[Senate Hearing 112-610]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-610
MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2012
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
JIM WEBB, Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MARCO RUBIO, Florida
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Campbell, Hon. Kurt, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
James M. Inhofe............................................ 21
Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement.... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma, ranking member
of the subcommittee, prepared statement........................ 5
(iii)
MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES IN ASIA
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Webb, Lugar, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Webb. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to
order. Let me make a comment at the beginning that the Senate
is in the middle of a vote. We may have other Senators come to
the hearing during the course of it, but I am going to go ahead
and begin.
I would also like to point out that Senator Inhofe will not
be at this hearing, but he has a statement that will be
inserted into the record--a written statement at the end of my
opening statement.
Today the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee will
consider the impact of recent and ongoing maritime territorial
disputes in Asia, one of the most critical issues of strategic
importance for the United States and for the entire Pacific
region.
I have written and spoken about this issue for many years,
since long before I entered the Senate. It was the subject of
the first substantive hearing I held as chairman of this
subcommittee in July 2009. And it probably will be the subject
of the last substantive hearing that I am holding as chairman
of this subcommittee.
Unfortunately, since that time, the disagreements over
sovereignty and the potential for conflict have only increased.
In addition to the much publicized pivot into East Asia, it is
imperative that the United States policy be based on a clear
set of principles that everyone here at home and in the region
can understand, and from which our enduring relationships can
continue to grow.
Throughout my entire professional life, I have worked to
emphasize the importance of a strong United States presence in
East and Pacific Asia. To state the obvious, the United States
has strong, enduring, vital interests in East Asia, and East
Asia would be a far more volatile place if the United States
were to recede from the region.
Since World War II, our country has proved to be the
essential guarantor of stability in this region, even as the
power cycle shifted from Japan, to the Soviet Union, and most
recently to China. Economically and politically, all of East
Asia and the Pacific has benefited from the stability that has
been made possible by our involvement in this region.
I reiterate this point in order to emphasize that neither
this hearing, nor any other comments and writings that have
been made over the years by me have intended to diminish or
discourage the evolution of our larger relations with China.
The great value that the United States has added to the complex
historical mix of East Asia transcends any one country.
The concerns that are raised today would have been raised
just as quickly if they were directed at Japan during the 1930s
or the Soviet Union when I was a Department of Defense
executive in the 1980s. The United States does not seek
hegemony in this region, nor does it seek containment.
Its vital interest is stability, which allows countries of
all different populations and sizes the opportunity to resolve
their differences without fear of intimidation or the tragic
consequences of war. And history teaches us that when stability
is lost in East Asia, violence replaces it.
A strong presence of the United States in the Pacific-Asia
region since World War II has been invaluable in the economic
development and growth of more mature political systems
throughout the region. This was true even in our frequently
misunderstood effort in Vietnam as Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew
of Singapore commented in his memoir ``From Third World to
First,'' and I quote, ``Although American intervention failed
in Vietnam, it brought time for the rest of Southeast Asia.
America's action enabled non-Communist Southeast Asia to put
their houses in order. Had there been no U.S. intervention, the
will of these countries to resist would have melted, and
Southeast Asia would have most likely gone Communist. The
prosperous emerging market economies of ASEAN were nurtured
during the Vietnam war years.''
During the cold war, American policy encouraged a stronger
relationship with China partly as a way to counter Soviet
influence in East Asia. When massive American investment in
China, coupled with the abrupt fall of the Soviet Union, helped
enable a rapid and continuing power shift in favor of China, at
the same time that American concerns in Pacific-Asia were
placed on the backburner due to the manner in which our
attention was distracted by the volatility of events in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Muslim world.
In April 2001, following the collision of a Chinese fighter
with a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace,
I warned of this development in an article in the Wall Street
Journal, noting that China, ``has engaged in a massive
modernization program fueled largely by purchases of Russian
weaponry and bolstered by the acquisition of American
technology, which was having an impact on sovereignty claims in
the East China Sea and the South China Sea.'' I warned in that
article that China, ``has laid physical claim to the disputed
Paracel and Spratly Island groups, thus potentially straddling
one of the most vital sea-lanes in the world, has made repeated
naval excursions into Japanese territorial waters, a cause for
long-term concern as China still claims Japan's Senkaku
Islands, and has never accepted the legitimacy of Okinawa's
1972 reversion to Japan.''
In 2006 in the final debate of my campaign for the U.S.
Senate, I was allowed to ask my opponent one question. I asked
him what he thought we should do about the sovereignty disputes
in the Senkaku Islands. For a region in relative peace compared
to the rest of the world, East Asia has a significant number of
open territorial disputes, mostly with maritime borders. China
and Japan both claim the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan
all claim sovereignty over all or part of the Spratly Islands,
also in the South China Sea. Japan and Korea have sovereignty
over the Liancourt Islands, also known as Takeshima by Japan
and Dokdo by Korea. Japan and Russia claim the Kuril Islands.
These are open, active disputes. They involve not only
claims to the land features, but also claims to surrounding
waters. And as all of these Asian nations have grown more
prosperous, their sovereignty claims have become more fierce.
It is the policy and the desire of the United States to
pursue harmonious relations with each of these countries. We
also recognize that these countries have long and complicated
histories with each other, which impact these claims. We take
no sides in the resolution of such historical disputes, but we
should not refrain from using our influence to discourage the
use of military force or the unilateral expansion of claims of
sovereignty. And it should be within the creative energy of our
leadership to seek proper venues for the resolution of these
disputes, particularly in the area of the South China Sea.
What we have been witnessing over the past several years is
not simply a series of tactical disputes. They are an
accumulation of tactical incidents designed to pursue a larger
strategic agenda. Virtually every country in the region
understands that. It is the duty of the United States to
respond carefully and fully to it.
In the past week, our most important ally in Asia, Japan,
has come to the brink of open conflict with our largest
creditor, China, over claims to the Senkaku Islands.
This latest incident represents years of growing tension.
In 2008, Japan and China agreed to develop oil and gas
resources in waters near the Senkaku Islands in an effort to
focus on the benefits of economic cooperation. This cooperation
was cut short in 2010 when a Chinese fishing captain rammed a
Japanese Coast Guard vessel near the islands.
Last week, Japan's Government announced that it would
purchase land from the Senkaku Islands from its private
Japanese owner in an attempt to prevent the Governor of Tokyo
from purchasing this land and perhaps using it to stoke further
controversy. A move that the Japanese Government expected to
relieve tensions was met with widespread misunderstanding,
including a blast by China.
Last Friday, China sent six maritime surveillance ships
into waters around the islands, the largest-ever intrusion by
China into this area. Anti-Japanese protests in China have
reached a new height. These protests, abetted by the Chinese
Government, have damaged Japanese-owned businesses and caused
considerable harm.
On Tuesday following a meeting with Secretary of Defense
Panetta in Beijing, China's Defense Minister stated that China
reserves the right to act further against Japan in this
dispute, which can only be read as a threat of the use of
military force.
