[Senate Hearing 112-741]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-741
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
february 16, 2012
Page
Clapper, Hon. James R., Jr., Director of National Intelligence... 10
Burgess, LTG Ronald L., Jr., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 33
(iii)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Webb,
Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe,
Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Graham, and Cornyn.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas
K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
Counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F.
Phillips, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional
staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority general counsel; John
W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Paul C. Hutton
IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional
staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Hannah
I. Lloyd, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Bryon Manna,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad
Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Ethan Saxon,
assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch,
assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
Ayotte; Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham; and Dave
Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Let me start by
welcoming our witnesses for today's hearing on current and
longer-term threats and challenges around the world. We are
glad to have the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James
R. Clapper, Jr., and the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA,
as our witnesses. We thank you both for your long and continued
service to our Nation on behalf of our troops to whom we all
owe so much.
This committee has a special responsibility to the men and
women of our Armed Forces to be vigilant about intelligence
programs because the safety of our troops, decisions on whether
or not to use military force, and the planning for military
operations depend so heavily on intelligence.
The security situation in Afghanistan remains one of our
highest priority threats for our Intelligence Community. In the
last year, there are clear signs of progress. Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) are in the lead in providing security in
Kabul, including during the gathering of over 2,000 Afghan
leaders for their recent loya jirga last November. The Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are in
charge of security in former Taliban strongholds in southern
Afghanistan. In addition, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Defense planners have developed a plan for the ministries'
combined team operations for 2012 and 2013. The ANA is widely
respected, and even the ANP, traditionally lagging far behind
in that virtue, are gaining increasing respect among the Afghan
people. Nevertheless, security remains fragile.
A key to progress on security in Afghanistan is the process
of transitioning the lead for securing the Afghan people from
coalition forces to the Afghan security forces. The transition
process is underway and continues apace, with the Afghan army
and police assuming the security lead in more and more areas
throughout the country. We heard on Tuesday from the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, that the
transition process is on track to meet the goal of having the
ANSF take the lead throughout Afghanistan by 2014.
Successful transition is going to depend on a number of
factors, including the growth in the capabilities of the ANA
and ANP and their readiness to take the security lead; the
nature of the insurgency; and progress on reconciliation talks.
We would be interested in hearing our witnesses' assessment of
the current security situation in Afghanistan and their views
on the progress both in terms of providing security and of
transition and the possibilities for reconciliation with the
Taliban.
I am concerned by recent news reports that the latest
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reflects a difference of
views between the Intelligence Community and our military
commanders over the security situation in Afghanistan.
According to these news reports, the NIE contains a set of
additional comments endorsed by coalition commander General
Allen, Ambassador Crocker, U.S. Central Command Commander
General Mattis, and U.S. European Command Commander Admiral
Stavridis, disagreeing with the NIE's assessment relative to
the sustainability of security gains particularly in the south.
I hope our witnesses will address this alleged difference of
views in the recent NIE.
Security in Afghanistan is going to remain in jeopardy so
long as there continues to be sanctuary in Pakistan for
insurgents conducting cross-border attacks against U.S.,
coalition, and Afghan forces, and against the Afghan people.
Pakistan's refusal to go after the safe havens of the Haqqani
network in North Waziristan and of the Afghan Taliban Shura in
Quetta belies Pakistan's assertions that it is committed to
peace and security in the region. Pakistan's support for the
Haqqani network, which former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Admiral Mullen called a ``veritable arm'' of the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Pakistan's
intelligence agency, is a major cause for U.S.-Pakistan
relations reaching a low point, where they are going to remain
until the Pakistan military ends its ties to these militant
extremists carrying out cross-border attacks.
We need to understand the Intelligence Community's
assessment of Pakistan's strategy with respect to these
insurgent groups and the reconciliation process and as to
Pakistan's power to determine outcomes.
The U.S. campaign against the global jihadist movement, as
Director Clapper's opening statement calls it, had a number of
significant successes in the last year, notably operations
against Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. These successes
struck major blows to al Qaeda's senior leadership and to one
of its most active affiliates. As a result of these operations
and sustained pressure in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North
Africa, al Qaeda and its affiliates are showing strain. We
would be interested in the Intelligence Community's assessment
of last week's announcement of a merger between al Qaeda and al
Shabaab and whether it signals an increased threat to the
United States and our interests in Somalia.
Last August, the President issued Presidential Study
Directive 10 which identifies the prevention of mass atrocities
and genocide as a core national security interest and moral
responsibility of the United States. I am pleased to see
Director Clapper has included in his testimony a discussion of
the importance of the prevention of mass atrocities and the
need for the Intelligence Community to report on these
incidents rapidly so as to inform policymakers of these deeply
concerning events.
Over the past year, the international community has acted
to prevent a mass atrocity in Libya, but we are currently
witnessing a mass atrocity in Syria. These tragedies have
resulted in deaths of many civilians seeking their universal
freedoms and destabilized a sensitive region that is critical
to the United States and our allies.
Now, relative to Iran, which is obviously a major topic,
there is a strong bipartisan determination on this committee
and in this Congress to do all that we can to counter the
threat posed by Iran and, in particular, to stop Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. In the most recent National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), we made a major breakthrough with
respect to Iran sanctions by requiring foreign financial
institutions to choose between maintaining ties with the U.S.
financial system or doing business with the Central Bank of
Iran, especially relative to the purchase of Iranian petroleum
and related products. President Obama has appropriately focused
considerable and determined diplomatic effort ``to prevent Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon,'' and he has repeatedly said
there are ``no options off the table to achieve that goal.''
The American people are entitled to a clear Intelligence
Community estimate about the length of time it would take Iran
to construct a usable nuclear weapon, if and when they decide
to produce one, and how likely is it that they will decide to
do so.
An additional matter of concern with regard to Iran was
raised in a recent report discussing Iran's apparent
willingness to host and support senior al Qaeda leaders and
facilitators. This is a matter that has not received a great
deal of attention in recent years. However, if true, Iran's
sanctuary of al Qaeda could preserve some of the group's most
senior leaders and potentially provide Iran with a dangerous
proxy. The committee looks forward to the Director's testimony
on that matter as well.
On Syria, the recent veto by Russia and China of the Arab
League-drafted resolution at the United Nations Security
Council has bolstered the Assad regime and has regrettably
demonstrated the willingness of China and Russia to support
regimes seeking to crush individuals who are seeking a better
and a freer life. We hope that the Directors here will share
with the committee what we know about the individuals seeking
to overthrow the Assad regime, what we know about who is
supplying the Assad regime with weapons, what the regime's
intentions are, and what we know about the willingness of the
Syrian military to continue to kill and maim their own
countrymen.
Relative to Iraq, despite the political, economic, and
security challenges that confront Iraq, the government's
leaders appear to be willing to work generally together to
resolve issues politically rather than through violence. While
there is much this new democracy needs to do to build a new and
truly pluralistic, stable, and sovereign nation, we would like
to hear our witnesses' views on the Iraqis' progress to date
and outlook for stability and political compromise. We also
would be interested in the risk of unchecked Iranian influence
in Iraq and what is the Iraqi Government's commitment and
capability to deal with that influence or their willingness to
deal with that influence.
I am going to put my comments relative to China and the
Asia-Pacific region in general in the record and end with just
a comment on cybersecurity.
Director Clapper's prepared statement indicates that the
Intelligence Community places the cybersecurity threat to our
country and our economy in the top tier of threats, alongside
of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). That is surely where that cyber threat
belongs. A recent report from the National Counterintelligence
Executive stated that entities operating from within China and
Russia are responsible for the massive and routine theft of
U.S. commercial and military technology, and that could
threaten our national security and our prosperity. It is
important to know what our Intelligence Community regards this
economic espionage as, whether it is a significant national
security threat, and also whether that view is shared by our
policymakers, and whether China would believe that we are just
bluffing if we talk about ending normal trade relations if the
economic espionage and counterfeiting and theft of our
intellectual property do not end.
Before turning to Senator McCain for his opening remarks
and then to our witnesses for their testimony, I would like to
remind everyone that we have arranged for a closed session in
room SVC-217, the Office of Senate Security, located in the
Capitol Visitor Center, following this open session, in the
event that such a closed session is necessary.
Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
I would like to welcome our witnesses for today's hearing on
current and longer-term threats and challenges around the world. We are
glad to have the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, and
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Ron
Burgess, as our witnesses today. We thank you for your long and
continued service to the Nation on behalf of our troops to whom we owe
so much.
This committee has a special responsibility to the men and women of
our Armed Forces to be vigilant about intelligence programs because the
safety of our troops, decisions on whether or not to use military
force, and the planning for military operations depend so heavily on
intelligence.
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
The security situation in Afghanistan remains one of the highest
priority threats for our Intelligence Community. In the last year,
there are clear signs of progress. Afghan security forces are in the
lead in providing security in Kabul, including during the gathering of
over 2,000 Afghan leaders for the recent Loya Jirga last November. The
Afghan Army and Police are in charge of security in former Taliban
strongholds in southern Afghanistan. In addition, Ministry of Interior
and Ministry of Defense planners have developed a plan for the
ministries' combined team operations for 2012 and 2013. The Afghan Army
is widely respected, and even the Afghan Police, traditionally lagging
far behind in that virtue, are gaining increasing respect among the
Afghan people. According to a United Nations survey last month, the
number of Afghans who expressed personal respect for the Afghan Police
has increased to 81 percent, up 8 percent from the year before.
Nonetheless, security remains fragile.
A key to progress on security in Afghanistan is the process of
transitioning the lead for securing the Afghan people from coalition
forces to the Afghan security forces. The transition process is
underway and continues apace, with the Afghan Army and Police assuming
the security lead in more and more areas throughout the country. By
later this year, approximately 50 percent of the Afghan population will
live in areas where Afghan security forces have assumed the lead for
providing security, supported by coalition forces. We heard on Tuesday
from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey that the
transition process is on track to meet the goal, agreed by Presidents
Obama and Karzai and endorsed at the NATO Lisbon Summit, to have Afghan
security forces in the lead for security throughout all Afghanistan by
2014.
Successful transition will depend on a number of factors,
including: the growth in the capabilities of the Afghan Army and Police
and their readiness to take the security lead; the nature of the
insurgency; and progress on reconciliation talks. We would be
interested in hearing our witnesses' assessment of the current security
situation in Afghanistan and their views on the progress both in terms
of providing security and of transition, and the possibilities for
reconciliation with the Taliban.
I am concerned by recent news reports that the latest National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reflects a difference of views between the
Intelligence Community and our military commanders over the security
situation in Afghanistan, particularly in the south. According to these
reports, the NIE contains a set of additional comments endorsed by
Coalition Commander General John Allen, Ambassador Ryan Crocker,
Central Command Commander General Mattis, and European Command
Commander Admiral Stavridis, disagreeing with the NIE's assessment of
the sustainability of security gains in the south. I hope that our
witnesses will address this alleged difference of views in the recent
NIE.
Security in Afghanistan will remain in jeopardy so long as there
continues to be sanctuary in Pakistan for insurgents conducting cross-
border attacks against U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces and the
Afghan people. Pakistan's refusal to go after the safe havens of the
Haqqani network in North Waziristan and of the Afghan Taliban Shura in
Quetta belies Pakistan's assertions that it is committed to peace and
security in the region. Pakistan's support to the Haqqani network,
which former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen
called a ``veritable arm'' of the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency,
is a major cause for U.S.-Pakistan relations reaching a low point,
where they will remain until the Pakistan military ends its ties to
these militant extremists carrying out cross-border attacks.
We need to understand the Intelligence Community's assessment of
Pakistan's strategy with respect to these insurgent groups and the
reconciliation process, and as to Pakistan's power to determine
outcomes.
TERRORISM THREATS
The U.S. campaign against the global jihadist movement--as Director
Clapper's opening statement calls it--had a number of significant
successes in the last year--most notably operations against Osama bin
Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. These successes struck major blows to al
Qaeda's senior leadership and one of its most active affiliates, al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As a result of these operations and
sustained pressure in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa, al
Qaeda and its affiliates are showing strain. The committee is also
interested in the Intelligence Community's assessment of last week's
announcement of a merger between al Qaeda and al Shabab and whether it
signals an increased threat to the United States and our interests from
Somalia.
MASS ATROCITIES
Last August, the President issued Presidential Study Directive-10
which identifies the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a
core national security interest and moral responsibility of the United
States. I am pleased to see that Director Clapper has included in his
testimony a discussion of the importance of the prevention of mass
atrocities, and the need for the Intelligence Community to report on
these incidents rapidly so as to inform policymakers of these deeply
concerning events.
Over the past year, the international community has acted to
prevent a mass atrocity in Libya and is currently witnessing a mass
atrocity in Syria. These tragedies have resulted in the deaths of many
civilians seeking their universal freedoms and destabilized a sensitive
region that is critical to the United States and our allies.
IRAN
There is a strong bipartisan determination on this committee and in
this Congress to do all we can to counter the threat posed by Iran and,
in particular, to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the most
recent National Defense Authorization Act, we made a real breakthrough
with respect to Iran sanctions by requiring foreign financial
institutions to choose between maintaining ties with the U.S. financial
system or doing business with the Central Bank of Iran, especially
relative to the purchase of Iranian petroleum and related products.
President Obama has appropriately focused considerable and determined
diplomatic effort ``to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,''
and he has repeatedly said there are ``no options off the table to
achieve that goal.''
The American people are entitled to a clear Intelligence Community
estimate about the length of time it would take Iran to construct a
usable nuclear weapon if or when they decide to produce one and how
likely it is that they will decide to do so.
An additional matter of concern with regard to Iran was raised in a
recent report discussing Iran's apparent willingness to host and
support senior al Qaeda leaders and facilitators. This is a matter that
has not received a great deal of attention in recent years. However, if
true, Iran's sanctuary of al Qaeda could preserve some of the group's
most senior leaders and--potentially--provide Iran with a dangerous
proxy. In recent congressional testimony, Director Clapper indicated
that sustained pressure on al Qaeda has the potential to reduce the
group to roaming criminal bands, but Iran's continued support could
contribute to a future resurgence. The committee looks forward to the
Director's testimony on these matters.
ARAB SPRING/EGYPT/SYRIA
The upheavals of the Arab Spring have had significant implications
for security and stability in the Middle East and North Africa. In
Egypt, the first democratically elected incoming government in more
than three decades, which is comprised of the Muslim Brotherhood and
more conservative religious parties, is an unknown entity. The
disposition of the Americans charged in the ongoing probe against
organizations building the capacity of Egypt's civil society is also of
great concern to many members of this committee. The committee looks
forward to Director Clapper's assessment of the new government's
intentions relative to these matters.
On Syria, the recent veto by Russia and China of the Arab League-
drafted resolution at the United Nations Security Council has bolstered
the Assad regime and has regrettably demonstrated the willingness of
Russia and China to support regimes seeking to crush individuals
seeking a better and freer life. I hope Director Clapper will share
with the committee what we know about the individuals seeking to
overthrow the Assad regime, what we know about who is supplying the
Assad regime with weapons, what the regime's intentions are, and what
we know about the willingness of the Syrian military to continue to
kill and maim their own countrymen.
IRAQ
Despite the political, economic, and security challenges that
confront Iraq, the government's leaders appear to be willing to work
generally together to resolve issues politically rather than through
violence. While there is much this new democracy needs to do to build a
truly pluralistic, stable, and sovereign nation, we would like to hear
the witnesses' views on the Iraqis' progress to date and outlook for
stability and political compromise. We also look forward to the
witnesses' assessment of the security situation in Iraq, the risk of
unchecked Iranian influence, and the Iraqi Government's commitment and
capability to improve political and economic conditions.
ASIA PACIFIC
One of the main components of the President's recently announced
Defense Strategic Guidance is to rebalance force structure and
investments toward the Asia Pacific and this strategic focus is most
appropriate and timely.
The recent death of long-time North Korean dictator Kim Jong il has
resulted in an abrupt, uncertain leadership change for a rogue nation
with ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities.
The lack of transparency associated with China's rapid military
growth, coupled with China's assertiveness, particularly in the South
and East China Seas, increases the potential for instability and
miscalculation.
These and other challenges underscore the need to continue and
enhance the U.S. military's commitment to the Asia Pacific and to
develop and strengthen alliances and partnerships in the region.
Director Clapper's prepared statement attributes China's recent
crackdown on internal dissension to concern among Chinese leaders about
contagious effects of the Arab Spring. We would like to hear from
Director Clapper whether there are, in fact, any reverberations in
China from the uprisings in the Middle East, as well as the
Intelligence Community's expectations regarding China's reaction to the
President's strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.
CYBERSECURITY
Director Clapper's prepared statement indicates that the
Intelligence Community places the cybersecurity threat to our country
and our economy in the top tier of threats, alongside terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That's surely where it
belongs. A recent report from the National Counterintelligence
Executive stated that entities operating from within China and Russia
are responsible for the massive routine theft of U.S. commercial and
military technology that could threaten national security and
prosperity. It is important to know whether Director Clapper regards
this economic espionage as a significant national security threat and
whether that view is shared by policymakers, and whether China would
believe we are just bluffing if we talk about ending normal trade
relations if the economic espionage and counterfeiting and theft of our
intellectual property do not end.
Before turning to Senator McCain for his opening remarks, and our
witnesses for their testimony, I would remind everyone that we have
arranged for a closed session in room SVC-217, the Office of Senate
Security, located in the Capitol Visitor Center, following this open
session, if that is necessary.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming Director Clapper and General
Burgess and thanking them for their many years of distinguished
service.
I also want to take this opportunity to express our
enormous gratitude to the men and women of our Intelligence
Community. It is a truism that intelligence often fails
publicly but succeeds privately. I only wish the American
people could know the full extent of what our Intelligence
Community does to keep us safe.
Today's hearing is a fitting companion to the one this
committee held on Tuesday to review the President's annual
budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as
his broader proposal to cut $487 billion in defense spending
over 10 years. As Secretary of Defense Panetta and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey told this committee on
Tuesday, the administration's planned reductions in defense
spending would entail greater risk to our military, to our
missions, and to our national security. This stands to reason.
But what does not is why we would choose to increase the
already growing risk to our national security at this time.
Just consider the scale and scope of these risks.
Despite the remarkable damage inflicted on al Qaeda's core
leadership by our military and intelligence professionals, al
Qaeda's affiliates in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb
are growing stronger, more independent, more diffuse, and more
willing to attack American interests.
As evidenced by their plot to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador in a Washington restaurant, the rulers in Iran
clearly pose a more direct threat to us than many would have
assumed just a year ago and that is on top of the hostile
actions in which Iran has been engaging for years, including
killing Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting terrorist
groups across the Middle East, destabilizing Arab countries,
propping up and rearming the Assad regime in Syria, and
continuing their undeterred pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability. The threat posed by the Iranian regime could soon
bring the Middle East to the brink of war if it is not there
already.
North Korea is in the midst of a potentially dangerous and
destabilizing transition. An inexperienced 29-year-old is now
in charge of a government that continues to produce nuclear
weapons, develop ever-more sophisticated ballistic missiles,
threaten our ally in the Republic of Korea, and administer the
most brutal apparatus of state oppression of any country on
Earth. The chances of increased conflict and miscalculations
are as real as ever before.
The Peoples Republic of China continues with a
nontransparent buildup of its military forces while engaging in
provocative acts against its neighbors in international waters.
Indeed, tensions in the South China Sea have rarely been
higher. At the same time, the number and sophistication of
cyber attacks on American targets by Chinese actors, likely
with Chinese Government involvement in many cases, is growing
increasingly severe and damaging. Indeed, as last year's report
from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
makes clear, ``Chinese actors are the world's most active and
persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.''
In Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency is damaged but not
broken, and regrettably their will to stay in the fight against
the international coalition and our Afghan partners has only
been increased by the administration's repeated public
commitments to certain dates for withdrawing down our military
forces regardless of conditions on the ground. Meanwhile,
Pakistan remains as fragile and combustible as ever. As our
witnesses' statements make clear, Pakistan's intelligence
service continues to support terrorist elements inside
Afghanistan that are attacking and killing Americans.
In Iraq, the fragile stability of democratic gains that
Iraqis have been able to forge, thanks to the surge, now seem
to be unraveling. Prime Minister Maliki appears to be
consolidating his power at the expense of the other political
blocs. Violence is up significantly since the departure of U.S.
troops. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and violent Shia extremist
groups are still very much active and threatening to Iraq's
stability. It is increasingly difficult to argue that Iraq, to
use the President's words, is ``stable and self-reliant.''
One year into the Arab Spring, the situation remains fluid,
uncertain, and in places very troubling. From Tunisia and Libya
to Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain, countries are undergoing
monumental changes and the outcomes of those changes are still
far from clear. Then there is Syria, where the conflict appears
to be entering a new phase. More than 6,000 lives have been
lost and there appears to be no end in sight.
The bloodshed must be stopped and we should rule out no
option that could help save lives. We must consider, among
other actions, providing opposition groups inside Syria both
political and military with better means to organize their
activities, to care for the wounded, to find safe havens, to
communicate securely, to defend themselves, and to fight back
against Assad's forces. The time has come when all options must
be on the table to end the killing and force Assad to leave
power.
We could continue for some time listing the myriad of other
threats facing our Nation, and I am confident we will cover
most of them in today's hearing. What should be clear is that
by no objective assessment are the threats to our national
security decreasing. To the contrary, they are increasing as
the prepared testimonies of our witnesses make vividly clear.
So the question that Members of Congress and the members of
this committee in particular need to think long and hard about
is this: Why, in an international environment of growing
uncertainty, risk, and threat, would we choose to add to those
risks by making large and misguided cuts to our national
defense budget, cuts that by themselves will not significantly
reduce our national debt, the real driver of which is our
domestic entitlement programs? I do not see a compelling answer
to this question at this time. I imagine today's hearing will
underscore that point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator McCain.
Director Clapper.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Director Clapper. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Ranking
Member McCain, distinguished members of the committee, for
inviting us to present the 2012 worldwide threat assessment. I
would observe you have probably already given it for us.
I am joined today by the Director of the DIA, my friend and
colleague of long standing, Lieutenant General Ron Burgess.
These remarks and our statement for the record reflect the
collective insights of extraordinary men and women of the U.S.
Intelligence Community whom you have recognized--and we most
appreciate that--and whom it is our privilege and honor to
lead. We are most appreciative of your acknowledgment of the
work, sometimes under very hazardous conditions, that is done
by the men and women of the community around the world.
We will not attempt to cover the full scope of worldwide
threats in these brief oral remarks, so I would like to
highlight some of the issues that we identified for the coming
year, some of which you have already done for us, as I said.
Earlier this month was the 51st anniversary of my
enlistment in the Marine Corps and during my subsequent entire
career, I do not recall a more complex and interdependent array
of challenges than we face today. The capabilities,
technologies, know-how, communications, and environmental
forces are not confined by borders and can trigger
transnational disruptions with astonishing speed. Never before
has the Intelligence Community been called upon to master such
complexity on so many issues in such a resource-constrained
environment.
We are rising to the challenge by continuing to integrate
the Intelligence Community, taking advantage of new
technologies, implementing new efficiencies, and as always,
simply working harder. But candidly maintaining the world's
premier intelligence enterprise in the face of our shrinking
budgets will be a challenge. We will be accepting and managing
risks more so than we have had to do in the last decade. When I
say ``we,'' I mean both the legislative and the executive.
We begin our threat assessment as we did last year with the
global issues of terrorism and proliferation. The Intelligence
Community sees the next 2 to 3 years as a critical transition
phase for the terrorist threat, particularly for al Qaeda and
likeminded groups. With Osama bin Laden's death, the global
jihadist movement lost its most iconic and inspirational
leader. The new al Qaeda commander is less charismatic and the
death or capture of prominent al Qaeda figures has shrunk the
group's top leadership layer. However, even with its degraded
capabilities and its focus on smaller, simpler plots, al Qaeda
remains a threat. As long as we sustain the pressure, we judge
that core al Qaeda will be of largely symbolic importance to
the global jihadist movement, but regional affiliates and, to a
lesser extent, small cells and individuals will drive the
global jihad agenda.
Proliferation, that is, efforts to develop, acquire, or
spread WMD, is also a major global strategic threat. Among
nation-states, as you have alluded, Iran's technical advances,
particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthen our assessment
that Iran is more than capable of producing enough highly
enriched uranium for a weapon if its political leaders,
specifically the Supreme Leader himself, choose to do so.
North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated
materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria,
illustrate the reach of North Korea's proliferation activities.
We do not expect that Kim Jong Un, North Korea's new young
leader, to change Pyongyang's policy of attempting to export
most of its weapons systems.
I note that in this year's statement for the record, as you
have noted yourselves, that we elevated our discussion of cyber
threats to follow terrorism and proliferation, and perhaps in
something of the coals of Newcastle, just to affirm that cyber
threat is one of the most challenging ones we face. We foresee
a cyber environment in which emerging technologies are
developed and implemented before security responses can be put
in place. Among state actors, we are particularly concerned
about entities within China and Russia conducting intrusions
into U.S. computer networks and stealing U.S. data. The growing
role that non-state actors are playing in cyberspace is a great
example of the easy access to potentially disruptive and even
lethal technology and know-how by such groups.
Two of our greatest strategic cyber challenges are, first,
definitive, real-time attribution of cyber attacks, that is,
knowing who carried out such attacks and where perpetrators are
located; and second, managing the enormous vulnerabilities
within the IT supply chain for U.S. networks. In this regard, a
cybersecurity bill was recently introduced by Senators
Lieberman, Collins, Rockefeller, and Feinstein. It addresses
the core homeland security requirements that would improve
cybersecurity for the American people, for our Nation's
critical infrastructure, and for the Federal Government's own
networks and computers. The Intelligence Community considers
such legislative steps essential to addressing our Nation's
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities which pose serious
national and economic security risks.
Briefly, looking geographically around the world, in
Afghanistan--and General Burgess will have more to say about
this--during the past year, the Taliban lost some ground, but
that was mainly in places where the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF) were concentrated. Taliban senior
leaders continue to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan. ISAF's
efforts to partner with ANSF are encouraging, but corruption
and governance challenges continue to threaten the Afghan
forces' operational effectiveness. Most provinces have
established basic governance structures, but they struggle to
provide essential services. The ISAF's support and the support
of Afghanistan's neighbors, notably and particularly Pakistan,
will remain essential to sustain the gains that have been
achieved. Although there is broad international political
support for the Afghan Government, there are doubts in many
capitals, particularly in Europe, about how to fund Afghanistan
initiatives after 2014.
In Iraq, violence and sporadic high-profile attacks
continue. Prime Minister Maliki's recent aggressive moves
against Sunni political leaders have heightened political
tensions. But for now, we believe the Sunnis continue to view
the political process as the best venue to pursue change.
Elsewhere across the Middle East and North Africa, those
pushing for change are confronting ruling elites, sectarian,
ethnic, and tribal divisions, lack of experience with
democracies, stalled economic development, military and
security force resistance, and regional power initiatives.
These are fluid political environments that offer openings for
extremists to participate more assertively in political life.
States where authoritarian leaders have been toppled, such as
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, have to construct or reconstruct
their political systems through complex negotiations among
competing factions. Nowhere is this transition, I believe, more
important than in Egypt, which, I think, will be a bellwether,
and, of course, is so strategically important because of its
size, its location, and, of course, the peace treaty that it
now has with Israel.
In Syria, regime intransigence and social divisions are
prolonging internal struggles and could potentially turn
domestic upheavals into regional crises.
In Yemen, although a political transition is underway, the
security situation continues to be marred by violence, and
fragmentation of the country is a real possibility.
As the ancient Roman historian Tacitus once observed, ``the
best day after a bad emperor is the first.'' But after that, I
would add, things get very problematic.
The Intelligence Community is also paying close attention
to developments across the African continent, throughout the
western hemisphere, Europe, and across Asia. Here too, few
issues are self-contained. Virtually every region has a bearing
on our key concerns of terrorism, proliferation, cybersecurity,
and instability, and throughout the globe, wherever there are
environmental stresses on water, food, and natural resources,
as well as health threats, economic crises, and organized
crime, we see ripple effects around the world and impacts on
U.S. interests.
Amidst these extraordinary challenges, it is important to
remind this distinguished body and the American people that in
all of our work, the U.S. Intelligence Community strives to
exemplify American values. We carry out our missions with
respect for the rule of law and the protection of civil
liberties and privacy. That pledge leads me to mention our
highest legislative priority this year and it requires the
support of both houses of Congress. I refer specifically to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)--which is set to
expire at the end of 2012.
Title 7 of FISA allows the Intelligence Community to
collect vital information about international terrorists and
other important targets overseas. This law authorizes
surveillance of non-U.S. persons located overseas who are of
foreign intelligence importance, meaning they have a connection
to or information about threats such as terrorism or
proliferation. It also provides for comprehensive oversight by
all three branches of Government to protect the privacy and
civil liberties of U.S. persons. The Department of Justice and
my office conduct extensive oversight reviews of these
activities and we report to Congress on implementation and
compliance twice a year. Intelligence collection under FISA
produces crucial intelligence that is vital to protect the
Nation against international terrorism and other threats.
We are always considering whether there are changes that
could be made to improve the law, but our first priority is
reauthorization of these authorities in their current form. We
look forward to the speedy enactment of the legislation
reauthorizing the FISA amendments act so there can be no
interruption in our ability to use these authorities to protect
the American people.
So I end this brief statement where I began and then turn
it over to General Burgess.
The fiscal environment we face as a Nation and in our
Intelligence Community will require careful identification and
management of the challenges the Intelligence Community focuses
on and the risks we must mutually assume.
With that, I thank you and the members of the committee for
your dedication to the security of our Nation, your support for
our men and women of the Intelligence Community, and your
attention here today.
[The prepared statement of Director Clapper follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. James R. Clapper
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members of the committee,
thank you for the invitation to offer the Intelligence Community's
assessment of threats to U.S. national security.
This statement provides extensive detail about numerous state and
nonstate actors, crosscutting political, economic, and military
developments and transnational trends, all of which constitute our
Nation's strategic and tactical landscape. Although I believe that
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cybersecurity, and
counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security
concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank--in terms of long-term
importance--the numerous, potential threats to U.S. national security.
The United States no longer faces--as in the Cold War--one dominant
threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of
potential threats--and the actors behind them--that constitute our
biggest challenge. Indeed, even the four categories noted above are
also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly changing international
environment of rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to nonstate
actors and ever greater access by individuals and small groups to
lethal technologies. We in the Intelligence Community believe it is our
duty to work together as an integrated team to understand and master
this complexity. By providing better strategic and tactical
intelligence, we can partner more effectively with other Government
officials at home and abroad to protect our vital national interests.
TERRORISM
The next 2 to 3 years will be a critical transition phase for the
terrorist threat facing the United States, particularly from al Qaeda
and like-minded groups, which we often refer to as the ``global
jihadist movement.'' During this transition, we expect leadership of
the movement to become more decentralized, with ``core'' al Qaeda--the
Pakistan-based group formerly led by Osama bin Laden--diminishing in
operational importance; regional al Qaeda affiliates planning and
attempting terrorist attacks; multiple voices providing inspiration for
the movement; and more vigorous debate about local versus global
agendas. We assess that with continued robust counterterrorism (CT)
efforts and extensive cooperation with our allies and partners, there
is a better-than-even chance that decentralization will lead to
fragmentation of the movement within a few years. With fragmentation,
core al Qaeda will likely be of largely symbolic importance to the
movement; regional groups, and to a lesser extent small cells and
individuals, will drive the global jihad agenda both within the United
States and abroad.
