[Senate Hearing 112-618]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-618
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT OF ITS NATIONAL
SECURITY LABORATORIES
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK BEGICH, Alaska ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
National Nuclear Security Administration Management of Its National
Security Laboratories
april 18, 2012
Page
Patel, Dr. C. Kumar N., President and Chief Executive Officer,
Pranalytica, Inc.; Co-Chair, National Research Council
Committee on Review of the Quality of the Management and of the
Science and Engineering Research at the Department of Energy's
National Security Laboratories-Phase 1......................... 9
Shank, Dr. Charles V., Senior Fellow, Howard Hughes Medical
Institute; Co-Chair, National Research Council Committee on
Review of the Quality of the Management and of the Science and
Engineering Research at the Department of Energy's National
Security Laboratories-Phase 1.................................. 14
McMillan, Dr. Charles F., Director, Los Alamos National
Laboratory..................................................... 15
Albright, Dr. Penrose C., Director, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory..................................................... 22
Hommert, Dr. Paul J., Director, Sandia National Laboratories..... 31
(iii)
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT OF ITS NATIONAL
SECURITY LABORATORIES
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Inhofe, and
Vitter.
Majority staff member present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel Lerner, professional
staff member.
Staff assistant present: Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Ryan Ehly, assistant
to Senator Nelson; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; and Charles Brittingham, assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. Let me today call the hearing to order.
Senator Sessions is in a budget hearing at the moment, so
he is not going to be able to join us, but Senator Inhofe is a
member of the subcommittee and he will be joining us shortly.
In the meantime, I thought we might get started.
I have two cans of pop here. I do not intend to drink both
of them, but when there is only one and you run out, you do not
have a successor. So it might be a two-drink hearing.
[Laughter.]
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the
relationship between the National Nuclear Security Agency
(NNSA), and its national security laboratories. We had a
similar hearing on this topic on March 14 with the NNSA, and
today it is the national security laboratories' turn to comment
on this relationship.
We also have as a witness the Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the National Academies of Science panel that examined how this
relationship is affecting the quality of science and
engineering at the labs.
Let me thank all of you for agreeing to testify today. It
is an exceptionally important hearing but also one whose time
has come and is due.
This hearing will examine five issues that have been
highlighted in part by the recent National Academies of Science
report on laboratory management.
First, how can the relationship between the NNSA and its
laboratories be streamlined to avoid the layers of bureaucracy
as it currently exists?
Second, how can the NNSA and its laboratories restore a
relationship of trust to minimize the detailed reporting
requirements that have resulted from a lack of trust?
Third, how can the NNSA be aligned within the Department of
Energy (DOE) to achieve independence as originally envisioned
when it was created 12 years ago?
Fourth, how can your laboratories be viewed as national
security assets to the U.S. Government as a whole?
Fifth, can your laboratories, as currently configured and
funded, meet the current Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear
stockpile requirements?
Those are the questions.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) brought
great attention to modernizing the laboratories' infrastructure
which in many cases dates over 60 years to the Manhattan
Project. The Budget Control Act has put constraints on the rate
at which much of this modernization can be achieved, but its
importance has not been lost on this Congress. That in order to
safely reduce the number of nuclear weapons deployed, we must
at a minimum ensure that our infrastructure can maintain these
fewer numbers of weapons so they are safe, secure, and
militarily effective.
Many experts such as former Secretaries Bill Perry and Jim
Schlesinger have stated the importance of this issue, and as
recently as last month, General Kehler, the Commander in Chief
of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), said before the full
committee that, ``of all the elements of the nuclear
enterprise, I am most concerned with the potential for
declining or inadequate investment in the nuclear weapons
enterprise that would result in our inability to sustain the
deterrent force.'' These are very serious words from the
combatant commander that is charged with ensuring our nuclear
deterrent and that it is capable of meeting the requirements
levied on it by the President and the Secretary of Defense.
As we examine the needs of each of your laboratories and
the large investments that they require to modernize, we in
Congress are worried and concerned that these investments will
not be used to the maximum extent possible if the relationship
between the NNSA and its laboratories is, as described by our
National Academies witnesses, ``dysfunctional.''
I look forward to hearing from each of you in the most
candid manner possible. We are emphasizing candor, not that we
would expect anything else, but I want to make sure that it is
clear that we are really pushing hard because this is your
chance to inform this subcommittee on the issues we must be
concerned with to help fix a broken relationship between the
NNSA and its laboratories as we begin to draft our annual
authorization bill for DOD and DOE.
I also have the white paper endorsed by the three
laboratory directors, and I would like to ask unanimous consent
that it be entered into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Nelson. When Senator Inhofe gets here--my good
friend and colleague--we will ask him for any opening remarks
that he may make.
Now it is an opportunity, if we might just start with Dr.
Patel and go down the line. I am going to emphasize brevity
but, on the other hand, not at the risk of candor. Dr. Patel?
STATEMENT OF DR. C. KUMAR N. PATEL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PRANALYTICA, INC.; CO-CHAIR, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON REVIEW OF THE QUALITY OF THE
MANAGEMENT AND OF THE SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING RESEARCH AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES-PHASE 1
Dr. Patel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you so well pointed
out the importance of the three national laboratories, this
study dealt with the present state looking at the management of
science and engineering and how it affects the long-term
sustainability of these activities while these activities,
science and engineering, are very important for maintaining the
nuclear stockpile safety, security, and its reliance.
Overall, we find that the status of management of science
and engineering at the laboratories is in good shape, in good
hands. However, there are a number of issues that need
immediate attention, and these include, first of all, blurring
of the responsibilities between NNSA and the laboratory
managers, undue emphasis on formalities, and management by
transaction rather than by oversight. The issue of management
and oversight is not the same. Management at the microscopic
level slows down individual's capability to be creative. It
slows down the amount of work that gets done and overall it
turns out to be less cost-effective than what it should be.
Yes, there were some problems earlier with respect to
safety and security, but those are well under control. Now the
time has come to carry out the management and oversight not by
transaction but by having the proper systems in place because
that, as we see from industrial experience, turns out to be the
most cost-effective way of spending funds which are allocated,
in this case public monies.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to open
the hearing.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Shank and Dr. Patel
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Dr. Charles V. Shank and Dr. C. Kumar N.
Patel
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and members
of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee:
My name is C. Kumar N. Patel. I am the President and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Pranalytica, a company located in Santa
Monica, CA. Concurrently, I am also a Professor of Physics and
Astronomy at UCLA. I had the privilege of co-chairing with Dr. Shank
the Committee on Review of the Quality of the Management and of the
Science and Engineering Research at the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Security Laboratories at the National Research Council. Dr.
Shank and I will provide the highlights of the committee's findings and
are available to respond to your questions.
The National Research Council is the operating arm of the National
Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the
Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, chartered by Congress
in 1863 to advise the government on matters of science and technology.
STUDY TASK
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
identified concerns regarding the quality and management of Science and
Engineering at the three National Security Labs and in turn mandated
that NNSA task the National Research Council (NRC) to study the quality
and management of Science and Engineering (S&E) at these Laboratories:
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
(LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The study is being
conducted in two phases. Phase one, which is completed, concerns
management of S&E. The second phase will look in detail at selected S&E
subject areas.
Health and vitality of science and engineering is critical for the
long term viability of the National Security Laboratories and their
ability to support the national defense and security needs, especially
as they concern our nuclear weapons. The primary mission of these
laboratories, assuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear
stockpile, requires that the science and engineering that forms the
underpinning of the needed technical capability, remain at the
forefront by having the best possible scientists and engineers and by
having the best management practices that maximizes the productivity of
the available resources.
Our report today addresses the management of the three NNSA
laboratories with specific emphasis on how management affects the
quality of the science and engineering needed to fulfill the charter of
these laboratories. ``Quality of S&E'' for the purposes of the report
measures the expertise and accomplishments in those areas of science
and engineering that are necessary to accomplish the laboratories'
missions. ``Quality of the management of S&E'' measures management's
capability to build, maintain and nurture S&E personnel and expertise
for current and future mission needs. Management includes government
(primarily NNSA and its three site offices), operations (M&O)
contractors, and onsite laboratory management.
Our overall conclusion is that the laboratory management is aware
of the importance of S&E for accomplishing their primary mission and
that the management is committed to assuring the long term health and
vitality of S&E. However, we have discerned a number of issues that
need early, if not immediate, attention to meet the long-term goals of
excellence of S&E. These include the blurring of the responsibilities
of NNSA and the laboratory managers, undue emphasis on formalities of
management, often as a result of congressional reporting requirements,
an apparent loss of trust between NNSA and the Laboratories and last
but not the least enormous pressure on the financial resources
available for carrying out the S&E mission. We recognize that some of
the onerous reporting requirements arose from serious lapses of safety
and security matters. But we have also concluded that most if not all
of the safety and security issues are under control and that it is
appropriate now to transfer the responsibility for these activities to
the local management. We have provided a number of recommendations,
which if implemented would help the laboratory management in carrying
out their task in a cost effective manner.
CONDUCT OF THE STUDY
To conduct the first phase, the NRC formed a study committee whose
membership was carefully chosen to provide broad and deep applicable
expertise and experience in the management of science and engineering
at major research and development laboratories. The committee members
include former directors of major government and industry laboratories,
current and former laboratory executives, and others with relevant
experience and expertise. The primary mode of gathering information was
through presentations and testimony from, and discussions with, a
substantial number of experts. These included current and former
managers and technical staff associated with the NNSA, the DOE, and the
laboratories, and the site offices. The study committee's meetings
included visits to each of the three laboratories for extensive
discussions with laboratory staff, as well as open public comment
sessions at which current and former laboratory employees, union
representatives, and others were given the opportunity to share their
views and experiences. The committee also examined the most recent
available management and operations (M&O) contracts, performance
evaluation plans (PEP), performance evaluation reports (PER), contract
management plans, parent organization oversight plans, and other
similar documents for each of the three laboratories.
The issue of management of these three laboratories is complex, and
has a long history. Within the mandated terms of reference of the
study, the committee concluded that the basic questions before it are:
(1) how well does the current management system support the conduct of
quality science and engineering now and into the future? (2) are there
significant management problems that need to be solved? (3) to what
extent are these problems the result of the change in contractors at
LANL and LLNL? (4) what are the most important problems, and what does
the committee recommend to resolve those problems? The committee set as
its goal the production of a short report that focuses on what it found
to be most important. Accordingly, our report addresses four topics:
the contracts; research base and the evolution of the mission; the
broken relationship; and management of S&E at the laboratories. We will
speak to these, and then conclude with our observations concerning the
future.
STUDY FINDINGS
Contracts
The contracting relationships between the DOE and its laboratories
have in some cases endured for many decades. In 2004, Congress mandated
that the longstanding contracts with the University of California to
manage Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories (LLNL
and LANL) be re-competed. As a result, these two contracts were awarded
to two independent limited liability corporations (LLCs) that both
include Bechtel Corporation and the University of California in their
parent organizations. Subsequently, Congress developed concerns about
the quality of science and engineering at the Laboratories, including
whether changes in contracts and contractors may have had a deleterious
effect on the quality of science and engineering.
The study committee heard testimony that LLNL and LANL were having
morale crises as a consequence of the change of management from a
public entity to a for-profit contractor. A number of current and
former employees of these laboratories expressed concerns about
deterioration of morale at the laboratories along with ongoing or
potential declines in the quality of science and engineering. Many
attributed those inferred trends to the new M&O contracts and
contractors. While it is true that all three labs have been under cost
and funding pressure, we did not find a morale crisis related to
actions of the new contractors. The costs of the recompeted contracts
are significantly greater than the previous contracting arrangements;
this is due primarily to the changes in contractor fees, state taxes,
and pensions. Some have been concerned that contractors pursuing fee
might not act in the public interest. The laboratory directors stated
that while fee is important, their primary objective remains to manage
the laboratories in the public interest. This concern is an important
one and constant vigilance will be required.
Evolution of the Mission
An evolution of the laboratory missions to ``National Security
Laboratories'' is well underway. Deputy NNSA Administrator Don Cook
presented to the Committee a vision for the laboratories, including a
governance charter among four agencies (the Departments of Energy,
Homeland Security, and Defense, plus the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence) to take advantage of the S&E capabilities of
these three laboratories. In a time of constrained budgets, broadening
the mandate to a national security mission helps preserve S&E expertise
by working on problems posed by partner agencies. Access to this
problem set helps the NNSA laboratories to recruit and retain S&E
capabilities beyond what could be achieved solely with available funds
in the stockpile stewardship program. While such work for others is
very important for the future of S&E at the laboratories, all three of
the laboratory directors were very clear that maintenance of the
stockpile remains the core mission of the labs.
The committee recommends that Congress recognize that maintenance
of the stockpile remains the core mission of the labs and that other
national security mission work contributes to the accomplishment of
that mission and in that context Congress should consider endorsing and
supporting in some way the evolution of the NNSA laboratories to
National Security Laboratories as described in the July 2010 four-
agency Governance Charter for an Interagency Council on the Strategic
Capability of DOE National Laboratories.
A crucial part of the laboratories' ability to conduct their
missions is derived from Laboratory Directed Research and Development
(LDRD), the primary source for internally directed R&D funding. Among
its other benefits, LDRD provides a major resource for attracting,
supporting and training staff at each laboratory.
The committee recommends that Congress and NNSA maintain strong
support of the LDRD program as it is an essential component of enabling
the long-term viability of the laboratories.
Historically, the laboratories had another source of discretionary
research spending.
The weapons program (at each laboratory) had the flexibility to use
part of its budget to fund a robust research program, in support of the
core weapons mission. Currently, the weapons program budget is
subdivided into so many categories with so many restrictions that this
important flexibility is effectively lost. This loss in funding
flexibility has significantly reduced the amount of core program
research being performed at the laboratories. This lessens the appeal
of the laboratories when recruiting.
The committee recommends that Congress reduce the number of
restrictive budget reporting categories in the Nuclear Weapons Program
and permit the use of such funds to support a robust core weapons
research program and further develop necessary S&E capability.
Relationship Between the Labs and NNSA Oversight
We observe that the relationship between NNSA and its National
Security Laboratories is broken. This very seriously degrades the
ability to manage for quality S&E. Both NNSA and the laboratories
recognize the importance of quality S&E, and each believes it is
working to achieve that goal, but their dysfunctional relationship
seriously threatens that common goal. This is not a new observation, as
it has been discussed in previous reports. There has been a breakdown
of trust and an erosion of the partnering between the laboratories and
NNSA to solve complex S&E problems.
The basic substantive relationship between NNSA and the
laboratories is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) partnership. The management relationship is a Government Owned,
Contractor Operated relationship. The FFRDC relationship is based on a
partnership between the government and the laboratory in which the
government decides what problems need to be addressed, and the
contractor determines how best to address those problems. There is a
perception among staff at the three laboratories that NNSA has moved
from partnering with the laboratories to solve scientific and
engineering problems to assigning tasks and specific S&E solutions with
detailed implementation instructions. This approach precludes taking
full advantage of the intellectual and management skills that taxpayer
dollars have purchased. Similar issues are found in transactional
oversight of safety, business, security, and operations. Science and
engineering quality is at risk when laboratory scientists and engineers
are not encouraged to bring forth their creative ideas in partnership
with NNSA to solve problems vital to our national security.
There is conflict and confusion over management roles and
responsibilities of organizations and individuals. For example, the
committee heard reports of mid-level issues being elevated to the
laboratory director level because there was no clarity about how to
resolve disputes between a laboratory and an NNSA Site Office. These
factors do not encourage the stable management that is necessary to
ensure success of long-term investment and planning. Another example
was a recent instance in which NNSA HQ tried to overrule a Laboratory's
best scientific judgment about how to carry out a scientific task.
Subsequently, language appeared in a congressional report opposing that
NNSA instruction. A better mechanism should be established for
resolving technical disputes, and they should definitely not be
elevated to top NNSA management and congressional levels. A technical
advisory committee, established at the NNSA level, would be a helpful
mechanism for filling this gap in S&E management. More generally, such
an advisory committee could monitor progress on other aspects of roles
and responsibilities.
This erosion of the trust relationship is especially prominent with
respect to Los Alamos, where past failures in safety, security, and
business practices attracted much national attention and public
criticism. But it has also spilled over to Lawrence Livermore and
Sandia National Laboratories. The loss of trust in the ability of the
laboratories to maintain operational goals such as safety, security,
environmental responsibility and fiscal integrity has produced detailed
scrutiny by NNSA HQ and site offices and increased aversion to risk. A
major byproduct of this has been to create a bias against experimental
work. The bias is problematic because experimental science is at the
very heart of the scientific method.
The committee recommends that NNSA and each of the Laboratories
commit to the goal of rebalancing the zmanagerial and governance
relationship to build in a higher level of trust in program execution
and laboratory operations in general.
The committee recommends that NNSA and the Laboratories agree on a
set of principles that clearly lay out the boundaries and roles of each
management structure, and also that program managers at headquarters,
the Site Offices, and in the laboratories be directed to abide by these
principles.
For example, the committee suggests that, among other measures, the
Site Manager and the Director and/or Deputy Director of each laboratory
apply a team-based process to identify and agree on eliminating certain
oversight procedures that are simply not necessary or related to the
overall goals of the Laboratory. Similarly, some mechanism should be
established to filter program tasks at both the headquarters level and
at the laboratory senior management level to assure that each tasking
is necessary and consistent with the agreed management principles.
The committee recommends that the goal of rebalancing the
relationship and the set of principles laying out the boundaries and
roles of each management structure be memorialized in memoranda of
understanding between NNSA and its Laboratories. Performance against
these understandings should be assessed on an annual basis over a 5-
year period and reported to Congress.
THE FUTURE
A key to ongoing laboratory success has been a strong focus on the
long-term and on maintaining deep technical capability. Looking
forward, the new management structure of the Laboratories, which relies
on the introduction of industrial and other private sector partners,
must assure that this long-term focus is maintained in words and in
deeds.
A great deal of work that has been accomplished over the years in
safety and security has required extensive effort by the NNSA and the
laboratories. We believe these efforts have been strengthened to the
point where they no longer need the current level special attention to
assure high quality results in laboratory operations.
The committee recommends that NNSA, Congress, and top management of
the laboratories recognize that the safety and security systems at the
Laboratories have been strengthened to the point where they no longer
need special attention. NNSA and Laboratory management should explore
ways by which the administrative, safety, and security costs can be
reduced over time consistent with maintaining high quality efforts in
these areas, so that they not impose an excessive burden on essential
S&E activities.