This threat has direct consequences for the United States.
In 2004, the Bush administration stated clearly that the
Japanese-United States security treaty obligations extended to
the Senkaku Islands, which, according to accepted principles of
international law, are under the administrative control of
Japan. Secretary Clinton reiterated this position in 2010
following the incident with the Chinese fishing boat. Given the
recent incursion by China into waters around the Senkaku
Islands, it is vital that we continue to state clearly our
obligations under the security treaty.
For several years, China has also demonstrated an increased
willingness to use force in the South China Sea. Its claims in
this area are based upon a roughly defined nine-dashed line,
the so-called cow's tongue, encircling the South China Sea. In
2009, Chinese vessels harassed a United States maritime
surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, and then a Chinese
submarine collided with a sonar cable of the guided missile
destroyer USS John S. McCain while it was operating in the
South China Sea. Last year on three separate occasions in
March, May, and June, China interfered with the maritime
surveillance activities of Vietnamese and Filipino ships by
cutting their cables.
Following those incidents, I introduced a Senate resolution
deploring the use of force by China, and reaffirming United
States support for the peaceful resolution of maritime
territorial disputes. This resolution passed the Senate
unanimously. This year in April, tensions on Scarborough Shoal,
an area less than 200 miles from the Philippines' coast,
escalated as a Philippine Coast Guard vessel investigated
illegal fishing by China. In response, Chinese maritime
enforcement ships, backed by PLA naval vessels, roped off the
mouth of the lagoon, denying access to the territory. China
also retaliated through trade measures by blocking Filipino
banana
exports.
In June, Filipino ships withdrew from the standoff due to
weather concerns, but Chinese ships remained and are there
today.
In July, the Chinese Government began implementing a
decision to assert administrative control over this entire
region, establish a prefectural level government called Sansha
on Woody Island located in the Paracel Islands chain, and
appointed 45 legislators, a standing committee, a mayor, and a
vice mayor.
Woody Island, also called Yongxing, has no indigenous
population, no natural water supply. The jurisdiction of this
new prefecture extends to more than 200 islets and over 2
million square kilometers of water. In other words, virtually
the entire South China Sea.
This political shift has been matched by economic and
military expansion. In late June, the China National Offshore
Oil Corporation opened bidding on oil blocks that fall within
Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone and overlap with oil blocks
that Vietnam itself is developing, some in partnership with
United States firms. Within days of establishing the Sansha
prefecture, China's central military commission announced that
it would deploy a garrison of soldiers to guard the area and
conduct regular combat readiness patrols in the South China
Sea.
Other countries in the South China Sea have been actively
working to reinforce their claims in the face of such
developments. In June, Vietnam passed a new maritime law that
restates Vietnam's claim to the Paracel Islands and Spratly
Islands. The Philippines has been working through the United
Nations Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf to
delimit its expanded Continental Shelf and clearly define its
maritime borders.
All countries are seeking to benefit from the resources in
the region, claiming mineral development rights or fishing
rights. However, China's actions this past year go a step
further in attempting to expand administrative and physical
control over the areas in the South China Sea previously out of
its international recognized jurisdiction.
These incidents have coincidentally been occurring near the
anniversary of Japan's September 18, 1931, invasion of
Manchuria. Historian Barbara Tuchman noted that the failure of
the international community, and particularly the League of
Nations, to respond to the Mukden incident at that time,
``breed the acid of appeasement that opened the decade of
dissent to war in Asia and beyond.'' The precedent for Munich
was set in Manchuria, in China, lived through the consequences
of the international community's failure to address the
unilateral actions taken against its territory.
One hopes the present Government of China will appreciate
the usefulness of international involvement in finding
solutions to the increasingly more hostile sovereignty issues
in Northeast Asia and in the South China Sea. All of East Asia
is watching the United States response to these recent actions
in the South China Sea and East China Sea, particularly the
countries of ASEAN, with whom we have shared expanding
relations, and Japan, and the Philippines, two countries with
whom we share the solemn commitment of being treaty allies.
To discuss these issues today, I would like to welcome
Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. Prior to his
confirmation in June 2009, Assistant Secretary Campbell was CEO
and cofounder of the Center for a New American Security, and
concurrently served as the director of the Aspen Strategy
Group.
He has served in several capacities in government,
including as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and
the Pacific, a director on the National Security Council staff,
Deputy Special Counselor to the President for NAFTA in the
White House, and White House fellow at the Department of
Treasury.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe,
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee
I want to thank Chairman Webb for holding this hearing on the
rising tensions involving overlapping maritime claims in the South
China Sea by Communist China, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan,
and Vietnam. This hearing will also include testimony about the
conflicting maritime claims in the East China Sea by China and Taiwan
with Japan, and the disturbingly rekindled dispute between South Korea
and Japan over the set of islets there.
For me, the number of incidents over the past 2 years by the
Communist Chinese military in these seas leads me to focus my comments
on China's destabilizing and harmful actions. Actions, that left
unanswered and unchecked by the peace-seeking nations in the region and
world, could lead to open conflict.
Along with Chairman Webb, I introduced and passed last year in the
Senate, S. Res. 217, a resolution that condemned China's calculated
acts of naval harassment in the South China Sea. The Senate resolution
noted that since China declared much of the South China Sea as its
Exclusive Economic Zone, it has repeatedly threatened the other
countries (nine in all) in the region who have overlapping claims to
this 1.35 million square miles of water.
Not even the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, signed by China and the 10-member Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, has helped in reaching a peaceful resolution
to this dispute. The added fact that China is a 1996 signatory to the
deeply flawed Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST)--which mandates negotiated
settlements of maritime disputes--clearly reveals China's willingness
to disregard its own treaty obligations, and is a testament to the
infectiveness of the LOST treaty itself, which I strongly oppose the
U.S. ratifying.
Since passage of our resolution, China has continued its
threatening and aggressive administrative and military actions, with
the latest being its proclaimed jurisdiction over the Paracel Islands--
more than 200 miles southeast of Hainan, mainland China's southernmost
territory. On June 21, 2012, the Communist leadership established a new
prefecture there, naming it Sansha, with its headquarters on Woody
Island. And most disturbingly, at the end of July, its People's
Liberation Army announced it would deploy a garrison of soldiers there
to guard the islands and conduct ``combat ready'' patrols.
Simply put, Communist China needs to receive a clear message from
the U.S. and other peace-seeking nations that China's continued
harassment, and expansive administrative and military actions in this
region, and specifically in the South China Sea, will no longer be
tolerated.
I look forward to hearing testimony from Assistant Secretary Kurt
Campbell today on concrete steps our Nation will be taking, along with
our allies, to ``come about'' and tack away from our present course of
diplomacy, and maneuver toward a new, robust one.
