[Senate Hearing 112-737]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-737
ASSESSING DEVELOPMENTS IN MALI: RESTORING DEMOCRACY AND RECLAIMING THE
NORTH
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 5, 2012
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MIKE LEE, Utah
TOM UDALL, New Mexico BOB CORKER, Tennessee
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Akuetteh, Nii, independent policy researcher, Washington, DC..... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Carson, Johnnie, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Dory, Amanda, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, U.S.
Department of Defense, Washington, DC.......................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Dufka, Corinne, senior researcher, Africa Division, Human Rights
Watch, Washington, DC.......................................... 34
Fomunyoh, Christopher, senior associate and regional director for
Central and West Africa, National Democratic Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Gast, Earl, Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Mahmoud, Mohamed Ould, vice president, Lobbying Network for
Peace, Security, and Development for Northern Mali, Bamako,
Mali........................................................... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 47
(iii)
ASSESSING DEVELOPMENTS IN MALI: RESTORING DEMOCRACY AND RECLAIMING THE
NORTH
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
A. Coons presiding.
Present: Senators Coons and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. I will be joined momentarily by my friend
and ranking member, Senator Johnny Isakson of Georgia, and we
expect other Senators to join, but I thought it was timely for
us to proceed.
I'm grateful for the support of the committee and the hard
work of my staff in making possible today the first time we
will have a witness testifying directly from a foreign country
which is the subject of a hearing, and I hope that will
contribute to an ongoing process of trying to expand the range
and scope of testimony included in these hearings.
Today's focus is on Mali, and as we speak, there are three
simultaneous crises occurring in Mali--a security, a political,
and a humanitarian crisis--all three of which, in my view,
threaten United States interests in Africa and require the
attention of the U.S. Government and the world. That's why
we've convened this hearing today, to assess developments in
Mali and to discuss a path forward to restore democracy, to
reclaim the north, to stabilize the security situation, and to
address ongoing humanitarian needs.
I would like to welcome my friend and partner on the
subcommittee, Senator Johnny Isakson, and I understand we may
well be joined by others, and to thank our distinguished
witnesses for sharing their insight and expertise.
Earlier this year, a military coup deposed the
democratically elected Government of Mali, and an ethnic
rebellion staked its claim on the northern two-thirds of this
vast country. This left a security and political vacuum that
was exploited by Islamic extremists. As of today, Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb--more commonly known as AQIM--and two
affiliated groups control the majority of northern Mali, an
area roughly the size of the U.S. State of Texas, making it the
largest territory controlled by Islamic extremists in the
world.
I am concerned that the current United States approach
toward Mali may not be comprehensive and forward-leaning enough
to address all three of these difficult, complex, and
interconnected crises--security, political, and humanitarian.
So today we will examine U.S. policy in these three areas with
the goal of providing recommendations for a path forward. We
will assess evolving plans for a regionally led, multilateral
military intervention in northern Mali and consider the
complementary goals of encouraging elections and restoring
security by reclaiming the north.
With growing ties between extremist and terrorist groups in
Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Somalia, and beyond, there is growing
concern that AQIM will leverage its new safe haven in Mali to
carry out training and advance plans for regional or
transnational terrorist attacks, making Mali, in the words of
Secretary Clinton, a powder keg of instability in the region
and beyond.
The U.N. Security Council will likely vote in the coming
weeks on a resolution authorizing a military intervention by
ECOWAS and the African Union. Similar African-led
interventions--for example, in Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia--have
provided a model for multilateral and regionally led solutions
that allow the United States and our allies to provide
operational support without putting boots on the ground.
This intervention will take time, and stability cannot be
restored through military action alone. The situation in Mali
is as much a crisis of governance as of security. The long-
running grievances of the Tuaregs in the north and a political
vacuum in the south must be addressed through diplomacy,
rebuilding democratic institutions, and the restoration of a
democratically elected government. In addition, any agreement
that attempts to peel off groups currently aligned with AQIM
will require a credible government to do so in Bamako.
Elections are the key to not only resolving and restoring
now-frozen U.S. bilateral assistance, but also for reclaiming
government control of the north and restoring Mali's nearly
three-decade-long history of democracy.
Mali's political and security challenges cannot be
addressed as separate issues. As the U.N. Secretary General's
recent report on Mali suggested, the international community
must work to address these multiple crises simultaneously and
consider the implications of moving forward with elections that
might exclude participation of northerners. Such an election
could be viewed as a symbolic victory for AQIM and may further
entrench those who aim to establish a permanent Islamic state
in the north.
In short, this conflict has caused humanitarian as well as
security, as well as diplomatic challenges. There are more than
400,000 people displaced in Mali, and an exacerbated and
ongoing food crisis across the Sahel, leaving more than 4.5
million people in need of emergency food aid. NGOs have
reported rampant human rights abuses in northern Mali, further
adding to the instability and challenges, which include
torture, executions, recruitment of child soldiers,
amputations, as well as violations of women's rights,
children's rights, and restrictions on fundamental freedoms
such as speech and religion.
To provide insight on our path forward and to discuss these
three strands, we have assembled two distinguished panels.
First, we will hear from Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Ambassador Johnnie Carson; then USAID
Assistant Administrator for Africa, Mr. Earl Gast; and last,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Ms. Amanda
Dory. We are grateful for your presence.
On our second panel we will hear from senior associate and
regional director for West Africa at the National Democratic
Institute, Dr. Chris Fomunyoh; and then senior researcher in
the Africa Division at the Human Rights Watch, Ms. Corrine
Dufka; and then independent policy researcher, Mr. Nii
Akuetteh; and vice president of the Lobbying Network for Peace,
Security, and Development for Northern Mali, Mr. Mohamed Ould
Mahmoud, who will be testifying via webcast in order to provide
a first-hand perspective from Bamako.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of all our
witnesses on these two panels, and would like to turn to
Senator Isakson for his opening remarks.
Thank you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Chairman Coons, and I
commend you on calling this hearing on what is a very important
and pressing issue in the ECOWAS area and in West Africa, where
you and I traveled about a year and a half ago in the area to
Ghana, Benin, and Nigeria, and there are a lot of fledgling
democracies. We saw what happened in Cote d'Ivoire, where we
ended up with free democratic elections and a transition of
power out of a very difficult situation, and obviously our
interest here today is to explore ways in which the United
States can be of help to hopefully bring about free and fair
elections in 2013 and return all of Mali back to a
democratically represented country, as it has been for the last
20 years, until the March and spring initiative in the north
which caused the coup and which caused the current problems.
The United States has played a significant role in Africa
in many areas where there were problems. The Sudan could be no
better example, where because of United States involvement,
nonmilitary involvement but diplomatic involvement and special
envoy involvement brought about a process in 5 years that
brought about the free elections in the south and the creation
of the newest independent state in the world, the South Sudan.
The United States can play a great role in that, and it's
important for us to understand the issues that affect us, the
issues that affect that area, and what we can do to help.
Of a personal note, I also have concern anytime al-Qaeda
takes advantage of a vacuum or flows into an area because of
poverty or because of lack of governance. That's what's
happened in the north. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb is
present. To the extent they are present we don't know for sure,
and I'm anxious to hear from our witnesses today to talk about
that. But that also is a point of concern for our people of the
United States and for our country.
So I commend you on calling the hearing. I look forward to
hearing from all our witnesses and thank all of them who are
testifying today.
Senator Coons. Thank you so much, Senator.
Let's now begin with our first panel, if we might,
Assistant Secretary Carson.
STATEMENT OF JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
opportunity to testify before you on this important subject. I
also want to recognize the ranking member, Senator Isakson, for
his keen interest also in issues related to Africa.
Mali's March 21, 2012, military coup d'etat ended two
decades of Malian democracy, resulted in the loss of the
northern Mali to extremist groups, and further destabilized an
already fragile Sahel region. Mali is now facing four distinct
but overlapping challenges: restoring democracy, negotiating a
political solution to the Tuareg rebellion, countering the
threat from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and responding to
an ongoing humanitarian crisis.
Mali, its regional partners, and the international
community must respond to each of these challenges
simultaneously. Without addressing each of these issues, Mali
will not be able to make a successful political or economic
recovery.
Mali's first challenge is the restoration of democratic
governance. The framework agreement negotiated by ECOWAS with
the military junta following the March 21 coup mandates that
Mali's interim government must organize elections and put in
place a legitimate, democratically elected government by April
2013.
While the interim government has made progress in
strengthening governance, preparations for elections are moving
slowly. We continue to strongly encourage the interim
government to set a date for elections and to develop a roadmap
for the transition to a new democratically elected government.
The United States, along with the international community,
stands ready to assist Mali in conducting free, fair, and
transparent elections.
The interim government should build on the preparations
that were undertaken before the aborted April 2012 elections
and hold elections by April 2013 with as many voters as
possible. The United States looks forward to working with the
interim government and the international community to examine
the best mechanisms to ensure that voters from all regions of
Mali, including those in refugee camps in neighboring
countries, can participate in national elections.
As Mali moves through its current political transition, we
have been clear and unequivocal in our messages to coup leader
Captain Sanogo and the Malian public about the need for Captain
Sanogo to leave the political stage and to be held accountable
for human rights abuses committed while he was in control.
We have imposed targeted travel sanctions on Captain Sanogo
and more than 60 other individuals who were involved in the
coup or who continue to impede the restoration of democracy.
The U.S Government has also formally terminated its assistance
to the Government of Mali except for programs providing
critical humanitarian assistance in health care and food
security. We will maintain these kinds of pressures until Mali
transitions to a new democratically elected government.
Elections and the restoration of Mali's democratic
institutions by 2013 are critical for ensuring that the Malian
Government has the legitimacy and the credibility that it needs
to negotiate with the Tuareg and other northern populations and
to coordinate effectively with regional and international
partners to defeat AQIM.
The ongoing rebellion in northern Mali by the Tuareg
community is a second major factor contributing to Mali's
current political and security problems. The government must
recognize and address the legitimate political and social-
economic grievances of the Tuareg community. The United States
commends the efforts of African leaders, including President
Compaore of Burkina Faso, to facilitate dialogue between the
interim government and northern groups that accept Mali's
territorial integrity and who reject terrorism.
We support the commitment of interim President Traore to
open a dialogue with those actors in the north who respect
Mali's territorial integrity. We also welcomed the news that
representatives of the Tuareg National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad, known as the MNLA, have retracted their
declaration of independence of the north, and that key figures
in the MNLA and the Ansar al-Dine have declared their readiness
to negotiate with the interim government. These political
negotiations should be pursued diligently.
Mali's interim government must demonstrate its commitment
to negotiations by appointing a lead negotiator for the north.
The interim government also must find ways to effectively
address legitimate northern grievances in a peaceful manner.
The Tuareg are not terrorists, and the grievances of the
Tuareg should be resolved peacefully and not through military
actions.
The participation of Algeria and Mauritania, which are not
members of ECOWAS, are also crucial in finding a lasting
solution to the Malian problem. Later this week, a delegation
of U.S. officials, including Deputy Secretary of State William
Burns, will be traveling to Algiers to encourage the Algerians
to play a more active role in addressing the political and
security problems in northern Mali. Secretary Clinton was in
Algeria to discuss Mali, among other issues, approximately a
month ago.
The third challenge in Mali is terrorism. We are gravely
concerned about the presence and activities of terrorist and
extremist groups in northern Mali. Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, known
as MUJAO, and other affiliated groups have exploited the
political unrest created by the March coup and northern
rebellion to expand their safe haven in northern Mali and to
impose their ideology on local communities throughout the
northern part of the country.
While these tactics remain alien to the vast majority of
the population in the affected areas, AQIM and MUJAO have
established at least temporary relationships with a number of
groups in northern Mali and currently control the key cities of
Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.
Any attempt to militarily oust AQIM from northern Mali must
be African-led. It must be Malian-led. It must be well-planned,
well-organized, and well-resourced to be successful.
Military plans must also account for civilian security and
humanitarian needs.
We support the efforts of the interim government of Mali,
ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations, neighboring
states, and others in the international community to prepare a
military response, in accordance with international law, to
address the threat of terrorists and extremists in northern
Mali. The threat of military force has contributed, we think,
to a change in some of the northern groups, as witnessed by the
recent willingness of the MNLA and other members of Ansar al-
Dine, to renounce their efforts to establish an independent
state in northern Mali.
The military concept proposed by ECOWAS and endorsed by the
African Union provides a foundation for planning a proposed
military intervention in northern Mali. However, several key
questions must be answered to ensure that this response is
well-planned, well-resourced, and appropriate.
These issues include, among other things, the required
force levels, the cost and funding needs, the logistical
requirements, the operational timeliness, the protection of
civilians, and ensuring that the proposed military action is
adequately linked to a political strategy and an end state for
military operations in the north.
We have sent military planners to ECOWAS to assist with the
continued development and refinement of the plans for
international intervention. As the planning continues, we
expect that many of the outstanding questions that I have
raised, that we have raised as a government, will, in fact, be
answered.
We also continue to engage actively in New York with the
U.N. and other international partners in preparation for the
ongoing U.N. Security Council discussions on a resolution on
military intervention in the north. As plans develop for the
military operation, we will be better able to determine how the
United States can best support ECOWAS and the AU elements in
this effort.
Mali's neighbors have intensified their ongoing efforts to
bolster their own security and to address the AQIM safe haven
in northern Mali. Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger are all deeply
concerned that any military intervention in northern Mali will
cause a spillover of extremists into their own countries. These
governments strongly favor exhausting all political dialogue
before any intervention.
We ourselves are assisting Mauritania and Niger, as well as
some eight other states in the region, through our Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Partnership program, TSCTP. This program is
designed to help build long-term capacity to counter and
marginalize terrorist organizations; disrupt efforts to
recruit, train, and provision extremists; and to build up the
capacities of the states in the region.
However, lasting resolution to the terrorist threat will
require that the countries in the Sahel develop the capacity to
counter AQIM, along with other transnational threats like drug
smuggling and human trafficking.
The fourth crisis in the region is one of humanitarian
proportions. The human toll of these overlapping challenges has
been enormous. Since the start of the fighting in northern
Mali, more than 410,000 people have become refugees or
internally displaced. Of these, nearly 200,000 people are
displaced within Mali alone, and more than 210,000 Malians have
fled to Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. Algeria also hosts
large Malian populations of refugees.
In an effort to mitigate the effects of the complex
humanitarian crisis in the Sahel, we are providing humanitarian
food assistance to those displaced in the region. In 2012, the
U.S. Government provided some $445 million in assistance to the
Sahel region, $119 million of which was in support of emergency
needs within Mali and among refugee populations outside of
Mali. The humanitarian response should remain a civilian-led
effort in order to ensure the neutral and impartial character
of humanitarian operations.
We have encouraged greater international cooperation and
coordination in developing a comprehensive approach to Mali's
multiple crises and the greater Sahel. The U.N. Secretary
General's recent appointment of a special envoy for the Sahel
will help provide the needed facilitation and coordination. We
will discuss the drafting of the Secretary General's integrated
strategy for the Sahel at a meeting in Rome this Friday. It is
important that the next U.N. Security Council resolution be
based in part on the U.N. Secretary General's recent report to
the Security Council on Mali, and that the restoration of
democracy, political negotiations with the Tuareg, and the
humanitarian response receive the same level of priority as any
discussions about military interventions against AQIM. All four
of these challenges must be met simultaneously.
ECOWAS clearly has a very important role to play in
assisting Mali. Five of the organization's 15 Member States
share borders with Mali. Although they are not ECOWAS members,
Algeria and Mauritania also share long borders with Mali and
have important contributions to make.
In closing, addressing these four overlapping challenges
will require comprehensive, sustained, and dedicated regional
and international support and engagement. We in Washington are
committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali.
We support inclusive dialogue and negotiations to address the
economic and social needs of the marginalized populations in
the north, especially the Tuareg. We support reunification of
Malian territory, both through negotiations with Malians who
support a unified and secular state and through well-planned
and well-resourced African-led military actions to dislodge the
terrorists. We will also continue to address the humanitarian
crisis in the Sahel region as well.
Mr. Chairman, I have a much longer statement which I have
submitted to you for the record. But again, thank you for this
opportunity to testify, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Senator Isakson, for your keen interest in this issue.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson
Thank you very much, Chairman Coons and members of the committee,
for the opportunity to testify before you on this most important
subject. Mali's March 21, 2012, military coup d'etat ended two decades
of Malian democracy, resulted in the loss of the northern Mali to
extremist groups, and further destabilized an already fragile Sahel
region. Mali is now facing four distinct but overlapping challenges--
the restoration of democratic governance, political negotiations with
northern groups that reject extremism, Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb's expanded presence in northern Mali, and an ongoing
humanitarian crisis. Mali, regional partners, and the international
community must respond to each of these challenges simultaneously. Our
response to any one of these challenges must not be dependent on the
achievement of another.
1. RESTORING A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT
Mali's first challenge is the restoration of democratic governance.
The framework agreement negotiated by ECOWAS with the military junta
following the March 21 coup mandates that Mali's interim government
must organize elections and put in place a legitimate, democratically
elected government by April 2013.
While the interim government has made progress in strengthening
governance, preparations for elections are moving slowly. The longer
Mali's political elite delay in putting this electoral process in
motion, the more likely it is that the April 2013 date will slip. We
continue to encourage the interim government to set a date for
elections and develop a roadmap for the transition to a democratically
elected government. I recently sent a letter to Interim Malian Prime
Minister Diarra urging him to support preparations for elections and
repeating our assurance that the United States, along with the
international community, stands ready to assist him in overcoming the
challenges for carrying out free, fair, and transparent elections. My
letter also emphasized our support for recent ECOWAS statements
regarding the ineligibility of current members of the interim
government to run in the elections.
The United States has made elections in Mali a priority because
historically transitional governments that are not pressed to hold
elections and restore constitutional order tend to hold on to power
long beyond their mandate. While we support Interim President Traore
and Interim Prime Minister Diarra as they guide the transition
government during this challenging time in Mali's history, transition
governments, including this one, are inherently weak. Mali needs now
more than ever a strong democratic government to restore its democratic
tradition and provide the strong leadership necessary to negotiate a
political agreement with northern rebels, reform its security sector,
and lead a military intervention in the north to restore and maintain
Mali's territorial integrity. Although there is currently some Malian
public resistance to holding elections before the reunification of the
country, we will continue to express the need to hold elections prior
to recapturing the north. We encourage the interim government to
consult with UNHCR and other stakeholders to find ways to hold polls in
refugee camps so those displaced by the violence in northern Mali are
given an opportunity to vote and ensure the participation of the
population of northern Mali. Elections can send a strong message to
coup leaders, extremists, and rebels alike--the Malian people will not
allow violence to rob them of their democracy.
