The key to success in Afghanistan is the ability of Afghan
National Security Forces to provide security. Our surge has allowed the
Afghans to build up a more capable force, and set conditions for
reducing our forces as planned.
Question. Do you believe that timetable should be accelerated?
Answer. No. I believe that the planned timetable to withdraw the
remaining 23,000 surge troops is appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to our strategy in Afghanistan as a result of the drawdown of U.S.
forces?
Answer. I believe that the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is sound,
and do not recommend any changes at present. I believe that the
strategy for Afghanistan (and other strategies and plans) should be
regularly assessed, and adjustments made as necessary.
Question. On March 11, 2012, 16 Afghan civilians, including women
and children, were killed in a village near Kandahar, allegedly by a
U.S. soldier acting alone. A few days later, it was reported that the
Taliban suspended preliminary peace talks with the United States and
decided not to open a political office in Doha. In addition, President
Hamid Karzai called for all NATO forces to withdraw from Afghan
villages and remain in major bases.
What is your assessment of the impact of the civilian killings and
of the February 22, 2012, incident involving burning of Qurans on the
ability of ISAF to carry out its mission?
Answer. These incidents created near-term challenges and likely
increased risks to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces in some areas of
Afghanistan. However, although tragic and unfortunate, these were
isolated incidents, and are not indicative of the state of the
campaign. As President Obama stated on March 15, 2012, after speaking
with President Karzai, the United States remains committed to
completing the process of transition and Afghan National Security
Forces taking full responsibility for security across the country by
the end of 2014.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of these incidents
on the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and the planned withdrawal of U.S.
surge forces from Afghanistan?
Answer. My assessment is that these incidents should not affect
U.S. strategy or the planned withdrawal of U.S. surge forces from
Afghanistan.
afghanistan transition
Question. Do you support the goal of transitioning lead
responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan
security forces by 2014?
Answer. Yes. Transition is progressing on a positive track. The
first two tranches of transition are being implemented, and
approximately 50 percent of the Afghan population now lives in areas
where the Afghans have the lead for security. We expect the third
tranche to be announced in spring 2012, and the fifth and final tranche
in mid-2013. We are finding that Afghan forces are able to provide
effective security in transition areas.
Question. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success
of the transition to an Afghan security lead throughout Afghanistan by
2014?
Answer. Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan and Afghan capacity
in the governance and development areas remain the most challenging
aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to
govern effectively and to fill government positions at the national and
sub-national levels hinders the ability to assume leadership on these
lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of
the security transition in the effort to achieve durable stability in
Afghanistan.
Question. What measures are being taken, following the murders of
U.S. and NATO soldiers last month, to protect NATO and U.S. trainers
working with Afghan security forces?
Answer. General Allen took some immediate steps after these
incidents, including removing U.S. personnel from ministries until
their security could be ensured in light of lessons learned from these
incidents. The Afghan Government is working to increase their
counterintelligence and biometric capability. We are also undertaking
additional steps, such as increasing cultural awareness training for
trainers and advisors, as part of the security force assistance
strategy.
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
professional and effective Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)?
Answer. ANSF operational effectiveness is improving and the ANSF
are demonstrating increasing capability. Currently, 13 of 156 ANA
Kandaks or Battalions have the highest possible rating, ``Independent
with Advisors.'' However, the more critical measure is the number of
units rated at ``Effective with Advisors'' and ``Effective with
Partners,'' which are the levels necessary to support transition. Since
December 8, 2011, the percentage of ANA units rated as ``Effective with
Partners'' or higher grew from 85 percent to 91 percent. Although the
ANSF are currently not ready to operate independently of ISAF in most
areas, they are assuming an ever increasing leadership role in
operations across Afghanistan, and are on schedule to meet the 2014
goal for transition of security responsibility to the Afghan
Government.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
capacity of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to be
able to assume lead security responsibility by 2014?
Answer. A first challenge is to continue to build out the full
complement of 352,000 ANSF, and to continue to improve the quality,
readiness, and performance of these forces. We need to continue ongoing
programs to expand ANSF literacy, and continue to provide financial and
advisory support to the institutional training centers and existing
Afghan training cadres that are currently building leadership and
technical capacity of both the Army and the Police. A second challenge
is for the ANSF to develop a greater capacity for critical enablers,
including logistics support; mobility (e.g., rotary wing);
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and operational
planning. Third and most broadly, the ANSF must continue building its
self-confidence through operational success in taking the lead
responsibility for securing transitioned areas and protecting the
Afghan people.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
make for addressing those challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue current efforts to simplify
and accelerate the distribution of ANSF goods and services, support the
continued provision of U.S. enabler support as a bridging strategy, and
continue the mentoring of Afghan leadership training and education
programs.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to sustaining the
ANSF through 2014 and beyond, and if confirmed, what recommendations,
if any, would you make for addressing these challenges?
Answer. A sustained and well-organized international effort to
train, advise, and assist the ANSF will be critical to their success
both before and after transition in 2014. Building ANSF ``enabler''
capacity, as noted in my answer to a preceding question, will also be
critical. Continued improvement in the functioning of the Ministries of
Defense and Interior, including sustained progress in fighting waste
and corruption will be essential. The United States and other coalition
partners must continue to provide the requisite fiscal and personnel
support. Maintaining the international community's support for the ANSF
through 2014 and beyond is essential. We have worked with other U.S.
Government departments and agencies to develop a focused international
engagement strategy leading up to the NATO Summit in Chicago in May.
The Chicago Summit will serve as a key milestone in solidifying the
international community's long-term support and commitment to the ANSF,
first established in Lisbon and reaffirmed in Bonn, through 2014 and
beyond.
u.s. relationship with pakistan
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Pakistan
security relationship?
Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan is challenging but critical
to our national security and our regional interests. Over the past
year, the relationship has suffered a number of setbacks and, until
recently, our relationship has been nearly frozen. We look forward to
working with Pakistan to define and develop a more constructive and
durable relationship once Pakistan's parliamentary review process
concludes.
Historically, the U.S. military-to-military relationship with
Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has seen good and bad phases.
However, we still have important shared objectives. A core U.S.
national security goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda
and its affiliates to ensure that they do not find safe havens in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to mitigate the threat to the United
States, our allies, and interests abroad. Pakistan has suffered more
than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded and more than 30,000
civilian casualities in recent years from terrorist actions. The
Pakistani military is operating currently against some, but not all,
militants that enable the safe havens, and we are committed to working
with Pakistan to address this persistent threat. As President Obama has
said, ``We have killed more terrorists on Pakistani soil than anywhere
else, and that could not have been done without their cooperation.''
Pakistan also has a clear stake in Afghan stability and will be an
important participant in the process that ultimately brings the
conflict to a successful conclusion.
Question. In your view, does the United States have a strategic
interest in pursuing increased cooperation with Pakistan on
counterterrorism or other security matters?
Answer. Yes. I believe U.S. interests in the region and in Asia
more broadly require a stable and constructive relationship with
Pakistan wherein we can cooperate on matters of shared concern, such as
counterterrorism. The fact that Pakistan is a state that possesses
nuclear weapons and faces internal threats from extremist organizations
adds to the importance of a continued relationship with Pakistan. It is
in the U.S. interest for Pakistan to have a strong, civilian-led
government and an open society, to live in peace and security with its
neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets remain secure.
President Obama recently stated, ``We will continue the work of
devastating al Qaeda's leadership and denying them a safe haven.'' The
conditions that allow the group to maintain its safe haven and
regenerate--including its ability to capitalize on relationships with
militant affiliates--can only be addressed through a sustained local
presence opposed to al Qaeda. Therefore, we will defeat al Qaeda only
through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. Greater Pakistani-U.S.
strategic cooperation across a broad range of political, military, and
economic pursuits will also be necessary to achieve the defeat of al
Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan as we work to change the conditions
on the ground that give rise to safe havens.
If confirmed, I will continue to support DOD's efforts in
coordination with our interagency partners for a constructive and
mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing
shared national security objectives.
the haqqani network
Question. The Haqqani network, which has been linked to a number of
deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in
Afghanistan, operates from safe havens in Pakistan. It has been
repeatedly alleged that the Pakistan intelligence agency, the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), provides support to the Haqqani network.
What is your understanding of the rules of engagement for U.S.
troops in Afghanistan who are subjected to cross-border attacks from
Haqqani or other insurgent forces on the Pakistan side of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border?
Answer. My understanding is that U.S. forces in Afghanistan are
authorized to act in self-defense when they are under attack. I also
understand that ISAF and CENTCOM are working with the Pakistanis to
improve cross-border coordination and have conducted several tripartite
meetings with Afghan and Pakistani security forces in recent months.
Question. Do you agree that it is essential, if U.S.-Pakistan
relations are ever to be normalized, that Pakistan eliminate its
support for the Haqqani network and denounce the cross-border attacks
conducted by the Haqqanis and other insurgents against Afghan and
coalition forces in Afghanistan? Why or why not?
Answer. The ability of violent extremist groups to find support and
safe haven in Pakistan poses a significant threat to U.S. forces, the
NATO mission, and the long-term stability of Afghanistan. Attacks
against U.S. and coalition personnel are unacceptable. It is Pakistan's
responsibility to prevent attacks from its territory on others,
including Afghanistan and U.S. forces there. If Pakistan does not
address these threats, the United States will have to consider a range
of options, but it is best when we have Pakistan's cooperation.
Pakistan has legitimate concerns that should be understood and
addressed, if possible, by the Afghan Government in any process to
bring about a stable and durable political solution in Afghanistan. But
Pakistan also has responsibilities of its own, including taking
decisive steps to ensure that the Afghan Taliban and affiliated
organizations, including the Haqqani network, cannot continue to
conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory.
Increased Pakistani action is particularly critical with respect to
groups such as the Haqqani network, which continues to maintain close
ties to al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations that pose
real threats to the United States, and indeed to the people and
Government of Pakistan. In my view, we should continue to work closely
with Pakistan to encourage it to act against extremists, including the
Haqqani network, and extremist safe havens that threaten U.S. and
Pakistani security, and works toward a stable, peaceful, and prosperous
region.
u.s. assistance to pakistan
Question. The United States has provided significant military
assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and
training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
(PCF) to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to
conduct counterinsurgency operations.
In your view, should the provision of U.S. military assistance to
Pakistan be conditioned on the Government of Pakistan, including the
Pakistan military, providing greater cooperation to the United States
on counterterrorism efforts?
Answer. In my view, our current capacity-building programs with the
Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important
component in improving the Pakistan military's counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency capabilities in order for Pakistan's military to
fight extremists whose safe havens enable terrorists that threaten the
United States. Our assistance has also helped to improve cross-border
coordination. Going forward, it is vital that Pakistan live up to its
responsibilities, including to cooperate fully in counterterrorism
matters, and to expand its counterinsurgency campaign against all
extremists and militant groups that have found safe haven inside
Pakistan. In the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, the administration
asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its
continued commitment to a cooperative and mutually beneficial
relationship. Future provision of security-related assistance will be
informed by Pakistan's response to these requests and to the overall
restart of our relationship in the wake of the November 26, 2011,
cross-border incident that resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistan Army
soldiers. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that the
support the United States provides to Pakistan yields the results we
seek.
iraq
Question. President Obama has said that the December 31, 2011,
withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Iraq marked the beginning
of a ``new chapter'' in the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
What in your view are the highest priorities for the U.S.-Iraq
security relationship going forward?
Answer. Developing a long-term security relationship with Iraq, as
part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security,
is one of our highest priorities. This relationship should include
consultation on regional security issues, and the continued development
of appropriate Iraqi military capabilities.
The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is a foundation for
our military-to-military ties with Iraq. OSC-I is under Chief of
Mission authority, and administers security assistance programs and
conducts security cooperation activities with the Iraq Security Forces.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges facing the
Department with regard to our security relationship with Iraq and, if
confirmed, how would you recommend meeting those challenges?
Answer. Ensuring Iraq's integration into the regional security
framework will remain an important task. We will continue to work to
strengthen our military-to-military ties with Iraq through security
cooperation activities, while helping to expand Iraq's military
engagement with key regional partners.
If confirmed as the USD(P), I will co-chair the Defense and
Security Joint Coordination Committee, established under the Strategic
Framework Agreement, and will continue efforts to strengthen bilateral
relations. We will seek to bolster the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on
a wide array of security-related matters.
iran
Question. The President said: ``America is determined to prevent
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no option off the
table to achieve that goal.''
Do you agree that we should leave all options on the table with
respect to Iran? If so, why? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes, I agree. As the President said, in ensuring that Iran
does not obtain a nuclear weapon, we are using all elements of national
power to encourage Iran to make a choice to meet its international
obligations and rejoin the community of nations, or face severe and
growing consequences if it continues to violate its obligations. This
includes a political effort aimed at isolating Iran, a diplomatic
effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is
monitored, an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions, and a
military effort to be prepared for any contingency. I believe that
sanctions are beginning to have an impact.
Sanctions and political pressures are having an effect on Iran, and
Iran is not on the verge of achieving a nuclear weapon. Therefore,
there is time and space to pursue diplomacy, backed by pressure. At the
same time, all options including the use of military force should
remain on the table, to increase pressure on Iran and improve the
prospects of diplomacy, and to be prepared to take action should
diplomacy not succeed.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, and the
USD(P) in particular, for advancing the President's policy with respect
to Iran?
Answer. The role of the Department and the Under Secretary is to
provide the Secretary of the Defense and the President sound policy
advice and prudent planning, in coordination with military
counterparts, to ensure that the President has the best available
options to meet U.S. policy objectives regarding Iran.
The Defense Department plays a supporting role to the Department of
State and Department of the Treasury in increasing pressure on Iran,
and a central role in reassuring our regional partners and preparing
for all possible contingencies.
The Defense Department supports State and Treasury's efforts to
isolate Iran diplomatically, regionally and globally, and to impede its
ability to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in
violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Building upon
this, the Office of the USD(P) is working with partners to counter
Iran's efforts to destabilize the region, especially following the Arab
Spring.
DOD has invested substantially in and deepened our defense
partnerships in the region, building a robust regional security
architecture that blunts Iran's ability to threaten and coerce its
neighbors.
We have enhanced our significant and enduring U.S. force presence
in the region and we have worked to develop a network of air and
missile defenses, shared early warning, improved maritime security,
closer counterterrorism cooperation, expanded programs to build partner
capacity, and increased efforts to harden and protect our partners'
critical infrastructure. We have conveyed clearly our commitment to
protecting maritime freedoms that are the basis for global prosperity;
this is one of the main reasons our military forces operate in the
region.
These efforts have reassured our partners in the region. They
demonstrate unmistakably to Tehran that any attempt to dominate the
region will be costly and futile.
Taken together, the Department contributes to the administration's
multi-dimensional approach to ensure that the President is in a
position where he can employ any option--or the full range of options--
as we continue to ratchet up the pressure and price for Iran's
intransigence.
syria
Question. The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate on a
daily basis and--absent international action--President Bashar al Assad
appears intent on staying in Syria and continuing his brutal crackdown
on the Syrian people.
What is your assessment of the situation in Syria?
Answer. As the Secretary said in his statement to this committee
earlier this month, the tragedy in Syria has justifiably evoked the
concern and outrage of the United States government, the American
people and much of the world. I agree with the President, the
Secretary, and a broad cross-section of the international community who
have stated unequivocally that Bashar al-Assad must halt his campaign
of killing and crimes against his own people now, step aside and allow
a democratic transition to proceed immediately.
Question. What role, if any, should the United States play in
developing international consensus on a path forward in Syria?
Answer. The situation in Syria demands an international response.
The United States has been leading efforts within the international
community to pressure Assad to stop his violence against the Syrian
people and to step aside.
The administration's focus is on translating that international
consensus into action along four tracks:
1. We are working to increase the diplomatic and political
isolation of the Assad regime and encourage other countries to join the
United States, the European Union, and the Arab League in imposing
sanctions on the regime.
2. We are providing emergency humanitarian assistance to the
Syrian people, with a total commitment to date of $12 million.
3. We are working closely with the Friends of the Syrian People
group (70 countries and the Syrian National Council) to try to
encourage the various opposing groups to unify and lay groundwork for a
peaceful, orderly transition to a democratic government that recognizes
and respects the rights of all Syrians--including minorities.
4. DOD is developing options that can be executed, as directed by
the President. These options address a range of potential contingencies
related to instability in Syria, including the provision of
humanitarian assistance.
We are reviewing additional steps that can be taken with our
international partners to help protect the Syrian people, end the
violence, and ensure regional stability.
yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Question. Prior to the current political crisis in Yemen, the U.S.
Government had a robust security assistance program to help the Yemeni
security forces take action against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). Some observers, while supportive of U.S. security assistance to
Yemen, have suggested that the problems being confronted by the
Government of Yemen cannot simply be addressed with the provision of
additional security assistance.
What is your assessment of the security situation in Yemen?
Answer. The United States and Yemen face a common enemy in al
Qaeda. Recent AQAP attacks against the Yemeni Government demonstrates
AQAP's determination to undermine the security situation and disrupt
Yemen's ongoing democratic transition. We must continue to work with
President Hadi and the national unity government to sustain the
pressure against AQAP and deny it a safe-haven and an operational
platform.
Question. What criteria would you use in determining whether
security assistance and associated training activities in Yemen should
resume?
Answer. Last year, the administration temporarily postponed the
transfer of lethal security assistance to Yemen in response to the
unstable political and security conditions. Since then, the situation
in Yemen has improved, and the new Yemeni Government has met key
benchmarks in their democratic transition process. The new Yemeni
leaders held successful presidential elections to replace Ali Abdullah
Saleh, and they have demonstrated a commitment to confronting al Qaeda.
In addition, they are preparing to reform their constitution and
reorganize their military. DOD has been working with the Department of
State to re-assess our Yemeni partner units and, thus far, we have not
found any evidence that Yemeni units that have received or are slated
to receive security assistance have committed human rights violations.
The administration has therefore agreed to resume the transfer of
lethal security assistance on a case-by-case basis to support units in
the Yemeni Armed Forces that are actively engaged in the fight against
al Qaeda. As part of our longstanding commitment to guard against
potential human rights abuses, the administration will continue to
monitor assistance to ensure it serves its intended purpose.
Question. Given the current policy limitations on lethal security
assistance to the Yemeni counterterrorism forces, what is your
assessment of the U.S. strategy to counter AQAP in Yemen?
Answer. Throughout the political instability of the past year, we
have maintained a strong working relationship with Yemeni
counterterrorism (CT) forces. Although we scaled back some U.S.
security assistance, we have still been able to collaborate on a number
of operational issues that have degraded AQAP and disrupted its
external plotting. In response to the relatively successful political
transition in Yemen, the administration has decided to resume and
expand U.S. security assistance with the goal of helping the Yemeni
Government better combat AQAP and secure its territory.
Question. As AQAP continues to gain territory in Yemen, some
observers have argued that the United States should assist the Yemeni
Government reverse these territorial gains. Others view the territorial
gains by AQAP as part of an insurgency and that any effort to confront
AQAP should be led and conducted by the Yemenis with limited--if any--
assistance from the United States.
What are your views on the proper role of the United States in
Yemen?
Answer. In my view, the United States should continue to work with
the Yemeni Government on combating AQAP, which poses a threat to both
U.S. and Yemeni security. This includes building Yemeni capacity to
counter AQAP and deny safe havens, collecting intelligence on AQAP and
the threat it poses, undermining AQAP's message, and, when necessary,
conducting combined operations against the group. AQAP has recently
made some territorial gains in Yemen, and many in the organization
desire to attack the United States and our allies and interests.
Therefore, it is in the interest of the United States to ensure that
the group is not able to succeed in any way.
Question. In your view, should U.S. interests be limited to those
individuals in AQAP that are seeking to conduct external operations
against the United States and our interests or should the United States
assist the Yemeni Government to confront this insurgency?
Answer. AQAP poses a sustained threat to the U.S. Homeland, and our
allies and partners defeating AQAP is the top CT priority for the
Arabian Peninsula. We should give top priority to preventing AQAP's
external attacks, but we cannot let AQAP seize territory and establish
a safe haven within Yemen. I believe that the United States should
continue to assist the Yemeni Government in confronting the group, and
continue to help build Yemeni security capacity so that the Yemeni
Government can eventually disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP with only
limited U.S. involvement.
nato
Question. In your view, how important is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our Alliance
partners to U.S. national security interests?
Answer. NATO remains of vital importance, and has become a net
provider of global security. As President Obama has said, ``Europe
remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world,'' and NATO is
``the most capable Alliance in history.''
The transatlantic relationship is of critical importance to U.S.
national security, and the transatlantic community has never been more
closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous,
and fast-changing world. For example, in Libya, NATO allies came
together with Arab and other partners to prevent a humanitarian
catastrophe, and to support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with
nearly 40,000 allied and partner forces alongside our own, we have
built and sustained NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. As Iran
has continued to defy its obligations pursuant to U.N. Security Council
resolutions, the United States, Europe, and other partners have put in
place the toughest sanctions yet.
Question. What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that
you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?
Answer. The United States has important stakes in a strong,
mutually supportive NATO Alliance, and the President has stressed his
strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships
to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO's new Strategic Concept
is an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its
unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its
members, and it will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution.
Over the next 5 years, the top NATO-related challenges include
achieving durable progress and a successful transition in Afghanistan,
implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the deterioration
in European military capability. Many of our NATO allies have been
underperforming in terms of their own investments in defense
capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary
forces. Many have significantly reduced their national defense budgets
in response to the global economic crisis, and some are planning
further cuts. A key challenge--and a key opportunity--will be for
allies to determine which capabilities must be sustained, and how that
can be done in a more cost effective manner.
Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the
next 5 years?
Answer. I agree with the President's statement that NATO
enlargement should continue so long as new candidates are democratic,
peaceful, and willing to contribute to common security. Which countries
would be candidates for further engagement and within what timeframe
NATO would undertake further enlargement are important questions the
administration would need to address in close consultation with
Congress and our allies. Each NATO aspirant should be judged on its
individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic, and
military reforms.
Question. In your view, what should the United States do to ensure
that NATO has the resources and capabilities necessary to carry out its
missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere?
Answer. As Secretary Panetta has made clear, our NATO allies need
to do more for security despite the financial crisis. Europe should not
expect the United States to shoulder a disproportionate share of the
burden.
In my view, the United States should continue to encourage our
European allies to reinvest the savings in operational costs that will
result from transition in Afghanistan in 2014 into the defense
capabilities that NATO will need in 2020 and beyond. We should also
continue to encourage Europe to pool defense resources and share
capabilities in order to get the most from scarce defense resources. In
addition, the United States should continue to place emphasis on
combined training, exercises, and military cooperation, as well as on
new capabilities, such as missile defense.
In my view, the United States should sustain a central role in
NATO, and help the Alliance prepare for 21st century challenges. This
includes, for example, the allocation of a U.S.-based brigade to the
NATO Response Force, and the rotation of U.S.-based units to Europe for
training and exercises with NATO counterparts to ensure strong links
and interoperability. It should also include continued European Phased
Adaptive Approach efforts--the United States has already established a
radar system in Turkey, we will be stationing SM-3 defensive
interceptor missiles in Romania and Poland, and we will be forward-
deploying four BMD-capable ships to Rota, Spain in fiscal year 2014. As
additional examples, I believe that we should continue as the framework
nation of the NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters; and in
Poland, we should move forward with plans to create an aviation
detachment for enhanced training.
Question. In your view, should NATO consider an expanded role for
Israel within the organization?
Answer. Israel is an active and valued partner of NATO through the
Alliance's ``Mediterranean Dialogue'' program, which includes practical
cooperation as well as political dialogue, both bilaterally with NATO
and multilaterally including the other six Partners in the
Mediterranean Dialogue. The United States supports and encourages this
partnership, and encourages other allies and partners to do so as well.
The Mediterranean Dialogue includes an ``Individual Cooperation
Program,'' developed between NATO and Israel, which outlines Israeli
desires for engagement with NATO.
russia
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Russian
security relationship?
Answer. In September 2010, then-Secretary Gates and Russian
Minister of Defense Serdyukov advanced the U.S.-Russia defense
relationship by establishing the Defense Relations Working Group
(DRWG). Through the DRWG and its eight sub-working groups, we engage
with the Russian Ministry of Defense across a wide spectrum of
cooperative defense activities--missile defense, defense technology,
social welfare, training and education, as well as regional and global
security, and defense policy. These efforts have helped us gain
important insights into one another's defense establishments.
Reciprocity is a key element of our engagement. Our defense
relationship and our military-to-military activities are focused in
part on helping Russia's efforts to reform its Armed Forces. We are not
enhancing the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, but we
believe strongly that a reformed Russian military is a positive goal
worth pursuing.
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) cooperation continues to be a
steady component of the U.S.-Russian relationship that has remained
largely insulated from the broader peaks and troughs. Although the
international agreement that governs our CTR cooperation with Russia
(i.e., the CTR ``Umbrella Agreement'') is due to expire in June 2013,
we look forward to an extension of that key agreement and a
continuation of our work with Russia.
Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-
Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of
common interest between the United States and Russia in the security
sphere?
Answer. The United States and Russia should be able to cooperate
effectively in the many areas for which we share common interests, and
communicate effectively in areas where we have competing interests, and
negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests.
Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia
have common interests is in countering the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant
cooperation on Iran. The Russians cancelled a major weapons sale worth
several hundred million dollars to Iran in 2010 and supported UNSCR
1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile
and nuclear programs. I believe that the United States should continue
to actively seek Russian support for ensuring that Iran does not
develop nuclear weapons. Similarly, Russia is a key player in reversing
North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and shares common interests
in this regard. As a third key example, the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program has been and continues to be one of the most
successful cooperation programs in the U.S.-Russia relationship.
Finally, the United States and Russia share strong interests in
reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as reflected in the New START
treaty, and prior treaties.
Russia also has an interest in stability in Afghanistan. Our
efforts in Afghanistan have benefited greatly from improved security
relations with Russia. The Northern Distribution Network has been
critical to continued operations given the closure of our Pakistan
ground lines of communication. Russia allows our military personnel,
supplies, and equipment to transit its territory by both air and rail
and will soon allow for reverse transit of wheeled armored vehicles
from Afghanistan. Russia has also been forward-leaning in identifying
possible areas of cooperation on counternarcotics, and we have been
engaging Russia to develop these ideas.
The United States and Russia are two of many countries working
together off the Horn of Africa to address the threat of piracy.
Although Russia does not participate in ongoing multilateral counter-
piracy operations, it does share important information and work
cooperatively with NATO and EU operations.
Question. In your view what policy steps should DOD take to improve
relations with Russia? For instance, would you support increased
military to military relations and exchanges with Russia?
Answer. DOD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the reset
with Russia. The OSD-MOD Defense Relations Working Group and the Joint
Staff-General Staff Military Cooperation Working Group revived U.S.-
Russia defense and military relations from the low-point after the
Russo-Georgia War.
As a result, DOD has a robust military-to-military work plan and
are constantly looking for ways to improve it by ensuring that our
cooperation with Russia serves U.S. and Russian interests and
contributes to greater security in the Euro-Atlantic space. The 2012
Military Cooperation Work Plan includes more than 100 events and
comprises a variety of quality activities such as cadet exchanges,
exercises, senior leader visits, and conferences. Over time,
cooperation on a wide range of issues may help to build a foundation
for more concrete and substantive cooperation with Russia.
A U.S.-Russia agreement to cooperate on missile defense would
remove a major irritant from the relationship, would send a strong
signal to Iran that development of long-range ballistic missiles and
nuclear weapons would be a waste of resources, would add to the
effectiveness of our missile defense system, and could help re-cast
perceptions U.S-Russia relations on both sides.
Question. Would you support any joint development or other programs
with Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be interested in supporting joint
programs that would benefit the United States. Through the Defense
Technology Cooperation Sub-Working under the Defense Relations Working
Group, DOD has been looking for such opportunities. Before undertaking
any joint programs, the United States and Russia would need to conclude
a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement, which has been in
negotiation for some time.
Question. Would you support joint U.S.-Russian cooperation on
missile defense as a way to send a powerful signal to Iran against
Iran's developing long-range missiles or having nuclear weapons?
Answer. I support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defenses
first and foremost because it could improve the effectiveness of U.S.
and NATO missile defenses, thereby improving the protection of the
United States, our forces overseas, and our allies. Missile defense
cooperation with Russia is in the security interests of the United
States, NATO, and Russia, first and foremost because it could
strengthen capabilities across Europe to intercept Iranian ballistic
missiles.
In addition, I believe that U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation
on missile defense. Such cooperation would contribute to the growing
strong signals to Iran--including those sent by U.S. and international
sanctions and diplomacy--that Iran's development of missiles and
pursuit of nuclear capabilities is reducing rather than enhancing
Iranian security.
Question. Do you support efforts mandated by the New START Treaty
Resolution of Ratification to seek reductions in the stockpiles of
Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes. As I stated in my November 2, 2011, testimony, I
believe that any future discussions with Russia should include tactical
nuclear weapons, as reflected in the certification and reporting done
pursuant to the resolution of advice and consent to ratification for
the New START treaty. Discussions regarding reductions in the total
number of nuclear weapons, both deployed and non-deployed, are also
needed. In any future reductions our aim should be to seek the
relocation of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons away from the
territory of NATO members.
Question. If so, what steps would you recommend for pursuing such
reductions, if confirmed?
Answer. The first step for the United States to determine
appropriate next steps is to complete the ongoing Nuclear Posture
Review Implementation Study. As this work approaches completion,
consultation with Congress will be essential to inform congressional
deliberations on budget and policy issues and to sustain bipartisan
support for any arms control proposals in the future. Consultation with
allies and partners will be essential to ensure that extended
deterrence and assurance remain strong. Finally, the administration
must work with Congress to ensure that key capabilities to support the
U.S. nuclear deterrent are funded adequately.
china
Question. China's defense spending has had double-digit increases
annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of
military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind
of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the
types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been
interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of
movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at
increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric
and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's
intentions in the region.
How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with
China?
Answer. The senior-most leaders of our two countries have
consistently affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and
comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I would describe the
relationship as simultaneously possessing elements of cooperation and
competition. The United States, including DOD, continues to pursue
opportunities to cooperate where there is a mutual benefit, while
pursuing frank discussions in areas where we may have differences.
Question. To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of
the United States and other major regional and international actors
will affect the direction in which China develops?
Answer. As Secretary of State Clinton noted in her March 7, 2012
speech at the United States Institute of Peace, the United States is
attempting to work with China to foster its rise as an active
contributor to global security, stability and prosperity while also
sustaining and securing American leadership in a changing world. The
United States is trying to do this without entering into unhealthy
competition, rivalry, or conflict, and without falling short on our
responsibilities to the international community. We need to work with
China to build a model in which we strike a stable and mutually
acceptable balance between cooperation and competition.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program?
Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, and
also to counter intervention by third parties. Its near-term focus
appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving
Taiwan, and deterring or denying effective intervention in a cross-
Strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and
area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention
and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's
immediate periphery. China's growing focus on military missions other
than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation
operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening
its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities
through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other
strategic capabilities, such as in space, counter-space, and computer
network operations.
Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese
military growth and modernization?
Answer. I believe the United States should continue to monitor
developments in China's military concepts and capabilities, while
encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and
security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the
pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve
the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The U.S.
response to China's military modernization should be flexible and
supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the
Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access,
the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering
anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and
partnerships.
Question. What effect is China's military growth having on other
countries in the region?
Answer. The pace and scale of China's military modernization,
coupled with the lack of transparency, raise many questions, both
within the United States and in the region as a whole, about China's
future. Uncertainty about China's military growth and intentions has
led to concerns about regional destabilization, leading other regional
countries to intensify their outreach to diverse major power partners.
As a result, we have seen the region become more welcoming of the
United States as a security partner of choice. In addition, some
nations have begun increasing their own military acquisitions, and on
the diplomatic front, concerns about the regional military balance have
been instrumental to the success of multilateral architecture based on
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-
China military-to-military relations?
Answer. As Secretary of Defense Panetta and China's Vice President
Xi affirmed in February, a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-
military relationship is an essential part of President Obama's and
President Hu's shared vision for building a cooperative partnership.
I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China
as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security
of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive
role in the region to discuss the peacetime interaction of our
respective military forces so as to minimize the risk of accidents, and
to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian allies
and partners in addressing common security challenges.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any
changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with
China? If so, what changes and why?
Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be
valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open
and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen
and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to
encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.
Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its
claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and
space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in
particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its
excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.
What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime
disputes in the South China Sea?
Answer. The United States is a Pacific nation with a national
interest in freedom of navigation and overflight, open access to Asia's
maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open
commerce, and respect for international law, including in the South
China Sea.
In my view, the United States should not take a position on the
competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea;
all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in
accordance with international law, without resorting to the threat or
use of force.
The United States should continue to call upon all parties to
clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with
international law. Accordingly, claims to maritime space in the South
China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land
features.
Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China
Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an
increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or
destabilize the situation?
Answer. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence
that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the
South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to
maintain its presence and assert our freedom of navigation and
overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary
international law.
Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend
largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military
forces conduct operations to challenge excessive maritime claims
asserted by coastal States. In the South China Sea, we have expressed
our desire for respect for freedom of navigation and overflight for
many decades, through operational assertions against excessive maritime
claims asserted by several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive
maritime claims asserted by any nation, including excessive claims by
allies and partners.
Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and
military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially
substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively
pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take
advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential
conflict situation.
If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is
protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other parts of DOD and the
U.S. Government, including the Departments of State, Homeland Security,
and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats,
not only from China, but from others as well. We must work together as
governments not only to defend, but also to develop options to respond
to and impose costs on cyber threat actors so as to deter future
exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International
Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States Reserves the right to
use all necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law--in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our
interests against hostile acts on cyberspace. In my view, we should
continue to prepare to do so as necessary, while continuing to
strengthen international norms of behavior regarding this essential
area.
Question. In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit
and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test
creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the
international community. Since then, China has continued its active
pursuit of missile and satellite technology.
What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these
capabilities?
Answer. In my view, this test was one aspect of a multidimensional
program that China has underway for counter-space activities. Counter-
space, and anti-satellite weapons, likewise are one element of a
comprehensive military modernization program underway in China that
includes an emphasis on developing and fielding disruptive military
technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as
for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States' goal should
remain to promote the responsible use of space.
Question. What do you see as the long term implications of such
developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for
U.S. interests in space?
Answer. Space systems are vital to our national security and our
economy. In this regard, the United States should continue to seek ways
to protect our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs
should be informed by China's space and counter-space capabilities,
which along with activities of other states, have contributed to
today's challenging space environment. Our first line of defense should
be to deter actions that threaten our space architecture (including
through defensive measures as well as credible response options), but
should deterrence fail, we must possess alternatives to retain
effective operations, albeit in a degraded environment.
The United States should continue to seek to engage China, a major
space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of space. However,
our concern should not be focused on only one country, but on the range
of actors that add to the increasingly congested, contested, and
competitive environment in space.
north korea
Question. Despite the recent death of long-time leader Kim Jong-il,
North Korea remains one of the greatest near term challenges to
security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean
Peninsula remains a top priority. In fact, with the uncertainties
associated with the ongoing leadership transition, upcoming challenges
on the Peninsula may be even greater.
With the precipitous change in leadership in North Korea, what is
your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean
peninsula?
Answer. North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional
military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric
advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs, including uranium enrichment, present a
serious threat to the United States, its allies and partners in the
region, and the international community. The opaque nature of the North
Korean system, coupled with an uncertain political transition, add to
our concerns. The two North Korean attacks on South Korean forces in
2010 provide a sober reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize its
capabilities to undertake provocative actions. I believe the United
States must work with our allies and other key partners in the region
and internationally on diplomatic solutions to the range of pressing
concerns we face with North Korea. Under the appropriate conditions,
direct diplomatic engagement with North Korea is important as well.
Question. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the
United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and
serious threat to our regional allies and partners, and have the
potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. As we witnessed
in 2006 and 2009, North Korea continues to flight-test theater
ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability to target South Korea
and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-
2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space launch
configuration but could also reach the United States if developed as an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's
WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation
activities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DOD continues to
work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these
and other emerging threats, to reduce our vulnerabilities and those of
our allies and partners, and to work cooperatively with our allies to
ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
Question. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if
confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?
Answer. North Korea maintains a large, offensively postured
conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic
missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons, and engages in the
proliferation of ballistic missiles contrary to international norms and
U.N. Security Council resolutions. North Korea has also conducted
provocative attacks against the Republic of Korea. What concerns me
most is that this range of threats comes from a single State standing
on the outside of the international community. If confirmed, I will
ensure that we sustain and advance our military readiness and
coordination with allies and partners, and explore all avenues for
shaping North Korean behavior.
republic of korea
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the
U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
Answer. In my view, the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains one of the
cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is as
strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently
reaffirmed by the Secretary of Defense to his counterpart at the
October 28, 2011 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul. Our
security relationship is based on a mutual commitment to common
interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning,
all of which ensure a comprehensive strategic Alliance.
Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
improve this security relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing realignment of
U.S. forces on the Peninsula and the preparation for the transition of
wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015. Also, I
believe it is important to ensure that the U.S. and Korean public
continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this
Alliance. Conversely, the public should also recognize that the ROK is
playing an increasing role in regional and global security issues,
commensurate with its economic status and influence, and the scope of
the Alliance is extending beyond the Peninsula. In light of the
heightened possibility of North Korean provocations, if confirmed, I
will ensure that we maintain constant communication and coordination
with the ROK senior leadership so that we can effectively deter North
Korea, and respond effectively and appropriately to any situation that
threatens the security of the Korean Peninsula.
Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of
wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now
planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this
transition takes place as planned?
Answer. The United States and the ROK have a comprehensive way
forward to transition wartime operational control from the ROK-U.S.
Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by December
2015. If confirmed, I will work with my ROK counterpart, and with
others in the U.S. and ROK Governments, to complete this process under
the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework and ensure that the combined
defense posture remains strong and seamless throughout the transition
process.
Question. Do you support increasing the tour lengths of U.S.
personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea to 2- or 3-year tours of
duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel
authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer
assignments?
Answer. I agree that a change in personnel policies related to tour
lengths could help improve the readiness of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) by
reducing the effects of constant turn-over of personnel. At this time,
however, DOD has not yet identified an affordable plan for full
implementation of tour normalization, and I understand that USFK is
holding at the currently authorized 4,645 Command Sponsored Families.
If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to consider alternative
options for the future.
Question. If so, how would you purport to implement such an
increase in accompanied tours?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to examine
how tour length extensions and unit rotations can enhance readiness.
Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South
Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or
should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or
global deployments?
Answer. In accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
two countries, the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to
deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would
threaten the peace and security of ROK. In my view, this presence has
not only deterred further war on the Korean Peninsula, but has also
contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asian region. It is my
understanding that the principles of Force Management, decided at the
2010 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, provide greater
flexibility for regional and global deployments for U.S. forces in
Korea, while ensuring that we will continue to meet our commitments to
the safety and security of Korea. As ROK military forces continue to
serve with the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq,
Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance
will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.
Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the
force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the
Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change
the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?
Answer. The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces
from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations
south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. I
assess that the movement of units and facilities to areas south of the
Han River provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the
political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves force
protection and survivability by placing the majority of personnel and
equipment outside of the tactical effective range of North Korean
artillery. The two plans will reduce the number of U.S. camps and
stations from 107 to 48. Thirty-three sites have been returned to the
ROK, with 26 remaining to be returned.
Question. Since the North Korean attacks last year--the sinking of
the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN and the artillery attack on the South
Korean island--South Korea has been adamant that it will responded
``firmly'' to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent
U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly the Joint
Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean provocations.
What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of
an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances
do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage
North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?
Answer. My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty,
when the political independence or security of the ROK or the United
States is threatened by external armed attack, the United States and
the ROK will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter
the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean
provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that
responses are effective.
japan
Question. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security
relationship?
Answer. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security
in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and
prosperity in the region. Our Alliance has held fast through the
turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and at
times contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised as a truly
global Alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a
complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance
Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions,
and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability,
and cohesiveness of the Alliance for the next several decades. In terms
of our military-to-military relationship, the shared experience of U.S.
and Japanese forces, working should-to-shoulder in response to the
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis of last spring, validated our
continuing close cooperation and mutual respect.
Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional
neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea influence the
U.S.-Japan relationship?
Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to continue to maintain
and further develop constructive relations with all of its neighbors.
Japan and other East Asian nations can and should increase their
security cooperation. Working with other U.S. allies and partners in
the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and
prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and
essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important
regional security architectures. Progress made to bolster trilateral
security dialogues in Northeast Asia effectively links Japanese, U.S.,
and ROK approaches.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to
become a more active partner in security activities with the United
States and in the international security arena?
Answer. Japan is already a close ally and strong security partner
with the United States, and is increasingly contributing to
international security activities; however, the changing security
environment in Asia will present new challenges. The United States
needs to continue to work with Japan to deal with these challenges,
including greater interoperability between our armed forces at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would
encourage Japan's development of joint doctrine and organizations that
will enhance Japan's ability to undertake complex missions to build
security in East Asia. I would also encourage trilateral security
cooperation with the United States, Japan and both the ROK and
Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the
functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture.
Regarding international security activity, Japan has actively
participated in combined counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden,
is participating in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and has
been a significant donor to ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction. I
believe participation in such international security operations are
very positive developments, and would encourage future Japanese
participation in such missions.
Question. What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint
development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense
interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the
United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?
Answer. Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a
success story for the Alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of
both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our
most important ballistic missile defense partners, and U.S.-Japan
bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important
role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM-3
Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a
significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.
Question. Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United
States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air
Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to
Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp
Schwab on Okinawa. In February, the United States and Japan announced
their intention to delink the movement of marines from the plan to
build the FRF. It also appears that, while the number of Marines
leaving Okinawa will not change, fewer will be relocated to Guam.
What is your understanding of the current plans for U.S. military
forces on Okinawa and Guam?
Answer. Plans for U.S. military forces on Okinawa and Guam should
result in a force posture that is geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A significant
number of U.S. Marine Corps forces will move from Okinawa to Guam,
which is a strategic hub that supports our ability to operate forces
from a forward location. At the same time, we will maintain forces in
Okinawa to provide deterrence and rapidly respond to security
challenges in areas around Japan.
Although planned posture shifts will result in a rebalancing of our
forces, they will not negatively affect our ability to respond to
contingencies or meet treaty obligations in Asia. They demonstrate our
commitment to allies and to fulfilling our agreements with Allies and
partners.
Question. How does delinking the movement of marines off Okinawa
from the construction of the FRF impact the realignment of marines in
Northeast Asia?
Answer. Delinking the movement of U.S. marines off Okinawa will
allow the United States to push forward with the realignment of the
Marine Corps in Northeast Asia, which is in our strategic interests as
we seek to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, delinkage
will allow the United States to establish a force posture that is
geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically
sustainable.
The United States and Japan remain committed to constructing the
FRF as the only viable alternative to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
Futenma, and are working together in taking the next step prior to the
start of construction: securing the Governor's approval for the
landfill permit.
Question. What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful
construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on
Okinawa?
Answer. I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S.
Government, remains committed to the principles of the 2006 Realignment
Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the
Futenma Replacement Facility will not be constructed by 2014, as
originally planned, there appears to be incremental but positive
movement towards the construction of a replacement facility at Camp
Schwab. The GOJ submission of the environmental impact statement to the
prefectural government of Okinawa in December 2011 was a necessary and
politically significant step forward. The U.S. Government is committed
to working with the GOJ in taking the next step prior to the start of
construction: securing the Governor's approval for the landfill permit.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander,
Pacific Command (PACOM), and the Military Services to update U.S.
military force posture in Japan and the Pacific Theater?
Answer. If confirmed, I would engage frequently and proactively
with the Commander, PACOM, and the Military Departments, as well as the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to update U.S.
force posture in Japan and the Pacific. I firmly believe that
maintaining a strong and comprehensive relationship with my military
counterparts is essential to creating a military force posture that
makes sense both strategically and operationally.
india
Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India
security relations?
Answer. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing,
including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense
trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. The strong ties
between our two militaries reflect this. Over the past decade, there
has been a rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship.
What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has
evolved into a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent
security powers in Asia.
In February I travelled to India to co-chair the annual U.S.-India
Defense Policy Group meeting. My trip reaffirmed my view that a close,
continuing, and expanding security relationship between the United
States and India will be important for security and stability in Asia
and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the twenty-first
century. Having said this, India has a long history of non-alignment
and is firmly committed to its policy of strategic autonomy. The
continued growth of our partnership should be focused on working
closely on common interests in a true partnership.
Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this
relationship should focus on increasing maritime security cooperation,
expanding the military-to-military relationship, and deepening
cooperation on defense trade, including cooperative research and
development. There is potential for increased cooperation on
counterproliferation, collaboration on humanitarian assistance and
disaster response, countering piracy, cooperation on counterterrorism,
greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards
stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.
Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship
between India and Pakistan?
Answer. India and Pakistan have a long and complex history
characterized by animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Support by elements
of Pakistan's military and intelligence services for violent extremist
organizations targeting India has the potential to result in military
confrontation that could rapidly escalate to a nuclear exchange.
Current efforts at dialogue through a renewed comprehensive
dialogue have yielded few concrete results on the core security issues,
especially regarding the resolution of territorial disputes; however,
the efforts have increased people-to-people exchanges and trade
relations between the two nations, and have provided each side greater
insight into the other's positions. Although progress is slow, the
trajectory is positive and offers the promise of increased confidence-
building measures.
Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between
Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia
generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?
Answer. India's actions in South and Central Asia generally align
with U.S. goals: increasing economic growth and political stability
through strengthened democratic institutions, and developmental
assistance to help prevent radicalization. Regional stability
ultimately depends on cooperation among India, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan. Transparency in the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-
Afghanistan bilateral relationships is critical to reduce
misunderstanding and mistrust between India and Pakistan. The ongoing
transition of lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan
forces, and the strategic partnerships Afghanistan has been negotiating
with the United States and other international partners are important
steps toward demonstrating long-term commitment of the international
community, addressing conditions that create uncertainty, and
stabilizing the region.
republic of the philippines
Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine
military-to-military relations, including efforts to increase the
number of rotational U.S. forces operating from the Philippines?
Answer. The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty
allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing
regional challenges characteristic of current geo-strategic realities.
In my view, the Alliance is strong and is the foundation of our
security partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the
Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security
forces (military, coast guard, and police) to address security needs
more effectively as evidenced by enhanced counterterrorism performance,
expanded maritime security activities, increased multilateral
engagement, and effective participation in U.N. peacekeeping
operations.
Question. What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the
Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?
Answer. The primary goal of the United States should be to
strengthen the Alliance and assist the Philippines in building and
maintaining the capabilities of their security forces. Our Alliances in
the Pacific, including with the Philippines, are the bedrock of U.S.
security strategy within the region as we face common threats. A
Philippines that is capable of mitigating terrorist threats, providing
a secure maritime environment that ensures freedom of navigation within
its subregion, and leading multilateral approaches towards regional
peace and stability will enable it to fulfill its treaty obligations to
the United States, directly benefit U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific
region, and contribute to regional security and stability.
Question. What is your assessment of recent U.S. military efforts
in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being
provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent
groups?
Answer. U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines are
in support of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to which both
sides are committed. The United States, however, does not assist the
Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups (e.g., the New
People's Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front). The Philippines
was the first country in Asia to support the United States after
September 11 in fighting terrorism. In this regard, U.S. military
assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by
assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than
those needed to help and protect its civilian population. It is the
Philippine Government's prerogative to assert its capabilities and
resources where needed in conducting its internal security operations.
Question. Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U.S. military
footprint or change in mission for U.S. military forces in the
Philippines in the near to mid-term?
Answer. The United States and the Philippines are discussing
arrangements that would allow greater flexibility for U.S. and
Philippine security forces to train and work together. This may
increase U.S. military engagement with the Philippines in the near to
mid-term.
indonesia
Question. What is your view of the current state of military-to-
military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?
Answer. In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the
U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad
partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with
Indonesia--a pivotal country to U.S. national interests--is managed
through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through
several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with
Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with nearly
200 theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal
year. These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of
activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, Maritime
Security, and continued Professionalization/Reform of the Indonesian
Defense Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of the military-
to-military relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number
and evolved from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more
complex bilateral and multilateral activities.
In addressing the current state of military-to-military relations
with the Indonesian Army Special Forces (Kopassus), it is worth noting
that this unit has undergone a near-complete transformation over the
past decade and is at the forefront of TNI professionalization and
adherence to human rights standards. Following a 12-year hiatus in
bilateral activities, at the direction of then-Secretary Gates, PACOM
established a measured and gradual program of security cooperation
activities with Kopassus. These security cooperation activities have
consisted of key leader engagements and small-scale subject matter
expert exchanges in areas such as military decision making, medical
planning, law of war, and safeguarding human rights. I anticipate that
these types of activities will continue and gradually expand at a pace
commensurate with the demonstrated progress in TNI transparency and
reform efforts. Chief among these reform efforts are the fulfillment of
commitments made by Indonesian leaders to DOD in 2010 to continue to
safeguard human rights and accountability throughout the Indonesian
military through the unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those
military personnel accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted,
their removal from military service.
Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-
military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-
military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership,
guided by close consultation between the Departments of State and
Defense, and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I
believe close military-to-military relations with Indonesia are
integral to achieving numerous stated U.S. national interests in the
region. I also believe that one of the most effective methods for
encouraging reform is through interaction between Indonesian and U.S.
servicemembers. Interactions with U.S. servicemembers reinforce
professional military practices, including respect for human rights and
the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater
understanding and reinforce professional values.
Question. What is your understanding of the factors that informed
the decision to re-engage with Kopassus members?
Answer. It is my understanding that the decision to begin a
measured and gradual re-engagement with Kopassus within the limits of
U.S. law was intended to acknowledge the significant progress made by
the TNI over the past decade and to encourage continued reform within
the TNI. Essential to this decision to move ahead with engagement with
Kopassus were the commitments made by the Government of Indonesia to
protect human rights and advance TNI accountability.
Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian
military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces,
adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and
cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute
those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?
Answer. Indonesian defense reform progressed at a rapid pace after
the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, and with the separation
of the police from the military, the elimination of formal political
roles for the TNI, increased accountability, and the establishment of
widespread human rights training initiatives. Although reform efforts
appear to have slowed, they have notably not reversed. According to
several public opinion polls, the TNI enjoys the respect of the
majority of the Indonesian populace. In fact, the TNI often is noted to
be the most respected of government institutions. This is a concrete
indicator of progress. Continued reforms that the United States should
continue to encourage include accountability for past human rights
abuses, strengthening civilian control and oversight of the military,
and continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps. Fully
normalized relations with Kopassus will not happen without demonstrated
Indonesian commitment to holding human rights abusers accountable.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for
human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the TNI's continued progress
by encouraging senior Indonesian leaders to fulfill their stated
commitments, with particular emphasis on accountability, transparency,
and respect for human rights. We can advance this agenda through
bilateral security discussions, joint training, and military
assistance, including military training programs. I view U.S.
interaction with TNI counterparts as an effective, indeed essential,
method to encourage professionalism and continued reform within the
Indonesian military.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.
What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?
Answer. I strongly support U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention.
Question. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as
the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?
Answer. The advantages of U.S. accession are numerous. As a treaty
party, the United States can best protect the navigational freedoms
enshrined in the Convention and exert the level of influence that
reflects our status as the world's foremost maritime power.
I do not believe that there are any serious national security
disadvantages to the United States becoming a treaty party.
Question. What is your understanding of the principal arguments
against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments?
Answer. From what I understand, the principal argument against
accession is that the United States would somehow surrender a portion
of its sovereignty. I do not believe this argument is valid. As a
treaty party we can reinforce our navigational freedoms--key to our
global power projection capabilities.
peacekeeping operations
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., stated that the U.S. ``is willing to consider directly
contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian
police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I should
note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute additional
military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in
support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. In general, I would support additional contributions of
U.S. military personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they
are positions that would add significant value to the mission, and that
the mission is a strategic priority for the United States.
Support for international peacekeeping remains an important
security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a
stake in the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations. I believe that,
where practicable, the United States should continue to provide
military personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially for key
staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the
mission. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate any proposals to
contribute military or civilian personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping
operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation
in the mission against other military commitments we have around the
globe and the proposed cost of U.S. involvement.
Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
additional military personnel to U.N. operations?
Answer. There are several potential advantages to contributing
additional military personnel to U.N. missions: the opportunity to
shape these missions from the inside and contribute to success of the
mission; professional development opportunities for military personnel
to serve in a joint, multi-lateral environment; and the benefit of
receiving real-time information and insights on emerging threats and
crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence.
It also enables an increased professional interaction by U.S. military
personnel with numerous partner nations' military personnel, with whom
we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.
The potential disadvantage of providing additional military
personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a
U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent years
and is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do not believe
the United States will be in a position to provide significant numbers
of military personnel to peacekeeping missions anytime in the near
future. However, I believe the selective placement of even modest
numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the personnel we
currently have assigned to U.N. operations can have a significant,
positive impact on U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
through which the DOD request for forces system could be more
responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral
peacekeeping missions, like the U.N.?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would support exploring ways that DOD
could more quickly respond to requests for personnel support, bearing
in mind applicable legal requirements and the current operational tempo
of U.S. forces.
colombia
Question. Success in suppressing violence in Colombia has been
credited to U.S. assistance to support Plan Colombia and to the growth
of the Colombian economy, which spread wealth to a larger portion of
the population. Over the past 2 years, there has been a debate about
the most effective balance of U.S. assistance to continue to build on
this success. Much of the U.S. assistance to Colombia over the past 5
years would be characterized as hard-side security assistance (such as
weapons, aircraft, and necessary training), but some argue hard-side
assistance should now be decreased significantly and a more robust
development plan should be implemented.
In your view, what is the most appropriate strategy for U.S.
engagement (including ``soft'' support) vis-a-vis Colombia?
Answer. U.S. security assistance to Colombia has always been a mix
of ``hard'' and ``soft'' components. As the conflict has evolved, the
ratio of ``hard'' to ``soft'' elements has steadily decreased. Between
2000 and 2006, our assistance was mostly focused on building Colombia's
military and police capacity, first to defend the country from the
offensive actions of irregular armed groups which included guerrillas,
paramilitaries and drug traffickers; then, once the situation
stabilized to support the government as it went on the offensive to
recover terrain dominated by these groups. When most of Colombia was
back under government control, our assistance began to focus on
supporting what Colombia called Consolidation. Basically this was an
effort to bring in the rest of the government to establish permanent
presence and services within the newly recovered areas. Currently
approximately two-thirds of our assistance to Colombia supports
consolidation, with the rest going for hardware and training. As the
internal conflict moves towards its conclusion, the ratio of ``hard''
to ``soft'' assistance will continue to diminish.
Question. In your view, should DOD reduce its security assistance
to Colombia as a result of the success of the last decade?
Answer. U.S. military assistance to Colombia has been gradually
diminishing since 2006. As Colombia's security capabilities and their
economy grow, our assistance becomes less critical. While the U.S. has
invested $8 billion in Colombia over the last 12 years, this never
exceeded 10 percent of the Colombian defense budget. However, it did
enable key capabilities which have put Colombia in a good posture to
bring the internal conflict to a successful conclusion. In addition,
the U.S.-Colombia relationship has now transformed from a donor-client
relationship, to one of increasing strategic partnership. Colombia is
reaching out to regional countries in Central America and Mexico, South
America, and even West Africa to help these countries combat illicit
trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. In some cases, like Mexico,
we are coordinating our engagement efforts with Colombia, and in other
cases, like West Africa, they are reaching out on their own. The United
States and Colombia are developing a mechanism through which to more
closely coordinate our regional security cooperation efforts. However,
we should maintain the appropriate level of robust and predictable
assistance to reinforce success, protect our investment, and reaffirm
our commitment to a strong, democratic and prosperous Colombia.
stability operations
Question. The new DOD Strategic Guidance states that, while U.S.
forces will capture the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, they ``will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale,
prolonged stability operations.''
In your view, what are some of the key lessons learned from the
stability operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. One of the most important lessons learned from these
conflicts is the importance of a whole-of-government approach to
stability operations. U.S. Government military and civilian efforts
must be closely synchronized and have unity of effort in order to
successfully address not just the military, but also the social,
political, and economic factors that can fuel a conflict.
From the DOD perspective, one of the key lessons from these
conflicts has been widening the aperture for how we think about
conflict environments, to not only include the military dimension of a
problem, but also factoring in these other social, political, and
economic factors in order to understand how they contribute to
insurgency and terrorism. The U.S. military must plan and train with
its civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate across a range of
environments and types of conflicts. Indeed, the need for greater
capabilities and capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring
lesson for the entire U.S. Government.
Of paramount importance is our ability to rapidly create effective
indigenous security forces. Only indigenous forces can ``hold'' and
``build'' on a lasting basis. Establishing effective military, police,
paramilitary forces, and local security forces is one of the most
critical elements of successful counterinsurgency and stability
operations. When building indigenous security forces we need to be
careful not to breed dependency. We also need to focus on transitions
which entail having the local government and military forces take the
lead in projects and operations whenever possible as soon as reasonably
possible.
Question. What do you believe is the proper role for the DOD in the
planning and conduct of stability operations in future contingencies?
Answer. As seen in recent operations, there is a great need for
economic development, governance, diplomatic, and law enforcement
experts who work for the State Department, USAID, and the Justice
Department. DOD must coordinate its plans with interagency partners,
especially State, USAID and Justice.
In my view, DOD should operate within whole-of-government
structures and in collaboration with international partners to conduct
these types of operations. DOD should continue to enable the deployment
and use of the appropriate civilian capabilities and resources, and I
encourage greater investment in civilian capacity for contingency
operations. When no other options are available, and when directed, DOD
should be prepared to lead stability operations activities to establish
civil security and control, restore essential services, repair and
protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance, and
then transition lead responsibility to other appropriate entities
(e.g., U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security
forces, and international governmental organizations and non-
governmental organizations). Close collaboration between DOD and other
civilian agencies on contingency planning before contingencies arise
can help contribute to success in the event that stability operations
are required.
building partner capacity
Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
nations, including the global train and equip authority (``section
1206''), targeted authorities in Yemen and East Africa, and the global
security contingency fund.
In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the
capacities of partner nations?
Answer. In my view, the main strategic objective of the United
States in building the capacity of foreign partners is to help them
develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide
for their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and
multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn,
mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats
outside the United States, and serves to build a base of countries that
can effectively participate in multinational coalition-based
operations.
Successfully countering violent extremist networks requires that we
develop and sustain a global network of allies and partners that is
capable and interoperable. Additionally, once partners become capable
and have sufficient capacity, they are able to help bolster regional
security in a way that supports U.S. interests. In some cases,
participation by these partner nations' forces provide cultural and
linguistic advantages that afford them better access and effectiveness
than U.S. forces executing the same mission. For example, today
Colombia provides justice sector and security force assistance to other
U.S. partner nations in the Americas and Africa.
Finally, efforts to build partner capacity promote interoperability
between forces and enable the U.S. military to establish personal
connections and long-term relationships with foreign counterparts. We
can never be certain where in the world U.S. forces may be required to
operate. Enduring relationships with partner nations are at the core of
a multinational coalition's strength, helping secure shared access to
facilities and territory, information, and diplomatic support.
Question. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if
confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of the
Department's programs for building partner capacity to ensure that
these programs are executed consistent with our national security goals
and objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support DOD capabilities
and investments that encourage and enable partners to develop capable
security forces and institutionalize the Department's capacity to
provide high impact security force assistance. I would provide
recommendations to the Secretary that enable him to make informed
choices with regard to the location and frequency of DOD activities
that build partners' security capacity. It is essential in this era of
shifting focus and constrained resources that we carefully prioritize
which partners we engage with, how often, and to what end.
Also if confirmed, I would continue to implement process
improvements in the delivery of defense articles and services for
urgent and emerging needs.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis
the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies in
efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?
Answer. The United States will be more successful at deterring and
responding to security challenges when allies and partner security
forces act in a way that is complementary to U.S. goals and objectives.
Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our continuing efforts to
counter violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal
organizations, and our preparations for future contingencies clearly
illustrate the need for capable partners who can apply capabilities
complementary to U.S. military objectives. In that vein, I believe that
DOD should sustain and grow the capability to develop partner security
forces, especially forces to train, advise, and assist partners during
conflict.
Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared
responsibility within the executive branch, particularly the
Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the
Departments is a key characteristic of the section 1206 authority, and
one of its greatest strengths. The Global Security Contingency Fund
epitomizes this shared responsibility, and represents an opportunity
for DOS and DOD to plan for contingencies jointly, and to establish a
new business model for interagency planning of security sector
assistance.
combating terrorism
Question. The administration recently released its National
Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups
``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
Asia.''
If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to
counter terrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be the principal staff assistant and
advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the
formulation of national security and defense policy, including
counterterrorism policy. In this capacity the USD(P) has historically
served as the Secretary's senior representative to Deputies Committee
meetings focused on counterterrorism policy (and other policy issues).
My role, if confirmed, would be to formulate, coordinate, and present
the views of the Secretary on CT policy issues. Currently these are
mainly oriented on the war against al Qaeda, which includes operations
and activities against its allies and affiliates, but we also recognize
that there are other terrorist groups that may seek to cause harm to
the United States and its allies. I would work closely in performance
of these duties with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
the DOD General Counsel, the Joint Staff, and the Regional and
Functional Assistant Secretaries in the office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, particularly the Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I would carefully consider the
views of our interagency colleagues and international partners to
consider whole-of-government solutions to counterterrorism problems.
Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda
and affiliated groups in each of the Geographic Combatant Commands?
Answer. The most significant groups that threaten the United States
and our allies are core al Qaeda, comprised of the group's senior
leaders, and AQAP, which is the most capable of the group's allies and
affiliates. However, a few key operatives operating from any of al
Qaeda's other affiliates, or even ``lone wolves'' inspired by al Qaeda,
may be able to perpetrate attacks abroad or against the U.S. Homeland.
Terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and anti-aircraft
weapons proliferating from unstable states is a chief concern, as is
the growing capability of some groups to construct concealed improvised
explosive devices.
In the CENTCOM area of responsibility, al Qaeda core leadership in
South Asia has been significantly degraded. Their most experienced
operational planners have been depleted, and they have lost the freedom
of movement they once enjoyed. Nonetheless, they remain determined to
launch attacks on the homeland and U.S. interests abroad, and have
shown recent capability to raise funds and formulate external plots. In
Yemen, AQAP poses probably the most direct threat to the United States.
The group has attempted two major attacks in the past 3 years, first
the so-called ``underwear bomber'' in December 2009, and the airline
parcel bombs in October 2010. Both of these plots were devised by the
same expert bomb maker, who remains at large in Yemen. AQAP has
exploited a year of political unrest in Yemen to expand its area of
operations in remote provinces, and continues to threaten domestic
stability while actively plotting operations against the United States.
AQAP has strong connections to al Shabaab in Somalia, which recently
announced its affiliation with al Qaeda, and uses these connections to
share resources and training among the two groups. In Iraq, al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) has shown resurgence in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal,
increasing its pace of attacks on the government and fomenting
sectarian violence. AQI is also seeking to exploit instability in
Syria, further fueling an already volatile situation there.
In the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility, al-Shabaab represents both a
terrorist threat to U.S. and regional interests and an insurgent
problem to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as well as
Somali regional administrations. On February 9, 2012, al Qaeda and al-
Shabaab jointly announced their formal merger. al-Shabaab has shown
interest in external attacks against the West and has active
connections to Somali diaspora communities in Europe and the United
States. In North and West Africa, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) uses ungoverned spaces in the Maghreb and Sahel as a
safe haven. Originally focused on overthrowing the government of
Algeria, AQIM evolved and now has a stated intent to attack western
targets. There are clear indications that AQIM is now involved in
trafficking arms from Libya. In addition, the upheavals in Libya and
Tunisia have created opportunities for AQIM to establish new safe
havens. We should also continue to monitor Boko Haram in Nigeria.
The threat of attack by al Qaeda and its affiliates against U.S.
interests in the PACOM AOR remains a serious concern. The possible re-
emergence of other terrorist organizations, like Jamaah Islamia and the
Abu Sayaaf Group, that have been weakened but not defeated by the
counter-terror efforts of our allies and partners could quickly affect
the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Other
decentralized groups and individuals ideologically linked to al Qaeda,
as well as organizations based primarily outside the PACOM AOR like
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, desire to support their agendas by conducting
destabilizing attacks inside the region. Additionally, al Qaeda-
affiliated groups operate in the PACOM AOR using facilitation networks
that support threats to U.S. interests throughout the world.
The EUCOM AOR continues to represent an area of high interest for
al Qaeda and its affiliates, seeking potential targets there and using
Europe as a support base. Terrorist organizations exploit the
relatively permissive European legal environment to radicalize local
populations and to seek material and financial support for jihadist
efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Radicalized fighters
returning home to Europe from conflict zones pose a real threat given
their experience, contacts, and ability to move across the continent.
The threat these extremists pose, using Europe as a base or corridor
for operations elsewhere in the world, including the United States,
cannot be discounted.
In the SOUTHCOM AOR, particularly in Central America, transnational
organized crime has evolved into a volatile and potentially
destabilizing threat to both citizens and regional security. These
transnational criminal organizations control smuggling routes that
traverse the hemisphere, many of which lead into the United States.
These routes represent potential access points that could be leveraged
by other groups. Although we have not yet seen any attempts by al Qaeda
to leverage these smuggling routes, we remain watchful for the
potential threat of transnational criminal organizations collaborating
to move terrorists through the AOR and into the United States. Sunni
extremists, although small in number, are actively involved in the
radicalization of converts and other Muslims; these efforts can be seen
through the influence of public personalities like Jamaica's Shaykh
Abdullah al-Faisal, who was convicted in the United Kingdom for
inciting terrorism.
Within the confines of U.S. borders, laws, policies, and democratic
traditions and practices properly restrict most counterterrorism
activities to support to civil authorities. As a result, NORTHCOM's
principal role is to synchronize joint force protection and ensure that
military infrastructure across the AOR is properly postured to mitigate
and prevent potential terrorist attacks. DOD is and must remain fully
aligned within the Federal Government's counterterrorism network and
plays a supporting role--assisting with information sharing and
remaining prepared to supply military-unique capabilities and to
enhance civilian capacity when directed by the President or Secretary
of Defense. Mexico is confronting serious security and public health
challenges driven by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)
responsible for illicit trafficking of drugs, human beings, money, and
weapons. These criminal organizations are increasingly adopting
terrorist tactics in their operations.
Question. Are you aware of any nexus between non-state actors and
criminal networks?
Answer. Terrorist groups and insurgent movements are increasingly
turning to criminality--including narcotics and other illicit
trafficking--to perpetuate and expand their activities. This is
certainly the case in Afghanistan. We also see criminal organizations,
such as Mexico-based drug cartels, adopting terrorist tactics in their
operations. Criminals and terrorists are also directly working
together. We only need to look at the recent Iranian plot to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington by engaging the
Los Zetas transnational criminal organization to see this trend. I
would also note the recent testimony by Director of National
Intelligence Clapper, in which he stated that ``Terrorists and
insurgents will increasingly turn to crime and criminal networks for
funding and logistics. Criminal connections and activities of both
Hizballah and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb illustrate this trend.''
Question. On September 22, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with 30 founding
members from around the world. The GCTF is a major initiative within
the Obama administration's broader effort to build the international
architecture for dealing with terrorism. The primary focus of the GCTF
is capacity building in relevant areas and aims to increase the number
of countries capable of dealing with the terrorist threats within their
borders and regions.
What is your understanding of this initiative?
Answer. My understanding is that the GCTF is a multilateral
platform that will provide a venue for governments to meet and identify
counterterrorism needs, and to mobilize the necessary expertise and
resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. The
GCTF is intended to complement ongoing efforts with the United Nations,
as well as other regional and sub-regional bodies. I understand that
the September 2011 launch of the GCTF was positively received by all of
the members involved.
Question. Given the emphasis on building partner capacity, what is
your understanding for the role of DOD--and in particular Special
Operations Forces--in this initiative?
Answer. Special Operations Forces will continue to have a leading
role in our operations and activities to defeat al Qaeda. The
Department is prepared to sustain a significant number of deployed SOF
around the world, working closely with allies and partners to develop
the capabilities and capacities they need to rid their territories of
terrorists and prevent their resurgence. We see this as predominantly
an advise and assist mission, but the United States should always
reserve the right to take direct action in order to defend itself from
a terrorist attack.
The defeat of al Qaeda cannot be achieved without bringing together
the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government--
intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments of
national power--in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If confirmed,
I would seek strong relationships with DOD's interagency partners, in
particular, the National Counterterrorism Center, the State
Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism, and the Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications, to maximize DOD's efforts to counter
violent extremism. The GCTF, as a State Department-led effort, is one
example where DOD including SOF counterterrorism and security
cooperation activities can support and inform interagency partners'
efforts in counterterrorism.
department of defense counternarcotics activities
Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the
capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyze
intelligence on CN-related matters.
What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?
Answer. Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a
multidimensional threat to the national security of the United States.
In addition to the impact on our Nation's public health and economy,
drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime
provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine
legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international
instability.
DOD counternarcotics efforts support global DOD national security
objectives by building partner nation capacity and working with U.S.
law enforcement agencies such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to disrupt
narcotics trafficking. These cost-effective, small-footprint efforts
are consistent with the Department's January 2012 strategic guidance.
I fully recognize the importance of DOD counterdrug activities,
including as the statutory lead agency for aerial and maritime
detection and monitoring of drugs bound for the United States and in
support of law enforcement in Afghanistan and other areas of national
security importance such as Mexico and Colombia.
If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that these activities are
given their appropriate level of attention and oversight, and to ensure
that they are as cost-effective as possible.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's CN
authorities?
Answer. The Department's counternarcotics authorities provide
critically important tools in confronting the convergence of narcotics
trafficking, terrorism, and other forms of transnational organized
crime, that pose a growing threat to our national security interests.
In addition to title 10 U.S.C. 124, which establishes the
Department as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring
of aerial and maritime drug trafficking bound for the United States,
longstanding provisions enacted in various National Defense
Authorization Acts, allow the Department to enhance the capabilities of
State, local, tribal, Federal, and international law enforcement
partners. DOD counternarcotics authorities not only support broader
U.S. Government efforts to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the
United States, but they also support the National Guard's counterdrug
activities in 54 States and Territories and the theater campaign plans
of all 6 Geographic Combatant Commands.
In my experience, counternarcotics authorities are often invaluable
in achieving strategic national security objectives. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with Congress to ensure these authorities are
sustained.
Question. Should the Department continue to play a role in
countering illegal narcotics trafficking?
Answer. I believe that the answer is yes. Based on my past
experience with this issue, DOD contributes militarily unique
capabilities that support law enforcement and a whole-of-government
approach to address this national security threat. DOD's contributions
have been critically important to the progress we have made since the
1980s.
In my view, DOD should continue to play an important role in U.S.
counterdrug efforts in support of the National Security Strategy, the
National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime.
The enemies we face on the battlefield today are increasingly
financed through non-traditional means, including through drug
trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Just as DOD has long
been focused on how traditional, State-funded adversaries are
supported, we must use all of the tools at our disposal to counter the
sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical threat we face today
and are likely to face for the foreseeable future.
Drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime
contribute to global instability by undermining legitimate government
institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic
activity. Consistent with the Department's January 2012 strategic
guidance, DOD's efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of
partner nation security forces serve to prevent and deter broader
conflicts that could require a much more costly military intervention
in the future.
Drug trafficking is by far the world's most lucrative illicit
activity and therefore is used as a source of revenue by terrorists,
insurgents, and other threats to national security. The vast illicit
proceeds of drug trafficking can also contribute to instability in
affected countries, particularly in smaller, more vulnerable countries
along key transit routes as we are seeing today in Central America and
West Africa. The national security implications of drug trafficking
necessitate our close attention--even when the drugs are not bound
directly for the United States.
counter threat finance
Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying
and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and
illicit trafficking.
What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
activities?
Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely
heavily on licit and illicit funding sources to support their
activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. As Director
for National Intelligence Clapper testified to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in January 2012, ``terrorists and insurgents
will increasingly turn to crime and criminal networks for funding and
logistics.''
It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and
halt the flow of moneys, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, where DOD has the
capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances by working
with interagency counterparts in Afghanistan and by supporting the U.S.
Embassy country team in Iraq.
DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter-threat
finance, but I believe that DOD can play a critical role working with
other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our
adversaries' ability to use global financial networks. I believe that
DOD should continue to work with law enforcement agencies to ensure
military support is targeted and tailored and are in line with DOD
priorities.
Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to
other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
threat finance activities (such as Department of Treasury, Drug
Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation)?
Answer. I believe that DOD could selectively increase its support
to U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Treasury Department, the
intelligence community, and the Department of State to target and
degrade our adversaries' funding sources. DOD brings unique
capabilities, such as planning, intelligence analysis and tools, and
the integration of intelligence into operations, to this effort.
DOD Counter Threat-Finance (CTF) Policy directs that DOD work with
other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with partner nations
to deny, disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries' ability to use
global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests
negatively.
Working through the interagency, we can increase the U.S.
Government's ability to target our adversaries' vulnerabilities through
interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement actions.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a
debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern
their nations and provide opportunities for their people. Last July,
President Obama released the first National Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime. DOD is by no means the U.S. Government's
law enforcement agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities
to our Nation's Federal law enforcement agencies.
What role, if any, should the Department play in combating
transnational criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime declares that transnational organized crime ``poses a significant
threat to national and international security.'' The Strategy calls for
the U.S. Government to ``build, balance, and integrate the tools of
American power to combat transnational organized crime.'' This
direction--to take a whole-of-government approach to combating a
national security threat--includes an important role for DOD. I believe
that DOD should continue to focus on delivering unique capabilities in
support of law enforcement agencies that are the lead agencies for
combating transnational organized crime.
Specifically, I believe that DOD should continue to provide
military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter-threat
finance support, and military-to-military capability development. When
appropriate (e.g. in warzones), DOD may take the lead in operational
activities against specific transnational criminal threats to the
United States. As the President's Strategy notes, ``transnational
organized crime presents sophisticated and multifaceted threats that
cannot be addressed through law enforcement action alone.'' DOD's
capabilities and authorities are thus critical supporting tools to
broader U.S. Government efforts against transnational organized crime.
The President's Strategy also directs DOD to ``enhance support to
law enforcement through the Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support
Center,'' a dedicated DOD-led center that integrates military,
intelligence, and law enforcement analytic capabilities to go after key
nodes in global criminal networks. This guidance further reflects the
added value that the Defense Department brings to whole-of-government
efforts against transnational organized crime.
nuclear weapons council
Question. The USD(P) is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
In your view, what are the significant issues that the Nuclear
Weapons Council should take up in the coming years?
Answer. The Nuclear Weapons Council should continue to ensure that
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective, in
the absence of underground nuclear testing, and ensure modernization of
the complex supporting the stockpile. One near-term issue before the
NWC is to address the immediate path forward with regard to weapon
activities that are to be conducted under NNSA's Future Years Nuclear
Security Program.
Question. If confirmed would you commit to active personal
participation in Nuclear Weapons Council matters?
Answer. I have participated in the NWC while serving as Principal
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, and plan to continue to do so as
Under Secretary, if confirmed.
nuclear weapons complex modernization
Question. Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84) required a report (the ``1251
report'') on plans for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and
strategic delivery systems. Prior to the Budget Control Act of 2011,
the 1251 report that accompanied the New START treaty set forth a
robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and the triad
of nuclear delivery vehicles.
Do you support the modernization plan set forth in the 1251 report?
Answer. Yes. The administration's commitment to maintaining a safe,
secure and effective nuclear deterrent, and recapitalizing the nuclear
complex, was set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review and amplified in
detail through the ``1251 report''. That plan remains sound, however,
the Budget Control Act requires DOD and the Department of Energy to
make a variety of difficult choices. If confirmed, I will continue to
work to ensure that both DOD and the Department of Energy have the
investments needed to support modernization of the nuclear weapons
complex and strategic delivery systems.
Question. Do you agree that modernizing the nuclear triad and
replacing critical infrastructure, such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) at Y-12, should be national security priorities that
should be addressed in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes. Modernizing the U.S. strategic nuclear enterprise as a
whole is a key national security priority. The decision to defer the
CMRR was a difficult one, but was made to permit critical warhead life
extension programs to move forward in the newly constrained fiscal
environment. This tradeoff was approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council
after careful review. Moreover, the DOD's independent UPF/CMRR study
concluded that if funding limits constrained parallel construction of
the two facilities, then phased construction would be a prudent
alternative approach, with UPF construction beginning first.
Question. There appear to be differing views on how best to reduce
the hedge stockpile of W-78 and W-88 warheads within the Department,
which is important to reduce the size of our overall stockpile. One
view advocates a common warhead and another view advocates two warheads
that have interchangeable components.
Please tell the committee which view you would advocate for, if
confirmed, and why.
Answer. Efforts to develop a common warhead would allow DOD to
reduce the number of warhead types in the stockpile and to reduce the
number of warheads needed to protect the nuclear deterrent should a
technical failure be discovered. Warhead commonality would also allow
for substantial reductions in life-cycle and production costs.
Adaptable or interchangeable components can be configured to provide a
degree of commonality, and would preserve more diversity in the
stockpile.
Before making a recommendation on this issue, I would like to see
the results of analysis currently under way on this issue by the
Services and the NNSA Labs.
dod's cooperative threat reduction program
Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among
the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in
Russia, e.g., DOD, the State Department and the Department of Energy?
Answer. I believe that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is
well-coordinated with activities of other U.S. Government agencies in
the Russian Federation, and in the other countries where it operates.
Coordination is accomplished at staff and management levels in
Washington, and through close collaboration in the field. If confirmed,
I will ensure that continuation of this approach remains a hallmark of
the program.
Question. The CTR program has been expanded to geographic areas
outside the former Soviet Union.
What in your view are the key proliferation concerns that CTR
should address outside the former Soviet Union? Please explain.
Answer. I believe that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program can
be an important tool to address specific WMD-related threats and
prevent new WMD threats from developing. For example, CTR can help
secure or eliminate radiological, chemical or bio-security threats, or
threats posed by related delivery systems or infrastructure. CTR can
also be used to build security partnerships related to WMD threats.
This is especially appropriate in some areas outside the former Soviet
states where partner countries are cooperating to improve bio-security
standards and surveillance, as well as border security to improve WMD
interdiction capacity.
Question. Which countries outside the former Soviet Union should be
the focus of this expansion of the CTR Program?
Answer. The focus of expansion beyond countries of the former
Soviet Union should be in areas where the CTR Program can directly and
appreciably reduce WMD threats, contribute to more effective military-
to-military or political strategic partnerships, strengthen the
nonproliferation framework, and bring to bear unique threat reduction
capabilities, resources or partnerships that other U.S. Government
threat reduction and related programs cannot. Current expansion efforts
are underway in Africa and Asia.
Question. CTR has completed or will soon complete the bulk of the
scheduled work with Russia.
What in your view is the next step, if any, in the U.S.-Russia CTR
program?
Answer. The United States and Russia can continue to cooperate on
nuclear security-related activities through the CTR program. These
include transition of sustainment responsibilities for U.S.-provided
security upgrades to the Russian Ministry of Defense, cooperation on
security for dangerous spent reactor fuel, and support to bilateral
defense and military cooperation related to WMD threat reduction.
illicit arms trafficking
Question. In July, governments of the world will gather at the
United Nations to negotiate a global Arms Trade Treaty which would set
global standards on the international transfer of conventional weapons.
What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking
and the role of the United States to deal with the problem?
Answer. The arms market is increasingly complex and global.
Existing regional and national arms export control systems do not
provide complete, global coverage. This creates gaps which are being
exploited by illicit arms dealers. I believe that the United States
should seek to negotiate a robust and effective Arms Trade Treaty,
which may close these gaps.
Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of
national controls and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the
illicit trafficking problem, and could efforts to respond to illicit
trafficking be improved if other countries adopted and enforced
national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to
those of the United States?
Answer. An Arms Trade Treaty would be a legally binding agreement
which will require states to establish high national standards in
controlling the export of conventional arms. Such norms should better
regulate the global arms market to prevent weapons reaching the hands
of terrorists, insurgents, and human rights abusers.
Question. Enhance U.S. national security interest efforts in the
region?
Answer. U.S. national security interests would be served by a
treaty that increases international standards in different regions;
includes major arms exporters such as Russia and China; reaffirms the
right of self-defense and the legitimacy of arms transfers for security
purposes; does not undermine existing nonproliferation and export
control regimes; and is agreed through consensus.
Question. What is your view on whether or not the United States
should be a party to this effort?
Answer. U.S. participation in the negotiations will help ensure the
treaty establishes a high standard of international behavior that will
ultimately reduce the proliferation of conventional arms. I would need
to see the results of negotiation to make any further recommendation.
arms control
Question. What role do you see for arms control as a means of
improving U.S. national security?
Answer. Arms control can continue to play an important role in
advancing U.S. national security by providing predictability and
stability in certain strategic relationships, particularly in U.S.-
Russian relations. Arms control should never be an end unto itself;
neither is it a tool that can be employed without the context of a
well-prepared and effective military force.
Question. What are your views on the next bilateral steps to
address nuclear weapons issues between the United States and Russia?
Answer. I believe that as New START is implemented and any issues
that arise are addressed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, we
should continue to work with Russia to lay the groundwork for future
bilateral negotiations on reducing both strategic and nonstrategic
weapons, including nondeployed weapons.
The Report of the Nuclear Posture Review noted that because of our
improved relations, strict numerical parity between the United States
and Russia is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War.
However, it also indicated that large disparities in nuclear
capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies
and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-
term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are
significantly reduced. By joining with the world's other principal
nuclear power to move to lower levels of forces in concert, arms
control thus provides a means for strengthening strategic stability in
our relationship with Russia.
Question. What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to
further reduce our strategic nuclear stockpile through arms control?
Answer. As I stated in testimony of November 2, 2011, the ongoing
Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study will help identify the
force levels needed to support deterrence and targeting requirements.
The completion of this analysis is necessary to inform the formulation
of any future arms control objectives involving our nuclear stockpile.
In general however, I believe that future nuclear reductions should
maintain strategic deterrence and stability with regard to Russia and
China, strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, and
ensure the credibility of our security assurances to our allies and
partners. We also must guarantee our operational flexibility and
ability to hedge against geopolitical and technical uncertainty.
Question. In your response to prehearing policy questions for your
nomination to be Deputy USD(P), you answered that ``One way to
strengthen the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)] regime would be
to ensure that any violation automatically triggers sanctions.''
Do you still agree with that statement, or would you modify it?
Answer. In my prior response, I said that we should work to
strengthen the Treaty by encouraging states to adhere to the NPT and to
agree to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. I continue to
believe that one way to strengthen the NPT regime would be to ensure
that violations automatically trigger sanctions. I also mentioned in my
response that other ways to strengthen the Treaty should be examined as
well. For example, this could include a requirement for a State that
withdraws from the NPT to return all nuclear material and equipment
that had been supplied while it was Party to the NPT.
Question. In your response to the pre-hearing policy questions for
your nomination to be Deputy USD(P), you stated that you believe the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is ``in America's national
security interest, and . . . that with careful planning and continued
investment that the United States can ensure the safety, reliability,
surety, security, and sustainability of our nuclear deterrent under a
CTBT.''
Do you still agree with that statement, or would you modify it?
Answer. I do still agree with that statement. The Department of
Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program has proven itself to be
successful, and continues to ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. At the same time, our ability
to detect nuclear tests has improved since the Treaty was first
considered. The CTBT remains fully in America's national security
interest.
ballistic missile defense
Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to
defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range
missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging
against future uncertainties.
Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you
implement them?
Answer. Yes, I continue to support the policies, strategies, and
priorities set forth in the February 2010 Report of the BMDR and, if
confirmed, I will continue to do my best to implement them.
Question. Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally
sustainable?
Answer. Yes. DOD has tailored its budget request to requirements of
the Budget Control Act. Missile defense is emphasized in the new
strategic guidance, and the Department has used a clear set of
priorities to guide spending decisions in this mission area. We have
protected our top missile defense priorities, including defending the
homeland, implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA),
and pursuing Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) with allies and partners
in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific.
Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the
European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against
potential future long-range missiles from Iran that could reach the
United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense
capability.
Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in
Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?
Answer. Yes, I support the EPAA and, if confirmed, I will continue
to support the United States' efforts to implement it.
Question. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems
(BMDS) that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective,
suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a
credible threat?
Answer. Yes. I believe that DOD should continue to subject new
ballistic missile defense capabilities to testing under realistic
operational conditions, against threat-representative targets. DOD
should invest in BMD capabilities that are fiscally sustainable over
the long term, and rely on mobile and relocatable assets in order to
provide maximum adaptability in a crisis or to reflect changing
threats.
Question. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs
to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and
Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations
of BMDS, prior to deploying such systems?
Answer. Yes. U.S. ballistic missile defense testing needs to be
operationally realistic and include robust Operational Test and
Evaluation. Realistic testing of the system allows us to field new
capabilities as they become available and integrate them into the BMDS
architecture. The ``fly-before-you-buy'' policy outlined in the Report
of the BMDR still makes good sense.
Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of
sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced
that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
capabilities.
Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
Iran, and could send a powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade
Iran not to pursue long-range missiles or nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes. I believe that missile defense cooperation with Russia
could strengthen common defenses against Iranian missiles, and send an
important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working
together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic
missiles.
Question. Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the
United States is committed to the continued development and deployment
of United States missile defense systems, including qualitative and
quantitative improvements to such systems, needed to meet our security
needs?
Answer. Yes. The United States has pursued missile defense
cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we would not
accept constraints on missile defense, and that we would undertake
necessary qualitative and quantitative improvements to meet U.S.
security needs
space management and organization
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the USD(P) should play
in the establishment of a national security space policy?
Answer. I believe that the USD(P) should lead DOD in supporting the
development and revision of national security space policy, and should
remain responsible for establishing and overseeing the implementation
of overarching DOD space policy developed in accordance with the
National Space Policy, National Security Space Strategy, and associated
guidance.
Question. Do you support the policy of having an operationally
responsive space (ORS) capability as a means to lower the cost and time
for the development of national security space payloads?
Answer. Yes, operationally responsive space capabilities are a key
way to ensure that resilience, survivability, and flexibility are
considered in all future space programs.
Question. The launch of the ORS-1 satellite demonstrated that
giving combatant commanders such as CENTCOM the ability to control a
small operationally responsive satellite can be successful.
Would you support extending this capability to other COCOMS through
the development of additional small tactically responsive satellites?
Answer. The valuable role that ORS capabilities can play in
responding to combatant commander needs is one of the lessons-learned
from ORS-1 that we are transferring to the Air Force's Space and
Missile Center. Incorporating these lessons-learned into the larger
space acquisitions enterprise will ensure that responsive space
capabilities continue to support COCOM needs.
Question. Space systems, like other military systems, rely on the
availability of sufficient frequency spectrum. However, frequency
spectrum is becoming scarce, and its sale has been used as a source of
revenue for the government.
If confirmed, how will you work with the Services, the Joint Staff
and other elements of DOD to ensure that the Department's frequency
spectrum requirements are accounted for in interagency discussions
about potential spectrum auctions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the DOD Chief Information
Officer, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff to ensure that the
Department achieves balanced policy solutions that maintain critical
spectrum-dependent mission capabilities for our warfighters while
addressing the economic value of spectrum to be auctioned for
commercial services.
special operations forces
Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have
mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and
enablers that directly support their operations.
Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
Answer. I believe that completing the QDR 2006 and 2010-directed
growth in Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Combat Support and Combat
Service Support personnel will posture U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) to conduct the range of anticipated operations effectively in
the future. These forces will continue to require Service provided
enablers to sustain the level of mobility, ISR, fires, and medical
evacuation, in differing mixtures, based on the operational
environment.
Question. In your view, how can the size of SOFs be increased while
also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for
special operators?
Answer. Experience has shown that SOF manpower growth of 3-5
percent annually can be sustained and has not diluted the force or
outpaced the required training and support structure. In my view, SOCOM
has done an excellent job of adjusting its processes to maintain the
quality of SOF operators and support personnel during this current era
of SOF growth.
Question. In recent years, SOFs have taken on an expanded role in a
number of areas important to countering violent extremist
organizations, including those related to information and military
intelligence operations. Some have advocated changes to the activities
of SOCOM's enumerated in section 167 of title 10 to more specifically
track the activities SOFs are carrying out around the world.
Do you believe any modifications to SOCOM's title 10 missions are
appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?
Answer. The Department uses a range of processes, including the
development of the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and
responsibilities it assigns to SOCOM on an ongoing basis. Additionally,
the language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., includes ``such other
activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of
Defense,'' which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense
the flexibility needed to meet changing circumstances. Hence, at this
time I would not advocate significant changes to SOCOM's title 10
missions.
Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
Answer. The activities of SOFs are quite varied, from high-risk
strikes and counterterrorist raids to working by, with, and through
local partners, whether in the form of training and advising foreign
counterparts, or providing support to civilian authorities abroad. I
believe that each of these missions is highly valued within the Special
Operations community. However, as the security landscape has changed,
the demands for these kinds of missions have begun to exceed the
ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet them. As a
remedy to this situation, and consistent with QDR 2010, the Department
is building the capacity and capabilities of the conventional forces to
be prepared to take on more of the kinds of missions that used to fall
exclusively to SOF; for example, Security Force Assistance. I believe
that broadening the spectrum of irregular missions that our
conventional forces are able to take on will alleviate some burdens on
the SOF community and ensure that the Total Force is adequately
prepared to undertake and support both direct and indirect missions. I
believe that increasing the contribution of conventional forces to
these missions will help ensure adequate capabilities overall, and
proper balance in both conventional and SOFs.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. SOFs, general purpose
forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a
significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this
collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. I believe one of the most important lessons learned has
been the necessity of close civil-military collaboration at all levels,
at the tactical level with organizations such as Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and Embedded PRTs, as well as unity of
effort at the operational and strategic level. Such unity of effort is
critical in missions ranging from direct action to building partner
capacity. We can facilitate this type of coordination through
organizational structures, but much of this is also a cultural issue--
making collaboration and coordination part of the ethos of our civil
and military institutions. Experiences from recent conflicts have done
this to a large degree, although institutionalization can and should be
continued.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. One of the lessons learned has been the need for close
collaboration early on in the planning phase, before a contingency
begins. This lesson can and should carry forward to future
contingencies. Recent conflicts have also pointed to the need for
sufficient capacity and capability within civilian agencies for these
kinds of contingency operations.
Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations?
Answer. The DOD has a host of mechanisms for capturing lessons
learned and incorporating them into doctrine, such as the Army Center
for Lessons Learned, as well as regular updates to Service and Joint
doctrine. I believe that DOD has been responsive and adaptive over the
past several years of conflict, releasing an updated joint Army and
Marine Corps Field Manual on Counterinsurgency as well as incorporating
tactical and operational lessons learned into deployment training and
forces deployed. I believe that such efforts should continue and I
believe they will serve the Department well in any future contingency.
private security contractors
Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
contractors to perform security functions risked undermining our
defense and foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in ensuring the Department's
responsibilities in this regard are met. The use of force by
contractors or military personnel can, if misapplied, undermine our
policy objectives. Contractors for physical security missions have been
a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and are likely to be so in future
contingencies. DOD has established procedures over time to manage these
contractors more effectively, in order to prevent unnecessary violence
that would be detrimental to our policy objectives. This is an area
that requires constant attention and continued supervision to ensure
that our policy is appropriate and effective.
Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
reduce the Department's reliance upon contractors to perform security
functions in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to facilitate the transition
from private security contractors to the Afghan Public Protection
Force. I would also ensure that the combatant commander is furnished
with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only
being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the
ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations
as the situation requires.
Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to
operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner,
consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Joint Staff,
the General Counsel of DOD, and combatant commanders to ensure that
commanders at all levels understand their responsibilities regarding
armed contractors operating in support of them or in their operational
area. This includes ensuring commanders are aware of extant legal
responsibilities with respect to qualification, training and vetting
requirements as well as the limitations on the use of force by these
contractors.
I would also work to ensure that combatant commanders are furnished
with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only
being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the
ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations
as the situation requires.
Question. Do you support the extension of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of
all Federal agencies?
Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is legal
accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for
the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I
will support DOD efforts to work with our interagency partners to build
appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes. I believe that DOD and more broadly U.S. leadership
should be mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards
for detainee treatment, including that the manner in which we treat our
own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts.
interrogation policy
Question. In answer to questions for the record at his nomination
hearing last June, Secretary Panetta stated that he fully supported
President Obama's decision to establish the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as
the single interrogation standard applicable to all interrogations by
U.S. Government personnel. Secretary Panetta also stated that he did
not support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open
to public scrutiny.
Do you agree with Secretary Panetta that the Army Field Manual 2-
22.3 should serve as the single interrogation standard for all
interrogations conducted by U.S. Government personnel?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree with Secretary Panetta in not supporting a
set of classified interrogation methods?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(P)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
artic policy
1. Senator Begich. Dr. Miller, I recently wrote you a letter
regarding the Department of Defense's (DOD) Arctic Policy. I
appreciated your response which talked about collaboration with the
Department of Homeland Security strategy for investment in required
Arctic capabilities and recognition of Alaska's strategic location. I
also appreciated your strong closing in the letter of support accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention. If confirmed, will you continue to
support accession? Please describe how accession would benefit DOD's
Arctic policy.
Dr. Miller. If confirmed, I will continue to support strongly U.S.
accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC).
With respect to the Arctic, we recognize that the United States has
broad and fundamental national security interests in the region and is
prepared to operate in conjunction with other nations when possible,
and independently if necessary, to safeguard these interests. DOD's
Arctic Report states that our strategic objectives are to prevent and
deter conflict, and to prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges
and contingencies. U.S. accession to the 1982 LOSC would benefit DOD's
Arctic Policy to the extent that all Arctic nations support the use of
existing mechanisms within the framework of existing international law,
including as reflected in the 1982 LOSC. As we look toward a peaceful
opening of the Arctic accompanied by a projected increase of human and
economic activity there, the LOSC would assist in addressing a range of
issues likely to arise, including maritime delimitation, shipping lane
management, and extended continental shelf claims. The LOSC could
thereby help deter conflict.
Further, as we prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and
contingencies worldwide, protecting our navigational freedoms enshrined
in the LOSC are key. The current status of the United States as a non-
Party requires us to assert our rights through customary international
law, subject to change based on state practice--whereas treaty law
remains the firmest foundation underpinning navigational freedoms.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
asia-pacific study
2. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, on March 23 2012, DOD responded to
the direction of Congress as provided in section 346 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012 by contracting for an independent study of the force
posture of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. If
confirmed, would you be committed to ensuring this committee receives
an objective, independent assessment, free of any type of restriction
imposed by DOD?
Dr. Miller. Yes, I am committed and, if confirmed, will remain
committed to ensuring this committee receives an objective, independent
assessment, free of any type of restriction imposed by DOD.
3. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, are you aware of any terms of
reference or guidance provided to the independent agency that deviates
in any way from congressional intent? If so, please explain.
Dr. Miller. No. The Department provided additional guidance to the
entity conducting the independent study, but I am confident that
guidance is consistent with congressional intent. The Department
requested the independent entity to provide Congress with a preliminary
independent assessment of the Department's current U.S. Marine Corps
realignment plan. Although this preliminary independent assessment is
not required by section 346 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, the Department submitted the preliminary
independent assessment to provide Congress with an assessment of
proposed posture changes currently under consideration with the
Government of Japan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
defense pow/mia office
4. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Miller, if confirmed, you will have
authority over the Defense Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action
(MIA) Office, or DPMO. I have a particular interest in POW/MIA issues
due to my position as a member of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on
POW/MIAs, the U.S. side of which is administratively under DPMO. I know
that POW/MIA issues can be challenging given the difficulty of getting
to some of the investigation sites, the limited amount of people
devoted to the problem, and the enormity of the task--given that DOD is
responsible for accounting for all U.S. POW/MIAs back to World War II.
I know from experience that the people involved with this issue,
obviously including the family members of those missing, are extremely
passionate and also extremely hard-working. If confirmed, will you make
a point to look into how DOD handles POW/MIA accounting issues and do
everything you can to make sure that mission is properly resourced and
absolutely as effective as possible?
Dr. Miller. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for
appropriate resources and support efforts to account for our missing
Service personnel. All DOD organizations have been receiving increased
scrutiny to ensure resources are employed efficiently. At the same
time, in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, the Department has increased resources, both manpower and
personnel, for the U.S. Pacific Command's Joint POW/MIA Accounting
Command (JPAC), and we are seeing growth in this mission. In fiscal
year 2012, this included a $30 million plus-up for JPAC for increased
capacity. Also, JPAC is in the process of hiring additional personnel
and establishing a second laboratory in the continental United States,
which should increase the pace at which remains are recovered and
identified. We have increased efforts to research losses from World War
II, collect DNA reference samples from families of missing Service
personnel and developed new methodologies to help identify remains of
unknown Service personnel interred in National Cemeteries.
5. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Miller, will you look into the
relationship between DPMO and the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/
MIAs including how DPMO currently does and should provide support to
the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and
ensure that the Commission is getting the appropriate support to carry
out its mission and that any DOD personnel and resources intended to
support the work of the Commission are used for that purpose?
Dr. Miller. Yes, I will ensure that the U.S.-Russia Joint
Commission on POW/MIAs receives the appropriate support to carry out
its mission. The Commission is comprised of relatively senior U.S.
Officials, including yourself. However, most of the personnel
accounting effort is carried out in Russia by the Defense POW/Missing
Personnel Office (DPMO), which has a statutory responsibility to
account for missing personnel through its Joint Commission Support
Directorate (JCSD). DPMO/JCSD conducts research, analysis, and
investigations in Russia on U.S. personnel missing from past wars. The
preponderance of this work is from material collected from Russian
archives, interviews with Soviet/Russian veterans, and field
investigations. Additionally, DPMO/JCSD searches for information in the
U.S. archives on missing Russian personnel (or assists the Russians in
conducting such searches) and intends to work with the planned Russian
support office to be established at the Russian Embassy in Washington,
DC.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
acquisition and deployment of defense systems
6. Senator Brown. Dr. Miller, does the acquisition and deployment
of area defense systems remain important to U.S. defense strategy,
especially in regions where our potential adversaries possess
significant armored or maritime forces?
Dr. Miller. Yes, it remains important to the U.S. defense strategy.
The Department is always reviewing its capacity to defend against
emerging threats to determine what improvements can be made to existing
systems and where we need to invest in new technologies.
sensor-fuzed weapon
7. Senator Brown. Dr. Miller, if international advocacy groups are
successful in breaking the supply chain for the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon,
what are the materiel, cost, and humanitarian implications for U.S.
contingency planning and warfighting strategy in the Korean Peninsula
and Persian Gulf regions?
Dr. Miller. Cluster munitions, employed in accordance with the laws
of war, are legitimate weapons with clear military utility. They
provide a distinct advantage against a range of targets and can result
in less collateral damage than unitary weapons. There remains a
military requirement to engage area targets that include massed
formations of enemy forces, individual target dispersed over a defined
area, targets whose precise locations are not known, and time-sensitive
or moving targets.
The Department considers a range of future scenarios when assessing
the ability of programmed forces to accomplish key missions. These
assessments include evaluations of programmed stocks of munitions. The
Department's programmed inventory of Sensor-Fuzed Weapons is sufficient
to meet currently anticipated requirements.
8. Senator Brown. Dr. Miller, what would the implications be for
U.S. allies that have current, pending, and prospective Foreign
Military Sales agreements with our Government?
Dr. Miller. U.S. Government exports the CBU-105 consistent with the
requirements of section 7056 of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law
111-8, Division H), which provides that, for purposes of military
assistance, defense export licensing, and technology sales or
transfers, cluster munitions must ``have a 99 percent or higher
functioning rate.'' If the supply chain is broken, our allies may
decide to keep their older munitions beyond their service life until
suitable replacements are acquired and/or developed. The Department has
not identified any potential alternatives for U.S. allies should U.S.
industry be unable to produce the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon.
9. Senator Brown. Dr. Miller, is DOD equipped to counter such
campaigns, whether it is the current one against the Sensor-Fuzed
Weapon or a looming one against armed drones? If so, how is DOD doing
this?
Dr. Miller. Any campaign focused on the U.S. defense industrial
base is a complex issue. Protecting the U.S. defense industrial base
and national security interests is a major priority and requires the
DOD to collaborate effectively with other Federal executive departments
and agencies, as well as with Congress. We must ensure that we
thoroughly understand the potential risks and communicate those risks
to our defense industry partners. We seek to work closely with our
defense industry partners to protect our domestic industrial
capabilities. We also must explain to the public that the weapons at
issue are legitimate, and their proper use fully consistent with both
international law and our values as a Nation.
10. Senator Brown. Dr. Miller, many of DOD's current inventories of
weapons do not meet the DOD policy of less than 1 percent unexploded
ordnance. Since the policy states that non-compliant weapons will not
be employed after 2018, please explain DOD's plans and programs (to
include budget lines and funding profiles) to replace or upgrade these
weapons.
Dr. Miller. I would defer to the acting Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for the specifics, but I
believe the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative
Warhead (AW) will replace the existing inventory of M26/M26A1/M26A2
dual-purpose, improved conventional munition (DPICM) rockets with a DOD
cluster munitions policy-compliant system. As you may know, the GMLRS
AW is a precision-guided, area suppression weapon system with a
required maximum range of 70 km.
Completion of development of the GMLRS AW will occur in 2015 with
an initial operational capability (IOC) of 324 GMLRS AW rockets
scheduled for early 2017. The GMLRS AW is fully funded with $159.6
million programmed for development. The GMLRS AW will be integrated
into the GMLRS rocket production line in 2016 with a remaining $1.35
billion programmed for procurement through 2022. The Army GMLRS
Procurement Objective (APO) is for 43,560 rockets.
A policy-compliant cannon DPICM replacement for M483 and M864 155mm
DPICM projectiles and the M39 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) missiles is being evaluated. The
intent is to capitalize on the GMLRS AW for potential technology reuse
for application to a 155-mm cannon DPICM and ATACMS APAM replacement.
The Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) program is developing a
modification plan and cost estimate to replace the non-compliant JSOW-A
submunitions (BLU-97) weapon with an alternate warhead (BLU-111), while
retaining the JSOW's area effect capabilities after 2018. The JSOW-A
modification program is not a program of record, and I understand that
no decision to fund or pursue this option has been made by the
Department of the Navy.
11. Senator Brown. Dr. Miller, can you reaffirm the U.S. position
that the BLU-108 is the submunition of the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, because
it is a conventional munition released by a cluster munition and
functions by detonating an explosive charge before impact?
Dr. Miller. I defer to the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for the specifics, but I believe
that the Department has assigned a Bomb Live Unit (BLU) designation
(BLU-108) to the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon submunition. The BLU designation
identifies a component of a U.S. cluster munition as a submunition. We
have not assigned a BLU or similar designation to any other component
of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon. Therefore, as I understand it, the U.S.
position is that the BLU-108 is the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon submunition.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
contracting with rosoboronexport
12. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Miller, are you aware of Rosoboronexport's
activities in Syria and how that company, which is affiliated with the
Russian Government, has continued to arm the Assad regime and enable
that regime's murder of its own citizens?
Dr. Miller. I cannot go into detail in an unclassified setting, but
can say that Russia remains a top supplier of weapons to Syria. Recent
press articles reported that several cargo ships used by
Rosoboronexport have delivered cargo to Syria. Other press reporting
indicates that Rosoboronexport signed a deal with the Syrian Government
in January to sell 36 military aircraft.
13. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Miller, what business is DOD conducting
with Rosoboronexport?
Dr. Miller. Rosonboronexport is a Russian Federation state-owned
enterprise which, under Russian law, has authority over export of Mi-17
aircraft that are purchased for military use. To support the U.S.
strategy to build the Afghan Air Force and thus facilitate a transition
to Afghan National Security Forces taking full responsibility for the
security of Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the Department has procured
Mi-17 aircraft, spare parts for maintenance, and engineering support
services. This includes documentation which is available only from
Rosoboronexport.
14. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Miller, is it correct that DOD is
purchasing helicopters from Rosoboronexport for use in Afghanistan?
Dr. Miller. Yes. In May 2011, the Army entered into a contract with
Rosoboronexport for 21 Mi-17 helicopters for use in Afghanistan. Under
Russian Law, Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of
military use Mi-17 helicopters. The contract includes purchase of spare
parts and engineering support and contains an option for 12 attrition
replacement aircraft.
15. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Miller, do you believe it is appropriate to
be paying taxpayers' dollars to a Russian company that is arming Assad
and enabling his murder of over 8,000 civilians?
Dr. Miller. Administration officials have repeatedly made it clear
to senior Russian leaders that the administration does not support
Russian arms shipments to the Assad regime while the regime engages in
violence against their people. The helicopter contact with the Russian
company Rosoboronexport reflects our commitment to balance between the
two national security priorities of equipping the Afghan National
Security Forces with the necessary equipment to transition security
responsibilities, and finding ways to isolate the Assad regime in
Damascus.
digital policy
16. Senator Graham. Dr. Miller, how would you deliver a more
holistic approach to administer and govern digital policy?
Dr. Miller. DOD has a critical role in developing and executing the
Nation's approach to cybersecurity. An integrated and coordinated
communications effort across the Department is vital to our overall
cyber efforts. The DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DSOC) is
an important milestone for the Department and is the first unified
strategy for operating in cyberspace. This cyber strategy combines and
institutionalizes previous DOD efforts, statements and initiatives into
formal Department policy. It also provides a framework for future
Department priorities for operating in cyberspace and establishes clear
guidelines for the Department and its components to comprehensively
approach operations in cyberspace.
DOD efforts under the DSOC can be organized into five strategic
initiatives: (1) Treating cyberspace as an operational domain so that
DOD can organize, train, and equip; (2) Employing new defense operating
concepts; (3) Partnering with the interagency and private sector; (4)
Working with allies and international partners to increase
cybersecurity; and (5) Leveraging our talent and technological
capacity. These five important initiatives are centrally managed under
the Cyber Integration Group, which consists of members from across DOD.
This group, which I have co-chaired along with a Joint Staff
counterpart, provides a unifying framework for coordinating and
synchronizing cyber activities across the Department in a holistic
fashion.
In addition to the Cyber Integration Group, DOD has also recently
established a senior-level Cyber Investment Management Board (CIMB) to
integrate processes and align strategies, resources, and governance for
cyber warfare capability acquisition across DOD. The CIMB will address
the Department's cyber requirements, R&D, and acquisition processes and
will support other governance groups, including the Defense Management
Action Group and the Cyber Integration Group, by providing status
updates, metrics, and portfolio information. The CIMB will also serve
as the oversight body for Cyber Science and Technology funding.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
syria and contracting with rosoboronexport
17. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you agree that the Assad regime
has committed acts of mass murder against its own people during the
Syrian uprisings that began in March 2011?
Dr. Miller. The situation is tragic for the people of Syria and for
the region. Democratic reform should have been the Assad regime's
response to the uprisings that began in March 2011. Instead the regime
has responded with brutality and violence towards its own citizens.
18. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you believe these actions also
constitute crimes against humanity?
Dr. Miller. There is no question that violence towards the people
of Syria has been brutal and devastating. The actions of the Assad
Government have outraged all good people. The United States has made
clear that the Assad regime has lost its legitimacy and that this
crisis has no effective solution without Assad's departure. As the
President has stated, Assad must go. I will defer to my counterparts at
the Department of State on specific judgments as to whether these
actions constitute crimes against humanity.
19. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware of Rosoboronexport's
history of arms sales to Syria?
Dr. Miller. Yes, I am aware that in recent years Rosoboronexport
has been a primary provider of military weapons and equipment to Syria,
with the press reporting estimated sales totaling $4.7 billion from
2007-2010.
20. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware that the U.S.
Government has sanctioned Rosoboronexport in the past for providing
illicit support to Iran's military?
Dr. Miller. Yes. DOD's effort to support Afghan Mi-series aircraft
was shaped to abide by the State Department sanctions, which were in
place until late spring 2010.
21. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware that this firm has
continued to supply weapons to Syria during the crackdown?
Dr. Miller. It is my understanding that there have been deliveries
of weapons and supplies to Syria from several counties, to include
Russia. Recent press reporting indicates that several cargo ships used
by Rosoboronexport have delivered arms and supplies to Syria since the
beginning of 2012. Separate reporting indicates that Rosoboronexport
signed a deal with the Syrian government in January to sell 36 military
aircraft.
22. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, what types and quantities of
weapons has Rosoboronexport delivered to Syria, directly or indirectly,
since the Syrian uprisings began in March 2011?
Dr. Miller. There is a great deal of reporting in the open press on
recent Russian arms deliveries to Syria. I would be pleased to provide
additional assessments through classified channels. Russia has a series
of ongoing contracts to provide Syria with advanced conventional
weapons.
23. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you have concerns about DOD's
ongoing business dealings with Rosoboronexport? If so, what are those
concerns?
Dr. Miller. Regarding DOD's ongoing business with Rosoboronexport,
my concern is that the firm delivers the remaining Mi-17 helicopters
ordered for the Afghan National Security Forces on schedule, within the
budget, and in the mission-ready configuration as specified in the
requirement. At the same time, I am concerned by Russia's provision of
arms to the Assad regime while they perpetrate brutal violence against
their own people. The administration has urged senior Russian officials
to suspend all deliveries of arms to Syria until the violence ends.
24. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, which other Russian entities have
transferred weapons to Syria since the Syrian uprisings began in March
2011?
Dr. Miller. To the best of my understanding, Rosoboronexport, as
Russia's state-authorized exporter of military use equipment and
technology, is responsible for weapon contracts with Syria. It is
possible that other Russian-connected entities have also been involved.
25. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, what types and quantities of
weapons have these entities delivered during that time?
Dr. Miller. I do not have specifics on the exact types and
quantities of weapons that these entities may have delivered. There has
been reporting in the press of Russian transfers of air defense weapons
as well as small arms to the Syrian regime. I would be pleased to
provide additional assessments through classified channels.
26. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, President Obama stated on February
3, 2011, that: ``Assad must halt his campaign of killing and crimes
against his own people now. . . . The suffering citizens of Syria must
know: we are with you, and the Assad regime must come to an end.'' Do
you agree with President Obama's statement?
Dr. Miller. Yes. The United States is committed to holding the
Syrian regime to its obligations. The United States is leading an
international effort to help stop the violence and support a peaceful
political transition in Syria. U.S. policy toward Syria is clear: we
support a political and democratic transition that fulfills the Syrian
people's aspirations.
27. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you agree that Russian arms
transfers to the Assad regime have been a key enabler of that regime
maintaining power in Syria?
Dr. Miller. Any transfer of weapons to the regime from sources
outside of Syria could enable the regime to continue to maintain power.
I am concerned about any weapons transfers and DOD monitors this issue
closely. The Department has raised our concerns about the Russian
delivery of weapons to Assad regime.
28. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you agree that the United States
has an obligation to use all of its leverage to pressure Russia and
Russian entities to end their support of the Assad regime?
Dr. Miller. The United States is pressing the Russians through
diplomatic channels to help end the violence in Syria with a view to a
transition of power. Russia has a long standing relationship with
Syria, and should be able to influence the actions of the Assad
Government.
29. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you agree that DOD has the
ability to sever all current contractual relationships with
Rosoboronexport?
Dr. Miller. Because the Department retains the right to terminate
all of its contracts, the contractual relationships with
Rosoboronexport can also be terminated. There are, however, two ways in
which the United States benefits from this relationship: by being
assured proper Mi-17 delivery and support to the Afghan Air Force; and
by obtaining accurate engineering information for the Mi-17s to ensure
safe air operations for the Afghans and for the U.S. aircrews and
passengers who utilize these aircraft.
30. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you agree that continuing to do
business with Rosoboronexport undermines U.S. policy regarding Syria?
Dr. Miller. DOD's business with Rosoboronexport is strictly limited
to acquiring Mi-17 helicopters and sustainment packages for the Afghan
National Security Forces. This helicopter continues to provide
excellent performance in the harsh operating climates of Afghanistan
and is relatively easy to operate and maintain by the Afghans. Despite
the decision to acquire Mi-17s from Rosoboronexport, DOD continues to
evaluate U.S.-manufactured alternatives that could provide a similar
capability.
31. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, who in the administration directed
that procurement of Mi-17 helicopters must be done using
Rosoboronexport as broker?
Dr. Miller. The Army was designated as the Lead Military Department
for Mi-17 and other non-standard rotary wing aircraft in January 2010
by the then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Dr. Ashton B. Carter. The Combined Airpower
Transition Force/438th Expeditionary Wing documented the need for these
aircraft to support development of an Afghan National Army Air Corps
(now known as the Afghan Air Force) to support the ability of Afghan
National Security Forces to take full responsibility for the security
of Afghanistan.
U.S. efforts to provide and support Mi-17s prior to May 2010 were
limited to purchases of civilian-variant Mi-aircraft in a world
marketplace. This approach slowed the development of Afghan capability
because it necessitated costly modifications and severe flight
limitations due to a lack of comprehensive engineering data.
Discussions with the Russian Government between August and December
2010 established--as was later confirmed through diplomatic channels--
that Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of military-
use Mi-17 helicopters and the only source of complete engineering data.
This situation led to USD(AT&L)'s December 2010 decision to transfer
the procurement responsibility for 21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems
Command to the Army.
The Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) authorized award of a
contract for the Mi-17s based on the public interest exception to full
and open competition. This decision was based on the need to provide a
familiar aircraft to the Afghans to support the war effort and the
demonstrated capability of the Mi-17 to meet the robust requirements of
operations in Afghanistan. This action was in compliance with title 10
U.S.C. 2304(c)(7) and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR 6.302-7)
and the congressional defense committees were notified consistent with
the statute prior to contract award.
32. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, the June 1, 2011, Army contract was
a no-bid contract. What justification existed for not awarding this
contract through an open and competitive selection process?
Dr. Miller. The Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) authorized
award of a contract for the Mi-17s based on the public interest
exception to full and open competition. This decision was based on the
need to provide a familiar aircraft to the Afghans to support the war
effort and the demonstrated capability of the Mi-17 to meet the
significant operational requirements in Afghanistan. This action was in
compliance with title 10 U.S.C. section 2304(c)(7) and the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR 6.302-7) and the congressional defense
committees were notified consistent with the statute prior to contract
award.
33. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you agree that the Obama
administration's policy of trying to reset bilateral relations with
Russia was a major factor in the decision to award this June 1, 2011,
no-bid contract to Rosoboronexport, a state-controlled firm that is
essentially an arm of the Russian Government?
Dr. Miller. No. The primary purpose for initiating discussions with
the Russian Federation following the lifting of sanctions in 2010 was
to obtain access to authentic engineering data to support Mi-17
airworthiness. Discussions with the Russian government between August
and December 2010 established -as was later confirmed through
diplomatic channels--that Rosoboronexport is the sole entity
controlling export of military-use Mi-17 helicopters and the only
source of complete engineering data. This situation led to USD(AT&L)'s
December 2010 decision to transfer the procurement responsibility for
21 Mi-17s from the Naval Air Systems Command to the Army.
The Secretary of the Army (as Agency Head) authorized award of a
contract for the Mi-17s based on the public interest exception to full
and open competition. This decision was based on the need to provide a
familiar aircraft to the Afghans to support the war effort and the
demonstrated capability of the Mi-17 to meet significant operational
requirements in Afghanistan. This action was in compliance with 10
U.S.C., section 2304(c)(7), and the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR 6.302-7) and the congressional defense committees were notified
consistent with the statute prior to contract award.
34. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware that Rosoboronexport
is not the actual manufacturer of Mi-17 helicopters, but only a broker?
Dr. Miller. Yes. In meetings with the Russian Federal Service for
Military-Technical Cooperation, U.S. representatives were advised that
Mi-17 aircraft purchased for military end-use can only be purchased
from Rosoboronexport. The prime aircraft manufacturer, Kazan, as well
as Rosoboronexport, participated in subsequent contract negotiations.
35. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, when will delivery of the initial
21 Mi-17 helicopters procured under the June 1, 2011, Army contract be
completed?
Dr. Miller. The delivery should be completed in June--15 of the 21
aircraft have been delivered, and the remaining 6 aircraft are on
schedule to be delivered to the Afghan Air Force at the end of June
2012.
36. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, under the June 1, 2011, Army
contract with Rosoboronexport for the purchase of 21 Mi-17 helicopters
and spare parts, has the $550 million option for additional Mi-17s been
exercised? If so, on what date was it exercised?
Dr. Miller. The option provides for up to 12 aircraft at a range of
pre-negotiated prices that depend on the desired delivery date. In
order to replace two aircraft destroyed in accidents, two aircraft with
initial spares, tools, and technical publication support were ordered
for $33.4 million in February 2012. The NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan (NTM-A) has also identified the need for 10 aircraft to
replace Mi-17s that are nearing their life limited flight hours. The
DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council, which was established in
compliance with congressional direction, reviewed and approved NTM-A's
request and funding source. The 10 aircraft option, including initial
spares, tools, and technical publications is planned to be exercised in
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012.
The $550 million cost cited in the question is the ceiling price
for both the 21 aircraft baseline and the 12-aircraft option.
37. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, if the option has not been
exercised yet, does DOD/Army intend to exercise it? If so, what is
approximate timeframe for that?
Dr. Miller. The option provides for up to 12 aircraft at a range of
pre-negotiated prices that depend on the desired delivery date. In
order to replace two aircraft destroyed in accidents, two aircraft with
initial spares, tools, and technical publication support were ordered
for $33.4 million in February 2012. The NTM-A has also identified the
need for 10 aircraft to replace Mi-17s that are nearing their life
limited flight hours. The DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council,
which was established in compliance with congressional direction,
reviewed and approved NTM-A's request and funding source. Exercise of
the 10 aircraft option, including initial spares, tools, and technical
publications is planned in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012 at a
projected price of $184.3 million.
38. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, once delivery of the last of the
initial 21 aircraft to be procured under this contract is complete, how
many additional Mi-17s does DOD/Army anticipate needing to buy in order
to round out the Afghan rotary aircraft requirement?
Dr. Miller. The planned inventory requirement for the Afghan Air
Force is met by the delivery of the 21 aircraft. However, two other
crash-damaged aircraft are planned to be replaced. Additionally, the
Afghan Air Interdiction Unit, which is being transformed to a Special
Operations Unit, also operates 30 Mi-17 aircraft. No further purchases
are planned at this time, but procurements will be needed to sustain
inventory levels, because Mi-17s must be overhauled at a depot at
specific flight hour limits. The number of overhauls is limited and
aircraft that have no further flight hour availability must be
replaced. The NTM-A recently identified 10 Afghan Air Force aircraft
for funded replacement. Those 10 plus the 2 crash damage replacements
can be accommodated using the priced option on the existing contract.
The DOD Afghanistan Resource Oversight Council is also currently
considering NTM-A-proposed alternatives to replace aircraft for the
Special Operations Unit.
39. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, do you agree that we have viable
alternative routes available to buy these same Mi-17 aircraft,
notwithstanding any Russian claims to the contrary?
Dr. Miller. As confirmed by working with the Department of State
and consulting bilaterally with Russian officials, Rosoboronexport's
control over exports of Mi-17 aircraft intended for military purposes
is part of Russian law. Delivery from within the Russian Federation
could be blocked by Rosoboronexport even if others are able to purchase
the Mi-17s. More importantly, the United States needs access to Kazan,
the prime aircraft manufacturer, for accurate engineering support and
data to ensure safe operations and maintenance and airworthiness on
behalf of Afghan and U.S. personnel who utilize these aircraft.
40. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware that in 2009 the Navy
legally purchased four of these same dual-use Mi-17 helicopters through
a private U.S. broker after an open and competitive selection process?
Dr. Miller. I am aware that the Navy purchased civilian variants of
the Mi-17 through a U.S. broker in 2009 and modified them to a viable
configuration at additional cost. This contract was awarded after prior
discussions with the Russian government that established--as was later
confirmed through diplomatic channels--that Rosoboronexport is the sole
entity controlling export of military-use Mi-17 helicopters and the
only source of complete engineering data.
41. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware that these four
helicopters are still flying today, presently in service with the NATO
Air Training Command-Afghanistan?
Dr. Miller. Yes. Maintenance and engineering support for these
aircraft is provided by the Army Program Manager for Non-Standard
Rotary Wing Aircraft. (Please note that the NATO Air Training Command
is a component of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.)
42. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware that, after the
successful 2009 procurement of Mi-17s, the Navy initiated a similar
effort to procure 21 additional Mi-17s through an open and competitive
selection process?
Dr. Miller. Yes. At that time, the Army's Non-Standard Rotary Wing
Aircraft Program was still being staffed and beginning operations and
the Navy was tasked to procure these aircraft. The USD(AT&L) directed
the Navy to cease these efforts following the discussions with the
Russian Federation that established Rosoboronexport's role regarding
Mi-17 exports. This responsibility was then transferred to the
Department of the Army.
43. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, are you aware that, on December 16,
2010, DOD put an end to that by transferring procurement authority for
these 21 aircraft from the Navy to the Army?
Dr. Miller. Yes. The decision to transfer procurement authority to
the Army was based on a determination, confirmed through diplomatic
channels, that Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of
military-use Mi-17 helicopters and the only source of complete
engineering data. The need for complete engineering data would not have
been addressed in the Navy's planned Naval Air Systems Command
contract.
44. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, how is a no-bid contract with
Rosoboronexport preferable to a competitively awarded contract with a
private U.S. broker?
Dr. Miller. The decision to contract with Rosoboronexport was based
on several criteria. Critically, the contract ensured DOD access to the
manufacturer's engineering expertise and direct support for
determinations regarding the operation, maintenance, and airworthiness
of these aircraft.
A broker not authorized by the manufacturer would lack access to
the latest safety updates and therefore would be unable to sustain the
airworthiness of the Mi-17s. Moreover, the contract with
Rosoboronexport delivers aircraft modified with the necessary equipment
to facilitate interoperability with U.S. platforms. Previous deliveries
from a broker have required subsequent modifications at increased cost.
By contracting with Rosoboronexport, the United States is assured that
export of these aircraft for their intended military use will not be
blocked. Finally, the United States was advised that under Russian law,
Rosoboronexport is the sole entity controlling export of military-use
Mi-17 helicopters and the only source of complete engineering data.
45. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, at your confirmation hearing,
Senator Blumenthal asked you about DOD's efforts to find other
helicopters that could be used, specifically asking if there is ``an
effort underway in development.'' You responded, ``Senator, yes there
is.'' Please describe what DOD has previously done and is currently
doing to find alternatives.
Dr. Miller. A 2010 study led by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff examined the worldwide need for rotary-wing
aircraft for Security Force Assistance, particularly in the instances
where building partner nation capacity was involved. The study examined
alternatives for meeting these requirements, including domestic source
alternatives. Since this study was done, there have been successes in
transitioning to U.S. helicopters in the case of partner nations. One
example is Iraq, which has purchased an armed variant of the Bell 407
helicopter. I understand that DOD briefed key members of the
congressional defense committees on this study.
In Afghanistan, six MD 530F helicopters were recently delivered to
serve as training aircraft for Afghan forces to begin a transition to
more sophisticated rotary wing aircraft. However, the unique situation
on the ground precludes a near-term transition to a U.S. alternative to
the Mi-17. The referenced study compared a wide range of alternatives;
however, in the high altitudes and hot temperatures of Afghanistan, the
Mi-17 has proven successful both in military and civilian operations,
and in terms of low procurement and operating cost. The Mi-17 is
familiar to the Afghan pilots, aircrews, and maintenance personnel.
With low rates of Afghan literacy, recruiting and training additional
personnel are difficult and transition to a more sophisticated western
aircraft would delay the timeline of the current U.S. strategy.
______
[The nomination reference of Hon. James N. Miller, Jr.,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 24, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
James N. Miller, Jr., of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, vice Michele A. Flournoy.
______
[The biographical sketch of Hon. James N. Miller, Jr.,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Hon. James N. Miller
Education:
Stanford University
1977-1981
B.A. with honors in Economics awarded June 1981
Harvard University
1983-1985
Masters in Public Policy awarded June 1985
Harvard University
1985-1988
Ph.D. in Public Policy awarded March 1989
Employment Record:
Department of Defense
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
February 2012-present
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
April 2009-present
Center for a New American Security
Senior Vice President and Director of Studies
February 2007-April 2009
Adaptive Strategies, LLC
President
August 2006-present
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
Senior Associate
October 2006-February 2007
Hicks and Associates, Inc.
Senior Vice President
October 2000-February 2007
Department of Defense
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation
September 1997-0ctober 2000
Duke University
Assistant Professor of Public Policy
September 1992-August 1997
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services
Professional Staff Member
August 1988-August 1992
Honors and Awards:
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (June
2011)
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service
(February 2011)
Department of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
(November 2000)
Atlantic Fellow in Public Policy (1995-1996)
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. James N.
Miller, Jr., in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James Northey Miller, Jr. (Nicknames: Jim, Jimmy).
2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
3. Date of nomination:
January 24, 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
August 15, 1959; Waterloo, IA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Adele Marie Balk Miller (formerly Adele Marie Balk).
7. Names and ages of children:
Allison Northey Miller: 21.
Zoe Adele Miller: 19.
Colin James Miller: 17.
Lucas Eugene Miller: 15.
Adrienne Sara Miller: 11.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Harvard University, 1985-1988. Ph.D. in Public Policy, March 1989.
Harvard University, 1983-1985. Masters in Public Policy, June 1985.
Stanford University, 1977-1981. B.A. with honors in Economics, June
1981.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Room 3E806,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC, February 4, 2012-present.
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Room 3E806,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC. April 8, 2009-present.
Senior Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for a New
American Security, 1301 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite #403, Washington,
DC, February 2007-present.
President, Adaptive Strategies, LLC, 3701 N. Harrison St.,
Arlington, VA, August 2006-present. (Sole-person company used for
consulting)
President, The Miller Agency, Inc., 2615 W. 4th St, Waterloo, IA,
July 2006-December 2009. (Assumed unpaid position upon death of father.
The company has since dissolved)
Consulting Employee, SAIC, 1710 SAIC Drive, Mclean, VA, February
2007-November 2008.
Senior Associate, CSIS, 1800 K St., NW, Washington, DC, October
2006-February 2007.
Senior Vice President, Hicks and Associates, Inc., 1710 SAIC Drive,
Mclean, VA, October 2000-February 2007. (Started in 2000 as Vice
President).
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans, and
Counterproliferation, Department of Defense, September 1997-October
2000.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Member, Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Challenges
to Military Operations in Support of National Interests
(uncompensated), 2007.
Member, Threat Reduction Advisory Council Panel on Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction (uncompensated), 2006-present.
Consultant to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and
Requirements, Defense Department, June-September 1997.
Consultant to Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Defense Department, April 1994-April 1995.
Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office
of Management and Budget, June-September 1984 (summer employment).
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
President, Adaptive Strategies, LLC, 3701 N. Harrison St.,
Arlington, VA. (Sole-person company used for consulting--in Dormant
Status Since April 7, 2009).
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Barack Obama Presidential Campaign: $100 (Nov. 7, 2008).
Barack Obama Presidential Campaign: $1,000 (Oct. 2, 2008)
Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign: $1,500 (Sept. 26, 2007).
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (June
2011).
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service
(February 2011).
Department of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
(November 2000).
Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies (2007-
present).
Atlantic Fellow in Public Policy (1995-1996).
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
U.S. Can't Risk Slow START, with Ellen Tauscher (Washington, DC:
Op-Ed in Politico, September 2010).
Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options, with Christine Parthemore
and Kurt M. Campbell (Washington, DC: Center for a New American
Security, June 2008).
``Enhancing Synergies and Gaining Efficiencies: Integrating the
'INTs' to Transform Operations and Mission Management,'' Building
Strategic Concepts for the Intelligence Enterprise--Conference Report
(Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence/
Policy, Plans and Requirements, January 2008).
``U.S. Strategic Capabilities for Preventing War: The Way
Forward,'' with Robert Barker (Washington, DC: Los Alamos/Livermore
Laboratories Conference on Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century,
January 2008).
``Iraq: Response to Max Boot,'' with Shawn W. Brimley, Commentary
(December 2007).
Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq, with
Shawn W. Brimley (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
June 2007).
``No More Iraqs,'' American Security Project, December 6, 2007.
``On the Road to Ruin,'' Defense News op-ed, with TX Hammes, May 7,
2007.
``Reducing Homeland Security Risks with a Balanced R&D Portfolio:
Analytical Tasks & Supporting Methods,'' Hicks & Associates, Inc.
report to Department of Homeland Security, January 2006.
``DART Review of Joint Operating Concepts and Joint Functional
Concepts,'' Defense Adaptive Red Team Report, October 2003.
``Operational Net Assessment: What are the Real Challenges?''
Defense Adaptive Red Team Report, March 2003.
``Challenges in Conducting Rapid Decisive Operations,'' Defense
Adaptive Red Team Report, February 2002.
``Red Teaming in Joint Forces Command's Unified Vision 01
Experiment: A Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) View,'' Defense Adaptive
Red Team Report, August 2001.
``Talking Trash: Analytic Aids for Understanding and Improving
Judgments in Landfill Siting Processes,'' Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, fall 1998, with Marie Lynn Miranda and Timothy L
Jacobs.
``Seeking Truth for Power: Integrating Policy and Political
Analysis,'' Working Paper 95-1, Terry Sanford Institute of Public
Policy, May 1995, with Frederick W. Mayer.
Approaching Zero: An Evaluation of Radical Reductions in Superpower
Nuclear Arsenals, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, March 1989.
``Zero and Minimal Nuclear Weapons,'' Chapter 1 in Fateful Visions:
Beyond Nuclear Deterrence, edited by Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale,
and Joseph Nye, Jr., Ballinger Press, 1988.
``How Study Design Affects Outcomes in Comparisons of Therapy. I.
Medical,'' Statistics in Medicine, Vol. 8, 1989, with Graham Colditz
and Frederick Mosteller.
``How Study Design Affects Outcomes in Comparisons of Therapy. II.
Surgical,'' Statistics in Medicine, Vol. 8, 1989, with Colditz and
Mosteller.
``Measuring Gain in the Evaluation of Medical Technology: The
Probability of a Better Outcome,'' International Journal of Technology
Assessment in Health Care, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1988, with Colditz and
Mosteller.
``The Effect of Study Design on Gain in Evaluations of New
Treatments in Medicine and Surgery,'' Drug Information Journal, Vol.
22, 1988, with Colditz and Mosteller.
``From Babbling to Speech: A Reassessment of the Continuity
Issue,'' Language, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1985 (numerous coauthors).
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
The following speeches, though not all inclusive, are a good
representation of the material presented as PDUSDP, relevant to the
nominated position of USDP. More speeches are available upon request.
``Missile Defense Cooperation'', Panel discussion at 12th RUSI
Missile Conference, June 15, 2011. [Speech].
``DOD's Nuclear Posture Review Rollout Briefing'', Media event at
Washington Press Center, April 7, 2010. [Transcript].
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Hon. James N. Miller, Jr.
This 26th day of March, 2012.
[The nomination of Hon. James N. Miller, Jr., was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 15, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 2012.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Erin C. Conaton by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has greatly
contributed to the strong framework for today's joint warfighting
capabilities. It has significantly improved interservice and joint
relationships, promoting greater effectiveness of the Military
Departments and combatant commands.
If confirmed, I would plan to evaluate the joint officer management
program to see if a recommendation of any specific changes would be
beneficial. But my current sense is that today's system supports the
objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Currently I am unaware of any areas where modifications are
needed. If I am confirmed, I would have an opportunity to assess any
further need to legislative modifications, in consultation with the
committee.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. In general, I bring 14 years of experience working on a
range of defense policy issues. As Minority and then Majority Staff
Director of the House Armed Services Committee, I was the overall lead
for the development of legislation and congressional oversight,
including in the areas of personnel and readiness. As Under Secretary
of the Air Force and as Chief Management Officer of the Air Force, I
have been significantly involved in a range of issues concerning
military personnel, civilian personnel, family programs, and readiness.
I look forward, if confirmed, to building on these experiences on
behalf of the Secretary of Defense and to the benefit of all
servicemembers, their families, and our civilian workforce.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness?
Answer. The new defense strategy and more constrained fiscal
environment put the highest premium on sustaining the quality and
readiness of the total force, particularly our exceptional All-
Volunteer Uniformed Force. The new strategy calls for an agile force
ready for a broad variety of missions. As we complete the mission
transition in Afghanistan, the Military Departments will all face
challenges in improving readiness rates and posturing their services
for the future security environment. We must also ensure appropriate
compensation, health care, and personnel policies that recognize both
the service and sacrifice undertaken by our troops and their families
and the new budgetary realities.
At the same time, there are programmed reductions in total force
military end-strength and continued workforce-shaping initiatives in
our civilian force. Retention of the highest quality military and
civilian force must be a top priority. For those that will leave
service, we have an obligation to ensure each servicemember is as
prepared as possible to succeed in civilian life, through a robust
Transition Assistance Program and generous benefits. We must maintain
the priority placed on the physical and mental health care, as well as
the transition assistance, for our wounded, ill, and injured warriors.
Secretary Panetta has rightly placed great focus on the issue of
sexual assault. Even one sexual assault is one too many and out of step
with the core values of the American military. Additionally and
critically, P&R must have a strong role with the Military Departments
in continuing to address issues of mental health and suicide that
plague too many.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to ensure I clearly understand the
priorities of Secretary Panetta and Deputy Secretary Carter. I would
further familiarize myself with the range of policies and issues
confronting the Department in these areas. I fully recognize this is a
team sport and that substantial progress on these issues cannot be made
without leadership and without close partnerships. I intend to work
closely with Congress; colleagues in the Office of Secretary of
Defense, Joint Staff, and the Military Departments and Services; as
well as with critical partners across the inter-agency to make progress
on these challenges.
duties
Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall perform such
duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may
prescribe in the areas of military readiness, total force management,
military and civilian personnel requirements, military and civilian
personnel training, military-civilian family matters, exchange,
commissary, and non-appropriated fund activities, personnel
requirements for weapons support, National Guard and Reserve
components, and health affairs.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect to be
assigned to you?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to carry out my responsibilities,
functions, relationships, and authorities, in accordance with the law
and consistent with DOD Directive 5124.2, ``Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).'' I would be the Secretary of
Defense's principal staff assistant and advisor in all matters relating
to the management and well-being of military and civilian personnel in
the DOD total force and for oversight of the readiness of this force. I
would develop policies and provide oversight for the direction of plans
and programs governing total force management as it relates to
manpower; force management; planning; program integration; readiness;
National Guard and Reserve component affairs; health affairs; training;
personnel requirements and management; and compensation. This also
includes equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation, and quality of
life matters for both civilian and military personnel and their
families.
Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your
relationship with the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to serve the Secretary as his
principal advisor and advocate for the management of human resources
and readiness in the Department.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the
Deputy Secretary to be fundamentally the same as that with the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(ASD(HA)).
Answer. If confirmed, ASD(HA) will be my principal advisor for all
DOD health policies, programs, and force health protection activities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(ASD(RA)).
Answer. If confirmed, ASD(RA) will be my principal advisor for all
Reserve component matters in the Department of Defense (DOD).
Question. The DOD General Counsel.
Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate regular communication,
coordination of actions, and exchange of views with the General Counsel
and the attorneys assigned to focus on personnel policy matters. I
would expect to seek and follow the advice of the General Counsel on
legal, policy and procedural matters pertaining to the policies
promulgated from the P&R office.
Question. The DOD Inspector General.
Answer. The DOD Inspector General is in charge of promoting
integrity, accountability, and improvement of DOD personnel, programs,
and operations to support the Department's mission and serve the public
interest. If confirmed, I will fully assist in any investigations or
issues that relate to personnel and readiness.
Question. The Service Secretaries.
Answer. If confirmed, I would hope to work closely with the
Secretaries of the Military Departments on all matters relating to the
management well-being, and readiness of military and civilian personnel
in the DOD total force structure.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to
the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces and
on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I look forward to a continued strong relationship, through
ASD(RA), to ensure effective integration of National Guard capabilities
into a cohesive total force.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Answer. If confirmed, I would intend to further strengthen the
partnership with these officials in carrying out the human resource
obligations of the Services for the total force.
Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for
Personnel, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of
the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to partner in effective working
relationships with these officers to ensure that DOD attracts,
motivates and retains the quality people it needs.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work to understand the combat
needs and total force concerns of these critical commanders.
Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower
and Personnel (J-1).
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to partner a close coordinating
relationship with the Joint Staff regarding manpower and personnel
policy issues.
systems and support for wounded warriors
Question. Servicemembers and civilians who are wounded and injured
performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and
New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their Service and the
Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation,
rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition
from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement
or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated and as ongoing problems with the
Integrated Disability Evaluation System continue to demonstrate, the
Services were not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded
servicemembers and civilians. Despite the enactment of legislation and
renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. The Office of Wounded Warrior Care and Transition Policy
was established by Congress to ensure wounded, ill, injured, and
transitioning servicemembers receive quality care and seamless
transition support through proactive leadership, responsive policy,
effective oversight and interagency collaboration.
The Department and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have made
some progress by reducing overall disability evaluation time from 500
days to under 400 days and reducing the post-separation wait for VA
disability. However, much work remains to be done. If confirmed, this
will be a top priority. I will continue the effort to ensure a seamless
transition from recovery to reintegration for our wounded, ill or
injured. Additionally, I would continue the Department's collaborative
efforts with the VA on compensation and benefits, transition assistance
and care coordination. I would look forward to working with Congress on
this critical issue.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based?
Answer. The greatest strength is the Department's commitment to
take care of its wounded warriors and their families. That commitment
should guide continued efforts by the Department and the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. The challenges lie in being continually vigilant to ensure
every recovering servicemember and family receive the full care they
need and deserve. Improving the Integrated Disability Evaluation System
is critical in that regard. Much work remains to be done.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. Providing needed care and support for servicemembers,
Veterans and their families should be and is an utmost priority for the
Department. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to consult with
the committee and to evaluate what additional support, in resources
and/or authority, is necessary to address the needs of the wounded
servicemembers and their families.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of access to care
and care management for Federal civilian employees who are ill or
injured in theater, including evaluation and response to traumatic
brain injury and post traumatic stress?
Answer. I understand Federal civilian employees have access to
emergency treatment in theater for illness, disease, injuries, or
wounds sustained while forward deployed in support of U.S. military
forces, and continued treatment in Military Treatment Facilities. If
confirmed, I will review efforts to include the evaluation of traumatic
brain injury and post-traumatic stress for deployed civilian employees.
Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES),
and the Services have now moved to the Integrated DES program to
improve processing of servicemembers. Nevertheless, the processing
times under the Integrated DES, initially encouraging, are now
worsening, and the system appears to be overloaded.
What is your assessment of the Integrated DES?
Answer. The events of the past ten years showed the Department was
not fully prepared to meet the needs of the Nation's returning wounded
servicemembers. Multiple bipartisan commissions confirmed the need to
streamline and improve the Department's disability evaluation system. I
agree with their general conclusions that the system needs to be
improved and processing time needs to be reduced significantly and with
a sense of urgency. Some progress has been made but much more needs to
be done. This will require continued leadership by both this Department
and the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Question. What is your assessment of the need to further streamline
and improve the Integrated DES?
Answer. It is my understanding that much work remains. I believe
the Department has an obligation to our servicemembers participating in
the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) to proactively
evaluate the program and apply lessons learned. Whenever two systems
are merged that are governed by separate statutes and with separate
purposes, there is always friction; but those friction points are
opportunities for improvement. IDES highlights the need for better
record sharing and case management tracking tools across the Department
and VA. If confirmed, I plan to look at all aspects of the system to
see where opportunities exist for improvement. Additionally, I believe
that leadership by both the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs
is critical to ensuring programs like the IDES are successful.
Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Department's work (with
the VA) toward improving the timeliness of the disability evaluation
system. I will carry on the Department's commitment to providing a
comprehensive, fair, and timely medical and administrative processing
system to evaluate our injured or ill servicemembers' fitness for
continued service. If confirmed, I would look forward to the
opportunity to work with this committee to understand your views on
further improvements to care for our wounded ill and injured
servicemembers.
department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
Question. The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs have in
recent years increased collaboration between the respective departments
to support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status
in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and
compensation.
If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that
the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs achieve the
Administration's objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be intimately involved in the
collaboration between the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs
and would look forward to a strong partnership. I fully support the
vision of a single experience of lifetime service through a partnership
that establishes a national model for excellence, quality, access,
satisfaction, and value. I will do my utmost to provide leadership that
enables the interagency effort. I would look forward to co-chairing--
with the Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs--the revitalized Joint
Executive Committee to work on the range of issues that ensure that
transitioning servicemembers receive the benefits, care, and transition
assistance they deserve.
disability severance pay
Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008,
enhanced severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be
deducted from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged
for disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-
duty in a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in
combat-related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In
adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of
a combat-related disability contained in title 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e).
Rather than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a
more limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that
the disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.
What is your understanding of the number of servicemembers impacted
by the DOD interpretation of ``combat-related disability,'' and how the
DOD interpretation affects their compensation?
Answer. Although I do not yet know the details, it is my
understanding that a review of the policy implementing section 1646 of
the Wounded Warrior Act is currently underway. If confirmed, I would
look forward to working with this committee once that review has been
completed.
Question. If confirmed, will you reconsider the Department's
definition of combat-related operations for purposes of awarding
enhanced severance pay and deduction of severance pay from VA
disability compensation?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look into the status of this review
to ensure that any policy change relating to the definition, if
warranted, meets the intent of Congress and is consistent with the
governing statute.
repeal of ``don't ask, don't tell''
Question. What is your assessment of the effect on the force of the
repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy?
Answer. The Services and combatant commands continue to provide
monthly progress reports on the implementation of repeal to the
Secretary of Defense. To date, and based on these reports, repeal is
going smoothly with no significant repeal-related issues identified. I
believe this success can be attributed to comprehensive pre-repeal
training programs, the discipline of our servicemembers, and continued
close monitoring and enforcement of standards by our military leaders
at all levels.
Question. What is your view on the issue of providing military
benefits to same-sex partners?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is conducting a
deliberative and comprehensive review of the possibility of extending
eligibility for some benefits, when legally permitted, to same-sex
partners of military personnel. Before recommending the extension of
any particular benefit, I believe it is necessary to complete the
ongoing, holistic review of all benefits to fully identify second and
third order effects, and to ensure consistency in the benefit
decisionmaking process.
Question. If confirmed, what actions if any would you pursue in
this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure the Department and
our servicemembers remain fully committed to the implementation effort,
consistent with our standards of military readiness, effectiveness,
unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces. I will
also provide leadership, if still ongoing, in the benefits review and
any recommendations made to the Secretary of Defense and Congress.
religious guidelines
Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department does not endorse the
establishment of religion, but it does guarantee its free exercise. The
Department and the Military Services ensure servicemembers' rights to
observe the tenets of their respective religions or to hold no specific
religious conviction or affiliation.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles
of faith or adhere to certain grooming practices related to faith?
Answer. It is my understanding that current policies allow for
consideration of accommodations of religious apparel that are neat and
conservative and do not interfere with the performance of military
duties. Current policy does not address accommodations for grooming
practices, and therefore this policy is under review for possible
revisions. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor and evaluate this
ongoing review.
Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes, in my view, current policies accommodate the free
exercise of religion for all servicemembers including those with no
religious belief.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. It is my understanding that existing policies provide the
military chaplaincy with sufficient guidance that allows them to
balance their own faith practices with respect to the beliefs of others
in both formal and informal setting. They continue to focus on
providing for the free exercise of religion within the pluralistic
environment of the military.
Question. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that
``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations
urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for
religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to
task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-disciplinary
study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-
radicalization . . . ''.
What is your view of this recommendation?
Answer. It is my understanding that these two recommendations are
still under Departmental review. If confirmed, evaluating the adequacy
of policies concerning the safeguarding of our servicemembers would be
a top priority.
Question. Will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based
approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department's
relevant policies on this topic?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would review plans currently in place
to address these challenges, and determine what, if any, changes should
be made. I would collaborate with my colleagues in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Services, the Joint Staff as
well as Congress in charting the right course for the Department.
protection of u.s. forces against internal threats
Question. A DOD review of the Fort Hood attack released in January
2010 concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend
against internal threats, including radicalization of military
personnel.
What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
Fort Hood?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department has undertaken
extensive reviews to ensure that guidance resulting from this tragedy
is actionable and to implement systems that will allow us to mitigate
such incidents in the future. I also understand the Department has
promulgated new guidance to the field to assist commanders in
evaluating and responding to uncertain situations based on lessons
learned. If confirmed, I look forward to becoming more familiar with
the application of these lessons in the field.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with Department
leadership to strengthen the areas identified by the Fort Hood
Independent Review to include mitigating violence in the workplace,
ensuring commanders/supervisors have access to appropriate personnel
records, and integrating and strengthening force protection policies.
Furthermore, I would work closely with our medical community to give
commanders a better understanding of how to identify violence
indicators.
muslims in the u.s. military
Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Ft. Hood could lead
to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
Answer. I believe, by law, every servicemember has the right to
practice their religious faith without fear of persecution or
retribution. If confirmed, I will review policies to ensure adequate
physical and emotional safety from religious harassment is guaranteed
and will take appropriate action if needed.
Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
U.S. military?
Answer. I believe safeguarding the rights of servicemembers
requires both formal and informal feedback procedures that quickly
identify and assess any harassment, should it occur. Responses to
grievances or any identified shortcomings must be quick, thoughtful,
and effective. If confirmed, I would review the viability of these
feedback systems, and take measures to correct them as appropriate.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Department has developed comprehensive policies and
procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of
sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for
victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual
misconduct involving military personnel are still being reported.
Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first
by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate
treatment for the victim. They assert that their command fails to
respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate
investigation of their charges followed by a failure to hold assailants
accountable.
Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures
to be effective?
Answer. Sexual assault simply has no place in the military and is
antithetical to its core values. It is my understanding the Department
continues to put considerable effort into the development of policies
and procedures designed to address sexual assault. If confirmed, I will
review those policies and partner with the Services to continue to
better educate and train the force to reduce the number of cases. I
will also work with them, if there is an assault, to ensure the
Department provides appropriate care to victims and commanders hold
offenders accountable.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
which the confidential reporting procedure has been put into operation?
Answer. I am not currently aware of any specific problems in
implementation of the confidential reporting option, called restricted
reporting. I am aware the Department has extended the restricted
reporting option to servicemembers' dependents 18 years and older. I am
also aware the restriction of no investigation when a victim chooses
restricted reporting has concerned commanders responsible for the
action of their unit members. I believe the Department must find a
balance between victim care and offender accountability but of the
utmost importance is that victims feel they can come forward to obtain
the support they need following an assault.
Sexual assault victims who elected restricted reporting and leave
the military may need to access their records for medical treatment and
to help them receive benefits from the VA. Under Restricted Reports,
the victim's confidentiality is a key focus. As a result, separate
document retention guidelines were designed to respect the
servicemember's desire for confidentiality. In cases of Restricted
Reports (where law enforcement and command are not contacted) the
Military Services must maintain a hard copy of certain records and the
Sexual Assault Medical Forensic Exam for 5 years.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
assaults against contractor personnel?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department has a program in
place to ensure servicemembers deploying to combat zones are
appropriately informed about how to prevent sexual assault and what to
do should it occur. I am aware the Department has made great efforts to
ensure all victims of sexual assaults--including those deployed--are
able to receive the same level of support as those stationed stateside.
The Department recently enacted a new policy to ensure that Department
civilian employees stationed abroad and Department U.S. citizen
contractors in combat areas receive emergency care and access to Sexual
Assault Response Coordinators and victim advocates. If confirmed, I
will continue these efforts.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. I know that all Services have been directed to establish
guidelines for a 24-hour, 7-day per week sexual assault response
capability for all locations, including deployed areas. I also
understand the Services are working towards increasing the training and
expertise of those investigating and prosecuting sexual assaults. If
confirmed, I will partner with the Services to ensure adequate
resources are dedicated to the training of those investigators and
prosecutors.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
Answer. I strongly believe that anyone who commits a sexual assault
in the military needs to be held accountable. This shows victims that
taking the difficult step of assisting with an investigation will help
ensure the safety of their fellow servicemembers and demonstrates to
would-be perpetrators that they will face justice. Secretary Panetta
directed an assessment, due at the end of May, on how we train officers
selected for command and key senior enlisted leaders on sexual assault
prevention and response, and what we can do to strengthen that
training. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that accountability
remains a key priority. I echo Secretary Panetta's regret that such
crimes occur in the U.S. military and I will do all I can to prevent
these sexual assaults from occurring in DOD.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults?
Answer. Sexual assault is a crime which reaches across the
Department, and as such, response and accountability efforts need to
have the same reach. I am aware that in January 2012, Secretary of
Defense Panetta directed an assessment be completed on Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response training for officers selected for command and
key senior noncommissioned officers. If confirmed, I will follow up on
any recommendations to ensure our most senior leaders receive the
necessary training and resources to combat sexual assault. I will also
ensure the Department has the correct structure in place to engage the
Departmental leadership, and the leadership of other agencies such as
the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services, and
Justice, in planning, guiding, and evaluating our efforts. I will also
work with the Services and other OSD and Joint Staff partners on issues
of perpetrator accountability.
hazing
Question. The press has recently reported numerous serious hazing
incidents in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. In the Army and Marine
Corps incidents, the victims allegedly committed suicide following the
hazing.
Does DOD have a policy addressing hazing in the Services? If so,
what is the policy?
Answer. I believe the Department has a clear ``no hazing'' policy,
implemented by each Service, to include mandatory training to prevent
hazing. Secretary of Defense Panetta reinforced the existing policy
against hazing with a personal message to the force in December 2011.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), there are
disciplinary and legal consequences of hazing. Furthermore, hazing is
explicitly prohibited at each of the Service Academies.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the
issue of hazing?
Answer. If confirmed, I would reemphasize the Department's policies
prohibiting hazing. I would work closely with the Services to review
their education and training in this area and to make updates as
appropriate. Finally I would review reporting procedures, strengthen
climate survey mechanisms, and increase awareness of hazing at all
levels of the chain of command.
service academies
Question. What do you consider to be the policy and procedural
elements that must be in place at each of the Service Academies in
order to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and
sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight?
Answer. I believe that, as in the general force, even one sexual
assault at a Service Academy is too many. The Academies are a critical
commissioning source for those who will lead our servicemembers. From
their earliest military education, it must be clear that there is no
place for sexual harassment or assault in our military; it is
antithetical to the core values by which servicemembers live and serve.
I believe the Department's general sexual assault and sexual
harassment policies provide a foundation for combating sexual
misconduct at the Service Academies. It is my understanding the
academies have institutionalized prevention and response programs that
encourage victims to come forward and hold offenders accountable. I
further understand the Department reviews the efforts of the Academies
annually and requires biannual updates on the outcome of the review. If
confirmed, I would continue rigorous oversight and determine whether
additional measures need to be taken.
Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service
Academies to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and to prevent
sexual assaults and sexual harassment?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to familiarizing myself with
what each of the Service Academies have been doing to ensure religious
respect and tolerance. At the USAF Academy, since 2009, chaplains have
been intentional and deliberate in working with commanders, students,
and civilian religious leaders to ensure free exercise of religion or
the choice to have no religion remains a time-honored tradition. I
believe it is imperative that leaders, at all levels, must continue to
ensure every member of the Department respects the spirit and intent of
laws and policies surrounding this free exercise.
On the topic of sexual assault, it is my understanding the
academies have institutionalized prevention and response programs that
encourage victims to come forward and that hold offenders accountable.
I further understand the Department reviews the efforts of the
Academies annually and requires biannual updates on the outcome of the
review. If confirmed, I would continue that rigorous oversight and
determine whether additional measures need to be taken.
women in the military
Question. In recent years, the Navy has opened service on
submarines to women and the Marine Corps has expanded service
opportunities for women in intelligence specialties. The issue of the
appropriate combat role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of
continuing interest to Congress and the American public. In a recent
interview with the Washington Post, General Peter Chiarelli, USA
(Retired), stated his belief that all military occupations, including
combat occupations, should be open to women who can meet appropriate
functional standards.
Do you agree with General Chiarelli's position on assignment
policies that restrict women in combat?
Answer. I believe the Department is committed to pursuing the
elimination of gender-restricted policies, where feasible, while
maintaining force readiness. If confirmed, I would continue the
Department's commitment to remove barriers that prevent servicemembers
from serving in any capacity based on their ability and qualifications,
not constrained by gender-restrictive policies.
Question. Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up
for service by women?
Answer. The Department's recent report on women in the services
commits the Department to review the opening of additional positions
and occupations to women through the establishment of gender-neutral
physical standards. I understand the Services will be assessing the
positions they have requested to be opened under an exception to
policy. The Department will use their experiences regarding the
suitability and relevance of the prohibition on direct ground combat
unit assignment, as well as ongoing research, to inform future policy
decisions.
Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy
regarding women in combat are needed?
Answer. Until the additional assessment is completed, I do not at
this time. It is my understanding the Services will be assessing the
positions they have requested to be opened under an exception to
policy. The Department will use their experiences regarding the
suitability and relevance of the prohibition on direct ground combat
unit assignment, as well as ongoing research, to inform future policy
decisions.
Question. If confirmed, I will continue ongoing efforts in this
area.
Answer. DOD has recently submitted to Congress the report on its
review of all gender-restricting policies, which will result in further
changes in DOD policy to remove barriers to women serving in certain
military roles.
Question. What is your assessment of the findings of this report?
Answer. It is my understanding that, while the findings of this
report did not indicate women have less than equitable opportunities to
compete and excel under the current assignment policy, the Services
requested changes to current assignment policy, based upon their combat
experiences over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. I support the
exceptions to policy made, after thoughtful consideration, by the
Services and would look forward to continuing the ongoing work
contemplated by this report.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the findings of
this report are implemented throughout DOD?
Answer. It is my understanding the Secretary of Defense charged the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness as the focal
point for reporting the progress of the Services in their efforts to
pursue gender-neutral physical standards, assessing newly opened
positions, and identifying any further positions that can be opened. If
confirmed, I will work with the Services to continue the Secretary's
commitment to removing barriers that prevent servicemembers from
serving in any capacity based on their ability and qualifications, not
constrained by gender-restrictive policies.
rising costs of medical care
Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the
Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
In April 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force
Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive''. In recent
years, the Department has attempted to address this growth through
various fee increases on military retirees. The Department's
preliminary budget briefings for fiscal year 2013 confirm that the
growth in military health care costs continues to outpace the growth in
the rest of the defense budget.
What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical
costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. I am informed that Department estimates indicate these
costs could rise to over 10 percent of the Department budget in just a
few years. These costs cannot be ignored, and in these fiscally
constrained times, we must achieve an appropriate balance among
compensation, force structure, and modernization. To address these
rapidly rising costs, the Department has put forward comparatively
modest increases in the beneficiary costs shares to be phased in over
several years. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department
continues to provide high quality care for our servicemembers and their
families, while also ensuring we remain good stewards of the Nation's
resources. All compensation changes should be viewed through the lens
of maintaining the strength of the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
recommend to the Secretary of Defense to mitigate the effect of such
costs on the DOD top-line?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with our healthcare
leadership in the Department to examine every opportunity to assure
military beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible
while managing cost growth and to provide that advice to the Secretary
of Defense.
Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
the costs of military health care?
Answer. I believe to control the costs of military health care, the
Department needs to continue to evaluate all possibilities including
infrastructure costs, provider payments, administrative costs, and the
benefit structure. If confirmed, I would examine the costs of the
direct care facilities, determining where efficiencies can be gained
and investing wisely in infrastructure requirements. I would look at
the efficiencies in procuring healthcare services in the civilian
market, I would look for ways to streamline administrative functions to
minimize duplication efforts, and, finally I would evaluate the benefit
structure to see where reasonable changes could occur.
personnel and entitlement costs
Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
entitlement spending continue to grow and is becoming an ever
increasing portion of the DOD budget. In order to combat this trend,
the Department is recommending that Congress establish a commission
with ``BRAC-like authority'' to conduct a comprehensive review of the
military retirement benefit ``in the context of total military
compensation''.
What do you think the charter of this Commission should focus on,
and do you agree that in this context the military retirement benefit
should include retiree health care and survivor benefits?
Answer. Military retirement is an enormous, complex, and sensitive
area, which includes disability retirements and the Survivor Benefit
Plan. I believe an independent, BRAC-like Commission is the best
vehicle to explore possible alternatives to the current system.
Healthcare is a very different, separate area, and I understand the
Department already has proposed other changes to the healthcare system.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the
Department's healthcare proposals, and at this time would not recommend
inserting healthcare into the charter of the Commission.
Question. Do you agree that in the event reforms are enacted that
the retirement benefits of current servicemembers should be
grandfathered and, if so, what is the soonest that substantial savings
would be realized by the Department?
Answer. I believe Secretary Panetta phrased it best when he said,
``With any proposed changes to the retirement system, current members
should be grandfathered.'' Assuming we grandfather current members, we
would expect to see modest savings in the near term after
implementation. The greatest savings would take effect in the later
years as the proportion of the force covered by any proposed, new
system increases.
Question. What steps has the Department taken to evaluate the
military system of compensation and benefits, and should this
commission also consider compensation and benefits reform?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department is evaluating changes
to the military compensation system, and is focusing first on military
retirement. I believe the Department has been conducting an internal
review to identify and evaluate retirement alternatives. If Congress
establishes an independent commission to review military retirement as
requested by the Administration, if confirmed I will ensure the
Department will provide the Commission with a formal proposal.
Following the review of military retirement, the Department plans to
continue its comprehensive review of military compensation to ensure it
maintains the Nation's All-Volunteer Force in the most cost conscious
manner. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress in
considering potential military retirement system alternatives as well
as other possible compensation and benefits reforms.
Question. Is the Department currently evaluating the military
system of compensation and benefits, or should this commission also
consider compensation and benefits reform?
Answer. I understand the Department is evaluating changes to the
military compensation system as a whole, and is focusing first on
military retirement. Following the review of military retirement, I
believe the Department plans to continue its comprehensive review of
military compensation to ensure we maintain the Nation's all volunteer
force in the most cost conscious manner. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with Congress in considering other compensation and benefits
reforms. At this time, however, I do not believe it is appropriate to
insert additional compensation and benefits reform into the charter for
the Commission.
Question. What actions do you believe can be taken to control the
rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
Answer. I am aware that an increasing proportion of the
Department's resources are devoted to personnel-related costs. I
believe it is imperative to remember when we discuss ``personnel
costs'' that our actions affect the lives of our servicemembers and
their families. Moreover, our compensation system should aim to ensure
we can continue to recruit and retain a high-quality All-Volunteer
Force.
I believe the Department must balance its responsibilities to our
servicemembers, to the Nation, and to the taxpayers. We must be ready
to fulfill our mission, while using our resources wisely. As such, I
believe it is appropriate to periodically review the military
compensation system. I understand the Department's leadership has
already started down this path, and if confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Department and Congress on this issue.
I understand the Department's review of the military retirement
system is in progress, and after the Department provides input to the
Commission, I expect the Department's comprehensive review will
continue to other parts of the compensation and benefits system.
mental health
Question. Senior military leaders increasingly recognize the need
to reduce the stigma for military personnel and their families and
veterans in seeking mental health care.
If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in expanding the
breadth of this message to military personnel and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support ongoing Department efforts to
combat stigma and increase help-seeking behavior among servicemembers,
their families, and affected civilians. The Services are currently
heavily engaged in this effort. However, I am prepared to provide the
Service Chiefs with whatever resources are necessary to expand the
breadth of the outreach efforts. I fully support the Department's
efforts to improve health and mental healthcare services, and reduce
the stigma of mental healthcare for our men and women in uniform, their
families, and affected civilians.
suicide prevention-readiness
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services has
increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that
analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to
help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase
the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?
Answer. Suicide is a difficult, ongoing issue across the Services
and is deserving of continued commander and senior leader attention. I
believe the Department must support a culture to promote health and
resiliency. This requires both military and civilian leaders throughout
the ranks to provide the requisite support. If confirmed, I will
partner with the Services to ensure suicide prevention is emphasized in
training at all levels and to ensure necessary access to care. I will
focus on finding best practices and using them to provide guidance from
which the Services can operate their suicide prevention programs across
the total force.
Question. What is your understanding of the action that OSD is
taking in response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data in
Chapter 3 in particular?
Answer. Chapter 3 focuses on ``The Lost Art of Leadership in
Garrison'' and discusses the challenges of an overall increase in high
risk behavior, the fragmentation of programs designed to address the
high risk behavior, and the atrophy of garrison leadership skills over
the past decade. Although most of the recommendations were derived from
Army-specific data, some recommendations have applied broadly to the
other Services. It is my understanding that the Services have since
strengthened leadership involvement at all levels. Examples include
emphasis on the commander's role in creating a positive command climate
and encouraging help-seeking behaviors specifically aimed at reducing
the stigma associated with receiving behavioral healthcare. I am also
told that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness is leading a collaborative effort across the Department
to implement the recommendations contained in the DOD Task Force
Report. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Service and other
partners on this issue.
readiness responsibilities
Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness certain
responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that
affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel
readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under
Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in ensuring military
readiness, including materiel readiness?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel & Readiness oversees both the policy for and the
monitoring of military readiness for the Secretary. This includes the
oversight of civilian and military training and education, personnel
and medical readiness, and the analysis of broad mission assessments
from the combatant commanders regarding the readiness of key units in
support of the Secretary's deployment decisions in execution of the
National Military Strategy.
As the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics oversees material readiness, and material readiness is an
important part of overall military readiness, if confirmed, I will work
closely with my Department counterpart on items specific to the
management of material readiness.
Question. What are the most critical objectives to improve
readiness reporting and monitoring of the military forces, and if
confirmed, how would you work with the Military Departments as well as
other OSD offices to achieve them?
Answer. After more than a decade of conflict and given a new
defense strategy, improving the readiness of our force for the range of
missions envisioned in that strategy is critically important. This will
require increased training efforts as the current operations tempo
improves, as well as efforts to ensure units have the people and
equipment they need to be mission-ready. Secretary Panetta committed
that even as the force becomes smaller, it will be a ready and agile
force. If confirmed, I would see my role as providing assessments to
the Secretary of how the force is doing in this regard, along with
recommendations of how to improve or mitigate any negative trends we
might observe.
To do so, I would intend to work with the Services to ensure such
accurate and timely readiness assessments of our military forces and to
implement any mitigations that may be needed. Only with accurate
assessments can the Department effectively plan and manage forces. If
confirmed, I would intend to partner strongly with the Services, the
Joint Staff, and other OSD partners.
Question. Do you believe the current readiness reporting system
accurately shows if our forces are not only ``ready'' but ``ready for
what''?
Answer. I believe the intent of the current readiness reporting
system is to provide a holistic view of the Services' ability to
accomplish those missions assigned by the President and the Secretary
of Defense. This is a complex undertaking though and currents reporting
can be improved. The Defense Readiness Reporting System directly
addresses the ``ready for what'' question by focusing on mission
capability. It assesses the readiness of all organizations throughout
the Department to perform their assigned missions as well as the
individual tasks that support those missions. If confirmed, I will work
with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD partners to continue
improvements in readiness reporting.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) with
respect to the Global Response Force?
Answer. I understand the responsibility of the USD(P&R) is to
provide policy guidance regarding the readiness monitoring for the
units that comprise the Global Readiness Force, and in collaboration
with the Joint Staff, identify readiness deficiencies and recommend
mitigation options for the Secretary.
end strength reductions
Question. Last year, the Department announced plans to reduce the
active-duty end strengths of the Army and Marine Corps. This year, the
Department has laid out a new defense strategy that will call for even
deeper cuts to the ground forces, proposing eventual end strengths of
490,000 for the Army and 182,000 for the Marine Corps over the next 5
years.
What is your understanding of the Army's and Marine Corps' ability
to meet these goals without forcing out many soldiers and marines who
have served in combat over the past 10 years with the implicit promise
that they could compete for career service and retirement?
Answer. These reductions in force, while appropriate to the new
strategy, inherently come with challenges for separating servicemembers
and their families. I support Secretary Panetta's commitment to
accomplish needed reductions in as humane and supportive a way as
possible. I believe the Department's policy of using voluntary measures
before considering involuntary separations is the right one. My
understanding is that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) is working with the Services to ensure they
provide servicemembers with as much advanced notice as possible of
their Service's drawdown plans and the likelihood of their being
retained. In addition, the Department is working with partners in the
Departments of Veterans Affairs and Labor to further strengthen the
Transition Assistance Program for any separating servicemembers.
I believe programmed reductions must be carefully and deliberately
managed to preserve force readiness. I am aware the Services have a
range of authorities to affect these reductions. If confirmed, I would
work with the Services and Congress to identify any additional
authorities that might prove beneficial in handling these reductions
effectively.
Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and
retiring servicemembers are as prepared as they can be as they enter a
struggling economy?
Answer. I understand the Department's current Transition Assistance
Program (TAP) is in place to help separating and retiring
servicemembers in their transition to civilian life, to include
preparation for a successful post-military career. The program consists
of pre-separation counseling; an employment workshop conducted by the
Department of Labor; a benefits briefing provided by the VA; and one-
on-one counseling based on individual servicemember requirements. I am
aware the Department is expanding and enhancing TAP to maximize the
career-readiness of servicemembers, and is working with other agencies
in developing a clear path to civilian employment; admission into and
success in an academic or technical training program; or successful
start-up of an independent business entity or non-profit organization.
The Department's efforts here are furthered by congressional action in
the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011.
Question. How fast can the Army and Marine Corps responsibly and
fairly reduce end strength while maintaining the integrity and
readiness of combat units?
Answer. I understand the Department expects to draw down the Army
from 562,000 to 490,000 by the end of fiscal year 2017, and the Marine
Corps from over 202,100 to 182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016. My
understanding is that the respective Services believe these drawdowns
can be achieved on these timelines. In making the forces leaner, the
Department should take care to learn the lessons of previous drawdowns.
Our military must also still be able to respond to any large-scale
mobilization against us. This will require careful consideration by
Services about their organizational structures and their ability to
reconstitute and mobilize forces. These reductions must be done with an
eye toward those who have already served in combat and for those with
families who have experienced extended separations, by maximizing
voluntary programs and using the full range of authorities provided by
Congress.
Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional
force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress provided
in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department may require
legislative authorities that allow targeted reductions and maximum
flexibility in achieving reductions both in the Active and Reserve
components. If confirmed, I will quickly become familiar with the
proposals under consideration and work with Congress to address any
concerns.
medical personnel recruiting and retention
Question. DOD continues to face significant shortages in critically
needed military medical personnel in both the Active and Reserve
components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support
requirements will compound the already serious challenges faced in
recruitment and retention of military medical, dental, nurse, and
behavioral health personnel.
What is your understanding of the shortages of health care
professionals in DOD and the sufficiency of the plans to meet
recruiting and retention goals?
Answer. Regarding military healthcare, it is my understanding that
Health Professions Officer strength is at 100 percent overall, but the
Department does have shortage specialties. Specialties of concern below
90 percent are Cardiothoracic Surgery, Critical Care Trauma Medicine,
Neurosurgery, Nuclear Medicine, and Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery. If
confirmed, one of my goals will be to improve the recruitment and
retention of health professional specialties which currently fall below
manning requirements. Congress has already given the Department broad
authority to provide special and incentive pays for all health
professional officers within title 37 U.S.C. section 335,
``Consolidation of Special Pay and Bonus Authority.'' I also believe
there is an increased need for civilian providers within the military
direct healthcare system and the Department must remain competitive to
recruit from the civilian labor market.
Question. What legislative and policy initiatives, including
bonuses and special pays, do you think may be necessary to ensure that
the Military Services can continue to meet medical support
requirements?
Answer. I believe with ``Consolidation of Special Pays and Bonus
Authority'' title 37 U.S.C. section 335 that the Department has
adequate tools to address Health Professions Officer retention and
recruitment issues in both Active Duty and the Reserves. If confirmed,
I will continue to support these programs and adjust based on
recruitment and retention needs. I remain in strong support of the
Health Professions Scholarship Program that provides the majority of
our physicians and dentists.
military accessions vital to national interest program
Question. Under the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest
(MAVNI) program, the Services may recruit non-permanent resident aliens
who have certain high-demand medical or linguistic skills for service
in the Armed Forces, and offer them an expedited path to citizenship.
Although the Services have enjoyed extraordinary recruiting and
retention in recent years, some specialties remain under strength.
While limited in scope, the program appeared successful and worthy of
expansion, but was halted after the initial quota was reached so the
Department could assess its utility and perform a security review.
What is the status of the MAVNI program and the security review?
Answer. It is my understanding that recruiting under MAVNI began in
February 2009, for a one-year pilot that recruited 1,000 personnel. The
program was extended in August 2010; however, implementation was
delayed pending development of directed enhanced security screening
protocols. The screening protocols were signed on February 16, and a
package is being finalized to extend the pilot for a 2-year period.
Question. When will the program be restarted?
Answer. I believe the Department is in the process of completing a
2-year extension of the MAVNI pilot program and anticipate that it will
restart by summer 2012 for a full 2-year pilot program.
medical marijuana
Question. What is your assessment on the need for legitimate
scientific study of the efficacy of medical marijuana in alleviating
the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by
servicemembers and veterans?
Answer. I would support any scientifically rigorous, lawful
research efforts that have the potential to help improve the lives of
patients who have been adversely affected by post-traumatic stress
disorder.
mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves - ra
Question. Over the past 10 years, the National Guard and Reserves
have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since
World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures
for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening
and medical readiness, monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited
transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access
to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management
policies and systems have been characterized in the past as
``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely
affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
do problems still exist?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department has focused on
increasing the alert and notification times prior to mobilization; the
Department needs to ensure it provides predictability to
servicemembers, their families, and employers. If confirmed, I would
continue the efforts of the Department to monitor this issue closely,
as we know that predictability is a major factor for all those
affected. I believe strongly that National Guard and Reserve personnel
deserve first-class mobilization and demobilization procedures, health
screening, and transition assistance programs.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
Answer. It is my understanding the most significant enduring
changes are in the implementation of service force generation plans,
which have been created to provide a defined cycle to prepare Reserve
component units for employment as an operational force. This enables
units to train for a mission prior to mobilization and deploy and
redeploy on a predictable timeline. I believe there is still work to be
done in projecting force requirements by combatant commands to avoid
mission and personnel requirement changes just prior to mobilization.
Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review existing authorities, to
include those just enacted but not yet implemented, to ensure the
Department has appropriate authorities in light of the role of the
Guard and Reserves in our force deployment plans. I know the Department
appreciates the authorities and support this committee has provided.
enhanced reserve mobilization authorities
Question. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress authorized the
Service Secretaries to mobilize units and individuals in support of
preplanned combatant command missions for up to 365 consecutive days.
In the new defense strategy announced in January, the President and
Secretary of Defense have stated that while conventional ground forces
will be reduced, special forces will be increased over the next 5
years, and a key component of the new strategy seems to be the
establishment of a rotational presence in Europe, the Middle East, and
anywhere U.S. interests are threatened. Some in the press have called
this a ``lily pad'' approach, and it potentially dovetails with an
operational view of the Reserve components.
What is your assessment of the operational reserve and how it will
fit into this new paradigm of smaller, more lethal forces rotating into
and out of many locations of strategic interest?
Answer. I believe we currently have the best trained and equipped
Reserve component in history. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines of today's Reserve Force are highly educated, enthusiastic, and
a great many have either volunteered to serve or continued serving
since the outbreak of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Services to ensure the Department preserves
this hard earned experience, and enables the Reserve component to
perform missions in strategic locations in support of national
objectives.
Question. What is your understanding of the appropriate size and
makeup of the Reserve components in light of the new defense strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Services to
ensure we have sized all elements of the total force--Active, Reserve,
National Guard, and civilian--appropriately to accomplish the new
defense strategy in the most efficient manner. In order for the
Department to meet the demands of the National Security and Defense
Strategy, as well as meet the constraints of reduced budgets, we will
need to ensure the optimal use of our total force.
I believe the Reserve component will continue to play an
instrumental role in maintaining the superiority of our Nation's forces
as part of their Service's force generation models and with appropriate
funding.
medical and dental readiness of the reserves
Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
personnel remains an issue of significant concern to the committee, and
shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved
policy oversight and accountability.
If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs' efforts to streamline and
standardize medical readiness screening and reporting. Every effort
should be made to improve efficiencies for cost containment. I concur
that an electronic solution that integrates the Reserve communities
with the active allowing for standardized reporting would improve
immediate information access and provide much needed efficiency.
Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to
produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?
Answer. It is my understanding that there is an impressive team of
Preventive Health clinical experts who are crafting a multi-discipline,
multi-community approach for the Department in collaboration with the
National Prevention Strategy of the Office of the Surgeon General. The
Department's effort addresses many of the core national preventive
health issues identified by the Department of Health and Human
Services. The Department's participation on these working groups aligns
with the National strategy to address our military community including
the military families and civilian workforce that supports DOD. If
confirmed, I would support these efforts.
military quality of life
Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
child care, education, employment support, health care, morale, welfare
and recreation services, especially as DOD's budget declines.
How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top
priorities for the Armed Forces?
Answer. I believe quality of life efforts impact the recruitment
and retention of military personnel and are key to maintaining the All-
Volunteer Force. A servicemember's satisfaction with various aspects of
military life as well as the servicemember's family experience
influences members' decision to remain in service. In his testimony
before this committee, Secretary Panetta said, ``One of the guiding
principles in our decisionmaking process was to keep faith with them
and their families. So we're protecting family assistance programs,
we're protecting basic benefits, we're sustaining important investments
in the budget to try to assist our troops with their needs and the
needs of their families.'' If confirmed, I would review how effectively
our programs meet the needs of servicemembers and their families, and
ensure that they are contributing positively to recruitment and
retention.
Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
qualify of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
Answer. If confirmed, I would aggressively pursue the Department's
priorities to promote the well-being and resilience of servicemembers
and their families. I would focus on understanding the needs of our
force and their families and try to expand assistance such as access to
counseling, fitness opportunities, and childcare support to help
minimize stress on the force. The Department leadership should work
together with advocacy groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps
and reduce overlaps in programs and to communicate effectively to
ensure that families know how to access available support when they
need it.
family support
Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced?
Answer. In his testimony before this committee, Secretary Panetta
said, ``One of the guiding principles in our decisionmaking process was
that we must try to keep faith with our troops and their families. For
that reason, we've determined to protect family assistance programs, to
sustain these important investments in this budget that serve our
troops and their families and continue to make efforts to ensure that
these programs are responsive to their needs.''
If confirmed, I would make family readiness issues a priority. I
would work with the Secretary and the Military Services to support,
prioritize, and appropriately resource quality physical and mental
healthcare, spouse career assistance, childcare, other elements of
dependent support, and education needs.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and anticipated reductions
in end strength?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's current
approach to identify and address family readiness needs, to gather
information from the Services, commands, servicemembers and families,
professional organizations, and researchers about how to best prepare
families for rebasing, BRAC, deployments and other stressful aspects of
military life.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and
family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department's Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program is properly focused and funded to address the
issues faced by reservists, geographically dispersed Active Duty, their
families and immediate support network. The program's proactive and
preventive scope provides information, access, referrals, and outreach
to military members and those who support them thanks to Congress for
continued support. Further efforts must be underwritten by a
coordinated, community-based network of care encompassing the
Department, VA, State, local, and private providers.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
enhance family support?
Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of
flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our
servicemembers and their families, whether they live on, near, or far
from military installations.
access to health care
Question. One of the major concerns for military family members is
access to health care. Military spouses tell us that the health care
system is inundated, and those stationed in more remote areas may not
have access to adequate care.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure complete access
to health care for the families of servicemembers?
Answer. I agree that access to care for family members is an
important concern and, if confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate
access to care is a key feature of our TRICARE program and will
continually explore ways to ensure all beneficiaries are provided the
appropriate level of care within the established TRICARE Access to Care
Standards.
department of defense schools in conus
Question. Some have questioned the continuing need for DOD-operated
schools for military dependent children within the Continental United
States (CONUS).
In light of the administration's request for additional Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) authorities and fiscal constraints,
should DOD should establish or update its criteria for the continued
operation of DOD schools within CONUS?
Answer. No, at this time I don't believe the criteria require
change. The law provides the Secretary of Defense the authority to
determine whether to establish DOD Domestic Dependent Elementary and
Secondary Schools (section 2164 of title 10, U.S.C.). In exercising
that discretion, the Secretary must consider the criteria established
by law and any other criteria the Secretary deems relevant in making
such a determination. The final decision about the establishment of a
DOD Domestic school rests with the Secretary.
In these times of fiscal pressures and significant high stress
periods for our military families, I believe the Department should
continue to weigh the cost and benefits associated with operating some
or all or the DOD Domestic Schools. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the committee on this important issue.
Question. If so, and if confirmed, how would you approach this
task?
Answer. While I do not believe the criteria should be updated, if
confirmed, I will review all DOD schools programs and ensure we provide
as much stability as possible to military dependent children.
office of community support for military families with special needs
Question. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Congress required the
establishment of an Office of Community Support for Military Families
with Special Needs within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness. The purpose of this office is to enhance
and improve DOD support for military families with special needs,
whether educational or medical in nature.
In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of
Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs?
Answer. If confirmed, services for military families with special
needs will be a priority for me. I believe the priorities of this
office include medical and educational programs to strengthen military
families with special needs. I would support the critical efforts of
this office to establish consistent policy and monitor its
implementation across the Services. I would identify programs already
in existence that can provide special services to military families. An
example I am familiar with from the Air Force is the Exceptional Family
Member Program Coordinating Committees. These organizations operate
within the Air Force's Community Action Information Boards and address
community based solutions to any gaps in services for special needs
families.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those
military families with special needs dependents so they are able to get
the support they need?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure increased communication
efforts to reach families with special needs through the use of
Webinars, social media outlets, base newspapers, commissaries and
exchanges, childcare centers and youth facilities, Department schools
and a variety of Department and services websites. In addition, I would
emphasize collaboration with civilian community resources outside the
gate to enhance the resources that the Services provide. Public school
systems, early intervention programs and non-profit organizations such
as Easter Seals and the March of Dimes provide invaluable, distinctive
resources that are not offered by the Services.
voluntary education programs
Question. The Department established the Military Spouse Career
Advancement Accounts (MyCAA) program, a demonstration project that
provides military spouses with funds through ``career advancement
accounts'' to help enable them to pursue portable careers. In February
2010, the Department became overwhelmed by the number of program
applicants, subsequently ran out of funds, and then temporarily halted
the program. The program has now restarted, but the funds, as well as
the number of spouses who would be eligible for the program, will be
more limited.
What is your understanding of the current focus and objectives of
the program?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department continues to
support MyCAA, but has shaped the program to target the spouses of
those members most in need of additional assistance. From my
understanding, as part of the larger, holistic Spouse Education and
Career Opportunities (SECO) program, the MyCAA program now offers
spouses of E1-E5, O1-O2, and W1-W2 servicemembers the opportunity of up
to $4,000 for education, a license, or a credential necessary for
employment in a portable career. The objective of the MyCAA program is
to ensure that these mostly younger military spouses have opportunities
to pursue and sustain a career while supporting their servicemembers.
Through the SECO program, spouses can obtain professional education and
career counseling that includes interest, aptitude, and skill testing,
information on education and licenses and projected career field growth
and salary levels required in specific occupations.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your objectives for the MyCAA
program and other spouse employment initiatives or programs?
Answer. If confirmed, my objective would be to assist, support, and
empower military spouses in making informed decisions by offering an
opportunity to obtain comprehensive information on high-growth, high-
demand, portable occupations. This should include occupational
information on education, license and credential requirements, how to
access other Federal, State, and private opportunities for financial
assistance in achieving these requirements, as well as understanding
earnings potential. It should also include the recent initiative by the
First Lady and Dr. Biden to encourage States to accept licenses from
other States for the spouses of servicemembers. If confirmed, I would
also promote the outstanding pipeline of talent that military spouses
represent to America's employers. Military spouses are talented,
diverse, and motivated.
Question. The Department continues to seek ways to improve
oversight of its tuition assistance programs, including standardizing
eligibility criteria among the Services and requiring all schools who
accept tuition assistance funding, whether for online courses or on-
post, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department
which will, among other things, subject online schools to Departmental
audits. We have heard concerns from some in the academic community that
certain provisions of the MOU infringe on institutions' academic
freedom.
What is the status of the MOU, and what will happen to
servicemembers enrolled in schools that refuse to sign?
Answer. It is my understanding the MOU, originally to be effective
January 1, 2012, was extended until March 30, 2012, at the request of
Congress. I also understand that DOD is collaborating with institutions
of higher learning to reach a resolution and will shortly have an
updated MOU for signature. Approximately 95 percent of current students
who use Tuition Assistance are enrolled in institutions which have
signed the MOU. It is my understanding that if servicemembers are
enrolled at an institution which will still not sign the revised MOU,
the Services will assist them to find schools that have the same
program and will transfer credits already earned. The Services will
also provide counseling to assist in identifying additional or
alternative sources of funding if the servicemember wishes to remain
enrolled in that school.
Question. What is your assessment of the tuition assistance program
in light of the needs of the Services and the current budget
environment?
Answer. It is my understanding, despite budget reductions, the
Department remains committed to providing servicemembers with support
programs and resources that empower them to address the challenges of
military life and prepare them for success when they return to civilian
life.
Question. What is your view the Post-9/11 GI Bill as a viable and
fair alternative for servicemembers and spouses if the military tuition
assistance and MyCAA benefits are eliminated or reduced?
Answer. Congress provided a significant benefit with the passage
for the Post 9-11 GI Bill. I do not believe the Post-9/11 GI Bill is a
viable alternative to Tuition Assistance or MyCAA because it is
designed for different purposes. Although currently serving members can
use the Post-9/11 GI Bill, it is better designed to provide financial
support for education and housing so prior servicemembers can attend
school in a full (or near full) time capacity. The Tuition Assistance
program is designed to assist current servicemembers in obtaining off
duty education to gain the knowledge and skill they need for their
military careers and prepare for success when they return to civilian
life.
The Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits are not available for transfer to a
spouse until after 6 years of service. Therefore, the majority of the
MyCAA spouses would not be eligible for the Post-9/11 GI Bill transfer.
The MyCAA program is designated to serve spouses of junior
servicemembers.
Question. What is your view of proposed changes to the so-called
90/10 rule that would require academic institutions to derive no more
than 85 percent of their revenue from Federal sources, including DOD
tuition assistance and VA GI Bill funding?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this
issue. It is my understanding that the Department does not currently
have an objection, as long as the legislation allows for a 2-year
period for a school to return to compliance.
medical research programs
Question. What do you see as the highest priority medical research
investment areas for DOD?
Answer. I agree with the Department's current research priorities
to improve the diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of wounded
warriors with emphasis on Traumatic Brain Injury, the psychological
health and well-being of military personnel and their families
including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and suicide prevention, pain
management, eye and other sensory system trauma, far forward hemorrhage
control and resuscitation, and improved prosthetics.
Question. How will you assess the amount of investment made in
these research areas to determine if they are sufficient to meet DOD
goals and requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the current research portfolio
to ensure it prioritizes and resources research appropriate to the
requirements of the Department.
Question. How will you ensure that DOD medical research efforts are
well coordinated with similar research programs within the private
sector, academia, the Services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, the VA, and the National Institutes of Health?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support coordination efforts to
ensure research is conducted jointly, building on, and partnering with
industry, academia, and other government agencies to ensure the
greatest benefit to our servicemembers. I am aware that joint program
reviews of medical research are conducted with DOD, VA, and National
Institutes of Health scientists to ensure our research reflects the
best interests of our servicemembers and leverages the Federal medical
research investment.
Question. How will you ensure that new medical technologies
(including drugs and vaccines) are independently and adequately tested
before their use by DOD organizations and personnel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work through the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs to ensure the Department continues to
apply the highest standards of the Food and Drug Administration to
ensure new medical technologies, drugs, and vaccines are safe and
effective before they are adopted for use in the Department.
Question. There have been growing privacy and security concerns
raised about the use of online social networks for medical research
purposes.
How will you ensure that the increasing use of social networking
media for medical research purposes will protect the privacy and
security of patients?
Answer. If confirmed, I would enforce the Department's policy,
which states that the rights and welfare of human subjects in research
supported or conducted by Department components will be protected. This
protection is based on the ethical principle of respect for persons and
encompasses requirements to obtain informed consent and to do no harm.
In application of this policy, I would support the Department's
adherence to the applicable statutory provisions for human protections
in research.
Question. What are your biggest concerns related to the DOD medical
research enterprise?
Answer. Although I do not have detailed knowledge of the entire
research portfolio, I am especially interested in the responsiveness of
the research program to medical readiness and our servicemembers'
medical needs. We must assure the Department has a balanced investment
in medical science and technology and in medical advanced development
leading to timely translation into clinical practice in the Military
Health System. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the
medical research enterprise.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
including Active Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs
(particularly in view of the Secretary's efficiency initiative) and, if
confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?
Answer. It is my understanding the benefits of strong MWR programs
are critical to esprit de corps, stress reduction, and personal health
and well-being. Although there are very extensive installation MWR
facilities and programs, I believe there is an immediate challenge in
ensuring that MWR programs for our deployed forces meet their needs,
especially free access to the Internet to communicate with family and
friends back home and fitness and recreation activities to keep forces
fit to fight. Recreation support for our wounded warriors is also
critical. In the longer term, I believe the Department needs to
understand what programs are valued by servicemembers and their
families in order to make wise investments. In addition, the MWR
customers need to be involved in expressing their needs and
satisfaction with our programs and policies.
commissary and military exchange systems
Question. Commissary and military exchange systems are significant
quality-of-life components for members of the Active and Reserve Forces
and their families.
What is your view of the need for modernization of business
policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems, and what
do you view as the most promising avenues for change to achieve
modernization goals?
Answer. I understand that commissary and exchange programs and
policies must continue to evolve to meet the needs and expectations of
our changing force and a changing marketplace. If confirmed, I will
work to become more familiar with the challenges in this area and look
forward to working with the committee on these issues.
Question. What is your view of the proposals by some to consolidate
or eliminate Commissaries and Exchanges in certain areas where they are
underused or duplicative of services readily available at reasonable
cost in the community?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review any proposals aimed at
reducing overhead, which may include closing underutilized locations or
eliminating duplicative services. I recognize that commissary and
exchange programs are an important element of the servicemembers'
compensation package and contribute to the quality of life of military
personnel and their families, including our retired members. Moving
forward, I believe we need to ensure the commissaries and exchanges
provide the necessary support for today's total military force, while
economizing operations. If confirmed, I would look forward to working
with the committee on these issues.
Question. In the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005,
Congress required the Secretary of Defense to establish an executive
governing body for the commissary and exchange systems to ensure the
complementary operation of the two systems.
What is your understanding of the purpose and composition of the
executive governing body?
Answer. I am aware the Department established the DOD Executive
Resale Board as the governing body to provide advice to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness regarding the
complementary operation of the commissary and exchange systems. I have
been informed that the Board works to resolve issues and has been
instrumental in pursuing matters of mutual benefit to the elements of
the military resale system. The Board is chaired by the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, and
members include both the senior military officers and civilians who
oversee and manage the commissary and exchanges systems.
Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to the
governing body, and what would your expectations be for its role?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Board would continue to
meet regularly to review operational areas of mutual interest to the
commissary and exchange systems.
civilian personnel systems
Question. Section 1113 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 provides
DOD with extensive personnel flexibilities for its civilian employees
that are not available to other agencies. In particular, section
9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as added by section 1113, directs the
Department to establish a new performance management system for all of
its employees. Section 9902(b) directs the Department to develop a
streamlined new hiring system that is designed to better fulfill DOD's
mission needs, produce high-quality applicants, and support timely
personnel decisions.
What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to implement the authority provided by section
1113?
Answer. I understand the Department and labor organizations that
represent the Department's employees have worked collaboratively over
18 months to design a performance management system and improved hiring
processes. The Department launched its ``New Beginnings'' pre-
decisional process effort in September 2010, which has culminated in a
comprehensive report from three design teams--performance management,
hiring flexibilities, and civilian workforce incentive fund--containing
over 100 pre-decisional proposals for Department leadership
consideration. If confirmed, I will support the work I understand is
underway to comply with the NDAA.
Question. Do you agree that DOD's civilian employee workforce plays
a vital role in the functioning of the Department?
Answer. Yes, the Department's civilian employee workforce plays an
instrumental role in the functioning of the Department as part of the
Total Force across a range of missions.
Question. What is your view of the personnel flexibilities provided
by section 1113?
Answer. I understand Congress provided these flexibilities to allow
the Department to better meet mission requirements by establishing a
new performance management system, redesigned hiring procedures, and a
civilian workforce incentive fund. I believe the Department's goal is
to establish a fair, credible, and transparent performance management
system with a continued focus on aligning Departmental and
organizational goals with individual job objectives. The Department is
also committed to ongoing hiring reform initiatives and efforts to
streamline the hiring process. If confirmed, I will support the work
that I understand is under way to develop these flexibilities.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
these flexibilities in a manner that best meets the needs of the
Department and promotes the quality of the Department's civilian
workforce?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would make it my priority to implement
those flexibilities that would facilitate accomplishing the
Department's missions. The Department has found great value in the
predecisional process involving union and non-union employees. My
understanding is that design team recommendations will be deliberated
to fully assess functionality, costs, potential benefits, and legal
viability, and will continue to involve employees through their labor
representatives as the Department moves forward on particular
recommendations and decisions about the performance management and
hiring processes.
Question. Section 1112 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the
Department to develop a Defense Civilian Leadership Program to recruit,
train, and advance a new generation of civilian leaders for the
Department. Section 1112 provides the Department with the full range of
authorities available for demonstration programs under section 4703 of
title 5, U.S.C., including the authority to compensate participants on
the basis of qualifications, performance, and market conditions. These
flexibilities are not otherwise available to DOD.
What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to implement the authority provided by section
1112?
Answer. I understand that the Department has designed a new
leadership program and has implemented the first pilot. If confirmed, I
will fully engage to ensure the new program meets the intent of the
NDAA authority.
Question. Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly
qualified civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its
acquisition, technical, business, and financial communities?
Answer. Yes. I completely agree that recruiting highly qualified
civilian personnel both in mission critical occupations, such as
acquisition and finance, and in leadership positions across the
Department is essential to mission success.
Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process
been successful in recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs?
Answer. Although I believe the Department currently has a highly
talented workforce, I wholeheartedly support the initiatives to
streamline and reform the civilian hiring process. While I understand
the Department is making progress, there is still work to be done in
this area. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department actively engages
in civilian hiring reform initiatives and aggressively pursues
continued improvements, in consultation with Congress.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the
needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department's
civilian workforce?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will make it a priority to implement
the authority provided by section 1112. The Department recognizes the
need for an improved leader development model to attract, retain, and
develop civilian leaders to support pipeline readiness and enhance
bench strength. If confirmed, I will assess the outcomes of pilot
programs designed in support of section 1112 to ensure final
implementation of a model necessary to provide the next generation of
innovative leaders with the technical competence to meet the future
leadership needs of the Department.
human capital planning
Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section
1108 of the NDAA for 2010, requires the Secretary of Defense to develop
and update in every even-numbered year a strategic human capital plan
that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's civilian
workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. Section 115b
requires that the plan include chapters specifically addressing the
Department's senior management, functional, and technical workforce and
the Department's acquisition workforce.
Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies
gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key
step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and
capabilities needed to meet future challenges?
Answer. Yes. I believe such planning well positions the Department
to acquire, develop, and maintain the workforce it needs to meet
current and future mission challenges.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements
for a strategic human capital plan under section 115b?
Answer. At this time, I have no recommendations. If confirmed, I
would review the strategic workforce planning that the Department has
conducted over the past years against the section 115b requirements, as
well as the current workforce planning approach, to determine if any
changes may be needed to improve the Department's overall workforce
planning effort. I look forward to working with the committee to this
end.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies
with these requirements?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would ensure the Department has a
robust strategic workforce plan in place as required by section 115b.
Question. Since the time that the Department's most recent
strategic human capital plan was issued, its civilian workforce plans
have been significantly altered by the changed budget environment and
extensive efficiencies initiatives.
What role do you believe human capital planning should play in
determining where reductions in the civilian workforce can be taken
with the lowest level of risk?
Answer. I believe that workforce plans should serve as a guide,
including specific strategies, for closing high-risk skill gaps. The
strategic workforce planning process can be a practical and crucial
tool for guiding workforce decisions necessitated by changing
strategies, budget constraints, and to prevent excessive or
irreversible reductions in any particular capability or competency. If
confirmed, I will monitor the strategic workforce planning process to
ensure comprehensive and sufficient plans are available to inform
civilian workforce reduction decisions.
Question. Would you agree that the strategic human capital plan
required by section 115b should be updated to more accurately reflect
the Department's current workforce plans and requirements?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department's biennial
strategic workforce plans under section 115b would be based on the
latest assessment of the Department's current workforce skills, based
on existing and future workload and requirements. Forecasts for the
Department's workforce must be based on validated mission requirements
and workload, both current and projected.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that civilian workforce levels are determined on the basis of careful
planning and long-term requirements, rather than by arbitrary goals or
targets?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect Department decisions on
workforce shaping to align to the Department's long term strategic
workforce plan, with the understanding that short-term exceptions may
be needed due to emerging dynamics in the budget environment. Forecasts
for the Department's workforce must be based on validated mission
requirements and workload, both current and projected, and these
forecasts should inform any reductions in the civilian workforce.
balance between civilian employees and contractor employees
Question. In recent years, DOD has become increasingly reliant on
services provided by contractors. As a result of the explosive growth
in service contracts, contractors now play an integral role in the
performance of functions that were once performed exclusively by
government employees, including the management and oversight of weapons
programs, the development of policies, the development of public
relations strategies, and even the collection and analysis of
intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same
offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many
of the same functions as Federal employees.
Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees
and contractor employees is in the best interests of DOD?
Answer. The Department's ``sourcing'' of functions and work among
military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with
workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management
needs, as well as applicable laws and statute. I believe the current
workforce mix reflects the Department's current best judgment today on
how to balance operational needs and fiscal reality. I am committed to
ensuring the Department meets its statutory obligations to annually
review missions, functions, and workforce composition, including
reliance on contracted services, and to ensure the workforce is
appropriately balanced and aligned to our most critical priorities.
I value the support provided by private sector firms and recognize
contracted services are, and will continue to be, a vital source of
expertise, innovation, and support to the Department. However, I
believe we must be vigilant against excessive or inappropriate reliance
on contract support. This includes ensuring we maintain adequate
control and oversight of our missions and operations, as well as
growing critical capabilities internally.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that DOD is not excessively reliant on contractors to perform its basic
functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would execute my title 10 responsibilities
regarding reviews of contracted services and in-sourcing. Where
appropriate, I support in-sourcing as one tool by which to reduce
reliance on contracted services; ensure inherently government, closely
associated, or critical work is performed by government civilians or
military; maintain management control and oversight of key functions
and workload in support of our warfighter; and deliver services in the
most cost efficient manner possible.
Question. Section 2330a of title 10, U.S.C., requires DOD to
maintain an inventory of contract services. Section 321 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011 amended this provision to give the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness a key role in implementing this
provision.
What is your understanding of the current status of the
Department's efforts to implement the requirements of section 2330a?
Answer. I understand the Department submitted a plan to the
congressional defense committees in November 2011 that delineated both
short- and long-term steps to become fully compliant with the statutory
requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure the necessary steps are taken
to enable the Department to fully move forward with the implementation
of the requirements of section 2330a.
Question. What additional steps if any will you take, if confirmed,
to ensure that the Department fully implements the requirements of
section 2330a?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and
will fully support efforts delineated in the November 2011, plan
currently underway across the Department to increase visibility and
accountability of contracted services.
department of defense efficiency initiatives
Question. In May 2010, then-Secretary Gates launched an initiative
to strengthen and modernize our fighting forces by eliminating
inefficient or duplicative programs. In an August 16, 2010 memo to DOD
components, the Secretary directed twenty specific initiatives, many
involving military and civilian personnel and DOD contractors.
Secretary Panetta has included similar efficiency initiatives in the
Department's budget for fiscal year 2013.
What is your assessment of the impact that the implementation of
these initiatives has had, to date, on the military and civilian
workforces of DOD?
Answer. Secretary Panetta has continued Secretary Gates' initiative
to ensure the Department executes its defense strategy with the most
effective use of each defense dollar. This continues the efforts to
seek efficiencies throughout the Department's business operations. The
fiscal year 2012 initiatives are only now being implemented. In the
oversight process, all components are called upon to identify any
potential unintended consequences to overall mission capabilities and
unit readiness. My understanding is that this oversight will include
looking for any impacts to the military and civilian workforce and
ensuring adjustments to this workforce are linked to mission needs.
Question. Do you believe that any adjustments or modifications are
needed in the implementation of these initiatives to avoid adverse
impacts on the military or civilian workforces of the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to minimizing the
potential adverse impact on our dedicated uniformed and civil service
workforces. I would support efforts to more appropriately size our
workforce to meet our most pressing and critical priorities while
ensuring well-reasoned reductions based on workload requirements, risk
factors, and fiscal realities. If confirmed, I will look carefully for
any adverse impacts and make recommendations for adjustments that may
be necessary.
Question. What additional efficiencies if any, do you believe the
Department should undertake with regard to its military and civilian
workforces?
Answer. I believe the revised strategy of the Department, as well
as the need for increased fiscal constraint, demands constant
assessments of the Department's total force. If confirmed, I will fully
support ongoing Department efforts to identify additional efficiencies
through program and mission prioritization while preserving the
viability, capabilities, and competencies of our military and civilian
workforces. However, identifying specific workforce efficiencies beyond
those in the Department's fiscal year 2013 budget request would be
premature.
acquisition workforce
Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established
an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address
shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund provides a
continuing source of funds for this purpose.
Do you believe that the DOD acquisition workforce development fund
is still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes. I believe the fund is essential to continuing efforts
to strengthen the acquisition workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to ensure
that the money made available through the workforce development fund is
spent in a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition
workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Department
components to ensure initiatives supported by the fund are sound,
aligned with human capital strategies, and address highest priority
workforce capability and capacity needs.
Question. Section 872 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
codifies the authority for DOD to conduct an acquisition workforce
demonstration project and extends the authority to 2017.
Do you believe it would be in the best interest of the Department
to extend and expand the acquisition workforce demonstration project?
Answer. I believe as we continue efforts to strengthen the
acquisition workforce capability, it is critical we review and use all
authorities and tools available. I believe it is in the best interests
of the Department to expand on a thoughtful, deliberate basis while we
assess effectiveness. The Department is authorized by law up to 120,000
employee participants covered under acquisition demonstration projects.
It is my understanding that today the Department has 15,300 employees,
the majority of which returned to the demonstration project following
the repeal of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) as directed
by the NDAA for fiscal year 2010. With that now complete, several
acquisition organizations across all components have expressed interest
in participating in the project. Project participation is voluntary and
based on meeting acquisition related workforce demographic eligibility
criteria. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to ensure leaders are
oriented to the design and see the value of participation before they
socialize, train, and prepare their organizations.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to implement
section 872?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Department
components to ensure the Department is effectively positioned to expand
the Acquisition Demonstration project as necessary.
laboratory personnel demonstration program
Question. The laboratory demonstration program founded in section
342 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1995 as amended by section 1114 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2001, section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2008, section 1108 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009, and section 1105
of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, paved the way for personnel
management initiatives and new flexibilities at the defense
laboratories. These innovations have been adopted in various forms
throughout other DOD personnel systems.
If confirmed, will you fully implement the laboratory demonstration
program and the authorities under these provisions?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed I will work to fully implement the
laboratory demonstration program.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the directors of the
defense laboratories are provided the full range of personnel
flexibilities and authorities provided by Congress?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with the directors of the
defense laboratories to provide the full range of personnel
flexibilities.
dod scientific and technical personnel
Question. Recently, the Department issued guidance, as part of its
efficiencies initiatives, to centralize certain hiring authorities,
including for Highly Qualified Experts and Inter-Governmental Personnel
Assignment positions. Both are heavily used by the Department's
scientific and technical (S&T) enterprise, including the DOD's
laboratories and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The
benefit of these authorities is to use them to make rapid hiring
decisions for individuals in a highly competitive national S&T jobs
market. However, there is concern that the centralization of the
process will actually slow down the Services' and defense agencies'
ability to hire rapidly.
What will you do to ensure that these special hiring authorities
are not negatively impacted in terms of allowing DOD to rapidly hire
these types of highly specialized individuals?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department actively
engages in initiatives to streamline and reform the civilian hiring
system, to include efforts to ensure that the Department's processes
for using special hiring authorities are efficient in fulfilling
mission needs.
Question. Under the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest
(MAVNI) program, the Department is able to expedite U.S. citizenship
for foreign nationals that enlist in the military and have either
specialized medical or linguistic skills.
How could this program be extended to include, subject to
appropriate security reviews, highly skilled scientific and technical
foreign nationals--e.g., graduates of U.S. universities with doctorates
in fields DOD has a demand for and where less than half of these
graduates are U.S. citizens?
Answer. It is my understanding that 1,000 personnel were recruited
under MAVNI in 2009, as a one-year pilot. I understand the Department
is completing a 2-year extension of the MAVNI pilot program with a
restart by summer 2012 for a 2-year pilot program. If confirmed, I look
forward to learning more about this program and assessing what changes
may be appropriate. My understanding at this time is that the
Department believes the program is appropriately scoped.
foreign language proficiency
Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at
transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include
revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based
requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
both military and civilian personnel.
In your view, what should be the priorities of the Federal
Government to expanding the foreign language skills of civilian and
military personnel and improving coordination of foreign language
programs and activities among the Federal agencies?
Answer. I believe priorities for the Federal Government for
expanding foreign language skills should include: building a globally
competent workforce by integrating Federal programs to educate a larger
pool of U.S. citizens beginning in pre-school and continuing through
their educational journey in high school and college; expanding select
learning opportunities such as The Language Flagship Program that
builds a pool of highly skilled language professionals from which all
Federal Government agencies can recruit; and partnering with academia,
interagency and international partners to expand and strengthen the
pipeline for the Federal Government's workforce in critical foreign
languages.
I believe we can improve coordination among Federal agencies by
utilizing existing organizations such as the National Security
Education Board.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend for the current
set of DOD language proficiency programs?
Answer. I believe our goal is to increase the proficiency level of
personnel with languages that are most critical to our mission, as well
as to establish viable career paths for individuals with needed
language, regional, and cultural skills. If confirmed, I would continue
to support the Department's vision and ongoing efforts to
systematically identify and build language proficiency in a
comprehensive, collaborative, and holistic manner. Recognizing that the
Department cannot do this alone, if confirmed, I will focus on both
internal and external partnerships to build and institutionalize these
vital skills in our Nation.
gi bill benefits
Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act in 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill) that created enhanced
educational benefits for servicemembers who have served at least 90
days on active duty since September 11. The maximum benefit would
roughly cover the cost of a college education at any public university
in the country.
What unresolved issues related to implementation of the Post-9/11
GI Bill (e.g., coverage of additional military personnel) do you
consider most important to be addressed?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department has not identified
any additional unresolved issues. I believe the provisions of the Post-
9/11 Educational Assistance Improvement Act corrected any major issues
in the original statute that had the greatest impact on the Department.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of the Post-9/11 GI
Bill on recruiting and retention, including the provision of
transferability for continued service?
Answer. I believe it is too early to empirically determine the
impact of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on either recruiting or retention,
though anecdotally it appears to have positive effects.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to appearing before this
committee and other appropriate committees in support of our Nation's
servicemembers.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness?
Answer. If confirmed, I will appear before this committee, or
designated members of this committee, and provide information in
support of our Nation's servicemembers.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. If confirmed, I agree to provide documents, including
copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the
committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such documents.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan
personnel hiring authorities
1. Senator Hagan. Ms. Conaton, over the years, this committee has
realized that it is of critical national security importance that DOD
recruit and retain the Nation's best and brightest scientists and
engineers for its Research, Development, Test and Evaluation enterprise
to ensure we have the most technologically-advanced weapons systems. In
order to achieve this goal, this committee has developed a wide range
of personnel authorities aimed at providing greater flexibilities in
hiring and promoting this segment of DOD's workforce, given the stiff
competition that DOD faces with industry and other technology sectors.
Will you work with this committee to ensure these authorities are
exercised to the greatest possible extent?
Ms. Conaton. Yes, if confirmed, I will work with the committee to
ensure the full range of personnel authorities are exercised to the
greatest possible extent.
2. Senator Hagan. Ms. Conaton, as a result of actions to increase
efficiencies in DOD, it appears that there is increased centralization
of personnel actions for positions such as for Interagency Personal
Agreements, Highly Qualified Experts, and section 1101 positions at
agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
The concern is that this centralization will lead to delays in hiring
decisions that will have a direct negative impact on the responsiveness
and flexibilities that are needed. Will you ensure that your office
will work with the DOD labs, and other science and technology
organizations like DARPA, to ensure that these centralized personnel
actions will not have a negative impact on their hiring?
Ms. Conaton. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure the Department
actively engages in initiatives to streamline and reform the civilian
hiring system, to include efforts to ensure that the Department's
centralized hiring processes are efficient in fulfilling hiring needs.
______
[The nomination reference of Hon. Erin C. Conaton follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 24, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Erin C. Conaton, of the District of Columbia, to be Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, vice Clifford L. Stanley.
______
[The biographical sketch of Hon. Erin C. Conaton, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Education:
Georgetown University
September 1989-June 1992
Bachelor of Arts Degree in foreign service,
awarded June 1992
Tufts University, The Fletcher School
September 1993-June 1995
Master of Arts Degree in law and diplomacy
awarded June 1995
Employment Record:
Air Force
Under Secretary
March 2010-present
U.S. House of Representatives
Staff Director, Committee on Armed Services
2007-2010
U.S. House of Representatives
Minority Staff Director, Committee on Armed
Services
2005-2007
U.S. House of Representatives
Professional Staff Member, House Armed
Services Committee 2001-2005
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century--
Hart-Rudman Commission
Research Staff Director and Research Associate
1998-2001
Central Intelligence Agency
Graduate Fellow
1998
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
International Security Studies Fellowship
1996-1997
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Associate
1995
National Security Council
Graduate Fellow
1994
Yield Enhancement Strategists, Inc.
Director of Client Services
1993
Salomon Brothers, Inc.
Financial Analyst
1992-1993
Honors and Awards:
Graduate Fellow, Central Intelligence Agency (1998)
National Finalist, White House Fellows Program (1998)
Graduate Fellow, Central Intelligence Agency (1998)
International Security Studies Fellowship, The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1996-1997)
Jacob K. Javits Fellowship (1993-1997)
Graduate Fellow, National Security Council (1994)
Graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa from
Georgetown University as a School of Foreign Service Scholar
and recipient of Dean's Citation for Service (1992)
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Erin C.
Conaton in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Erin Cathleen Conaton.
2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
3. Date of nomination:
January 24, 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 26, 1970; Hackensack, NJ.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Single.
7. Names and ages of children:
None.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993-
1998, received Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy in May 1995;
continued on to the Ph.D. and left completing all requirements except
the doctoral dissertaton.
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1988-1992,
graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service in May 1992.
Immaculate Heart Academy, Washington Township, NJ, 1984-1988;
received high school diploma 1988.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Under Secretary of the Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense, March
2010-present (March 2012).
Staff Director, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington DC, January 2007-March 2010.
Minority Staff Director, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington DC, September 2005-January 2007.
Professional Staff Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House
of Representatives, Washington DC, June 2001-September 2005.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
N/A.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
N/A.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Fletcher Alumni Association of Washington, DC, member, 1998-present
Capitol Hill Historical Society, member 2008-present
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
N/A.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Volunteer member of defense policy team for Obama/Biden Campaign,
2008.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
$2,300 Obama for America, 2008
$50 DCCC 2011
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
1998, National Finalist, White House Fellows Program
1998, Graduate Fellow, Central Intelligence Agency
1996-1997, International Security Studies Fellowship, The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy
1993-1997, Jacob K. Javits Fellowship
1994, Graduate Fellow, National Security Council
1992, Graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa from Georgetown
University as a School of Foreign Service Scholar and recipient of
Dean's Citation for Service
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Conaton, Erin C. and Rudy Barnes. ``Air Force Implementation of the
National Space Policy: Space Situational Awareness and Launch.'' High
Frontier, Volume 7, Number 2, February 2011, pp. 9-12.
Conaton, Erin C. and Laurent L. Jacque. Management and Control of
Foreign Exchange Risk (A Guide for Instructors). Kluwer Academic Press,
1997.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Erin C. Conaton.
This 21st day of March, 2012.
[The nomination of Hon. Erin C. Conaton was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on May 15, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 2012.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mrs. Jessica Lynn Wright
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has greatly
contributed to the strong framework for today's joint warfighting
capabilities. It has significantly improved inter-service and joint
relationships, promoting greater effectiveness of the Military
Departments and combatant commands (COCOM).
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Currently I am unaware of any areas where modifications are
needed. If I am confirmed, I would have an opportunity to assess any
further need to legislative modifications.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have served this country in uniform for over 35 years, a
large part of that time in key leadership positions as an Active Guard
Reserve officer as well as a traditional Reserve component member. My
last assignment for over 7 years was as The Adjutant General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Commander of the Pennsylvania National
Guard where I worked with a wide variety of officials at the Federal,
State, and local levels.
During that time, I was responsible for a vast array of programs
and activities including the personnel, equipping, training,
mobilizations, deployment and demobilizations of over 20,000 guards men
and women, the management and implementation of the Pennsylvania
National Guard responsibility for the National Special Security Event
G-20, the role the Pennsylvania National Guard played in providing
support to Hurricane Katrina, and several aspects of the Presidential
Inauguration in January 2009, to name just a few. I was also
responsible for all of the veterans programs within the Commonwealth as
well as our family support networks, Yellow Ribbon and Employer Support
of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) Programs.
Since retirement in November 2010, I have worked in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) and Acting Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs?
Answer. A key challenge, from my perspective, is to sustain the
Reserve component as an integral part of the All-Volunteer Total Force,
and at the same time protect and enhance the skills gained in a decade
of conflict. Unemployment and underemployment of our returning troops
is a growing concern along with allowing new ideas to flourish to build
strength and resiliency in the families.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to focus on maintaining a balance
for servicemembers, families, and employers. I believe we need to
utilize the continuum of service to sustain the All-Volunteer Force
with flexible service options. I intend to apply the Department's
utilization rules that govern the frequency and duration of
activations. This would provide predictability for servicemembers,
thereby managing the expectations of our servicemembers, their
families, and employers.
duties
Question. Section 138 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs shall have as her
``principal duty the overall supervision of Reserve component affairs
of the Department of the Department of Defense (DOD).''
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that the
Secretary of Defense will prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to meet with
Citizen Warriors, their families, and employers to make sure I
understand their concerns and carry that message back for possible
resolution. I would strive to be a voice for the Reserve components. I
feel that it would be necessary to meet with the Reserve chiefs,
combatant commanders, and other gaining force commanders, to understand
their views and expectations. I would then carry that message as an
advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your
relationship with the following officials?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would report through the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) to the Secretary of
Defense; this position reports directly to the USD(P&R).
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, the same will hold true for Deputy Secretary
Carter.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Under Secretary in
whatever framework that is established. I will strive to have
transparent information flow both in and out.
Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to have a transparent relationship
with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness and support her efforts to support the USD.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas' Security Affairs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will develop a collaborative relationship
with Assistant Secretary Stockton.
Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek his advice and counsel on matters
that fall under the purview of his office.
Question. The combatant commanders, particularly the Commander,
U.S. Northern Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to have open communication with U.S.
Northern Command and all of the combatant commanders.
Question. The assistant secretaries in the Military Departments
responsible for Reserve matters.
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Office of the ASD/RA
has open communications with the assistant secretaries at all levels.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. I believe he is a key partner and the channel of
communication between the Services and the 54 States and Territories.
If confirmed, I will foster an open dialogue.
Question. The Chiefs of Reserves of each of the Services.
Answer. I believe all the Reserve Chiefs are key stakeholders and
if confirmed would work to foster open and frank dialogue.
Question. The assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for Guard and Reserve Matters.
Answer. I believe an open and transparent relationship must exist
between the ASD/RA and the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
Guard and Reserve Matters. If confirmed, I would develop this
communication.
Question. The Reserve Forces Policy Board.
Answer. In the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
sponsorship within DOD has passed to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness. If confirmed, I will continue an open
relationship with the independent Board and facilitate RA staff in
providing information and research on key topics impacting our Reserve
components when asked.
Question. The State Governors and the Adjutants General of the
States.
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the OSD/RA has an open and
collaborative relationship, using the Chief, National Guard Bureau as a
channel of communications. If confirmed, I would work with Dr. Stockton
and the Council of Governors.
recruiting and retention
Question. Some have expressed concern that use of the Reserve
component as an operational force and the regular mobilizations of
Reserve component members will have an adverse effect on recruiting and
retention in the Reserve components.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to enhance recruiting and
retention of experienced members of the Reserve components?
Answer. To date, Reserve component recruiting and retention goals
have been met for the department, in both quantity and quality and I
fully anticipate them to be met through the remainder of the fiscal
year. As such, I believe the current incentives/benefits programs
appear to be working.
If confirmed, maintaining open and effective communication with the
Reserve Chiefs and their subordinate leaders will ensure I understand
their needs in these areas. I also believe that Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs should encourage and
facilitate new ideas and approaches that adapt to changes that may
occur in recruiting the highest quality members and retaining the
experience necessary to meet the Nation's future challenges.
medical personnel recruiting and retention
Question. Much of the medical infrastructure for DOD is in the
Reserve components. DOD has experienced significant shortages in
critically needed medical personnel in both the Active and Reserve
components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support
requirements will compound the already serious challenges faced in
recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral
health personnel.
What is your understanding of the medical support requirements in
the Reserve components and the sufficiency of plans to meet recruiting
and retention goals in these specialties?
Answer. It is my understanding that medical recruiting has remained
strong across the Services with the exception of some critical wartime
specialties. These deficits are reflective of the availability of those
professionals in the civilian population as well as their economic
vulnerability with a mobilization. I believe the Services have
consistently and exceptionally met operational medical missions often
enabled by our stateside Medical Treatment Facility purchased care
system.
Question. What legislative and policy initiatives, including
greater involvement of personnel in recruiting and enhanced bonuses and
special pays, do you think may be necessary to ensure that the Reserve
components can continue to meet medical support requirements?
Answer. I believe it will be critical to continue to fund accession
and retention bonuses and special pays to meet recruiting and retention
missions. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure a Total
Force approach for pay management offering the greatest flexibility for
each of the Services to meet long term health care recruiting and
retention goals is available.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Department has developed comprehensive policies and
procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of
sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for
victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual
misconduct involving military personnel continue to occur.
In the context of the Reserve components, do you consider the
current sexual assault policies and procedures to be effective?
Answer. The Guard and Reserve have extensive policies, procedures
and trained staff in place to deal with incidents of sexual assault. If
confirmed, I will work with colleagues in OSD and the Services to
review these procedures and ensure they are effective.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of support
systems and processes for victims of sexual assault in the Reserve
components?
Answer. The Guard and Reserve have outstanding personnel trained to
support victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will review these
systems and processes in the Reserve components to assess their
effectiveness.
Question. What is your assessment of the authorities available to
Reserve component commanders to hold assailants accountable for sexual
assault?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Services in coordination
with the DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office have the
required authorities to hold assailants accountable. If confirmed, I
will continue to review these authorities to ensure that we are
facilitating the opportunity for our servicemembers to serve with
dignity and have confidence in their peers and leaders.
enhanced reserve mobilization authorities
Question. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress authorized the
Service Secretaries to mobilize units and individuals in support of
preplanned combatant command (COCOM) missions for up to 365 consecutive
days. In the new defense strategy announced in January, the President
and Secretary of Defense stated that while conventional ground forces
will be reduced, special forces will be increased over the next 5
years, and a key component of the new strategy seems to be the
establishment of a rotational presence in Europe, the Middle East, and
anywhere U.S. interests are threatened.
What is your assessment of the operational reserve and how it will
fit into this new paradigm of forces rotating into and out of multiple
locations of strategic interest?
Answer. I would consider this an opportunity to sustain the
readiness that we have achieved in the past 10 years. This new
authority will give Service Secretaries more autonomy and flexibility
in sourcing COCOM requirements through the use of their Reserve
components.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate size and makeup of
the Reserve components in light of the new defense strategy?
Answer. I think that the Services should take advantage of this new
authority when making decisions on restructuring their forces.
Utilization of the Reserve components as a partner in the rotational
support to COCOMs should reduce the infrastructure required of a
permanent party Active component in theater and relieve stress on the
Total Force, thereby making the Reserve component an economical and
viable partner in the force mix.
homeland defense and homeland security
Question. What do you see as the appropriate role of the National
Guard and Reserves in homeland defense and homeland security?
Answer. I know that the National Guard has a dual purpose and their
participation in domestic threats is well founded in law and history.
Recent changes to law have enabled the Reserves to also participate. I
believe that homeland defense and homeland security is a total force
responsibility, and that the Nation should take advantage of the
extensive competencies and capabilities of the National Guard and
Reserves in support of priority missions.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Guard and Reserves have the
equipment, training, and personnel to accomplish their missions, both
at home and abroad.
mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
Question. Over the past decade, the National Guard and Reserves
have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since
World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures
for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening
and medical readiness monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay
systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization,
and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve
Force management policies and systems have been characterized as
``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely
affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
component mobilization and demobilization procedures over the past
decade, and where do problems still exist?
Answer. It is my understanding that the paradigm of ``Train-
Mobilize-Deploy'' provides predictability to servicemembers, their
families, and employers. Additionally, this allows the units identified
for mobilization to ramp up for deployment.
Servicemembers and their families receive TRICARE medical benefits
and Yellow Ribbon training in advance of mobilization, increasing their
fitness for duty and reducing the time necessary to mobilize. The
standardization of procedures at home station allows the mobilization
station to certify deployment readiness.
If confirmed, I will examine the current processes and work to
address any challenges that exist.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
Answer. I believe one of the most significant enduring changes is
the implementation of Service force generation plans that enable units
to train and deploy on a more predictable time line.
Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves
beyond the new mobilization authority in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012?
Answer. Two important changes were made and at this time, I don't
believe that any additional changes are needed. However, if confirmed I
will monitor the effect of the changes closely and propose changes
where necessary.
lessons learned
Question. What do you believe are the major personnel lessons
learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), and Operation New Dawn which you would seek to address if
confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to mitigate the stress on the
Total Force by ensuring the Services continue to utilize the National
Guard and Reserves. I believe the Reserve components can continue to
provide trained, ready, and cost-effective forces that can be employed
on a regular operational basis, while also ensuring strategic depth for
large-scale contingencies or other unanticipated national crises.
operational and personnel tempo
Question. Current DOD policy is that Reserve component members
should have 5 years of dwell time for each year they are mobilized.
What is your view of the achievability of this goal? What measures
must be taken to be able to achieve it within 5 years?
Answer. I believe the Department is making progress toward that
goal. I think the 1-to-5 dwell-time ratio is achievable. We must ensure
that continuing efforts to rebalance Active and Reserve component units
are outlined and set the conditions to comply with the Department's 1-
year involuntary mobilization policy.
Question. In your view, how does the shift of resources from Iraq
to Afghanistan affect dwell-time ratios?
Answer. I believe this shift has made the 1-to-5 dwell goal more
attainable based on the lower demand for resources. If I am confirmed,
my goal would be to continue policies that support the attainment of
the 1-to-5 dwell goal for all Reserve components.
Question. What measures are being taken to respond to operational
requirements for low-density, high-demand units, and personnel whose
skills are found primarily in the Reserve components, e.g., civil
affairs, medical personnel, and truck drivers?
Answer. I am told the Services are expanding capacity in selected
areas, continuing to rebalance the AC/RC mix where appropriate, and
using joint solutions. Force structure decisions and rebalancing are a
continual process. If confirmed I intend to be involved in this process
to ensure the Reserve components are used to the best advantage of the
Total Force.
Question. In your judgment, what would be the impact on the current
rates of operations and personnel tempo of assigning principal
responsibility for support to civil authorities for consequence
management of natural, domestic disasters to Reserve component forces?
Answer. It is my understanding that to avoid this situation the
Services are accounting for support to civil authority missions in
their force generation models which is a good practice. I would not
want to break faith with the servicemembers who have volunteered with
the expectation that they would have the honor to defend this Nation on
the homefront and overseas.
stress on families
Question. National Guard and Reserve families have been under great
stress since 2001 as a result of multiple and lengthy deployments in
OIF and OEF.
In your view, what are the key indicators of the stress on Reserve
component families at this time?
Answer. From what I understand, some key indicators of stress on
the Reserve component families include everything from communication
issues to substance abuse, significant relationship issues and even
domestic violence. I believe it is critical to track these trends and
seek input from Military Family Life Consultants in order to best deal
with these issues.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to address these key
indicators?
Answer. The Services are aware of and have multiple programs to
address each of these issues and are available for leaders to
implement. If confirmed, I would work to support these programs as well
as the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP) which connects
Reserve component family members with assistance.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important family
readiness issues in the National Guard and Reserves?
Answer. Predictability and communication are key issues faced by
Reserve component family members. If confirmed I would work with the
Services to provide awareness of and access to support services to
ensure family readiness.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support for Reserve
component families, particularly those who do not reside near an
Active-Duty military installation, related to mobilization, deployment,
and family readiness?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department's YRRP is
properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by reservists,
geographically dispersed Active Duty, their families and immediate
support network. The program's proactive and preventive scope provides
information, access, referrals, and outreach to military members, their
families and immediate support network. This needs to be underwritten
by a coordinated, community based network of care encompassing the
Department, VA, State, local, and private providers. My goal would be
to provide a full range of services available to Active, Guard, and
Reserve members and their families.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to
ensure that family readiness needs, including child care, are addressed
and adequately resourced?
Answer. I believe this is a critical area where DOD must not become
``installation minded'' but work to utilize community partners. If
confirmed I would work to identify where there are service gaps in
communities and build community capacity.
guard and reserve unemployment and transition assistance
Question. Many Guard and Reserve members return from deployment and
cannot find employment or are underemployed.
If confirmed, how will you address unemployment issues regarding
members of the Reserve components?
Answer. I believe that civilian employment is a critical readiness
factor for the Reserve components. If confirmed, I will support ongoing
efforts in Reserve Affairs and ESGR to connect servicemembers with
military friendly employers who understand their continuing
obligations.
individual ready reserve
Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves found
that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war has
been problematic and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning
is a failed concept.
What is your view of the proper role of the IRR in force management
planning?
Answer. The last 10 years of persistent conflict have allowed DOD
to validate the resiliency and capabilities of an All-Volunteer Force.
I believe the Total Force is best leveraged when an appropriate force
mix of Active component and Reserve component members is achieved. In
my view, the IRR must remain part of the total force planning strategy
now and well into the future--particularly as a means to provide
rapidly expanding capacity as the Services consider their structure and
capability.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making
to the IRR recall policy?
Answer. The Services own and manage their respective IRRs, and
utilize them as manpower requirements necessitate. At this time, I do
not see the need for DOD to significantly affect the Services' IRR
policy or procedures for mobilization. If confirmed I will remain
committed to providing the necessary policy and guidance to support and
shape this valuable resource for continued utilization.
Question. What is your view of policies affecting continued service
by officer and enlisted personnel in the Reserve components who have
fulfilled their MSO?
Answer. I am confident that the Service Secretaries have the
appropriate management procedures to effectively engage and monitor
participation for those members that have completed their military
service obligation and desire a continued affiliation with military
service. If confirmed, I will examine appropriate technologies to
enhance training opportunities for those members that remain active
participants, as well as to engage those members that wish to continue
in service.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in
place for members in the IRR receiving orders to Active Duty to request
a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in
place for appealing the decision on that request?
Answer. I am confident that the Services have well-established
processes for delay and exemption for IRR members. I am further
confident that these requests, processed through their chain of command
are handled in a timely manner and are fair and appropriate.
Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the
All-Volunteer Force?
Answer. The IRR remains a critical enabler to the All-Volunteer
Force. The IRR provides strategic depth to the operational as well as
the strategic reserve with pre-trained individual manpower, and can
flex as manpower requirements dictate.
medical and dental readiness of national guard and reserve personnel
Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
personnel remains an issue of significant concern to the committee, and
shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved
policy oversight and accountability.
If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
Answer. I believe medical readiness must remain a top priority, as
it is critical for the success of the Reserve components. Currently,
the Services report overall status on a quarterly basis to DOD's Force
Health Protection agency, and the reports have shown steady progress in
overall readiness. Dental readiness improved most dramatically due to
new programs that offered dental restorative care along with the
standard screening. If confirmed, I would continue to support efforts
to standardize reporting efforts across the Services.
Question. How would you improve on the ability to produce a healthy
and fit Reserve component?
Answer. It is my understanding that there is an impressive team of
Preventive Health clinical experts who are crafting a multi-discipline,
multi-community approach for DOD in collaboration with the National
Prevention Strategy of the Office of the Surgeon General. DOD's effort
addresses many of the core national preventive health issues identified
by the Department of Health and Human Services. DOD participation on
these working groups aligns with the national strategy to address our
military community including the military families and civilian
workforce that supports DOD. If confirmed, I would support these
efforts.
health care for reservists
Question. Members of the Reserve and National Guard who are ordered
to active duty for more than 30 days are eligible for the same health
care and dental benefits under TRICARE as other Active Duty
servicemembers.
What is your view of the adequacy of health care for Reserve
component members?
Answer. I believe that proactive healthcare is tied to readiness
and that improvements have been made when Reserve members are ordered
to active duty or mobilized for greater than 30 days. Currently,
Reserve members and their families receive TRICARE coverage both pre-
and post-mobilization. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
are not eligible to purchase TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS), but may
purchase dental coverage. I believe the department continues to make
progress in mental health care access and coverage for our Reserve
members and their families, particularly for those injured while
serving.
Question. What are your suggestions for improving continuity of
care for Reserve members and their families?
Answer. I believe continuous medical coverage is essential for
Reserve members and their families during their transitions from
civilian to military status. TRS has provided a bridge to improve
continuity of care and has improved satisfaction for members and their
families who have purchased this option. If confirmed, I would look at
the feasibility of extending eligibility for TRICARE to members of the
IRR who are currently not eligible for this option.
Question. TRICARE Reserve Select authorizes members of the Selected
Reserve and their families to use TRICARE Standard military health care
program at a subsidized rate when they are not on active duty.
What is your assessment of TRICARE Reserve Select and its level of
utilization in the Reserve components?
Answer. I believe there has been steady growth of TRS enrollment to
nearly 20 percent of the eligible reservists. Members pay premiums that
reflect 28 percent of the total cost of the coverage. TRS is important
for our members, and is a competitive option for their health care
needs. Additionally, I believe that this availability can improve
readiness.
Question. What impact has TRICARE Reserve Select had on recruiting
for the Reserve components?
Answer. I believe that TRICARE Reserve Select is an incentive for
recruiting and even more for retention, particularly for retaining
those members of the Reserve components that are self-employed. TRS
provides a means for Reserve component members to maintain their health
and individual medical readiness. TRS also provides an affordable
continuum of health care for members and their families who might
otherwise be required to change health plans and providers during each
transition between military and civilian status.
Question. One of the major concerns for military family members is
access to health care. Military spouses tell us that the health care
system is inundated, and those stationed in more remote areas may not
have access to adequate care, a particular concern for members of the
Reserve components.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure complete access
to health care for the families of members of the Reserve components?
Answer. I believe we must ensure that TRS premiums remain
affordable for members and their families. If confirmed, I would
partner with Health Affairs to improve complete access to health care
for Reserve component family members.
national guard equipment and readiness
Question. Numerous changes to the roles and responsibilities of the
National Guard and Reserves have occurred in recent years, including
elevating the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to membership on the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, over the past 10 years, the Army
has relied on its Reserve components to deploy in support of operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other operations worldwide. To
supply ready forces, the Army implemented a rotational readiness model
for its Active and Reserve components based on a cycle of increased
training until a period of eligibility for deployment. Under this force
generation system, Reserve units would be equipped to readiness levels
that mirror the active force. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance
stressed that the Department will need to examine the mix of Active and
Reserve component elements best suited to the new strategy and stated
that expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a
significant driver in determining an appropriate mix of Active and
Reserve component forces and level of readiness. The Guidance also
stressed the need for a robust homeland defense.
How would reducing the pace of operations affect the Active and
Reserve component mix and Reserve readiness?
Answer. I believe that even as the pace of operations declines,
placing the Reserve components in the Service rotational models
preserves readiness, permits the active force to reset and train, and
provides an efficient use of the total force. I believe this may be a
reduced overall cost. Continued training within the Reserve components
will remain an important part of this model.
Question. In your view, how will the missions of the Reserve
components change to meet these new priorities?
Answer. I believe the Reserve components are well positioned today
to meet the demands of the new strategy. The Reserve components are
well suited for security force assistance missions, providing forces
for long-term stability operations, and fighting side-by-side with
their Active component counterparts in major combat operations. Being
located in communities throughout the United States makes them the
ideal force for Homeland Defense missions.
Question. How would you provide the ``strong, steady-state force
readiness'' for the Nation as it rebalances its Reserve component
forces?
Answer. I believe the service force generation models provide the
best opportunity to maintain a ready Reserve component force that can
contribute routinely to the overall operational force. If confirmed I
intend to work closely with the Services and Joint staff to ensure a
ready Reserve component that contributes to the efficient use of the
Total Force.
national guard and reserve budgeting
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play, if any, in the
Department's budget formation process for the Reserve components?
Answer. I believe that the role of the ASD(RA) is to serve as an
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters pertaining to
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System for the Reserve
components within DOD. As such, the budget estimates are prepared by
the Services and OSD reviews for sufficiency and balance. If confirmed,
I would hope to provide input to, and coordination on, the overall DOD
Budget Justification Book, especially with respect to the Reserve
components.
Question. How does DOD's annual budget request document priorities
and proposed funding levels for equipment procurement for each of the
Reserve components?
Answer. The Service budgets reflect equipment requests and needs
for all of their components. It is my understanding that those
estimates may not always reflect the full requirement. If confirmed, I
plan to consider all available options to capture this important
information and improve transparency.
Question. What changes, if any, would you make to the process or
documentation of the equipment-related funding request for the Guard
and Reserve?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support all efforts to improve
transparency, visibility and coordination of the development of
combined Active and Reserve equipment estimates.
Question. How would you improve oversight of Reserve component
budget execution, particularly to increase the transparency of the
Reserve components' execution of their annual appropriations for
personnel, operations, and procurement?
Answer. National Guard and Reserve components have separate
appropriations for operations and personnel. This allows us the needed
transparency to perform our oversight role and assess the Service's
budget requests and appropriations each year. If confirmed, I would
work closely with the Reserve component chiefs on ways ASD(RA) could
help them utilize needed funds reprogramming and other management tools
to improve budget execution. If confirmed, I would look for
opportunities to increase transparency.
evolving roles of national guard and reserve in the defense
establishment
Question. The roles and responsibilities of the National Guard and
Reserve have evolved over the last 10 years particularly given their
successful preparation and participation in support of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The practical result is that the Reserve component is
now trained, equipped, and more ready than ever as an operational
rather than a strategic reserve.
What is your assessment of the changes, if any, over the past 10
years in the expected levels of readiness of the Guard and Reserve
prior to mobilization?
Answer. The past 10 years of conflict have made the Reserve
components the most ready force in history. My assessment is that there
will need to be appropriated baseline funding levels to support these
readiness levels.
Question. How do these changes affect the manning, equipping,
training, and budgeting for the Reserve component as an operational
reserve as opposed to its historical role as a strategic reserve?
Answer. I believe to function as an operational reserve, the
Services must provide baseline funding for required training,
equipping, and operational use.
Question. In your view, what changes, if any, are required to DOD
or Military Department policies or programs to sustain the Reserve
component as an operational reserve?
Answer. Currently, the Services' Yellow Ribbon activities are
funded entirely through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds. As
these funds draw down I believe it is vitally important that we
identify a more sustainable funding stream to ensure that resources
will continue to be available to support the enduring requirement for
reintegration activities for an operational reserve force.
reserve forces policy board
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role, function, and
membership of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB)?
Answer. I see the Reserve Forces Policy Board as a highly valued
source of independent advice to the Department. The structure and
reporting line for the RFPB was modified to bring in outside experts
and to give the Board direct advisory access to the Secretary of
Defense.
employment of full-time support personnel &
Question. Active Guard and Reserve personnel providing full-time
support are not authorized to perform State Active-Duty missions even
in emergencies or disaster situations. On occasion, this can deny an
important resource such as an aviation capability to a Governor in need
of assistance.
Do you think, as a matter of policy, AGR members should be
authorized in limited circumstances to perform limited State Active-
Duty missions?
Answer. The law prohibits title 10 AGR servicemembers from
providing full-time support for State Active-Duty missions. I see no
reason that DOD policy should be inconsistent with this law. As I
understand, title 32 AGR members have limited authority to perform
these duties.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe such use
should be authorized?
Answer. I believe that AGRs should be used under extreme
circumstances with strict coordination with their higher headquarters
when time and life saving measures are of the essence. If confirmed,
and if those circumstances exist and a change in law is warranted, I
would work with stakeholders to draft the change and submit the
proposal for consideration.
repeal of ``don't ask, don't tell''
Question. What is your assessment of the effect in the Reserve
components of the repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Service and COCOM continue
to provide monthly progress reports on the implementation of repeal to
the Secretary of Defense. The Services are responsible for
implementation and training of their Reserve components. To my
knowledge, repeal is going smoothly and there have been no significant
repeal-related issues.
gi bill benefits
Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act in 2008 (``Post-9/11 GI Bill'') that created enhanced
education benefits for servicemembers who have served at least 90 days
on active duty since September 11. Many Reserve component members have
earned these benefits by virtue of their mobilizations.
What is your assessment of the effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on
recruiting and retention in the Reserve components?
Answer. While the Department continues to assess the effects on
recruiting and retention, I believe that this benefit has had a
positive effect on both recruiting and retention and will continue to
do so. Also, I understand the transferability provision of the Post-9/
11 GI Bill has been extremely popular with the career Reserve component
force.
Question. What is your understanding of the sufficiency of the
implementation plan for the transferability provisions contained in the
act?
Answer. The Services are implementing the transferability plan and
I am not aware of any unresolved issues relating to transferability.
Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) education benefits for members of the
Selected Reserve under chapter 1606 of Title 10, U.S.C., are an
important recruiting and retention incentive. However, the level of the
monthly benefit has not risen proportionately over time with that of
MGIB benefits payable to eligible veterans under chapter 30 of title
38, U.S.C.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the current monthly
benefit levels under the MGIB for Selected Reserve?
Answer. I think there are indications that the current monthly
benefit level has not kept pace with the rising cost of education.
Question. Would you recommend any changes to this program?
Answer. If confirmed I will work with the Services to review the
level of benefit and seek congressional support if any changes are
needed.
civil-military programs
Question. The DOD STARBASE program is an effective community
outreach program currently operating at about 60 locations throughout
the United States that operates under the oversight of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
What is your view of the STARBASE program?
Answer. The President has taken a position to make math and science
education a national priority. The DOD STARBASE program is an
outstanding program that supports this effort through a three-way
partnership between the military, the local communities and the school
districts which advanced the culture of educating and developing our
Nation's youth in both the military and civilian communities.
Question. Do you believe that Guard and Reserve personnel should be
involved in the STARBASE program?
Answer. Yes, because the students benefit by becoming exposed to
the military culture which values knowledge, opportunity, and
diversity.
Question. Do you believe it is appropriate to fund this program
through the DOD budget? How well is it coordinated with other DOD
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics outreach programs?
Answer. Yes, I believe DOD should continue to provide funding for
this program. The STARBASE Program as part of the overall Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics initiative is coordinated
through the interagency process.
Question. The National Guard Youth Challenge Program was
established in 1993 to help at-risk youth improve their life skills,
education levels, and employment potential. Over time, the share of
Federal funding decreased to 60 percent.
What is your view of the National Guard Youth Challenge Program?
Answer. The President has taken a position to address the high
school dropout crisis and the National Guard Youth Challenge Program
helps address this dropout crisis. It is a productive and outstanding
performing program. I believe studies have shown that graduates of the
Youth Challenge Program were much more likely to have obtained a high
school diploma or a General Education Development certificate and earn
college credits and more likely working.
Question. Do you believe this program should be funded through the
DOD budget, or through some other means?
Answer. The National Guard Youth Challenge Program should be funded
and managed by DOD and operated by the National Guard because of the
strong military linkage which is a key element to the program's
success, and because of the close National Guard/community connections.
yellow ribbon reintegration program
Question. The committee has learned that in fiscal year 2012,
nearly 30 percent of the funds appropriated for support of the YRRP
will be allocated to employment and hiring initiatives for members of
the Guard and Reserve, including funding of 60 employment specialists
to coordinate State and local employment initiatives. Congress
established the YRRP in the NDAA for 2008 to improve access to a broad
range of family support programs before, during and following
deployments.
If confirmed, how will you ensure that the redirection by DOD of a
significant portion of the YRRP resources will not erode the
availability of other needed services, including counseling, substance
abuse and behavioral health support, that must be provided to members
of the Guard and Reserve returning from deployments?
Answer. I believe that the YRRP is dedicated to providing a variety
of resources to assist servicemembers with transitioning back into
their communities. If confirmed, I will support the YRRP in continuing
to provide all of the essential services required in statute while
maintaining flexibility to direct funding towards meeting emerging
needs.
comprehensive review of the future role of the reserve component
Question. Please provide your assessment of the results of the
Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve component
published in April 2011.
In your view, did the review achieve its objectives?
Answer. In my view, yes the review did achieve its objectives. The
report objective was to outline the future roles and missions of the
Reserve components. Among the findings the report clearly recommends
best future uses of the Reserve components and offers a variety of law,
policy, and regulatory change recommendations.
Question. What is your understanding of how and to what extent the
report informed the new Defense Strategic Guidance?
Answer. The new Defense Strategic Guidance, ``Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense'' (5 January
2012), contains numerous concepts which are complimentary to those
found in the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve
component study. Specifically, I believe that six of the missions
highlighted in the new strategic guidance are especially well-suited
for the Reserve component, and the new strategic guidance offers
significant opportunities for the Reserve component to contribute to
the Total Force effort.
If confirmed, I would work to continue to seek efficiencies and
provide better information to senior decisionmakers. Developing more
robust and consistent costing methods will help DOD senior leaders
better meet the recent Defense Strategic Guidance.
Question. If confirmed, what are the greatest challenges that you
will face in applying the findings and recommendations of the Review to
future decisions about the role of the Reserve components as part of
our national defense strategy?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD is considering
implementation of these recommendations. The challenges will be
implementation as Services develop their programs to support emerging
Defense strategies in ever changing environments.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to appearing before this
committee and other appropriate committees in support of our Nation's
servicemembers.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will appear before this committee, or
designated members of this committee, and provide information in
support of our Nation's servicemembers.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided in a timely manner to
this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. If confirmed, I agree to provide documents, including
copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the
committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such documents.
______
[The nomination reference of Mrs. Jessica L. Wright
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 24, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Jessica Lynn Wright, of Pennsylvania, to be an Assistant Secretary
of Defense, vice Dennis M. McCarthy, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Mrs. Jessica L. Wright, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Jessica L. Wright
Education:
Alderson Broaddus College, 1970-1974, BA, May 1974
Webster University, 1991-1993, MA, June 1993
Employment Record:
November 8, 2010-Present: Department of Defense Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, RA (Manpower and Personnel) 1 June 2011 also
assumed the duties ``Acting'' Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Arlington, VA
February 2004-November 2010, The Adjutant General, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
June 2000-February 2004, Deputy Adjutant General--Army,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
Honors and Awards:
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with one Silver Oak Leaf
Cluster and one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
National Defense Service Medal (with one Bronze Star)
Global War on Terror Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Gold Hourglass)
Army Service Ribbon
Army Staff Identification Badge
Senior Army Aviator Badge
Pennsylvania Commendation Medal
Pennsylvania Service Ribbon (with two Silver Stars)
Pennsylvania 20-Year Medal (with two Silver Stars)
Major General Thomas R. White Jr. Medal
General Thomas J. Stewart Medal
Governor's Unit Citation Lithuanian Medal of Merit
2000 ATHENA Recipient
2004 Honorary Doctorate--Alderson Broaddus College
2005 Gold Medallion--Chapel of the Four Chaplains
2005 Law and Justice Award--Sons of Italy
2006 Gold Medal Award--Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters
2008 Honorary Doctorate--Peirce College
2009 Military Person of the Year--Veteran Community Initiatives,
Inc.
2009 Distinguished Soldier Award--Union League of Philadelphia
2010 Founders Day Award--Lebanon Valley College
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mrs. Jessica
L. Wright in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Jessica Lynn Wright, Maiden Name: Garfola.
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
3. Date of nomination:
January 24, 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
November 2, 1952; Charleroi, PA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Charles Edwin Wright.
7. Names and ages of children:
Philip Michael Wright, age: 22.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Alderson-Broaddus College, 1970-1974, BA, May 1974
Webster University, 1991-1993, MA, June 1993
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
08 November 2010-Present: Department of Defense Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, RA (Manpower and Personnel) 1 June 2011 also
assumed the duties ``Acting'' Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Arlington, VA
February 2004-November 2010: The Adjutant General, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
June 2000-February 2004; Deputy Adjutant General-Army, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, Fort Indiantown Gap, PA
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
National Guard Association of the United States, Member, 1975-
Present
Pennsylvania National Guard Association of the United States,
Member, 1975-Present
Association of the U.S. Army, Member, 1975-Present
Army Aviation Association of America, Member
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with one Silver Oak Leaf
Cluster and one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
National Defense Service Medal (with one Bronze Star)
Global War on Terror Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Gold Hourglass)
Army Service Ribbon
Army Staff Identification Badge
Senior Army Aviator Badge
Pennsylvania Commendation Medal
Pennsylvania Service Ribbon (with two Silver Stars)
Pennsylvania 20 Year Medal (with two Silver Stars)
Major General Thomas R. White Jr. Medal
General Thomas J. Stewart Medal
Governor's Unit Citation
Lithuanian Medal of Merit
2000 ATHENA Recipient
2004 Honorary Doctorate--Alderson Broaddus College
2005 Gold Medallion--Chapel of the Four Chaplains
2005 Law and Justice Award--Sons of Italy
2006 Gold Medal Award--Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters
2008 Honorary Doctorate--Peirce College
2009 Military Person of the Year--Veteran Community Initiatives,
Inc.
2009 Distinguished Soldier Award--Union League of Philadelphia
2010 Founders Day Award--Lebanon Valley College
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
One article on ARNG Aviation published in the National Guard
Association of the United States magazine. (2010)
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
I gave multiple speeches during my time as Adjutant General of the
PA National Guard. These would have been speeches at deployments,
homecoming events, holiday events such as Veterans or Memorial Day, to
Rotary clubs and Chambers of Commerce. I do not have copies.
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Jessica L. Wright.
This 26th day of March, 2012.
[The nomination of Mrs. Jessica L. Wright was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 15, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 2012.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mrs. Katharina G.
McFarland by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No. I believe the current allocation of responsibility for
acquisition-related matters in title 10, U.S.C., appropriately assigns
responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, and that the law also appropriately
identifies the acquisition-related functions of the Military Department
secretaries. If confirmed, I will continue to assess this issue.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
N/A.
duties
Question. Section 138(b)(6) of title 10, U.S.C., describes the
duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition (ASD(AT&L)). Under this provision, the ASD(A) is the
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L) on
matters relating to acquisition.
Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties do you expect
that the Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) will prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary and USD(AT&L) to
assign duties and functions commensurate with the ASD(A)'s function and
expertise as he deems appropriate.
Question. Do you recommend any changes to the provisions of section
138 of title 10, U.S.C., with respect to the duties of the ASD(A)?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you believe that the Department of Defense (DOD) has
effectively implemented a streamlined chain of command for acquisition
programs, as envisioned by the Packard Commission?
Answer. I believe that the Department has implemented a strong
acquisition chain of command, built upon an effective management
structure that meets the current acquisition requirements and outcomes.
If confirmed, I will assess the structure and the workforce skills,
proficiency and oversight to advise USD(AT&L) required to ensure
continued success in leadership.
Question. Do you see the need for modifications in that chain of
command, or in the duties and authorities of any of the officials in
that chain of command?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support evaluations by USD(AT&L) of
the current chain of command and will recommend adjustments should any
be needed to ensure continued success.
qualifications
If confirmed, you will play a major role in managing an acquisition
system pursuant to which DOD spends roughly $400 billion each year.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have 26 years of acquisition experience. I have a
professional engineering license. I am a graduate of the international
Program Managers Institute and have senior certifications (DAWIA Level
III) in Testing, Engineering, Program Management, and Logistics. I
completed my Engineering in Training requirements for my Professional
Engineering qualifications by working as a Quality Assurance Engineer
and a workflow process engineer at ALCAN industries. I began Federal
service in 1986 during the transition of Goldwater-Nichols Act
implementation in support of the Marine Corps at Headquarters as one of
eight engineers assigned to support all Marine Corps procurements. I
was the lead engineer for all vehicles and electronic systems.
In 1990, I was recruited by the Canadian Government to work their
procurement group head for Electronic systems. In late 1991, the Marine
Corps recruited me back to the Marine Corps where I became the Air
Defense lead engineer. Then in 1994, I became the Assistant Program
Manager for the Marine Corps theater missile defense. During this time,
I was credited for leading the Marine Corps to 13 international firsts
in ballistic missile testing, and successfully achieved an operational
suitable and operationally effective designation for the missile system
and its components. At that time in 1996, this was considered the
largest operational test conducted by MCOTEA and was delivered on time
and within budget.
In 1998, I received the Navy civilian tester of the year for
managing the development and testing of an integrated cooperative
engagement capability and successful missile engagement. In 1999, I was
assigned to co-lead an acquisition redesign team for the Marine Corps
System Command, its organic Acquisition activity of which I received a
Civilian Meritorious Service Medal in 2001. At this same time, I was
the program manager for the engineering and design of new acquisition
facilities to consolidate 15 sites housing approximately 1,200 people
into new facilities. I structured the program to reuse the Navy's
Hospital Point facility at Quantico and saved the Marine Corps several
million dollars.
In 2000, I was appointed Product Group Director for Battle
management and Air Defense Systems. In this portfolio, all aviation
support assets (UAVs, RADARs, Sensors, command and control and Missiles
and ground Command and control were managed.
In 2006, I was selected to be the Acquisition Director for the
Missile Defense Agency. As lead for Acquisition, I had the contracting
and acquisition workforce to include PMs under my management and all
program management policy and implementation.
In addition, I was selected by USD(AT&L) to co-chair the Better
Buying Power initiatives and was awarded the Secretary of Defense
Meritorious Civilian Service and Secretary of Defense Exceptional
Civilian Service Award in 2011 for these efforts.
In 2011, I was appointed the President of the Defense Acquisition
University (DAU) to oversee the training and education of the
workforce. During my tenure, the University has won several national
awards for continuous learning and teaching methodologies.
Finally, about 5 months ago, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Mr. Kendall, asked me to
support AT&L's role in Acquisition and I have been Performing the
Duties of OASD(A) in addition to my role as President of DAU.
Question. What background or experience, if any, do you have in the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. In 1990, my responsibilities for the Canadian Government
included procurements equivalent in American dollars to MAIS and MDAP
levels. I successfully developed the acquisition strategy and
procurement package for the replacement of the Air Traffic Control
System that serves both civilian and military air coordination, as an
example.
In my job as Product Group Director for Battle Management and Air
Defense Systems, I managed the Acquisition strategy, RFP development,
and selection for the ACAT ID GATOR program. The Unit Operations
Center, an ACAT II program that I managed was given critical acclaim by
the operating and joint deployed forces in OIF and was competitively
awarded.
In my role as Acquisition Director of Missile Defense Agency, I
oversaw the management of cost, schedule, and performance of all the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Elements, often in their own
right investment decisions on the scale of MAIS and MDAP programs. As
all of the major system elements were concluding their Periods of
Performance at MDA within a 2 year window, I was lead for creating the
Acquisition Strategies that opened up $37 billion of BMDSs' budget to
competition. The Acquisition Strategies created a competitive
environment at all product component levels and also included
consolidation of all knowledge management services. Consolidation of
services opened up over 30 percent of budgeted contract funding to
small business and saved the Government over 12 percent. I also
constructed and led the agencies baseline of programs and within 1 year
had all BMDs elements base lined with their service leads. I was
awarded a Presidential Rank Meritorious Civilian Service Award in 2010
for these efforts.
In performing the duties of OASD(A), I engage in all the
predecision process for MDAP and MAIS programs in support of USD(AT&L).
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, what would be your
relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense's
priorities in acquisition and technology.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Deputy Secretary's
priorities in matters of acquisition and technology.
Question. The USD(AT&L).
Answer. The USD(AT&L) would be my immediate supervisor. If
confirmed, I will be the principal advisor to the USD(AT&L) for matters
relating to acquisition. In addition, I will assist the USD(AT&L) in
the performance of his duties relating to acquisition and in any other
capacity that he may direct.
Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I would be the principal advisor to the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary in the same manner as to the Under
Secretary.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation to ensure the Department has appropriately tested
and evaluated defense acquisition programs.
Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation to ensure that the Department has
independent cost analysis for defense acquisition programs and
appropriate resource assessments for other programs within my
responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to ensure the science
and technology acquisition workforce is adequately staffed and
qualified to maintain the technological edge and innovative
capabilities to serve the Armed Forces and to reduce the cost and risk
of our major defense acquisition programs.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Developmental Testing.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing, including to ensure
there is strong involvement early in program formulation, that
comprehensive, independent developmental testing assessments of program
maturity and performance are available to inform acquisition decisions,
and that the developmental test community within the acquisition
workforce is appropriately staffed and qualified.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for System
Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for System Engineering to ensure that the systems
engineering community within the acquisition workforce is appropriately
staffed and qualified and that the application of sound systems
engineering principles are adhered to for major defense acquisition
programs.
Question. The Director of Performance Assessments and Root Cause
Analyses (PARCA).
If confirmed, I will direct and support the work of the Director of
PARCA to ensure that the defense acquisition system performs with
sufficient rigor to maintain situational awareness on the execution
status of our acquisition portfolio. I will also ensure that all
relevant root cause lessons learned are captured from ``problem''
programs, and those lessons promulgated throughout the acquisition
workforce. I will assure that PARCA's performance measurement policies
for DOD programs and institutions are effectively implemented. Finally,
I will see that underlying tools and supporting systems, such as Earned
Value Management for external projects, and an internal DOD acquisition
institutional performance measurement system, are resourced and
implemented adequately to DOD's needs.
Question. The Acquisition Executives in the Military Departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize communication and
coordination through the Secretaries of the Military Departments, with
the Service Acquisition Executives. I will support USD(AT&L) in working
with the Acquisition Executives to ensure effective oversight of
acquisition programs though insight into their areas, support
transparency in sharing information about program status, recommend
appropriate remedial actions to rectify problems, actively engage in
the development of departmental processes to improve acquisition
outcomes, and support the policies and practices of the Department.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. If confirmed, I will advise USD(AT&L) on acquisition issues
related to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council matters and work
closely with the Vice Chairman and his staff as appropriate. I will
also seek to ensure the requirements and acquisition processes work
effectively together in terms of stabilizing requirements, and ensuring
requirements established for acquisition programs are achievable within
appropriate cost, schedule, and technical risk by engaging early in the
requirements development process.
major challenges and problems
Question. If confirmed, you will be the first person to fill the
position of ASD(A).
In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the
ASD(A)?
Answer. I support the acting Under Secretary's position in his
Initial Guidance where he outlined the following six major challenges
that confront the AT&L enterprise:
(1) Supporting the war efforts
(2) Ensuring affordable programs
(3) Achieving more efficient execution of product and service
acquisitions
(4) Strengthening the industrial base
(5) Strengthening the acquisition workforce
(6) Protecting the future despite budget decline
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. In Performing the Duties as Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition), I either chair or support the working groups formed by
the acting Under Secretary (Acquisition) to focus on addressing these
major challenges. If confirmed, I will continue to champion these
activities.
Supporting war efforts places top priority on ensuring the needs of
the warfighters are met as effectively, efficiently, and timely as
possible.
Ensuring affordable programs will be pursued by enforcing the
discipline of data-based decisions in our acquisition programs. If
confirmed, I will ensure the effects of policy and process decisions
are measured through data for programs. Lessons learned will provide
support to future decisions. I will leverage the Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) oversight to require portfolio affordability analyses to
inform programmatic decisions. Finally, I will focus on acquisition
processes being more responsive to the Warfighter and more cost
effective for the taxpayer by exposing Defense acquisition experience
into the early formulation of program requirements. These measures
should also underpin more efficient execution of product and service
acquisitions.
Strengthening of the industrial base will be undertaken by
systematic evaluation of proposed acquisition programs to understand
potential impacts on critical national manufacturing resources. The
system must be built into the program review process, combining data
from program executives with data collected through AT&L's Sector-by-
Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) assessment.
To strengthen the acquisition workforce, I am focused on the
training, education and evaluation of the workforce. There must be a
conscious effort to elevate the status, prestige and professional
standards of acquisition personnel. The United States has the best-
equipped military in the world. The capability and professionalism of
the Defense acquisition workforce are major underlying factors in this
success. I will work with the Military Department leadership to elevate
the promotion potential and the prestige of the Acquisition Workforce
to instill a culture of cost-consciousness across the Department, the
leadership must demonstrate consistently cost-conscious decisions and
the training and rewards system must focus on cost consciousness.
To protect the future, I will focus on achieving small business
goals, advocate competition, use Open Architecture and Intellectual
Property, assess manpower and training needs, and advocate the
investment accounts.
acquisition organization
Question. Do you believe that the office of the ASD(A) is
appropriately organized and staffed to execute its management and
oversight responsibilities?
Answer. The organizations supporting the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (ASD(A)) have served me well in the
past 6 months that I have been performing the duties. If confirmed, I
will do an assessment to ensure the organization and staffing fully
support the execution of the office's management and oversight
responsibilities.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the structure or
operations of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)?
Answer. I strongly support the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs'
initiatives to emphasize cost-informed decisions in the military needs
validation process. The current construct encourages direct and open
discussion between senior military needs officials and USD(AT&L). If
confirmed, I will work continuously to advise USD(AT&L) in the
evolution of these processes to deliver better capability.
Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe are needed in
the lines of authority and accountability for the acquisition of major
weapon systems?
Answer. I see no need for changes at this time. I believe in clear
lines of authority and accountability for the procurement of major
weapon systems. If confirmed, I will continuously assess and advise
USD(AT&L) on any changes that I believe might be needed.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to empower
program managers to execute major defense acquisition programs and hold
them accountable for how well their programs perform?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the implementation of the
Department's strategy in response to section 853 of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007. The foundation of
accountability is based on competency, continuity, and experience. As
DAU President, my focus has been on assessing the training methods and
needs with the Military Departments. As a result of this assessment, we
are changing how we train our acquisition workforce, and we will
require demonstration of competency to be qualified for positions. If
confirmed, I will reinforce this effort and also work to ensure that
program senior leadership continuity exists. Finally, I support the
acting Under Secretary's initiative to include specific goals and
objectives in the military and civilian evaluations relating to program
execution to reinforce accountability.
major weapon system acquisition
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given decreasing defense budgets, the
historic cost growth trends for major systems, and the continuing costs
of ongoing contingency operations?