Senator Webb. Before Secretary Campbell begins his
comments, I would like to welcome Senator Lugar, the former
chairman and ranking Republican on the full committee. And we
are very pleased to have you at the hearing today, Senator
Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you have
certainly set the stage for a very important hearing with a
very important witness. I simply want to take the opportunity
to thank you and to congratulate you, Secretary Campbell, on
your vigorous and tenacious work in East Asia throughout the
past 3 years of time and your service before that. It has been
extremely helpful not only with regard to the current issues
that the chairman has outlined, but a whole host of issues
which may arise in your testimony and our questions today.
Welcome to the committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the hearing.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Senator Lugar. And welcome,
Secretary Campbell.
STATEMENT OF HON. KURT CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Campbell. First of all, Senators, thank you very much
for holding this hearing today. I cannot imagine a more
important or more delicate set of questions for us to
undertake.
I would like to put my full testimony on the record and
just open with a few comments.
Let me first say that I want to commend both of you for the
strong bipartisan support that you have given for decades to
our engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Sometimes we have
not always agreed as parties or as people, but I think we are
united in our quest to see a strong, enduring American role in
Asia for decades and decades to come.
I travel a lot through the region, and almost more than any
other issue I hear is a concern about what happens in Congress
in the years ahead. Will there be people like Senator Lugar and
Senator Webb who will care about the region? I try to assure
them that there will be, but frankly you both leave enormously
large shoes and military boots to fill. And so I want to thank
you for your service and your support going forward.
I would just like to take a couple of moments to talk a
little bit about the overarching strategy because I think it is
important, and then I will turn to the specific questions that
Senator Webb, I think, has very effectively laid out.
I think our approach has been built on a bipartisan
approach, but it has some new elements over the course of the
last several years. And this has been articulated clearly by
the President, and I think acted on very strongly by Secretary
Clinton and Secretary Gates, and Secretary Panetta as well.
At the heart of our effort in the Asia-Pacific region are
our strong alliances, and we have sought to take steps to
strengthen these alliances across the board. More needs to be
done, particularly in Southeast Asia, but I believe we have
done important things with Australia, Japan, and South Korea.
But it cannot end there. We must take steps to deepen ties
with new and emerging partners. Those include friends in
Southeast Asia, a much more vigorous relationship with New
Zealand than we have enjoyed in the past, and we are
increasingly taking steps to draw India into the Asia-Pacific
region. And as part of that is a recognition, as Senator Webb
clearly articulated, that we need to work closely with a China
that is emerging as a dominant player, not only in the Asia-
Pacific region, but in the world. This is clearly an enormous
proposition, very challenging, but it is incredibly important
for this and the next generation of Americans going
forward.
When Asians look at the United States, they expect us to
play a role in a variety of fields, none more important than
economic statecraft. And with your strong support, both of you
and others, we have been able to take steps to build on that
bipartisan tradition.
Last year, we passed the Korea Free Trade Agreement. We are
already seeing the benefits there, and we are taking steps to
work toward advancing a very high quality trade agreement, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. And we will be looking to take steps
to further our commercial diplomacy in Asia. At the
encouragement of Senator Webb, Secretary Clinton held the
largest-ever meeting of American business leaders, ministers,
and heads of state in Cambodia in July after the ASEAN Regional
Forum to articulate that we have a role to play, and that
American products and services can play a huge role in the
prosperity of Asia and the building of a strong and durable
middle class.
We are also attempting to articulate a comprehensive
defense strategy, diversifying our capabilities around the
Asia-Pacific region, taking steps to strengthen our military
ties through training and new arrangements for joint
facilities, and exploring new opportunities for cooperation,
such as in the area of disaster relief.
We have noted the helpful role that Senator Webb and others
have played to help us think deeply about the relationship that
we have with Okinawa and Guam going forward. I look forward to
ensuring that our defense and security relationships remain
strong, and as we speak, Secretary Panetta is in the region
advancing those goals.
And last, we also believe fundamentally that a new wrinkle
in our strategy has got to be engaging multilateral
institutions more effectively, such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum. We joined the East Asian summit. We are working more
closely with defense partners in a number of institutions.
This is increasingly going to be the focus of our
diplomatic efforts. These are all young institutions, new
institutions without deep roots, but strengthening them and
encouraging partners like ASEAN to have the confidence to stand
up on issues of mutual import is at the center of our strategy
going forward. We want to see a series of institutions take
root--APEC, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and
military institutions.
Now all of this work has to be animated by our values, the
advancement of the cause of freedom, democracy, and rule of
law. And I have to say, I do not think there are two people who
have done more for making what happened yesterday possible than
you two. I have been in a number of meetings where each of you
took us to the woodshed about needing to try harder--to work
harder, on issues associated with Burma. And yesterday was a
day to celebrate with Aung San Suu Kyi's receipt of the
Congressional Gold Medal. That does not mean our work is over.
We have a lot more to do, as she indicated yesterday. But at
least we have been able to get this far with your strong
support, and I want to underscore our continuing commitment to
support the process of reform. We look forward to the visit of
President Thein Sein next week. We are going to engage with him
closely in New York.
So this is a region that we believe is the cockpit of the
global economy. With slowdowns in Europe, the United States
still climbing out of economic difficulties, we recognize how
important the maintenance of peace and stability is at this
time. We acknowledge that recent disputes in the South China
Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan have sent
reverberations throughout the region.
Our consistent and systematic diplomacy has been, both in
public and behind closed doors, that we want to see cooler
heads to prevail in the current set of challenges.
The South China Sea, as Senator Webb indicated, is a vital
throughway for global commerce and energy. Almost half the
world's merchant tonnage flows through there, about a third by
value, and over 15 million barrels of oil a day.
Now if you look at these disputes and tensions, as Senator
Webb has indicated in greater detail and more elaborately and
profoundly, the tensions have ebbed and flowed over time. But
with rare exceptions, countries have chosen peace and
diplomacy. And so even during this period of the last 30 years
where they have been accentuated, we must recognize that this
has also been the best 30 years of peace and prosperity in
Asia's history. There has been an understanding in capitals
about how important it is to keep a lid on tensions.
We view the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea as an important effort at
maintaining peace and stability and sustaining dialogue among
the key partners. It unequivocally signaled the willingness to
approach disputes multilaterally.
I just want to quote quickly, Senator, what Secretary
Clinton said in her important intervention at the ASEAN
Regional Forum this year. ``None of us can fail to be concerned
by the increase in tensions, the uptick in confrontational
rhetoric, and disagreements over resource exploitation. We have
seen worrisome instances of economic coercion and the
problematic use of military and government vessels in
connection with disputes among fishermen. There have been a
variety of national measures taken that create friction and
further complicate efforts to resolve disputes.
Recent incidents in Scarborough Reef, including
confrontational behavior like the use of barriers to deny
access and regional disputes over oil and natural gas
exploration blocks underscore the need for agreement among all
parties on rules of the road and the establishment of clear
procedures for addressing disagreements.