The interim government should build on the preparations that were
undertaken before the aborted April 2012 elections and hold elections
as soon as technically feasible with as many voters as possible. The
United States looks forward to working with the interim government and
the international community to examine the best mechanism to ensure
that voters from all regions of Mali, including those in refugee camps
in neighboring countries, can participate in national elections.
The 2013 elections must be transparent and free of intimidation
from the coup leaders and their supporters. We have been unequivocal in
our messages to coup leader Captain Sanogo and the Malian public about
the need for Sanogo to leave the political stage and be held
accountable for the excesses of this period, and in particular the
human rights abuses and mistreatments credibly ascribed to Captain
Sanogo and his associates. We have imposed targeted travel sanctions on
more than 60 individuals who were involved in the coup, supported its
authors, or who continue to impede the restoration of democracy. We
will maintain these kinds of pressures until Mali transitions to a
democratically elected government.
As a result of the March 2012 coup in Mali, the U.S. Government
formally terminated assistance to the Government of Mali. Funding for
programs that provide life-saving, critical assistance in health and
food security, as well as democratic elections support programming, is
reviewed on a case-by-case basis. These decisions will be affected by
the current political and security situation in Mali and how it
develops, with recognition that these are complex challenges. Programs
that have resumed include activities to reduce child mortality, HIV/
AIDS prevention and treatment, essential life-saving services for
maternal and child health, and preparation for the planting season to
ensure food security. These activities are implemented through
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
The United States firmly believes that Mali's interim leaders must
continue preparations in earnest to hold elections simultaneous with
efforts to address the political grievances of Mali's northern
populations, restore Mali's territorial integrity, and respond to the
continued humanitarian crisis. Elections are critical for ensuring that
the Malian Government has the legitimacy needed to negotiate with
indigenous northern groups and effectively coordinate with regional and
international partners to oust AQIM.
2. REBELLION IN THE NORTH AND NEGOTIATIONS
The ongoing rebellion in northern Mali is another major factor
contributing to the instability and crises in Mali and the Sahel.
Recognizing that the Tuareg and other nonextremist groups in northern
Mali have legitimate political and socioeconomic grievances, ECOWAS,
the AU, and the international community have encouraged a renewed and
strengthened process of mediation to end the northern rebellion.
The United States commends the efforts of African leaders, including
President Compaore of Burkina Faso, to facilitate dialogue between the
interim government and northern groups that accept Mali's territorial
integrity and reject terrorism.
We support the commitment of interim President Traore to open
dialogue with those actors in the north who are committed to Mali's
territorial integrity and secular nature. We also welcomed the news
that representatives of the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation
of the Azawad (MNLA) have retracted their declaration of independence
of the north, and key figures in the MNLA and Ansar al-Dine have
declared their readiness to negotiate with the interim government.
Mali's interim government must demonstrate its commitment to
negotiations by appointing a lead negotiator for the north to
peacefully address the long-standing political grievances of northern
groups that accept Mali's territorial integrity and renounce terrorism.
The feasibility of a lasting negotiated settlement, however, will
ultimately depend on the legitimacy that can only come with a
democratically elected government. Long-term talks will be needed to
address the legitimate social and economic needs of northern
populations; these future negotiations are a necessary complement to
the current short-term negotiations to separate those groups in the
north who respect Mali's territorial integrity and secular nature from
the extremists and terrorist groups with whom negotiation is not an
option.
The participation of Algeria and Mauritania, which are not members
of ECOWAS, also will be crucial to a lasting solution in northern Mali.
This week, a delegation of U.S. officials, including Deputy Secretary
of State Burns, will be traveling to Algiers to encourage the Algerians
to play a more active role in addressing the crises in northern Mali,
as Secretary Clinton did during her recent visit to Algeria.
3. THREATS FROM TERRORISTS AND OTHER EXTREMIST ELEMENTS
We are seriously concerned about the presence and activities of
terrorist and extremist groups in northern Mali. Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO),
and affiliated groups have exploited the political chaos created by the
coup and northern rebellion to expand their safe haven in northern Mali
and impose their radical ideology on local populations. While their
tactics and ideology remain alien to the vast majority of the
population in the affected areas, AQIM and MUJAO established at least
temporary relationships with a number of groups in the area and
currently hold the military upper hand in the areas under their
control, including the key towns of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.
Any attempt to militarily oust AQIM from northern Mali must be
African-led, well-planned, and well-resourced. Military plans must also
account for civilian security and humanitarian response. We support the
efforts of the interim government of Mali, ECOWAS, the African Union,
the United Nations, neighboring partners, and others in the
international community to prepare a military response, in accordance
with international law, to address the threat of terrorists and
extremists in northern Mali. The threat of military force has
contributed to change in some of the actors, witnessed by the recent
willingness of the MNLA and some members of Ansar al-Dine to negotiate
with the interim government.
The military concept proposed by ECOWAS and endorsed by the AU
provides a foundation for planning a proposed military intervention in
northern Mali. The military concept proposes an Africa-led effort, but
several key questions must be answered to ensure that this effort is
also well-planned and well-resourced. These issues include outstanding
questions about necessary force levels, the capabilities of the Malian
and international forces to accomplish the objectives of the mission,
cost and funding needs, logistical requirements, operational timelines,
planning for minimizing impacts on civilian security and the
humanitarian situation, and ensuring that the proposed military action
is adequately linked to a sufficiently detailed political strategy and
end state for military operations in the north.
We have sent military planners to ECOWAS to assist with the
continued development and refinement of the plan for international
intervention. As the planning continues, we expect that many of the
outstanding questions will be answered. We also continue to engage with
the U.N. and our international partners in preparation for an
anticipated U.N. Security Council resolution on a military intervention
in the north.
As plans develop for the military operation we will be better able
to determine how the United States can best support the ECOWAS and AU
elements of the military force.
Mali's neighbors have intensified their ongoing efforts to bolster
their own security and address the AQIM safe haven in northern Mali.
Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger are concerned that any military
intervention in northern Mali will cause a spillover of extremists
across their borders. This could also have repercussions on the
security of refugees. These neighbors are increasing their border
security, and we are urging UNHCR to work with host governments to
ensure appropriate security and screening measures are in place in
order to maintain the impartiality, neutrality, and civilian nature of
refugee camps. These governments strongly favor exhausting political
dialogue before an intervention.
We are monitoring the actions of AQIM and other extremist and
terrorist organizations in the north, and continue to work with the
international community to address this evolving threat. We continue to
enhance our work with Mali's neighbors, to increase their capacity to
secure their borders, disrupt AQIM supply lines, and contain the spread
of extremist groups. We assist Mauritania and Niger through the Trans-
Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which is designed to help
build long-term capacity to contain and marginalize terrorist
organizations and facilitation networks; disrupt efforts to recruit,
train, and provision terrorists and extremists; counter efforts to
establish safe havens for terrorist organizations; and disrupt foreign
fighter networks that may attempt to operate outside the region.
Lasting resolution to the terrorist threat will require that the
countries in the Sahel develop the capacity to counter this threat,
along with other transnational threats like drug smuggling and human
trafficking.
4. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
The human toll of these overlapping challenges has been enormous.
Since the start of the fighting in northern Mali, more than 410,000
people have become refugees or internally displaced. Of these, nearly
200,000 people are displaced within Mali, and more than 210,000 Malian
refugees have fled to Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. Algeria also
hosts Malian refugees.
In an effort to mitigate the effects of the complex humanitarian
crisis in the Sahel, we are providing humanitarian and food assistance
to those displaced by the conflict in northern Mali and those affected
by the region's food crisis. For 2012 to date, the U.S. Government
provided more than $445 million in assistance to the Sahel region, $119
million of which was in support of emergency needs within Mali and
among refugee populations outside of Mali. We support the work of the
United Nations Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel and his
efforts to ensure access to affected populations and coordinate the
humanitarian response, including contingency planning for possible new
displacements as a result of a military intervention. We hold that the
humanitarian response should remain civilian-led in order to ensure the
neutral and impartial character of humanitarian operations.
5. RESPONSE FROM PARTNERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
We have encouraged greater international cooperation and
coordination in developing a comprehensive approach to Mali's multiple
crises and the greater Sahel. The U.N. Secretary General's recent
appointment of a special envoy for the Sahel will help provide the
needed facilitation and coordination. We will discuss the drafting of
the Secretary General's integrated strategy for the Sahel, at a meeting
in Rome meeting on December 7. We will also discuss coordination at a
UNSC ministerial-level discussion on the situation in the Sahel to be
convened by the Kingdom of Morocco on December 10 during its Presidency
of the Security Council. UNSC Resolution 2071 provided a useful
framework for addressing Mali's four overlapping challenges. It is
important that the next UNSC resolution, which will be based in part on
the U.N. Secretary General's report to the Security Council on Mali,
ensures that the restoration of democracy, political negotiations with
northern populations, and the humanitarian response receive the same
level of priority as military preparations to oust AQIM.
ECOWAS clearly has a very important role to play in coordination.
Mali was a founding member of ECOWAS and 5 of the organization's 15
Member States share borders with Mali. But we have to recognize that
Algeria and Mauritania also border Mali, but are not members of ECOWAS.
We have encouraged ECOWAS, the AU and our international partners to
structure their engagements on Mali in a way that will incorporate
Mali's neighbors, including Algeria and Mauritania.
We are continuing to work with our international partners to
develop a specific plan for any military intervention in northern Mali
that includes details on cost- and burden-sharing for the intervention.
We look forward to consulting with Congress further to ensure the
support necessary to make our policy in Mali successful.
In closing, addressing these four overlapping challenges will
require comprehensive, sustained and dedicated regional and
international support. The United States continues to encourage Mali to
prepare for elections to restore democratic governance. We are
committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. We
support inclusive dialogue and negotiation to address the economic and
social needs of marginalized groups in the north. We support
reunification of Malian territory, both through negotiations with those
Malians who support a unified and secular state and through well-
financed, -resourced, and -managed military action to dislodge
terrorists. And we continue to address the humanitarian crisis in the
Sahel region with assistance.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much. Thank you, Assistant
Secretary Carson, for your service and your very active and
effective engagement with the region over such a long period.
We're always grateful to have your testimony.
Next we turn to Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl
Gast.
STATEMENT OF EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gast. Good morning, Chairman Coons and Ranking Member
Isakson. Thank you for inviting me to speak before you today. I
have submitted a longer statement for the record, but I thought
I would use my time to briefly give you an update on the
current situation and how it has affected our development
programming, as well as outline some of the key factors that
are needed for development to progress.
The U.N. reports that 4.6 million persons in Mali are
affected
by food insecurity and in need of assistance. They are
recovering
from last year's food shocks, high prices, and the effects of
conflict and displacement. Nearly 200,000 Malians have been
displaced within the country, and another 210,000 have fled to
neighboring countries.
In the north, international and local humanitarian actors
are able to provide assistance in many places. However, access
still remains negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and it is
often very inconsistent.
Moving forward, a necessary component for solving Mali's
complex crises is the establishment of a democratically elected
government by April 2013, as called for by ECOWAS. The
Government of Mali must pursue preparations for elections at
the same time that it resolves the crisis in the north. To do
this successfully, a legitimate process is needed to maximize
the participation of populations that have been displaced by
the violence.
It is also necessary to develop provisions for how the
north will be meaningfully included in a new government, and to
engage the broader Malian population in a dialogue about
national reconciliation.
Prior to the coup, USAID's broad development portfolio
included activities to strengthen democratic institutions, grow
the agricultural sector, support literacy and education,
improve community health and health systems, and manage
instability and threats in the north, and Mali had made
significant gains in these areas. Annual economic growth
averaged more than 5 percent across the past decade, reducing
the incidence of poverty from 56 percent to 44 percent by 2010.
That was over a period of about 10 years.
Mali liberalized its cereal markets. It opened up trade
routes, and it improved conditions for doing business.
What we have seen is that agricultural production has
increased, particularly in areas where USAID support has been
active.
As a result of the March 2012 coup in Mali, the U.S.
Government formally terminated assistance to the Government of
Mali. However, our support to address the emergency health,
nutrition, and food needs of the Malian people continues.
In evaluating which programs can move forward in light of
the applicable legal restrictions, we consider whether they
provide essential life-saving assistance, whether they support
children, strengthen food security, or advance U.S. foreign
policy. We also consider operational issues, including
efficient management and oversight. This case-by-case analysis
ensures that there is careful consideration of the context
surrounding a proposed activity.
Before the coup, USAID was the largest donor supporting
elections in Mali. Programs trained poll workers and improved
election monitoring systems, strengthened political parties,
and provided voter education.
When the electoral support activities resume, provided the
consent of Congress, assistance will help support a foundation
for free and fair elections in Mali and a peaceful political
exit from the current situation. A key issue will be ensuring
the inclusion and participation of the internally displaced
persons and refugees in the political process.
We plan to expand our election assistance programming to
include broader civic engagement activities to support national
reconciliation as part of the return to an inclusive democratic
Malian society. The only USAID-supported economic growth
activities that are continuing in Mali are those that address
food security under the Feed the Future Initiative.
Agricultural assistance has focused on supporting farmers and
herders to increase their productivity, strengthen market
linkages, and increase resilience to drought.
Some health sector activities have been approved to
continue, including programs aimed at preventing maternal and
child mortality through the provision of basic community health
services, support of malaria testing and treatment, and other
critically community-based health interventions.
Our approach to development programming is affected by the
current political and security situation in Mali and how it
develops. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives recently
conducted an assessment to determine the feasibility and
appropriateness of a transition program in Mali. If initiated,
this program would allow the U.S. Government to respond to any
opportunities and challenges that arise in the course of the
transition, particularly in the areas of peace and security and
reconciliation.
The ability of the United States to resume full assistance
will depend on a democratically elected government taking
office. USAID continues to monitor current humanitarian needs
and plan for possible future needs in Mali. Since the crisis in
April, USAID has provided nearly $80 million to address
humanitarian needs among Malians affected by drought and
conflict.
While initial harvest projections are positive for this
coming year, the most vulnerable will continue to need
additional assistance for recovery and resilience to future
shocks. In the north we will continue to respond to needs when
and where access allows.
While USAID can provide immediate relief to the people,
help set the foundation for democratic elections, and provide
basic social services in the interim, Mali's future development
must be led
by the Malian people. This can only be achieved through a duly
elected and participatory government against the background of
peace and stability.
Accordingly, it is critical that the Government of Mali and
the Malian people be encouraged to pursue a simultaneous and
multipronged approach to the return to democracy,
accountability, and a negotiated peace. None of these gains
will be sustainable in the absence of the other.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I welcome any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Administrator Earl Gast
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. Mali
is facing a complex emergency: a political crisis, recovery from a
major drought, and threats to internal and regional security. I would
like to provide an update on the current situation and how it has
affected our programming, as well as outline the key factors that are
needed for development to progress.
COMPLEX EMERGENCY ENVIRONMENT
Insufficient rains during the 2011 Sahel agricultural season led to
nearly 19 million people being at risk of food insecurity, nearly half
of whom required emergency food assistance during 2012, according to
national governments and U.N. data. In fiscal year 2012, the
governments of eight Sahel countries and the U.S. Government declared
disasters. Since the beginning of this year, the United States has
responded with more than $445 million in programming across eight
countries in the Sahel. Food insecurity was exacerbated by the conflict
in northern Mali, which led to large population displacement inside of
Mali and to refugee flows in neighboring countries, further straining
the ability of both displaced people and host communities to cope with
increased food insecurity.
Although all indications are that this past agricultural season was
above average, the U.N. reports that 4.6 million people in Mali are
affected by food insecurity and will still need additional assistance
in order to recover from last year's food shocks and deal with the
ongoing high food prices and the effects of conflict and displacement.
Humanitarian actors are currently refining monitoring of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and conducting individual registration of
refugees. While this is ongoing, the numbers will fluctuate; the most
recent estimates of IDPs inside of Mali stands at nearly 200,000 and
the number of refugees is reported to be more than 210,000. In the
North, the conflict has more or less stabilized for the moment,
allowing international and local humanitarian actors to provide
assistance in many places. Many markets are open and trade is flowing
across borders, and while there are more than 20 humanitarian
organizations currently active in northern Mali, access still remains
negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The ongoing uncertainty has halted
foreign and domestic investment in Mali, economic and tourism activity
has slowed, and according to some estimates, 2012 economic growth
projections have dropped from previous estimates of 6 percent to
negative 1 percent or worse. It is also estimated that government
revenues are one-fourth the level they were just 1 year ago and
accordingly, that the majority of basic social services are being
provided by humanitarian organizations.
In October, the U.N. Security Council adopted an important
resolution addressing the overlapping governance, security, and
humanitarian crises affecting Mali. In November, ECOWAS announced a
plan to send an African-led force into northern Mali to resolve the
security crisis. The United States has called on the interim Malian
Government to engage in negotiations in earnest and appoint a lead
negotiator for the north, demonstrating commitment to unifying the
country.
The Government of Mali must pursue preparations for broadly
inclusive, legitimate, democratic elections in parallel to negotiations
and military intervention to resolve the crisis in the north. The
restoration of democratically elected government in Mali by April 2013,
as called for by ECOWAS, is a crucial component of the overall long-
term solution to Mali's current crises. We support efforts by the
interim government to ensure a legitimate process that maximizes the
participation of populations that have been displaced by the violence,
to develop provisions for how the North will be reflected in a new
government, and to engage the broader Malian population in a dialogue
about national reconciliation.
Progress on security and the restoration of democracy is also
linked to accountability. Persons must be held accountable for abuses,
including abuses against civilians that have occurred in the context of
this crisis. Accountability supports our peace and democracy objectives
by helping victims, and society as a whole, address past wrongs and
move toward the future.
PAST DEVELOPMENT GAINS AT RISK
Mali has been a strong partner, particularly in the area of
economic growth through the U.S. Government's Feed the Future
Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Corporation program. The
current threats to Mali's stability and development are all the more
concerning given the cooperation that has characterized relations
between our governments and Mali's past development gains.