The committee recognizes that this cannot happen unless the broken
relationship is fixed, but the committee also recognizes that these
operational problems contributed to the broken relationship.
Senator Nelson. My colleague and friend has arrived. In
case you have any opening remarks, Senator Inhofe, the floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
I am anxious to pursue this with this panel that we have,
and I think we have the right people that are here right now.
The Perry/Schlesinger Commission stated it was alarmed by the
disrepair and neglect of our nuclear weapons stockpile and our
complex. Vice President Biden has said maintaining our nuclear
stockpile and modernization is essential. President Obama had
said back in December 2010, I recognize that nuclear
modernization requires investment in the long term. He goes on,
making the commitment to do what is necessary.
However, at the same time, we hear from Dr. Michael
Anastasio of Los Alamos National Lab. He said, I am very
concerned about that budget profile. That profile delays many
of the issues that are a concern to us today especially in the
science and engineering area. Much of the planned funding
increases for weapons and activities do not come to fruition
until the second half of a 10-year period. Now, we are seeing a
lot of that nowadays. They say, yes, we are going to do it and
the amount is going to be same. However, it is not going to
happen for 5 more years. I think we can read in there what we
want to.
Secretary Gates talked about it. He said, no way can we
maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons
in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our
stockpile or pursuing a modernization program. I think we all
understand. One or the other is necessary. After the New START
program, we were promised by the administration to have robust
resources backing behind it, and yet that has not happened.
So, I think in the full committee, we heard testimony from
General Kehler, the Commander of STRATCOM, who informed us of
his concern with the budget and its failure to demonstrate a
viable, long-term modernization strategy. Our witnesses today
provide yet another opportunity to assess the adequacy of the
request. I look forward to hearing from them, our national
nuclear weapons labs, to better understand the impact of the
NNSA's budget, what it will have on their ability to certify
our existing stockpile.
So I say this and I am anxious to hear the truth from you.
Can we really do all these reductions? Can we not keep the
commitment that we made at one time and carry out what you have
an obligation, in terms of certification?
So those are my concerns. Have we had one witness'
testimony so far?
Senator Nelson. Yes, Dr. Patel.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, continue and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. We stress how we
have a working relationship, and I look forward to the
questions here shortly.
Dr. Shank?
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES V. SHANK, SENIOR FELLOW, HOWARD HUGHES
MEDICAL INSTITUTE; CO-CHAIR, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ON REVIEW OF THE QUALITY OF THE MANAGEMENT AND OF THE
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING RESEARCH AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S
NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES-PHASE 1
Dr. Shank. Thank you for the opportunity to describe the
results of our report on science and engineering management at
the three national security laboratories.
I wanted to emphasize in my remarks some of the
recommendations that we made as a result of our deliberations
of our committee. We visited all three laboratories. We heard
from management and staff at all levels.
First is the evolution of the mission. We heard a
compelling discussion from the Deputy NNSA Administrator Don
Cook talking about a new governance charter among four
agencies, the DOE, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
DOD, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), that would allow the laboratories to make a transition
from weapons laboratories, to more broadly national security
laboratories and that these laboratories would use their
capabilities to tackle problems of importance to all four
agencies. We think that in a time of constrained budgets and
the complexity of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), the
opportunity to maintain capabilities by working on problems for
other agencies is a win-win and it is something that we hope
that this expertise can be taken advantage and it is something
that is encouraged by Congress.
Second, I want to spend some time discussing the
relationship between the laboratories and oversight. We think
that oversight is an extremely important responsibility of the
NNSA. However, we observed that the relationship between the
NNSA and the national security labs appears be broken. We think
that this seriously degrades the ability to manage quality
science and engineering, and we recognize having that high
quality in science and engineering is very important to achieve
the mission ends, but a dysfunctional relationship seriously
threatens that goal.
This is not a new observation. It has been discussed in
previous reports. We see what appears to be a breakdown of
trust, an erosion of partnering between the labs and the NNSA
to solve complex problems. As you are well aware, the basic
elements of this relationship between NNSA and its laboratories
are a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)
relationship. We have seen an evolution of NNSA moving from
partnering with the laboratories to solve scientific and
engineering problems to assigning tasks with specific solutions
and implementation instructions. This approach precludes taking
full advantage of the intellectual and management skills that
have been purchased to manage these laboratories under
contract. In addition, we see issues in transactional oversight
of safety, business, security, and operations.
We think that there is a conflict and confusion over
management roles and responsibility. We think this sometimes
leads to scientific disputes. We have seen an example, a recent
instance, in which NNSA headquarters tried to overrule a
laboratory's best scientific judgment on how to carry out a
task and subsequently language appeared in a congressional
report opposing the NNSA instruction. We think a better
mechanism needs to be made to resolve scientific and technical
issues. We are recommending that a technical advisory committee
be established at the NNSA level. That would be a helpful
mechanism in being able to resolve disputes and look at more
broadly how the operations of the laboratories can be most
effectively accomplished.
The erosion of trust is especially prominent with respect
to Los Alamos, where past affairs and safety and security and
business practices have attracted much national attention. But
it has also spilled over to the other laboratories as well.
This loss of trust and emphasis on transactional management has
created an environment in which there has been a bias against
experimental work. We think that this is a very important issue
and one that needs to be dealt with.
We have heard from NNSA and all parties that Los Alamos has
greatly improved its performance, and we think that it is time
to recognize that this has occurred and that the laboratories
have strengthened to the point where they no longer need clear,
special attention. We are hoping that the relationship between
DOE and the NNSA can be rationalized and renormalized in a way
that will make the laboratories both effective and successful
in their future missions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much.
Dr. McMillan.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES F. McMILLAN, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS
NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. McMillan. Thank you, Chairman Nelson. Ranking Member
Inhofe, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to speak here
today.
I am Charlie McMillan. I am the Director at Los Alamos. I
bring to this discussion 29 years of experience in the weapons
program. Nearly 2 decades of that was with my colleagues at
Livermore. The last 6 years have been at Los Alamos, and for
about the last year I have been the Director.
I am proud of the incredible staff at Los Alamos,
especially during today's budget challenges and the recent
workforce actions I have had to take at the laboratory. Their
service to the Nation has been unwavering as it has been for
the last 70 years.
Mr. Chairman, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
coupled with the 1251 report, set a course for the deterrent
that in my view was credible and consistent. Now, because of
budget pressure, I am concerned that we do not yet have a path
forward for meeting all of our commitments. We continue to work
closely with our colleagues at both DOE and DOD to find the
best path forward.
NNSA governance will inevitably play a key role as we
address mission and budget challenges.
The recent National Academy of Sciences report described
the NNSA laboratory relationship as broken. Those were the
words you used. It described a lack of trust, burdensome
oversight, and structural flaws.
The weapons laboratories have served as trusted technical
advisors to the government. Today, we are often managed as
traditional contractors rather than as partners who can provide
expertise to solve technical issues. Trust has been replaced by
reliance on operational formality. As the Academy said, this
approach is a mismatch. It stifles the innovation we must have
to address challenging issues in our nuclear deterrent. It is
the ability to innovate that drives the staff, that I have
responsibility for at Los Alamos, to produce at the highest
levels for our Nation. I believe that a governance model must
include the ability to work within a risk framework to
accomplish goals and priorities set by Congress and the
administration.
Mr. Chairman, there are other issues in the nuclear
enterprise. I am concerned that we are shifting the balance of
priorities too far toward the near-term at the expense of
longer-term science needed to address future problems that will
affect the stockpile. Deferring the construction of the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility
(CMRR-NF) leaves the country with no known capability to meet
the current expectation. Those expectations are something like
50 to 80 pits per year. Furthermore, because of limited and
aging infrastructure, it will take significant investments to
produce even 20 or 30 pits per year.
With appropriate infrastructure investments, we can sustain
a limited pit manufacturing capability. However, we will need
to augment new pit production with a pit reuse strategy that is
still in development. We have available legacy pits that are
candidates for reuse. I am cautiously optimistic that we can
reuse some of these pits, but we must do the scientific work to
further understand the effects of aging and to provide modern
safety, safety that starts within sensitive high explosive
systems. If we choose this path, it will require an investment
over the next 5 to 10 years.
Let me offer an analogy for you. It is a little bit like
taking an engine out of a 1965 Ford Mustang and putting it into
a 2012 Mustang and continuing to meet 2012 emission standards.
You can probably do it but not without a lot of work.
Mr. Chairman, we succeed today because of the investments
our Nation has made over the last 20 years, investments that
have produced capabilities and insights that are already
addressing today's challenges. Two examples would be the Dual-
Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility, as well as our
modern high-performance computing capabilities. We must prepare
today for the challenges we will inevitably face in the future.
In closing, I am increasingly concerned. Today, I cannot
say with confidence that we are on a path to a healthy program.
The laboratories that we serve are among the greatest,
supporting the deterrence with knowledge second to none. The
country needs to decide whether it is willing to maintain this
level into the future. If so, balanced investments must be made
in life extension today, as well as in our abilities to solve
the problems that we will inevitably face in the future. If
not, we risk both the future of the deterrent and the ability
of the laboratory to solve issues as they arise.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McMillan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Charles F. McMillan
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am Dr. Charles McMillan, Director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL). My 29-year commitment to America's nuclear weapons
program encompasses over two decades of service at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) and 6 years at Los Alamos. Following the
moratorium on nuclear testing, I participated in the discussions that
helped establish Stockpile Stewardship.
Since I assumed leadership at Los Alamos almost a year ago, it has
become clear that our Nation faces a difficult budget situation, and
hard choices must be made. I am proud of the way that the men and women
of Los Alamos have played their role in helping to meet these
challenges with professionalism and innovation. Through difficult
times, they are maintaining a focus that is delivering on the
Laboratory's mission. I look forward to working with you as we continue
delivering national security science in both the present and the future
by making challenging investment decisions--while keeping faith with a
workforce that has demonstrated career-long dedication to the service
of our Nation.
I continue to believe that the direction laid out in the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and the 1251 Report provides an appropriate and
technically sound course. These documents outline a consistent plan
that, if implemented, would do the work necessary to support the
Nation's stockpile through modernization of our nuclear infrastructure
and a warhead life extension program (LEP).
Now, because of changes in budget and policy priorities, I am
concerned that we do not yet have a clear path forward for meeting all
of our commitments to the stockpile.
The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) governance will play a
key role in determining both our efficiency and effectiveness as we
address looming mission and budget challenges. In my view, a strong
partnership between NNSA and the laboratories, building on the full
opportunities afforded by our status as Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers (FFRDC), can serve to reestablish the trust that
has been a source of solutions in previous challenges.
GOVERNANCE
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on oversight of the
NNSA labs is the latest in a series of reports that has highlighted
governance issues for the laboratories: governance that is
characterized by a lack of trust, burdensome oversight, and structural
flaws. The issues they identified in their report ring true in my
experience at the Laboratory.
``An erosion of trust on both sides of the relationship
shapes the oversight and operation of the laboratories. This in
turn has resulted in an excessive reliance on operational
formality in important aspects of Laboratory operations,
including the conduct of science and engineering . . . '' (NAS
report, page 23, emphasis added)
In my view, we have become so focused on operational formality that
we risk losing sight of the reasons why the government-owned,
contractor-operated business arrangements were created in the first
place. Our common objective is to safely maintain the stockpile using
best business practices; operational formality is a means to that end.
As the NAS report states, this formality can be a mismatch when applied
to creative activities such as science and engineering (report, page
24).
I agree with the report's statements on oversight:
`` . . . the NNSA, Congress, and top management of the
Laboratories recognize that safety and security systems at the
Laboratories have been strengthened to the point where they no
longer need special attention. NNSA and Laboratory management
should explore ways by which the administrative, safety, and
security costs can be reduced, so that they not impose an
excessive burden on essential S&E activities.'' (NAS
recommendation 5-1, page 31, emphasis added)
While NNSA had an auspicious beginning, the promise of semi-
autonomy has not yet been fulfilled. Duplication and overlap remain
between the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA regulations and
guidance. As an example, the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security
still plays a significant role in NNSA--despite NNSA having its own
regulations and guidance.
Structural issues continue to be a challenge for NNSA:
``The 2001 Foster Panel report reiterated the points it made
in its previous report, emphasizing that the Secretary of
Energy must remove the unnecessary duplication of staff in such
areas as security, environmental oversight, safety, and
resource management.'' (NAS report, page 51)
The weapons laboratories are FFRDCs that serve as trusted,
independent advisers to the government on complex technical issues--
foremost among these being nuclear weapons. For much of the last
decade, I have seen a trend within NNSA toward treating the
laboratories more like traditional contractors rather than fully
employing the capabilities they offer the government through the
special FFRDC relationship (FAR 35.017).
A maturing model between the labs and NNSA would include the
ability to work within a framework to accomplish goals established by
policies set by Congress and the administration. Changing the type of
oversight from transactional to strategic can lead to a smaller
bureaucracy, and thus reduce the size of the infrastructure needed to
respond to that bureaucracy.
In the last few months, the NNSA leadership has begun to reengage
the lab directors in substantive dialogue on program priorities. This
is a first step toward reestablishing the type of trust that was
necessary to create the stewardship program. Many steps remain if we
are to meet the challenge of the next decade: modernizing the stockpile
at a pace that exceeds our past experience.
There are examples of increasing burden and in other cases where
there is a glimmer of hope. I mention two of the latter.
The Office of Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) has
worked to balance the need for robust security with the reality
of shrinking Federal security budgets. The DNS engages
individual sites to understand programmatic needs and then
develops a solid approach that allows work to be accomplished
within a well-defined risk envelope.
In recent months, we have worked with our colleagues
at the Los Alamos Site Office to develop a risk-based framework
for evaluating computer system security and streamlining
documentation required to operate these systems. This framework
may reduce a bookshelf of documentation to a single binder.
While these examples illustrate positive steps to reduce
administrative costs, they remain the exception in a system that has
become moribund over many years. Studies such as those cited above have
examined structural options for NNSA; all have merit, none are perfect.
Whichever path we adopt for the future governance of the laboratories,
it is essential that all relevant branches of government are aligned to
ensure its success.
NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
The existing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility at
Los Alamos is 60 years old, sits on a seismic fault, and, as the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
said in 2009, ``is already well past the end of its planned life.'' The
facility is unable to meet the high-volume analysis needed to meet the
Department of Defense (DOD) expectation of 50 to 80 newly manufactured
pits per year. Three wings of CMR's six have been closed because of
their location over the fault and to reduce risk. At the direction of
NNSA, we are preparing to retire the facility in 2019.
The decision to defer construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) leaves the United
States with no known capability to make 50 to 80 newly-produced pits on
the timescales planned for stockpile modernization. This will affect
our path forward on the W78 LEP.
Let me be very clear: CMRR-NF is not a manufacturing facility for
pits. It fulfills a critical mission in supporting the analytical
chemistry and metallurgy needed to certify that the plutonium used in
the stockpile meets basic material requirements. The ability at CMRR-NF
to quickly analyze and characterize special nuclear materials--to know
where they were made, their purity, and their chemical and mechanical
properties--also underpins our work for the Nation in nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, and treaty verification missions. Pit production
occurs and will continue in Building PF-4 at Los Alamos. CMRR-NF was
designed to provide needed capacity for materials characterization,
waste staging and shipment, non-destructive assay, and vault storage.
In the absence of CMRR-NF, the limited floor space in PF-4 must be used
to address these functions, albeit at reduced levels.
At the direction of NNSA, we are in the process of completing a 60-
day analysis of existing plutonium capabilities within the Radiation
Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) at Los Alamos, Superblock at
Livermore, and other sites. Because of our limited plutonium
infrastructure, investments that are not in the current plan will be
required to produce even 20 to 30 pits per year using all of these
facilities. In this study, LANL is examining accelerating the removal
of material from the vault in PF-4, expanding the capability of RLUOB,
and constructing a system to transport materials between PF-4 and
RLUOB. The not-yet-budgeted costs associated with these changes are
expected to extend over 5 to 8 years.
PIT REUSE
Pit reuse has been suggested as a way to bridge the shortfall in
newly-produced pits caused by delaying CMRR-NF construction. The nation
has pits that are not needed in current systems. These are candidates
for use in a modernized stockpile. While I am cautiously optimistic
that some of these pits can be reused, two important issues must be
addressed before certification for stockpile use:
First, continued progress in understanding the effects
of pit aging.
Second, the system modifications necessary to ensure
that pits designed for use with conventional explosives can be
reused in modern, insensitive high explosive systems.
Both are challenging scientific problems.
In 2006, the JASON issued a report on plutonium aging based on
studies conducted by LANL and LLNL. In a letter responding to this
report to then-chairman John Warner of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, NNSA said that it ``is imperative that we continue to assess
plutonium aging through vigilant surveillance and scientific
evaluation, since the plutonium-aging database only extends to
approximately 48 years for naturally aged material and 60 years for the
accelerated aged material. The primary performance database from
underground testing is even more limited.'' Unfortunately, since this
letter was written, work in this area has been constrained by funding;
much work remains to be done.
The pits that are available for reuse were not designed to provide
the safety of a modernized stockpile using insensitive high explosives.
While we have concepts for using these pits in a modernized stockpile,
the extensive work required to convert these concepts to systems that
could be certified is yet to be done.
Consider the following analogy: using old pits in a modernized
stockpile would be like taking an engine from a 1965 Mustang and
installing it in a 2012 model while continuing to meet 2012 emission
requirements. It might be possible, but not without a lot of work, not
to mention impacts to the other parts under the hood. Furthermore,
certifying that it would work without ever driving the car would be
challenging.
LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS
As our systems age, LEPs have become necessary to continue
confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.
It is in LEPs that we see a return on investments made in long term
science.
I am pleased to report that Los Alamos Life Extension activities on
the W76-1 continue smoothly at the plants with Los Alamos providing
technical support as needed. We will continue our engagement to monitor
product quality and ensure that design intent is maintained.
As you are aware, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) authorized
Phase 6.3 for the B61 LEP with a first production unit (FPU) in 2019.
At Los Alamos, we are on a path to meet this deliverable because of
investments that have been made over many years in the science and
engineering campaigns. Tools such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro-
Test (DARHT) Facility, high performance computing and the Advanced
Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program codes that we use to predict
weapons performance are being applied today to the B61 LEP. We have
used the investments in these campaigns to develop the technologies for
gas transfer systems (GTS) so that we can quickly and cost-effectively
implement specific designs for the B61. Given stable, predictable
funding at levels consistent with the 6.2A study, I am confident that
LANL will deliver on its responsibility for the B61.