Answer. I support the acting Under Secretary's position that the
current investment budget is affordable if properly managed but that it
will be challenging to do so. Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter foresaw
the Department's imminent economic situation and began the Better
Buying Power initiative in 2010 to ensure that the performance of the
defense acquisition system was in the best interest of the warfighter
and taxpayers. As Co-Chair of the team that supported the Better Buying
Power initiative, it is my observation that there is clear evidence
that we can do better business deals for the Department. We must reduce
the cost growth and the number of failed programs to meet our minimum
needs for recapitalization and modernization.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make cost control an ingrained
culture. As the ASD(A), I will advise the Under Secretary on
affordability methods that produce results. I will integrate
affordability and cost-consciousness into the acquisition workforce
training. I will work to control potential cost growth for existing
programs and work to improve the Department's requirements,
acquisition, and budgeting processes to ensure investment decisions are
informed by sound affordability constraints.
Question. What would be the impact of a decision by the Department
to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?
Answer. I believe additional reductions in our recapitalization and
modernization rates could jeopardize our ability to keep up with
anticipated military threats, reduce production efficiency, increase
sustainment costs for the existing force structure, and impact the
health of the industrial base. The Department must balance force
structure with operating costs, capital investments, and modernization.
Question. Nearly half of DOD's major defense acquisition programs
have exceeded the so-called ``Nunn-McCurdy'' cost growth standards
established in section 2433 of title 10, U.S.C., to identify seriously
troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 (WSARA) tightened the standards for addressing such
programs.
What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address the out-
of-control cost growth on DOD's major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on continued implementation of
WSARA and its tools. Emphasis on cost control business skills will help
the work force aggressively manage programs at risk of cost growth.
With the help of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund,
the Department is working to rebuild its organic acquisition expertise
that has had its fundamental acquisition and business skills atrophy
and are encouraging industry to do the same.
Question. What steps if any do you believe that the Department
should consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition
programs that exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in
the ``Nunn-McCurdy'' provision?
Answer. I believe DOD has full authority to take appropriate
measures, including major restructuring or termination of poor
performing programs. Due to our overall affordability constraints, the
Department will need to be more aggressive in taking action before
Nunn-McCurdy threshold breaches occur. If confirmed, I will support
USD(AT&L) in the practice of conducting Nunn-McCurdy-like reviews as
soon as cost growth became likely so that this mechanism is applied
proactively instead of reactively.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy
provision, as revised by section 206?
Answer. No.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to
recommend terminating a program that has experienced critical cost
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. If confirmed, the five criteria listed in the law will
continue to guide me.
operating and support costs
Question. The Department estimates that operating and support (O&S)
costs account for up to 70 percent of the acquisition costs of major
weapon systems. Section 832 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 requires
the Department to take a series of steps to improve its processes for
estimating, managing, and reducing such costs.
What is the current status of the Department's efforts to implement
the requirements of section 832?
Answer. USD(AT&L) has instituted a number of programs and tools,
such as the Logistics Assessment Guidebook, the O&S Cost Management
Guidebook, and the Business Case Analysis Guidebook to assist in
managing O&S Costs and improving life cycle affordability. Training
curriculum at DAU is being updated to reflect these new requirements
and associated skills. The implementation of section 805, NDAA of 2010
assigns a Product Support Manager to each major weapon system.
USD(AT&L) has enhanced the collection, reporting, retaining, and
updating of O&S cost information (organic and commercial) throughout a
program's life cycle, as well as improving the ability to standardize
reporting and collection of this data.
On September 14, 2011, the Acting Under Secretary signed a
memorandum entitled, ``Document Streamlining--Life-Cycle Sustainment
Plan (LCSP),'' which directed that each Major Defense Acquisition
Program (MDAP) complete an improved and streamlined LSCP earlier in the
life-cycle (Milestone A). This tool was designed to assist the Program
Manager in the effective and affordable management of life-cycle
sustainment requirements. It drives integration among functional areas
(particularly between the Product Support and Engineering communities)
to ensure that O&S cost drivers influence system design early on,
especially as related to reliability, the single largest driver of O&S
costs. Section 832 requirements are being incorporated into a major
revision of the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02 which
will include a specific enclosure that addresses Life Cycle Sustainment
Management. The LCSP, along with increased focus and guidance at the
Program, Service, and Department level will ensure that we continue to
reduce O&S costs throughout a Program's life-cycle.
The Better Buying Power initiative also required programs to take
full life cycle costs into the formulation of affordability targets and
requirements as well, which provides for emphasis on the total
ownership costs of O&S.
Question. What steps remain to be taken to implement section 832,
and what is the Department's schedule for taking these steps?
Answer. The Department is currently addressing implementation of
the requirements of section 832 in a major revision of the (DODI)
5000.02. To ensure compliance, this policy will be supplemented with
guidance, training, mentorship, and oversight. Insight will be gained
into the effectiveness of our efforts through Defense Acquisition
Reviews lessons learned incorporated into future policy refinements.
Question. What steps, if any, are needed to ensure that the
requirements and acquisition communities fully and effectively
collaborate to understand and control the O&S costs prior to and early
in product development, when it is possible to have the most
significant impact on those costs?
Answer. The Department recognizes the alignment and partnership
among the operational requirements, acquisition, and sustainment
communities are essential to optimizing warfighter operating and
support strategies at a minimal cost. O&S costs are directly
attributable to the operational concept and sustainment requirements
for systems determined very early in the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) process before developmental costs are
incurred. The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) provides sufficient
fidelity for the warfighter's capability requirements to inform the
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). The Weapon System Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 (WSARA) coupled with recent changes within the JCIDS have
placed a premium within the Department on conducting a thorough,
rigorous AOA prior to initiating large acquisition programs. The AOA
must provide full consideration of possible trade-offs among cost,
schedule, and performance objectives for each alternative considered in
the context of its life cycle to include energy considerations; and an
assessment of whether the joint military requirement can be met in a
manner that is consistent with the cost and schedule objectives
recommended by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This
has resulted in a better examination of the tradeoffs among cost,
capability, and risks of programs prior to Milestone A. The results of
the AOA provide the acquisition Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
information on which to base an informed materiel solution decision at
Milestone A, prior to proceeding into the developmental phase of
acquisition. An important input into this decision is ``targeting
affordability and controlling costs,'' which was an essential element
of Dr. Carter's Better Buying Power initiative. O&S costs associated
with the system solution are highlighted as one of the affordability
targets at Milestone A. Further, the user's Capability Development
Document (CDD) and the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) include O&S
costs as a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) prior to program initiation.
O&S cost estimates are then closely monitored by both the acquisition
executive and the JROC throughout development. Including planning for
sustainment and associated costs ``upfront'' enables the acquisition
and requirements communities to provide a system with optimal
availability and reliability to the warfighter at best value.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
Department needs to take to bring O&S costs under control?
Answer. Implementation of the ``Better Buying Power'' initiatives
will bring Operating and Sustainment (O&S) costs under control overall,
but specific focus on affordability targets at Milestone A and the
requirements at Milestone B will place the appropriate focus on the
affordability of a capability as a Total Ownership Cost (TOC) to the
Department. Doing this early, when technical and programmatic trades
can be made most effectively, will allow for full attention to
lifecycle costs as part of the design trades. Reduction of costs in the
Operations & Support Phase of an acquisition program is closely married
to the ``Should Cost'' initiative. In this execution of this phase, the
program office team should take discrete, measurable actions to reduce
total ownership costs. The ``Will Cost'' or Independent Cost Estimate
(ICE) projection, including projected Operations & Support Phase costs,
should be continually reviewed during design trade-offs and
programmatic decision points to ensure management of these costs.
Additionally, if confirmed, I will also support the use of
performance-based sustainment strategies to drive O&S costs down.
Properly structured and executed, performance-based sustainment
strategies produce better performance results at less cost than
traditional, transactional sustainment approaches.
systems engineering
Question. One of the premises for WSARA was that the best way to
improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a
sounder footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in
the early phases of the acquisition process. The Defense Science Board
Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation reported in May 2008
that ``the single most important step necessary'' to address high rates
of failure on defense acquisition programs is ``to ensure programs are
formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the
beginning.''
Do you believe that DOD has the systems engineering and
developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed
to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements,
acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition
programs?
Answer. Since the passage of WSARA, the Department has worked to
rebuild the systems engineering and developmental test expertise
required for effective acquisition. While much progress has been made,
I believe the Department can continue to improve its engineering and
test practice.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department's
implementation to date of section 102 of WSARA, regarding systems
engineering?
Answer. I believe the Department has properly and effectively
implemented section 102. The organization of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering has been established, the
office has been staffed with highly qualified teams, and it is
providing guidance and oversight to the systems engineering
capabilities in the Military Services.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
implement this provision?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary in working
with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their Service
Acquisition Executives to ensure the effective implementation of
recently approved systems engineering policy and guidance and the
adequacy of the competency, capacity, and authority of the systems
engineering workforce as critical components in support of successful
acquisition system performance.
Question. Do you believe that the Nation as a whole is producing
enough systems engineers and designers and giving them sufficient
experience working on engineering and design projects to ensure that
DOD can access an experienced and technically trained systems
engineering and design workforce? If not, what do you recommend should
be done to address the shortfall?
I do not believe the Nation is currently producing enough systems
engineers and engineers in other disciplines to meet the Department's
complex engineering challenges. The Department has ongoing efforts to
promote engineering education in college curricula, and, if confirmed,
I will support those efforts to promote engineering as an important
field of study with our national educational system. I will also
promote engineering excellence within the acquisition work force, to
include the training curriculum.
Question. Last year, the chairman and ranking member of the Armed
Services Committee expressed concern that the annual report to Congress
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing failed to meet
applicable statutory requirements.
What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that future
reports on developmental testing and systems engineering fully comply
with applicable statutory requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary to ensure
timely, complete data is provided as needed to ensure sufficiently
detailed reports are provided in assessing the developmental test and
evaluation and systems engineering capabilities of DOD.
technological maturity
Question. Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone
Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to certify
that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of
maturity before Milestone B approval.
What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
DOD complies with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, in support to the Under Secretary as chair of
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) for major defense acquisition programs, I will ensure technology
readiness assessments (TRAs) are properly used to ensure compliance
with section 2366b. I will focus on evaluating whether the stated
formal TRA levels are critically assessed for risk status prior to
entering Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). Technology,
engineering, and integration risk associated with products entering EMD
must all be assessed thoroughly before committing to EMD. Technology
Readiness Level (TRLs) inform engineering risk analysis, they do not
replace them.
Question. What steps if any will you take to ensure that the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is
adequately staffed and resourced to support decisionmakers in complying
with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with ASD(R&E) and other members
of OSD and the Military Department staffs to ensure the adequacy of
resources available to meet the challenges of complying with the
requirements of section 2366b. Also, I will work to ensure the
acquisition workforce is provided the right training.
Question. Are you satisfied that technology readiness assessments
adequately address systems integration and engineering issues which are
the cause of many cost overruns and schedule delays in acquisition
programs?
Answer. TRAs inform program managers with respect to risk
management strategies, planning, and execution, but their results are
extremely sensitive to their programmatic and operational context.
TRA's by themselves are not adequate for addressing systems integration
and engineering risks. TRAs are, however, absolutely necessary for
identifying and maturing the Critical Technology Elements enabling the
key performance characteristics of advanced systems.
Question. Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in
acquisition programs, what other steps should the Department take to
increase accountability and discipline in the acquisition process?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to improve the acquisition
workforce, to improve its professional skills, and to instill a culture
of cost consciousness and stewardship of the taxpayer's dollars
throughout. Critical in this and all of our Better Buying Power
initiatives is the education and training of our workforce, which the
DAU is addressing through many avenues, to include Rapid Deployment
Training, and Mission Assistance and curriculum updates. The Department
is striving to ensure that everyone who touches acquisition in a
meaningful way is qualified in the skill sets required to achieve
successful acquisition results. Finally, I will work to ensure clear
goals and objectives are included in workforce evaluations to ensure
accountability.
Question. What features of an acquisition program, in your view,
contribute most to the effective maturation and integration of advanced
technologies?
Answer. The most important ``feature'' needed to mature and
integrate advanced technologies in an acquisition program is strong
leadership with business skills to engage multiple resources to field
rapidly the best technology at the best price. The Better Buying Power
initiative has committed the DOD to a path of improving competitive
contracting practices and using Open Systems Architectures to reduce
redundancy and maximize value. Solution sources across DOD must be
searched and analyzed to provide mature, innovative solutions that can
be integrated into current and developing systems.
The Government is moving to manage more effectively the business
and technical architectures of weapon systems and direct the use of
competitive acquisition practices. Competition is the environment in
which innovation and lower costs are born and, when coupled with an
Open Systems Architecture, provide the ability to deliver cost-
effectively cutting edge solutions across a wider array of platforms.
Critical to this strategy is for architectures and integration
environments to be open, published, and accessible.
The Government has become more practiced and aware in asserting its
data rights. Taking delivery of designs and supporting information, and
ensuring our data rights are fully asserted as a part of accepting the
contract delivery are critical steps to enabling a level playing field
for healthy competition and cyclical recompetes. This is another
important element of providing lower cost and spawning innovation,
while also reducing the chance of vendor-lock.
There will always be a need for a ``platform'' (ship, aircraft,
ground system, etc.) integrator. The market environment is created
through our business practices and contract incentives, such that
platform integrators can cost-effectively integrate components and
capabilities from Government-provided sources. Open System
Architecture, asserting Government Data Rights, publishing interfaces,
regular cyclical open competitions, tech insertions, and open business
models will yield the desired lower price and increased performance.
concurrency
Question. Some of the Department's largest and most troubled
acquisition programs appear to have suffered significantly from
excessive concurrency--the effort to produce a weapon system, even as
it is still being designed.
What impact do you believe that such excessive concurrency has on
our efforts to produce major weapon systems on schedule and on budget?
Answer. I believe excessive concurrency can drive cost growth and
result in major schedule disruptions that produce further inefficiency.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address this
issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that balance is
properly struck between the risk associated with the development phase,
the urgency of the need, and the likely impact on cost and schedule of
any related risk. I will ensure that appropriate tools such as the
Configuration Steering Board are used to assess the risk/benefit of any
given degree concurrent development and production to insure that major
weapons systems programs clearly articulate the framing assumptions
underlying concurrency risks, to track progress against these
assumptions and the resulting concurrency effects, and I will require
programs to reassess levels of concurrent development and production
planned as necessary if these underlying assumptions change.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that it
is useful and appropriate to require prime contractors on major defense
acquisition programs to share in concurrency costs?
Answer. In most circumstances, the government will bear the bulk of
concurrency risk. When the government initiates production before
development is complete, concurrency may drive up production costs as
design changes are implemented late in the production process or after
Government accepts delivery. Industry should not be asked to bear
excessive risk but should be incentivized to reduce those risks through
design methodologies. In a well-structured program, concurrency risk
should be reduced to the extent that industry can reasonably bear a
portion or all of that risk. Until industry is willing to share this
risk as reasonable part of doing business, it may be premature to
contract for production.
Question. In your view, would a requirement for such cost sharing
reduce the likelihood of excessive concurrency in the development and
production of major weapon systems?
Answer. In my view, this cost sharing would incentivize prime
contractors to reduce the impacts of excess concurrency on cost,
schedule, and performance. Cost sharing arrangements don't change the
existence of the risk, but if industry is unwilling to accept some
concurrency risk as a condition of a production contract, then it is an
indication that the risk may be too high to begin production.
Recent congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to reduce
technical and performance risks associated with developing and
producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize
premature entry into production.
fixed price-type contracts
Question. Recent congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to
reduce technical and performance risks associated with developing and
producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use
of cost-reimbursable contracts.
Do you think that the Department should move towards more fixed
price-type contracting in developing or procuring major defense
acquisition programs? Why or why not?
Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 16 prescribes
policies, procedures, and guidance for selecting a contract type
appropriate to the circumstances of the acquisition. A wide selection
of contract types is available to provide needed flexibility in
acquiring the large variety and volume of supplies and services
required by agencies. I believe the Department needs to move towards
having the appropriate skills to know what risk and opportunities there
are to ensure that cost certainty is available to form the basis of
negotiating a fixed price type contract where appropriate. This skill
is needed on both the Government and industry teams.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the Department to use a cost-type contract for the
production of a major weapon system?
Answer. I do not know a case where a cost type production task is
appropriate, but would not want to limit the department in utilizing
the full toolkit if a compelling case exists.
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations
Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance
expectations. Section 201 of WSARA seeks to address this problem by
promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs.
Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition,
budget and requirements communities in DOD can help ensure more
realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure such communication?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to take steps to forge closer
ties between military needs and acquisition solution development.
ASD(A) now has a small team of individuals who directly works with the
OIPTs and the JROC staff as requirements are being vetted through the
process to work the assessment of affordability, realism, and
executability of the requirements. Input from this assessment is
provided to the acting Under Secretary to assist him in his interaction
on the JROC. These informed decisions can yield savings in time and
resources for acquisition responses.
Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition
and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule,
and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.
Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development
can help improve the performance of the Department's major acquisition
programs?
Answer. Yes. The Department applies the term ``incremental'' to
both the incremental and spiral acquisition approaches. An incremental
approach could be the right strategy when the program manager is faced
with an evolving requirement, rapidly evolving technology (IT), an
evolving threat, or where an investment in an immature technology is
needed to achieve a longer-term advantage. Fielding a partial (80
percent, for example) now, with an eye to incorporating the new
technology when it is ready later, is a good strategy. Getting a
capability into the warfighters' hands sooner, then upgrading to a more
capable system can be a smart business approach, and better serve our
troops.
Question. What risks do you see in the Department's use of
incremental acquisition and spiral development?
Answer. The purpose of incremental acquisition is to reduce risk
and speed delivery. An open design that can accommodate incremental
upgrades is necessary to reduce risks and may not be engineered
appropriately. Part of the trade off for lowering the initial technical
risk is the necessity in such a strategy to incorporate an intentional
plan that allows for upgrading early deliveries to the final
configuration or cutting changes into the production line. Cost and
complexity for these upgrades is an important consideration that must
be factored into the overall plan. Smart use of open architecture and
commercial standards, assertion of data rights and a well defined form,
fit, and function interface construct are important to upgrading
systems at a reasonable cost.
Question. In your view, has the Department's approach to
incremental acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or
why not?
Answer. The Department applies the term ``incremental'' to both the
incremental and spiral acquisition approaches. In my view, the
Department's success has been mixed and we are working to improve our
workforce's skill set to improve it. We produce open designs that can
accommodate unforeseen new technology when it is available and mature.
These opportunities for improvement can come from either new
technology, possibly from private investment, or from emergent
capability needs derived from real-world warfighting experience.
Preplanned future spirals are generally not as agile to emerging
threats as need be. Our success depends upon technical risk management,
requirements management, avoiding and breaking vendor-lock, and
responsive program management and oversight structures. Incremental
acquisition strategies that enable multiple block upgrades and risk/
cost-prudent infusion of new capabilities can provide the Department
with a useful flexibility and efficient improvements in capability.
Question. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure
that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can
accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?
Answer. Each increment of capability requires approved/achievable
requirements, full funding for the increment, and a test plan designed
to assess the capability the increment is expected to provide. Our
policies are designed to support an incremental acquisition approach.
Question. How should the Department ensure that the incremental
acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines
against which to measure performance?
Answer. Each increment of capability requires approved/achievable
requirements, full funding for the increment and a test plan designed
to assess the capability the increment is expected to provide. These
are the Acquisition Program Baselines under which programs are managed
and measured. DOD policies are designed to support an incremental
acquisition approach.
funding and requirements stability
Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition
programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and
requirements. In the past, DOD has attempted to provide greater funding
stability through the use of multiyear contracts. More recently, the
Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting
Configuration Steering Boards to exercise control over any changes to
requirements that would increase program costs.
Do you support the use of Configuration Steering Boards to increase
requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes, I strongly support activities such as Configuration
Steering Boards that provide Service leadership a forum to review and
assess proposed changes to program requirements or system configuration
and preclude adverse impact on program cost and/or schedule.
Question. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to
increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. Implementation of Affordability Targets at Milestone A,
Affordability Requirements at Milestone B, and working to build
realistic schedules and hold programs to them are recommended steps.
Combined with the Configuration Steering Board process, these steps as
described in the Better Buying Power (BBP) will increase the program
funding and requirements stability.
time-certain development
Question. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA)
panel recommended in 2006 that the Department set fixed durations for
program phases, including a requirement for the delivery of the first
unit of a major weapon system to operational forces within 6 years of
the Milestone A decision. The DAPA panel believed that durations for
program phases could be limited by ensuring appropriate levels of
technological maturity, defined risk-reduction horizons, and program
execution criteria, while allowing for the use of spiral development or
block upgrades for enhancements in capability or increased requirements
over time. Proponents of this approach, called time-certain
development, have highlighted its potential for helping ensure that
``evolutionary'' (or ``knowledge-based'') acquisition strategies are
used to develop major systems by forcing more manageable commitments to
discrete increments of capability and stabilize funding by making costs
and schedules more predictable.
What is your view of the DAPA panel's recommendation?
Answer. Many of the DAPA panel findings--shortening development
timelines, reducing non-value added oversight, improving coordination
with the requirements process--are included in the Better Business
Power initiatives put in place last year. The Department is seeing
positive results from these efforts.
Question. What is your view of time-certain development as an
acquisition strategy for major weapons systems development programs?
Answer. I believe with the appropriate qualified workforce being
available, this strategy has merit in application for many of our
programs. The Government workforce need to understand technologies and
their inherent risks, have a thorough knowledge of the industrial
capability and have the requisite exposure to draft a reasonable
acquisition strategy to conduct evolutionary acquisition. I believe
these skills still need further development to successfully execute the
panel's recommendations. I believe we are working to achieve this goal
through Defense Acquisition Workforce Defense Fund (DAWDF).
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
implement time-certain development strategies in the future acquisition
programs?
Answer. Focusing on where skills are available and where the
commitment of funding is greatest, I will, if confirmed, focus on a
step-by-step implementation of the recommendations by aggressively
reviewing requirements for incremental build opportunities, focusing on
open architecture development with appropriate assertion of
intellectual property rights, and carefully assessing schedule
development and market research. These tools would allow for time
certain constraints to be realistically and effectively applied, and
quickly meet the needs of warfighters in response to urgent needs.
multiyear contracts
Question. The statement of managers accompanying section 811 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major
defense systems under multiyear contracts as follows: ``The conferees
agree that ``substantial savings' under section 2306b(a)(I) of title
10, U.S.C., means savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of
carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that
multiyear contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at
less than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department
presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other
requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The conferees agree with
a Government Accountability Office finding that any major system that
is at the end of its production line is unlikely to meet these
standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multiyear
procurement contract.''
If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you anticipate
that you would support a multiyear contract with expected savings of
less than 10 percent?
Answer. If confirmed, I will expect that any case brought forward
with less than 10 percent savings expected would need to be assessed
against the compelling need and how it can best serve the warfighter
and taxpayer before I would recommend it be considered.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you
support a multiyear contract for a major system at the end of its
production line?
Answer. If confirmed, it would depend on an exceptionally strong
case for me to support a recommendation for multiyear procurement for a
program when it is nearing the end of production. It depends upon the
circumstances of the particular procurement.
Question. What are your views on multiyear procurements? Under what
circumstances do you believe they should be used?
Answer. I support the statement of managers' requirement
accompanying section 811 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008.
Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that
constitute ``substantial savings'' for purposes of the defense
multiyear procurement statute, title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. The 10 percent figure cited in the conference manager's
statement is a reasonable benchmark but it need not be absolutely
required in special cases.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a
multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that
have-unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost,
scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply
with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute,
title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. I do not know of circumstances that would support multiyear
procurement for programs that are executing unsatisfactorily. If the
history has been replaced with demonstrated satisfactory performance,
then compliance with the requirements of the defense multiyear
procurement statute, title 10 U.S.C. section 2306b, could be assessed
and if appropriate, multiyear recommended.
Question. How would you analyze and evaluate proposals for
multiyear procurement for such programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure analysis and evaluation of
proposals for multiyear procurements are in accordance with all
statutory and regulatory requirements, and as noted previously, I will
ensure for all programs that we fully understand the benefit to the
warfighter and taxpayer before I recommend proceeding with a multiyear
procurement.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in
determining whether procuring such a system under a multiyear contract,
is appropriate and should be proposed to Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all of the regulatory and
statutory requirements are met before recommending to proceed with any
multiyear procurement.
Question. What is the impact of the Department's current budget
situation, in your view, on the feasibility and advisability of
additional multiyear procurement contracts for major weapon systems?
Answer. If compliant with the defense multiyear procurement statue,
title 10 U.S.C. section 2306b, programs submitted for multiyear could
provide savings to the department, particularly when there is a firm
requirement and the quantities to be procured are stable.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a
multiyear procurement?
Answer. If the Department has done its job properly, the
cancellation of a multiyear contract should be a very rare event.
However, there are circumstances when it could occur. One such event
would be the failure to fund a program year. Another would be the
failure of the contractor to perform, which ultimately could lead to a
decision to terminate for default. In these circumstances, cancellation
of a multiyear procurement could be appropriate or even required.
Question. What impact if any does the use of a multiyear contract
have, in your view, on the operation and sustainment cost for a weapon
system?
Answer. Appropriate contract length should be determined based on a
number of factors to include design and support concept maturity,
maintenance strategy, contractual arrangements, and risk assessments.
When properly applied, a multiyear contract often lowers a program's
operating and support (O&S) costs. The stability provided by a
multiyear contract enables the prime contractor and subcontractors in
the supply chain to make investments that improve their product and
processes and to recover a return on investment (ROI). Without
multiyear contracts, industry is forced to make investment decisions
based on a 1 year ROI period. For complex weapon systems, that is
rarely sufficient to design, implement, and support any improvements
that make real gains in the areas of efficiency and cost reduction.
Question. To what extent should the Department consider operation
and sustainment costs, and the stability of such costs, before making a
decision whether to acquire a major system under a multiyear contract?
Answer. The Department strongly considers operation and sustainment
support (O&S) costs and the stability of these costs when making
multiyear contracting decisions to focus on reducing the total cost of
ownership. Multiyear contracts incentivize contractors within the
industrial base and encourage them to implement cost saving
investments. This in turn drives down costs and allows them the
opportunity to recover a return on investment (ROI), investing early on
and realizing benefits in the later years of the contract. As part of
the consideration process, the Department conducts Business Case
Analyses (BCA) throughout a Program's lifecycle to optimize sustainment
strategies and to make informed acquisition decisions. The BCA provides
a standardized and objective process that can be used to determine the
best sustainment strategy for a Major Defense Acquisition Program
(MDAP). The Department uses this information to make informed decisions
that mitigate risk, improve performance, and select the most affordable
solution available.
Question. The Defense Department's fiscal year 2013 budget proposal
seeks approval for $52.7 billion in multiyear procurement contracts.
This proposal would affect the Virginia-class submarine, the DDG-51
destroyer, the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and CH-47 helicopter programs.
What impact would procuring these systems under multiyear contracts
have on the Department's budgetary flexibility in a period when tight
budgets and possible sequestration could require deep budget cuts?
Answer. Multiyear procurement strategies must provide for
substantial savings and must comply with congressional requirements
established in section 2306b of title 10, U.S.C. In general, I favor
multiyear procurement strategies if they provide such savings.
Frequently, multiyear procurements can offer substantial savings
through improved economies in production processes, better use of
industrial facilities, and a reduction in the administrative burden in
the placement and administration of contracts. While multiyear
procurements reduce the government's flexibility during the years the
strategy is being executed, the potential for multiyear procurement can
be a powerful incentive to suppliers to reduce cost and negotiated
price.
Question. Do you believe that it is in the best interests of the
Department to restrict its budgetary flexibility in this manner? Why or
why not?
Answer. In general, the total percentage of the Department's budget
committed to multiyear contracts is low. The Department examines risk
factors in conjunction with the potential for cost savings in
determining whether multiyear procurement would be appropriate for a
program, and multiyear procurement is one of the Department's
initiatives focused on improving funding and requirements stability.
While multiyear procurement restricts the Department's budgetary
flexibility somewhat, the benefits of significant savings to the
taxpayer and improved stability of requirements and funding both to
industry and the Military Departments may far outweigh any disadvantage
from restriction in budgetary flexibility but that flexibility must
naturally be considered in the final determination.
continuing competition and organizational conflicts of interest
Question. Section 202 of WSARA requires DOD to take steps to
promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition)
throughout the life of major defense acquisition programs.
What is your view on the utility of continuing competition as a
tool to achieve long-term innovation and cost savings on major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. I am a strong proponent of competition to achieve
innovation, to reinvigorate the industrial base, to focus on
engineering and business management excellence, and to drive out
inefficiencies and costs.
Question. Do you believe that such continuing competition is a
viable option on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that competition can be conducted at all levels,
prime and sub contractors, large and small business, and at the
component and system level. The budget itself can be the competition,
i.e., an affordable program or no program.
Question. In your view, has the consolidation of the defense
industrial base gone too far and undermined competition for defense
contracts?
I do not believe that consolidation has gone too far; however, with
the shrinking diversity of capabilities being procured today compared
to history (airframes, as an example), we do need to consider all
methods of creating competition, as discussed in the previous question.
We will examine merger transactions carefully to ensure we focus on
preserving competition and facilitating the most efficient and
effective industrial base possible.
Question. If so, what steps if any can and should DOD take to
address this issue?
Answer. It is the Department's policy to oppose transactions that
reduce or eliminate competition and are not ultimately in the best
interest of the warfighter and taxpayer. The Department continues to
discourage mergers and acquisitions among defense suppliers that are
anti-competitive or injurious to national security. The Department has
long-established procedures to provide information and the support
needed by the antitrust regulators for their merger reviews. Ultimately
however, the Department is not an antitrust regulator, and the ability
for the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to
intervene must meet statutory criteria. In areas where consolidation
has resulted in a loss of competition, the Department has in the past
encouraged new entrants or explored the use of alternative
capabilities.
Question. Section 203 of WSARA requires the use of competitive
prototypes for major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of
producing such prototypes would exceed the lifecycle benefits of
improved performance and increased technological and design maturity
that prototypes would achieve.
Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. I support the use of competitive prototyping for Major
Defense Acquisition Programs where the use of this approach
appropriately incentivizes industry and reduces Government risk.
Competitive prototyping can be an effective mechanism for maturing
technology, refining performance requirements, and improving our
understanding of how those requirements can drive systems acquisition
costs.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of
competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial?
Answer. When technology is immature or where the benefits of
alternative technical approaches are best assessed after further
maturation, competitive prototyping during the technology development
phase is an important element of a comprehensive technical risk
management process. Competitive prototyping may require a higher
initial investment, longer technology development phase schedules, and
carefully incentivized competitive sources to properly identify and
drive down risk.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such
prototypes is likely to outweigh the potential benefits?
Answer. In cases where the material solution is based on mature,
well-integrated technologies and well-integrated and well-demonstrated
designs, the upfront investment costs of competitive prototyping may
not be offset by the potential reduction of system lifecycle costs and
must be evaluated as part of a careful cost-benefit analysis.
Question. Section 207 of WSARA required the Department to
promulgate new regulations to address organizational conflicts of
interest on major defense acquisition programs.
What is your understanding of the steps the Department has taken to
implement section 207?
Answer. Section 207 of the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA) of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-23) required the Secretary of Defense to
revise the Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(DFARS) to provide uniform guidance and tighten existing requirements
for organizational conflicts of interest by contractors in major
defense acquisition programs. The DFARS rule was published on December
29, 2010. Additionally, the Civilian Acquisition Advisory Council
(CAAC) determined that the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
coverage on organizational conflicts of interest needed updating and a
proposed rule was published on April 20, 2011. The public comment
period was extended to July 27, 2011, and the CAAC is evaluating public
comments. The report is due to be completed shortly. The Department's
Panel on Contracting Integrity has also conducted a review of post-
employment restrictions applicable to DOD personnel pursuant to Section
833 of the National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Section 833
also required the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to
perform an independent assessment of the Panel's report. The Panel
completed its report in December 2010 and it was provided to NAPA for
its assessment. NAPA completed its review in February 2012 and provided
additional recommendations for post award restrictions. The Panel will
review the NAPA recommendations in 2012 and recommend the way forward.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe DOD should
take to address organizational conflicts of interest in major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. The Department published a final DFARS rule in December
2010 that provides uniform guidance and tightens existing requirements
for organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) by contractors in major
defense acquisition programs. Currently, the Civilian Acquisition
Council and the Defense Acquisition Council are evaluating comments on
proposed OCI changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) that
update and broaden coverage of OCI issues. If confirmed, I will support
the Department's activities in ensuring that OCI issues are adequately
reviewed in developing acquisition strategies.
Question. What are your views on the use of system engineering and
technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense
contractors to provide ``independent'' advice to the Department on the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. Contractors must not be used to perform inherently
governmental functions and they must not be used in a situation where a
conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest would
exist.
Question. What lines do you believe the Department should draw
between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently
governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?
Answer. I believe that inherently governmental functions involve
the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority, or
the making of value judgments in decisions which obligate government
funds and commit the government contractually.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and
proprietary information of DOD and other defense contractors?
Answer. The Department issued an interim rule amending the DFARS to
implement section 821 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. Section 821
provides authority for certain types of Government support contractors
to have access to proprietary technical data belonging to prime
contractors and other third parties, provided that the technical data
owner may require the support contractor to execute a non-disclosure
agreement having certain restrictions and remedies. This rule was
effective March 2, 2011. Work on the final rule is ongoing.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for
subcontracts in a manner that would disadvantage the government or
potential competitors in the private sector?
Answer. Competition is one of the four cornerstones of the Better
Buying Power initiatives. I believe that competition at both the prime
and subcontract levels is essential. One step we can and are taking is
to challenge prime contractors' practices, such as the use of exclusive
teaming arrangements, and instead insist that competitive procurements
are employed throughout all levels of the supply chain. The Director of
Defense Pricing is accomplishing that in the course of the peer reviews
he conducts and I fully support that effort. If confirmed, I will
continue to emphasize the importance of effective competition at both
the prime and subcontract levels.
implementation of the weapon systems acquisition reform act of 2009
Question. Several new major weapons programs have been started
since the WSARA was enacted. Examples include the Ohio-Class Submarine
Replacement Program, the KC-46 Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement
Program, the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program, and the
Ground Combat Vehicle Program.
In your view, how effectively have such ``new start'' major defense
acquisition programs abided by the tenets, and implemented the
requirements, of the WSARA, particularly those that address ``starting
programs off right'' by requiring that early investment decisions be
informed by realistic cost estimates, sound systems engineering
knowledge and reliable technological risk assessments?
Answer. The Department has abided by the tenets and implemented the
requirements of WSARA in each of its ``new start'' programs begun since
the enactment of WSARA. This includes the examples you cite. The
certifications required by WSARA provide a means to enforce each
program's implementation.
Question. Where do you think there might be room for improvement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support assessment of WSARA
implementation by these programs.
possible revisions to dodi 5000.02
Question. Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall is currently considering
revisions to DOD Instructions (DODI) 5000.02, which governs the defense
acquisition system.
What are the top five changes to this instruction you would
recommend to streamline or otherwise improve the defense acquisition
system?
Answer. There are five changes that I believe will improve the
acquisition system: First, fully implement and institutionalize the
Better Buying Power initiative; second, enforce the requirements of the
Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act and associated statute; third,
develop acquisition processes tailored to the unique characteristics of
information technology and rapid acquisition; fourth, improve the
quality of program business arrangements, and fifth, enhance the skills
of the acquisition workforce.
Question. What role do you expect to play if confirmed in the
review and revision of the DODI 5000.02?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be a principal advisor to the
USD(AT&L) in the development of all policies that will impact the DOD
acquisition process.
Question. What is your understanding of the schedule and objectives
of the review effort?
Answer. I understand that revised policies are in development and
will be coordinated throughout the department following USD(AT&L)
approval. In addition, I understand that we will be developing a
separate 5000 series document for the acquisition of services to ensure
we have policies tailored to the specific characteristics of those
important acquisitions. The intent is to coordinate and publish both
policies during this calendar year.
performance-based payments
Question. In 1995, the Federal Acquisition Regulation was revised
to create a new category of payments, known as Performance-Based
Payments (PBPs) on fixed-price contracts. PBPs are made on the basis of
the physical completion of authorized work, rather than the incurrence
of seller costs.
In your view, what advantages, if any, can the Department gain by
using PBPs more extensively in connection with fixed-price contracts
for the development of its major systems?
Answer. PBPs are not practical for use on all fixed-price
contracts, but when a fixed-price contract for development is
appropriate, the use of PBPs should be considered. When practical for
use, PBPs provide the opportunity for the Government and the contractor
to achieve a win-win financial arrangement. This win-win arrangement
occurs when the government provides better cash flow than customary
progress payments and the contractor accepts a lower profit rate in
consideration for the improved cash flow. PBPs are most practical for
use on stable production programs where there are objective
manufacturing milestones to use as PBP events and cost history to
establish the contractor's financing needs at each event. Development
contracts are generally less suitable for PBPs because objective events
are less plentiful and there is no cost history.
Question. Do you believe that PBPs should be the preferred means of
providing contract financing under fixed-price contracts for the
development of the Department's major systems? Why or why not?
Answer. As FAR states, PBPs are the preferred method when the
contracting officer determines them to be practical and the contractor
agrees to their use. However, PBPs are not practical for use on every
fixed-price contract and the contracting officer must determine whether
they are practical for a particular contract. PBPs are most practical
for use on stable production programs where there are objective
manufacturing milestones to use as PBP events and cost history to
establish the contractor's financing needs at each event. Development
contracts are generally less suitable for PBPs because objective events
are less plentiful and there is no cost history.
the better buying power initiative
Question. DOD's Better Buying Power initiative provides acquisition
professionals with important guidance on how to achieve greater
efficiency, enhanced productivity and affordability in how the
Department procures goods and services.
If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to follow-through on
this guidance and ensure that it is implemented as intended?
Answer. I am co-leader for the development, implementation, and
continued assessment of these initiatives. If confirmed, I will
continue to follow-through on implementation of the initiative and
carefully consider additional steps consistent with the principles and
objectives of the initiative.
Question. In particular, what steps will you take to ensure the
implementation of the following elements of the better buying power
initiative?
a. Sharing the benefits of cash flow
b. Targeting non-value-added costs
c. Mandating affordability as a requirement
e. Eliminating redundancy within warfighting portfolios
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize the steps already taken
toward better buying power in these areas, as well as implementing ways
to improve performance in these areas as identified:
Sharing the benefits of cash flow: The Better Buying Power
initiative includes the use of adjusted progress payments to
incentivize contractor performance, as well as providing the government
appropriate consideration for this benefit. Integral to this is the use
of Performance-Based Payments (PBP) in lieu of other than customary
progress payments where it makes sense to do so.
Targeting non-value-added costs: I will mandate the use of
``Should-Cost'' principles to eliminate non-value added costs at the
program level and continually reduce costs wherever it makes sense.
Review of the affordability requirement and Should Costs opportunities
is and will continue to be a major driver in all current and future
Defense Acquisition Board investment decisions. In parallel, continuing
to seize opportunities to eliminate duplicative and overly restrictive
requirements that add to costs without improving value is necessary. A
strong emphasis has been placed on this area during critical reviews of
Requests for Proposal (RFPs) under development, as well as critical
review of all contract deliverables (CDRLs) against this standard
throughout the life of a contract.
Affordability: The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must now
establish affordability targets at Milestone A decisions, to include
sustainment costs, that are applicable to design and decisions early in
the program. At Milestone B and beyond, these targets become
requirements, based on the information garnered from the technology
development phase and a more mature cost estimate. The affordability
requirements are now being treated as Key Performance Parameters in the
Acquisition Program Baseline and will be closely monitored during the
remainder of the acquisition process.
Eliminating redundancy in warfighting portfolios: A program's
affordability assessment is in the context of the portfolio within
which it resides, and needs to include analysis both at the parent
Military Departments, and DOD wide, levels. Portfolio reviews have
commenced to identify existing redundancies. If confirmed, I will
continue to emphasize that each Military Department regularly review
its portfolios to determine whether a new capability is affordable
based on anticipated budgets, while eliminating or reducing
redundancies.
Question. Are there any elements of the Better Buying Power
initiative with which you disagree and which you intend to modify
materially or discontinue?
Answer. I do not disagree, consistent with the fact I am co-lead
for their development; however, we are modifying and adding to the
initiatives as we are learning through implementation.
Question. Recently, you reportedly observed that the Defense
Department's Better Buying Power initiative ``aren't understood'' at
the ``working level'' and that it may take 2 to 4 years for this
initiative to be fully implemented at the working level.
Does this statement accurately reflect your views?
Answer. Yes, while we have made tremendous progress implementing
the Better Buying Power initiatives over the past 18 months, we do
still have a ways to go. The culture of our workforce is deeply
embedded, and it will indeed take time to fully educate the workforce
to gain the benefits of all our efficiency initiatives. This is why Mr.
Kendall and I, along with Military Department counterparts, are
committed to a long term communications plan, using many different
strategies and tactics, to reach every level of the acquisition
workforce as well as others involved in the acquisition process. It is
also why one of the new tasks for the Better Buying Power initiative is
elevating the status, prestige and professional standards of
acquisition personnel.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the
relevant acquisition workforce is fully trained on the Better Buying
Power initiative and to maximize the likelihood that this initiative
will achieve its intended results?
Answer. It is apparent that while the workforce is implementing
many of the Better Buying Power concepts, there's still some degree of
uncertainty in many areas. As such, education and training of the
workforce are absolutely critical. I am supporting this on many fronts,
to include ongoing updates to the guidance contained in our primary
acquisition policy instruction (DODI 5000.02) and the Defense
Acquisition Guidebook, as well as revisions to the teaching curriculum
and methods at the DAU.
I have also focused on shifting from ``certification'' to
``qualification,'' a competency-based initiative centered on basic
fundamentals, application of knowledge and experience to ensure that
everyone who touches acquisition in a meaningful way is qualified in
the skill sets required to achieve successful acquisition results.
DAU is also providing on-the-road mission assistance on the
application of Better Buying Power at acquisition organizations and
programs wherever it can, and has provided tools that are already
helping in the area of services acquisition. In all cases, though,
communication at every level will remain the key, and hence, the
Communications Plan I mentioned above is an essential piece of all
this. I have every reason to believe that if we stay the course, the
efficiencies we seek will be realized.
contracting for services
Question. By most estimates, the Department now spends more for the
purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon
systems). After a decade of rapid growth, section 808 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012 placed a cap on DOD spending for contract services.
What role if any do you expect to play, if confirmed, in oversight
and management of the Department's acquisition of contract services?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work with the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy in his role as the Senior Service
Acquisition manager at OSD, along with the Service Acquisition
Executives and their appointed senior Services Managers, to participate
in oversight of the major service acquisition programs and in refining
the governance structure for services. For example, I expect to
contribute to the development of a new, 5000 series DOD Instruction
dedicated solely to the acquisition of services so that we may
institutionalize policy to address the unique challenges that service
acquisitions present. Doing so will continue the progress we have made
in improving the Department's management of contract services and
ensure the appropriate contract type is utilized for the acquisition of
services to appropriately balance risk and return on investment for the
Defense Department and private industry.
In support of this goal, the Department has increased training for
the acquisition of services as well as for Contracting Officer
Representatives (CORs), and has developed on-line performance work
statement tools to aid in the development of requirements that
maximizes the potential for competition while incentivizing efficient
delivery of services. Notable examples of training for the acquisition
of services are the DAU Services Acquisition Workshops, the Acquisition
Requirements Roadmap Tool, and DOD's model curriculum for both
classroom and online training of CORs with a variant and a Handbook
specifically tailored for CORs deployed in contingency operations.
Question. Do you believe that DOD can do more to reduce spending on
contract services?
Answer. Yes, the Department can and is doing more to reduce
spending on contract services. The administration has identified
management support services as an area in which spending has outpaced
other contracted activities. The Department is aligned with OMB's
target to reduce spending in this area by 10 percent by the end of
fiscal year 2012. To achieve this end, the Department is addressing
what it is buying in terms of the level of contracted support, and the
manner in which it is acquiring these services. If confirmed, I will
continue the effort to improve our tradecraft in the way we acquire
contacted services. I will make this a high priority and ensure we
adhere to the provisions contained in section 808 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2012 which limits the amount the Department can expand on
contract services in fiscal years 2012 and 2013.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
control the Department's spending on contract services and ensure that
the Department complies with the requirements of section 808?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Departments effort to
control spending as described above. In addition, I will focus on the
increased use of the Automated Requirements Road Map Tool (ARRT).
Further, I will work to ensure that the workforce is trained with tools
such as the Services Acquisition Mall. Finally, I will emphasize the
inclusion of small business innovation and cost savings in the service
industry through training and the use of tools to support market
research such as Small Business Maximum Practicable Opportunity
Prediction Model.
Question. Do you believe the Department is providing appropriate
stewardship over service contracts?
Answer. I believe the Department is improving the quality of the
stewardship it maintains over our service contracts through better
training, standardization of contract management, and additional senior
leader attention. Effective stewardship requires proactive engagement
from senior leaders at operational and strategic levels to manage these
contracts. The Department is making a concerted effort to instill
processes to drive leadership involvement.
Question. Do you believe that the Department has appropriate
management structures in place to oversee the expenditure of more than
$150 billion a year for contract services?
Answer. Not entirely, but I believe the Department improved the
management structure to oversee service contracts by establishing
Senior Service Managers in each of the Military Departments. If
confirmed, I will work toward an enterprise-wide, structured program to
enable thoughtful decisions about how to fulfill service contract
requirements. Fundamental to the success of these structures will be
the effectiveness of the front-end process to review and validate
requirements for services (as required by section 863 of the Ike
Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011).
Question. Do you support the use of management reviews, or peer
reviews, of major service contracts to identify ``best practices'' and
develop lessons learned?
Answer. Yes. I fully support the use of peer reviews on major
service contracts to identify best practices and lessons learned. The
practice of conducting peer reviews on the Department's major service
contracts has become well engrained in our process and we have derived
significant benefit from this initiative. The requirement to conduct
peer reviews has been institutionalized in DODI 5000.02.
socom acquisition authorities
Question. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is unique within
DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and
funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed
commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive.
Would you recommend any changes to SOCOM's current acquisition
authorities?
Answer. I believe that SOCOM currently has sufficient acquisition
authorities. If confirmed, I will support assessment of SOCOM for
opportunities to improve acquisition efficiency and effectiveness.
Question. What role do you believe SOCOM's development and
acquisition activities should play in broader Service and DOD efforts?
Answer. I believe that the Department should always seek the
broadest benefit and application of its development and acquisition
activities, including those activities sponsored or led by SOCOM.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that special
operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall
DOD research, development, and acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the reviews conducted by
USD(AT&L) with SOCOM, the Military Departments, and Defense Agencies to
improve collaboration efforts to ensure that special operations
capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall Department of
Defense research, development, and acquisition programs.
acquisition of information technology
Question. Most of the Department's Major Automated Information
System (MAIS) acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind
schedule. In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated
difficulties with virtually every new business system it has tried to
field in the last 10 years. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2010 required DOD to establish a new acquisition process for
information technology.
What role if any do you expect to play, if confirmed, in oversight
and management of the Department's acquisition of information
technology?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to be assigned duties and functions
commensurate with the ASD(A) position to include active participation
in the management and oversight of information technology.
Question. Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of
business systems require different acquisition strategies or
approaches?
Answer. Yes, I believe there are unique characteristics associated
with the acquisition of information systems that call for the use of
acquisition approaches that are different from those traditionally used
by the Department for acquiring weapon systems. The acquisition of
business systems requires a process that is tailored to the specific
technology, business process, performance and support requirements
associated with the development and deployment of business systems. The
Department has already begun to adapt to the unique challenges of
business information system acquisition through the implementation of
the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL), an alternative acquisition
approach for defense business systems. The Department continues to make
significant progress in defining the policies and procedures needed to
support the successful implementation of the BCL acquisition model.
Question. What steps if any do you believe DOD should take to
address these problems?
Answer. The issuance of the 23 June 2011 directive requiring the
use of the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL) for the acquisition
process for business systems and the updates made to the DODI 5000.02
for BCL policies and procedures are important steps forward in
reforming the acquisition processes. Additionally, the Department has
been implementing the BCL model on a case-by-case basis. It is the
Department's intent that each new defense business system will begin
its lifecycle under the BCL model. If confirmed, I will actively
support the use of incremental acquisition approaches to delivering
capabilities, as well as engage the Department to look for
opportunities whenever possible to tailor the acquisition process to
include the streamlining acquisition documentation.
Question. What steps has the Department taken to implement the
requirements of section 804? What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. The Department has made steady progress in implementing
several of the key approaches outlined in section 804, specifically in
the areas of Acquisition, Requirements, Testing and Certification and
Human Capital. On 23 June 2011, a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) on
Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL) was signed and issued by USD(AT&L).
The BCL provides a framework for implementing a more flexible and
streamlined processes for the acquisition of these business information
systems. The acting Under Secretary recently launched efforts to update
DODI 5000.02 supporting some key IT acquisition reform efforts
identified in the 804 report. The Joint Staff has initiated efforts to
include more streamlined requirements management and approval process
for acquisition of information systems. They are updating policy to
establish improved cycle times for the review/approval of requirements
documents and producing a high-level capability Initial Capabilities
Document that adopts a portfolio perspective and document requirements
in the context of the portfolio. The Department's testing community has
been working in collaboration with USD(AT&L) to incorporate an
integrated testing, evaluation, and certification approach into the
DODI 5000.02, to reduce redundancies in system testing activities and
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of testing the Department's
information systems.
A comprehensive review of IT acquisition competencies is currently
being conducted. This review will update the IT acquisition
competencies to better define DOD critical skill sets and assist in the
update of curricula at the Defense Acquisition University and the
Information Resources Management College.
The Department is working directly with ongoing and new start
acquisition programs to drive many of the IT reform principles
identified in section 804. Implementation of Business Capabilities
Lifecycle (BCL) is a current focus area. The Department will use the
experience and lessons learned from the ``pilots/early adopters'' to
inform and shape the ongoing reforms and updates to policy and
guidance.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Chief
Information Officer of DOD to take these steps?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DOD CIO, and I
will ensure the OUSD(AT&L) staff and the DOD CIO staff work
collaboratively to identify and take any steps needed to improve the
acquisition of information technology based capabilities. This is an
important area for the Department as we need to achieve more consistent
and better outcomes given the continuing evolution of technology. In an
effort to facilitate an even greater alignment of acquisition resources
and processes between the two organizations, as of February 26, 2012, a
majority of the acquisition responsibilities and resources that fell
under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information
Integration (ASD(NII)) within the DOD CIO have transferred to the
USD(AT&L).
Question. Some have argued that the current test and evaluation
process does not appropriately address the unique circumstances
applicable to the acquisition of information technology systems.
What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to
improve the test and evaluation process for information technology
systems, including their vulnerabilities in the face of a growing
cybersecurity threat environment?
Answer. The Department has taken steps to develop a new Rapid IT
Acquisition process, as the traditional acquisition process timelines
are not as agile as the commercial sector. Long acquisition timelines
result in IT systems that, at deployment, can be several steps behind
current technology and, thus, more vulnerable to sophisticated cyber
attacks. The Department is moving towards incorporating `agile'
development techniques for information systems, more in line with
industry practices. To support iterative, incremental development, we
will employ a continuous integration and test approach that integrates
developmental test, operational test, and certification and
accreditation activities. This approach will rely more heavily on early
user involvement, use of automated testing, and continuous monitoring
of deployed capabilities. An essential element of this more agile
approach is a robust preproduction cyber test environment that permits
us to better understand and characterize the cyber threat, and take
preventative actions prior to fielding systems. The Department is still
working through how to effectively develop and use this type of test
bed.
Question. Recently, you reportedly observed that ``real
challenges'' exist in the acquisition of information technology (IT)
because the Defense Department does not have the skills necessary to
procure information technology capability efficiently.
Does this statement accurately reflect your views?
Answer. Yes, training our acquisition professionals remains a top
priority. This training must include a combination of formal classroom
training, mentoring, coaching, and on the job learning to provide the
skills to ensure a workforce that is agile, flexible, and ready to
respond to the unique needs of acquiring IT for the Department.
Question. What challenges do you see in this area?
Answer. As DOD draws down the overall force the Department must
retain critical skills and recruit new personnel to address known gaps
and deficiencies specific to IT. The Department needs to assist our
acquisition professionals to be conversant in new technology and
development methods specific to IT. It needs to train our acquisition
professionals to be more confident in their ability to deal with
industry during the acquisition process. It needs to work on achieving
better business arrangements in terms of products and support over the
entire lifecycle. To achieve this, the acquisition workforce must be
agile, flexible, and prepared to adapt our buying practices to match
our needs in the area of acquiring IT. The Department needs to equip
the workforce with the necessary skills to be on par with industry as
they negotiate contracts set expectations for goods and services.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to address these
challenges?
Answer. As stated in the previous question, recruiting, training,
and retention initiatives are vital, including particularly these
supported with DAWDF resources. Dealing effectively with industry,
getting better business deals, and generally institutionalizing our
Better Buying Power Initiatives are priorities to me.
Question. The Department's Information Technology Enterprise
Strategy and Roadmap, dated 6 September 2011, proposes overhauling IT
policies to provide improved access to information, common identity
management, standardized Department-wide services/applications/tools,
streamlined IT acquisition, consolidated data centers, and cloud
computing services.
What reorganization if any do you believe will be needed in the IT
acquisition structures of DOD and the Military Departments to achieve
these objectives?
Answer. At this time I have no specific recommendations for changes
as this initiative is new; however, if confirmed, I will work to assess
the organizational changes necessary, if any, to achieve these
objectives.
Question. In your view, how fundamentally different, in ways
relevant to procuring needed defense capability-effectively, is
acquiring information technology products and services from how the
Defense Department more typically procures products and services?
Answer. Existing DOD hardware development processes do not always
translate effectively in IT given the speed at which technological
change occurs is often faster than we as a Department can effectively
implement or upgrade the technology for our users. The Department needs
to continue to move away from large IT development projects to smaller,
more incremental IT projects, utilizing commercial applications
whenever possible.
Question. How, in your view, are the Department's existing
processes inadequate to procuring defense-related IT products and
services effectively?
Answer. Existing acquisition processes primarily accommodate
hardware development, in which highly customized weapons systems are
methodically developed over time. The process rightfully focuses on
maturing and developing technology, mitigating manufacturing risk and
engineering for sustainment. Information technology is continually
evolving and inherently different. The process needs to focus on
network and process optimization, data management continually (and
rapidly) changing technology, and mitigating cyber vulnerabilities.
Question. What specific changes, if any, would you recommend to
improve how the Department procures Major Automated Information
Systems?
Answer. The Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL), an alternative
acquisition approach for defense business systems and instantiated in a
June 23, 2011, policy directive, has been an important step in adapting
the Department's approach. The BCL model requires the rigorous upfront
analysis of functional requirements, establishment of performance
measures and incremental delivery of capability. Continued
implementation of this approach as well as other agile acquisition
approaches for other types of MAIS IT are critical to improving how the
Department delivers these types of capabilities.
Question. In your view, what are the implications of the challenges
and differences you discussed above on efforts by the Department to
procure effectively cyber-security products and services?
Answer. One of the challenges with procuring and deploying cyber-
security solutions is the sheer scope of the DOD enterprise. Once the
capability has been developed or procured, it can take several
additional months to install, configure, and deploy to forces overseas
and afloat. An additional challenge is the lack of a time-focused
acquisition approach to acquire and deploy cyber-security products and
services. The Weapon system and the streamlined IT acquisition
processes do not always support the rapid acquisition timelines
necessary to deliver cyber warfare capabilities. The Department is
addressing these challenges as part of our response to section 933 of
the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011.
Question. Are there any special acquisition authorities not
currently available that if authorized could help address some of the
observed IT and cyber security-related acquisition shortfalls?
Answer. Acquiring cyber-related capability requires a new approach
to support the rapid acquisition of cyber tools and applications. As
part of the Department's response to section 933 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2011, it is assessing the degree to which current acquisition
authorities and policies impact the speed at which the Department can
acquire capabilities for cyber warfare.
Question. In your view, does the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) deliver enterprise computing services and provide IT
infrastructure in an operationally responsive and cost effective
manner?
Answer. The DISA is continuing to enhance and improve its ability
to deliver an integrated enterprise infrastructure ``platform''
capability across the Department. This infrastructure ``platform'', to
include computing, networks, enterprise services and information
assurance, is intended to range from the ``tactical edge'' (any user,
any device, anywhere) to Senior Department leadership, thereby
enhancing operational responsiveness and decision making. In the face
of rapidly changing technologies and cyber threat environments, DISA is
employing numerous strategies to improve cost effectiveness to meet
these challenges, to include agile acquisition and testing techniques,
leveraging and maturing of cloud computing and service models and
enhancing seamless information sharing via mobile computing
technologies.
Question. What specific recommendations would you make to improve
DISA's delivery of telecom and IT contracting, enterprise services, and
computing/application hosting?
As documented in their 2011-2012 Campaign Plan, DISA has
established a clear vision and set of operating principles, defined
through their three ``Lines of Operation'' (Enterprise Infrastructure,
C2 and Information Sharing, and Operate and Assure), and nine
underlying ``Joint Enablers''. The simplest way to improve on DISA's
delivery of services is to focus on creatively and efficiently
executing the plan as defined in the Campaign Plan. The Department is
committed to monitoring and assisting DISA in that process.
A very tangible and specific means of improving enterprise services
and computing/application hosting is through the continued growth of
the DISA Cloud. Utilization of cloud computing has the potential to
significantly reduce costs and enhance security across a wide range of
services and applications in areas such as web services, acquisition,
logistics, financial management, and personnel management. The
Department will articulate its plans for cloud computing in its
response to section 2867 of the 2012 NDAA.
acquisition workforce
Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established
an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address
shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund provides a
continuing source of funds for this purpose.
What role if any do you expect to play, if confirmed, in management
and oversight of the Department's acquisition workforce?
Answer. I would expect, if confirmed, to be responsible and
accountable to USD(AT&L) for management and oversight of workforce
matters.
Question. Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development
Fund is still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of
employees with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the
most cost effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes. The fund supports continued strengthening of the
acquisition workforce. The quality and capability of the workforce is
critical to improved acquisition outcomes and achieving efficiencies.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the
money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in
a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition
workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with senior acquisition
leaders to ensure that this funding is allocated in a manner that best
meets the needs of DOD, in the continued development of a professional
DOD acquisition workforce. This will include providing the necessary
workforce education, training, and experience required to meet the
current acquisition environment.
Question. What do you see as the most significant shortcomings if
any in the quality of the Department's acquisition and contracting
workforce?
Answer. The Department has great people. They equipped the best
military in the world and they deserve credit for this. Many attained
basic and advanced acquisition certification requirements. Now, I want
to build upon that process with tools to ensure the established
certifications are combined with demonstrating competency in
acquisition proficiencies to better provide an even better qualified
workforce for current and future responsibilities. I call this ``C2Q''
or Certification to Qualification. Our goal is to have a workforce that
is both fully certified to today's standards and also fully qualified
to perform its duties as acquisition professionals. Our
``certification-to-qualification'' initiative will provide a critical
fourth dimension to certification--on-the-job demonstration of mastery
of functional competencies. C2Q builds on the saying, ``Tell me, and I
will forget; Teach me and I will remember; Involve me and I will
learn.'' If confirmed, I will implement this process to equip the
workforce with improved training and development opportunities for
performance and acquisition success.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
addressing these shortcomings?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead Department-wide efforts to
improve acquisition outcomes. This includes strengthening and
supporting the acquisition workforce and championing the strategies,
initiatives, and resources necessary for an enduring high level of
workforce quality and capacity. This includes updating the Human
Capital Plan.
Question. What specific skill sets or core competencies if any do
you believe to be vital in the Department's ability to procure goods
and services effectively and are lacking within the Department's
acquisition and contracting workforce?
Answer. I believe we have time-tested core acquisition
competencies--we will always need competencies in effective program
management, systems engineering, test and evaluation, logistics and
sustainment, contracting, quality, pricing, audit and others. However,
I also believe a basic understanding of business skills from the
industry perspective is vital to the Department's ability to support
effectively our servicemembers with goods and services. As such, we've
worked with university business schools and industry training centers
to develop business acumen competencies for our acquisition workforce,
including contracting experts. In addition, the Defense Acquisition
University is currently developing courseware to enhance our
workforce's business knowledge to ensure better business deals for the
government. If confirmed, I will actively work with the components to
target these and other high priority improvements across the
acquisition workforce.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's human capital plan
for the acquisition workforce includes adequate measures to acquire or
reconstitute these vital skill sets or core competencies?
Answer. Our human capital plan begins the process for strengthening
our workforce systems engineering, program management, contracting and
other critical functions to include rebuilding the capacity of the
Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency.
The Department has made significant progress in all these areas to
include initiatives to increase our training capacity for certification
and targeted training available to the workforce. If confirmed, I will
work to update and refine the plan with Military Departments and
Defense agencies to ensure its wise use to create and maintain a high
quality acquisition workforce.
Question. What steps if any would you take if confirmed to improve
the Department's human capital plan for the acquisition workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will exercise strong leadership and partner
with the Military Departments, functional leaders, Personnel and
Readiness, and other partners to champion the highest priority
strategies and workforce initiatives. Our updated plan will leverage
the proven best practices from our recent efforts and include
objectives that challenge us to take the workforce to a higher level of
readiness, qualification, and results.
Question. You have reportedly observed that you believe that some
of the problems in defense acquisition may stem from a lack of passion
new employees have for their craft.
Does this statement accurately reflect your views?
Answer. I stated that it is difficult for the workforce to have
passion for its craft when publically criticized as often as the
members are. They need mentorship or coaching, opportunities to get
experience, clear and supported opportunities for advancement, and
opportunities for growth through progressively more challenging
assignments. Lacking all that, passion for one's profession can
dissipate.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should
take to address this problem?
Answer. The workforce needs mentorship and coaching, opportunities
to get experience, and to have clear and supported opportunities for
advancement like their peers in the military. They need opportunities
for growth. Sustaining their passion is something we do by example, by
organizational culture, by treating people as valued professionals, and
by giving them training and career opportunities to grow and develop.
Here is an example: A couple of years ago DAU instituted for all new
contracting specialists CON 090, an intensive and challenging 4-week,
in-class course on the FAR and the DFARS. It has been very successful.
One could say it was ``re-instituted,'' because many of our now-senior
procurement executives recall that their passion for acquisition
started with a similar course they took early in their careers. The
certification-to-qualification initiative (C2Q), holds promise for
developing and validating professionalism in job performance. I am
leading the effort to conduct pilots in program management, contract
pricing, and earned value management to determine the feasibility and
potential value of C2Q. Depending on the results, I will address policy
and process to implement and institutionalize the C2Q initiative in
much the same way as the Better Buying Power process.
the defense industrial base
Question. What role if any do you expect to play if confirmed, in
management and oversight of the Department's defense industrial base
policy and practices?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the office of Manufacturing
and Industrial Base Policy to ensure the policies and practices to the
defense industrial base are integrated into the Milestone decision
process and acquisition strategy development.
Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.
defense industry?
Answer. The defense industry is a vital component of our force
structure and as such is a vital element of our national security. It
lags behind the commercial sector in terms of stock market trends, and
recovers slower. However, as compared to the commercial sector, it is a
consistent and reasonably steady performer. In terms of status, my
assessment of the defense industrial base is that is has recently taken
a strategic pause in risk taking due to the uncertainties of the
budget, as well as taking a closer look internally at its core
competencies with an eye on spinning put risky or low profit business
units. The largest companies in the Defense industry are well prepared
for the fiscal austerity with high levels of retained earnings and low
debt to equity ratios.
They have been through the down cycle before. The same does not
necessarily hold true for the mid-tier and small businesses. This is
why the impacts of acquisition decisions on the industrial base will be
examined and the department will intervene only on the rare occasions
where it may be warranted.
Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense sector?
Answer. If confirmed, I will implement USD(AT&L)'s decisions and
direction on foreign investment in the U.S. defense sector. I am not
opposed generally to foreign investment in the defense sector with
appropriate security protections. Foreign firms can enhance
competition, which allows for the inclusion in the United States of
leading edge technologies that have been developed abroad, as well as
lower costs of specific defense systems. In addition, such foreign
investment in the long-run may increase interoperability between the
United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Department must ensure
that foreign investment in the defense sector does not create risks to
national security.
Question. What steps if any do you believe DOD should take to
ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. DOD must take responsible steps to ensure that the defense
industry can support our Warfighters' needs, now and in the future.
Activities such as the Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) analysis
are specifically needed by the Department to make informed decisions.
The Department's effort to increase real competition will incentivize
companies to become lean and more efficient. Judicious investments in
Independent Research and Development (IRAD), Science, Technology
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM), and critical engineering skills
will help maintain technological dominance in the industrial base.
Through competition, industry will be incentivized to trim excess
overhead, which will lead to a healthier industrial base.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of the
Department's ongoing Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) analysis of
the defense industrial base?
Answer. The S2T2 project has been able to collect valuable
information across the sectors and down the tiers of the industrial
base that has contributed to Department's decisionmaking in the recent
fiscal year 2013 activities.
Question. Has the Department taken any concrete steps to enhance
the health and status of a particular sector or tier based upon this
analysis?
Answer. The Department did adjust some of the program activities to
include schedules and procurements in the fiscal year 2013 budget
proposal to smooth work f1ow, maintaining the health of some critical
and fragile niches in the industrial base.
Question. Under what circumstances if any do you believe the
Department should use Defense Production Act title III authorities to
address defense industrial base needs?
Answer. The Department should use title III authorities, consistent
with section 303 of that law when: (1) Such action ``is essential to
the national defense; and (2) without [such action], U.S. industry
cannot reasonably be expected to provide the capability for the needed
industrial resource, material, or critical technology item in a timely
manner.'' Title III decisions should be informed by thorough industrial
base analysis.
Question. What is your view of current or anticipated consolidation
efforts by major defense contractors?
Answer. The Department has no merger bias (pro or anti-merger), but
evaluates mergers on a case-by-case basis to protect its long-term
interests. However, the Department is generally going to look
unfavorably on merger and acquisition activity among the major primes
due to the uncompetitive realities such consolidation would create. The
Department would review a transaction among the top-tier if proposed,
but we would like to Reserve as much competition as possible at the
major prime level. Below the major prime level, we believe that there
could be some reasonable consolidation activity that could take place
as firms to reposition themselves; in such cases, the Department will
be particularly interested in ensuring any potential vertical
integration which may result does not result in a significant loss of
current or future competition.
Question. How does the Department evaluate the effect that such
consolidations may have on the ability of DOD to leverage competition
to obtain fair value and the best quality in the goods and services it
procures and cultivate technological and engineering innovation?
Answer. When examining a merger, the Department weighs potential
harm to competition and innovation caused by horizontal consolidation
and vertical integration against potential benefits such as reduced
overhead costs and other synergies. In retrospect, however, there have
been cases where the consolidation/synergy benefits projected were not
realized and consolidation occurred without real rationalization. Given
this experience, the Department may be more skeptical of arguments
proposing that financial benefits outweigh the potential loss of
competition.
Question. What role, if any, should DOD have in vetting and
approving or disapproving such consolidation efforts?
Answer. I believe mergers and acquisitions are a normal response to
budget changes, and should not reflexively oppose this market reaction.
If confirmed, I will scrutinize proposals that come forward to ensure
that the government's interests are protected. Adjustments that lead to
greater efficiency or innovation are encouraged. I promote industry's
efforts to develop strong well-financed business that avoid over-
leveraging and poor balance sheets with the intention of ensuring
industry emerges stronger following structural changes. I believe the
Defense Department will use its position as a buyer, its subsidy of
research and its ability to forecast needs to boost investment,
competition and innovation to the maximum extent while still allowing
market forces to propel the sector forward.
manufacturing issues
Question. Section 812 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD
to issue comprehensive guidance to improve its management of
manufacturing risk in major defense acquisition programs.
What steps has the Department taken to implement the requirements
of section 812? What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. In July 2011, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) updated the Defense Acquisition
Guidebook (DAG) with new guidance on how manufacturing readiness should
be assessed throughout all phases of the acquisition process and at
specific systems engineering technical reviews. This new guidance,
added to DAG Chapter 4 (Systems Engineering), was developed based on
industry best practices and DOD knowledge maintained by DAD. We will
continue to refine these best practices to stay abreast of rapidly
changing technologies and industrial-base capabilities.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address continuing shortcomings in manufacturing research and
capabilities in the development and acquisition of defense systems?
Answer. As the budget environment changes, it is expected that
companies will adapt through both organic efficiencies and inorganic
growth and realignment. Successful companies are constantly trying to
anticipate market shifts and position themselves to be more competitive
and to achieve greater growth and profitability. In general, this is a
healthy process. If confirmed, I will support use of the new S2T2
repository of industrial base data and which will serve as a jumping
off point for future assessments by all Defense components. I will
focus research initiatives to address shortcomings early in the
process. I will support the efforts for the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) and the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base
Policy to accelerate their achievement of the steps in recently issued
strategic guidance; specifically, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense and Defense Budget Priorities and
Choices.
Question. Do you believe that additional incentives are needed to
enhance industry's incorporation and utilization of advanced
manufacturing processes developed under the manufacturing technology
program?
Answer. The Department's competitive acquisition and procurement
processes incentivize offerors to employ advanced manufacturing
processes in response to the DOD's solicitations. Additionally, the
Department remains ready to ``intervene when absolutely necessary to
sustain industrial and technological capabilities,'' which includes
investment in advanced manufacturing.
The Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program is a partner in the
National Strategic Plan for Advanced Manufacturing, delivered February
2012 by the administration, which states, ``Advanced manufacturing is a
matter of fundamental importance to the economic strength and security
of the United States.'' This strategy incorporates intensive engagement
among stakeholders at the national, State, and regional levels,
including the DOD ManTech program, to promote U.S. competitiveness
through innovation in manufacturing.
Question. What is your view of the utility of the Industrial Base
Innovation Fund for advancing manufacturing technology and processes?
Answer. The Industrial Base Innovation Fund has been a valuable
resource for addressing short term, operational needs and issues such
as surge and diminishing manufacturing sources.
Question. Do you believe that DOD is making an appropriate level of
investment in improvement of manufacturing technologies?
Answer. The administration and Department have consistently made
advanced manufacturing a priority, as exemplified by the President's
recently announced National Network for Manufacturing Innovation
(NNMI), a $1 billion investment in new manufacturing institutes
throughout the U.S. The Department, in collaboration with other
agencies, is initiating the first of these institutes in 2012. NNMI,
along with funding in the fiscal year 2013 budget submission for
manufacturing technology programs, demonstrates the Department's deep
commitment to advanced manufacturing processes and practices. I believe
the ManTech Program, Title III of the Defense Production Act, and the
DARPA Manufacturing Initiative remain focused on driving down costs,
improving delivery times, and enhancing the health and resiliency of
the defense industrial base, with direct benefits to our acquisition
programs. For instance, ManTech investments in the F-35 of just $14.5
million are now projected to reduce costs by $1.1 billion over the life
of the aircraft. However, these investments certainly need to be
reinforced throughout the acquisition community. Through the
Department's Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives and consistent with
section 812, program executives are now considering manufacturing and
production issues early in source selection, leading to increased
productivity throughout acquisition process. If confirmed, I will
continue to adhere to BBP initiatives and hone their focus on superior
manufacturing and acquisition outcomes.
test and evaluation
Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these
systems are put into production.
What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of
the Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. I fully support the independence of the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation as an important aspect of ensuring the
Department's acquisition programs are realistically and adequately
tested in their intended operational environment. If confirmed, I will
seek the advice of the DOT&E.
Question. What are your views about the role of the Director of
Developmental Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of the
Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. The role of the DASD(DT&E) is to be the principal advisor
to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on all matters relating to
developmental test and evaluation within the Department. In this role,
the DASD(DT&E) is to help improve acquisition outcomes through early
and continuous engagement with Program Offices to reduce the discovery
of problems in operational testing. The DASD(DT&E) develops policy and
guidance, and provides support to Program Offices and the DOD T&E
community, assists with test planning and data analysis, reviews and
approves DT&E plans within the TEMP for MDAPS, and identifies and
shares best practices. Additionally, I believe it is important for the
DASD(DT&E) to provide an independent Assessment of Operational Test
Readiness on all major defense acquisition programs to advise milestone
decision authorities and the Component Acquisition Executives early of
any risks prior to entering initial operational test and evaluation.
Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation
conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be
tested?
Answer. I believe that there needs to be Government led DT&E
supported by appropriate contractor testing. The establishment of the
DASD(DT&E), the Chief Developmental Tester, and the Lead DT&E
Organization will help the Department provide government leadership and
oversight to improve acquisition outcomes.
Question. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the
standard testing process? If confirmed, how will you work to ensure
that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is
subject to appropriate operational testing?
Answer. If confirmed, I will do all I can to ensure that equipment
and technology is subject to appropriate operational testing. The
Department is currently developing new policy for the Defense Rapid
Acquisition System (DRAS) which will require the milestone decision
authority (MDA) to collaborate with the supporting operational testing
agency (OTA) to approve the performance assessment approach for urgent
needs. For DRAS programs that are MDAPs or otherwise under oversight of
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), the Director
must approve operational and live-fire test plans. Performance, safety,
suitability, and survivability are to be assessed. A second assessment
will be done 6 months post fielding. With these two assessments in
place, the user will have a strong voice in determining whether to
accept and deploy the capability.
Question. Do you believe that the operational and developmental
testing organizations in DOD and the Military Services are adequate to
ensure an appropriate level of testing, and testing oversight, on major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe there are adequate resources to ensure an
appropriate level of testing and testing oversight on major defense
acquisition programs. I also believe we need to shift more emphasis to
early developmental testing to reduce the likelihood of late discovery
of design or production issues. If confirmed, I will work with the
DOT&E and DASD(DT&E) to ensure the conduct of rigorous developmental
and operational testing to improve acquisition outcomes.
Question. Section 102 of the WSARA established a new Director of
Developmental Testing to help address this problem. Section 835 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 built on this provision by establishing new
organizational and management requirements for developmental testing on
major defense acquisition programs.
What steps has the Department taken to date to implement these two
provisions?
Answer. The Acting Under Secretary approved DOD Instruction (DODI
5134.17) which assigns responsibilities and functions and prescribes
relationships and authorities for the DASD(DT&E). The guidelines for
implementing the requirements of section 835 of the NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2012 are being developed and the acting Under Secretary is in the
process of including those requirements in a future update to the
Defense Acquisition System Instruction (DODI 5000.02).
Question. What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department and
Defense Acquisition University to implement these provisions and
associated training requirements.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
ensure adequate developmental testing on major weapon systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of having
early and continuous engagement those responsible for DT&E. I will work
collaboratively with the Component Acquisition Executives through the
secretaries for the Military Departments, and through the Program
Offices to develop adequate test programs, assist with test planning
and data analysis, and identify and share best practices to help
improve acquisition outcomes.
Some have argued that testing takes too long and costs too much.
Others contest this view pointing out that testing and evaluation is an
essential tool to assist in the development of weapon systems and
ensure that they perform as intended. The Armed Services Committee has
expressed concern that problems with weapons systems have been
discovered during operational testing and evaluation that should have
been discovered during developmental testing and corrected during
subsequent development.
Question. Do you believe that major defense acquisition programs
are helped or hurt by cutting tests budgets and reducing the time
available for developmental testing?
Answer. Cutting test budgets and reducing DT can hurt programs; and
more importantly, can place burden on our operational forces. Testing
is an essential function that supports acquisition of enhanced military
capabilities. Reductions in test budgets have the potential adverse
impact that we do not discover critical design or production issues
early in the lifecycle when it is least costly to take corrective
actions. Robust developmental test and evaluation brings a mission
focus early in the acquisition life cycle to understanding how the
capability will be used, identifying and correcting problems, and
thereby decreasing costs, enhancing performance, and retaining schedule
for programs. Cutting test budgets and reducing test activities as a
means to accelerate programs will likely have the opposite effect.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the program management community and the testing and evaluation
community work collaboratively and effectively in a way that maximizes
the likelihood that developmental testing and evaluation will detect
and identify problems timely in software and hardware to provide
opportunities to correct them before production and before operational
testing and evaluation begins?
Answer. If confirmed, my goal is the early discovery of
deficiencies in programs through DT&E and to increase the probability
of programs being found to be effective and suitable in Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). I will focus my efforts on
ensuring that the program management community and the testing and
evaluation community work collaboratively and effectively, and that
DT&E has a clear voice within the acquisition process by providing
independent risk based assessments of DT&E planning, resourcing, and
execution.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(A)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
starting major weapons programs off right
1. Senator McCain. Mrs. McFarland, the main focus of the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), which applies to new
programs and seeks to have major defense acquisition programs start off
right, requires that early investment decisions be informed by
realistic cost estimates, sound systems engineering knowledge, and
reliable technological risk assessments. The Department of Defense
(DOD) has indeed started some new major programs since WSARA was
enacted, or will do so in the near future. I would like to review a few
of them with you. Please tell me what has been done to help ensure that
they comply with these very important aspects of WSARA or how they are
being structured now (or will be structured in the future) to minimize
excessive cost-growth and schedule delays.
Ohio-class Ballistic-Missile Submarine Replacement
Program--SSBN(X)
Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement Program--KC-46A
Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program--VXX
Long-Range Strike--LRS (formerly called Next-
Generation Bomber--NGB)
Ground Combat Vehicle--GCV
Joint Tactical Radio System--JTRS, as restructured
Amphibious Combat Vehicle--ACV (the successor to the
cancelled Marine Corps program, Expeditionary Combat Vehicle--
ECV)
Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)
Mrs. McFarland. Since WSARA was enacted, we have ensured all
programs reviewed do comply with WSARA and that investment decisions
are informed by realistic assessments of cost, engineering, and risk.
The Director of Systems Engineering, the Director of Development Test
and Evaluation, and the Director of Cost Analysis and Program
Evaluation influence all new start programs. The Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System encompasses combatant commanders'
inputs. Acquisition strategies address competition strategies and
prototyping considerations.
Much of the cost growth we have seen in major defense acquisition
programs can be traced to poor program planning, a problem recognized
in WSARA. To address affordability in performing the duties of ASD(A),
I have ensured every program reviewed has a realistic cost goal
consistent with what the Department can afford. I am working to instill
a culture of cost consciousness through the acquisition workforce. If
confirmed, I will continue to work aggressively on programs at risk of
cost growth. I believe that we have also experienced program execution
issues as a result of a loss of organic acquisition expertise within
the Department, and similar deficiencies in industry. With the help of
WSARA and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, the
Department is working to rebuild its organic acquisition expertise and
is working with industry to encourage them to do the same. Quality
matters as much or more than quantity, however, and I will also
continue my efforts to strengthen the existing workforce.
In response to your request that we address specific programs, I
offer the following:
Ohio-class Ballistic-Missile Submarine Replacement Program-SSBN(X)
The program received MS A approval in January 2011 and
the ongoing development of the program is fully compliant with
WSARA and its underlying principles. The Navy is designing to
the minimum capability that will satisfy the projected
strategic requirement throughout the projected life of this new
ship class. At MS A, affordability targets were established for
average ship end cost (Hulls 2-12) of $4.9 billion and
Operation and Sustainment cost per hull of $110 million (in
CY$10, Navy shipbuilding indicies). The program has established
a dedicated Design for Affordability (DFA) group, consisting of
NAVSEA and Electric Boat representatives to promote, review,
and track DFA initiatives for Non-Recurring Engineering,
construction Operations and Sustainment.
Aerial Refueling Tanker Replacement Program-KC-46A
The Air Force has mitigated the greatest risk to the
taxpayer by structuring the competitive development contract
with both fixed price incentive (firm target) and firm fixed
price components. The KC-46 development contract has an overall
contract ceiling price of $4.9 billion. Boeing is fully
responsible for any cost growth beyond the $4.9 billion overall
contract ceiling price. For production, firm fixed-price
contract options are established for the first two low-rate
initial production lots. The remaining 11 full-rate production
options have not-to-exceed prices with equitable price
adjustments. The commercial-derivative nature of the KC-46 also
contributes to controlling cost growth by allowing the
Government to leverage commercial processes and parts pools. By
maintaining tight oversight of contract execution during
development and production, Boeing is incentivized to deliver
on its contract commitments and within schedule.
Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program-VXX
The Navy has conducted an extensive Analysis of
Alternatives under formal guidance from the Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE). Those activities have provided
extensive data regarding realistic cost estimates,
comprehensive systems engineering assessments, and
unprecedented insights into technical risks, ways to leverage
In-Service investments to reduce risk and minimize change for
the users and operators, and opportunities for in-house risk
reduction efforts that will result in aquisition of data rights
and key interfaces for the communications suite in order to
better control technology risk in the future. This extensive
analysis will lead to presentation of a program strategy for
the Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program that is
compliant with WSARA and structured to minimize cost growth and
schedule disruption.
Long-Range Strike-LRS
The program has incorporated cost estimation, systems
engineering, and technological risk guidance by CAPE, Offices
of the Director, Systems Engineering (SE) and Developmental
Test and Evaluation (DT&E). Any specific descriptions of how
the acquisition strategy has been influenced by WSARA are
classified.
Ground Combat Vehicle-GCV
GCV was certified at MS A on August 17, 2012. The
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) fully considered the
requirements, resources, and schedule and established
affordability targets for the GCV Program in both the
investment and O&S phases of the Program. Additionally, I
directed a comprehensive three-prong strategy that builds
towards a fully informed Milestone B and Engineering and
Manufacturing Development Phase. This strategy will continue to
review the AOA's cost informed trades, evaluate potential Non-
Developmental Items (including international sources), and
conclude a 24-month TD phase with two potential GCV candidates.
I am personally reviewing the technical risk and mitigation
plans. I do not intend to approve MS B for GCV until I am
satisfied the plan is executable and affordable.
Joint Tactical Radio System-JTRS
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Joint Program
Executive Office (JPEO) continues to support WSRA objectives in
each of its programs. JTRS is a family of acquisition programs
established to provide software programmable, networking radios
for effective communication at the last tactical mile. On
October 14, 2011, I signed the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (GMR)
Nunn-McCurdy Review Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) based
on independent cost estimates from the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation and the program was never
certified. Instead, I directed closeout of the current contract
and development of a modified Non Developmental Item (NDI)
approach to meet remaining requirements at lower costs. This
effort is being conducted under the auspices of the Army's Mid-
Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) Program. Handheld,
Manpack, & Small Form Fit (HMS) radios for the individual
solider received Milestone C approval in June 2011. The
Department is preparing for a full rate production decision for
the HMS handheld radios and is again using independent cost
estimates and testing data from Government developmental
testing (GDT), operational testing and evaluation (OT&E), and
participation in the Army's Network Integration Evaluation
(NIE) processes. For the manpack radios, the department is
drafting an acquisition strategy which will incorporate an
``on-ramp'' process to encourage full and open competition at
various future points in the acquisition process to drive down
costs and improve performance. The Network Enterprise Domain
(NED) Program sustains the JTRS' software waveforms and
continues to conduct Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs) with
vendors to reduce technical risk in new radio development with
the aim of driving down costs and improving performance.
Amphibious Combat Vehicle-ACV
In January 2011, the Marine Corps formalized a Systems
Engineering-Operational Performance Team SE-OPT (SE-OPT)
specifically to address affordability consistent with WSARA
principles. The SE-OPT culminated in December 2011, when I
authorized the Navy entry into the Materiel Solution Analysis
phase. I expect the ACV program to be a highly tailored
acquisition approach structured to provide the most cost-
effective program, emphasizing engineering and design analysis
through the process and in support of the next DAB In-Process
Review. In addition, it will highlight the relationship between
life-cycle cost, schedule, and performance for each alternative
considered. I will document, as appropriate, Marine Corps/Navy
affordability targets that I expect to be included in the ACV
Request for Proposal to industry.
Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)
The JHSV received MS B approval in November 2008,
prior to enactment of WSARA. However, the program is addressing
all applicable (i.e., post-MS B) WSARA principles. The JHSV
program was informed by prior high speed vessel experimentation
programs (e.g. Swift, Westpac Express) and is a modification to
a non developmental commercially derived high speed ferry
design, thus reducing developmental risk. Although the lead
ship has experienced cost and schedule growth, the
shipbuilder's performance on following JHSVs is improving. Due
to investment in a modular manufacturing facility which
supports efficient construction, and use of a fixed price
incentive contract, the follow on JHSVs are expected to deliver
as planned at or below target contract costs.
2. Senator McCain. Mrs. McFarland, while the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) is, of course, not a new start, it is critical that it be
restructured to comply with WSARA's key requirements (on realistic cost
estimates, sound systems engineering, and reliable risk assessments).
In what sense has it been restructured along these lines?
Mrs. McFarland. The Department fully supports the organizational
and policy changes enacted in the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA) for all DOD acquisition programs, including the F-35 JSF. The
Department's goals with respect to WSARA are the same for all
acquisition programs: implement all of the applicable acquisition
policy measures called out in WSARA and integrate WSARA organizational
changes into the oversight of the program. The majority of the actions
required to achieve these goals in the F-35 program have been
completed. While some near-term actions remain, continued and regular
interactions between the F-35 program office and the WSARA-formed
organizations will occur for the life of the program to achieve the
goal.