Prior to the coup, in fiscal year 2011, USAID and the Department of
State provided $137.9 million in bilateral foreign assistance to Mali.
The broad development portfolio included activities to strengthen
democratic institutions, promote inclusive and sustainable agricultural
growth, support literacy and educational development, improve health
status and health systems, and manage instability and threats in the
North.
U.S. assistance has advanced significant development gains in Mali
through our longstanding partnerships. I would like to outline just a
few examples of the progress that has been made. These development
gains are precarious in the current situation, and underscore the
promise of the Malian people and the importance of returning to
democratic rule.
Over the past decade, annual economic growth has averaged more than
5 percent, reducing the incidence of poverty from 56 percent in 2001 to
44 percent in 2010. In the past two decades, under-5 mortality was
reduced from 255 to 178 per 1,000 live births--still ranking among the
highest in the world, but demonstrating progress nevertheless. Access
to education has increased from 20 percent of primary school children
in school in the 1990s to 80 percent of children in school in 2011.
Prior to the coup, print and radio media were vibrant and largely
independent with 230 stations, many established with USAID support,
reaching more than 80 percent of the population.
Mali has liberalized its cereal markets, opened up trade routes,
and improved conditions for doing business. The most vulnerable have
survived drought and other disasters through the response and
resilience provided by USAID's assistance. Agricultural production has
increased in three regions where USAID has focused its assistance as a
result of improved seeds and other inputs, extension services to
improve farming methods and techniques, and farm-to-market linkages
with greater private sector involvement.
In addition, Mali has been a central participant in the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) from its onset. Programs to
address drivers of violent extremism were implemented in the Northern
regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, focusing on radio programming,
basic education, out-of-school youth vocational training,
microenterprise development, governance, and conflict prevention and
peace-building. USAID established 10 FM radio stations reaching 385,000
people, and extended national interactive radio instruction to 200,000
students at 1,270 religious schools (madrasas). Prior to the coup, the
program had just begun a significant expansion to increase the scope of
activities and geographic reach in the north.
While USAID has made significant contributions to Malian
development through its long engagement in the country and the hard
work and diligence of the Malian people, recent events stand to reverse
these gains.
LIFE-SAVING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CONTINUES WHILE ASSESSING FUTURE
NEEDS
As the complex crisis began to unfold in Mali, USAID proactively
supported early initiatives to mitigate the impacts of food insecurity
through programs aimed at increasing agricultural production, improving
diets, and strengthening livelihoods--all of which limited the impact
of this year's shocks. Early fiscal year 2012 programs also focused on
mitigating the impact of food insecurity through local and regional
procurement of food, support for livestock health, and cash-based
assistance to sustain adequate food consumption during the particularly
hard lean season. In response to the conflict in the North, USAID
scaled up assistance for IDPs, host families, and other conflict-
affected populations, both in southern Mali, where populations were
already struggling with decreased food availability, and in the North,
once need was assessed and security permitted the safe delivery of
life-saving assistance. USAID worked closely with the State
Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, which
provided timely support to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other U.N.
agencies and nongovernmental organizations to respond to the resultant
refugee situation.
For the current crisis, USAID has provided over $80 million to
address humanitarian and food needs among drought and conflict affected
Malians. In addition, the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration provided more than $40 million in
humanitarian assistance for refugees in the region and conflict-
affected populations throughout the region.
For the coming year, the humanitarian situation is likely to be
similarly complex. While initial harvest projections are positive, the
most vulnerable will continue to need additional assistance in order to
promote their recovery from the previous drought and help build their
resilience to future food crises. Many vulnerable people took on large
debts or sold productive assets to cope with last year's shocks. In
addition, the conflict in Northern Mali remains fluid with various
groups continuing to compete for position and territory in advance of a
presumed ECOWAS military intervention, which will likely result in
additional internal displacement and refugee outflows in 2013. USAID
continues to monitor current humanitarian needs and plan for possible
future needs in Mali.
In the year to come, we aim to support recovery from the past
drought and build resilience to future droughts by helping the most
vulnerable to diversify their livelihoods, improve agricultural
productivity, improve livestock practices, and adopt behaviors that
improve nutritional status. In terms of IDPs currently in southern
Mali, many are congregating in urban areas. Recent evidence has shown
that they are increasingly moving out of host family situations and are
in need of housing and livelihoods. In response, USAID plans to provide
resources to ensure appropriate housing, likely in the form of cash
grants to assist with rent and support livelihood development. In the
north, USAID will continue to support livelihoods, safe water,
sanitation and security, as well as respond to newly identified needs
when and where access allows. USAID, with the State Department, also
supports U.N.-led regional humanitarian contingency planning for
displacement and other likely humanitarian needs in advance of any
military intervention in the North.
PRESERVING THE FOUNDATION NEEDED FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY
In addition to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, USAID
recognizes the need in times of crisis to deliver basic social services
and thus preserve the foundation needed to resume a democratic,
peaceful, and productive society. The continuity of carefully provided
development assistance in Mali is critical to supporting a return to
constitutional and accountable governance. It is also important to
protecting the considerable development gains that Mali has achieved,
maintaining stability and encouraging the economic and social
conditions that facilitate a rapid rebound following the
reestablishment of elected leadership.
As you are aware, section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (SFOAA)
states that no funds appropriated under titles III through VI of that
act can be, ``obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance
to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government
is deposed by military coup d'etat.'' This restriction applies to
assistance to the central, regional, and local governments of Mali.
On April 10, 2012, the United States formally terminated assistance
to the Government of Mali, consistent with coup restrictions in the
SFOAA. Some of the activities that were terminated included capacity-
building programs for the Government of Mali Department of Health,
public school construction, support for government efforts to increase
agricultural production, and government capacity-building to spur
commercial investment. Other assistance to Mali was also suspended on
policy grounds, though certain forms of humanitarian assistance
(including food assistance) and elections support were never terminated
or suspended based on available legal authorities.
Programs that are life-saving, critical assistance in health and
food security, as well as democratic elections support programming,
have been under consideration for resumption as part of a case-by-case
policy and legal review. In evaluating which programs can move forward
in light of the applicable legal restrictions, USAID and the State
Department consider the policy importance of the activities--for
example, whether the proposed activity provides essential life-saving
assistance, supports children or strengthens food security, advances a
strategic U.S. foreign policy objective--as well as operational
considerations, including efficient management and oversight of
funding. This case-by-case analysis ensures that there is a careful
consideration of the context surrounding a proposed activity and the
expected impact of such an activity if it is approved to move forward.
The analysis also takes into consideration how to protect previous U.S.
Government investments in the proposed activity.
Before the coup, USAID was the largest donor supporting Mali's
planned April 2012 elections, with activities that provided training of
poll workers, political party strengthening, elections monitoring, and
voter education. When the electoral support activities resume,
assistance will help support a foundation for free and fair elections
in Mali and a peaceful political exit from the current situation. A key
issue in resuming assistance will be ensuring the inclusion and
participation of internally displaced persons and refugees in the
political process. USAID plans to expand its elections assistance
program to include broader civic engagement activities to support
national reconciliation as part of the return to an inclusive,
democratic Malian society.
The only USAID-supported economic growth activities that are
continuing in Mali are those that address food security under the Feed
the Future Initiative. Agricultural assistance has focused on
supporting farmers and herders to increase their productivity,
strengthen market linkages, and increase resilience to drought. This
continued assistance is critical not only to preventing further
deterioration of the food security situation in-country, but also to
maintaining the stability of the most populated parts of the country
that are outside of the conflict areas.
Some health sector activities have been approved to continue in
order to provide life-saving interventions. These include programs
aimed at preventing maternal and child mortality through the provision
of basic community health services, support of malaria testing and
treatment, and other critical community-based health interventions.
USAID has currently suspended all education activities in Mali that
benefited the Government of Mali, which included teacher training,
curriculum development, and other forms of education assistance.
USAID's peace and security programs, including those under the TSCTP,
are generally on hold pending further analysis of the operating
environment and policy considerations. A minimal amount of community-
based programs that address peace-building and youth engagement are
slated to continue.
These decisions are affected by the current political and security
situation in Mali, with recognition that these are complex challenges.
The ability of the United States to resume full assistance will depend
on a democratically elected government taking office.
FUTURE OUTLOOK
The restoration of democracy and the return to a development focus
in Mali is important to the region and to Africa as a whole. As the
situation evolves, we remain vigilant to changes in the operating
environment and the risks and opportunities involved.
Lives and livelihoods are at great risk without the prompt
resolution of the current political, security, and food crises. While
these crises are complex and interrelated, they also vary with regards
to their timeframes for resolution. Under the right conditions, Mali
has the potential to be a major food producer for the region as well as
advance trade and economic growth. Its history of partnership with the
United States to improve health, education, and living conditions is
noteworthy. While USAID can provide immediate relief to the people,
help set the foundation for democratic elections, and provide basic
social services in the interim, Mali's future development must be led
by the Malian people. This can only be achieved through a duly elected
and participatory government against a background of peace, stability,
and accountability for past abuses. Accordingly, it is critical that
the Government of Mali and the Malian people be encouraged to pursue a
simultaneous and multipronged approach to the return to democracy,
accountability, and a negotiated peace. None of these gains will be
sustainable in the absence of the other.
I thank you for the opportunity for today's discussion and invite
any questions you have on our assistance to Mali and its development
outlook.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Assistant Administrator Gast.
Next we turn to Ms. Amanda Dory from the Department of
Defense.
Ms. Dory.
STATEMENT OF AMANDA DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Dory. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Coons,
Ranking Member Isakson. I add my thanks for the opportunity to
speak about the overlapping challenges in Mali and the broader
Sahel region this morning, and how the Department of Defense
fits into the broader picture of how the U.S. Government is
addressing this situation.
Department of Defense is extremely concerned about
instability in Mali and is working closely with our interagency
partners to strengthen efforts at countering AQIM and
affiliates, as well as supporting Malian efforts to restore its
territorial sovereignty. Our approach is to support Mali's
neighbors to isolate the terrorist threat and to enable ECOWAS
and others to degrade AQIM while working to restore Malian
sovereignty.
This approach is consistent with section 7008 of the fiscal
2012 State Appropriations Act, which proscribes certain
assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected
government is deposed by military coup. As a result of the coup
in Mali, DOD
has ceased mil-to-mil capacity-building efforts with the Malian
military.
Since January 2012, northern, primarily Tuareg groups have
waged a rebellion, driven by longstanding political and
economic grievances. This rebellion is the fourth such
rebellion since Mali gained its independence in 1960. Although
not caused by instability in Libya, the flows of militants and
weapons from Libya have strengthened the rebellion and made it
more difficult for the Malian authorities to combat it this
time.
In late March, the President was overthrown by forces loyal
to Captain Sanogo, who then installed a junta government. In
response, ECOWAS imposed sanctions, as did the United States
and others. ECOWAS has since brokered an agreement with the
parties to establish an interim government, but Captain Sanogo
continues to influence decisionmaking in Mali as head of a
military reform committee.
Northern Mali has become a safe haven for extremist and
terrorist groups, including AQIM and affiliates. As the
Government of Mali lost control of its northern territory,
these groups took over administration of northern cities and
began imposing a harsh version of sharia law. This expanded
safe haven and control of territory allows al-Qaeda and its
affiliates to recruit supporters more easily and to export
extremism. It also gives them greater control over illicit
trafficking networks that provide an important element of their
funding.
Beyond the obvious threat to Mali's citizens and its
neighbors, the growing terrorist presence in Mali also
threatens U.S. citizens and our interests in the region, to
include the ability to attack embassies and conduct kidnapping
operations. Although AQIM has not demonstrated an ability to
attack targets in the United States homeland, it does have a
history of attacks in the Sahel and Maghreb, and has expressed
an intent to target Europe.
The United States approach is focused on restoring
democratic governance and security in Mali. This will require
democratic elections, a political settlement of legitimate
northern grievances, the restoration of Malian sovereignty,
focused pressure on AQIM, and continuing a civilian-led
response to the humanitarian situation. Department of Defense
is working with African partners to enable ECOWAS to conduct
military planning for an African-led international military
force called AFISMA. This is very much an African-led process.
Our efforts are aimed at making our partners more capable both
at combating the terrorist threat in their territories and at
providing better security for their people more generally.
The worsening situation in Mali also poses a risk to the
surrounding governments in the region, especially Mauritania
and Niger. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is the
interagency mechanism for coordinating U.S. Government
capability efforts to enable governments in the Maghreb and
Sahel to counter AQIM. Department of Defense, the State
Department, USAID, and others work closely to coordinate our
capacity-building efforts to ensure unity of effort with the 10
participating partners, which include Mali and its neighbors.
ECOWAS, with the support of other partners, is planning for
a military intervention in northern Mali in tandem with the
African Union's work on a comprehensive strategic concept for
the resolution of the crises in Mali.
Department of Defense, through U.S. Africa Command, is
actively supporting the military planning effort through the
provision of planning expertise. The broad strategic concept
for that deployment is sound. More specific planning is
underway to address myriad operational details.
The U.S. Government is exploring options for supporting
countries that contribute forces to the ECOWAS mission. This
could include the provision of training and equipment to
countries that would contribute forces to deploy as part of the
AFISMA international military force and additional planning and
advisory support.
I'll stop for now and look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda Dory
Mister Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today about the overlapping challenges in
Mali and how the Department of Defense is responding to the situation.
The Department of Defense is extremely concerned about the
instability in Mali and is working closely with interagency partners,
especially in the State Department, to strengthen our efforts at
countering Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
supporting Malian efforts to restore its territorial sovereignty. Our
policy is to support Mali's neighbors to isolate the terrorist threat,
and concurrently to enable the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) to degrade AQIM while working to restore Malian
sovereignty. This approach is consistent with the section 7008 of the
FY 2012 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, which proscribes certain assistance to the government of any
country whose duly elected government is deposed by military coup
d'etat. As a result of the coup in Mali, DOD has ceased mil-to-mil
capacity-building efforts with the Malian military.
Since January 2012, northern, primarily Tuareg, groups, have waged
a rebellion, driven by longstanding political and economic grievances.
This rebellion is the fourth Tuareg rebellion since Mali gained its
independence in 1960. Although the rebellion was not caused by
instability in Libya, the flows of militants and weapons from Libya
strengthened the rebellion and made it more difficult for the Malian
authorities to combat it.
In late March, President Ahmadou Toumani Toure was overthrown by
forces loyal to Captain Amadou Sanogo, who then installed a junta
government. In response, ECOWAS imposed sanctions, and the State
Department reached the conclusion that a military coup d'etat had
occurred, triggering the appropriations act restriction on most
assistance to that government. As stated before, the Department of
Defense followed suit, ceasing all DOD capacity-building efforts in
Mali. ECOWAS brokered an agreement with the parties involved to
establish an interim government, with Diouncounda Traore as President
and Cheick Modibo Diarra as Prime Minister. Captain Sanogo continues to
influence decisionmaking in Mali as head of a military reform
committee.
Northern Mali has become a safe haven for extremist and terrorist
groups, including AQIM and affiliates. As the Government of Mali lost
control of its northern territory, these groups took over the
administration of northern cities and began imposing a harsh version of
Islamic sharia law. This expanded safe haven and control of territory
allows al-Qaeda and its affiliates to recruit supporters more easily
and to export extremism. It also gives them greater control over
illicit trafficking networks that provide part of their funding.
The growing terrorist presence in Mali threatens U.S. citizens,
interests, and partners in the region. AQIM maintains the ability to
attack regional embassies and other Western interests, and to attack or
kidnap Westerners in the region for ransom. Indeed the group is
currently holding Western hostages. Although AQIM has not demonstrated
an ability to attack targets in the United States, it does have a
history of attacks in the Sahel and Maghreb, and has expressed an
intent to target Europe.
The U.S. approach is focused on restoring democratic governance and
security in Mali. This will require democratic elections, a political
settlement of legitimate northern grievances, the restoration of Malian
sovereignty, increased pressure on AQIM, and continuing a civilian-led
response to the humanitarian situation. The Department of Defense is
working through African partners to enable ECOWAS to conduct military
planning and limit the threat posed by AQIM. Failure to provide robust
support to local partners at this stage could allow the threat to grow
to a point where regional states could no longer address it. This is
very much an African-led process and our efforts are aimed at making
our partners more capable, both at combating the terrorist threat in
their territories and at providing better security for their people
generally.
The worsening situation in Mali is also a risk to the surrounding
governments in the region, especially Mauritania and Niger. The lack of
Malian control in the north, the increasing number of refugees and
internally displaced persons, and a history of Tuareg grievances in the
region, raise the possibility that the situation in Mali could
destabilize neighboring states. The food insecurity across the region
further underscores the fragile political situation in the region.
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the
interagency mechanism for coordinating U.S. Government capacity-
building efforts to enable governments in the Maghreb and Sahel to
counter AQIM and has 10 regional partners. The Department of Defense,
the State Department, USAID, and others work closely to coordinate our
capacity-building efforts to ensure unity of effort. Mauritania and
Niger are both critical partners in TSCTP and are acting proactively to
defend their territories, but their capacity is limited. For those
reasons, the Department of Defense--in close coordination with the
State Department--is providing capacity-building assistance to these
governments. These efforts include enhancing Mauritania's ability to
collect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and to
project power throughout its territory. We are also supporting Niger to
help it better control its borders and project power within its
territory.
ECOWAS, with the support of other partners, is planning for a
military intervention in northern Mali in tandem with the African
Union's Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali. The
Department of Defense, through U.S. Africa Command, is actively
supporting the military planning effort through the provision of
planning expertise. The broad strategic concept for that deployment is
sound; more specific planning is underway to address operational
shortfalls. We understand that the ECOWAS mission in the north will
have the dual objectives of restoring Malian national sovereignty and
countering al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The United States strongly
believes in the need to address the parallel political, security, and
humanitarian crises simultaneously.
The U.S. Government is considering options for supporting countries
that contribute forces to the ECOWAS mission. This could include the
provision of training and equipment to countries that would contribute
forces to deploy as part of the international military force and
additional planning and advisory support. France and the European Union
are also planning to provide significant support, and it will be
critical to coordinate our efforts closely. The specific needs of troop
contributing countries are not clear yet. Once we better understand the
needs of the ECOWAS troop contributing countries, we will be able to
assess how the U.S. Government and other international partners can
best support that effort.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Dory. I'm grateful to the panel and for the
opportunity to explore further this complex and very
challenging situation.