During and after this transition, the movement will
continue to be a dangerous transnational force, regardless of
the status of core al Qaeda, its affiliates, and its allies.
Terrorist groups and individuals sympathetic to the jihadist
movement will have access to the recruits, financing, arms and
explosives, and safe havens needed to execute operations.
A key challenge for the West during this transition
will be conducting aggressive CT operations while not
exacerbating anti-Western global agendas and galvanizing new
fronts in the movement.
The CBRN Threat
We assess that a mass attack by foreign terrorist groups involving
a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapon in the
United States is unlikely in the next year, as a result of intense
counterterrorism pressure. Nevertheless, given the compartmented nature
of CBRN programs, the spread of technological information, and the
minimal infrastructure needed for some CBRN efforts, the Intelligence
Community remains alert to the CBRN threat.
Although we assess that a mass attack is unlikely, we worry about a
limited CBR attack in the United States or against our interests
overseas in the next year because of the interest expressed in such a
capability by some foreign groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula's (AQAP).
The Intelligence Community judges that lone actors
abroad or in the United States--including criminals and
homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) inspired by terrorist
leaders or literature advocating use of CBR materials--are
capable of conducting at least limited attacks in the next
year, but we assess the anthrax threat to the United States by
lone actors is low.
Core al Qaeda in Decline
With Osama bin Laden's death, the global jihadist
movement lost its most iconic and inspirational leader, even
for disaffected members of the group.
We do not assess that al Qaeda's new leader, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, will change al Qaeda's strategic direction, but most
al Qaeda members find Zawahiri's leadership style less
compelling than bin Laden's image as a holy man and warrior,
and will not offer him the deference they gave bin Laden.
The death or capture of prominent al Qaeda figures since bin
Laden's death has shrunk the layer of top lieutenants directly under
Zawahiri. These losses, combined with the long list of earlier losses
since CT operations intensified in 2008, lead us to assess that core al
Qaeda's ability to perform a variety of functions--including preserving
leadership and conducting external operations--has weakened
significantly.
We judge that al Qaeda's losses are so substantial and
its operating environment so restricted that a new group of
leaders, even if they could be found, would have difficulty
integrating into the organization and compensating for mounting
losses.
We judge that with its degraded capabilities al Qaeda
increasingly will seek to execute smaller, simpler plots to
demonstrate relevance to the global jihad, even as it aspires
to mass casualty and economically damaging attacks, including
against the United States and U.S. interests overseas.
With sustained CT pressure, we anticipate that core al
Qaeda will suffer sustained degradation, diminished cohesion,
and decreasing influence in the coming year.
Leadership of the Global Jihad
We assess that core al Qaeda still communicates with its
affiliates, but its ability to do so probably rests with only a few
remaining senior leaders and their communications facilitators. We
judge senior leaders almost certainly believe that persistent contact
with affiliates is necessary to influence them to act on al Qaeda's
global priorities and preserve a unified narrative.
The Intelligence Community judges that al Qaeda's regional
affiliates--AQAP, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Shabaab--will remain committed to the group's
ideology, and in terms of threats to U.S. interests will surpass the
remnants of core al Qaeda in Pakistan. We expect that each group will
seek opportunities to strike Western targets in its operating area, but
the intent and ability of each affiliate to conduct transnational
attacks varies widely. The future of any affiliate, and its role in the
jihadist movement, will depend on how external forces (primarily the
pace and effectiveness of CT operations) and internal forces (the
competition between the local and global jihadist agendas) play out.
Despite the death in September of AQAP transnational
operations chief and U.S. person Anwar al-Aulaqi, we judge AQAP
remains the node most likely to attempt transnational attacks.
His death probably reduces, at least temporarily, AQAP's
ability to plan transnational attacks, but many of those
responsible for implementing plots, including bombmakers,
financiers, and facilitators, remain and could advance plots.
We assess that AQI will remain focused on overthrowing
the Shia-led government in Baghdad in favor of a Sunni-led
Islamic caliphate. It probably will attempt attacks primarily
on local Iraqi targets, including government institutions,
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) personnel, Shia civilians, and
recalcitrant Sunnis, such as members of the Sons of Iraq, and
will seek to rebuild support among the Sunni population. In its
public statements, the group also supports the goals of the
global jihad, and we are watchful for indications that AQI
aspires to conduct attacks in the West.
In Africa, AQIM and al-Shabaab are prioritizing local interests--
combating regional CT operations--over transnational operations. Al-
Shabaab has many sub-clans with divergent interests; most rank and file
fighters have no interest in global jihad.
Internal divisions and diminished local support for
al-Shabaab in the wake of the 2011 humanitarian crisis, coupled
with military pressure from the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Kenya,
and Ethiopia, have eroded alShabaab's control in southern
Somalia. In late 2011, Kenyan troops moved to encircle the port
of Kismaayo, the port al-Shabaab has used in past years to
generate much of its revenue. The ability of anti-Shabaab
forces to consolidate gains, control proxy forces, and win
support of local clans will be key to preventing al-Shabaab's
reclamation of Somali territory.
We assess that most al-Shabaab members in 2012 will
remain focused on battling AMISOM, TFG, and Ethiopian/Kenyan-
backed forces in Somalia. However, other al-Shabaab leaders may
intend to expand the group's influence and plan attacks outside
areas that al-Shabaab controls in southern and central Somalia,
such as in East Africa; al-Shabaab fighters were responsible
for twin bombings in Uganda in July 2010. Members of the
group--particularly a foreign fighter cadre that includes U.S.
passport holders--may also have aspirations to attack inside
the United States; however, we lack insight into concrete
operational plans outside the Horn of Africa.
Other militant and terrorist networks will continue to threaten
U.S. interests outside their primary operating areas. However, we judge
that most lack either the capability or intent to plan, train for, and
execute sophisticated attacks in the United States. Tehrik-e Taleban
Pakistan (TTP), for example, is likely to remain heavily engaged
against the Pakistani military and Coalition forces in Afghanistan,
while providing some support to the Afghan insurgency.
The Threat from Homegrown Violent Extremists
We assess that at least in the near term the threat in the United
States from HVEs will be characterized by lone actors or small groups
inspired by al Qaeda's ideology but not formally affiliated with it or
other related groups. Most HVEs are constrained tactically by a
difficult operating environment in the United States, but a handful
have exhibited improved tradecraft and operational security and
increased willingness to consider less sophisticated attacks, which
suggests the HVE threat may be evolving.
In the past decade, most HVEs who have aspired to
high-profile, mass-casualty attacks in the United States--
typically involving the use of explosives against symbolic
infrastructure, government, and military targets--did not have
the technical capability to match their aspirations; however,
in 2009, extremists who were first radicalized in the United
States, but then travelled overseas and received training and
guidance from terrorist groups, attempted two mass-casualty
explosives attacks in the United States.
We remain alert to potential dynamics that might emerge in the
United States, online, or overseas that would alter the nature of the
HVE threat. Some include:
A galvanizing event or series of events perceived to
reflect an anti-Islamic bias or agenda in the United States.
U.S. or Western military involvement in another Muslim
country.
Increased HVE learning from past disruptions and
plots.
Increased HVE use of the Internet to share propaganda,
form social or peer networks, or recruit others for attack
planning.
Civil or inter-state conflict overseas leading to the
radicalization of individuals in diaspora communities in the
United States.
The Threat from Iran
The 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United
States shows that some Iranian officials--probably including Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei--have changed their calculus and are now more
willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real
or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime. We are also
concerned about Iranian plotting against U.S. or allied interests
overseas.
Iran's willingness to sponsor future attacks in the
United States or against our interests abroad probably will be
shaped by Tehran's evaluation of the costs it bears for the
plot against the Ambassador as well as Iranian leaders'
perceptions of U.S. threats against the regime.
PROLIFERATION
Nation-state efforts to develop, acquire, and/or proliferate
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related delivery systems
constitute a major threat to the safety of our Nation, our deployed
troops, and our allies. The threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear
proliferation, as well as the threat from the proliferation of
materials and technologies that could contribute to existing and
prospective chemical and biological weapons programs, are among our top
concerns.
Traditionally, deterrence and diplomacy have constrained most
nation states from acquiring biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons,
but these constraints may be of less utility in preventing terrorist
groups from doing so. The time when only a few states had access to the
most dangerous technologies is past. Biological and chemical materials
and technologies, almost always dual-use, move easily in our globalized
economy, as do the personnel with scientific expertise to design and
use them. The latest discoveries in the life sciences diffuse globally
and rapidly.
We assess that no nation states have provided WMD assistance to
terrorist groups and that no nonstate actors are targeting WMD sites in
countries with unrest; however, as governments become unstable and
transform, WMD-related materials may become vulnerable to nonstate
actors, if the security that protects them erodes.
WMD THREATS: IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear
weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better
position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do
not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear
weapons.
Iran nevertheless is expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities,
which can be used for either civil or weapons purposes. As reported by
the International Atomic Energy Agency, to date, Iran in late October
2011 had about 4,150 kg of 3.5 percent LEUF6 and about 80 kg of 20-
percent enriched UF6 produced at Natanz. Iran confirmed on 9 January
that it has started enriching uranium for the first time at its second
enrichment plant, near Qom.
Iran's technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment,
strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and
industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the
central issue its political will to do so. These advancements
contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of
producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so
chooses.
We judge Iran would likely choose missile delivery as its preferred
method of delivering a nuclear weapon. Iran already has the largest
inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding
the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces,
many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload.
We judge Iran's nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit
approach, which offers the international community opportunities to
influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran's security,
prestige, and influence, as well as the international political and
security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.
Iran's growing inventory of ballistic missiles and its acquisition
and indigenous production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) provide
capabilities to enhance its power projection. Tehran views its
conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to
deter--and if necessary retaliate against--forces in the region,
including U.S. forces. Its ballistic missiles are inherently capable of
delivering WMD, and, if so armed, would fit into this strategy.
North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious
threat to the security environment in East Asia. Its export of
ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries,
including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria--now ended--in
the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007), illustrate
the reach of the North's proliferation activities. Despite the October
2007 Six-Party agreement--in which North Korea reaffirmed its
commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how--
we remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again export
nuclear technology.
We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices. Its October
2006 nuclear test is consistent with our longstanding assessment that
it produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself was a
partial failure. The North's probable nuclear test in May 2009 had a
yield of roughly two kilotons TNT equivalent and was apparently more
successful than the 2006 test. These tests strengthen our assessment
that North Korea has produced nuclear weapons.
In November 2010, North Korea revealed a claimed 2,000 centrifuge
uranium enrichment facility to an unofficial U.S. delegation visiting
the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, and stated it would produce low-
enriched uranium to fuel a planned light-water reactor under
construction at Yongbyon. The North's disclosure supports the United
States' longstanding assessment that North Korea has pursued a uranium-
enrichment capability.
The Intelligence Community assesses Pyongyang views its nuclear
capabilities as intended for deterrence, international prestige, and
coercive diplomacy. We judge that North Korea would consider using
nuclear weapons only under narrow circumstances. We also assess, albeit
with low confidence, Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use
nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or territory, unless it perceived
its regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an
irretrievable loss of control.
CYBER THREATS: AN EVOLVING AND STRATEGIC CONCERN
Major Trends
Cyber threats pose a critical national and economic security
concern due to the continued advances in--and growing dependency on--
the information technology (IT) that underpins nearly all aspects of
modern society. Data collection, processing, storage, and transmission
capabilities are increasing exponentially; meanwhile, mobile, wireless,
and cloud computing bring the full power of the globally-connected
Internet to myriad personal devices and critical infrastructure. Owing
to market incentives, innovation in functionality is outpacing
innovation in security, and neither the public nor private sector has
been successful at fully implementing existing best practices.
The impact of this evolution is seen not only in the scope and
nature of cyber security incidents, but also in the range of actors and
targets. In the last year, we observed increased breadth and
sophistication of computer network operations (CNO) by both state and
nonstate actors. Our technical advancements in detection and
attribution shed light on malicious activity, but cyber intruders
continue to explore new means to circumvent defensive measures.
Among state actors, China and Russia are of particular concern. As
indicated in the October 2011 biennial economic espionage report from
the National Counterintelligence Executive, entities within these
countries are responsible for extensive illicit intrusions into U.S.
computer networks and theft of U.S. intellectual property.
Nonstate actors are also playing an increasing role in
international and domestic politics through the use of social media
technologies. We currently face a cyber environment where emerging
technologies are developed and implemented faster than governments can
keep pace, as illustrated by the failed efforts at censoring social
media during the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya. Hacker groups, such as Anonymous and Lulz Security (LulzSec),
have conducted distributed denial of service attacks and web site
defacements against government and corporate interests they oppose. The
well publicized intrusions into NASDAQ and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) networks underscore the vulnerability of key sectors of the U.S.
and global economy.
Hackers are also circumventing network security by targeting
companies that produce security technologies, highlighting the
challenges to securing online data in the face of adaptable intruders.
The compromise of U.S. and Dutch digital certificate issuers in 2011
represents a threat to one of the most fundamental technologies used to
secure online communications and sensitive transactions, such as online
banking. Hackers also accessed the corporate network of the computer
security firm RSA in March 2011 and exfiltrated data on the algorithms
used in its authentication system.
Subsequently, a U.S. defense contractor revealed that hackers used
the information obtained from RSA to access its network.
Outlook
We assess that CNO is likely to increase in coming years. Two of
our greatest strategic challenges regarding cyber threats are: (1) the
difficulty of providing timely, actionable warning of cyber threats and
incidents, such as identifying past or present security breaches,
definitively attributing them, and accurately distinguishing between
cyber espionage intrusions and potentially disruptive cyber attacks;
and (2) the highly complex vulnerabilities associated with the IT
supply chain for U.S. networks. In both cases, U.S. Government
engagement with private sector owners and operators of critical
infrastructures is essential for mitigating these threats.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
We assess that foreign intelligence services (FIS) are constantly
developing methods and technologies that challenge the ability of the
U.S. Government and private sector to protect U.S. national security
and economic information, information systems, and infrastructure. The
changing, persistent, multifaceted nature of these activities makes
them particularly difficult to counter.
Given today's environment, we assess that the most menacing foreign
intelligence threats in the next 2 to 3 years will involve:
Cyber-Enabled Espionage. FIS have launched numerous
computer network operations targeting U.S. Government agencies,
businesses, and universities. We assess that many intrusions
into U.S. networks are not being detected. Although most
activity detected to date has been targeted against
unclassified networks connected to the Internet, foreign cyber
actors have also begun targeting classified networks.
Insider Threats. Insiders have caused significant
damage to U.S. interests from the theft and unauthorized
disclosure of classified, economic, and proprietary information
and other acts of espionage. We assess that trusted insiders
using their access for malicious intent represent one of
today's primary threats to U.S. classified networks.
Espionage by China, Russia, and Iran. Russia and China
are aggressive and successful purveyors of economic espionage
against the United States. Iran's intelligence operations
against the United States, including cyber capabilities, have
dramatically increased in recent years in depth and complexity.
We assess that FIS from these three countries will remain the
top threats to the United States in the coming years.
We judge that evolving business practices and information
technology will provide even more opportunities for FIS, trusted
insiders, hackers, and others to collect sensitive U.S. economic data.
Corporate supply chains and financial networks will increasingly rely
on global links that can be exploited by foreign collectors, and the
growing use of cloud data processing and storage may present new
challenges to the security and integrity of sensitive information.
MASS ATROCITIES
Presidential Study Directive-10, issued in August 2011, identifies
the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core national
security interest and moral responsibility of the United States. Mass
atrocities generally involve large-scale and deliberate attacks on
civilians, and can include genocide. The Presidential Directive
establishes an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board that will
coordinate a U.S. Government-wide effort to prevent or mitigate such
violence. The Intelligence Community will play a significant role in
this effort, and we have been asked to expand collection and analysis
and to encourage partner governments to collect and share intelligence
on this issue.
Unfortunately, mass atrocities have been a recurring feature of the
global landscape. Since the turn of century, hundreds of thousands of
civilians have lost their lives during conflicts in the Darfur region
of Sudan and in the eastern Congo (Kinshasa). Recently, atrocities in
Libya and Syria have occurred against the backdrop of major political
upheavals. Mass atrocities usually occur in the context of other
instability events and often result from calculated strategies by new
or threatened ruling elites to assert or retain control, regardless of
the cost. Violence against civilians also emerges in places where
poorly institutionalized governments discriminate against minorities,
socioeconomic conditions are poor, or local powerbrokers operate with
impunity, as in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. In addition, terrorists and
insurgents may exploit similar conditions to conduct attacks against
civilians, as in Boko Haram's recent attacks on churches in Nigeria.
GLOBAL CHALLENGES
South Asia
Afghanistan
The Afghan Government will continue to make incremental, fragile
progress in governance, security, and development in 2012. Progress
will depend on capable Afghan partners and require substantial
international support, particularly to fight the still resilient,
Taliban-led insurgency. International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)
will remain essential to secure gains and nurture developmental
initiatives through 2012. Enduring stability also depends heavily but
not exclusively on neighboring states, especially Pakistan. We judge
that, although there is broad international political support for the
Afghan Government, many European Governments harbor doubts about
funding for Afghanistan initiatives post-2014.
Resilient Insurgency
We assess that the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan has lost
ground in some areas. For example, the Taliban's ability to influence
the population and maintain its strongholds inside Afghanistan has
diminished since last year. However, its losses have come mainly in
areas where ISAF surge forces are concentrated; it remains resilient
and capable of challenging U.S. and international goals; and Taliban
senior leaders continue to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan, which enables
them to provide strategic direction to the insurgency and not fear for
their safety.
We assess al Qaeda's impact on the Afghanistan insurgency is
limited. It most often works to support other insurgent groups that do
not rely on al Qaeda or foreign fighter participation to mount
successful operations. That said, al Qaeda is committed to the Afghan
jihad, and the propaganda gains from participating in insurgent attacks
outweigh their limited battlefield impact.
Afghan Internal Capabilities
In terms of security, we judge that the Afghan police and Army will
continue to depend on ISAF support. ISAF partnering and mentoring have
begun to show signs of sustainable progress at the tactical and
ministerial levels; however, corruption as well as poor leadership and
management will threaten Afghan National Security Forces' (ANSF)
operational effectiveness.
In terms of governance, there have been incremental improvements
extending rule of law, including official endorsement of traditional
legal systems, and most provinces have established basic governance
structures. However, provinces still struggle to provide essential
services. Moreover, access to official governance is primarily limited
to urban areas, such as district and provincial capitals, leaving much
of the rural population isolated from the government.
The Karzai Government did achieve some successes in 2011. The first
phase of the process to transition security to Afghan leadership
proceeded smoothly, and the second tranche of the transition is
progressing as scheduled. The Karzai administration successfully
convened a Loya Jirga in November to socialize the strategic
partnership with the United States. Now that the fall 2010 electoral
crisis is resolved, the Wolesi Jirga will likely regroup during the
current winter recess and return its focus to limiting President
Karzai's authority, likely using the parliamentary approval process for
ministerial appointees as a way to highlight Parliament's independence.
Status of the Afghan Drug Trade
Afghanistan is the largest supplier of illicit opium to the world
market and probably produces enough to fulfill yearly global demand for
illicit opiates. Afghans earned $1.8 billion from the opiate trade,
equivalent to 12 percent of the licit gross domestic product (GDP) in
2010, according to U.S. Government, IMF, and United Nations estimates.
We judge the level of security in local areas, including ease of access
to markets for licit crops, is the most significant factor affecting
poppy farmers' decisionmaking; additional contributing factors include
coercive measures, the viability of licit crops, and, to a lesser
extent, opium prices.
Pakistan
We judge al Qaeda operatives are balancing support for attacks in
Pakistan with guidance to refocus the global jihad externally, against
U.S. targets. al Qaeda also will increasingly rely on ideological and
operational alliances with Pakistani militant factions to accomplish
its goals within Pakistan and to conduct transnational attacks.
Pakistani military leaders have had limited success against al Qaeda
operatives, other foreign fighters, and Pakistani militants who pose a
threat to Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the country's economic recovery is at risk. In an effort
to keep its coalition in power to the end of the 5-year parliamentary
term, the government has been unwilling to persuade its disparate
coalition members to accept much needed but unpopular policy and tax
reforms. Sustained remittances from overseas Pakistanis (on the order
of $10-12 billion a year) have kept Reserves high, as have borrowed
resources from the IMF. However, the economy last fiscal year expanded
at a slower rate of about 2 percent, partly because of flood damages;
both foreign direct investment and domestic investment are declining;
and Pakistan's investment-to-GDP ratio declined for the third year in a
row to 13.4 percent at the beginning of the fiscal year in July 2011.
India
Relations with Pakistan
After a 4-year pause, India and Pakistan revived expert-level
discussions on conventional and nuclear confidence-building measures
(CBM), when they met in Islamabad December 26-27, 2011. Following the
meetings, a joint statement noted that both sides reviewed the
implementation and strengthening of existing CBMs in the framework of
the Lahore MoU, and agreed to explore possibilities for additional,
mutually acceptable CBMs. India-Pakistan relations also improved in
2011 after both sides in February agreed to resume the bilateral
dialogue, suspended since the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai.
The two countries' home secretaries in March charted a
work program to improve cooperation, including commitments to
establish a hotline, streamline visa procedures, and meet on a
biannual basis. Both sides also began to negotiate procedures
to review each other's investigations into the Mumbai attack.
The two countries are making progress in these areas.
Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Gilani had
cordial meetings during the April international cricket
championships and the November South Asia Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting.
Progress expanding trade ties has also helped improve
relations, and Islamabad in November publicly committed to a
proposal for granting most favored nation trade status to
India.
Less progress has been made in discussions over the
difficult border issues of Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek, and
we judge New Delhi will maintain a go-slow approach in these
negotiations.
Relations with Afghanistan
India significantly increased its engagement with Afghanistan in
2011, when it pledged another $500 million in aid during Prime Minister
Singh's May visit to Kabul and finalized a Strategic Partnership
Agreement with Afghanistan in October. This pact is likely to
facilitate closer bilateral security cooperation, more training of
Afghan security personnel, and modest material support to Afghan
Government security forces. However, New Delhi in the near term is
unlikely to send troops or heavy equipment to Kabul because it does not
want to provoke Pakistan. India's increased engagement is aimed at
helping the Afghan Government sustain its sovereignty and independence
during and after ISAF forces draw down. The Indian Government also is
increasing efforts to spur Indian investment in Afghanistan's fledgling
natural resources sector, which New Delhi sees as crucial to its
strategic and economic interests in the region.
We judge that India sees its goals in Afghanistan as consistent
with U.S. objectives and favors a sustained ISAF and U.S. presence in
the country. India will almost certainly cooperate with the United
States and Afghanistan in bilateral and multilateral frameworks to
identify assistance activities that will help bolster civil society,
develop capacity, and strengthen political structures in Afghanistan.
Moreover, India consistently ranks among the top three nations that
Afghans see as helping their country rebuild. As of August 2011, India
ranked as Afghanistan's fifth largest bilateral donor.
Relations with China
Despite public statements intended to downplay tensions between
India and China, we judge that India is increasingly concerned about
China's posture along their disputed border and Beijing's perceived
aggressive posture in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. The
Indian Army believes a major Sino-Indian conflict is not imminent, but
the Indian military is strengthening its forces in preparation to fight
a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to balance
Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean. India has expressed
support for a strong U.S. military posture in East Asia and U.S.
engagement in Asia.
East Asia
North Korea
Kim Jong Un became North Korea's leader following the death of his
father, Kim Jong Il, on 17 December 2011. Although it is still early to
assess the extent of his authority, senior regime leaders will probably
remain cohesive at least in the near term to prevent instability and
protect their interests.
China
China in 2011 appeared to temper the assertive behavior that
characterized its foreign policy the year before, but the internal and
external drivers of that behavior persist. Moreover, although Chinese
leaders have affirmed their commitment to a peaceful and pragmatic
foreign policy--and especially to stable relations with China's
neighbors and the rest of the world--Beijing may take actions contrary
to that goal if it perceives that China's sovereignty or national
security is being seriously challenged.
Internal Dynamics
The Arab Spring uprisings stoked concern among Chinese leaders that
similar unrest in China could undermine their rule, prompting Beijing
to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade. At
the same time, apprehension about the global economy and the potential
for domestic instability also appeared to increase in 2011, heightening
Beijing's resistance to external pressure and suspicion of U.S.
intentions.
China's economic policies came under review, as leaders shifted
their focus from fighting inflation to supporting growth because of
concerns that the global consequences of debt problems in Europe would
reduce external demand and Chinese GDP growth. Chinese GDP growth did
slow down over the course of the year, albeit from levels that are the
envy of most countries. Beijing continued a policy of permitting modest
appreciation of the renminbi--which rose about 5 percent against the
currencies of China's trading partners in 2011--although it remains
substantially undervalued.
Politically, China's impending leadership succession in the fall of
2012 will reinforce Beijing's tendency toward a cautious and
nationalist posture this year. Leaders will focus on the personnel
changes expected at the Party Congress, and are unlikely to risk
internal criticism by advocating bold policy changes or compromises on
sovereignty issues.
People's Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization
China began its military modernization program in earnest in the
late 1990s, after observing the long-range precision guided warfare
demonstrated by Western powers in Operation Desert Storm and the
Balkans, and determining that the nature of warfare had changed. It
responded by investing in short- and medium-range ballistic missiles,
modern naval platforms, improved air and air defense systems,
counterspace capabilities, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) to support over-the-horizon military operations.
Since 2008, Beijing has shown a greater willingness to project military
force to protect national interests, including Chinese maritime
shipping as far away as the Middle East, and more recently to enforce
sovereignty claims throughout the South China Sea. However, Taiwan
remains the PLA's most critical potential mission and the PLA continues
to build capabilities to deter it from declaring independence and to
deter, delay or deny U.S. interference in a potential cross-Strait
conflict.
Many of Beijing's military capability goals have now been realized,
resulting in impressive military might. Other goals remain longer term,
but the PLA is receiving the funding and political support to transform
the PLA into a fully modern force, capable of sustained operations in
Asia and beyond.
Taiwan
The Taiwan Strait was characterized in 2011 by relative stability
and generally positive developments, with China and Taiwan implementing
economic cooperation initiatives and exploring agreements on a range of
practical issues. President Ma Ying-jeou's reelection on 14 January
suggests continued cross-strait rapprochement. Progress, however,
probably will continue to be incremental because of differences over
sensitive political issues, and because both sides have other domestic
priorities. In the meantime, the military balance continues to shift in
China's favor.
Near East: Middle East and North Africa
Regional Implications of the Arab Spring
The Arab world is in a period of turmoil and change that will
challenge the ability of the United States to influence events in the
Middle East. This turmoil is driven by forces that will shape Arab
politics for years, including a large youth population; economic
grievances associated with persistent unemployment, inequality, and
corruption; increased popular participation and renewed hope in
effecting political change; and a greater ability by opposition groups
to mobilize nonviolent resistance on a large scale. Meanwhile, the
forces propelling change are confronting ruling elites; sectarian,
ethnic, and tribal divisions; lack of experience with democracy;
dependence on natural resource wealth; and regional power rivalries.
Arab countries are undergoing a variety of contested transitions.
These political transitions are likely to be complex and protracted.
States where authoritarian leaders have been toppled--Tunisia, Egypt,
and Libya--will have to reconstruct their political systems via complex
negotiations among competing factions. In Syria, regime intransigence
and societal divisions are prolonging internal struggles and
potentially turning domestic upheavals into regional crises.
The countries most affected by the Arab Spring--Egypt, Libya,
Syria, and Tunisia--suffered setbacks to development, with economic
activity stalling or declining. Tunisia faces challenges in boosting
growth and employment, but economic conditions probably will improve
modestly in the coming year. Oil production in Libya declined
substantially, causing fluctuation in global oil prices, but increased
production from other countries prevented serious market disruption and
capped price increases. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have expanded social
spending and food subsidies to address popular concerns, which will
saddle them with large budget deficits if oil prices decline
substantially.
Fluid political environments across the Arab world also offer
openings for Islamic activists to participate more fully in political
life. The strong showing by the Islamist al-Nahda party in the Tunisian
elections and the success of Islamist parties in elections in Egypt and
Morocco suggest that they might be the best organized competitors in
diverse electoral contests. Although Islamist parties' long-term
political prospects probably will depend on how they actually solve
economic and social problems, their platforms and rhetoric suggest they
will adopt a mix of pro-market and populist social welfare policies.
This new regional environment poses challenges for U.S. strategic
partnerships in the Arab world. However, we judge that Arab leaders
will continue to cooperate with the United States on regional security
to help check Iran's regional ambitions, and some will seek economic
assistance.
Libya
Tripoli similarly faces profound challenges in the wake of the
insurgents' defeat of Muammar al-Qadhafi, including navigating
political obstacles, rebuilding the economy, and securing Libya. The
Libyans have thus far met the deadlines contained in the roadmap they
developed, and are on track to hold elections in June for the National
Congress, which will then draft a constitution. To continue to achieve
its milestones, however, the interim government needs to assert its
authority without igniting divisions among Libya's various
stakeholders. It also needs to work toward disbanding and integrating
the country's various militias. Libyan authorities will need continued
international assistance to locate and secure what is left of the
estimated 20,000 Manportable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) Qadhafi's
regime acquired since 1970. Central to Libya's rebuilding is also the
recovery of its economy, particularly oil production and export
capability. Over the longer term, restarting oil production and exports
will be critical to Libya's growth and development.
Tunisia
In recent months, Tunisia has passed several milestones on its path
toward democracy, the most significant being the 23 October Constituent
Assembly elections, accepted both by international observers and the
Tunisian public as fair, credible, and transparent. Out of the
elections, a new governing coalition has emerged, led by the Islamist
Nahda Party, in partnership with the secularist Ettakatol party and
Congress for the Republic party. Hamadi Jebali, Nahda's Secretary
General, assumed the post of Prime Minister on 14 December and rolled
out his cabinet on 22 December.
Yemen
President Ali Abdallah Salih signed a GCC deal to transfer power
and has recently departed Yemen to receive medical treatment in the
United States. However, youth protestors, who sparked the movement for
political reform, rejected the GCC deal for failing to call for Salih
to step down immediately and be put on trial. An additional obstacle to
completing a peaceful transfer of power is that the political actors
involved in the negotiations do not represent all the key armed
opposition groups. For example, Huthi rebels, southern secessionists,
and antigovernment tribes--none of whom are part of the GCC
negotiations--will likely try to strengthen their control locally if a
political deal excludes them.
Ongoing instability in Yemen provides AQAP with greater freedom to
plan and conduct operations. AQAP has exploited the political unrest to
adopt a more aggressive strategy in southern Yemen, and it continues to
threaten U.S. and Western diplomatic interests, particularly in Sanaa.
Lebanon
Lebanon has not experienced violence or widespread political unrest
as a result of the events of the Arab Spring, but it suffers from
sectarian tensions that make its stability fragile. The risk of
violence remains because of: potential developments with the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which in June 2011 indicted Hizballah
members for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri;
the possibility that Syrian unrest might spread into Lebanon; threats
to Hizballah's leadership, infrastructure, or weapons; and the
potential for renewed conflict between Hizballah and Israel. Prime
Minister Miqati was able to provide funding to the STL using funds from
the Prime Minister's office, but Hizballah will continue trying to
undermine the STL investigation. Hizballah's Secretary General in mid-
November publicly warned that an Israeli attack on Iran would spark a
regional war, signaling that Hizballah may retaliate for a strike on
Iran.