Subsequent to the passage of WSARA in May 2009, the F-35 program
was the subject of numerous reviews, culminating in a Nunn-McCurdy
critical cost breach certification review that was guided by the
acquisition reform principles founded in WSARA. The cost and schedule
assessment reviews were led by the WSARA-formed Office of the Director,
CAPE. The Nunn-McCurdy review and certification of the F-35 program was
guided by process improvements institutionalized in WSARA, to include
the participation and assessments of the Office of PARCA, and the
Offices of the Director, SE and DT&E. Additionally, the F-35 program
has instituted a renewed emphasis on sound systems engineering
principles, realistic cost and schedule estimating, a re-energized
focus on integrated test and evaluation, and implementation of tighter
cost control measures; all of which can be traced directly to WSARA
principles. Following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, and statutorily-
directed rescission of Milestone (MS) B, the F-35 program conducted a
bottoms-up Technical Baseline Review to determine a realistic cost,
schedule, and risk basis for completing the developmental phase of the
program, which the Offices of the Director, SE and DT&E participated
in. These organizational and policy changes in WSARA were instrumental
in the completion of the thorough review of the F-35 program that
resulted in Nunn-McCurdy certification on June 2, 2010.
WSARA-implemented organizational changes were leveraged in the
November 2011 F-35 Concurrency Quick Look Review (QLR), commissioned by
the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AUSD) for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). This review was led by PARCA, SE and
DT&E, and found the overall F-35 design to be sound. However, there is
significant risk remaining in the F-35 program. Resolving key technical
issues is important to address concerns about the F-35's operational
capabilities and to have confidence in the design so that production
rates can be increased. The Department used the result of the QLR to
inform the fiscal year 2013 Future Years Defense Program, which holds
U.S. production at 29 aircraft per year through 2014 to permit
additional progress on the test program before increasing production
and reduce concurrency risk.
The WSARA amendments to section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C., directly
influenced F-35 program planning, documentation and execution that led
to the AUSD(AT&L) approval of a new MS B in March 2012. Two DAB reviews
of the F-35 program were conducted in January and February 2012 with
full involvement of CAPE, PARCA, SE and DT&E. Per WSARA, CAPE cost
estimators worked closely with the program office as they developed the
Independent Cost Estimate and reviewed the program office estimates.
This culminated in concurrence from the Director, CAPE, with the
AUSD(AT&L) choice of cost estimate for the program. PARCA has completed
three semi-annual performance assessments of the F-35 program since
2010. In accordance with WSARA, these assessments will occur semi-
annually until at least March 2013; the next assessment is planned for
July 2012.
The F-35 Acquisition Strategy dated March 2012 includes plans for
competitive subsystem contracting for follow-on development,
procurement, and sustainment. Competitive acquisition of future F-35
and F-35 subsystem configurations, as well as sustainment support, will
be considered beginning with Low Rate Initial Production Lot 7 in
fiscal year 2013. Activities supporting this strategy are associated
with each contract action and, as such, will continue through the life
of the program. All such efforts will be evaluated to ensure they meet
the best interests of the F-35 program and are consistent with statute,
policy and international agreements. Additionally, the F-35 program
will not require the contractors to submit a make-or-buy plan since
they are responsible for managing contract performance, including
planning, placing and administering subcontracts as necessary to ensure
the best value to the Government.
The remaining actions to fulfill the overall goal involve continual
interaction between the WSARA-instituted organizations and the F-35
program office. To that end, the Department is planning an F-35 DAB
review in September 2012, with annual reviews to follow. Additionally,
CAPE will continue to work with the Services and the F-35 program
office to identify and quantify opportunities to reduce operating and
support costs for the program's life cycle.
excessive concurrency
3. Senator McCain. Mrs. McFarland, a big problem with how DOD buys
major systems is this: it has tended to go all in on these procurement
programs without understanding enough about their technical or systems
engineering to assess whether developing them may have too much risk.
So, these programs struggle endlessly in development--where costs grow
and schedules slip--without needed combat capability delivered. Far too
often, DOD has tried to execute such programs under cost-plus
contracts. In my view, this has been an utter disaster. Do you agree?
If so, how would you address it?
Mrs. McFarland. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that balance is
properly struck between the risk associated with the development phase,
the urgency of the need, and the likely impact on cost and schedule of
any related risk. I consider the department historically ``optimistic''
in assessing risk and with focus on assessment of risks in determining
if the program's content and schedule is too aggressive. I will ensure
that appropriate tools such as the Configuration Steering Board are
used to assess the risk/benefit of any given degree concurrent
development and production to insure that major weapons systems
programs clearly articulate the framing assumptions underlying
concurrency risks, to track progress against these assumptions and the
resulting concurrency effects, and I will require programs to reassess
levels of concurrent development and production planned as necessary if
these underlying assumptions change. If confirmed, I will also engage
the prime contractors in deliberate sharing/allocation of this risk as
they propose the schedule and costs for the capability.
4. Senator McCain. Mrs. McFarland, if confirmed, what overall
approach would you take to ensure that programs with too much
concurrency are never started?
Mrs. McFarland. Assessment of the risk/benefit of any given degree
of concurrent development and production must ensure that major weapons
systems programs clearly articulate the framing assumptions underlying
concurrency risks to identify clear and measureable steps to mitigate
them, and to track progress against these assumptions. If confirmed, I
will require programs to reassess levels of concurrent development and
production planned as necessary if the underlying metrics indicate
issues are not getting resolved, and also require a modular, open
system design architecture to reduce risk and costs, and allow for
program flexibility.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
acquisition and deployment of defense systems
5. Senator Brown. Mrs. McFarland, does the acquisition and
deployment of area defense systems remain important to U.S. defense
strategy, especially in regions where our potential adversaries possess
significant armored or maritime forces?
Mrs. McFarland. Yes, area defense is a key element of U.S. defense
strategy. The Department assesses current capabilities against
adversary threats to determine capability gaps and prioritize
requirements and what new capabilities need to be acquired.
sensor-fuzed weapon
6. Senator Brown. Mrs. McFarland, if international advocacy groups
are successful in breaking the supply chain for the Sensor-Fuzed
Weapon, what are the materiel, cost, and humanitarian implications for
U.S. contingency planning and warfighting strategy in the Korean
Peninsula and Persian Gulf regions?
Mrs. McFarland. Currently, the Department considers the programmed
inventory of Sensor-Fuzed Weapons as sufficient to support the
Department's requirements. We are concerned about the supply chain for
these munitions and our ability to fulfill our inventory objectives
should international advocacy groups prevail in disrupting supply in
the future, but the Department has not fully assessed the implications.
7. Senator Brown. Mrs. McFarland, what would the implications be
for U.S. allies that have current, pending, and prospective Foreign
Military Sales agreements with our Government?
Mrs. McFarland. The Department has not identified any potential
alternatives for U.S. allies should the U.S. industry be unable to
produce the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon.
8. Senator Brown. Mrs. McFarland, is DOD equipped to counter such
campaigns, whether it is the current one against the Sensor-Fuzed
Weapon or a looming one against armed drones? If so, how is DOD doing
this?
Mrs. McFarland. Protecting the U.S. defense industrial base and
national security interests requires DOD to collaborate effectively
with other executive branch agencies and Congress. We must ensure that
we thoroughly understand potential risks and communicate those risks to
our industry partners. We will work closely with our industry partners
to preserve domestic industrial capabilities.
9. Senator Brown. Mrs. McFarland, many of DOD's current inventories
of weapons do not meet the DOD policy of less than 1 percent unexploded
ordnance. Since the policy states that non-compliant weapons will not
be employed after 2018, please explain DOD's plans and programs (to
include budget lines and funding profiles) to replace or upgrade these
weapons.
Mrs. McFarland. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
Alternative Warhead (AW) is a precision guided, area suppression weapon
system with a required maximum range of 70KM. GMLRS AW will replace the
existing inventory of M26/M26AI/M26A2 dual-purpose, improved
conventional munition (DPICM) rockets with a DOD Cluster Munition
policy-compliant system. GMLRS AW will complete development in 2015
with an initial operational capability (IOC) of 324 GMLRS AW rockets
scheduled for early 2017. The GMLRS AW is fully funded with $159.6
million programmed for development. AW will be integrated into the
GMLRS rocket production line in 2016 with a remaining $1.35 billion
programmed for procurement through 2022 in order to achieve a GMLRS
Army Procurement Objective (APO) of 43,560 rockets.
A policy-compliant cannon DPICM replacement for M483 and M864 155mm
DPICM projectiles and the M39 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
Anti-Personnel Anti-Material (APAM) missiles is being evaluated. The
intent is to afford potential technology reuse from OMLRS AW for
application to a 155mm cannon DPICM and ATACMS APAM replacement.
In addition, the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) program is examining
a possible JSOW-A modification plan and cost estimate to replace the
non-compliant JSOW-A submunitions (BLU-97) weapon with an alternate
warhead (BLU-1 11), while retaining JSOW's area effect capabilities
after 2018.
10. Senator Brown. Mrs. McFarland, can you reaffirm the U.S.
position that the BLU-108 is the submunition of the Sensor-Fuzed
Weapon, because it is a conventional munition released by a cluster
munition and functions by detonating an explosive charge before impact?
Mrs. McFarland. Yes. The Department views the BLU-108 as the
Sensor-Fuzed Weapon submunition.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts
11. Senator Ayotte. Mrs. McFarland, I believe we should minimize
using cost-plus contracts to procure major weapons systems. In most
cases, by the time DOD is ready to produce major systems at a low rate,
enough development risk should have been burned off that contractors
should be ready to sign a fixed-price contract. Otherwise, cost-plus
contracts should be used for only those pieces where significant risk
is left over. This is the thrust of the amendment on cost-plus
contracting I offered with Senator McCain last year in connection with
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012.
What is your view of this issue?
Mrs. McFarland. Generally, I agree we should minimize the use of
cost-plus arrangements under our production contracts for major weapon
systems. Once we have completed low rate initial production, most of
the Department's contracts for major weapon systems should be fixed
priced. I believe there are circumstances however where we cannot
adequately reduce the risk in the low rate initial production phase and
therefore a form of cost reimbursable contract may be appropriate. Such
would be the case in support of an operational urgency (addressed as an
exception in one version of the amendment you offered in connection
with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012). Another circumstance that might
warrant use of a cost-type contract would be where we require the
contractor to deliver a production unit as a risk reduction measure to
assess technical feasibility. In general though, I am inclined to use
firm fixed-price contracts for low rate initial production and
production phases when the risk is low, production processes are
mature, and the costs are known. The Department would likely use fixed-
price incentive contracts when there is more risk and less of an
understanding about production processes and costs.
12. Senator Ayotte. Mrs. McFarland, do you support the floor
amendment Senator McCain and I offered last year, S.A. 1249?
Mrs. McFarland. One of the important elements of the Better Buying
Power initiative has been our emphasis on increasing the use of fixed
price type contracts, where appropriate. In particular, the Department
is more frequently using fixed-price contracting for the early stages
of production. However, since each program has unique features that
dictate the degree of risk involved, I believe it is important the
Department retain the flexibility to use the appropriate contract type
for a given contract. For example, I believe there are occasions where
it is appropriate to use cost-type contracts for low rate initial
production, or for incremental improvements after a program has entered
into the production phase. Therefore, I am not inclined to support a
provision that would broadly preclude cost-type contracts for the
production of major defense acquisition programs (MDAP). If confirmed,
I am committed to working with the committee on this issue.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Lyndsey Graham
cyber and intelligence acquisition
13. Senator Graham. Mrs. McFarland, how would you approach the
acquisition process for rapidly changing technologies, such as cyber
and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), versus those that remain
relatively constant and mature over long periods of time such as
airplanes, ships, and automotive land vehicles?
Mrs. McFarland. Command, control, and communications and cyber are
among the Department's fastest growing acquisition and technology
areas. Due to the complex and potentially crippling nature of cyber
attacks, requirements and technology are evolving at a very rapid rate.
There are unique characteristics associated with the efficient and
effective acquisition of cyber and C4ISR capabilities. In order to
maximize the operational benefit of the rapidly changing technologies
associated with these types of programs, the Department must use
different approaches in place of the established model normally used
for acquiring weapon systems. To keep pace with technology, C4ISR
programs must use an iterative, incremental, and time-limited approach
that will put capability into the hands of the user quickly.
This more rapid approach must be based on well defined increments
of capability that are developed, tested, and often fielded in
increments structured around 1 to 2 year software builds. The
capability should be delivered in partial deployments, with each
deployment providing an operationally useful capability. The Department
intends to incorporate this approach as one of the acquisition
approaches covered by the new DOD Instruction 5000.02 which is
currently in staffing.
Regarding Cyber technologies, on March 22, the Department also
submitted a report to Congress pursuant to section 933 of 2011 NDAA
which articulated a new strategy for acquiring cyberspace warfare
capabilities. The new cyber framework allows for alternative
acquisition processes, identified as ``rapid'' and ``deliberate.''
These processes will be tailored to the complexity, cost, urgency of
need and fielding timelines associated with the cyber warfare
capability being acquired. As cost increases and operational immediacy
and the tolerance for risk decreases, enterprise-level discipline
factors increase. These new processes for rapidly acquiring cyber
warfare capabilities will be piloted in the coming months and then
implemented throughout the Department as formal acquisition policy.
______
[The nomination reference of Mrs. Katharina G. McFarland
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 13, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Katharina G. McFarland, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary
of Defense (New Position).
______
[The biographical sketch of Mrs. Katharina G. McFarland,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Katharina G. McFarland
Education:
Rochester University, Life Sciences
September 1977-December 1980
Transferred to Queens University
Queens University, Engineering Department
January 1981-March 1985
Bachelor of Science Degree awarded May 1985
Professional Engineer License conferred May 1985
Professional Program Management Institute
Program Management Professional certificate conferred
October 2004
Employment Record:
Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition)
October 2011-present
Defense Acquisition University
President
January 2011-present
Missile Defense Agency
Director of Acquisition
May 2006-January 2011
Marine Corps Systems Command
Product Group Director, Battle Management and Air
Defense Systems
October 2001-May 2006
Program Manager, Acquisition Center of Excellence
September 1998-October 2001
Program Manager, Theater Missile Defense
October 1991-September 1998
Department of National Defense, Ottawa, Ontario
Procurement Head of Electronics
October 1990-October 1991
Headquarters, Marine Corps
General Engineer
November 1986-September 1990
Honors and Awards:
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service (2011)
Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award (2011)
Presidential Rank Meritorious Civilian Service (2011)
Outstanding Civilian Performance (1991-2006)
Civilian Meritorious Service Medal, U.S. Navy/Marine Corps (2001)
Navy Civilian Tester of the Year (1998)
Government Computing News Excellence Award (2000)
Unit Meritorious Service Medal
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mrs. Katharina
G. McFarland in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Katharina Ginger McFarland.
Maiden name: Wahl; Prior Married Surname: Brant; Nickname: Katrina.
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition).
3. Date of nomination:
February 13, 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
Watertown, NY; June 14, 1959.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Ronnell Reed McFarland.
7. Names and ages of children:
Son: Jacob John Brant, 18.
Stepson: Andrew McFarland, 31.
Stepson: Austin McFarland, 23.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
University of Rochester, School of Life Sciences, 1977-1980, no
degree conferred
Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Bachelor of Science,
Engineering, Professional Engineer, May 25, 1985, attended 1980-1985
Professional Program Management Institute Graduate, Oct. 1, 2004
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Oct. 2011 to present: Performing the duties of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Jan. 2011 to present: President, Defense Acquisition University
May 2006 to Jan. 2011: Director of Acquisition, Missile Defense
Agency
Oct. 2001 to May 2006: Product Group Director, Marine Corps Systems
Command, Quantico VA
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
I am the ``Domestic Partner'' (limited partner) of a family Limited
Liability Corporation (holds French Creek Marina Property) in Clayton,
NY. Wilbert C. Wahl, Jr. is the owner and my father.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Marine Corps Aviation Association, 1991
Program Management Institute, 2001
Defense Acquisition University Alumni Association, 2010
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Outstanding Civilian Performance (Every year from 1991 thru 2006)
Civilian Meritorious Service medal, U.S. Navy/Marine Corps . . .
2001
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service . . . 2011
Presidential Rank Meritorious Civilian Service . . . 2010
Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award . . . 2011
Navy Civilian Tester of the Year . . . 1998
Government Computing News Excellence Award . . . 2000
(I have received awards as DAU President, but they are for the
entire University, not just me)
Unit Meritorious Service Medal (Several years)
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
U.S. Marine Corps Theatre Missile Defense Models and Simulations
(American Society of Computer Simulation, Journal of Models and Sims,
2004 volume) Co-author with Alex Brofos, 1999
AT&L magazine ``Better Buying Power'', May 2011
Military Operations Research Society, ``Common Command and
Control'', 1992
International Aeronautical Engineering Societies, Proceedings on
Interoperability, 1993
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Technology,
Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and Procurement
Reform, ``On the Frontlines in the Acquisition Workforce's Battle
Against Taxpayer Waste,'' November 16, 2011.
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Katharina G. McFarland.
This 9th day of March, 2012.
[The nomination of Mrs. Katharina G. McFarland was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 23, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 2012.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Ms. Heidi Shyu by Chairman
Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. This milestone legislation is now more than 20 years old
and has served our Nation well. I believe that the framework
established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved
interservice and joint relationships and promoted the effective
execution of responsibilities. It is appropriate for the Department,
working with Congress, to continually assess the law in light of
improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational
dynamics. Although I am currently unaware of any reason to amend
Goldwater-Nichols, if confirmed, I hope to have an opportunity to
assess whether the challenges posed by today's security environment
require amendments to the legislation.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. As noted above, I have no specific proposals to modify
Goldwater-Nichols. As with any legislation of this magnitude, however,
I believe it may be appropriate to review past experience with the
legislation with a view toward identifying any areas in which it can be
improved upon, if any, and then consider with Congress whether the act
should be revised.
Question. Do you see the need for any change in the roles of the
civilian and military leadership of the Department of the Army
regarding the requirements definition, resource allocation, and
acquisition processes?
Answer. I have no specific proposals regarding the roles and
assigned missions at this time. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity
to review roles of the civilian and military participants in these
processes, as appropriate, with a view toward identifying areas that
can be improved upon.
Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the
Service Chiefs in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation process?
Answer. Section 861 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 formally recognized the
important role of the Service Chiefs in specified acquisition-related
functions of the Military Departments, including the development of
requirements relating to the defense acquisition system and the
coordination of measures to control requirements creep. In addition,
the Service Chiefs' collaboration in the resource allocation process is
very important.
Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the
combatant commanders in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-
allocation processes?
Answer. In my view, the existing warfighting responsibilities of
combatant commanders and their role as described in the Defense
Department Reorganization Act of 1986 is appropriate. I support
language in the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act mandating that
the input of combatant commanders be considered in the development of
joint requirements.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the structure or
operations of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)?
Answer. Based upon my experience as the Principal Deputy, I see no
current basis for recommending changes to the structure or operations
of the JROC. I fully support provisions in the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act mandating consideration of cost, schedule, and
performance tradeoffs by the JROC in establishing warfighter
requirements.
duties
Question. Section 3016(b)(5)(A) of title 10, U.S.C., states that
the principal duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) shall be the overall
supervision of acquisition, technology, and logistics matters of the
Department of the Army.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
ASA(ALT)?
Answer. The ASA(ALT) is one of five Assistant Secretaries of the
Army. The principal duty of the ASA(ALT) is the overall supervision of
acquisition, logistics, and technology matters within the Department of
the Army. The ASA(ALT) serves, when delegated, as the Army Acquisition
Executive and the Army's Senior Procurement Executive, and also as the
Science Advisor to the Secretary and the senior research and
development official for the Department of the Army. The ASA(ALT)
appoints, manages, and evaluates Program Executive Officers and direct-
reporting program managers, while also managing the Army Acquisition
Corps and the Army Acquisition Workforce. The ASA(ALT) executes the DA
procurement and contracting functions, including exercising the
authorities of the agency head for contracting, procurement, and
acquisition matters pursuant to laws and regulations, the delegation of
contracting authority; and the designation of contracting activities.
He or she is responsible for setting the strategic direction and
ensuring execution of policies, plans and programs relating to Army
acquisition, logistics, technology, procurement, the industrial base,
materiel-related security cooperation (including security assistance
and armaments cooperation) and the Army's responsibilities within the
Department of Defense (DOD) Chemical Demilitarization program.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the ASA(ALT), as set forth in section
3016(b)(5)(A) of title 10, U.S.C., or in DOD regulations pertaining to
functions of the ASA(ALT)?
Answer. I have no specific recommendations at this time. If
confirmed, however, I look forward to the opportunity to serve in the
position before recommending any potential changes in the duties and
functions of the ASA(ALT).
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), I have first-hand experience
in assisting in the oversight and supervision of Army acquisition
programs, procurement, logistics, sustainment and scientific and
technology initiatives within the Army.
Prior to serving in the Department of the Army, I developed a wide-
range of expertise in the development of defense weapon systems. Most
recently, I worked as the Vice President of Technology Strategy for
Space and Airborne Systems at Raytheon. In this capacity, I developed
technology strategy for a variety of sensors and systems. Previously, I
held several senior leadership positions at Raytheon, including
Corporate Vice President of Technology and Research, Vice President and
Technical Director of Space and Airborne Systems, Vice President of
Unmanned and Reconnaissance Systems, Senior Director of Unmanned Combat
Vehicles, Senior Director of Raytheon's Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
efforts, and Director of JSF Integrated Radar/Electronic Warfare
Sensors. As Director of JSF Antenna Technologies at Raytheon, I was
responsible for the development of lightweight, low-cost, Tile Active
Electronically Scanned Antenna technologies. I also served as the
Laboratory Manager for Electromagnetic Systems at Raytheon.
In addition, I have worked as a Project Manager at Litton
Industries and was the Principal Engineer for the Joint STARS Self
Defense Study at Grumman. Previously, I began my career as an engineer
at the Hughes Aircraft Company.
From 2000 to 2010, I served as a member of the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board, including tenure as Vice Chairman from 2003 to 2005 and
as Chairman from 2005 to 2008.
I hold a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mathematics from the
University of New Brunswick in Canada, a Master of Science Degree in
Mathematics from the University of Toronto, Master of Science Degree in
System Science (Electrical Engineering) from the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and the Engineer Degree from UCLA. I am
also a graduate of the UCLA Executive Management Course and the
University of Chicago Business Leadership Program. These combined
experiences and responsibilities have prepared me to serve in the
position, if confirmed.
Question. What background or experience do you have in the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), I assisted efforts to oversee
the acquisition of weapon systems, equipment and services for the U.S.
Army.
I have worked as the Vice President of Technology Strategy for
Space and Airborne Systems at Raytheon, developing the technology
strategy for a variety of sensor and radar development programs.
Previously, I held several senior leadership positions at Raytheon,
including Vice President of Technology and Research, Vice President and
Technical Director of Space and Airborne Systems, Vice President of
Unmanned and Reconnaissance Systems, Senior Director of Unmanned Combat
Vehicles, Senior Director of JSF, and Director of JSF Integrated Radar/
Electronic Warfare Sensors. As Director of JSF Antenna Technologies at
Raytheon, I was responsible for the development of lightweight, low-
cost, Tile Active Electronically Scanned Antenna technologies. I also
served as the Laboratory Manager for Electromagnetic Systems at
Raytheon. I have worked on numerous major weapons systems during my
career such as F/A-18, F-15, JSF, U-2, and Global Hawk.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army
would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect that I would be held
accountable for the Army's acquisition, logistics and technology
efforts.
relationships
Question. In carrying out your duties, what would be your
relationship with:
The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Army's
priorities in acquisition, logistics and technology.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of the
Army, both in his role as the Under Secretary and in his role as Chief
Management Officer.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Staff of the
Army to ensure that our soldiers receive world class equipment and
support to perform their missions within available resources.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L) in connection
with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs, and I will
support the USD(AT&L) in the discharge of his responsibility to
supervise DOD acquisition. I assume that my duties as Army Acquisition
Executive will bring me into close working contact with the USD(AT&L),
and I am confident that our collaboration will be very beneficial for
the Army and DOD.
Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation in support of efforts to provide the
Department with independent analysis and resourcing assessments for
weapons systems programs.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation to ensure appropriate operational testing oversight
for Army acquisition programs.
Question. The Director of Defense Pricing.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Defense
Pricing to ensure implementation of effective, best-value procurement
strategies in Army acquisition programs.
Question. The Director of Procurement and Acquisition Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Procurement
and Acquisition Policy to ensure appropriate oversight for Army
acquisition programs, procurement and contracting.
Question. The Director of Program Assessment and Root Cause
Analysis.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Program
Assessment and Root Cause Analysis to ensure proper oversight of Army
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and compliance with
applicable statutory reporting requirements.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering to rapidly field technologies and
capabilities in support of ongoing operations and to ensure the Army
and the Nation maintain a strong technical and engineering foundation
to reduce the cost, acquisition time, and risk of our major defense
acquisition programs.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Engineering.
Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on the expertise and advice of
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Engineering and encourage
his early involvement in support of Army acquisition programs.
Moreover, if confirmed, I would consider the Deputy Assistant
Secretary's independent assessments and recommendations in decisions
relating to Major Defense Acquisition Programs.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Developmental Test and
Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Developmental Test and Evaluation on oversight of
developmental testing and evaluation activities within Army acquisition
programs.
Question. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the JROC in support of its
missions related to the development and prioritization of joint
military requirements.
Question. The Service Acquisition Executives of the other Military
Departments.
Answer. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the other Service
Acquisition Executives to share information regarding relevant
acquisition programs, to seek opportunities to improve acquisition
processes, and to support the policies and practices of the Department.
Question. The Commander of the Defense Contract Management Command.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the Defense
Contract Management Agency to ensure effective administration of Army
contracts.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army General Counsel to
ensure all actions within the Office of the ASA(ALT) comport with law,
regulation and policy.
Question. The Auditor General of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Auditor General of the
Army in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology
programs.
Question. The Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Principal Military
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology to ensure that appropriate oversight and
direction is provided to the Army acquisition workforce and Army
acquisition programs, policies, procedures, and contracting efforts.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the ASA(ALT)?
Answer. I believe the principal challenges facing the ASA(ALT)
consist of equipping the Army through reset and modernization efforts
at a time of declining budgetary resources.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with senior Department of
the Army officials, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
to address these challenges and meet the acquisition priorities of the
Secretary of the Army. Meeting these challenges will require close and
continuous collaboration between organizations responsible for
requirements generation, programming and budgeting, and acquisition
program management to ensure the delivery of affordable, timely, and
effective equipment to the Army. I would maintain emphasis on enhancing
the acquisition workforce and on adopting sound business practices to
ensure that the Army achieves the maximum benefit from its scarce
fiscal resources.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the management of acquisition functions in the Army?
Answer. I believe that uncertainty regarding the extent of the
current decline in Army budgets presents a significant challenge in
planning and executing current and future planned investments in weapon
systems and equipment.
Question.What management actions and timetables would you establish
to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will rapidly work with Army leadership to
carefully plan and execute modernization and equipping efforts that
meet warfighter needs on an affordable, timely, and effective basis.
major weapon system acquisition
Question. Do you believe that the Army's current investment budget
for major systems is affordable given historic cost growth in major
systems, costs of current operations, projected increases in end
strength, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. I believe that current investments in major weapon systems
are affordable and the Army has recently undertaken significant efforts
to avert the leading causes of cost growth in past major programs.
Moreover, the Army has carefully balanced competing demands for
declining resources, to include support for ongoing operations, asset
recapitalization, and support for soldiers in the current budget
submission.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to develop and execute sound and
affordable acquisition strategies in close collaboration with the
requirements and resourcing organizations within the Army to ensure
that cost growth is prevented to the fullest extent possible. Moreover,
I would work with the Army leadership to ensure that the Army's
investment in major weapons systems programs remains sustainable.
Question. What would be the impact of a decision by the Army to
reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?
Answer. In addition to the possible impacts on and fielding
schedules for equipment in support of the warfighter, a reduction in
the manner described above may result in an increase in the unit price
of capabilities, thereby impacting planned acquisition strategies. Such
increases in unit cost may also result in cost breaches under the Nunn-
McCurdy legislation. Lastly, such reductions may have adverse effects
on the key industrial base suppliers.
Question. Nearly half of DOD's major defense acquisition programs
have exceeded the so-called Nunn-McCurdy cost growth standards
established in section 2433 of title 10, U.S.C., to identify seriously
troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 (WSARA) tightened the standards for addressing such
programs.
What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address out-of-
control cost growth on the Army's major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. It is my understanding that cost growth in many Army
programs resulted from the instability of requirements, combined with a
reliance on immature technologies, which contributed to a high degree
of risk in associated cost growth. If confirmed, I would place an
emphasis on acquisition strategies that anticipate and mitigate the
causes for such risk in major defense acquisition programs. Moreover, I
would work closely with the organizations responsible for requirements
generation to ensure that cost informed trade-offs in system
requirements are fully explored to reduce risk and ensure that programs
remain affordable.
Question. What steps if any do you believe that the Army should
consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition programs that
exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in the Nunn-
McCurdy provision?
Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor program cost to minimize Nunn-
McCurdy breaches. Where a program experiences a ``critical'' Nunn-
McCurdy breach, I would insist on strict compliance with all statutory
and regulatory requirements associated with the Nunn-McCurdy reporting
process. In programs involving critical breaches traced to root causes
other than planned reductions in procurement quantities, I would insist
on fully understanding, addressing, and preventing the specific causes
of cost growth in future programs.
Question. Do you believe that the office of the ASA(ALT), as
currently structured, has the organization and resources necessary to
effectively oversee the management of these major defense acquisition
programs? If not, how would you address this problem?
Answer. I believe that the Army acquisition community is
appropriately structured and resourced. If I am confirmed, I intend to
conduct an assessment to ensure that the Office of the ASA(ALT) is
structured and adequately resourced to effectively oversee the
management of Army acquisition, logistics, and technology efforts in
the future.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy
provision, as revised by section 206?
Answer. I am aware that section 831 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 provided some additional
flexibility in this area. At the present time I do not see a need for
broader amendments to the Nunn-McCurdy provision. However, if
confirmed; I will have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges
posed by compliance with the statutory requirements triggered by unit
cost growth associated with planned reductions in procurement
quantities require amendments to the legislation.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to
recommend terminating a program that has experienced ``critical'' cost
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. It is my view that a decision on whether to recommend
terminating a program that has experienced critical cost growth under
Nunn-McCurdy must be made on a case by case basis, by taking into
account the specific causes of cost growth in individual programs. This
assessment should include whether the program is delivering
capabilities essential to national security, consideration of
alternatives that can provide comparable capability at less cost,
whether the cost and schedule estimates are sound, and program
management.
systems engineering
Question. One of the premises for WSARA was that the best way to
improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a
sounder footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in
the early phases of the acquisition process. The Defense Science Board
Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation reported in May 2008
that ``the single most important step necessary'' to address high rates
of failure on defense acquisition programs is ``to ensure programs are
formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the
beginning.''
Do you believe that the Army has the systems engineering and
developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed
to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements,
acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition
programs?
Answer. I believe that the Army currently has the required
organizations, resources and capabilities to ensure that requirements,
acquisition and budget decisions on major defense acquisition programs
are sound. Since WSARA was enacted, the Army has placed significant
emphasis on systems engineering in the development of major acquisition
programs, to include the formulation of acquisition strategies tailored
to identify and address systems engineering challenges early in major
programs. WSARA also placed a renewed emphasis on developmental
testing, focusing on the maturation of technologies and effective use
of developmental testing to prevent issues arising in operational
tests. The Army has implemented this statutory guidance and given
systems engineering and developmental testing a high priority in its
acquisition programs.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's implementation to
date of section 102 of WSARA, regarding systems engineering?
Answer. In my view, the Army has implemented the requirements under
section 102, which call for development of systems engineering plans in
major defense acquisition programs under the oversight of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering. Since WSARA was
enacted, the Army has established the Office of the Chief Systems
Engineer to provide the Army's leadership and materiel developers with
the necessary engineering/architectural products to manage and shape
the Army's materiel portfolio, to ensure a System Engineering
discipline across the materiel developer community throughout the
acquisition life cycle. This Chief Systems Engineer's responsibilities
also include the cultivation of System Engineering capabilities within
the Army through education, engineering policy, guidelines and adoption
of best industry practices.
Additionally, the Army has established a Directorate of Systems of
Systems Integration, designed to improve reliability, availability,
maintainability, and sustainability of Army equipment through rigorous
system of systems assessment and analysis.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
implement this provision?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to expand efforts to improve
systems engineering throughout the lifecycle of Army acquisition
programs. Particularly as the Army undertakes modernization of
networked and interoperable weapon systems and equipment, systems
engineering oversight and expertise would be given significant
emphasis.
Question. Do you believe that the Nation as a whole is producing
enough systems engineers and designers and giving them sufficient
experience working on engineering and design projects to ensure that
the Army can access an experienced and technically trained systems
engineering and design workforce?
Answer. As a Nation, we are short of systems engineers, and I
believe we must continue to attract, train, and utilize talented
systems engineers--both within the private sector and the government
workforce. I am encouraged by the expansion of systems engineering
training offered in our colleges and universities, but the Army must
continue to develop and acquire this type of critical expertise.
Question. If not, what do you recommend should be done to address
the shortfall?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with other stakeholders
within the Department to expand the Army's efforts to recruit and
retain a skilled systems engineering workforce and work to leverage the
expertise at universities and other federally funded institutions where
appropriate.
technological maturity
Question. Over the last several years, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that private sector programs
are more successful than DOD programs because they consistently require
that new technologies achieve a high level of maturity before such
technologies may be incorporated into product development programs.
Section 104 of WSARA addresses this issue by tightening technological
maturity requirements for major defense acquisition programs.
How important is it, in your view, for the Army to mature its
technologies with research and development funds before these
technologies are incorporated into product development programs?
Answer. In my view, the Army must continue to address the maturity
of technologies incorporated within development programs in order to
avert a leading cause of cost growth. Whether the technologies are
matured using government research and development funds, or through the
private sector, I believe it is critically important to accurately
gauge their maturity level prior to initiation of the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development program.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the key components and technologies to be incorporated into major
acquisition programs meet the Army's technological maturity goals?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all technologies are peer
reviewed for maturity before they transition to a program of record and
I would ensure compliance with guidance regarding technological
maturity standards issued by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering pursuant to section 104 of WSARA.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has the organizations,
resources and capabilities necessary to assess effectively the maturity
of technologies that are critical to the development of major weapon
systems that the Army procures?
Answer. I believe the Army does.
Question. If not, how should the Army address these deficiencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Army
adequately and consistently applies standards for assessing
technological maturity used within the Department.
Question. Do you believe that the Army should make greater use of
prototypes, including competitive prototypes, to ensure that
acquisition programs reach an appropriate level of technological
maturity, design maturity, and manufacturing readiness before receiving
Milestone approval?
Answer. In my view, the Army should generally make greater use of
prototypes in acquisition programs, to include competitive prototypes
as required under WSARA, if these strategies contribute to the
effective reduction of cost and schedule risk. These and other risk-
mitigation strategies should be tailored to meet the needs of
individual acquisition programs.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Army should take to
increase its use of such prototypes?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize its importance
and work to ensure that adequate resources are made available to
support prototyping, as appropriate.
Question. The Army budget for fiscal year 2012 included $10 million
for a Technology Maturation Initiative. The Army has requested $25
million for this initiative in fiscal year 2013.
What is your understanding of the purpose of the Technology
Maturation Initiative?
Answer. My understanding is that the Technology Maturation
Initiative provides a mechanism for expediting technology transition
from the laboratory to operational use. The Army is using this
initiative to mature promising technologies and subsystems to
Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) greater than six, while conducting
some competitive prototyping activities for key emerging systems prior
to Milestone B. I believe this initiative will help reduce technical
risk in future acquisition programs, increase transition opportunities
for innovative technology-based solutions, and ultimately reduce cost
in acquisition programs.
I understand that investments under this program are selected
according to established criteria that consider the potential to
accelerate technology transition, the prospect of cost and risk
reduction associated with technology development and the project's
potential for integration within an Army acquisition program. Each
funded project is closely monitored to ensure that it is on track to
deliver products on time and within budget.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
funding provided for the Technology Maturation Initiative is used in
the most effective manner possible to promote the objectives of the
initiative?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Technology
Maturation Initiative funding is allocated only to those efforts that
have high potential for addressing capability needs and transitioning
mature technologies to programs of record. I would continue to require
that candidate programs receive careful vetting and that projects are
selected according to established criteria that further the
initiative's goals. Also, if confirmed, I would continue to require
that efforts funded under the Technology Maturation Initiative receive
close oversight by my office.
Question. Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Milestone
Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to certify
that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of
maturity before Milestone B approval.
What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
the Army complies with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Army conducts Technology
Readiness Assessments (TRA) to document that technologies have reached
an appropriate level of maturity before receiving Milestone B approval.
I will also ensure that processes, tools and resources are in place to
meet all the requirements of section 2366a.
Question. What is your view of the recommendation of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on the Manufacturing Technology Program that
program managers should be required to make use of the Manufacturing
Readiness Level tool on all programs?
Answer. In my view, the readiness of manufacturing processes plays
a significant role in the cost, schedule, and production performance of
the Army's development efforts. Understanding and ensuring a system's
readiness for manufacturing is essential to success. While
Manufacturing Readiness Levels may provide a tangible measure of
maturity in manufacturing processes, such metrics must weigh the
maturity of the system's design--particularly in the early stages of
development, when designs have not yet fully matured--in order to
provide a useful indication of risk.
Question. Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in
acquisition programs, what other steps should the Army take to increase
accountability and discipline in the acquisition process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would utilize milestone decision and other
program reviews to emphasize accountability and discipline within the
process. In addition, I would work closely with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to continue implementation of ``should cost''
benchmarks--bottom up assessments of what a program should cost--in
addition to affordability targets under the Department's Better Buying
Power initiative to impose rigor and discipline in our performance.
Overall, I would work to instill a culture of cost-consciousness across
the acquisition workforce.
excessive concurrency
Question. Some of the Army's largest and most troubled acquisition
programs appear to have suffered significantly from excessive
concurrency--the effort to produce a weapon system, even as it is still
being designed.
What impact do you believe that such excessive concurrency has on
our efforts to produce major weapon systems on schedule and on budget?
Answer. In my view, a high degree of concurrency--commencement of
production while design is ongoing--contributes significant risk to
weapon systems programs, particularly if the concurrency is
attributable to evolving requirements in the late phases of
development. This type of risk is likely to result in significant cost
growth in major acquisition programs.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address this
issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work diligently with affected
stakeholders, to include the requirements generation community, to
minimize concurrency and associated risk in Army acquisition programs.
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations
Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance
expectations. Section 101 of WSARA is designed to address this problem
by establishing an independent Director of Cost Assessment and
Performance Evaluation, who is charged with ensuring the development of
realistic and unbiased cost estimates to support the Department's
acquisition programs.
Do you agree with the assessment that overly optimistic cost and
schedule estimates and unrealistic performance expectations contribute
to the failure of major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, how do you expect to work with the Director
of the new office to ensure that the Army's cost, schedule, and
performance estimates are realistic?
Answer. The Director, CAPE performs a critical role in the
acquisition process by providing independent cost assessment and
program evaluation to the Milestone Decision Authority. If confirmed, I
will work closely with the Director, CAPE to ensure that cost,
schedule, and performance estimates are performed early, independently
validated, and managed throughout a program's life cycle.
Question. Section 201 of WSARA seeks to address this problem by
promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs.
Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition,
budget and requirements communities in the Army can help ensure more
realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations?
Answer. I do. Greater collaboration between the program management,
requirements and resourcing communities is essential to the development
of a realistic and realizable program. This collaboration must take
place early and throughout the development of new capabilities in order
to maintain affordability and meet warfighter requirements on a timely
and effective basis.
Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure such communication?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army's requirements and
resourcing stakeholders to collectively maintain affordable and
achievable weapon system programs by identifying requirements tradeoffs
and instituting sound acquisition strategies consistent with available
resources.
Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition
and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule,
and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.
Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development
can help improve the performance of the Army's major acquisition
programs?
Answer. In my view, incremental acquisition strategies are
effective; particularly where rapidly evolving technologies are
involved or rapid fielding is needed to meet operational need.
Question. What risks do you see in the Army's use of incremental
acquisition and spiral development?
Answer. In pursuing incremental acquisition, an open architecture
needs to be established to enable incorporation of next-generation
technologies. In addition, growth margins must be accommodated in the
architecture to enable rapid insertion.
Question. In your view, has the Army's approach to incremental
acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or why not?
Answer. I believe the Army's approach has been successful in the
conduct of recent major weapon systems. For example, the Ground Combat
Vehicle program strategy was designed with prioritized requirements as
part of an incremental strategy for development of an improved infantry
fighting vehicle. This approach provides industry with significant
flexibility in developing designs that meet the Army's cost and
schedule targets. Similarly, the Army has had success implementing
incremental strategies in development of tactical network.
Question. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure
that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can
accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Army
requirements, resourcing and testing communities to develop and execute
incremental acquisition strategies, where appropriate.
Question. How should the Army ensure that the incremental
acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines
against which to measure performance?
Answer. I believe that appropriate baselines must be developed in
close collaboration with the warfighter to ensure that the capability
provided by each increment, and its cost, is well understood.
time-certain development
Question. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA)
panel recommended in 2006 that the Department set fixed durations for
program phases, including a requirement for the delivery of the first
unit of a major weapon system to operational forces within 6 years of
the Milestone A decision. The DAPA panel believed that durations for
program phases could be limited by ensuring appropriate levels of
technological maturity, defined risk-reduction horizons, and program
execution criteria, while allowing for the use of spiral development or
block upgrades for enhancements in capability or increased requirements
over time. Proponents of this approach, called time-certain
development, have highlighted its potential for helping ensure that
``evolutionary'' (or ``knowledge-based'') acquisition strategies are
used to develop major systems by forcing more manageable commitments to
discrete increments of capability and stabilize funding by making costs
and schedules more predictable.
What is your view of the DAPA panel's recommendation?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to assess
the merits of the DAPA panel's recommendation within the conduct of
acquisition programs in the Army's portfolio.
Question. What is your view of time-certain development as an
acquisition strategy for major weapons systems development programs?
Answer. In my view, the use of set or fixed durations for each
phase of the acquisition cycle may preclude tailored acquisition
strategies.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
implement time-certain development strategies in the future acquisition
programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with affected
stakeholders to assess the feasibility of implementing time-certain
development strategies, where appropriate.
performance-based payments
Question. In 1995, the Federal Acquisition Regulation was revised
to create a new category of payments, known as Performance-Based
Payments (PBPs) on fixed-price contracts. PBPs are made on the basis of
the physical completion of authorized work, rather than the incurrence
of seller costs.
In your view, what advantages, if any, can the Army gain by using
PBPs more extensively in connection with fixed-price contracts for the
development of its major systems?
Answer. Where specified program achievements are well-defined, PBP
strategies, in conjunction with fixed-price contracts, may help address
risks in technical performance and program schedules in appropriate
cases.
Question. Do you believe that PBPs should be the preferred means of
providing contract financing under fixed-price contracts for the
development of the Army's major systems? Why or why not?
Answer. A preference for PBPs within Army fixed-price contracts
would depend on whether the program has well-defined requirements and a
stable design. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to
evaluate the utility of PBPs within fixed-price contracts used in the
Army.
funding and requirements stability
Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition
programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and
requirements. In the past, DOD has attempted to provide greater funding
stability through the use of multiyear contracts. More recently, the
Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting
Configuration Steering Boards to exercise control over any changes to
requirements that would increase program costs.
Do you support the use of Configuration Steering Boards to increase
requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I fully support the use of Configuration Steering Boards
(CSBs) to address the stability of requirements in major defense
acquisition programs. I believe that funding and requirements stability
is an essential component of successful acquisition programs. The Army
currently employs CSBs on a regular basis to identify opportunities to
de-scope requirements contributing to undue cost growth and performance
risk in major defense acquisition programs.
Question. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to
increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with senior officials
within the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to continue
the use of CSBs in the conduct of Army major weapon systems programs to
address the need for requirements and funding stability. Moreover, I
would place a significant emphasis on greater collaboration with the
requirements generation and resourcing communities to identify and
address areas where instability presents challenges in acquisition
programs.
fixed price-type contracts
Question. Recent Congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to
reduce technical and performance risks associated with developing and
producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use
of cost-reimbursable contracts.
Do you think that the Army should move towards more fixed price-
type contracting in developing or procuring major defense acquisition
programs? Why or why not?
Answer. Use of fixed-price contracts, where appropriate, is a key
tenet of the Department's Better Buying Power initiative. In my
opinion, the Army should use the type of contract that is best suited
for the acquisition program at issue, after considering the complexity
and risk associated with technical designs, the speed with which
capabilities must be provided to the warfighter, industry's experience
in developing and integrating relevant technologies, and the need to
maintain technological superiority. If confirmed, I will ensure that
Army acquisition strategies reflect sound business judgment in
selecting the appropriate contract type.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the Army to use a cost-type contract for the
production of a major weapon system?
Answer. In my view, cost-type contracts may be appropriate in
development programs. These include efforts involving significant
technical challenges, such as high risk associated with development of
unprecedented technologies, significant software development or
development of new manufacturing technologies and/or processes. Cost-
type contracts may also be appropriate during production where there is
operational urgency for the needed capability, or where a lack of
experience within the defense industry, the need to maintain
technological superiority over peers and adversaries, or where some
combination of these and other related factors warrant such a
contracting strategy.
technology transition
Question. The Department continues to struggle with the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with
moving technologies from DOD programs or other sources rapidly into the
hands of operational users.
What impediments to technology transition do you see within the
Army?
Answer. In my view, the successful transition of new technologies
to Army programs of record is critical to the long-term success of our
acquisition efforts. In my opinion, the most significant impediment to
technology transition lies in the lack of coordination among relevant
stakeholders necessary to facilitate the transition. While S&T programs
often demonstrate technology concepts, they frequently are not mature
enough for direct insertion into Programs of Record. Close and
continuous coordination between the S&T organizations, industry,
academia, FFRDCs, government laboratories with the Army materiel
developers is essential for success.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance
the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that technology
investment strategies are closely coordinated with warfighter
requirements and capabilities developed within the acquisition process
in order to transition mature technologies as appropriate. I will also
assess appropriate metrics applicable to the S&T community to gauge
progress in transition efforts.
Question. What can be done from a budget, policy, and
organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies
from science and technology programs and other sources, including small
businesses, venture capital funded companies, and other nontraditional
defense contractors, into acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, as well as the small
business and S&T communities to encourage tighter collaboration with
the acquisition community.
Question. Do you believe that the Army's science and technology
organizations have the ability and the resources to carry technologies
to higher levels of maturity before handing them off to acquisition
programs?
Answer. I do.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to
ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce
technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be
demonstrated at the appropriate time?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to ensure
that the Army science and technology effort is resourced to accomplish
its mission.
Question. What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and
Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Army's efforts to
enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in
acquisition programs?
Answer. In my view, well-defined and consistently applied
assessments of technological readiness and manufacturing readiness
serve as valuable tools in reducing the cost and risk in Army
acquisition programs. Technology Readiness Assessments provide a
standardized metric to identify the maturity of new technologies, or
existing technologies used in a new or novel fashion. By ensuring that
new technologies are at adequate maturity levels with appropriate risk
mitigation plans to warrant continued progression through the
acquisition process, the Army mitigates the risk of having schedule and
cost overruns that can result from having immature technology matured
within an acquisition program.
While Manufacturing Readiness Levels may provide a tangible measure
of maturity in manufacturing processes, such metrics must weigh the
maturity of the system's design--particularly in the early stages of
development, when designs have not yet fully matured--in order to
provide a useful indication of risk. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
effectiveness of formal Manufacturing Readiness Levels in reducing cost
and risk in acquisition programs and facilitating technology
transition.
Question. What is your view of the Rapid Innovation Program
established pursuant to section 1073 of the Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011?
Answer. In my view, the Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) is a valuable
mechanism for supporting truly innovative technology solutions that are
not funded through the Army's customary structured processes. I believe
RIF support can help small and nontraditional businesses realize an
increased role in meeting the Army's needs more rapidly and
innovatively.
I understand that candidates for funding are solicited through a
Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) followed by a careful selection of
proposals with a high potential to demonstrate technology enabled
capabilities that can be transitioned to either programs of record or
rapidly fielded to soldiers.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges to successful
implementation of this program?
Answer. I do not anticipate any major challenges, but if confirmed,
I would ensure that the selection process is consistently and
transparently employed and that oversight of RIF funded projects is
diligently maintained to promote the best use of these funds.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
funds authorized and appropriated for this program are spent in the
most effective manner possible to promote the objectives of the
program?
Answer. See response above.
multiyear contracts
Question. The statement of managers accompanying Section 811 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the
requirements for buying major defense systems under multiyear contracts
as follows: ``The conferees agree that `substantial savings' under
section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10, U.S.C., means savings that exceed 10
percent of the total costs of carrying out the program through annual
contracts, except that multiyear contracts for major systems providing
savings estimated at less than 10 percent should only be considered if
the Department presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal
meets the other requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The
conferees agree with a Government Accountability Office finding that
any major system that is at the end of its production line is unlikely
to meet these standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a
multiyear procurement contract.''
What are your views on multiyear procurements? Under what
circumstances do you believe they should be used?
Answer. I support the use of multiyear procurements as a potential
source of substantial procurement savings in the Army. In my view,
multiyear procurements offer improved use of industrial facilities,
funding stability, economies of scale and reduced administrative
burdens in contracting. This, in turn, enables industry to focus their
IR&D to improve manufacturing processes. The decision to pursue
multiyear procurements should weigh the stability of system
requirements and availability of funding, the maturity of system
designs and associated technical and manufacturing risks, and
industry's expertise in production processes.
Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that
constitute ``substantial savings'' for purposes of the defense
multiyear procurement statute, title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. It is my understanding that title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b
does not establish a specific numerical savings threshold below which
multiyear procurements would be disfavored. In addition, I am aware of
citations to a 10 percent savings minimum as a reasonable measure of
``substantial savings.'' I agree that multiyear savings must indeed be
substantial as compared to annual procurements, and that a 10 percent
benchmark serves as a reasonable indicator of such savings. However, if
confirmed, I would not foreclose the option to pursue multiyear
procurements achieving a level of savings below 10 percent in
appropriate circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you
anticipate that you would support a multiyear contract with expected
savings of less than 10 percent?
Answer. See response above.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you
support a multiyear contract for a major system at the end of its
production line?
Answer. If confirmed, I would pursue multiyear procurements, as
appropriate, where such procurement strategies are warranted by the
verified identification of substantial savings to the taxpayer. The
decision to enter a multiyear procurement on systems nearing the end of
production would depend on careful consideration of a variety of
factors and the degree of savings to be achieved.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a
multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that
have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost,
scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply
with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute,
title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. The decision to enter a multiyear procurement would depend
on careful consideration of a variety of factors, to include program
risks and contractor performance, in addition to the degree of savings
to be achieved. If confirmed, I would carefully evaluate and assess all
such factors in determining whether to pursue multiyear procurements.
Unsatisfactory program performance will be a major factor in
consideration of whether to pursue a multiyear procurement.
Question. What is the impact of the Department's current budget
situation, in your view, on the feasibility and advisability of
additional multiyear procurement contracts for major weapon systems?
Answer. In my view, declining resources present a significant
challenge to the sustained use of multiyear procurements in the Army.
Any decision to pursue additional multiyear procurement contracts must
carefully weigh the potential risk associated with funding instability
with the positional cost savings for the Army.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should the Army ever
break a multiyear procurement?
Answer. In my view, a break in multiyear procurement should be a
rare event warranted only under exceptional circumstances, to include
an unplanned or sharp reduction in funding, or poor delivery
performance by the contractor.
Question. What impact if any does the use of a multiyear contract
have, in your view, on the operation and sustainment cost for a weapon
system?
Answer. In my opinion, multiyear procurements can offer significant
savings in the area of operation and sustainment costs of a major
weapon system. The funding stability provided by a multiyear contract
enables both the prime contractor and their subcontractors to invest to
improve their manufacturing processes.
Question. To what extent should the Army consider operation and
sustainment costs, and the stability of such costs, before making a
decision whether to acquire a major system under a multiyear contract?
Answer. In my view, the Army should assess all factors and
potential areas of risk in determining whether to pursue savings
through multiyear procurements.
Question. The Army's fiscal year 2013 budget proposal seeks
approval to enter into a new 5-year contract for the procurement of CH-
47 Chinook helicopters.
What impact would procuring these helicopters under a multiyear
contract have on the Army's budgetary flexibility in a period when
tight budgets and possible sequestration could require deep budget
cuts?
Answer. In my view, the proposal to enter into a new 5-year
contract for CH-47 Chinook helicopters comports fully with the
statutory requirements for multiyear procurements and reflects a
deliberate assessment of associated risks and projected substantial
savings.
Question. Do you believe that it is in the best interests of the
Army to restrict its budgetary flexibility in this manner? Why or why
not?
Answer. Particularly in a resource constrained environment, I
support the decision to achieve substantial taxpayer savings. The CH-47
program has a long history of stability and success in meeting
warfighter needs.
continuing competition and organizational conflicts of interest
Question. Section 202 of WSARA requires DOD to take steps to
promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition)
throughout the life of major defense acquisition programs.
What is your view on the utility of continuing competition as a
tool to achieve long-term innovation and cost savings on major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. I fully agree that competition serves as a valuable tool in
driving technological innovation, achieving cost savings and reducing
schedule in acquisition programs. I support efforts to expand use of
competition at key program milestones, consistent with the Department's
Better Buying Power initiative.
Question. Do you believe that such continuing competition is a
viable option on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that increased competition is a vital tool for
promoting long-term innovation and cost savings in weapon system
programs.
Question. If so, what steps if any can and should the Army take to
address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that acquisition strategies
for Army programs incorporate increased use of competition where ever
appropriate.
Question. Section 203 of WSARA requires the use of competitive
prototypes for major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of
producing such prototypes would exceed the lifecycle benefits of
improved performance and increased technological and design maturity
that prototypes would achieve.
Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. I do. Competitive prototypes provide a valuable mechanism
for identifying and addressing systems integration challenges in
complex systems, maturing technologies, identifying potential
requirements trades and reducing the overall cost and schedule risk of
developmental efforts. I support the use of competitive prototypes at
the system and subsystem level where the use of this approach
effectively reduces government risk.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of
competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial?
Answer. In my view, competitive prototypes are useful in the
technology development phase involving immature technologies,
technologies integrated in new ways, or where system requirements need
refinement.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such
prototypes is likely to outweigh the potential benefits?
Answer. There may be instances in which competitive prototypes do
not provide a cost-effective means to reduce risk in an acquisition
program. Such instances may include programs calling for competition of
relatively mature technologies, or cases in which the government
acquires the most current versions of rapidly evolving technologies,
such as radios or mobile handheld devices. A cost benefit analysis
could be used to determine if a prototype is beneficial.
Question. Section 207 of WSARA required the Department to
promulgate new regulations to address organizational conflicts of
interest on major defense acquisition programs.
Do you agree that organizational conflicts of interest can reduce
the quality and value of technical support services provided to the
Army and undermine the integrity of the Army's acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Army has
taken to implement section 207 and the new regulations?
Answer. My understanding is that section 207 of WSARA has been
implemented within the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement, which is fully applicable to the Army.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the Army
should take to address organizational conflicts of interest in major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. The occurrence and perception of organizational conflicts
of interest presents a serious threat to the integrity of the
acquisition process. If confirmed, I would ensure that senior Army
program and contracting officials remain sensitive to potential OCIs
and ensure that they are appropriately addressed. I also would work
closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to determine
and implement appropriate policies, procedures, and other measures
needed to address this concern.
Question. What are your views on the use of system engineering and
technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense
contractors to provide ``independent'' advice to the Army on the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. I support the applicable statutory and regulatory guidance
that governs the use of such contractor personnel. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure that Army acquisition programs closely adhere to
guidance regarding inherently governmental functions in this area and
that programs adhere to applicable rules, regulations and statutes
governing organizational conflicts of interest.
Question. What lines do you believe the Army should draw between
those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently governmental and
those that may be performed by contractors?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with other Army senior
leaders to execute Departmental guidance regarding the performance of
inherently governmental functions in acquisition by the government
workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and
proprietary information of the Army and other defense contractors?
Answer. If confirmed, I would emphasize compliance with and
enforcement of applicable rules, policies and laws governing the misuse
of sensitive and proprietary information within the Army. Moreover, to
the extent that revised or additional measures are required to
safeguard sensitive or proprietary information, I would support efforts
to strengthen existing policies.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for
subcontracts in a manner that would disadvantage the government or
potential competitors in the private sector?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to develop or reinforce policies
that support competition at the subcontractor level, as appropriate.
operating and support costs
Question. Operating and support (O&S) costs far exceed acquisition
costs for most major weapon systems. Yet, DOD has placed far less
emphasis on the management of O&S costs than it has on the management
of acquisition costs. Section 832 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requires the Department to take a series of
steps to improve its processes for estimating, managing, and reducing
such costs.
What steps will you take, if confirmed, to implement the
requirements of section 832 in the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fully support implementation of
section 832 and associated efforts under the legislation designed to
assess, manage and control operation and support (O&S) costs in major
weapon system programs. In the conduct of Army acquisition programs, I
would ensure that the life cycle cost data required under the
legislation is collected and assessed in major weapon systems programs.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has appropriate
organizations, capabilities, and procedures in place to monitor and
manage O&S costs?
Answer. It is my understanding that a large percentage of system
lifecycle costs are generally attributable to O&S costs. I believe that
the Army has the appropriate organizations, capabilities and procedures
in place to monitor and manage O&S costs. To the extent that the Army
needs strengthened support in this area, if confirmed, I would work
closely with Army leaders to ensure that O&S costs are appropriately
addressed.
Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
develop such organizations, capabilities, and procedures?
Answer. See response above.
contracting for services
Question. By most estimates, the Department now spends more for the
purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon
systems). After a decade of rapid growth, section 808 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 placed a cap on DOD
spending for contract services.
Do you believe that the Army can do more to reduce spending on
contract services?
Answer. I believe that the Army has made significant progress in
identifying and categorizing service contracts under the Better Buying
Power initiative and efforts under the Army's Institutional Army
Transformation Commission, while identifying areas of cost growth and
potential reduction. If confirmed, I would work closely with Army
leadership to implement and expand these efforts as appropriate.
Question. Do you believe that the current balance between
government employees (military and civilian) and contractor employees
is in the best interests of the Army?
Answer. It is my opinion that a combination of military, government
civilians, and contractor employees is necessary. If confirmed, I will
work with Army leadership to identify the right mix of resources in the
best interest of the Army.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
control the Army's spending on contract services and ensure that the
Army complies with the requirements of section 808?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Army commands and
organizations to implement the requirements of section 808 and continue
ongoing efforts within the Department to control the growth of spending
in this area.
Question. Section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
2007 required DOD to develop a management structure for the procurement
of contract services. Sections 807 and 808 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (subsequently codified in
section 2330a of title 10, U.S.C.) require DOD to develop inventories
and conduct management reviews of contracts for services.
Do you believe that the Army has appropriate organizations,
capabilities, and procedures in place to manage its service contracts?
Answer. I do. Oversight and management of the Army's service
contract initiatives falls within the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), which is
responsible for execution of detailed plans to identify and harness
savings in service contracts and address areas of cost growth through
formal oversight.
Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
develop such organizations, capabilities, and procedures?
Answer. See answer above.
Question. Do you support the use of management reviews, or peer
reviews, of major service contracts to identify ``best practices'' and
develop lessons learned?
Answer. I do. If confirmed, I will continue to study and support
mechanisms that effectively facilitate the identification of best
practices and sharing of lessons learned in this area. In addition, I
will collaborate with the Air Force and Navy acquisition executives to
share lessons learned.
Question. If confirmed, will you fully comply with the requirement
of section 2330a?
Answer. If confirmed, I will fully comply with the requirements
under section 2330a relating to the procurement of services.
Question. Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD to establish a process for identifying,
assessing, reviewing, and validating requirements for the acquisition
of contract services.
What is the status of the Army's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 863?
Answer. The Army has established a Senior Services Manager (Senior
Executive Service position) within the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) to
provide policy and oversight of Army services acquisition. In September
2011, the Secretary of the Army approved a Services Optimization Plan
that established an organizational structure and processes for
oversight and management of services acquisitions that focuses on
efficiency, effectiveness, and cost reductions.
Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the
Army established for taking these steps?
Answer. The Army is implementing a number of initiatives during
fiscal years 2012 and 2013. These efforts include annual requirements
and execution reviews of services acquisitions in an effort to obtain
effective and efficient services at the lowest cost, developing a
services business intelligence capability to provide Army leaders end-
to-end understanding of services acquisitions requirements, performance
and cost, efforts to codify procedures and standards in applicable Army
regulations, and working with the Defense Acquisition University to add
new services acquisition management practices into training courses.
Question. What additional steps if any would you take, if
confirmed, to improve the Army's management of its contracts for
services?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with Army commands and
organizations to identify areas to refine and improve the management of
contracts for services, establish metrics, and monitor progress.
contractor performance of critical governmental functions
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, has the Army become too reliant on contractors to
support the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. In my view, the Army must maintain the appropriate mix of
military, civilian, and contractor support within the acquisition
function. If confirmed, I would focus on making any necessary
adjustments to ensure that the Army's acquisition workforce possesses
and retains critical skills needed to equip soldiers and reduces
dependence on contractors.
Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
services contracts is in the best interest of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with Army leadership to
address the extent to which personal services contracts should be used.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of
personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements
to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those
performed by government employees?
Answer. In my opinion, appropriate personal conflict of interest
standards and other ethics requirements should be applied to contractor
employees when they are performing functions similar to those performed
by government employees. It is my understanding that, based on the
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,
standards and requirements relating to contractor employees who perform
acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental
functions are prescribed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. If
confirmed, I will use the resources of my office to ensure that such
standards and requirements are applied as intended. The Army must
always be an honest and transparent steward of the taxpayer dollars.
Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S.
military operation. According to widely published reports, the number
of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has exceeded the
number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.
Do you believe that the Army has become too dependent on contractor
support for military operations?
Answer. In my opinion, contractors provide vital life, safety, and
health support to both wartime and peacetime military operations. Their
contributions allow military personnel to focus on warfighting
operations under established strength levels. I believe that the Army
must continue to assess and define the appropriate levels of contractor
support in current and future military operations.
Question. What risks do you see in the Army's reliance on such
contractor support? What steps do you believe the Army should take to
mitigate such risk?
Answer. In my view, the use of contractors provides critical
support to warfighting operations. This situation presents potential
operational risks in future situations where comparable contract
support may be unavailable. It also may result in the Government
incurring excessive costs for this support. To mitigate these risks, I
believe that the Army must emphasize oversight of contractor
performance and assess requirements in future operations.
Question. Do you believe the Army is appropriately organized and
staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. I believe we have made significant progress in growing the
acquisition workforce to expand the ranks of trained contract oversight
personnel, but much more work remains to be done. In my opinion, it
will take time and continued efforts to adequately fill the increased
authorizations with properly trained acquisition professionals.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to
improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. In my opinion, the Army has made significant strides in
developing new Policy, Doctrine, Organizations, Materiel solutions and
Training focused on improving Operational Contract Support. It is my
opinion that continued Army senior leader emphasis on the full
implementation of these initiatives is required.
contracting methods
Question. In recent years, DOD has relied heavily on time-and-
materials contracts for the acquisition of services. Under such a
contract, the Department pays a set rate per hour for contractor
services, rather than paying for specific tasks to be performed. In
some cases, contractors have substituted less expensive labor under
time-and-materials contracts, while continuing to charge Federal
agencies the same hourly rates, resulting in effective contractor
profits of 25 percent or more.
What is your view of the appropriate use of time-and-materials
contracts by the Army?
Answer. Time-and-material contracts are the least preferred
contract type. They may be appropriate in limited circumstances such as
when the requirement cannot be defined and work must start. Once the
requirement becomes better defined, however, time-and-materials
contracts should be replaced with fixed-price or cost type contracts.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to
minimize the abuse of time-and-materials contracts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Army reviews
its contract portfolio on a regular basis to identify those time-and-
materials contracts that can be converted to more appropriate contract
vehicles. Moreover, I would review existing policies and procedures to
ascertain whether supplemental guidance is needed in this area.
Question. Section 852 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 requires DOD to promulgate
regulations prohibiting excessive ``pass-through'' charges on DOD
contracts. Pass-through charges are charges added by a contractor for
overhead and profit on work performed by one of its subcontractors, to
which the contractor provided no added value. In some cases, pass-
through charges have more than doubled the cost of services provided to
DOD.
What is your view of the regulations promulgated by DOD to
implement the requirements of section 852?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fully support enforcement of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement provisions that governs pass-
through charges. In my view, these provisions adequately addresses the
need for oversight and control of excessive pass-through charges. As
part of ongoing efforts to prioritize affordability within the
Department, must ensure that our acquisition and contracting
professionals evaluate contractor proposals with an eye towards
reduction of excessive pass-through charges.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the Army
should take to address the problem of excessive pass-through charges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with Army contracting
professionals, the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense
Contract Management Agency to ensure that proper measures are in place
to address excessive pass-through charges in the acquisition process. I
would also work with Army Principal Assistants Responsible for
Contracting (PARCs) to ensure that prime contractors are held
accountable for the pass-through cost of subcontract performance.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the Army
should take to address the problem of excessive pass-through charges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the effect of existing
regulations to determine what additional steps, if any, may be
necessary.
better buying power
Question. DOD's Better Buying Power initiative provides acquisition
professionals with important guidance on how to achieve greater
efficiency, enhanced productivity and affordability in how the
Department procures goods and services.
What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the
Army's acquisition and contracting professionals implement this
guidance, and achieve intended results?
Answer. I strongly support full implementation of the Department's
Better Buying Power initiative and, if confirmed, will vigorously
monitor, emphasize, and prioritize ongoing progress in its
implementation.
Question. Which elements if any of this guidance do you disagree
with and would not expect to fully implement, if confirmed?
Answer. There are no tenets of this guidance with which I disagree.
Question. How would you measure how effectively the Army's
acquisition and contracting workforce is implementing the tradecraft
and best-practices called for under this initiative?
Answer. The Army's success in implementing this initiative is
reflected in the efficiencies identified and continuously monitored in
an ongoing basis within acquisition programs.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to implement the
following elements of the Better Buying Power initiative?
(1) Sharing the benefits of cash flow
(2) Targeting non-value-added costs
(3) Mandating affordability as a requirement
(4) Eliminating redundancy within warfighting portfolios
Answer. (1) If confirmed, I would continue efforts to implement
guidance by the Office of Secretary of Defense regarding cash flow
incentives tied to contractor performance in Army acquisition programs.
(2) If confirmed, I would work closely with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to implement policies, directives and guidance in
this area.
(3) If confirmed, I would continue efforts to prioritize
affordability in the development of acquisition strategies for weapon
systems and to use cost-informed trade-offs in system development. In
addition, affordability targets must now be established at Milestone A
decisions.
(4) If confirmed, I would continue support for the Army's existing
use of capability portfolio reviews to assess requirements for existing
systems across portfolios and identify areas of redundancy for
elimination.
interagency contracting
Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits
associated with the Army's continued extensive use of interagency
contracts?
Answer. In my view, interagency contracts can provide efficient and
effective methods for meeting Army mission requirements, but their use
must carefully balance considerations regarding contract oversight and
the incentives created under fee-for-service arrangements.
Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are
needed to hold Army or other agency personnel accountable for their use
of interagency contracts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review existing Army policies and
guidance regarding interagency contracts and determine whether
additional measures are warranted.
Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for
assuring that the work requested by Army personnel is within the scope
of their contract?
Answer. While compliance with contract terms is a duty shared
equally among the parties to any agreement, I believe that the primary
responsibility for ensuring that work requested by the Army is within
the agreement's scope rests with the Army contracting officer. The
contractor has the responsibility to ensure that they can accomplish
the tasks defined in the contract within cost and schedule.
Question. Do you believe that the Army's continued heavy reliance
on outside agencies to award and manage contracts on its behalf is a
sign that the Army has failed to adequately staff its own acquisition
system?
Answer. I believe that a variety of factors have contributed to the
increased use of outside agencies to award and manage contracts, to
include operational urgency in meeting warfighter needs and challenges
attributable to staffing. The Army has undertaken robust efforts to
grow the contracting workforce in response to these underlying issues.
Furthermore, in my view, interagency contracting should only be used as
appropriate and not as an expedient alternative to existing Army
contracting processes. If confirmed, I would examine existing
processes, manpower and policies to confirm the best response to this
development.
acquisition of information technology
Question. Most of the Department's Major Automated Information
System (MAIS) acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind
schedule. In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated
difficulties with virtually every new business system it has tried to
field in the last 10 years. Section 804 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required DOD to establish a new
acquisition process for information technology.
Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of business
systems require different acquisition strategies or approaches?
Answer. I agree that the acquisition of complex business systems
calls for consideration of unique strategies and approaches that are
different from traditional weapons systems acquisitions.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to
address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chief
Management Officer of the Army, the Army Chief Information Officer and
other affected stakeholders to review existing business systems under
development and refine existing strategies as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Chief
Information Officer of the Army to take these steps?
Answer. See response above.
Question. Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 establishes new requirements for DOD and its
contractors to detect and avoid the use of counterfeit electronic
parts.
What steps will you take, if confirmed, to implement the
requirements of section 818? What schedule will you establish for
taking these steps?
Answer. A comprehensive response to counterfeit parts requires a
joint government and industry-wide effort to address and establish
effective anti-counterfeit standards. If confirmed, I will work with
organizations and leaders across the Department to comply with the
requirements under section 818. In carrying out this mandate, the
Department is focusing on weapon systems safety, mission assurance, and
sensitive/critical parts across the supply chain. The Army has
established a centralized reporting capability with industry to share
information and to report potential counterfeit incidents and is
strengthening its detection, supplier involvement, internal inspections
and legal and contractual actions to address this issue. If confirmed,
I would continue and reinforce these efforts.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Army needs to
take to address the problem of counterfeit electronic parts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with Army leadership and
the Office of Secretary of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of
existing measures and recommend improvements if needed. In addition, I
would seek industry's help in strengthening their detection and
monitoring of potential counterfeit parts and establishment of improved
quality control processes.
acquisition workforce
Question. Do you believe that Army's workforce is large enough and
has the skills needed to perform the tasks assigned to it?
Answer. I strongly support ongoing initiatives to grow the capacity
and capability of the defense acquisition workforce as a means to
maximize the effective use of resources in the acquisition of weapon
systems. If confirmed, I will maintain a high priority on the success
of efforts to improve the size and quality of the acquisition
workforce.
Question. In your view, what are the critical skills, capabilities,
and tools that the Army's workforce needs for the future? What steps
will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the workforce will, in
fact, possess them?
Answer. In my view, the list of required critical skills is
diverse--ranging from contracting, program management, systems
engineering, cost estimating, risk management, and test planning and
management, to name a few. If confirmed, I will vigorously support and
advance efforts to grow the acquisition workforce and cultivate
expertise in all critical areas.
Question. Do you agree that the Army needs a comprehensive human
capital plan, including a gap analysis and specific recruiting,
retention and training goals, to guide the development of its
acquisition workforce?
Answer. I agree that a comprehensive human capital plan is useful
in evaluating current workforce capabilities and determining future
needs and gaps and that extensive planning has been underway since the
Department initiated efforts to increase the size of the acquisition
workforce.
Question. What steps if any do you think are necessary to ensure
that the Army has the ability it needs to attract and retain qualified
employees to the acquisition workforce?
Answer. I believe it is essential that the Army has effective
recruiting and retention tools necessary to attract and retain a highly
professional and skilled acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I would
further assess this area to determine whether additional measures may
be needed.
Question. What are your views regarding assertions that the
acquisition workforce is losing its technical and management expertise
and is beginning to rely too much on support contractors, FFRDCs, and,
in some cases, prime contractors for this expertise?
Answer. The Army's current effort to rebuild and reconstitute
technical and management expertise in the workforce is in response to
past reductions following the end of the Cold War. My view is that high
quality technical and management expertise must reside within the
Army's workforce in order to accomplish ongoing objectives in executing
efficient, affordable, and ultimately successful acquisition programs.
If confirmed, I would weigh these considerations in determining the
appropriate degree of reliance on FFRDCs and contractors in current and
future Army acquisition programs.
Question. What is the appropriate tenure for program managers and
program executive officers to ensure continuity in major programs?
Answer. The tenure requirements for program managers are based on
the Acquisition Category level of the Program and range from 3 to 4
years. I also understand that the Army and/or Defense Acquisition
Executive have the authority to adjust the tenure requirement based on
unique aspects of the program. I believe this policy represents the
appropriate balance between program continuity and the professional
development of the workforce.
Question. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund
to help DOD address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund
provides a continuing source of funds for this purpose.
Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is
still needed to ensure that the Army has the right number of employees
with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes, I believe the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Development Fund is essential to carry out current initiatives to grow
the capacity and capability of the defense acquisition workforce.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you ensure that the
money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in
a manner that best meets the needs of the Army and its acquisition
workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Fund is supported by
the Army to continue the development of a professional acquisition
workforce.
army modernization
Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not
been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, Army
modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved
under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After
Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and
Modularity. Instability in funding, either as provided by DOD or
Congress, has been cited by the Army and others as a principal cause of
program instability. For the most part, however, the Army has benefited
from broad DOD and Congressional support for its modernization and
readiness programs even when problems with the technical progress and
quality of management of those programs have been apparent.
What is your assessment of the Army's modernization record?
Answer. The Army's past challenges in modernization efforts are
attributable to a variety of factors, which generally include costly,
unconstrained and shifting requirements, excessive reliance on immature
technologies and technical challenges leading to cost growth and
schedule delay. In my view, the Army has drawn valuable lessons from
these prior efforts and has instituted significantly improved processes
and approaches to modernization in response to this record.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program
for the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work in close collaboration with the
requirements generation community and the programming and resourcing
communities to develop affordable, sustainable and achievable
modernization strategies and incorporate lessons learned in prior
efforts.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
modernization investment strategy?
Answer. My understanding is that Army's modernization investment
strategy is based on assessments of evolving threats, military
requirements, the state of current and planned capabilities and the
Army's resources. Despite declining budgets, the Army must conduct
modernization efforts to provide affordable, adaptive, flexible and
decisive capabilities to soldiers in response to global
responsibilities. Consistent with the Army's strategic review and
assessment of modernization needs, I understand that the Army's top
modernization priorities include the Network, the Ground Combat
Vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and Soldier Systems. If
confirmed, I would work to advance affordable, sound and successful
modernization strategies consistent with these efforts. In addition, I
will collaborate with the requirements community and intelligence
community to ensure that the Army's modernization portfolio can address
a broad spectrum of emerging threats.
Question. In your view, what trade-offs would most likely have to
be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned
to fund the Army's modernization efforts?
Answer. Any decisions regarding proposed trade-offs in the event of
unanticipated decline in the budget or cost growth would need to be
fully coordinated across the Army and Department. A careful assessment
of the Army's priorities, emerging threats, current and projected
capabilities, affordability, and industrial base issues will have to be
performed. In the case of unanticipated cost growth in programs, I
would work with industry to understand the root causes and implement
appropriate mitigation efforts. In addition, I would collaborate with
Army and Department stakeholders to determine the best approach for
meeting warfighter needs.
army weapon system programs
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
following research, development, and acquisition programs?
Ground Combat Vehicle.
Answer. My understanding is that the Army's current Infantry
Fighting Vehicle is reaching the limit of its capacity to receive
upgrades proven critical for soldiers in combat operations. The Ground
Combat Vehicle (GCV) is the Army's replacement program for the Infantry
Fighting Vehicle and is the centerpiece of the Army's overall combat
vehicle modernization strategy. It will be designed to deliver and
protect a full nine-man squad with improved survivability, mobility and
network integration, which is crucial in combat operations. The current
acquisition strategy draws from best practices in acquisition and
institutes a variety of measures designed to maintain affordability and
reduce program risk in meeting program objectives.
Question. Stryker combat vehicle, including the double-v hull and
Stryker mobile gun variants.
Answer. In my view, the Stryker combat vehicle is an acquisition
program that has proven to be highly successful in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Blast deflecting double-v hull improvements have saved
lives in Afghanistan and the Army continues to procure vehicles under
existing equipping plans. My understanding is that the Army is
currently assessing plans to procure additional variants of Stryker
vehicles, to include the mobile gun variant.
Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV).
Answer. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is a joint Service program
between the Army and Marine Corps to replace approximately one-third of
the Army's existing tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. The JLTV
incorporates the strengths of Mine-Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles and will be capable across a range of military operations and
physical environments providing improved mobility and protection to
soldiers.
The Army and Marine Corps strategy in JLTV development reflects
sustained efforts in collaboration with the requirements community to
maintain an affordable and effective effort.
Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) Helicopter.
Answer. The AAS program is needed to meet existing capability gaps
in the area of manned armed aerial reconnaissance and find a materiel
solution to replace the current fleet of OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW)
helicopters. The Army is currently studying alternatives to meet the
gaps and, consistent with an analysis of alternatives, determine
whether to execute a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of the
entire Kiowa Warrior fleet or pursue a new AAS program
Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization.
Answer. The Abrams tank remains the best tank in the world, and the
age of the current tank fleet is low--only 2-3 years on average. The
Army currently plans to conduct improvements to the Abrams tank in
order to increase protection, ensure required mobility, and allow
integration of the emerging network on future platforms. These
modernization efforts are planned to commence in fiscal year 2017.
Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.
Answer. The Bradley also has been an integral part of the Army's
force structure for decades and requires modernization. The infantry
fighting vehicle variant will be replaced by the Army's Ground Combat
Vehicle while non-infantry fighting vehicle models will undergo
incremental improvements to improve protection, mobility and support
integration of the network. These improvements are planned to commence
in fiscal year 2014.
Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
Answer. The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) program
provides the Army a secure, high-speed, high-capacity networking
backbone for mobile, ad-hoc networks in tactical environments. WIN-T is
vital to Army modernization efforts to develop and field a network in
tactical environments. Fielding of the first increment of WIN-T is
currently underway, while WIN-T Increment 2 will undergo planned
Initial Operation Test and Evaluation this year at the Army's next
Network Integration Event.
Question. Logistics Modernization Program.
Answer. This program is part of the ongoing effort to modernize the
primary business systems of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) Commodity
Commands. This system is currently undergoing fielding within the Army
and, if confirmed, I will work closely with AMC to ensure it meets Army
needs.
Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).
Answer. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is the Army's
program for deployable mobile communications family of radios. It uses
Internet Protocol (IP)-based technology to provide a networked exchange
of voice, data, and video connectivity from the commander down to the
soldier and is vital to the Army's efforts to develop the tactical
network. Years of Department investment in JTRS development has
resulted in a viable, sustainable and competitive market for software
defined radios. JTRS have undergone thorough review to refine
requirements and in the case of the Ground Mobile Radio, revise
acquisition strategies to support competition among existing, secure
nondevelopmental solutions.
Question. UH-58D Kiowa Warrior safety and life extension program.
Answer. The Army is conducting an analysis of alternatives to
confirm whether capability gaps within the existing fleet of UH-58D
Kiowa Warrior fleet are best addressed through a Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP) or a new aircraft.
ground combat vehicle
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program is executed affordably, and is
delivered on time, and with the required capability?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the significant efforts
undertaken to date in an effort to develop and execute an affordable
and achievable GCV acquisition strategy, as appropriate.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
this new program comports with the WSARA, particularly the requirements
that major defense acquisition programs be supported by realistic cost
estimates; reliable risk assessments; and viable acquisition,
technology development, and systems engineering strategies at the
outset?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the GCV program, and any
major defense acquisition program, fully complies with the statutory
requirements of WSARA. As appropriate, I would take necessary steps to
ensure that compliance is met in connection with program milestone
decisions and other reviews.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that technologies critical to developing the GCV as a system are
sufficiently mature prior to the program, receives Milestone B
approval, and enters the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
phase of the acquisition process?
Answer. If confirmed, I would, as appropriate, fully utilize data
derived from the current ``three-prong'' strategy during the technology
development phase of the GCV program--to include designs matured by
industry, the update to the GCV Analysis of Alternatives and the
assessment of Non-Developmental Vehicles (NDI) to ascertain the state
of technological maturity incorporated into designs leading to a
Milestone B decision.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that
overall risk associated with the development of the GCV is sufficiently
reduced to allow for the use of fixed price-type contracts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would, as appropriate, continue to work
collaboratively with the requirements and resourcing communities to
refine requirements to mitigate technological risk and secure stable
funding for the program.
stryker
Question. On January 30, 2012, you notified Congress of your
determination that only one source was qualified and capable of
performing manufacturing, sustainment, and recapitalization of the
Stryker family of vehicles, resulting in the award of a sole-source
procurement contract worth an estimated $5.1 billion. The supporting
justification documents indicated that no other source had ``access to
the requisite comprehensive technical data or the complex vehicle
engineering tasks associated with the Stryker [family of vehicles].''
Does the Army have full and complete access to technical data
pertaining to the Stryker family of vehicles? If not, why not?
Answer. The Army does not have full and complete access to
technical data pertaining to the Stryker Family of Vehicles. The
original competitive solicitation did not include a requirement for a
Technical Data Package (TDP) and subsequent negotiations with the
contractor to obtain a TDP have thus far been unsuccessful.
Question. If confirmed, to what extent would you consider
contracting alternatives that might leverage existing Government-owned
depots to provide competition within scenarios such as this?
Answer. If confirmed, I would pursue acquisition strategies that
deliver needed capabilities to soldiers at best value to the
Government. To the extent that technical data rights owned by the
Government facilitate greater competition in the acquisition process, I
would pursue such strategies in an effort to meet warfighter
requirements.
mine resistant ambush protected (mrap) vehicles
Question. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's
long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large
MRAP vehicle fleet?
Answer. If confirmed, I would collaborate with Army stakeholders to
determine the appropriate long-term strategy for utilization and
sustainment of the MRAP fleet. This assessment would balance
sustainment costs for multiple MRAP variants, the utility of vehicles
in training operations and their potential use in future operations.
residual future combat systems lead systems integrator (lsi) contract
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the former
and restructured elements of the now terminated FCS program?
Answer. My understanding is that the Future Combat Systems (FCS)
Engineering and Manufacturing Development effort has been cancelled.
The Army's remaining efforts are related to formal contract and
subcontract termination. In my view, prior to termination, the FCS
program faced significant challenges stemming from its heavy reliance
on immature technologies, unconstrained requirements and attendant cost
growth and schedule delay.
As a result of FCS cancellation and restructure, the Army has
harvested some relevant technologies and processes, in addition to
valuable lessons learned regarding risk management in major acquisition
efforts. I understand that this experience has informed revised
approaches to the Army's tactical network development, unmanned
technology development, manned ground vehicles, radio development and
its modernization strategy in general. In addition, FCS cancellation
has led to an increased emphasis on systems engineering, affordable and
achievable acquisition strategies, and increased use of soldier
feedback in weapon system development.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the FCS
program's residual LSI management concept and contract?
Answer. Termination and closeout activities are underway in
connection with the FCS contract and that further efforts under this
construct have been terminated.
Question. In your view, what should be the current and future role
of the LSI and, if confirmed, what modifications, if any, would you
propose to the LSI contract and fee structure; on what timeline?
Answer. My understanding is that the Army has discontinued use of
the LSI construct in connection with the cancellation of the FCS
program.
m1 abrams
Question. Congress authorized and appropriated funding not included
in the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request to continue
upgrading M1 tanks to the M1A2 SEP configuration. A recent RAND
analysis indicates that a 2014 shutdown and 2017 restart of the sole M1
tank production line would be less costly than continuing production.
What course of action would you recommend for the program, if
confirmed?
Answer. The Abrams tank remains the best tank in the world, with a
low average fleet age of approximately 2 to 3 years. I understand that
there is no current requirement for additional tanks at this time and
that the Army plans to commence Abrams modernization efforts in fiscal
year 2017. Moreover, the Army's business case analysis determined that
the costs to shut down and restart the Abrams production line during
this period is approximately $600 million to $800 million, while the
costs to continue production of Abrams at minimum sustaining rates was
determined to be approximately $2.8 billion. RAND Arroyo has undertaken
an independent verification of the Army's business case analysis;
preliminary results from RAND Arroyo confirm that the Army's assessment
of the costs and benefits of the planned production break are valid. If
confirmed, I would continue to assess the final results of this
independent analysis, anticipated in late April 2012, along with other
considerations--to include the health of the combat vehicle industrial
base--in determining a recommended approach to this issue.
army enterprise email
Question. What is your understanding of the basis for the Army's
migration to Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Enterprise
Email?
Answer. My understanding is that the Army's decision to adopt a
DISA-based e-mail solution was based on a business case analysis
weighing both quantifiable and nonquantifiable factors to provide
improved capability to users across the Army.
Question. Do you believe that the projected cost savings for this
migration are realistic?
Answer. In my view, Enterprise Email migration offers the potential
for significant cost savings across the Army.
Question. Under what Army Program Executive Office will Enterprise
Email be managed?