LONG-TERM SCIENCE
Science is the base that allows LANL to address challenging issues
that face the stockpile. At LANL we have a scientific workforce that
includes approximately 2,500 PhDs. They form the core of our scientific
base. The weapons program directly benefits when these scientists work
on challenging technical problems using tools such as DARHT, the Los
Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), and the ASC Program. Our
ability to do stockpile work today is the product of these investments.
Our science and engineering campaigns produced mature technology that
was ready when needed. Similar investments are needed today to ensure
that the Laboratory has tools and technologies to be ready for
tomorrow's challenges.
In addition to benefiting the Lab's weapons program, we are able to
leverage these capabilities for broader national interests. They, in
turn, feed valuable technical insights directly back into the nuclear
weapons program, including LEPs. Our work in nuclear forensics and
medical isotope production illustrates these points.
Nuclear forensics and attribution: Los Alamos
delivered a suite of models and databases for National
Technical Nuclear Forensics applications, such as modeling
debris signatures and other nuclear security applications.
LANL's capabilities in this area are a direct outgrowth of the
former nuclear weapons testing program where scientists had to
study the detailed chemistry of soil samples to determine
various characteristics of detonation. Our experts in this area
not only help with the current nuclear forensics, they also
support the weapons program by helping to reinterpret data from
previous underground tests. This information is then used to
validate our weapons codes.
Thanks to the Isotope Production Facility at LANSCE,
LANL is a national leader in producing strontium-82 for cardiac
imaging and germanium-68 for calibrating proton emission
tomography (PET) scanners. Other isotopes, such as aluminum-26
and silicon-32, are unique to Los Alamos and are not produced
anywhere else in the world. With the demand for short-half-
lived medical isotopes being one of the fastest-growing needs
of health care providers, the industry and medical researchers
are looking to Los Alamos to provide a stable supply of these
isotopes. Providing these isotopes as a service to the Nation
maintains the skills at Los Alamos for producing and handling
exotic isotopes.
Despite difficult and uncertain budgetary scenarios, a careful
balance between LEPs and science, technology, and engineering must be
maintained.
LOOKING AHEAD
Just as training and equipping prepare our Armed Forces to fight in
battle, the science done at the national laboratories prepares our
employees with the knowledge and tools needed to sustain the stockpile.
While the balance must shift as we apply our knowledge and tools to
LEPs, we cannot abandon preparation for the future any more than the
military can abandon training and equipping, even in the midst of
fighting a war.
In general, the budget for Directed Stockpile Work Services has
seen successive cuts that have hampered progress toward goals set in
the NPR, especially in the Component Maturation Framework, more
sustainable hydrotest capability, nuclear safety research and
development, and Plutonium Sustainment.
Over the last few months, I have been asked to estimate the budget
impacts of pit reuse as a way to bridge our manufacturing gap. We are
still in the early phases of work that would allow pits designed for
conventional-high-explosive systems to be used in systems using
insensitive explosives. Should the Nation choose to pursue this path,
we believe that approximately $50 million per year will be needed for
the next 5 to 10 years beyond already-planned investments before we
could certify systems using these pits. Because this work must start
now if this concept is to be viable for coming LEPs, we are planning
experiments this summer to gain insight into system behavior. While we
believe this a promising direction for innovation to meet a national
challenge, we cannot confidently predict the outcome. There is risk.
Whether the ultimate decision is to move forward with an
alternative plutonium approach, or to continue with CMRR construction,
every day that we do not address the issue is a day in which our risks
increase. At a minimum, we need access to the $120 million appropriated
in fiscal year 2012 that will remain after placing CMRR-NF in a stable
state to make investments supporting a path forward. Furthermore, the
$35 million already in the budget request for fiscal year 2013 will be
needed to accelerate PF-4 vault clean-out. Access to these funds will
allow us to continue making wise investments in our plutonium
capability. This includes studying a transportation system between PF-4
and RLUOB, expanded use of RLUOB, and a migration of processes from CMR
to PF-4. If we are to support the LEPs necessary over the next decade,
we cannot afford to postpone action to address the Nation's plutonium
capability.
FUNDING ISSUES
When looking at funding, we must address the issues we see today as
well as the investments needed to meet challenges in an uncertain
future. Today, the stockpile requires action--action to address changes
that we see occurring in the stockpile on timescales that are dictated
by nature. Chemistry and physics take an unrelenting toll on the aging
stockpile. As we work to modernize the stockpile, the balance is
shifting toward today's issues as it must. However, I am concerned that
short term stockpile needs may be shifting the balance too far to the
present--putting our ability to care for the stockpile in the future at
risk.
I must speak about the difficult budget issues facing LANL this
fiscal year. While planning in fiscal year 2011 for the increases
outlined in the 1251 report, LANL was prudent in hiring. Nevertheless,
as fiscal year 2012 began it seemed unlikely that we would see the full
planned increase. In November 2011, I established the Laboratory
Integrated Stewardship Council to ensure that we manage our resources
in a consistent, conservative manner across the Laboratory. This
council is chartered with making financial decisions to keep Laboratory
spending in line with a highly constrained budget.
For fiscal year 2012, LANL funding across our national security
accounts is some $300 million lower than it was in fiscal year 2011. In
the fiscal year 2013 budget request, funding at LANL appears to be down
another $100 million.
These cuts made it necessary for me to make the difficult decision
to move forward with a voluntary separation program to reduce our
workforce. Just over a week ago more than 550 employees left the Lab.
Many had decades of experience in the Weapons Program. Despite
succession planning, we are losing valued employees sooner than
expected.
PENSION RELIEF
In 2006. Los Alamos made major changes in its pension system. New
employees are no longer able to enroll in a defined benefits pension
system. Rather, they are part of a defined contribution plan. While
this system no longer provides the incentive to remain at the
Laboratory until retirement, it also relieves LANL of the long-term
liabilities associated with a defined benefits program.
The Laboratory remains committed to the benefits promised to
employees who have, for many years, been participants in the defined
benefits program--a program that has been closed since 2006. However,
historically low interest rates coupled with the actuarial rules of the
Pension Protection Act (PPA) have caused estimates of future
liabilities to balloon. As a result, the Laboratory has been making
contributions to the pension plan out of program funds for the last few
years at well above the $100 million level. While we have increased
employee contributions, they are only a partial offset to the
contributions required by the PPA. If interest rates return to levels
that have been typical over the last 25 years, it will not be long
before our plan appears to be over-funded.
Mr. Chairman, I urge Congress to pass the proposed changes to the
Pension Protection Act (PPA) that include a permanent ``funding
stabilization'' provision. Today's unusually low interest rates,
combined with existing pension funding legislation, have artificially
increased our pension liabilities in the short term. This has reduced
and will continue to reduce the funding available for the mission by
tens of millions of dollars per year at a time when mission needs are
growing and budgets are severely constrained.
In summary, I believe the proposed ``funding stabilization'' relief
would provide a substantial amount of funding back to weapons program
activities without incurring undue risk in pension funding over the
long term.
CLOSING
The fundamental premise of Stockpile Stewardship is that a healthy
program can sustain a workforce able to make technically sound
decisions supporting the stockpile, using the scientific tools they
have developed. Today we are well-positioned to make these decisions
because of the investments the country has made over the last two
decades. However, I'm increasingly concerned that we may no longer be
on a healthy path. As our budgets at LANL are reduced, our risks
increase. Some risks may be acceptable, but I am sure that there will
be a point at which those risks become unacceptable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Albright?
STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Albright. Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee.
I have submitted my full statement to the subcommittee,
which I ask be made part of the hearing record.
Senator Nelson. Without objection.
Dr. Albright. If I may, I will now make a brief opening
statement.
This is a challenging period for the Federal Government
with many priorities that require attention at a time of budget
austerity. This is also the case for the Nation's SSP,
including those activities at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
I think it is worth reminding ourselves why we have a SSP.
It was formally begun in the 1990s and it is really an
ambitious experiment. It is founded on the premise that the
expertise of a workforce and the judgments that they make that
results from a detailed understanding of the fundamental
science of how nuclear weapons work can serve as a substitute
for the expertise and judgment that we historically developed
back in the days when we had multiple and frequent design
efforts and we did testing in the desert.
It is important to note that at the time we stopped nuclear
testing, we really did not think we understood well enough how
weapons work. It is why we had the tests. There were a great
number of empirical factors and approximations that were built
into the weapons design process that allowed efforts to
proceed, but there was also a landscape of test failures that
had, over time, indicated our lack of understanding of the
basic underlying science. Hence, for stockpile stewardship to
work, we needed to learn far more about the physical processes
that transpire in the functioning of a weapon.
We have actually been quite successful in developing many
of those science tools, in fact, probably more successful than
many of the proponents, when the program started, would have
imagined. But developing those tools remains extremely
challenging. Our knowledge of the basic underlying physics is
embodied ultimately in computer models. These models utilize
scientifically justified approximations, and they are rendered
more and more accurate by improvements in computing power and
by controlled experiments that we do at Livermore and other
laboratories at Los Alamos to determine some of the important
needed parameters. The idea here is to represent what we
believe to be reality.
However, the thing you have to always worry about with
these models is that they cannot become holy writ. It is
absolutely crucial that they be tested repeatedly against
experiments conducted at relevant physical conditions so that
the assumptions and approximations embedded in the models can
be verified and corrected as needed. To do otherwise is to
invite disaster.
Hence, the pillars of the SSP have included both the
development of independent analytical capabilities utilizing
the world's most capable computing platforms at Lawrence
Livermore, at Los Alamos, at Sandia, but also the development
of experimental facilities to collect data on the conditions
that are relevant to the operation of a nuclear weapon. It is
worth noting that every nuclear state that has abjured testing
is following the same approach to maintaining their stockpile.
Of course, the scientific understanding of nuclear weapons
is not an end all by itself. It is rather a process that
underlies our capability to maintain the stockpile. It informs
our annual assessments. It informs how we react to issues that
are raised during the surveillance program, and it informs how
we conduct our life extension programs (LEP).
We are very excited about the recent accomplishments that
we have made in this program, and I highlight many of these in
my written testimony. But we are also very concerned about
impediments to current programs and the long-term success of
stockpile stewardship. So let me stress four points.
First, without sustained support for nuclear weapons
science, stockpile stewardship will eventually fail.
Second, provided that support is sustained, we do remain
optimistic about the prospects for long-term success of this
science-based stockpile stewardship. The skills that we derive
from the science base, as I said earlier, enable the Nation to
maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent and deliver on
very challenging LEPs.
Third, recognition and support of the NNSA laboratories
serving as national security laboratories is actually very,
very important to that nuclear stockpile mission. It
complements and enhances the workforce. It adds depth and
breadth and strength to the laboratories' capabilities.
Then finally, the NNSA laboratories would perform their
vital national security mission far more effectively if they
were managed as trusted partners of the Federal Government and
governed in a more streamlined and cost-effective way
consistent with the original intent of the FFRDC construct.
Thank you for your attention, and I will be pleased to
answer your questions during the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Penrose C. Albright
OPENING REMARKS AND SUMMARY
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the National Nuclear Security
Administration Management of its National Security Laboratories. I am
Parney Albright, Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL).
LLNL is one of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear design laboratories responsible
for helping sustain the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
Nation's strategic deterrent. In addition to our stockpile stewardship
efforts, we also leverage our capabilities to develop innovative
solutions to major 21st century challenges in nuclear security, defense
and international security, and energy and environmental security. I
thank the committee for your continuing support for the important work
we do.
This is a challenging period for the Federal Government, with many
priorities that require attention at a time of budget austerity. This
is also the case for the Nation's Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP),
including the activities at Livermore. We are very excited about recent
and prospective major accomplishments, which I will highlight, but we
are also very concerned about impediments to current programs and long-
term success in stockpile stewardship. In particular, I stress four
points:
Without sustained support for nuclear weapons science,
stockpile stewardship will eventually fail.
We remain optimistic about the prospect of long-term
success of ``science-based'' stockpile stewardship provided
that support is sustained. The skills deriving from a solid
science base will enable stockpile stewards to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective deterrent and deliver on challenging
life-extension programs.
Recognition of and support for the NNSA laboratories
serving as ``national security laboratories'' will better help
the United States meet a broad set of 21st century security
challenges. These broader activities complement our nuclear
weapons responsibilities, adding depth, breadth, and strength
to the laboratories' capabilities.
The NNSA laboratories would perform their vital
national security mission much more effectively if they were
managed as trusted partners of the Federal Government and
governed in a more streamlined/cost-effective way, consistent
with the original intent of the Federally-Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC) construct.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCIENCE
The SSP, which formally began in the 1990s with the decision to
enter into a moratorium on nuclear testing, is an ambitious experiment.
It is founded on the premise that the expertise of a workforce (and the
judgments they make) that results from a detailed understanding of the
fundamental science of how nuclear weapons work can serve as a
substitute for the expertise (and judgment) developed historically
through multiple and frequent design efforts--efforts that ultimately
had to be proven in nuclear tests. To add to the complexity of this
enterprise, this new workforce must deal with weapons that will be
deployed well beyond their initially intended service lifetimes, and
over time upgraded with the (highly desirable) safety and security
features called for by the recent Nuclear Posture Review--features that
represent changes to previously tested configurations of those weapons.
It is important to note that at the time we stopped nuclear
testing, we did not understand well enough how weapons worked (which is
why we had to test); there were a great number of empirical factors and
approximations built in to the weapons design process that allowed
efforts to proceed, but with that there was a landscape of test
failures that indicated our lack of understanding of the basic
underlying science. Hence, for stockpile stewardship to work, we needed
to learn far more about the physical processes that transpire in the
functioning of a weapon. When the SSP was initiated, the nuclear
stockpile was in good shape, which meant that we had a window of time
to develop necessary nuclear weapons science tools and knowledge before
more difficult-to-deal-with problems would likely arise.
Developing these science tools has been--and remains--extremely
challenging. Our knowledge of the underlying basic physics is
ultimately embodied in computer models. These models utilize
scientifically justified approximations--rendered more and more
accurate by improvements in computing power, and by controlled
experiments that determine needed parameters--to represent what we
believe to be reality. However, these models cannot become ``holy
writ;'' it is crucial that they be tested repeatedly against
experiments conducted at relevant physical conditions, so that the
assumptions and approximations embedded in the models can be verified
and corrected as needed. To do otherwise is to invite disaster. Hence,
the pillars of the SSP have included both the development of
independent analytic capabilities--utilizing the world's most capable
computing platforms--at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national
laboratories (each laboratory with differing approaches to modeling the
underlying physics); but also the development of experimental
facilities to collect data at the conditions relevant to the operation
of a nuclear weapon. It is worth noting that every acknowledged nuclear
state that has abjured testing is following the same approach to
maintaining their stockpile.
Of course, the scientific understanding of nuclear weapons is not
an end, but rather, as noted above, a process that underlies our
capability to maintain the stockpile. First, each laboratory director
provides an annual assessment of the stockpile. Hence, a crucial
component to the SSP is the ongoing surveillance of the stockpile and
the development of better surveillance methods. Again, here, the
underlying premise of the SSP--that developing a detailed understanding
of fundamental weapons science will lead to a workforce with the
judgment and intuition heretofore developed through new weapons design
and testing--is critical. If an issue is identified in a stockpile
weapon, we as a nation need to know whether it can be ignored, fixed in
the field, or is critical enough to call into question the reliability
of a portion of the deterrent.
Finally, that judgment and experience must be turned toward Life
Extension Programs (LEPs) that both sustain the extant stockpile and
also allow for critical improvements in its safety and security. These
advancements will in some cases result in deviations from fully tested
configurations, and hence rely heavily on improvements in our
understanding of fundamental weapons science. Furthermore, even if a
weapon system were to have its lifetime extended without any deviations
from the prior design, the reality is that component manufacturing
processes change with time, some materials are no longer available, and
no ``blueprint'' is sufficiently detailed to fill in all the decisions
made historically on the production line. Certifying any weapon
requires a workforce that understands the fundamental scientific
aspects of nuclear weapons.
The full spectrum of SSP activities--a fundamental understanding of
weapons science (based on theory and, crucially, experiments); its
application to assessments; stockpile surveillance and development of
better surveillance methods; dealing with significant findings and
fixes; and LEPs--all serve to sustain the stockpile, exercise the
skills and judgments of stockpile stewards, and, importantly, train the
next generation of stewards. When the next round of LEPs for the extant
stockpile is expected to begin in the 2030s, the people executing those
LEPs will have been trained by people who themselves have never engaged
in the development of a new design, nor executed a full nuclear test.
SSP depends on stockpile stewards being fully capable of
identifying issues that arise in stockpiled weapons; resolving those
issues through minor fixes or LEPs; and certifying the safety,
security, and performance of the modified weapon without conducting a
nuclear test. Strong support of all aspects of the SSP is required,
because questions about safety, security, and performance will arise as
long as the United States has nuclear weapons. Laboratory scientists
and engineers must have the wherewithal to find and address problems,
and the Nation must have confidence in their ability to do so.
We have made remarkable progress in developing the necessary
computational and experimental tools and in using them to gain
knowledge about key issues. We are attending to the immediate needs of
the stockpile. Today, however, the hard challenges are now much closer
as weapons age beyond their intended service life and important work to
resolve key issues in nuclear weapons science remains to be done.
As noted briefly above, the simulation codes must have much higher
fidelity than those originally used in the design of the weapon.
Evaluating the performance of a weapon ``as designed'' is one issue;
evaluating it when materials have aged and anomalies are present is
much harder. Materials age at an accelerated rate when confined for
years in the radioactive environment inside a nuclear weapon. The
improved physics models required for science-based SSP are very complex
(e.g., turbulence and the interaction of intense radiation with matter)
and necessitate powerful computers. However, these codes--which embody
our state of knowledge--must be tested against data.
Data collection about nuclear weapons performance falls into two
broad categories: information pertaining to dynamics of the primary
implosion and information pertaining to the nuclear explosion itself.