Syria
We are now nearly a year into the unrest and antiregime protests in
Syria, and the situation is unlikely to be resolved quickly. Both the
regime and the opposition are determined to prevail, and neither side
appears willing to compromise on the key issue of President Bashar al-
Asad remaining in power.
The Arab League's decision on 12 November 2011 to suspend Syria's
membership and impose sanctions further galvanized international
opposition to Asad. Syria's opposition has taken steps to organize and
some elements have taken up arms. The shift toward violent tactics is
intensifying pressure on the regime's security and military assets, and
it risks alienating Syrians opposed to the violent overthrow of the
regime, dividing the political opposition, and increasing widespread
sectarian tension. Regional criticism of Asad increased markedly over
the last several months, with a growing number of states taking
measures to support the opposition. A draft United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) resolution endorsing the League's call for Asad to
transfer much of his power to Vice President Farouk al-Shara was vetoed
by Russia and China on 4 February. The League had called for Shara to
preside over an interim unity government that would write a new
constitution and hold elections within 3 months. The League also is
looking to restrict Syria's regional diplomatic capabilities to exert
pressure on the Asad regime. A League official on 4 February called on
member states to expel Syrian ambassadors and cut diplomatic and
economic ties with Syria, according to a Middle Eastern press report.
Arab Spring and the Global Jihadist Movement
The unrest potentially provides terrorists inspired by the global
jihadist movement more operating space, as security services focus more
on internal security and, in some cases, undergo transformations in
make-up and orientation.
Bin Ladin's death, combined with other leadership
losses, probably will distract the group from exploiting the
unrest in the short run. al Qaeda leaders likely assess that
gaining traction in countries undergoing transitions could
prepare the way for future operations against Western and local
targets, but they probably will struggle to keep pace with
events. Rhetoric from Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Ladin's successor,
has not resonated with the populations of countries
experiencing protests. Regional groups, however, may move more
quickly to exploit opportunities.
If, over the longer term, governments take real steps
to address public demands for political participation and
democratic institutions--and remain committed to CT efforts--we
judge that core al Qaeda and the global jihadist movement will
experience a strategic setback. al Qaeda probably will find it
difficult to compete for local support with groups like the
Muslim Brotherhood that participate in the political process,
provide social services, and advocate religious values.
Nonviolent, pro-democracy demonstrations challenge al Qaeda's
violent jihadist ideology and might yield increased political
power for secular or moderate Islamist parties.
However, prolonged instability or unmet promises of
reform would give al Qaeda, its affiliates, and its allies more
time to establish networks, gain support, and potentially
engage in operations, probably with less scrutiny from local
security services. Ongoing unrest most likely would exacerbate
public frustration, erosion of state power, and economic woes--
conditions that al Qaeda would work to exploit.
The ongoing turmoil probably will cause at least a temporary
setback to CT efforts and might prove a longer-term impediment, if
successor governments view violent Sunni extremism as a less immediate
threat than did previous regimes. The prospects for cooperation will be
further complicated if senior security officials who have cooperated
with U.S. and allied services lose their positions.
Iran
Iran's leaders are confronting continued domestic political
problems, a stalling economy, and an uncertain regional dynamic as the
effects of the Arab Spring unfold. Elite infighting has reached new
levels, as the rift grows between Supreme Leader Khamenei and President
Ahmadi-Nejad. The regime has intensified attacks on prominent
government officials and their families, as well, including former
President Ali Hashemi-Rafsanjani. The infighting has worsened in the
runup to the legislative elections in March and the presidential
election in 2013, especially in the wake of Khamenei's musings in
October 2011 that the popularly elected president could be replaced by
a prime minister chosen by the legislature.
Iran's economy is weighed down by international sanctions. The new
U.S. sanctions will have a greater impact on Iran than previous U.S.
designations because the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) is more important
to Iran's international trade than any of the previously designated
Iranian banks. The CBI has handled a greater volume of foreign bank
transactions than other designated banks and receives the revenue for
the roughly 70 percent of Iranian oil sold by the National Iranian Oil
Company.
Despite this, Iran's economic difficulties probably will not
jeopardize the regime, absent a sudden and sustained fall in oil prices
or a sudden domestic crisis that disrupts oil exports. In a rare public
indication of the sanctions' impact, Ahmadi-Nejad said in a speech to
the legislature in early November that Iran is facing the ``heaviest
economic onslaught'' in history, a sentiment echoed by the head of the
CBI.
In its efforts to spread its influence externally, Iran continues
to support proxies and surrogates abroad, and it has sought to exploit
the Arab Spring but has reaped limited benefits, thus far. Its biggest
regional concern is Syria because regime change would be a major
strategic loss for Tehran. In Iraq, it probably will continue efforts
to strengthen ties to Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. In
Afghanistan, Iran is attempting to undermine any strategic partnership
between the United States and Afghanistan.
Iraq
The Iraqi Government is positioned to keep violence near current
levels through 2012, although periodic spikes are likely. ISFs are
capable of planning and executing security operations, and Iraqi
counterterrorism forces have demonstrated they are capable of targeting
remaining terrorists and insurgents. However, AQI--despite its weakened
capabilities--remains capable of high-profile attacks, and some Shia
militant groups will continue targeting U.S. interests, including
diplomatic personnel.
Despite slow progress on political goals, Iraqi citizens are
pursuing change through the political process, rather than violence.
Prime Minister Maliki's relations with Sunni and Kurdish leaders,
currently under strain due to his accusations against senior Sunni
officials, will be a critical factor in maintaining political
stability.
On the economic front, despite recent growth, Baghdad needs to
improve its financial systems and institutions, diversify its economy,
improve transparency and delivery of essential services, and rebuild
infrastructure to satisfy public expectations and attract foreign
capital. Oil revenues were considerably higher in 2011 than 2010, due
to a combination of increased output and higher oil prices, and
sustaining those gains is important. Iraq's poor employment rates--as
much as half of the workforce is unemployed or underemployed, according
to United Nations estimates--illustrate the difficulties of
transitioning to a private sector economy. If unaddressed, high
unemployment could, over the long term, be a source of domestic unrest.
Africa
Africa faces a broad range of challenges in 2012. Sub-Saharan
Africa collectively falls at the bottom of almost all economic and
social indicators, and, although the overall continent is seeing
economic progress, Africa remains vulnerable to political crises,
democratic backsliding, and natural disasters. We assess that violence,
corruption, and terrorism are likely to plague Africa in areas key to
U.S. interests. Unresolved discord between Sudan and South Sudan,
continued fighting in Somalia, extremist attacks in Nigeria, and
ongoing friction in the Great Lakes region highlight unstable
conditions on the continent.
Sudan and South Sudan
Sudan and South Sudan in 2012 will face political uncertainty and
potential instability. Several key bilateral issues were left
unresolved prior to South Sudan's independence in July 2011, including
the disposition of Sudan's debt burden, the status of the disputed
province of Abyei, and the mechanisms of sharing oil wealth. Although
we assess that neither side wants to return to war, we anticipate
episodes of violence--an unintentional spark could escalate quickly.
President Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) are
confronting a range of challenges, including growing public
dissatisfaction over economic decline and insurgencies on Sudan's
southern and western borders. Sudanese economic conditions have
deteriorated since South Sudan's independence--Khartoum lost 75 percent
of its oil Reserves along with 20 percent of its population; and the
country is facing a decline in economic growth, projected hard currency
shortages, high inflation, and increasing prices on staple goods, all
of which threaten political stability and fuel opposition to Bashir and
the NCP. We assess Khartoum is likely to use all available means to
prevent protests from escalating and will pursue a military response to
provocations by Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)
rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States.
We assess the conflict in Sudan's western Darfur region will simmer
as a low level insurgency through 2012. Lengthy talks in Doha concluded
in 2011, but resulted in a peace agreement with only one rebel group;
significant Darfur rebel groups remain outside the peace process.
Khartoum is concerned about ties between some Darfur rebel groups and
the SPLM-N and about Justice and Equality Movement rebels, who returned
to Darfur from Libya in late 2011.
South Sudan in 2012 will face serious challenges that threaten to
destabilize its fragile, untested, and poorly resourced government.
Festering ethnic disputes are likely to undermine national cohesion,
and the southern government will struggle to provide security, manage
rampant corruption, and provide basic services. Anti-Juba rebel militia
groups active in the areas along South Sudan's northern border are
undermining stability and challenging Juba's ability to maintain
security. We assess the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement will
continue to turn to the international community for assistance.
Somalia
After two decades without a stable, central governing authority,
Somalia is the quintessential example of a failed state. The mandate of
the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) expires in August
2012, and we see few signs that Somalia will escape the cycle of weak
governance. The TFG and its successor almost certainly will be bogged
down with political infighting and corruption that impede efforts to
improve security, provide basic services, or gain popular legitimacy.
The TFG is certain to face persistent attacks from al-Shabaab and
remains reliant on the current 9,700 peacekeepers from the African
Union Mission in Somalia to retain control over Mogadishu.
Nigeria
Nigeria is critical to U.S. interests--it is Africa's most populous
nation and the source of 8 percent of total U.S. oil imports--but it
faces three key challenges in 2012: (1) healing political wounds from
the April 2011 presidential election, which triggered rioting and
hundreds of deaths in the largely Muslim north, after the victory of
Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and a southerner; (2) managing the
chronic unrest in the oil-rich Niger Delta region; a 2009 truce between
militants and the government appears to be holding, but widespread
criminality and corruption are undermining both local development and
oil production; and (3) most pressing, dealing with the Islamic
extremist group popularly known as Boko Haram. The group carries out
near-daily ambushes, assassinations, and raids in the northeast. It
carried out two high-profile suicide attacks in the capital in 2011,
hitting the national police headquarters in June and the U.N. building
in August. Its attacks on churches in northern Nigeria have spurred
retaliatory attacks on mosques in the South, and prompted thousands of
Muslims to flee southern Nigeria for safety in the North. There are
also fears that Boko Haram--elements of which have engaged with AQIM--
is interested in hitting Western targets, such as the U.S. Embassy and
hotels frequented by Westerners.
Central Africa's Great Lakes Region
The Great Lakes region, despite gains in peace and security in the
past decade, remains vulnerable to the chronic pressures of weak
governance, ethnic cleavages, and active rebel groups. For example,
volatility is a risk for Burundi, which faces continued political
violence and extrajudicial killings. The Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) is still struggling to recover from the trauma of foreign
invasion and civil war from 1996-2003, and the government has little
control over large swaths of the country. Much of Congo's stability
depends on U.N. peacekeepers, at an annual cost to the international
community of over $1 billion. Many Congolese are discontented with the
government's failure to improve the economy and rein in rebel groups,
undisciplined soldiers, and ethnic militia that operate with impunity
in the east. Much of the Congolese Army--poorly led and rarely paid--
will continue to be a predator to, rather than a protector of, the
population. The lack of credible presidential and legislative elections
in the DRC in November 2011 demonstrates that significant challenges
remain as President Kabila begins his second term.
Russia and Eurasia
Russia
The prospect of another Putin presidency has sparked frustration
and anger in some circles, evidenced by the protests following the
December 2011 Duma elections, as well as debate over its impact on
Russia's development. We assess Putin's return is likely to mean more
continuity than change in Russian domestic politics and foreign policy,
at least during the next year.
On the domestic political front, Putin is most likely to preserve
the political/economic system rather than be an agent of reform or
liberalization, despite looming problems that will test the
sustainability of Russia's ``managed democracy'' and crony capitalism.
Putin will likely focus on restoring elite cohesion, protecting elite
assets, and securing new opportunities for elite enrichment. At the
same time he will seek a level of prosperity that placates the masses,
while managing growing demands for change, which might prove
increasingly difficult, given Russia's moderate growth rates.
Foreign Policy
In foreign policy, Putin's return is unlikely to bring immediate,
substantive reversals in Russia's approach to the United States, but
advancement of the bilateral relationship will prove increasingly
challenging. Putin has acknowledged that the ``reset'' with Washington
has yielded benefits for Russia, suggesting he sees value in preserving
a cooperative relationship. Nevertheless, Putin's instinctive distrust
of U.S. intentions and his transactional approach towards relations
probably will make him more likely to confront Washington over policy
differences.
Maintaining the positive momentum of the reset will also be harder
because several areas of mutual interest, such as the New START
agreement and cooperation on Afghanistan, have already been addressed.
Russia continues to view the reset largely as a U.S. initiative and
believes that the onus is on the United States to demonstrate
flexibility and make compromises to advance the relationship.
Missile defense will remain a sensitive issue for the Kremlin, and
Moscow will look to the U.S. and our NATO partners for binding
guarantees that any system will not be directed at Russia. Continuing
concerns about U.S. missile defense plans will reinforce Russia's
reluctance to engage in further nuclear arms reductions. Moscow is also
not likely to be particularly helpful in dealing with Syria or with
Iran and its nuclear program. Russia is unlikely to support additional
sanctions against Iran, which it worries are aimed at regime change,
and argues that confidence-building measures and an incremental system
of rewards are the best way to persuade Iran to increase cooperation
with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the case of Syria,
Moscow is troubled by the Libyan precedent and believes the West is
pursuing a policy of regime change that Moscow assesses will
destabilize the region. The Kremlin also will remain suspicious of U.S.
cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union.
Assessing the Russian Military
Russian military forces, both nuclear and conventional, support
deterrence and enhance Moscow's geo-political clout. The Kremlin since
late 2008 has embraced a wide-ranging military reform and modernization
program designed to field a smaller, more mobile, better-trained, and
high-tech force over the next decade. This plan represents a radical
break with historical Soviet approaches to manpower, force structure,
and training. The initial phases, mainly focused on force
reorganization and cuts in the mobilization base and officer corps,
have been largely implemented and are being institutionalized. The
ground forces alone have reduced about 60 percent of armor and infantry
battalions since 2008, while the Ministry of Defense cut about 135,000
officer positions, many at field grade.
Moscow is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of
rearmament and professionalization. In 2010, Medvedev and Putin
approved a 10-year procurement plan to replace Soviet-era hardware and
bolster deterrence with a balanced set of modern conventional,
asymmetric, and nuclear capabilities. However, funding, bureaucratic,
and cultural hurdles--coupled with the challenge of reinvigorating a
military industrial base that deteriorated for more than a decade after
the Soviet collapse--will complicate Russian efforts.
The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that
will allow the Russian military to more rapidly defeat its smaller
neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet
space, but will not--and are not intended to--enable Moscow to conduct
sustained offensive operations against NATO collectively. In addition,
the steep decline in conventional capabilities since the collapse of
the Soviet Union has compelled Moscow to invest significant capital to
modernize its conventional forces. At least until Russia's high
precision conventional arms achieve practical operational utility,
Moscow will embrace nuclear deterrence as the focal point of its
defense planning, and it still views its nuclear forces as critical for
ensuring Russian sovereignty and relevance on the world stage, and for
offsetting its military weaknesses vis-a-vis potential opponents with
stronger militaries.
Central Asia and the Caucasus
The unresolved conflicts of the Caucasus and the fragility of some
Central Asian states represent the most likely flashpoints in the
Eurasia region. Moscow's occupation and military presence in and
expanded political-economic ties to Georgia's separatist regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia account for some of the tensions. Meanwhile,
Tbilisi charged Russia with complicity in a series of bombings in
Georgia in 2010 and 2011, while the Kremlin has been suspicious about
Georgian engagement with ethnic groups in Russia's North Caucasus.
Georgia's new constitution strengthens the office of the Prime Minister
after the 2013 presidential election, leading some to expect that
President Saakashvili may seek to stay in power by serving as Prime
Minister, which could impact the prospect for reducing tensions.
The Nagorno-Karabakh region is another potential flashpoint.
Heightened rhetoric, distrust on both sides, and recurring violence
along the Line of Contact increase the risk of miscalculations that
could escalate the situation with little warning.
Central Asian leaders are concerned about a Central Asian version
of the Arab Spring, and have implemented measures to buttress their
control and disrupt potential social mobilization, rather than
implementing liberalizing reforms. The overthrow of the Kyrgyzstani
Government in April 2010 and the subsequent ethnic violence in the
country's south--the unrest in June 2010 left over 400 dead and led to
a brief exodus of ethnic Uzbeks to Kyrgyzstan's border with
Uzbekistan--show that instability can come with little warning in parts
of Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan successfully held a peaceful presidential
election in October 2011, but Kyrgyz authorities remain concerned about
the potential for renewed violence in the country's south, and
Uzbekistan's Government has set up temporary shelters in the event of
violence and another wave of refugees.
Central Asia's ability to cope with violent extremist
organizations--especially militants based in Pakistan and Afghanistan--
represents an additional focus, particularly in light of the planned
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. The region's violent
extremism is also a growing security concern for Moscow. In 2011,
Kazakhstan experienced labor unrest and minor clashes with militants,
including the country's first-ever suicide attack in May. Tajikistan is
particularly important due to its extensive border with Afghanistan and
its history of internal and cross-border violence. In 2010, Dushanbe
had to contend with small groups of militants, an indicator that
Tajikistan is also potentially vulnerable.
Ukraine and Belarus
Developments in Ukraine and Belarus, while not threatening to U.S.
national security, present challenges to important U.S. interests in
the region. Democracy in Ukraine is increasingly under siege as Kyiv
drifts closer toward authoritarianism under President Yanukovych. The
selective prosecution of members of the political opposition, including
former Prime Minister and Yanukovych rival Yuliya Tymoshenko, on
politically-motivated legal charges, government use of administrative
levers to stifle independent media, and attempts to manipulate election
laws ahead of this October's parliamentary elections are all indicative
of this trend.
In Belarus, the systemic economic crisis presents Belarusian
President Lukashenko with the strongest challenge yet to his hold on
power. Continuing support among significant segments of Belarusian
society, a loyal and responsive security apparatus, a wary population
reluctant to take political action against the regime, and occasional
Russian support decrease the near-term likelihood of regime change.
Europe
The Balkans
Deep ethnic and political divides in the Western Balkans pose a
challenge to stability in Europe in 2012. Protracted instability in
Kosovo--especially Serb-majority northern Kosovo--and lack of progress
with the European Union (EU)-facilitated Serbia-Kosovo dialogue remain
sources of tension requiring Western diplomatic and security
engagement. Inter-ethnic strains and dysfunctional state structures
also threaten stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).
Northern Kosovo is particularly crucial. Clashes between NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers and local Serbs in late 2011--in which
over 60 KFOR soldiers were injured, two by gunshot--underscore ethnic
Serbs' commitment to violently resist KFOR attempts to remove
roadblocks in the north. The impasse has settled into an uneasy
stalemate; Kosovo Serbs are allowing KFOR limited ground movement, but
refusing to allow EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) vehicles through the
roadblocks and thwarting KFOR efforts to permanently remove roadblocks
or shut down bypass roads.
More than 80 countries, including 22 of 27 EU members, have
recognized Kosovo's independence, but in the coming years it will
remain a fragile state, dependent on the international community for
economic, security, and development assistance. As we saw in 2011,
violence can erupt with little to no warning, especially in the
northern municipalities. We assess that local forces cannot be relied
upon to assume KFOR's key tasks--fixed-site security, riot control, and
border management--at least until Belgrade and Pristina normalize
relations. The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) has nearly reached its
authorized strength of 2,500 lightly armed personnel but faces
recruiting, funding, and training challenges. KSF will likely decide to
transform itself into an armed force when its mandate comes up for
review in June 2013. We assess that the Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade will
continue to oppose any effort to expand Pristina's control over
northern Kosovo, but in different ways. Belgrade will politically limit
its response to sharp rhetoric condemning Pristina's efforts, while
Kosovo Serbs will likely employ familiar tactics, such as roadblocks
and street protests that pose a risk of sparking violence.
Turkey and the Kurdish Issue
A significant uptick in violence since June 2011 by the Turkish
Kurdish terrorist group Kongra-Gel (KGK/formerly PKK) complicated
Turkish Government efforts--already faltering in the face of mounting
nationalist sentiment--to forge a political solution to the
longstanding conflict. The KGK attack of 19 October 2011 that killed 24
Turkish security forces was the deadliest incident since 1993 and the
fourth largest KGK attack ever. Public outcry over the violence forced
Prime Minister Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) to place increased emphasis on military operations against the
KGK.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional Dynamics
Latin America is making progress in sustaining economic growth and
deepening democratic principles. Weathering some of the worst effects
of the global recession, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and
Panama have earned investment-grade status. Competitive, democratic
elections are increasingly the standard in most of the region. However,
populist, authoritarian leaders in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Nicaragua are undercutting representative democracy and consolidating
power in their executives.
The drug threat to the United States also emanates primarily from
the Western Hemisphere, where rising drug violence and corruption are
undermining stability and the rule of law in some countries. The
majority of U.S.-consumed drugs are produced in Mexico, Colombia,
Canada, and the United States. The drug trade also contributes to the
fact that Central American Governments, especially Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala, are coping with some of the highest violent
crime and homicide rates in the world. In addition, weak institutions
and corrupt officials in these countries have fostered a permissive
environment for gang and criminal activity to thrive.
Efforts to shape effective regional integration organizations
continue with uneven results. In December 2011, Caracas hosted the
inaugural Community of Latin American and Caribbean States summit,
excluding the United States and Canada. The Venezuela-led Bolivarian
Alliance for the Americas--created in part to spread Chavez's influence
in the region--is only muddling through. The Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR) has attempted to take on some multilateral issues,
provide a forum to coordinate positions, and calm regional tensions.
Nonetheless, enthusiasm for UNASUR likely will outpace the
institution's ability to develop specialized capabilities and programs.
Latin America increasingly has accommodated outside actors seeking
to establish or deepen relations, at times to attenuate U.S. influence.
Ties with Tehran offer some regional governments a means of staking an
independent position on Iran--thereby mitigating its isolation--while
also attempting to extract Iranian financial aid and investment for
economic and social projects. Russia has established political and
trade relations with most countries in the region. China has
dramatically increased its economic outreach to Latin America, and
during the last few years has become the largest trade partner to
several of the region's larger economies, including Brazil, Chile, and
Peru.
Mexico
Mexico's Government remains committed to fighting the country's
drug cartels and enacting reforms aimed at strengthening the rule of
law. The government has scored important takedowns of cartel leaders,
but the implementation of its ambitious reform agenda is a slow process
requiring legislative action at the Federal and state levels.
During Calderon's presidency, Mexican Federal police and military
operations have degraded several cartels, caused some to split into
factions, and disrupted some of their criminal operations. Since
December 2009, military and police units have killed or captured five
senior cartel leaders, and Mexican officials report that 23 of the 37
``most wanted'' traffickers have been arrested or killed by
authorities. In the meantime, criminal violence has increased sharply
since 2007. Drug-related homicides rose to over 15,000 in 2010 and
stood at 12,903 as of October 1, 2011, with sharp upticks in some
states and declines in others, such as Chihuahua, during the last year.
The vast majority of these homicides are the result of trafficker-on-
trafficker violence.
The Mexican cartels have a presence in the United States, but we
are not likely to see the level of violence that is plaguing Mexico
spill across the U.S. border. We assess that traffickers are wary of
more effective law enforcement in the United States. Moreover, the
factor that drives most of the bloodshed in Mexico--competition for
control of trafficking routes and networks of corrupt officials--is not
widely applicable to the small retail drug trafficking activities on
the U.S. side of the border. U.S. officials and citizens in Mexico are
at increased risk because of generalized violence.
Venezuela
Venezuelan politics will be highly competitive and polarized over
the next year. At stake in the October 2012 presidential election is
whether essential characteristics of President Chavez's 12 years in
power--the weakening of democratic institutions and representative
democracy and virulent anti-U.S. foreign policy--persist and even
deepen or begin to reverse. Chavez announced that he is cancer-free,
but there are still doubts about his health; and there is no other
leader who can match his charisma, force of personality, or ability to
manipulate politics and policy should he be unable to run again. In
addition, his failure to groom others to lead his United Socialist
Party of Venezuela means that any successor would lack his stature.
Once the campaign season begins in February 2012, the electorate will
be seeking solutions for the country's 25 percent inflation, widespread
food and energy shortages, and soaring crime and homicide rates.
Cuba
Cuban President Raul Castro has begun a delicate, cautious process
of reform designed to revive the island's flagging economy without
loosening political control. With a weakening Hugo Chavez as their
primary patron, Cuba's leaders are desperately seeking to diversify
their foreign investment partners and increase their access to hard
currency and foreign credit. Wary of instability, authorities are only
gradually implementing economic reforms announced last year. For
example, the delay in the planned layoff of a million state workers
reflects the sensitivity of the Castro regime as it observes uprisings
elsewhere in the world.
Cuban leaders are also concerned that economic reform will increase
pressure on them for a political opening and greater individual rights.
The stiff prison term imposed on the U.S. Agency for International
Development subcontractor Alan Gross for facilitating uncensored
internet connectivity demonstrates the Castro regime's fear of social
media. Indeed, harsh government repression of peaceful protests and an
upswing in short-term arrests of dissidents suggest economic changes
will not be coupled with political changes.
At this writing, we anticipate that the 28 January 2012 Communist
Party conference will emphasize the importance of technocratic
competence, rather than party membership, underscoring Castro's stated
focus on improving government bureaucracy and expertise. There is no
indication that Castro's efforts, including his stated interest in
laying the groundwork for a generational transition in leadership, will
loosen the Party's grip on power.
Haiti
President Martelly was inaugurated in May 2011. Political
disagreements between the legislative and executive branches impeded
the confirmation of a prime minister and stalled the government's
ability to make decisions for nearly 5 months. In October, the new
government, headed by Prime Minister Garry Conille, was sworn in. New
to governance, President Martelly is still learning how to navigate the
political arena and has made several missteps since taking office.
These decisions have further strained his relations with the
opposition-led Parliament and have at times caused friction with
international partners. That said, since taking office, the Martelly
administration has made progress on several fronts, including in the
rule of law, education, housing, and infrastructure, and as such has
demonstrated its commitment to improving the well being of the Haitian
people and helping the country achieve economic growth and development.
Although the lack of a duly functioning government for a large part
of 2011 affected recovery and reconstruction efforts, it did not halt
all activity. Almost two-thirds of the estimated 1.5 million Haitians
displaced by the earthquake have left tent encampments and over half of
the estimated 10 million cubic meters of rubble created by the
earthquake has been removed. The Haitian-led international campaign to
prevent and treat cholera mitigated the impact of the outbreak,
bringing the case mortality rate below the international standard of 1
percent. The Haitian economy is slowly improving and the macroeconomic
situation is stabilizing. We judge that, given these improving
conditions and the Haitians' recognition of the standing U.S. policy of
rapid repatriation of migrants at sea, there is little current threat
of a mass migration from Haiti.
significant state and nonstate intelligence threats
Transnational Organized Crime
Transnational organized crime (TOC) is an abiding threat to U.S.
economic and national security interests, and we are concerned about
how this threat might evolve in the future. We are aware of the
potential for criminal service providers to play an important role in
proliferating nuclear-applicable materials and facilitating terrorism.
In addition, the growing reach of TOC networks is pushing them to form
strategic alliances with state leaders and FIS personnel.
The increasingly close link between Russian and
Eurasian organized crime and oligarchs enhances the ability of
state or state-allied actors to undermine competition in gas,
oil, aluminum, and precious metals markets, potentially
threatening U.S. national and economic security.
As global trade shifts to emerging markets--many plagued by high
levels of corruption and criminal activity--U.S. and western companies'
competiveness is being eroded by overseas corrupt business practices.
In Russia, pervasive corruption augmented by powerful
criminal organizations probably drove public perceptions and
led to Russia being ranked with sub-Saharan Africa on
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in
2010.
Transnational organized criminal groups are also weakening
stability and undermining rule of law in some emerging democracies and
areas of strategic importance to the United States.
Mexican drug cartels are responsible for high levels
of violence and corruption in Mexico and contribute to
instability in Central America, while the drug trade continues
to fuel the Revolutionary Armed Forces insurgency in Colombia.
In addition, human smuggling and trafficking are transnational
organized criminal activities that are increasing due to globalization.
Kidnapping for ransom is increasing in many regions worldwide and
generates new and deep income streams for transnational criminal
organizations (particularly in Mexico) and terrorist networks.
Those who smuggle humans illegally have access to
sophisticated, forged travel papers and the ability to
constantly change their smuggling routes--routes that may span
multiple continents before reaching their destinations.
Smugglers undermine state sovereignty and sometimes facilitate
the terrorist threat. For instance in September 2011, three
Pakistanis pled guilty to conspiracy to provide materiel to TTP
by agreeing to smuggle a person they believed to be a member of
a terrorist organization across U.S. borders.
As pressure is applied to their traditional illicit
businesses, members of transnational criminal organizations are
moving into human trafficking because it is a lower risk,
higher profit operation, according to a 2010 U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime review. Human traffickers often use the same
document forgers, corrupt officials, and illicit travel experts
to exploit their victims by force, increasing human suffering
around the globe. Although the nature of the problem frustrates
collection of reliable statistics, most countries are affected
by human trafficking, serving as source, transit, or
destination points. The International Labor Organization
estimates human trafficking for the purposes of sexual and/or
economic exploitation to be a $20 billion business.
Terrorists and insurgents will increasingly turn to
crime and criminal networks for funding and logistics, in part
because of U.S. and Western success in attacking other sources
of their funding. Criminal connections and activities of both
Hizballah and AQIM illustrate this trend.
Space
In 2011, the Department of Defense and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence published the first joint National Security Space
Strategy. It emphasized that two key trends challenge our use of
space--the congested and contested nature of the space environment.
Growing global use of space--along with the effects of spacecraft
structural failures, accidents involving space systems, and debris-
producing, destructive antisatellite tests--has increased congestion.
To meet growing demand for radiofrequency bandwidth, more transponders
are placed in service, raising the probability of interference. If
space congestion grows unchecked, it will increase the probability of
mishaps and contribute to destabilization of the space environment.
Space is also increasingly contested in all orbits. Today, space
systems and their supporting infrastructures face a range of manmade
threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets.
Potential adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space
vulnerabilities. As more nations and nonstate actors develop
counterspace capabilities during the next decade, threats to U.S. space
systems and challenges to the stability and security of the space
environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems
could also have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting
worldwide services on which civil and commercial sectors depend.
Economics
New Economic Shocks and Unresolved Financial Strains
The fledgling economic recovery from the global recession of 2008-
2009 was challenged in 2011 by a series of shocks embroiling countries
and regions important to the global economy and leading to heightened
volatility in financial and commodity markets. Shocks included the Arab
Spring uprisings, which triggered widespread disruptions to business
activity and eventually changes to regimes; the Japanese earthquake and
tsunami that caused a nuclear tragedy and painful, significant
disruptions in manufacturing supply chains; and European leaders'
inability to restore financial market confidence in the
creditworthiness of a number of debt-troubled euro-zone countries,
putting the survival of the common currency and the stability of the
European economy in jeopardy. Additional challenges facing euro-zone
recovery include continued high unemployment and a tightening of credit
in 2012.