Answer. Enterprise Email will be managed under the Program
Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to
separately develop and contract for information technology services
which may already be available and in-use elsewhere within DOD?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with all affected stakeholders
to determine the most effective, secure and best-value materiel
solutions to information technology requirements within the Army.
network integration exercise
Question. The Army's attempt to encourage commercial development
via the Network Integration Exercise (NIE) represents a new construct
for determining what technologies to develop and procure.
Has the Army tied NIE evaluation and/or test results to currently
available rapid innovation or equipping programs?
Answer. The Army is developing processes to incorporate the lessons
learned from the rapid equipping efforts we have undertaken during 10
years of war. The NIE is a key part of this effort and enables our
Capability Set Management approach. Through Capability Set Management
(CSM), we evaluate in an operational environment, and design a suite of
systems and equipment to answer the projected requirements of a 2-year
cycle. Every year, we integrate the next capability set, reflecting any
changes or advances in technology. This construct applies lessons
learned from existing rapid equipping efforts.
Question. What is the Army's defined acquisition process that
follows the NIE?
Answer. Following each NIE, the Army examines capabilities
evaluated at the NIE, which helps identify capability gaps, inform
decisions regarding requirements and help to shape future acquisition
efforts. The Army is taking steps to refine the NIE Sources Sought and
Request for Proposal process to provide us with a formal process for
procuring systems that show promise coming out of the NIE.
modularity
Question. Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental
reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based
structure. The new modular brigade combat team is supposed to have an
increased capability to operate independently based upon increased and
embedded combat support capabilities such as military intelligence,
reconnaissance, and logistics. Although somewhat smaller in size, the
new modular brigades are supposed to be just as or more capable than
the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more
capable mix of equipment--such as advanced communications and
surveillance equipment. To date, the Army has established over 80
percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it
will take to fully equip this force as required by its design has
slipped from 2011 to 2019.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity
transformation strategy?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's modular
transformation was designed to create a more expeditionary force
capable of addressing the full-spectrum of missions in 21st century
operations. In support of this transformation, the Army has implemented
strategies for the distribution of equipment to modular units in order
to provide increased readiness over time. My understanding is that
transition to this approach is still underway and will continue to
assess evolving force structure levels. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Army leadership to make a full assessment of this
strategy.
Question. In your view, what are the greatest equipment and
sustainment challenges in realizing the transformation of the Army to
the modular design?
Answer. Our greatest challenge, I believe, is maintaining a balance
between sustaining equipment for the current fight in this fiscal
environment, while selectively and incrementally modernizing systems to
provide future capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you
propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy and
plans for equipping and sustaining the force?
Answer. The Army is currently assessing its modular transformation
strategy and plans for equipping and sustaining the force, in light of
new defense strategic guidance and budget changes. If confirmed, I
would closely examine the transformation strategy to ensure a focus on
resources that sustain the current fight, while making critical
investments to Army modernization.
manufacturing issues
Question. The recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study on the
Manufacturing Technology Program made a number of findings and
recommendations related to the role of manufacturing research and
capabilities in the development and acquisition of defense systems.
Have you reviewed the findings of the DSB Task Force on the
Manufacturing Technology Program?
Answer. I have not reviewed the specific findings, but I am
generally familiar with the recommendations regarding the need to
invest in manufacturing technology (ManTech) as a means to reduce risk
in acquisition programs.
Question. What recommendations, if any, from the Task Force would
you plan to implement if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would carefully assess the findings and
recommendations of the DSB Task Force and work closely with the Office
of Secretary of Defense to implement measures as appropriate.
Question. What incentives do you plan to use to enhance industry's
incorporation and utilization of advanced manufacturing processes
developed under the manufacturing technology program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to identify and implement such
incentives as deemed necessary in cases where advanced manufacturing
processes are not developed through competition.
science and technology
Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of science and
technology programs in meeting the Army's transformation goals and in
confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive
threats?
Answer. In my view, the Army's Science and Technology (S&T)
investment programs should function as the ``seed corn'' of future
capabilities; facilitating the maturation of new technologies while
investing in true leap-ahead capabilities. It is my view that the
Army's S&T investment should be informed by evolving threats, the state
of foreign technologies, industry research and development, and Army-
specific capability needs.
Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding
funding targets and priorities for the Army's long term research
efforts?
Answer. I believe that it is important to maintain a balanced and
responsive science and technology portfolio that complements
Department-wide and joint efforts and investment within the defense
industry. If confirmed, I would advance a strategy consistent with the
parameters outlined above.
Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to
assess whether the Army is making adequate investments in its basic
research programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assess Army investments in basic
research across portfolios to develop leap-ahead capabilities. I would
promote the development of metrics to assess future transformational
opportunities and measure progress.
Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between
and among the science and technology programs of the military services
and defense agencies such as DARPA?
Answer. I believe that there is good coordination between DARPA,
other defense agencies and the Army. If confirmed, I would expand that
level of collaboration as appropriate.
Question. What is the Department's role and responsibility in
addressing national issues related to science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics education and workforce development?
Answer. I believe the Army, which is significantly dependent on
science and technology to fulfill its national defense mission, has
effective policies and programs in place to help maintain the technical
edge our Nation needs to ensure its security and to be globally
competitive. It's important to recognize that the Army not only needs
to attain and retain the talent today, but also needs to develop a
talented future workforce to maintain the technical edge. If confirmed,
I plan to continue and strengthen, where necessary, Army educational
outreach programs and initiatives.
Question. What steps if any would you take to support efforts to
ensure that the Nation has the scientific and technical workforce
needed for its national security technological and industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I would utilize current legislative
authorities and Army investment vehicles to cultivate a talented and
high-quality pool of scientists, mathematicians, engineers, and
technicians.
Question. How would you use science and technology programs to
better reduce technical risk and therefore potentially reduce costs and
schedule problems that accrue in large acquisition programs?
Answer. Science and technology programs offer the potential to
reduce risk in acquisition programs by maturation of incorporated
technologies. If confirmed, I would examine ways to better utilize S&T
programs to mature technologies and reduce risk in Army acquisition
programs.
Question. Do you feel that the science and technology programs of
the Army are too near-term in focus and have over-emphasized technology
transition efforts over investing in revolutionary and innovative
research programs?
Answer. I believe that Army investment decisions in science and
technology must balance the Army's needed capabilities from mid-term to
long-term across a broad portfolio. This implies a need that spans
across revolutionary and innovative research to mature technologies.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Army has a well articulated
and actionable science and technology strategic plan?
Answer. I believe that the Army has made significant strides in
articulating and implementing an S&T strategic plan based on critical
challenges faced in the Army. If confirmed, I would extend these
efforts to continue to improve the Army's S&T strategic plan.
Question. Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring
authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure and ethics
requirements, to ensure that the Army can recruit and retain the
highest quality scientific and technical workforce possible?
Answer. I believe that the need to attract, recruit and retain the
highest quality workforce remains an enduring challenge in any
organization; include the Army. At this point, I do not recommend
specific changes in any of these areas. If confirmed, however, I would
welcome the opportunity to fully assess the impact of these processes
and recommend changes as appropriate.
Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the Military
Accessions Vital to National Interest Program to recruit non-U.S.
citizens who graduate from U.S. universities with advanced degrees in
scientific and technical fields of critical national importance?
Answer. I understand that the Military Accessions Vital to National
Interest Program is designed to facilitate the availability of
scientific and technical expertise in each of the Military Services. If
confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to evaluate the
effectiveness of this program in collaboration with other Services and
the Office of Secretary of Defense to enhance technical and scientific
skills in the Army.
Question. What steps if any would you take if confirmed to ensure
the continued effectiveness of this program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other Services and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to ascertain the effectiveness of
this program before taking any appropriate measures in this area.
defense laboratories
Question. What is your view on the quality of the Army laboratories
as compared to the DOE national laboratories, Federal laboratories,
academic laboratories, and other peer institutions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will undertake a review of Army laboratory
capability with a view toward enhancing their capability.
Question. What metrics will you use, if confirmed, to evaluate the
effectiveness, competitiveness, and scientific vitality of the Army
laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to identify and develop
appropriate metrics to evaluate laboratory effectiveness. It is my
understanding that the Army currently conducts peer reviews annually to
assess the vitality of the laboratories.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to
increase the mission effectiveness and productivity of the Army
laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with relevant Army organizations
to assess and improve mission effectiveness in those areas in need of
improvement.
Question. Do you see value in enhancing the level of technical
collaboration between the Army laboratories and academic, other Federal
and industrial scientific organizations?
Answer. I definitely do. If confirmed, I would encourage increased
collaboration by Army laboratories with other research institutions. In
my view, this form of collaboration is essential to refining the Army's
focus in S&T investment and complementing efforts by other leading
institutions.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance
such technical collaboration?
Answer. See response above.
Question. Do you feel that past investments in research equipment;
sustainment, repair and modernization; and facility construction at the
Army laboratories have been sufficient to maintain their mission
effectiveness and their standing as world class science and engineering
institutions?
Answer. I believe that maintaining appropriate investments in this
area is critical to the development of future capabilities for soldiers
and would work with the Army laboratories to identify and address areas
of need, if confirmed.
Question. What is your view of the funding mechanism for the
research and development priorities of defense laboratory directors
provided by section 219 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009?
Answer. I support the funding mechanisms authorized under section
219 of the legislation.
Question. What continuing impediments, if any, do you see to the
full implementation of this provision?
Answer. I support the funding mechanisms authorized under section
219 of the legislation. In my view, Congress has provided Laboratory
Directors the needed authority to use funding for important
discretionary efforts.
test and evaluation
Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these
systems are put into production.
What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of
the Army's acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe it is appropriate to have an independent
operational test and evaluation authority separate from the materiel
developer to plan and conduct operational tests, report results, and
provide evaluations on operational effectiveness, operational
suitability, and survivability.
Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation
conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be
tested?
Answer. Contractors are responsible to ensure that their system
meets developmental test and evaluation criteria. The Army should
provide oversight. The Army must work with the contractor to ensure it
understands the Government's OT&E plans and ensure that its system is
able to meet all the criteria.
Question. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the
standard testing process?
Answer. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that all
equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is subject to
appropriate operational testing?
I understand that rapid fielding requirements call for revised
testing procedures that meet warfighter needs while ensuring that
proper testing and evaluation concerns are addressed. If confirmed, I
would work with the testing community to ensure that rapid acquisition
efforts are responsive to warfighter requirements and that appropriate
testing requirements are met.
Question. Do you believe that the developmental testing
organizations in the Army are adequate to ensure an appropriate level
of developmental testing, and testing oversight, on major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe that there are adequate resources in the Army to
ensure appropriate level of testing and testing oversight on major
acquisition defense programs. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the developmental testing community to emphasize early developmental
testing within acquisition programs to minimize program risks.
Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address any inadequacies in such organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor the status of
these organizations to ensure that they remain capable of accomplishing
their mission.
Question. As systems grow more sophisticated, networked, and
software-intensive, DOD's ability to test and evaluate them becomes
more difficult. Some systems-of-systems cannot be tested as a whole
until they are already bought and fielded.
Are you concerned with Army's ability to test these new types of
systems?
Answer. I agree that system interoperability presents increased
challenges as Army equipment becomes more sophisticated, networked and
software intensive. In my view, the Army has taken a pioneering
approach to identifying and addressing these challenges through the
development of the NIE at Fort Bliss, TX. These events provide soldiers
an opportunity to evaluate and use multiple systems in an operational
setting, which affords the Army a valuable opportunity to address
complex systems-of-systems challenges prior to procurement and
fielding. If confirmed, I would support the ongoing use of NIE events
to provide critical feedback in this area throughout the acquisition
cycle.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
to improve its test and evaluation facilities to ensure adequate
testing of such systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide support to the Army test and
evaluation community and support efforts to ensure that they are
properly resourced.
Question. In your view, does the Army have sufficient capabilities
to test and evaluate the cybersecurity of its new information
technology systems and networks?
Answer. The capability and methodology is in place to address
current and anticipated cybersecurity threats. Existing processes
include robust enforcement of the information assurance requirements
under DOD Directive 8500.1 and Army Regulation 25-2. These requirements
serve as screening criteria for new systems, with input from the Army
Cyber Command, Army Test and Evaluation Command, Army Research Lab,
Army Threat Systems Management Office and the office of the ASA(ALT).
Question. What steps if any would you propose to take, if
confirmed, to enhance this capability?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Army and Department's
cybersecurity community to evaluate our existing processes and assess
emerging threats to enhance our capabilities, as appropriate. In my
view, these approaches could include enhanced use of automation and
simulation to augment our testing processes.
Question. Some have argued that testing takes too long and costs
too much. Others contest this view pointing out that testing and
evaluation is an essential tool to assist in the development of weapon
systems and ensure that they perform as intended. The Armed Services
Committee has expressed concern that problems with weapons systems have
been discovered during operational testing and evaluation that should
have been discovered during developmental testing and corrected during
subsequent development.
Do you believe that major defense acquisition programs are helped
or hurt by cutting tests budgets and reducing the time available for
developmental testing?
Answer. I believe that an independent testing function is a vital
part of the defense acquisition process and agree that it serves as an
essential tool in discovering and addressing issues in system
development. In particular, developmental testing early in the
acquisition life cycle will discover design and production issues early
on when it is the least costly to take corrective action. Test budget
reductions may result in discovery of design or production issues much
later in the program, during operational test and evaluation, when it's
more expensive to modify a system design.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the program management community and the testing and evaluation
community work collaboratively and effectively in a way that maximizes
the likelihood that developmental testing and evaluation will detect
and identify problems timely in software and hardware to provide
opportunities to correct them before production and before operational
testing and evaluation begins?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of close
collaboration between the program management community and the test and
evaluation community to enable early discovery of design and production
issues.
Question. To what extent do you think that dedicated operational
testing can be more efficiently integrated into developmental and live-
fire testing in a way that is also sufficiently rigorous?
Answer. I believe that the NIE suggests a valuable model for
integrating early operational testing in Army acquisition programs in
novel ways. If confirmed, I would assess the potential of efforts to
integrate early operational testing within developmental testing to
achieve efficiencies.
Question. The Decker-Wagner report cited unconstrained
requirements, weak trade studies and an erosion of the relevant
workforce as causes of many of the Army's failed acquisition programs.
To what extent do you believe that the Army can improve how it
states requirements supporting its acquisition programs by using
establishing more measurable and testable parameters, or by justifying
such requirements on the basis of accomplishing missions in combat--
rather than merely meeting technical specifications?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the requirements community
to address unconstrained requirements with cost-informed review of
potential trade space. It is critical to understand the trades between
mission effectiveness and technical risk while meeting program
objectives and maintain affordability.
army industrial base
Question. What is your assessment of the health and status of the
key elements of the Army's industrial base?
Answer. I am concerned about the impacts of planned reductions in
Army budgets on the health of the industrial base. While major defense
contractors have faced downturns before and will likely explore
diversification in commercial activity or foreign military sales, risks
to the viability of second and third tier suppliers impacted by the
drawdown may present more challenges to the Army as it conducts future
modernization efforts.
Question. In your view, is DOD's sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier
(S2T2) activity providing useful information to assist the Army in
maintaining and improving key elements of its industrial base?
Answer. The assessment currently underway across the Department is
a critical step toward the identification and prioritization of
potential industrial base issues.
small business innovation research (sbir) program
Question. What do you see as the major successes and challenges
facing the Army SBIR program?
Answer. The SBIR program is designed to provide small, high-tech
businesses the opportunity to propose innovative research and
development solutions in response to critical Army needs. In fiscal
year 2011, small businesses submitted over 3,000 proposals, which were
evaluated by the Army SBIR office and resulted in over 600 awards
valued at approximately $200 million.
In my view, the Army SBIR program performs a valuable role in
developing innovative capabilities through small business investment. I
understand that the Army continues to explore ways to streamline the
SBIR process, further increase program success rates and ultimately
facilitate the transition of products that are developed under Army
SBIR contracts.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the
Army has access to and invests in the most innovative small businesses?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that small businesses funded
with SBIR dollars have stronger ties to the Army's S&T program and to
emerging acquisition program needs.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that
successful SBIR research and development projects transition into
production?
Answer. If confirmed, I would conduct regular SBIR program reviews
to monitor ongoing projects. I would also work to refine the criteria
for transition of SBIR funded programs to programs of record, as
appropriate. Also, I would work to ensure that existing Army programs
of record have resources and acquisition strategies in place to
incorporate technologies developed under SBIR.
technical data
Question. Do you believe that the Army has been as aggressive as it
should have been in (1) securing ownership of technical data in
connection with items and processes associated with major weapon
systems that it procures when doing would best serve the Government's
interests and (2) asserting ownership rights over this data in a manner
sufficient to ensure competition for the production and maintenance of
these systems over their lifecycle?
Answer. The Army has recently reviewed policies governing efforts
to acquire ownership of technical data and has implemented guidance
encouraging such ownership when it represents a best-value approach in
the development of systems.
Question. What steps if any will you take if confirmed to ensure
that the Army obtains the technical data rights that it needs to avoid
being locked into unnecessary sole-source follow-on production and
sustainment to incumbents to the detriment of the taxpayer and the
warfighter?
Answer. If confirmed, I would affirm current efforts to encourage
the purchase of technical data rights where appropriate.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the ASA(ALT)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
new army major weapons procurement
1. Senator McCain. Ms. Shyu, the Army has two prominent programs
currently in the early stages of development: the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV) and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Each has had its
requirements substantially reduced to help ensure affordability. I am
concerned that as these programs move forward in development, their
requirements may change again, resulting--predictably--in major cost
overruns. What confidence do you have that the requirements for JLTV
and GCV are now stable?
Ms. Shyu. Requirements stability is essential to our ability to
plan and execute designs and produce vehicle capabilities within
schedule and budget constraints. The addition of capabilities to
planned weapon systems, even as development is ongoing, generally
exacerbates risks associated with the program's cost and schedule. Many
of the policies and practices that have been put into place over the
past 2 years are specifically designed to address cost and schedule
growth in major acquisition programs resulting from requirements
instability. The institution of Configuration Steering Boards, for
instance, currently required on an annual basis, guard against
requirements creep through the review and evaluation of the program
requirements to control cost. In addition, the Army has taken proactive
steps to address requirements in both the JLTV and GCV programs, both
to reduce technical risk and meet affordability goals. These efforts
are ongoing, as we endeavor to continuously refine requirements to keep
these risks as low as possible.
Within the JLTV program, the Army executed a comprehensive
Technology Development (TD) phase that facilitated greater
understanding of the feasibility of planned JLTV requirements, which
led to key adjustments. The requirements communities from both the U.S.
Army and U.S. Marine Corps conducted extensive cost informed
requirement trades that brought the program's cost down and reduced
technical risk.
Similarly, the Army worked to substantially revise requirements for
the GCV program in 2010 in order to support an affordable program with
minimized technical risk, consistent with the planned schedule for
development. As the Army conducts the current technology development
phase of GCV development, further opportunities to refine requirements
to avert excessive cost and technical risk will be assessed.
2. Senator McCain. Ms. Shyu, will you allow production decisions to
be made prior to the prototyping and testing of these vehicles and/or
their subsystems?
Ms. Shyu. Production decisions will not be made prior to the
prototyping and testing of these vehicles. The JLTV program has a 33-
month comprehensive Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD)
program in which three contractors will fabricate 22 vehicles each and
the Government will conduct mobility, reliability, transportability and
blast testing to demonstrate performance. Results from the
comprehensive test program will be used during the down select for
production process. The GCV is currently in the TD phase and anticipate
a 4-year EMD period to refine designs and build and test prototypes,
well before any production decision is reached.
3. Senator McCain. Ms. Shyu, what confidence do you have in the
Army's ability to effectively assess the technological risks associated
with the maturity of weapons systems and GCV, in particular?
Ms. Shyu. The Army's has the ability to effectively assess the
technological risks associated with the maturity of weapons systems. To
reduce the risk associated with entering the EMD phase, Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.02 requires Requests for Proposals (RFPs) to
incorporate language that prevents the award of an EMD contract if it
includes technologies that have not been demonstrated adequately in a
relevant environment, called Technology Readiness Level 6. Also, the
Government, independent from the Product Manager, conducts a Technology
Readiness Assessment on all the competitors' proposals in the EMD
source selection.
In the GCV program, the Army has specifically developed an
acquisition strategy designed to make effective use of these
assessments. Specifically, the GCV program incorporates a comprehensive
evaluation plan throughout the TD phase to assess risk, specifically in
connection with key technologies, to support any adjustments to the
program's planned EMD effort, if necessary. To further reduce
technological risk, planned prototypes call for existing, Government-
proven technologies in subsystems, such as transmissions. Additionally,
the two GCV vendors under contract have already made initial design
trades in support of Army direction requiring technologically mature
systems prior to the start of EMD.
The Army will test and evaluate the subsystem in connection with
completion of the Preliminary Design Review. This information will be
coupled with data obtained from the other two TD phase activities
(Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) update and Nondevelopmental Item
evaluation), in order to assess the program's technological risks and
inform the EMD Request for Proposal performance specifications.
excessive concurrency
4. Senator McCain. Ms. Shyu, a big problem with how DOD buys major
systems is this: it has tended to go all in on these procurement
programs without understanding enough about their technical or systems
engineering to assess whether developing them may have too much risk.
So, these programs struggle endlessly in development--where costs grow
and schedules slip--without needed combat capability delivered. Far too
often, DOD has tried to execute such programs under cost-plus
contracts. In my view, this has been an utter disaster. Do you agree?
If so, how would you address it?
Ms. Shyu. Cost growth and related challenges to program execution
can be traced to a myriad of factors in major defense acquisition
programs. I generally believe that past major Army modernization
programs failed as a result of system requirements instability,
combined with a reliance on immature technologies, which significantly
contributed to a high degree of risk and associated cost growth. I
believe the key to addressing our challenge is based on early and
continuous collaboration between the communities responsible for
requirements generation, budget and programming, and acquisition
program management to ensure the delivery of affordable, timely and
effective equipment to the Army. If confirmed, I would place an
emphasis on acquisition strategies that anticipate and mitigate the
causes for such risk in major defense acquisition programs. The
strategies I would promote include an emphasis on competition,
implementation of fixed-price contracts where appropriate,
affordability caps in large-scale acquisition programs, and cost
reduction through ``should cost'' program management.
In addition, I would ensure that materiel development is
continuously informed by considerations of cost and technical risk
throughout the acquisition lifecycle. Specifically, I would emphasize
the development and use of cost-informed trade-offs in requirements,
through Configuration Steering Boards, to reduce technical risk and
address causes of cost growth. I further believe that the emphasis on
cost-informed trade-offs ought to commence at the earliest stages of
the materiel development cycle--in requirements generation--before
expensive design and development begins in earnest. If confirmed, I
would prioritize collaboration with the warfighter to address these
leading causes of program failure during this critical phase, where the
foundations of large scale modernization programs are set.
5. Senator McCain. Ms. Shyu, if confirmed, what overall approach
would you take to ensure that programs with too much concurrency are
never started?
Ms. Shyu. In my view, a high degree of concurrency contributes
significant risk to weapon systems programs, particularly if the
concurrency is attributable to evolving requirements in the late phases
of development. The acceptable degree of concurrency depends on several
factors, to include the urgency of the operational need for the
capability, the technical risks inherent in the program's development
and consideration of the potential impact on the planned program cost
and schedule. If confirmed, I would weigh these and other related
factors in determining whether to commence a program with a high degree
of concurrency.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
army armed aerial scout requirements
6. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, Congress funded an AOA to establish an
armed scout replacement program as far back as 2009. The fiscal year
2012 budget included $15 million to conduct an additional Request for
Information (RFI) and Voluntary Flight Demonstration (VFD) this year.
Little guidance is being shared about the Army Armed Aerial Scout (AAS)
requirements and how the RFI and demonstrations will be conducted. What
are the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) requirements for the AAS
program and have you communicated those requirements to industry?
Ms. Shyu. The July 2009 ICD does not prescribe specific threshold
and objective requirements for a material solution, rather, it
describes the capability gaps that exist in the mission area. Although
the ICD has not been released to industry, the planned RFI describes
the capability shortfalls that currently exist in terms of
responsiveness, performance margins, and lethality. Additionally, the
planned RFI contains a detailed description of the AAS mission sets.
7. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, were they the same requirements used
in the original AOA?
Ms. Shyu. The AOA was focused on the same capability gaps addressed
in the current ICD. The July 2009 ICD does not prescribe specific
threshold and objective requirements for a material solution, rather it
describes the capability gaps that exist in the mission area.
8. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, will the ICD requirements be used as
the baseline for the planned AAS RFI and VFD and your materiel
solution?
Ms. Shyu. Yes. The AAS RFI and VFD seek to address the same
capability gaps in the current ICD. The capability gaps addressed in
the current ICD are the same capability gaps that were used in the
conduct of the Armed Aerial Scout AOA. In addition, these same
capability gaps will be used in the market research analysis associated
with the release of the RFI and VFD.
flight demonstration
9. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, upgrades requested to keep to the OH-
58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter operating safely have become more complex
and costly. It is important that a final determination is made for
addressing the Army's validated AAS requirement to assure valuable time
and resources are invested on a platform that will best meet the Army's
requirements. Congress anticipates that the upcoming RFI and VFD will
be conducted with the utmost rigor, objectivity, and fairness in order
to reach a credible and conclusive AAS acquisition strategy. For the
VFDs, how will you ensure the process is fair and transparent?
Ms. Shyu. The Army will ensure that market research is conducted
thoroughly and fairly consistent with prescribed guidance in the
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The VFD maneuvers will be
executed in accordance with standard test techniques and normalized to
standard atmospheric conditions. Once the VFD is complete, industry
participants will have the opportunity to update their RFI response.
10. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, how do you plan to establish
standardized flight conditions?
Ms. Shyu. The Army will use Experimental Test Pilots that are
graduates of the Naval Test Pilot School. The pilots will execute
maneuvers that are voluntarily agreeable to the industry participant,
as outlined in the RFI. Moreover, these maneuvers will be conducted in
accordance with standard test techniques and normalized to standard
atmospheric conditions.
11. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, what method or trade basis will be
used to drive your materiel solution decision in regard to weapons
systems cost, schedule, and performance considerations?
Ms. Shyu. Results of the RFI and VFD will be assessed against the
known weighted capability gaps defined in the initial capabilities
document and validated by the AAS AOA. The methodology for determining
cost, schedule, and performance trades will be similar to the
methodology used in the AAS AOA.
kiowa warrior service life extension program
12. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, the Army states that the Kiowa
Warrior Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is the basis for
comparison in the AAS evaluation. I am not aware that a SLEP has been
established or approved and there is no SLEP in the fiscal year 2013
budget request. Have you conducted, or do you intend to conduct, the
required Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) to validate your Kiowa
Warrior SLEP assumptions?
Ms. Shyu. Kiowa Warrior SLEP is referenced as `RECAP' in the budget
exhibits. The Kiowa Warrior fiscal year 2013 budget request contains
funding to execute the SLEP, or `RECAP', requirement if the Army
decides against a new materiel solution for AAS.
The Kiowa Warrior SLAP is designed to investigate and analyze
various approaches to enhance airframe Reliability and Maintainability,
as well as identify safety improvements to the fuselage structures. The
SLAP program is currently ongoing and will identify the specific
structures requiring improvement; these changes would be implemented
via a SLEP effort.
13. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, what are the cost, technical, and
schedule risk findings of the SLEP?
Ms. Shyu. The cost, technical, and schedule risks of a SLEP program
are low. The Army has extensive reliability and cost data on the 40+
year-old OH-58 airframes, a trained and capable workforce performing
depot-level maintenance via the Crash Battle Damage & Overhaul
programs, and new cabin production lines in the Wartime Replacement
Aircraft (WRA) program. Together these programs lower the risk involved
in executing a SLEP initiative.
Any SLEP program would include replacing the aircraft structures,
which could occur on an already established production line such as
WRA. The OH-58F Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP) begins
production on that line in 2015, providing a good entry point for new
metal production that could align with the current CASUP production
schedule.
14. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, based on the findings of the SLAP, is
the Kiowa Warrior program in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
considered to be low risk for execution? If so, by what measures?
Ms. Shyu. The initial findings of the SLAP study will be available
in late summer 2012. Execution of fiscal year 2013 program funds for
the Kiowa Warrior program is not dependent on SLAP results and the
outcome of this analysis is not anticipated to present any risk or
otherwise affect the fiscal year 2013 budget or Kiowa Warrior program
execution. Based on the fact that the Critical Design Review was
successfully completed ahead of schedule in April 2012, the first two
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Demonstrator prototype
aircraft are being modified and the critical component programs are
executing well. Accordingly, the Kiowa Warrior program is at low risk
for execution in fiscal year 2013.
materiel solution determination
15. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, if performance is validated during
the flight demonstration, will the Army use the validated performance
data for the comparative analysis, or will the Army make unilateral
adjustments and assumptions?
Ms. Shyu. The Army will conduct market research to determine what
technology is available that may be able to contribute to a material
solution option that delivers greater capability than the Kiowa
Warrior. The Army does not intend to compare individual results but
rather assess their capability against the weighted capability gaps
from the Armed Aerial Scout AOA.
16. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, if performance capability is not
validated by a flight demonstration, how will the claims be treated
during the evaluation?
Ms. Shyu. The Army realizes that industry RFI performance
projections could exceed what is physically demonstrated. In those
instances, or those instances where industry elects not to participate
in the voluntary flight demonstration, the Army will assess the risk of
achieving the RFI performance projection. This assessment will be based
on associated technical readiness levels and technology roadmap.
17. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, if performance is validated during
the flight demonstration, how will the claims be treated in conducting
the cost/benefit analysis to make your materiel solution decision?
Ms. Shyu. Validated performance data serves to mitigate risk
associated with achievement of performance projections identified
through the RFI. The Army will conduct a risk assessment on all
responses, whether they are validated by performance data or strictly
claimed. The goal is to identify an affordable, achievable, moderate
risk material solution option based on the current state of technology
in the market.
18. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, what is your methodology to conduct
your comparison?
Ms. Shyu. The Army will not compare individual industry responses
against each other. Based on open source documentation, industry
appears to have further developed technology, initially described 2
years ago in their RFI responses, that represents a considerable
increase in capability gap mitigation. However, the Army currently has
no insight into these potential improvements. Individual responses to
the RFI and the demonstrated capabilities will be analyzed to assess
the performance, cost and schedule attributes needed to procure an
improved capability. The methodology used to determine the capability
tradeoffs will be consistent with the methodology used during the AAS
AOA and validated by the AAS AOA Senior Advisory Group.
19. Senator Wicker. Ms. Shyu, how will the Army determine if the
AAS materiel solution is deemed unaffordable and is terminated?
Ms. Shyu. The AAS program has not advanced beyond the material
alternatives analysis phase and is not currently a program of record
subject to termination. Ongoing analysis, subsequent to the formal AOA,
is further examining cost and performance estimates associated with a
new materiel solution. The Army will make an affordability decision in
conjunction with the capabilities determination decision at the end of
the current market research effort.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
army acquisition failures
20. Senator Ayotte. Ms. Shyu, since 2004 and including the Future
Combat System program, the Army has lost about $3.3 to $3.8 billion (or
35 to 42 percent) per year of funding for testing and evaluation for
programs that were ultimately canceled. If you are confirmed, how would
you address this history of Army acquisition failures?
Ms. Shyu. Cost growth and related challenges to program execution
can be traced to a myriad of factors in major defense acquisition
programs. I generally believe that past major Army modernization
programs failed as a result of system requirements instability,
combined with a reliance on immature technologies, which significantly
contributed to a high degree of risk and associated cost growth. I
believe the key to addressing our challenge is based on early and
continuous collaboration between the communities responsible for
requirements generation, budget and programming, and acquisition
program management to ensure the delivery of affordable, timely and
effective equipment to the Army. If confirmed, I would place an
emphasis on acquisition strategies that anticipate and mitigate the
causes for such risk in major defense acquisition programs. The
strategies I would promote include an emphasis on competition,
implementation of fixed-price contracts where appropriate,
affordability caps in large-scale acquisition programs, and cost
reduction through ``should cost'' program management.
In addition, I would ensure that materiel development is
continuously informed by considerations of cost and technical risk
throughout the acquisition lifecycle. Specifically, I would emphasize
the development and use of cost-informed trade-offs in requirements,
through Configuration Steering Boards, to reduce technical risk and
address causes of cost growth. I further believe that the emphasis on
cost-informed trade-offs ought to commence at the earliest stages of
the materiel development cycle--in requirements generation--before
expensive design and development begins in earnest. If confirmed, I
would prioritize collaboration across the Army to address these leading
causes of program failure during this critical phase, where the
foundations of large scale modernization programs are set.
21. Senator Ayotte. Ms. Shyu, how will you address the problems of
requirements-creep?
Ms. Shyu. I think greater collaboration between the program
management, requirements and resourcing communities is essential to the
development of realistic and realizable programs based on stable
requirements. This collaboration must strive to identify cost-informed
trade-offs in system design requirements throughout the program cycle,
in large part to ensure that the program remains affordable and
prevents requirements creep. If confirmed, I would use Configuration
Steering Boards to implement the trades necessary to ensure sound
execution of acquisition programs. Furthermore, I would complement
these efforts by instituting supporting acquisition strategies to
address related cost growth, to include strategies emphasizing
competition, implementation of fixed-price contracts where appropriate,
affordability caps in large-scale acquisition programs, and cost
reduction through ``should cost'' program management.
______
[The nomination reference of Ms. Heidi Shyu follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 6, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Heidi Shyu, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of the
Army, vice Malcolm Ross O'Neill, resigned.
______
[The biographical sketch of Ms. Heidi Shyu, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Heidi Shyu
Heidi Shyu, a member of the Senior Executive Service, was named the
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology (ASA(ALT)) on June 4, 2011. She also continues to serve as
the Principal Deputy, a position to which she was appointed on November
8, 2010.
As the Acting ASA(ALT), Ms. Shyu serves as the Army Acquisition
Executive, the Senior Procurement Executive, the Science Advisor to the
Secretary of the Army, and the Army's Senior Research and Development
official. She also has principal responsibility for all Department of
the Army matters related to logistics.
Ms. Shyu leads the execution of the Army's acquisition function and
the acquisition management system. Her responsibilities include
providing oversight for the life cycle management and sustainment of
Army weapons systems and equipment from research and development
through test and evaluation, acquisition, logistics, fielding, and
disposition. Ms. Shyu also oversees the Elimination of Chemical Weapons
Program. In addition, she is responsible for appointing, managing, and
evaluating program executive officers and managing the Army Acquisition
Corps and the Army Acquisition Workforce.
Prior to this position, Ms. Shyu was the Vice President of
Technology Strategy for Raytheon Company's Space and Airborne Systems.
She also held several senior leadership positions there, including
Corporate Vice President of Technology and Research, Vice President and
Technical Director of Space and Airborne Systems, Vice President of
Unmanned and Reconnaissance Systems, Senior Director of Unmanned Combat
Vehicles, Senior Director of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and Director
of JSF Integrated Radar/Electronic Warfare Sensors. As Director of JSF
Antenna Technologies at Raytheon, Ms. Shyu was responsible for the
development of lightweight, low-cost, Tile Active Electronically
Scanned Antenna technologies. She also served as the Laboratory Manager
for Electromagnetic Systems.
In addition to her extensive experience at Raytheon, Ms. Shyu
served as a Project Manager at Litton Industries and was the Principal
Engineer for the Joint STARS Self Defense Study at Grumman. She began
her career at the Hughes Aircraft Company.
Ms. Shyu holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mathematics from the
University of New Brunswick in Canada, a Master of Science Degree in
Mathematics from the University of Toronto, Master of Science Degree in
System Science (Electrical Engineering) from the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and the Engineer Degree from UCLA. She
is also a graduate of the UCLA Executive Management Course and the
University of Chicago Business Leadership Program.
A member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board from 2000 to
2010, Ms. Shyu served as the Vice Chairman from 2003 to 2005 and as
Chairman from 2005 to 2008.
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Ms. Heidi Shyu
in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Heidi Shyu (Heidi McIntosh, Hedy McIntosh, Shyu Ruo Bing).
2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology).
3. Date of nomination:
February 6, 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 28, 1953; Taipei, Taiwan.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Single (Divorced).
7. Names and ages of children:
None.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Fredericton High School, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, 1971-
1972, High School diploma
University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada,
1972-1976, B.S., Math, 1976
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 1976-1977, M.S.,
Math, 1977
University of California Los Angeles, 1978-1981, M.S. in Systems
Science 1981 (Systems Science subsequently was merged into Electrical
Engineering Dept)
University of California Los Angeles, 1981-1982, Engineer Degree,
1982
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology), U.S. Army, 103 Army Pentagon, Rm 2E520, Washington, DC, 6/
3/11-present
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology), U.S. Army, 103 Army Pentagon, Rm 2E520,
Washington, DC, 11/8/10-Present
Vice President of Technology Strategy, Raytheon Space and Airborne
Systems, El Segundo, CA, 10/15/10-06/2009
Corporate Vice President of Technology and Research, Raytheon
Company, Waltham, MA, 06/2009-01/2007
Vice President and Technical Director, Raytheon Space and Airborne
Systems, El Segundo, CA, 01/2007-01/2004
Vice President of Unmanned and Reconnaissance Systems, Raytheon
Space and Airbome Systems, El Segundo, CA, 12/2003-10/2002
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
2008-2010 Member, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
2005-2008 Chair, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
2005-2008 Ex Officio, Defense Science Board
2003-2005 Vice Chair, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
2000-2003 Member, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Heidi Shyu 2008 Revocable Trust, Heidi Shyu Trustee
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Rhodes Hill Square Condominium HOA, Member
WestEnd Living HOA, member
AUSA, Member
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Air Force Exceptional Civilian Service Award
Chinese-American Engineers and Scientists Association of Southern
CA. (CESASC) achievement award
Asian-American Engineer of the Year Award from the Chinese
Institute of Engineers
Raytheon Hero Award
Raytheon Corporate Excellence in Technology Award
Hughes Aircraft Company Superior Performance Award
Hughes Fellowship
University of Toronto Fellowship
New Brunswick Post-Graduate Scholarship
University Special Undergraduate Scholarship
Atlantic Provinces Inter-University Committee Scholarship
N. Myles Brown Science Award
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Winter AUSA Symposium Key Note Address--02/22/2012
NDIA Women in Defense keynote speech at National Annual Fall
Conference--10/19/2011
Latrun 5th Annual International Conference--9/7/2011
NDIA Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering Technology Conference--8/
10/2011
AIAA conference--5/11/2011
DIA conference--3/15/2011
17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Heidi Shyu.
This 19th day of March, 2012.
[The nomination of Ms. Heidi Shyu was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on May 15, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on September 22, 2012.]
NOMINATIONS OF DR. KATHLEEN H. HICKS TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY; AND MR. DEREK H. CHOLLET TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, McCain, Inhofe,
Portman, and Ayotte.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research
assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter
K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel;
Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Ann E. Sauer, minority
staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; and
Christian D. Brose, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Kathleen
A. Kulenkampff.
Committee members' assistants present: Lindsay Kavanaugh,
assistant to Senator Begich; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman;
and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
This morning the committee considers the nominations of Dr.
Kathleen H. Hicks to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy; and Mr. Derek H. Chollet to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA).
Dr. Hicks and Mr. Chollet, welcome to both of you. Our
nominees have demonstrated their commitment to public service
throughout their careers. We appreciate your willingness to
continue to serve.
We also appreciate the support that your families have
provided and that is so essential, as we have seen throughout
the decades. As is our custom, you are free to take the
opportunity to introduce any family and friends who are here
today with you to support you. You can do that at the time of
your opening statements.
Our witnesses today are nominated for policy positions that
deal with some of the most complex security challenges
confronting the Department of Defense (DOD).
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
on the full range of policy matters, including strategy
formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of DOD
plans and policy with overall national security objectives. Dr.
Hicks has been nominated to replace Dr. Jim Miller whose
nomination for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
presently pending before the committee.
Since 2009, Dr. Hicks has served as the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. In this
position, she has helped lead efforts within the Department to
develop and implement strategic guidance, including the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the Department's recent
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) issued in January.
Derek Chollet is nominated to be the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, the principal
advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and
policy on issues of DOD interest relating to Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa, and for the oversight of security cooperation
programs and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in those regions.
Since 2009, Mr. Chollet has held positions at the State
Department and on the National Security Council where he has
worked on many of the issues that he will confront at DOD if he
is confirmed by the Senate.
One of the primary challenges that both our witnesses will
have to wrestle with, if confirmed, is maintaining progress in
Afghanistan as the lead for security transitions to the Afghan
security forces and U.S. coalition forces are reduced in number
between now and 2014. Key to the success of this transition
will be the Defense Department's policies and efforts to build
the capacity of the Afghan army and police and the sustained
commitment of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
allies and other coalition partners to the goal agreed on at
the NATO Lisbon summit of having Afghan forces in the security
lead throughout Afghanistan by 2014.
In that regard, I am deeply concerned about news reports
regarding an administration proposal to reduce the future size
of the Afghan security forces after these forces assume the
lead for security throughout Afghanistan. It has been reported
that the United States is advocating a proposal in NATO to cut
the future size of the Afghan security forces by one-third from
352,000 this year to less than 230,000 after 2014.
Yesterday, Senator McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator
Graham, and I sent a letter to President Obama stating our
concerns about these proposed reductions in the Afghan security
forces. These cuts appear to be based primarily on current
presumptions regarding what the security situation will be in
Afghanistan several years from now. We believe that is the
wrong approach. It is just too early to decide that conditions
2 or 3 years from now will allow a one-third reduction in the
size of the Afghan security forces. I will place our letter to
the President in the record of today's hearing.
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Chairman Levin. Our NATO and international partners share
an interest in a secure and stable Afghanistan and should
invest some of their defense savings from drawing down their
forces in sustaining Afghan forces over the long-term. We
should not, however, jeopardize the hard-won gains of the past
years by failing to help fund and sustain the Afghan security
forces with what they need to provide enduring security in
Afghanistan.
Other major security challenges that our witnesses will
share responsibilities for include: countering a potential
Iranian nuclear threat and Iran's broader efforts to
destabilize the Middle East; ensuring adequate policy and
resource support for ongoing counterterrorism and counter
proliferation operations; pressuring the Assad regime to end
its murderous campaign against its own people; managing our
changing security relations in the Middle East and North Africa
in the wake of the Arab Spring; establishing clear policies and
priorities for building the capacity of partner nations to
address security challenges on their own; and to support the
Department's operations to advise and assist the Ugandan effort
to eliminate the Lord's Resistance Army and to remove Joseph
Kony and his top lieutenants from the battlefield.
Dr. Hicks would also play an important role in implementing
the Department's recent DSG which she helped craft. That DSG
sets the goal of reshaping the U.S. joint force to be smaller
and leaner and at the same time more agile, flexible, and fully
capable of meeting the Department's global challenges. That
includes rebalancing our global posture and presence, pivoting
more toward the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East.
This week, Secretary Panetta and Secretary Clinton will be
meeting with their counterparts from Japan in the so-called Two
Plus Two meetings to continue work on arrangements for the
future presence of U.S. marines in Okinawa and Guam in light of
U.S. plans for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in the Asia-
Pacific region under the new DSG.
Senators McCain, Webb, and I wrote to Secretary Panetta
earlier this week to express our concerns regarding the
affordability, executability, and timing of the realignment of
marines. Also, it is important that we understand how this
planned distribution of the marines throughout the Pacific
supports and complements the broader U.S. strategy and force
posture in this important region.
Other challenges include countering transnational threats,
ensuring the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, addressing
the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, and strengthening the capabilities of our allies
and friendly nations to provide their own security.
On the issue of protecting cyber operations, this new but
increasingly important and complex mission affects not only DOD
but the Government and the economy as a whole. The committee
needs to understand the dimensions of the threat of industrial
espionage being waged relentlessly against U.S. industry and
Government, predominantly by the Chinese security
establishment, and its impact on our national security and
prosperity. This committee has focused for some time on the
need to develop comprehensive policies and frameworks to govern
planning and operations in cyberspace. The administration has
made some progress in these areas as reflected in recent
strategy statements in the development of comprehensive
legislation to improve cybersecurity, but much, much more needs
to be done. These cyber issues will be among Dr. Hicks' many
duties and should be a top priority.
Our witnesses this morning bring strong qualifications to
the positions for which they have been nominated. We look
forward to their testimony. I now call upon Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our nominees before the committee today and thank
them for their continued willingness to serve our country.
Dr. Hicks, you have been nominated for the position of
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In this
capacity, if confirmed, you would serve as the principal
advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense on matters concerning the formulation,
integration, and oversight of defense policy and plans.
Mr. Chollet, you have been nominated for the position of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA. In this capacity, if
confirmed, you would support the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Secretary of Defense on Defense Policy and
Strategy for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Both of these positions entail important responsibilities
for addressing an increasingly complex global security
environment. As recent and repeated testimony before this
committee has made abundantly clear, the threats confronting
our security, our interests, and our ideals are growing not
diminishing.
Al Qaeda is becoming more decentralized, and its affiliates
in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb are growing
stronger, more independent, and increasingly determined to
attack American interests.
Iran continues to threaten the stability across the Middle
East through its hostile actions, including killing Americans
in Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting terrorist groups across the
region, destabilizing Arab countries, propping up the Assad
regime in Syria, and its continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency is damaged but not
broken. Hard-won security gains are put at risk by the safe
havens for the insurgency in Pakistan, by poor governance and
corruption in Afghanistan, and by the continued perception that
America will abandon Afghanistan. Chairman Levin and I, and
other members of this committee, are also concerned by the
administration's intent to reduce the ultimate end strength of
the Afghan National Security Forces from 352,000 to 230,000.
On the other hand, recent reports that the United States
and Afghanistan are close to concluding a strategic partnership
agreement are very encouraging. I would be eager to hear from
you, Dr. Hicks, about what the administration's plans are
concerning a residual U.S. military force for Afghanistan
beyond 2014 as part of this and other agreements with the
Government of Afghanistan.
In Iraq, violence is up since the departure of U.S. troops.
Democratic gains are increasingly fragile as Prime Minister
Maliki appears to be consolidating his power at the expense of
other political blocs. Meanwhile, al Qaeda in Iraq appears to
be making a comeback.
From Tunisia and Libya to Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, many
countries in the Middle East are undergoing monumental changes
resulting from the Arab Spring. The situation remains fluid.
The outcome of these revolutions remain unclear, and DOD has an
important role to play.
Then there is Syria, where the Bashar al-Assad regime has
slaughtered nearly 10,000 Syrians and there is no end in sight.
What is obvious and indisputable is that the Kofi Annan Plan
has failed. Assad has not abided and will not abide by a cease-
fire. Assad's tanks and artillery continue to shell civilian
populations. His forces continue to assault and murder Syrians
who attempt to protest peacefully. His helicopters are now
increasingly attacking Syrian towns and cities. Indeed, since
the Annan Plan was announced last month, Assad has escalated
the violence, killing at least 1,000 additional Syrians and
displacing thousands more from their homes. The only practical
effect that the Annan Plan is having at this point is to
provide diplomatic cover for Assad to kill more people.
Assad's campaign of violence will continue, as it has for
more than a year now, until the military balance of power
inside the country shifts against him. This shift will only
occur when the United States demonstrates the necessary
leadership and takes tangible steps with our friends and allies
to help the Syrian opposition to defend themselves. Right now,
the United States and the world are failing the people of
Syria. Every day that we refuse to lead, more Syrians will die.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate my concerns about
several recent instances where DOD has been nonresponsive to
this committee's requests and noncompliant with the law. I sent
a letter to Secretary Panetta on March 29th listing several
such instances, and while I have received a response to that
letter, several issues remain outstanding. I would like to
include that exchange of letters in the record of this hearing.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
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Senator McCain. Most recently, however, we requested a
briefing from the Department on military involvement and
possible misconduct in Colombia during the Summit of the
Americas. Our intention and our effort was to find out if there
were any breaches or possible evidence of breaches of national
security. That briefing which we received yesterday was wholly
nonresponsive to our request. The briefers had no information
except to provide a timeline and mechanics of the ongoing
investigation. By the way, this stands in stark contrast to the
briefings that the chairman and ranking member of the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee are
receiving from the Secret Service. Incredibly, our briefers did
not even know the basic facts about the present schedule or the
misconduct instance themselves.
Another matter of concern is the establishment of the
Defense Clandestine Service. The first we heard about it was in
a Washington Post article last week. This committee has a
certain responsibility and we should not have to learn about
major policy decisions through the public media.
I want the witnesses to know that this unresponsiveness
cannot continue.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and I
hope it will provide this committee with a clear understanding
of how they will approach what is an increasingly complex and
dangerous global security environment in the midst of looming
cuts to our national defense budget.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain's letter to the Secretary raises very
important issues about the relationship of this committee to
DOD in terms of their lack of responsiveness too often to our
requests and to our laws and to their commitments. I am going
to be taking that issue up, as I have assured Senator McCain,
personally with Secretary Panetta.
Senator McCain has also made reference to the Defense
Clandestine Service, that announcement that we read about in
the paper and should have been briefed about before we read
about it. We are going to have a committee hearing when we get
back, promptly after we get back from next week's recess.
Senator McCain and I are trying to find a good date for the
committee to have that hearing on that proposed change, and
there are representatives here today from DOD. If you have not
already received a call, you will very soon to set up that
date, and we would expect the appropriate witnesses to be here
for that hearing.
Let us now call upon our witnesses, and we will first call
upon Dr. Hicks.
STATEMENT OF DR. KATHLEEN H. HICKS TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members
of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you today as the President's
nominee for the position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. I have had the great privilege to serve
President Obama, Secretary Gates, and now Secretary Panetta for
the past 3 years, and if the Senate chooses to confirm me for
this position, I look forward to continuing to support
America's men and women in uniform.
I have been fortunate to serve under the Secretary of
Defense since 1994. For much of that time, I did so as a member
of the career Civil Service. In my experience, Senators, we as
a Nation possess an unmatched career national security
workforce. They are often unsung patriots serving with superior
dedication across administrations and political parties and
alongside their military colleagues. I am deeply humbled to
represent that community in some small way through my presence
here.
I want to acknowledge and thank my family foremost. I want
to thank my husband, Tom Hicks, and our three children,
Benjamin, Margaret, and Alexander. They have made considerable
sacrifices for the demands of my job. If confirmed, I will rely
on their continued support and understanding.
I am also grateful to be joined by my parents: my father,
retired Rear Admiral William J. Holland, Jr.; and my mother,
Ann Holland. It is especially fitting that they are here today
as it is my parents who taught me the value of a life spent in
service to country and community, a value I hope I am passing
to my own children.
Finally, I want to acknowledge my oldest brother, Bill
Holland, also a former naval officer, and my five brothers and
sisters who could not be here today.
Senator, the lives of Americans today are influenced more
than ever by events beyond this country's borders, and the need
for American leadership in the world has never been greater. If
confirmed, I will work closely with Congress and this committee
to advance U.S. national security interests. I will look to
assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense in building and maintaining strong defense
relationships around the globe, preventing crises where
possible, and preparing for crises when necessary, and ensuring
alignment of DOD activities and programs with strategic
guidance. I will also place a high priority on assisting the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the day-to-day
leadership of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
policy organization, upholding its hallmark standards of
excellence, integrity, and responsiveness.
The U.S. military is only one instrument in our holistic
national security approach, but it is the key instrument. If
confirmed, I pledge to provide policy advice and guidance that
advances Secretary Panetta's first key strategic principle for
DOD: to maintain the world's best military.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee,
thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Hicks.
Mr. Chollet.
STATEMENT OF MR. DEREK H. CHOLLET TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. Chollet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this
morning.
I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama has
shown by nominating me to this position, and I thank Secretary
Panetta, Deputy Secretary Carter, and Acting Under Secretary
Miller for their support of my nomination.
I would also like to acknowledge the support from two of my
bosses during the past 3\1/2\ years, Secretary of State Clinton
and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and express
appreciation for the confidence they have shown in me.
I also want to thank my family for their support, for I
could not do this without them. My wife, Heather Hostetter, is
here today and serves as an inspiration for everything I do.
Our son Lucas is also here. I would thank both he and his mom
for putting up with so many missed dinners and lost weekends
while I have been at work.
I would also like to thank my brother-in-law, Adam
Hostetter, and many other friends and colleagues who are here
with me today.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, America's national
security interests covered by the position of ISA in Europe,
the Middle East, and Africa are as profound as they are vast.
From ensuring that the transatlantic alliance remains strong,
to strengthening Israel's security, to preventing Iran from
developing a nuclear weapon, to seizing the opportunities and
meeting the threats stemming from the Arab Spring, to working
with NATO to ensure a steady transition in Afghanistan, to
developing deeper partnerships with African states to meet
shared interests, the United States must play a central role.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and
Congress as a whole to address these challenges and seize the
genuine opportunities these issues present.
Mr. Chairman, 20 years ago this spring I had one of my
first experiences in Washington as an intern on your personal
staff, and if I recall, I assisted your staff with research on
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Since then, I
have had the opportunity and privilege to work closely with
several of our country's foremost national security leaders
such as former Secretary of State James Baker, former Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke.
From them and many others, I learned not just by experience but
by their example of the importance of public service, of a deep
belief in bipartisanship, and the conviction that American
leadership remains indispensible to helping solve global
problems.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will make every effort to
live up to the confidence placed in me and the excellence
demonstrated by our men and women in uniform around the world
every day.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chollet.
Here are the standard questions we ask of our nominees and
you can answer them together. In order to exercise our
oversight and legislative responsibilities, we must be able to
receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of
information, and that is why we ask our nominees the following
questions.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Dr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Dr. Hicks. No.
Mr. Chollet. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in the hearings?
Dr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Dr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Dr. Hicks. No. I am sorry. Yes. I apologize. I misheard the
question.
Chairman Levin. That is okay. I probably did not state it
clearly. Let me repeat it.
Dr. Hicks. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Dr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Chairman Levin. By the way, thank you for listening. Even
though you misheard, you obviously were trying to listen.
Sometimes I wonder if our witnesses have been just prepared to
go ``yes, yes, yes, no, no.'' [Laughter]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon
request by this committee?
Dr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Dr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Chollet. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let us try a 7-minute round for questions. A number of our
colleagues are actually at subcommittee hearings of this
committee this morning, and I am afraid that kind of conflict
happens a lot, usually not with our own subcommittees, but
today it did and we cannot help that at times. So they will not
be able to be with us, I am afraid.
First of all, Dr. Hicks, about the Afghan security forces,
this is an important issue for us, and as I mentioned, four of
us have sent a letter to the President about this matter
because we are concerned about the announcement or the
statement by our general over in Afghanistan that we are going
to--or more accurately, the Afghan security forces are going to
be decreased in number after 2014 from 352,000 to 230,000 which
is a reduction of one-third. That was based on saying that
basically it was an affordability issue.
Now, we think that the right approach is to wait until a
later point when we know a number of things, number one, what
the circumstances are on the ground, because transfer of the
responsibility for security to the Afghan forces is really a
key part of the mission in Afghanistan because they are in the
position to defeat the insurgency with our support. That is the
ongoing success that it is going to be achieved in Afghanistan.
So this announcement or statement relative to reductions we
thought, those of us who sent this letter, myself, Senator
McCain, Senator Lieberman, Senator Graham--that announcement,
we thought, was very premature.
Let me ask you, Dr. Hicks, about your views on that
subject.
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I am not familiar with the statement
that you are drawing from. What I can tell you is I agree
completely with your statement that we should have a
conditions-based approach to our way ahead, and to my
knowledge, no decisions have yet been made, certainly on U.S.
Force levels following 2014.
I do think that as we look ahead--and, if confirmed, I
would certainly look to make this a priority--we should be
thinking very hard about how the sustainability of the force
for Afghanistan can be assured into the future. Part of that is
cost for the Afghans, but it is not the only factor. I would
look forward to working with this committee, if confirmed.
Chairman Levin. Cost not just for the Afghans but also the
cost for the coalition, NATO, and ourselves in terms of
sustaining is going to be one factor, but it surely should not
determine, number one, what the size of that Afghan force is.
Second, compared to the current cost of our presence in
Afghanistan, being able to have an Afghan army and police that
is able to do the job would really be a bargain. Would you not
agree?
Dr. Hicks. I do agree.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Chollet, do you have any comment on
that?
Mr. Chollet. Sir, I would just add that I believe General
Allen in testimony before this committee made clear that no
decision had been made, and that in terms of the slope downward
from the surge of 352,000 troops, that is something that he
would do a rigorous assessment of the metrics on how we could
have that down slope.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let me ask you about the Afghanistan-U.S. strategic
partnership agreement, which Senator McCain made reference to
as being an important step forward, and I totally concur with
him in that statement.
What impact do you believe that agreement, strategic
agreement for an ongoing relationship, is going to have on
Pakistan's strategic calculus and on its continuing support to
insurgents who are using safe havens in Pakistan to launch
cross-border attacks against coalition, U.S., and Afghan
forces? Do you see any effect of that strategic agreement on
Pakistani behavior?
Dr. Hicks, why do we not start with you?
Dr. Hicks. Mr. Chairman, I think the strategic partnership
agreement--I have not been briefed on it in detail, but I think
it signifies a significant commitment by the United States to
sustain itself and its relationship with Afghanistan into the
future. My understanding and view is that would have a
significant effect on the Pakistanis' understanding of the
United States' commitment to remain engaged in the economic
future and the political future, as well as the security of
Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Chollet, do you have any comment on
that?
Mr. Chollet. Sir, I as well have not been briefed fully on
the strategic partnership agreement. My understanding is you
will be receiving a briefing from administration officials
later today on the scope of that.
If confirmed, Pakistan will not be in my portfolio, but I
would just say on the Afghanistan piece that it will send an
extremely important signal of our long-term commitment to
Afghanistan and it will send a clear signal that we will not be
withdrawing from the region as we did in the 1990s.
Chairman Levin. Now let me ask you a question about Syria.
Apparently Turkey is willing to create and defend a safe zone
along the border inside of Syria. Are you aware of that
willingness? Is that, in fact, the case? If so, what has been
the reluctance of NATO to step up and support Turkey in that
effort? Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of that commitment.
What I can tell you is that in my current capacity, I am
familiar with the combatant commanders' planning efforts with
regard to Syria and we are doing a significant amount of
planning for a wide range of scenarios, including our ability
to assist allies and partners along the borders.
Chairman Levin. You are not familiar with that report that
there was an expression of willingness on the part of Turkey to
create a safe zone?
Dr. Hicks. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with that
report.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Chollet?
Mr. Chollet. Mr. Chairman, I am familiar with the reports
that Turkey might be willing, but I am unaware of any official
request, or even serious discussion for that matter, about how
NATO and other powers may be able to help Turkey in that
regard. I may note that in the cross-border incident several
weeks ago, there was again some reports about a possible
article 4 discussion within NATO. Again, to my knowledge, that
has not been requested by the Turkish Government.
Chairman Levin. Do you have any opinion as to whether or
not that would be a wise move, and if Turkey is willing to take
the lead in doing that, do you have an opinion as to whether or
not NATO should be supportive of that willingness?
Mr. Chollet. Mr. Chairman, I think if the Turkish
Government requests an article 4 discussion with NATO, NATO
would be obliged to have that discussion with them. I would
support that, of course.
In terms of the details of a so-called buffer zone, I know
that as Chairman Dempsey and Secretary Panetta have testified
before this committee and others, there are risks clearly with
any military option by the United States or anyone in Syria.
But it would be a discussion I would think we would at least be
willing to pursue with the Turkish Government if they were to
so initiate it.
Chairman Levin. Do you have thoughts on that, Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. Mr. Chairman, I agree. I think we should take
seriously any efforts by others to think through ways of
dealing with the problem set. This is a very complex problem,
many risks involved, but worth looking at.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. So we should take seriously any suggestions
rather than lead? Right? Is that pretty much what you are
saying?
Dr. Hicks. Senator McCain, my view is that the United
States is leading diplomatically.
Senator McCain. How are they doing that?
Dr. Hicks. Senator McCain, my understanding is that the
President has been very clear in pulling together both the
Friends of Syria group, working through the United Nations
(U.N.) aggressively, working the sanctions issue.
As far as the DOD role, again, we are focused--in my
current capacity, I am focused on supporting the combatant
commanders in developing plans for all kinds of approaches,
should the President decide to take further steps in the
military vein.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chollet, do you have a comment on that
since you work at the National Security Council? Are we taking
the lead vis-a-vis the issue of Syria?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, the President has been very clear--
what an outrage that is happening in Syria today. He gave a
speech on Monday at the Holocaust Memorial in which he was very
clear on that score and spoke of the unspeakable violence and
brutality that is being wrought upon the Syrian people. There
are no questions there are mass atrocities.
Senator McCain. I am glad he has spoken up.
What concrete actions have been taken, Mr. Chollet?
Mr. Chollet. I think the administration has been moving on
multiple tracks, as Dr. Hicks has mentioned: an economic track
to put incredible pressure on the Assad regime, working with
our friends and allies; a diplomatic track through the Friends
of Syria to strengthen the international consensus, some 70
countries against Assad----
Senator McCain. Actually they have not worked with the
Friends of Syria. At least the Friends of Syria say they have
not because I met with them, Mr. Chollet. So that is not a
fact.
Do you believe that Assad has complied with any of the six
conditions set forth in the Kofi Annan Peace Plan?
Mr. Chollet. I believe he has not complied with most of
them.
Senator McCain. Is it true that the number of people that
Assad has killed in Syria has grown considerably since the
Syrian Government agreed to the Annan Plan?
Mr. Chollet. There has certainly been an uptick of
violence. I do not have----
Senator McCain. In your view, will the administration admit
that the Annan Plan has failed and then move beyond it to take
other actions to end the killing?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, the Security Council resolution
passed last Saturday allows for certain reports back to the
council.
Senator McCain. Do you believe the Annan Plan has failed or
succeeded?
Mr. Chollet. It is too early to tell.
Senator McCain. It is too early to tell whether the Annan
Plan has succeeded or failed?
Mr. Chollet. I would say it is failing.
Senator McCain. What would you say, Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. Senator McCain, I would say it is failing and
that Annan himself has indicated he is extremely worried about
progress on the plan.
Senator McCain. Who is worried about it?
Dr. Hicks. Kofi Annan has, himself, said he is very
concerned about the ability of his plan to succeed at this
point given the actions of the Syrian regime.
Senator McCain. Yes. So his suggestion has been to have
more observers. The Washington Post had an interesting
editorial, I would refer for your reading, this morning,
``Where U.N. monitors go in Syria, killings follow.''
Mr. Chollet and Dr. Hicks, I am glad to hear that we are
planning such a leadership role. I can guarantee you nobody in
the Middle East believes that. I can guarantee you that this is
a shameful situation where these people are being slaughtered,
and we are talking about economic sanctions and diplomatic
sanctions when we should be helping these people as we helped
the people of Bosnia, as we helped in Libya, and we have helped
in other times in our history. So I am very disappointed in
your answers.
Mr. Chollet, do you believe the Syrian opposition is al
Qaeda?
Mr. Chollet. The opposition, as Secretary Panetta has
mentioned before this committee, is deeply splintered. There
are probably as many as 100 different groups. There are
definitely some extremists within the opposition, but the vast
bulk is not.
Senator McCain. Do you believe that the situation has
improved or worsened in Iraq since the withdrawal of U.S.
military forces from the country?
Mr. Chollet. I think it is stabilized.
Senator McCain. You think it is stabilized when the vice
president of the country has to go to Erbil because of the
threat of being arrested, that Maliki is greeted in Tehran with
full honors, that there is exacerbated relations. Barzani made
a statement yesterday that he thought that they would have to
consider being an independent country. Do you think all those
things are good?
Mr. Chollet. No, sir, I do not. I think Iraq----
Senator McCain. You think it is stabilized.
Mr. Chollet. I do. I do. Iraq was able to host a successful
Arab League summit in Baghdad without incident.
Senator McCain. Which most countries did not show up for.
Go ahead.
Mr. Chollet. But Iraq has enormous challenges. I will not
deny that. If confirmed, it will be one of my priorities to
work hard on Iraq, although the DOD role is much reduced there,
and to ensure that we meet the opportunities that a new Iraq
offers.
Senator McCain. The United States has provided roughly $1.5
billion a year for about 3 decades to the Egyptian Government
under Mubarak. Do you think we should review that whole issue
of aid to the Egyptian military, Mr. Chollet?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, it was an issue the administration
looked at very closely over the course of the last few months.
Secretary Clinton decided to move forward with that aid. I
think it is something that at the current time, given how
fragile Egypt is, given the important transition that is
upcoming in the next few months of the election and then the
writing of the new constitution, given that Egypt is the heart
and soul of the Arab world, at this point we do not want to
look into that or pursue that option.
However, we need to be able to ensure that a new Egyptian
Government is held accountable and lives up to its obligations,
including its peace treaty with Israel.
Moving forward, it may be something we do consider, but at
this time, I do not think the time is right.
Senator McCain. General Mattis recently told this committee
that Assad has the momentum on the ground in Syria. Do you
think Assad is currently winning militarily? Both of you.
Mr. Chollet. He clearly has the balance of force on his
side and again, as the President had made clear, there is
unspeakable violence on the Syrian people.
Senator McCain. So our answer then is not to provide them
with arms or means to defend themselves? It is better to use
diplomatic and economic measures. Is that your answer?
Mr. Chollet. Secretary Clinton has made clear we are
providing non-lethal support to the nonviolent opposition. The
State Department is administering that, sir. It includes
communications equipment, and that is the course we are
pursuing at the moment.
Senator McCain. I see. So you feel that non-lethal
equipment really does the job against artillery, helicopters,
and tanks? Is that correct?
Mr. Chollet. Sir, we believe that the non-lethal support
does help the opposition, but clearly they are still threatened
every day by Assad.
Senator McCain. I hope that you and Dr. Hicks might have an
opportunity to go to the refugee camps on the Turkish border
and hear from the now 25,000 people who have fled their homes
who have been subject to systematic murder, rape, and torture,
and you might have a little bit different view as to the
efficacy of non-lethal assistance and diplomatic and economic
measures.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last week I was in Afghanistan, and saw a lot of things you
do not get through the media. We had an extensive time with not
just Ambassador Crocker and General Allen, but also a lot of
the troops in the mess halls and that type of thing, which we
always try to do.
General Allen made a statement, and he had some pretty
strong feelings because of the rumors that are out there, that
perhaps prior to the mandatory withdrawal of 2014 they might be
accelerating this. He had some strong feelings about this. He
said that this could be disastrous if we did that, for 2012 and
2013 will be, in his words, the critical moments in this fight
as International Security Assistance Force continues to grow,
train, and transition control to the Afghan army and the Afghan
police.
Do you agree with him in that statement?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I do. I think we have to be very
careful about the way in which we move forward. Our approach
should be conditions-based. There are many considerations that
go into that, and no decisions have been made. General Allen's
voice is a key voice in the decisionmaking going forward.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate the word, because you used
``conditions-based'' also in your opening statement, which I
always appreciate hearing.
As I said to both of you before, one of the frailties in
this kind of a hearing is that whether the President is a
Republican or a Democrat, it does not really matter. Those
people who are nominated by him are generally going to say that
they support his policies. This always puts it awkward.
For example, one of the worst things that he has done, in
my opinion, when he first started was to make a commitment to
close Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). Now, that has not happened, but he
has made every effort to do that. If I were to ask you if you
agree that we should close GTMO, you would probably say that is
what the President said and we agree to that.
I want you to keep in mind--and I would like to ask both of
you to do this. Look at the expeditionary legal complex that we
have there and the history of the trials that have taken place,
the military tribunals that take place there.
The reason I say this is because there is some discussion--
even though I consider that to be a great asset that we have.
In fact, it is one of the few good deals that this country has.
We have had GTMO since what, 1904, and it is about $4,000 a
year and they forget to collect about every other year. It is a
pretty good deal.
But they have a great complex there and it is one that it
really disturbs me when they talk about releasing more of the
combatants who are there. As of December 29, 2011, of the 599
that have been released, 167 we can document have returned to
the fight. That is 28 percent. That is really disturbing to me,
and it was a mistake.
Now, while this President has not been able to close it, he
has tried to do it. We have stopped him from doing it in this
committee. But now there is talk of the five Taliban that they
are talking about releasing at this time.
We set up something in the law in our Senate Armed Services
Committee, our authorization committee, that the Secretary of
Defense has to certify before further release of combatants,
and the certification process is pretty complicated. It says he
has to certify that the state to receive the released combatant
is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism, maintains
control over each detention facility, is not as of this date of
certification facing a threat. This has put him in a very
awkward situation for having to do that.
What I would like to have you share with me is your
feelings about GTMO, not the policy that is in place right now,
but its future and specifically these five combatants that they
are talking about releasing, the Taliban.
Dr. Hicks. Senator, under my current position, I have no
purview over detainee operations anywhere in the world, to
include at GTMO. But if confirmed, that will be part of my
responsibilities, and I take very seriously the concerns that
you express. I would commit to certainly looking with the
general counsel at the issues you raise of the five detainees
in particular and coming forward with hearing your view on how
we should move forward and coming to some conclusions.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I think that is fair enough. Would
you add to that that you would be looking at the advisability
of maybe bringing more people into GTMO? There has not been one
new detainee admitted since 2008. In light of the recidivism
rate that I just went over, I just want to know what your
thinking is.
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I would certainly commit to, if
confirmed, coming in and having an understanding from you of
your concerns and working within the administration to look at
that issue.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is really all I could ask at
this time because it is a resource we have to start using
again. People are dying because we are not using it properly.
Mr. Chollet, you mentioned in your opening statement U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM). That was my thing that I was
originally interested in because heretofore it was under three
different commands, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European
Command, and U.S. Central Command. It is working very well. I
just got back from Africa and from Stuttgart where their
headquarters is.
A couple of things there. There is always an effort by
Members of Congress to say, ``let us take that AFRICOM and take
it away from Stuttgart in this case and put it in my State.'' I
would like to have you be aware and talk to General Ham about
what a mistake that would be. My feeling was it should have
actually been located in Ethiopia or someplace on the
continent. However, with all of their concerns, I have
personally talked to the presidents of many of the countries
who agree that would have been good except they can never sell
the idea to the Africans because they will think about going
back to colonialism and that type of thing.
I would like to have your commitment to this committee that
you will look at the resources that General Ham has and make
sure that we are paying proper attention. It has been my
feeling for a long time that as the squeeze takes place and
there is the terrorism going down through the Horn of Africa,
through Djibouti, that this committee has made a commitment to
work with the Africans in establishing brigades so that they
can take care of their own needs if such time comes. Do you
agree with my concern about AFRICOM?
Mr. Chollet. Sir, I absolutely agree that AFRICOM has been
a very successful command. In my current job, I have had the
opportunity to work a bit with General Ham, and he is very
impressive. You have my commitment that, if confirmed, I would
love to come and talk with you further about how we might work
with AFRICOM.
Senator Inhofe. All right. I appreciate it.
I want to get you also on record because I think I know
what your answer is. Some of these programs, the security
assistance and engagement programs, have been my favorite. I
single out sometimes Africa in terms of the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the train-and-
equip program. They have been very successful there. There was
a time, as I have talked to both of you about this before, that
we considered an IMET program participation as we are doing
them a favor when, in fact, if we do not do it--and I am
talking about now training the junior grade officers here in
the United States. Once we do that, they have an allegiance
that is always there. I would want to maintain those programs
in a very strong way, not just IMET but train-and-equip, FMS,
foreign military financing, and some of the other programs.
Dr. Hicks. Senator, those are highlighted in our DSG. I
completely agree with you on their importance and they are part
of what we highlight as building partnership capacity efforts
that help us throughout the world.
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I completely agree. If confirmed, I
would look forward to working with you.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that is good.
My time has expired, but for the record, I would ask some
questions having to do with our nuclear modernization program,
Dr. Hicks. We are very much concerned about it. I know that
back during the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
program, which I opposed, commitments were made by this
administration to sustain a modernization program and a U.S.
nuclear deterrent. It is becoming more and more significant
right now than it has been in the past. I will be asking some
specific questions for the record on that issue.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Chollet, for being
here today and for your service and future service to our
country.
Dr. Hicks, I wanted to ask you about an issue. I had the
chance to visit the Philippines in January, and it was also an
issue raised by my constituents. It was about Clark Air Force
Base, a cemetery at that Air Force base where more than 8,300
U.S. servicemembers and their loved ones have been buried. In
fact, that cemetery was maintained by the Air Force for 90
years until 1991. In 1991, after the Air Force vacated Clark
Air Force Base and there was a volcanic eruption there, they
left the cemetery and then it was not maintained at all until,
fortunately, in 1994 there was a group of private citizens that
came forward--and I certainly want to commend those private
citizens that did that--to maintain this area where 8,000 of
our service men and women and their dependents were buried and
those who sacrificed for us. Certainly they deserve our
gratitude. But I believe that it is a responsibility for us
when we have our veterans, that they deserve to be treated with
dignity and respect.
I wanted to ask you, I understand that you are coming into
this position and not to rehash what the Air Force should or
should not have done. I actually believe that there are other
areas of the Federal Government that have responsibility to
maintain this cemetery. What I wanted to hear from you is,
notwithstanding your other responsibilities, that you will
ensure that there is coordination in the future. For example,
if we close bases overseas that we coordinate with other
agencies within the Federal Government to make sure that where
our veterans are buried, that those cemeteries are properly
maintained consistent with the dignity that our veterans and
their families deserve. If that is something that you could
assure me that in our responsibilities you would make sure that
we did have coordination going forward, that we would fulfill
our responsibility to those veterans?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I will assure you of that. I believe,
as you have stated, that the dignity of our veterans and
certainly our buried Americans are vital, and that as we close
bases or move our global posture, that is an issue we should be
addressing in our considerations.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I have also introduced a bill with Senator Begich that is a
bill that will ensure that those 8,000-plus men and women and
their family members that are buried at the Clark Air Force
Base veterans cemetery are properly--that those facilities are
maintained with the dignity that they should be. I would love
to send you a copy of that just to get your feedback on it, Dr.
Hicks.
Dr. Hicks. I welcome that, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
I wanted to follow up on Senator Inhofe's questions on
nuclear modernization. Let me just start with this, Dr. Hicks.
I know this is going to be a very important responsibility that
you have in your new position and wanted to ask you, do you
believe a reliable and modern nuclear deterrent is central to
America's national security?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I do.
Senator Ayotte. Do you believe a strong and dependable U.S.
nuclear deterrent also helps prevent nuclear proliferation
around the world?
Dr. Hicks. I do.
Senator Ayotte. I recently introduced a letter, which I
would like to submit for the record. I have sent a letter to
the President expressing my concerns in following up on the New
START treaty that he has not followed through in the proposed
fiscal year 2013 budget with a commitment to making sure that
we have sufficient resources to modernize our nuclear
capabilities. In fact, one of the deep concerns I have is that
in order for us to be able to ensure that our nuclear deterrent
is modernized and capable, we also have to have sufficient
resources to build and maintain the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement facility. Are you familiar with the plans
for that facility at Los Alamos?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I am not.
Senator Ayotte. This is very important in terms of
modernizing, making sure that we have a sufficient nuclear
deterrent. I am going to submit this letter that I wrote to the
President expressing my concerns about the fact that there has
not been follow-through on the commitment to modernize our
nuclear weapons and our deterrent to make sure that they are
effective.
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Senator Ayotte. For the record, I would ask that you take a
look at this letter that I, along with several other Senators,
have sent to the President, and would ask you to also comment
on that letter, when you are confirmed. I would ask for an
answer to receive your comments on the concerns I have raised
to the President and what you believe needs to be done to
ensure that our nuclear deterrent is modernized, effective, and
capable.
Dr. Hicks. Senator, if confirmed, I welcome an opportunity
to review the letter and respond.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I think this is very
important, and I am deeply concerned about where we are right
now on this issue. I am also concerned that if we do not
modernize in the way that I believe the President made a
commitment in the confirmation of the New START treaty that it
will be to the detriment of our nuclear deterrent and also in
my view could encourage proliferation around the world
particularly when we look at some of the actors that we are
trying to prevent from having nuclear weapons capability,
including Iran.
One final additional issue I would like to follow up on
from Senator Inhofe's question, because you will have
responsibility, Dr. Hicks, over our detainee policy. Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, I have questioned many of our
military leaders about this issue if we were tomorrow, for
example, to capture Ayman al Zawahiri, who is now the head of
al Qaeda. For example, if we were to capture him in Pakistan,
where would we detain an individual like that to question that
individual to gather intelligence to be able to protect our
country and obviously, hopefully, find out more about that
organization so we could stop their dangerous activities.
You are, of course, familiar with Mr. al Zawahiri?
Dr. Hicks. I am.
Senator Ayotte. Do you know, if we did capture him
tomorrow, where we would detain him?
Dr. Hicks. I do not know that answer.
Senator Ayotte. I got the same answer from Admiral McRaven
who is the distinguished Commander of our U.S. Special
Operations Command when he first came before the committee,
when I was first elected to the Senate, and then I asked him
again recently that question. He did not have an answer for me
either of where we would put him or an individual like that.
Would you agree with me that if we capture someone like
that, one of the important responsibilities we have is to
gather intelligence about what an individual, particularly the
head of al Qaeda, would know about future attacks and also the
activities of that terrorist organization?
Dr. Hicks. I agree that would be very important.
Senator Ayotte. To me, this is the ultimate issue as you
review the closure of GTMO. In the absence of bringing anyone
to detain them at the Guantanamo facility, if we do not have an
equivalent facility, then there is no place for us to put them.
So to me, without an answer to that, it is very troubling in
terms of how we would gather intelligence, how we would assure
their security. That is a question that I would like you to
answer when you take on this responsibility because if you are
going to be responsible for detainee policy in this country,
this is the foremost question that must be answered. I look
forward to receiving your answer on that in your new capacity
because if we cannot answer that question, I think it is a
grave problem for our country. Would you agree?
Dr. Hicks. I agree.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you so much for coming before the
committee today and look forward to working with you on this
detainee issue and answering that important question, as well
as the nuclear modernization question for the safety of our
country. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Hicks and Mr. Chollet, thank you for being here today.
You have gotten some input from members of the committee that I
hope you have found useful and I hope we will see you back here
again after you are confirmed because I assume you will be.
I will start by saying that Senator Ayotte's comments on
nuclear modernization are probably some of the more significant
ones that we have heard today because this will be, at the end
of the day, critical to our ability to maintain the peace. I
was a signatory of the letter for the reasons that she stated,
which is we are concerned about the administration's
commitment. You will both have an opportunity to have further
input on that. We do look forward to you not just reviewing
that letter, Dr. Hicks, but getting back to us as to our
concerns and hopefully providing us some degree of confidence
that the administration is moving forward with their
commitments.
I am the ranking member on this committee's Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. It deals a lot with the
threat of terrorism and particularly some of our capabilities
in that regard, and I will tell you with our challenges
globally now and with our budget pressures, I am concerned that
we do not have the authorities, we are not moving aggressively
enough showing American leadership, but working with our
allies. We cannot do it all ourselves. We need effective
partners. Senator McCain talked a little about this in the
context of Syria. Senator Inhofe talked a little about it in
terms of Africa. I would say we need to look at our national
strategies for counterterrorism and combating transnational
criminal organizations which again is a part of our
subcommittee's work, as well as looking at the recently
released DSG, building the capacity of other nations to more
effectively combat terrorists within their borders should be a
top priority.
There are some authorities focused on this, section 1206,
the global train-and-equip authority, the recently created
Global Security Contingency Fund, and then there are some
targeted authorities. I think Yemen and Somalia would be
examples of that where there is a targeted authority.
But I am concerned that they are not sufficient to
accomplish this mission in an effective and efficient way. I
would love to hear from both of you on that. Do you agree with
me? What is your assessment of the current authorities
available to you, and do you think that the Department needs
additional authority to be able to be more flexible to be able
to respond?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, let me first say that the authorities
we do have, have made a tremendous difference, and the
Department is very grateful to Congress for helping us to pass
these authorities.
We are, within the Department, currently actually reviewing
the authorities we do have for building partnership capacity
and attempting to assess if we need further authority, and if
so, what that authority ought to look like. That is an ongoing
internal process that I think would most likely result, if it
has any legislative results, in information for next year's
cycle of legislative proposals. But it is, again, a key
component of our strategy, building partnership capacity. It is
the kind of area we want to protect and invest in because we
think it has significant pay-off for us, and so we are very
serious at looking at the authorities.
Senator Portman. I am glad you are looking at it. Mr.
Chollet, I want to hear from you on it. I hope you will talk to
some of the combatant commanders about it. What they tell me is
that it is a bureaucratic maze to go through it; that it needs
to be streamlined; that there is not effective coordination or
synchronized U.S. interagency coordination and that it creates
an issue for them; they need to move quickly; and it can be far
more user-friendly.
Mr. Chollet?
Mr. Chollet. Senator, I would just concur that these
authorities are extremely important, these programs are
extremely important, particularly as we look in the Middle East
and Africa and the importance of building partnerships in those
regions. If confirmed, it is something I will look at very
closely because it will be a very important tool in the toolkit
that, if confirmed, I would have in terms of developing
relationships in those parts of the world.
Senator Portman. Let me give you a specific concern that I
would have, and that would be the Horn of Africa and Yemen and
what is happening. Some of this is information that we have
received in closed briefings. I would encourage both of you not
just to look at it, but to go into it with this notion that we
do need reform and streamlining, and this is going to be part
of our ability to be successful, not necessarily to put boots-
on-the-ground but to arm others, not just to provide diplomatic
assistance, and even going beyond training.
With regard to the plan for the future, the QDR is our
overall plan that we look to, and a lot of work went into that,
the most recent QDR, and a lot of the programs and force
structure requirements, of course, were built on the various
assumptions that were in there. After the Budget Control Act
(BCA), the new DSG was issued about 4 months after the BCA.
My question here is, is the new DSG as effective at
thinking through what our challenges are, and do we have a
force structure and do we have programs in place that actually
can work under this new DSG?
This, of course, does not even take into account the fact
that we are now facing a sequester which would make it even
more challenging, which Chairman Levin and I and others would
like to alter. I am concerned even about the operational plans
based on the new DSG.
Can you tell me what you think about that, Dr. Hicks?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I do think that the new DSG was fully
informed, if you will, in terms of its analysis and assessment,
much as a normal QDR would be. It involved all the combatant
commanders, the Service Chiefs, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs in providing their important military advice in the
process.
I do believe that the DSG positions us well for the future
both in terms of the security environment and the economic
effects of contributing to deficit reduction. At the same time,
I think it will take, as Chairman Dempsey said, several cycles
of program development to get us fully to that joint force of
2020 that we are aiming for. As in all strategies, we have made
a significant down payment in this first budget, and we will
continue to adapt the force over time to meet that strategy in
its full form.
Senator Portman. Let me talk about a specific concern that
I have with regard to capabilities and, again, programs that
you say are covered under the current plans. I would tell you
that the QDR was based on a force structure that was very
different than the new DSG, and yet we still seem to have the
same policy in place. Iran is an example. The Secretary has
said, your current boss for you, Dr. Hicks, and both of your
future bosses--that if Iran proceeds developing nuclear
weapons, we will ``take whatever steps are necessary to stop
it.''
Can we do that? I look at some of the capability
development over the past decades and then what has happened
with some of those capabilities, replacing the Marine Corps
amphibious vehicles, the Navy amphibious ship. I am talking
about the fighter bomber with regard to the Marine Corps. The
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, other
capabilities to counter anti-access/aerial denial strategies.
How were currently planned force structures informed by these
changes in our plans? Do you assess any increased risk there
based on the current proposal?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, as Secretary Panetta discussed, when he
rolled out the new DSG, we, in fact, explicitly looked at Iran
scenarios in developing the force structure that accords to the
strategy. In my current capacity, I am very familiar with
combatant commander plans for various scenarios that could
occur in and about Iran, and as the President said, all options
are on the table. We are looking very rigorously at how to
combat any such activity. I am confident, based on my exposure
to that, that at acceptable risk we can succeed in campaign
plans related to Iran.
Senator Portman. From a budget perspective, tell me how far
you think we are away from degrading those capabilities since
you say that currently we continue to have them; are we at the
edge? Are we precariously close to not having the capabilities
we need?
Dr. Hicks. Senator, I do believe that if we have further
cuts to the defense budget, we will need to relook at our
strategy and the force structure is a part of that. How we
reshape the strategy is to be determined and thus whether it
would affect those particular capabilities.
Senator Portman. My time has expired, but again, we look
forward to continuing to talk to you about these and a lot of
other issues that were raised today. Thank you for your
service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
The further cuts that you just referred to would be the
sequestration--is that correct--that Senator Portman made
reference to?
Dr. Hicks. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. I just have a couple of questions on
missile defense.
First, on the new European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
In your view--and I think I will ask this of you, Mr. Chollet,
first. Does the EPAA send a strong and unified message from
NATO to Iran about the unity of the international effort to
counter its destabilizing activities and its nuclear and
missile programs?
Mr. Chollet. I believe it does, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Now, in an advance policy question, Dr.
Hicks, on whether you would support U.S. and NATO cooperation
with Russia on missile defense, you said you supported such
cooperation because it could, ``strengthen common defenses
against Iranian missiles and send an important signal to Iran
that Russia and the United States are working together to
counter the proliferation and use of ballistic missiles''. It
is a position I very strongly support, I think you probably
know.
Would you include in that considering the possibility of
sharing radar and early warning data with Russia as one option
for cooperation with Russia on missile defense?
Dr. Hicks. I would.
Chairman Levin. Okay. We thank you. We thank your families.
