- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

[Senate Hearing 112-590, Part 5]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

S. Hrg. 112-590, Pt. 5

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3254

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

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PART 5

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

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MARCH 20, 27; APRIL 17; JUNE 12, 2012

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES

S. Hrg. 112-590 Pt. 5

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 3254

__________

PART 5

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

__________

MARCH 20, 27; APRIL 17; JUNE 12, 2012

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

Ann E. Sauer, Minority Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina, Chairman

JACK REED, Rhode Island ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas

(ii)
?

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Cybersecurity Research and Development
march 20, 2012

Page

Lemnios, Hon. Zachary J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, Department of Defense................ 4
Gabriel, Kaigham J., PhD, Acting Director, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense................ 10
Wertheimer, Michael A. PhD, Director, Research and Development,
National Security Agency....................................... 13
Peery, James S. PhD, Director, Information Systems Analysis
Center, Sandia National Laboratories........................... 14

The Department of Defense's Role in the Implementation of the National
Strategy for Counterterrorism and the National Strategy to Combat
Transnational Organized Crime
march 27, 2012

Sheehan, Hon. Michael H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict...................... 50
Reid, Garry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Combating Terrorism............................. 55
Wechsler, William F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats............................ 56

Health and Status of the Department of Defense Science and Technology
Laboratories and Enterprise
april 17, 2012

Lemnios, Hon. Zachary J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering....................................... 91
Freeman, Dr. Marilyn M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research and Technology.................................... 99
Lacey, Mary E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.................... 112
Walker, Dr. Steven H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering................. 120

(iii)
Proliferation Prevention Programs at the Department of Energy and at
the Department of Defense
june 12, 2012

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs, Department of Defense................ 164
Harrington, Anne, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy........................................... 171
Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, Department of Defense; and Director, U.S. Strategic
Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction....... 173

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

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TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:04 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan and Portman.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member; and Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: John W. Heath, Jr.,
minority investigative counsel; Daniel A. Lerner, professional
staff member; and Michael J. Sistak, research assistant.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Hannah
I. Lloyd, and Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistant present: Brent Bombach,
assistant to Senator Portman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Hagan. We're going to go ahead and open this
hearing up. I know that Senator Portman is definitely coming,
but is tied up, so I think we'll go ahead and start because I
think you also know that we have some votes occurring this
afternoon, and what I'd like to do is go ahead and get started.
This afternoon, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee meets to review testimony on cybersecurity
research and development (R&D), in review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP). The topic of cybersecurity has been the
subject of growing concern and has figured prominently, not
only in the newest strategic defense guidance released in
January of this year, but also in previous national security
and defense planning documents.
The 2010 national security strategy states that:
``Cybersecurity threats represent one of the most serious
national security, public safety, and economic challenges we
face as a Nation.'' The recent strategic defense guidance lists
as one of the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces the
need to operate effectively in cybersecurity and space, which
will require investments by the Department of Defense (DOD) in
advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational
capability, and resilience in cybersecurity.
The challenge DOD faces is to find resources to address
this growing threat in an era where there are increasing
budgetary pressures on investments in the future. To its
credit, cyber is one of the few areas in which DOD actually
increased its investments in the fiscal year 2013 budget
request.
The objective of this hearing is to gain a better
understanding of DOD's cybersecurity R&D activities and how
these activities support DOD's cybersecurity objectives. We
would like to better understand the research challenges facing
the cybersecurity R&D community, the diversity of approaches to
solving these challenges and gaps if they exist. We would like
to understand the interactions between DOD with other Federal
agencies, such as the Department of Energy's (DOE) national
laboratories, industry, and academia.
We welcome the subcommittee ranking member, Senator
Portman.
The focus today will be on gaining a better understanding
of mechanisms to rapidly develop, test, and field innovative
approaches to address the expanding threat spectrum and whether
appropriate coordination is present across all the various
cyber research communities. In addition, we would like to
address the status of DOD's cyber testing infrastructure as
well as the health and status of its cyber workforce and DOD's
ability to attract and retain the best and the brightest in the
field.
This hearing is planned to have both open and closed
sessions. We're pleased to have four expert witnesses to help
us understand these complex issues. Mr. Zachary J. Lemnios is
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, and in this position he is DOD's Chief Technology
Officer and oversees and coordinates DOD's broad cyber research
portfolio across the Services and DARPA. In addition, Mr.
Lemnios oversees DOD's efforts in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education efforts, of which
cyber is an important element. The subcommittee looks forward
to hearing about DOD's overarching strategies, plans, and
programs in cybersecurity R&D.
Dr. Kaigham J. Gabriel is the Acting Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Created in
the wake of the surprise launch of the world's first satellite
by the Soviets in 1957, DARPA was created to prevent
technological surprise to our Nation. DARPA is investing
heavily in cyber-related research, with roughly $500 million
requested over the FYDP, and has developed some innovative
approaches to addressing emerging cybersecurity threats.
I should point out that our original hearing notice listed
Dr. Regina E. Dugan as the witness for DARPA. However, she is
leaving DARPA for the private sector, and I would like to
acknowledge Dr. Dugan's contributions to DARPA and sincerely
thank her for her service to our country.
Dr. Michael A. Wertheimer is the Director of Research and
Development at the National Security Agency (NSA). The Director
of NSA is also the Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM), so NSA is an indispensable partner in cybersecurity
efforts. The subcommittee looks forward to hearing about the
research activities at NSA and how they support DOD's
cybersecurity objectives.
Dr. James S. Peery is the Director of the Information
Systems Analysis Center at Sandia National Laboratories, a DOE
national laboratory at Albuquerque, NM, and a source of
expertise on cybersecurity. We look forward to hearing how
Sandia's activities are benefiting DOD.
I really want to thank all of our witnesses for your
service in the cause of our national security, and we look
forward to your testimony. In order for us to have adequate
time to discuss a broad range of topics, I do ask that our
witnesses keep their opening remarks to no more than 5 minutes
each. But we will include your full written statements in the
hearing record.
For the information of the members and our witnesses, I do
want to indicate how we plan to proceed in light of the series
of roll call votes scheduled at 4 o'clock today. We'll conduct
the open portion of the hearing until we have to vote, and then
we'll reconvene in room SVC-217 of the Capitol Visitor Center
for the closed portion of the hearing after we finish voting. I
think there's a series of three votes.
Before we hear from our first panel, I'd like to turn to my
colleague and ranking member, Senator Portman, for his opening
remarks. Senator Portman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate
your holding the hearing and look forward to the testimony from
these well-informed and sophisticated witnesses, who can help
us in a very important task.
But before I do that, I must mention that this Friday the
Bobcats of Ohio University are playing the Tar Heels, and I
would like in public hearing----[Laughter.]
Senator Hagan. Then we play NC State. [Laughter.]
Senator Portman. We'll see, injuries aside. But anyway,
since we beat number four seed Michigan, UNC shouldn't be a
problem for the Bobcats. So we'll make a bet later, maybe
chocolate Buckeyes and North Carolina barbecue sauce.
This is a great opportunity for us to hear from you. Again,
I look forward to doing it. This is the topic of the day. When
you look at our budgets, you can see it. In a very tough budget
environment, we see significant increases at DOD for cyber
defenses, a $200 million increase from last year; Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), $310 million increase from 2012. So,
coupling these figures with the billions of dollars likely to
be invested by the public or by the private side, private
sector, universities and others, it's evident that we have a
serious concern here and it's now being acknowledged, and that
we view ourselves as being vulnerable to cyber attacks.
These increases in spending do come at a time when we are
looking at decreases in I guess what you would call our
physical defenses. One of the purposes of this hearing I
believe is to be sure that we are balancing those two. We can't
ignore the threats posed to the technological infrastructure by
terrorist groups and other adversaries, like rogue hackers, but
we also can't win the battle in cyber alone. We have to have
both, and as we're downsizing our military are we becoming too
reliant on cyber defense, is one question I would like to have
us discuss today.
I think the answer, of course, is that our cyber
capabilities should be complementing our kinetic forces and
resources and making sure that we're working together.
With the kind of increase in funding we're talking about
here, of course, there's also the potential for some wasteful
spending and duplication. So knowing better what the private
sector is doing, universities are doing, is important too, and
you have some great information there, I'm sure.
I've heard from some of you about your concern about the
workforce and particularly with more and more young people not
getting into subjects like computer science, which are critical
to cyber capabilities. We have to talk about how we can be sure
that we have a workforce that's capable of defending America in
these new ways. The STEM disciplines are something we all talk
about. How do we actually make that a reality and what are your
recommendations there?
Then, as Chairman Hagan has pointed out, we have to be sure
we're properly coordinating across the Federal Government,
because again we have these new resources. Like all science and
technology (S&T) programs we invest in, we have to be sure
we're eliminating duplication and having a synergistic
relationship between various agencies and departments. Again,
you'll be very helpful to us understanding how we do that.
This is just one more challenge we have as a country, isn't
it? We have to be sure that we're spending our limited tax
dollars in a difficult budget environment in the most prudent
way possible.
So this is a great witness panel--defense, intelligence,
energy agencies--and we look forward to a frank assessment in
both sessions today and a good sense of where you think our
defenses are today and where we're going tomorrow.
So thank you, Madam Chair. I look forward to the testimony.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Secretary Lemnios, if you would like to begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. ZACHARY J. LEMNIOS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Lemnios. Yes. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hagan, Ranking
Member Portman. I have a short statement that I'd like to read
and just leave my written testimony for the record.
Last year, DOD issued its strategic guidance and strategy
for operating in cyberspace that defined cyberspace as an
operational domain. It was a landmark point, and it defined the
critical element of cyber operations as a concept to enable
business operations, military operations, and the command and
control backbone for DOD--critically important.
In fiscal year 2013, the President's budget request for DOD
includes a $3.4 billion investment in cyber activities, of
which $486 million is dedicated to S&T investments. This
investment is significant and critically necessary to give DOD
a complex set of cybersecurity responsibilities and challenges.
The responsibilities extend beyond our enterprise systems to
15,000 networks, the 7 million computing devices across
hundreds of installations in dozens of countries around the
globe which are used for business operations.
That capability has to extend to include the mission-
critical command and control networks, our cyber physical
systems, and our cyber radio frequency systems, and our
communications systems that make up DOD's tactical systems. The
emergence of networked tactical systems and cyber physical
systems have created new opportunities for increased
cybersecurity attack and disruption.
When I think of cyber operations, I think of computer
network defense of our enterprise IT systems and I think of
computer network defense, attack, and exploitation of our
tactical systems. In regard to mobile radio, a desktop terminal
and an unmanned surveillance aircraft are all clients on our
networks that need to be protected.
This is an operational domain built upon measures and
countermeasures, where tactical depth, operational innovation,
and technology transition are the key ingredients for
leadership.
In mid-2009, we assembled the technology leaders from
across government, industry, and academia to provide their
insight into the fundamental challenges faced by DOD and the
tactical approaches that are emerging in academia, precisely to
the point, Senator, that you made regarding academia. We
followed through on that insight and focused our cyber
investments in four key areas. We focused on mission assurance,
resilient architectures, agile operations, and foundations of
trust.
Over this past year I've added an additional area, a cyber
measurement campaign. All of these are described in my written
testimony.
We realize the importance of ensuring that taxpayers'
dollars are invested wisely and efficiently. We have the
appropriate forms in place to ensure cybersecurity research is
well-coordinated among DOD's organizations, among other Federal
activities, and across all of government. Investments are also
scrutinized by DOD's senior leadership through the recently
established Cyber Investment Management Board.
The key to success of all of our cybersecurity efforts is
the talent, the workforce that we have in our laboratories, in
academia, in industry, in our small business community, and the
workforce of tomorrow. There are a number of programs underway
to advance the cyber R&D workforce, and they are described
again in our written testimonies.
Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present
these brief remarks and I look forward to questions from the
subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lemnios follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Zachary J. Lemnios

Chairwoman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this written
testimony on the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) cybersecurity
research and development activities.
I am honored to be joined today by Dr. Michael Wertheimer, the
Director of Research at the National Security Agency (NSA), Dr. Ken
Gabriel, Deputy Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), and Dr. James Peery, Director of the Information
Systems and Analysis Center at the Sandia National Laboratories.
The Department has a comprehensive strategy for cyber operations,
as conveyed in the recently published DOD Strategy for Operating in
Cyberspace.\1\ This Strategy recognizes that cyberspace is an
operational domain and a critical element to enable its military,
intelligence, and business operations, including the movement of
personnel and material and the command and control of the full spectrum
of military operations. The fiscal year 2013 President's budget request
includes a $3.4 billion investment in cyber activities of which $486
million is for Science and Technology (S&T) activities across
Department organizations, to include the Department's organizations
testifying here today. This level of investment is significant. The
President and the Secretary of Defense recognize the critical
importance of ensuring the Department has the required capabilities
across the full spectrum of operations--capabilities that protect the
Department's enterprise and tactical systems against cyber attack;
capabilities that ensure these systems will continue to operate
effectively despite cyber attacks; and capabilities that ensure our
Joint Forces dominate in any cyber warfare campaign waged against us.
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\1\ Department of Defense web site: Department of Defense Strategy
for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011.
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DEPARTMENT'S ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS

While the cybersecurity challenges to the Department's enterprise
information technology reflect those of the private sector in scale and
scope, its operational challenges are significantly more complex. The
Department operates over 15,000 networks and 7 million computing
devices across hundreds of installations in dozens of countries around
the globe. The Department's enterprise information technology systems
rely upon commercial network service providers and include secure
enclaves that protect business data and secure operational data.
Breaches of these networks have an impact on national security. The
cybersecurity threat to the enterprise is evolving on shorter timelines
and with much more aggressive threats.\2\ By September 2011, over 70
million cumulative malware threats were identified; augmented by a new
class of tailored social engineering threats that target mobile
platforms.
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\2\ McAfee web site: McAfee Threats Report: Third Quarter 2011.
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As a first step, the Department began implementation of the Host
Based Security System (HBSS) in 2007.\3\ The HBSS solution is attached
to each host (server, desktop, and laptop) in the Department and is
managed by local administrators and configured to address known exploit
traffic using an Intrusion Prevention System and host firewall.
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\3\ DISA Host Based Security System web site.
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In early 2011, the Department began an engagement with the
industrial base, through the Enduring Security Framework to build a
common threat understanding and best practices for the enterprise.\4\
Among the first efforts, this work has developed approaches for
improving the security and integrity of computer system Basic Input
Output System (BIOS) controls. These concepts have been certified by
the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) and will be
available to the Department through the private sector.\5\
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\4\ Parrish, Karen, American Foreign Press Services: Lynn Urges
Partnership Against Cyber Threat, Feb. 15, 2011.
\5\ NIST Tech Beat: Protecting Computers at Start-Up: New NIST
Guidelines, Dec. 20, 2011.
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TACTICAL SYSTEM VULNERABILITY SYSTEMS

The Department's cybersecurity concerns extend beyond enterprise
Information Technology, command and control, and network operations.
Tactical system complexity and network dependency create new
opportunities for cybersecurity attack and disruption of our
warfighting platforms. Tactical systems include manned and unmanned
platforms, munitions, control systems, where cyber network attack or
exploitation could compromise mission effectiveness. ``Perimeter''
security techniques engendered by information systems security
engineering and other cyber defenses lack sufficient defense for
tactical systems should a perimeter defense be compromised. This is
increasingly problematic as tactical systems grow in complexity and
adversaries have more opportunities for exploit through supply chain or
inherent tactical system software, hardware and firmware
vulnerabilities. A ``system'' security approach is required for total
mission assurance.
The Department has revitalized its Program Protection policy and
practice to apply system security principles to the design, development
and fielding of tactical systems. Today's systems are built using a
combination of COTS and DOD-unique hardware and software. In the past,
the DOD was primarily focused on protecting the release of advanced
technology contained in systems, but these systems must also be
protected from insertion of malicious content through supply chain
attack, and the defense of the system against unauthorized access,
control, or alteration during operations. The Department is now
applying a comprehensive program protection planning approach as
systems mature through the acquisition lifecycle; performing
vulnerability assessments, embedding system security engineering and
supply chain risk management practices and reducing cyber
vulnerabilities.^6,7
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\6\ Department of Defense Instruction 5200.39: Critical Program
Information (CPI) Protection Within the Department of Defense, Dec. 28,
2010.
\7\ Defense Acquisition Guidebook: Acquisition Protection Strategy
for Program Managers: Program Protection Plan.
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ENTERPRISE AND TACTICAL SYSTEMS CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH

The challenge for the Department's research and engineering
enterprise is to develop cybersecurity concepts that will enable the
Department's enterprise and tactical systems to operate effectively in
today's environment, and to lay the foundation for future capabilities
against an increasing complex, capable, and ubiquitous cyber
operational threat. Given the many cybersecurity attacks against the
Department's networks we have seen over the past few years, we must be
prepared to respond rapidly. However, we must also take the long view
and seek fundamentally new concepts and capabilities for cybersecurity.
There are no silver bullets that will completely eliminate the cyber
threat. The Department's cybersecurity research investments are
designed to build a strong technical foundation across the public-
private enterprise, supported by robust engineering, modeling,
simulation and measurement campaigns.
Four areas are under development to support the ``DOD Strategy for
Operating in Cyberspace'' \1\ and have been shaped by a joint DOD and
IARPA study. This study reported the independent views of technology
leaders from across government, industry and academia who were asked to
consider the fundamental challenges faced by Department and the
technical approaches that are emerging in academia. The Department's
research investments are designed to build technical foundations in the
following areas:

Mission Assurance: This focus will enable commanders
to successfully execute their missions whether in joint or
coalition environments, in the cyber domain and while under
cyber attack. This capability requires that our DOD commanders
be able to assess and control the cyber situation in the
context of the overall mission. Research in this area is in the
development of tools and techniques that enable efficient
modeling of blue, grey, and red behavior (cyber and kinetic) to
determine the correct course of action in the cyber domain.
Resilient Infrastructure: Resiliency is the ability to
absorb and fight through cyber-attacks to complete the mission.
In the event of an attack, while network performance may
degrade, it will not fall below a given critical mission
derived level. Achieving this performance characteristic
involves developing capabilities that lead to recovery and
reconstitution of critical functions in milliseconds. The
research in this area is focused in two areas: integrated
architectures optimized to speed recovery to a known secure
state, and novel protocols and algorithms at the component
nodes within the architecture to distribute resiliency
mechanisms.
Agile Operations: Agility refers to the ability of
systems to dynamically reshape their cyber posture as
conditions and goals change, both to escape harm and to thwart
the adversary. It requires that networks are able to rapidly
change attributes and operating conditions including attack
surfaces in near real time. The research in this area is
focused on enabling high speed responses with respect to
healing, network optimization, and protective cyber mechanisms.
Foundations of Trust: Trust is confidence that our
systems--the devices, networks, and cyber-dependent functions -
perform as expected, and have not been comprised. DOD systems
use components that provide mixed trust levels; some components
are provided by domestic and foreign commercial sources, and
some components are special highly assured secure components.
The research objective for this area is to develop capabilities
that result in trustworthy systems even though the components
individually have varying degrees of trustworthiness. The
technical approach is to create models that characterize the
trust of the systems by observation and analysis of system
characteristics and behavior.