If I might, first just on the question of sequencing, all
three of you spoke to the interrelated and complex challenges
on the path toward restoring democracy, dealing with
humanitarian issues, addressing historic grievances in the
north, and resolving security concerns in the north. In fact,
Secretary Carson, I think you said in your testimony a response
to any one of these challenges must not be dependent upon the
achievement of another. Yet, they seem inextricably
intertwined.
For reasons of our own laws, which I support, we've ceased
mil-to-mil aid. We've cut off a lot of vital aid that will then
make more difficult, in some ways, the accomplishment of the
security objectives, the electoral objectives.
Please, if you would, in turn, just explain how you see the
sequencing of events--elections, addressing regional and
historic grievances in the north, restoration of sort of basic
humanitarian support and services, and regional planning and
execution--under an ECOWAS Malian-led, regionally led effort.
How do these three things move forward, and is it possible to
move forward on a security resolution without an election?
Ambassador Carson. Mr. Chairman, a very good question. We
have said that these four challenges must be handled
simultaneously and in parallel. They must all be considered
critical, and they all must be considered important. Addressing
some of these challenges along one lane will move faster than
along another lane, but we should not hold any one of these
programs or efforts or streams of activity hostage to the
success or the completion of another.
For example, we have to move forward in continuing to
provide humanitarian services and assistance to the north, to
displaced populations to the extent that we have access to them
through NGOs and through the international community, and we
are doing that. We are continuing to push as hard as we can for
political negotiations between Tuareg groups and nonterrorist
groups in the north with the government. We are at the same
time moving forward with discussions about military planning
and preparation. And primarily on the democracy front, we do
think that it's absolutely critical that the government not
lose sight, in putting down a strategy, a roadmap, and a
timetable for the return to democracy in that country.
I mention this last because in many ways it's critically
important. If, in fact, there are going to be successful
political negotiations with the Tuareg and the other northern
groups who have political and social-economic grievances, they
have to have a legitimate government in Bamako that they can
rely on to fulfill these agreements. This has been a failure in
the past. Negotiations and deals have been made with the Tuareg
and others, and the government in Bamako has reneged on them.
There needs to be a credible government in Bamako to be sure
that these things are going to be done.
Equally, while we move ahead and work with ECOWAS and the
international community on an African-led response to the
terrorist problem in the north against AQIM and extremist
groups, in the end, even if these terrorist groups are pushed
out and eliminated, there will need to be a credible government
in Bamako capable of extending services and providing security
and authority over the areas that are recaptured from the
north.
So there is a centrality in all of this. There also needs
to be a credible government there to be able to deliver
humanitarian response and to build up resilience against
recurring droughts and food shortages, all in parallel,
simultaneously. We should not hold the continued movement
toward democracy hostage to the success of the military
operations. We should not hold military operations and planning
hostage to the completion of a restoration of democracy. But we
must keep all four of these things clearly as objectives and
goals, moving simultaneously toward them.
Senator Coons. Let me follow up with a more focused
question about elections. In order to have a government that is
credible in terms of negotiating some resolution to historic
grievances that have led to four Tuareg rebellions, how
critical is it to have northern participation in the election,
and how is it possible to have meaningful northern
participation in the election with 400,000 IDPs and refugees
and with a very unstable security situation in the north? These
two seem inextricably intertwined and very difficult. If you
could just briefly address the question, how do you include
northern participation in the election?
Ambassador Carson. It can be done, and it would have been
done in April 2012. The coup in March occurred approximately 6
weeks before national elections were to be held. They would
have been difficult elections in the north, but they could
have, in fact, occurred.
It's important to remember both a little bit about the
geography as well as the population distribution. Although some
55 percent of the north has been taken over by the rebellious
groups, only 10 percent of Mali's population lives in the
northern part of the country. Some 90 percent of the population
would have been able to carry on with elections.
But we also realize it is important not to exclude the
north, but to include the north. Even today, it is possible to
accommodate many, many of the northerners. We estimate that
something in the neighborhood of 800,000 to 1 million people
are residing in the north--resided in the north. We think that
probably half of that population, as we've talked about, has in
fact left--approximately 400,000 people--200,000 dispersed in
refugee camps in the region, particularly in Mauritania, where
one camp has 110,000 Malians. There are approximately 30,000 to
40,000 in Niger and Burkina Faso, and 200,000 dispersed to the
south.
If there were elections, the elections could be held in the
Mauritanian refugee camp, supervised by the UNHCR or with their
assistance. This has happened before in other places, and those
who are in the south as displaced persons could also be
identified so that they could vote. It's not ideal but, in
fact, it could occur.
Historically, the north has voted in a smaller percentage
of the population than any other zone, and we estimate that in
the last national elections it accounted for a very, very small
percentage of the national turnout. The north must be included
because we believe that, aside from the AQIM threat, there is a
legitimate concern that people in the north have not benefited
the way people in the south have from education, from health
care, infrastructure. So they must be accommodated because this
is important.
But we don't think that the movement toward the restoration
of democracy should be held hostage to a complete military
victory in the north. That's a date that is uncertain, and we
may not know it. And there was tremendous instability across
the north during the last national elections, as well.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
I'm going to turn to Senator Isakson for our next set of
questions.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ms. Dory, for your testimony. I have a question
for you which I understand I may need to receive the answer in
a secure area, which I would be happy to do. But in your
statement, you say AQIM maintains an ability to attack regional
embassies and other Western interests, and to attack or kidnap
Westerners in the region for ransom.
Given what happened in Benghazi, do you know if we have any
evidence that it was Al Qaeda in the Maghreb that was a part of
the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, and ultimately
the death of Chris Stevens?
Ms. Dory. I think in this setting we can say that AQIM
played a role, and the investigations are still underway
precisely how AQIM members interacted with others, and the rest
is better left to a closed session.
Senator Isakson. And we'll try and arrange that at some
appropriate time.
On that same point, you acknowledge that U.S. Africa
Command is coordinating with ECOWAS on making planning for an
intervention in the north. I guess that should be a potential
intervention in the north. Is that correct?
Ms. Dory. It's correct to say that the intervention is in
the planning phases at this point. The intervention would be
led by the Malian Armed Forces with support from the
international military force. There is no construct or
intention of having a U.S. boots-on-the-ground type of support
to that intervention, but at this point we're providing
planning and support exclusively, and we will look at
opportunities to provide training support to those partners
with whom we can engage.
Senator Isakson. In your statement it says we understand
the ECOWAS mission in the north will have dual objectives of
restoring Malian national sovereignty and countering al-Qaeda
and its affiliates. I understand the sovereignty goal. On
countering al-Qaeda, you're talking about a significant,
potentially significant military intervention. Do you think the
people that you're planning to train are going to be
sufficiently capable of taking on a force like al-Qaeda?
Ms. Dory. For any military force to succeed, it's a
combination of training, equipping, and will. I believe that
the countries in the region are demonstrating the will and the
intent to intervene. They are certainly capable to do some of
the related missions, and for those where additional training
and equipping is required, that's the role of the international
community to provide that support.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Carson, thank you, as always, for your tireless
efforts on behalf of the African people and the United States
interests in Africa. I appreciate the great job that you do.
On the question that was raised by Senator Coons regarding
elections and your statement that it's absolutely essential
that the north be included in those elections--I think that's
what you said, and I agree with that--we have a recommendation.
I haven't talked this over with the chairman yet, but I think
I'm right. You can tell me if I'm wrong.
There's a gentleman in Nigeria who pulled off the Nigerian
elections when Goodluck Jonathan was elected. He was the
election commissioner. His name was Yaeger, if I'm not
mistaken. Jaeger? I'd get him over there in a heartbeat and see
if you couldn't get his help to do that because he overcame
similar obstacles of violence, and it was in the north where
they had their problems in Nigeria. So I just wanted to throw
that out as possible help.
Mr. Gast, on delivering--we've got a bunch of people hungry
because we had a famine in Mali, particularly in the north.
Since the coup, have we been disrupted from being able to get
humanitarian aid to the people in Mali?
Mr. Gast. Initially, Senator, I would say that that was the
case. There was a period where no humanitarian assistance was
being delivered. Since then, since the early months, our
partners who are operating in the north have been able to
negotiate access. For the most part, the population in need,
their needs are being met.
And so in addition to the displaced persons, whether
they're refugees or internally displaced persons, as well as
those who are still residing in the north, the needs are being
met.
Senator Isakson. Has the coup in the north caused a refugee
problem in any of the bordering countries? Have there been
people who have left Mali because of the disruption?
Mr. Gast. Yes, roughly 210,000 persons.
Senator Isakson. And where have they gone?
Mr. Gast. Mainly to Mauritania. The majority have gone into
Mauritania, and then a sizeable population going into Niger.
Senator Isakson. Is USAID assisting in those camps to get
humanitarian services?
Mr. Gast. We are, but primarily through PRM.
Senator Isakson. And PRM stands for----
Mr. Gast. I'm sorry. That's the State Department
Population, Refugee and Migration Bureau.
Senator Isakson. You have the most acronyms of anybody I've
ever heard.
Mr. Gast. Sorry about that. [Laughter.]
Senator Isakson. I'm going to have to learn acronyms one of
these days.
Mr. Gast. The short answer is yes, the needs are being met.
Senator Isakson. Good.
Ambassador Carson, the goal is to have elections by April.
Is that right?
Ambassador Carson. Yes, sir, by April or as soon as
technically feasible.
Senator Isakson. I'd just ask this question and get you to
just opine on it. It's not really a specific question. But if
you have a 20-year successful democracy in West Africa, which
Mali was, and then you have a coup, things leading up to that
coup had to take place which created some degree of
instability, and also those things probably are still present
to a certain extent and need to be overcome for an election. Do
you know what led to the deterioration of the democracy that
caused the coup?
Ambassador Carson. The proximate cause of the coup was the
series of military defeats that occurred in the north. These
were military defeats at the hands of the Tuareg. The military
felt very strongly that it was being underresourced, that it
was not being given the kind of equipment and material support
that it required to go after the Tuareg rebels and to fight a
successful military campaign.
The Tuareg, of course, were fighting because they felt that
the government had not fulfilled its obligations under the last
agreement signed in Algiers in 2006. This combined with growing
discontent among some elite in the south with the corruption of
the outgoing government under former President ATT were
probably the precipitating reasons for the coup d'etat.
Military discontent and elite disaffection in the south with
corruption and poor governance and poor delivery of services.
Senator Isakson. So Africa's biggest developmental problem,
which is corruption, is still alive and well in Mali. Is that
correct?
Ambassador Carson. Indeed. I think that the former
President, ATT, toward the end of his administration, was not
resolving, and he was not responding effectively to crises in
his own country. I think that he probably had begun to tune
out, had not focused sufficiently on the economic and social
issues in the south, and had neglected deeply the issues
throughout the north. His leadership was starting to flag. His
interest had flagged, and he was not doing a very effective or
energetic job.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
We'll go to a second round of questions. First, if I might,
to Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory, just what is the
feasibility of plans to train and restructure and equip a force
of 5,000 Malian Armed Forces? As was just referenced by the
Assistant Secretary, the proximate cause of the coup in many
ways was a series of military defeats, and the capacity of the
Malian Armed Forces is a critical first step. What's the
feasibility of that? Under what timeline is it possible to
stand up a Malian security force that could actually
meaningfully contribute to retaking the north? And if elections
were held, what kind of role might the U.S. be prepared to play
directly in training or supporting or equipping the Malian
forces, rather than through regional partners?
Ms. Dory. In terms of feasibility, I think that's the key
dimension in the planning process, which is at what point do
your missions align with your proposed concept of a maneuver in
alignment with the force generation process? And you don't
engage until you've assessed that the feasibility in a
situation of moderate risk is accessible to the force on the
ground. So the feasibility is built into the planning process,
which continues.
We're very fond of quoting former Commander in Chief,
General Eisenhower, in the Department when it comes to
focusing. On preparing for a battle, the criticality of the
planning process, even above the plan itself, is that process
of bringing the different military components together,
identifying the scheme of maneuver, what the vulnerabilities
are, how those can be addressed, and then interfacing in a very
robust way with the political process, to refer to your second
question.
I think one of the concerns that we have at this point is
that the military intervention planning has moved relatively
robustly and is making excellent progress. The political
development, relatively speaking, is underdeveloped as far as a
political roadmap is concerned, whether it's the roadmap to
elections, as Ambassador Carson was speaking to, or a roadmap
for the negotiations between Bamako and the various disaffected
elements in the north that are willing to renounce violence and
engage in a negotiations process.
Obviously, if we get to a point of elections being held and
being able to resume assistance with the Malian Armed Forces,
that will be an important step forward for the United States to
be able to directly help the Malian Armed Forces, in addition
to support to other troop contributing countries.
The European Union, France, others have all already begun
to reengage with Malian Armed Forces. So it's not as if there
is absent support for them in the intervening period.
Senator Coons. What lessons have we learned, if I might,
both Ms. Dory and Mr. Gast? We were actively engaged--I think
the USAID mission just celebrated a 50th anniversary in Mali.
We were actively engaged in mil-to-mil training, equipping,
support, and very broadly in democracy support and in trying to
create and sustain a culture of democracy. What lessons are
there that we might learn going forward about political
failures, ignored domestic issues? Our rather abrupt
requirement that we break off relations and support here has
created a great difficulty, with regional consequences. What
lessons would you suggest we learn from this?
Mr. Gast. Thank you, Senator. An excellent question. I
would say in the best of times, Mali is a country in crisis,
and when one looks at the human development index, Mali is a
country that ranks in the bottom dozen. As Assistant Secretary
Carson mentioned, 90 percent of the population is in the south,
and that population is also in need of services.
So it is unfortunate that the government hasn't included,
both in the delivery of services as well as in the governance
of the country, the people of the north. And although we have
implemented programs in the north, unless there is the
connection between government and individuals, our programs
aren't going to have the effect of people feeling as though
they're part of the society.
So there was an effort planned over the last couple of
years, where the development partners, in tandem with the
government, the central government, would deliver resources to
the north, again with the government out in the lead and with
the donors supporting. Unfortunately, the pace of that was too
slow and not very effective.
Another point moving forward I think is that we do need to
concentrate on decentralization and making connection between
government delivery of services and the individual at the
community level.
Ms. Dory. To build further on the comments about the
resource base within Mali, clearly there are difficult choices
for the government there involved between guns versus better
types of decisions, and the resourcing for the Malian Armed
Forces was insufficient, relatively speaking, to the building
threat that they now face vis-a-vis AQIM. I think in terms of
the United States support to the Malian military, we provided
training and equips for many years now, but in relatively
modest quantities, and I don't think that level of resourcing
was commensurate with the threat either.
I think the other lesson learned for us is to look beyond
the tactical level of training that's provided by Department of
Defense to consider what ways we might also engage in terms of
institutional development with defense institutions, and that's
something in the last several years where we are really ramping
up within the Department the ability to provide advisors and
other types of institutional reform engagement with various
military partners to ensure that, just as we're looking at
strengthening at the tactical level, we're also focusing on the
institutional strength of these defense institutions.
Senator Coons. Let me ask a last question. Then I'll turn
to Senator Isakson.
Ms. Dory, can we afford to wait what may well be a year for
planning, training, assembly of a regional force for the
completion of negotiations for a successful election? In some
press accounts, AQIM in northern Mali is described as, at this
point, the best funded, best equipped, most potentially lethal
AQ affiliate in the world, and perhaps those accounts are
overblown. But the suggestion that we should have an area the
size of Texas controlled by terrorists who are engaged in drug
trafficking, kidnapping, that have had an inflow of some
sophisticated weaponry from Libya is to some quite concerning.
Can we afford to wait a year for a regional solution, or is
that the only way to achieve an appropriate security solution?
Ms. Dory. I think one of the things that, as we look at the
situation on the one hand, your question, can we afford to
wait, on the other hand can we afford not to wait to allow the
political environment to be more conducive to a successful
military intervention and to allow the process of force
generation to proceed, which does take time to train, equip,
develop a force before it's employed. So in a sense, we have
few choices but to allow those processes to unfold. Clearly,
we're concerned that it takes time to do so, but I think we
have a sense of moving forward as rapidly as feasible, as
rapidly as the circumstances will allow us to do so,
recognizing the tremendous leadership that the African partners
have already shown both in terms of the political dynamics and
the initiatives that are supporting this AFISMA planning
process at present.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. I really just have one question. Ms. Dory,
if, as Johnnie Carson said, or Secretary Carson said, if
military discontent with the government support was a major
contributing factor to the coup, and the military is going to
be a major contributing factor to how successful an election is
going to be, in your testimony you say there's a Sanogo,
Captain Sanogo is in charge of the reform of the military for
the interim government, do you know his capabilities and
whether he's capable of pulling off the type of support it
would take to bring the military together to support an
election?
Ms. Dory. Captain Sanogo as a field-grade officer is
certainly
capable in terms of the activities that he has already caused
of creating a difficult condition by mobilizing others to
support a coup. Whether he is capable of leading the difficult
efforts to restructure an institution and to mobilize the
resources that will be required, I would say that I question
that at this point.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much. That's all my
questions. Thank you for your testimony, all of you.
Senator Coons. I'd like to thank our first panel. I'm
mindful of the time. We have a four-member second panel.
Senator Isakson and I, I know both, are very concerned about
and interested in this and will follow up with each of you,
perhaps with additional questions but also actions that are
appropriate and ways in which we might work together
collaboratively to support U.S. efforts in what is a very
challenging and dynamic security, humanitarian and diplomatic
context.
Thank you very much for your testimony. We'll take a brief
break while the second panel comes.
[Pause.]
Senator Coons. I'd like to now turn to our second panel on
today's hearing about Mali and the path forward. Our second
panel will include Mr. Fomunyoh, followed by Ms. Dufka,
followed by Mr. Akuetteh, and then last by Mr. Mahmoud, who is
joining us live from Bamako. This is our first attempt at live
testimony by--forgive me, is it Google Hangout? [Laughter.]