We collect data about the hydrodynamics of a weapon primary
implosion at LLNL's Contained Firing Facility (CFF) and at the Dual
Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamics Test (DARHT) Facility at Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL). For example, in fiscal year 2010, one of
our large-scale tests explored advance safety and security concepts
that could be used in future LEPs; another demonstrated advanced
capabilities for assuring weapon performance. Through marked
improvements in diagnostics, we are obtaining greater amounts of higher
fidelity data about implosion dynamics. These data are compared to pre-
shot predictions of results--performed with our most advanced
computers--and gauge how well our physics models work.
Other key experimental facilities managed by Livermore that provide
information about non-nuclear performance include the High Explosives
Applications Facility (HEAF), where state-of-the-art diagnostics are
used to study the performance of aging high explosives in nuclear
weapons, and the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research
(JASPER) Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. A two-stage gas
gun, JASPER is used to produce an extremely high-pressure shock wave in
plutonium and collect material properties data critical to the
simulation codes. JASPER completed mandated upgrades in fiscal year
2011 and now operates as a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility. Since
JASPER returned to operation, five plutonium shots so far have
collected vital data for LLNL and LANL.
A critical gap in our understanding of nuclear weapons science is
the need for experimental data pertaining to the behavior of materials
at the extreme conditions of a functioning nuclear weapon (100 million
degrees temperature and 10 billion atmospheres pressure). With the
National Ignition Facility (NIF) (and lesser but complementary
capabilities in the Omega laser at University of Rochester's Laboratory
for Laser Energetics and the Z-machine at Sandia National Laboratories
(SNL)), it is now possible to gather high-energy-density (HED) science
data at a precision and experimental rate that simply would not be
possible by other means. Crucially, the NIF holds the promise of
probing experimentally the conditions in a nuclear weapon that occur
during the initial detonation--in particular, the boost process that
determines the performance of the primary, which, in turn, drives the
overall performance of the weapon. The ability to anchor the simulation
codes with ignition data is pivotal to any discussion of design margins
and performance.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
My discussion of recent successes and challenges in the SSP will
largely focus on NIF, high-performance computing, and the W78 LEP,
which are crucial to long-term success.
The National Ignition Facility (NIF)
NIF was commissioned at LLNL in 2009, and since then, the 192-beam
laser has been performing very reliably as a high-precision
experimental tool. During fiscal year 2011, a total of 286 shots were
fired on NIF, with 62 shots for the National Ignition Campaign (NIC)
and 50 shots for stockpile stewardship and HED science applications.
Over 100 shots were fired in January and February of 2012--a record
performance for complex shots. The demands for experimental time are
high. Even with NIF operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, the
requests for shots in fiscal year 2012 total more than 500 days.
Researchers are executing the program to achieve fusion ignition
and energy gain, and the wide range of record breaking experiments
results to date demonstrate the enormous utility of NIF as a users'
facility for nuclear weapon science, broader national security
applications, frontier science, and pursuit of fusion power for energy
security. We are making excellent progress toward transforming NIF into
a users' facility in fiscal year 2013.
NIF Laser Performance
In March 2012, NIF delivered a record-setting 1.875 million joules
(MJ) of ultraviolet laser light to the center of the facility's target
chamber. NIF generates nearly 100 times more energy than any other
laser. This shot met a major milestone and exceeded NIF's design
specification of 1.8 MJ. NIF is now able to conduct routine operations
at full power. Very importantly, the recordsetting event was also one
of the most precise shots ever fired at NIF. The laser's precision and
enormous flexibility in how to use the beams make possible the fielding
of many different types of ignition and HED science experiments for
which more than 50 different types of diagnostic instruments, many
developed specifically for NIF, are providing exceptional data for a
wide range of types of experiments.
Support of Stockpile Stewardship
NIF has already made a pivotal contribution to stockpile
stewardship with resolution of the ``energy balance'' issue after a
series of experiments performed last year. The issue was originally
identified during the era of nuclear testing and it has remained a
significant anomaly for 40 years--an anomaly that in the past was an
important reason for full nuclear testing. Over the last decade,
experiments on a variety of experimental facilities contributed to
improving the understanding of this anomaly and pointed to its likely
source. LLNL researchers developed a sophisticated computational model
that better simulated nuclear weapons performance and, in particular
the specific aspects of performance that could possibly explain the
anomaly. The unique capabilities of NIF were required to validate
simulation results. With resolution of the energy balance anomaly, LLNL
and LANL will have more confidence in assessments of the current
weapons, which continue to change with age, and will be able to make
better-informed choices in upcoming LEPs.
Additional SSP-supportive experiments were conducted in fiscal year
2011-2012 to study how materials that are normally solids behave when
subjected to unprecedented pressures--in this case tantalum and carbon.
These experiments are important stepping stones toward understanding
the more complex material behavior of substances like plutonium. fiscal
year 2013 is projected to be a very busy year for SSP experiments at
NIF. Future plans call for a wide range of types of experiments to be
performed by LLNL and LANL to better understand the physics of boost
(thermonuclear burn in the primary explosion) and answer questions
crucial to stockpile assessments, investigation of significant
findings, and certification of LEPs.
The National Ignition Campaign
The goal of the National Ignition Campaign (NIC) is to compress and
heat a millimeter-size target filled with deuterium and tritium to
achieve fusion ignition and energy gain (at least as much energy output
as input). The NIC team is also transitioning NIF to routine operations
as a highly flexible HED science experimental facility. NIC, which
concludes at the end of fiscal year 2012, is managed for NNSA by the
Laboratory and includes many national and international partners,
representing national laboratories, academia, and industry.
NIC is making substantial progress in the quest to achieve fusion
ignition and burn. Activities are progressing through a series of
milestones with ignition and burn as a major milestone scheduled for
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012. The goal is to compress the
cryogenically-cooled fusion fuel to a very small volume (compressed by
more than a factor of 10,000 in density) and create a central ``hot
spot'' that ignites and consumes a larger amount of surrounding
hydrogen fuel. The goal is to turn mass into energy. A series of four
shocks that must be precisely shaped and timed are used to implode the
capsule and ignite the fuel.
NIC researchers are conducting a series of experiments to optimize
the target implosion following the standard scientific approach of
interweaving experiments and theory. These experiments occur at
energies, temperatures, and pressures that have never before been
probed, and hence that are well outside of the domain where our
simulation models have been anchored--a domain that approaches the
conditions inside a nuclear weapon. Through the iterative process of
pre-shot prediction, experiment, and post-shot data analysis, new
ground is being broken on the path to ignition. We are learning new
physics and gaining a more fundamental understanding of thermonuclear
reactions. This information is being used to continue improving our
models as we move through the program, which in itself is testimony to
the need for anchoring data and skepticism of models that are based
solely on theory or are validated outside the domain of interest.
NIC (and more generally, the SSP) is a grand challenge with many
scientific and engineering obstacles that test the skills and ingenuity
of NNSA laboratory researchers. So far, we have overcome many obstacles
and I have confidence that the NIC team will reach its objective of
fusion ignition and burn. Others around the world see great value in
having NIF-like capabilities and share confidence that the goal is
within reach. China, Russia, and France are all committing to build (or
have started to build) large laser systems for inertial confinement
fusion (ICF); the United Kingdom works closely with NIF; and Japan and
Korea are making substantial investments in ICF.
High-Performance Computing (HPC)
HPC is and always has been a defining strength of our Laboratory.
SSP advances have required continuously pushing the envelope in HPC. As
part of NNSA's Advanced Strategic Computing (ASC) program, we work
closely with U.S. computer manufacturers to improve capabilities, and
every generation of state-of-the-art computers pioneered at LLNL or
LANL has later found broad application in making U.S. industry able to
develop better products more quickly. Livermore is currently bringing
into operation two highly capable machines: ``Sequoia'' and ``Zin''.
Sequoia
In January 2012, the IBM technical team began installation of the
first four racks of Sequoia, the next leap forward in computing
capability; the last of the 96 racks arrive this month. This next
generation ``BlueGene/Q'' technology operates at an order of magnitude
faster than previously deployed systems. Sequoia, which includes 1.5
million processors and 6 million threads, is capable of record-setting
20 petaflops (20 quadrillion, or a million billion, floating point
operations per second). Sequoia is also record-breaking in power
efficiency--at over 2 billion calculations per watt, it is nearly 50
percent more power efficient than any competing technology. Our goal is
to have the machine fully performing science simulations before the end
of 2012 and dedicated to classified computing in mid-2013.
Sequoia is an important step toward even larger computers that are
needed to run predictive models of boost physics and thermonuclear burn
processes in nuclear weapons. Equally importantly, considerable effort
has gone into development of improved methods to efficiently
characterize and bound margin to failure and its uncertainties.
Quantification of Margin and Uncertainty (QMU) provides the
underpinning of our assessment and certification processes. Rigorous
implementation of QMU requires running many thousands of high fidelity
simulations to map out the impact of uncertainties on weapon
performance, which, in turn, requires more powerful computers.
Zin
In March 2012, LLNL completed installation and began classified
computing on Zin, a machine with 1 petaflop performance. As part of the
ASC Tri-Lab Capacity Cluster 2 (TLCC2) program, similar computers are
being installed at LANL and SNL to increase computing capacity. LLNL
led the vendor selection to procure standardized hardware and software
environment through TLCC2 so that the laboratories would realize
significantly reduced costs, increased efficiencies, and enhanced
collaboration. Zin provides a substantial boost to classified computing
at LLNL, and full deployment of TLCC2 will allow users from all three
laboratories to begin preparing their codes on the actual architecture
that they will experience when Sequoia goes into service.
High-Performance Computing as a National Security Imperative. To
meet the demanding needs of SSP, we urge support for an initiative to
reach the challenging milestone of exascale computing (a billion
billion calculations per second) by 2020. LLNL is working with other
NNSA and DOE laboratories to formulate a strategy for how to achieve
this ambitious goal. Exascale computing is also critical to our role as
a broad national security laboratory, with Livermore bringing to bear
on critical problems HPC as one of our principal strengths. Modeling
and simulation of complex systems to understand and predict their
behavior is key to solving challenging problems in national security,
energy security, and economic competitiveness. Other nations equally
recognize the value of leadership in HPC to their futures. Sequoia puts
the United States back in the lead (surpassing Japan and China) and it
is critical that we sustain leadership by reaching exascale performance
level before competitor nations.
The W78 Life-Extension Program (LEP)
In June 2011, LLNL and the U.S. Air Force launched a concept
development study to extend the life of the W78 Minuteman III warhead.
The W78, which is the dominant system for the ICBM leg of the Nation's
nuclear deterrent, is well beyond its planned service life and will
reach 40 years before the LEP production begins. We need to address
concerns identified in the surveillance of W78 that do not now affect
performance. The LEP process, which begins with concept development
(Phase 6.1), will take at least a decade to complete. As the program is
conceived, production would start in fiscal year 2023.
The concept development study is evaluating different LEP
approaches including refurbishment, reuse, or replacement of weapon
components. As required by the Department of Defense (DOD), the study
encompasses options that improve safety and security features and that
make the warhead adaptable for deployment on SLBMs as well as ICBMs. At
the end of the study, which should conclude this year, the California
team (LLNL and SNL-California) will report findings and recommendations
to the DOD/NNSA Project Officers Group. A key issue is the
manufacturability of LEP components and systems--cost-efficiency, waste
reduction, and avoidance of use of hazardous materials are important
factors.
In addition to meeting the critical need to extend the service life
of the W78, the LEP serves the long-term need to work on the full
spectrum of stockpile stewardship activities--including warhead
development from physics and engineering design through production
engineering. This is an essential part of hands-on training to increase
skills and expert judgment. The young scientists and engineers who
worked on the W87 LEP in the 1990s are now the technical leaders for
the W78 LEP, and they are training the next generation of leaders.
Other Stockpile Stewardship Program Successes and Challenges.
Assessments and Directed Stockpile Work (DSW)
LLNL completed Cycle 16 of the Annual Stockpile Assessment with
support from the newly implemented Independent Nuclear Weapon
Assessment Process to strengthen peer review. Cycle 16 benefited from
reduced uncertainties and increased scientific rigor due to improved
simulation models, results of recent plutonium aging experiments, and
better fundamental nuclear data deriving from joint work with LANL.
Livermore also effectively managed its Significant Finding
Investigation workload and its stockpile surveillance activities.
However, our weapon assessments and DSW support activities are funding
constrained, and of the systems in the stockpile, the B83 bomb and W80
cruise missile warhead are the least supported. With the fiscal year
2013 proposed budget, we will likely have to curtail activities that
impact our ability to assess the performance of these systems. Funding
for technology development to improve certification and safety is also
very constrained.
Facilities
LLNL sustained very nearly 100 percent availability of its mission-
critical and mission-dependent facilities throughout fiscal year 2011
as part of its Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF)
effort. However, we have not been able to keep pace with the needs for
reinvestment in the Laboratory's aging overall infrastructure. LLNL
receives less RTBF funds (by a factor of greater than two) than any
other site in the complex. RTBF activities include our ongoing effort
to prepare for shipping from the site special nuclear material
requiring the highest level of security protection. More than 93
percent of the material has been removed and the work is on schedule to
be completed in 2012. Important programmatic activities continue at the
Laboratory's Superblock Facility and this well-maintained facility
stands ready to support NNSA's new plutonium strategy with the planned
delay in construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) at LANL.
Additional Budget Burdens
The Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS), LLC, Defined
Benefit Pension Plan up to now has been sufficiently funded that
contributions have not been legally required. However, with interest
rates at an historic low, liabilities have grown dramatically since
mid-2009. As a consequence, statutory requirements of the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 are forcing LLNS to act, and NNSA has granted
LLNS approval to begin employee and employer contributions in fiscal
year 2012. By starting now, we save NNSA almost $200 million through
fiscal year 2022. I urge Congress to examine whether the provisions of
the Pension Protection Act, designed to protect private sector pension
plans, are appropriate for the NNSA complex of laboratories and plants.
If a Pension Protection Act waiver/exception/modification is not
enacted, $88 million will have to be diverted from programmatic work in
fiscal year 2013.
llnl as a national security laboratory
For many years, LLNL employees have applied their very special
capabilities to develop innovative technical solutions to help meet a
broader set of national needs. Work for NNSA on nuclear
nonproliferation and counterterrorism, the Office of Science and others
in DOE, other Federal agencies, and additional sponsors (e.g., in U.S.
industry), is very important and has long been integrated into our
mission and contribution to national security in the broadest sense.
Our notable accomplishments in fiscal year 2011-2012 include:
Radiation Detection. LLNL researchers developed the
first plastic material capable of identifying nuclear
substances such as uranium and plutonium from benign
radioactive sources. The new technology could be used in large,
low-cost detectors for portals to reliably detect nuclear
substances that might be used by terrorists.
Emergency response. Operating around the clock for 22
days, LLNL's National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
provided up-to-date atmospheric dispersion predictions, plume
projections, and radiation dose estimates to agencies in the
United States and Japan responding to the Fukushima nuclear
reactor disaster.
Low-collateral-damage munition. The U.S. Air Force
funded LLNL in May 2010 to rapidly develop the design for a new
low-collateral damage munition (BLU-129/B). Fielding of the
munition was approved in September 2011. The effective
integration of experiments with HPC simulations enabled quick
and effective optimization of munition performance while
meeting demanding engineering requirements.
Cyber security. LLNL has created new capabilities for
cyber-security work sponsors to provide real-time situational
awareness inside a large computer network using a distributed
approach to monitoring for anomalous behavior.
Space situational awareness. LLNL has developed
detailed physics-based simulations to provide real-time
analysis of space flight safety risks, and we are designing new
prototype collision-warning mini-sensors for deployment in
orbit.
Rapid development of new pharmaceuticals. Working with
an industrial partner, LLNL researchers applied sophisticated
computer models to sift through a large range of possibilities
and identify three efficacious drug candidates in 3 months
(normally a 2- to 5-year process).
Industrial partnering in HPC. In March 2012, LLNL
selected six pilot projects to partner with industry to
accelerate the development of energy technology using LLNL's
(unclassified) HPC resources through the Livermore Valley Open
Campus (adjoining LLNL and SNL-California).
It is widely appreciated that the NNSA laboratories are unique (in
terms of capability, talent, scale, and dedication to mission) national
resources that should be more broadly applied to address pressing 21st
century needs in defense and international security, energy security,
and innovations to enhance economic competitiveness. As a dual benefit,
the activities crucially add depth, breadth, and strength to the
laboratories' technical base, which is important to long-term success
in stockpile stewardship. Managing for High-Quality Science and
Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories, recently
prepared by a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee at the
behest of Congress, recommended ``that Congress recognize that
maintenance of the stockpile remains the core mission of the Labs, and
in that context consider endorsing and supporting in some way the
evolution of the NNSA Laboratories to National Security Laboratories .
. . '' Formal recognition of our national security mission
responsibility would be very beneficial--as would steps to help lower
operating costs at the laboratories and simplify the processes for
arranging interagency work.
the laboratories as trusted partners in national security
Employees at the NNSA laboratories and plants are dedicated to
national service. At the laboratories, we take on careers because we
believe we can ``make a difference'' working with outstanding
colleagues at state-of-the-art facilities on nationally important
problems. As Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs), our management contracts in principle place the day-to-day
responsibility for national security research in the hands of non-
Federal employees in order to ensure that staff and infrastructure of
the highest quality are available and dedicated to the missions of our
government sponsors. In this model, the government decides ``what''
needs to be done and provides the funding, and the laboratories decide
``how'' to assure the needed capabilities are available, and then how
best to accomplish those tasks within the federally defined
constraints. This partnership with the government should indeed be a
partnership
The national laboratories, along with the plants, are the sinew and
muscle of the nuclear weapons enterprise; they are the corporate
memory, the execution arm, and the infrastructure. In many ways, they
fulfill the same role within NNSA as does the uniformed military within
DOD. Such a relationship works well when there is mutual trust between
the partners, a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, and
a shared vision and clear focus on mission.
The Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA
National Security Laboratories report by the NAS committee speaks of
the broken relationship between NNSA and the laboratories, stemming
from a fundamental lack of trust. We need to return to a strong
partnership between the government and the laboratories with active
engagement of the laboratory directors in collaborative strategic
discussions with NNSA management about program direction, health of the
laboratories, and mission priorities.
The NAS committee's findings are not new. America's Strategic
Posture, issued in 2009 as the final report of the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, is highly
critical of the governance structure and ``micromanagement and
unnecessary and obtrusive oversight.'' An investigation of other FFRDC
governance models should be able to provide alternatives and help
affect a cultural change in the way the laboratories are managed. We
need to move from a duplicative, multi-layered, and poorly aligned
governance system to a more streamlined, cost-effective approach that
would restore a focus on mission and a trusted partnership. An
operational way to do this is to provide a level of funding for
oversight that is consistent with best practices for other FFRDCs. The
savings, which could be substantial--within the government and at the
laboratories, which have to absorb the costs of transactional
oversight--could be reinvested to make for stronger programs and
healthier laboratories.