The research in these thrust areas supports a range of applications
including wired networks, mobile networks, cloud computing, tactical
information technology, system security engineering, and trusted
components for military systems.

CYBER TESTING INFRASTRUCTURE

The Department's cyber testing infrastructure is comprised of
approximately 60 facilities and ranges that support a wide array of
activities including research, experimentation, developmental test,
operational test, and training. Eleven of these ranges support cyber
research and development, the balance are used for training and
operational test and evaluation.
The Department has embarked on a strategy to extend
interoperability, threat models, traffic generation, and user behavior
models for these ranges to support rapid development and test of new
cybersecurity capabilities. The Department has testing infrastructure
improvement programs in four key areas:

cyber range automation technology that will enable
larger scale, faster turnaround, lower costs, and better
utilization of scarce test resources and expertise;
high fidelity, validated emulations of cyberspace as
well as realistic mission scenarios, environment, adversary
models, and attack vectors;
standardized data collection tool suites; and
cyber measurement framework.

We are exploring two options for how best to integrate cyber range
capabilities with the Department's existing test and evaluation
infrastructure, which currently supports traditional kinetic missions.
The first is to aggregate many of the Department's cyber test resources
in a single large cyber-kinetic range, with elements of traditional
test ranges onsite. The second option is establish a number of smaller
test ranges that can both work independently or be networked together
and/or to kinetic test ranges, to support national-level tests and
exercises. We plan to evaluate this trade space through a series of
tests and pilot exercises during this fiscal year.

COORDINATION AND TRANSITION OF CYBER RESEARCH INVESTMENTS

Research and development efforts are well-coordinated among the
Department's organization and other Federal and international
organizations. Since taking office, I have personally met with
operational and research leaders at NSA, Combatant Commands, Services,
and Agencies to coordinate strategic research thrusts and investments,
to assess results, and to identify gaps. Recently, the Department
established the Cyber Investment Management Board (CIMB), comprised of
the Department's policy, acquisition, and technology leaders, to
provide strategic oversight of the Department's cyber investments
supporting the enterprise information technology systems and system
platforms.
DOD cyber program research is coordinated among Department
organizations through the DOD Cyber S&T Working Group. The membership
of the Cyber Working Group includes representatives from across DOD's
operational organizations, STRATCOM, CYBERCOM, NSA, DISA, the Joint
Staff, and S&T organizations--the Service Labs and DOD Federally Funded
Research and Development Centers. The Working Group's primary task is
to develop a roadmap of research programs to include programmatic
technical goals, milestones, and investment levels for the four
cybersecurity research thrust areas.
Interagency coordination takes place through multiple Federal
working groups, including the Computer Security and Information
Assurance Interagency Working Group--sponsored by the Network and
Information Technology Research and Development subcommittee. Further
coordination with our allies and partners occurs through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Research and Technology Organization and
the Technical Cooperation Program.
Across the Department, our researchers are engaged with industry,
academia, and other government laboratories to drive innovation in
cybersecurity research and to rapidly transition concepts to
operational use. Transition occurs through several channels. Some
projects will be adopted for use in commercial technology and involve
vendor modifications or the launch of new products. We have seen
results in incubating new cybersecurity technologies for commercially
available products through our Small Business Innovation Research
program. Other projects involve technologies that require the
development of custom components and are transitioned through the
defense industrial base.
While early research is performed under the management of the
Service scientific organizations, much of the applied S&T research and
development is carried out through Service laboratories. These
organizations maintain connections with acquisition program executive
offices, and engineering centers. Through these connections, the
Service laboratories share results from emerging concepts and outline
joint pilot efforts. These technologies will be available to mitigate
vulnerabilities identified in program protection analysis and planning
activities performed by program staffs.

CYBER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) WORKFORCE AND SKILL SET

I remain concerned that in emerging and very dynamic technical
fields, such as cybersecurity, and system security engineering, the
Department needs to build a strong workforce and needs access to the
highest caliber technical talent in academia and industry. Formal
educational programs address basic cyber threats and fundamental
mechanisms of security, but not high end cyber threats, foundations of
trust, adversarial reasoning, or game changing approaches. The
Department's prospects for satisfying its cyber human capital needs
remain challenging due to the following:

Projected shortages of cyber R&D talent driven by the
dearth of clearable candidates electing studies in these areas;
this is one area we cannot outsource.
Limited specialization in cyber academic programs; and
Significant competition by the private sector.

We are taking an active role in transitioning lessons learned from
Cyber R&D to academia to improve cyber education. DOD involvement in
the development of formal cyber education will provide interested and
formally trained cyber graduates with visibility into research
opportunities and career opportunities for public service.
We have several programs underway to advance our cyber R&D
workforce through Service labs, agencies, OSD, and national
initiatives. I would like to highlight several of these:

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
\8\ has used competitions to attract high school and college
students in cybersecurity. These include CyberPatriot National
High School Cyber Defense Competition \9\, U.S. Cyber Challenge
\10\, Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) Digital
Forensics Challenge \11\, and National Collegiate Cyber Defense
Competition.\12\
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\8\ The White House--National Security Council web site: The
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.
\9\ CyberPatriot--National High School Cyber Defense Competition
web site.
\10\ National Board of Information Security Examiners web site:
U.S. Cyber Challenge.
\11\ Department of Defense web site: DC3 Cyber Crime Challenges.
\12\ National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Centers of Academic Excellence in Information
Assurance Education \13\ recognizes schools with programs that
integrate research activities into the curriculum. The schools
serve as a source for DOD-academic researcher exchanges; of the
146 centers, 42 are focused on cybersecurity research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ National Security Agency, Central Security Service web site:
National Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance
Education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DOD Information Assurance Scholarship Program is a
recruitment, retention and academic capacity-building
program.\14\ Since the inception of the program in 2001, DOD
has sponsored over 470 scholars to complete a degree in a
cyber- or information assurance-related field of study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Department of Defense web site: DOD Information Assurance
Scholarship Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
Multidisciplinary University Research Initiatives (MURI): MURIs
fund consortiums of universities for complex research problems.
AFOSR has six MURI research teams addressing four cybersecurity
topics. In total over 140 graduate students, 19 post docs and
10 undergraduate students are being trained in the field at 29
universities.
Service Lab R&D Involvement with Academia: Over the
past 10 years, the Information Directorate (AFRL/RI) educated
top ROTC cadets and civilian college students on the science of
information assurance and trained them in cyber warfare. These
programs have graduated over 300 cyber warriors.
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Cyber Academic
Group \15\ includes course work on cyber operations and
planning. Semi-annual Cyber Wargame courses are open to all NPS
students. A Cyber Battle Lab with classified and unclassified
segments supports interdisciplinary education and research
spanning student theses and large projects involving government
agencies, DOD, industry, and academia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Naval Postgraduate School web site: Cyber Academic Group
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Security Agency's Cyber Defense Exercise
(CDE) was conceived to evaluate the effectiveness of the IA
education instilled at the service academies. DOD provides Red
Team participants to this exercise annually to evaluate the
performance of the cadets in securing a network. The overall
CDE goal is to generate interest among students nation-wide to
engage in challenging cybersecurity problems. A team of 38
cadets won the 2011 CDE for the Army.

SUMMARY

Soon after coming into office, President Obama identified
cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security
challenges facing our Nation. DOD faces particular challenges to its
enterprise information technology systems and to its tactical systems.
The emergence of networked tactical systems and cyber-physical systems
has created new opportunities for increased cybersecurity attack and
disruption.
In response to these threats, we are building a strong technical
foundation across the research and engineering enterprise. DOD will
develop concepts to enable enterprise and tactical systems to operate
effectively in today's environment, and to lay the foundation for
future capabilities against an increasing complex, capable, and
ubiquitous cyber operational threat.

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Secretary Lemnios.
Dr. Gabriel, if you'll go next. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF KAIGHAM J. GABRIEL, PhD, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. Gabriel. DARPA's role in the creation of the Internet
means we were party to the immense opportunities the Internet
created and we share in the intense responsibility of
protecting it. While national policymakers will ultimately
determine how cyber capabilities will be employed, DARPA's
responsibility is to explore the outer boundaries of such
capabilities so that the United States is best prepared for
future challenges.
Chairwoman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman, members of the
subcommittee: My name is Ken Gabriel. I am the Acting Director
of DARPA. DARPA's bottom-line message today is that DOD is
capability-limited in cyber, both defensively and offensively.
We need to change that.
It goes without question that a complete picture of the
cyber threat should inform policies and laws related to DOD's
cybersecurity efforts. Such decisions depend on a complete
understanding of the threats and opportunities, an
understanding that can be supported by our discussions today,
but one that will remain incomplete. The complete picture
requires a discussion at the special access level.
In this unclassified discussion, much of what we can share
you already know. Attackers can penetrate our networks. Users
are the weakest link in cybersecurity. The defense supply chain
is at risk. Physical systems are at risk, and the United States
continues to spend billions on cybersecurity with limited
increase in protection.
Our approach to cybersecurity is dominated by a strategy
that layers security onto a uniform architecture. This approach
is taken for good reason, to protect against known threats and
to create tactical breathing room. But it is not convergent
with a growing and evolving threat. That's the defensive
picture.
With respect to cyber offense, modern warfare will demand,
as you said Senator Portman, the effective use of both cyber
and kinetic means. The tasks required for military purposes are
sufficiently different that we cannot simply scale
intelligence-based cyber capabilities and adequately serve the
needs of DOD.
Features that are vital for intelligence-based
capabilities, such as nonattribution and persistence, are
typically not as critical for DOD operational cyber
capabilities. For example, a cyber exploit that always causes
the target system to crash is not much of an intelligence
exploit. But it may be exactly the effect that a DOD mission
calls for.
DARPA activities are part of the larger effort within the
whole-of-government at NSA, the newly formed CYBERCOM, the
Services, and as appropriate, DHS. DARPA's engagement in
defensive and offensive cyber is not new. DARPA's expanded
efforts build on an existing foundation and continuing
contributions to cyber. DARPA-developed technologies are widely
prevalent in military, intelligence, and commercial use today,
but there is still much to do.
From our vantage point, the greatest vulnerability in cyber
offense for DOD is the lack of capabilities with
proportionality, speed, and diversity of effects.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gabriel follows:]

Prepared by Dr. Kaigham J. Gabriel

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) role in the
creation of the Internet means we were party to the immense
opportunities the Internet created and share in the intense
responsibility of protecting it. While national policymakers, not
DARPA, will determine how cyber capabilities will be employed to
protect and defend national security interests, the agency has a
responsibility to explore the outer boundaries of such capabilities so
the United States is best prepared for future challenges.
The following comments are unclassified. To understand the complete
picture of the DOD cyber challenges and DARPA's contributions,
classified discussions at the special access level are essential.
DARPA's bottom line: DOD is capability limited, both defensively and
offensively. We need to fix that.
Chairwoman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman, and members of the
subcommittee, my name is Regina E. Dugan. I am the Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. I appreciate the opportunity
to discuss DOD's cybersecurity research and development activities at
DARPA.
DARPA has a multidecade history in cyber. Agency activities across
the full spectrum of conflict have significantly changed the Nation's
toolbox of capabilities.
In today's unclassified discussion, we can focus on the challenges
of cyber defense, informed by our analytic framework. These challenges
include:

Attackers can penetrate our networks: In just 3 days
and at a cost of only $18,000, the Host-Based Security System
was penetrated.
User authentication is a weak link: 53,000 passwords
were provided to teams at Defcon; within 48 hours, 38,000 were
cracked.
The Defense supply chain is at risk: More than two-
thirds of electronics in U.S. advanced fighter aircraft are
fabricated in off-shore foundries.
Physical systems are at risk: A smartphone hundreds of
miles away took control of a car's drive system through an
exploit in a wireless interface.
The United States continues to spend on cybersecurity
with limited increase in security: The Federal Government
expended billions of dollars in 2010, but the number of
malicious cyber intrusions has increased.

After months of original data collection and analysis, DARPA's
conclusion is that the U.S. approach to cybersecurity is dominated by a
strategy that layers security onto a uniform architecture. This
approach is taken to create tactical breathing space, but it is not
convergent with an evolving threat.
DARPA's recent testimony before Congress highlighted how cyber
threats jeopardize National Security to the point of keeping the Agency
leadership awake at night. Malicious cyberattacks are not merely an
existential threat to DOD bits and bytes; they are a real threat to
physical systems--including military systems--and to U.S. warfighters.
The Unites States will not prevail against these threats simply by
scaling our current approaches.
That's the defensive picture. With respect to cyber offense;
DARPA's belief is that the Department must have the capability to
conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation,
allies, and interests. To be relevant, DOD needs cyber tools to provide
the President with a full range of options to use in securing our
national interests. These tools must address different timescales and
new targets, and will require the integrated work of cyber and
electronic warfare at unprecedented levels.
Modern operations will demand the effective use of cyber, kinetic,
and combined cyber and kinetic means. The shelf-life of cyber tools and
capabilities is short--sometimes measured in days. To a greater degree
than in other areas of Defense, cybersecurity solutions require that
DOD develops the ability to build quickly, at scale, and over a broad
range of capabilities. This is true for both offensive and defensive
capabilities. To be sure, the list of needed capabilities is long.
Specifically, the tasks required for military purposes are
sufficiently different so that we cannot simply scale intelligence
cyber capabilities and adequately serve the needs of DOD. Rather, cyber
options are needed that can be executed at the speed, scale, and pace
of our military kinetic options with comparable predicted outcomes.
A great deal of time is spent on determining the cyber governance
structure, rather than resolving the inevitable question that follows:
``What now?'' The lack of capability is the overwhelming issue. Further
oversight strategies must be updated and be at pace with the threat.
DARPA activities are part of a larger whole within national
security at the National Security Agency, the newly formed U.S.
CYBERCOM, the Services, the private sector, universities, nonprofits
and, as appropriate, the Department of Homeland Security.
Clearly, the challenges of cyberspace require the concerted efforts
of many. We all must be protectors of and operate within cyberspace.
The Agency is ready to meet a continuing responsibility in advisory
roles during the formation of policy and legal frameworks, because new
policies and laws--domestic and international--must be executable,
enforceable, and sustainable.
To be of use, such policies and laws will demand evaluation and
adjustment on timescales that correspond to the dynamic nature and
compressed evolutionary timescales of advances in cyberspace. That
means moving faster than accustomed.
The complete picture of the cyber threat should inform such
policies and laws. Truly understanding the threat, however, cannot come
from unclassified discussions.
DARPA's engagement in cyber is not new. The Agency's expanded
effort builds on an existing foundation and continuing contributions to
cyber. DARPA-developed technologies are widely prevalent in military,
intelligence, and commercial use today. But there is still much to do.
Thank you.

Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Wertheimer.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. WERTHEIMER, PhD, DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

Dr. Wertheimer. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman:
Thank you very much for inviting NSA Research today. NSA
Research is unique in the Intelligence Community. Of all 16
components in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, we are the only component with in-house research,
a national government workforce that's dedicated to providing
research. We do very little program management. We're
supporting both the information assurance and the signals
intelligence (SIGINT) mission of NSA.
We do that with a very, very highly skilled technical
workforce, better than a third of which have PhDs, another
third masters, and just under a quarter have bachelor's
degrees.
Our legacy is mostly in cryptography and in the design and
breaking of encryption. Over the past 10 years, in the living
laboratory that really is the SIGINT system, we have seen our
mission grow in defensive cyber and offensive cyber. NSA
Research is responsible for virtually all the major tool sets
that we deploy both offensively and defensively. We're very
proud of that legacy.
But I would be remiss in not sharing with you things that
concern me most at night when I go to sleep. First, the
production of computer scientists in our Nation is on the
decline. I can share facts and figures with you. We are not
recruiting and retaining them. There are things we can and must
do to retain them that we are not.
I am concerned also that the investments from Congress and
from the people in research is almost all period of performance
of 1 year or less that I see. It's to build tools, it's to be a
rapid deployment of capability. I rarely get the opportunity to
think 3 years down the line even in research. The money that
comes to us has very directed purpose. I will tell you in
closed session many of the wonderful things we're doing with
that money, but I feel that the Nation is a little frightened
to think much beyond 1 or 2 years on this problem, and that
keeps me up at night as well.
Most of the examples I'd like to share with you in closed
session, so I'll conclude my remarks at that point.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wertheimer follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. Michael Wertheimer

INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman, distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss my Agency's
collaborative efforts on cyber research and development. First, I want
to take this opportunity to thank you for the support this committee--
and Congress--has given us.

OVERVIEW OF CYBER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Throughout the past 6 decades, NSA Research has delivered deep and
important science that has enabled many Intelligence Community
breakthroughs. Our legacy extends from cryptology to high performance
computing. We were early pioneers in fields ranging from computer
science to digital communications. Today we find ourselves developing
new science in such diverse fields as data storage, microelectronics,
and cloud computing. We have extremely deep expertise in Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics--the so-called STEM--
disciplines especially as they relate to our core missions: Signals
Intelligence and Information Assurance. With this diversity of skills
and depth of experience, we find ourselves at the center of a number of
government-wide cyber activities. We are a core member of the
Department of Defense Cyber Network Operations Science and Technology
Steering Council and its Priority Steering Committee. NSA Research is a
co-chair of the Office of Science and Technology Policy Special Cyber
Operations Research and Engineering (SCORE) Interagency Working Group
and we are an active member on the Intelligence Community's Cyber
Security and Information Assurance interagency working group. We
participated in the assistant Secretary of Defense (R&E) Cyber workshop
series crafting the DOD-wide cyber vision, thrusts and roadmaps. The
SCORE committee coordinates cyber research across all Federal
departments and ensures that the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative unclassified research efforts are integrated into an overall
cyber research and development plan.
NSA Research also has a leadership role in the nongovernment cyber
R&D community. For example, we are members on the Joint Advisory
Committees of MIT Lincoln Labs and CMU Systems Engineering Institute
and sit on the cyber advisory board for the University of Maryland. We
also participate on evaluation boards for Department of Energy National
Laboratory cyber-related internal research proposals.
NSA commitment to growing the quality and quantity of U.S. science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics students is a model for
government. We work with universities in many ways, ranging from our
Center of Academic Excellence program, which identifies and supports
excellence in information assurance and cyber network operations, to
direct program support and curriculum discussions. We sponsor and
support events such as the ``Capture the Cyber Flag'' inter-university
competitions, involve student interns in our research, and maintain a
strong grants program. Nevertheless, the United States is neither
graduating nor recruiting to government sufficient numbers of computer
scientists to meet the demand. Indeed, in 2010 there were only 726
Computer Science PhDs awarded to U.S. citizens. Of them, only 64
elected to join government.\1\ This is an area where we need to
redouble our efforts to attract the Nation's best and brightest to
government service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Computing Research Association, Taulbee Survey Report 2009-
2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As my colleagues here today can and will attest, cybersecurity
demands tremendous diversity of thinking and broad collaboration. We
understand, together, the need to not only deliver immediate
capabilities, but to invest in long-term disruptive innovation. NSA is
a leader in this regard and will continue to outpace much of industry
and academia for years to come. Our talented and dedicated workforce is
our strength, your support crucial, and the common purpose shared by
colleagues here,today the path to success.
We have tremendous offensive and defensive capabilities in
cyberspace. Maintaining that advantage, growing it, and ultimately
providing mastery over cybersecurity is our contract with the Nation. I
look forward to sharing with you specifics of our strategy in closed
session.
I welcome your questions. Thank you.

Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Peery.

STATEMENT OF JAMES S. PEERY, PhD, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS CENTER, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

Dr. Peery. Chairman Hagan and Ranking Member Portman: Thank
you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I'm James
Peery, Director of Information Systems Analysis Center at
Sandia National Laboratories. As you may know, Sandia is a
multi-program national security laboratory owned by the U.S.
Government and operated by Sandia Corporation for the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
Sandia is one of three NNSA laboratories with
responsibility for stockpile stewardship and annual assessment
of the Nation's nuclear weapons. But within the U.S. nuclear
weapons complex, Sandia is uniquely responsible for assuring
that U.S. nuclear weapons cannot be used without the
President's intent. It's because of this responsibility that
Sandia has had an extensive cyber R&D program for over 50
years, with a rich history of providing vulnerability and
adversarial threat assessments for U.S. nuclear command and
control systems.
Although nuclear weapons remain Sandia's core mission,
because of these capabilities, it has been able to support
other agency missions in national security, including
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism,
Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security. In all of these areas,
I think you recognize that cyber is a key element.
My written statement focuses on the questions you raised,
including the challenges and technical developments in
cybersecurity, along with how the DOE laboratories contribute
to the DOD mission in cybersecurity.
There are three points I'd like to emphasize. First, today
the DOE laboratories are a resource to DOD in raising the bar
to our adversaries in cybersecurity. I am very confident that a
large part of DOD is aware of where the cyber talent lies or
resides within the DOE laboratories and has effectively used
DOE procedures to acquire that talent.
The second point is--and I think you're aware of this--
there is no silver bullet to solve the existing cyber problem.
That's true for DOD, DOE, and the private sector. It's
virtually impossible to make an absolutely secure information
technology system. However, with sustained and coordinated
investments and deployment of government-owned S&T, we can
dramatically change the cost equation to our adversaries.
Third, compliance-based security is not effective. We need
a set of metrics to objectively measure system security. New
technologies and policies should be evaluated and adopted based
on how they objectively improve system security and how much
they cost. This is not a static process. The adversary will
adapt.
Specific to the committee's requested questions, on the
area of encryption versus network security, I would just like
to point out that they shouldn't be viewed as competing
alternatives. Better network security and careful use of high-
quality encryption significantly raises the adversary's costs,
but unfortunately today the driver in IT systems is cost
reduction. Diversity is another way to increase the cost, but
today again cost reduction is the predominant driver in IT.
The question of transition from signature-based detection
of attacks to behavioral-based detection. I just point out--we
can talk more in closed session about this, but new classes of
anomaly detection methods have been developed and are based on
aggregating events across time and multiple sources to identify
network and host-based behavior that might be malicious. These
approaches and behavioral-based methods have been successful in
finding previously undiscovered malware. One drawback of this
technology, though, is that it has a very high false positive
rate.
I think I'll conclude my comments now on the issue of
workforce within Sandia, which I can speak on and is near and
dear to my heart. I believe, as was said earlier, confronting
today's cyber challenges requires a highly skilled and
motivated research community. It's well-documented that the
demand for cyber expertise greatly exceeds the supply.
At Sandia, through several enticement programs we've been
able to attract and hire some of the top U.S. students, both at
the undergraduate and graduate level. But I would like to draw
your attention that retention is a growing concern. Although
the importance of the national security mission and job
stability remain highly attractive features to our employees,
new hires today receive benefits similar to those found in U.S.
industry, so we should start expecting that in this area that
we might see retention rates approaching that of U.S. industry,
which is approximately 5 years.
The reason this is a concern is that historically the
laboratories have been asked to solve some of the impossible
problems, and that requires a cadre of senior experienced staff
members. Just like in nuclear weapons, the government level of
resources in cyber--to get the skills to the level the
government needs usually takes between 3 to 5 years. If the
retention rate is around 5 years, then we have a growing
problem of trying to keep those people around to solve the
impossible problems.
Presently, many of Sandia's cyber staff are being solicited
by private companies offering greater than 50 percent increases
in salary and better benefits. We've been very fortunate that
historically we've only been losing on the order of about less
than 1 percent annually in the area of cyber, but this year we
expect to reach approximately 10 percent loss in our staff to
outside employment.
Just in summary, I'd say that the DOE labs complex has a
deep reservoir of technical talent and S&T capabilities that
have helped address some of the government's most challenging
national security problems, including the cyber area, and I
look forward to the closed session to be able to tell you about
some of those accomplishments.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Peery follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. James Peery

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman, and distinguished members
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify. I am James Peery, Director of the Information Systems and
Analysis Center at Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is a multi-
program national security laboratory owned by the United States
Government and operated by Sandia Corporation for the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA).
Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility
for stockpile stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation`s nuclear
weapons. Within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, Sandia is uniquely
responsible for the systems engineering and integration of nuclear
weapons in the stockpile and for the design, development, and
qualification of all non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons. While
nuclear weapons remain Sandia`s core mission, the science, technology,
and engineering capabilities required to support this mission position
us to support other aspects of national security as well. Indeed, there
is natural, increasingly significant synergy between our core mission
and our broader national security work. This broader role involves
research and development (R&D) in nonproliferation, counter
proliferation, counterterrorism, energy security, defense, and homeland
security. With the United States growing dependence on information
technology, cyber security has become a key foundation in all of these
areas.
Sandia's extensive cyber R&D program is rooted in its rich history
of providing adversarial threat assessments for the U.S. nuclear
command and control systems. This program draws heavily upon our core
science and technology (S&T) capabilities. These S&T investments afford
the Nation the ability to leverage world-leading capabilities in
advanced analytics, trusted microelectronics, and modeling and
simulation. Sandia's differentiating value comes from its unique
systems approach integrating scientific understanding, technology
development, and complex requirements-driven engineering to develop
solutions.
Sandia has developed a comprehensive understanding of mission needs
and constraints through its longstanding relationship with key
government agencies. Working in partnership with government, other
national laboratories, academia, and industry, Sandia has been a key
to:

Providing technical leadership in threat-informed
information assurance technology development and assessment
Serving as an operational model for information
security--with a goal of defining effective operational
security guidelines and practice for Sandia, other government
agencies, and high-value private-sector networks
Expanding the cadre of highly-skilled cyber
professionals through its hands-on research internship program
Functioning as a hub that works at the intersection of
academia, national laboratories, industry, and government to
drive cyber innovation and advance the overall national and
global cyber health

My statement today will focus on a number of the challenges and
technical developments in cyber security along with how the Department
of Energy (DOE) laboratories contribute to the Department of Defense
(DOD) mission in cyber security. I have been employed within the DOE
labs for 22 years collectively, 17 of those years at Sandia National
Laboratories, where I have done research in high performance computing
and high energy density physics. Within management, I have led teams in
cyber security, computational physics, high performance computing,
nuclear weapons R&D and hydrodynamic testing. For the past 2 years, it
has been my privilege to lead the organization at Sandia that
represents the largest collection of cyber experts within the DOE
laboratories. My testimony represents the vast knowledge that they have
imparted to me.

MAJOR POINTS OF THIS TESTIMONY

It is the belief of a Sandia team of cyber security experts that:

1. The DOE laboratories are a resource to DOD in ``raising the
bar'' to the adversaries in cyber security. We believe that a large
part of the DOD is aware of where the cyber talent resides within the
DOE laboratories and has effectively used DOE procedures to acquire
that talent.
2. A silver bullet for solving the ``cyber problem'' for DOD, DOE,
dot-gov or the private sector does not exist. It is impossible to make
an absolutely secure information technology (IT) system. Sustained and
coordinated investment in and deployment of government-owned science
and technology could dramatically change the cost equation for our
adversaries.
3. Compliance-based security and attempting to secure the
perimeter are not effective. We need a set of metrics to objectively
measure system security. New technologies and policies should be
evaluated and adopted based on how they objectively improve system
security and how much they cost. This is not a static process as
adversaries also adapt.

Based on the committee's request, the following topics are
addressed:

1. Mechanisms to rapidly develop, test, and field innovative
approaches to address the expanding threat spectrum
2. Research on network security versus data encryption
3. Research on the transition from signature-based detection of
attacks to behavioral detection
4. Test and evaluation infrastructures at various classification
levels (e.g. digital sandboxes)
5. Other research priorities
6. Workforce issues
7. Coordination across the community