Senator Coons. I suspect no one has testified by Google
Hangout, a thing I didn't know existed. So my thanks to the
technical assistance and the policy support of several very
capable folks who made this happen.
Dr. Fomunyoh, if you might begin? Thank you and welcome,
and we appreciate your repeat testimony before this
subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER FOMUNYOH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND
REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL AND WEST AFRICA, NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you very much, Chairman Coons and
Ranking Member Senator Isakson. On behalf of the National
Democratic Institute, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
recent political developments in Mali.
Today Mali faces three interwoven crises: An ongoing armed
occupation of two-thirds of the country with a humanitarian
emergency in the north that has displaced an estimated 450,000
people; persistent political uncertainty in the capital,
Bamako; and a severe food shortage that is affecting the entire
Sahel subregion. If this crisis were allowed to fester, they
would have a devastating and long-lasting negative impact on
Mali and its neighbors in west and north Africa, especially
countries such as Niger, Mauritania, and Algeria, with which
Mali shares common and often very porous borders.
Mali's current transition often looks like a three-legged
executive because of the ambiguous division of power and
influence amongst three main actors: Iterim President
Dioncounda Traore; Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, who was
given expanded powers under an ECOWAS-brokered agreement as the
junta left power; and former coup leader Captain Sanogo, who
continues to pull some levers of power from behind the scenes.
Without strong political leadership and clear decisionmaking in
Bamako, Mali's transition government would find it difficult to
achieve its two primary objectives, which are to reconquer the
country's northern regions and organize credible elections
before May 2013.
When I was in Bamako in October, the country seemed to face
a conundrum of sorts in that some Malians argued that elections
cannot be conducted in a peaceful and inclusive manner while
the north is occupied by extremists. Others believed that the
government in Bamako may lose its legitimacy at the expiration
of the May 2013 ECOWAS deadline and that only credible
elections can provide the next government with the legitimacy
to tackle the country's challenges.
Holding elections before May 2013 would require significant
technical and political commitments on the part of Malians and
development partners. Increasingly, Malians are demanding that
the impending military operation in the north not preclude
active preparations for national elections.
Concrete steps would have to be taken to include displaced
populations and Malian refugees in the electoral process, given
that the electoral law of Mali allows for Malians residing
outside of the country to vote. Working in collaboration with
organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees that maintain statistics on displaced
persons and refugees, the government could take steps to allow
the now significant population of refugees in neighboring
countries and internally displaced persons to vote while out of
the three occupied regions of the north.
At the same time, as logistically challenging as it may be,
holding elections in major cities in the northern regions would
be the strongest signal possible of Mali's exercise of
sovereignty over its territory and of early steps at rebuilding
its democracy.
The transition government must continually and clearly
communicate government plans and actions to the public and be
cognizant of the potential crisis of legitimacy that looms on
the horizon once the May 2013 date lapses.
The international community needs to harmonize its approach
toward the simultaneous pursuit of polls that could lead to a
legitimately elected government in Bamako and military actions
to retake the north. Contradictory public statements that take
the military option off the table in the short or medium term
may only serve to embolden the extremists, allowing them time
to reinforce their presence in the north. Such declarations
also exacerbate fears amongst many Malians that there may be a
conspiracy afoot to break up their country.
Active United States support for Mali's return to civilian
democratic rule would bolster the hand of pro-democracy forces
within the country and further reinforce the work of regional
bodies such as ECOWAS and the AU that are deeply invested in
Mali's return to democratic rule.
Many Malians in the precoup era were proud of their
country's democracy, although they envisaged consolidating it
further by strengthening institutions and enhancing
transparency and accountability in governance. Nine months
after the March 2012 military coup, the false excitement about
dramatic change in the early days of the coup has now been
superseded by consternation over the cloud of uncertainty that
now hovers over Mali.
Despite the numerous challenges confronting Malian
democrats today, I am optimistic that with concerted efforts
and the right kind of support, Malians will be able to rebuild
a stronger, renewed democracy that works effectively for all of
the country's citizens.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Dr. Fomunyoh.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Fomunyoh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Christopher Fomunyoh
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss recent political developments in Mali. Since Mali's first steps
toward democratization in the early 1990s, NDI and other U.S.-based
nongovernmental organizations have worked with Malian legislators,
party leaders, and civil society activists to support the country's
nascent democracy. Early this year, and with funding from USAID and
other partners, NDI was providing technical assistance to citizen
observers of the electoral process, fostering interparty dialogue, and
taking steps to increase the participation of women and youth in
political processes. I last visited Bamako in October, and met with
civic and political leaders to gauge the level of election preparations
and their overall commitment to a democratic transition.
INTRODUCTION
Today Mali faces three interwoven crises: an ongoing armed
occupation of two-thirds of the country and a humanitarian emergency in
the north that has displaced an estimated 450,000 people \1\;
persistent political uncertainty in the capital, Bamako; and a severe
food shortage that is affecting the entire Sahel region.\2\ Should Mali
rebound from these crises, Malian democrats and the international
community would need to better understand the reasons for the political
alienation of citizens, including youth, women, and ethnic minorities
from the previous democratically elected government so as to avoid
future backsliding. On the other hand, if the current situation were to
be allowed to fester, they would have a negative impact on its
neighbors in West and North Africa, especially countries such as Niger,
Mauritania, and Algeria, with which Mali shares common and often porous
borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For more information on the humanitarian crisis in northern
Mali, see UN HCR: ``Mali Emergency.'' Available: http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/4f79a77e6.html.
\2\ For more information on the Sahel food crisis and its impact on
Mali, see World Food Program ``Sahel Crisis: Country by Country.''
Available: http://www.wfp.org/stories/sahel-crisis-by-country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The military coup of March 2012 brought to the fore Malian
disenchantment with the country's fledgling democracy under the
previous government of President Amadou Toumani Toure. While the
immediate trigger of the coup may have been the military's frustration
with losses incurred in fighting separatist rebels and jihadists in the
country's northern regions, the population in Bamako showed surprising
indifference to the coup while it was in progress, and was willing to
embrace the group of junior officers that staged the coup once
President Toure agreed to step down. The overthrow of Toure surprised
many in the international community, especially because it came 6 weeks
before Presidential elections in which Toure was not a candidate.
However, the country's democracy showed many weaknesses in the last
decade, notably: consistently low voter turnout; allegations of
widespread corruption; ineffective institutions; and the embrace of a
``consensus politics'' model in which almost all political parties
aligned their policy to those of the head of state.
Shortly after the March coup regional organizations--notably the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union,
and the international community at large--strongly condemned the
military's incursion into politics and hence denied the coup leaders
legitimacy. By April 2012, ECOWAS had negotiated an agreement whereby
the military junta relinquished power to the former speaker of the
National Assembly, who became interim President and who appointed a
Prime Minister after consultations with the junta.
COMPETING POWER BASES IN BAMAKO
Under the agreement brokered by ECOWAS, the coup leader, Captain
Amadou Sanogo, ceded power to the transition government. Despite these
early signs of a swift return to civilian rule, the junta continues to
influence decisionmaking in Bamako and thereby threatens to undermine
prospects for a prompt resolution to the security crisis in the north
and the timely organization of elections in 2013. Many months after the
coup, Captain Sanogo and his allies dominated public space and
discourse, with frequent appearances on the state-run radio and
television station. By tapping into the frustrations of citizens who
were marginalized by the previous government, Sanogo gained early
support among unemployed youth and others who organized rallies in his
favor. Also, some military officers with close ties to Sanogo were
appointed to key positions in the transition government, such as the
Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, the Minister of Territorial
Administration, Decentralization, and Territorial Integrity, and the
Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection. As recently as
October 2012, it was revealed that Sanogo had been appointed chairman
of the Committee on Security Sector Reform in August--a position that
allows him to wield considerable influence within the Malian military
even as that position further undermines both the credibility of
civilian authority in Bamako and the professionalism of the Malian
Armed Forces.
Mali's current transition often looks like a ``three-legged''
executive because of the ambiguous division of power and influence
among three men--interim President Dioncounda Traore, who derives his
power from the Malian Constitution and ECOWAS support; Prime Minister
Cheick Modibo Diarra, who was given expanded powers in the initial
agreement that forced the junta to give up power after the coup; and
Captain Sanogo, who seems to pull the levers of power from behind the
scenes.
Upon President Toure's resignation on April 8, the Malian
Constitutional Court conferred power to the then-President of the
Malian National Assembly Dioncounda Traore. President Traore, a member
of Mali's largest political party, ADEMA, is viewed by critics as
emblematic of the ``old guard'' of the Malian political elite whose
mismanagement contributed to citizen discontent and the military coup.
In a brazen show of disrespect for President Traore, supporters of the
military junta staged demonstrations and physically attacked Traore at
the Presidential palace on May 21. He was later evacuated to France for
medical attention, and returned 2 months later, but has seemed hesitant
in asserting his leadership.
After consultations with party leaders and the military junta,
President Traore appointed Cheick Modibo Diarra as Prime Minister in a
government largely composed of technocrats. Prime Minister Diarra is
criticized by his opponents for his family ties to the former autocrat
Moussa Traore, who ruled Mali from 1968-1991 (Diarra is Traore's son-
in-law) and his alleged closeness with Captain Sanogo. In a move that
is seen as possibly intended to curb the personal partisan ambitions of
Diarra and other members of the transition government, ECOWAS declared
in November that none of the transitional leaders would be allowed to
contest the Presidential elections of 2013.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The full text of ECOWAS's statement, Communiqe 311/2012,
``ECOWAS determined on its two-pronged approach to resolving Mali
crisis,'' dated November 12, 2012, is available at: http://
news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=311&lang=en&annee=2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 20, Traore named a broad-based government of national
unity. He also declared his intention to appoint two transition Vice
Presidents and hold a national convention to validate his government's
proposed structure and a transition roadmap. However, as of early
December, the new transition bodies have not been created, and the
government had yet to release a detailed roadmap for the elections or
the transition process. Mali's 147-member National Assembly's mandate
has been extended until the end of the transition; but its
responsibilities could conflict with those of the National Transition
Council (Conseil Nationale de la Transition-CNT), should one be created
as proposed by President Traore.
Against this backdrop, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2071 (2012)
of October 12 was welcome news. It clarified the leadership structure
in Bamako and strengthened the hand of the interim President by
recognizing his legitimacy and urging him to present a timeline for
elections. The resolution also reiterated its previous demands that
remnants of the military junta refrain from further interference in the
political process.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The full text of resolution 2071 is available at: http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10789.doc.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without strong political leadership and clear decisionmaking
structures in Bamako, Mali's transition government would be challenged
to instill much-needed confidence regarding its ability to achieve the
two primary goals of the transition which are to reconquer the
country's northern regions in the immediate term and organize credible
Presidential and legislative elections before May 2013. Similarly, the
lack of such leadership would deprive development partners and the
international community in general of a strong and reliable anchor in
the Malian Government to facilitate partnerships and technical
assistance in meeting these two goals.
EVOLVING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND CRYSTALLIZING DISAGREEMENT
Since March 2012, new political movements and alliances have
emerged in Mali. Currently, there are seven major political groupings
that are likely to influence the country's political transition and its
future:
The Unified Front for the Safeguard of Democracy and the
Republic of Mali (FDR) is a grouping of political parties,
civil society organizations and labor unions that was opposed
to the coup in March and continues to speak out against the
national convention favored by Captain Sanogo. At various
times, the FDR also has called for the resignation of Prime
Minister Diarra.
The Alliance of Patriotic Democrats for an End to the Crisis
(ADPS) is another antiputsch grouping led by former Prime
Minister Soumana Sacko.
The Alliance IBK 2012 is a coalition supporting former Prime
Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, a leading Presidential
candidate prior to the coup. Originally part of the FDR, the
Alliance IBK separated from the group in April but still shares
the FDR's staunch opposition to the coup and its advocacy for a
swift return to democracy.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Coordination of
Patriotic Organizations in Mali (COPAM) is the most prominent
organization affiliated with Captain Sanogo and the coup
makers. COPAM has organized large demonstrations in Bamako
demanding the resignation of President Traore and protesting
against foreign military assistance in the reconquest of the
north.
The Convergence for Saving Mali (CSM) is a coalition formed
in support of Prime Minister Diarra.
The Force for Reconciliation, Democracy, and Peace (FRDP-
Mali-Ko) aligns itself with COPAM and others in staging
demonstrations in favor of Captain Sanogo.
The Coalition of Immigrants from the North (COREN) is a
heterogeneous group of northerners that seeks to draw attention
to the plight of Malians from the northern regions and urges a
swift reconquest of the three occupied regions.
The recent controversy over the national convention on the
transition roadmap is illustrative of a sharp political discord between
junta sympathizers and their opponents that will continue to fester in
the coming months. The FDR threatened to boycott the convention,
claiming that participation had been stacked in favor of pro-junta
forces and that its input had not been incorporated into the agenda.
The transition government responded by delaying the convention until
December 11-13, although the participation of the FDR and its allies
has yet to be confirmed.
IMMINENT MILITARY ACTION IN NORTHERN MALI
From most indications, an international military intervention to
assist the Malian military to retake the north is inevitable. The
Malian Government, ECOWAS and the African Union have asked for military
intervention as a matter of urgency. Extremists continue to consolidate
their control over the three northern regions of Gao, Kidal, and
Timbuktu; historic sites are being destroyed; and sharia law is being
rigorously implemented in those areas. Many Malians are fearful that
without military intervention, the partition of their country would
become a geopolitical reality and extremist elements would have found a
safe haven and enormous territory from which to destabilize other
fragile democracies in the subregion and beyond. The persistent
insecurity that now prevails in northern Mali would have a significant
impact on the credibility of the 2013 electoral process if the
estimated 450,000 displaced citizens are not able to vote and the
government is not able to hold elections in the three occupied regions.
The recent U.N. Security Council resolution on Mali lays the
groundwork for regional and international support to the Malian
Government in organizing a military operation to retake the north of
the country. ECOWAS is prepared to deploy approximately 3,300 troops to
assist in this effort. While dissonant voices have emerged with regard
to the exact timing of such an intervention, it is hoped that regional
and international efforts to support the Malian military will bolster
the country's transition leadership, provide strategic guidance, and
embolden a now weakened and demoralized Malian military. The role of
countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, and Chad that are not members of
ECOWAS, but share a common border with Mali and/or have combat
experience in the Sahel, would be crucial in such a military
undertaking.
TWO BENCHMARKS ON THE HORIZON: MILITARY OPERATION IN THE NORTH
AND COUNTRYWIDE ELECTIONS
The first half of 2013 will be of paramount significance to Mali's
political transition as two critical benchmarks would have to be met:
the ECOWAS-mandated May 2013 deadline for the holding elections and
swearing in of a civilian democratically elected President; and the
launch of a military operation to retake the country's three northern
regions.
When I was in Mali in October, the country seemed to face a
conundrum of sorts in that some Malians argued that elections cannot be
conducted in a peaceful and inclusive manner while the north is
occupied by extremists; others believed that the government in Bamako
may lose its legitimacy at the expiration of the May 2013 deadline
granted by ECOWAS, and that elections would therefore need to be held
by this date so as to elect a government with the legitimacy to tackle
many of the country's challenges. Holding elections before May 2013
would require significant technical and political commitments on the
part of Malians and development partners, as a number of challenges
would have to be addressed with urgency. Increasingly, Malians are
demanding that the impending ECOWAS-African Union (AU) military
operation not preclude active preparations for national elections.
As of today, the transition government has yet to release a
credible roadmap for elections. While an audit of the voter register is
underway, the government has not consulted other elections
stakeholders, such as political parties and civil society
organizations, to obtain their buy-in to the process. The government
has not yet updated the voter register, nor has it defined how to
facilitate voting by displaced citizens and Malian refugees in
neighboring countries. As a result, many Malians are doubtful that the
transition will be as broadly inclusive and participatory as originally
hoped. For example, according to the electoral law, Mali's voters list
should have been updated from October 1-December 31, 2012. This did not
occur, even in the regions of the country where the security situation
is stable. Hopefully, when the political decision is made to proceed
with election preparations, the Minister of Territorial Administration
would invoke a section in the electoral law that allows for an
exceptional update of the national voter registry outside of the usual
October-December timeframe.
Concrete steps would have to be taken to include displaced
populations and Malian refugees in the electoral process, given that
the electoral law allows for Malians residing outside the country to
vote. Working in collaboration with organizations such as the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that maintain
statistics on displaced persons and refugees, the government could
update the voter rolls to include the now-significant population of
refugees in neighboring countries and internally displaced persons.
Some analysts speculate that even if the military operation succeeds in
liberating key cities in the north relatively quickly, some remnants of
occupying forces may retreat into the more remote areas of the north.
Under these circumstances, holding credible elections in major cities
in these northern regions would be the strongest signal possible of
Mali's exercise of sovereignty over its national territory and of early
steps at rebuilding its democracy. Organizing elections in the north
would be challenging. Nevertheless, it would reassure Malians that the
country is on track to restoring national unity and civilian democratic
rule across its entire territory.
LOOKING FORWARD--A LOOMING CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY
As the electoral deadline of May 2013 approaches, questions about
the continued legitimacy of the Malian Government will likely be raised
by various domestic constituencies and their international allies.
An early release of the electoral timeline would help calm
political tensions and assure Malians that the transition government
has the political will to work toward restoring the country's democracy
and rebuilding its democratic institutions. The recent declaration by
ECOWAS leaders that members of the transition government would not be
permitted to stand as candidates in the 2013 polls is an important step
in building citizen confidence in the impartiality of those leaders as
they execute the transition. Public commitments by these officials
themselves would provide further assurances and invite greater citizen
engagement in the electoral process.
The transition government must continually and clearly communicate
government plans and actions to the public, and be cognizant of the
potential crisis of legitimacy that looms on the horizon once the May
2013 date lapses.
CONCLUSION
For decades, Mali faced governance challenges, even as its
leadership continued to profess its commitment to democracy. Indeed,
the quick unraveling of Mali's democracy is yet another reminder that
multiparty elections alone, even when regularly held, are not a
guarantor. As we seek to assist Malian democrats forge a path toward
elections in 2013 and restore the country's democratic institutions in
the post-election phase, we must draw hard lessons from this experience
to make sure that future institutions are more inclusive, effective,
and transparent in their management of public affairs and resources.