As an example of how other agencies approach FFRDC governance, the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is an instructive (but by no means
unique) example. There are significant differences between JPL and
LLNL; even so, the contrast in the FFRDC relationship is striking. JPL
is a $1.5 billion center with more than 5,000 employees, managed by the
California Institute of Technology as an FFRDC for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA governs the agency
with three-agency level councils and the center directors are members.
The Site Office at JPL performs no assessments and Headquarters
performs Mission and Environment, Health, and Safety reviews three
times per year. In contrast, over 1,300 external audits were performed
at LLNL in fiscal year 2011 as part of NNSA's transactional oversight.
NNSA monitors performance at LLNL using an annual Performance
Evaluation Plan (PEP). In fiscal year 2011, the PEP had 11 Objectives,
42 Measures, 79 Targets, 5 Award Term Incentives, 12 Multi-site Targets
(all but 2 applicable to LLNL), and a large number of supporting
metrics to gauge performance. The DOE/NNSA Site Office at Livermore
defines 324 elements in their management assessment plans. JPL and NASA
dispensed with the PEP approach, deciding that it interfered with a
focus on mission.
There is one area where we have seen improvement toward an
effective partnership with NNSA: reform of security policy and
procedures. The effort, which began about 2 years ago, is led by NNSA's
Defense Nuclear Service (DNS) and is collaborative with NNSA sites and
contractors. DNS formed combined teams (Federal and contractor) of
subject matter experts (e.g., in Information Security and in Physical
Protection). The goal was to review and replace DOE Office of Health,
Safety and Security orders with a more streamlined set of NNSA policies
(NAPs) that provide the security directors at NNSA sites greater
flexibility to meet their particular needs. So far, two NAPs have been
created, which is saving an estimated $37 million per year in operating
costs at LLNL alone. Seven more NAPs are in the pipeline and expected
to be released soon.
CLOSING REMARKS
My overall message is a ``good news'' story with a note of caution.
With continuing investments in HPC and with NIF coming on-line as a
unique experimental facility to gather necessary input and validation
data for nuclear weapons science simulation codes, science-based
stockpile stewardship is on the path to success. However, vigilance and
strong partnerships are required to sustain program support so that
there will be skilled and motivated stockpile stewards as long as the
Nation relies on nuclear deterrence.
All of us at LLNL look forward to serving as a trusted partner in
the Nation's national security enterprise and are proud to provide
innovative science and technology to meet a broad set of national
security needs. We thank you for your continuing support.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Hommert?
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT, DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL
LABORATORIES
Dr. Hommert. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Inhofe, thank
you for the opportunity to testify.
I would like to request that my full testimony be made part
of the record.
Senator Nelson. Without objection.
Dr. Hommert. I am Paul Hommert, Director of Sandia National
Laboratories, a multi-program national security laboratory.
I would like to begin by putting my testimony in an overall
context. It is my view that we have entered a new era for the
U.S. nuclear deterrent, a period when the nuclear weapons
enterprise must address for the first time modernization of the
stockpile, which depends critically on the use and continued
advancement of the tools of stewardship; targeted upgrades to
the production infrastructure; and maintenance of the current
stockpile through a modernization transition period. Such
imperatives create funding demands not seen in recent decades
and will require risk-based prioritization of the program,
along with continued emphasis on strong program management and
cost-effectiveness.
With this background, now let me discuss the four major
points of my testimony.
I am pleased to report that the appropriated fiscal year
2012 budget will allow Sandia to complete the 6.2A cost study
for the B61 LEP and initiate full-scale engineering development
at a pace consistent with fiscal year 2019 first production
unit (FPU) with the scope agreed by the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
Furthermore, the President's fiscal year 2013 budget
request to Congress, if authorized and appropriated, does
provide sufficient funds for Sandia to support the fiscal year
2019 FPU schedule for the B61-12.
However, I must emphasize that beginning now consistent and
timely, multiyear is vital if the B61 LEP schedule is to be
maintained.
Second, the schedule and scope of the B61 LEP relate to
strong technical drivers, which are discussed in my classified
September 2011 annual stockpile assessment letter. I recommend
the members read the letter, and I welcome the opportunity to
discuss it further.
Beyond the B61 program, as we move forward on
modernization, we must have a clear understanding and broad
agreement about the vision for our stockpile 20 years from now.
That vision must be robust in the face of current and future
treaty obligations, evolving policy direction, stockpile
technical realities, our infrastructure capabilities, and
fiscal constraints. I believe such a vision is possible and
emerging and we are actively supporting DOD and NNSA as they
work through this planning.
Finally, I am encouraged by the recent discussion
concerning governance of the NNSA laboratories. In my view,
reinvigorating the government-owned and contractor-operated
model, which implies government oversight at the strategic
rather than transactional level, offers the potential for
improvements in operational performance, contractor
accountability, and cost-effectiveness at the labs with
attendant cost savings on the Federal side.
With respect to fiscal constraints, we recognize the
funding required at Sandia for the B61-12 is significant. In my
full testimony, I outline steps we have taken to control costs.
These include changes to pension and medical benefits,
leveraging the work we do for other Federal agencies, and the
utilization of the tools of stewardship. Throughout this
program, we will continue to see further cost efficiencies.
I just mentioned the work that we do for other Federal
agencies. I strongly believe that today it is no longer
possible for my laboratory to continue to deliver consistently
on the commitments to the nuclear weapons program without the
synergistic interagency work that attracts top talent, hones
our skills, and provides stability through the nuclear weapons
program cycles.
Regarding talent, I am pleased to tell you that we have
been able to recruit to Sandia top talent to support the full
range of our national security programs. Specifically since
fiscal year 2010, we have hired about 300 outstanding advanced
degreed scientists and engineers directly into the weapons
program. Of these, well over one-half are recent graduates
anxious to begin their careers working on the Nation's nuclear
deterrent. It is very important that we provide them with a
stable environment to pursue the multiyear learning it takes to
technically steward the Nation's nuclear stockpile now and into
the future. To enable their success, we must strive for a
national commitment to the program, for in the end the Nation's
deterrent rests on the strength of our people.
Let me close by summarizing the key points.
Authorization and appropriation of the fiscal year 2013
budget request and consistent, timely multiyear funding are
critical to a fiscal year 2019 FPU for the B61.
The schedule and the scope for the B61-12 is based on
strong technical drivers.
We need a broadly agreed, 20-year detailed vision for our
nuclear deterrent.
We are staffed and ready to execute the B61-12.
Operational performance, productivity, and cost-
effectiveness can be increased at the laboratories by
improvements to the government construct under which we
currently operate.
Thank you and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hommert follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Paul J. Hommert
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, thank
you for the opportunity to testify. I am Paul Hommert, President and
Director of Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogram
national security laboratory owned by the U.S. Government and operated
by Sandia Corporation \1\ for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).
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\1\ Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin
Corporation under Department of Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-
94AL85000.
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Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility
for stockpile stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation's nuclear
weapons. Within the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, Sandia is uniquely
responsible for the systems engineering and integration of the nuclear
weapons in the stockpile and for the design, development,
qualification, sustainment, and retirement of nonnuclear components of
nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons represent Sandia's core mission,
the science, technology, and engineering capabilities required to
support this mission position us to support other aspects of national
security as well. Indeed, there is natural, increasingly significant
synergy between our core mission and our broader national security
work. This broader role involves research and development in
nonproliferation, counterterrorism, energy security, defense, and
homeland security.
My statement today will provide an update since my testimony of
March 30, 2011, before this subcommittee. Starting from an overall
perspective of the nuclear weapons program and the challenges facing us
since the end of the Cold War, I will refer to the following major
issues:
(1) modernization programs with emphasis on the B61 Life Extension
Program (LEP),
(2) U.S. nuclear stockpile assessment,
(3) status of the capability base needed to support our mission,
(4) nonproliferation,
(5) broader national security work,
(6) workforce, and
(7) governance.
These issues will be viewed within the context of the
administration's request to Congress for the fiscal year 2013 budget
and of the appropriated fiscal year 2012 budget.
MAJOR POINTS OF THIS TESTIMONY
1. For the nuclear weapons enterprise to meet the B61 LEP scope
and schedule as decided by the Nuclear Weapons Council in December
2011, it is essential that the funding levels in the President's fiscal
year 2013 budget request to Congress be authorized and appropriated. In
addition, funding disruptions that could result from a fiscal year 2013
continuing resolution would have an almost immediate impact on our
ability to meet the fiscal year 2019 first production unit schedule for
the LEP. Therefore, if the schedule is to be met, plans for
uninterrupted execution under a possible continuing resolution will be
needed.
2. The schedule and scope of the B61 LEP relate to strong
technical drivers, which are discussed in my September 2011 annual
stockpile assessment letter. I recommend that members read the letter,
and I welcome the opportunity to discuss it in an appropriate venue.
3. Beyond the B61 LEP, further planning is needed to determine the
details of the modernization activities consistent with the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review framework. The planning update needs to reflect
the current plutonium strategy, improved understanding of modernization
costs, and technical state of the stockpile; it also needs to be
consistent with overall fiscal constraints. We are supporting
Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA planning efforts currently
underway.
4. I am encouraged by the recent discussion concerning governance
of the NNSA laboratories. In my view, reinvigorating the government-
owned and contractor-operated model, which implies government oversight
at the strategic rather than transactional level, offers the potential
for improvements in operational performance, contractor accountability,
and cost-effectiveness at the laboratories, with attendant cost savings
on the Federal side.
PERSPECTIVE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
It is my view that we have entered a new era for the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. The nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the first
time the following imperatives: modernizing the nuclear weapons
stockpile, which depends critically on the use and continued
advancement of the tools of stewardship, upgrading production
infrastructure in a targeted manner, and maintaining the current
stockpile through a modernization transition period. Such an
environment creates funding demands not seen in recent decades, and it
will require risk-based prioritization of the program, along with
continued emphasis on strong program management and cost-effectiveness.
The current nuclear stockpile was largely developed, produced, and
tested in the 1970s and 1980s, during the Cold War. It was the time of
the arms race, as new nuclear systems were frequently being developed
and fielded.
After the 1992 moratorium on underground testing, the nuclear
weapons program went into its next phase, science-based stockpile
stewardship. The advanced tools and deeper scientific understanding we
developed in that period have been applied to our annual assessment of
the stockpile, to stockpile maintenance activities such as replacement
of limited-life components, and to the qualification of the W76-1 LEP.
Science-based stockpile stewardship has been successful in generating
the required scientific competencies and resources and attracting
talented staff, but it was not accompanied by a broad-based effort to
modernize the nuclear arsenal.
Now, some 20 years after the end of the Cold War, we have a
stockpile that has become significantly smaller and older. Considering
the average age (27 years) of the stockpile and our insights into the
stockpile, we have clearly reached a point at which we must conduct
full-scale engineering development and related production activities to
modernize the nuclear arsenal. This work can be accomplished only by
relying on the tools of stewardship and a revitalized, appropriately
sized production capability. Let me restate that, in my view, the
nuclear weapons enterprise has never before faced the combined need to
modernize the stockpile, address production infrastructure, and further
stewardship while sustaining major elements of the current stockpile.
The new era of the nuclear deterrent is guided by the strategic
framework for U.S. nuclear weapons policy outlined in the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review and associated documents, such as the fiscal year 2012
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. However, in the past year,
several factors have required further detailed planning to confidently
establish the basis for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear
deterrent. These factors include changes in the plutonium strategy, a
deeper understanding of modernization costs, and the technical state of
the stockpile. As we move forward, we must have a clear understanding
and broad agreement about the vision for our stockpile 20 years from
now. That vision must be robust in the face of current and future
treaty obligations, evolving policy direction, stockpile technical
realities, our infrastructure capabilities, and fiscal constraints. I
believe such a vision is emerging, and we are actively supporting the
DOD and NNSA as they work through this planning. Simultaneously, we are
ensuring that Sandia is positioned to fulfill its responsibilities in
support of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. We are confident in our
ability to do so.
BUDGET OVERVIEW
I am pleased to report that the appropriated fiscal year 2012
budget will allow Sandia to both complete the 6.2A cost study for the
B61 LEP and initiate full-scale engineering development at a pace
consistent with a fiscal year 2019 first production unit. In this
context, I wish to extend my thanks to the key authorization and
appropriation committees of Congress for having approved reprogramming
of fiscal year 2012 funds to achieve the full budget level required to
complete our work. Without reprogramming, staffing would have been
impacted at a number of nuclear weapons enterprise sites, including
Sandia. In my view, fiscal year 2013 is critical to sustaining
modernization at the schedule and scope required by recent Nuclear
Weapons Council decisions and the overall framework of the Nuclear
Posture Review. Within this section, I will focus on key elements
required for Sandia to execute its near- and long-term responsibilities
and the manner in which the fiscal year 2013 budget request to Congress
reflects those requirements.
The B61 Life Extension Program
Sandia supports the administration's fiscal year 2013 budget
request to Congress, which addresses funding for the B61 life
extension. If fully appropriated, the fiscal year 2013 site splits for
Sandia provide the necessary budget growth that permits Sandia to meet
program requirements. fiscal year 2013 is crucial for the B61 as all
component designs must be brought to a level that ensures successful
system qualification on the path to fiscal year 2019. We will complete
detailed cost estimates for the required scope of the B61 program in
June of this year; however, from work we completed in 2011, we know
with high confidence that the level of funding included in the fiscal
year 2013 budget request is commensurate with the technology maturation
and integration that must be conducted in fiscal year 2013 in order to
meet the required schedule.
Last year I testified that the B61 LEP would complete the cost
estimation for the full-scope B61 LEP in fiscal year 2011. Indeed, a
detailed cost study was completed on schedule that met all the DOD and
NNSA objective requirements. As it became clear that the cost of
meeting all objective requirements with delivery in fiscal year 2017
would exceed near-term resource availability, the B61 LEP system design
team was directed to examine reduced-scope options, which meet a
renegotiated set of threshold requirements that would represent
acceptable risk for the weapon system going forward. This work led to
the scope accepted by the Nuclear Weapons Council in December 2011,
which reduces the cost of the program while ensuring a modernized B61
that meets military threshold requirements and addresses technical
concerns expressed in my annual stockpile assessment letter from
September 2011. While I strongly support this scope, it is important to
recognize that the new program does have increased risk resulting from
the partial reuse of components and the loss of schedule margin. The
schedule is now driven tightly by technical realities in the current
system. The reuse of certain components further heightens the
importance of a robust surveillance program.
I cannot emphasize enough the significance of timely funding
authorization and appropriation. Consistent, predictable multiyear
funding is vital for the fiscal year 2019 B61-12 first production unit
as it allows for the seamless progression of development,
qualification, and production and for development of the necessary
workforce. Plans for uninterrupted execution under a possible
continuing resolution in fiscal year 2013 will be needed if the
schedule is to be met. The success of the B61 LEP also requires the
necessary support for the nuclear explosive package agency (Los Alamos
National Laboratory) and the production complex.
The B61 LEP represents the largest nuclear weapon product
development effort that the nuclear weapons complex has undertaken
since the 1970s, an effort roughly three times that of the W76 Trident
II SLBM warhead LEP, which is now in production. We recognize that the
funding levels required at Sandia for this program are significant.
Therefore, we are focused on efforts to reduce cost over the life of
the program and to manage with full transparency and commitment to
program rigor. Examples of our efforts include: (1) actions we have
taken to reduce, by over $1 billion, labor costs associated with
Laboratory-wide pension and medical care over the coming decade; (2)
maximum leverage we have sought from other weapon development efforts
and from the work we do for other Federal agencies; and (3) consistent
use of the tools of stewardship to reduce the costs of weapon
qualification by comparison with historical efforts. Throughout this
program, we will continue to seek further cost efficiencies. For
example, the governance reform efforts being considered also afford the
opportunity for further savings.
My last comment on the B61 program has to do with staffing. For
this life extension, we have now approximately 30 product realization
teams working to complete the Weapon Development and Cost Report and
being prepared to initiate full-scale engineering design of components
and subsystems upon entry into Phase 6.3. We aggressively staffed this
program in fiscal year 2011 to accomplish our objectives on the current
schedule. In July 2010, we had a core of approximately 80 staff on the
B61 project. By the end of fiscal year 2011, we had staffed to more
than 500. This group includes experienced weapon designers, individuals
with design and program management experience from other large non-
nuclear-weapon programs at Sandia, and many new professionals who
represent the future intellectual base of our deterrent. It has been a
challenge to assemble this team, but we have done so. Major
instabilities in funding will make it difficult to keep this team
stable and will lead to amplified schedule and cost impacts if we need
to periodically reassemble the team.
Further Modernization Efforts
The B61 LEP is one in a series of programs with timelines extending
to 2035 that have been documented in the fiscal year 2012 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan. Among them are the W88 Alteration
(ALT), the modernization of elements of our ballistic missile
capabilities, and a possible weapon system associated with long-range
stand-off delivery vehicles.
Sandia is pursuing work on the W88 ALT, which involves replacing
the Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) system and other nonnuclear
components. The W88 ALT is scheduled for first production unit in
December 2018, driven by the overall Navy program and schedule,
components reaching their end of life, the need for additional
surveillance quantities, and alignment with the common fuze developed
for the Air Force for the W87.
The Nuclear Posture Review recommended ``initiating a study of LEP
options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using
the resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead
types'' (p. xiv). A larger vision of an interoperable set of ballistic
warheads has matured since the release of the Nuclear Posture Review 2
years ago; this approach will support a more flexible, responsive,
resilient stockpile for an uncertain future. Indeed, the Phase 6.1
concept assessment study for this modernization effort is nearing
completion, and Sandia provided the warhead systems engineering and
integration. We are fully leveraging the work we have done over the
past several years on modular warhead architectures and adaptable
nonnuclear components, including a recent study focused on a modular
AF&F design.