More can be said about these topics in a closed session.
1. Mechanisms to rapidly develop, test, and field innovative
approaches to address the expanding threat spectrum: This issue is
particularly relevant in the cyber domain, given the rate of change of
both technology and threats. Historically, national security technology
has evolved on the time scales of years. In the cyber realm, new
exploits can render defenses that seemed effective obsolete in a matter
of seconds. Given the speed with which cyber capabilities can be
created and the relatively low cost for entry, the potential for
possibly far-reaching technological surprise is very high.
Technology innovation has two key components: creation and
adoption. One can support technology creation by providing consistent
funding to create and maintain effective facilities and to attract
properly trained researchers who are immersed in the problems of the
day. Positive and open competition can be a powerful incentive to
operate efficiently. I spent more than a decade of my career in the
NNSA Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program. Its goals were
clear and technically compelling, we had challenging milestones, and
funding was relatively stable. Because of those government investments,
today we certify the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile without the need for
underground testing. Overall, the ASC program should be considered both
an enormous technical success and a government success for a critical
national security problem.
Creating a new technology and getting it adopted are two different
tasks. There are significant barriers that prevent technology adoption
including expediency, cultural inertia, and investments in legacy
technologies. The business case for investing in new security
technologies is often not clear, reinforcing the need for better
metrics, risk assessment, and cost analysis.
Technology adoption can be accelerated by ensuring that researchers
are partnered with users who understand operational needs and with
vendors who can rapidly commercialize promising technology. Integrating
and funding operational pilots as part of R&D programs can also improve
the likelihood and pace of adoption. Results obtained from lab
experiments are typically not enough to convince operators to deploy
new technology. They need to see results in real world environments.
2. Research on network security versus data encryption: Encryption
and network securities are complementary topics and should not be
viewed as competing alternatives. Data encryption raises the bar for an
adversary, but it is wrong to believe that encrypting all network
traffic and all data at rest is sufficient to provide adequate security
if you cannot also keep an enemy out of your networks. Again, there is
no silver bullet. Our goal should be to raise the cost of successful
attacks. Better network security and careful use of high quality
encryption both raise adversary costs.
Cryptography is a based on well-understood mathematics. Time-tested
algorithms and protocols exist. We can estimate how much work is
required to break a given encryption scheme. Techniques exist for
analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols. However,
cryptography is quite subtle and it is easy to make mistakes especially
in implementation. The early implementers of wireless communication
protocols, who were all skilled engineers made numerous cryptographic
errors. As technology evolves, effort is required to adapt the large
body of cryptographic knowledge to the new technology. The adaptation
is often straightforward and more of an engineering exercise than a
basic research task.
Other aspects of network security are much less mature. For
example, network filtering is often driven more by existing network
protocols and recent exploitations than a coherent protection
philosophy. Most networks use Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) and thus base protection on filtering of TCP/IP
packets, so filtering is limited to attributes visible in TCP/IP. Since
TCP/IP has no notion of user identity, even a simple policy like ``only
administrators can configure the domain controller'' requires multiple
security mechanisms. A network filtering policy may ensure that only
certain ports are open and that only certain types of packets can be
sent to those ports. A host-based policy then ensures that only
administrators have access to powerful configuration features.
Verifying that this collection of policies properly enforces the
desired abstract policy is difficult.
3. Research on the transition from signature-based detection of
attacks to behavioral detection: Computer attacks have historically
been detected using either signature-or anomaly-based methods. Anomaly-
based techniques look for statistically significant deviations from
normal activity. Because of the challenges in characterizing an
accurate baseline of normal activity, anomaly-based detection systems
to date have had limited utility. Signature-based methods, in contrast,
compare network and file data against a database of known attack
signatures to detect attempted intrusions and malware. Signature-based
methods are incapable of detecting new attacks. Polymorphic malware
that can change its structure while retaining the same functionality is
mostly immune to signature-based techniques.
More recently, a new class of anomaly detection methods have been
developed that are based on aggregating events across time and multiple
sources to identify network--or host-based behaviors that might be
malicious. These behavior-based methods are not as brittle as
signature-based techniques because they can detect new, as well as
known, variations within a general class of attacks. Behavioral methods
have been successful in finding previously undiscovered malware.
However, most behavior-based detection tools are not real-time
detectors. They require the development of robust classifiers that
describe patterns of anomalous events representing potential misuse,
ranging from low-level events such as the opening of a network
connection to excessive Facebook use or watching World Cup soccer.
Using these classifiers, behavior-based techniques typically find
anomalies after the fact in batch-processed data. Anomalies are then
ranked so that a human analyst can focus on the most significant
problems. However, when an anomaly is determined to be part of a larger
infection, these behavioral techniques produce important and unique
signatures, which can then be used to stop infections in real time.
More can be said about the current state of the art techniques in a
closed session.
Current behavioral-based detection systems, however, are prone to
high false positive rates. They require the supervision of skilled
analysts to monitor and investigate alerts and to develop and adjust
classifiers. The demand for skilled analysts far exceeds supply.
Furthermore, difficult tasks can sometimes overwhelm even the best
analysts. Depending on the time scale and complexity of the pattern of
behavior associated with a particular type of malicious activity,
behavioral techniques can also fail to detect an attack before an
adversary has caused damage. Behavioral detection offers promise and
will improve, but does not represent a panacea today.
An often overlooked component of cyber security is that anyone can
obtain virtually any security product on the market. The fact that our
adversaries can use their knowledge of common security tools to predict
the barriers they might face during an attack suggests two requirements
for network--and host-based intrusion detection systems: (1) signature-
based products should provide an open interface by which we can develop
and deploy proprietary signatures and scripts; (2) behavior-based tools
that allow us to detect new attacks must be introduced to complement
our signature-based methods. As behavioral-based detection systems
improve, we anticipate a crossover where behavioral-based tools will
become predominant and will be supplemented by signature-based methods.
4. Test and evaluation infrastructures at various classification
levels (e.g. digital sandboxes): Experimentation plays a central role
in science and engineering as a rigorous means of testing hypotheses
and potential solutions. The cyber research and operational communities
recognize the necessity of more realistic test and evaluation
infrastructures, or test beds, to advance computer security research
and conduct cyber planning, training, and exercises. Significant
foundational work has been done through private-sector and government
funded efforts, including the development of hardware and operating
system emulation and virtualization tools, network traffic generators
and test bed management systems, and actual cyber test beds of varying
size, realism, and classification levels. Examples include DOD
Information Operations (IO) Range, and the National Cyber Range.
However, cyberspace is a highly complex, manmade environment of
vast scale and heterogeneity and presents unique and daunting
experimental challenges that we have not yet been able to adequately
represent in test facilities. Our current capabilities fall short in
fidelity and in scaling up to regional and Internet-sized networks.
Additionally, while our adversaries use the Internet as their cyber
test bed, it is not responsible for the United States to do the same
because of possible, unintended side effects.
Sandia, in partnership with a number of government agencies and
national laboratories, conducts significant research in cyber and
cyber/physical test and evaluation technologies, including contributing
roles in the IO Range, National Cyber Range, and DOE National
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Test Bed. These
activities build upon our longstanding investments and capabilities in
high-performance computing and in modeling and simulation of physical
and cyber systems. We and others have developed techniques and tools to
conduct so-called live-virtual-constructive experiments that integrate
real people and computer systems with simulated computer systems and
modeled human behavior to evaluate consequences and mitigation
strategies for realistic cyber scenarios like a cyber-attack on
critical infrastructure.
Significant challenges remain, however, to realize the high-
fidelity experiments required to support scientifically rigorous
testing and evaluation of cyber solutions and scenarios. Cyber testing
and evaluation can be broken down into four distinct experimental
phases: design, configuration, execution, and result analysis. Research
and development gaps remain in all four phases.
Cyber experiment design presents specific challenges stemming, in
part, from the limited scientific foundation in cyber. In other
disciplines, well-developed approaches like wind tunnel testing and
scientific laws like those governing fluid dynamics can be brought to
bear to design an effective experiment. By contrast, we struggle today
to design good cyber experiments that are controlled and repeatable.
The complexity from integrated circuits to Internet scale networks and
the adversarial nature of cyberspace, make it difficult to design a
complete, valid and meaningful experiment to study cyber phenomena of
interest, such as the propagation of a botnet, or evaluate a prototype
security technology. Additional work is needed to develop and
promulgate a scientifically rigorous approach to designing cyber
experiments and exercises.
There has been considerable progress in the last few years with
tools and technologies for configuring and executing cyber experiments,
but major gaps remain in these areas too. Although several test bed
configuration tools now exist to specify and automatically configure
elements like computer systems, and network topology, required for
small experiments, large and complex experiments require time-consuming
hand configuration and tuning of test bed elements. Configuration and
execution of high fidelity, regional and Internet-scale experiments
still pose many research challenges. In some cases it is unclear what
scale and fidelity are even needed to answer important questions.
Running realistically scaled experiments poses challenges of its
own. Sandia recently demonstrated what we believe to be state-of-the-
art scale by booting 4.5 million virtual computer nodes. These nodes
were light-weight virtual machines, meaning they exhibit some, but not
all, of the complex behavior of a typical desktop computer. However, at
this scale one is getting close to representing the Internet resources
of a small country. Current test beds also have overly simplistic human
behavior modeling elements, and thus fail to adequately represent user
frailties, like susceptibility to spear phishing--an e-mail spoofing
fraud attempt that targets a specific organization, seeking
unauthorized access to confidential data or the perverse creativity of
adversaries.
The challenge of gathering and analyzing test results is also only
partially solved. Fine-grained instrumentation is lacking from most
existing test beds, as are tools for efficiently distilling and
extracting pertinent results from the vast volumes of data that can be
generated by large tests and exercises. Lastly, future test beds will
need to be integrated in a much larger percentage of wireless
components.
Advancing the state of the art in cyber test and evaluation will
require major research and infrastructure investments. The government
has already made large investments in this area through several
standalone programs such as National Cyber Range. However, we see a
need for a new strategy that coordinates future investments across the
government in a way that maximizes technological advancements and
ensures test bed access for academia, government, private-sector, and
military users, while respecting agency--and program-specific test bed
capability and classification requirements.
5. Other research priorities: We must devote additional attention
to developing and implementing strategies for assuring the safety of
the Nation's most critical national security systems. These systems are
particularly challenging to defend because of the full-spectrum attacks
that a nation state or other highly capable threat actor is likely to
employ.
The information technology supply chain is a particularly insidious
risk to high-consequence national security systems, because of our
widespread reliance on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and
software technology that is increasingly produced in whole or in part
by untrusted, non-U.S. organizations. Unfortunately, the growing
complexity of these systems also makes it economically infeasible to
verify them thoroughly.
Insufficient attention has been given to technical approaches for
mitigating supply chain risks. Counterfeiting and subversion of
critical components in high-consequence DOD systems could have a
devastating effect on our ability to project military power with
confidence around the world. Better methodologies and technologies are
needed for assessing and managing supply chain risks.
IT system trust must ultimately be rooted in hardware. Additional
research is needed to enable scalable, cost-effective hardware
integrity evaluation to verify that no malicious features have been
added and that security features have not been weakened. We must be
able to positively identify and track components throughout their
complete lifecycle. We need to discover how to compose higher assurance
systems from largely untrusted COTS components and a small set of
simple trusted components.
To tip the balance in favor of defenders, we must create and deploy
technologies and policies that decrease benefits and impose costs on
attackers. Attackers are able to leverage the complexity of modern
hardware and software systems to find and exploit a seemingly endless
stream of vulnerabilities. These attacks scale globally to provide
disproportionate benefit to attackers as a result of the relatively
homogenous computing base that exists in most enterprise environments
throughout the world. Although various secure design approaches, such
as formal verification, offer promise, they do not currently scale to
the size and complexity of COTS systems. In the near-term it is
unlikely that COTS systems will be drastically simplified to facilitate
formal methods-based, high-assurance development. Alternatively,
approaches that introduce manageable and cost-effective diversity
within hosts and across an enterprise could dramatically reduce the
utility of many attacks and sharply raise development costs for
attackers, forcing adversaries to have to discover and exploit multiple
vulnerabilities simultaneously to mount a successful attack.
6. Workforce issues: Confronting the challenges I have outlined
today requires a highly skilled and motivated research community. It is
well documented that the demand for cyber expertise greatly exceeds the
supply.^1,2 Over the past 3 years, Sandia has been able to
attract and hire top United States citizen undergraduate talent by
paying for their master's degree at the school of their choice and
supporting them with 75 percent of their salary while they attend
school full time. Upon returning to Sandia, they owe us 2 years without
penalty. This has been a very successful recruiting program but
retention results won't be available for a few more years. Doctoral and
experienced cyber hires are more difficult, even with market-based
salary offers, because of intense competition for their knowledge and
skills. However, we have been successful in attracting a few high-
quality PhD researchers through a new competitive early-career research
program that provides selected PhD hires with 2 years of internal
funding for independent research.
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\1\ http://www.cioinsight.com/c/a/Trends/Damn-the-Economy-IT-
Employment-Rises-to-New-Heights/
\2\ Langevin Assesses State of Cyber Workforce, http://
langevin.house.gov/news/press-releases/2011/10/langevin-assesses-state-
of-cyber-workforce.shtml
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Retention is a growing concern. Although the importance of the
national security mission and job stability remain highly attractive
features to our employees, new hires today receive benefits similar to
those found in U.S. industry. Over time, therefore, we may see the
retention rate for computer science professional's approach that of
industry, which retains such staff for approximately 5 years. This
could become a significant issue because it takes 3 to 5 years of
mentoring for a recent graduate to become highly skilled in supporting
cyber research for the U.S. Government.
Historically, the laboratories are asked to solve the
``impossible'' problems. Congress should consider the implications of
not having the best and brightest U.S. cleared and experienced staff
available to tackle the Nation's most challenging security needs.
Presently, many of Sandia's cyber staff are being solicited by private
companies offering more than 50 percent increases in salary and better
benefits. Historically, we have lost less than a percent of our cyber
workforce to outside employment; however, we are currently on a path to
lose 10 percent this fiscal year.
Outside of the labs' recruitment and retention challenges, there
are additional areas that deserve attention. Academic programs for
computer security specializations need improvement. Curricula vary from
one university to another and few programs produce graduates who have
both the required deep knowledge of computer hardware and systems
combined with practical security understanding and skills. The
Scholarship For Service (SFS) program has helped produce more qualified
graduates, but in my opinion could be enhanced to attract the Nation's
best students who are in turn intentionally cultivated for government
service through improved curricula and hands-on training programs.
Government labs and agencies participate today by providing SFS
students with internships and hiring SFS graduates, but we could also
partner with SFS-funded universities to help develop appropriate
curricula, training toolkits, and exercises.
Beyond SFS, the labs can serve a broader role as a training ground
for the Nation's next generation of security researchers and
operational defenders. For the past 10 years Sandia has run an
innovative hands-on computer security internship program for
undergraduate and graduate students called the Center for Cyber
Defenders (CCD). Drawing summer projects from our customer-funded
security R&D programs provides students with an opportunity to work on
real security problems and experience the satisfaction of contributing
directly to national security. For the first time this year, thanks to
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) S&T support, we will be piloting
a secure systems research challenge for CCD students that we hope can
be extended to include other labs. In general, we believe student
competitions are an important and still underutilized mechanism to
attract, engage, and accelerate the development of cyber professionals.
Professional education and training is another challenge. Knowledge
in cyber disciplines constantly evolves, often in obscure corners of
the Internet. Continuous learning and skills refreshing are required to
maintain a world-class R&D and operational cyber workforce. We and
others have done some preliminary work on competency-based training and
other professional development activities such as rotational
assignments between research and mission-focused roles, but this area
requires additional attention, especially in light of the magnitude of
the government's cyber workforce needs and the retention issues
mentioned previously.
7. Current coordination across the community: From a laboratory R&D
perspective, coordination is good. For example, DOD T&E reaches out to
the labs that have specific skills and the labs coordinate well with
each other in assessing and improving DOD IT systems. Coordination is
similarly close with other government agencies including people working
together at each other's sites and through quarterly reviews.
From an operational perspective, coordination within the Federal
Government is improving. U.S.-CERT has created capable collaboration
facilities within their secure web site. In our opinion there is still
too much focus on security compliance. Compliance-based security is not
effective. When coupled with excessive oversight, a compliance focus
results in brittle and unresponsive security systems. Today, victims
are often punished for the actions of adversaries.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To tip the balance in favor of defenders, approaches and
technologies must be developed and deployed that decrease benefits and
impose costs (or risk) to attackers. Attackers are able to leverage the
complexity of modern hardware and software systems at the component
level to find and exploit a seemingly endless stream of
vulnerabilities. These attacks scale globally to provide
disproportionate benefit to attackers as a result of the relatively
homogenous computing base that exists in most enterprise environments
throughout the world. However, the cost equation to the adversary can
be changed. Cyber defensive technology has been shown to accelerate
when long-term stable funding is in place, technical collaboration
among research organizations involves ``prisoner exchanges,'' test
facilities are prepositioned and analysis/operators are an integral
part of the team. As one example, behavioral-based detection systems
are having significant success and as they improve, eventually we
anticipate a crossover where behavioral-based tools will become
predominant and supplemented by signature-based methods.
Two areas within the scope of this committee's questions need to be
addressed: (1) the test environments available to the research
community; and (2) the retention of the government's cyber research
community, which includes the national laboratories. To continue the
acceleration of government-developed and-owned cyber defense
technologies, testing and emulation environments of various
combinations of scale, fidelity, and heterogeneous representations of
regional and Internet-sized networks are needed to address multiple
national security missions. With their deep reservoir of technical
talent and science and technology capabilities, the DOE national
laboratory complex has helped address some of the government's most
challenging national security problems, including cyber. However,
unlike the Cold War where the government used work environment,
benefits and mission to attract and retain top scientists to government
agencies and national labs, only a small fraction of those retention
tools exist for the cyber war and the implications should be of great
concern.

Senator Hagan. Thank you. Thank you all for your opening
testimony. Now we will go to the questions. I will ask that we
will have 6 minutes each, and then if nobody else comes in you
can certainly go longer.
DOD is facing challenges seeking new graduates with
advanced degrees, and I think each one of you mentioned that in
your opening testimony, specifically in scientific and
technical fields to help develop complex military systems. The
field of cybersecurity is a key example where there is a rising
demand, as you just mentioned specifically in the private
sector. Yet, I think we all know it appears that the supply
side is not keeping pace.
Secretary Lemnios, as the key person in DOD responsible for
our STEM education and outreach activities, how are you
ensuring that DOD is able to recruit and retain the best and
brightest in cybersecurity research? How are you monitoring the
quality of DOD's cybersecurity research workforce? Then the
final part of this question is, how much is a highly
experienced, trained cybersecurity researcher paid within DOD?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator Hagan, I think through testimony and
through our written material, I think we've all recognized that
the workforce, the talent, is central to this entire
discussion. As such, we have been shaping our STEM programs to
include cyber as one of the disciplines that we're focused on.
Our Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation
(SMART) program, our scholarship program which provides a year
of scholarship for each year of service in one of our
laboratories, is one example of many. In my written testimony,
I gave several of these.
This summer we will have roughly 600 students from that
program entering DOD's laboratory infrastructure, and of those
a significant number of them are in the cyber or related
technology areas. I view that as one of a number of ways to
attract young talent to pursue their work and to understand
where their work will actually make a difference for DOD.
The challenge beyond that, though, is to track those
students long-term in competition with industry, in competition
with other pay grades and other environments. I think you do
that by, first of all, engaging those students in first-rate
work--and you've heard from Dr. Wertheimer about the NSA piece
of it. The same could be said with regard to the environment at
Sandia.
I think you also engage those students in an environment
where they can actually learn, where they are contributing and
they have a mentor side-by-side that helps them increase their
skillcraft and increase their game, and certainly putting
students and those groups on a project that has national
significance, and we're doing that through the SMART program
and other programs.
Senator Hagan. How about salaries?
Mr. Lemnios. I'm sorry?
Senator Hagan. How about actual salaries?
Mr. Lemnios. I don't have the salary numbers. I'd defer to
others that might have that, and we can certainly take that
question for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

As I stated during the hearing, I would defer to the other
witnesses to discuss salary numbers.