To do so, the international community must maintain pressure on
coup leaders to return definitively to the barracks and avoid any undue
influence on the governance and electoral processes. Development
partners can also contribute to a credible transition by encouraging
meaningful, inclusive dialogue around political and electoral issues,
as many political party leaders and civil society activists feel
excluded from decisionmaking process. They should provide more
technical assistance to Mali's shaky transition government in
finalizing and widely publicizing, as soon as possible, a credible
electoral timetable. The sooner such a timetable is released, the
greater prospects will be for higher public confidence in the country's
prospects to transition back to civilian democratic rule. At the same
time, the international community needs to harmonize its approach
toward the simultaneous pursuit of polls that would lead to a
legitimately elected government in Bamako and military operations to
retake the north. Contradictory public statements that take the
military option off the table in the short or medium term may only
serve to embolden the extremists, allowing them time to reinforce their
presence. Such declarations also exacerbate fears among many Malians
that there may be a conspiracy afoot to break up their country.
Restoration of U.S. aid programs to Mali would have a positive
impact on the country's ability to tackle many of the political and
technical challenges I have outlined today. The U.S. Government can be
a valuable interlocutor with Malian partners in shaping transition and
electoral processes. While some of the missteps or sluggishness of the
past few months can be attributed to inexperience on the part of Malian
transition leaders, renewed American involvement in Mali during this
critical period could enhance prospects for successful and peaceful
elections in the coming year. Active U.S. support for Mali's return to
civilian democratic rule would also bolster the hand of pro-democracy
forces within the country and further reinforce the work of regional
bodies such as ECOWAS and the AU, that are deeply invested in Mali's
return to democratic rule and have benefited from American support in
the past.
Once touted as a model of democratic progress in West Africa, Mali
quickly lost this standing after the coup in March. Many Malians in the
pre-coup era were proud of their country's democracy, although they
envisaged consolidating it further by strengthening institutions and
enhancing transparency and accountability in governance. Nine months
after the March 2012 military coup, the false sense of dramatic change
of the early days of the coup have been superseded by consternation
over the cloud of uncertainty that now hovers over Mali because of
developments in the northern regions and political maneuvering in
Bamako. Despite the numerous challenges confronting Malian democrats
today, I am optimistic that with concerted efforts and the right kind
of support Malians will be able to rebuild a stronger, renewed
democracy that works effectively for all of the country's citizens.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
Ms. Dufka.
STATEMENT OF CORINNE DUFKA, SENIOR RESEARCHER, AFRICA DIVISION,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Dufka. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Coons and Ranking
Member Isakson, for providing Human Rights Watch the
opportunity to testify this morning. It is a great honor to be
here.
Since April, I've conducted four research missions to Mali
during which I have interviewed hundreds of victims and
witnesses to serious abuses and war crimes in both the
Islamist-controlled north and government-controlled south. I've
also spoken with a wide variety of other individuals, many from
the armed factions from various different groups, government
officials, civil society and religious leaders. I am also in
daily phone contact with Malians all over the country who keep
me abreast of ongoing violations and dynamics.
This hearing comes at a critical time not only for Mali,
but for Mali's partners, including the United States, as they
struggle to establish a vision and actionable plan to put Mali
back together in a way that doesn't simply turn back the clock
to December 2011. I will today briefly characterize our
findings on abuses by all factions, very briefly. It's more
detailed in the testimony that I've submitted. And then I'll
highlight four issues the United States might consider as it
crafts a response to the crisis, and perhaps more importantly,
the issues that gave rise to it.
With respect to Islamists groups, since consolidating their
control in the north, Ansar al-Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM have
become increasingly repressive as they tighten their grip over
the population, among whom, I wish to emphasize, they have
precious little support. Abuses committed include frequent,
often severe beatings, arbitrary arrests against those engaged
in haram or forbidden behavior such as smoking, drinking,
watching television, listening to music, or having music on
one's cell phone. Countless women that I have interviewed have
been beaten and detained for failing to adhere to their dress
code.
The Islamists have also carried out summary executions,
including the January execution in Aguelhoc of some 70 Malian
soldiers, which is, to date, the single most serious war crime
of this conflict.
Also in Aguelhoc, Islamists stoned to death a couple for
adultery. A witness I spoke with described seeing the man and
the woman crouch, hands bound, in a hole as the Islamists
hoisted large rocks, shattering the skull of first the woman
and then the man. As well, they have carried out eight, at
least eight limb amputations as punishment for theft.
These punishments were meted out by the Islamic police,
often after a summary trial before a panel of hand-picked
judges, many of them foreign. These trials can only be
described as a cruel parody of justice.
They have also recruited hundreds of child soldiers as
young as 11. Dozens of witnesses I've interviewed, and a few
children as well, have seen these kids in training camps
manning checkpoints, guarding prisoners, and applying sharia.
In advance of the planned intervention, they have ramped up
recruitment. Indeed, a witness I spoke with just yesterday had
just seen, just visited three of these camps within the Gao
region in which she saw many, many children being planned.
The Islamists have also destroyed mausoleums, shrines,
amulets, ritual masks, both in Timbuktu as well as the Dagon
Country, which hold tremendous significance for Malians. They
have as well denied Malians, who have a rich musical tradition,
to be able to play or listen to their local music. Quoting one
witness, ``They have erased our history. They have taken all
joie de vivre from our lives.''
With respect to the MNLA, they too have perpetrated
numerous and often systematic abuses after taking over the
towns of Menaka, Goundam, Niafounke, and Gao. These included
the abduction and brutal rape, often gang rape of numerous
women and girls, widespread pillaging of hospitals, schools,
aid agencies, government buildings, and use of child soldiers.
The MNLA has done absolutely nothing to rein in their forces,
as well as even acknowledge that these abuses have taken place.
Briefly, with respect to the Malian Army, the coup, of
course, has led to a striking deterioration in discipline and
command and control within the army. For example, very
worryingly, in the days after the attempted countercoup on
April 30, security forces directly under the command of Captain
Sanogo disappeared at least 21 soldiers allegedly implicated in
it. A witness I interviewed told me how at 2 a.m. on May 3, the
soldiers removed at least 21 men from Kati barracks, put them
bound and blindfolded into a military truck, and they have not
been heard from since. Many other victims of torture described
how they were stabbed, starved, burned with cigarettes, and
forced at gunpoint to sodomize one another.
The security forces have also intimidated opposition
voices, including journalists who have been abducted by masked
gunmen, beaten and dumped on the outskirts of Bamako after
being warned to stop criticizing the military. More recently,
they have done the same thing. They have tried to abduct,
descended upon the home of a local rapper who wrote a song
critical of the military.
Outside of Bamako, soldiers have detained and executed
numerous men accused of collaborating with the groups in the
north. Most of these victims were Tuareg and Arab. In
September, 16 Islamic preachers were executed within a military
camp in Giabali, and in October eight Tuareg herders were
executed by soldiers also in Giabali.
Again, there has been no meaningful effort to investigate,
much less hold accountable, those implicated in any of these
incidents, and as others have noted, disturbingly, Sanogo, who
we believe--we have testimony suggesting he is directly
implicated in the torture and disappearances, was rewarded with
the position of being put in charge of security sector reform.
Briefly, with respect to recommendations, I want to
highlight four areas. The first is to publicly raise abuses by
all sides. The U.S. Government has been very strong in their
condemnation of Islamic behavior, of the Islamic forces, as
well as Sanogo. However, I would say they also have to widen
that view, widen that criticism of the Malian Army outside of
Sanogo, as well as the MNLA. The United States should press all
parties to investigate and prosecute those responsible, as well
as stand firm against any attempt to include an amnesty as part
of an eventual negotiation.
The second area addresses rising ethnic tension. Mr.
Chairman, over the last 8 months I have observed an alarming
increase in ethnic tension. Perceptions of neglect or
favoritism by the Malian Army or international community of one
community or the other has led communities to seek redress for
their grievances, including through the formation of armed
militias and apparent organized plans to settle scores outside
the legal framework.
I cannot emphasize enough how impunity, not only for Path
violations during Path Tuareg rebellions, but also more recent
violations, is fueling this tension on all different sides from
all different ethnic groups. If not addressed, I believe these
tensions could, in the short term, lead to incidents of deadly
collective punishment, and in the long term sow the seeds for
future violence.
To address this, I urge the U.S. Government to do a few
things. No. 1, as the negotiation process takes shape, push
Mali to ensure the grievances of all northern residents are
heard, not just those who have taken up arms. The second would
be press the Malian Government to adopt a communication
strategy that addresses the rising level of ethnic tension and
to respond to hate speech that incites violence. No. 3, through
USAID, support Malian civil society to be able to support
community radios and peacebuilding initiatives, and that's
something that should not wait. It should be done now. And the
fourth would be to ensure the situation in Mali is discussed by
the Atrocities Prevention Board.
The third area I want to address, and this gets to Senator
Isakson's question, is adopt policies that address the
underlying causes of this conflict. Mali's recent crisis is
rooted in years of deterioration in the institutions--the
police, the army, the judiciary, the Parliament--that should
have protected and represented them adequately. Mali's partners
turned a blind eye to corruption scandals, criminality creeping
into state institutions, some predatory behavior by the
security forces, and lagging development indicators
countrywide, but especially in the north.
Mali's judiciary, which could have mitigated some of these
problems, was severely neglected, allowing a dangerous culture
of impunity. And as we have seen, narcotraffickers, extremist
religious figures, and those with ethnic agendas have taken
advantage of this rule-of-law vacuum. The United States must
support programs in the short and long term that serve to
strengthen Mali's stressed institutions.
The last point is, in advance of the planned military
intervention, I urge the United States to press for a strong
human rights component within this military intervention to
avoid some of these problems that we have seen with AMISOM
intervention in Somalia, which failed to adequately monitor
human rights abuses, particularly indiscriminate shelling.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Ms. Dufka.
We have just about 15 minutes left in our hearing.
Mr. Akuetteh.
STATEMENT OF NII AKUETTEH, INDEPENDENT POLICY RESEARCHER,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Akuetteh. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, good
morning, and thank you very much for including me. But I really
appreciate that you are focusing on such a grave problem in
Africa, so I can't thank you enough. I submitted a longer
statement, so I'll just take a few minutes to highlight some of
it, but I would like for it to be kept in the record.
Senator Coons. Yes, it will.
Mr. Akuetteh. I mentioned that some issues in the way Mali
descended, we have to keep certain things in mind. One of them
is the connection with Libya. The Tuareg rebellion had occurred
many times, but this particular one did not occur because of
incidents--did not start because of incidents inside Mali but
because of weapons that flowed over from Libya. And I think it
is interesting that Libya does not share a border with Mali,
but troops and men went all the way, and it seems to me the
question should be raised about why they were not seen. Mali's
Army had been trained in the Trans-Sahara counterterrorism
program, and yet they collapsed very quickly. So it seems to me
that also raises questions.
But the core of my testimony is I am suggesting four
improvements in U.S. policy, particularly in the State
Department. Mr. Chairman, I notice that some people look at the
crises as three, others say four. I think that the
international community, it would be good to actually add a
fifth dimension, which is contagion, because I think it is
important, whether three or four, they are inside Mali. But the
reason that ECOWAS is so concerned is the real risk that this
will not be contained inside Mali. So I think it's important to
stress contagion.
Second, I think that the State Department, if we listen
carefully, my reading of their priorities is elections first,
by all means, and then negotiate. As for intervention, maybe.
Frankly, I think that should be the other way around, that
it's very hard to have real elections with so much insecurity
around, and populations have moved. So the security issue is
extremely important, and I'm reminded of what happened in Cote
d'Ivoire, where they took 5 years to do an election and still
questions were raised. I fear that if you rush elections in
Mali, you are giving people all kinds of excuses who lose to
stir up trouble and make allegations. So it's important to
establish enough security so the elections can be credible.
I also think that while the grievances of Tuaregs must be
addressed and minority issues are very important, Mali has
almost 60 ethnic groups. So we must be careful that it's not
seen as favoritism toward Tuaregs, which might suggest to other
groups that the way to get attention is to create the same kind
of problem.
And the fourth and final area of policy recommendation that
I'm making, Mr. Chairman, is actually that I do think that
since 9/11 and United States counterterrorism policy in Africa,
I think the problem in Mali should be an opportunity and an
occasion to do a thorough review of the whole strategy,
because, for instance, the Trans-Sahara counterterrorism issue,
as I mentioned, its job was to make the Malian Army strong, and
yet the army collapsed very quickly. The Operation Flintlock,
which used Mali as the base to train soldiers, again it raises
the question why did the Malian Army collapse so quickly. So I
think this is an opportunity to do a very thorough review and
raise a lot of questions.
My particular question, because I really think that
democracy is so important, that in the training of African
soldiers, I would very much like it if the respect for civilian
leadership and for democracy is stressed, that the first thing
the soldiers have to learn is to respect their civilian leaders
and the democracy process, and any training to make them better
fighters must come second.
I thank you very much again for including me, and I'll be
happy to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akuetteh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nii Akuetteh
OPENING
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, other subcommittee members,
thank you. The personal honor of your invitation is my smaller reason.
The much bigger reason is this: Being African-born and a strong
believer in democracy, I very much appreciate that you are devoting the
moral prestige and other priceless resources of this great institution
of democracy to the deadly cocktail that is assailing Mali. It has and
continues to inflict much suffering on millions of Malians.
Furthermore, it is contagious and poses grave threats to the rest of
Africa, to Europe and even to the United States. In walking me through
the process, your staff astounded me with their competence, promptness,
patience, courtesy and sense of humor. I am grateful to them as well.
INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW
Tuesday, January 17, 2012, (45 weeks ago) is a very important date
in understanding Mali's dizzying decent. That was the day heavily armed
Tuaregs (hardened former fighters for Libya's late leader, Col.
Gaddafi) fired opening shots and reignited the latest Tuareg
secessionist war against Mali.
Other 2012 dates are also vital. One is Thursday, March 22, 2012,
when Capt. Amadou Sanogo and his fellow putchists chased their
commander in chief away from the Presidential palace, declared
themselves the government, and effectively killed the infant that is
Mali's much admired democracy. It is crucial to keep in mind their
professed reason: Allegedly, the democratically elected President,
Amadou Toumani Toure, himself a former general, had not prosecuted the
war in the north well enough; the treasonous soldiers bragged they
would do a far better job.
Within hours, the world--with one curious exception--sharply and
emphatically rejected the coup. ECOWAS, the African Union, the U.N.,
even the international financial institutions, were all scathing in
their condemnation.
The lone exception was the U.S. administration. Initially,
following an interdepartmental meeting, the State Department
spokesperson was strangely sympathetic to the coupmakers, questioning
whether this was really a coup, and speaking about the coupmakers'
``legitimate grievances,'' about the government needing to negotiate,
and taking days before announcing that some aid has been suspended as
required by law. Happily this puzzling equivocation from the State
Department has since disappeared.
From Mali's neighbors, there was not the slightest hint of such
equivocation. By promptly closing land-locked Mali's most vital
borders, ECOWAS forced the reluctant coupmakers to hand over power to
an interim regime which in turn was forced to agree to a 1-year
deadline for holding the previously scheduled legitimate national
elections.
The next memorable day came 15 days after the coup. The Tuareg
secessionists--allied with three jihadist fighting groups--completed
conquest of 66 percent of Mali (a territory rivaling France in size).
On Friday, April 6, from Paris, they declared the conquered territory
the independent nation of Azawad. This proved a phantom independence.
And rather brief. Not a single country recognized the declaration.
Much worse soon followed. The Tuareg secessionists, the MNLA, had
implemented their war project by forming alliance with three jihadist
groups--AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO. Within weeks, the jihadists turned
on their former allies killing and chasing them out of the population
centres in the north, taking over and announcing their real intent--an
Islamic rule based on strict sharia law. What has transpired since is
more legitimately described as a reign of terror: summary executions;
amputations and floggings; forced marriages; conscription of child
soldiers; confiscation of private property; enforcement of dress codes;
banning of much music; and destruction of ancient Islamic shrines
recognized by the globally as World Heritage monuments. Understandably,
a large proportion (perhaps half) of Malians in the north who are able
to have fled. That non-Malians (from as far away as Pakistan and
Afghanistan) have played leading roles only makes the situation more
intolerable.
Two more dates must be mentioned. On Sunday July 15, with little
territory remaining under their control, some Tuareg secessionist
leaders told Reuters they were renouncing independence.
Mr. Chairman, my condolences. Reason: I am acutely aware that the
remaining date carries pain for Americans and especially for this full
committee--Tuesday September 11, 2012. That day witnessed the murder of
Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other patriots in Benghazi, Libya.
The relevance to Mali is this: Though investigations are ongoing, there
have already been believable hints that some of the murderers of
Ambassador Stevens are jihadists who came from northern Mali.
There is a reason for my recounting these many dates in 2012: They
show that Malians and friends could be forgiven for regarding this year
as our own annus horribilis.
And yet this one year of agony does not reflect the entire
historical journey traveled by Mali and its people. For West Africans
and hundreds of millions of others, admiring fascination with Mali goes
back centuries to the ancient empire. After military dictatorship
dampened the pride brought by 1960 independence, people again held
their heads high when ``the soldier for democracy,'' Amadou Toumani
Toure, in 1991 and 1992, stopped the massacre of protesting women and
children, humanely but decisively eased out the dictatorship, set the
democratic experiment on course, and then gave up power to an elected
politician. Ten years later, there was little surprise when popular
sentiment brought him back to power on the strength of two landslide
electoral victories.
However, there was disappointment when, many years into the Toure
administration, Malians and outsiders began recounting stories of
corruption in Mali.
More than disappointment, concern was the emotion evoked in some
observers by one other observation. What triggered the concern were the
incentives provided to the Malian Government by U.S. antiterrorism
strategy in general and in particular by three elements--the Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Program, AFRICOM, and Operation Flintlock.
Some observers including me felt unease that, as operated, these
elements in U.S. policy might prove an ineffective and even
counterproductive strategy for combating terrorism is Mali, and perhaps
in other African countries as well.