By being adaptable to several weapon systems, our modular AF&F
approach leads to significant cost savings. Using an envelope of the
requirements for the W78, W88, and W87, our study concluded that the
modular AF&F approach is technically feasible. While the modular AF&F
cannot be identical in each weapon system because the nuclear explosive
package is different, it can be designed to be adaptable, with many
common components and common technologies. In each life extension, we
will also make appropriate improvements in safety and security, which
are enabled in part by miniaturization of electronics. Savings in
weight and volume, at a premium in reentry systems, can be used for
those additional safety and security features. The results of the W78
LEP Phase 6.1 concept assessment study are planned for briefing to the
Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee later this year.
Stockpile Surveillance and Assessment
Stockpile surveillance and assessment play a crucial role in
assuring the nuclear deterrent. Findings from conducting this program
provide us with knowledge about the safety, security, and reliability
of the stockpile, provide the technical basis for our annual stockpile
assessment reported to the President of the United States through the
annual assessment process, and inform decisions about required elements
of the LEPs and their timelines.
Multiple drivers heighten the importance of the surveillance
program. Among them are the following: an unprecedented age of the
stockpile, which includes many subsystems that were not originally
designed for extended life; smaller stockpile numbers; and for at least
the next 20 years, surveillance of a stockpile that will contain
simultaneously both our oldest weapons and life-extended weapons, which
must be examined for possible birth defects and for further aging of
reused components.
If fully appropriated, the fiscal year 2013 site splits for Sandia
provide the resources to meet our highest priority surveillance needs,
which include conducting planned system tests--both flight and
laboratory tests--but they limit the pace at which we can implement
additional component tests and develop new diagnostics needed to
improve our predictive capabilities. These predictive capabilities,
which provide a better understanding of margins, uncertainties, and
trends, are needed to ensure lead times necessary to respond to aging
issues that would have the potential to reduce stockpile safety,
security, or reliability. To minimize the risk to the stockpile, given
the realities of the current fiscal environment, we are implementing a
risk-based prioritization of our surveillance activities. Success in
this important area will require continued strong budget support in the
out-years.
Essential Infrastructure and Capabilities
Sandia's capabilities are essential to its full life cycle
responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition
to design, development, qualification, testing, and ultimately to
ongoing stockpile surveillance and assessment. Let me point out a few
examples.
The NNSA complex transformation plan designated Sandia as the Major
Environmental Test Center of Excellence for the entire nuclear weapons
program. Our facilities and equipment in this area are extensive: (1)
20 test facilities at Sandia; (2) the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada; and
(3) the Weapon Evaluation Test Laboratory in Amarillo, TX. We use
environmental test capabilities to simulate the full range of
mechanical, thermal, electrical, explosive, and radiation environments
that nuclear weapons must withstand, including those associated with
postulated accident scenarios. In addition to these experimental and
test facilities, Sandia's high-performance computing capabilities are
vital tools for our mission responsibilities in stockpile surveillance,
certification, and qualification, and they have proved to be
indispensable in our broader national security work.
I am very pleased that funding for the completion of the Test
Capabilities Revitalization Phase 2 is included in the administration's
fiscal year 2013 budget request for weapons activities. This funding
will enable us to renovate our suite of mechanical environment test
facilities, which are essential to support the design and qualification
of the B61 life extension and subsequent life extensions.
The administration's fiscal year 2013 budget request also includes
funding for the initial Tonopah Test Range upgrades in recognition of
this facility being an essential mission requirement. However,
sustained investment over multiple years is necessary to complete the
required scope of the upgrades. Development flight tests will be
conducted at the Tonopah Test Range for the B61 life extension.
I am equally pleased that the new budget request addresses the
beginning of a recapitalization program for our silicon fabrication
facility, the requirements for which I addressed in my testimony last
year. I will restate that Sandia stewards for the nuclear weapons
program, as well as for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
nonproliferation payloads, the microelectronics research and
fabrication facility, where we design and fabricate an array of unique
microelectronics, specialty optical components, and
microelectromechanical system devices. The fiscal year 2013 budget
request includes funding for the first year of a 4-year program that
will recapitalize the tooling and equipment in our silicon fabrication
facility, much of which dates back about 15 years in an industry where
technology changes almost every 2 years. For completion of the program,
commitment to multiyear funding is required. Recapitalization will
reduce the risk for delivering the B61 LEP and ensure production of the
radiation-hardened components required by the W88 ALT and all future
reentry system LEPs. As we go forward on modernization, our
microelectronics fabrication facilities, which form the basis of our
trusted foundry, will be critical to ensuring the integrity of our
supply chain.
Nonproliferation
Sandia's portfolio of nonproliferation activities contains a full
array of programs aimed at combating the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Working collaboratively with Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore national laboratories and several other DOE laboratories, we
are:
developing technologies to ``convert, remove, and
protect'' nuclear and radiological materials that could be used
in nuclear and radiological weapons,
conducting international work for material protection,
increasing effectiveness in large-scale field
experimentation for nonproliferation test monitoring and arms
control,
ensuring that the on-orbit satellite program meets
current requirements and adapts to future monitoring
challenges,
developing ground-based systems for more effective
seismic monitoring;
enabling other countries to develop nuclear security
centers of excellence, and
conducting international work in support of
cooperative threat reduction programs.
In addition to working with other laboratories, we are engaging
globally with international partners in more than 100 countries to
reduce the threat of proliferation. Our primary customers for this work
are the NNSA, Department of State, and DOD. As a general comment, I
will state that nonproliferation funding has shown stability at Sandia.
The administration's fiscal year 2013 Budget Request to Congress
continues that trend, with budget increases in certain areas and
reductions in others. I am pleased to see balanced increases both in
the technologies that respond to immediate national security needs and
in the R&D necessary to sustain the flexibility to meet future national
security requirements. In particular, the long lead time for satellite
monitoring systems requires a sustained commitment to leading-edge R&D.
This budget demonstrates that commitment and will enable the national
labs to attract ``the best and the brightest,'' who are eager to
participate in exciting R&D projects with an enduring impact on U.S.
and global security.
Synergy between Our Nuclear Weapons Mission and Broader National
Security Work
Today's national security challenges are highly diverse. The NNSA
laboratories are contributing solutions to the complex national
security challenges. Indeed, as mentioned in the fiscal year 2011
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Summary, ``while NNSA nuclear
weapons activities are clearly focused on the strategic deterrence
aspects of the NNSA mission, they also inform and support with critical
capabilities other aspects of national security'' (p. 7). In turn, to
sustain and sharpen these competencies, Sandia relies on its broader
national security work. The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear
weapon mission and broader national security missions prevents
insularity and creates a challenging, vigorous scientific and
engineering environment that attracts and retains the new talent that
we need. Such an environment is essential to succeed against the
challenges we now face. The following example highlights the way in
which this symbiotic relationship works.
Sandia has led the development of real-time processing and high
performance-to-volume ratio technologies for synthetic aperture radar
(SAR). Both technologies were made possible by our extensive design and
development work for radars for nuclear weapon fuzing. The technologies
have been leveraged and are currently used by the DOD. The extensive
SAR work has sharpened our radar design competencies and kept Sandia
aligned with advances in radar technology, such as radio-frequency
integrated circuits. We are now applying these modern technologies to
the design of the replacement radar for the B61 LEP and the W88 ALT.
This symbiotic relationship enables leveraging not only
capabilities and technologies, but also engineering practices and
processes. One of these areas with direct application across business
areas and customers is cost management. A new cost management process
was developed and successfully implemented during our work on fuze
development for the U.S. Navy. Once work was delivered within the
Navy's cost targets, many of the staff transitioned to work on the
large satellite programs, where additional processes were developed for
cost and change control. Once again, after delivery of expected
results, many of those same staff transitioned onto NNSA's current
LEPs, including the B61 LEP. This synergistic rotation of staff across
business areas and the lessons learned from a diverse set of customers
and programs have created an environment of cost control and provided a
set of cost management processes and practices that are now being
implemented on NNSA's current programs. In a climate of fiscal
responsibility, Sandia is finding innovative solutions to control cost.
Today it is no longer imaginable that the laboratories could
deliver consistently on the commitments to the nuclear weapons program
without the synergistic interagency work that attracts top talent,
hones our skills, and provides stability through the nuclear weapons
program cycles. Government commitment for the broad national security
work of the laboratories is essential for the United States to ensure
the preeminence of our nuclear weapons and to enable multidisciplinary
technical solutions to other complex and high-risk national security
challenges.
Workforce
Our talented people are our most fundamental capability. Given the
scope and nature of our work, it is mandatory to continue attracting,
retaining, and training a highly capable workforce committed to
``exceptional service in the national interest.'' To do so, we must:
(1) ensure that our work is aligned with the national purpose; (2)
create a climate of innovation and creativity that inspires our
workforce; and (3) create a balanced work environment that is both
responsive to the fiscal realities of our times and attractive to the
talented staff we need in the future.
At Sandia, we have been proactive about hiring new staff into the
weapons program, as experienced staff retired. The modernization
program provides opportunities for the new technical staff to work
closely with our experienced designers: from advanced concept
development to component design and qualification, and ultimately to
the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. Since the
beginning of fiscal year 2010, we have hired approximately 300
outstanding advanced-degree scientists and engineers directly into the
weapons program as we execute modernization. Of these, well over one-
half are essentially new graduates anxious to begin their careers
working on the Nation's nuclear deterrent. It is very important that we
provide individuals such as these with an environment where they can
undertake the multiyear learning it takes to technically steward the
Nation's nuclear stockpile now and into the future. Indeed, in the end,
the Nation's deterrent rests upon the strength of our people. We have a
new generation of scientists and engineers prepared to take on that
challenge now that we have entered the modernization era, but we must
strive to provide the stability, focus, and national commitment that
will enable their success.
As I testified last year before this subcommittee and as I stated
above, fiscal realities have forced us to reduce costs by addressing
the funding liabilities in our pension program, restructuring the
healthcare benefits, and simplifying internal processes. All these
actions were necessary, but they can go no further without compromising
our ability to attract and retain.
Governance
Finally, I would like to state that I am much encouraged by the
recent broad discussion around NNSA's oversight of the national
security laboratories. Future improvements, as recommended by the
National Academy of Sciences study ``Observations on NNSA's Management
and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise'' will allow us to
reinvest needed resources back into the mission.
A strategic oversight model is needed, which will bring to the
forefront the need for such governance principles as mission clarity,
commitment to using the robust construct of federally funded research
and development centers, and commitment to the full use of the
government-owned and contractor-operated model.
We understand that effective government oversight of our operations
is essential. However, I am concerned that the magnitude and detailed
level of our current oversight model can impede our efforts to
continually improve our safety, security, environmental, and cost
performance. It is also not evident that the oversight model under
which the NNSA laboratories operate is comparable to that of other
federally funded entities engaged in similar work. I encourage the
administration and Congress to consider improvements in this area.
CONCLUSIONS
As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, ``as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal'' (p. iii). Having embarked on the new era of
the nuclear deterrent, we are guided by the strategic framework for
U.S. nuclear weapons policy outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
and associated documents, such as the fiscal year 2012 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan. However, in the past year, several
factors have required further detailed planning to confidently
establish the basis for sustaining and modernizing our nuclear
deterrent. Among these factors are changes in the plutonium strategy, a
deeper understanding of modernization costs, and the technical state of
the stockpile. As we move forward, we must have a clear understanding
and broad agreement about the vision for our stockpile 20 years into
the future. I believe such a vision is emerging, and we are actively
supporting the DOD and NNSA in their planning efforts. Simultaneously,
we are ensuring that Sandia is positioned to fulfill its
responsibilities in support of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. We are
confident in our ability to do so.
Sandia supports the administration's fiscal year 2013 budget
request to Congress. Seamless progression of development,
qualification, and production on the B61 LEP requires funds
appropriated in a timely manner in fiscal year 2013 and all subsequent
years to meet the goal of a first production unit in fiscal year 2019.
Our commitment to the demanding and solemn responsibility for stockpile
modernization, stewardship, and annual assessment is unwavering. It
also comes with an obligation to be second to none in science and
engineering and to steward the Nation's resources efficiently. Sandia
is committed to fulfilling its service to the Nation with excellence
and judicious cost management. The fact that the three national
security laboratory directors were invited to speak before you today
and answer your questions is a clear indication of the leadership role
of Congress in authorizing a sound path forward for U.S. nuclear
deterrence.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
We will do a 7-minute round. Senator Inhofe has to attend
another hearing. So I will defer to him.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that.
I just returned from Afghanistan, and I will say the same
thing to you that I said to some of the commanders there. There
are a lot of things that we need that we are not getting. They
are not adequately funded. This is true at the labs. This is
not your fault. You did a great job. All three of you are doing
a great job with the hand that you are dealt, but I think we
need to deal you a better hand, if I have said that right, Mr.
Chairman.
Let me just mention a couple of things that I would like to
get on record. Then I do have to go to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee because I am actually the ranking member
there.
The fiscal year 2013 budget for the NNSA makes a number of
significant changes to the nuclear weapons complex
modernization plan the President supported when he asked for
the Senate to ratify the New START treaty. Some of you were not
really involved on a lot of those discussions, but in
attempting to get the votes necessary for the New START treaty,
commitments were made that affect you.
By deferring a major construction project at Los Alamos,
the NNSA effectively terminated a key enabler necessary to meet
STRATCOM requirements as well as the confidence necessary to
support the future reductions. During our hearing in March,
General Robert Kehler, the head of STRATCOM, testified that he
is concerned with the lack of a plan and strategy to meet
STRATCOM requirements. According to General Kehler, he will be
``concerned until somebody presents a plan that we can look at
and be comfortable with and understand that it is being
supported.''
So, Dr. McMillan, Dr. Hommert, and Dr. Albright, if you
would just answer these questions, I would like to get you on
the record.
Do you share General Kehler's concerns?
Dr. McMillan. Senator Inhofe, why don't I start since CMRR
is my responsibility?
If I could, Mr. Chairman, I failed to ask to get my written
comments into the record. So if they could please be included.
Senator Nelson. Without objection.
Dr. McMillan. I would say we do not yet have a plan. In
that I agree with General Kehler. However, from my perspective,
I see a substantial amount of work going on both with DOD and
with DOE, and at the laboratory we have been involved with that
work to develop a plan.
I mentioned elements of that development in my testimony
which is to talk about the concept of pit reuse. In my view, a
plan is more than a concept. A plan involves ideas, a project
plan, and funding that is consistent with that, and we are not
yet at that stage.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Comments, Dr. Albright? Basically do you agree with General
Kehler?
Dr. Albright. Yes, I would say I generally do agree with
him. I would just make the caution that because of the deferral
of CMRR, the technical solutions that we are looking at for our
LEPs are constrained in a certain way that we are, I think, I
would say, cautiously optimistic that we can accommodate those
constraints, but it is by no means a done deal.
Senator Inhofe. Not with the current resources you have.
Dr. Albright. With the current resources we have. The issue
here gets around to pit reuse and how you can accommodate that
pit reuse within the constraints of the NPR.
Senator Inhofe. Do you generally agree with that, Dr.
Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. I would share General Kehler's view that right
at this moment we do not have a plan, as I mentioned in my oral
statement. It is very important that we can see what the
stockpile we want to have 20 years from now because when you
back up from that, we have to make technical choices or begin
scientific work today that would position us to have that
stockpile in the future. I am encouraged that I think such a
plan can be developed, but we do not have that in hand today.
Senator Inhofe. The three of you heard me say in my opening
statement that the commitment on behalf of the administration
to modernize the nuclear weapons complex was a key element in
the ratification of the New START treaty. Were you aware of
that? Okay.
Do you agree that modernization is universally recognized
as essential to the future viability of the nuclear weapons
complex and the prerequisite for future reductions? You would
generally agree with that statement?
Dr. Hommert. I would say that modernization from a
technical standpoint is required for the U.S. stockpile, yes.
Senator Inhofe. Is it true that this budget would result in
a--and I am going to name some delays here--the 2-year delay in
the B61 LEP and also delay of the completion of the W76 LEP by
4 years and then by 3 years the W78, W88 LEP, those three
extensions? This budget would result in those extensions?
Dr. Hommert. Yes. The budget is consistent with the
timeframe.
Senator Inhofe. Lastly, I would say, does your budget
provide the resources necessary to meet the DOD requirements?
Here is what I am trying to get at. These are not trick
questions or anything. I am very much concerned. It harms those
of us who are trying to expand this program trying to meet the
commitments that are out there that we should be meeting as a
committee. We are on your side, but when we do not get you on
record saying that there are some inadequacies we do not have
much to hang our hat on. I am concerned about this, about the
requirements.
First of all, you talk about a letter that you sent. I am a
little confused because I hear now and then the term
``certification.'' Do you folks have to certify and is this in
the form of a letter? How does that work?
Dr. Hommert. We are required annually to submit a letter to
the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, each
individually stating our technical view of the annual
assessment of the stockpile as to its safety and reliability.
Senator Inhofe. And modernization and----
Dr. Hommert. Requirements that might flow from that.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
Dr. McMillan. In addition, when a system first enters the
stockpile system, Senator, we certify it at that point, and
then we review it annually to make sure that things have not
changed in a way that would cause us to have----
Senator Inhofe. You are actually certifying for that point
in time, that snapshot.
Dr. McMillan. That is right, and then we review that.
Senator Inhofe. All right. The subcommittee has been told
that 1 or 2 years of additional funding will not be sufficient
to put the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise back on a sound
footing. I believe, having visited with the STRATCOM people,
that their requirement is for NNSA to generate up to 80 nuclear
pits per year, and the NNSA will not be able to achieve that
rate until a new CMRR facility is in operation.
How critical are the uranium processing facility and the
chemistry and metallurgy research replacement nuclear
facilities to our future stockpile?
Dr. McMillan. Senator, I have responsibility for that
facility, so let me start.
The purpose of that facility, just to make sure we are all
on the same page, is that it provides the analytical
capabilities to ensure the quality. It provides analytical
capabilities that can serve in nonproliferation/
counterproliferation missions. It is simply the ability to
handle the number of samples that would be required when we
produce pits in PF4 that we need that for. At this point,
without CMRR, we do not have a way that I know of to be able to
make as many as 50 to 80 pits.
Senator Inhofe. I see.
Dr. McMillan. We can make, with investments that we do not
yet have, we could make maybe 20 to 30 with the facilities we
have.
Senator Inhofe. That is a very good answer, a good answer
to the question. Any disagreement with that?
The last thing I want to mention, Mr. Chairman--I know my
time expired and I do need to get back upstairs. But relating
to these two $5 billion buildings, I do not quite understand. I
have heard a lot of views on this that those funds and
resources could be used elsewhere more effectively. Is there a
reason that the two buildings have to be $5 billion buildings?