The United States supports firmly a binding code that is
based on international law and agreements, including the Law of
the Sea Convention and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a
code that creates a rules-based framework for regulating
conduct in the South China Sea, including preventing and
resolving disputes. Recent tensions lend further urgency to
this effort.''
I want to underscore that we have been involved in a
sustained interactive process over the course of the last
several months, involved with every party involved in these
disputes, to underscore our strategic interests in the peaceful
handling of these disputes. We are very clear and firm about
our opposition to the use of coercion, intimidation, and
threats of force. And we encourage in all instances diplomatic,
peaceful approaches.
We have called on parties to clarify and pursue claims
consistent with international law as reflected in the Law of
the Sea. As you know, Secretary Clinton has strongly supported,
as has our government, our ratification of that agreement.
Our close allies have been clear on recent incidents with
ASEAN, with China, and others. We are very actively engaged
currently as we lead into the East Asia Summit and in all our
multilateral platforms. We have seen signs of renewed diplomacy
between ASEAN and China on issues associated with the South
China Sea. We welcome that dialogue, and we think this is the
appropriate way forward.
There are many other elements of this that are important. I
think we recognize the significance of the topic. We want to
handle it carefully. We have sought to promote dialogue among
the key partners. We have tried to be clear about our
principled approach, and we have made crystal clear to all
involved that the United States is going to continue to play a
strong central role in the diplomacy and the security
activities of the Asia-Pacific region for decades to come.
I will stop here. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell
Chairman Webb, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on these critically important issues.
Before I begin, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you,
Chairman Webb, for your leadership on this issue and for your work to
enhance our engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, particularly
Southeast Asia. Your strong voice on this committee and in the Senate
to draw attention to East Asian and Pacific issues is greatly
appreciated. You and your subcommittee have played a fundamental role
in sustaining the rich bipartisan tradition of engaging the Asia-
Pacific and advancing U.S. interests in the region. Working together,
it is as important as ever to demonstrate without question the enduring
nature of this bipartisan commitment.
The United States is and will remain a Pacific power, bound to the
Asia-Pacific region by virtue of our geography, history, alliances,
economic ties and people. Much of the history of the 21st century will
undoubtedly be written in this dynamic region, which today accounts for
more than half the world's GDP and nearly half of its trade, is a key
driver of innovation, and houses some of the fastest growing economies
in the world. The Asia-Pacific holds vast opportunity, but still faces
tremendous challenges that, if not addressed, will pose significant
risk to the future of the region and America's interests as well.
The United States is intensifying its focus on the Asia-Pacific,
recognizing that greater strategic investment in the region will be
essential to both seize opportunities and address challenges. We are
taking steps to strengthen our alliances with Japan, the Republic of
Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. We are deepening
partnerships with new and emerging partners, like Singapore, India,
Indonesia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Vietnam and taking steps to
strengthen unofficial relations with Taiwan. As Secretary Clinton noted
in her recent visit to Beijing, we are also working tirelessly to build
a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China and
write a new, constructive answer to the age-old question of what
happens when an established power and an emerging power meet.
Beyond our bilateral relationships, a critical evolution in
American strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been an unprecedented
commitment to engaging the region's multilateral institutions--
principally, ASEAN, the Pacific Island Forum and APEC--and supporting
their evolution into more effective, solutions-oriented bodies. We have
taken systematic steps to elevate our economic statecraft in the region
to help fuel the U.S. recovery, as exemplified by July's U.S.-ASEAN
Business Forum, which brought together the largest grouping of U.S. and
ASEAN governments and business leaders ever to discuss shared
opportunities. We are expanding our economic ties to the region and
refocusing our efforts to build a level playing field so that American
companies can compete and win. In addition, as you know, we have
embarked upon a comprehensive defense strategy to develop a force
posture in the region that can better respond to nontraditional
security threats, protect allies and partners, and ultimately defend
U.S. national interests. Finally, we remain steadfast in our commitment
to advance freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Senator Webb, your
efforts with respect to Burma have played an essential role in this
regard. Each element of this strategy is mutually reinforcing and meant
to positively affect the Asia-Pacific strategic environment and to
advance peace, prosperity, and security.
As the United States pivots to the Asia-Pacific region, the recent
spate of disputes in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the
Sea of Japan are sending reverberations throughout the region,
threatening instabilities that could undermine U.S. interests.
Let me begin by noting recent developments in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea is a vital throughway for global commerce and
energy. Half the world's merchant tonnage flows through the South China
Sea and over 15 million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of
Malacca last year. We cannot afford to allow disputes in the South
China Sea to endanger the global economy, our recovery, or regional
security; diplomatic approaches must prevail.
Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Vietnam each claim sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea,
including its land features. The parties vary widely in their claims,
as well as the intensity and manner in which they assert them.
Despite the fact that tensions in the South China Sea have ebbed
and flowed for decades, the most important feature of these disputes is
that, with rare exceptions, countries have chosen the path of peace,
diplomacy, and shared prosperity to address them. Even following
heightened tensions in the 1990s, including the events at Mischief Reef
in 1995, ASEAN and China resolved to reach agreement on a Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. While nonbinding, the
2002 Declaration was an important milestone, built upon the 1992 ASEAN
Declaration on the South China Sea and unequivocally signaling a
willingness among the parties to approach disputes multilaterally. In
the 2002 Declaration, ASEAN and China committed to respect freedom of
navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea in accordance with
international law, as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
and to resolve their disputes through peaceful means, without resorting
to the threat or use of force. They also committed to exercise self-
restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or
escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including steps to
inhabit presently uninhabited land features.
Nevertheless, the region entered into a new period of heightened
tensions beginning in 2007, stemming in part from the combination of an
increasingly intense demand for natural resources, including
hydrocarbons, and rapidly improving capabilities to extract resources
in deep water. Additionally, fishing stocks in coastal and inland areas
have significantly declined due to overfishing and environmentally
harmful techniques, pushing fishing fleets further offshore into the
South China Sea.
Complex domestic political dynamics in each of these countries are
also a significant factor in efforts to build lasting and peaceful
solutions. The separate incidents this year involving the Philippines,
Vietnam, and China, underscore this deeply complex environment.
U.S. policy toward the South China Sea has been both consistent and
well coordinated. Our strategy strives to set a context for peaceful
approaches to disputes in the region, with the long-term goal of
supporting a rules-based order, undergirded by agreements and strong
institutions, that can support the management and, ultimately,
resolution of the disputes. In order to promote a stable environment in
the region, the United States has clearly articulated our principles
and interests in accordance with longstanding policy. As Secretary
Clinton has made clear, as a Pacific nation and resident power, the
United States has a national interest in the maintenance of peace and
stability; respect for international law; unimpeded lawful commerce;
and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The United States
does not take a position on the competing sovereignty claims over land
features in the South China Sea, and we continue to encourage all
parties to take steps to address these disputes diplomatically and in a
collaborative manner. We oppose the use of coercion, intimidation,
threats, or force by any claimant to advance its claims. We believe
that claimants should explore every diplomatic and other peaceful means
for dispute resolution, including the use of arbitration or other
international legal mechanisms. In order to decrease the risk of
misunderstanding and miscalculation, we continue to urge all parties to
clarify and pursue their territorial and maritime claims in terms
consistent with international law, including the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention.