That is not to say terrorism does not bother Africa. To the
contrary. Terrorism and violent extremism remains the gravest of
threats to Africa--by itself and because terror attacks makes it
impossible for Africans to respond to other challenges and
opportunities. The attacks must be fought robustly and effectively. The
war waged in Algeria by what is now AQIM; the Embassy bombings in Kenya
and Tanzania; al-Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria; the World
Cup bombing in Kampala--all these have killed and maimed thousands of
innocent Africans, even when the declared targets have been Western
officials, installations, and interests. Clearly, defanging violent
extremists across the continent saves African lives and otherwise
serves African interests.
There are two parts to the concern about U.S. counterterrorism
strategy in Mali. One is overreliance on militarization instead of on
democratization, reconciliation, and development. The other is a near-
exclusive focus on incoming foreign jihadists such as AQIM at the cost
of paying even greater attention to the home-grown challenge of Tuareg
grievances.
When in January, Tuareg fighters abandoned Col. Gaddafi, and
returned to Mali to launch the latest of their latest secessionist
wars, there was a sinking feeling that our worst fears had happened.
FOUR SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S. POLICY
Mr. Chairman, in June, I paid close attention to the Mali testimony
that Ambassador Carson gave in the other chamber. In the ensuing 6
months, I have tried being an even keener observer of the Mali
situation: monitoring events on the ground in Mali and dissecting the
words and deeds of the major stakeholders--Malian factions; ECOWAS
countries, especially Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Nigeria;
non-ECOWAS neighbors especially Algeria, Mauritania, and Chad; the
African Union; the European Union, especially France, Germany and
Italy; the United Nations, and above all, the United States.
In his June testimony, Ambassador Carson reacted as follows to
Malian and African vows to restore territorial integrity, ``We think an
ECOWAS mission to militarily retake the north is ill-advised and not
feasible.'' Months later, however, at the U.N. and in Algiers to push a
reluctant Algeria, Secretary Clinton said kinder things about military
intervention. And last week at Howard University, here in Washington,
another senior State Department official said this: ``We support the
efforts of the government of Mali, ECOWAS, the African Union, the
United Nations, neighboring partners, and others in the international
community to prepare a military response as necessary, in accordance
with international law, to restore the unity of Mali.''
The pattern is unmistakable: U.S. policy toward Mali is evolving--
for the better, in my opinion. This is commendable.
Despite this progress, however, some concerns remain. Put another
way, further improvements are possible and needed in current Mali
policy. Consequently, the heart of my testimony today is to highlight
four such concerns/improvements. They are unequal, varying in
individual importance and weights.
The first concern/improvement is semantic and may appear trivial
and unimportant. But I believe this appearance is deceptive because
precise semantics reflect clear thinking which is a pre-requisite for
effective problemsolving.
A cocktail of four crises. That is how today's Mali situation is
described by the U.S.--and by all the major global actors and even most
analysts. The four are: the Bamako-centred broken democratic rule; the
deeply rooted, recalcitrant secessionist aspiration and wars of the
Tuaregs; Mali's loss of integrity over most of its territory and the
control of that area by violent religious extremists, significant
numbers of whom are foreigners; and the humanitarian crisis centred in
the north, epitomised by mass displacement of the population and fueled
by environmental deterioration, by the secessionist war, and by harsh
jihadist rule.
While agreeing that these four crises are afflicting Mali, I add a
fifth dimension--contagion--which must be recognized and explicitly
included in the discussion and analyses. By contagion I refer to the
clear and present danger that Tuareg irredentism, large population
displacements, and most critically, jihadist violence, will not be
contained within Mali's borders. Indeed they are already boiling over
and destabilizing other countries. And not just in Africa: Jihadist
violence especially has not been shy in declaring Europe and the U.S.
as its prime targets.
To a significant degree, the international community already
appreciates the high contagion risk in Mali. Contagion and enlightened
self-interest--and nothing else--explain why Paris, Bonn, and Brussels,
are so seized by the agony an impoverished African country. I am
convinced that were the risk of contagion negligible, Mali would get
little or no global attention.
But I am also convinced that significant benefits would flow from
explicitly adding contagion--correctly counting Mali's crises as five.
Put another way, I believe the American and European general publics,
if they became more persuaded that the jihadists in Mali have them in
the cross-hairs, would be far more supportive of rapid reaction to help
the Malians. In other words, recognizing the high risk of contagion
would mean much less foot dragging and hand-wringing outside Africa
when it comes to extinguishing the jihadist threat in Mali.
Nor can it be denied that such foot dragging does exist.
Irrefutable evidence is the reason. Exhibit A, to my mind, is time:
Seven months after 66 percent of Mali was violently sliced off by
irredentists who were then shoved aside by their own jihadist allies
who immediately began terrorizing and pushing out much of the populace,
the U.N. Security Council has still not authorized an alarmed Africa to
use force. Perhaps the Council has a convincing argument for such
nonchalance. If so I have not heard it. Which makes me wonder: Would
Security Council authorization would be this slow in coming had the
amputee country whose cultural heritage are being smashed been a rich,
powerful global player--Brazil, China, Canada, Germany, or Italy?
African disappointment and frustration at the delay is
unmistakable. This is apparent in a leaked letter sent last Thursday by
the Africa Union's head, President Boni Yayi of Benin to U.N. Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon. The letter described U.N. foot dragging as
``beneath the expectations of the African Continent as a whole,''
warned that this ``will be interpreted as a sign of weakness,'' and
advised that ``What we must avoid today is giving the impression that
we lack firmness in the face of determined terrorists.''
But reluctance to urgently and forcefully dislodge the terrorists
from Mali is not confined inside the Security Council. Sadly, and
hoping I am wrong, it seems apparent in U.S. policy too. As observed
above, compared to June, U.S. today is noticeably more serious about
Mali's terrorism crisis.
But this progress is clearly limited and insufficient. The State
Department continues to discourage a swift restoration of Mali's
territorial integrity and a forceful end to the terrorizing and
displacement of northern Malians which has continued for 7 months. This
conclusion seems inescapable after scrutinizing what last week's Howard
University statement said about intervention and contrasting that with
its stance on elections and negotiations.
On national elections across Mali in 2013: ``The United States
firmly believes that Mali's interim leaders must continue preparations
in earnest to hold elections in this timeframe simultaneous with
efforts to restore territorial integrity. We continue to encourage the
interim government to set a date for elections. The interim government
should build on the preparations that were undertaken before the
aborted April 2012 elections and hold elections as soon as possible
with as much of the country as possible . . . The return of democracy
must not be held hostage to the security agenda.'' [emphasis added].
On negotiations with the brutal terrorist and secessionist groups:
``We urge the interim government to find ways to effectively address
northern grievances in a peaceful manner . . . We also welcome the news
that representatives of MNLA have retracted the declaration of
independence of the north, and key figures in the MNLA and Ansar al
Dine have declared their readiness to negotiate with the interim
government. Mali's interim government must demonstrate its commitment
to negotiations by appointing a lead negotiator for the north.''
[emphasis added].
And on the overwhelming Africa desire to militarily eject the
jihadists and restore Mali: ``We . . . recognize that an African-led,
multinational force, supported by the international community, may be
necessary to assist the Malians to dislodge extremists from the north.
. . . '' [emphasis added].
Reflecting on these pronouncements, I conclude thus: The two top
priorities of the Department are first, elections by May 2013, and
second, negotiations with northern groups including the irredentist
MNLA and the jihadist Ansar Dine.
Sugar-coating feels impossible; so here goes: I disagree
respectfully but firmly with these State Department priorities. Instead
I believe the number one priority must be swift African-led
international military intervention (with zero European and American
boots on the ground, none) to restore Mali. Intervention must be given
higher priority over elections and over negotiations--vital as those
two are. To flip one of the State Department's assertions: Re-asserting
Mali's sovereignty, restoring its territorial integrity, and ending the
terrorizing of its population--these steps must remain top priority and
they must not be held hostage to hasty ill-planned elections in only
parts of the country, nor to endless haggling with violent,
untrustworthy groups of questionable legitimacy. But there is another
State Department argument that I do fully endorse, ``Any military
response in Mali should be well planned, managed, and resourced, and
account for civilian security . . . '' No question about that. But the
bottomline remains that I believe the State Department's current
priorities--putting security and Mali's restoration on the back
burner--have it backward.
Several arguments support my critique. To begin with, ECOWAS and
the African Union clearly prefer making security and Mali's restoration
the number one priority. President Yayi's fresh letter is only one
indicator among many of this strong African preference. This is not to
deny that forceful U.S. advocacy of a different strategy can be
extremely valuable in such a global effort. But it is to say that an
unmistakable contradiction must be acknowledged: dismissing what
Africans are loudly demanding negates the following assertion routinely
made by State, ``The United States supports the principle of regional
ownership . . . ''
A sequencing question also arises in this disagreement over
priorities. State is right in saying that all of Mali's crises are
critical and all must be addressed simultaneously. However, to govern
is to choose; this observation is a cliche precisely because it is so
true. Consequently, choices and setting of priorities must be made in
allocating resources to Mali's crisis. This poses a question: Is it a
better sequence to first establish reasonable peace and security in
Mali as a condition for properly preparing, organizing, and holding
credible elections across the country? In contrast to State, my answer
is emphatic yes.
Now it may well be that current Malian conditions and other
information justify the opposite sequence preferred by State:
prioritizing hasty, ill-prepared truncated elections in only part of a
war-torn country over the restoration of sovereignty, law and order
over 66 percent of Mali's territory. But if so, such conditions and
information must be woven into a convincing argument. So far, I have
not seen such an argument; I am yet to see the persuasive case made.
One's preferred images for seeing military intervention in Mali
constitute another important consideration in the priorities
disagreement. In a way it is a variation on the sequencing question.
Two images capture my view: Proper military intervention in Mali to me
is akin to a fire brigade that must race to a dangerous fire in a
crowded neighborhood. My other image is of intervention as the sending
of a SWAT team to a hostage situation. Either way, I see the proposed
African-led military intervention as a first responder. And like all
first responders, it must still respond first to bring to the swiftest
end to a dangerous emergency wreaking havoc.
To reiterate: In northern Mali, 7-month-old dire havoc must be
swiftly ended. For Malians the havoc takes the form of summary
executions; amputations and floggings; forced marriages; conscription
of child soldiers; confiscation or destruction of private property;
enforcement of dress codes; banning of much music; destruction of
ancient Islamic shrines recognized by globally as World Heritage
monuments; and forcing much of the northern population into involuntary
exile.
For the international community the havoc also includes contagion--
the reality that the jihadists will keep trying to attack bigger fish,
especially France and the United States.
The urgent need to immediately halt northern Mali's havoc is
crucial. This urgency drives my strong recommendation that the State
Department should upend its current priorities and adopt a new one
where military intervention is deemed a higher priority than elections
and negotiations--even though those two are very important. This
recommendation is the second--and by far the most important--among the
four policy improvements that this testimony is advocating.
Now to the third desired policy improvement. It emanates from
observed American attitudes toward the Tuareg minority in Mali. Mr.
Chairman, in the very first paragraph of this testimony I identified
myself as an ardent believer in democracy. Vanity was not the reason.
Nor does self-pity drive this other self-description: I am a double
ethnic minority--within both of the two countries I love: Ghana where I
was born and the United States where I immigrated almost four decades
ago. Rather, I offer the self-observations as possible explanations of
political sentiments I hold: I happen to possess deep empathy for
minorities everywhere and minority rights to me are no mere academic
concept.
Notwithstanding these sentiments, I am today concerned about
romanticization of the Tuareg political project in Mali. I fear this
may be coloring and tilting U.S. policy views and positions.
Specifically, evidence abounds of persistent U.S. pressure, throughout
2012, for Mali to concede ``that the Tuaregs and others in northern
Mali have legitimate political and socioeconomic grievances'' and to
negotiate with them. Washington has exerted this pressure on Bamako and
on ECOWAS, even though throughout the spring of 2012, when the MNLA
Tuareg had the choice, they rejected negotiation and opted to plunge
Mali into war, dismemberment, and other dire consequences. And even
though the MNLA cynically formed alliances with brutal Islamists like
Ansar Dine--whose leadership contains ethnic Tuaregs as well. I fail to
understand the U.S. is running so much interference for a minority that
rejected negotiation, unleashed devastating war, broke Mali's
territorial integrity and ceded most of the country to marauding
jihadists.
Two reasons drive my concern. Democracy, equal justice and peaceful
coexistence within multiethnic African countries constitute the big
one. According to one U.N. data source, Tuaregs form two related
branches among Mali's 57 ethnic groups. At 813,000 they constitute 5
percent of today's population of 16,319,000. Given this slim proportion
within much diversity, extra care must be taken to avoid creating the
impression of unfair ethnic favoritism for the Tuaregs--especially one
purchased through the barrel of a gun.
African colonial history is my other reason. After carving up
Africa, 19th century European imperialists embarked on strategies of
divide, weaken, and rule. They vigorously promoted division by
romanticizing some groups while demonizing others; by rewarding others
while depriving others; and by stirring up mutual prejudice, suspicion,
and antagonism. The baleful consequences still plague Africa more than
a century later. The visible signs discernible from Rwanda to Nigeria,
and from Kenya and Congo to Cote d'Ivoire are only the tip of an
iceberg. This politicized ethnicity may even apply to Mali's Tuaregs.
Some analysts suggest that in addition to legitimate grievances, the
four secessionist wars of the Tuaregs have been driven by a superiority
complex. Allegedly, with independence approaching, French colonialists
encouraged the lighter-skinned Tuaregs to refuse to live under the rule
of Mali's darker-skinned majority, presumed to be inferior. These
analysts claim that this is a reason why the very first Tuareg
rebellion against Bamako's rule happened within days of independence.
The third policy improvement this testimony is advocating then is
this: The U.S. must put in place effective mechanisms and bend over
backward to ensure that its pronouncements and positions are not
perceived as playing ethnic favorites in Mali.
Policy review and adjustment is the fourth and final improvement
this testimony calls for. The policy in question is America's
counterterrorism strategy not just in Mali before the implosion, but
across the Sahel-Sahara area and from 9/11 to today.
If a reason for the review is required, perhaps the following can
suffice. A question has persisted since Mali's implosion almost a year
ago: Why did the collapse of the much-admired 20-year democracy happen
so fast and with such apparent ease? To find answers, all possibilities
must be explored. As noted above, some observers, several years ago,
had become concerned at the counterterrorism strategy's close
militaristic embrace of Mali's young democracy. Consequently, one
hypothetical possibility is that the strategy inadvertently
contributed. After all, Captain Sanogo, the soldier who inflicted the
fatal blow, had been trained multiple times by the U.S. as part of the
strategy.
I have a preferred list of constituent elements within the strategy
which must be scrutinized for their possible impact on Mali. They must
include AFRICOM, the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Program (TSCTP),
Operation Flintlock, and the curriculum used to train African soldiers.
The policy review must establish if any of these produced unintended or
unforeseen consequences in Mali. If so the consequences and their
causal mechanisms must be fully understood. One narrow practical reason
why is obvious. Any detrimental consequences in Mali must be guarded
against in Mauritania and Niger where TSCTP is being operated right
now. A broader positive reason can also be advanced for the policy
review: It could lead to improvements that make more effective the
overall strategy that the U.S. has used to fight the scourge of
terrorism across Africa since 9/11.
THUMBNAIL ANSWERS TO SELECT QUESTIONS IN INVITATION LETTER
Mr Chairman, your invitation letter posed several questions. They
have proved extremely helpful in shaping the preceding bulk of my
testimony. In this rump section I will provide direct thumbnail answers
to a select few.
Q1: What recommendations do you have for U.S. policy as we consider
next steps in addressing the simultaneous political, security,
humanitarian crises in Mali?
As the bulk of the testimony elaborates, I make four strong
recommendations. Washington must:
(a) Highlight the high contagion risk in Mali and designate
contagion as crisis #5.
(b) Change the State Department's current priorities and place
military intervention to dislodge terrorists from northern Mali above
elections and negotiations.
(c) Take precautions to prevent U.S. from being perceived as
practicing ethnic favoritism to benefit Tuaregs.
(d) Conduct thorough, in-depth review of U.S. counterterrorism
strategy, especially how the component elements of AFRICOM, TSCTP,
Operation Flintlock, and training of African soldiers worked or not in
Mali and then adjust policies accordingly.
Q2: Why were we so unprepared for the recent coup in Mali, a
country which was largely heralded as a stable democracy for so many
years? What lessons can be learned from this experience as we look at
U.S. policy toward Mali and the region?
This first is among the questions that can only be well answered
following a thorough policy review. One superficial answer is that
presumably we, like everyone else, were taken in by the appearances and
failed to drill below the surface. Regarding causes, chances are that
many causal factors contributed to Mali's implosion. Good candidate
hypotheses to test include: (a) the extreme fragility of all infant
democracies; (b) the incentive to focus on foreign terrorists diverted
Mali's attention from aggrieved domestic groups such as the Tuaregs;
(c) why TSCTP failed to make a capable fighting force of Mali's army;
(d) the failure to detect and neutralize armed Tuaregs moving into Mali
from Libya; and (e) the failure to come to the aid of Bamako once
Tuaregs from Libya struck in January and to give sufficient help in
defeating returning Tuaregs. Lessons, like causes, are best extracted
after thorough policy review. Excellent early warning systems that
target domestic grievances may be one likely lesson. Another might be
to change curriculum for training African soldiers to imbue them with
sacred and robust respect for civilian control.
Q3: What are the regional implications of AQIM's presence in
northern Mali and what is the extent of the threat to U.S. interests?
The implications cannot be good--especially the more time AQIM has
to create a thriving haven in northern Mali, a territory as big as
France. Significantly, it has already been reported that AQIM personnel
probably participated in inflicting the U.S. national trauma that was
the Benghazi murder of Ambassador Stevens and his three colleagues.
Being no expert, I must defer to the judgement of the countless
experts advising both State and DOD--except to observe that with time
the threat to the U.S. can only worsen.
Q5: How can the government in Bamako negotiate more effectively
with the
Tuaregs?
I believe legitimacy on both sides is the key, a critical
prerequisite. The Bamako government must be democratically elected.
Similarly, Tuareg leaders negotiated with must also be legitimate
representatives of the community and its subgroups. We must not be
satisfied with unelected, self-appointed Tuareg individuals. This again
bolsters the sequence that this testimony advocates: security first,
then impeccably prepared democratic elections to reveal Mali's real
leaders both in Bamako and among Tuaregs.