Have you all looked into that and made recommendations?
Dr. McMillan. Again, I have looked very hard at that
because of my responsibilities, and I can assure you that I
pressured my team substantially on that.
What you always have with buildings like this is you have a
range of prices. Our current estimate at Los Alamos is
something in the region of $3.7 billion, but I can tell you as
delay occurs, we are moving toward the upper end of that range.
The range that--your $5 billion is closer to the top end of
that range.
But as a manager, I feel a deep responsibility for the
taxpayers' dollars, to use those as efficiently as we can, and
I can assure you I have worked closely with my teams to get the
costs as low as we can while ensuring safety for the material
that we handle.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate your answer, and I think it is
significant because a lot of the things that are happening
there, delays, things that were not in my opinion agreed upon
in advance when they signed the New START treaty, are budget-
driven. So you look for places where the budget is on the other
side of it. It just appears to me that some of that could be in
better use.
I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, your allowing me to do this
so I can get back to my other committee.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate
very much your being here.
Dr. Shank, your recent study finds a lack of trust between
the NNSA and its laboratories. I think you have outlined it as
the relationship as oversight over transactions versus
oversight over processes. Can you tell us a little bit how you
determined that lack of trust to draw that conclusion?
Dr. Shank. In our discussions, we visited all three
laboratories. We talked to site managers. We talked to all
parties involved. We looked at the core issue of how one does
oversight and does oversight effectively. If you do oversight
with a trusted organization, you create an overall system and
you audit that system. If you do oversight where there is a
lack of trust, you want to look at every transaction. You want
to look every time something moves. You want to look at every
safety activity.
We said, well, the really core problem is reestablishing
trust so that one could put together a structure so that the
laboratories could have very cost-effective oversight with
fewer people more cost-effectively and begin to look how one
does oversight in the industrial part of our society. We think
it is eminently doable, but it means a very different way of
going about doing this business.
Sandia has a model that they have attempted to put in
place. It has been more than a decade in coming. It is not
making progress. It seems to me, unless we do something
different, we will be stuck with our current situation.
So, my view of this is there is a time now to think about
not just doing oversight, but doing more effective oversight
with less cost and that really is going to use some kind of
national standards, taking advantage of other agencies that
could do oversight, that do oversight more broadly and begin to
make the laboratories look like not only other industry but
even some other national laboratories in places outside NNSA.
Senator Nelson. You are not suggesting that there not be
oversight. What you are saying is you just cannot have
oversight over every transaction, every movement, everything
every day.
Dr. Shank. Correct. Oversight is absolutely essential to
assure the American taxpayer that the dollars are being spent
well. We are in no way saying that that should be in any way
done with less intensity. It should be done more efficiently,
and when you do not trust an organization, you look at every
movement. When you have trust and the laboratories have
qualified through a process to have a system--they do not just
have a system. You have to go through a qualification process--
then you monitor that system and it is a more effective way of
doing business. It is the way industry does this kind of thing.
Senator Nelson. Monitoring and auditing.
Dr. Shank. Through auditing.
Senator Nelson. I am going to ask each of the directors.
Dr. McMillan, do you agree with what Dr. Shank has said?
Dr. McMillan. I do. If I could just maybe add a little to
what Dr. Shank said.
I think the operational issues of trust may be where things
show up most for me, and by that, I do not just mean how people
feel about it, but rather what shows up day-to-day at the
laboratory. I firmly agree with the importance of oversight
because we are in a government-owned/contractor-operated
situation, there are substantial liabilities. So the government
has, in my view, an important governmental function in ensuring
that we who have the responsibility for managing those
facilities are doing it well and carefully.
Senator Nelson. Do you agree that the current situation
involves a lack of trust?
Dr. McMillan. I certainly see that at the operational
level, just as Dr. Shank described it, the evidence being that
so many of the transactions are individually monitored. Yes.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Albright, do you agree that there is
this lack of trust?
Dr. Albright. Yes, I do, and let me elaborate just a little
bit.
The real issue here, I think, is part of it is the
unwillingness of the government to allow the people who they
have actually hired to operate these facilities to make
rational assessments of risk and operate the facilities and
make the trades that they need to make in order to do the
mission.
But I think the even larger issue is the idea that we at
the national laboratories--we are the corporate memory. We are
the sinews and muscle and the brains of the nuclear complex. We
need to operate as partners with the Federal Government, not as
suppliers or vendors in the kind of contractual model that, I
think, really is a more pervasive attitude.
So I think we have to restore this idea that we are really
linked arm-and-arm. We are here for the mission, both the
government side and the laboratories. We each have a role and
responsibility to play, and we ought to be allowed to do that.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, I would agree. I would just say that the
terminology ``lack of trust'' to me equates to not functioning
at the system level. I actually believe that the model we
operate today, even from the government perspective, is not a
highly effective oversight model in achieving an integrated
overall improvement in the operational performance, the cost-
effectiveness, the productivity of the institutions, which I
think at a system level we share the same goal. I think we are
actually not progressing on that as effectively as we could
because of the model we operate in.
Senator Nelson. If there were trust, then it would be much
easier for the oversight to move away from transactional to
more directional because you have been hired to do what now
they do not trust you to do without their oversight. Right?
Understandable. Thank you.
Senator Vitter, you have arrived. Do you have some opening
comments you might like to make or would you like to go to some
questions?
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I will wait until
the questions and discussion, if that is appropriate now or a
little later.
Senator Nelson. Okay, thank you. We are taking 7-minute
rounds.
Dr. Patel, your study found that the autonomy in the
laboratories has significantly declined as FFRDCs, a hallmark
of DOE dating back to the Manhattan Project which has given
rise to scientific excellence. Can you explain this perhaps in
a little bit more detail?
Dr. Patel. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What do I mean by autonomy? By autonomy, we mean a task is
given and then it is monitored not on a transaction basis but
on a performance basis, performance which is based on a system
of checks and balances that, as the work is carried out, that
are put in place.
What has happened and what we observed through our visits
to the three laboratories, as well as discussions with a number
of scientists, engineers, and mid-level managers, is that many
of the decisionmaking capabilities no longer exist with them,
resulting in a more short-term look at how science and
engineering are carried out and much of the long-term planning
often does not get done principally because of the
transactional oversight that I just mentioned and we have heard
about earlier.
So one issue is how do we go about getting to this issue of
autonomy. I think especially in the science and engineering
area where the work gets carried out not over a yearly period,
but it is also over several years, and the importance of it
cannot be minimized because that is what provides the
underpinning of the primary responsibility of the three
laboratories for the nuclear stockpile. In order to do that,
what is required is a level of trust but, more than that, an
understanding on the part of NNSA and other managers that the
laboratory directors are the people who are closest to the real
problems and should be given an opportunity to plan a program
which assures the long-term reliability of the science and
engineering, which then in turn impacts upon the long-term
reliability of the nuclear stockpile.
The second issue with autonomy is an increasing amount of
non-scientific and non-technical operational oversight of what
gets done, and this very quickly results in some parts of the
activity seem to be being discouraged. Especially experimental
activities where a young scientist or an engineer wants to
carry out an experiment to assure that certain expectations,
certain modeling calculations are right, those are often slowed
down. The ultimate result is that the autonomy which should
reside with the young people in deciding how to get things done
is not there. It leads to, over the long-term, difficulty in
hiring the kind of outstanding people the laboratories need.
I believe that a good example of an autonomous laboratory
which produces a lot from my personal experience is Bell
Laboratories where I managed all of their physics and material
science activities for a fair period of time. We were given
overall responsibility to ensure that the physics or material
science that was needed by the company was there, but we were
not told how to do each and every single experiment. Yes, we
were audited at the end of the year. Yes, we were required to
provide progress reports, but nobody second guessed us in terms
of what we were doing. I think that level of autonomy should
come back to the laboratory directors for us to assure that our
taxpayers' dollars get us the biggest bang for the buck.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. McMillan, do you agree that there has been pressure on
the independence of your laboratory compared to prior years?
Dr. McMillan. I think there are two areas for that, Mr.
Chairman.
First, let me refer back to the annual assessment process,
the annual assessment of certification. In that regard, I feel
no pressure on the outcomes of our studies, and were there any
pressure there, I would be deeply concerned.
However, in the types of activities that Dr. Patel
described, I share his concern. In particular, he talked about
the assignment of tasks and then monitoring to see that they
are finished. I would add to that ensuring that that assignment
is at the right level because if the assignment is at a very
low level, it becomes do this, do that, do the other thing. On
the other hand, if it accomplishes this goal, I think that
draws on the laboratory's skills.
Finally, as Dr. Patel mentioned in Bell Labs, I think there
are other examples that we need to look to today to understand
relationships between the government and FFRDCs. Here, I think
of places like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Applied
Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins, et cetera. We have
examples, and I think looking at those examples for models
could be very helpful.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Albright?
Dr. Albright. I actually have nothing to add. I think Dr.
McMillan hit the nail right on the head.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, I agree, Mr. Chairman. I would just add
that I think this is a very pragmatic issue for us. As we
approach modernization, it is very important that we can look
to best leverage the funds. If we are tasked at a very fine
level, we lose some of the ability to leverage and achieve
overall cost-effectiveness and productivity as we try to
accomplish modernization.
Senator Nelson. Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
of you for being here and, more importantly, for your work.
Like a lot of members on the subcommittee and otherwise, I
have a single, very basic, fundamental concern which is funding
for all this activity really being dramatically cut and changed
since the New START treaty was passed in a way that is
inconsistent with some of the fundamental discussions,
including the section 1251 updated report that led to it being
passed. That is my big, big concern here. There are plenty of
other areas of concern, but that is my big concern.
So, Dr. Hommert, let me start with you because I think you
signed onto a letter that is a clear example of the scenario I
am talking about. In December you wrote Senators Kerry and
Lugar as chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee with other national laboratory leadership
saying that, ``we are very pleased by the update to the section
1251 report as it would enable the laboratories to execute our
requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and
effective stockpile,'' et cetera. Also, ``it clearly responds
to many of the concerns that we and others have voiced in the
past about potential future year funding shortfalls and it
substantially reduces risk to the overall program.''
Since then, we passed New START and since then the budgets
have suffered. So what is your current assessment of our
staying on that promised section 1251 report path?
Dr. Hommert. It is clear that since that letter, which I
think was probably late 2010, some of the conditions have
changed. We have a different plutonium strategy that will
require, as Dr. McMillan can speak to, a different approach. We
have a better understanding of the costs of modernization, and
I think that right now, as I mentioned earlier, we do not yet
have a plan that is completely closed and by that I mean with
an authorized and appropriated budget plan in multiyears that
would lead me to believe the same level of confidence at that
time. I believe we can get to that. Of course, in the
intervening time, we have faced additional fiscal constraints
overall which have clearly impacted the budget effort. So some
further work is necessary to achieve that same level of
confidence going forward at this point.
Senator Vitter. Today, as we speak, would you be prepared
to sign the same type of letter and express the same level of
confidence?
Dr. Hommert. I would not be able to do that today without
seeing the details of the plan of how we would move the
entirety of the stockpile through a modernization period given
the current constraints we have.
Senator Vitter. The changes that have occurred, including
strategy that affects spending--do any of those justify in your
mind the level of budget cuts that we have seen in proposals
since that assurance to Congress since the section 1251 report
update?
Dr. Hommert. Let us see. I believe that we have pressure on
both sides, downward pressure on the budget, also some cost
estimates that in the intervening time both in the facility
space and in the modernization effort require a new risk
position on the program overall. We do not have that plan yet
defined. So I guess I cannot quite answer that. What I can say
is that clearly the budget picture is more constrained from
both the costs of the enterprise and also the overall fiscal
constraints that you are dealing with. That requires a new plan
which we do not have at this point fully developed.
Senator Vitter. Dr. McMillan, I would like to ask you the
same general sorts of things. You say in your testimony today
that you, ``continue to believe that the direction laid out in
the NPR and the 1251 report provides an appropriate and
technically sound course.''
Dr. McMillan. That is correct.
Senator Vitter. Now, first of all, I assume when you say
the 1251 report, you mean that update.
Dr. McMillan. The updated report, yes. Thank you.
Senator Vitter. I agree that that is a sound course. My
question is, are we on that course anymore?
Dr. McMillan. No, we are not on that course.
In answer to elements of the other questions you had asked,
I see us in a position where our risk is increasing. We are
working very closely with our colleagues in DOD and DOE to
develop the plan that my colleague, Dr. Hommert, talked about.
However, I believe that is a plan that has higher risk than the
plan that we had laid out in the 1251 updated report.
Senator Vitter. So I take it from what you just said, first
of all, the budget cuts since December 2010 did not flow out of
developing a new plan. They just happened and we are trying to
get a new plan built around that now.
Dr. McMillan. I cannot speak to all the details of how the
budget occurred. That is not something I am an expert in. But I
can tell you that in the current budget environment, which is
understandably constrained with the overall budget that our
Nation faces, that we are working now to say how can we move
forward given the budget we have. It is a very difficult
problem.
Senator Vitter. My only point is that these new numbers,
these cuts happened first and we are trying to cope with it. It
is not the natural outflow of a new, improved plan.
Dr. McMillan. From my perspective, we do not yet have a
plan because we do not have a budget that is associated with
that plan that we understand yet.
Senator Vitter. I think also what you said a few minutes
ago is that when we get there, you expect that new plan to put
us at higher risk.
Dr. McMillan. That is correct. This plan has more technical
risk in it than the technical risk that we had in the plan that
was laid out in 2010.
Senator Vitter. Mr. Chairman, that is my big concern, and I
think it is a pretty simple story. The Senate, I think, paid
great attention to this testimony from these experts in
December 2010, and I think the 1251 updated report was pivotal
in passing New START through the Senate. Now, I did not vote
for it, but I think it was pivotal in getting the affirmative
votes. Here we are a year and a half later and it is all out
the window, and all bets are off, and I am gravely concerned
about that.
Now, I know we are in a tough budget environment, but it is
not like we were running surpluses in December 2010. It is not
like we are in a very different budget environment. We knew all
of that then. I am real concerned about our collectively having
passed New START based on these promises, this course, and now
hardly a year and a half later, we are way off course. We are
trying to get a plan to catch up with lower budget numbers, and
the experts tell us when--and we are not there yet--we will be
at higher risk.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Dr. Shank, your report stressed the importance of NNSA
laboratories being national security laboratories for the
government as a whole, and this was put forth in a governance
charter signed by Secretaries Chu, Gates, Director of National
Intelligence Blair, and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security
Lane.
Can you explain the importance of this charter? Do you see
it as competition to other government agency laboratories, and
if there is, is competition such a bad thing?
Dr. Shank. I believe the governance charter gives the
agencies who signed onto that charter an opportunity to utilize
the unique skills of the laboratories that have been developed
as a part of their weapons mission. The weapons mission is
becoming much more complex and costly. We just heard about cost
in discussing that. By having the core capabilities that allow
one to execute the weapons mission, having those capabilities
exercised in problems that are important to the Nation, I think
that that is an extraordinary advantage and a cost-effective
way for the laboratories to deliver on their mission.
I believe the capabilities are so unique that I do not see
the issue of competition arising. I do not think that is an
issue from my perspective. However, I must say we, as a
committee, did not study competition. We looked at what were
the unique capabilities in the lab, and those are the ones that
are likely to be used.
Senator Nelson. Dr. McMillan, what is your view on the
importance of this governance charter, and do you feel that it
creates from your perspective competition with the other
laboratories? Or do you, as Dr. Shank has indicated, feel that
perhaps your approach is so unique that competition is not a
factor?
Dr. McMillan. Let me take the second question first, Mr.
Chairman, if I may. I think, by and large, the reason that
other organizations come to our laboratories is because we are
able to offer unique capabilities to them. So we look very hard
to say are the questions we are being asked, the problems we
are being asked to solve by DOD, DHS--are they aligned with the
capabilities we have from the nuclear weapons work that we do
and do we bring uniqueness to that.
In answer to your first question, I think in many ways the
memorandum of understanding really is aimed at formalizing
something that has been happening over time. I think it is good
in that regard because if there are important national security
problems that the capabilities of the laboratories can be
brought to bear on, particularly ones that then feed back in a
positive way to our nuclear weapons mission, which, I think,
almost all do, that it is very appropriate that these other
organizations have better access to the laboratories.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Albright?
Dr. Albright. The NNSA national laboratories have the
world's fastest computers. We have the world's biggest lasers.
We have 25,000 collectively among us of the world's smartest
people, who work at the laboratory because they are dedicated
to the mission of national security. To not put that into the
service of the broader national security mission, in my view,
would be a dereliction of duty for us. In fact, it is written
into each one of the laboratory's charters. In fact, it is
written into the NNSA charter that that is something that
should happen.
Any government program manager, whether he is sitting in
DOD or DHS or anywhere--certainly DOD, for example--they have
the ability and have had for a long time to make a decision as
to whether they are going to one of their organic laboratories
or they are going to go to a NASA laboratory or to a DOE
laboratory. Generally, they choose to come to the national
laboratories precisely because we have these kinds of
capabilities. We are not cheap. So if you are a subject-matter
expert with a particular problem to solve, you come to the
national laboratories because you are trying to tap into that
core set of capabilities.
I think the Mission Executive Council and this memorandum
of understanding that you are referring to, as Dr. McMillan
pointed out, really just is aimed at trying to get rid of some
of the viscosity associated with the ability of these other
agencies to interact with the laboratories. All three of us
have been part of the ecosystem within DOD for 50 years, and we
have been within the ecosystem of the DHS from the day it was
founded. So the real issue here is, how can we bring this to a
more strategic plane, how can these other agencies have a bit
more insight into what our capabilities are and our sustainment
of those capabilities, so that they can make rational
decisions.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would just add to what my
two colleagues have said. In my laboratory, we probably have
the largest portfolio of work with other Federal agencies. To
me, it is a very great example of win-win. For us to execute
the nuclear weapons mission, you need a set of capabilities
that we sustain over time. That means recruiting new talent,
sustaining their competence, developing their competence. There
is just no way to really do that practically without broadening
that work. They also bring back skills that they learn on other
problems that benefit the weapons program.