Senator Hagan. DARPA has taken some interesting approaches
to hiring personnel from nontraditional areas, such as the
hacking community, where these individuals might not have a
doctorate in a traditional academic field. I don't know if they
have a master's or a college degree. But what lessons has DARPA
learned by tapping into this talent pool that may have
applicability across the broader DOD spectrum? Then, what does
DARPA have as far as the necessary mechanisms to rapidly hire
talented cybersecurity researchers? Then how much are they
paid?
Dr. Gabriel. Three questions.
Senator Hagan. The hacking community.
Dr. Gabriel. The white hat hacker community, I think, has
been instrumental in us beginning to understand the nature, the
challenges and opportunities in cybersecurity, both defensively
and offensively. In particular, I point to the Cyber Fast Track
program, which, I think, we described to you briefly.
It was with the insight that we gained from recruiting from
that community program managers that we understood that the
connectivity to that community was very poor, not only for
DARPA but the Federal Government overall. The timeframe of
contracts, the other things that typically go into reaching out
to the research community from our perspective, was not well-
matched to the pace of business that they did.
Through the Cyber Fast Track program, which we launched
last August, we have had 135 proposals, submissions, over that
8-month period, 87 percent of them from innovative,
nontraditional performers who have never done work for the
government before. That was through a contracting mechanism
that matched the speed and the period of performance.
Just to give you an example, 36 contractors were awarded.
The average period of performance is 5 months. So if we don't
have contracting procedures that are much shorter than that
period of time, it makes no sense to take 9 months contracting
if they're only going to do 5 months of work. So the average
time from submission to award has been 8 days, and we view that
as a very vital part of getting the freshness, the innovation,
and the perspective coming from that community.
Our program managers, you asked what are the mechanisms we
have to hire them. Ma'am, we have a culture where we
essentially refresh essentially every 3 to 5 years. Program
managers come to DARPA 3 to 5 years. They come to do their work
and they leave, and that's true from program managers to office
directors to the deputy director to the director, as you
pointed out earlier.
That is the pace at which we believe you need to bring in
the talent, to bring in the perspective and the sense of
urgency.
We are paid just like any other civil service scales and
other hiring authorities in DOD.
Senator Hagan. Since I said we would limit it to 6 minutes,
I'll hold the next two questions for the other two until it
comes back to me. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
Thanks for that response. I'd like to back up a little bit
and talk about the budget. As I indicated in my opening and you
have identified, there are areas where we're increasing
spending. DOD's budget is one. Homeland Security is another.
Despite this, Secretary Carter has said recently, Mr.
Secretary, that we're not spending as much as we need to. He's
also said we'd spend a lot more if we could figure out where to
spend it.
So I have two questions for you, and others feel free to
chime in. One is, in terms of the budget levels, and as a
former Office of Management and Budget Director, I know your
answer is always going to be we could spend more. But honestly,
are we spending enough? Then the second question, you can think
about it, would really be to Dr. Gabriel's intriguing
testimony, which is, we're spending more and yet there are more
attacks; is that because there are just such an increase in
attacks that the more spending and the more we throw against
it, although we're having some impact, it's still resulting in
a net increase in attacks? Or is it because we're not spending
the money wisely?
So if you could start with the first question, Secretary
Lemnios, and then if others could chime in with regard to both
of those questions.
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, the question of DOD's funding level
is something that we took head-on early last year. I was
interested in actually two questions. First is what should
DOD's funding level be for S&T, 6-1 through 6-3, but also what
should the content of that spend be?
It goes to your point: Are we funding-limited or idea-
limited in some of these issues? We tried to parse that. We did
it the following way. I spent between August 15 and essentially
the end of October last year going through every project in
DOD. I went through 270 program elements. I visited each of our
laboratories. I visited DARPA, the Services. I got a look at
the project spend in dollars and content, what were the ideas
that were being funded.
We rolled that up to compare it against the strategic
guidance that was being developed at the time to try to
understand where were the gaps in ideas, where were those areas
that if we had a little bit more money they were ideas that
were ready to be harvested vice if we have more money we'll
just kind of peanut butter it to the right. I wasn't interested
in the peanut butter cut. I was looking at strategic
investments.
As a result, the President's budget request that's on the
Hill now includes in it increases in targeted areas where we
identified ideas and we identified concepts that would be ready
for funding, that would be responsive to the strategic guidance
of DOD.
Within that, one example, we looked at a new concept at the
convergence of cyber and electronic warfare. We can talk about
it in detail in closed session, but it was an area that it was
clear to us was going to come about and we had good ideas that
we could harvest in that particular area and get well ahead of
a threat.
We also plussed up work in manufacturing and some other
areas, and we identified those concepts. We took funding out of
some topics that we identified were either mature enough or
weren't leading to a program of record that would be of
critical importance for DOD. So we actually made those trades,
and the trades were not in budget ceiling; the trades were
informed by what are the ideas that we thought we could
address. As you can imagine, that was a spirited discussion.
But at the end of the day we put in the budget request those
ideas that we thought would make that trade for us.
As far as network attacks, the question is at what point do
we make investments in cyber network defense to the point we
can curb network attacks? The way we're looking at that--and I
think Dr. Gabriel has done some groundbreaking work in that
area--is to identify where do we start changing the calculus
for the work factor that an attacker presents as a function of
how much work we have to put in to defending that attack. So
we're trying to measure that, that calculus, and put concepts
in place that in fact are non-convergent. They don't track with
the work level of an attacker, but they actually fundamentally
change the game. We have some concepts again we can talk about
in closed session that address that.
But the fundamental issue is identifying those areas that
were funding-limited and those areas that were idea-limited,
and I think we balanced that in the budget submittal that's on
the Hill.
Senator Portman. You covered most of those ideas? You feel
these requests are adequate to cover most of them?
Mr. Lemnios. I think there were some others that we'd like
to go back and take a look at, and we'll be reviewing those
over time. But I think we put in place a balanced portfolio
that covers some real long shots and some things that we can,
in fact, make clarity on over the next year or so.
Senator Portman. Dr. Gabriel, could you follow up on that,
again in reference to your comment that we are, as I wrote
here, capability limited on defense and offense, and that you
see more funding and yet more attacks?
Dr. Gabriel. Thank you, sir. I would specifically like to
address the comment you made. I don't believe it's that we're
doing wrong things. It's just the nature of playing defense in
cyber that it's hard, and the analogy that we've used in the
buying tactical breathing room, it's much like treading water.
If you find yourself in the middle of the ocean, treading water
is a good thing. You need to tread water to stay above, keep
your head above water. But if that's the only strategy you have
for getting out of the predicament, you will eventually get
tired and become overwhelmed.
That's what we mean by taking advantage of the tactical
breathing room, some of the work that we're doing today to
protect us, the patching and the consistency of defensive
measures. But if that's all we do, it is not convergent with
the evolving and growing threat.
So we have articulated and begun to make and shifted
investments over the last 2 years to make sure we're looking,
not only at things that buy us tactical breathing room, but to
actually look at aggressive programs that seek to become
convergent with the threat, to change the game, so it's not the
way it is difficult to play defense, and make it difficult, to
change those asymmetries, to change the cost calculus for what
it means to have an attack on a cyber system.
Likewise, I would say we'd be happy to get into some of the
specifics of how we believe we can do that, given some of the
investments we're making.
Senator Portman. My time has expired, but I would just say
that----
Senator Hagan. You can take some more time.
Senator Portman. Okay, I'll just take a couple minutes if
that's okay and turn it to you.
Dr. Wertheimer mentioned earlier the fact that he's
concerned that some of the spending is too short term. I don't
mean to paraphrase you, but are you referring in part to the
tactical breathing room approach? In other words, are you
concerned that we're not looking long enough term? Or is it
more that we are focused more on just retaining our current
position rather than, as Dr. Gabriel indicated, looking at how
to deal with some of these asymmetrical threats and being more
creative?
What's your take on it?
Dr. Wertheimer. Senator, at the risk of pushing March
Madness too far, we have to deploy a division 1 team because
the adversaries are division 1 in most cases that DOD sees.
Google any of the headlines you've read, their first
inclination was to attribute this to a nation-state adversary,
one which in some sense they felt or implied that they couldn't
be held accountable for defending against that.
It is my belief that we are rushing to this threat numbers,
lots of attacks, and we're trying to deploy tools and
techniques to slow that, and in my view, we're not keeping
enough of a strategic eye on that nation-state threat, that
division 1 that's going to come at us and adapt to most of the
kinds of tools and techniques that you're going to need to stop
your routine--and routine doesn't mean it isn't important and
it isn't scary--botnets and other large efforts.
Senator Portman. Is it your sense that the numbers that are
being requested would be adequate for us to think more
strategically, so in other words, it's not so much a question
of budgets as it is a function of approach?
Dr. Wertheimer. I agree exactly with that statement.
Senator Portman. With regard to NSA, you also talked about
what I mentioned in my opening about the production of computer
scientists being on the decline. You said you had some
information about that. We don't need it all today, but if you
could provide that to the committee that would be very helpful,
because, as we have discussed in previous hearings, there are
various approaches and some involve more direct government
action. Secretary Lemnios talked about some interesting ways in
which you're encouraging more young people to get into the STEM
disciplines and providing them an opportunity along the way.
There was discussion about whether it's advanced degrees
that are needed or whether it may be something more
fundamental, just to attract people into the field and then
maybe help them to subsidize their advanced degrees.
Just what are your thoughts as to how to deal with what you
identified as a major problem, which is a talent shortage?
Dr. Wertheimer. I agree that the seeding of more talent
must occur. We have charts and I will share them with the
committee gladly. Today, if you look at the number of PhDs in
2010, that was 1,500 PhDs. 720 were U.S. citizens or U.S.
persons. 64 in total came to work for any form of government.
We are not competitive salary-wise. We tend to hire PhD
computer scientists at grade 12, step 7, which is about
$90,000. The middle 50 percent of offers run $75,000 to
$124,000 in the private sector. They come in at a 12, step 7,
and they hit a pay freeze. The average increase in salary for a
computer scientist in industry is 4 percent a year. We hit them
with a pay freeze.
They come in as a 12, step 7, and they hit the pay caps
that we have imposed upon us by DOD and particularly the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issued a memo on the
conversion to Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System
(DCIPS), the pay banding that never happened, and it limits us
to how many 13s, 14s, and 15s we may have as an agency.
The average time in grade if it was just fair-shared is 12
years to your first promotion, 12 years to your second
promotion. You can't walk in and tell them you're going to wait
6 years if you're good, 12 years if you're average.
Just to give you another number--as a mathematician, I
can't control myself--if you look at attrition across NSA, 44
percent of the people who attrite are resigning as opposed to
retiring. In computer science it's 70 percent.
Senator Portman. So you've identified--and I'll turn it
back to the chair after I ask this last question. You've
identified an obvious problem. Looking at Dr. Peery's testimony
here, to bring him into it, he's talked about the DOE labs and
all the cyber talent that's there. You talked about the
retention issue. You said 5 years on average is not enough time
to be able to plan and to be able to develop the kind of, I
assume, both offensive and defensive capabilities that are
needed.
What are some of your solutions? What would you do to try
to both attract and retain? One would obviously be salary from
what you said. If there are only 64 going into government, that
may, in part, be because that range of $75,000 to $100,000
versus $60,000 is a disincentive coming out of school with a
bunch of loans.
So I assume you would agree with that. You talked about pay
bands and you talked about--and we've done this in other
agencies and departments and do it to a certain extent in your
agencies, I know we do at DOD. But what are some other ideas
that you would have for this subcommittee as to how to attract
and retain?
Dr. Wertheimer. The first thing I would like to recommend
is across the government in particular a STEM waiver for pay
limitation. That is, I'd like to be able to promote to 13, 14,
15 based on merit if they're in a STEM field, especially if
they're in an advanced STEM field. I think that would be a
simple and exciting solution, to know that the government makes
an exception for STEM and that there isn't a career ceiling.
We are expanding--we put out a 3-year postdoc program at
NSA precisely to attract new folks. Three years. We had 140
applications before we even advertised. This is something, they
only are allowing me to get three. I'm only allowed to have
three because it's a prototype, something we haven't done
before.
I would like a great deal more of a sense of Congress and
others that we can experiment in the STEM fields in
nontraditional ways. Give us some more latitude to bring them
in for 3 years at a time, again promotions, pay. They love the
work. The data we showed them, the challenges they have, they
absolutely adored it. Every one of them says to me on an exit
interview: It's less about the money; it's the sense that I
cannot advance in my organization; I simply cannot advance.
Senator Portman. I'll turn it back to the chair, but maybe
we could continue this conversation at least in a submission to
the committee that would be helpful. It does sound like it's a
matter of pay, but also because it is exciting work and some
people are willing to take lower pay to do it and for their
sense of service and certainly the national security area, but
they also want the ability to be recognized and promoted
through merit.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I think when we're talking about this, too, and we're
talking about national security, we're talking about the new
threat of cybersecurity as the next terrorist activity, that it
really concerns me that we're limited in pay scales, promotion
scales, because when I look at what the alternative is, the
private sector that is also desperately trying to attract the
same talent, I think it is an issue of national security that
we do need to address.
Dr. Wertheimer, you answered some of the questions that I
was going to raise for you. But when you specifically mentioned
the point about personnel policies that are not conducive to
hiring and retaining the best and brightest cybersecurity
researchers, I was wondering if you could elaborate, or
Secretary Lemnios, on what we need to do to change that? Mr.
Secretary?
Mr. Lemnios. Sure. Let me try to recenter some things and
add a little bit of sunshine to something that is a very
difficult problem, and that is how do we attract talent for new
areas. While NSA has a remarkably talented research laboratory
second to none--and Mike and I have spent a lot of time there
and I love spending a day there or longer--the bet that we're
making in DOD is that it has to be a balance between what we
have in terms of internal resources, those concepts that we see
from industry, from academia, and from our government
laboratories. So when I look to drive early stage innovation,
some of that will come through our laboratories, some of that
will come through captive laboratories, but we're really trying
to make a bet with how we can increase the pace of innovation
and drive technical concepts through the small business
community, through the rapid innovation fund, through other
channels, through contract R&D agreements that couple our
laboratories with early stage developers. The DARPA experiment
of nontraditionals is absolutely superb.
Much of that we can do with our existing authorities. As
one example, we spoke last week about the Rapid Innovation
Fund. We received 3,500 proposals from the small business
community in that area in a fairly short-notice set of broad
agency announcements. Some of those, in fact, were targeted to
address cybersecurity concerns, wireless security concerns.
We're going through that source selection now. But it seems
to me that that's an environment that taps a community that
wasn't engaged in this discussion earlier, and it's one that, I
think, we'll see lots of good ideas from with enormous
leverage.
So when I think about our investments in STEM, absolutely
we need to strengthen DOD's position in our laboratories and in
the core workforce of the government. But I'm also looking at
how do we strengthen the skillcraft and the game of industry
and of academia as we move into these new fields. I think we've
started along that path.
Senator Hagan. But, Mr. Secretary, how can we change the
policies as far as the freeze on pay and the freeze on
advancement? I think if you've been told--is it 12 years, 6
years, 12 years? I think we'll be losing those people to be
contract employees.
Mr. Lemnios. I don't have a comment on that. I just don't
have a suggestion at this point.
Senator Hagan. Dr. Peery, if you could just comment on
hiring and retaining? You mentioned it in your opening
statement, but how much is a highly experienced, trained person
at Sandia paid?
Dr. Peery. I probably don't have exactly the numbers that
you need, but we could get that to you. What I will say is that
we're able from an initial offering to compete with U.S.
industry for starting salaries, and I can give you those
numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]

As of 4/6, the average research and development family Principal
Member of the Technical Staff (PMTS) titled Research and Development
Scientist & Engineer, Computer Systems. PMTS is $125,892.
The job description of individuals that fit under the PMTS umbrella
is as follows: applies integrated technical judgment--which requires
using the scientific method to recognize and formulate problems, to
collect data through observation and experimentation, and to formulate
and test hypotheses--to anticipate, innovate, and deliver solutions to
Sandia National Laboratories missions. Roots the work in the
fundamentals of science and engineering while applying a deep
understanding of engineering and scientific principles. Creates and
applies scientific theories and laws and engineering methods used
within scientific and engineering disciplines to develop or demonstrate
new designs, concepts, materials, machines, products, processes, or
systems. Uses physical and computational simulation, analysis, and
evaluation as inherent activities of development. Plans, conducts, and
manages Sandia's scientific programs from fundamental research through
development and demonstration.