Elsewhere, numerous governments were challenged by rising food and
energy prices that surged in the first half of the year and ended up
averaging more than 25 percent higher than in 2010. In an atmosphere of
growing pessimism about the near-term prospects for global economic
activity and corporate profitability, as of late in 2011 equity markets
for the year were down sharply in almost every major financial center,
with 15 to 25 percent declines in Germany, France, Japan, China, India,
Brazil, and Turkey. Far greater losses were suffered in the stock
markets of the most vulnerable countries, such as Egypt and Greece,
which were down almost 50 percent. In January 2011 the IMF projected
global economic growth would slow from the 5.1 percent growth achieved
in 2010 to 4.4 percent in 2011 and 4.5 percent in 2012, but by
September it had lowered its projections to 4 percent growth in both
2011 and 2012. Many forecasters were reducing growth estimates during
the final months of 2011, and the majority predicted an outright,
though likely brief, recession for the euro zone and several emerging
market countries.
Energy
Oil prices ended the year well below the highs reached just after
Libyan oil output ceased in March. From time to time during 2011,
market participants voiced concerns about supply disruptions from other
potential shocks, for example one that could originate in Iran, but
these worries did not overshadow the emerging sentiment that a euro-
zone recession and associated deceleration of global growth could curb
demand. On balance, by year-end the main oil price benchmarks were up
about 20 percent from the 2010 average, but roughly 15 percent below
the earlier peaks in 2011.
Although the most promising advances in global energy production
have been in renewable energy, fossil fuels continued to dominate the
global energy mix and the political discussion in 2011. West Texas
Intermediate oil prices (the U.S. benchmark) have remained above $70
per barrel for 2 years and averaged $95 per barrel in 2011, providing a
favorable price environment for innovations in fossil fuel extraction
as well as alternative energy sources. Oil and gas production gains
from U.S. shale formations, Canadian oil sands, and offshore deep water
wells in Brazil are examples of energy output driven by high oil prices
and technology advances, such as horizontal drilling, hydraulic
fracturing, and deep water exploitation. The impact of Japan's tsunami,
meanwhile, has clouded the prospects for low-carbon-emissions nuclear
power. Germany has pledged to phase out nuclear power over 11 years--
nearly a quarter of its current electricity production--and approvals
and construction of additional nuclear facilities worldwide are likely
to slow under increased scrutiny of safety procedures.
Water Security
During the next 10 years, water problems will contribute to
instability in states important to U.S. national security interests.
Water shortages, poor water quality, and floods, by themselves, are
unlikely to result in state failure. However, water problems combined
with poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual
leadership, and weak political institutions contribute to social
disruptions that can result in state failure.
Depletion of groundwater supplies in some agricultural areas--
caused by poor management--will pose a risk to both national and global
food markets. Depleted and degraded groundwater can threaten food
security and thereby risk internal, social disruption, which, in turn,
can lead to political disruption. When water available for agriculture
is insufficient, agricultural workers lose their jobs and fewer crops
are grown. As a result, there is a strong correlation between water
available for agriculture and national GDP in countries with high
levels of agricultural employment.
Now and for the foreseeable future, water shortages and pollution
probably will negatively affect the economic performance of important
U.S. trading partners. Economic output will suffer if countries do not
have sufficient clean water supplies to generate electrical power or to
maintain and expand manufacturing and resource extraction. Hydropower
is an important source of electricity in developing countries--more
than 15 developing countries generate 80 percent or more of their
electrical power from hydropower--and demand for water to support all
forms of electricity production and industrial processes is increasing.
Water-related state-on-state conflict, however, is unlikely during
the next 10 years. Historically, water tensions have led to more water-
sharing agreements than violent conflicts. As water shortages become
more acute beyond the next 10 years, water in shared basins will
increasingly be used as leverage; the use of water as a weapon or to
further terrorist objectives also will become more likely.
Improved water management--involving, for example, pricing,
allocations, and ``virtual water'' trade--and investments in water-
related sectors (such as, agriculture, power, and water treatment) will
afford the best solutions for water problems. Because agriculture uses
approximately 70 percent of the global fresh water supply, the greatest
potential for relief from water scarcity will be through mechanisms and
technology that increase water use efficiency and the ability to
transfer water among sectors.
Health Threats and Natural Disasters
The past year illustrates, again, how health threats and natural
disasters can not only kill and sicken thousands of people and destroy
homes and livelihoods, but also challenge--and potentially
destabilize--governments, as they attempt to respond.
Although Tokyo responded adequately in the immediate
aftermath of Japan's largest earthquake, the triple disaster
contributed to Prime Minister Kan's resignation, and led then-
Finance Minister Noda, now the Prime Minister, to admit that
the government's inability to lead raised distrust of lawmakers
and government to levels not previously seen.
An outbreak of Escherichia coli (E. coli) associated
with contaminated sprouts infected 3,500 people in Germany
between May and July, produced life threatening complications
in 855, and resulted in 53 deaths. The inability to quickly
identify the source led to loss of life and caused economic
losses estimated at $1 billion.
Although we can say with near certainty that new outbreaks of
disease and catastrophic natural disasters will occur during the next
several years, we cannot predict their timing, locations, causes, or
severity. We assess the international community needs to improve
surveillance, early warning, and response capabilities for these
events, and, by doing so, will enhance its ability to respond to
manmade disasters. This can be accomplished in part by member state
implementation of the World Health Organization's International Health
Regulations (2005). The key challenge is that fiscal austerity measures
in many countries might so restrict funding that preparedness declines.
conclusion
The issues that we consider here confront responsible citizens and
their governments everywhere. The Intelligence Community is fully
committed to arming our decisionmakers--policymakers, warfighters, and
law enforcement officers--with the best intelligence and analytic
insight we can provide. This is necessary to enable them to take the
actions and make the decisions that will protect American lives and
American interests, here and around the world.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Director Clapper.
General Burgess.
STATEMENT OF LTG RONALD L. BURGESS, JR., USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Burgess. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and
other members of the committee, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to join my longtime friend and professional
colleague, Director Clapper, in representing the men and women
of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
I would like to begin with current military operations in
Afghanistan where we assess that endemic corruption and
persistent qualitative deficiencies in the ANA and ANP
undermine efforts to extend effective governance and security.
The ANA remains reliant on ISAF for key combat support such as
logistics, intelligence, and transport. While ANA performance
improved in some operations when partnered with ISAF units,
additional gains will require sustained mentoring and support.
Despite successful coalition targeting, the Taliban remains
resilient and able to replace leadership losses while also
competing to provide governance at the local level. From its
Pakistani safe havens, the Taliban leadership remains confident
of eventual victory.
To the west, Iran remains committed to threatening U.S.
interests in the region through its support to terrorists and
militant groups, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, while it
remains committed to strengthening its naval, nuclear, and
missile capabilities. Iran can close the Straits of Hormuz at
least temporarily and may launch missiles against U.S. forces
and our allies in the region, if it is attacked. Iran could
also attempt to employ terrorist surrogates worldwide. However,
the agency assesses Iran as unlikely to initiate or
intentionally provoke a conflict.
Iranian ballistic missiles in development could range
across the region and Central Europe. Iran's new space launch
vehicle demonstrates progress toward a potential
intercontinental ballistic missile. Iran today has the
technical, scientific, and industrial capability to eventually
produce nuclear weapons. While international pressure against
Iran has increased, including through sanctions, we assess that
Tehran is not close to agreeing to abandon its nuclear program.
In Iraq, DIA assesses that Baghdad security forces probably
can maintain current security levels this year despite manning
shortages and overly centralized command and control. Despite
perceptions of sectarian bias and a need for logistics,
intelligence, and tactical communications training, Iraq's
security forces are putting forces on the street, they are
securing high-profile sites, and they are conducting
intelligence-driven targeting. However, Sunni insurgent and
Shia militant groups likely will remain serious challenges for
Iraq and remaining U.S. personnel until more comprehensive
political reconciliation reduces lingering tensions among
religious and tribal constituencies.
More broadly across the region, the popular forces sweeping
the Middle East and North Africa are demonstrating the
potential to reorder longstanding assumptions, relationships,
and alliances in a way that invites risk and opportunities for
the United States and our allies. Armed domestic opponents pose
an unprecedented challenge to the al Assad regime in Syria, and
its collapse would have serious implications for Iran,
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Lebanon.
Turning to Asia, North Korea's third-generation leadership
transition is underway. Improving the economy and regime's
survival remain enduring leadership priorities. Pyongyang's
nuclear and missile programs provide strategic deterrence,
international prestige, and leverage to extract economic and
political concessions. While North Korea may abandon portions
of its nuclear program for better relations with the United
States, it is unlikely to surrender its nuclear weapons.
Pyongyang's forward-positioned military can attack South
Korea with little or no strategic warning, but it suffers from
logistic shortages, aging equipment, and poor training.
Pyongyang likely knows it cannot reunite the peninsula by force
and is unlikely to attack on a scale that would risk its own
survival.
We see no sign that the leadership transition has changed
the regime's calculus regarding nuclear weapons, and the DIA
retains continued focus on the peninsula to provide warning
against additional attacks from the north.
China continues to build a more modern military to defend
its core interests, which are territorial sovereignty, national
unity, and sustained access to economic resources. Countering
U.S. forces in a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency remains
a top Chinese military priority. Investments in naval anti-air
and anti-ship capabilities are designed to achieve periodic and
local sea and air superiority to include the islands closest to
the mainland. Once focused on territorial defense, China's air
force is developing offshore strike, air and missile defense,
strategic mobility, and early warning and reconnaissance
capabilities. China may incorporate new capabilities in novel
ways that present challenges for U.S. forces.
Last year's first flight of a fifth-generation fighter and
launch of China's first aircraft carrier underscore the breadth
and quality of China's military modernization program. However,
a lack of modern combat experience is but one example that
steps remain before China achieves the full potential of its
new technologies, platforms, and military personnel.
Regarding cyber threats, we continue to see daily attempts
to gain access to our Nation's government and business computer
networks, including our own secure systems. This threat is
large and growing in scale and sophistication.
Finally, al Qaeda losses in 2011 have focused the core
group and its affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa on
self-preservation and reconstitution. Though damaged, the group
and its affiliates remain committed to transnational attacks in
Europe and against the United States. Al Qaeda in the lands of
the Maghreb (AQIM) acquired weapons from Libya this year,
kidnapped westerners, and continued its support of Nigeria-
based Boko Haram. While we have made important gains against al
Qaeda and its affiliates, we remain in a race against their
ability to evolve, regenerate leadership, and launch attacks.
Self-radicalization or lone wolf individuals, including within
the United States and even within our own ranks, remain an
enduring concern.
I would like to close by noting how honored I am to
represent the men and women of the DIA. We remain acutely aware
that while much of what we do is secret, our work is always a
public trust. On their behalf, I would like to thank the
members of this committee for your continued support and
confidence in our work. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Burgess follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., USA
Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of
the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify and for your
continued support of the dedicated men and women of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), many of whom are forward-deployed directly
supporting U.S. and allied military forces in Afghanistan and around
the world.
The United States faces a complex security environment marked by a
broad spectrum of dissimilar threats, including rising regional powers
and highly adaptive and resilient transnational terrorist networks.
This testimony reflects DIA's best analysis, based on the Agency's
worldwide human intelligence, technical intelligence,
counterintelligence, and document and media exploitation capabilities,
along with information from DIA's Intelligence Community (IC) partners,
international allies, and open sources.
I will begin my testimony with an assessment of Iraq in the post
U.S. military drawdown environment and then focus on Afghanistan, where
the Department of Defense (DOD), the IC, and DlA remain actively
engaged supporting military operations.
Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance
with the U.S.-Iraq security agreement, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
will probably be able to maintain internal security at current levels
over the next year. The ISF have led Iraqi security operations since
late 2010 but still require training in a number of areas, including
logistics, intelligence, and on new equipment purchased from the United
States. The ISF have demonstrated the ability to put forces on the
street, conduct static security of high-profile sites, operate
checkpoints, and conduct intelligence-driven targeting. However,
numerous security vulnerabilities remain due to manning shortages,
logistical shortfalls, and overly centralized command and control. The
ISF are unable to maintain external security and will be unable to
secure Iraq's borders or defend against an external threat over the
next year.
Interior Ministry police forces are not prepared to take the lead
for internal security from the Iraqi army. Outside of select Iraqi
counterterrorism units, many Iraqi police forces are understaffed, ill-
equipped, and vulnerable to terrorist attack, intimidation,
infiltration, and corruption.
Sunni insurgent and Shia militant groups will remain persistent
security challenges for the Iraqi Government and remaining U.S.
diplomatic, military, and civilian personnel. Sunni groups will likely
contract in size as members motivated by opposition to the U.S.
presence cease fighting, leaving a core of fighters committed to
continued attacks on the Shia-dominated government. However, without an
increase in popular support for insurgent activities or sustained
external support, the Sunni insurgency will be unable to pose an
existential threat to the Iraqi Government.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) exhibits resiliency through its sustained
ability to conduct periodic coordinated and complex attacks throughout
Iraq. The group directs the majority of its propaganda and attacks
against Iraqi Government, security, and Shia civilian targets, hoping
to destabilize the government and inflame sectarian tensions. With the
departure of U.S. forces, AQI will seek to exploit a more permissive
security environment to increase its operations and presence throughout
the country.
Iraq's political environment will remain volatile and marked by
periodic crises. However, the various ethno-sectarian political blocs
perceive greater advantage can be gained through the political process
than through violence and will probably remain engaged. Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki and Kurdish leaders have strong incentives to maintain
the current political dynamic, and both sides likely will seek to
resolve Arab-Kurd issues diplomatically. However, an uncoordinated
Kurdish or Iraqi military deployment in the disputed territories in
2012 risks inadvertent conflict.
Iraq will attempt to balance its relationship with the Sunni Arab
states, Iran, and Turkey in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. Sunni Arab
states will remain suspicious of the Shia-led Government, citing its
close ties to Tehran. Iran will seek to broaden its diplomatic,
security, and economic ties with Iraq. DIA expects Baghdad will attempt
to balance these competing interests rather than gravitating toward one
camp.
Turning to Afghanistan, the Afghan army and police exceeded growth
benchmarks for 2011 although persistent qualitative challenges continue
to impede their development into an independent, self-sustaining
security apparatus. The Afghan National Army (ANA) showed marked
improvements in some operations when partnered with International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) units. However, continued gains in ANA
capability and operational effectiveness require sustained mentoring
and direct support from ISAP. Moreover, the ANA's reliance on ISAF for
many critical combat enabling functions underscores its inability to
operate independently. Nevertheless, Afghanistan's population generally
favors the army over the police.
The Afghan National Police (ANP) has improved in both capacity and
capability, but its viability as an effective, cohesive security force
currently requires ISAP's direct oversight, partnering, and support.
The ANP suffers from pervasive corruption and popular perceptions that
it is unable to extend security in many areas. Unlike the army, the ANP
is additionally challenged by serving in both counterinsurgency and law
enforcement roles. This dual mission places acute demands on the ANP's
already limited capacity. Local initiatives such as the Afghan Local
Police are intended to augment the ANP by filling security voids and
have helped to counter insurgent influence in some areas.
The Afghan Government will face several challenges to its
development over the next year. Endemic human capital shortages make it
difficult for the government to fill many positions with qualified
personnel. Underdeveloped government institutions, especially at the
district and village level, will impede service delivery and limit the
government's connection to the population. Corruption will continue at
all levels of the government and efforts by the Afghans to root it out
will be hindered as officials and powerbrokers, especially at the
subnational level, focus on maintaining their patronage networks.
Finally, as the transition process continues, the Afghan Government
will struggle to fill the vacuum left by ISAF troops and resources,
while continuing to support ongoing ISAF efforts in non-transitioned
areas.
In Pakistan, the May 1, 2011, raid in Abbottabad followed several
other high-profile events that inflamed anti-U.S. sentiments. Some
criticized the army for being powerless to stop the U.S. raid inside
Pakistan; others questioned whether the military was either complicit
in hiding Osama bin Laden or incompetent in failing to find him. Much
criticism was placed on Pakistan's cooperation with the United States
and that enticed Islamabad to further distance itself from the United
States.
Pakistan's Army, Air Force, and paramilitary forces has been tested
by increased combat operations in the tribal areas since 2007.
Approximately 140,000 Army and paramilitary forces are deployed to
combat positions at any given time. This continued state of deployment,
combined with budgetary constraints, has taken a toll on Pakistan's
combat capabilities.
Safehavens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of
Pakistan continue to be crucial enablers for the Taliban, Haqqani
Network (HQN), Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin insurgent groups, and al Qaeda
which seek to recruit, train, and equip fighters for operations in
Afghanistan. Pakistan military efforts focused on Tehrik-e Taliban
Pakistan (TIP) which threatens Pakistan's stability in the FATA and
Khyber Paktunkhwa (KP) have had no effect in limiting HQN use of the
FATA as a safehaven. Continued ISAF efforts in Afghanistan, coupled
with simultaneous Pakistan military operations targeting Afghan
insurgent groups based in the FATA, are required to help disrupt
insurgent freedom of movement.
Al Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership has been degraded by several
years of attrition and is now forced to rely on a shrinking cadre of
experienced leaders restricted to operating primarily inside an HQN-
facilitated safehaven in North Waziristan. The cumulative effect of
sustained counterterrorism operations has made it difficult for al
Qaeda to replenish its senior ranks with the type of experienced
leaders, trainers, and attack planners it promoted in previous years.
Recent key losses compound other challenges facing the group,
especially significant competition from the Arab Spring movements in
the battle of ideas and the shift of focus away from the battlefields
of Iraq and Afghanistan as Western troops decrease their presence.
Sustained counterterrorism pressure since 2008--including the
killing of al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden, Atiyah Abel al Rahman, and
Ilyas Kashmiri in 2011--reduced the Pakistan-based core al Qaeda's
cohesion and capabilities, including its ability to mount
sophisticated, complex attacks in the west similar to the 2006
Transatlantic Airliner plot. However, despite these setbacks, al Qaeda
retains its intent, though perhaps not the robust capability, to plan
and conduct terrorist attacks against the west, including the U.S.
Homeland. Core al Qaeda almost certainly will also try to inspire
regional nodes and allies, as well as unaffiliated but like-minded
extremists, to engage in terrorism against the west. The group can be
expected to continue its limited support to the Afghan insurgency over
the next year. Looking ahead, we assess that keeping up
counterterrorism pressure against core al Qaeda will be crucial to
maintaining and building upon gains against the group.
Polls indicate that inflation and unemployment are the primary
concerns for the Pakistani populace. With Pakistan's 2013 elections
approaching, Islamabad will be challenged by the difficult economic
conditions and opposition parties seeking to undermine the government.
Pakistan views India as its greatest threat, but Islamabad has
engaged in confidence building talks with New Delhi that seeks an
expansion of economic ties. The military situation is calm, but a major
terrorist attack, especially if linked to Pakistan, would jeopardize
continued progress. New Delhi and Islamabad are expected to hold talks
on confidence-building measures in 2012. Sustained momentum on these
issues may enable discussions on more contentious issues over time.
India considers regional stability a prerequisite for maintaining
its continued economic growth. New Delhi views economic growth coupled
with a strong military as essential for gaining recognition as a global
power. Domestic political issues such as unemployment, inflation, and
several high-level corruption scandals continue to dominate New Delhi's
attention. Senior Indian leaders also remain concerned about the
country's Maoist-inspired insurgency, terrorism, and the security
situation in Kashmir, although the latter saw a marked decline in
violence compared to 2010. While India continues to carefully monitor
events in Pakistan, China is also viewed as a long-term challenge.
In 2011, India continued efforts to increase economic and military
engagement with countries in East and Southeast Asia. India and Japan
agreed to conduct a bilateral naval exercise, their first since 2008;
India and Vietnam pledged to increase naval training; and the India-
South Korea relationship continues to progress following the Indian
Defense Minister's late 2010 visit.
Beijing and New Delhi resumed military-to-military engagement in
mid-2011, held their first strategic economic dialogue in September,
and discussed their longstanding border dispute in November. The
military situation along the contested border is quiet. However, India
is concerned over Chinese logistical improvements and is taking steps
to improve its own capabilities. India is raising additional ground
forces, is improving logistical capacity, and has based advanced
fighter aircraft opposite China.
India conducts periodic tests of its nuclear-capable missiles to
enhance and verify its ballistic missile reliability and capabilities.
India's current delivery systems include nuclear-capable fighter
aircraft and ballistic missiles, and India claims it is developing a
nuclear-capable 6,000 kilometer (km)-range intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) that will carry multiple warheads. India intends to test
this ICBM in 2012.
Turning to North Korea, the primary goals of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are preserving its current system of
government, improving its poor economy, and building national
confidence and support for Kim Jong Un--youngest son of the late Kim
Jong Il and North Korea's new ``Great Leader.'' North Korea's
leadership is emphasizing policy continuity under Kim Jong Un which DIA
anticipates will include continued pursuit of nuclear and missile
capabilities for strategic deterrence and international prestige, as
well as to gain economic and political concessions.
Kim Jong Un was appointed to the rank of four-star general and Vice
Chairman of the Korea Workers Party (KWP) Central Military Commission
in 2010, he was given the title of Supreme Commander shortly after his
father's death. He has yet to assume his father's other titles,
however, such as General Secretary of the KWP and Chairman of the
National Defense Commission. DIA believes he will assume these titles
after an appropriate period of mourning when doing so will not be seen
as detracting from his father's legacy.
North Korea signaled last year a willingness to return to Six-Party
Talks. In November 2010, North Korea showed a visiting group of
American academics a site at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center where
it claimed to be building a light water reactor (LWR) and operating a
gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility intended to support low-
enriched uranium fuel production for the LWR. The development of this
type of uranium enrichment capability could enable North Korea to
produce fissile material to support its nuclear program.
North Korea's large, forward-positioned military can attack South
Korea with little or no strategic warning, but it suffers from logistic
shortages, aging equipment, and poor training. It has attacked South
Korean forces in/near disputed territories in the past and maintains
the capability for further provocations. Pyongyang is making some
efforts to upgrade conventional weapons, including modernizing certain
aspects of its deployed missile forces--short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range systems.
North Korea has tested missiles, including the Taepo-Dong-2 space
launch vehicle/ICBM, in violation of international law. Pyongyang also
has a long history of ballistic missile development.
North Korea's intelligence resources are focused primarily on South
Korea and are dedicated to influencing public opinion, collecting
sensitive information on U.S. and Republic of Korea Government and
military targets, and in some cases assassinating high-profile
defectors and outspoken critics of the North Korean regime. North
Korean intelligence officers and agents for years have infiltrated
South Korea by posing as defectors. Firsthand accounts of confessed
North Korean agents describe long-term strategies that can involve many
years of living in South Korea as sleeper agents before being tasked
with a mission. North Korean intelligence activity is likely greatest
in East Asia; however, the full extent of activity outside the Korean
peninsula is unknown.
Shifting focus to Iran, Tehran poses a threat to U.S. interests
through its regional ambitions, support to terrorist and militant
groups, and improving military and nuclear capabilities. The recent
plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States
illustrates the terrorist threat posed by Tehran beyond the region.
Iran also continues efforts to gain regional power by countering
Western influence, expanding ties with its neighbors, and advocating
Islamic solidarity while supporting and arming groups in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the Levant. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) trains and provides weapons and logistic support to Lebanese
Hizballah. In turn, Lebanese Hizballah has trained Iraqi insurgents in
Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon at Iran's behest, providing them with tactics
and technology to attack U.S. interests. We estimate the IRGC-QF
enables similar training of HAMAS, also using Lebanese Hizballah as a
conduit.
Iran's military capabilities continue to improve. The navy is
adding new ships and submarines and expanding bases on the Gulf of
Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea. Additionally, Iran is
deploying vessels into the Arabian Sea for counter-piracy operations
and conducted its first transit by a submarine to the Red Sea in 2011.
If attacked, or if sanctions on its oil exports are enacted, Iran
has threatened to control traffic in or temporarily close the Strait of
Hormuz with its naval forces, a capability that it likely has. Iran has
also threatened to launch missiles against the United States and our
allies in the region in response to an attack; it could also employ its
terrorist surrogates worldwide. However, it is unlikely to initiate or
intentionally provoke a conflict or launch a preemptive attack.
Iran can already strike targets throughout the region and into
Eastern Europe with ballistic missiles. In addition to its growing
missile and rocket inventories, Iran is seeking to enhance lethality
and effectiveness of existing systems with improvements in accuracy and
warhead designs. Iran's Simorgh space launch vehicle shows the
country's intent to develop technologies applicable to developing an
ICBM.
In Afghanistan, Tehran seeks to prevent a strategic partnership
declaration between Afghanistan and the United States and has
repeatedly claimed that a U.S. presence will promote long-term
instability. Iran provides weapons, funding, and training to
insurgents, while maintaining ties with the Government in Kabul and
supporting development efforts.
In its relationship to Iraq, Tehran supports Prime Minister Maliki
and wants to maintain a friendly, Shia Islamist-led government in
Baghdad. Iran welcomed the U.S. drawdown, and Supreme Leader Khamenei
and senior Iranian military officials have credited the Iraqi people's
unified resistance for forcing the withdrawal. Despite some points of
friction, Tehran generally has strong relations with Baghdad, but over
the long-term, Iran is concerned a strong Iraq could once again emerge
as a regional rival.
Iran characterized the Arab Spring as being inspired by its own
1979 revolution--an assertion that has not resonated with Arab
populations. Iran seeks new opportunities to expand its influence with
the fall of a number of governments that were perceived to be allies of
the United States. Iran is concerned by the unrest in Syria, a country
essential to Tehran's strategy in the Levant. Iran continued to support
Syria during the unrest but has called on President Bashar al-Asad to
implement reforms.
With regard to counterintelligence concerns, Iran views the United
States as one of its highest priority intelligence targets, in addition
to Israel and internal opposition groups. [ran's MOIS and the IRGC-QF
target DOD interests throughout the world, most markedly in areas such
as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gulf Cooperation Council states. In each of
these regions Iran constitutes the most significant foreign
intelligence service threat.
Iran's intelligence services play a vital role not only in
collection, but also in projecting Iranian influence beyond its
borders. The Qods Force plays a central yet often hidden role in
formulating and implementing Iran's Foreign Policy, particularly in
areas considered vital to Iran's national security interests.
The events of the Arab Spring unleashed powerful new popular forces
in the Arab world, a world long suppressed by autocratic regimes, and
led to a high degree of uncertainty. With elections and the formation
of new governments only now beginning across North Africa, the
political and security outcomes remain unclear. Religion will playa
more prominent role in governments than in the past. However, new
governments will continue to face the same significant socioeconomic
challenges that hastened their predecessors' downfall. That suggests
struggle ahead to satisfy newly emboldened electorates, making future
unrest likely.
The outcome in countries still facing civil unrest is similarly
unclear. Syria and Yemen remain in stalemates between cohesive, but
embattled, regimes and fractured oppositions that have yet to either
coalesce into forces capable of overthrowing the regimes or convince
the majority of the population they are a viable alternative. At this
stage, both regimes have lost enough legitimacy that their long-term
survival is unlikely. When and how the stalemates will break is
uncertain.
Following the death of Moammar Qadhafi on October 20,2011, and the
declaration of liberation 3 days later, Libya faces a series of
challenges to include: meeting election deadlines; disarming and
reintegrating militias; and resolving political, tribal, regional,
religious, and ideological rivalries. Transitional National Council
(TNC) Chairman Mustafa Abd al-Jalil's controversial pledge to invoke
Islamic law raised concern, although the new Prime Minister, Abd al-
Rahim al-Keeb, later clarified the TNC espouses a moderate Turkish-
style government. It is unclear how much influence hard-line Islamists
will have on the development of the new government.
The threat of insurgency and aggression against the TNC remains if
former Qadhafi regime supporters are not successfully reconciled and
brought into the political transition. Revenge attacks, arbitrary
arrests, and forced displacement of Libyans and sub-Saharan Africans
were common in September and October. Human Rights Watch urgently
recommended in December that the TNC address abuses of detainees held
by the TNC and militias, and continuation of such practices will
sharpen the desire for retaliation.
In addition to increasing security concerns during the post-Qadhafi
transition, the completion of repairs to the Libyan oil infrastructure
will be critical to improving the oil-dependent national economy.
Effective demobilization of militias is unlikely if meaningful jobs and
income are unavailable. At the same time, rebuilding and maintaining
other critical infrastructures, such as security, essential public
services, and day-to-day effective governance, will also be crucial to
building and sustaining the new Libyan Government's legitimacy and
credibility.
In 2004, Libya had declared a stockpile of bulk liquid sulfur
mustard, jellified mustard heel, and liquid precursors. TNC forces
during the unrest discovered undeclared Chemical Warfare (CW) weapons
or material in Libya which they have since declared to the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Libya's TNC indicated they
intend to cooperate with the international community regarding CW
stockpiles in Libya including the destruction of CW material.
Turning to Egypt, since the February 2011 resignation of President
Hosni Mubarak, smaller scale protests have continued over issues such
as the prosecution of former regime officials, government transparency,
the transition process, economic issues, and sectarian tensions. To
control protests and stabilize the country, the military-led transition
government has given in to many protester demands.
After 10 months of unrest, the regime and opposition in Syria are
in a stalemate; however, the regime is cohesive. The leading opposition
umbrella organization, the Syrian National Council (SNC), announced its
leadership structure on October 2 and continues to call for the non-
violent ouster of the regime. The Syrian military, despite some
desertions and defections to the armed opposition, on the whole remains
a viable, cohesive, and effective force. The military suppresses unrest
throughout the country. The SNC has yet to emerge as a clear or united
alternative to the Asad regime, and it has not been able to unite
Syrians on a strategy for ousting and replacing the regime. Regional
pressure on the regime increased as the Arab League (AL) suspended
Syria's membership in mid-November and deployed monitors to Syria in
late December after earlier calls to the regime to end violence,
withdraw forces from cities, release detainees, permit access to AL
monitors, and begin dialogue with the opposition. The AL, in late
January, publicly called for Asad to transfer power to a deputy and
accelerate legislative elections. On February 2, following an AL
request for U.N. support for their proposal, the U.N. Security Council
(UNSC) convened to discuss a potential UNSC resolution.
Syria is acquiring sophisticated weapons systems such as advanced
surface-to-air and coastal defense missiles. In addition, Damascus is
developing long-range rockets and short-range ballistic missiles with
increased accuracy and extended range.
Syria is suspected of maintaining an active chemical warfare (CW)
program, with a stockpile of CW agents which can be delivered by
aircraft or ballistic missiles. Syria seeks chemical warfare-related
precursors and expertise from foreign sources to supplement its
domestic capabilities.
Damascus maintains a small civil nuclear program that includes a
Chinese-built research reactor containing one kilogram of weapons-grade
uranium, an irradiation facility for sterilizing medical products, a
facility that produces radiopharmaceuticals, and about one metric ton
of unenriched uranium produced domestically. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards the reactor. Syria's former covert
nuclear program--for which the IAEA recently referred Syria to the UN
Security Council--appears to be dormant.
Damascus continues its strategic partnership with Hizballah and
perceives it as an extension of its defense against Israel. Syria's
strategic partnership with Iran centers on shared regional objectives
that include countering Israel by transferring increasingly
sophisticated arms to Hizballah.
The northern and southern borders of Israel have largely remained
calm despite periods of tension, such as the June 5 Nakba Day violence
in the Golan Heights and the August 18 terrorist attack near Eilat in
southern Israel. Both HAMAS and Hizballah are applying lessons learned
from past conflicts with Israel. Even if neither intends to resume
fighting, escalation could result from miscalculated responses to a
provocation or incident.