We particularly want to thank Benjamin, Margaret, and
Alexander--your children--for staying with us. Your mother--I
know how important it is to her that you are here.
Is Lucas still here? He is somewhere in the building. If
you can hear me, Lucas, the same thing goes for you. I know how
important it is to your dad, as well as your mom, that you are
here to support your dad.
We look forward to your confirmation, hopefully very early
but you never know around here. We will do our best. We will
now stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I believe there is no need to modify the provisions of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. The Act was a very significant
piece of legislation that, over the course of more than 2 decades, has
led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Please see my response above.
relationships
Question. What do you see as the relationship between the Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)) and each of the
following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), as the USD(P)'s
principal assistant, the PDUSD(P) serves as a staff assistant and
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the
formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration
and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security
objectives.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The PDUSD(P) provides support to the Deputy Secretary
similar to that provided to the Secretary, as described above.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The PDUSD(P) is the principal assistant to the USD(P) and
is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all
responsibilities, fulfilling functions, managing relationships, and
exercising authorities provided for in law to the USD(P). The PDUSD(P)
advises on and supports the USD(P) with all responsibilities in
providing advice to the Secretary of Defense in interagency fora (such
as National Security Council deliberations), engagement with
international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department,
including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Nuclear Posture
Review, and annual program and budget reviews.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary for Policy works closely with the other Under Secretaries of
Defense and their deputies, including the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence, to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes
providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their
respective areas of responsibility.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the PDUSD(P) works
closely with Assistant Secretaries of Defense across the Department to
achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy
input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of
responsibility. As the USD(P)'s principal assistant, within the Office
of the Under Secretary for Policy, the PDUSD(P) provides oversight of
Assistant Secretaries on issues and at times as directed by the USD(P).
The Policy team works together to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary
with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues
under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to
ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented
properly.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a
broad range of issues, including strategy development, force planning,
and other areas in which the Military Departments are critical
stakeholders.
Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD).
Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues that
involve a legal dimension. This generally requires significant and
regular coordination on a broad range of issues.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of
Defense, the President, and the National Security Council, the Chairman
has a unique and critical military role. The Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Chairman and
Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, and to help ensure
that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner
across a broad range of issues relating to strategy, force development,
force employment, and other matters.
Question. The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant
Commands.
Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy also works
closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders to
support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of strategy
and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.
Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
Answer. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy works with
the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, in support of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy's oversight of strategy for nuclear weapons and forces, as
well as USD(P)'s role on the Nuclear Weapons Council.
duties of the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy
Question. Section 134a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy in the performance of his duties. DOD
Directive 5111.3 emphasizes that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and
the integration of DOD plans and policy with overall national security
objectives.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current
regulations and practices?
Answer. My understanding is that, as the principal assistant to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for assisting the
USD(P) in advising the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning
the formulation of national security and defense policy, and for
assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all USD(P) responsibilities
outlined in section 134(b) of title 10. This includes, but is not
limited to, strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the
integration of DOD plans and policy with overall national security
objectives.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect that my duties and functions would
include advising and assisting the Under Secretary for Policy and the
Secretary of Defense on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and
the integration of DOD plans and policy. I expect that this would
include involvement in the planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution (PPBE) system, and in major departmental reviews such as the
QDR and the Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I look forward to
speaking with the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy further about how I could best support their
efforts.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. During the past 3 years, I have been honored to serve as
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Strategy, Plans, and
Forces (SPF). In that capacity, I advise the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on matters pertaining to the
development of U.S. national security and defense strategy. I lead
Policy's efforts to provide strategic guidance and implementation
oversight to the Department's planning, programming, and budgeting
process, including the 2010 QDR. I also oversee the efforts to guide,
review, and assess military contingency plans and the plans for the
day-to-day military activities of combatant commanders; various force
development, force management, and corporate support processes; and the
integrated assessment of U.S. military posture, force structure, and
associated defense activities and capabilities.
Prior to serving as DUSD for SPF, I spent 15 years working on a
wide range of defense and national security issues, both in and out of
government. For 13 years, I was a career civil servant in OSD Policy,
beginning as a Presidential Management Intern and eventually joining
the ranks of the Senior Executive Service. During that time, I held a
broad range of responsibilities across the Policy organization, from
Deputy Director for Resources, to Director for Strategy, Director for
Strategic Planning and Program Integration, and Chief of Staff for the
Quadrennial Roles, Missions and Organizations Team. I participated in
the 1997 and 2006 QDRs and authored follow-on planning guidance to
implement the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 2001 QDR. From 2006 to 2009 I
was a Senior Fellow at a national security and international studies
think tank, where I directed research and task forces on defense
governance, capabilities-based planning for stability operations, the
future of U.S. civil affairs forces, and nontraditional security
assistance. I hold a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and a master's degree from the University of
Maryland's School of Public Affairs. I believe that my substantive
expertise and experience would allow me to serve the country well if
confirmed as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
strategy formulation and contingency planning
Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase
military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and
contingency planning. DOD Directive 5111.3 specifically assigns a major
role to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for those
important matters.
What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military
role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?
Answer. The role of civilian leadership is not only statutorily
mandated, but critical in the formulation of defense strategy and
planning. Civilian defense leadership is particularly vital in
translating broad national security policies and principles into the
strategic ends that ultimately drive military planning.
More specifically, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy (PDUSD(P)) assists the Under Secretary for Policy (USD(P))
in supporting the development of the President's National Security
Strategy, leading the development of the defense strategy, establishing
realistic objectives and guidance to form the basis for contingency
planning, and reviewing DOD plans and programs to ensure they support
strategic objectives. In addition to the provision of written guidance,
an important civilian leadership role is to review contingency plans
submitted by the combatant commanders for approval. The PDUSD(P) also
assists the USD(P) in facilitating interagency coordination on
contingency planning efforts, as necessary.
Question. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently
have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and
contingency planning?
Answer. I believe that the current level of civilian oversight of
strategy formulation and contingency planning is appropriate.
Question. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure
effective civilian control and oversight of strategy formulation and
contingency planning?
Answer. DOD should continue to fortify its capacity for strategic
thinking and strategic planning to ensure that it not only deals with
the challenges of today but is also well-prepared for those of
tomorrow.
The recently released DOD Strategic Guidance (DSG) is evidence that
the Department thinks critically about strategy formulation and its
associated resource implications. If confirmed, I will continue to work
to reinforce these competencies within OSD(Policy). If confirmed, I
would also strive to provide the best advice possible to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense in
fulfilling their responsibilities to provide written policy guidance
and to review contingency plans. Finally, I would coordinate closely
with the Joint Staff to develop further opportunities to collaborate on
planning guidance and strategic reviews, such as the QDR.
major challenges and problems
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, I look forward to playing an important role within the
Department and the interagency process in developing policy in a number
of key areas, including: defeating al Qaeda and countering the
continuing threat of violent extremism; transitioning security
responsibility in Afghanistan in a way that protects U.S. vital
interests; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), particularly in the cases of Iran and North Korea; strengthening
alliances and partnerships globally to strengthen U.S. and
international security; maintaining stability in Asia and other key
regions; advancing U.S. interests in the context of dramatic changes
that have unfolded and are unfolding in the Middle East and North
Africa; continuing to strengthen the U.S. defense posture globally, as
well as in cyberspace and outer space; and most importantly, ensuring
that the United States and its vital interests are secure from attack
(this requires continued effort in all of the above-noted areas, as
well as sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent, missile defenses, and
Homeland defense capabilities). A key challenge will be to support the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense, and
the U.S. Government in resolving these and other issues--and pursuing
opportunities--in the context of significant fiscal pressures.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would address these challenges by
undertaking the development and implementation of both DOD and
interagency strategies, policies, and plans for key regional and
functional issues. I would continue to work closely with other
components of DOD in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Secretary of Defense, our interagency partners, U.S. allies
and partners, and where appropriate, the private sector and
nongovernmental organizations. I would seek to ensure that strategies,
policies, and plans are updated as needed to reflect new challenges and
new opportunities. I would work to support the President and the
Secretary's guidance to shape a Joint Force for the future that will be
smaller and leaner, but will be flexible, agile, ready, and
technologically advanced. I would work with counterparts in other
departments and agencies and across the Department to rebalance towards
the Asia-Pacific region and place a premium on the Middle East, while
remaining the security partner of choice across the globe.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DOD pursues a
strategic and balanced approach consistent with the recently released
new DSG. I would also ensure a strong connection between strategy and
resources--supporting the Secretary in making disciplined decisions
based on our priorities--and ensure effective working relationships
with both military and civilian counterparts throughout the Department
and with other Federal departments and agencies. Top priorities would
include addressing the challenges listed in my answer to the previous
question, including defeating al Qaeda, ensuring the success and
effective transition of the mission in Afghanistan, preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon, rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific
region, and protecting the U.S. Homeland. Continuing to strengthen our
alliances and partnerships, and ensuring that the United States engages
through forward presence and is the partner of choice globally, would
also be key priorities.
department of defense strategic guidance
Question. The new DSG, ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense,'' announced by President Obama on
January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century
and the key military missions for which the DOD will prepare.
What role, if any, did you play in the preparation of the new DSG?
Answer. As the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy,
Plans, and Forces, I provided advice and assistance to the Secretary of
Defense, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
and worked closely with other civilian and military components
including the Joint Staff. More specifically, I participated actively
in the conceptualization and writing of the guidance, including the
description of the projected security environment, the key military
missions for which DOD must prepare, and prioritization of the key
capabilities associated with succeeding at those military missions.
Question. In your view, was the strategic review and decision
process comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent?
Answer. Begun under Secretary Gates and continued under the
leadership of Secretary Panetta, the Department's strategic review and
decision process were comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent. The
review developed a revised defense strategy and accompanying investment
priorities over the coming decade, including the identification of
priority missions and associated capabilities essential to safeguarding
U.S. and allied security interests in light of the range of challenges
posed by the future global environment. The conduct of the review
included routine discussion among and input from all OSD principal
staff assistants, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, the Secretaries of
the Military Departments and Service Chiefs, and the combatant
commanders.
Question. Do you agree with the defense priorities set out in that
guidance? What changes, if any, would you recommend to those defense
priorities?
Answer. I agree with the defense priorities set out in the
guidance, and would not recommend any changes at this time. As with all
strategies and guidance, I believe that it will be important to review
our approach and, if necessary, adapt it as shifts in the strategic
environment require.
Question. The new DSG includes a new emphasis on U.S. security
interests and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, the
Department is taking steps to shape U.S. Forces relative to the air and
maritime demands of the Far East and deemphasizing readiness for
prolonged or large-scale stability operations.
What is your understanding and assessment of the new DSG's shift of
emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and away from large-scale stability
operations, and the implications of this shift for shaping U.S. Force
structure?
Answer. The new DSG noted that, ``given that we cannot predict how
the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we will
maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the
aggregate, offer versatility'' across a wide range of missions. The
Department's decision not to divest from the capability to conduct any
mission reflects a recognition that the future security environment is
uncertain.
The new DSG also recognizes that the future strategic environment
will require even greater flexibility and agility in projecting power
to accomplish the Nation's security objectives. The United States has
important and enduring interests in the Asia-Pacific region. We will
maintain, and in some areas enhance, our military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region by making our posture more geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. To that end, the
fiscal year 2013 budget request protects and, in some cases, increases
investments that are critical to our ability to rebalance toward the
Asia-Pacific region, including our ability to project power. For
instance, this budget funds the development of the next-generation
bomber and new aerial refueling aircraft.
The ability of our ground forces to ensure access, reassure allies,
deter adversaries, build security capacity and interoperability with
partners, and, ultimately, respond to and succeed in crises and
contingencies remains an indispensable component of U.S. military
capabilities. U.S. Forces will retain sufficient capacity to undertake
limited counterinsurgency and stability operations, if required.
Equally important, U.S. Forces will retain and continue to refine the
lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been
developed over the past 10 years of counterinsurgency and stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recognizing the uncertainties of
the international environment, we will also ensure that we have the
ability to mobilize and regenerate forces if a larger-scale stability
operation becomes necessary in the future.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, in DOD manning,
training, force structure, and equipment would you recommend are
necessary to meet the requirements of the new DSG?
Answer. Under the new DSG, although the U.S. Armed Forces will be
smaller in number, we must ensure that they are ready, agile, flexible,
and capable forces, with a forward presence that positions them to
respond quickly in the event of threats or contingencies. Toward that
end, the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request preserves or
enhances investments in key areas of continuing urgency, such as
counterterrorism efforts and counter-WMD efforts, and areas that will
grow in prominence in coming years, such as cyber, missile defense,
Special Operations Forces (SOF), and long-range ISR and strike.
strategic reviews
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD
processes for analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting results for each
of the following strategic reviews:
The National Defense Strategy;
The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10,
U.S.C.);
The QDR (section 118 of title 10, U.S.C.);
Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10,
U.S.C.); and
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of
title 10, U.S.C.)?
Answer. Each of these efforts serves as a lever to help senior
defense officials steer the Department, ensuring that components are
moving forward with common goals and objectives and understanding of
the security context. They also provide ways to convey information
about the defense strategy and program to Congress and the American
people.
I have been involved, directly and indirectly, in many of these
reviews. With the exception of the National Military Strategy, for
which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible, the
Secretary of Defense determines the processes and decisionmaking bodies
for developing and approving the results of these strategic reviews.
Although a wide range of approaches and mechanisms have been employed
for these purposes over the years, each review is based on candid
advice from senior military and civilian leaders and informed by
relevant data and analyses. It is my assessment based on my past 3
years in the Department that the processes for analysis,
decisionmaking, and reporting on each of the above-mentioned reports
are outstanding.
The QDR examines what DOD will do to support the President's
national security strategy, which articulates the administration's
views on national security interests and sets priorities. Specifically,
title 10 provides that the QDR should be a comprehensive examination of
the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization
plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense
program and policies of the United States, with a view toward
determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States
and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. The QDR
therefore articulates the national defense strategy and the appropriate
mix of forces and capabilities to execute it. The QDR 2010 process
included broad stakeholder involvement and significant, quality
analysis that helped to inform the national defense strategy and its
link to U.S. force structure, plans, and programs. Transparency and
analytic rigor were also hallmarks of the 2012 DSG development and
decision processes.
The National Military Strategy must be reviewed biennially by the
Chairman in concert with a risk assessment and submitted to Congress
with the budget. If risk is significant, the Secretary's Risk
Mitigation Plan accompanies it; the most recent review was completed
and submitted in February 2012. The Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy played an important role in the review of the
National Military Strategy and in the development of the Secretary's
Risk Mitigation Plan.
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) focuses on key
organizational and capability aspects of how the Department can best
meet its responsibilities. Title 10 requires a comprehensive assessment
of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the core competencies
and capabilities of DOD to perform and support such roles and missions.
The development of the 2010 QDR and the 2012 DSG has significantly
influenced its assessment of military roles and missions.
The Department issues an annual Global Defense Posture Report to
Congress. DOD continually assesses U.S. defense posture in an iterative
and cooperative manner, informed by the defense strategy and supporting
operational requirements. To that end, the Department has organized a
senior executive council, composed of representatives from across the
community of interest, including OSD, the Joint Staff, the Military
Department and Service staffs, the State Department, and the combatant
commands, to formulate recommendations on global posture to the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if
any, to improve DOD's processes for analysis, policy formulation, and
decisionmaking relative to each review above?
Answer. In general, I have found that the following factors have
been associated with successful strategic reviews:
All relevant stakeholders are represented in formal
review and decisionmaking fora. These stakeholders generally
include Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, leadership of
components, and the combatant commanders.
Leadership of working groups and review groups is
assigned to organizations with the predominant expertise and
involvement in the issue areas under examination. Generally,
this entails co-chairing arrangements that involve, at a
minimum, key offices within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff.
The deliberations and findings of working groups are
transparent and are vetted with stakeholders before being
presented to top leadership.
The Secretary establishes and maintains ``hands-on''
oversight of the overall effort from start to finish.
Also critical for the success of any strategic review is the
maintenance of a vibrant, ongoing set of analytical efforts that
continually assess the ability of current, programmed, and projected
forces to accomplish key missions. If confirmed, I would recommend that
insights gained from previous reviews, along the lines of those
outlined above, be applied to upcoming reviews, including the
development of the next QDR.
afghanistan
Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
Answer. I believe that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. I
also believe that, over time, the administration should continue to
assess and adjust as necessary its implementation of the overall
strategy based on conditions on the ground. If confirmed, I am
committed to consulting with Congress, and with our allies and partners
in this regard.
Question. Do you support the President's decision to withdraw the
33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by the end of this summer?
Answer. Yes. I support a responsible, conditions-based drawdown as
called for by the President. The United States has already withdrawn
the first 10,000 surge forces, and the remaining 23,000 will be
withdrawn by the end of September. The key to success in Afghanistan is
the ability of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide
security. The surge has allowed the Afghans to develop a more
operationally capable and professional force and, in doing so, has
established conditions that will support the reduction of forces as
planned.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to our strategy in Afghanistan as a result of the drawdown of U.S.
Forces?
Answer. I believe that the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is sound,
and I do not recommend any changes at present. I believe that the
strategy for Afghanistan (and other strategies and plans) should be
regularly assessed, with coordinated adjustments made as necessary.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make on the
pace of further drawdowns in U.S. Forces in Afghanistan after the end
of this summer, when the full U.S. surge force will have been withdrawn
from Afghanistan?
Answer. It is my understanding that decisions on further drawdown
of forces beyond the recovery of the surge force have not been made.
Future decisions on the pace and scale of force drawdown should be
based on assessments of operational conditions, and the resources
needed to continue progress toward our objectives. If confirmed, any
recommendations I make will be based on future assessments of these
factors.
afghanistan transition
Question. Do you support the goal adopted at the 2010 North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Lisbon of transitioning
lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan
security forces by 2014?
Answer. Yes, I do support that very important goal.
Question. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success
of the transition to an Afghan security lead throughout Afghanistan by
2014?
Answer. Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan and Afghan capacity
in the governance and development areas remain the most challenging
aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to
govern effectively and to fill government positions at the national and
sub-national levels hinders its ability to assume leadership on these
lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of
the security transition in the effort to achieve durable stability in
Afghanistan.
afghanistan national security forces
Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing
professional and effective ANSF?
Answer. ANSF operational effectiveness is improving and the ANSF
are demonstrating increasing capability. Currently, 13 of 156 ANA
Kandaks or battalions have the highest possible rating, ``Independent
with Advisors''. However, the more critical measure is the number of
units rated at ``Effective with Advisors'' and ``Effective with
Partners,'' which are the levels necessary to support transition. Since
December 8, 2011, the percentage of ANA units rated as ``Effective with
Partners'' or higher grew from 85 percent to 91 percent. Although the
ANSF are currently not ready to operate independently of ISAF in most
areas, they are assuming an ever-increasing leadership role in
operations across Afghanistan, and are on schedule to meet the 2014
goal for transition of security responsibility to the Afghan
Government.
Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
capacity of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibility by 2014?
Answer. A first challenge is to continue to build out the full
complement of 352,000 ANSF, and to continue to improve the quality,
readiness, and performance of these forces. We need to continue ongoing
programs to expand ANSF literacy, and continue to provide financial and
advisory support to the institutional training centers and existing
Afghan training cadres that are currently building leadership and
technical capacity of both the Army and the Police. A second challenge
is for the ANSF to develop a greater capacity for critical enablers,
including logistics support; mobility (e.g., rotary wing);
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and operational
planning. Third and most broadly, the ANSF must continue building its
self-confidence through operational success in taking the lead
responsibility for securing transitioned areas and protecting the
Afghan people.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
make for addressing those challenges?
If confirmed, I would continue current efforts to simplify and
accelerate the distribution of ANSF goods and services, support the
continued provision of U.S. enabler support as a bridging strategy, and
continue the mentoring of Afghan leadership and other training and
education programs.
Question. General Allen has testified that options are under
consideration for reducing the size of the ANSF after 2014, including a
proposal to cut the ANSF by one third from 352,000 in 2012 to around
230,000 after 2014.
What do you see as the main challenges for sustaining the ANSF
through 2014 and beyond, and if confirmed, what recommendations, if
any, would you make for addressing these challenges?
Answer. A sustained and well-organized international effort to
train, advise, and assist the ANSF will be critical to their success
both before and after transition in 2014. Building ANSF enabler
capacity, as noted in my answer to a preceding question, will also be
critical. Continued improvement in the functioning of the Ministries of
Defense and Interior, including sustained progress in fighting waste
and corruption, will be essential. The United States and other
coalition partners must continue to provide the requisite fiscal and
personnel support. Maintaining the international community's support
for the ANSF through 2014 and beyond is critical to ANSF sustainability
and ensuring that the ANSF remain able to provide security for
Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy and the Secretary of Defense in their efforts to develop a
focused international engagement strategy, in conjunction with other
elements of the United States Government, leading up to the NATO Summit
in Chicago in May. The Chicago Summit will serve as a key milestone in
solidifying the international community's long-term support and
commitment to the ANSF, first established in Lisbon and reaffirmed in
Bonn, through 2014 and beyond.
Question. Do you agree that the security conditions on the ground
in Afghanistan should be a determining factor in considering any future
reductions in the size of the ANSF after 2014?
Answer. I do.
u.s.-afghanistan strategic partnership
Question. In your view, how important to the success of our
strategy in Afghanistan is the conclusion of a Strategic Partnership
Declaration between the United States and Afghanistan setting out our
bilateral relationship over the longer-term?
Answer. I assess the Strategic Partnership to be of great
importance to our long-term success in Afghanistan. A Strategic
Partnership has important benefits for our campaign in Afghanistan and
our broader relationship with Afghanistan, and it is important to note
that the Strategic Partnership encompasses U.S. actions and intentions
as well as those of the Government of Afghanistan. As a long-term,
broad strategic framework for future U.S. and Afghanistan relations,
the Strategic Partnership will send a critically important message to
the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan people, and enemies of the
Afghan state that the United States remains committed to the security
and stability of Afghanistan and the welfare of its people. Of critical
importance, it emphasizes that we will not abandon the Afghan people
while clearly signaling to al Qaeda and its affiliates that Afghanistan
will not once again become a safe haven for their use.
u.s. relationship with pakistan
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Pakistan
security relationship?
Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan is challenging but critical
to our national security and our regional interests. Over the past
year, the relationship has suffered a number of setbacks and, until
recently, our relationship has been nearly frozen. If confirmed, I look
forward to assisting the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense in
their work with Pakistan to define and develop a more constructive and
durable relationship once the Government of Pakistan informs us of its
plans to implement the recommendations for the bilateral relationship
that Pakistan's Parliament put forth.
Historically, the U.S. military-to-military relationship with
Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has seen good and bad phases.
However, we still have important shared objectives. A core U.S.
national security goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda
and its affiliates to ensure that they do not find safe havens in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to mitigate the threat to the United
States, our allies and partners, and our interests abroad. Pakistan has
suffered more than 12,000 military personnel killed or wounded and more
than 36,000 civilian causalities in recent years from terrorist
actions. The Pakistani military is operating currently against some,
but not all, militants that enable the safe havens, and we are
committed to working with Pakistan to address this persistent threat.
As President Obama has said, ``We have killed more terrorists on
Pakistani soil than anywhere else, and that could not have been done
without their cooperation.'' Pakistan also has a clear stake in Afghan
stability and will be an important participant in the process that
ultimately brings the conflict to a successful conclusion.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have
regarding the nature and extent of U.S. engagement with Pakistan going
forward on issues of counterterrorism and other security matters?
Answer. As President Obama has stated, ``We will continue the work
of devastating al Qaeda's leadership and denying them a safe haven.''
The conditions that allow the group to maintain its safe haven and
regenerate--including its ability to capitalize on relationships with
militant affiliates--can only be addressed through a sustained local
presence opposed to al Qaeda. Therefore, we will defeat al Qaeda only
through sustained cooperation with Pakistan. Greater Pakistani-U.S.
cooperation across a broad range of political, military, and economic
pursuits will be necessary to achieve the defeat of al Qaeda in
Pakistan and Afghanistan as we work to change the conditions on the
ground that give rise to safe havens.
If confirmed, I would continue to support DOD's efforts in
coordination with our interagency partners for a constructive and
mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing
shared national security objectives.
u.s. assistance to pakistan
Question. The United States has provided significant military
assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing (FMF) and
training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
(PCF) to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to
conduct counterinsurgency operations. The United States has also
provided significant reimbursements to Pakistan through the Coalition
Support Fund (CSF) for support that Pakistan has provided to U.S.
operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. Currently, both U.S. military
assistance and reimbursements to Pakistan have been largely suspended.
In your view, under what conditions, if any, should the provision
of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan under FMF and PCF be resumed?
Answer. Please see combined answer below.
Question. In your view, under what conditions, if any, should the
provision of reimbursements to Pakistan under CSF be resumed?
Answer. In my view, our current capacity-building programs with the
Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important
component in improving the Pakistan military's counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency capabilities in order for Pakistan's military to
fight extremists whose safe havens enable terrorists that threaten the
United States. Our assistance has also helped to improve cross-border
coordination. Going forward, it is vital that Pakistan live up to its
responsibilities, including to cooperate fully in counterterrorism
matters, and to expand its counterinsurgency campaign against all
extremists and militant groups that have found safe haven inside
Pakistan. In the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, the administration
asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its
continued commitment to a cooperative and mutually beneficial
relationship. Future provision of all security-related assistance will
be informed by Pakistan's response to these requests and to the overall
restart of our relationship in the wake of the November 26, 2011,
cross-border incident that resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistan Army
soldiers. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that the
support the United States provides to Pakistan yields the results we
seek.
iraq
Question. President Obama has said that the December 31, 2011,
withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Iraq marked the beginning
of a new chapter in the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
What in your view are the highest priorities for the U.S.-Iraq
security relationship going forward?
Answer. Developing a long-term security relationship with Iraq, as
part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security,
is one of our highest priorities. This relationship should include
consultation on regional security issues, and the continued development
of appropriate Iraqi military capabilities.
Question. What, in your view, are the greatest opportunities for
U.S.-Iraq security cooperation going forward, and, if confirmed, how
would you recommend that DOD pursue those opportunities?
Answer. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), under
Chief of Mission authority, is the cornerstone of the long-term U.S.-
Iraqi strategic security partnership. It will serve as the main vehicle
to expand our security cooperation relationship with the Iraqis. On a
daily basis, the OSC-I coordinates security assistance and security
cooperation activities, and conducts training to support the
development and modernization of the Iraq Security Forces.
The Defense and Security Joint Coordination Committee (DSJCC),
established under the Strategic Framework Agreement, is another vehicle
to strengthen bilateral relations, including security cooperation. The
DSJCC, the next meeting of which will take place in late May, will be
co-chaired by the acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the
acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control.
If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy in advancing both of these important vehicles for expanding our
security cooperation.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges facing the
Department with regard to our security relationship with Iraq and, if
confirmed, how would you recommend meeting those challenges?
Answer. Ensuring Iraq's integration into the regional security
framework will remain an important task. The Department will need to
continue strengthening its security relationship with Iraq through
security cooperation activities, while helping to expand Iraq's
military engagement with key regional partners.
If confirmed, I will support the DSJCC and will seek to bolster the
U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on a wide array of security matters.
transatlantic relationship and nato
Question. In your view, how important to U.S. national security
interests is the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our European
partners?
Answer. NATO remains of vital importance, and is a net provider of
global security. As President Obama has said, Europe remains the
cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and NATO is the most
capable alliance in history.
The transatlantic relationship is of critical importance to U.S.
national security, and the transatlantic community has never been more
closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous,
and fast-changing world. In Libya, NATO allies came together with Arab
and other partners to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and to
support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 allied
and partner forces alongside our own, we have built and sustained
NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. As Iran has continued to defy
its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions, the United
States, Europe, and other partners have put in place the toughest
sanctions yet.
Question. In your view, what is the role of the NATO alliance in
meeting U.S. security interests?
Answer. The United States has important stakes in a strong,
mutually supportive NATO alliance, and the President has stressed his
strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships
to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO's new Strategic Concept
is an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its
unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its
members, including in meeting U.S. security interests, and it will
guide the next phase in NATO's evolution.
Question. What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that
you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?
Answer. Over the next 5 years, the top NATO-related challenges
include achieving durable progress and a successful transition in
Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the
deterioration in European military capability. Many of our NATO allies
have been under-investing in defense capabilities, especially when it
comes to deployable expeditionary forces. Many have significantly
reduced their national defense budgets in response to the global
economic crisis, and some are planning further cuts. A key challenge--
and a key opportunity--will be for allies to determine which
capabilities must be sustained, and how that can be done in a more
cost-effective manner.
Question. Should NATO consider an expanded role for Israel within
the organization?
Answer. Israel is an active and valued partner of NATO through the
alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue program, which includes practical
cooperation as well as political dialogue, both bilaterally with NATO
and multilaterally including the other six Partners in the
Mediterranean Dialogue. The United States supports and encourages this
partnership, and encourages other allies and partners to do so as well.
The Mediterranean Dialogue includes an ``Individual Cooperation
Program,'' developed between NATO and Israel, which outlines Israeli
desires for engagement with NATO.
building partner capacity
Question. In the past few years, the Defense Department has
requested and Congress has approved a number of temporary authorities
to build the capacity of partner nations or provide security
assistance. These include the section 1206 global train-and-equip
authority, targeted authorities to build capacity in Yemen and East
Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund.
In your view, what are the strategic objectives and priorities for
the Department's programs for building the capacity of partner nations?
Answer. In my view, the primary strategic objective of the United
States in building the capacity of foreign partners is to help them
develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide
for their countries' internal security and contribute to regional and
multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn,
mitigates the burden on U.S. Forces responding to security threats
outside the United States, and serves to build a base of countries that
can effectively participate in multinational coalition-based
operations.
Successfully countering violent extremist networks requires that we
develop and sustain a global network of allies and partners that is
capable and interoperable. Additionally, once partners become capable
and have sufficient capacity, they are able to help bolster regional
security in a way that supports U.S. interests. In some cases,
participation by these partner nations' forces provide cultural and
linguistic advantages that afford them better access and effectiveness
than U.S. Forces executing the same mission. For example, today
Colombia provides justice sector and security force assistance to other
U.S. partner nations in the Americas and Africa.
Finally, efforts to build partner capacity promote interoperability
between U.S, and other nations' forces, and enable the U.S. Military to
establish personal connections and long-term relationships with foreign
counterparts. We can never be certain where in the world U.S. Forces
may be required to operate. Enduring relationships with partner nations
are at the core of a multinational coalition's strength, helping to
secure shared access to facilities and territory, information, and
diplomatic support.
Question. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if
confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of the
Department's programs for building partner capacity to ensure that
these programs are executed consistent with U.S. national security
goals and objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support DOD capabilities
and investments that encourage and enable partners to develop capable
security forces and institutionalize the Department's capacity to
provide high impact security force assistance. I would provide
recommendations to the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense that
enable them to make informed choices with regard to the location and
frequency of DOD activities that build partners' security capacity. It
is essential in this era of shifting focus and constrained resources
that we carefully prioritize which partners we engage with, how often,
and to what end.
Also if confirmed, I would continue to assist the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy in implementing process improvements in the
delivery of defense articles and services for urgent and emerging
needs.
Question. What is your assessment of the implementation and
effectiveness of the Department's programs for building partner
capacity in achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives?
Answer. In general, the Department's capacity-building programs are
useful tools that contribute significantly to the achievement of our
national security goals and objectives. These programs are most
effective when they are closely aligned with the Department of State's
foreign policy objectives while addressing critical needs as identified
by our foreign partners. This is best demonstrated by several examples.
First, our security force assistance programs with the Philippines
military over the last several years have enabled those forces to
conduct effective domestic counterterrorism operations and to
contribute to regional maritime security. Specifically, we have
improved their surveillance, tracking, and interception capabilities,
and provided tactical equipment that has been used in numerous
operations against extremist organizations in the Southern Philippines.
Importantly, the provision of radars has been a catalyst for Philippine
interest in acquiring secure communications methods, which will enable
information sharing with U.S. Pacific Command on radar and intelligence
operations. The Government of the Philippines recognizes the importance
of these investments and is now sustaining its newly acquired
capabilities through national funds and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF)/Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.
Colombia is another good example of where more than a decade of
security force assistance has enabled a partner to combat internal
destabilizing elements effectively--in that case, the FARC. In
particular, we have provided support to aviation training, intelligence
and operational fusion, operational planning, riverine operations,
logistics, command and control, security, and medical training. Now, we
are encouraged to see that Colombia is in turn providing justice sector
and security force assistance of their own to other U.S. partner
nations across the Americas and in Africa.
Finally, Georgia is an example of how our coalition support
authorities have enabled a relatively small partner nation to serve in
Afghanistan, not only deploying there with battalion-sized combat units
that operate without caveats, but punching well above their weight
class while doing so. The provision of high-mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicles, night vision goggles, communications equipment, and
training has enabled Georgian forces to make a significant contribution
to coalition operations, in turn lessening the burden on U.S. Forces
deployed to Afghanistan.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis
the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies, in
efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?
Answer. The United States will be more successful at deterring and
responding to security challenges when allies and partner security
forces act in a way that is complementary to U.S. goals and objectives.
Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our continuing efforts to
counter violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal
organizations, and our preparations for future contingencies clearly
illustrate the need for capable partners who can apply capabilities
complementary to U.S. military objectives. In that vein, I believe that
DOD should sustain and grow the capability to develop partner security
forces, especially forces to train, advise, and assist partners during
conflict.
Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared
responsibility within the executive branch, particularly by the
Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the
Departments is a key characteristic of the Section 1206 authority, and
one of its greatest strengths. The Global Security Contingency Fund
epitomizes this shared responsibility, and represents an opportunity
for the State Department and DOD to plan for contingencies jointly, and
to establish a new business model for interagency planning of security
sector assistance.
russia
Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Russian
security relationship?
Answer. In September 2010, then-Secretary Gates and Russian
Minister of Defense Serdyukov advanced the U.S.-Russia defense
relationship by establishing the Defense Relations Working Group
(DRWG). Through its eight subworking groups, the Department engages
with the Russian Ministry of Defense across a spectrum of cooperative
defense activities--missile defense, defense technology, social
welfare, training and education, as well as regional and global
security, and defense policy. These efforts have helped each country
gain important insights into one another's defense establishments.
Reciprocity is a key element of this engagement. The defense
relationship and military-to-military activities are focused in part on
helping Russia's efforts to reform its Armed Forces, and a reformed
Russian military is a positive goal worth pursuing. These efforts are
not enhancing the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) cooperation continues to be a
steady component of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Although the
international agreement that governs CTR cooperation with Russia (i.e.,
the CTR Umbrella Agreement) is due to expire in June 2013, the
administration looks forward to an extension of this agreement and a
continuation of its work with Russia.
Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-
Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of
common interest between the United States and Russia in the security
sphere?
Answer. The United States and Russia should be able to cooperate
effectively in the many areas where we share common interests;
communicate effectively in areas where we have competing interests; and
negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests.
Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia
have common interests is in countering the proliferation of WMD,
particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant cooperation on--
for example--Iran. The Russians cancelled a major weapons sale worth
several hundred million dollars to Iran in 2010 and supported UNSCR
1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile
and nuclear programs. I believe that the United States should continue
to seek Russian support to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear
weapons. Similarly, Russia is a key player in reversing North Korea's
nuclear and missile programs, and shares common interests in this
regard. As a third example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
continues to be one of the most successful cooperative programs in the
U.S.-Russia relationship. Finally, the United States and Russia share
strong interests in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as
reflected in the New START treaty.
Russia also has an interest in stability in Afghanistan. U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan have benefited greatly from improved security
relations with Russia. The Northern Distribution Network has been
critical to continued operations given the closure of our Pakistan
ground lines of communication. Russia allows our military personnel,
supplies, and equipment to transit its territory by air and rail and
will soon allow for reverse transit from Afghanistan. Russia has also
been forward-leaning in identifying possible areas of cooperation on
counternarcotics, and we have been engaging Russia to develop these
ideas.
Question. What are the greatest challenges in the U.S.-Russian
security relationship?
Answer. The United States has developed a constructive relationship
with Russia over the past several years. Despite mutual cooperation,
challenges remain and progress has been uneven in some areas. Georgia,
conventional arms control in Europe, and missile defense are some of
the more challenging issues in our bilateral security relationship.
In the case of Georgia, the United States is holding Russia to the
letter of the Medvedev-Sarkozy Agreement, urging it to restore
international monitors to the occupied territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The Department would like to see more transparency on
Russian military activity in the region. Together with our European
partners, we will maintain our support for Georgia's territorial
integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders
and will continue to support international efforts to find a peaceful
resolution to the dispute over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
We would like to see more progress on conventional arms control in
Europe and Russia's full implementation of its existing commitments.
The United States is committed to revitalizing the conventional arms
control regime in Europe and continues to consult on a way forward with
Russia and our other treaty partners.
Finally, differences remain on missile defense. As President Obama
has stated, the United States is committed to finding the right
approach to enable missile defense cooperation with Russia. A U.S.-
Russia agreement to cooperate on missile defense would remove a major
irritant from the relationship. We continue to believe that cooperation
with Russia on missile defense can enhance the security of the United
States, our allies in Europe, and Russia. If confirmed, I will assist
the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in working with
Russia to define the parameters of possible cooperation.
Question. In your view, what policy steps should DOD take to
improve security relations with Russia? For instance, would you support
increased military-to-military relations and exchanges with Russia?
Answer. DOD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the reset
with Russia. The OSD-MOD Defense Relations Working Group and the Joint
Staff-General Staff Military Cooperation Working Group revived U.S.-
Russia defense and military relations from the low-point after the
Russo-Georgia War.
As a result, DOD has a robust military-to-military work plan and is
constantly looking for ways to improve the relationship and contribute
to greater security in the Euro-Atlantic space. The 2012 Military
Cooperation Work Plan includes more than 100 events and comprises a
variety of activities such as cadet exchanges, exercises, senior leader
visits, and conferences. Over time, cooperation on a wide range of
issues may help to build a foundation for more concrete and substantive
cooperation with Russia.
One way to improve cooperation would be a U.S.-Russia agreement to
cooperate on missile defense. Such an agreement would remove a major
irritant from the relationship, send a strong signal to Iran that
development of long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons would
be a waste of resources, add to the effectiveness of our missile
defense system, and could help recast perceptions U.S.-Russia relations
on both sides.
Question. Would you support any joint development or other programs
with Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be interested in supporting joint
programs that would benefit the United States. Through the Defense
Technology Cooperation Subworking Group under the Defense Relations
Working Group, DOD has been looking for such opportunities. Before
undertaking any joint programs, the United States and Russia would need
to conclude a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement, which has been
in negotiation for some time.
iran
Question. The President said: ``America is determined to prevent
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no option off the
table to achieve that goal.''
Do you agree that we should leave all options on the table with
respect to Iran? If so, why? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the President that all options should
remain on the table to address Iran's illicit activities. It is DOD's
responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent
military planning we continue to refine options to protect U.S. and
partner interests from Iranian aggression. However, we continue to
believe that diplomacy and economic pressure are the most effective
tools for changing Iranian behavior at this time.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD for
advancing the President's policy with respect to Iran?
Answer. DOD plays a supporting role in the whole-of-government
strategy of engagement and pressure toward Iran, which is led by the
Departments of State and Treasury. In addition to DOD's support of
interagency efforts, it is the responsibility of DOD to plan for all
contingencies, and to provide the President with a wide range of
military options should they become necessary.
china
Question. China's defense spending has had double-digit increases
annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of
military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind
of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the
types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been
interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of
movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at
increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric
and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's
intentions in the region.
How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with
China?
Answer. The senior-most leaders of our two countries have
consistently affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and
comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I would describe the
relationship as simultaneously possessing elements of cooperation and
competition. The United States, including DOD, continues to pursue
opportunities to cooperate where there is a mutual benefit, while
pursuing frank discussions in areas where we may have differences.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady
increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization
program?
Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, and
also to counter intervention by third parties. Its near-term focus
appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving
Taiwan, and deterring or denying effective intervention in a cross-
Strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access/area
denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and
resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate
periphery. China's growing focus on military missions other than war
includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and
counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear
deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through the
modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other strategic
capabilities, such as in space, counter-space, and computer network
operations.
Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese
military growth and modernization?
Answer. I believe the United States should continue to monitor
developments in China's military concepts and capabilities, while
encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and
security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the
pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve
the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The U.S.
response to China's military modernization should be flexible and
supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the
Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access,
the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering
anti-access/area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and
partnerships.
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-
China military-to-military relations?
Answer. As Secretary of Defense Panetta and China's Vice President
Xi affirmed in February, a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-
military relationship is an essential part of President Obama's and
President Hu's shared vision for building a cooperative partnership.
I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China
as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security
of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive
role in the region to discuss the peacetime interaction of our
respective military forces so as to minimize the risk of accidents, and
to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian allies
and partners in addressing common security challenges.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any
changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with
China? If so, what changes and why?
Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be
valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open
and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen
and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to
encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.
Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its
claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air, and
space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in
particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its
excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.
What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime
disputes in the South China Sea?
Answer. The United States is a Pacific nation with a national
interest in freedom of navigation and overflight, open access to Asia's
maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open
commerce, and respect for international law, including in the South
China Sea.
In my view, the United States should not take a position on the
competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea;
all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in
accordance with international law, without resorting to the threat or
use of force.
The United States should continue to call upon all parties to
clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with
international law. Accordingly, claims to maritime space in the South
China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land
features.
Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China
Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an
increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or
destabilize the situation?
Answer. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence
that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the
South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to
maintain its presence and assert our freedom of navigation and
overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary
international law.
Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend
largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military
forces conduct operations to challenge excessive maritime claims
asserted by coastal states. In the South China Sea, we have expressed
our desire for respect for freedom of navigation and overflight for
many decades, through operational assertions against excessive maritime
claims asserted by several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive
maritime claims asserted by any nation, including excessive claims by
allies and partners.
Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and
military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially
substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively
pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take
advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential
conflict situation.
If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is
protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with other parts of DOD and the
U.S. Government, including the Departments of State, Homeland Security,
and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats,
not only from China, but from others as well. We must work together as
governments not only to defend, but also to develop options to respond
to and impose costs on cyber threat actors so as to deter future
exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International
Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States reserves the right to
use all necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic--as appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law--in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our
interests against hostile acts on cyberspace. In my view, we should
continue to prepare to do so as necessary, while continuing to
strengthen international norms of behavior regarding this essential
area.
north korea
Question. Even with the recent death of long-time leader Kim Jong-
il, North Korea remains one of the greatest near-term challenges to
security and stability in Asia, and deterring conflict on the Korean
Peninsula remains a top priority. On April 12, 2012, North Korea
launched what it said was satellite launch vehicle, despite broad
international condemnation and in contravention of U.N. Security
Council resolutions 1718 and 1874.
Despite the failure of the April 12th launch, what do you see as
the implications for regional security and stability of North Korea's
continued refusal to curb its provocative behavior?
Answer. North Korea's April 12 missile test will not be its last.
Not only the United States, but every country in the region recognizes
that such actions, in contravention of U.N. Security Council
resolutions 1718 and 1874, pose a threat to regional stability. If
confirmed, I will assist the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy in working closely with our allies and partners to
strengthen security cooperation and ensure optimal readiness against
North Korea's unpredictable and reckless behavior.
Question. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the
United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and
serious threat to our regional allies and partners, and have the
potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. As we witnessed
in 2006 and 2009, North Korea continues to flight-test theater
ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability to target South Korea
and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-
2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space launch
configuration, but which could also reach the United States if
developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's
WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation
activities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DOD continues to
work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these
and other emerging threats, to reduce our vulnerabilities and those of
our allies and partners, and to work cooperatively with our allies to
ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
Question. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if
confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?
Answer. North Korea maintains a large, forward deployed
conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic
missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons, and engages in the
proliferation of ballistic missiles contrary to international norms and
U.N. Security Council resolutions. North Korea has also conducted
provocative attacks against the Republic of Korea. What concerns me
most is that this range of threats comes from a single state standing
on the outside of the international community. If confirmed, I will
ensure that we sustain and advance our military readiness and
coordination with allies and partners, and explore all avenues for
shaping North Korean behavior.
republic of korea
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the
U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
Answer. In my view, the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance
remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific
region and is as strong and viable today as it has ever been. Our
security relationship is based on a mutual commitment to common
interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning,
all of which ensure a comprehensive strategic alliance.
Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of
wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now
planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this
transition takes place as planned?
Answer. The United States and the ROK have a comprehensive way
forward to transition wartime operational control from the ROK-U.S.
Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by December
2015. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary of Defense and Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy in working with ROK counterparts, and
with others in the U.S. and ROK Governments, to complete this process
under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework and ensure that the
combined defense posture remains strong and seamless throughout the
transition process.
Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the
force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the
Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. Forces change
the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?
Answer. The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. Forces
from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations
south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The
movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River
provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political
sustainability of our forward presence, and improves force protection
and survivability by placing the majority of personnel and equipment
outside of the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery.
Question. Since the North Korean attacks last year--the sinking of
the South Korea Navy ship Cheonan and the artillery attack on the South
Korean island--South Korea has been adamant that it will responded
firmly to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent U.S.-
ROK Security Consultative Meetings was the Joint Operational Plan for
responding to future North Korean provocations.
What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of
an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances
do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage
North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?
Answer. My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty,
when the political independence or security of the ROK or the United
States is threatened by external armed attack, the United States and
the ROK will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter
the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean
provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that
responses are effective.
japan
Question. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security
relationship?
Answer. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security
in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and
prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the
turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and at
times contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised as a truly
global alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a
complicated realignment process that is part of a larger alliance
transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions,
and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability,
and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. In terms
of our military-to-military relationship, the shared experience of U.S.
and Japanese forces, working shoulder-to-shoulder in response to the
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis of last spring, validated our
continuing close cooperation and mutual respect.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to
become a more active partner in security activities with the United
States and in the international security arena?
Answer. Japan is already a close ally and strong security partner
with the United States, and is increasingly contributing to
international security activities; however, the changing security
environment in Asia will present new challenges. The United States
needs to continue to work with Japan to deal with these challenges,
including greater interoperability between our Armed Forces at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would
encourage Japan's development of joint doctrine and organizations that
will enhance Japan's ability to undertake complex missions to build
security in East Asia. I would also encourage trilateral security
cooperation with the United States, Japan, and both the ROK and
Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the
functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture.
Regarding international security activity, Japan has actively
participated in combined counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden,
is participating in the U.N. Mission in South Sudan, and has been a
significant donor to ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction. I believe
participation in such international security operations are very
positive developments, and would encourage future Japanese
participation in such missions.
Question. The United States and Japan have decided to revisit some
of the terms of the 2006 Roadmap Agreement as they relate to the
realignment of U.S. marines on Okinawa and to delink the movement of
marines off Okinawa from the plan to build a Futenma Replacement
Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab. It appears that, while the number of
marines leaving Okinawa will not change, fewer will be relocated to
Guam.
What is your understanding of the current plans for U.S. military
forces on Okinawa and Guam?
Answer. Plans for U.S. military forces on Okinawa and Guam should
result in a force posture that is geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A significant
number of U.S. Marine Corps forces will move from Okinawa to Guam,
which is a strategic hub that supports our ability to operate forces
from a forward location. At the same time, we will maintain forces in
Okinawa to provide deterrence and rapidly respond to security
challenges in areas around Japan.
Although planned posture shifts will result in a rebalancing of our
forces, they will not negatively affect our ability to respond to
contingencies or meet treaty obligations in Asia. They demonstrate our
commitment to allies and to fulfilling our agreements with allies and
partners.
Question. How does delinking the movement of marines off Okinawa
from the construction of the FRF impact the realignment of marines in
Northeast Asia?
Answer. Delinking the movement of U.S. marines off Okinawa will
allow the United States to move forward with the realignment of the
Marine Corps in Northeast Asia, which is in our strategic interests as
we seek to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, de-
linkage will allow the United States to establish a force posture that
is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically
sustainable.
The United States and Japan remain committed to constructing the
FRF as the only viable alternative to Marine Corps Air Station Futenma,
and are working together in taking the next step prior to the start of
construction: securing the Governor's approval for the landfill permit.
Question. What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful
construction of the FRF at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?
Answer. I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S.
Government, remains committed to the principles of the 2006 Realignment
Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the FRF
will not be constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears
to be incremental but positive movement towards the construction of a
replacement facility at Camp Schwab. The GOJ submission of the
environmental impact statement to the prefectural Government of Okinawa
in December 2011 was a necessary and politically significant step
forward. The U.S. Government is committed to working with the GOJ in
taking the next step prior to the start of construction--securing the
Governor's approval for the landfill permit.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander,
Pacific Command, and the Military Services to update U.S. military
force posture in Japan and the Pacific theater?
Answer. If confirmed, I would engage frequently and proactively
with the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Military Departments,
as well as the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
to update U.S. force posture in Japan and the Pacific. I firmly believe
that maintaining a strong and comprehensive relationship with my
military counterparts is essential to creating a force posture that
makes sense both strategically and operationally.
india
Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-India
security relations?
Answer. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing,
including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense
trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. The strong ties
between our two militaries reflect this. Over the past decade, there
has been a rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship.
What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has
evolved into a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent
security powers in Asia.
A close, continuing, and expanding security relationship between
the United States and India will be important for security and
stability in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in
the 21st century. Having said this, India has a long history of non-
alignment and is firmly committed to its policy of strategic autonomy.
The continued growth of our partnership should be focused on working
closely on common interests in a true partnership.
Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this
relationship should focus on increasing maritime security cooperation,
expanding the military-to-military relationship, and deepening
cooperation on defense trade, including cooperative research and
development. There is potential for increased cooperation on
counterproliferation, collaboration on humanitarian assistance and
disaster response, countering piracy, cooperation on counterterrorism,
greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards
stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.
Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship
between India and Pakistan?
Answer. India and Pakistan have a long and complex history
characterized by animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Support by elements
of Pakistan's military and intelligence services for violent extremist
organizations targeting India has the potential to result in military
confrontation that could rapidly escalate to a nuclear exchange.
Current efforts toward a renewed comprehensive dialogue have
yielded few concrete results on the core security issues, especially
regarding the resolution of territorial disputes; however, the efforts
have increased people-to-people exchanges and trade relations between
the two nations, and have provided each side greater insight into the
other's positions. Although progress is slow, the trajectory is
positive and offers the promise of increased confidence-building
measures.
Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between
Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia
generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?
Answer. India's actions in South and Central Asia generally align
with U.S. goals: increasing economic growth and political stability
through strengthened democratic institutions, and developmental
assistance to help prevent radicalization. Regional stability
ultimately depends on cooperation among India, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan. Transparency in the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-
Afghanistan bilateral relationships is critical to reduce
misunderstanding and mistrust between India and Pakistan. The ongoing
transition of lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan
forces, and the strategic partnerships Afghanistan has been negotiating
with the United States and other international partners are important
steps toward demonstrating long-term commitment of the international
community, addressing conditions that create uncertainty, and
stabilizing the region.
Question. What effect, if any, do you anticipate that India's
successful test launch of the Agni V rocket on April 19, 2012, will
have on India-U.S. relations?
Answer. India's successful test launch of the Agni V rocket
demonstrates that India is increasingly capable of developing its
indigenous weapons systems and has a role to play in international
nonproliferation forums. India has a strong track record on
nonproliferation issues, both of missile and WMD technology. We
continue to urge all nuclear-capable states to exercise restraint
regarding nuclear and missile capabilities, and continue to discourage
actions that might destabilize the South Asia region.
republic of the philippines
Question. What is the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-
military relations, including efforts to increase the number of
rotational U.S. Forces operating from the Philippines?
Answer. The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty
allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing
regional challenges characteristic of current geo-strategic realities.
In my view, the alliance is strong and is the foundation of our
security partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the
Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security
forces (military, coast guard, and police) to address security needs
more effectively as evidenced by enhanced counterterrorism performance,
expanded maritime security activities, increased multilateral
engagement, and effective participation in U.N. peacekeeping
operations.
Question. What is your assessment of recent U.S. military efforts
in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being
provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent
groups?
Answer. U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines are
in support of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to which both
sides are committed. The United States, however, does not assist the
Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups (e.g., the New
People's Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front). The Philippines
was the first country in Asia to support the United States after
September 11 in fighting terrorism. In this regard, U.S. military
assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by
assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than
those needed to help and protect its civilian population. It is the
Philippine Government's prerogative to assert its capabilities and
resources where needed in conducting its internal security operations.
Question. Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U.S. military
footprint or change in mission for U.S. military forces in the
Philippines in the near- to mid-term?
Answer. The United States and the Philippines are discussing
arrangements that would allow greater flexibility for U.S. and
Philippine security forces to train and work together. This may
increase U.S. military engagement with the Philippines in the near- to
mid-term.
indonesia
Question. What is the current state of military-to-military
relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?
Answer. In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the
U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad
partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with
Indonesia--a pivotal country to U.S. national interests--is managed
through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through
several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with
Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with nearly
200 theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal
year. These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of
activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief; Peacekeeping Operations; Maritime Security;
and continued Professionalization/Reform of the Indonesian Defense
Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of the military-to-
military relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and
evolved from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex
bilateral and multilateral activities.
In addressing the current state of military-to-military relations
with the Indonesian Army Special Forces (Kopassus), it is worth noting
that this unit has undergone a near-complete transformation over the
past decade and is at the forefront of TNI professionalization and
adherence to human rights standards. Following a 12-year hiatus in
bilateral activities, at the direction of then-Secretary Gates, U.S.
Pacific Command established a measured and gradual program of security
cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security cooperation
activities have consisted of key leader engagements and small-scale
subject matter expert exchanges in areas such as military
decisionmaking, medical planning, law of war, and safeguarding human
rights. I anticipate that these types of activities will continue and
gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress
in TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform
efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders
to DOD in 2010 to continue to safeguard human rights and accountability
throughout the Indonesian military through the unequivocal
investigation and prosecution of those military personnel accused of
human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from military
service.
Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-
military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-
military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership,
guided by close consultation between the Departments of State and
Defense, and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I
believe close military-to-military relations with Indonesia are
integral to achieving numerous stated U.S. national interests in the
region. I also believe that one of the most effective methods for
encouraging reform is through interaction between Indonesian and U.S.
servicemembers. Interactions with U.S. servicemembers reinforce
professional military practices, including respect for human rights and
the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater
understanding and reinforce professional values.
global force posture
Question. As the Defense Department continues its assessment of
projected budget cuts on its end strength, force structure, and other
programs, it must also consider the costs, benefits, and risks
associated with the permanent stationing of military forces in
countries around the world. Based on a series of reports by the
Government Accountability Office, evidence indicates that the
Department is challenged in its ability to comprehensively and reliably
estimate the cost of our global defense posture.
What is your understanding and assessment of the cost and benefits
of the U.S. global defense posture and the stationing of U.S. military
forces overseas?
Answer. There is high value in U.S. military presence overseas. The
United States maintains a posture overseas in order to defend the U.S.
Homeland and U.S. interests--which are global in nature--as well as to
deter aggression, ensure regional stability, demonstrate commitment to
the security of allies and partners, and facilitate working alongside
allies and partners to address security challenges. There is a clear
value in deterrence, assurance, and rapid crisis response, though these
benefits are often difficult to quantify precisely.
Sustaining U.S. military presence using forces stationed in the
United States incurs rotational costs on top of the basic basing and
facilities costs associated with every unit, regardless of where it is
stationed. Conversely, sustaining this presence using forces stationed
overseas often incurs higher basing, personnel (through allowances such
as Cost of Living Allowance and Overseas Housing Allowance), and
facilities costs. The Department employs a continuous review process to
determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-
stationed forces, taking account of the conditions in each region and
the operational demands on U.S. Forces.
Question. In light of the force structure reductions associated
with the Department's planned end strength cuts, and potentially even
deeper future end strength cuts, if confirmed, how would you propose to
allocate those reductions between forces based within the United States
and forces stationed outside of the United States?
Answer. Our plans for global force presence are directly linked to
our Defense Strategic Guidance. The Department employs a continuous
review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based
and overseas-stationed forces, taking account of the conditions in each
region and the operational demands on U.S. Forces. If deeper end
strength reductions are required by Congress, our current defense
strategy, and our associated global posture, will need to be reviewed.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD
methodology and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of
overseas posture compared to stationing forces in the United States?
Answer. The Department employs a continuous review process to
determine whether our strategic and national interests are best served
by U.S.-based or overseas-stationed forces. Considerations include:
operational requirements articulated by the geographic and functional
combatant commanders, consistent with current strategy and assigned
missions; the political-military dynamics and the risks and
implications of change; force management and force structure
efficiencies and effects; issues relating to the executability of
stationing; and costs, including the offsets provided by some host-
nation governments. The Department believes there is a high value
provided by maintaining forces forward; further, stationing forces
forward can yield significant efficiencies in force structure and force
management.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take or changes
would you recommend, if any, to DOD's methodology and assumptions in
determining the cost of overseas force posture compared to forces
stationed in the United States?
Answer. Working with Congress and the Government Accountability
Office over the past several years, the Department has improved its
global defense posture management process, which is now on a strong,
positive trajectory. In particular, the Department has made significant
improvements to the theater posture planning and decision-making
process, including enhanced cost reporting and improved consideration
of costs. If confirmed, I would endeavor to keep DOD on this positive
trajectory and ensure continuation of improved cost accountability in
our overseas posture decisionmaking.
combatting terrorism
Question. The administration recently released its National
Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups
``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
Asia.''
If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to
combating terrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be the Deputy Principal Staff
Assistant and Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters
concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy,
including counterterrorism policy. My role, if confirmed, would be to
formulate, coordinate, and present the views of the Secretary on
counterterrorism policy issues. Currently these are mainly oriented on
the effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, which includes
operations and activities against its allies, adherents, and
affiliates, but we also recognize that there are other terrorist groups
that may seek to cause harm to the United States, its interests, and
allies.
I would work closely in performance of these duties with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, the DOD General Counsel, the Joint Staff, and the
regional and functional Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, particularly the Assistant
Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, who has
the Department lead for all special operations and low-intensity
conflict matters. I would carefully consider the views of our
interagency colleagues and international partners to consider whole-of-
government solutions to counterterrorism problems.
On September 22, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched
the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with 30 founding members from
around the world. The GCTF is a major initiative within the Obama
administration's broader effort to build the international architecture
for dealing with terrorism. The primary focus of the GCTF is capacity
building in relevant areas and aims to increase the number of countries
capable of dealing with the terrorist threats within their borders and
regions.
Question. What is your understanding of this initiative?
Answer. The GCTF is a multilateral platform that will provide a
venue for countries to meet and identify counterterrorism needs and
mobilize the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs
and enhance global cooperation. The GCTF is intended to complement
ongoing efforts with the U.N., as well as other regional and sub-
regional bodies. I understand that the September launch of the GCTF was
positively received by all of the countries involved.
Question. Given the emphasis on building partner capacity, what is
your understanding for the role of DOD--and in particular Special
Operations Forces--in this initiative?
Answer. Special Operations Forces will continue to have a leading
role in our operations and activities to defeat al Qaeda. The
Department is prepared to sustain a significant number of deployed SOF
around the world, working closely with allies and partners to develop
the capabilities and capacities they need to rid their territories of
terrorists and prevent their resurgence. The Department sees this as
predominantly an advise-and-assist mission, but the United States
should always reserve the right to take direct action in order to
defend itself from a terrorist attack.
The defeat of al Qaeda cannot be achieved without bringing together
the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government--
intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments of
national power--in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If confirmed,
I would seek strong relationships with DOD's interagency partners--in
particular, the National Counterterrorism Center, the State
Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications--to maximize DOD's
efforts to counter violent extremism. The GCTF, as a State Department-
led effort, is one example where SOF's counterterrorism and security
cooperation activities can support and inform interagency partners'
efforts in counterterrorism.
department of defense counternarcotics activities
Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support U.S. CN operations, build
the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and
analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.
What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?
Answer. Drug trafficking and associated transnational organized
crime (TOC) pose multidimensional challenges to U.S. and international
security interests. In addition to the impact on our Nation's public
health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of TOC provide a
funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate
governments, and contribute to international instability.
DOD counternarcotics efforts support global DOD national security
objectives by building partner nation capacity and working with U.S.
law enforcement agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs
and Border Protection, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement to disrupt narcotics trafficking. These cost-
effective, small-footprint efforts are consistent with the Department's
January 2012 strategic guidance.
Terrorist groups and insurgent movements are increasingly turning
to criminality--including narcotics and other illicit trafficking--to
perpetuate and expand their activities. This is certainly the case in
Colombia and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the insurgency uses the
narcotics trade as a critical source of revenue, and therefore, DOD
focuses its efforts on degrading narco-insurgent networks through
sustained counternarcotics operations and building the capacity of
Afghan counternarcotics forces and judicial system. If confirmed, I
would continue to work with interagency partners to provide support to
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan to mitigate or eliminate the
narcotics threat, which endangers our objectives and undermines the
viability of the Government of Afghanistan.
There is some evidence of criminal organizations, such as Mexico-
based drug cartels, adopting terrorist tactics in their operations.
Criminals and terrorists are also directly working together. We only
need to look at the recent Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi
Arabian Ambassador in Washington by engaging the Los Zetas
transnational criminal organization to see this trend. In different
circumstances, the links between crime, terrorism, and insurgency may
range from full integration, to occasional cooperation, to drawing on
overlapping networks of money launderers, weapons providers, corrupt
governmental officials, and other facilitators. Even when there is no
direct nexus between drug trafficking, terrorism, and insurgency, these
and related threats tend to feed on and worsen conditions of weak
governance.
DOD provides critical training, equipment, infrastructure,
information sharing, technology research and development,
transportation, communications, analytical, reconnaissance, and related
support to U.S. and foreign counterdrug law enforcement agencies and
other security services. In doing so, DOD seeks to provide one element
in wider whole-of-government strategies to reduce drug trafficking,
build rule of law, extend effective governance, and stabilize
endangered regions. Within the United States, DOD provides
counternarcotics support primarily through the National Guard, but also
provides other domestic law enforcement support in specialized areas.
As a matter of law, DOD also has the lead responsibility in the U.S.
Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime
transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Even in this mission
area, however, DOD cooperates with U.S. and foreign partners.
Question. What is your understanding of the Department's CN
authorities?
Answer. Since the enactment of title 10, U.S.C. 124, in 1989 and
section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991, the Department's counternarcotics authorities have allowed the
Department to provide critical support for U.S. and partner nation law
enforcement efforts to confront drug trafficking into the United
States. Today, these and subsequent counternarcotics authorities
provide the Department with critical tools to confront the association
and convergence of narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and related TOC,
that pose a growing threat to our national security interests.
These authorities allow the Department to enhance the capabilities
of State, local, tribal, Federal, and international law enforcement
partners. The Department's counternarcotics authorities support the
National Guard's counterdrug activities in 54 States and territories
and the theater campaign plans of all six geographic combatant
commands. These authorities are often invaluable in achieving strategic
national security objectives. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with Congress to ensure that these authorities are sustained.
Question. Should the United States reassess ongoing efforts to
combat the trafficking of illegal narcotics in the Western Hemisphere
given the increasing concerns of many of the nations in the hemisphere
about the lack of results from the decades old war on drugs?
Answer. The U.S. Government, including DOD, consults closely with
governments, policy experts, civil society leaders, international
organizations, and others throughout the Western Hemisphere, to refine
our combined efforts against illegal drug production, trafficking, and
consumption. In this regard, we are working with the interagency to
synchronize U.S. and partner country military, intelligence, law
enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial, and penal efforts with public
health, anti-corruption, economic development, financial regulation,
and related activities to address weaknesses that transnational
criminal organizations exploit and exacerbate. The United States and
partner countries are also cooperating to ensure that counter-drug
efforts are integrated with operations against related threats, such as
weapons smuggling, money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, and in some
places, terrorism and insurgency. The term ``citizen security'' is now
widely used in the Western Hemisphere to signify that governments need
to go beyond suppressing crime to provide justice and security to their
populations. Defense Department counternarcotics efforts play a
supporting role, but by no means the leading one.
All DOD international counternarcotics support is provided at the
request of, and in close coordination with, the partner nation and the
U.S. Embassy. DOD also plays a coordinating role, providing support to
multinational efforts to exchange counternarcotics information and
coordinating interagency and multinational interdiction efforts through
Joint Interagency Task Force-South.
Colombia is one of the best examples of what can be achieved by
sustained U.S. support for a partner country's efforts resulting in a
real return on investment. Once facing a seemingly insurmountable
narco-terrorist problem that threatened to overwhelm its legitimate
government, the Colombian Government today clearly has the upper hand
and is extending effective governance by working to resolve many of the
social issues underlying that country's protracted conflict. Colombia
still has a long way to go, but it has turned the corner. Narco-
terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal organizations
are, however, extremely flexible. As Colombia, the United States,
Mexico, and other countries have put pressure on criminal organizations
over time, the surviving groups have adapted by dispersing to places
such as Central America, forming global illicit networks, and
diversifying into other crimes. Therefore, our efforts must continue to
be flexible to keep pace with this ever-evolving threat.
national strategy to combat transnational organized crime
Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a
debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern
their nations and provide opportunities for their people. Last July,
President Obama released the first National Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime. DOD is not a law enforcement agency, but
it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our Nation's Federal law
enforcement agencies.
What role, if any, should DOD play in combating transnational
criminal organizations?
Answer. The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime declares that TOC ``poses a significant threat to national and
international security.'' The Strategy calls for the U.S. Government to
``build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat
TOC''. This direction--to take a whole-of-government approach to
combating a national security threat--includes an important role for
DOD. I believe that DOD should continue to focus on delivering unique
capabilities to support law enforcement agencies that are combating
TOC.
Specifically, I believe that DOD should continue to provide
military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter-threat
finance support, and military-to-military capability development. When
appropriate (e.g. in theaters of conflict), DOD may take the lead in
operational activities against specific transnational criminal threats
to the United States. As the President's Strategy notes, TOC ``presents
sophisticated and multifaceted threats that cannot be addressed through
law enforcement action alone.'' DOD's capabilities and authorities are
thus critical supporting tools to broader U.S. Government efforts
against TOC.
The President's strategy also directs DOD to enhance ``support to
U.S. law enforcement through the Narcotics and Transnational Crime
Support Center,'' a dedicated DOD-led center that integrates military,
intelligence, and law enforcement analytic capabilities to go after key
nodes in global criminal networks. This guidance further reflects the
added value that the Defense Department brings to whole-of-government
efforts against TOC.
DOD should also consider how it can play a role in breaking the
links among criminal organizations, terrorists, and insurgencies. As
the President's strategy states, ``terrorists and insurgents are
increasingly turning to TOC to generate funding and acquiring
logistical support to carry out their violent acts''. As the Department
continues with its counterterrorism efforts around the world, it will
be important to account for the links between criminal and terrorist
entities.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.
What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?
Answer. I strongly support U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention.
Question. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as
the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?
Answer. I do not believe there are any national security
disadvantages to the United States becoming a treaty party, and there
are numerous advantages. As a treaty party, the United States could
best preserve the navigational freedoms enshrined in the convention and
not have to rely on customary international law, which is subject to
change based on state practice. In turn, this could allow us to
influence the development and interpretation of the convention,
reflective of our status as the world's premier maritime power.
Question. What is your understanding of the principal arguments
against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments?
Answer. From what I understand, there are a range of arguments
against accession, including that the United States would surrender a
portion of its sovereignty. Simply stated, this is a flawed argument.
As a treaty party, we can reinforce our navigational freedoms--key to
our global power projection capabilities and access.
cyberspace
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the development of policy
and strategy for military operations in cyberspace and in exercising
oversight of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency?
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(OUSD(P)) advises the Secretary of Defense on the formulation of DOD
cyberspace policy and strategy, including development and oversight of
DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives in and
through cyberspace. OUSD(P), through the Joint Staff, works closely
with U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command on cyberspace
strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of
cyberspace operations. A close partnership with the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the National Security Agency
ensures that policy formulation and execution are well informed and
supported by their cyber capabilities and expertise.
Question. In the cyberspace domain, for each of the mission areas
of cyber network defense, cyber network exploitation, and cyber network
attack, what is your understanding of the relationship between the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the
following: the Chief Information Officer; the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?
Answer. The OUSD(P) serves as the lead within DOD in the
development, coordination, and operational oversight of overarching DOD
strategy, policy, and planning related to cyberspace. The Chief
Information Officer is the primary official responsible for policy
matters and oversight of Information Resources Management, Information
Technology, Information Assurance, and network operations. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics advises
the Secretary on cyberspace matters relating to the DOD Acquisition
System; research and development; modeling and simulation; systems
engineering; advanced technology; developmental test and evaluation;
production; and systems integration. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence advises the Secretary on cyberspace intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, and other intelligence-related matters.
Question. What is your assessment of the maturity and adequacy of
policy and doctrine governing defensive, offensive, and intelligence-
gathering operations in cyberspace, both within DOD and the
interagency? What gaps or deficiencies remain, in your view?
Answer. DOD continues to assess organizational relationships,
doctrine, and policies necessary for its cyberspace mission. As it
continues to develop cyber capabilities, DOD is addressing cyber
governance in general by refining doctrine, training, standing rules of
engagement, and command and control structures for cyberspace
operations. DOD continues to work closely with interagency partners to
meet the cross-cutting challenges of cyberspace. DOD also supports the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 to provide for the development of risk-based
standards for the critical infrastructure that the Department depends
upon for its national security mission.
What is your assessment of the appropriate roles and
responsibilities of DOD, vis-a-vis other Government agencies (such as
the Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and
the Justice Department) and the private sector in preparing for, and
the conduct of, the defense of government and critical infrastructure
networks in cyberspace?
Answer. As stated in the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,
DOD is partnering closely with other U.S. Government departments and
agencies, as well as the private sector, to enable a whole-of-
government approach to cybersecurity. DOD works closely with Department
of Homeland Security to protect U.S. critical infrastructure, the
Intelligence Community to understand and counter cyber threats, and the
Department of Justice to protect against cyber crime. DOD is working
closely with Defense Industrial Base companies and Department of
Homeland Security to protect DOD information, spur innovation, and
increase the cybersecurity of the Nation as a whole. The protection of
critical infrastructure from cyber threats is of particular importance
to DOD. Development of risk-based standards and increased information
sharing such as those included in the Cybersecurity Act of 2012
represent important advances in the ability of the Department and the
Nation to secure government and critical infrastructure networks in
cyberspace.
illicit arms trafficking
Question. In July, governments of the world will gather at the U.N.
to negotiate a global arms trade treaty intended to set global
standards on the international transfer of conventional weapons.
What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms
trafficking and the role of the United States to deal with the problem?
Answer. The arms market is increasingly complex and global.
Existing regional and national arms export control systems do not
provide complete, global coverage. This creates gaps that are being
exploited by illicit arms dealers. I believe that the United States
should seek to negotiate a robust and effective arms trade treaty,
which may close these gaps.
Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of
national controls and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the
illicit trafficking problem, and could efforts to respond to illicit
trafficking be improved if other countries adopted and enforced
national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to
those of the United States?
Answer. An arms trade treaty would be a legally binding agreement
that will require states to establish high national standards in
controlling the export of conventional arms. Such norms should better
regulate the global arms market to prevent weapons reaching the hands
of terrorists, insurgents, and human rights abusers.
Question. Do you think an arms trade treaty, such as is being
contemplated in the U.N., would enhance U.S. national security
interests?
Answer. U.S. national security interests would be served by a
treaty that increases international standards in different regions;
includes major arms exporters such as Russia and China; reaffirms the
right of self-defense and the legitimacy of arms transfers for security
purposes; does not undermine existing nonproliferation and export
control regimes; and is agreed through consensus.
Question. What is your view on whether or not the United States
should be a party to this effort?
Answer. U.S. participation in the negotiations will help ensure the
treaty establishes a high standard of international behavior that will
ultimately reduce the proliferation of conventional arms. I would need
to see the results of negotiation to make any further recommendation.
arms control
Question. What role do you see for arms control as a means of
improving U.S. national security?
Answer. Arms control continues to play an important role in
advancing U.S. national security by providing predictability and
stability in certain strategic relationships, particularly in U.S.-
Russian relations. Arms control should never be an end unto itself;
neither is it a tool that can be employed without the context of a
well-prepared and effective military force.
Question. What are your views on the next bilateral steps to
address nuclear-weapons issues between the United States and Russia?
Answer. I believe that as the New START is implemented and any
issues that arise are addressed in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission, we should continue to work with Russia to lay the
groundwork for future bilateral negotiations on reducing both strategic
and nonstrategic weapons, including non-deployed weapons.
The Report of the Nuclear Posture Review noted that because of our
improved relations, strict numerical parity between the United States
and Russia is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War.
However, it also indicated that large disparities in nuclear
capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies
and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-
term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are
significantly reduced. By joining with the world's other principal
nuclear power to move to lower levels of forces in concert, arms
control thus provides a means for strengthening strategic stability in
our relationship with Russia.
Question. What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to
reduce further the U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile through arms
control?
Answer. The ongoing Nuclear Posture Review implementation study
will help identify the force levels needed to support deterrence and
targeting requirements. Completion of this analysis is necessary to
formulate any future arms control objectives involving our nuclear
stockpile. In general, I believe that future nuclear reductions should
maintain strategic deterrence and stability with regard to Russia and
China, strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, and
ensure the credibility of our security assurances to our allies and
partners. We also must guarantee our operational flexibility and
ability to hedge against geopolitical and technical uncertainty.
Question. What is your view of the role of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty in U.S. national security, and how should it be
strengthened or improved?
Answer. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a valuable
foundational element of the broader international nonproliferation
regime, and contributes significantly to strategic stability. We should
work to strengthen the treaty by encouraging greater state-party
adherence and agreement to International Atomic Energy Agency
inspections, among other steps.
ballistic missile defense
Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
programs, and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to
defend the Homeland against attack by a small number of long-range
missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging
against future uncertainties.
Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?
Answer. Yes, I support the policies, strategies, and priorities set
forth in the 2010 Report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
Question. Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally
sustainable?
Answer. Yes. DOD has tailored its budget request to fiscal
requirements. We have protected our top missile defense priorities,
including defending the Homeland, implementing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and pursuing Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAA)
in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.
Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a PAA to missile defense in Europe.
This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and
emerging threats from Iranian missiles, increasing in capability with
each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the EPAA is intended to provide a
capability to defend against potential future long-range missiles from
Iran that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing
Homeland missile defense capability.
Do you support the PAA to Missile Defense in Europe and, if
confirmed, will you implement it?
Answer. Yes, I support the EPAA and, if confirmed, I will support
its implementation.
Question. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems
that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable,
survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible
threat?
Answer. Yes. I believe that DOD should continue to subject new
ballistic missile defense capabilities to testing under realistic
operational conditions against realistic targets. DOD should invest in
ballistic missile defense capabilities that are fiscally sustainable
over the long-term and are mobile and relocatable.
Question. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs
to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and
Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations
of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to deploying such systems?
Answer. Yes. U.S. ballistic missile defense testing needs to be
operationally realistic and include robust Operational Test and
Evaluation. I support the ``fly-before-you-buy'' policy outlined in the
Report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of
sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced
that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
capabilities.
Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
Iran, and could send a powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade
Iran not to pursue long-range missiles or nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes. Missile defense cooperation with Russia could
strengthen common defenses against Iranian missiles and send an
important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working
together to counter the proliferation and use of ballistic missiles.
Question. Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the
United States is committed to the continued development and deployment
of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative
improvements to such systems, needed to meet our security needs?
Answer. Yes. The United States will not accept constraints on
missile defense. We will undertake the necessary qualitative and
quantitative improvements to the ballistic missile defense system to
meet U.S. security needs.
national security space policy
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment
of a national security space policy?
Answer. I believe that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense should support the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy in developing and ensuring implementation of
national security space policy. If confirmed, I will work with the
Under Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs to establish and oversee the implementation of
overarching DOD space policy developed in accordance with the National
Space Policy, National Security Space Strategy, and associated
guidance.
special operations forces
Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in
our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their
operations.
Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
Answer. I believe the completion of the directed growth in Special
Operations Forces and Combat Support and Combat Service Support
personnel directed in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs would posture U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) to conduct the range of anticipated
operations effectively to meet future requirements. These forces will
continue to require service-provided enablers to sustain the level of
mobility, ISR, fires, and medical evacuation, in differing mixtures,
based on the operational environment.
Question. In your view, how can the size of Special Operations
Forces be increased while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and
training standards for special operators?
Answer. Experience has shown that SOF manpower growth of 3 to 5
percent annually can be sustained and will not dilute the force or
outpace the required training and support structure. In my view, SOCOM
has done a magnificent job of adjusting its processes to maintain the
quality of SOF operators and support personnel during this current era
of SOF growth.
Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
extremist organizations, including those related to information and
military intelligence operations. Some have advocated changes to the
activities of SOCOM's enumerated in section 167 of title 10 to more
specifically track the activities special operations forces are
carrying out around the world.
Do you believe any modifications to SOCOM's title 10 missions are
appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?
Answer. The Department uses a range of processes, including the
development of the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and
responsibilities it assigns to SOCOM on an ongoing basis. The language
in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., also includes ``such other
activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of
Defense,'' which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense
the flexibility needed to meet changing circumstances. Hence, at this
time I would not advocate significant changes to SOCOM's title 10
missions.
Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
Answer. The activities of Special Operations Forces are quite
varied, from high-risk strikes and counterterrorist raids to working
by, with, and through local partners, whether in the form of training
and advising foreign counterparts, or providing support to civilian
authorities abroad. I believe that each of these missions is highly
valued within the Special Operations community. However, as the
security landscape has changed, the demands for these kinds of missions
have begun to exceed the ability of the Special Operations community
alone to meet them.
As a remedy to this situation, and consistent with QDR 2010 and the
January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Department is building the
capacity and capabilities of the general purpose forces to be prepared
to take on more of the kinds of missions that used to fall exclusively
to SOF. Security force assistance is an example of that. I believe that
broadening the spectrum of irregular missions that our general purpose
forces are able to take on will alleviate some burdens on the SOF
community and ensure that the Total Force is adequately prepared to
undertake and support both direct and indirect missions. I believe that
increasing the contribution of general purpose forces to these missions
will help ensure adequate capabilities overall and proper balance
between general purpose forces and Special Operations Forces.
Question. Some have advocated providing the SOCOM Commander with
new authorities that would, among other things, better resource the
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and provide Special
Operations Forces with additional flexibility and funding to build the
capacity of partner nation security forces.
Do you believe additional special operations-specific authorities
are appropriate? If so, what types of authorities would you suggest?
Answer. TSOCs are essential to all facets of the Geographic
Combatant Commander's (GCC) engagement and campaign plans. The
Department is currently conducting a full scale review of authorities
to guarantee that we are providing the TSOCs the flexibility and
agility to best meet GCC objectives.
interagency collaboration
Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
agencies has played a significant role in the success of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
Answer. I believe one of the most important lessons learned has
been the necessity of close civil-military collaboration at all levels,
at the tactical level with organizations such as Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Embedded PRTs, as well as unity of
effort at the operational and strategic levels. Such unity of effort is
critical in missions ranging from direct action to building partner
capacity. We can facilitate this type of coordination through
organizational structures, but much of this is also a cultural issue--
making collaboration and coordination part of the ethos of our civil
and military institutions. Experiences from recent conflicts have
facilitated this to a large degree, although institutionalization can
and should be continued.
Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
Answer. One of the lessons learned has been the need for close
collaboration early in the planning phase, before a contingency begins.
This lesson can and should carry forward to future contingencies.
Recent conflicts have also pointed to the need for sufficient capacity
and capability within civilian agencies for these kinds of contingency
operations.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in encouraging
greater interagency collaboration between U.S. Special Operations
Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments
and agencies?
Answer. Several parts of the Department, including the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands,
work with interagency partners, both in Washington and in the field. If
confirmed, I would continue to support these activities by
participating in interagency fora and providing policy input and
oversight, as directed by the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy.
In terms of counterterrorism, Special Operations Forces will
continue to have a leading role in our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. The
Department is prepared to sustain a significant number of deployed SOF
around the world, working closely with allies and partners to develop
the capabilities and capacities they need to rid their territories of
terrorists and prevent their resurgence. The defeat of al Qaeda cannot
be achieved without bringing together the expertise and resources of
the entire U.S. Government--intelligence, law enforcement, military,
and other instruments of national power--in a coordinated and
synchronized manner. If confirmed, I would seek strong relationships
with DOD's interagency partners; in particular, the National Counter-
Terrorism Center, the State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism,
and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, to
maximize DOD's efforts to counter violent extremism.
Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a key part of
any counterinsurgency effort. It is a shared responsibility within the
executive branch, particularly the Departments of State and Defense.
Close collaboration between the Departments is a key characteristic of
the section 1206 authority, and one of its greatest strengths. The
Global Security Contingency Fund epitomizes this shared responsibility,
and represents an opportunity for the State Department and DOD to plan
for contingencies jointly, and to establish a new model for interagency
planning of security sector assistance.
To foster operational-level integration, our interaction with other
departments and agencies continues to deepen both in Washington and at
the combatant commands. In the field, combatant commands use Joint
Interagency Coordination Groups to support interagency planning and
coordination. The interagency is also playing an increasing role in DOD
exercises, making them a more realistic reflection of the environment
in which our forces would operate. If confirmed, I would continue to
promote such cooperation.
readiness oversight
Question. Part of the scope and responsibility of the Office of
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is to help shape and decide how
and where DOD deploys forces, but without direct oversight into the
readiness of those forces. Currently, that readiness oversight function
resides with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness. Arguably, a shift of the readiness oversight
responsibility from personnel into policy could provide a comprehensive
and broader insight into the readiness of our forces.
If confirmed, would you be in favor of shifting the readiness
oversight from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy?
Answer. Both the Offices of Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (P&R) and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(Policy) play important but distinct roles in monitoring the readiness
of the Armed Forces. P&R focuses on the delivery of readiness through
the key elements of training, personnel, health affairs, Reserve
component affairs, and quality of life programs. P&R is also staffed by
people with expertise appropriate to assessing programs and activities
in these areas. Policy, on the other hand, articulates the requirements
for readiness through the development and issuance of guidance on
strategy, plans, force structure, and regional and global posture
initiatives. These two different but complementary perspectives on
readiness provide the Department's leaders with appropriate and
separate oversight of readiness that ensures the Military Departments
and Services are prepared to support the combatant commanders'
operational requirements with ready forces.
multilateral peacekeeping operations
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., stated that the United States ``is willing to consider directly
contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian
police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I should
note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
additional military personnel to both staff positions and military
observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. In general, if confirmed, I would support additional
contributions of U.S. military personnel to staff officer positions,
provided that they are positions that would add significant value to
the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the
United States.
Support for international peacekeeping remains an important
security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a
stake in the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations. I believe that,
where practicable, the United States should continue to provide
military personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially for key
staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the
mission. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate any proposals to
contribute military or civilian personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping
operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation
in the mission against other military commitments we have around the
globe, and the estimated cost of U.S. involvement.
Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
additional military personnel to U.N. operations?
Answer. There are several potential advantages to contributing
additional military personnel to U.N. missions: the opportunity to
shape these missions from the inside and contribute to the success of
the mission; professional development opportunities for military
personnel to serve in a joint, combined environment; and the benefit of
receiving real-time information and insights on emerging threats and
crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence.
It also enables an increased professional interaction by U.S. military
personnel with numerous partner nations' military personnel, with whom
we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.
The potential disadvantage of providing additional military
personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a
U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent
years, and that is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do
not believe the United States will be in a position to provide
significant numbers of military personnel to peacekeeping missions
anytime in the near future. However, I believe the selective placement
of even modest numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the
personnel we currently have assigned to U.N. operations can have a
significant, positive effect on U.N. peacekeeping operations.
minerva initiative
Question. The Minerva Initiative is a DOD-sponsored, university-
based social science research initiative launched by the Secretary of
Defense in 2008 focusing on areas of strategic importance to U.S.
national security policy. The goal of the Minerva Initiative is to
improve DOD's basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral,
and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic
importance to the United States. OSD Policy and the ASD (Research and
Engineering) co-lead this initiative.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Minerva
Initiative?
Answer. The Minerva Initiative is a basic research program in the
defense social sciences initiated by former Secretary of Defense Gates
and now supported by Secretary Panetta. The program is jointly managed
by OSD Policy and ASD (Research and Engineering). The Minerva
Initiative has sponsored innovative university research on topics
ranging from terrorism to the relationship between climate change and
political stability to technological innovation in China. The Minerva
Initiative also sponsors research faculty chair positions at select
Joint Professional Military Education schools and the three Service
Academies. After only 3 years, the program has contributed to
developing new intellectual capital in the social sciences, building
ties between the Department and the academic social science community,
and improving the Department's understanding of key areas of strategic
importance to U.S. national security policy.
Question. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, what guidance, if any, would you provide to the
Minerva Initiative, including incorporating the results from the
research produced thus far and utilizing the expertise affiliated with
this initiative?
Answer. If confirmed, I would provide guidance to ensure the
Minerva Initiative continues to strengthen the ties between the social
science research community and the defense community. Many Minerva
findings have already been applied to inform policy for today's defense
priorities, and Minerva Initiative scholars have briefed valuable,
warfighter-relevant insights to senior officials such as the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decisionmakers in the defense policy
community, and our combatant commands. As a basic research program,
however, the Minerva Initiative's most important contributions may be
greatest over the longer term.