Q6: How might military operation impact the humanitarian situation
in the north and plans for elections, and what is a realistic timetable
for holding elections in 2013?
Clearly, war would affect the humanitarian situation for the worse.
However precautions can and must be taken to minimize the detrimental
effects. This is because the risks and consequences of not intervening
and leaving northern Mali at the mercy of the brutal jihadists, those
risks and consequences are far worse than intervention and they will
only deteriorate with time.
Q7: What are potential implications of holding elections without
the participation of the northerners in the north?
I believe this runs a high risk of opening up a messy post-
elections Pandora's box. Sore losers would make all manner of claims.
At worse they could ignite small wars and stir up other trouble across
a land already torn by war and instability.
This risk bolsters the argument for a sequence of restoring Mali
first and thereafter making impeccable plans and preparations for free
and fair elections nationwide.
Cote d'Ivoire's recent trauma may be instructive. Ex-President
Laurent Gbagbo's claim of rigging failed to convince the world
precisely because there had been 5 years of pains-taking and
transparent electoral preparations. The Gbagbo claims would likely have
been more credible, the world would have been more divided and the
Ivorian civil war would have been longer and bloodier had the elections
been less well prepared.
CLOSING
Mr. Chairman, let me express again my deep appreciation for this
focus on a grave situation afflicting countless Africans. I hope that
my opinions are of some use. I would be glad to respond to any
questions or clarifications you might have.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Mr. Akuetteh.
Mr. Mahmoud, you've been quite patient. You are, if I
understand correctly, in Bamako at the U.S. Embassy, and I'm
grateful for your taking the time and for being quite patient
in joining with the six other witnesses we've already heard
from. I'd like to invite your testimony now.
STATEMENT OF MOHAMED OULD MAHMOUD, VICE PRESIDENT, LOBBYING
NETWORK FOR PEACE, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT FOR NORTHERN MALI,
BAMAKO, MALI
Mr. Mahmoud. Thank you very much for inviting me to talk
about the issue.
Early in January 2012, the rebellion started under the
label of MNLA, National Movement of Azawad Liberation. It took
3 months for the army to be defeated and sent back to the
capital, Bamako. The national army was at the threshold of its
capacity to sustain security and national integrity. Therefore,
the morale of the troops was seriously undermined, and the
military was horrified by exactions of the insurgents mainly in
Aguelhoc and Tessalit. Accordingly, the army claimed munitions
and guns to be more equipped to face the insurgents. This
demand was followed by demonstrations and riots from the army
which led to the coup in March 2012.
However, the northern part of the country was really
occupied by all kinds of networks--drug trafficking, arms
smuggling, hijacking, tribal conflicts, and so on. The National
Security Forces had never controlled the area for the last 20
years and, therefore, the GISP had found a no-man's land to
operate and implement his terrorism activities. They enrolled
and trained many young people coming from many countries.
The GPC--the Salafist Group for Call and Combat--became
AQIM--Al Qaeda of the Northern Maghreb--and developed an
international network of recruitment of jihadists. Furthermore,
AQIM became the most important security actor in northern Mali
and controlled all roads of drug trafficking and arms
smuggling. AQIM leaders also developed a strong connection with
security officials, politicians, traders, and some local
chiefs' tribes. This situation turned AQIM into an important
actor within the local communities by delivering some basic
services such as health care and water supply, and later on,
the group started offering equity and justice through the soft
application of sharia law.
Meanwhile, officials of the central government were very
reticent to talk or hear about these issues because of their
strong involvement in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and the
liberation of Western hostages. As a result, community leaders
became more and more skeptical of the role of the central
government to take charge of the local security issues and
deliver justice and equity all over the country, especially
where controlling drug trafficking and AQIM are concerned.
Alternatively, leaders in the north started to concert and
organize themselves to determine the best way to face the
terrorist activities and take control of drug trafficking. In
December 2009, all community leaders and stakeholders from the
north held a meeting in Kidal to share information and debate
about the best approaches to deal with terrorist activities.
The 3-day meeting resulted in the formation of the Chiefs
Network for Lobbying for Peace and Development.
Groups controlling the northern part. Since the clashes
between MUJAO and MNLA, there remain only three main groups
controlling the area: Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM. These
different groups have one common interest, the implementation
of the sharia law. MNLA, on the other hand, was claiming the
independence of the Azawad Republic.
MNLA currently has no control of any territory in the
north, but they are claiming to adhere to the values of
democracy and ``laicite''--secularism--unlike the three other
groups. MNLA is composed of former Tuareg rebellion officers
and intellectuals and is reinforced by the former Libyan
Leaders Legion. This organization was the most popular among
the youth community, but today it has lost its credibility as
it has lost its ability to control the north. During the last
months, MNLA has lowered its own political ambitions and
instead of claiming the independence of Azawad, MNLA members
are now talking about federalism.
Ansar Dine was created by Iyad Ag Aghaly to balance the
leadership of rising MNLA, which did not accept him as a
leader. On the other hand, Ansar Dine was created to protect
the interests of the Ifoghas community, and it has benefited
from the protection of AQIM where Iyad Ag Aghaly used to be an
important intermediary with the central government to free
hostages.
Ansar Dine is today controlling two main regions, Kidal and
Timbuktu. This group is joined by some jihadists of AQIM and
MNLA fighters. Ansar Dine has tried to combine forces with MNLA
many times without success, up until now. This failure of
having a single Tuareg organization has demobilized too many
fighters from MNLA to Ansar Dine.
It seems today that Ansar Dine has integrated militants and
fighters from MNLA and built credibility within the Tuareg
community.
The relationship between Ansar Dine and AQIM is a tactical
deal to consolidate the leadership of the Ifoghas communities
and create a connection between AQIM and local leaders. In
reality, Ansar Dine had no sound political agenda, and this
explains the will of Ansar Dine to join jihadists in the
implementation of sharia law. This practice does not fit with
the expectations and traditions of the Tuareg community.
Ansar Dine has the strongest military position compared to
MUJAO and MNLA. To get Ansar Dine out of the influence of AQIM,
we need to create a space of debate for the Tuareg community as
a whole in order to decide what will be the most appropriate
future of the society, the ruling system, and the spiritual and
cultural dimensions. The strategy to create the space and
framework for people to talk would help dilute the role of the
actual Ansar Dine leaders.
MUJAO is an international network of jihadists hosted by
the Lamhar community of Gao. It is composed of Arabs who are
specialized in drug trafficking and who have a strong
connection with AQIM leaders. The only agenda held by MUJAO is
to create terror beyond the Malian borders and to impose their
local leadership on other communities in the region. This is
the most criminal organization and will never give up drug
trafficking and terrorism as activities.
People's perceptions and expectations. The majority of
people living under the occupation and who are in refugee camps
want to see an end to AQIM's activities and living in a strong
state which can ensure freedom, equity, and justice. War is the
last wanted solution because terrorists and others groups could
easily escape and leave the people under the bombs of
international community.
How to get the north back to the country. First of all, we
need a legitimate and credible central government in the south.
We have to organize free and independent elections. This does
not mean that the north is neglected, but it's the part of
starting point.
To engage talk with Ansar Dine and MNLA; to create spaces
for people and local leaders to debate on the future of their
lives; and to change the national governance which could allow
freedom of choices.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mahmoud follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mohamed Ould Mahmoud
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Early in January 2012, the rebellion started under the label of
MNLA (National movement of Azawad liberation). It took 3 months for the
army to be defeated and sent back to the capital, Bamako; the national
army was at the threshold of its capacity to sustain security and
national integrity. Therefore, the moral of the troops was seriously
undermined, and the military was horrified by exactions of the
insurgents mainly in Aguelhoc and Tessalit. Accordingly, the army
claimed munitions and guns to be more equipped to face the insurgents;
this demand was followed by demonstrations and riots from the army
which led to the coup in March 2012.
However, the northern part of the country was really occupied by
all kinds of networks (drugs trafficking, arms smugglings, hijacking,
tribal conflicts, and so on). The national security forces had never
controlled the area for the last 20 years, and therefore, the GISP had
found a no man's land to operate and implement his terrorism
activities. They enrolled and trained many young people coming from
many countries.
The GPC (The Salafist Group for Call and Combat) became AQIM (Al-
Qaeda of the Northern Maghreb) and developed an international network
of recruitment of jihadists. Furthermore, AQIM became the most
important security actor in northern Mali and controlled all roads of
drugs trafficking and arms smuggling. AQIM leaders also developed a
strong connection with security officials, politicians, traders and
some local chiefs tribes. This situation turned AQIM into an important
actor within the local communities by delivering some basic services
such as health care and water supply, and later on, the group started
offering equity and justice through the soft application of sharia law.
Meanwhile, officials of the central government were very reticent
to talk or hear about these issues because of their strong involvements
in drugs trafficking, arms smuggling, and the liberation of Western
hostages. As a result, community leaders became more and more skeptical
of the role of the central government to take charge of the local
security issues and deliver justice and equity all over the country,
especially where controlling drugs trafficking and AQIM are concerned.
Alternatively, leaders in the north started to concert and organize
themselves to determine the best way to face the terrorist activities
and take control of drugs trafficking. In December 2009, all community
leaders and stakeholders from the north held a meeting in Kidal to
share information and debate about the best approaches to deal with
terrorist activities. The 3-day meeting resulted in the formation of
the ``Chiefs Network for Lobbying for Peace and Development.''
GROUPS CONTROLLING THE NORTHERN PART
Since the clashes between MUJAO and MNLA, there remain only three
main groups controlling the area: ANSAR DEEN, MUJAO and AQMI. These
different groups have one common interest--the implementation of the
sharia law. MNLA, on the other hand, was claiming the independence of
the Azawad Republic.
MNLA currently has no control of any territory in the north
but they are claiming to adhere to the values of democracy and
``laicite'' (secularism) unlike the three other groups. MNLA is
composed of former Touareg rebellion officers and intellectuals
and is reinforced by the former Libyan Leaders Legion. This
organization was the most popular among the youth community,
but today, it has lost its credibility as it has lost its
ability to control the north. During the last months, MNLA has
lowered its own political ambitions, and instead of claiming
the independence of Azawad, MNLA members are now talking about
federalism.
Ansar Dine was created by Iyad Ag Aghaly to balance the
leadership of rising MNLA which did not accept him as a leader.
On the other hand, Ansar Dine was created to protect the
interests of the Ifoghas community, and it has benefited from
the protection of AQIM where Iyad Ag Aghaly used to be an
important intermediary with the central government to free
hostages. Ansar Dine is today controlling two main regions
(Kidal and Timbuktu). This group is joined by some jihadists of
AQIM and MNLA fighters. Ansar Dine has tried to combine forces
with MNLA many times without success up until now. This failure
of having a single Touareg organization has demobilized too
many fighters from MNLA to Ansar Dine.
It seems today that Ansar Dine has integrated militants and
fighters from MNLA and built credibility within the Touareg
community.
The relationship between Ansar Dine and AQIM is a tactical deal
to consolidate the leadership of the Ifoghas communities and
create a connection between AQIM and local leaders. In reality,
Ansar Dine had no sound political agenda, and this explains the
will of Ansar Dine to join jihadists in the implementation of
sharia law. This practice does not fit with the expectations
and traditions of the Touareg community. Ansar Dine has the
strongest military position compared to MUJAO and MNLA. To get
Ansar Dine out of the influence of AQIM, we need to create a
space of debate for the Touareg community as a whole in order
to decide what will be the most appropriate future of the
society, the ruling system, and the spiritual and cultural
dimensions.
The strategy to create the space and framework for people to talk
would help dilute the role of the actual Ansar Dine leaders.
MUJAO is an international network of jihadists hosted by the
LAMHAR community of GAO. It is composed of Arabs who are
specialized in drugs trafficking and who have a strong
connection with AQIM leaders. The only agenda held by Mujao is
to create terror beyond the Malian borders and to impose their
local leadership on other communities in the region. This is
the most criminal organization and will never give up drugs
trafficking and terrorism as activities.
PEOPLE'S PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
The majority of people living under the occupation and who are in
refugee camps want to see an end to AQIM's activities and living in a
strong state which can insure freedom, equity, and justice. War is the
last wanted solution because terrorists and others groups could easily
escape and leave the people under the bombs of international community.
HOW TO GET THE NORTH BACK TO THE COUNTRY
First of all, we need a legitimate and credible central
government in south. We have to organize free and independent
elections. This does not mean that the north is neglected but
it's the part of starting point.
To engage talk with Ancar Deen and MNLA;
To create spaces for people and local leaders to debate on
the future of their lives; and
To change the national governance which could allow freedom
of choices.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Mahmoud.
I'm going to ask one question. Just if I could summarize,
and thank you for your testimony, each of the four members of
this panel. The United States has had a long and a close
relationship with the Malian people. We have long supported
development, security, democracy. The developments of the last
year, nearly 2 years, have been very upsetting, disturbing,
troubling. We now have a significant area of Mali and many of
its people facing security challenges, legitimacy challenges,
human rights abuses, fundamental human rights abuses caused by
many different actors, and this should cause us in the United
States to reconsider some of our strategic approaches and some
of our choices.
If each of you had one suggestion for what is the most
important thing that we should be taking away from this hearing
and pressing for the United States to do, whether to advance
human rights, to advance a secure and credible election, to
advance a regional strategy that is successful, or to ensure
that we effectively engage with the real human needs of the
people of Mali, what is your one suggestion for us, for our
actions going forward?
Mr. Mahmoud, I will start with you, and then Mr. Akuetteh,
Ms. Dufka, and Dr. Fomunyoh.
Mr. Mahmoud. I think for us, the first thing to do is to
get this election done, a legitimate government in Bamako, so
that they can stop openly the rebellion movement in the north.
As far as we don't have legitimacy, we can't move forward to a
peaceful north, and even the south part of the country.
I'm afraid that even Bamako and the other cities will be
occupied by the terrorists and so on. So we should be rushing
to get this election done as soon as possible.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Mr. Mahmoud.
Mr. Akuetteh.
Mr. Akuetteh. Thank you very much. My choice would be, my
recommended choice would be a regional strategy for combating
terrorism, because I do think if you look at what has happened,
a lot of Africans have been killed. So terrorism in Africa is
not just a threat to the United States. It is to Africans, too.
Now, the kind of strategy that I will stress, though, is I
think it has to be rooted in democracy and social justice and
good governance inside every African country. That will then
take away the grievances and the things that will attract--
create terrorists.
Now, if there are foreign terrorists coming around, there
are different ways of dealing with them. But I do think that it
has to be rooted in democracy because if we focus on foreign
terrorists and ignore what is happening inside countries, I
think it's really dangerous. For 2 years, some of us were
worried about the lack of focus on the Tuareg problem until
they moved back from Mali.
So I think the regional strategy rooted in democracy as a
way of fighting the big threats of terrorism across Africa.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Ms. Dufka.
Ms. Dufka. You've given us the most difficult question. I
would say a few things. Of course, I see things through the
prism of rule-of-law institutions which, as I've noted, were
very weak.
I would say to encourage a dialogue in which all Malians
can be a part, because to focus only on the Tuaregs and those
Tuaregs who have taken up arms, which are a tiny minority--
there were a lot of Tuaregs who were not in favor of this war.
They felt it was a very opportunistic action on the part of a
very few. So to open up with respect to the north, to ensure
that there is a dialogue so that all voices in the north can be
heard, not just the Tuaregs who have taken up arms, and to
ensure a dialogue that would address the underlying causes
which affect all Malians, not just Malians in the north but
some of these rule-of-law issues that affect all Malians.
And then, of course, do not forget the issue of addressing
abuses and the culture of impunity, which could potentially
lead to much graver violations in the future as military
intervention happens and after a vacuum is left in some of
these areas in the north in which abuses could happen. Thank
you.
Senator Coons. A broad and inclusive dialogue, and real
accountability.
Dr. Fomunyoh.
Dr. Fomunyoh. Mr. Chairman, I would say the one thing to
take out of this is I think all of us are trying to draw
lessons from the Malian experience and asking ourselves
constantly what happened to this country that for 20 years
seemed to be a functioning democracy. I think one of the
takeaways for us is that elections, even when held regularly,
do not necessarily an effective democracy make.
So even if we fast-forward into 2013 and the military
operation goes well, and the big cities are regained by the
government in Bamako, and we have good elections, inclusive
elections, I think the one lesson that we should all take from
this experience is the need for sustainable partnerships, that
democracy support programs shouldn't end with support for an
electoral process. We really have to deepen the process of
service delivery and strengthening of institutions.
Senator Coons. Terrific. Thank you very much. I appreciate
those concise summations.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Underlining concise, I'll be quick.
I thank all of you for your testimony. Mr. Mahmoud, thank
you very much for your testimony. You focused on one of the
first, most important needs is a credible government in Mali,
in the south.
I'll ask Ms. Dufka a question. I asked the DOD lady before,
Amy, or Amanda. Evidently, from your testimony, Captain Sanogo
is not the kind of guy that would be the representative of
reform. Is that correct?
Ms. Dufka. Yes.
Senator Isakson. I think that's representative of what Mr.
Mahmoud said and what they need in terms of the government to
build on.
Second, I want to make a comment. Mr. Akuetteh made a
critical observation, adding contagion as a fifth concern in
Mali, and it may be really the biggest concern for the United
States of America, because if this spreads across boundaries
and if Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb becomes more and more
powerful in neighboring partners around there, it will be a
significant problem not just for the United States but for all
of West Africa, and I appreciate your testimony on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Senator Isakson. I'm
always grateful for your partnership and for the ease with
which our staff works together to prepare these important
hearings.
Forgive us but it is past 11 o'clock, our appointed hour.
All of your testimony, all of your written testimony will be
submitted for the record.
There were several other Senators who expressed real
interest in this hearing today but due to their schedules were
not able to join us. So I'm going to leave the record open for
a week, which will allow other Senators to submit questions for
the record of any of our witnesses, and for us to then take
some actions going forward.
I'm grateful for the support efforts that made it possible
for us to get a great and full discussion of the many
challenging issues facing us in the United States, in the
region, and in Mali.
Thank you, Mr. Mahmoud, for joining us from Bamako.
Thank you, Dr. Fomunyoh. Thank you, Ms. Dufka. And thank
you, Mr. Akuetteh. We are grateful for your testimony today.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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