A very practical example. The radar engineers at my
laboratory today designing the B61-12 radar 5 years ago were
working on things that were deployed in theater that supported
our warfighter, very unique applications. That is, in my view,
a really synergistic value for our taxpayers in the investments
you are making for us to accomplish our core mission.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
We have already explored the problems and the challenges
with funding. Is it true and my understanding is correct that
unless something is done, additional funding, you cannot meet
the expectations that we have in place for modernization of the
weapons in accordance with what our expectations are for the
New START treaty? Dr. McMillan? If I have not stated the
question properly, would you state it for me?
Dr. McMillan. Let me try answering and see if I come close
to the question.
On the B61 LEP, if we have stable, predictable funding, as
we have laid out in what we call the 6.2A study, I believe we
are positioned to deliver on that system by 2019.
Senator Nelson. Stable funding is what you are talking
about.
Dr. McMillan. Stable funding is a very big deal at the
levels that we have laid out. Unpredictability makes it very
difficult for us.
I am much more concerned in the areas of the W78 and the
W88 because the delay in CMRR directly affects our plans there.
As I mentioned earlier, we are working today with both DOD and
DOE to develop a plan forward for the 78 and the 88 systems. So
we do not yet have that plan, and until we have it, I cannot
really answer your question.
Furthermore, there is a body of technical work--and I
mentioned some of this in my written testimony--associated with
pit reuse that we are working on with experiments coming this
summer that could say that strategy looks like it is worth
pursuing or that strategy may have serious problems. So there
is a body of technical work that will have to be done. I think,
in fact, it will stretch over about 5 years.
So I am not sure that answers your question, Mr. Chairman.
I hope it comes close.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Albright?
Dr. Albright. Let me first echo what Dr. McMillan said,
that certainly in the near-term with some additional technical
risk, we can execute, we believe, the LEPs that are over the
near-term. But I will again reemphasize there is some technical
risk associated with that.
My larger concern is not so much what happens next year or
the year after that. It is what happens 5 or 10 years from now.
If we do not continue to sustain funding of the overall effort,
particularly in the areas of understanding the science of
nuclear weapons, both experimentally and analytically, we run a
huge risk ultimately in our ability to continue to do
assessments and to conduct future LEPs. I think it is worth
noting that there are LEPs on the books, on the schedule today,
where the people executing them will have been trained by
people who themselves have never conducted a nuclear test or
designed a nuclear weapon from scratch.
So this idea that we have to continue to sustain the
overall program--it is not just about LEPs, but the overall
program--to assure that we have a workforce that is qualified
to do these LEPs as they come up and is qualified to understand
when an issue shows up during surveillance whether it is a
minor problem or a major problem, that is where I worry, that
over time, that sustained level of effort will be under huge
pressures.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Mr. Chairman, I think your question was very
well-articulated. Let me emphasize an area of concern that I
have, and that is on the B61. When we changed the schedule from
2017 to 2019, which I understood and agreed, we did, however,
exhaust the schedule margin that we had. The 2019 schedule is
important for real technical reasons which we would discuss in
a closed session. So that is putting a challenge to us overall
as an enterprise, including Congress, that we have the
consistent multiyear funding that is required. If we have
significant breaks due to a continuing resolution or other
changes that might occur that you all understand far better
than I, that is going to put that schedule in a significant
risk position. So I think that this is a near-term test for our
national commitment to modernization in executing the B61-12.
Beyond that, I do believe that we can craft a plan to take
the larger scope of our deterrent forward, but I would agree
with what Dr. McMillan said, that that will involve some
increased risk because of where we are at in our overall
production capabilities.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if I can just try to
clarify the same point because I think it is our big core
concern. I do not mean to try to dumb down this question too
much for our sake, but let me ask it in a very sort of real-
world way.
On a scale of 0 to 10, how would you have described your
comfort level, your level of confidence, with the plan overall
in December 2010 based on the updated 1251 report, based on all
of the commitments that were made at that time, and compared to
that number, how would you peg your confidence level, your
comfort level today?
Dr. Hommert. Since I am the one whose signature is on that
2010 letter, let me start. I never thought of it in quite those
terms, Senator, but I would say that--it is hard, but let me
try and use your scale.
I would say back then if everything that we anticipated--
and recognize we did not have the detailed costing yet on some
of these programs, but if we assumed that the costing was in
alignment with what we expected in the 1251--and that
confidence was probably 8, just down from technical issues we
knew we would have to deal with, budget realities, and budget
uncertainties.
If you look today, for my case, since my lab is so much on
the hook with respect to the B61-12, I have confidence in what
we have costed to execute that work and the plan we have laid
out. We know exactly, I think, what we have to accomplish. If
budgeted, I am at a 9 or 10 in our ability to do that.
When I look at the entirety of the modernization, then I am
back at a lower level of confidence, 5 or 6, because we have
not adjusted a plan to some of the boundary conditions that you
articulated earlier and changes of funding and production
capability.
I hope that is not too complicated an answer, but I do look
at a near-term and long-term perspective of where I sit today.
Dr. Albright. If you look at the situation that existed in
2010, the program that was in place in 2010 was adequately
funded, given what we understood about the costs. At that
point, you would have to give it something like a 9 or a 10.
That was a pretty robust program.
Two things, of course, changed: the costs went up and the
budgets came down. One of the impacts of that budget, as we
have all pointed out, has been some additional technical risk
which drives you down to--I hate to put a number on these
things, but a 6 or a 7 or a 5 or something in that ballpark
because we have not done the work yet to know whether or not we
can actually overcome some of those technical issues.
Senator Vitter. Okay.
Dr. McMillan?
Dr. McMillan. Your scale is, of course, difficult to use
but I will try anyway. It is interesting that we all are
falling in the same range.
I was involved in the weapons program in 2010. So while my
name is not on the document, I certainly had discussions about
it.
I would say if 10 is a slam dunk, we know we can do it, the
risks are very low, we were not there, but somewhere around an
8 or a 9 is probably right.
My reasons today for saying something more in the range of
a 6 are that I see higher risks in our path forward. As I said
in an earlier answer, and I am very concerned about the long-
term because I see the pressures of doing things in the here
and now, which we have to do--I fully agree--possibly shifting
the balance so far that we then increase the risk in the
future. So those are the reasons why I would back off today.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
We are all talking about how we are able to do more with
less and how we can be more cost-effective in delivering the
required mission expectations. Let me turn to what some
perceive as at least one way to streamline oversight and move
away from transactional oversight and at the same time save
funding because that is a critical piece as well. If current
oversight is getting in the way, that is not cost-effective. If
we can find a way to streamline it, perhaps we can save funding
in the process and also increase productivity by reducing the
size of the NNSA's site offices that oversee the laboratories.
It seems to me that now that the weapons design laboratories
are operated by for-profit entities, that the site offices do
feel obliged as civil servants to grade the approximately $200
million in fee that is awarded to the operators of the three
design laboratories.
Now, I know that we are all interested in the savings. Let
me start with you first, Dr. McMillan. Do you believe that the
local site offices can be streamlined so that the oversight is
not transactional, that it is more on the basis of trust and
verified, to use an often used expression, the verification
being operational as opposed to transactional?
Dr. McMillan. I think you have hit on really the key point
there, Mr. Chairman, that the amount of oversight depends on
what type of oversight you do. At some level, for the kinds of
oversight we have today, it is probably the case the site
offices are sized in the right ball park to provide that kind
of oversight.
Senator Nelson. Let me interrupt just for a second. How
many positions are there at the local site?
Dr. McMillan. At Los Alamos, it is a bit over 100.
So if we go to a different model for that oversight, I
believe we could have smaller contingents both at the site, as
well as possibly at headquarters. The scale of the organization
is determined by what it has to do, in my view.
Senator Nelson. Is there a potential of cost savings by not
having--not just in terms of the personnel costs of the local
site offices, but of the costs associated with having to
respond to the oversight?
Dr. McMillan. Yes. At the laboratory, I do not know for
sure what the numbers are, but I know that I have people whose
main job is responding to oversight issues. If we were able, in
the way that our National Academies' colleagues have talked
about, to change that model, I believe there would be
efficiencies inside the laboratory as well.
Senator Nelson. I am going to get to our experts here in a
second too.
Dr. Albright, how many are there located in your local
site?
Dr. Albright. I do not think I have the exact number, but
there are roughly over 100 Feds and about 20 or 30 support
contractors. It is about 130 people all together.
Just two points. First, the site offices are part of the
oversight infrastructure in NNSA and DOE, but they are not the
entire story.
Senator Nelson. Under any set of circumstances, you might
have fewer if they are doing a different kind of oversight.
Dr. Albright. I think to echo the point that Dr. McMillan
made, you would have to ask yourself--so right now we have a
transactional oversight model where everything is reviewed,
everything is very hands-on. We have well over 1,000 audits
that occur every year. If, on the other hand, you migrate to
what the National Academies have been talking about, which is
more of a set standards than audit model, then I think you have
to ask yourself the question: what do I actually need to have
physically located at the site in order to accomplish that?
This is for comparison sake. I would point out that if you
look at the way DOD does this at a place like Hopkins, APL, or
Lincoln Lab, the numbers of people they have are--you can count
on the fingers of one hand or two, and they have a relatively
small office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that
periodically conducts audits and does all the things that they
need to do, safety audits, that sort of thing. So again, the
question comes up what do you actually have to have physically
on site. That is one point.
The other point again is that you have people--it is not
just the site offices. In a lot of ways, they are responding to
commands that come from headquarters. So you have a fairly
large infrastructure, for example, Health, Safety, and Security
Office within DOE. There are hundreds of people there. Then
there are equivalent activities within NNSA itself.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. We have a similar size site office, order, 100
as well.
I can use this one metric. I think we all have a
performance evaluation plan that we do. It is a contractual
statement of performance on a yearly basis with NNSA. That
document is, in our case, 60 to 65 pages of fairly detailed
evaluation of performance against at, again, a somewhat
overused term today, ``transactional'' level. We have talked
with NNSA about this, about moving that to a higher level to
something leaner but still demanding upon our performance. I
believe that that will allow cost savings on both sides of the
equation very definitely. It will not happen overnight. We did
not get to this position overnight, but it would allow us to
change the direction of that, and I am encouraged that the
dialogue is happening in that direction.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Shank and Dr. Patel, I know you have
stated that streamlining the operations could save costs if
there could be another way of doing it apart from a
transactional analysis and oversight. Dr. Shank, what kinds of
recommendations would you make to streamline the process, to
change it so that you get the kind of oversight that is
required that is cost-effective?
Dr. Shank. I think if we are going to have the number of
people we have in the site offices, we are going to have the
current model. Unless we change the oversight model, we are not
going to see change. Then there is a chance to have a sharply
reduced number of people.
I think that just counting the number of people in the site
offices is not correct. I think what was represented here by
Dr. McMillan was he has people in his own lab each feeding each
of these people in the site offices. It is also correct there
is a large group of people in the Forrestal Building that also
create work for all the people to do.
We have to fundamentally rethink about how we can do
oversight cost effectively. There is always an argument to be
made if we just spend a little more money, we can be a little
more safe or a little more this or a little more that. At some
point, that last increment of cost gives us a very little for a
great deal of money. I think there is a chance for substantial
operational savings if we take a different model, and the way
to look for models that will work--their description was two
other laboratories that do things differently, do not have the
huge overhang of people doing oversight. We can also look to
industry for those models.
I would say that in order to qualify a system, it is going
to require some investment. I believe that over a period of
time, a very short period of time, you would then get to reap
the rewards of that and begin to wind the thing down into a
more rational, understandable way that industry or other
Federal FFRDCs would look--DOE would look similar to them. I
think that we would have organizations within the laboratories
also right-sized to be able to deal with a cost-effective
approach.
Senator Nelson. Is it fair to say that the uniqueness of
the labs does not drive the unique method of oversight, that
other labs have a different standard of oversight, different
methodology of oversight that works? Can you describe, for
example, in other labs where you have outside sources coming in
and checking out and inspecting for safety or security or the
like?
Dr. Shank. I think the example was given by Dr. Hommert
that his laboratory, Mesa Laboratory, looks very much like an
Intel Laboratory down the street. They have very similar safety
records. The expenditure on the safety is much, much higher at
the Mesa facility than it is at Intel. I think we can learn a
great deal by looking at how Intel does this, and they do it in
a way in which is done standard in industry. You have a system.
You audit that system. You keep track of where you are. It
takes fewer people to do that if there is a system in place
that you can recognize. Intel simply could not be in business
if they did the level of transactional oversight that has been
done in these laboratories.
Senator Nelson. Who would go to the Intel Laboratory to
check out for worker safety?
Dr. Shank. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). Other agencies that do these kinds of
oversight for industry seem to me to be some of the ideal skill
base, maybe even the exact people, to do that kind of thing at
the laboratories. In the past, having external oversight has
been investigated. It is one of those things that is very
difficult. There are many different issues one way or another
whether to do that.
I personally believe if the laboratories look like other
institutions, they are better off because the people like OSHA
who are investigating the laboratories do that in a way that
would be most cost-effective. Industries have to operate. The
laboratories have to operate. There is not an individual power
base that says we do this, this, one kind of thing here
regardless of cost. OSHA has the burden of making organizations
safe, the safety and health of the workers, but it also has to
do that in a way that it is actually possible to comply with
cost-effectively.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Patel?
Dr. Patel. I think almost everything that needs to be said
has been said. But let me comment on two things.
Having the transactional oversight adds cost by having too
many people both at site offices plus in the laboratories plus
at NNSA. So that is one part of the cost.
The second part of the cost, which is hidden cost that is
incurred by the laboratory because that oversight gets in the
way of getting people to do the right things at the right time
at the right cost. What we will accomplish if we change from a
transactional oversight to a systems-based oversight is that we
will empower the laboratory directors and empower the people
who are there to deliver the right product at the right price.
Senator Nelson. Now I will ask the directors. Are you
comfortable inviting OSHA into your operations versus having
the site offices doing a similar sort of thing? There are
probably other areas of oversight other than, let us say,
worker safety or overall safety. Would there be, as in the case
of any other lab, available outside inspection teams or
agencies capable of doing the similar work? Dr. McMillan?
Dr. McMillan. It is interesting that we are having this
discussion today because just yesterday, as part of a
discussion with DOE and NNSA, the issue of OSHA was on the
table. I do not know enough at this point, Senator, to be able
to answer your question definitively. I would say that I am
optimistic because industry makes it work. Other laboratories
make it work.
Senator Nelson. That is what I was going to say. If
industry makes it work with other laboratories and if what they
are looking for is similar to what they would be looking for
within your laboratories, perhaps the one difference is
nuclear?
Dr. McMillan. That might be an area where we would treat
that differently because that is not a normal part of most
industries. It is different also than what happens in the
nuclear power industry. So I think there may be some exceptions
but I would say overall I am optimistic with a recommendation
such as our National Academies' colleagues have suggested, in
part because it puts the laboratories on a level playing field.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Albright? You do not have to agree.
Dr. Albright. No, no, no. It is hard not to agree.
Let me just give you some information on that. Just in the
environmental safety and health area, we have reviews that are
conducted by the DOE Health, Safety, and Security Office, the
NNSA Safety and Health Office, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board. We have two people on site, 22 environmental
safety and health functional managers at our site office with
staff, and then there are 30 annual reviews by State and local
governments. We actually are in California, so we have Cal-OSHO
which is more stringent than OSHA. Then, of course, we do our
biannual reviews and International Standards Organization (ISO)
14001 and 1801 as well. So what you see is a lot of overlap, a
lot of duplicative effort. We would be delighted to fit within
the OSHA regulatory framework along with the safety culture
that you get with the ISO standards.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes. I will make two comments in this regard.
First of all, I think it is important to recognize that
there is a difference from industry for us. These are
government-owned facilities. So there is a very clear and
appropriate role for effective government oversight.
What I do believe, though, is that we have a vast body of
industry standards that we can work against and that then the
government can utilize and benefit from the fact that that is
largely in place whether it is ISO or it is OSHA or other
standards and construction or the like. I think getting that
model right that says, yes, there is a reason that the
government has to look at facilities they own but let us take
advantage of what is already in place.
The second thing I would like to say on this is, that as
Dr. Albright has identified, while we deal with a model that
has duplication in it--and that is true and we deal with a
model that, I think, can be improved from a cost-effective
standpoint, and I agree that that is true--the thing that
concerns me the most in what we operate in today is that I
actually believe the complexity of the model impedes the
ability for me to advance the safety culture or the overall
operational culture of my organization. While we have an
outstanding safety record, we can be better. I believe the
complexities of what we operate actually impede our ability to
move to a higher level. In the end, since these are my
coworkers, I care deeply about them. That is probably the
strongest motivation I have to say, can we do something
different.
Senator Nelson. Would it not be appropriate to expect NNSA
to establish what the standard is to begin with, as in the case
of the other nongovernmental laboratories? So if you do not
have a standard, what do you measure it against? So if the
standard is established, then others can come and measure
against that or against their own standards which might even be
higher. Is that fair, Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. I agree, Mr. Chairman. There has to be
clarity. Again, the government has to be clear on what their
expectations are and how they wish us to be measured. But
again, there is a lot available for them to take advantage of.
Then they have to find a way to verify and appropriately audit
that in a way and ultimately trust that we will operate at the
system level against those standards. I agree.
Senator Nelson. Dr. McMillan?
Dr. McMillan. Yes, I agree.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Albright?
Dr. Albright. I agree.
Senator Nelson. To other panelists here, from your own
experience looking at other laboratories, a simple question.
Does it work having these other entities come in and measure
against standards?
Dr. Shank. I have actually looked at that with respect to a
lab that I used to manage compared to the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, and they have a more effective process than what we
had then at DOE which is similar to what NNSA--it is actually
more difficult today than in my days. But yes, they do have
effective not only oversight of health and safety, but you also
have financial oversight and there are systems for that and
systems for oversight of human resources. There are, in fact,
standards for all of these operational activities in
laboratories that are standard throughout industry that could
be brought in.
The worry that I would have is that we bring those
standards in and keep all the site offices and all there
together. That is my nightmare. I think that if you make a
different model, it has to be clear that it is a different
model. You do not have both models.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Patel, do you agree with that?
Dr. Patel. Yes, I agree with that. Even though my
experience has been limited to private industry, I can
wholeheartedly say that having standards which are accepted by
others being your guiding principles helps everybody.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. That is all the questions I
have.
Now, what question did I not ask that I should have? I know
what I know. I do not know what I do not know.
Thank you all for being here today, for being
straightforward and candid in your remarks. We appreciate it
very much. As we work toward finding some solutions here, your
input is going to be extremely helpful. Thank you. We are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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