For our part, we can strengthen our hand in engaging disputes in
the South China Sea by joining the Law of the Sea Convention. As the
Secretary emphasized when she testified before the full committee in
May, ``[O]ur navigational rights and our ability to challenge other
countries' behavior should stand on the firmest and most persuasive
legal footing available, including in critical areas such as the South
China Sea. . . . [A]s a party to the convention, we would have greater
credibility in invoking the convention's rules and a greater ability to
enforce them.''
Over the past several months, we have closely watched incidents and
activities by multiple parties that have raised tensions in the region.
We have maintained close, direct dialogue with the Philippines,
Vietnam, China, other ASEAN members, and ASEAN as a whole, facilitated
by our mission and Resident Ambassador to ASEAN located in Jakarta. In
the past several years, we have substantially increased the level and
frequency of our engagements with ASEAN which has significantly
improved our ability to address tensions. We have also sustained
substantial dialogue with other countries that have critical interests
in the region, including India, Japan, Australia, Russia, as well as
the European Union, to explore how we can work together to foster a
peaceful, stable environment. In multilateral channels, we remain
committed to advancing a collaborative and diplomatic course of action
in ASEAN-based meetings, particularly the ASEAN Regional Forum and the
East Asia Summit.
We have also coordinated closely with our colleagues at the
Department of Defense to ensure that our South China Sea diplomacy is
supported by an effective and well-calibrated defense strategy.
A consistent and critical element of our approach has been
exercising U.S. leadership and maintaining public engagement when
necessary to underscore the importance of peaceful and diplomatic
approaches to disputes. Most recently, the United States released a
statement on August 3 which reaffirmed U.S. interests, raised concerns
about recent incidents, and urged the parties involved to take
necessary steps to lower tensions. The statement was eagerly welcomed
by key ASEAN states, contributing to a cooler political environment and
helping to set the stage for progress on ASEAN-China Code of Conduct
discussions.
We support ASEAN and China's efforts to develop an effective Code
of Conduct, as called for in the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration. History
has shown that a region united by rules and norms enjoys greater peace
and stability, and a Code of Conduct can be an important element of the
emerging rules-based order in the region. While it is up to the parties
to agree to the terms of a Code of Conduct, we believe that it should
be based on the widely accepted and universal principles of the U.N.
Charter, the international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of
the Sea Convention, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the 2002
Declaration on Conduct. An effective Code of Conduct would also create
a rules-based framework for managing and regulating the conduct of
parties in the South China Sea, including preventing and managing
disputes.
We also encourage relevant parties to explore new cooperative
arrangements for managing the exploitation of resources in the South
China Sea. For example, as Secretary Clinton discussed at the ASEAN
Regional Forum this July in Cambodia, this could include equitable
joint exploration and exploitation arrangements for hydrocarbon
resources in areas of unresolved claims. Joint exploration would not
only allow claimants to reap material benefits, but could also help to
build the habits of cooperation and collaboration that will ultimately
be needed to resolve these disputes.
I would now like to say a word about other maritime disputes that
are currently roiling the region, different but equally complex
situations, where territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands and
Liancourt Rocks (known to the Japanese as Takeshima, and Korea as
Dokdo) have flared up in recent months. In both cases, as with the
South China Sea disputes, the United States has reiterated its long-
held position that it does not take a position on the ultimate
sovereignty of the land features in question, and that the claimants
should address their differences peacefully. The United States has an
interest in peaceful relations among all of our Northeast Asian
partners and allies, and has nothing to gain from seeing the situation
escalate.
Given the intense level of commerce and people-to-people ties among
these three great Northeast Asian nations of China, Japan, and the
Republic of Korea, and the extraordinary potential costs of conflict,
we are hopeful that all involved will make sincere efforts to settle
their disputes amicably. These economies account for a fifth of global
GDP and if not appropriately managed these tensions can pose risk to
the necessary foundation of global economic recovery: security and
stability. As Secretary Clinton said when meeting with the APEC nations
in Vladivostok this month, now is the time for everyone to make efforts
to reduce tensions and strengthen diplomatic involvement. We have made
this point both publicly and privately to all of the countries
involved.
The United States has no better or closer allies than Japan and the
Republic of Korea (ROK). For more than half a century, our alliances
with both countries have undergirded peace and stability in the Asia-
Pacific and have provided a context for regional and global economic
growth and prosperity. As the United States increases its strategic
investments in the Asia-Pacific, our close and enduring ties with the
ROK and Japan will remain the fulcrum of this pivot, and tensions
between our closest allies damage our strategic interests.
Over the past several years, the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral
relationship has become an increasingly important engine for promoting
our mutual national security goals both in the region and around the
world. From our cooperative efforts to put a stop to North Korea's
nuclear ambitions and promote the human rights of its people, to our
coordinated actions to address Iran's nuclear program, to our efforts
to address maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa, to our shared work
to promote democracy and good governance in Burma and around the world,
the United States, Japan, and South Korea enjoy an active and growing
partnership on a global scale.
A key pillar of this trilateral partnership is the ROK-Japan
relationship. The United States welcomes both countries' efforts to
strengthen their political, economic, security, and people-to-people
ties, as well as to address in a constructive and future-oriented
manner the differences between them. As we enter the second decade of
the Asia-Pacific century, we have every hope and expectation--and we
will do what is necessary to ensure--that the ties and cooperation
between and among the United States, Japan, and the ROK will continue
to strengthen in every way.
A stable and productive Japan-China relationship is also in the
strategic interest of the United States and the region as a whole. We
have been concerned by the rising tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
over the Senkaku Islands, the violence of anti-Japanese protests in
China, and the potential for miscalculation or accidents in the East
China Sea that could lead to even greater tension. We have consistently
urged both sides to take steps to defuse the situation and resolve
their differences peacefully.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would underscore that the United
States is deeply engaged in the region--diplomatically, economically,
and militarily--all of which support our interests and advance peaceful
progress.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I am
pleased to answer your questions.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Secretary Campbell. Your
full written statement will be included in the record at this
point. And also to reiterate that Senator Inhofe's opening
statement will be in the record immediately at the end of my
opening remarks.
Let me begin first by thanking you for appearing here
today. This is not only a very busy time in terms of our
foreign policy, but this is a delicate ongoing subject. And I
think it is one that we need to hear more about, but also I
would like to express my own appreciation for the work that has
been undertaken by people in the State Department, including
Secretary of State Clinton over the past 2 months to try to
resolve some of these issues and to continue the type of
dialogue that we need.