In Gaza, HAMAS is preoccupied with internal Palestinian issues and
is still rearming and rebuilding after Israel's December 2008 Operation
Cast Lead. HAMAS is avoiding provocations that could trigger another
major conflict with Israel. Increased international cooperation against
HAMAS and Iranian arms smuggling will hamper the group's rearmament but
will not affect its ability to control Gaza.
Since it interdicted an international, Turkish-led aid flotilla to
the Gaza Strip in May 2010, Israel has demonstrated its willingness to
maintain a naval blockade of Gaza, but changed its policy from a list
of permitted items to a list of prohibited items. This allows entry of
more food and commercial goods. Israel also has reiterated it will
permit international aid shipments to Gaza if they come through
Israeli-controlled crossing points after unloading in an Israeli or
Egyptian port.
Hizballah is focused on internal Lebanese political issues and
improving its paramilitary capabilities, which now are stronger than
when it fought Israel in 2006. Both sides expect and are preparing for
another round of fighting, but Hizballah appears to have no interest in
renewing the conflict at this time. Israel's next battle with Hizballah
is likely to involve more ground forces early in the conflict and may
extend much deeper into Lebanon.
Iran funds, instigates, and coordinates most anti-Israeli activity
in the region. Israel is concerned that Iran is giving increasingly
sophisticated weapons to its enemies, including Hizballah, HAMAS, and
Palestine Islamic Jihad. These actions could offset Israel's
traditional military superiority, erode its deterrent, and lead to war.
In Yemen, Arab Spring protests calling for President Ali Abdallah
Salih's ouster and prosecution have often devolved into open fighting
between regime forces, dissident military units, and tribal
confederations. President Salih's return to Yemen from Saudi Arabia,
where he was convalescing after a failed assassination attempt, has
done little to reestablish stability in the country. Political elites
have since agreed to a consensus government and implementation of a
political transition plan, but protest activity has continued. Yemeni
forces eventually rescued a military unit besieged by al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula in the city of Zinjibar, but the regime still
struggles to secure the city and the surrounding area. Calls for
autonomy from a Huthi insurgency in the north and an often violent but
fractured secessionist movement in the south will challenge any future
Government of Yemen. These threats, combined with dwindling water and
oil resources, will complicate efforts to stabilize Yemen.
Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has the intent, but a
diminished capability, to target the U.S. Homeland. Over the next 6
months, the group will likely focus on local attacks against U.S.,
Western, Yemeni, and Saudi interests in the Arabian Peninsula. In the
longer term, the permissive operating environment in Yemen will allow
the group to reconstitute this capability, absent sustained
counterterrorism pressure.
In general, the cohesion of the al Qaeda network is not reliant on
a single, unifying leader, and the network will remain intact even if
senior leaders are removed or communication with al Qaeda core is
severed. Over the long term, as each regionally-based al Qaeda node
increasingly pursues its own agenda, we anticipate decentralization
away from Pakistan-based al Qaeda leadership. Indeed, as core al
Qaeda's position deteriorates, we assess the center of gravity for the
broader global jihadist movement could shift from Pakistan to another
theater. Each node, however, almost certainly will continue to self-
identify as part of al Qaeda, as long as it benefits the node's
recruitment, fundraising, and prestige. The nodes' public recognition
of Ayman al-Zawahiri as successor to bin Laden underscores this
continuing adherence to the notion of a broader al Qaeda movement.
Nonstate actor, particularly al Qaeda and its associated movements,
have learned much from their successes and failures over the past few
years, as well as through their associations with state-based
intelligence services, and they have instructed their personnel in
espionage tradecraft, interrogation, counterintelligence, and
operational security concepts. They continue to use this knowledge and
training both offensively to target U.S. interests worldwide and
defensively to counter U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
In 2011, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
acquired weapons from Libya, though we have not been able to confirm
AQIM's acquisition of Libyan manportable air defense systems; kidnapped
Westerners; and continued its support to Nigeria-based Boko Haram. AQIM
espouses the al Qaeda ideology and eulogized Osama bin Laden following
his death.
I now turn to the Horn ofAfrica. In 2011, increased regional
opposition against al-Shabaab led to their first territorial losses
since 2006. In early August, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and
African Union Mission in Somalia expanded control of territory in
Mogadishu when al-Shabaab abandoned their front lines and implemented a
guerrilla-style retaliation strategy. In the western Somali border
regions, Ethiopian-and Kenyan-backed TFG proxy forces fought al-Shabaab
since early 2011, and in October, Kenyan Defense Forces also entered
southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab called upon its supporters to launch
attacks in Kenya. In response, al-Shabaab-associated foreign fighters
are executing attacks in Kenya. East Africa-based al Qaeda operatives
remain interested in conducting attacks in Europe.
In 2011, al-Shabaab continued its operations against the Somali TFG
and the African Union Mission in Somalia and sought to exploit foreign
aid and nongovernmental organizations responding to the Somali famine
crisis.
Prolonged drought will worsen security conditions, driving
population migration and increased competition over food and natural
resources. Despite increased humanitarian efforts, al-Shabaab's
restrictions on international humanitarian relief, ongoing insecurity
that hampers distribution of aid, and low rainfall will contribute to a
prolonged food crisis until at least August 2012.
Southeast Asia (SEA) is a geographic facilitation hub for
transnational terrorist groups, with al Qaeda maintaining links to
associated networks in SEA. Other transnational and regional Islamic
terrorists and insurgents continue to exploit porous borders and
limited security cooperation between SEA nations, enabling movement of
personnel and logistics throughout SEA.
China is building a modern military capable of defending its self
proclaimed ``core interests'' of protecting territorial integrity,
sovereignty and national unity; preserving China's political system;
and ensuring sustainable economic and social development. Defense
against intervention by U.S. forces in a regional contingency over
Taiwan is currently among the highest priorities for the military's
planning, weapons development training.
DIA estimates China spent as much as $183 billion on military-
related goods and services in 2011, compared to the $93 billion Beijing
reported in its official military budget. This budget omits major
categories, but it does show spending increases for domestic military
production and programs to improve professionalism and the quality of
life for military personnel.
Even as the Chinese military plans for conflict and continues its
build-up across from Taiwan, cross-Strait relations have gradually
improved since 2008 and currently remain stable and positive. Both
sides continue to strengthen economic and cultural engagement and have
largely adhered to a diplomatic truce in the competition to persuade
other countries to switch diplomatic recognition.
China's investment in naval weapons primarily focuses on anti-air
and anti-surface capabilities to achieve periodic and local sea and air
superiority within the first island chain. China's first aircraft
carrier, which began sea trials in 2011, will serve as a training
platform once it is commissioned, likely in 2012. The carrier will not
reach its full potential until it acquires an operational fixed-wing
air regiment several years after commissioning.
Once oriented solely on territorial defense, the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force is transforming into a force capable of
both offshore offensive and defensive roles, including strike, air and
missile defense, strategic mobility, and early warning and
reconnaissance. The PLA Air Force began testing a fifth generation
fighter prototype in 2011.
China's strategic missile force, the Second Artillery, currently
has fewer than 50 ICBMs that can strike the continental United States,
but it probably will more than double that number by 2025. To modernize
the nuclear missile force, China is adding more survivable road-mobile
systems, enhancing its silo-based systems, and developing a sea-based
nuclear deterrent. The Navy is developing the JIN-class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine and JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic
missile, which may reach initial operational capability around 2014.
China deployed a number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic
missiles and is probably preparing to deploy the medium-range DF-21D
anti-ship ballistic missile.
China is beginning to develop and test technologies to enable
ballistic missile defense. The space program, including ostensible
civil projects, supports China's growing ability to deny or degrade the
space assets of potential adversaries and enhances China's conventional
military capabilities. China operates satellites for communications,
navigation, earth resources, weather, and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, in addition to manned space and space exploration
missions. China successfully tested a direct ascent anti-satellite
weapon (ASAT) missile and is developing jammers and directed-energy
weapons for ASAT missions. A prerequisite for ASAT attacks, China's
ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by technologies
from China's manned and lunar programs as well as technologies and
methods developed to detect and track space debris. Beijing rarely
acknowledges direct military applications of its space program and
refers to nearly all satellite launches as scientific or civil in
nature.
China has used its intelligence services to gather information via
a significant network of agents and contacts utilizing a variety of
methods to obtain U.S. military technology to advance their defense
industries, global command and control, and strategic warfighting
capabilities. The Chinese continue to improve their technical
capabilities, increasing the collection threat against the United
States. The Chinese also utilize their intelligence collection to
improve their economic standing and to influence foreign policy. In
recent years, multiple cases of economic espionage and theft of dual-
use and military technology have uncovered pervasive Chinese collection
efforts.
In Russia, Moscow has pursued a more cooperative approach to
relations with the United States and the West. Although the recent
election showed diminishing results for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's
political party, he is still on a course to win the March 2012
presidential election. If elected, he would continue to advocate
strengthening the Russian military. If Putin's mandate is weakened, he
may moderate some of his views; however, no major changes are likely in
Russia's defense and foreign policy objectives toward the United States
in the coming year.
An example of recent cooperation is Moscow's willingness to permit
supplies to pass through Russia to Coalition forces in Afghanistan, but
a push to maintain the current presence in Central Asia beyond the
publicized 2014 drawdown or the creation of new bases in the region may
drive the Kremlin to reconsider its level of support. Russia also has
cooperated with the United States by agreeing to U.N. sanctions on
Iran; however, Russian officials are now calling for an incentives
approach, arguing sanctions options have been exhausted and further
sanctions would stifle Iran's economy.
Despite areas of cooperation, Moscow has serious concerns about
missile defense plans in Europe and is using diplomacy and public
relations to try to shape implementation of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach--the U.S. contribution to a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization missile defense system. Moscow insists on legal
guarantees, which would ensure missile defense systems would not target
Russia's strategic capabilities.
Russia also opposes sanctions and foreign intervention against
Syria and has consistently urged the opposition to reach an
accommodation with the regime. Moscow has enjoyed close ties with Syria
since Soviet times and has strategic and economic interests in Syria.
The Russian military's most comprehensive reform since World War II
continues. The goal is to create more agile, modern, and capable
forces. General purpose forces will be smaller, more mobile, and combat
ready. They will be better suited to respond to threats along Russia's
periphery, win local conflicts, and quickly end regional wars. Russia
will rely on its robust nuclear arsenal to deter and, if necessary,
engage in larger regional or worldwide conflicts.
Russia has moved from division--to brigade-centric ground forces,
disbanded most of its Soviet-era ground force mobilization bases, and
consolidated air force units and bases. To better control general
purpose forces in regional conflicts, it has formed the first peacetime
joint strategic commands--West, East, South, and Center. Additionally,
the military has established an Aerospace Defense Command under General
Staff control, which will perform integrated air, missile, and space
defense missions.
Moscow's 10-year modernization plan is a top priority for the Armed
Forces, but it faces funding and implementation risks owing in part to
a possible decline in the price of oil. The Federal budget is set to
increase spending by more than 55 percent in 2014 from 2011 spending
levels. Competing demands to sell arms abroad, Russia's aging
industrial base, insufficient resources, plus corruption and
mismanagement most likely will keep modern equipment below those
levels.
New equipment for the general purpose forces will increase in 2012,
but deliveries will be small and Soviet-era weapons will remain the
standard. Russia also will buy selected foreign systems, such as
France's Mistral amphibious assault ship and Italian light armored
vehicles, and will integrate foreign technology and sustain joint
production programs. Russia will continue to field the SS-26 short-
range ballistic missile, with the first deployed unit being fully
supplied recently. Development of the PAK-FA, Russia's new fifth-
generation fighter, will continue, though deployment will not occur for
several years.
Russia is upgrading massive underground facilities that provide
command and control of its strategic nuclear forces as well as
modernizing strategic nuclear forces as another top priority. Russia
will field more road-mobile 55-27 Mod-2 ICBMs with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles. It also will continue
development of the Dolgorukiy/SS-NX-32 Bulava fleet ballistic missile
submarine/submarine-launched ballistic missile and next-generation air-
launched cruise missiles.
Russia recognizes the strategic value of space as a military forces
multiplier. Russia already has formidable space and counterspace
capabilities and is improving its navigation, communications, ballistic
missile launch detection, and intelligence-gathering satellites. It has
extensive systems for space surveillance and tracking and others with
inherent counterspace applications, such as satellite-tracking laser
rangefinders. Russia is researching or expanding directed-energy and
signal jamming capabilities that could target satellites.
Military readiness is generally increasing in Russia's new units,
but demographic trends, the 1-year conscription policy, and contract
personnel recruitment problems will complicate efforts to fill the
ranks adequately. Programs to build a professional military are
proceeding slowly because they are expensive and Moscow's current
priority is rearmament.
Turning to Latin America, President Felipe Calderon of Mexico
continues his aggressive campaign against transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) through high-value-targeting operations, although
critics contend that it has increased drug-related violence. This
leaves Mexico's traditional counterdrug efforts such as interdiction
and eradication as lesser priorities. Almost 50,000 people have died in
drug-related violence since Calderon declared war on cartels shortly
after taking office in December 2006. Security forces--the Army, Navy,
and police--captured or killed 21 of Mexico's 37 most wanted
traffickers on a list the attorney general announced in March 2009.
Government leaders are appointing active and retired military officers
to key police leadership positions to tackle corruption, conduct more
aggressive anti-cartel operations, and maximize civil-military
cooperation. National elections in July 2012 will result in a complete
turnover in the presidency and both houses of Congress.
In Cuba, President Raul Castro's April 2011 appointment as First
Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) officially established his
dominance over all aspects of government. Economic reforms, including
permission for Cubans to buy and sell real estate and automobiles, are
proceeding slowly. A PCC conference in January 2012 failed to address
sensitive leadership and JX)litical issues, such as term limits and
succession. Cuba, overly dependent on ailing Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez, will work to expand economic ties, especially with China and
Brazil.
Cuba remains the predominant foreign intelligence threat to the
United States emanating from Latin America.
In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez's June 2011 cancer diagnosis
has not derailed his bid to win reelection in 2012. Prior to the
October 7 presidential election, we believe the Venezuelan Government
will stay focused on domestic issues such as the country's high cost of
living and the escalating crime rate. Meanwhile, Venezuela is
modernizing its armed forces, unveiling recently acquired Russian
equipment including tanks, armored personnel vehicles, multiple rocket
launchers, self-propelled howitzers, and anti-aircraft guns.
I will now shift from a geographic focus to address issues that
spread across national boundaries such as proliferation, cyber
security, and health and water security.
The proliferation and potential for use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles remains a grave and enduring
threat. Securing nuclear weapons and materials is a worldwide
imperative to prevent both accidents and the potential diversion of
fissile and radiological materials. Chemical and biological weapons are
becoming more technically sophisticated as technology proliferates.
Terrorist organizations are working to acquire and employ chemical,
biological, and radiological materials.
Many advanced nations are cooperating to stop WMD proliferation;
however some aspects of WMD-related research and technology are beyond
their direct control, including commercial scientific advances,
scientists' enthusiasm for sharing their research, and the availability
of dual-use information and education. For example, the availability of
naturally-occurring pathogens of proven virulence exploitable from
actual disease outbreaks presents a low-cost, low-risk, low-complexity
alternative to obtaining such organisms from either a secured
laboratory facility or an environmental reservoir.
Determined groups and individuals, as well as the proliferation
networks they tie into, often sidestep or outpace international
detection and export-control regimes. They supply WMD and ballistic
missile-related materials and technologies to countries of concern by
regularly changing the names of the front companies they use, operating
in countries with permissive environments or lax enforcement, and
avoiding international financial institutions.
Ballistic missiles continue to pose a threat as they become more
survivable, reliable, and accurate at greater range. Potential
adversaries are basing more missiles on mobile platforms at sea and on
land. Technical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses
also are increasing. China and Iran for example, exercise near
simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to saturate missile
defenses. Countries are designing missiles to launch from multiple
transporters against a broad array of targets, enhancing their mobility
and effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter launch-preparation times
and smaller footprints are making new systems more survivable, and many
have measures to defeat missile defenses.
Theater ballistic missiles already are a formidable threat in the
Middle East and Asia, and proliferation is expanding their availability
worldwide. Technology sharing will accelerate the speed with which
potential adversaries deploy new, more capable ballistic missile
systems over the next decade. Sophisticated missiles and the equipment
to produce them are marketed openly.
On space and counter-space issues, governments and commercial
enterprises continue to proliferate space and counter-space related
capabilities, including some with direct military applications. Space
technologies and services that have both civilian and military uses, in
such areas as communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and
targeting, remain relatively easy for states and nonstate actors to
obtain.
One example is Chinese development of the Beidou position,
navigation and timing system which the Chinese plan to have available
for regional users by 2012 and internationally by 2020. This system
will enable subscribers outside of China to purchase receivers and
services that give civilian and military applications greater
redundancy and independence in a conflict scenario that employs space
assets.
From the counter-space perspective, Russia and China continue
developing systems and technologies that can interfere with or disable
vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication, and intelligence
collection satellites. North Korea has mounted Soviet-made jamming
devices on vehicles near the North-South demarcation line that can
disturb Global Positioning System (GPS) signals within a 50-100
kilometer (km) radius and is reported to be developing an indigenous
GPS jammer with an extended range of more than 100 km. Other state and
non-state actors rely on denial and deception techniques to defeat
space-based imagery collection, conduct electronic warfare or signal
jamming, and possibly attack ground sites for space assets.
Another important transnational threat is that potential
adversaries are increasingly more capable of conducting cyberspace
operations against the United States. The pace of foreign economic
collection and industrial espionage activities conducted by foreign
intelligence services, corporations, and private individuals against
major U.S. corporations and government agencies is accelerating. China
is likely using its computer network exploitation capability to support
intelligence collection against the United States. Russia also poses a
highly capable cyber threat to the United States.
Many countries are considering emulating the United States by
creating their own cyber commands or dedicated military cyber
organizations. On May 16, 2011, Iran announced plans to create a cyber
command. The U.S. national infrastructure, which includes
communications, transportation, financial, and energy networks, is a
lucrative target for malicious actors.
In addition to cyber, another capability that is spreading is the
use of underground facilities (UGFs) in foreign countries to conceal
and protect critical military and civilian assets and functions. China,
North Korea, Iran, Syria, Russia, Pakistan, and Lebanese Hizballah have
active underground programs. Foreign nations and non-state actors
employ UGFs in an attempt conceal and make more survivable a variety of
programs, including WMD strategic command and control, leadership
protection and relocation, military research and development,
industrial production, and ground, naval, and air military assets. A
significant trend of concern is the basing of ballistic and cruise
missiles and other systems designed for anti-access/area denial weapons
directly within UGFs.
Another transnational military issue is that many of the countries
mentioned above continue to receive advanced conventional munitions,
including modern air defense systems, precision weapons, and counter
precision-guided munition systems. DIA remains concerned with the
proliferation of advanced cruise missiles, such as Russia's supersonic
Yakhont anti-ship cruise missile which Moscow sold to Syria and
Vietnam. The 300 km range Yakhont poses a major threat to naval
operations particularly in the eastern Mediterranean.
Another important issue that transcends national borders is the
impossibility of predicting when and where new outbreaks of diseases
and catastrophic natural disasters with global health security
implications will occur.
In Asia, both North Korea and China face domestic health related
challenges. China's efforts to improve food and drug safety have
significant shortcomings that affect human health and trade with the
United States and other partners. China's poor environmental protection
practices will continue to fuel internal social discontent. North
Korea's inadequate response to multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, avian
influenza, foot-and-mouth disease, and other infectious diseases poses
a health threat to South Korea, China, and other countries as well as
to its own population.
As a result of demographic and economic development pressures,
North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia will face major
challenges coping with water problems. Problems associated with water
shortages and flooding will contribute to instability in many countries
important to the United States and may require U.S. military assistance
over the next 10 years. Water shared across borders will increasingly
be used as leverage in relations between States. Engagement on these
and other security issues important to our regional partners will be
key to maintaining U.S. interests and minimizing the risks of conflict
over the next 10 years and beyond.
In some of the same countries that face the challenges discussed
above, the narcotics trade is also a problem. The multi-billion dollar
global narcotics trade is a major and growing source of crime,
violence, and political instability in Latin America, Afghanistan, and
Africa, undermining the rule of law, sapping legitimate economic
development, and inflicting high socio-economic costs. Cocaine and
heroin are the two drugs whose production and trafficking are most
associated with conflict, insurgency, and insecurity. Gross annual
profits from these two drugs alone exceed $150 billion. Traffickers
often use these vast earnings to bribe officials and buy military-grade
weapons and sophisticated communications equipment. This gives them
state-like intelligence and security capabilities that often outpace
government capacities, even in countries such as Colombia and Mexico,
where there is substantial U.S. counterdrug support. At least 10
terrorist and insurgent groups obtain funding from the drug trade to
support operations, logistics, and recruitment. As drug consumption is
expanding in the developing world, anti-government groups increasingly
will exploit growing drug market opportunities to supplement irregular
sympathizer donations.
In addition to the transnational threats discussed above, the
United States and DOD face a persistent and significant intelligence
threat posed by numerous countries and a few sub-national actors. DOD
counterintelligence must focus both on identifying, neutralizing, and/
or exploiting the activities of foreign intelligence officers and
international terrorists and those trusted insiders who support our
adversaries. Effective counterintelligence is a significant priority
for DIA, the Military Services, other defense agencies, and DOD.
Foreign intelligence services conduct a wide range of intelligence
activities, as discussed earlier, to degrade our national security
interests worldwide. They target our Armed Forces, warfighting and
commercial research, development and acquisition activities, national
intelligence system, and our Government's perceptions and decision
processes. A few transnational terrorist groups, often aided by foreign
intelligence organizations, have developed their own intelligence
collection and counterintelligence capabilities. In an era of
globalized commerce, an emerging threat that concerns the department
involves possible foreign compromise of our supply chain which could
degrade or defeat our information systems or weapons platforms by
inserting malicious code into or otherwise corrupting key components
bound for these important warfighting systems.
I would like to now turn to two areas where DIA is focusing
revitalized efforts as an outgrowth of our strategic plan. These are
strategic warning and our investment in scientific and technical
intelligence (S&TI) collection and analysis.
The events of the Arab Spring underscore enduring concern regarding
the potential for strategic surprise and the need for effective
warning. Enduring strategic problems like WMD proliferation, regional
conflicts, and terrorism will remain at the forefront of our warning
concerns. However, small and varied events--with seemingly limited
relevance to DOD--can rapidly evolve and radically alter U.S. policy.
DIA analysis must recognize the implications of these events and
include them in our perceptions of strategic threat.
In the foreseeable future, the United States will remain the
dominant military power with few countries seeking comparable, full-
spectrum conventional military forces. Despite this advantage, the gap
between the United States and others will narrow through the adaptation
of asymmetric alternatives to conventional capabilities and a continued
effort to identify our strategic vulnerabilities.
The pace at which our strategic and operating environments evolve
is in creasing-offering advantage to those actors which are most agile
and able to seize new opportunities or mitigate emerging risks. This
advantage amplifies the ability of single actors to alter the strategic
environment. Global austerity measures will impact the military and
intelligence capability of strategic partners, further amplifying the
risk to U.S. interests.
The acceleration of technological change also has potential to
create surprise. Less developed countries and nonstate actors may
acquire innovative capabilities that could negate some U.S. military
capabilities. Proliferation of advanced technology and the rapid
improvements in commercial off-the-shelf technology will aid
development of new asymmetric threats.
DIA's efforts in the area of scientific and technical intelligence
(S&TI) are intended to allow our customers to anticipate foreign
advanced weapons and emerging technology, provide characteristics and
performance of foreign systems, provide onboard mission data to
maximize the effectiveness of our military systems, and to provide
warning of the disruptive use of existing technologies by both state
and nonstate actors. In recent years DIA has noted, for example, the
appearance of sophisticated threats to our naval forces, efforts to
counter our advantages in precisions guidance and low-observable
systems, and the ability of terrorist groups and insurgents to rapidly
adapt improvised explosive devices to newly introduced countermeasures.
We have also seen the appearance on the horizon of technologies such as
quantum computing or electromagnetic weapons that may eventually pose a
threat to our information security and computer capabilities.
In order to meet these challenges DIA's Directorate for Analysis,
as the functional manager for all-source analysis within the defense
intelligence enterprise, has undertaken several initiatives intended to
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the DIA and wider defense
intelligence enterprise S&TI efforts. In April, the Defense
Intelligence Analysis Program Board of Governors declared Emerging and
Disruptive Technology Intelligence a complex analytic issue. As a
result the DIA Defense Warning Office was chosen as the lead integrator
for this issue and we formed a Defense Intelligence Disruptive
Technologies Analysis Committee to coordinate tasking, collection, and
production in this area. S&TI is an area that requires constant
research as well as production and, in accordance with DIA's Strategic
Plan, we are currently circulating for comment a draft Strategic
Research Plan at the defense intelligence enterprise level. We are also
drafting a framework for S&TI analysis and collection and will have a
high-level kickoff meeting for this effort in late January that also
involves our principal customers.
The potential for trusted U.S. Government and contractor insiders
using their authorized access to personnel, facilities, information,
equipment, networks or information systems in order to cause great harm
is becoming an increasingly serious threat to our national security.
Trusted insiders now have unprecedented access to U.S. Government
information and resources in secure work environments that stress
information-sharing and connectivity. As experienced by the U.S.
Government in the recent massive ``WikiLeaks'' disclosure, the
unchecked distribution of classified information compromises our
national security and also endangers lives. The Defense Intelligence
Agency, Defense Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence Center,
is the functional manager for the DOD CI Insider Threat Program and has
been coordinating with the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense
and Americas Security Affairs) in developing DOD policy for the Defense
Insider Threat Program, to include identifying roles and
responsibilities for the DOD CI enterprise.
DIA's Counterintelligence and Security Office has devised and
deployed a multi-faceted Insider Threat program designed to identify
threats to DIA personnel, information and operations from within.
Strategic reports are also crafted based on lessons learned. These
reports are designed to increase the Agency's security awareness, and
to inform the development of an array of personnel and technical
capabilities to respond to any identified threat or breach in security.
In conclusion, today's focus on combat operations against
insurgents and transnational terrorists does not preclude the potential
that other threats will come to the fore, including conflicts among
major countries that could intersect vital U.S. interests. Defense
intelligence must be able to provide timely and actionable intelligence
across the entire threat spectrum.
In cooperation with the IC, DIA is strengthening collection and
analysis and sharing more information across intelligence disciplines
and among agencies and the Nation's close allies.
The men and women of DIA know they have a unique responsibility to
the American people and take great pride in their work. While their
work is often secret, it is a public trust. I am privileged to serve
with them and present their analysis to you.
On behalf of the men and women of DIA and the defense intelligence
enterprise, thank you for your continuing confidence. Your support is
vital to us.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Burgess.
Let us try 7 minutes for a first round, and I hope there
will be time for a second round.
Director Clapper's prepared statement said the following in
terms of the Intelligence Community's assessment about Iran's
nuclear program: ``We assess Iran as keeping open the option to
develop nuclear weapons should it choose to do so. We do not
know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear
weapons.'' His statement also said that we judge Iran's nuclear
decisionmaking as guided by a cost-benefit approach which
offers the international community opportunities to influence
Tehran.
General Burgess, do you agree with that statement of
Director Clapper in his prepared statement?
General Burgess. Yes, sir. Sir, I think it would be very
consistent with what the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
myself, along with a couple of other witnesses, stated before
this committee almost a year and a half ago.
Chairman Levin. Director Clapper, I understand that what
you have said--and what General Burgess agrees with--is that
Iran has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons. Is that
correct? Is that still your assessment?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. That is the Intelligence
Community's assessment that that is an option that is still
held out by the Iranians and we believe the decision would be
made by the Supreme Leader himself and he would base that on a
cost-benefit analysis in terms of--I do not think he would want
a nuclear weapon at any price. So that, I think, plays to the
value of sanctions, particularly the recent ratcheting up of
more sanctions in anticipation that that will induce a change
in their policy and behavior.
Chairman Levin. It is the Intelligence Community's
assessment that sanctions and other international pressure
actually could--not will necessarily, but could--influence Iran
in its decision as to whether to proceed?
Director Clapper. Absolutely, sir. Of course, the impacts
that the sanctions are already having on the Iranian economy,
the devaluation of their currency, the difficulty they are
having in engaging in banking transactions, which will, of
course, increase with the recent provisions in the NDAA. So to
the extent that the Iranian population becomes restive and if
the regime then feels threatened in terms of its stability and
tenure, the thought is that that could change their policy.
I think it is interesting that they have apparently asked
the European Union for resumption of the Five Plus One
dialogue, and of course, there is another meeting coming up,
another engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). So we will see whether the Iranians may be changing
their mind.
Chairman Levin. I must tell you I am skeptical about
putting any significance in that, but nonetheless, it is not my
testimony that we are here to hear. It is your testimony and it
is obviously important testimony.
Director Clapper, in a recent interview, Defense Secretary
Panetta said that if Iran decides to pursue a nuclear weapon
capability, ``it would probably take them about a year to be
able to produce a bomb and then possibly another 1 or 2 years
in order to put it on a delivery vehicle of some sort in order
to deliver that weapon.'' Do you disagree with Defense
Secretary Panetta's assessment?
Director Clapper. No, sir, I do not disagree, and
particularly with respect to the year, that is, I think,
technically feasible but practically not likely. There are all
kinds of combinations and permutations that could affect how
long it might take should the Iranians make a decision to
pursue a nuclear weapon, how long that might take. I think the
details of that are best--it is rather complex and arcane and
sensitive because of how we know this--left to a closed session
discussion.
Chairman Levin. You say that the year is perhaps right, but
it is more likely that it would take longer. Was that the
implication of your statement?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, a Washington Post columnist recently
wrote that a senior administration official believes that an
Israeli strike against Iran was likely this spring. General
Burgess, in the view of the Intelligence Community, has Israel
decided to attack Iran?
General Burgess. Sir, to the best of our knowledge, Israel
has not decided to attack Iran.
Chairman Levin. I was concerned, as I indicated in my
opening statement, Director Clapper, by recent news reports
that the latest NIE reflects a difference of views between the
Intelligence Community and our military commanders over the
security situation in Afghanistan. I made reference as to who
signed up to that difference of views, including General Allen,
Ambassador Crocker--not including. These are the ones who
signed the difference: General Allen, Ambassador Crocker,
General Mattis, and Admiral Stavridis.
Can you tell us whether those news reports are accurate,
that there is a difference of views on that matter?
Director Clapper. Without going into the specifics of
classified NIEs, I can certainly confirm that they took issue
with the NIE on three counts having to do with the assumptions
that were made about force structure. They did not feel that we
gave sufficient weight to Pakistan and its impact as a safe
haven, and generally felt that the NIE was pessimistic.
Chairman Levin. Pessimistic about that or about other
matters as well?
Director Clapper. Just generally it was pessimistic.
Chairman Levin. About the situation in Afghanistan?
Director Clapper. In Afghanistan and the prospects for
post-2014. That, by the way, was the timeframe. It is after
2014.
If you forgive a little history, sir, I served as an
analyst briefer for General Westmoreland in Vietnam in 1966. I
kind of lost my professional innocence a little bit then when I
found out that operational commanders sometimes do not agree
with their view of the success of their campaign as compared to
and contrasted with that perspective displayed by intelligence.
Fast forward about 25 years or so and I served as the Chief
of Air Force intelligence during Operation Desert Storm.