Dr. Peery. Where we run into problems is, because we are
under a government-owned, contractor-operated model, the
government has a say in what kind of raises we can provide to
the workforce, and because of that we've seen significant
salary compression in this area over the last 5, maybe 10
years. Because of that, that's what's starting to drive people
out.
We're not quite in the same restrictions with regard to
promotions that Mike spoke about, but we do have somewhat of a
promotion policy. I'd hate to see us accelerate that just for
the sake of retaining people. It's really supposed to be
performance-based. But we don't have any artificial limits on
that.
Like I said, we are able to attract people to the
laboratory because of the very challenging work that we can
offer them in cyber, the fact that we have certain resources
that we can train them up and get them some really special
skills. Then if we can work on that work environment, I think
we could have a better retention policy. We're not within DOD.
We're within DOE. I think you probably heard of the latest
National Academies study on the work environment within the
NNSA laboratories, led by Dr. Shenk. That's pretty much a good
description of exactly what our workforce is seeing today.
Senator Hagan. It appears to me that DOE is paying
considerably more than DOD in hiring.
Dr. Peery. I think our initial salaries are considerably
more. Our initial salary for a computer scientist PhD is
$115,000. For a master's it's $95,000. Some of the enticements
we have been able to offer is we can give very top
undergraduate U.S. citizens, out of an undergraduate program
and after a year of service, send them to a school of their
choice to get their master's degree. In that program we provide
them 75 percent of their salary while they work on their
master's degree and then they owe us 2 years of service back.
Senator Hagan. So not only is DOD competing with the
private sector; they're also competing with our own DOE
laboratories. So I see a conflict here, obviously.
Dr. Gabriel?
Dr. Gabriel. I'd like to just make an observation, perhaps
from a different perspective. The shelf life of cyber
capabilities is short. I think we've all heard that, and we
understand that. We might even posit that the shelf life of
cyber skills is relatively short. So this might create
opportunities for us where there would be a core subset of
folks that we would want to retain, but in fact, perhaps that
we should just plan on building a model where there will be a
significant refresh of folks coming from the cyber community.
This is a community where the traditional metrics of a
master's degree or a PhD may not be as important. Half of our
so-called cyber punks, the group of about a half a dozen or
eight program managers at DARPA, don't have Ph.Ds. Their
skills, their capabilities, their insights, are coming from
their practice in the community. Frankly, it will have a shelf
life. They'll go through the 3 to 5 years and then they'll move
on and others will come in with a newer, different perspective.
I think that's an interesting thing about cyber. That's the
perspective, that it has such a fast refresh and a short shelf
life that we may have opportunities for a different model of
how we retain that capability.
Senator Hagan. That's a valid point, but I also think the
mentoring aspect in some of these other areas certainly plays a
role. You do need some time for that.
Let me move to another area, and that is the cyber ranges.
These are physical and virtual networks that can be used across
the spectrum for R&D to the test and evaluation of new
technologies, to providing the real-world environment for
training. I understand that DOD does not perhaps have a
complete inventory of all of the cyber ranges dispersed through
military commands and Services.
I'd like to ask all of you, what cyber ranges does your
agency use? Are they adequate and could they be improved?
Secretary Lemnios?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, the concepts that are being developed
in cyber are emerging, as are the testing and the way we
evaluate those concepts. DOD currently operates 60 ranges
total. We know where they are. We know what they're connected
to.
But some of these ranges, in fact, are operational. Some of
them are training. Some of them are actually system testbeds
for particular systems, they're targeted for a particular
system. We have, for example, a test environment for the Joint
Strike Fighter that's targeted exactly to support that one
system in all of its complexity. We have similar testbeds for
those as well. Sometimes those are called ranges as well.
Senator Hagan. Is that included in the 60?
Mr. Lemnios. It is.
There are roughly 11 or so ranges that are configurable in
some fashion to do network assessments. There are some ranges
that integrate classic network and radio frequency
capabilities. So it's a broad scope.
Last week, I had the opportunity to visit the DARPA cyber
range with two of the DARPA program managers--one of the DARPA
program managers and an office director. I had an opportunity
to spend a day down in Orlando looking at what's called the
National Cyber Range. What was interesting for me there was
really two points. The first is that that was the first
demonstration of how we could build a range that is separate
from the network, that could be isolated and cleansed once a
malicious attack is embedded in that environment.
It also had a very unique approach that allowed us to
compose testing in a very natural way. We could build a test
environment in software and actually run tests in parallel.
As I looked at that, the question was, well, how do we
translate the results of that. I think what that's telling us
is a way that we might think about operating some of our other
ranges, and we're certainly taking that lesson now.
So we're operating these as a way to validate new concepts,
and I think that work will certainly continue to be critically
important.
Senator Hagan. Dr. Gabriel?
Dr. Gabriel. So let me start by answering your question
about our performers in general use a variety of different test
ranges. But since Zack mentioned the National Cyber Range, I
think it's important to point out that the focus of the cyber
range was to develop the architecture and the tools that could
be demonstrated and used elsewhere, and we've just begun to do
that.
This last year of DARPA's involvement in the cyber range is
to take it through its operational test phase and sort of
shakeout. But already we have had the two key elements
demonstrated, which are multiple classification levels, so
everything from unclassified to Top Secret, as well as rapid
and cost-effective reconfiguration and cleanup.
We have had two operational tests, I think, since December.
We had one in December and one in January. Both of them have
shown the ability to take a system, configure it, do the test,
and then tear it down for the next one and completely clean it
from the previous one. We've taken that cleanup time from what
would normally take months to days, so increasing the pace at
which testing can be done as well as the range of
classifications that that testing can be handled at.
Senator Hagan. While we're on that subject, I understand we
spent about $140 million in preparing this range.
Dr. Gabriel. Over about 3 years, that's correct.
Senator Hagan. I wasn't quite sure how many years.
Dr. Gabriel. Yes.
Senator Hagan. That it is intended to transition in some
manner to CYBERCOM. Can you give me the status of that
transition plan, and have you received confirmation from
General Alexander about taking over that for CYBERCOM?
Dr. Gabriel. We've been working with CYBERCOM, and in
particular, Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., Deputy Commander for U.S.
Cyber Command. In fact, one of the two tests, operational tests
that we're talking about, was done by CYBERCOM. They were using
the test range. So we are continuing the discussions and we
believe that that will be our transition path.
Senator Hagan. Once again while we're on this, Dr.
Wertheimer, what are your thoughts on whether CYBERCOM will
become the day-to-day owner and operator of this range? Are the
resources adequate to continue maturing the range capabilities?
Dr. Wertheimer. I'm afraid, Senator, I have no knowledge.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, if I could just add one thing. I
think when we talk about continuing that range as an entity, I
view the real value of that range as the architecture that was
demonstrated and the software that's now been developed, for
which the government has intellectual property and can be--so
it's really the control and the design and simulation layer
that's been demonstrated on that range, that we can now apply
to other ranges.
Whether or not we use that cluster of processors and
memory, that's interesting, but the real nugget there is the
control architecture that's been demonstrated, how we can apply
that to DOD's ranges for reconfigurability, for multi-level
testing. We're going through that assessment now.
One path would be to, in fact, use the range that exists in
Orlando as one of DOD's ranges. Another path would be to say,
well, let's declare success on that, it was a DARPA project, it
demonstrated the intellectual property (IP); let's take that IP
and then apply it to other ranges that DOD operates globally.
We're looking at the trades between those two and I can see
value in each of those paths.
Senator Hagan. Evidently our first vote has started. Do you
want to take 5 more minutes?
Senator Portman. Yes. Let me just, if I could, follow up on
a couple of things that have been said. Great questions and I
appreciate the answers, and go back and ask a fundamental
question here in the open session about what are we able to do.
I thought it was interesting, Dr. Peery, in your comments
you twice said that you believe that we can dramatically change
the equation for our adversaries. What you meant by that was
the cost equation. In other words, we can do things to make it
more costly for them to hack into our systems or to attack
through cyber, maybe cyber and electronic warfare.
But you didn't say that we can stop them. In open session
here--maybe we can get into this more in closed session--what
do you think of that as a general matter? Is this a question of
making it more costly, and if that's the case do some of our
adversaries have resources to be able to circumvent whatever
defenses that we are putting in place if they have adequate
resources?
Dr. Peery. Let me just make a global statement that we are
in an environment of measures and countermeasures. It's no
different than electronic warfare. It's no different in some
cases than kinetic warfare. We will build capabilities, we are
building capabilities, that put the adversary at risk. In some
cases they're designed to put the adversary in a position where
they are more vulnerable, and protect our equities in large
areas.
But you also have an adversary, certainly nation-state
adversaries, that are doing the same thing. Then you have
another community that's doing the same thing for other
reasons. This is not an environment for which we can say there
are zero defenses and zero consequences. There's always going
to be a probability to detect, false alarm rate curve that we
have to think through. We always have to think through what's
the consequence of our action, what's the likely response, and
how do we define what that redline actually looks like. We can
talk more about that in closed session.
But it will be--it certainly is an environment where for
every concept that's deployed, a countermeasure is deployed by
an adversary. You see this in your private lives. We see this
in our private lives with nothing more than the firewalls, now
the embedded network systems that we all have on our private
systems. Those have matured over time.
For each of those maturations that have occurred,
additional levels of attack and sophistication have come into
play. Now it's no longer just your desktop system; it's now
your mobile system. Now the attacks aren't just spam attacks.
They are tailored to your actions. Dr. Wertheiemer and I have
talked a lot about this. It's very much an environment where we
have to continually up the game and get ahead of the threat.
The last thing I'd point to is we started in computer
network defense years ago with a perimeter defense strategy, a
firewall strategy. We then moved to an environment where we
have on the commercial side embedded agents that look at
network traffic. Eventually, we're moving to a point where no
longer will we be looking for particular attacks, but we will
be designing systems on the commercial side that actually morph
autonomically, actually change their features and change their
operating roles, to respond to threats before those threats
present themselves.
The private sector is working in that domain. Every one of
these is a plateau, but that doesn't actually end because you
have an adversary that's working to counter each of those.
Senator Portman. Speaking for Dr. Peery, who I'm going to
ask to speak for himself in a moment here, when he says we can
dramatically change the cost equation for our adversaries, I
perhaps misunderstood that to have it mean a cost in terms of a
budget and a commitment of resources to it. What you're
referring to, at least from what I infer from what Secretary
Lemnios is saying, is that the cost is sometimes the
countermeasure. In other words, that if someone or some nation-
state chooses to engage in this, there is a resource cost, but
there's also a potential cost to their security. Is that what
you were referring to?
Senator Hagan. Let me interrupt. I think we have about 4
minutes and then we'll need to adjourn and go to the closed
session after the vote.
Senator Portman. If you'd rather talk to this in closed
session or you feel you need to, I understand.
Dr. Peery. I think I can answer this fairly quickly. First,
it's not an ``or.'' It's both. It's both the countermeasures
and it's actually their cost of doing business. I think we have
the wrong mental model here. I don't think we would think that
we could keep spies out of our country. I think we have this
model for cyber that says we're going to develop a system where
we're not attacked.
I think we have to go to a model where we assume the
adversary is in our networks, it's on our machines, and we have
to operate anyway. We have to protect the data anyway. That's
where I think the research needs to be headed, is assuming
they're in our systems, because if they're not doing it by
coming through an Internet gateway then they're going to do it
through supply chain. There's where the costs increase
significantly.
Senator Portman. Thank you. A sobering end.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. For sure.
After the vote, we will resume in closed session in Room
SVC-217 in the Capitol Visitor Center. Thank you, and this
hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

CYBERSECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

1. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, the fiscal year 2013 President's
budget request includes a $3.4 billion investment in cyber activities.
It is not clear how much is devoted to science and technology (S&T). In
your written statement, you stated that $486 million is for S&T.
However, according to the Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information
Officer (CIO), S&T investments are only $246 million. What is the
actual S&T investment in fiscal year 2013?
Mr. Lemnios. The difference in the fiscal year 2013 cyber S&T
investment reported by the DOD CIO, who cited $246 million investment,
and my written testimony is a result of definition. The total cyber S&T
investment in fiscal year 2013 is $486 million. This figure includes
National Security Agency (NSA) applied research, which is binned in
Budget Activity (BA) 7. The $486 million figure, cited in my testimony,
included additional NSA efforts that are actually S&T.
The cybersecurity S&T investments reported by the DOD CIO only
included two Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) S&T
programs.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD
(Comptroller)) is currently working with the DOD CIO to better define
what investments should be included in DOD's figures for cybersecurity.

2. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, does this investment account for all
the Services' S&T, DARPA investments, and activities directly under the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E))?
Mr. Lemnios. Yes, this investment accounts for all the Services'
S&T, DARPA investments, and activities directly under the ASD(R&E), as
well as NSA's cyber research.

3. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, could you please provide a list of
all the cyber S&T-related programs that comprise the $486 million
investment figure for fiscal year 2013.
Mr. Lemnios. The actual fiscal year 2013 cybersecurity S&T
investment is $486 million; however, as detailed in question 1, this is
open to definition. This $469 million includes numerous individual
efforts. At the broad level, the investment includes the following
organizations and programs. Note that the Program Elements (PEs) may
also fund other research areas.

OASD(R&E) ($38.9 million): cyber applied research,
cyber advanced technology development (PEs 0602668D8Z and
0603668D8Z).
DARPA ($274.9 million): cyber sciences, cyber
technology, information assurance and survivability,
information integration systems, and secure information and
network systems (PEs 0601101E, 0602303E, and 0603760E).
U.S. Army ($32.0 million): cyber research in MURIs,
network technology security, and wireless information insurance
(PEs 0601102A, 0601103A, 0601104A, 0602270A, 0602783A, and
0603008A).
U.S. Navy ($23.2 million): cyber research in MURIs,
information assurance, and computer network defense (PEs
0601103N, 0601152N, 0601153N, 0602235N, and 0603235N).
U.S. Air Force ($59.1 million): Cyber research in
MURIs, assurance and trust worthiness in complex systems, and
global battlespace awareness (PEs 0601102F, 0601103F, 0602202F,
0602204F, 0602788F, 0603456F, and 0603788F).
NSA ($40.9 million): cyber research in areas such as
ubiquitous secure collaboration, high assurance software and
hardware, and trusted computing (PE 0303140G).
The remaining $17 million is embedded in assorted NSA
PEs.

JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS RANGE

4. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, the Joint Information Operations
Range (JIOR) has been successful in creating a worldwide, distributed
network that can link multiple nodes and environments in highly
classified events. It would seem that the JIOR will be a critical
capability for the increasing demand of research, development, test and
evaluation, and training events. Yet, with the disestablishment of the
U.S. Joint Forces Command, the JIOR has been transferred to the Joint
Staff and has experienced budget cuts, as opposed to the increases one
would expect for such a critical capability. What is DOD's plan to
ensure the JIOR is adequately resourced to fully meet the needs of
capability developers, testers, and the training community?
Mr. Lemnios. I have been assured that the Joint Staff fully
recognizes the current and future criticality of the JIOR. In
accordance with guidance from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff
established a governance structure for the JIOR involving all DOD
entities to facilitate a closer alignment of requirements to resources
and normalize the event planning process. This governance structure
will ensure greater synchronization among all DOD capabilities and
ongoing development efforts, such as the National Cyber Range and U.S.
Strategic Command's Cyber Training Initiative. In addition, the Test
Resource Management Center (TRMC) is currently conducting a
comprehensive review of DOD test and evaluation infrastructure needs.
Part of this study will examine cyber test infrastructure, to include
the JIOR, and make recommendations for their future funding and
management. In late summer, these recommendations will go to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)), one of the co-chairs of a four-star level Cyber Investment
Management Board (CIMB). The CIMB's purpose is to improve alignment of
investments for the fiscal year 2014 President's budget request to meet
needs across the cyber enterprise, including developers, testers, and
the training community.

5. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, in addition to basic range
connectivity, what is DOD doing to improve the operational and threat
environments that may be accessed via the JIOR?
Mr. Lemnios. In coordination with JIOR stakeholders, the Joint
Staff is developing an information operations/cyber capabilities
repository and seeking out new technologies to provide persistent
environments when needed, streamline planning efforts, emulate network
traffic, and rapidly reset or sanitize environments. DOD is actively
seeking to harvest new capabilities that will enhance JIOR technology,
capacity, and compatibility. Additionally, in partnership with the
Joint Mission Environment Test Capability (JMETC) program, DOD is
planning to enhance capacity and efficiency through new technology, and
to invest in improved instrumentation, visualization, traffic
generation, and threat capabilities.

6. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, are these efforts fully resourced so
that most range customers will have ready access to standard
environments without significant delays and costs to develop and
accredit their own tailored environments?
Mr. Lemnios. Yes, the JIOR is resourced sufficiently, balanced with
other DOD priorities, to allow the highest priority range customers to
have ready access. However, the current budget climate does force
prioritization, and DOD is addressing resource challenges now for the
anticipated technology and future capacity requirements of this
critical capability. The Joint Staff is currently postured to ensure
proper establishment, prioritization, and alignment of requirements and
development efforts to support range customers. In addition, the CIMB,
which was created in response to section 933 of Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, and co-chaired by
USD(AT&L), is addressing cyber investment across DOD.