With respect to--well, no, let me just agree with you.
Yesterday was a really incredible day. And I have said many
times that that came about, in my view, largely because of the
courage of two people. One is Aung San Suu Kyi, who we
recognized, and the other is someone who I was glad to hear you
mention, and I was very glad to hear her mentioned more than
once yesterday, and that is President Thein Sein. Two people of
completely different backgrounds in every sense of the word,
who came together after 2010 and showed the type of leadership
that the only way that this country could move forward the way
that it has is for those two have shown the type of courage and
leadership that they showed. So he's coming--Thein Sein is
coming next week. I hope that the leadership in our country can
help to recognize through the contributions that he made,
working alongside Aung San Suu Kyi to bring this moment about.
And since I made such a long opening statement, Senator
Lugar, I am going to yield to you for your questions.
Senator Lugar. Thank you. Let me just start, Mr. Secretary,
with this basic question. Since 2010, the United States
repeatedly stated at ASEAN forums and elsewhere that freedom of
navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes in the South
China Sea is a U.S. interest. Yet, in the intervening time,
disputes seem no closer to resolution. In fact, there could be
an argument there appear to be even more of them being
articulated by the parties.
So I would ask, is the position we enunciated in 2010
sufficient? And what other leverage or role do you see as
advisable for the United States to take now? And would this be
done at the current summit as planned or through other forums?
Mr. Campbell. Thank you very much, Senator. Let me try to
answer that. I think as you clearly articulated, Secretary
Clinton laid out in 2010 our position at the ASEAN Regional
Forum in Vietnam. Last year in Bali, that position was further
articulated. And this year she reiterated our position, but
also elaborated on a couple of key variables, which we think
are important.
At the basis of everything that we have done, however, are
those specific principles that you underscore: freedom of
navigation and the insistence on the peaceful resolution of
disputes.
I would simply say that, in fact, the disputes that you
refer to, Senator, have gone on for decades. Some of them get a
lot of attention. Others do not. Some countries have been very
vocal about their concerns. Others have been less so. We
believe a clear enunciation of our position has been helpful in
encouraging the parties toward a dialogue, and we will continue
to stress our interest in seeing progress toward a Code of
Conduct.
These issues are now discussed at the ASEAN Regional Forum
and the East Asia Summit in a way that they were not just a few
years ago. Secretary Clinton just got back from a long trip
that included stops in Southeast Asia, and she has met
virtually every ASEAN leader in the last 3 or 4 weeks. And we
have heard the same thing, that a strong, steady, persistent
role of the United States is in the interest of ASEAN.
They have encouraged us to engage on these issues, but to
do it carefully. And frankly, they believe that in the current
environment it will be important for ASEAN to play a critical
role in diplomacy. We support that effort as well.
I think we have a strong foundation, and we need to make
sure that we articulate it and that our actions are animated by
those overall principles, Senator.
Senator Lugar. Well, I think it is an important--it is in
the historical context that you mention these disputes have
been there for quite a while. One thing that is different is
the United States much more intense participation in ASEAN, and
the fact that we have literally been out there, and you and
others have been visiting the countries intensively so that
that interest is not superficial. You are on the ground. And
that has certainly fortified the countries that are involved,
and may have led also to many visits by their Foreign Ministers
and others to the United States, who have given new hope.
I have tried to encourage Members of Congress to become
much more vocal and interested in all this. But I think your
statement essentially is that you have a policy enunciated in
2010, and it still holds. It is just that all the activity now
and all the actors are interacting with us are much more vocal
and much more obvious.
Let me center on a specific country, and that is, is there
a common understanding now of the United States obligations
under the United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty in
Manila and in Washington? And how do these understandings
relate to the South China Sea? And are we perfectly clear on
this both in our dialogue with the Philippines as well as
ourselves?
When President Aquino came to the United States recently,
it was obvious from his conversation that he was much more
intensively interested in Subic Bay and in a lot of other
things that have been rather dormant or off the charts for
quite a while. There was a revitalization of our overall
Department of Defense in the Philippines in a way we had not
seen for quite a while. Can you relate the Philippine situation
to the ASEAN overall?
Mr. Campbell. I will. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Let me just
add one other point to the previous discussion, which I think
is important. Many of the incidents that we saw over the past
several decades have involved fishing issues. But in a series
of op-ed pieces that Senator Webb and others have written over
the last several years, obviously the new dimension is
resources. These are all countries that import an enormous
share of their hydrocarbons, and they look at studies and other
kinds of research that suggest in many of these areas, there
may be large reservoirs of natural gas, oil, and petroleum.
One of the things that Secretary Clinton has brought up in
many of our discussions is whether it is possible to advance
agreements, understandings, or contracts for exploration and
exploitation of natural resources in a situation in which
sovereignty is unresolved.
Now that is very difficult, very challenging. We recognize
that. It has been done between countries in Southeast Asia
before, and we are interested to see whether that model can be
applied in other circumstances. There is some wariness
understandably, but clearly that is one potential for the kind
of creative diplomacy that Senator Webb and you have called for
in the past.
Specifically, on the Philippines, first of all, let me
thank you for your strong support of this relationship. I
believe we are entering a period of renaissance with the
Philippines. I believe that this is a partnership that has not
received enough attention for decades. And I am thrilled to see
renewed support across the board, for people-to-people,
economic, and commercial ties. We are strongly involved in
efforts to tackle corruption, to promote trade, education, you
name it.
This is very important for the United States, and there is
a critical defense component to it that we are working on in
terms of our strategic dialogues. More will be clear in the
months and years to come. This is a country that we share a
unique history with and a very strong security alliance.
Secretary Clinton has stated our alliance has kept both of
our countries secure for more than 60 years, and it has been a
bulwark of peace and stability in Asia. Our alliance is rooted
not just in a deep history of shared democratic values, but in
a wide range of mutual concerns.
Now we stand by and fully honor our MDT commitments, and we
have taken steps in recent months to significantly strengthen
our bilateral relationship across the board through many new
dialogues and high-level diplomacy. We were thrilled with the
visit of President Aquino.
We are cooperating much more effectively on maritime domain
awareness. We are shifting some of our military collaboration,
which in the past has been primarily involved in critical
issues in Mindanao, and we are focused more on naval
coordination and cooperation. We have recently inaugurated the
National Coast Watch System, and we are looking to articulate a
number of new areas for diplomacy. Behind the scenes, our
diplomacy with the Philippines in the last several months has
been extraordinarily intense, and we will continue with that
process.
We have seen in recent weeks closer dialogue and
interaction between the Philippines and China. We support that
and we want that to continue.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Secretary Campbell, I mentioned in my opening statement the
Chinese Government having established a prefectural level of
government which they call Sansha on Woody Island, in which
they have appointed 45 legislators, a standing committee, a
mayor, a vice mayor, and claimed the jurisdiction to more than
200 islets or 2 million square kilometers of water.