General Schwarzkopf protested long and loud all during the war
and after the war about the accuracy of the intelligence, in
fact, that did not comport with his view.
Classically intelligence is supposedly in the portion of
the glass that is half empty, and operational commanders and
policymakers, for that matter, are often in the portion of the
glass that is half full. Probably the truth is somewhere at the
water line.
So I do not find it a bad thing. In fact, I think it is
healthy that there is contrast between what the operational
commanders believe and what the Intelligence Community
assesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to follow up on the chairman's
questions. So you believe that post-2014, Afghanistan faces
extremely difficult challenges?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, I do. I think in terms of
governance and the ability of the ANSF, which we are striving
hard to train up, there are some indications that that is
having success, but I think the Afghan Government will continue
to require assistance from the West. Of course, another issue
is the extent to which we and other coalition members will be
able to sustain that support.
Importantly as well is the achievement of a strategic
partnership agreement with the Afghan Government which would be
a preface for our continued presence in some form to advise and
assist and perhaps assist particularly with counterterrorism
(CT).
Senator McCain. There has been no change in the ISI
relationship with the Haqqani network who are killing Americans
in Afghanistan.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. With respect to the Pakistani
Government--and ISI is a kind of microcosm of the larger
government--their existential threat is India, and they focus
on that. Their concern is, of course, sustaining influence and
presence in Afghanistan, and they will probably continue to do
that through proxy militias.
Senator McCain. So our relationship with Pakistan must be
based on the realistic assessment that ISI's relationship with
the Haqqani network and other organizations will probably not
change.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. There are cases where our
interests converge government-to-government, and that
relationship and that factoid is reflected in the relationship
with ISI.
Senator McCain. Secretary Panetta publicly stated that
Israel will decide in April, May, or June whether to attack
Iran's nuclear facilities or not. Do you agree with that?
Director Clapper. I think he was quoted by a columnist. I
think General Burgess answered that question. We do not believe
at this point that they have made a decision to do that. What
could have given rise to this is simply the fact that the
weather becomes better, obviously, in the spring and that could
be conducive to an attack. But to reemphasize what General
Burgess said, we do not believe they have made such a decision.
Senator McCain. We are seeing a very intriguing kind of
situation evolve here. There have been what is believed to be
Iranian attacks or attempts to attack worldwide: in the United
States in the case of the Saudi ambassador, Georgia, India--the
explosions there. Now today we read about Thailand. Does this
tell us a number of things, including the extent of the Iranian
worldwide terrorist network, and does this also tell us that
there is a covert conflict or war going on between Israel and
Iran?
Director Clapper. There are two dimensions of this. I think
on the one hand, they feel somewhat under siege. On the other
hand, they are sort of feeling their oats. Through the Iranian
lens, they probably view Arab Spring as a good thing and
opportunities for them to exploit, which thus far have not
worked to their favor. So they, through their proxies, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) particularly,
decided--made a conscious judgment to reach out against
primarily Israeli and then secondarily against U.S. interests.
Senator McCain. They are displaying some capabilities.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, to a certain extent. Even
though the attacks that you reference were not successful, in
one case they blew one of their own up, but they regard those
as successful because of the psychological impact they have in
each one of the countries.
Senator McCain. Quickly, in the situation in Mexico, 50,000
Mexicans have lost their lives as a result of drug-related
violence. Is your assessment that these violent criminal
organizations pose a threat to the United States, including
States along the border?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, they do. There is always the
prospect of a spillover, and that is one reason why we are
working closely with the Mexican Government and that is
particularly true with respect to intelligence initiatives that
we are working with them, which I would be happy to discuss in
closed session. But it is a profound threat to both countries.
Senator McCain. Have you seen any indication that the top
candidates vying to succeed President Calderon will alter the
way the Mexican Government addresses the threat of the cartels?
Director Clapper. I cannot do a one-by-one assessment, but
I believe that no matter who succeeds President Calderon, they
will be committed to continue this campaign.
Senator McCain. I suggest you look a little more carefully
because I think that may not be the case, at least with one of
the candidates.
If the status quo remains in Syria with increasing Russian
arms and equipment, Iranian presence and assistance to Assad,
what is the outlook as far as the situation in Syria is
concerned, and what in your view do we and the Arab League and
other likeminded countries need to do to alter that equation if
it is an apparent stalemate with the massacre continuing?
Director Clapper. There are, as we characterize them, four
pillars of the Assad regime.
The continued effectiveness of the military and support of
his own military, which is quite large. There have been
desertions but, for the most part--and they have engaged about
80 percent of their maneuver units in assaults on the civilian
population.
The economy is another pillar that has really taken some
hits. The price of gas has doubled since September. The price
of food has gone sky high. They have periodic electrical
interruptions. So the economy is going south.
The state of the opposition, which is quite fragmented. It
is very localized. The Syrian National Council really does not
only command and control these opposition groups. The Free
Syrian Army is a separate organization not connected to the
Syrian National Council.
Of course, the other is the cohesion of the elites.
Although we have seen signs of some of the seniors in the Assad
regime making contingency plans to evacuate, move families,
move financial resources, to this point, they have held
together. Assad himself, probably because of his psychological
need to emulate his father, sees no other option but to
continue to try to crush the opposition.
Senator McCain. I guess my question, sir, was unless
something changes as far as assistance from the outside, do you
see a continued stalemate in Syria?
Director Clapper. I do, sir. I think it will just continue.
Short of a coup or something like that, Assad will hang in
there and continue to do as he has done.
Senator McCain. The massacre continues.
I thank the witnesses. It has been very helpful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Director Clapper, General Burgess, thanks for your really
extraordinary leadership of the Intelligence Community and all
you do to protect our security.
Director Clapper, I want to just go back to Iran for a
couple of minutes quickly. You said this morning that it is
your assessment, or the Intelligence Community's assessment,
that Iran has not made a decision to build a nuclear weapon.
But I assume you also believe, based on IAEA reports and
information that the Intelligence Community has, that Iran has
taken steps to put them in a position to make a decision to
break out and build a nuclear weapon.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. That is a good
characterization. There also are certain things they have not
yet done, which I would be happy to discuss in closed session,
that would be key indicators that they have made such a
decision.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. But they have done things--is it
fair to say--that are inconsistent with just wanting to have
peaceful nuclear energy capacity?
Director Clapper. Obviously, the issue here is the extent
to which they produce highly enriched uranium. They have
produced small amounts of 20 percent highly enriched uranium
which ostensibly could be used for legitimate peaceful
purposes. So if they go beyond that, obviously, that would be a
negative indicator. I will put it that way.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Burgess, do you want to add to that at all?
General Burgess. Sir, I would agree with what Director
Clapper said, but, sir, I would agree with your
characterization because of the movement from 3.5 to the 20
percent enrichment. That is already a leap and it is not that
much of a bigger leap to the 90 percent that they would need to
go to.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Thank you.
Do you both agree or is it your assessment that if Iran
makes a decision to build a nuclear weapons capability and, in
fact, achieves it, that it is likely to set off a nuclear arms
race within the region; in other words, that other countries,
Saudi Arabia, for instance, will want to also have a nuclear
weapons capacity?
Director Clapper. It is certainly a possibility, sir,
absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. Is it also fair to say--and we have
talked about the Iranian sponsorship of terrorism--that if they
did have nuclear weapons capability, it might well embolden
them in their use of terrorism against regional opponents and
even the United States?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir. It would serve as a deterrent.
I think even to a certain extent the ambiguity that exists now
serves as a deterrent and does serve to help embolden them.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, thanks.
Let me go to cybersecurity. Thank you very much, Director
Clapper, for your statement of support for the legislation that
Senators Collins, Rockefeller, Feinstein, and I introduced.
The main intention of the legislation--it does a lot of
things--is to create a system where the Federal Government,
through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), advised and
supported, if you will, by the National Security Agency, can
work with the private sector to make sure that the private
sector is defending itself and our country against cyber
attack. I have spent a lot of time on this. Right now, because
of the remarkable capacities of cyber attackers and the extent
to which they can attack privately owned and operated cyber
infrastructure for either economic gains or to literally attack
our country, we need to ask the private sector to make
investments to defend themselves and us that I am afraid they
are not yet making.
Is that your general impression? In other words, bottom
line, do we have a vulnerability at this moment? Does the
privately owned and operated cyber infrastructure of America
have a vulnerability to both economic thievery and strategic
attack?
Director Clapper. Both the chairman and the ranking member
cited the National Counterintelligence Executive report that we
issued in October which called out both China and Russia as our
primary concerns particularly with respect to the Chinese and
their theft of intellectual property; of course much of which
occurs in the private sector.
I know the bill is quite lengthy, some 270 pages. I have
not read it all. The important thing for me was the precepts
that it addresses. It delineates roles of the various
components of the government to include the DHS, which I
believe has an important role to play here. It defines what I
feel is a good balance in the relationship with the private
sector and how intrusive the government is going to be, which
is certainly an issue, and most importantly, protect civil
liberties and privacy. I am sure there are other provisions in
the bill that some might take issue with, but the precepts, I
think, are important in terms of the balance between protection
and our freedom.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate very much what you have
just said.
Part of the problem here as we go forward, I think, is that
so much of the vulnerability we have and even the attacks that
are occurring now or the exploitation occurring are largely
invisible to the public. So am I right in this regard that
there is--the report you just cited said it--extensive, ongoing
theft of intellectual property of American businesses, which in
fact enables competition from abroad that actually costs us
jobs here at home and diminishes our economic prosperity at
home.
Director Clapper. Absolutely, sir. One of the downsides of
this, profound downsides, for the United States, of course,
particularly when people are robbing us of our technology,
which saves them the investment in research and development--so
that is almost a double whammy, if you will. I think there is
difficulty for some--it is something you cannot see, feel, or
touch since it is a passive theft and you do not directly see
immediately the negative impacts of that, unlike an attack
which, obviously, is by its nature active in which you would
feel the effect of seizure of the banking system or the
stopping of our electrical grid or some other egregious effect
like that.
Senator Lieberman. Finally, would you agree with General
Burgess, that right now our privately owned and operated cyber
infrastructure, electric grid, banking system, transportation,
even water supply and dams, are not adequately defended against
such an attack?
Director Clapper. That is probably true and it is uneven.
Some parts of the infrastructure are reasonably well-protected.
Senator Lieberman. I agree.
Director Clapper. But it is not complete. Of course, the
weakest link proposition here is vulnerability.
Senator Lieberman. General Burgess, do you want to add
something?
General Burgess. Sir, I was just going to say, I, like
Director Clapper, have not read the whole bill, but from my
days when I was in the Office of the DNI and took on the issue
of cyber security with Mike McConnell, I think what you have
put on the table, sir, is a great first step. As an American
citizen, thank you to the Senate for doing that. It is a good
first step. It is progress. Change is generally evolutionary as
opposed to revolutionary, and I would say this is evolutionary
in my humble opinion.
If I had one thing that I would comment on, as I think I
understand, there is not a requirement to share some
information. It is encouraged. I always tell people when I
speak publicly, we are a Nation separated by a common language.
We all define words a little differently. So in terms of
economic attack and things like that, some entities may not
want others to know about what has been taken and they are not
required to divulge that.
Senator Lieberman. I take that seriously. It is a good
comment. It is a thoughtful poke. Thank you for your words.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I really think that this is one of the better hearings that
we have had with the straightforward responses, and I
appreciate that very much. Your comment about language--I am
going to get that from the record. I am going to use that later
on.
Chairman Levin. I just wrote it down.
Senator Inhofe. Oh, you did? That was a good one, General.
I think we pretty much have decided on this 20 percent,
getting back to Iran now, that it is something that is either
achieved or is being achieved, as we talk. General Burgess, you
said we have the scientific, technical, and industrial
capabilities of producing a weapon. We did not really talk
about when. ``When'' is the big issue.
I remember what Secretary Panetta said just the other day,
and we have repeated it several times. Several of the
questioners have. I think that is consistent. Back in the
debate, where we had a difference of opinion as to whether or
not we should continue with the ground-based interceptor in
Poland, at that time the unclassified date was actually 2015.
So this is pretty consistent.
One thing I do not understand--and I think there are a lot
of people who do not, and I would like to get the
clarification. We do know, in terms of the percentage necessary
for the production of power. We are talking about from 3.5 to 5
percent enrichment. Is that pretty well something that has been
used?
Director Clapper. I think so, sir. I cannot verify it for
power generation. I do not know what the percentage is, but I
think that is right.
Senator Inhofe. But it is something less than the 20
percent, apparently where they are right now.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, I would guess.
Senator Inhofe. This morning in today's Early Bird, they
talked about Iran has invoked the medical reactor to justify
its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, the higher level of
refinement that nuclear power systems require. The higher
enriched material also enables Iran to potentially move more
quickly.
It talks about something that I have heard and I assume is
correct that the difficulty is getting up to the 20 percentage.
The time between reaching that level and reaching the 90
percent that we have been concerned about goes much more
rapidly than it would be to get up to 20 percent. Is this
accurate?
Director Clapper. That is generally true, sir, but there
are a number of factors that would affect the pace and volume
which would, frankly, be best left to a closed discussion. I
would be happy to do that with you.
Senator Inhofe. Sure, and that is good. But I have heard
this. These are things that we assume, we have talked about,
and my concern has been when we do end up getting to that
point.
It has been reported by the President that he is weighing
the options of cutting down our nuclear arsenal unilaterally by
up to 80 percent, and that is something that I am very much
concerned about. There are a lot of us who actually, back when
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was debated,
were concerned about these things, and I still am. It is my
understanding--and I remember it. I am going to read a quote by
the President. When the President was trying to get the
additional Senators on board to pass the treaty, he made some
commitments. He said, ``I recognize that nuclear modernization
requires investment in the long term. It is my commitment to
Congress that my administration will pursue these programs and
capabilities for as long as I am President.'' Yet, in the
fiscal year 2013 budget, he is decreasing that amount by $347
million and actually delaying the system of modernization.
I have a quote that I have used recently by former
Secretary of Defense Gates that talks about--I cannot find it
right here, but it talks about the fact that we have some 30
other countries that depend on our nuclear umbrella here. Do
either one of you have any comments to make about this, which
is not a proposal yet, but it is a discussion of reduction of
some 80 percent?
Director Clapper. Sir, that is news to me. To what extent
we may reduce or not our nuclear arsenal is certainly not an
intelligence call, but I can assure you that the Intelligence
Community will be a participant in such deliberations and would
certainly convey the threat dimensions of this, particularly
with respect to the nations of primary nuclear concern which,
of course, are Russia and China.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. You said it is news to you, but this
was released yesterday and maybe you were preparing for this
hearing and did not get that.
Let me just mention something about North Korea.
Director Clapper. What I meant was news to me, sir, was
reducing that to that extent.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That was in the release yesterday.
In the area of North Korea, I have always been concerned
about the accuracy of our intelligence there. I told the story
of going back to 1998 when I made the request as to when North
Korea would have the capability. At that time--this is a multi-
stage rocket--they talked about 3 to 5 years, and it was 7 days
later in 1998, August 31, that they actually fired one. I would
just like to know how confident the two of you are on the
quality of the intelligence we have on North Korea.
Director Clapper. Sir, I have followed North Korea for a
long time. I served as the Director of Intelligence to U.S.
Forces Korea in the 1980s, and I will tell you that North Korea
is one of the toughest intelligence targets we have and has
long been a very, very secretive society, very controlled
society. There is ambiguity about our insight into North
Korea's nuclear capabilities and their intentions.
There are some promising developments, which I would be
happy to discuss with you in closed session, with respect to
enhancing the quality of our intelligence insights.
Senator Inhofe. I would appreciate that very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Webb is next.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe both, actually the writer
in me has to say this. Before you use that quote from General
Burgess, I believe the first person who made that statement was
Winston Churchill, when he said that the United States and
Britain were two countries separated by a common language. So I
did not want to out you, General Burgess, but somebody was
going to do it sooner or later.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that.
Senator Webb. It actually goes to one of the points that I
need to make this morning and to ask both of you for your
advice on, and that is words do count. I also sit on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and the last few days, we have
been trying to put together a resolution with respect to Syria.
First, I would say, Director Clapper, that your testimony and
your comments were very helpful today. You can hear the
frustration from people like Senator McCain on the fact that
people up here think they need to do something, but we have to
be careful what we do and we have to be careful about the
statements that we make as a Senate.
I have had a number of occasions, since I have been here,
to attempt to look at some of these statements that are well-
meaning but hastily drawn and sometimes overly conclusive in
their tone and yet are not really complete in the detail. These
things are pulled into the media and they say the Senate
unanimously made this particular conclusion about one event or
another.
We had General Dempsey up here 2 days ago. I asked him a
question about the nature of the opposition in Syria, the
question going not to what the Assad regime would be capable of
doing which, by the way, Director Clapper, I thought you laid
out in very understandable specifics, but really what is on the
other side of the picket line? Who are they? How much of this
is domestic? How much of it is foreign? What is the regional
dynamic?
He made one comment. I am going to give you a partial
quote. He said, ``Syria is a much different situation than we
collectively saw in Libya. It presents a very different
challenge in which we also know that other regional actors are
providing support as a part of a Sunni majority rebelling
against an oppressive regime.'' We all know this. I think you
made some comments about this as well.
I asked him about the reports in the media last week that
al Qaeda was involved in some of the assassination attempts in
Syria. He would not reject it out of hand. He said he did not
know.
But one of the things that General Dempsey was very clear
about was they were still attempting to analyze the
intelligence information to come to some sort of conclusions.
So this is an opportune time for me to be able to ask both of
you, what are your thoughts on the nature of the opposition
that is active on the ground in Syria right now?
Director Clapper. Let me take a stab at that and then I
will ask General Burgess to amplify or correct, as the case may
be.
As I indicated earlier, the opposition is very
fractionated. There is not a national movement even though
there is a title of the Syrian National Council, but a lot of
that is from external exiles and the like. But there is not a
unitary, connected opposition force. It is very local. It is on
a community-by-community basis. In fact, in some communities,
the opposition is actually providing municipal services as
though it is running the community and trying to defend itself
against attacks from the Syrian regime-controlled military.
The Free Syrian Army, which is a blanket generic name that
is applied to the collection of oppositionists, is itself not
unified. There is an internal feud about who is going to lead
it.
Complicating this, as you implied, of course, are the
neighborhood dynamics. The Iranians are very, very concerned
about propping up Assad. So they have sent help in terms of
trainers, advisors, and equipment, mostly riot suppression
equipment, that sort of thing.
Another disturbing phenomenon that we have seen recently
apparently is the presence of extremists who have infiltrated
the opposition groups. The opposition groups, in many cases,
may not be aware they are there.
We have had the two attacks that you alluded to, the two
bombings in Damascus in December, I think it was, and then the
two additional bombings in Aleppo, both of which were targeted
against security and intelligence buildings and had all the
earmarks of an al Qaeda-like attack. So we believe that AQI is
extending its reach into Syria.
Complicating all this is--this is another contrast with
Libya where we had one or two or three sites that had chemical
warfare components. It is a much more complex issue in Syria
which has an extensive network of such installations, although
to this point--and we are watching these very carefully--they
appear to be secure.
So many complexities here involving the opposition which I
am sure will affect any discussion about coming to some
assistance.
Senator Webb. General?
General Burgess. Sir, there is not a whole lot I can add to
what Director Clapper laid out.
The only other comment that I would make is in regards to
what we have seen, reference the al Qaeda-like events. As we
try and look at some of that, it appears to be those elements
that may already be in-country. But what we have not seen so
far and what we have not assessed yet is whether there would be
what I would call a clarion call to outsiders coming in to
augment. We have not seen much of that up to this time. So
basically the team that is on the ground is playing with what
it has.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
My time is up, but I would like to read very briefly from a
piece that was just published by Leslie H. Gelb, who needs no
introduction, a foreign policy expert in our country, saying,
``when interventionists become avenging angels, they blind
themselves and the nation, and run dangerously amok. They
plunge in with no plans, with half-baked plans, with demands to
supply arms to rebels they know nothing about, with ideas for
no-fly zones and bombing. Their good intentions could pave the
road to hell for Syrians--preserving lives today, but
sacrificing many more later.''
Again, I hope members of this body will keep this in mind
as we develop policies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Clapper, General Burgess, thank you so much for
being here today and for your service.
Director Clapper, I believe you have previously testified
that the reengagement rate from those who have been released
from Guantanamo Bay was 27 percent. What is the current
reengagement rate of terrorists who have been released from
Guantanamo and has it gone up again from the 27 percent?
Director Clapper. I think the next assessment will reflect
a very small, less than a percentage point, increase.
Senator Ayotte. So the next assessment will reflect perhaps
a percentage increase. So from 27 percent to 28 percent?
Director Clapper. Somewhere in that neighborhood.
Senator Ayotte. Certainly anyone being released from there
and getting back in to fight our soldiers is one too many. Is
it not?
Director Clapper. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to ask you about--there have been
reports from the administration about the potential of
exchanging--and I asked Secretary Panetta about this the other
day--of five detainees to Qatar in exchange for gestures of
good will from the Taliban in Afghanistan. As I understand
these five detainees that have been reported by both the
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, they have been
previously assessed by the administration in 2010 to present a
high risk of returning to the fight. Has the designation for
these five detainees changed by the administration?
Director Clapper. No, ma'am, they have not.
I hasten to add that, of course, negotiations have always
been a part of any winding down of combat hostilities, and that
is the case here. This is a case of exploring the option to see
what sort of reaction we might get from the Taliban.
A couple points I would make here is that I do not think
anyone harbors any illusions about these five Taliban members
and what they might do if they were transferred. Part and
parcel of this discussion would be their transfer to a third
country such as Qatar, and then the conditions under which they
would be surveilled and monitored.
I would also want to add that under the provisions of the
NDAA of Fiscal Year 2012, the Secretary of Defense has to
certify his view on whether or not anyone can be transferred
with respect to their recidivism. I can tell you from personal
encounters with Secretary Panetta, he treats that authority
with the gravity that it deserves. So this is something I think
the administration will do very deliberately.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that and I appreciate what the
Secretary had to say about his responsibilities the other day,
and I know that he takes these very seriously.
But I want people to understand very clearly these
individuals were designated by the administration in 2010 to be
high risk. Nothing has changed about that assessment. The
notion that we can monitor them or surveill them--we have tried
that in the past with releasing people that have come from
Guantanamo, terrorists, to third-party countries. Now we think
may go up to a 20 percent reengagement rate for what I
understand the administration has described as good will from
the Taliban.
I think this is an unacceptable risk. Unless we are going
to get them to lay down their arms, I do not know why we would
do this to our military men and women and to our allies. So I
appreciate what you are saying. I just see this as a huge risk
in terms of safety for our troops and our allies.
I wanted to ask you briefly about Iran. I know that you
have received many, many questions, both of you, about Iran. I
just want to clarify a couple of issues.
Does the Iranian regime continue to support Hezbollah? What
kind of threat does Hezbollah pose to our ally, Israel? Is Iran
supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip? General Burgess, is Iran
supporting insurgents in Afghanistan, and what role is Iran
playing in Iraq?
Director Clapper. I did not quite write down all those
questions.
Senator Ayotte. Do they continue to support Hezbollah?
Director Clapper. Yes, they do.
Senator Ayotte. Hamas?
Director Clapper. There is a very close relationship
between particularly the IRGC, the Republican Guard Corps, Qods
Force, which is the organization responsible for external
operations around the world, and Hezbollah. It is a partnership
arrangement with the Iranians as the senior partner.
Senator Ayotte. Is Hezbollah not a terrorist group that
threatens our close ally, Israel?
Director Clapper. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Does Iran continue to support Hamas in the
Gaza Strip?
Director Clapper. Indirectly, yes.
Senator Ayotte. Are they not a threat also to Israel and
also to the peace process?
Director Clapper. Hamas?
Senator Ayotte. Yes.
Director Clapper. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. General Burgess, is Iran supporting the
insurgents in Afghanistan?
General Burgess. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. What type of role are they playing in
Afghanistan?
General Burgess. They have provided arms. They have been
caught. We have found Iranian arms in Afghanistan. So they are
working what we would call a dual-track strategy as they work
not only against U.S. and coalition desires in there, but at
the same time, they want to put forward the Government of
Afghanistan. So they are walking a very fine line.
Senator Ayotte. But they are clearly supporting our enemies
and trying to kill our soldiers.
General Burgess. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. In Iraq, what role are they playing right
now, now that we have withdrawn, and how would you describe
their role there?
General Burgess. I would describe their role in much the
same way as I did in Afghanistan as very dual-track. Iran does
not want a strong Iraq on their border, but at the same time,
they also want to encourage us out of there totally. So again,
they are walking both sides of the fence.
Senator Ayotte. So again, they are working contrary to a
stable Iraq and they are also working contrary to our national
security interests.
General Burgess. I would not disagree with that statement.
Director Clapper. They would like to have a cooperative
Shia-dominated government in Iraq, which they have, but that is
not to say that the Iraqi Government, particularly Prime
Minister Maliki, is necessarily a complete satellite of Iran.
He has his issues with the Iranians as well.
Senator Ayotte. But clearly their efforts are continuing to
fuel sectarian violence.
Director Clapper. Absolutely. The three principal Shia
militant groups that Iran has supported in the past, some of
which were directly responsible for attacks on U.S. forces--and
of course, the issue is whether they will turn their ire
against the Iraqi Government or simply become part of the
political process, remains to be seen.
Senator Ayotte. When you throw on top of it, of course,
their efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, no question they are
a grave threat to our national security and to that of our
allies.
Director Clapper. That is true. Iran is a big problem.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join with
other members of the committee in thanking you for your service
and for your excellent testimony here this morning.
Focusing on Afghanistan and the improvised explosive
devices (IED), members of this committee and the U.S. Senate
consider the role of Pakistan in providing ingredients used to
make those roadside bombs as a grave threat to this Nation. In
fact, in the 2012 NDAA, the $700 million in aid to Pakistan is
frozen until they--and I am quoting--``demonstrate significant
efforts toward implementation of a strategy to counter
improvised explosive devices.''
I have heard nothing. I have seen nothing that indicates
they are making that kind of significant effort. Am I
misinformed? Could you shed some light on that issue?
General Burgess. Sir, IED usage in Afghanistan is up by 15
percent, and most of the precursors and components for those
IEDs, while they are assembled in Afghanistan, come through
Pakistan.
Senator Blumenthal. That could not be happening if Pakistan
were making significant efforts to stem the flow of ammonium
calcium nitrate and fertilizer, the components of those
roadside bombs. Am I correct in that?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, that is correct. Two of the
major companies that produce these materials are located in
Pakistan. There is an extensive network from Pakistan into
Afghanistan to move these materials.
Senator Blumenthal. We know where those plants are, do we
not?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, we do.
Senator Blumenthal. In fact, the congressional delegation
that I joined, as recently as August, met with at least one of
the owners of those plants who indicated that their production
is ongoing and the Pakistanis have the wherewithal to stop the
flow of those ingredients into Afghanistan. Do they not, sir?
Director Clapper. That is a good question, sir, as to how
much the Pakistani Government controls anything in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the FATA regions
which border Afghanistan. But it is clear they could probably
do more than they have to this point.
Senator Blumenthal. Again, to come to the bottom line here,
they have really made no significant effort so far.
Director Clapper. Not that I am aware of, no, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Turning to another area of inquiry,
could you shed some light on the talks that are in progress, if
there are such talks--as Mr. Karzai has acknowledged in the
past few days, there are apparently--involving the three
parties--the Taliban, the United States, and Afghanistan?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, there have been. I do not think
either General Burgess or I are the authorities on the
negotiations with the Taliban. I am sure the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mark Grossman, is
far better informed of that.
But I am sure there has been dialogue. I am sure President
Karzai, either directly or through intermediaries, has been
discussing reconciliation issues with the Taliban.
Senator Blumenthal. You are aware that such talks are
ongoing?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, I believe they are.
Senator Blumenthal. What would be the need then for
releasing these currently incarcerated Taliban insurgents if
those talks are ongoing at the moment?
Director Clapper. Sir, this is part of confidence building.
I think that started as a separate track and there are some
reciprocity considerations which I would prefer to talk about
in closed session.
Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate that. I would just say I
would see no need for that kind of release if, in fact, the
talks are ongoing, and if, in fact, our adversaries have an
interest, a self-interest, in talking, I personally would
question the need for any such release, apart from the security
issues that have been raised by my colleague from New
Hampshire, Senator Ayotte, and others previously.
Let me ask you, if I may, a general question, and I
understand you may be reluctant to go into details in this
setting. But if you could characterize whether there are
differences in the threat assessments from our intelligence
about the Iranian nuclear capability and the potential response
to Israeli intervention there and the Israelis' intelligence
assessments, if you understand my question, which calls for a
general answer. I am not asking for the details.
Director Clapper. If your question is, just to make sure I
understand it, do we and the Israelis largely agree, the answer
is, yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you agree, General Burgess?
General Burgess. Sir, I do. We have been in these
discussions for many years. I have personally been involved in
them in both my time at the Office of the DNI and as Director
of DIA. Sir, generally speaking, our assessments track with
each other. They comport.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Let me ask a final question and you may not think it is
directly relevant to all of the questions that you have had so
far, but we have been in discussions, as recently as a couple
of days ago, with Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey about
the overall budget of DOD and the platforms that exist. In
terms of platforms for intelligence gathering, are there
particular areas where you think the expenditure of resources
poses a threat; in other words, to put it more simply, where
diminished funding impedes or imperils intelligence gathering
by the United States?
Director Clapper. Sir, we are going through our own cuts in
the Intelligence Community since a large portion of the
national intelligence program is embedded in the DOD budget. So
we were given the same reduction targets on a proportionate
basis. So we are in the mode, for the first time in 10 years,
of cutting intelligence resources. We have been on a steady
upward slope for the whole decade and that is going to come to
a halt. So we will have less capability than we have had in the
last 10 years.
That said, I have been through this before. When I served
as Director of DIA in the early 1990s and we had to reap the
peace dividend after the fall of the wall, we did some profound
cutting in the Intelligence Community, and did not do it very
well. So we have tried to profit from that experience and place
stock in those capabilities that make us resilient and agile so
we can respond as we need to wherever hot spots or crises occur
in the world.
So as DOD, for example, pivots to the Far East or the
Pacific, we will do that as well. Obviously, a major equity for
us in the Intelligence Community is support to the military.
Where we are affected, I think, to get to your question,
is, for example, as we draw down in Iraq and have a much
reduced footprint across the board to include intelligence,
that will affect the fidelity of the intelligence that we have
previously had on Iraq. I anticipate, when we draw down in
Afghanistan and intelligence resources are drawn down
proportionately, that we will also not have the fidelity that
we have today. So in that context, yes, we will lose some
capability.
But the premise of the Intelligence Community and one of
the organizing principles I have tried to push, as a result of
my experience 20 years ago, is those capabilities that enable
global coverage to include for denied areas such as Russia and
China, and enable us to adapt and be resilient depending on
what the crisis of the day is.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. Again, thank you
both for answering my questions and for being so forthcoming to
our committee. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will not belabor the points two of my colleagues have
made in reference to Iran, and I agree with most of what was
said. But I just want to emphasize how important it is that we
ensure that Israel has everything it needs from us to close any
intelligence capability gaps it has with respect to Iran. Do
both of you agree with that recommendation or suggestion?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, and I think both of us have
been proponents for sharing intelligence with the Israelis. I
will be going there next week to engage with the Israeli
intelligence officials to discuss that very point.