DARPA COLLABORATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL ``ARPA'' AGENCIES

7. Senator Hagan. Dr. Gabriel, the DARPA mission is to ``prevent
strategic surprise from negatively impacting U.S. national security and
create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the
technological superiority of the U.S. military.'' The Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency's (HSARPA) mission is to focus on
``Homeland security research and development (R&D) that could lead to
significant technology breakthroughs and greatly enhance departmental
operations.'' The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
(IARPA) ``invests in high-risk/high-payoff research programs that have
the potential to provide the Nation with an overwhelming intelligence
advantage over future adversaries.'' It appears that these R&D agencies
share similar objectives of focusing on technologies to address
persistent and future threats. What collaborative and coordinated
efforts are underway or planned between DARPA and its counterparts,
HSARPA and IARPA, to address threats emanating from cyber space?
Dr. Gabriel. DARPA has had a robust collaborative and coordinated
effort with both HSARPA and IARPA. There are numerous interactions of a
more informal nature with both agencies. In addition, the following
program-level interactions have occurred:

DARPA and HSARPA are collaborating to integrate and
transition technologies developed under DARPA's Scalable
Network Monitoring (SNM) program. DARPA has also provided SNM
data to HSARPA's PREDICT database where it is available to
HSARPA and IARPA researchers.
DARPA and HSARPA are developing a Memorandum of
Agreement to transition technology created under DARPA's
Military Networking Protocol Program (MNP) to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
IARPA has provided a reviewer for the source selection
panel for DARPA's new High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems
(HACMS) program.
DARPA closely coordinates with IARPA on all natural
language understanding R&D efforts. In addition, DARPA and
IARPA are sharing language data: IARPA is providing Babel
speech data to DARPA and DARPA is providing BOLT data to IARPA.
DARPA and IARPA are exploring possible collaborative
activities in the area of ``big data'' involving DARPA's new
XDATA program.

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

8. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios and Dr. Gabriel, at a recent hearing
before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the
House Armed Services Committee, Dr. Gabriel stated that commercial
electronics, such as smart phones and tablets, have created
``vulnerabilities for the United States by enabling sensors, computing,
imaging, and communications capabilities that as recently as 15 years
ago, were the exclusive domain of military systems.'' With the U.S.
military becoming increasingly dependent on these same or similar
technologies, how does the U.S. military regain/maintain cyber
superiority in the future?
Mr. Lemnios and Dr. Gabriel. DOD is striving to reduce the time
needed to build military and enterprise systems by taking advantage of
fast-moving commercial hardware, software, and services, thereby
harnessing global investments in information technology to its benefit.
This reliance, however, does create dependencies and potential
vulnerabilities owing both to the quality of the technologies and to
adversaries' ability to access the same products and services. First
and foremost, DOD has instituted the requirement for all major
acquisition programs to have a program protection plan, specifically to
address potential vulnerabilities and mitigation. In addition, the DOD
cyber S&T strategy addresses these potential vulnerabilities in several
ways: by creating foundational models for attaining trust in system
design and operation with elements of mixed trust (i.e., trusted
systems built from untrusted components); by creating techniques for
making systems resilient to cyber incursions or failures by
incorporating features such as architectural diversity and
unpredictability; and by creating the ability to maneuver or adapt
cyber systems dynamically as conditions arise. Finally, DOD recognizes
that certain elements of critical systems technology should never be
open to adversary view. To help maintain cyber superiority, commercial
off-the-shelf technologies must be supplemented with certain key
government-only and carefully-protected technological components.

9. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios and Dr. Gabriel, is DOD investing
adequately in the test capabilities and range environments that will be
needed to remain current with these advancing technologies?
Mr. Lemnios and Dr. Gabriel. The adequacy of investment needed for
cyber test ranges is hard to answer. This is a new and uncertain
technology area that we are still working to understand completely.
However, DOD, through the JMETC program, is planning to enhance
capacity and to invest in improved instrumentation, visualization,
traffic generation, and threat capabilities as required. The TRMC is
currently conducting a comprehensive review of DOD test and evaluation
infrastructure. Part of this study will examine cyber test
infrastructure and make recommendations for their future capabilities
and funding in response to the growing total DOD investment. We believe
understanding the needs in this area will continue to be a priority.

10. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios and Dr. Gabriel, how are lessons
learned from cyber events during major exercises and real-world
operations being addressed by DOD?
Mr. Lemnios and Dr. Gabriel. My (Mr. Lemnios) staff (primarily in
my Rapid Fielding Directorate) has a S&T liaison at each combatant
command (COCOM). Additionally, we have S&T ties with the military
departments, the NNSA, and all other defense agencies.
COCOMs identify capability gaps based on lessons learned during
exercises and real-world operations. They prioritize these gaps and
submit them as an Integrated Priority List (IPL). The S&T liaisons at
the COCOMs have the responsibility for identifying limitations,
identified in the IPLs that result from lessons learned (capability
gaps), to our staff so we can rapidly address their needs. In addition,
these COCOM S&T advisors forward key lessons learned from exercises to
us. This works well. For instance, after U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM)
Exercise Terminal Fury 2010, we identified, with the help of our PACOM
S&T liaison, several serious potential limitations in the PACOM
network. Details are classified, but as a result, we initiated the
Computer Active Network Defense in Depth (CANDID) Joint Capability
Technology Demonstration (JCTD). CANDID creates a sub-net that enables
current C2 systems using dedicated hardware to create a Virtual Secure
Enclaves (VSEs) that will allow them to operate in a cyber-challenged
environment. CANDID also provides a cyber monitoring and alerting
system. This will be demonstrated during PACOM's Exercise Valiant
Shield 12.
In September 2011, we began an initiative titled Cloudbreak to
address COCOM C2 gaps by providing composable, net-centric capabilities
based on common architectures across networks. CLOUDBREAK provides the
venue to demonstrate mature capabilities that address IPL gaps and have
sustainable transition paths. Our first campaign is underway at PACOM
and will demonstrate cyber capabilities needed by their CYBER PAC, C2
capabilities needed by their Joint Operations Center (JOC), and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
needed by their Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). We began
fielding these capabilities in February 2012. They are operational now
and will be used in the upcoming PACOM Exercises Terminal Fury and
Valiant Shield.
We are only providing these two examples to show how we are
identifying, then addressing, limitations from exercises and real world
operations. We do similar things with the other COCOMs.

CYBER TESTING

11. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, today's weapons systems are more
complex and more interdependent than any of their predecessors. Cyber
capabilities are inherent in virtually every system deployed by the
U.S. military. Interoperability both enhances a weapon system's
effectiveness while creating new potential vulnerabilities. As these
weapons systems are tested and fielded, how does DOD ensure that its
weapons systems remain both interoperable and secure?
Mr. Lemnios. Through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DASD(DT&E)) and Director, TRMC, DOD
is developing new cyberspace test and evaluation capabilities to
support interoperability and cyber testing for weapon systems in
development. As this effort matures, so will DOD improve its ability to
ensure that weapons systems remain both interoperable and secure. The
DASD(DT&E) conducted an initial pilot program in December 2011 to
examine methodologies and infrastructure for testing mission threads
within a realistic cyber environment. To facilitate these efforts, DOD,
in partnership with the JMETC program, is planning to enhance capacity
and to invest in improved instrumentation, visualization, traffic
generation, and threat capabilities.

12. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, what new test or experimentation
methodologies or capabilities are needed to ensure that the cyber
components of these systems meet warfighters' needs in the evolving
operational and threat environments?
Mr. Lemnios. Ensuring that cyber components meet warfighters' needs
requires that the experimentation environments resemble the real
operating environments in which cyber technologies are meant to work.
The challenge includes the integration of cyber and military platforms
and weapons systems. Reusable scenario packages must be developed to
create realistic environments, including cyber and simulated
operational aspects, and new measurement and recording capabilities
need to be developed to allow collection of data during experiments to
refine them for future use.
In fiscal year 2011, we initiated a pilot project called the Cyber
Measurement Campaign to develop experimentation methodologies to
measure effectiveness of new cyber security S&T. For instance,
experiments in operational agility will focus on quantitatively
measuring the ability to respond to attacks in a timely manner, and to
rapidly adapt to thwart the attack. Experiments such as these will
provide the empirical data for objectively evaluating new research
ideas early in the technology development lifecycle and will allow us
to validate and refine our research roadmaps. Improved testing
methodologies developed in these experiments can also be subsequently
used by the testing community.
In addition, permanent distributed cyber ranges are needed, with
sufficient flexibility to enable running many different variations of
each test and rapid replanning and reconfiguration of experiments.
Prototype cyber range technology, in conjunction with existing range
facilities, must be matured to meet these needs. The investments needed
to develop these capabilities are being examined by the newly created
DOD CIMB. The goal is to establish a persistent, distributed community
for ongoing experimentation in applying scientific methods to
cybersecurity.

BEHAVIOR-BASED VS. SIGNATURE-BASED DEFENSES

13. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, in his testimony, Dr. Peery
stressed that defensive systems that rely on knowing in advance what
the signature of an attack looks like, so that a monitoring device or
software on the defended network can recognize that attack as it is
happening and block it, are just not robust. Such systems cannot
prevent new forms of attack that are becoming easy and inexpensive to
construct. He points out that a different generic approach based on
analyzing the behavior of new software entering a defended computer,
and the subsequent behavior of that computer, is much more promising
and will eclipse signature-based defenses over time. The major,
enterprise-wide defensive system deployed in DOD is a signatures-based
system--the Host-Based Security System (HBSS). In addition, the system
provided by NSA, known as Einstein, to defend DOD, the rest of the
Federal Government, and potentially critical infrastructure, is also
signature-based. Last year this committee passed a provision requiring
DOD to develop a comprehensive strategy to adopt behavior-based
approaches for cybersecurity at every level of its network--endpoints,
enclaves, and gateways--to enable rapid discovery of previously unknown
threats. In addition, the committee has funded pilot programs to
demonstrate advanced commercial technologies for defense that use
techniques other than signatures of known threats. Your statement makes
no mention of the importance of behavior-based detection technology for
cyber defense, or of the pilot programs that Congress has funded. Non-
signature-based defenses do not appear in any list of technology
thrusts. Why not?
Mr. Lemnios. While my statement did not specifically cite the
importance of behavior-based technology, that does not indicate the
development of this capability is not important. DOD's approach to
network defense is consistent with Dr. Peery's observations regarding
signature-based capabilities. We believe that the signature-based
defenses provided by HBSS and network sensors are a necessary baseline
that should be augmented, and in the future potentially replaced by,
non-signature-based tools, capabilities, and techniques. The overall
approach is best understood in the context of a layered cyber defense
approach, which incorporates signature-based capabilities, non-
signature-based capabilities, proper configuration and management of
endpoints, and robust attack detection and diagnosis. The signature-
based capabilities are well known and ubiquitously deployed, forming
the foundation of the defenses and harnessing the well-funded
commercial investments in threat identification and signature
development.
Non-signature-based capabilities are currently deployed on a more
limited basis, partially because of the relative immaturity of the
products involved and issues with respect to enterprise DOD fielding. A
key example is the Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) module
within HBSS which incorporates heuristic and behavior-based techniques
and flexible policy definitions to detect and remediate malicious
activity. In addition, HBSS includes protections against generic buffer
overflows based on generalized packet anomalies rather than specific
signatures to detect adversary attempts to execute malicious code. At
the network level, a variety of policy-based traffic blocks are
implemented at various levels across DOD based on anomalous behaviors
and non-signature-based information developed through the attack
detection and diagnosis process.
Proper configuration and management of endpoints is implemented
with the goal of removing technical vulnerability as much as possible.
Examples are DOD's efforts to configure every computer as securely as
possible and DOD's efforts to deploy and use strong cyber identity
credentials from the DOD Public Key Infrastructure. Since a given
vulnerability may play a role in a variety of different types of cyber
attack, these vulnerability removal efforts are more robust against
classes of attack than are signature-based protections. The attack may
be blocked without knowing much about the attack characteristic other
than that the attack depended on the now non-existent vulnerability.
An additional goal relative to protection of endpoints is to shield
remaining vulnerabilities against attack. Examples are: the several
layers of perimeter defense (often firewalls) between the internet and
a given DOD computer; and some of the functions of DOD's HBSS. Some of
the current perimeter defenses use both signature and non-signature-
based protections, examples of which are protocol and application
filtering firewalls. These at least partially depend on recognizing the
behaviors of particular protocols or applications contained in the
protocols, and on recognizing the signatures of particular attacks
embedded in the protocols the defenses allow to pass.
Robust attack detection and diagnosis acknowledges that defenses
will be defeated, and calls for the collection, processing, and
continuous analysis of network sensor data and traffic. This approach
is strengthened by the analytical integration of data from multiple
sources and multiple collection approaches, including signature-based,
non-signature-based, and end-point baseline configuration and
activities.
DOD is engaged in pilot efforts to investigate the advantages and
applicability of behavior-based technologies at distinct layers in the
network defense. The Defense Information Systems Agency is conducting
pilots of network-based and end-user-based non-signature technologies.
At the host level, lab testing has determined several potentially
useful solutions that apply to key security concerns, including safe
browsing, anomaly-based detection and mitigation, and various
whitelisting strategies. At the network level, a pilot is being pursued
that seeks to sandbox questionable traffic to identify malicious
attacks at the DOD boundary.
The pilots were chosen to complement DOD's existing protection and
detection systems so that if a particular pilot is successful,
transition to production can be done in a way that is compatible with
existing technology, or that takes advantage of some of the features of
the existing technologies. A key goal is to be able to deploy non-
signature-based technologies without reengineering the other components
of DOD's layered defenses.

SECURE SOFTWARE AND SOFTWARE TESTING

14. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, your statement stressed the
challenges we face in achieving security for our information systems
and our tactical weapons systems due to inadvertent or potentially
purposefully inserted vulnerabilities in the so-called ``supply chain''
of hardware components and software that come from diverse industry
sources, many of which are overseas. You rightly emphasize the need for
technology solutions to this problem. What is DOD doing to discipline
and incentivize the defense industrial base to write secure software
code in the first place, so that there are far fewer vulnerabilities
for adversaries to exploit?
Mr. Lemnios. In an effort to discipline and incentivize the defense
industrial base to ensure that custom developed DOD software solutions
are secure, DOD has established comprehensive program protection
planning policy and guidance for all acquisition programs. Program
Protection Plans (PPP) are now required at all major milestones; these
plans communicate data and requirements for all security aspects of the
program, including software security. These processes require DOD's
acquisition programs to use software assurance best practices,
including tools, methodologies, and standards, to test for, detect, and
mitigate vulnerabilities and weaknesses during software development.
Additionally, DOD is engaged with key commercial software vendors
to actively contribute to community-wide standards and practices to
identify common vulnerabilities and weaknesses and improve the secure
development of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software products. DOD
actively encourages the sharing of common vulnerabilities, weaknesses,
and attack patterns information within the software industry to develop
more secure code in DOD custom software development and the secure
adaptation of COTS software for DOD use.

15. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, what is DOD doing to exploit and
further develop commercial tools that can automatically analyze both
source code and so-called machine code to detect vulnerabilities and
weaknesses? These tools can help developers to correct mistakes as code
is being written, and they can help the testing community determine the
quality and security of software being developed for DOD.
Mr. Lemnios. DOD has taken steps to address the need to identify
vulnerabilities and weaknesses during software development, and
encourage use of, and further development of commercial software
assurance (SwA) tools. First, DOD has established comprehensive program
protection planning policy and guidance for all acquisition programs.
PPP are now required at all major milestones; these plans communicate
data and requirements for all security aspects of the program,
including software security. These processes require DOD's acquisition
programs to use SwA tools, methodologies, and standards, to test for,
detect, and mitigate vulnerabilities and weaknesses during software
development. Second, DOD is working with academia, industry, the
Services, and defense agencies on the development of improved SwA tools
and techniques such as formal verification, secure-coding, run-time
analysis, and code visualization.
DOD actively engages with the broader SwA community through the DOD
SwA Community of Practice (CoP), which consists of organizations across
DOD, industry, FFRDCs, and other government agencies. This CoP serves
as a forum to share knowledge and feedback regarding SwA tools and
their use.

ENTERPRISE-SCALE CYBERSECURITY SOLUTIONS

16. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, starting about 5 years ago, DOD
undertook a large-scale, DOD-wide fielding of HBSS. DOD has
approximately 7 million desktop computers spread across all the
Services, defense agencies, and COCOMs--on each of which HBSS had to be
installed, managed, and supported. This was an expensive and difficult
process--and it still is not complete. Our sense is that this
experience instilled reluctance in DOD to attempt any further
enterprise-wide security solutions that require touching these millions
of endpoints. The problem is that HBSS is a first-generation security
solution that relies chiefly on programming signatures of known cyber
attack tools and methods--an approach that is insufficient for the
future. Commercial industry is rapidly developing new tools that use
different approaches to either discovering threats that have not been
seen before or preventing such threats from being able to take control
of a targeted computer. This committee has funded pilot programs to
demonstrate this technology. In your view, what can be done to overcome
the challenges to fielding endpoint or host-based enterprise
cybersecurity solutions when the enterprise is so vast, diverse, and
complex as DOD?
Mr. Lemnios. The premise of your question is that DOD's
infrastructure is too vast, diverse, and complex to rely on host-based
enterprise cybersecurity solutions. You asked ``what can be done to
overcome . . . these challenges.'' Implicit in your question is that we
should investigate new methodologies. We agree that the current DOD
enterprise is very complex and that malware signature-based security is
not enough. However, HBSS is just one layer of a security architecture
that starts at the DOD gateways and extends to the cryptographic tokens
for user identity. We believe maturing technologies to improve both
host-based architectures and new network methodologies offers the most
prudent course for the protection of DOD.
HBSS is an integrated system that is more than a signature-based
detection solution. It is also a sensor that can collect many kinds of
information about the state of the host--information that can be used
in future non-signature methods of detection--and an extensible
infrastructure for fielding new plug-in capabilities. In addition to
host level intrusion detection and prevention, HBSS also provides
detailed asset tracking, security policy management and control, host
level baseline and program identification, security compliance
reporting, and control of devices connected to the host.
There is no question that fielding an endpoint security
architecture on 7 million desktops throughout DOD was an arduous
process. However, the work done to put HBSS in place has provided an
installation infrastructure for future deployments. The initial work on
the infrastructure, as well as continuing initiatives, will make future
deployments a much less arduous and expensive process. New HBSS plug-in
modules are deployed much more rapidly and efficiently now that the
server structure is in place.
New types of information can be tapped by configuring the HBSS
sensing capabilities and reporting to security services at the host or
off-host. New tools and detection methods coming from industry, such as
the recent cyber pilots, can be acquired and distributed to DOD's
desktops as plug-ins to the platform that HBSS provides, so that
advanced S&T can be incorporated as it emerges. In addition to host
level protection, new capabilities for defending DOD's systems and
networks are also being implemented at the enclave network, backbone
network, and boundary controller access points, intercepting attack
actions before they reach the hosts themselves.