The DOD community already plays an active role in both shaping
Minerva Initiative research priorities and benefiting from scholarly
insights. In particular, staff officers in OSD Policy serve not only as
reviewers but as advisors and potential customers for Minerva
Initiative efforts while connecting those insights to the broader
defense community. If confirmed, I would seek to continue this strong
oversight to ensure the results of Minerva Initiative research are
connected to the key social science-related issues the Department
faces.
private security contractors
Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
contractors to perform security functions risked undermining our
defense and foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in ensuring the Department's
responsibilities in this regard are met. The use of force by
contractors or military personnel can, if misapplied, undermine our
policy objectives. Contractors for physical security missions have been
a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and are likely to be so in future
contingencies. DOD has established procedures over time to manage these
contractors more effectively, in order to prevent unnecessary violence
that would be detrimental to our policy objectives. This is an area
that requires constant attention and continued supervision to ensure
that our policy is appropriate and effective.
Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
reduce the Department's reliance upon contractors to perform security
functions in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to facilitate the transition
from private security contractors to the Afghan Public Protection
Force. I would also ensure that the combatant commander is furnished
with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only
being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the
ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations
as the situation requires.
Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to
operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner,
consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Joint Staff, the
General Counsel of DOD, and combatant commanders to ensure that
commanders at all levels understand their responsibilities regarding
armed contractors operating in support of them or in their operational
area. This includes ensuring commanders are aware of extant legal
responsibilities with respect to qualification, training, and vetting
requirements as well as the limitations on the use of force by these
contractors.
I would also work to ensure that combatant commanders are furnished
with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only
being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the
ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations
as the situation requires.
Question. Do you support the extension of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of
all Federal agencies?
Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is legal
accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for
the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I
will support DOD efforts to work with our interagency partners to build
appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes, I do.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes. I believe that DOD and more broadly U.S. leadership
should be mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards
for detainee treatment, including that the manner in which we treat our
own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
captured in future conflicts.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
defense strategy formulation
1. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hicks, in your responses to the advance
policy questions you state, ``It is my assessment based on my past 3
years in the Department that the processes for analysis,
decisionmaking, and reporting on each of the above-mentioned reports
[including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)] are outstanding.''
However, I have become increasingly concerned by the brittle nature of
the Department of Defense's (DOD) recent strategy formulation efforts.
The 2010 QDR did not even last 2 years before DOD felt compelled to
replace it with the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). Key elements of
U.S. force structure identified in the 2010 QDR, most notably in the
ground force, are now regarded as unnecessary. It would seem that there
is significant room for improvement in formulating strategies that
stand up to significant changes in resources and the strategic
environment. How would you compare the findings of the 2010 QDR and the
2012 DSG? Specifically, which findings of the 2010 QDR remain valid and
which need to be eliminated?
Dr. Hicks. In order to meet the Nation's security needs most
effectively, the Department must adapt its strategic approach to shifts
in the strategic environment, including international dynamics,
operational transitions, and resource realities. I am comfortable that
DOD's strategy efforts represent an adaptable, rather than brittle,
process.
In 2011, the President directed DOD to conduct a comprehensive
review in light of geopolitical changes and the Nation's fiscal
challenges since the Department had published the QDR in 2010.
The resulting DSG maintained several key themes emphasized in the
2010 QDR, such as maintaining pressure on al Qaeda and affiliated
groups, accelerating modernization and concept development to counter
anti-access challenges, continuing a broad array of activities to build
partner capacity, and ensuring the ability of our forces to operate
effectively in cyberspace and space. A notable shift from the 2010 QDR
is the Department's current assessment that long-duration, large-scale
U.S. ground operations are less likely to be a prevalent feature of the
security environment. Precise prediction of the future operating
environment is not possible, however, which is why the DSG sets forth
an approach to mitigate the risk that U.S. Forces may be called upon to
conduct such operations. This includes the requirement to protect our
ability to mobilize and generate capabilities as needed, and to
maintain the skills and experience learned over the past decade of war.
2. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hicks, given the significantly compressed
timeline to produce the DSG as compared to the 2010 QDR, would you say
that the analysis behind the DSG, and by extension the fiscal year 2013
budget request, was more rigorous or less rigorous than the analysis
that went into the 2010 QDR?
Dr. Hicks. I have confidence in the analytics that underpin the DSG
of 2012. Compared to the development of a QDR, the timing of the DSG
required a shorter duration but equally high-intensity effort on behalf
of DOD, which drew upon a wealth of information and depth of expertise
resident across DOD. Such a significant effort was necessary to ensure
that the Department was making strategy-driven decisions to meet its
fiscal obligations as we adjust to changes in the security environment.
Moreover, as Secretary Panetta has noted, the creation of the DSG
involved significant personal attention from senior leaders--uniformed
and civilian--throughout the Department. The DSG also underwent
substantial review by our interagency colleagues and senior officials
at the White House, including the President.
Because many of the analytic resources used to inform the DSG,
including scenario sets, databases, and modeling and simulation, were
generated during the QDR; and because there was continuity in many of
the individuals involved across the two efforts, DOD was able to
provide for the DSG a level of supporting analytics on par with those
developed for the QDR of 2010.
3. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hicks, did the expectation of reduced DOD
budgets play a role in the analysis that produced the DSG? If so, how
was this concern weighed against other strategic concerns?
Dr. Hicks. Two key factors drove the analysis that produced the
DSG--changes in the security environment and the need to take steps to
protect our Nation's economic vitality. DOD faced a strategic
inflection point with the responsible drawdown from a decade of combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and shifting economic and security
interests in a world of accelerating change. The DSG describes the
projected security environment and the primary military missions of the
Department as we rebalance from prevailing in current conflicts to
preparing for an uncertain future. The enactment of the Budget Control
Act in August 2011 and other appropriate budget guidance, also informed
our analysis.
The decisions made during the development of the DSG, which provide
the precepts for the size and shape of the Joint Force of the future,
were reflected in the subsequent fiscal year 2013 budget and will
continue to be reflected over subsequent program and budget cycles.
These were tough choices. The DSG describes a broad portfolio of
military capabilities that offer versatility across a range of priority
missions. We will also take steps to build resiliency to be able to
address unforeseen developments in the security environment by
protecting our ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed
in the future.
4. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hicks, did budgetary concerns play a role
in the analysis that produced the 2010 QDR? If so, how was this concern
weighed against other strategic concerns?
Dr. Hicks. The QDR of 2010 was strategy-driven and resource-
informed. The QDR concluded that the U.S. Armed Forces must balance
resources and risk among four priority objectives:
Prevail in today's wars--the first time this objective
appeared in a QDR;
Prevent and deter conflict;
Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide
range of contingencies; and
Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force, the
single greatest strategic asset of the United States.
Throughout 2009, DOD conducted extensive analyses of the
capabilities and capacity of a range of future forces, and concluded
that the Nation could field a force sufficient to execute the QDR's
defense strategy within then-projected resource levels.
5. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hicks, in general, do you believe DOD
strategic reviews should be shaped by resource considerations? If so,
how should they be weighed against other strategic concerns?
Dr. Hicks. I believe that the DOD strategic reviews, such as the
QDR or the recently released DSG, should continue to be informed by a
general understanding of the level of resources that the Nation is
prepared to commit to national security. To do otherwise would be to
risk developing strategies that cannot successfully match ends to ways
and means.
6. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hicks, in the future, should DOD
strategic reviews like the QDR include separate resource-unconstrained
and resource-constrained components? If not, how do you believe these
reviews should best account for the strategic consequences of resource
constraints?
Dr. Hicks. I do not believe that DOD strategic reviews, such as the
QDR and the DSG, should assume unlimited resources. To do so would mean
that the strategy would not meet the essential objective of strategy-
making: creating approaches that match ends, ways, and means. Although
resources are an important factor in informing strategy development,
they must not be allowed to drive our strategy. Instead, DOD must
balance resources and risks as they relate to desired end-states. Our
existing analytical processes provide decisionmakers with insights
regarding the consequences of likely resource constraints by assessing
the ability of our forces to accomplish priority missions across a
range of plausible scenarios.
7. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Hicks, the 2010 QDR included assessments
of operational risk, force management risk, institutional risk, future
challenges risk, and strategic, military, and political risks incurred
by its recommended approach. The DSG was not accompanied by a similar
assessment. Can you identify the most important risk factors in each
category in the DSG?
Dr. Hicks. The 2012 DSG and the decisions in the fiscal years 2013
to 2017 Future Years Defense Program were informed by our desire to
reduce risk is several key areas, notably in adapting to the growing
importance of new operational domains, continuing challenges posed by
adversaries employing anti-access/area denial approaches, and the
Nation's financial crisis. Early insights from the Chairman's Risk
Assessment were instrumental in the development of the Department's
strategic guidance. More broadly, during the strategic review, we
assessed risk through wargaming scenarios, trend analysis, and other
means.
Although the Department faced difficult choices in managing trade-
offs within defense approaches and resources, I believe that the risks
associated with the new DSG are manageable and acceptable. Spending
reductions of the magnitude directed by the Budget Control Act of 2011
required difficult choices. For example, by reducing overall end
strength and aggregate force structure, we are accepting greater risk
should long duration, large-scale U.S. ground operations be a prevalent
feature of the future security environment. The DSG sets forth an
approach to mitigate this risk by protecting our ability to mobilize
and regenerate capabilities as needed. This includes maintaining
intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to
expand key elements of the force. This ensures that the U.S. Reserve
component is well-equipped and well-trained, and that we preserve the
health and viability of the Nation's defense industrial base.
The Department's risk mitigation plan identifies active mitigation
efforts for the specific risks identified in the Chairman's Risk
Assessment.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
readiness oversight
8. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Hicks, in your response to advance policy
questions, you indicated that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
has oversight of, among other things, force structure. What actions
have you taken, or, if confirmed, would you take, with respect to
significant force structure changes in the Army and the Air Force?
Dr. Hicks. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is
one of several advisors to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating
to the structure and capabilities of U.S. Forces. If confirmed, I would
support the USD(P) in ensuring the Department considers the following
in its force planning efforts:
Defense strategy, which prescribes how military power
and capabilities will be harnessed in the pursuit of stated
objectives, as outlined in the President's National Security
Strategy;
Defense planning scenarios and other expressions of
demand for U.S. military capabilities and activities. These
include, in the near-term, ongoing operations and the
operational plans of the combatant commanders, and in the
longer-term (5 to 7 years and beyond), scenarios that reflect
decisionmakers' judgments regarding the most important types of
operations that U.S. Forces must be prepared to undertake; and
Force assessments--qualitative and quantitative
analyses of the ability of current, programmed, and alternative
forces to meet the demands reflected in the scenarios,
operational plans, and other sources of operational
requirements listed above.
Within DOD, USD(P) plays the leading role in developing the defense
strategy, a shared role in defining and developing scenarios, and a
supporting role in assessing the capabilities of U.S. Forces. As the
Deputy Under Secretary for Strategy, Plans, and Forces, I have assisted
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (PDUSD(P)) and the
USD(P) in these efforts.
9. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Hicks, please describe the approval
process in place, or, if confirmed, the approval process you would
recommend putting in place, for oversight of major force structure
changes.
Dr. Hicks. Since I began my tenure as Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces, the Secretary and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, working in close cooperation with the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been responsible
for reviewing and approving all major elements used in the force
planning process. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary have also included
OSD components, the military departments, and geographic combatant
commands in the review process to ensure as comprehensive an approach
as possible. Collectively, they review and refine, and ultimately, make
recommendations to the Secretary regarding the defense strategy upon
which force structure changes are based. Likewise, the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary have forged a DOD-wide consensus on which missions
should be the primary focus of the Department's force planning efforts
and what expressions of operational requirements--ongoing operations,
operational plans, scenarios--should be used for evaluating current and
future forces. They take into account force assessments when they make
choices regarding future force structure and the allocation of
resources.
In my experience, this process has worked well, and I believe that
it should be continued in the future. In the conduct of the QDRs, as
well as the annual program and budget review, there is no substitute
for hands-on involvement by the Department's top leaders.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
nuclear modernization
10. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) and during the discussion on the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START), the administration made substantial commitments to the
sustainment and modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Enhanced
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile,
modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and maintenance of the
nuclear delivery systems are integral to maintaining our nuclear
deterrence. Do you support the triad of bombers with gravity bombs and
nuclear cruise missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)?
Dr. Hicks. I support the United States retaining a triad of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), ICBMs, and heavy bombers.
At current force levels, retaining all three triad legs will best
maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against
potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. Strategic nuclear
submarines (SSBN) and the SLBMs they carry represent the most
survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. Single-warhead ICBMs
contribute to stability, and like SLBMs are not vulnerable to air
defenses. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs, bombers can be visibly deployed
forward, as a signal in crisis to strengthen deterrence of potential
adversaries and assurance of allies and partners.
11. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, it has been reported that President
Obama is weighing options for sharp new cuts to our nuclear arsenal
unilaterally, potentially up to 80 percent, proposing 3 plans that
could limit the number to as low as 300. Is the United States
considering unilaterally reducing its arsenal of nuclear weapons?
Dr. Hicks. Secretary Panetta recently testified before Congress
that: ``We've gone through a nuclear review and presented options to
the President. But let me be very clear that these options are in no
way unilateral.''
The April 2010 Report of the NPR stated that the United States
intends to pursue further reductions in nuclear weapons negotiations
with Russia. The Department's NPR follow-on analysis of deterrence
requirements and force postures will help identify the force levels
needed to support these objectives and any potential risks. The
completion of this analysis is necessary to inform future arms control
objectives involving our strategic nuclear stockpile.
12. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, how would a unilateral reduction
impact our ability to deter, provide extended deterrence, and defend
ourselves, if attacked?
Dr. Hicks. The President directed follow-on analysis to the April
2010 NPR that considers a number of factors to shape goals for future
U.S.-Russia reductions in nuclear weapons below New START treaty
levels. Among those factors is maintenance of the reliability and
effectiveness of our security assurances to allies and partners, while
also maintaining strategic stability with Russia. A primary goal of
this study is ensuring that U.S. deterrence requirements and U.S. plans
are aligned to address today's threats.
13. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, how would unilateral reductions
affect nuclear proliferation?
Dr. Hicks. The April 2010 Report of the NPR highlighted the need to
better align our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent
priorities: preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The
NPR identified several factors that would influence future reductions
in U.S. nuclear forces below the New START treaty levels. Those factors
include: continued strengthening of deterrence, strategic stability,
and assurance; continued investment in and implementation of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program; and considerations with regard to
Russia's nuclear forces.
14. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, is it important to maintain our
nuclear triad?
Dr. Hicks. Yes, the United States should retain a triad of SLBMs,
ICBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The April 2010 NPR clearly
states that the U.S. nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers will be maintained under the New START treaty. At current
force levels, retaining all three triad legs will maintain strategic
stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical
problems or vulnerabilities. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and
the SLBMs they carry represent the most survivable leg of the U.S.
nuclear triad. Single-warhead ICBMs contribute to stability, and like
SLBMs are not vulnerable to air defenses. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs,
bombers can be visibly deployed forward, as a signal in crisis to
strengthen deterrence of potential adversaries and assurance of allies
and partners.
15. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, are you committed to the nuclear
modernization plan, referred to as the 1251 plan, that was the basis
for Senate support for the New START treaty?
Dr. Hicks. Yes, maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent, and recapitalizing the nuclear complex, were clearly
articulated in the NPR well before the New START treaty was submitted
to the Senate. The administration's approach to sustainment and
modernization is clearly set forth in the Report to Congress pursuant
to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 (the 1251 Report). However, the road ahead will be
challenging as DOD adjusts to current and projected budget cuts. We
will have to make hard choices, and this may cause changes to NPR
implementation and the 1251 Report. DOD is committed to fulfilling its
requirements associated with the NPR. To date, DOD has been able to do
this by adjusting programs to shift funds as necessary. Unfortunately,
we understand the future will likely include more budget cuts, and we
expect potential challenges that could affect the current plan.
16. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, do you support modernization of our
nuclear weapons labs, and if so, would you characterize this funding as
national security activities?
Dr. Hicks. Yes, DOD is committed to modernization of our nuclear
security complex, which includes the weapons labs. Both the April 2010
NPR Report and the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (the 1251
Report) plan highlighted the need to recapitalize our nuclear security
infrastructure to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent. These investments will support the full range of nuclear
security work, including nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear
counterterrorism, emergency management, intelligence analysis, and
treaty verification.
tricare
17. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, healthcare costs have doubled since
fiscal year 2001, growing from around $17 billion to over $42 billion
in fiscal year 2009. Healthcare is projected to consume 12 percent of
DOD's budget in 2015, compared to 4.5 percent in 1990. The new Obama
budget calls for military families and retirees to pay increasingly
more for their healthcare, while leaving other Federal unionized
workers alone. Enrollment fees for TRICARE Prime in the fiscal year
2013 budget request would increase fees anywhere from 30 percent to 78
percent. Over 5 years, compared to current fees, the fiscal year 2013
proposal would increase the enrollment fee by 94 percent and up to 345
percent for some retirees. If costs are increased as planned in the
fiscal year 2013 proposal, will some military beneficiaries not be able
to afford TRICARE?
Dr. Hicks. The Department's proposed fee increases will mostly
affect retirees and, especially, retirees who are under the age of 65
and are still in their working years. These fees are comparatively
moderate and tiered-based on retirement income. While some retirees are
expected to opt out of TRICARE as a direct result of the fee increases,
they will be doing so in favor of other health care coverage options.
In fiscal year 2000, approximately 60 percent of retirees relied on
TRICARE for their health care. Today, it is roughly 84 percent with
projections that it will reach 90 percent by fiscal year 2017. Our
estimate is that these proposals will reduce this reliance to 79
percent, roughly what it was in fiscal year 2008.
For 15 years, the Department had not increased most fees. Over the
years, the TRICARE benefit was expanded, providing more coverage, at no
additional cost. In 1996, retired beneficiaries used to bear 27 percent
of overall health care costs; by 2012 they were responsible for only 10
percent of their health care costs. At the end of the proposed multi-
year phase-in period, beneficiary out-of-pocket costs will rise from 10
percent to less than 15 percent of total health care costs,
considerably less than in 1996.
While the President's budget does not change the formula for
enrollment fees for non-military Federal Government civilian employees
or civilian retirees, those fees have increased and are still
increasing. These increases are because civilian employees and retirees
health related fees are tied to private-sector plans' increases in
health care costs. If the fee changes are approved, the TRICARE benefit
will remain one of the finest and most generous health benefits
available in the country, better than the TRICARE benefit in 1996, and
far lower than costs by other Federal Government employees.
18. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, do you know how many beneficiaries
will no longer be able to afford TRICARE in the out-years with the
increases planned in the fiscal year 2013 proposal?
Dr. Hicks. Because the proposed fees are comparatively modest, and
based on retirement income, TRICARE will continue to be an attractive
health option for the vast majority of retirees. However, as noted
above, the Department estimates that the proposals will reverse the
increase in the number of retirees who use TRICARE as their primary
health insurance vice using their employer-sponsored insurance. In
fiscal year 2000, approximately 60 percent of retirees relied on
TRICARE. Since then, we have seen a steady rise in the number of
retirees using their TRICARE benefit. Today, it is roughly 84 percent,
with projections that it will reach 90 percent by fiscal year 2017. Our
estimate is that these proposals will reduce this reliance to 79
percent, roughly what it was in fiscal year 2008.
19. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, if beneficiaries no longer opt-in to
TRICARE, will cost-driven attrition put TRICARE's sustainability at
greater risk than healthcare costs?
Dr. Hicks. Because the TRICARE benefit will remain one of the
finest and most generous health benefits available in the country, with
relatively low beneficiary associated costs, we believe that a majority
of retirees will continue to use TRICARE as their primary health
insurance. Implementing the proposed changes will make TRICARE more
sustainable, as the Department will be able to continue to increase
investments in patient care--such as building exceptional new medical
facilities, improving access to care, and providing preventive services
at no cost to our beneficiaries.
20. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, are other options available for
military beneficiaries that are driven out of TRICARE due to cost?
Dr. Hicks. Because the proposed fees are comparatively modest, and
based on retirement income, we believe that TRICARE will continue to be
an attractive health option for the vast majority of retirees. However,
we expect some retirees will opt-out of TRICARE in favor of their
employer-sponsored health coverage.
21. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, do you consider the proposed
increases to be fair and appropriate, given the time and the sacrifices
of our servicemembers and their families?
Dr. Hicks. Yes; at the end of this effort, the TRICARE benefit will
remain one of the finest and most generous health benefits available in
the country, better than the TRICARE benefit in 1996, and far lower
than costs of other Federal Government employees. The projected savings
of $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2013 and $12.9 billion through fiscal
year 2017 generated by the proposed TRICARE changes are an essential
component for ensuring DOD can successfully meet both the new national
defense strategy and the funding caps imposed under the Budget Control
Act.
strategy pivot to asia
22. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, in a taped interview about the shift
in strategy in January 2012, you maintain that DOD can still execute a
two-war strategy. With the cutting of Army and Marine Corps end
strength, can you explain how that can be accomplished? We had to grow
the force to meet requirements in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom, and the force was still stressed with minimal dwell time.
Dr. Hicks. When considering how to allocate resources across a
range of investment priorities, the Department's leaders assess current
and future forces against a number of criteria. For more than 20 years,
one of these has been the requirement for joint forces to be able to
deter and defeat aggression by an adversary in one region even when our
forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere. During last
year's strategic review, the Department evaluated the demands of the
most plausible potential conflicts and concluded that, although there
will be challenges, forces fielded in the fiscal years 2013 to 2017
Future Years Defense Plan will meet this requirement with acceptable
risk.
As our strategy makes clear, and as we have seen in Iraq and
Afghanistan, it may be necessary for outside forces to assist in
establishing conditions suitable for stable self-governance in the
aftermath of large-scale ground-intensive conflicts. Our planning calls
for retaining forces with sufficient capacity to conduct such post-
conflict stability operations on a small scale for a limited period
using standing forces or, if necessary, for an extended period with
mobilized forces. Recognizing that future circumstances might call for
a larger, extended commitment, as occurred over the last decade of war,
the defense strategy calls on components to take steps to protect the
Department's ability to regenerate and sustain capabilities that might
be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands.
guantanamo bay
23. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, last week two Uighurs (separatists
from western China who were captured in Pakistan at the beginning of
the war and held for 10 years at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO)) were
transferred out of U.S. custody to El Salvador. The last detainee
arrived at GTMO in June 2008; and the total number in U.S. custody is
now 169. What is the status of the transfer of the five Taliban
fighters to Qatar, and is this an effort by the administration to jump-
start talks with the Taliban?
Dr. Hicks. The U.S. Government has made no decision to transfer any
Guantanamo detainees to Qatar. Any decision to transfer detainees from
Guantanamo to another country would be made according to applicable
legal requirements and in keeping with U.S. national security
interests.
24. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, can you describe the criteria for
the release of detainees and do you support releasing them to a host
country?
Dr. Hicks. In the past, when a detainee was designated for transfer
via the Executive Order Task Force (per Executive Order 13492), it was
based on a finding that the detainee could be transferred consistent
with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States. The Task Force followed detainee review guidelines developed
specifically for the Executive order review and approved by the Review
Panel. The guidelines addressed four types of evaluations relevant to
determining whether a detainee should be recommended for transfer,
which were as follows: a threat evaluation; an evaluation of potential
destination countries; a legal evaluation to ensure that any detainee
falling outside the Government's lawful detention authority was
recommended for transfer or release; and an evaluation to determine
whether a Federal court or military commission prosecution should be
recommended for any offenses the detainees may have committed.
The guidelines governing the interagency periodic review process
mandated by President Obama's March 7, 2011, Executive Order 13567, now
have been issued. The Periodic Review Boards (PRB) will review each
Guantanamo detainee to determine whether continued detention is
warranted to protect against a continuing significant threat to the
security of the United States. In making that assessment, the PRB may
review all relevant materials on which the Government seeks to rely to
show the detainee should continue to be detained. This includes
information from the final Task Force assessments produced pursuant to
the interagency review conducted pursuant to Executive Order 13492, the
work product of a prior PRB, or any relevant intelligence produced
subsequent to either such review. The PRB will also be provided all
mitigating information. These boards are another step forward in
ensuring that the United States has a principled, credible, and
sustainable policy for detention in 21st century warfare.
25. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, as a senior policy advisor, what is
your opinion of GTMO and its operations?
Dr. Hicks. Detention operations at Guantanamo Bay are conducted
under the command and control of a joint task force, which is overseen
by U.S. Southern Command. These operations are conducted professionally
and humanely, and in full compliance with applicable U.S. law and the
law of war. The quality of U.S. military personnel at the base is
outstanding.
26. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, do you still believe we are fighting
the war on terrorism?
Dr. Hicks. We are currently fighting a war against al Qaeda, its
affiliates, and adherents. The President's National Strategy for
Counterterrorism is intentionally focused on al Qaeda rather than on
terrorism or extremism broadly defined. The Strategy makes clear that
our ultimate objective is the defeat of al Qaeda. The Strategy has also
made it clear that our focus is on al Qaeda's affiliates and adherents
as well, as they continue to plot and plan terrorist attacks against
us.
27. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, as we capture terrorists or other
high value targets, do you agree with long-term detention at GTMO as a
primary course of action?
Dr. Hicks. Our first priority must be to capture terrorists--to
eliminate the threat that an individual poses and to elicit valuable
intelligence that can help protect the American people. To the greatest
extent practicable, we will work to ensure that we are able to maintain
a viable long-term disposition option to keep dangerous individuals off
the battlefield, and to ensure that they can no longer threaten the
American people or our interests.
This administration has made clear its intention to close the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and adding to the population
there would undermine those efforts.
28. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Hicks, do you believe that we should
prosecute terrorists in military tribunals at GTMO or in the Federal
court system?
Dr. Hicks. Both systems--Article III Federal courts and our
reformed military commissions--can be used to prosecute terrorists.
When determining which system--our Article III Federal courts or our
military commissions--to use to prosecute a particular individual, we
must remain relentlessly practical, focusing exclusively on which
option will produce a result that best serves our national security
interests in light of the unique facts and circumstances of each case.
DOD and the Department of Justice together developed a prosecution
protocol for guiding these forum decisions, which are made on a case-
by-case basis. The protocol looks to factors including the nature of
the alleged offense, the nature and gravity of the conduct alleged, the
identity of the victims, and the manner of investigation.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
israeli participation
29. Senator Collins. Dr. Hicks, not that long ago, the United
States withdrew from at least one joint exercise with Turkey, due to
Turkey's refusal to allow Israeli participation. Subsequently, I
believe we participated in an exercise from which Israel was excluded.
What advice will you provide to the Secretary of Defense about
participating in exercises from which Israel has been excluded?
Dr. Hicks. DOD remains concerned by diminished ties between Turkey
and Israel and continues to urge both countries to find a creative
solution to move forward and repair relations. Despite the fact that
Israel and Turkey have suspended their military cooperation with one
another and that this has affected our ability to exercise with those
countries jointly, we continue a range of exercises with both Israel
and Turkey in other bilateral and multilateral contexts. The United
States does not permit others to determine our security cooperation
activities. If confirmed, I would advise the Secretary of Defense to
continue that policy and support efforts to strengthen our defense
relationship with Israel.
______
[The nomination reference of Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 19, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Kathleen H. Hicks, of Virginia, to be a Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense, vice James N. Miller, Jr.
______
[The biographical sketch of Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks
Education:
Mount Holyoke College
September 1988-May 1991
A.B., magna cum laude with honors in History,
awarded May 1991
University of Maryland, School of Public Affairs
September 1991-May 1993
Master of Public Administration, awarded May
1993
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September 1999-June 2010
PhD in Political Science, awarded June 2010
Employment Record:
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans, and Forces
2009-present
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Senior Fellow, International Security Policy
2006-2009
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the DASD for Strategy
Director for Strategy
Chief of Staff for QDR Roles,
Missions, and Organizations Team
2005-2006
Office of the ASD for Homeland Defense
Director for Strategic Planning and
Program Integration
2004-2005
Office of the DASD for Resources and Plans
Deputy Director, Resources
2001-2004
Office of the Secretary of Defense Graduate
Fellow
Doctoral Candidate, MIT
1999-2001
Office of the DASD for Strategy
Assistant for Strategy Development
1995-1999
Presidential Management Intern
1993-1995
Honors and Awards:
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Public Service Medal
(2012)
Secretary of Defense Outstanding Public Service Medal
(2011)
Excellence in Leadership Award, Department of Defense
Senior Women's Professional Association (2011)
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service
Medal (2006)
Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service
Medal (1999 and 2004)
Distinction, Ph.D. Comprehensive Exams, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (2001)
Department of Political Science Fellowship,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1999-2001)
Office of the Secretary of Defense Graduate
Fellowship, Department of Defense (1999-2001)
University Graduate Fellowship. University of Maryland
(1991-1993)
Evelyn Church Wilber Prize. Excellence in U.S.
History, Mount Holyoke College (1991)
Inducted, Phi Beta Kappa (1991)
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Kathleen
H. Hicks in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Kathleen Holland Hicks.
Kathleen Anne Holland (Maiden Name).
2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
3. Date of nomination:
March 19, 2012.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
September 25, 1970; Fairfield, CA.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Thomas Warren Hicks.
7. Names and ages of children:
Benjamin Daly Hicks, 13.
Margaret Elizabeth Hicks, 9.
Alexander Thomas Hicks, 8.
8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Point Loma High School, San Diego, CA, 1984-1985.
Lake Braddock Secondary School, Burke, VA, 1985-1988, High School
Diploma, May 1988.
Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA, 1988-1991, A.B., May 1991.
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1991-1993, Masters of
Public Management, May 1993.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1999-2010,
PhD, Political Science, June 2010.
9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Foreign Affairs Specialist (Career GS), Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 1993-May 2005. Pentagon,
Washington, DC. Titles: Presidential Management Intern (1993-1995);
Assistant for Strategy (1995-1999); OSD Graduate Fellow (1999-2001);
Deputy Director for Resources (2001-2004); Director for Homeland
Defense Strategy, Plans and Forces (2004-2005).
Senior Executive (Career SES), Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, May 2005-August 2006. Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Titles: Director for Strategy; Chief of Staff, QDR Roles, Missions and
Organizations Integrated Process Team (concurrent positions).
Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
August 2006-February 2009. Washington, DC.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Pentagon, Washington,
DC. February 2009-present.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Unpaid consultant to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Policy Planning, August 2006-February 2009.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations.
Hospitality Committee Co-Chair, Charles Barrett Elementary School
Parent Teacher Association, Alexandria, VA.
13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Jack Reed for Senate, 7/13/2006, $250.
Jack Reed for Senate, 9/29/2007, $250.
Obama for President, 9/24/2008, $1,000.
Obama for President, 4/4/2012, $1,000.
14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Pass with Distinction, PhD Comprehensive Exams, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2001.
Department of Political Science Fellowship, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1999-2001.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Graduate Fellowship, Department
of Defense, 1999-2001.
University Graduate Fellowship, University of Maryland, 1991-1993.
Evelyn Church Wilber Prize, Excellence in U.S. History, Mount
Holyoke College, 1991.
Phi Beta Kappa, inducted 1991.
Phi Alpha Theta, inducted 1991.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations.
Excellence in Leadership Award, Department of Defense, Senior
Women's Professional Organization, 2011.
Secretary of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal, 2012.
Secretary of Defense Outstanding Public Service Medal, 2011.
Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, 2006.
Secretary of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Medal, 1999 and
2004.
15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``Force Planning in the 2010 QDR,'' with Samuel J. Brannen, Joint
Forces Quarterly, Vol. 59, October 2010.
The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces, with Christine E. Wormuth,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009.
Invigorating Defense Governance: Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase IV,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008.
Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives, with David
Berteau, et. al., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008.
Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, with
J. Stephen Morrison, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2008.
U.S. National Security and Global Health: An Analysis of Global
Health Engagement by the U.S. Department of Defense, with Eugene V.
Bonventre and Stacy M. Okutani, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2009.
``Strengthening AFRICOM's Case,'' CSIS Commentary, with J. Stephen
Morrison and William M. Bellamy, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 5 March 2008.
``A New U.S. Command for Africa,'' in Global Forecast: the Top
Security Challenges of 2008, with Jennifer G. Cooke, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 14 November 2007.
``AFRICOM,'' CSIS Commentary, with J. Stephen Morrison, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 5 October 2007.
Planning for Stability Operations: The Use of Capabilities-Based
Approaches, with Eric Ridge, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2007.
Department of Defense Environmental Programs: Background and Issues
for Congress, with Stephen Daggett, Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress (96-218F), 6 March 1996.
Defense Budget: Alternative Measures of Costs of Military
Commitments Abroad, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
(95-726F), with Stephen Daggett, 16 June 1995.
Defense Spending: Effect of the Declining Dollar on the Department
of Defense Budget, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress
(95-663F), 30 May 1995.
16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
The nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.
17. Commitment regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Kathleen H. Hicks.
This 25th day of April, 2012.
[The nomination of Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on May 15, 2012, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 2012.]
----------
[Prepared questions submitted to Mr. Derek H. Chollet by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD)
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Goldwater-Nichols was landmark legislation that led to
dramatic improvements in operational effectiveness, unity of effort,
and civilian oversight. There is now a generation of military leaders
who are experienced with operating in a coordinated and joint, multi-
Service environment. I do not see the need to change the provisions of
this legislation.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. See my previous answer.
duties of the assistant secretary of defense for international security
affairs
Question. DOD Directive 5111.07 (11/7/2008) delineates the
functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)). Under this Directive, the
ASD(ISA) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on international security
strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to the
nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia), the Middle East, and
Africa; their governments and defense establishments; and for oversight
of security cooperation programs.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
ASD(ISA)?
Answer. The responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs is to advise and support the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on defense
policy and strategy for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
relationships
Question. What do you see as the relationship between the ASD(ISA)
and each of the following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs advises the Secretary of Defense on international security
strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to the
nations and international organizations of Europe (including NATO), the
Middle East, and Africa.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs advises the Deputy Secretary of Defense on international
security strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to
the nations and international organizations of Europe (including NATO),
the Middle East, and Africa.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs provides similar support to the Under Secretary as
described above.
Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense,
including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to achieve
the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input to
each Under Secretary, as appropriate. that relates to the nations and
international organizations of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Question. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. At the direction of the Under Secretary or Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs works with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to provide support on matters that affect strategy and policy
for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, working to ensure that
military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs works with the Secretaries of the Military Departments
on a broad range of issues related to international security strategy
and policy.
Question. The combatant commanders, in particular, the commanders
of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European
Command.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs works closely with the commanders of U.S. Central
Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European Command to support the
efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Secretary and
Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of strategy and policy,
contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.
Question. The Other Functional and Regional Assistant Secretaries
of Defense.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs works with the other functional and regional Assistant
Secretaries of Defense to provide sound policy advice to the Under
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense on cross-cutting
international security strategy and policy issues.
Question. The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs (ASD(ISA) works with the Director of the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency on implementation of security cooperation
activities, such as Foreign Military Sales, with countries in Europe,
the Middle East, and Africa to ensure that these activities support
national security policy objectives and strategies.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for the position of ASD(ISA)?
Answer. I believe that my experiences in government--at the
Department of State, National Security Council Staff, and as staff in
the U.S. Senate--as well as my experience dealing with national
security issues in numerous research institutions, provides me with the
necessary background to handle the responsibilities of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Throughout my
career, I have worked closely with DOD in shaping and implementing U.S.
policy in Europe and the Middle East and in managing a wide range of
international conflicts and crises. Over the years, I have deeply
appreciated the importance of close civil-military coordination to the
achievement of U.S. objectives--something that is especially important
in meeting the new threats and challenges of the 21st century.
priorities and challenges
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(ISA)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DOD pursues a
strategic and balanced approach as outlined in the January 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance. Top priorities would include strengthening
America's alliances with key partners and allies; ensuring the success
and effective transition of the NATO mission in Afghanistan; preventing
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon; combating terrorism;
strengthening security and stability across the Middle East;
maintaining a strong relationship with Israel; pursuing a constructive
relationship with Russia while supporting the sovereignty and
independence of Russia's neighbors; and working with the states of
Africa to meet urgent security challenges and achieve opportunities.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the ASD(ISA)?
Answer. If confirmed, my office will aim to play an important role
within the Department and the interagency process in developing policy
for a number of key issues, including among others: countering the
continuing threat of violent extremism; transitioning security
responsibility in Afghanistan in a way that protects U.S. vital
interests; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), particularly in Iran; strengthening alliances and partnerships
globally to further strengthen U.S. and international security;
advancing U.S. interests in the context of dramatic changes that have
unfolded and are unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa; and
continuing to strengthen the U.S. defense posture globally. A key
challenge will be to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Government in resolving these and
other issues--and pursuing opportunities--in the context of significant
fiscal pressures.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would address these challenges by
undertaking the development and implementation of DOD and interagency
strategies, policies, and plans on key issues relating to Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa. I would continue to work closely with other
components of DOD in support of the Secretary of Defense, as well as
our interagency counterparts, U.S. allies and partners, and where
appropriate, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations. I
would seek to ensure that strategies, policies, and plans are updated
as needed to reflect new challenges and new opportunities. Under the
direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would work to
support the President and Secretary's guidance to shape a Joint Force
for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be flexible,
agile, ready, and technologically advanced.
strategy and contingency planning
Question. One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase
military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and
contingency planning.
What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military
role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?
Answer. I believe that civilian leadership is critical in the
formulation of strategy and planning. Civilian defense leadership is
particularly vital in translating broad national security policies and
principles into the strategic goals that ultimately drive military
planning. The Joint Staff is a critical partner in the development of
guidance for contingency planning and provides independent military
advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In addition to
the provision of written guidance, an important civilian role is to
review contingency plans submitted for approval by the combatant
commanders.
Question. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently
have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy and contingency
planning?
Answer. The United States is at a critical time in history--with
multiple wars, enduring threats, and imminent challenges. Strong
civilian and military partnership on the range of national security
issues facing our Nation is vital. I believe that the level of civilian
oversight is appropriate. But if confirmed, I will examine this issue
closely and seek to ensure that civilian leadership has the appropriate
level of oversight on the full range of strategy, planning, and use-of-
force issues, while respecting the importance of receiving independent
military advice from the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders.
Question. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure
effective civilian control and oversight of strategy and contingency
planning?
Answer. I agree with the acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy that DOD should continue to fortify its capacity for strategic
thinking and strategic planning to ensure that it not only deal with
the challenges of today but is also well-prepared for those of
tomorrow.
The DSG released in January is evidence that the Department thinks
critically about strategy formulation and its associated resource
implications--a trend that, if confirmed, I will continue to work to
reinforce. If confirmed, I would strive to provide the best advice
possible to the Under Secretary of Defense in the provision of written
policy guidance and in the review of contingency plans for Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa.
strategic reviews
Question. If confirmed, what role--if any--will you play in the
formulation of policy, implementation of policy, and reporting of
results for each of the following strategies:
The National Defense Strategy;
The National Military Strategy;
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism;
The Quadrennial Defense Review;
Global Defense Posture Review; and
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review.
Answer. With the exception of the National Military Strategy, for
which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible, the
Secretary of Defense determines the processes and decisionmaking bodies
for developing and approving the results of each of these strategic
reviews. Although a wide range of approaches and mechanisms have been
employed for these purposes over the years, each review is based on
candid advice from senior military and civilian leaders and informed by
relevant data and analyses. If confirmed, I will provide input into
these reviews on matters that affect strategy and policy for Europe,
the Middle East, and Africa.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if
any, to improve DOD's processes for analysis, policy formulation, and
decisionmaking relative to each review above?
Answer. Given my experiences at the State Department and on the
National Security Council Staff, I have found that the following
factors have been associated with successful strategic reviews:
All relevant stakeholders are represented in formal
review and decisionmaking fora. At DOD, these stakeholders
generally include Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, leadership
of components, and the combatant commanders.
Leadership of working groups and review groups is
assigned to organizations with the predominant expertise and
involvement in the issue areas under examination.
The deliberations and findings of working groups are
transparent and are vetted with stakeholders before being
presented to top leadership.
Senior leadership establishes and maintains hands-on
oversight of the overall effort from start to finish.
Also critical for the success of any strategic review is the
maintenance of a vibrant, ongoing set of analytical efforts that
continually assess the ability of current, programmed, and projected
forces to accomplish key missions. If confirmed, I would recommend that
insights gained from previous reviews, along the lines of those
outlined above, be applied to upcoming reviews, including the
development of the next National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial
Defense Review.
department of defense strategic guidance
Question. The new DSG, ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense,'' announced by President Obama on
January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21s1 century
and the key military missions for which DOD will prepare.
Do you agree with the defense priorities set out in that guidance?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to those defense priorities?
Answer. I would not recommend any changes at this time. However,
like all strategies and guidance, I believe that it will be important
to review and update this guidance in the future.
transatlantic relationship and nato
Question. In your view, how important to U.S. national security
interests is the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our European
partners?
Answer. NATO remains of vital importance, and is a net provider of
global security. As President Obama has said, Europe remains the
cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and NATO is the most
capable alliance in history.
The transatlantic relationship is of critical importance to U.S.
national security, and the transatlantic community has never been more
closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous,
and fast-changing world. In Libya, NATO allies came together with Arab
and other partners to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and to
support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 allied
and partner forces alongside our own, we have built and sustained
NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. As Iran has continued to defy
its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions, the United
States, Europe, and other partners have put in place the toughest
sanctions yet.
Question. What do you see as the main benefits and costs of that
relationship?
Answer. Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is
critical to ensuring the alliance is ready when it is needed. Allies
look to the United States for leadership--to craft the compromises
necessary to move forward, and to lead the way in keeping NATO strong,
relevant, and credible. NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the Balkans,
in pirate-infested waters off Somalia, and last year conducted
operations in Libya. Future challenges to the United States and our
allies include ballistic missile proliferation, violent extremism, WMD,
and global instability. In today's interconnected world, these
challenges will be best addressed with the United States working
alongside our allies.
Question. In your view, what is the role of the NATO alliance in
meeting U.S. security interests?
Answer. The United States has important stakes in a strong,
mutually supportive NATO alliance, and the President has stressed his
strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships
to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO is our most reliable
source of coalition partners. NATO's new Strategic Concept is an
important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its unique
and essential role in ensuring the common security of its members,
including in meeting U.S. security interests, and it will guide the
next phase in NATO's evolution.
Question. What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that
you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?
Answer. Over the next 5 years, the top NATO-related challenges
include achieving durable progress and a successful transition in
Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the
deterioration in European military capability. Many of our NATO allies
have been under-investing in defense capabilities, especially when it
comes to deployable expeditionary forces. Many have significantly
reduced their national defense budgets in response to the global
economic crisis, and some are planning further cuts. A key challenge--
and a key opportunity--will be for allies to determine which
capabilities must be sustained and how that can be done in a more cost-
effective manner.
Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the
next 5 years? What criteria should the United States apply in
evaluating candidates for future NATO membership?
Answer. I agree with the President's statement that NATO's door
should remain open so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful,
and willing to contribute to common security. Which countries would be
candidates for further engagement and within what timeframe NATO would
undertake further enlargement are important questions the
administration would need to address in close consultation with
Congress and our allies. Each NATO aspirant should be judged on its
individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic, and
military reforms.
Question. Should NATO consider an expanded role for Israel beyond
the Mediterranean Dialogue?
Answer. Israel is an active and valued partner of NATO through the
alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue, which includes practical cooperation
as well as political dialogue, both bilaterally with NATO and
multilaterally including the other six Partners in the Mediterranean
Dialogue. The United States supports and encourages this partnership,
and encourages other allies and partners to do so as well. The
Mediterranean Dialogue includes an Individual Cooperation Program,
developed between NATO and Israel, which outlines Israeli desires for
engagement with NATO.
nato-russia council
Question. What, in your view, is the potential of the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC) to serve as a forum for promoting cooperation between
NATO and Russia on security issues?
Answer. The NRC, and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council before
it, have been important drivers of institutionalizing and promoting
cooperation between NATO nations and Russia since 1997. While there
have been successes in the relationship, the United States can build on
existing cooperation and intensify efforts to address the common
challenges that our nations face in the 21st century.
The NRC is a dynamic forum for discussions on areas where the two
countries disagree, and for constructive dialogue to move forward
practical cooperation in areas of shared concern. Both elements of
NATO's engagement with Russia are important.
At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, leaders endorsed the NRC Joint
Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges (Joint Review) that
identified five key areas for practical cooperation: Afghanistan,
counterterrorism, counter-piracy, countering WMD, and responding to
natural and manmade disasters. NATO and Russia have already developed
cooperation in these areas, and in particular on Afghanistan, which
remains a common cause between Russia and NATO partners. The NRC also
cooperates on countering terrorist hijackings of airplanes even as
Russian and NATO ships continue to help each other fight piracy in the
Indian Ocean.
nato mission in afghanistan
Question. At the NATO Summit at Lisbon in 2010, the countries
participating in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) affirmed their support for the goal of having Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) in the lead and providing security throughout
Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Do you support the Lisbon goal of transitioning the security lead
in Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?
Answer. Yes. I support the strategy that the United States is now
implementing along with NATO allies and ISAF partners as originally set
forth at Lisbon. I believe a focused counterinsurgency campaign, with a
transition plan that includes an enduring U.S. commitment to
Afghanistan, is the right strategy. It will allow us to help the
Afghans build security forces and government capacity, which can help
ensure the security necessary for an Afghanistan that never again
becomes a safe haven for terrorists.
While the U.S. and allied strategy in Afghanistan is sound, I also
believe that both the administration and ISAF should continue to assess
and adjust as necessary the implementation of the overall strategy
based on conditions on the ground. If confirmed, I am committed to
consulting with Congress, and with our allies and partners in this
regard.
Question. In your assessment, is NATO on track to achieve this
goal?
Answer. Yes. Transition is progressing on a positive track. ISAF
and the Afghan Government are currently implementing the first two
tranches of transition, and approximately 50 percent of the Afghan
population now lives in areas where the Afghans have the lead for
security. I understand the third tranche is to be announced in the
spring of 2012 and the fifth and final tranche in mid-2013. As
transition progresses, Afghan forces have been able to provide
effective security in transition areas.
I understand that important challenges remain between now and the
end of 2014. Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan and Afghan capacity
in governance and development remain the most challenging aspects of
transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to govern
effectively and to fill government positions at the national and sub-
national levels hinders the ability to assume leadership on these lines
of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of the
security transition in the effort to achieve durable stability in
Afghanistan.
Question. It appears likely that the Afghan security forces will
still need significant assistance and support even after the 2014
transition. In addition to training and equipment, Afghan security
forces still lag in certain key enablers, including logistics, airlift,
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
What role, if any, do you believe NATO forces should play in
Afghanistan after 2014?
Answer. More needs to be done to determine NATO's post-2014 role in
Afghanistan, but a sustained and weIl-organized international effort to
train, advise, and assist the ANSF will be critical to their success
after transition is complete. Going forward, building ANSF enabler
capacity, improving the functioning of the Ministries of Defense and
Interior, and fighting waste and corruption will also be critical.
The United States and other coalition partners must continue to
provide the requisite fiscal and personnel support to help make this
happen. Securing the international community's support for the ANSF
through 2014 and beyond continues to be a major U.S. interagency effort
ahead of the NATO Summit in Chicago this May. The Summit is an
opportunity to send a unified message that NATO is on track to achieve
our Lisbon goals, and advance a cohesive approach to the closing stages
of this war.
building partner capacity
Question. In the past few years, DOD has requested and Congress has
provided a number of temporary authorities to build the capacity of
partner nations or provide security assistance. These include the
section 1206 global train-and-equip authority, targeted authorities to
build capacity in Yemen and East Africa, and the Global Security
Contingency Fund.
In your view, what are the strategic objectives and priorities for
DOD's programs for building the capacity of partner nations?
Answer. In my view, the main strategic objective of the United
States in building the capacity of foreign partners is to help them
develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide
for their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and
multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn,
mitigates the burden on U.S. Forces responding to security threats
outside of the United States, and serves to build a base of countries
that can effectively participate in multinational coalition-based
operations.
Successfully countering violent extremist networks requires
developing and sustaining a global network of allies and partners that
is capable and interoperable. Additionally, once partners become
capable and have sufficient capacity, they are able to help bolster
regional security in a way that supports U.S. interests. In some cases,
participation by these partner nations' forces provide cultural and
linguistic advantages that afford them better access and effectiveness
than U.S. Forces executing the same mission.
Finally, efforts to build partner capacity promote interoperability
between forces and enable the U.S. Military to establish personal
connections and long-term relationships with foreign counterparts. We
can never be certain where in the world U.S. Forces may be required to
operate. Enduring relationships with partner nations are at the core of
a multinational coalition's strength, helping secure shared access to
facilities and territory, information, and diplomatic support.
Question. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if
confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of
DOD's programs for building partner capacity to ensure that these
programs are executed consistent with U.S. national security goals and
objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support DOD capabilities
and investments that encourage and enable partners to develop capable
security forces and institutionalize the Department's capacity to
provide high impact security force assistance. I would provide
recommendations to the Secretary that enable him to make informed
choices with regard to the location and frequency of DOD activities
that build partners' security capacity. It is essential in this era of
shifting focus and constrained resources that we carefully prioritize
which partners we engage with, how often, and to what end.
Question. What is your assessment of the implementation and
effectiveness of DOD's programs for building partner capacity in
achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives?
Answer. The Department's capacity-building programs are useful
tools that contribute significantly to the achievement of our national
security goals and objectives. These programs are most effective when
they are closely aligned with the Department of State's foreign policy
objectives while addressing critical needs as identified by our foreign
partners.
For example, in Georgia, our coalition support authorities have
enabled a relatively small partner nation to serve in Afghanistan, not
only deploying there with battalion-sized combat units that operate
without caveats, but punching well above their weight class while doing
so. The provision of high-mobility vehicles, night vision goggles,
communications equipment, and training has enabled Georgian forces to
make a significant contribution to coalition operations, in turn
lessening the burden on U.S. Forces deployed to Afghanistan.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis
the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies, in
efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?
Answer. The United States will be more successful at deterring and
responding to security challenges when allies and partner security
forces act in a way that is complementary to U.S. goals and objectives.
Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our continuing efforts to
counter violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal
organizations, and our preparations for future contingencies clearly
illustrate the need for capable partners who can apply capabilities
complementary to U.S. military objectives. In that vein, I believe that
DOD should sustain and grow the capability to develop partner security
forces, especially forces to train, advise, and assist partners during
conflict.
Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared
responsibility within the executive branch, particularly the
Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the
Departments is a key characteristic of the Section 1206 authority, and
one of its greatest strengths. The Global Security Contingency Fund
epitomizes this shared responsibility, and represents an opportunity
for the State Department and DOD to plan for contingencies jointly, and
to establish a new business model for interagency planning of security
sector assistance.
russia
Question. What role will you play, if confirmed, in establishing
policy with respect to the U.S.-Russia security relationship?
Answer. DOD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the reset
with Russia. The OSD-MOD Defense Relations Working Group and the Joint
Staff-General Staff Military Cooperation Working Group revived U.S.-
Russia defense and military relations from the low-point after the 2008
Russo-Georgia War. As a result, DOD has a robust military-to-military
work plan with the Russian MOD and is constantly looking for ways to
improve the relationship and contribute to greater security in the
Euro-Atlantic space.
If confirmed, I would play an active role in managing the efforts
of the U.S.-Russia Defense Relations Working Group, as well as
providing oversight and input to the Joint Staff-led Military
Cooperation Working Group and the annual U.S.-Russia Military
Cooperation Work Plan, which is developed by U.S. European Command in
cooperation with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Policy.
The Defense Relations Working Group, which meets at the Secretary
of Defense level and consists of eight subworking groups, has proved to
be an effective venue for advancing the U.S.-Russia security
relationship. If confirmed, I would chair the Sub-Working Group on
Global and Regional Affairs, which enables frank and open dialogue with
our Russian counterparts on issues of key importance, such as the
Middle East and North Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia,
and others. In addition, if confirmed, I would oversee the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs, which
leads the planning and coordination for all meetings of the Defense
Relations Working Group at all levels.
Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-
Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of
common interest between the United States and Russia in the security
sphere?
Answer. The United States and Russia should be able to cooperate
effectively in the many areas where we share common interests;
communicate effectively in areas where we have competing interests; and
negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests.
Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia
have common interests is in countering the proliferation of WMD,
particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant cooperation on,
for example, Iran. The Russians cancelled a major weapons sale worth
several hundred million dollars to Iran in 2010 and supported UNSCR
1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile
and nuclear programs. I believe that the United States should continue
to seek Russian support to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear
weapons. Similarly, Russia is a key player in reversing North Korea's
nuclear and missile programs, and shares common interests in this
regard. As a third example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
continues to be one of the most successful cooperative programs in the
U.S.-Russia relationship. Finally, the United States and Russia share
strong interests in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as
reflected in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Russia also has an interest in stability in Afghanistan. Our
efforts in Afghanistan have benefited greatly from improved security
relations with Russia. The Northern Distribution Network has been
critical to continued operations given the closure of our Pakistan
ground lines of communication. Russia allows our military personnel,
supplies, and equipment to transit its territory by air and rail and
will soon allow for reverse transit from Afghanistan. Russia has also
been forward-leaning in identifying possible areas of cooperation on
counter-narcotics.
Question. In your view, what steps should DOD take to improve
security relations with Russia? For instance, would you support
increased military-to-military relations and exchanges with Russia?
Answer. The 2012 Military Cooperation Work Plan includes more than
100 events and comprises activities such as cadet exchanges, exercises,
senior leader visits, and conferences. Over time, cooperation on a wide
range of issues may help to build a foundation for more concrete and
substantive cooperation with Russia.
Question. Would you support other cooperative programs with Russia,
including cooperation on missile defense in relation to Iran?
Answer. I support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defenses
first and foremost because it could improve the effectiveness of U.S.
and NATO missile defenses, thereby improving the protection of the
United States, our forces overseas, and our allies. Missile defense
cooperation strengthens capabilities across Europe to intercept Iranian
ballistic missiles and would send a strong signal to Iran--in addition
to those sent by U.S. and international sanctions and diplomacy--that
Iran's development of missiles and pursuit of nuclear capabilities is
reducing rather than enhancing Iranian security.
iraq
Question. President Obama has said that the withdrawal of all U.S.
military forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 marked the beginning of a
``new chapter'' in the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
In your view, what should be the nature of the long-term U.S.-Iraq
security relationship?
Answer. Developing a long-term security relationship with Iraq, as
part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security,
is one of the highest priorities. This relationship should include
consultation on regional security issues, and the continued development
of appropriate Iraqi military capabilities. The Strategic Framework
Agreement (SFA), as the roadmap for long-term relations, provides the
framework for the long-term strategic security relationship.
Question. What in your view are the greatest opportunities for
U.S.-Iraq security cooperation going forward, and, if confirmed, how
would you recommend that DOD pursue those opportunities?
Answer. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), under
Chief of Mission authority, is the cornerstone of the long-term U.S.-
Iraq strategic security partnership. It will serve as the main vehicle
to expand our security cooperation relationship with the Iraqis. On a
daily basis, the OSC-I coordinates security assistance and security
cooperation activities, and conducts training to support the
development and modernization of the Iraq Security Forces.
The Defense and Security Joint Coordination Committee (DSJCC),
established under the Strategic Framework Agreement, is another vehicle
to strengthen bilateral relations, including security cooperation. If
confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary for Policy in advancing
both of these important vehicles for expanding our security
cooperation.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges facing DOD
with regard to the U.S. security relationship with Iraq and, if
confirmed, how would you recommend meeting those challenges?
Answer. Ensuring Iraq's integration into the regional security
framework will remain an important task. The Department will need to
continue strengthening its security cooperation activities, while
helping to expand Iraq's military engagement with key regional
partners.
If confirmed, I would support the DSJCC and would seek to bolster
the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on a wide array of security matters.
Question. What is your assessment of the role that Iran is playing
within Iraq with respect to Iraq's internal security and stability?
Answer. The Iranian regime will continue to attempt to influence
the future of Iraq. However, we have seen that there are real limits to
Tehran's ability to affect the trajectory of Iraq. The Iraqi Security
Forces have demonstrated the ability to maintain security and prevent
the emergence of wide-scale violence.
Question. What additional steps, if any, should the United States
take to counter Iran's influence within Iraq?
Answer. The strong, sovereign, self-reliant Iraq we see emerging
today has no desire to be dominated by Iran or by anyone else. Iraqi
nationalism is real and powerful, and the Iraqis have consistently
shown their willingness to resist the Iranians and their surrogates
when Tehran has overreached. The Iraqis have made clear that they
desire a strong and enduring relationship with the United States under
the SFA.
For DOD, building the capacity of our partners in the region is a
vital avenue for countering destabilizing Iranian activities in Iraq.
These efforts have helped shore up the ability of our regional partners
to defend themselves. The Foreign Military Sales program with Iraq is
the fourth largest in the Middle East and the ninth largest in the
world. That represents an Iraqi alignment with the U.S., not Iran. In
countering Iranian influence within Iraq, it is important for us to
continue to build on this strategic relationship.
iran
Question. The President said: ``America is determined to prevent
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no option off the
table to achieve that goal.''
Do you agree that we should leave all options on the table with
respect to Iran? If so, why? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the President that all options should
remain on the table to address Iran's illicit activities. It is DOD's
responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent
military planning, refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests
from Iranian aggression. However, I continue to believe that diplomacy
and economic pressure are the most effective tools for changing Iranian
behavior at this time.
Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD for
advancing the President's policy with respect to Iran?
Answer. DOD plays a supporting role in the whole-of-government
strategy of engagement and pressure toward Iran, which is led by the
Departments of State and Treasury. In addition to DOD's support of
interagency efforts, it is the responsibility of DOD to plan for all
contingencies, and to provide the President with a wide range of
military options should they become necessary.
Question. What more do you believe the United States and the
international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a
nuclear weapons program? Specifically, what actions do you believe that
DOD ought to undertake to support diplomatic efforts to dissuade Iran
from pursuing a nuclear weapon?
Answer. The United States has a dual-track strategy of engagement
and pressure. With the broad support of the international community,
the United States has steadily increased the pressure on the Iranian
regime to meet its international obligations. The next round of P5+1
talks is set for May 23. In support of the whole-of-government
strategy, DOD builds partnership capacity in the region, maintains a
robust force presence to enhance stability and deter regional
aggression, and conducts prudent defense planning.
gulf security cooperation
Question. The administration has been working with Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) governments to enhance regional cooperation and security
against ballistic missile threats, particularly from Iran.
What is your view of the potential for missile defense cooperation
within the GCC to enhance regional security, and how do you see this
potential cooperation fitting into the U.S. missile defense efforts in
the Middle East?
Answer. GCC interest in missile defense cooperation is increasing
in response to the growing ballistic missile challenges to regional
security. During the inaugural U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in
March, foreign ministers stressed the need to expand individual and
bilateral missile defense cooperation to more multi-lateral
collaboration. Greater GCC interest and involvement in missile defense,
including through acquisition of advance missile defense technologies
and participation in multi-lateral training and exercises, will
complement U.S. missile defense efforts and enhance the overall
regional security architecture.
Question. What role do you see for the sale to the United Arab
Emirates of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot
missile defense systems in regional security against Iranian missile
threats?
Answer. The acquisition of THAAD, advanced Patriot missile
batteries, and other missile defense technologies bolsters Gulf
nations' capabilities to defend against a growing number of regional
air and missile threats. Partner nations' procurement of ballistic
missile defense (BMD) platforms will lead to improved cooperation and
help promote interoperability with U.S. BMD assets and enhance overall
regional missile defense.
post-arab spring military-to-military engagement
Question. The past 18 months have brought great change to the
Middle East and North Africa. These changes may require adjustments to
our military-to-military engagement efforts throughout the region.
What is your understanding of U.S. military-to-military engagement
in the Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, and
other countries in the region), and what changes--if any--would you
advocate for in light of the Arab Spring?
Answer. The developments of the so-called Arab Awakening present
both strategic opportunities and challenges for U.S. interests in the
region, and more specifically for U.S. defense objectives. Events of
the Arab Awakening have clearly demonstrated that military-to-military
partnerships are critical for protecting enduring U.S. security
interests, and also for providing a channel through which U.S. defense
officials can discuss the importance of reform. As partner governments
in transition continue to implement reform agendas, our military-to-
military relationships remain vital. If confirmed, I will work to
continue to use our security partnerships to deliver messages on
reform, focus U.S. security assistance and cooperation activities to
elevate reform in the security sector, and leverage our military-to-
military relationships to mitigate the risks that arise from the
uncertain trajectory of regional developments.
israel
Question. With regard to our relationship with Israel, President
Obama has stated: ``Our military and intelligence cooperation has never
been closer. Our joint exercises and training have never been more
robust. Despite a tough budget environment, our security assistance has
increased every year. We are investing in new capabilities. We're
providing Israel with more advanced technology--the type of products
and systems that only go to our closest friends and allies. Make no
mistake: we will do what it takes to preserve Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge--because Israel must always have the ability to defend
itself, by itself, against any threat.''
Do you agree with President Obama's position and views with regard
to the U.S. security relationship with Israel?
Answer. Yes. The statement that the U.S.-Israel defense
relationship is stronger than ever is backed by unprecedented actions
that the administration has taken over the past 3 years to improve
Israel's security and ensure its Qualitative Military Edge to defend
itself, by itself, against any enemy, to include previously unmatched
levels of Foreign Military Financing, missile defense funding for
Israel's multi-tier rocket and missile defense architecture, and a more
expansive set of military exercises. This fifth-generation fighter
technology will also ensure Israel's aerial superiority for decades to
come. These are just a few examples of the hundreds of tangible efforts
that are underway to improve Israel's security.
libya
Question. Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector saved
countless Libyans from the potential slaughter at the hands of Muammar
Qadhafi and his regime and--ultimately--they also ended a more than 4-
decade long reign of a brutal dictator.
What is your understanding of U.S. policy toward Libya in the post-
Qadhafi era?
Answer. It is in U.S. interests to build strong ties with the new
Libyan Government and support the Libyans through their transition to
democracy, in coordination with our partners and the United Nations
(U.N.).
Libya is a resource-rich country and can be expected to fund its
own reconstruction. However, during this sensitive transition period,
the administration believes it is prudent to support limited activities
that are critical to U.S. interests to ensure they take place, such as
the collection and destruction of MANPADS.
On security policy, I understand that DOD is committed to working
with the Libyan Ministry of Defense to encourage a unified, capable,
and apolitical military that can effectively deny access to extremists
and maintain effective control over its weaponry--including WMD--that
is respectful of human rights, and that will be able to work
constructively with its neighbors toward regional stability.
Question. What is your understanding of the military-to-military
relationship between the United States and Libya?
Answer. Following the end of Operation Unified Protector, I
understand that DOD is focused on normalizing the bilateral military-
to-military relationship and on mitigating the regional fall-out
resulting from the turbulence of last year. Given Libya's substantial
national assets, the United States is seeking to undertake low-cost,
high-impact activities in close coordination with partners and the U.N.
Within this context, I understand DOD is prioritizing assistance to
focus on building institutional capacity and on improving the Libyans'
ability to counter terrorism, counter weapons proliferation, and secure
and destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles.
It is my understanding that DOD has offered the Libyan Ministry of
Defense advisory support through the Defense Institute Reform
Initiative and Global Ministry of Defense Advisors programs to assist
in the process of establishing defense institutions and armed forces.
Other projected activities include non-lethal train-and-equip missions,
invitations to multilateral military exercises, professional military
education at U.S. institutions, and English language training.
Question. What opportunities and challenges does post-Qadhafi Libya
present to the United States? If confirmed, what actions would you
undertake to take advantage of and to address these opportunities and
challenges?
Answer. Libya is still very much a country in transition. Its
prospects are good, but the path to democracy is difficult. There have
been sporadic instances of militia violence, retributive attacks, and
power jockeying. The U.S. Government is taking these events seriously,
but recognizes that they are not systematic or occurring on a scale
that represents a serious threat to the stability of the new
government.
While the challenges are great, the opportunities are even greater.
There is tremendous goodwill towards the United States in Libya right
now, and there is a unique opportunity to forge a strong and mutually
beneficial relationship with a newly emerging democracy.
The Libyan Government understands the need to consolidate control
over the militias and I understand that senior Libyan officials have
assured DOD that they consider the establishment of a national army and
police force top priorities. Indeed, progress is already being made in
this area.
ballistic missile defense
Question. In February 2010, DOD issued its report on the first-ever
comprehensive review of U.S. BMD policy and strategy, the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR
established a number of policy priorities, including establishing
defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of
missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities.
Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?
Answer. Yes, I support the policies, strategies, and priorities set
forth in the 2010 Report of the BMDR.
Question. Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally
sustainable?
Answer. Yes. DOD has tailored its budget request to fiscal
requirements. The Department has used a clear set of priorities to
guide spending decisions in this mission area. It has protected our top
missile defense priorities, including defending the Homeland,
implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and pursuing
Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAA) in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific.
Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a PAA to missile defense in Europe.
This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and
emerging threats from Iranian missiles, increasing in capability with
each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the EPAA is intended to provide a
capability to defend against potential future long-range missiles from
Iran that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing
Homeland missile defense capability.
Do you support the PAA to missile defense in Europe and, if
confirmed, will you implement it?
Answer. Yes, I support the EPAA and, if confirmed, I will support
its implementation.
Question. Do you agree that any BMD systems (BMDS) that we deploy
operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable,
cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?
Answer. Yes. I believe that DOD should continue to subject new BMD
capabilities to testing under realistic operational conditions against
realistic targets. DOD should invest in BMD capabilities that are
fiscally sustainable over the long-term, mobile, and relocatable.
Question. Do you agree that BMD testing needs to be operationally
realistic, and should include operational test and evaluation, in order
to assess operational capabilities and limitations of BMDS, prior to
deploying such systems?
Answer. Yes. U.S. BMD testing needs to be operationally realistic
and include robust operational test and evaluation. Realistic testing
of the system allows us to field new capabilities as they become
available and integrate them into the BMDS architecture. The fly-
before-you-buy policy outlined in the Report of the BMDR still makes
good sense.
Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of
sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced
that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
capabilities.
Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
Iran, and could send a powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade
Iran not to pursue long-range missiles or nuclear weapons?
Answer. Yes. I believe that missile defense cooperation with Russia
could strengthen common defenses against Iranian missiles, and send an
important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working
together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic
missiles.
Question. Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the
United States is committed to the continued development and deployment
of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative
improvements to such systems, needed to meet our security needs?
Answer. Yes. The United States has pursued missile defense
cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we would not
accept constraints on missile defense and that we would undertake
necessary qualitative and quantitative improvements to meet U.S.
security needs.
al qaeda
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda,
its affiliates, and adherents in the geographical area of
responsibility (AOR) for ASD(ISA) to the United States, our allies, and
our interests?
Answer. In the ISA AOR, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
poses the most direct threat to the United States. AQAP has exploited a
year of political unrest in Yemen to expand its area of operations in
remote provinces, and continues to threaten domestic stability while
actively plotting operations against the United States.
AQAP has strong connections to al-Shabaab in Somalia, which
represents a terrorist threat to the United States and its regional
interests and is an insurgent problem to the Somali Transitional
Federal Government and Somali regional administrations.
In Iraq, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been significantly weakened.
Shia militants continue to observe a cease-fire and are engaged in
reconciliation talks with the Government of Iraq. While AQI has
attempted to make a comeback, they do not pose a significant threat to
Iraq's overall stability.
AQI is also seeking to exploit instability in Syria, further
fueling an already volatile situation there. In North and West Africa,
al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) uses ungoverned
spaces in the Maghreb and Sahel as a safe haven. Originally focused on
overthrowing the Government of Algeria, AQIM evolved and now has a
stated intent to attack Western targets. There are clear indications
that AQIM is now involved in trafficking arms from Libya.
Question. What is your understanding of DOD's ongoing effort to
combat al Qaeda in the geographical AOR for ASD(ISA)?
Answer. The Department is working closely with multiple regional
and interagency partners to disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. The Department provides
training, advice, and assistance to regional security forces in order
to build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities and to
deny al Qaeda safe haven.
africa-related security matters
Question. The new DSG, ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense,'' announced by President Obama on
January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century
and the key military missions for which DOD will prepare. The primary
emphasis of the strategy relates to the Middle East and Asia. The
strategy makes little reference to Africa and its myriad security
challenges.
In light of the emphasis on areas outside of the African continent,
if confirmed, how would you draw attention to the myriad security
challenges confronting African nations?
Answer. The new DSG makes clear that from a regional prioritization
perspective, the Department will rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific
region. From a mission perspective, however, the guidance also clearly
directs a strong focus on counterterrorism and irregular warfare, in
particular holding al Qaeda and affiliates (AQAA) under constant
pressure wherever they may be. In light of this focus and growing AQAA
presence on the continent, I do not anticipate a lack of attention to
African security challenges.
countering the lord's resistance army
Question. On October 14, 2011, the President announced the
deployment of approximately 100 members of the U.S. Armed Forces to the
central Africa region to assist the efforts of regional militaries to
remove Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants from the battlefield.
What is your understanding of this ongoing operation in central
Africa?
Answer. The United States continues to pursue a multi-faceted,
comprehensive strategy to help the region eliminate the threat posed by
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The pillars of this strategy include
increasing protection of civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph
Kony and senior commanders from the battlefield; promoting the
defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining
LRA fighters; increasing humanitarian access; and providing continued
relief to affected communities.
One part of this strategy is the deployment of U.S. military
advisors to the LRA-affected region. As part of their advise-and-assist
mission, the military advisors are building relationships with military
and civilian leaders and working with regional forces to increase
overall effectiveness. It is too early to quantify the direct impact of
the deployment of U.S. advisors, but my understanding is that DOD is
satisfied with the steady progress of the deployment to date,
considering the complexity of the operating environment, the number of
partners involved, and the remoteness of the operational areas. As per
the President's announcement on April 23, the deployment of U.S. Forces
will continue. DOD will continue to regularly assess and review whether
we are making sufficient progress.
Question. If confirmed, what changes--if any--would you advocate to
make to this ongoing operation?
Answer. I look forward to becoming more familiar with this
operation, if I am confirmed. Based on my understanding of this
operation and its intent, I believe it is on the right track. I
understand that several areas for bolstering the operation have been
identified and are being addressed, including intelligence and
logistics capacity, building the capacity of partner forces, and
increasing LRA defections. If confirmed, I will work to reinforce these
efforts in the months ahead.
combating terrorism
Question. During the summer of 2011, the Obama administration
released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy
highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while
building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The
strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter
threats from al Qaeda-linked groups ``that continue to emerge from
beyond its core safe haven in South Asia.''
If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to
combating terrorism?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy in the formulation of national security and defense
policy on matters relating to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa,
including counterterrorism policy. My role, if confirmed, would be to
assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in formulating,
coordinating, and presenting the views of the Secretary on
counterterrorism policy issues. Currently, these are mainly focused on
the effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, which includes
operations and activities against its allies, adherents, and
affiliates, but we also recognize that there are other terrorist groups
that may seek to cause harm to the United States, its interests, and
allies.
Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
if confirmed, I would work closely in my performance of these duties
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the DOD General
Counsel, the Joint Staff, and the other regional and functional
Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, particularly the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, who has the Department lead for all special
operations and low-intensity conflict matters. I would carefully
consider the views of our interagency colleagues and international
partners to craft whole-of-government solutions to counterterrorism
problems.
multilateral peacekeeping operations
Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to consider
directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers,
civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I
should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
additional military personnel to both staff positions and military
observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. In general, if confirmed, I would support considering
additional contributions of U.S. military personnel to staff officer
positions, provided that they are positions that would add significant
value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for
the United States.
Support for international peacekeeping remains an important
security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a
stake in the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations. I believe that,
where practicable, the United States should continue to provide
military personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations, especially for key
staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the
mission. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate any proposals to
contribute military or civilian personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping
operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation
in the mission against other military commitments we have around the
globe, and the estimated cost of U.S. involvement.
Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
additional military personnel to U.N. operations?
Answer. There are several potential advantages to contributing
additional military personnel to U.N. missions: the opportunity to
shape these missions from the inside and contribute to the success of
the mission; professional development opportunities for military
personnel to serve in a combined, multi-lateral environment; and the
benefit of receiving real-time information and insights on emerging
threats and crises from places where there might not otherwise be a
U.S. presence. It also enables an increased professional interaction by
U.S. military personnel with numerous partner nations' military
personnel, with whom we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.
The potential disadvantage of providing additional military
personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a
U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent
years, and that is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do
not believe that the United States will be in a position to provide
significant numbers of military personnel to peacekeeping missions at
anytime in the near future. However, I believe the selective placement
of even modest numbers or U.S. military personnel, in addition to the
personnel we currently have assigned to U.N. operation, can have a
significant, positive effect on U.N. peacekeeping operations.
special operations authorities
Question. Some have advocated providing the Commander of U.S.
Special Operations Command with new authorities that would, among other
things, better resource the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC)
and provide Special Operations Forces with additional flexibility and
funding to build the capacity of partner nation security forces.
Do you believe additional special operations-specific authorities
are appropriate? If so, what types of authorities would you suggest?
Answer. It is my understanding that the TSOCs are essential to all
facets of the Geographic Combatant Commanders' (GCC) engagement and
campaign plans. The Department is currently conducting a full-scale
review of authorities to guarantee that it is providing the TSOCs the
flexibility and agility to best meet GCC objectives.
u.s. military basing in europe
Question. DOD has announced reductions of approximately 10,000 of
the 80,000 U.S. military personnel currently stationed in Europe,
including 2 of 4 brigade combat teams (BCT) in Europe drawing down over
the next 2 years.
Do you support the decision to reduce the U.S. Force posture in
Europe, including the drawdown of two of four BCTs?
Answer. Yes, I support Secretary Panetta's decision to adjust the
U.S. force posture in Europe, including the inactivation of two BCTs.
Over the past 10 years, forces assigned to the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) were frequently deployed into the U.S. Central Command AOR, so
a steady state of two BCTs in Europe now would be an improvement in
availability. The two remaining BCTs will provide the EUCOM Commander
with adequate ground maneuver capability to meet operational and
training requirements. To mitigate the impact of inactivating two BCTs,
the Department is preparing to initiate the periodic rotation of a
maneuver battalion task force into the EUCOM AOR in order to promote
enhanced capacity and interoperability with our European allies and
partners.
Question. Do you believe that further reductions in the U.S. Force
posture in Europe are in order? Why or why not?
Answer. Maintaining interoperability with European militaries is
critical to our ability to form effective coalitions to address global
security challenges. As coalition operations in Afghanistan wind down,
our ability to train with European allies and partners to prepare for
future missions is essential. Therefore, we must maintain a strong
presence in Europe, emphasizing combined training, exercises and
military cooperation, as well as new capabilities, such as missile
defense. To this end, we must reorient the remaining U.S. ground forces
and plans for a U.S. Army rotational battalion toward broad-spectrum
training, continue implementation of the EPAA (the United States has
already established a radar system in Turkey and will be stationing SM-
3 missiles in Romania and Poland and forward deploying four BMD-capable
ships to Spain), and create an aviation detachment in Poland.
arms control
Question. What role will you have, if confirmed, in future arms
control negotiations, such as a follow-on to the New START treaty?
Answer. Negotiation of arms control agreements, such as a follow-on
to the New START treaty, is the responsibility of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. If confirmed, I will
work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic
Affairs in supporting any future negotiation. Arms control plays an
important role in advancing U.S. national security by providing
predictability and stability in certain strategic relationships,
particularly in U.S.-Russian relations. Arms control should never be an
end unto itself; nor is it a tool that can be employed without the
context of a well-prepared and effective military force.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the provisions of section 1403 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 which state
that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the
U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall
be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment?
Answer. I believe the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment is clearly in America's best strategic interest
and consistent with American values. During the long history of the
Cold War, when America's way of life was challenged by a powerful
competing ideology, we were ultimately successful, in part, because we
held true to the best ideals and principles that sustained America as a
shining beacon to millions under totalitarian rule. Power in the 21st
century will stem as much from the strength and appeal of our ideas and
moral principles as from our military might. If we are to defeat
violent extremism, we must hold true to those ideas that make this
country great and continue to inspire the growth of freedom and
tolerance around the world.
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes, I will.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(ISA)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
nuclear modernization
1. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) and during the discussion on the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START), the administration made substantial commitments to the
sustainment and modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Enhanced
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile,
modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and maintenance of the
nuclear delivery systems are integral to maintaining our nuclear
deterrence. Do you support the triad of bombers with gravity bombs and
nuclear cruise missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)?
Mr. Chollet. The NPR concluded that U.S. nuclear weapons--including
the U.S. triad of ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers--have played an essential role in
extending deterrence against nuclear attacks or nuclear-backed coercion
to our allies and partners. The review determined that each leg of the
triad presents advantages that warrant the United States retaining the
triad under the New START. I agree with the review's analysis and
support its conclusion that retaining each of the three triad legs will
best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging
against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.
2. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, it has been reported that President
Obama is weighing options for sharp new cuts to our nuclear arsenal
unilaterally, potentially up to 80 percent, proposing 3 plans that
could limit the number to as low as 300. Is the United States
considering unilaterally reducing its arsenal of nuclear weapons?
Mr. Chollet. The NPR states that in the near- to mid-term, the
United States will reduce its strategic-deployed nuclear force through
arms control agreements with Russia, initially by the New START. The
NPR envisions further negotiations with Russia after the entry-into-
force of the New START aimed at achieving additional reductions. As
Secretary Panetta recently testified, the Department has presented
options for reducing the nuclear arsenal to the President, but these
options are not unilateral--rather, they are based on potential
bilateral negotiations with Russia.
3. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, how would a unilateral reduction
impact our ability to deter, provide extended deterrence, and defend
ourselves, if attacked?
Mr. Chollet. The NPR states that any future nuclear reductions must
ensure deterrence of potential adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-
vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. It also
states that implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and
nuclear infrastructure investments will facilitate reductions while
sustaining deterrence under the New START and beyond. The NPR makes
clear that Russia's nuclear force will remain a significant factor in
determining how much and how fast the United States is prepared to
reduce its nuclear forces. Since any planned reduction will take these
factors into consideration, such a reduction would not negatively
impact the ability of the United States to deter, provide extended
deterrence, and defend itself.
4. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, how would unilateral reductions
affect nuclear proliferation?
Mr. Chollet. I agree with the NPR determination that reducing the
role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons would strengthen the United
States' ability to persuade our Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
partners to adopt similar measures needed to reinvigorate the
nonproliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.
5. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, is it important to maintain our
nuclear triad?
Mr. Chollet. Yes. As the NPR determined, each leg of the U.S. triad
of ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers presents advantages that warrant the United States
retaining the triad under New START. I agree with the review's analysis
and support its conclusion that retaining each of the three triad legs
will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while
hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.
6. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, are you committed to the nuclear
modernization plan, referred to as the 1251 plan, that was the basis
for Senate support for the New START Treaty?
Mr. Chollet. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting, within my
area of responsibility as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, the NPR's objective of maintaining a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. The NPR makes clear that
in order to remain safe, secure, and effective, the U.S. nuclear
stockpile must be supported by a modern physical infrastructure. While
the Department is committed to the 1251 Report, it is my understanding
that budget cuts may require changes to the implementation of the NPR
and the 1251 Report.
7. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, do you support modernization of our
nuclear weapons labs, and if so, would you characterize this funding as
national security activities?
Mr. Chollet. I fully support the modernization of our nuclear
weapons labs. As stated in the NPR, increased investments in nuclear
infrastructure and a highly skilled workforce are needed to ensure the
long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal.
Funding for modernization supports the full range of nuclear security
work, including nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear
counterterrorism, emergency management, intelligence analysis, and
treaty verification--all of which I would characterize funding for
modernization of our nuclear weapons labs as funding to support
national security activities.
strategy pivot to asia
8. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, what has changed globally that
allows the United States to decrease the size of its military?
Mr. Chollet. As Secretary Panetta has said, the United States is at
a strategic turning point after a decade of war. The U.S. military's
mission in Iraq has ended and we are enabling a transition of security
responsibility in Afghanistan. Targeted counterterrorism efforts have
significantly weakened al Qaeda and decimated its leadership. Although
Congress has mandated that the Department of Defense achieve
significant defense savings, a strategic shift was necessary regardless
of the Nation's fiscal situation. As the President and Secretary have
made clear, the reductions the Department is proposing are driven by
rigorous analysis of the changing security environment. The U.S. Joint
Force will be smaller and leaner, but it will be more agile, more
flexible, ready to deploy quickly, innovative, and technologically-
advanced--prepared to meet complex future challenges. Moreover, the
Secretary has said that the reductions in the Nation's ground forces
will be structured in such a way that the forces can surge, regenerate,
and mobilize capabilities needed for any contingency.
9. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, has the world become more secure--
has there been an increase in stability in the Middle East, Eastern
Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Asia?
Mr. Chollet. I believe that the global security environment is
changing and presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and
opportunities--which brings opportunities for both greater stability
and instability.
For example, it is clear that U.S. economic and security interests
are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the
Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South
Asia. Building and sustaining relationships with allies and key
partners in this region will be critical to the future stability and
growth of the region. In the Middle East, regime changes as a
consequence of the Arab Spring, as well as tensions within and among
states under pressure to reform, present strategic opportunities but
also uncertainties. Europe remains our principal partner in seeking
global and economic security and stability, yet security challenges and
unresolved conflicts persist in parts of Europe and Eurasia--and the
economic crises in Europe are deeply concerning. In Africa, a number of
urgent challenges remain--including terrorist threats, humanitarian
crises, and armed conflicts--and we must continue working with African
partners to help foster stability and prosperity throughout the
continent. The United States must also pursue partnerships with the
growing number of Latin American nations whose interests and viewpoints
are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity.
If confirmed, I will work to strengthen America's alliances with
key partners and allies, as well as pursue relationships with new
strategic partners in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.
guantanamo bay
10. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, do you still believe we are
fighting the war on terrorism?
Mr. Chollet. The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism
articulates that our principal focus is on fighting those organizations
that pose the most direct and significant threats to the United
States--and during the past 3-plus years, we have been doing so with
greater lethality and precision. We continue relentlessly to fight a
war against al Qaeda, and its affiliates and adherents--and since 2009
we have eliminated more key al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin
Laden, in rapid succession than at any time since September 11, 2001.
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chollet, as we capture terrorists or other
high value targets, do you agree with long-term detention at Guantanamo
Bay as a primary course of action?
Mr. Chollet. As President Obama has made clear, the United States
must work to bring terrorists to justice, consistent with our
commitment to protect the American people and uphold our values. That's
why the Obama administration has worked to maintain a viable long-term
option to keep dangerous individuals off the battlefield and to ensure
they can no longer threaten the American people or our interests. The
administration remains committed to closing the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay, and to maintaining a lawful, sustainable, and
principled regime for the handling of detainees there, consistent with
the full range of U.S. national security interests.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
israeli participation
12. Senator Collins. Mr. Chollet, earlier this week it was reported
that Turkey refused to allow Israel to take part in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) summit occurring next month. What is the
U.S. view on Turkey's refusal to consider Israel's participation?
Mr. Chollet. Contrary to press reporting, NATO issues in which
Israel is an active partner, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue, are
not on the agenda for the Chicago Summit--so there was no intention to
invite Israel. Non-NATO nations attending the Chicago Summit were
invited to discuss specific summit agenda items related to the
International Security Assistance Force, the Northern Distribution
Network, and Smart Defense Initiatives.
However, I remain concerned about the continued tensions between
Turkey and Israel. Israel is a key security partner of the United
States and we would find unacceptable an attempt by any country to
disrupt our cooperation. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
Israel's partnership with the NATO alliance remains strong.
13. Senator Collins. Mr. Chollet, in general, do you believe that
Israel's participation in NATO activities has benefited the alliance,
and if so, what can the United States do to enable Israeli
participation?
Mr. Chollet. Israel continues to be an active and valued partner of
NATO through the alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue program. Israel's
participation benefits the alliance. Mediterranean Dialogue countries
work with NATO, both individually and as a group (Israel is one of
seven current Mediterranean Dialogue partners), for practical
cooperation as well as political dialogue. That cooperation includes
individual cooperation programs developed between NATO and each
respective Mediterranean Dialogue partner; Israel, in 2006, became the
first Mediterranean Dialogue country to develop such a program,
outlining its desires for cooperation with NATO, and it is now working
on an update. Israel actively engages in a full range of political
dialogue, including at top levels, both bilaterally with NATO and in
various NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue meetings. The United States
strongly values Israel as a NATO partner, supports and encourages this
partnership, and encourages other allies and partners to do so as well.
______
[The nomination reference of Mr. Derek H. Chollet follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
March 19, 2012.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Derek H. Chollet, of Nebraska, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense, vice Alexander Vershbow.
______
[The biographical sketch of Mr. Derek H. Chollet, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Derek H. Chollet
Education:
Cornell University
September 1989-May 1993
Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded May 1993
Columbia University, Department of Political Science
September 1995-1998
PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science
(passed exams in 1998)
Employment Record:
The White House, National Security Council Staff
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director for Strategic Planning