Senator Brown. Great. Thank you.
Director Clapper, also just to add on a little bit more, my
colleagues have already mentioned Syria and how the people are
enduring serious attacks from Assad. Earlier this week, the
head of al Qaeda released a video calling on all Muslims in the
countries surrounding Syria to join the fight against the Assad
regime. Given that the President and the administration
officials continue to say it is not a matter of if, but when,
it will fail and fall, are we prepared for the situation of a
possible failed state where al Qaeda enjoys a safe harbor and
refuge from which to coordinate attacks i.e., like what is the
plan if Syria falls?
Director Clapper. That is a great question, sir, because
who would succeed or what would succeed Assad is a mystery. We
certainly do not know--I do not--what would ensue. As the quote
that I read in my oral remarks here at the outset of the
testimony, quoting the Roman historian Tacitus, when he said
the best day after a bad emperor is the first day and after
that, I would add, it goes down hill. There is no identifiable
group that would succeed him. So there would be a vacuum, I
think, that would lend itself to extremists operating in Syria,
which is particularly troublesome in light of the large network
of chemical warfare, chemical and biological weapons storage
facilities and other related facilities that there are in
Syria.
Senator Brown. I agree. I have a concern that AQI is moving
towards Syria and consolidating themselves there now. Do you
have any evidence of that?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, we do. We have seen evidence of
Sunni extremists. I cannot label them specifically as al Qaeda,
but a similar ilk, who are infiltrating the oppositionist
groups, in many cases probably unbeknownst to those opposition
groups.
Senator Brown. Just to shift gears a little bit to the Fort
Hood shooting. I know that there were some recommendations made
regarding information-sharing. What is the status of that? Can
you tell me a little bit about the Counterintelligence
Community and what they are doing to help the leaders on the
ground identify potential breakdowns like the one we saw at
Fort Hood?
Director Clapper. I am not sure what you are asking.
Senator Brown. Key reforms have yet to be completed,
particularly in the area of information-sharing which
continues, I think, to put our Nation at risk for homegrown
terrorism and insider threats. Are you getting all the
information you need from U.S. agencies to adequately address
our domestic threats, do you think?
Director Clapper. Sir, I will put it this way. I think we
have come a long way in the last 10 years in information-
sharing. It is a big focus for me for the Office of the DNI,
sharing vertically across the agencies, as well as--or
horizontally and vertically, as well with the Federal, State,
local, tribal, and private sector. There has been a lot of work
done towards that. It is an emphasis area for me, and I do
think we have made great improvements.
At the same time, of course, we have had episodes like
Wikileaks which reminds us of the need to balance sharing and
security. So we always have that fine line to draw between
those two. But I think we have improved, but there is always
more to do.
Senator Brown. Very well. Thank you both.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, but I would like to
yield to Mr. Manchin. I know he has a scheduling conflict, but
I would like to keep my place in the queue, if I might.
Senator Manchin. We are just flip-flopping, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We always appreciate those kind of
courtesies.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Clapper, I am reading a book, finishing it up. It
is called ``The Coming Jobs War'' by Jim Clifton. I would
recommend it if you all have not seen it. It says basically the
coming jobs war is going to be the biggest war that we have
facing this world; who is fighting for what jobs. It basically
breaks it down: 7 billion human beings on this great planet
Earth; 5 billion over the age of 15; 3 billion seeking a job of
some sort or working; only 1.2 billion formal jobs in the world
today. So we can see the mammoth problem that we are facing.
With that, I think, what I am asking is when you conduct
intelligence estimates, do you consider the impact of
unemployment and what it will have on the stability of a
population and how that increases the likelihood of unrest and
terrorism?
Director Clapper. Absolutely, sir. I have not read the
book, but I will get it. I think the point, even more basic
than jobs, is if you project out in the future what the world's
supply of food and water is going to be in the face of the
growing population, if you project out what the population of
the Earth is going to be in the face of declining resources.
Yes, absolutely we do account for that in doing any kind of
intelligence assessments. An indelible illustration of that, of
course, was Arab Spring because of the conditions which
actually still exist, the population bulge of high numbers of
young, unemployed people, rising economic difficulties and
deprivation, the lack of political freedom of expression. Of
course, one of our major insights into that is in social media,
which has become a major bellwether for the attitudes of
people. So the short answer to your question, sir, is
absolutely, we do consider that in assessing the potential for
disruption.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
General, following up on that, when I read this book and I
was thinking our involvement and the amount of money that we
have spent in Afghanistan, knowing that when we leave, they
have no economy; they have had no economy; the only economy
they have is us. Knowing that the unrest, instability,
terrorism, or the ability to foster terrorism will be the
same--and I have a very, very hard time understanding why we
are still there, and I know I have talked to everybody and I
feel very strong about that.
What I will say is this, sir. There are reports that North
Korea and Iran have possession of U.S. drones that crashed in
December and will likely try to reverse engineer them so they
would have them at their disposal. Why on earth did we not
design or request a design of destruction when we lost those
drones under any circumstance, that we could have destroyed
them so they could not have been copied and reproduced back to
use against us?
Director Clapper. I would be happy to discuss that with you
in closed session, sir.
Senator Manchin. I understand.
General Burgess, what does the succession of Kim Jong Un
mean for the security of the Korean Peninsula, and what does it
mean for the North Korean nuclear program and the Six Party
Talks that are going on?
General Burgess. Sir, what I would tell you so far, as we
have watched the succession, it is unfolding as we had thought
it would. It is actually moving as has been designated. At this
time, we see no change to any of their policies and we actually
see no impact on the way they are going about conducting
business at the present time.
Senator Manchin. Concerning al Qaeda, al Shabaab, the
terrorist insurgent group in Somalia, formally joined al Qaeda
this past week. Some Somalian Americans have traveled from the
United States to join al Shabaab and fight the transitional
government in Somalia. I would like to know from you, sir, what
are we going to be doing to respond to this threat?
Director Clapper. First of all, I would play down a bit the
significance of this union between al Shabaab and al Qaeda. I
think the core al Qaeda is an organization under siege and is
in decline. Al Shabaab, for its part, is under pressure by
virtue of both of the Ethiopian and Kenyan incursions into
Somalia. They have lost territory and are under the gun. So I
think we will continue to do what we have always done with
these two organizations. Al Shabaab, for its part, has been
largely focused on regional issues, that is, within the Horn of
Africa as opposed to projecting out a homeland threat. What is
bothersome about al Shabaab, of course, are the number of
foreign fighter recruits that they bring in and train and then
fight.
Senator Manchin. Finally, to both of you all, on Tuesday,
General Dempsey testified that the military government in Egypt
is aware that they stand to lose $1.3 billion of aid from the
United States, and we have been a solid partner. According to
press reports, the same government General Dempsey spoke of is
losing power to anti-American factions. Some of these factions
are a campaign to end the U.S. aid to Egypt.
Based on your intelligence assessments, will we be able to
rely on a future Egyptian Government to uphold the 1979 peace
treaty with Israel?
Director Clapper. That is an excellent question, sir, and I
think that will depend very much on the continuation of the
transitional process in Egypt, particularly when they write
their constitution and what the constitution may or may not say
about the treaty with Israel. I think under any circumstance--I
cannot foresee a circumstance with any civilian government that
emerges after the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
transitions or hands off in June that there will not at least
be a review of the treaty. But how that will come out we do not
know.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Burgess. Sir, I would agree with Director Clapper.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say thank you to both of you
for your outstanding service to this country of ours.
With that, I want to thank my gracious colleague, most
generous colleague from Colorado.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service to our country.
I think it was mentioned that the intelligence budget is
wrapped up in the DOD budget. Secretary Panetta said that if we
did sequestration, if we took another $500 billion to $600
billion on top of the $487 billion being planned, it would be
devastating. It would be irresponsible on the DOD side. Would
it have the same effect, Director Clapper, on the intelligence
side?
Director Clapper. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that if America
ever needed a smart intelligence network, it is now? Because
the enemies we are fighting really do not care if they die.
They just want you to go with them.
Director Clapper. That and other reasons, yes, sir.
If I may add, the provisions, as they pertain to
intelligence, are actually even more onerous because we would
not have any latitude to move or pick and choose where we would
reduce. It is stipulated for us that every single program
within intelligence would have to take a proportional hit. So
we would be faced with the prospect of RIFing a lot of
employees, which would have a devastating effect not only on
them, but the employees who were not, as well as it would
affect virtually every major acquisition system we have in the
Intelligence Community because they would all be wounded. So it
would be a disaster.
Senator Graham. Would you say it would result in destroying
the ability of the Intelligence Community to adequately defend
this country?
Director Clapper. Sir, I would have a hard time saying, as
the DNI, that I could face a group like this and say I have any
degree of confidence that I can provide adequate intelligence
for the safety and welfare of this Nation if that happened.
Senator Graham. In many ways, America would go blind in
terms of intelligence gathering.
Director Clapper. It would, sir, over time.
Senator Graham. Over time, okay.
Let us go to Iran. Keep this at the 30,000-foot view. The
regime's goal, do you not think, is survival? Right? Do you
both agree with that?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you think they have made a decision that
maybe the best way to survive is to develop a nuclear weapon?
Director Clapper. Sir, we have said consistently that they
will base this on a cost-benefit analysis.
Senator Graham. Do you think they are trying to develop a
nuclear weapon? Do you think that is their goal?
Director Clapper. They are putting themselves--they are
sustaining the industrial infrastructure to enable them, if
they make that decision, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you think they are building these power
plants for peaceful nuclear power generation purposes?
Director Clapper. That remains to be seen.
Senator Graham. Do you have doubt about the Iranians'
intentions when it comes to making a nuclear weapon?
Director Clapper. I do.
Senator Graham. So you are not so sure they are trying to
make a bomb?
Director Clapper. I am sorry?
Senator Graham. You doubt whether or not they are trying to
create a nuclear bomb?
Director Clapper. I think they are keeping themselves in a
position to make that decision, but there are certain things
they have not yet done and have not done for some time.
Senator Graham. How would we know when they have made that
decision?
Director Clapper. I am happy to discuss that with you in
closed session.
Senator Graham. I guess my point is that I take a different
view. I am very convinced that they are going down the road of
developing a nuclear weapon. I cannot read anyone's mind, but
it seems logical to me that they believe if they get a nuclear
weapon, they will become North Korea and nobody really in the
future is going to bother them.
Let us talk about nuclear capability in the hands of the
Iranians. Is that a good outcome for U.S. national security
interests if they were able to have nuclear capability?
Director Clapper. Obviously not, if they were to have a
nuclear weapon and the means of delivering it.
Senator Graham. Right.
The reason being, it would create a nuclear arms race most
likely in the Middle East.
Director Clapper. That is certainly a potential and likely
outcome.
Senator Graham. Arab Sunni states would not take kindly to
Persian Shias having a nuclear trump card.
Director Clapper. Correct.
Senator Graham. The likelihood of a terrorist organization
being able to access nuclear materials in the hands of the
Iranian ayatollahs would be greater, not less. Would you not
think?
Director Clapper. Probably so, and of course, that is the
nexus of a terrorist group and WMD.
Senator Graham. So when President Obama says it is
unacceptable for the Iranians to achieve nuclear capability, do
you agree with that?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. Congress is about to introduce a resolution
that says containment of a nuclear-capable Iran is not a good
national security strategy. So we are going to be backing up
the President, and I am glad to hear you agree with that
proposition, that we should not as a Nation try to contain a
nuclear-capable Iran. We should try to prevent it. As you said,
sanctions may work. I hope they do. I am not in the camp of
believing that all is lost.
Do you also believe that all options should remain on the
table when it comes to stopping them from getting a nuclear
capability?
Director Clapper. Sir, that is a personal view. That is not
the Intelligence Community's policy, but certainly I do.
Senator Graham. Just personally.
Yes. That is what the President said and I certainly agree
with him.
Now, let us get back to Iraq. Has the security environment
deteriorated since we left Iraq militarily?
Director Clapper. I think it is about the same. We have
recently done an assessment on the prospects in Iraq for the
next 18 months, and I think the view is that while there are
challenges and uncertainties, we believe, at least for the next
year or so, that the Iraqi Government will continue. It appears
that the Sunnis at this point believe that their best prospect
for protecting their interests is to participate in the
government.
Senator Graham. So do you believe that us withdrawing all
of our forces from Iraq has really had no effect on the Iraqi
security environment?
Director Clapper. I would not say no effect.
Senator Graham. Would you say minimal effect?
Director Clapper. I think there are certain enabler
capabilities that they no longer have by virtue of our absence.
But at the same time, as General Burgess indicated in his
statement, they have done reasonably well and they have a
reasonably capable CT force.
Senator Graham. Do you know why Vice President Hashimi, a
Sunni Vice President, why they tried to indict him days after
we left and not before?
Director Clapper. I do not know why the timing other than,
I guess, the implication would be that our presence there,
although we were doing all we could diplomatically--I do not
know why the timing.
Senator Graham. Is it generally viewed by the Sunnis and
the Kurds that when America left Iraq, that was a boon to
Iranian influence?
Director Clapper. Sir, I do not really know how----
Senator Graham. Have you talked to the Sunnis and Kurds
about this?
Director Clapper. I have not.
Senator Graham. I would suggest that you do.
Now, when it comes to Afghanistan.
Director Clapper. There is no question they are concerned
about----
Senator Graham. I would suggest you sit down with some
leading Sunnis and Kurds and have a discussion about what they
think is happening in Iraq.
Now, Afghanistan. The Strategic Partnership Agreement is
really the last card to be played in many ways--is that not
correct--via Afghanistan?
Director Clapper. I am not sure what you mean by ``last
card.''
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, just if I could have 30
additional seconds here, I will be quick.
The bottom line is if we have an American military presence
post 2014 at the request of the Afghan Government and people
that would allow a CT capability, American air power, that
would always give the edge to the Afghan security forces and
probably be the end of the Taliban militarily. Do you agree
with that construct?
Director Clapper. I do. I think that would be a very
positive thing not only in Afghanistan, but regionally.
Senator Graham. Would be the best way to negotiate with the
Taliban saying you are never going to take this country back
over militarily. You need to get involved in the political
system.
Director Clapper. At a minimum, that the Taliban would not
provide a reservoir or harbor or safe haven for the likes of al
Qaeda.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Mr. Chairman, I am again going to yield to a
colleague, Senator Hagan, who chairs the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee, who has to preside on the floor in a
few minutes. So if I might, I would yield to her.
Chairman Levin. Of course. Senator Hagan?
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly thank
you, Senator Udall.
I wanted to follow up on Senator Graham's question
concerning Iraq, but I also wanted to state how much I
appreciate both of you being here today testifying but, in
addition, your leadership and long-term security interests in
our country. So thank you.
Director Clapper, in your prepared testimony, you state
AQI, despite its weakened capabilities, remains capable of
high-profile attacks and some Shia militant groups will
continue targeting U.S. interests, including diplomatic
personnel.
What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the
capabilities of Iraqi CT forces to continue similar operations
against AQI in the absence of our U.S. forces? General Burgess?
General Burgess. Ma'am, I would tell you that our
assessment is that the CT force that was left there is a
capable force but also AQI is a capable and formidable foe. So
while the Iraqis have some capability, there are certainly some
things that we are still looking at doing to help them from an
intelligence standpoint and some others with some of the
resources----
Senator Hagan. How about protecting our diplomatic forces?
General Burgess. Ma'am, we put a lot of resources against
that as the United States and we work with our Iraqi friends.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Let me move to Libya and the proliferation of their weapons
stockpiles. When Qaddafi's regime fell, it was discovered he
had undeclared stocks of chemical weapons, as well as large
quantities of conventional weapons. Can you tell me if the
chemical weapons are secured?
Director Clapper. Yes, they are.
Senator Hagan. Were these weapons produced by Libya or
whether they had help in producing these weapons?
Director Clapper. We do not know and have not been able to
determine that.
Senator Hagan. What about your assessment of what happened
to all the stockpiles of conventional weapons such as missile
and artillery?
Director Clapper. The principal area of concern, of course,
are the so-called Manportable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS), or
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons, and the estimate was,
going into the upheavals there, of about 20,000 MANPADS. In
fact, Libya had more MANPADS than any non-producing country in
the world.
There has been an active and aggressive program run by the
Department of State (DOS) to recover MANPADS, and through that
program, the estimate--they have recovered about a quarter of
them, about 5,000 MANPADS. There are some number of others that
were probably destroyed in the course of the air campaign that
were in depots and other storage places, but the truth is that
MANPADS and other weapons are distributed all over the place,
in homes, in factories, in schoolhouses. It is all over. So
there is a concern, obviously, about recovery of these weapons.
I would say, though, that the transitional government in
Libya is on schedule and is moving towards elections and
reforming the government. Their oil refinery capacity has
recovered faster than we anticipated. They are up to, we
estimate, about 1 million barrels a day, and their pre-upheaval
level was about 1.6 million. So there are problems there, but
there is some room for optimism.
Senator Hagan. How did you estimate 20,000 MANPADS and then
5,000 recovered?
Director Clapper. The 5,000 recovered is by count.
Senator Hagan. Right.
Director Clapper. That was the best intelligence assessment
that we had based on all-source analysis of the number of
MANPADS they had before the demonstrations and the like
started.
Senator Hagan. In recent weeks, we have seen a spike in
violent attacks by the Boko Haram in Nigeria. Are some of these
weapons getting into Nigeria, especially the MANPADS that you
are discussing?
Director Clapper. We do not have any evidence of a direct
relationship between weapons in Libya and Nigeria, no.
Senator Hagan. According to press reports, al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), partially as a result of the ongoing
political crisis in Yemen's capital, continues to gain
territory in the southern region of Yemen. AQAP's gains are a
cause for concern, obviously, for many reasons, including the
fact that it potentially creates a sanctuary for planning of
external operations.
My question is what is the Intelligence Community's
assessment of AQAP's territorial gains in southern Yemen and
has it provided planning and training space for the potential
AQAP external operations.
Director Clapper. Obviously, we are very concerned about
that, particularly to the extent that it would provide a haven
for training facilities. We are monitoring that very carefully
and also watching. I think it interesting when a terrorist
group like al Qaeda and AQAP all of a sudden has municipal
responsibilities and just how they deal with that and whether
that will be a distraction to their foreign plotting. I think
AQAP, though, as one of the al Qaeda franchises, is probably
the organization that we are most concerned about in terms of
potential threats to Europe or the Homeland.
Senator Hagan. What is your assessment of the ability of
the Yemeni security service to confront AQAP and regain the
government's control of this space?
Director Clapper. To this point, we continue to have good
cooperation with the Yemeni intelligence and security
organizations, and hopefully that will be sustained even as the
government transitions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service, gentlemen. You have our respect
and admiration.
I just have a few questions I want to ask you about the
economy. Director Clapper, on page 28 of your prepared remarks,
you talk about the challenges to the global economy and also to
energy. I want to specifically ask you about the red lines that
Secretary Panetta identified with regard to blockades of the
Strait of Hormuz which I do not think it takes a fertile
imagination to see if there was some sort of action by Israel
against Iran because of concern about their nuclear capability,
that there would be retaliation and part of that could well be
a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and I am confident we could
break that blockade.
But I just want to ask you when 20 percent of the world's
oil supply transits the Strait of Hormuz, what is the impact on
oil prices of the geopolitical issues that we see in the Middle
East? In other words, does the threat of a possible action by
Israel against Iran and possible retaliation, which would
include a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, affect worldwide
oil prices?
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, it does, and, of course, for
the reasons you cite, if the strait were blocked, that would
have profound impact not only in the region but in the rest of
the world. It would have great impact, obviously, on the price
of oil. Of course, that is one thing we have to manage very
carefully with the NDAA provisions on imposing more sanctions
on Iran so that we do not end up in the worst of both worlds.
But you are quite right. It is a very delicate balance here and
clearly would have impacts on the price of oil and the world
economy.
Senator Cornyn. A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, because
of the blockade of the oil trade--would you see that that would
have a negative impact not only on the global economy in terms
of the projections of growth--and what I am getting at is,
obviously, we are coming out of a very tough patch and
projections by the Congressional Budget Office and the Federal
Reserve are for a relatively slow rate of growth and higher
unemployment here for the next several years. I just would like
to get your impressions of the possibility of a blockade--what
that would do in terms of the rate of expected growth of our
economy here and related topics.
Director Clapper. Sir, I would have to take that one under
advisement. I am not an economist, and I would want the experts
to--if there is the possibility for projecting what the impacts
would be globally on the economy and individually, and it would
vary from country to country depending on how dependent they
are on oil that transits the Strait. I think the general answer
is, it is hard to see a good effect for any number of reasons
if a blockade were allowed to stand.
Senator Cornyn. We have been debating a payroll tax
holiday. An estimate is that it would provide an extra $20 a
week for a person making $50,000 a year, but in 2011, the
average family spent more than $4,000 in gasoline. So my
concern is, in terms of our economy, the geopolitical
uncertainty that we have been talking about, and what impact
that would have on families here in the United States and what
impact it would have to perhaps dampen, if not wipe out, our
economic recovery. I know you know that is the direction I was
heading in.
Let me ask you. Because I am from Texas, obviously Mexico
is our southern neighbor. Senator McCain had some questions
about Mexico, and obviously, it is a matter of continual
concern.
The Department of Justice, and more particularly the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, had a program called ``Fast
and Furious'' that you are aware of whereby approximately 2,000
weapons were allowed to walk from gun dealers in the United
States by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. I
believe the last estimate I saw is that roughly only about a
quarter of those weapons have actually been recovered. Of
course, one of them--or two of them, actually were found at the
scene of the death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.
Could you shed any light or do you have any opinion on what
the impact of the transit of those firearms would have on the
cartels and the violence and the crime that we might see as a
result?
Director Clapper. Sir, this is not an intelligence issue.
Fortunately, it is one aspect that I do not have any
responsibility for. It is a very unfortunate incident.
Obviously, guns, whether in a case like this or by any other
means, that find their way from the United States into Mexico
certainly do not help the situation.
Senator Cornyn. I am advised Mexico Government officials
were not advised by the Department of Justice or the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms about this ``Fast and Furious''
program. Do either of you have anything you can tell us about
their reaction to this diplomatic breakdown?
Director Clapper. No, I cannot, sir. Again, it was not an
issue conducted in intelligence channels. So I do not know
anything about it.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Burgess. Sir, I would agree with Director Clapper.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good morning to you. Thanks for the incredible
breadth and depth of your work and the tour that you have taken
us on touching on many of the hot spots in the world. I also
want to thank you for your service, which has included many,
many years.
Let me turn to a comment that Secretary Gates made at West
Point. He said, ``I must tell you when it comes to predicting
the nature and location of our next military engagements, since
Vietnam our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten
it right from Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the
Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more. We had no idea, a year
before any of these missions, that we would be so engaged.''
Do you agree with Secretary Gates on this point, and if so,
what can we do and what can you do to address that failing? I
guess I presupposed, Director Clapper, you would agree with me
and Secretary Gates, but if you disagree, please feel free to
do so.
Director Clapper. I am a great fan of Secretary Gates. We
are good friends and have known each other, so I am loathe to
disagree with him.
I would say that as far as our obligation, our
responsibility is to provide as much insight for decisionmakers
and policymakers, which we are not, what the implications are,
what the threat situation is, what kind of a situation we are
getting ourselves into for any military operation overseas.
Senator Udall. General Burgess, do you care to comment and
particularly if there are any thoughts you have of changes,
additional resources?
General Burgess. No, sir, I would not. Like Director
Clapper, I would probably never publicly disagree with
Secretary Gates.
But having said that, as we have discussed even last year
in front of this committee having this same discussion as we
looked at the Arab Spring, as it was called then, I am one of
those that think that the Intelligence Community did, in fact,
paint the picture of the environment and the situation and
things that were going on. Did we make the tactical call in
some cases? No, sir. Can we be faulted for that? Sure, because
there is intelligence failure and operational success as we
say.
Senator Udall. I think it is important to note that
Secretary Gates said we have a perfect record--I am
paraphrasing--when it comes to predicting the nature and
location of our next military engagements. He did not
necessarily imply that our intelligence did not give us some
indication or that we were not prepared with some understanding
of those cultures and societies.
Let me piggyback on your comment about the Arab Spring and
direct a question to both of you. I would be interested to see
what you have to say. What has the Intelligence Community
learned in the wake of the Arab Spring?
Director Clapper. We have learned that in our focus on CT,
where we were in many of these countries engaged with local
liaison services on that subject and maybe were not paying as
much attention to the back yard that we were in at the time, so
there is that lesson.
Certainly, we put a lot of emphasis on the use of social
media as an indicator. It is not a panacea. It is not the cure-
all and it is not clairvoyant, but it is certainly a great
indicator of the general attitudes and tenor of a citizenry.
That, as well as how a host government may try to suppress that
social media. So that is somewhat a new thing for us which I
think was brought home to us very clearly as a result of Arab
Spring.
Senator Udall. General Burgess, do you have anything else
to add?
General Burgess. I have nothing to add.
Senator Udall. I am slightly loathe to even mention it
here, but it is in the general information that North Korea's
citizens now have more access, Director Clapper, to new media
technologies.
Director Clapper. Well, not much. There are certain elite
that have access to that sort of thing, but the general
citizenry, unless it is smuggled in from the outside, do not.
Of course, the North Korean regime realizes that and what
social media means in terms of the outside world and freedom of
information.
Senator Udall. There is an opportunity there but also
fraught with danger for their citizens, obviously.
Let me turn to Pakistan. We know that it is a fractious
environment there. It is a regime divided. Who determines there
the level of cooperation on CT and on the counterinsurgency
efforts?
Director Clapper. Sir, the Pakistani Government is in the
throes of reexamining a reset, if I can use that term, of just
what the relationship will be with the United States. That is a
subject their parliament is going to take up, and so we will
await the outcome of that.
Senator Udall. How do you assess the current economic
situation in Pakistan?
Director Clapper. They have their challenges. It is a tough
situation there for them.
Senator Udall. Another question on Pakistan. Your
assessment, General Burgess and Director Clapper, on the
likelihood of another military coup in Pakistan over the next
year to 2 years. Is that a closed session topic?
Director Clapper. The history has been that they have never
had an administration that saw the completion of its whole
term. I am moderately optimistic that this one may succeed
despite all its current challenges and the court proceeding
that is going on there now. But I do not think it is the
inclination of the current army leadership, specifically
General Kayani, who I think is very sensitive to the
independence of the military and not doing that.
Senator Udall. I see Senator Shaheen is here. Let me ask
one last question.
Would you describe--and I know you speak in plain English,
but I will put it that way as well--the magnitude of the cyber
threat facing the country? We were privy to some important
briefings as you all participated in these last few weeks on
the Senate side.
Director Clapper. Sir, we discussed this quite a bit, and
both of us have spoken to it in our written testimony and it is
quite profound. In my oral remarks, I just highlighted the fact
that CT, proliferation, and cyber are our three major concerns
that we highlighted in the oral testimony. The National
Counterintelligence Executive, which is part of my staff,
issued a report on the impact of economic espionage in this
country, which was put out in October, which called out both
Russia and China, particularly China because of the grand theft
of intellectual property in this country. So it is quite a
profound threat, and that is one reason why we are supportive
of the Lieberman, Collins, Rockefeller, Feinstein bill.
Senator Udall. You included it in your three central
threats?
Director Clapper. I did.
Senator Udall. Thank you again. Thanks for your service and
thank you for spending all morning with us. I appreciate it.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director Clapper and General Burgess, for being
here. I hate to keep you past the noon hour, so I will try and
be quick.
Last year, in the midst of the Libyan operation, Senator
Collins and I wrote to the administration expressing our
concerns that I know you share about Libya's vast arsenal of
unsecured MANPADS. Considering that these pose a continuing
threat and there are an estimated 20,000 still out there, I am
not going to ask you to speak to that because we asked that the
Intelligence Committee give us a report as part of the NDAA. I
just wanted to say that I look forward to hearing from you
about that subject because it is clearly going to continue to
be a concern.
Director Clapper. It is a concern, and you are quite right
about the estimate, the all-source estimate we had before the
anti-Qaddafi demonstrations started of about 20,000 MANPADS in
Libya. DOS is managing an aggressive program to recover
MANPADS, and to this point it has recovered about 25 percent of
them, about 5,000. There are many others that we are certain,
although we cannot count them all, that were destroyed by
virtue of the fact they were in ammo depots and bunkers and
this sort of thing that were destroyed during either the
contest between the opposition and regime or the NATO air
strikes. That said, there is a large number that are unlocated
and will be very problematic in recovering since they have them
all over the place. Libya was awash in weaponry.
So we will continue with the program to do what we can to
either account for the ones destroyed or damaged during the
demonstrations and encounters and, as well, continue, I would
guess, with the recovery program that the DOS team is running.
Senator Shaheen. How often are we seeing these come up with
the militias in Libya as there is continuing conflict there?
Director Clapper. There is. Many of the Libyan militias
have not folded under a central government yet and many of them
are keeping their weapons for one reason or another. So that
too is another issue that we are trying to watch.
Senator Shaheen. I want to pick up on Senator Udall's
questioning about Pakistan, which I believe continues to be one
of the most dangerous parts of the world, and especially given
the continued back-and-forth in our relationship with Pakistan.
Can you talk about what the current vulnerabilities are of
their nuclear program and the potential to lead to
proliferation of sensitive technology or material?
Director Clapper. I would be pleased to discuss that with
you in closed session.
Senator Shaheen. I thought that is what you might say, but
can you talk about how confident you are that the Pakistani
nuclear program has the appropriate safeguards and protections?
Director Clapper. I am reasonably confident they do.
Senator Shaheen. Are we also feeling like the next level of
military leadership down from General Kayani also shares the
same commitment to safeguarding that arsenal that we have seen
from the top leadership in the military?
Director Clapper. I believe they do.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Obviously, Pakistan's relations with India play a role in
their defense plans and operations. There has been some small
good news in terms of the potential for a thaw in that
relationship in the last year or so. Can you talk about how you
assess the potential for improved ties between the two
countries and how that might affect stability in that region?
Director Clapper. Obviously, from Pakistan's standpoint,
they view India as an existential threat, but as you alluded,
there have been some encouraging breaks here in the context of
dialogue between the two countries. I know from having traveled
and dialogued with--the Indians would be very interested as
well in relaxing tensions, but there are longstanding,
fundamental issues there that, I think, will be hard to
overcome. Obviously, if they did reach some agreement, it would
be huge, but there are lots of countervailing factors, I think,
that are again best left for discussion in closed session that
I think are going to make that difficult.
Senator Shaheen. When we were there last summer--I was
there with Chairman Levin, and this issue came up. The
political leadership was quick to reassure us that they were
taking measures to try and thaw relations. Is our assessment
that there is a commitment at the top levels in both India and
Pakistan to try and address this longstanding conflict that has
existed between the two countries?
Director Clapper. I think that is probably a fair
assessment. I think at the top levels, they would both see
advantages, mutual advantages.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Burgess, for nearly 2 decades, the submarine force
is a major priority and its military modernization has been
something that we have seen from China. To what extent do those
ongoing modernization efforts and its focus on expanding its
submarine force raise concerns with our Navy and our ability to
respond to that Chinese buildup?
General Burgess. I think across the board the Chinese are
making modernization improvements, whether it be in their air
force, in their navy, and other aspects of what they are doing.
They are taking a very holistic approach. Submarines are part
of that.