Two questions just to clarify administration policy. First,
did the State Department have any advance warning that this
prefecture would be established?
Mr. Campbell. Senator, to the best of my knowledge, the
answer to that is ``No.'' Even though some have suggested that
this was established long ago, the first articulation of it in
the spring was in the media, and the military dimension in late
July, early August was also unanticipated.
I think as you know, the Department of State, in a policy
carefully coordinated with the White House and the Defense
Department, issued a statement on August 3 that reaffirmed our
interest. It raised concerns with this and other activities,
and it urged all parties to lower tensions.
I will say, Senator, that that statement has been broadly
welcomed, oftentimes quietly by ASEAN interlocutors. We believe
that any steps that introduce a military dimension to these
very complex territorial matters is unhelpful.
Senator Webb. Thank you. And for the record, let me say
that I got the same answer from Admiral Locklear, commander in
chief of PACOM, during an open line telephone conversation on
July 28. He had just been in China and had no advance warning
that this was going to take place.
What is the administration position on the creation of this
prefectural level government? Would you consider this to be an
escalation from China's past actions in terms of asserting
territorial claims?
Mr. Campbell. I would say, Senator, that the statement on
August 3 stands and speaks for itself. We have made clear to
all parties to refrain from provocative actions. Some of these
issues are extraordinarily hard to deal with in this
environment given heightened nationalism and swirling
demonstrations. We want cooler heads to prevail, and we want
the action to shift from military interactions to the field of
diplomacy.
Senator Webb. Thank you. In 2004, the Bush administration
stated that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty obligations extended
to the Senkakus. Deputy Secretary Armitage made a comment,
``There is no question for the United States that the Japan-
U.S. Security Treaty obligation extends to the Senkakus.''
Secretary Clinton, as I mentioned in my opening comments,
reiterated this position in 2010. I assume this is still our
official position on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
Mr. Campbell. Yes, Senator. I believe the first time this
was articulated as U.S. position was actually in 1997, much
more forcefully, clearly, and firmly, by Deputy Secretary
Armitage, by Secretary Clinton again in 2010, and 3 days ago by
Secretary Panetta in Tokyo.
Senator Webb. Last week, the Japanese Government announced
its intention to purchase land on the Senkaku Islands. And
again, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I think there
has been some misinterpretation internationally about what
their intention was as opposed to sovereignty, administration,
and land ownership on top of something.
Has the administration given a view on the legal impact of
this type of a purchase in whether it actually affects
sovereignty?
Mr. Campbell. Senator, we have not. We have stated very
clearly that we want this issue to be resolved peacefully
through dialogue between Japan and China. Secretary Panetta and
Secretary Clinton have stated this very clearly. We are
concerned, as you indicated, by recent demonstrations, and
frankly by the potential for the partnership between Japan and
China to fray substantially in this environment. That is not in
our strategic interest, and clearly would undermine peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. We very much
want a process of reengagement dialogue to continue and to
build between Tokyo and Beijing.
Our position is clear. We do not take a position on the
ultimate sovereignty of these islands. We do acknowledge
clearly through the process that you have set out, Senator,
that Japan maintains effective administrative control. And
third, that as such, the Senkaku Islands fall clearly under
article 5 of the Security Treaty.
But in the current environment, we want to focus more on
issues associated with the maintenance of peace and stability,
and less on the particular details of this very complex and
challenging matter.
Senator Webb. Does the administration have any official
indication from China that it recognizes the sovereignty of
Japan over the Ryukyus?
Mr. Campbell. No.
Senator Webb. With respect to the Chinese National Offshore
Oil Corporation's open bidding on oil blocks that are generally
recognized to fall within Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone,
and actually some of them, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, overlap with oil blocks that Vietnam itself is
developing, some of them in partnership with American farms.
Has the administration expressed any concerns over this
attempt? Do we have a position on it?
Mr. Campbell. As you well understand, Senator, it is a very
complex matter, and let me try to state clearly a few facts.
As you know, the United States does not have state-owned
oil companies. And as private firms in the United States,
energy companies have to make their own decisions based on
their own commercial interests. We oppose any efforts at
political, economic, or military harassment or coercion of
international energy firms.
Secretary Clinton has stated clearly that we support
equitable joint exploration and exploration in areas of
unresolved territorial sovereignty. This set of circumstances
also involves Vietnam's new maritime law, and we are assessing
how this new maritime law impacts our own national interests.
We recognize that there is a very delicate set of issues
involved here. And we have encouraged clear communication
between Vietnam and China on these matters.
Senator Webb. Well, just to be absolutely clear, and there
is little in your statement that I would disagree with, we do
support the validity of internationally accepted Exclusive
Economic Zones, those that are set out under basically agreed-
upon international law.
Mr. Campbell. That is true, Senator. But there are elements
of the establishment of those parameters that require a level
of knowledge of legal history and precedence that frankly I do
not possess. Those are some of the issues that are set out in
the Law of the Sea. That is one of the reasons why we think
that this is such an important instrument for dealing with
these matters, and one of the reasons why we would like to see
efforts toward a Code of Conduct.
Senator Webb. Assuming that the Exclusive Economic Zones
that we are speaking of are recognized under generally accepted
principles of international law, we would, I assume, have some
difficulty with the recent activities of China. I am not asking
for an answer, but I would appreciate a statement of the
position of the State Department perhaps for the record.
Mr. Campbell. All I would say, Senator, is Secretary
Clinton's statement at the ASEAN Regional Forum and our August
3 statement made very clear that activities that interrupt or
raise concerns about legitimate commerce are antithetical to
the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea
and, by extension, the Asia-Pacific region.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Senator.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
ask a question about Vietnam. The delegation that came to visit
me a while back indicated in their judgment, that Chinese
claims in the South China Sea seem to extend almost, if not to
their coast, that there was no area that appeared to be theirs.
This was a group of people in their foreign ministry perhaps
who were not specifically versed on the questions we are
discussing today.
But how would you describe the Vietnam plight as you have
talked to those leaders? How do they take a look at it?
Mr. Campbell. Well, Senator, we have had hundreds of hours
of conversations, interactions with all the key players. I have
been struck by a certain quality to all of the interactions and
a commonality, that in private, the diplomats of all of these
nations indicate that they are under enormous pressure, that
there are huge domestic issues that they are dealing with. All
feel on the defensive, and all feel that they are responding to
activities that have been driven elsewhere. Many feel that they
do not have a full picture of what is going on, and all are
concerned.
In that environment, we think the most important role the
United States can play is to urge everyone to be cautious, to
stand down, and to shift the focus back to venues where
diplomacy and dialogue in a multilateral forum is the order of
the day. That set of interactions would apply to Vietnam as
well.
Senator Lugar. Well, is the Vietnam situation one in which
this diplomacy almost inevitably would have to be international
or multinational? In other words, if the Vietnamese were to
have dialogue with the Chinese, they would appear to be at a
disadvantage just in terms of the size of the parties that are
there quite apart from the number of ships or other devices. So
what hope would there be for a country like this, with respect
to diplomacy?
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Senator Lugar. I would simply
point out that in Senator Webb's opening statement, he did go
through all the areas where we have lingering problems that
have persisted for decades. But the truth is there are also
areas where we have had very successful, very careful, and very
quiet diplomacy on maritime border issues between other
countries in Southeast Asia. There is precedent for being able
to make adjustments, and to ensure that redlines and other
concerns are sensitized.
In the current environment, some of these issues are
extraordinarily difficult to solve. They are probably best
managed for a period of time, and our particular role in the
current set of circumstances is to reestablish dialogue,
rebuild trust, and to remind everyone of the larger endeavor at
work here. The world cannot afford a crisis in Asia that would
have untold consequences for our economy, for the economies of
Asia and Europe and the rest of the world.
It is a moment where great care is needed. That means
rapid, fast movements are to be discouraged. Careful,
extraordinarily well-thought-out approaches are the order of
the day.
Senator Lugar. Before I ask my last question, I just want
to note that possibly this will be the final hearing that
Senator Webb will chair. And I just want to add my voice to
many who have pointed out how his leadership in this area, as
well as on the full committee, has been remarkable, exemplary,
and we have appreciated it very much.
Having said that, let me ask the final question, and that
is, essentially what risks are there during all of these
negotiations for American ships, American craft that are in the
area, presumably on normal missions, commercial or military as
the case may be. While the negotiations are proceeding, are we
likely to get into harm's way without knowing it, or how would
you describe the tactical situation for our craft?
Mr. Campbell. Thank you. We have for decades been very
active in our naval activities and our overflight activities
across Asia, and that includes in the South China Sea. Those
activities will continue, and they are part of a global policy
to support the maintenance of freedom of navigation, which is
at the core of our strategic interests in the South China Sea
and Asia as a whole.
I believe that all players recognize the importance of
freedom of navigation and the freedom of the seas. We have seen
incidents in the past that have involved tensions between our
vessels and the vessels of the People's Republic of China. One
of the greatest challenges we face in Asia is the risk of
inadvertence or accidents--local commanders, things operating
too closely in proximity. That is one of the reasons why we are
seeking much greater dialogue and discussion.
Institutions like the Incidents at Sea Agreement that we
maintained with the former Soviet Union. We have a similar
dialogue with China, but we would like that to be amplified. We
need more interactions that would prevent misunderstandings or
accidents, and that is a critical component of the 21st century
relationship that the United States and China are building.
We are going to be operating much more regularly in
proximity. Maintaining that peace and stability which we all
recognize is the heart and blood of the global economy, is
increasingly in the interest of not just the United States, but
China as well.
Senator Lugar. Thank you again for your important
testimony.
Mr. Campbell. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Senator Lugar, and thank you for
those comments as well. I mean, you are listening to someone
who is one of the most revered members of this committee in the
history of the Senate, and whose reputation was established in
a very great way before I ever got here.
Thank you, sir, for all of the work you have done for our
country.
Secretary Campbell, I am going to just seize for a moment
on something that you said because I think it is the key reason
that I asked to have this hearing. And that is that it is very
important that we take care in the way that we address these
issues in East Asia, and very aware of the potential volatility
in this region. And I also think that it is important that we
communicate this concern very clearly to the Government of
China because it is the activities that have been taking place
over the last 2 years particularly that have caused us the kind
of concern that brought about this hearing, particularly the
situation with the establishment of this prefectural level
government and the inclusion of a military garrison.
They are just beyond the normal debates about sovereignty,
and the other issues that we would discuss if we go in other
places around the Pacific rim. It is really a step that
requires us to have some form and continuing response. And you
mentioned the August 3 statement. I thought that was a very
useful statement for us.
But I just think it is so important that we communicate to
China on a number of fronts that it is in every country's
interest in this region, including theirs, that we try to work
to find multilateral solutions. And that includes other areas
that we have worked on since I have been on the committee, such
as the Mekong River, by the way, where as you well know, we
have 70 million people at risk at the lower end of the Mekong
River because of decisions that had been made up river on
hydroelectric dams on the main stem. And China does not
recognize downstream water rights, and it will not enter into
multilateral discussions about the health of the Mekong system.
So the more that we can do our part to show the validity of
the multilateral process and to encourage all of the countries
in the region to understand that this is the best way for it,
the better off we will be.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. No questions at this time.
Senator Webb. OK. Secretary Campbell, thank you very much
for coming today. This has been, I think, a very useful hearing
for all of us.
I have one point that I want to make sure we get
clarification on from you, and that is the question about the
administration position with respect to these overlapping
grants, oil blocks, and what under international--our
recognition of international law, what our position is on that.
They could potentially affect ongoing CFIUS review of Nexen or
a Canadian firm. But more importantly, I would like to
understand more fully what the administration position is on
that.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Campbell. All right, thank you. I will get the answer
to you, Senator.
[The submitted written response from Assistant Secretary
Campbell to the question above follows:]
The administration's position on territorial disputes and
sovereignty issues has been clearly stated by Secretary Clinton on a
number of occasions, including in her discussions with China, Vietnam,
ASEAN members, and other countries in the region. The United States has
a national interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect
for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea. The United States opposes the use of
coercion, intimidation, threats, or force by any claimant to advance
its claims. The policy of the United States is not to take sides on
competing claims over land features in the South China Sea. We
encourage all parties to pursue their territorial claims and
accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with international
law, including as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The
United States calls on all parties to clarify their claims in the South
China Sea in terms consistent with customary international law,
including as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, and believes
that the parties should exercise self-restraint in the conduct of
activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace
and stability. We continue to encourage all parties to take steps to
manage their differences in a peaceful and constructive manner.
Senator Webb. Thank you. And this hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell to Question Submitted
by Senator James M. Inhofe
Question. The tension between Japan and China over the Diaoyutai/
Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea is escalating. President Ma of Taiwan
recently proposed an ``East China Sea Peace Initiative,'' calling on
all parties concerned to show restraint, set aside controversies, and
settle the dispute in a peaceful manner.
Please comment on this initiative. Specifically, does the
administration welcome such an initiative?
Answer. On August 5, President Ma Ying-jeou proposed an East China
Sea Peace Initiative, reiterating Taiwan's territorial claims to the
Senkaku Islands and calling on all parties to resolve disputes
peacefully based on the United Nations Charter and relevant provisions
in international law.
U.S. policy on the Senkaku Islands is longstanding and has not
changed. The United States does not take a position on the question of
the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. We expect the
claimants to the Senkakus to resolve the issue through peaceful means
and among themselves. We welcome any collaborative and diplomatic
solution that resolves this issue without coercion, without
intimidation, without threats, and without the use of force.
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