We in DIA, along with the Navy and others, are watching
that very carefully and we continue to watch their
developments.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Director Clapper, I want to go back to Russia. I chair the
European Affairs Subcommittee in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and so we have been watching very closely what is
happening in Russia right now, the protests, the reaction to
Putin's announcement that he would switch from being Prime
Minister to being President again. You talked in your January
testimony about Putin's return to the presidency is resulting
in more continuity than change.
Can you talk about how we view, first of all, the impact of
demonstrations in Russia and what change that might effect as
we are looking at a changeover in Putin's role there?
Director Clapper. I think I find this evolution in Russia
very interesting. Again, this is another manifestation of the
impact of social media. I think the Russian Government, the
Russian elite are finding real challenges in putting that free
information flow via social media genie back in the bottle. I
often wonder whether Mr. Putin will rue the day he decided to
come back. He might have been better served to quit while he
was ahead. I think he comes from the old school, and I do not
think the old order is going to work in Russia. I think the
thousands of people willing to turn out in a bitter, bitter
Moscow cold in January and February is a great testament to
some profound change I believe is going on in Russia.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
I have a few questions which may be the beginning and the
end of round two, depending if any other Senators arrive.
First, in response to a question about how long an Israeli
military attack on Iran would postpone Iran getting a bomb,
Secretary of Defense Panetta said, ``that at best it might
postpone it maybe 1, possibly 2 years''. Does the Intelligence
Community agree with that?
Director Clapper. I do not disagree with it, but I think
there are a lot of factors that could play here. How effective
such an attack was, what the targets were, what the rate of
recovery might be. So there are a lot of imponderables there
that could affect a guesstimate--and that is all it is--about
how long it would take to resume.
Chairman Levin. Has the Intelligence Community made an
estimate of that issue, how long it would take to resume after
an Israeli military attack?
Director Clapper. We have not come up with a single number
for the reasons I just alluded to. It would be hard to come up
with a number because it would have to be an assessment as well
as how well the Iranians could recover and how much damage--how
effective the attack was.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, you indicated that our
Intelligence Community and the Israeli Intelligence Community
are aligned on issues relative to Iran. Do the Israelis agree
with you that Iran has not made a decision as to whether or not
to have a nuclear weapon? Do they agree with that?
Director Clapper. I am happy to discuss that with you in
closed session, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
By the way, I do not believe there is going to be a need
today for that closed session to give us all hope for lunch.
Director Clapper, what is the Intelligence Community's
assessment of the performance of the ANSF in providing security
in those areas where they have assumed the lead?
Director Clapper. I think so far, so good. The areas that
have been turned over in the initial tranche, I think, have
performed reasonably well, but let me ask General Burgess if he
wants to add to that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. General?
General Burgess. Sir, I think the Intelligence Community
would agree with what you just stated, and, in fact, this is
one of the places where the Intelligence Community is in
agreement with the commanders on the ground in terms of how the
Afghan forces are performing.
Chairman Levin. That is, that they are performing?
General Burgess. They are performing well when they are
backed up by enablers from ISAF.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
In a DOD press briefing recently, Lieutenant General
Scaparadi, Commander of the ISAF Joint Command, and who is in
charge of operations in Afghanistan, described some signs of
progress by the ANSF. He indicated that he gave a positive view
of the progress to build the capabilities of the ANA and the
ANP. I think, General Burgess, you have indicated you just
basically share that view, and I think also Director Clapper
indicated pretty much the same thing.
This is my question to you, General. Do you share General
Dempsey's assessment--that was just a couple days ago--that the
ANSF are on track to assume the lead for providing security
throughout Afghanistan by 2014 while still requiring support
from coalition forces for key enablers like intelligence and
lift?
General Burgess. Yes, sir, I would be in agreement.
Chairman Levin. A question on Pakistan. According to news
reports, a leaked NATO report titled ``State of the Taliban
2012'' included claims by Taliban detainees that Pakistan is
providing support to the insurgency, and it reportedly also
portrayed, though, a strained and a distrustful relationship
between the Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, and key insurgent
groups, including the Haqqani network. This is what the
document reportedly stated: ``There is a widespread assumption
that Pakistan will never allow the Taliban the chance to become
independent of ISI control.''
Do you share that same assumption that Pakistan will never
allow the Taliban a chance to become independent of ISI
control?
Director Clapper. I have not seen this report, sir.
I think the Pakistanis via the ISI would want to maintain
visibility and influence. I am not sure I would go so far as to
say they would insist on dominance, but they certainly want to
have insight and influence in Afghanistan, particularly in a
post-2014 context, remembering that their primary interest is
India.
Chairman Levin. General, in your assessment, does the
Pakistan military have the intention to take steps to stop the
Haqqani's use of the FATA or the KP province as a safe haven
for conducting cross-border attacks into Afghanistan?
Director Clapper. The Pakistani army, within its
capabilities and in light of its other obligations, has done a
lot in the FATA and has lost a lot of soldiers in that process.
Chairman Levin. My question, though, is whether they have
the intention to take steps to stop the Haqqanis.
Director Clapper. I do not think so.
General Burgess. Sir, I would agree with that. If you look
at what the Pakistan army has done, they have actually cut
forces from 2010 to now in terms of the number of brigades that
are in there because they have a sustainment issue.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Relative to the reconciliation talks,
Director, what are the Taliban's motivations for participating
in the reconciliation talks?
Director Clapper. That is a great question, sir. I think
they want to, I believe, achieve some legitimacy. They want to
be players in some form in a Government of Afghanistan. Of
course, they obviously see us as key to that end.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I will not prolong this because it looks like I
may be between you and a much-deserved break for lunch.
First of all, thank you for your testimony today. I had two
other hearings. So I bounced around a little.
But I got to hear some of the opening and I also listened
to Senator McCain and his opening. He talked a little about the
increasing reports of a link between al Qaeda and Iran.
Director Clapper, last year the Treasury Department
designated a number of high-ranking members of al Qaeda who
operate a facilitation network from inside of Iran. There was a
press release announcing the designations from David Cohen, the
Under Secretary. He says--and I quote--``Iran is the leading
sponsor of state-sponsored terrorism in the world today. By
exposing Iran's secret deal with al Qaeda and allowing it to
funnel funds and operatives through its territory, we are
illuminating yet another aspect of Iran's unmatched support for
terrorism.'' That is a pretty troubling statement.
What is your understanding of this secret so-called deal
between Iran and al Qaeda?
Director Clapper. Iran and al Qaeda have had a, to a
certain extent, shotgun marriage. I think Iran has harbored al
Qaeda leaders, facilitators but under house arrest conditions,
remembering of course that Iran is a Shia state and al Qaeda is
Sunni. So they do not agree ideologically in the first place. I
think Iran, of course, pays attention to our pursuit of al
Qaeda and what we have done in Afghanistan and Iraq, next door
neighbors to them. So on the one hand, they have had this sort
of standoff arrangement with al Qaeda allowing them to exist
there but not to foment any operations directly from Iran
because they are very sensitive about, hey, we might come after
them there as well. So it has been this longstanding, as I say,
kind of a shotgun marriage or a marriage of convenience. I
think probably the Iranians may think that they might use
perhaps al Qaeda in the future as a surrogate or proxy.
Senator Portman. Would they think, Mr. Director, that they
might use them as a hedge against an attack from the West?
Director Clapper. That is what I meant. They may have that
in mind for future use, but I think for now--and the history
has been that they have not allowed them to operate freely in
Iran.
Senator Portman. You think they have not allowed them to
conduct operations using Iran as a platform.
Director Clapper. I do not think they have, sir, not
directly, not in the sense, say, by core al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Senator Portman. Speaking of core al Qaeda and core al
Qaeda leadership, it seems as though some significant progress
has been made. Your statements today say that there is a
diminishing operational importance of the core al Qaeda
leadership and that they play an increasingly symbolic role.
Director Clapper. That assumes we sustain the pressure on
them, though.
Senator Portman. Okay. That is one of my questions. Having
dedicated a lot of resources to that effort over the years to
go after the core leadership and we have not had success in
attritting their numbers and their role, what do you think our
resource level needs to be going forward, and what happens to
the lower-level al Qaeda in Pakistan if the final elements of
the core leadership are taken out?
Director Clapper. They are about down to that. I think what
we have to ensure is that they do not regenerate, that they do
not recruit and continue to operate there. So we will always
have to be vigilant to prevent a recurrence or regeneration of
the al Qaeda leadership centering its planning and operational
planning from the safe haven in Pakistan.
Senator Portman. If we are successful in the continued
effort, how would you prioritize resources that we are
currently using targeting the core? Would you think those
resources would have to continue to be devoted to the al Qaeda
threat?
Director Clapper. Well, yes, sir, because of the
franchises, so-called, notably AQAP which currently we view as
the primary threat to the homeland because of their planning
and intent to attack either in Europe or the United States.
Then there are the variants in AQIM in Africa. So as these
franchises emerge, drawing on the ideology of al Qaeda wherever
they are, I think we will always be in the mode of being
vigilant to their reemergence.
Senator Portman. I thank you.
General Burgess, thank you for your leadership with the
National Air and Space Intelligence Center and all the other
intelligence work that your folks are doing to provide us with
the information that we need as a country to be able to respond
to these threats. As the ranking member of the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee, I am continually impressed by
the good work of your folks. So thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to allow these witnesses, who have
spent a lot of time here today, the opportunity now to take a
much-deserved break. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. I know you want to allow it, but I am going
to ask two more questions. So despite your good suggestion,
Senator Portman, I am going to just finish up with a couple of
questions.
My last question had to do with the motivation of the
Taliban. My next question relating to the reconciliation talks
that they are apparently engaging in has to do not with their
motivation, which you addressed, but what your assessment is of
the prospects of success in any degree of those talks.
Director Clapper. Sir, I do not know and we will not know
until we actually engage.
Chairman Levin. Do you have an assessment?
Director Clapper. No, I do not. I honestly do not know. I
do know that Taliban objectives----
Chairman Levin. I am talking about prospects. Do you think
you are likely to advance the cause of some kind of a positive
success in Afghanistan?
Director Clapper. It could, and I believe that is the
reason that such negotiations are being pursued, to see whether
there is a path there that may buttress or support
reconciliation and resolution.
Chairman Levin. Like a number of other members of the
committee, I have expressed some real concern at the reports
that the administration is considering transferring some
Taliban detainees from Guantanamo to Qatar, and I have
expressed this both publicly and to the administration
privately. It seems to me that such transfers would be
premature and should only be considered after the Taliban has
engaged in positive discussions on reconciliation. I think you
heard at least one or maybe more of our members express similar
concerns this morning, and I just want to let you know that
there is some real concern by many members of this committee
about such a transfer in the absence of some real progress and
real showing of good faith in meeting some of the other
conditions.
We are aware that the Secretary of Defense has to certify
certain things before that takes place, but in addition to that
certification, there are some real feelings that the people who
would be released, even though they may be contained in Qatar,
nonetheless could have an effect on the battle by some control,
by some propaganda that they might utilize, and in other ways.
So I want you to be aware of that feeling on the part of
many members of this committee--I do not know if all of us feel
that way, but there has been so much expression that you should
be aware of it.
My question, though, has to do with this. Has the decision
been made regarding the transfer of detainees to Guantanamo?
Director Clapper. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Now, Mr. Director, you stated that there has been about a
decade of funding increases to the Intelligence Community and
now, as part of the defense budget, cuts that have been
mandated by the law that was passed by Congress, that there is
now going to be a reduction in the DOD budget and that includes
in the Intelligence Community budget as well and that that
would reduce some capability. My question is whether you are
able to administer the cut in a way that any reduction in
capability is manageable and acceptable.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, we can. Now, just to be clear,
that is under the Budget Control Act. If we were to go to
sequestration, that is quite a different matter.
Chairman Levin. No. My question was the Budget Control Act.
Under the 2013 budget request, which does follow the Budget
Control Act, that came in from the administration a few days
ago, that request, including the request relative to your
budget and any reduction in the budget, has your support.
Director Clapper. Yes, sir, it does.
Chairman Levin. Senator Portman? So you can take some of
the brunt for delaying their lunch. After all your good
instincts and your sensitivity, I took that on myself.
Thank you both for your fine testimony, your service to our
Nation, for all of the people who work with you in the
Intelligence Community, for the great work that they do. We
frequently talk about our troops and we consider people in the
Intelligence Community to be very much like our troops with the
dedication that they show, the risks that many of them take. So
we are thankful to you and to them and to their families
because families need to support your community as they do our
troops.
This hearing will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
SYRIA
1. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, we all agree that the
conduct of the Asad regime in Syria is an outrage and that the
slaughter must come to an end. With this escalating violence in Syria,
some have called for the United States to work toward the removal of
the Asad regime by arming the opposition forces fighting it and the
state security forces. However, the prospect of arming opposition
forces in Syria--whether directly or indirectly--has been something
many observers have cautioned against. Specifically, the dynamics of
the opposition appear uncertain, and some believe arming the opposition
groups could have new negative effects on U.S. security interests and
regional stability. The actors under the umbrella of the Free Syrian
Army appear to have little unity, and the opposition as a whole is
complicated by competing regional, tribal, and sectarian interests. You
also testified before this Committee that al Qaeda's Iraqi affiliate
group appears to have infiltrated Syrian opposition groups and was
likely responsible for recent suicide bombings in Damascus and Aleppo
in Syria. I am concerned that the situation in Syria will allow for al
Qaeda's operations to grow alongside or outside of the opposition's
command. Based on our intelligence of the make-up of the opposition,
would it be possible for the international community to provide arms to
the rebels without running the risk that those weapons could fall into
the hands of al Qaeda forces operating in Syria?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
2. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, what are the most
significant risks of providing arms to the Syrian opposition?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
3. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, what other options should
the international community consider that would reduce the chance of
providing support to groups that run counter to U.S. security
interests, such as al Qaeda, while still applying pressure against the
Asad regime?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
IRAN
4. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, Secretary Panetta and
President Obama have made it clear that it is unacceptable for Iran to
acquire nuclear weapons capabilities--a position I firmly agree with--
and that, accordingly, all options remain on the table as international
tensions rise. As we saw years ago in Iraq, it is clear that
intelligence plays a critical role in the decision to commit diplomatic
or military resources to achieve our national security goals. The past
decade has shown that the quality and utility of our intelligence can
have significant consequences on our international political standing,
as well as tremendous costs in blood and treasure. Therefore, it is
essential that we critically assess our intelligence. In light of the
recent boasts of advances in its nuclear program, what analyses are
being done to determine the credibility of the Iranian regime's
assertions?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
5. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, are we confident in the
strength of our intelligence in regards to Iran's nuclear capabilities
and intentions?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
6. Senator McCaskill. Director Clapper, what steps do we take to
address the credibility and veracity of our intelligence on such
sensitive issues that could impact major national security decisions in
light of past failures to more critically assess our intelligence and
to affectively seek additional information?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
COUNTERTERRORISM
7. Senator McCaskill. General Burgess, even as we wind down our
military operations in Afghanistan, we continue to face the threat of
violent extremism around the globe. Extremist and militant groups such
as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic Maghreb and Al
Shabaab in Somalia remain a threat to U.S. security interests. It is
clear today that our operations in Afghanistan placed immense pressure
on our fiscal and military resources, and it is critical to our
national security that our counterterrorism (CT) strategy moving
forward be as effective as possible. In the current environment, from
what location is an attack against our Homeland most likely to emanate?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
8. Senator McCaskill. General Burgess, where do you feel the
greatest threat to our national security exists today?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
9. Senator McCaskill. General Burgess, do you feel that our CT
operations in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are
resourced properly to achieve their operational goals of preventing
safe havens for terrorists and countering extremist groups?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
10. Senator McCaskill. General Burgess, in light of the recent
political instability in Yemen, are you confident that the United
States will be able to continue operations to counter extremist groups
in that country?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
11. Senator McCaskill. General Burgess, where is al Qaeda most
active in the world today?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
PAKISTAN
12. Senator McCaskill. General Burgess, as we wind down U.S. combat
operations in Afghanistan, there is great concern that al Qaeda and
other extremist groups could work toward reestablishment in that
country. Pakistan remains a key player in countering such reemergence,
but senior U.S. military officials have raised blunt concerns that the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has supported insurgent
networks that engage in attacks on U.S. targets in Afghanistan. Given
concerns about Pakistan's implicit or explicit support of extremist
groups such as the Haqqani network, how confident are you in Pakistan's
commitment to continuing to being a CT partner in the region once U.S.
military operations have ended in Afghanistan?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
COMMERCIAL IMAGERY
13. Senator Udall. Director Clapper, in light of language regarding
commercial imagery in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012
and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2012, how is the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence assisting the Department of
Defense (DOD) to conduct the requirements, performance, and cost review
required by both bills?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Udall. Director Clapper, how are the J-8 and the
combatant commands involved in the imagery requirements and industrial
base study ordered by the White House?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Udall. Director Clapper, in light of multiple
presidential policies (to include Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama)
and directives that stress the use of commercial imagery to the maximum
extent possible, how do you justify the fiscal year 2013 proposed
reduction for commercial imagery?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
IRANIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
16. Senator McCain. Director Clapper, in response to questions from
Senator Lieberman regarding Iran making a decision to build a nuclear
weapon, you stated that there are ``certain things they [Iran] have not
done which I'd be happy to discuss in a closed session that would be
key indicators that they have made such a decision.'' Please identify
these key indicators.
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
CYBER SECURITY
17. Senator McCain. Director Clapper, earlier this year in a speech
at Fordham University, General Keith Alexander, USA, Commander of U.S.
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and the Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA), asserted that if a significant cyber attack against this
country were to take place there may not be much that he and his teams
at either CYBERCOM or NSA can legally do to stop it in advance.
According to General Alexander, ``in order to stop [a cyber attack] you
have to see it in real time, and you have to have those authorities.
Those are the conditions we've put on the table . . . Now how and what
Congress chooses, that'll be a policy decision.'' Do you agree with
General Alexander's assessment?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
18. Senator McCain. Director Clapper, to date, legislative
proposals before Congress have done very little to address this real
concern. Why hasn't more been done to ensure that DOD and NSA have the
tools necessary to protect the Homeland from cyber attacks?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
19. Senator McCain. Director Clapper, after the release of the DOD
cyber security strategy in September of last year, General Cartwright,
the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that DOD
is spending 90 percent of its time playing defense against cyber
attacks and 10 percent playing offense and that DOD should invert this
defense-offense ratio to assert that there will be consequences to a
cyber attack against the United States. Do you agree with General
Cartwright's statements?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
20. Senator McCain. Director Clapper, what do you view as the
appropriate direction DOD and the Nation as a whole should be headed
with respect to cyber deterrence?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
21. Senator McCain. Director Clapper, do you view this as a matter
of urgency?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
IRAN AND ISRAEL
22. Senator Wicker. General Burgess, Iran continues its path toward
a nuclear weapons capability. Sanctions have clearly begun to affect
the Iranian economy but do not appear, as of yet, to have altered their
nuclear weapons efforts. Just yesterday, Iran threatened to cut oil
exports to several European Union countries and unveiled advances in
its nuclear fuel programs. The United States has certain intelligence
capabilities that our allies do not. Broadly speaking, do you believe
your counterparts in the Israeli Ministry of Defense and Israeli
Security Services are pleased with the level of cooperation and mutual
trust with DOD and our Intelligence Community?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Wicker. General Burgess, what would be the implications
of an attack by Israel against Iran for our regional allies?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
SYRIA
24. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, the situation in Syria
continues to deteriorate. Thousands of innocent Syrians have been
brutally murdered and countless have been wounded. President Obama said
in his State of the Union Address that in Syria, he has ``no doubt that
the Assad regime will soon discover that the forces of change can't be
reversed, and that human dignity can't be denied.'' How do you judge
the capabilities of the Free Syrian Army?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, members of the administration
have stated we will exhaust all diplomatic options in an effort to
avoid any military confrontation, though there have been reports that
the United States is beginning to rethink its military strategy and
support. What would this entail?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what is the extent of the
Syrian chemical stockpile?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what can be done to secure
the Syrian chemical stockpile if the Assad regime loses control?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, are we working with the
Israelis to ensure these weapons do not get into the wrong hands?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what, if any, military
options do you see for DOD?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
EGYPT
30. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, just over a year ago, the
Egyptian people took to the streets and overthrew President Hosni
Mubarak. Today, it appears that Islamist factions are poised to take
control of the Egyptian Government and the country's future. How would
you characterize our current relationship with the Egyptian
intelligence services?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, has their cooperation and
relationship with DOD and the Intelligence Community changed since last
year?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what is your assessment of
the Muslim Brotherhood?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
33. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, what impact will a
Brotherhood-led government have on relations between the U.S. military
and the Egyptian military?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
34. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, how are we strategically
adapting to the new role the military is taking within the Egyptian
Government?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
35. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, it appears that the Egyptian
Government has little, if no, control over Sinai. What is the impact of
that likely to be in our security calculations for the upcoming year?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
REGIONAL EVENTS AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY
36. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, events of recent months have
highlighted the unique role Israel plays in the Middle East as a
reliable, stable, and democratic U.S. ally who not only shares our
interests, but also our values. That said, the uncertainty of the
regional tumult has raised questions about Israel's qualitative
military edge (QME). Maintaining Israel's QME has been a longstanding
cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East. What strategy is in
place to ensure Israel's QME as the security situation in the region
continues to change?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
37. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper, there have been reports that
the joint military drill with Israel has been rescheduled for the fall.
Why are we participating in such a drill at this time, and what
benefits do we hope to achieve from the exercise?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
38. Senator Wicker. General Burgess, I do not see any tactical or
diplomatic sense in your recent announcement about telling the enemy
the date we are going to pull out troops. This gives the enemy an
advantage on the ground and also eliminates any incentive for the
Taliban to engage in substantive political negotiations with the Afghan
Government. Our strategy in Afghanistan must be based solely on the
conditions on the ground and not on the politics of the 2012 election.
Political expediency should never be an excuse for a rush to judgment
on public policy--let alone our national security. How does DOD plan to
execute this announced withdrawal while not further endangering the
lives of our troops and still meeting operational demands?
General Burgess. As this question concerns Department of Defense
(DOD) plans and policy, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) defers to
the appropriate DOD planning and policy element.
39. Senator Wicker. General Burgess, in your testimony you stated
that ``the Afghan Government will struggle to fill the vacuum left by
the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and resources,
while continuing to support ongoing ISAF efforts in nontransitioned
areas.'' What specific struggles are you referring to?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
foreign language training and retention of qualified personnel
40. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper and General Burgess, I am a
strong proponent of foreign language and cultural training at the
military academies, ROTC cadets and midshipmen, as well as similar
training and incentives for college students interested in the
Intelligence Community. These initiatives include the Center for
Intelligence and Security Studies at the University of Mississippi,
which prepares undergraduate students for careers in intelligence
analysis. To what extent do you believe education and training in
foreign languages and cultures are important in preparing the next
generations of military officers and civilian analysts?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. Education and training in foreign languages and
cultures are exceptionally important to the Nation at this time in
history. The need for language, cultural proficiency, and regional
expertise is only going to grow--not just within the Intelligence
Community and DOD, but across all parts of society that touch an
increasingly interconnected world. For all concerned, it is a very
dynamic strategic environment. More than ever, language, cultural
proficiency, and regional/area expertise are the keys that open hard
targets. They are prerequisites for success.
41. Senator Wicker. Director Clapper and General Burgess, can you
elaborate on the Intelligence Community's--and DIA's--ongoing efforts
to recruit and retain qualified and capable Active Duty and civilian
analysts and operators, and what challenges you face?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. DIA recently moved to Centralized Recruitment,
Hiring, and Placement. Under this initiative, DIA centrally manages
staffing to meet the mission and skills requirements while shaping the
next generation of intelligence professionals. This initiative allows
DIA to hire and retain the required skills and competencies through an
increased focus on hiring at the developmental level and retaining our
best and brightest by affording them career developmental
opportunities. Specifically, DIA has developed programs to advance
employee careers, including Joint Duty Assignments, the Upward Mobility
Program, and the Accelerated Career Transition Program. DIA's primary
programs to attract external talent include summer internships,
cooperative education, and Wounded Warrior. Future challenges include
budget constraints and a constantly changing environment; however, we
are confident that Centralized Recruitment, Hiring, and Placement will
allow DIA to meet our mission.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
FUTURE U.S. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS
42. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, in April
2009, President Obama declared his intention to ``seek the goal of a
world without nuclear weapons.'' While such an outcome would be nice, I
see this goal as, at best, the stuff of pure fantasy, and, perhaps more
accurately, incredibly misguided and perilous for our Nation's long-
term security. In December 2010, the Senate ratified the President's
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). I voted against it, partly
because of the fantastical nature of the President's stated long-term
goal of a nuclear-free world. Earlier this week, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, USA, testified that a nuclear
posture review was underway. According to recent reports, DOD is
exploring scenarios that could reduce our nuclear weapons stockpile by
up to 80 percent. I am deeply troubled by this. Iran continues to make
progress in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, North Korea's nuclear
weapons program remains a serious threat to regional security and
stability, and we do not know the full extent of the Chinese nuclear
arsenal. Nuclear weapons exist in the world, and this is not a genie
that we can put back in the bottle. If, in his pursuit of a zero-nuke
world, President Obama succeeds in eliminating the entire U.S. nuclear
arsenal, what effect would that have on the global threat picture for
the United States?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
43. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, are you
on board with the President's goal of eliminating the U.S. nuclear
arsenal?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. As an intelligence agency, DIA provides analysis
to executive branch policymakers to inform policy decisions. However,
we do not comment on policy.
CHINA
44. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, according
to DOD, China's official defense budget has grown by an average of 12.1
percent each year since 2001. According to reports earlier this week,
China's defense budget is now expected to double by 2015, making it
more than all the rest of the Asia-Pacific regions combined. What is
your assessment of the strategic intent behind China's military
modernization, both in the region and globally?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
TAIWAN
45. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, you note in your prepared
testimony that ``Defense against U.S. forces in a regional contingency
over Taiwan is currently among the highest priorities for the Peoples
Republic of China military's planning, weapons development, and
training.'' Since 2006, Taiwan has sought unsuccessfully to purchase 66
new F-16 C/D fighters from the United States in order to bolster its
defensive capabilities and address a massive shortfall in fighter
aircraft that is looming. In your view, what would be the impact on
U.S. interests in the region if the size of Taiwan's fighter fleet is
cut in half through retirements of aging and obsolete aircraft, as is
projected?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
46. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, if Taiwan's existing capacity
to defend its skies against Chinese military aggression is diminished,
what new risks would the United States face?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
CYBER ATTACKS
47. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, in recent
years, our Nation has experienced an increasing volley of cyber attacks
and cyber theft emanating from China, and this is of great concern to
many senators. According to an October 2011 report by the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive, ``Chinese actors are the
world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic
espionage.'' The report goes on to highlight that ``computer networks
of a broad array of U.S. Government agencies . . . were targeted by
cyber espionage; much of this activity appears to have originated in
China.'' What is your assessment of this growing threat?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
48. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper, you also note that Russia is
of particular concern in this area, as entities within Russia are
``responsible for extensive illicit intrusions into U.S. computer
networks and theft of U.S. intellectual property.'' Please elaborate on
this point, and compare it to the scope of the cyber threat emanating
from China.
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
IRAN
49. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, you note in your testimony
that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps trains and provides weapons
and logistical support to Lebanese Hizballah, which in turn trains
insurgents in Iraq at Iran's behest, ``providing them with tactics and
technology to attack U.S. interests.'' Furthermore, you state that in
Afghanistan, Iran also provides ``weapons, funding, and training to
insurgents, while maintaining ties with the Government in Kabul.''
Would you agree that Iran is directly responsible for the death of U.S.
servicemembers in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past several years?
General Burgess. DIA, as an intelligence agency, defers to legal
counsel at the policy level within the executive branch for a response
to this question which requests legal determinations or
characterizations concerning the activities of a foreign nation state.
50. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, do you consider those actions
to be acts of war?
General Burgess. DIA, as an intelligence agency, defers to legal
counsel at the policy level within the executive branch for a response
to this question which requests legal determinations or
characterizations concerning the activities of a foreign nation state.
POTENTIAL ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAN
51. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, our
friend and ally, Israel, sees an existential threat to their east--
Iran. Media speculation continues to mount about a potential Israel
strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. If the Israelis do attempt to take
out these sites in Iran, what can you tell me about Iran's likely
retaliation?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
52. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, how might
this play out, and what U.S. interests would be most at risk in such a
situation?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
IRAQ
53. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, you,
Director Clapper, made clear in your prepared statement that Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) ``are capable of planning and executing security
operations, and Iraqi CT forces have demonstrated they are capable of
targeting remaining terrorists and insurgents.'' Yet, General Burgess
stated ``the ISF are unable to maintain external security and will be
unable to secure Iraq's borders or defend against an external threat
over the next year.'' These seem like two very different conclusions.
Please explain the inconsistency.
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
54. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, you note that ``Tehran
generally has strong relations with Baghdad, but over the long-term,
Iran is concerned a strong Iraq could once again emerge as a regional
rival.'' Do you believe Iran's influence has grown in Iraq since the
last U.S. troops were withdrawn in December?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLES
55. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, Secretary
Panetta recently stated ``by the mid- to latter-part of 2013, the
United States would transition from a combat role to a training,
advise, and assist role.'' I remain concerned by this administration's
insistence on timetables for the future U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan.
You both state that the ISAF are essential, providing oversight and
direct support to the Afghan police and army. If we withdraw our forces
precipitously and the Afghan Government fails, we would be left with a
failed state not much different than the pre-September 11 Afghanistan.
In your opinion, is this a realistic timeline and, if the Afghans
cannot ``fill the vacuum left by ISAF troops and resources,'' what are
the implications for our own national security?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
56. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, do you
think explicitly stating our military timetables makes it easier for
the Taliban and its affiliates to formulate their strategy and plan for
the future?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
FUTURE OF EGYPT
57. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, just over
a year ago, the Egyptian people took to the streets and overthrew
President Hosni Mubarak. Today, it appears that Islamist factions are
poised to take control of the Egyptian Government and the country's
future. What is your assessment of the risks posed to U.S. interests by
the Muslim Brotherhood?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
MEXICO
58. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, you note that Mexican
President Felipe Calderon's aggressive campaign against transnational
criminal organizations has resulted in Mexican security forces having
captured or killed 21 of Mexico's 37 most wanted traffickers. What is
your assessment of the progress that has been made since Calderon took
office in December 2006?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
59. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, Mexico
will hold presidential elections this summer. In your opinion, if the
next president of Mexico loses focus of the necessity to combat the
drug cartels and strengthen the rule of law, what would the impact be?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
60. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, can the
progress that has been made since 2006 be sustained if the Mexican
Government's attention is focused elsewhere?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
61. Senator Cornyn. Director Clapper and General Burgess, how would
an increased level of threat from the drug cartels most likely impact
the United States?
Director Clapper. [Deleted.]
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
INDIA
62. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, in your prepared testimony,
you note that Pakistan views India as its greatest threat, and while
India continues to carefully monitor events in Pakistan, it also views
China as a long-term challenge. As a result, you highlight India's
efforts to increase economic and military engagement with countries in
East and Southeast Asia. Director Clapper notes that ``India has
expressed support for a strong U.S. military posture in East Asia and
U.S. engagement in Asia.'' How do you view the importance of U.S.-India
military-to-military engagement?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
63. Senator Cornyn. General Burgess, what contributions to regional
security and stability does increased U.S.-India military cooperation
offer?
General Burgess. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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