HIRING THE MOST QUALIFIED EXPERTS

17. Senator Hagan. Dr. Gabriel, understanding that DARPA relies on
a mix of hiring authorities to bring the best talent to DOD, what help
do you need from this committee to ensure you can continue recruiting
the best talent for our Nation?
Dr. Gabriel. DARPA uses a dynamic mix of hiring authorities: Highly
Qualified Experts, 1101s, and Intergovernmental Personnel Act. In order
for DARPA to continue to rapidly and efficiently hire the Nation's most
qualified technical experts from industry, academia, and the private
sector; DARPA is asking for an increase in our 1101 authorization by
20, from the current number of 40 to 60.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

BUDGET CONTROL ACT

18. Senator Portman. Mr. Lemnios, as you know, the Budget Control
Act requires DOD in January 2013 to reduce all major accounts over 10
years by a total of $492 billion through sequestration. This will
result in an immediate $55 billion reduction to the fiscal year 2013
defense program. The Secretary of Defense has been quoted on numerous
occasions that the impact of these cuts would be ``devastating'' and
``catastrophic,'' leading to a hollow force and inflicting serious
damage to our national defense. Yet, the Military Services must begin
this month with some type of guidance on developing a Service budget
for fiscal year 2014. Can you specifically describe what impact you
anticipate in regard to cyber defense programs if sequestration occurs?
Mr. Lemnios. The fiscal year 2013 budget includes significant
funding for cybersecurity efforts across the government and includes
both defense and non-defense, and classified and unclassified
activities. At this stage, it would be premature to speculate on the
specific impacts sequestration would likely have on cybersecurity
activities. However, cuts under sequestration could hurt efforts to
fight cyber threats, including four key efforts:

Improving the security of our classified Federal
networks and addressing WikiLeaks;
Continuing the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative (CNCI);
Sustaining the National Strategy for Trusted
Identities in Cyberspace; and
Initiating continuous monitoring of unclassified
networks at all Federal agencies.

19. Senator Portman. Mr. Lemnios, what programmatic cuts would have
the most significant impact on DOD's ability to defend against cyber
intrusions?
Mr. Lemnios. The fiscal year 2013 budget includes significant
funding for cybersecurity efforts across the government and includes
both defense and non-defense, and classified and unclassified
activities. At this stage, it would be premature to speculate on the
specific impacts sequestration would likely have on cybersecurity
activities. However, cuts under sequestration could hurt efforts to
fight cyber threats, including four key efforts:

Improving the security of our classified Federal
networks and addressing WikiLeaks;
Continuing the CNCI;
Sustaining the National Strategy for Trusted
Identities in Cyberspace; and
Initiating continuous monitoring of unclassified
networks at all Federal agencies.

20. Senator Portman. Mr. Lemnios, how will you assess the risk of
each cut?
Mr. Lemnios. DOD is not currently preparing for sequestration, and
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not directed agencies,
including DOD, to initiate plans for sequestration. It is premature to
assess the risk of each cut.

21. Senator Portman. Mr. Lemnios, was any planning commenced to
date to ameliorate the impact of sequestration reductions to
cybersecurity programs?
Mr. Lemnios. DOD is not currently preparing for sequestration, and
OMB has not directed agencies, including DOD, to initiate plans for
sequestration.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

INFORMATION-SHARING

22. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Lemnios, both government and commercial
networks worldwide have experienced repeated assault by hackers over
the past several years. In your testimony, you touched on the need for
increased information-sharing between agencies and sectors in order to
effectively protect our national security. Several pieces of
legislation have been introduced in the House and Senate to address
this fundamental point; however, while we all agree on the need for
information-sharing, there is disagreement on the most effective
approach. Keeping in mind private sector concerns and the potentially
negative impact of increased regulation, what do you recommend as the
best approach to facilitate greater information-sharing?
Mr. Lemnios. I am not sure I want to assess any approach as best,
but one approach to facilitate greater information-sharing of cyber
threat intelligence is to reduce the barriers to sharing, and promote a
federated communities approach to sharing. In support of this approach,
the Secretary of Defense recently endorsed the Cybersecurity Act of
2012 introduced into the Senate by Senators Lieberman, Collins,
Feinstein, and Rockefeller. Reducing barriers will be accomplished in
part by making sharing voluntary, not mandatory; by incentivizing
sharing and considering safe harbor provisions; and by sharing more
broadly the threat information provided in government brokered
exchanges (e.g., Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information
Sharing Environment) by relaxing restrictions on secondary sharing in
ways consistent with the voluntary nature of the sharing. The nature of
information shared should also be considered. Threat indicators can be
shared more broadly and readily if sensitive information about
compromises and vulnerabilities is not required, while still providing
value to a larger sharing community.
One size will not fit all. Instead, the approach should support a
federation of sharing communities each with possibly different sharing
models (e.g., hub and spoke, post to all, hybrid) and each with its own
``circle of trust'' among its members. To encourage wider, voluntary
sharing of actual incident data, the approach should also support
models that allow the use of sensitive information in cyber defenses
without exposing the information too broadly. This could be done for
instance by supporting models in which security service providers use
such sensitive information to protect customers, but without sharing
the sensitive information with those customers. To manage costs, scale,
and enable automated cross-sharing among federated communities, we
should develop and adopt common standards (e.g., National Institute of
Standards and Technology's (NIST) Security Content Automation Protocol)
and trust models; structured cyber threat information sharing
repositories, and frameworks for creating, managing, and evolving
federated information sharing communities.

23. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Lemnios, in your testimony you highlight
``foundations of trust'' as one of the areas of development to support
the ``DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.'' This trust is
confidence that our systems will perform as expected and have not been
compromised. The military supply chain is extremely vulnerable to cyber
attacks as we have seen from media reports. Given supply-chain
challenges and the fact that many components are provided by foreign
commercial sources, is it possible that some components of our cyber
defenses may contain components from less than fully trusted sources?
If so, how do you recommend we address this issue and maximize the
trust we place in our cyber defenses?
Mr. Lemnios. Yes, it is possible that left unaddressed, some
components of our cyber defenses could contain components from less
than fully trusted sources. The globalization of the Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) market has provided DOD with
significant cost and performance benefits but also presents challenges
to our national security systems. DOD is, however, taking a proactive
risk management approach to address this issue through its Trusted
Defense Systems Strategy, first reported to Congress in the Report on
Trusted Defense Systems in January 2010.
The strategy is based around four core elements that:

(1) prioritize scarce resources based on mission criticality of
the system in question,
(2) make comprehensive program protection planning a requirement
for all acquisition programs,
(3) improve DOD's capability to detect and respond to
vulnerabilities, and
(4) collaborate with industry to develop commercial standards for
supply chain risk management and secure commercial products.

DOD is deploying this strategy in partnership with the Military
Services and acquisition program offices, strengthening and leveraging
systems security engineering, supply chain risk management, hardware
and software assurance, counterintelligence, test and evaluation, and
information assurance capabilities in a risk-based approach to
mitigating cyber and supply chain vulnerabilities.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

CYBER WORKFORCE

24. Senator Brown. Mr. Lemnios, in light of DOD's need to address
the Nation's evolving cyber threat, how does DOD plan to build a strong
cyber workforce and access the highest caliber technical talent in
academia and industry?
Mr. Lemnios. DOD efforts to build a strong cybersecurity workforce
are led by the DOD CIO. Among many ongoing efforts, most noteworthy is
DOD's key role in the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
(NICE). Working closely with appropriate DOD activities and with other
NICE agencies such as NIST, the CIO has identified the knowledge,
skills, and abilities required to perform key cybersecurity skill sets.
This framework of skill sets forms the foundation for developing in-
house cybersecurity expertise.
DOD is sharing the NICE skill set framework with industry and
academia. Leading educators and certification institutes have begun to
incorporate the NICE framework into their training and education
programs, and into standards and requirements documents.
The NICE component on Cybersecurity Workforce Training and
Professional Development is in the process of assessing the size and
quality of the cyber workforce, identifying workforce gaps, and will
develop requirements, a training catalog, and professional development
roadmaps for cybersecurity professionals. DOD is a leader in these
efforts and is actively incorporating the NICE guidance into cyberspace
workforce efforts.

25. Senator Brown. Mr. Lemnios, are you aware of the high
technology throughout New England and its potential to quickly identify
solutions that meet DOD's cyber requirements?
Mr. Lemnios. Yes, as a long-time resident of Massachusetts, and
former Chief Technology Officer of MIT/Lincoln Lab in Lexington, MA, I
am very familiar with high technology throughout New England, and
especially in the Boston high technology corridor. For example, the
nationally-recognized Massachusetts' Advanced Cyber Security Center
(ACSC) is a cross-sector research facility established in September
2011 and hosted by MITRE Corporation. Members of ACSC's Strategic
Advisory Board have leadership experience with DHS and DOD, and bring
an insider's understanding of DOD cyber requirements. Additionally, the
University of Rhode Island hosts the Digital Forensics and Cyber
Security Center, which is a multi-disciplinary university center that
provides courses and degree programs, research, services, and
consulting in Digital Forensics, Information Assurance, and Cyber
Security. These are only a small sample of the types of organizations
located in New England that are capable of contributing to the solution
of DOD's cyber requirements.

[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay Hagan
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan, Portman, and
Inhofe.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J.
Kuiken, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Adam J. Barker, professional
staff member.
Staff assistant present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff.
Committee members' assistants present: Anthony Lazarski,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Brent Bombach, assistant to
Senator Portman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY HAGAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Hagan. We will bring to order the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee hearing today. I want to welcome
all of our witnesses and Senator Portman.
Today in preparation for the subcommittee's upcoming work
on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year 2013, we will hear testimony from our witnesses on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) role in the implementation of the
National Strategy for Counterterrorism (CT) and the National
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), as well
as the new Defense Strategic Guidance and Priorities.
I want to welcome the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), Michael A.
Sheehan, to the subcommittee for his first hearing since being
confirmed by the full Senate in December. Welcome back to the
subcommittee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Combating Terrorism, Garry Reid; and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global
Threats, William F. Wechsler. Thank you for being here.
Last June, President Obama released the new National
Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy was released
shortly after an inflection point for our Nation's CT operators
with the successful mission against Osama bin Laden, preceding
it by a month. While our Nation's CT efforts appropriately
remain an interagency endeavor under the new strategy, DOD has
and will continue to play a key role in building security
partnerships that enable our foreign partners, as well as
directly applying various CT tools and capabilities wherever
appropriate.
In addition to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism,
in July of last year, the President released our Nation's first
National Strategy to Combat TOCs. Rightly, in my view, the
strategy recognizes that TOC is a significant threat to
national and international security. While combatting TOC is
certainly not a core function of DOD, the Department does play
a key role in supporting operations of both U.S. and foreign
law enforcement agencies, and it does so by providing funding
and unique enabling capabilities, conducting operations to
detect and monitor illicit trafficking that may be destined for
the United States, and, again, the building of relationships
and the capacity of foreign militaries and law enforcement
forces to carry out similar operations themselves.
More recently, the new Defense Strategic Guidance and
Priorities further emphasized the importance of capacity
building and other theater security cooperation activities in
support of the geographic combatant commanders, as well as the
important role our Special Operation Forces (SOF) will play in
the implementation of our Nation's engagement overseas. We hope
our witnesses will address their ongoing efforts to support the
implementation of these new strategies and any legislative
authorities or funding they may need to carry out adequately
their assigned responsibilities under these strategies.
A number of authorities expire this year, including DOD's
ability to support CT partners in Yemen and national
contributing to international CT operations in Somalia. Another
authority to provide a broad range of support to the Colombian
security services is also set to expire at year's end. The
subcommittee looks forward to discussing DOD's requirements in
these regions and elsewhere.
In the interest of ensuring that there's adequate time for
questions, I'll insert the remainder of my opening statement
into the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagan follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Kay R. Hagan

Today, in preparation for the subcommittee's upcoming work on the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, we will hear
testimony from our witnesses on the Department of Defense's (DOD) role
in the implementation of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism and
the National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, as well
as the new Defense Strategic Guidance and Priorities. I want to welcome
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
Conflict, Michael A. Sheehan, to the subcommittee for his first hearing
since being confirmed by the full Senate in December, and welcome back
to the subcommittee Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Combating Terrorism, Garry Reid; and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, William
F. Wechsler.
Last June, President Obama released the new National Strategy on
Counterterrorism. This strategy was released shortly after an
inflection point for our Nation's counterterrorism (CT) operators with
the successful mission against Osama bin Laden preceding it by a month.
While our Nation's counterterrorism efforts appropriately remain an
interagency endeavor under the new strategy, DOD has and will continue
to play a key role in building security partnerships that enable our
foreign partners, as well as directly applying various CT tools and
capabilities wherever appropriate. At all times, these efforts must be
conducted in a manner that adheres to our core American values.
In addition to the National Counterterrorism Strategy, in July of
last year, the President released our Nation's first National Strategy
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. Rightly, in my view, the
strategy recognizes that transnational organized crime (TOC) is a
significant threat to national and international security. While
combatting transnational organized crime is certainly not a core
function of DOD, the Department plays a key role in supporting
operations by both U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies. It does
so by providing funding and unique enabling capabilities, conducting
operations to detect and monitor illicit trafficking that may be
destined for the United States, and--again--the building of
relationships and the capacity of foreign militaries and law
enforcement forces to carry out similar operations themselves.
More recently, the new Defense Strategic Guidance and Priorities
further emphasized the importance of capacity-building and other
theater security cooperation activities in support of the Geographic
Combatant Commanders, as well as the important role our Special
Operations Forces (SOF) will play in the implementation of our Nation's
engagement overseas.
We hope our witnesses will address their ongoing efforts to support
the implementation of these new strategies and any legislative
authorities or funding they may need to carry out adequately their
assigned responsibilities under these strategies. A number of
authorities expire this year, including the Department's ability to
support certain CT partners in Yemen and national contributing to
international CT operations in Somalia. Another authority to provide a
broad range of support to the Colombian security services is also set
to expire at year's end. The subcommittee looks forward to discussing
the Department's requirements in these regions and elsewhere.

COUNTERTERRORISM AUTHORITIES

Appropriately, the President's National Strategy for
Counterterrorism maintains our focus on pressuring al Qaeda's core,
while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity
in priority countries around the world. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Sheehan and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Reid, in
addition to continued direct action operations against al Qaeda, all
three strategies emphasize the importance of DOD expanding its
military-to-military and security cooperation activities, particularly
as they relate to counterterrorism.
Over the past decade, Congress has provided DOD with a number of
counterterrorism ``train and equip'' authorities that enable U.S.
forces to train with and enhance the capabilities of foreign nations to
conduct counterterrorism operations on their own. These activities have
paid dividends--most notably in Somalia where the Ugandan military,
acting as part of an African Union peacekeeping force, has made
substantial gains in recent months against al Shabab--an al Qaeda
affiliate. Our engagements with the Ugandans, as well as the Kenyans
and Ethiopians, have contributed to the ability of these forces to
achieve such success. As the Department continues to invest in these
activities, and as additional SOF become available from U.S. Central
Command, I look forward to seeing similar efforts in other regions of
particular concern.
I hope our witnesses will discuss the Department's views on the
various CT authorities at their disposal, as well as discuss any
legislative gaps that may currently exist. As Assistant Secretary
Sheehan and I discussed last week, it is important to continue our CT
activities--both direct and indirect, but we must also invest in
building broader relationships with those foreign security forces with
whom we are engaging. We look forward to hearing of these broader
efforts as well.

COUNTERNARCOTICS AUTHORITIES

DASD Wechsler, most--if not all--of DOD's authorities to support
the President's National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime are in your portfolio. The Department's unique counternarcotics
authorities permit DOD to engage with, and build the capacity of,
foreign law enforcement services and militaries, as well as enable the
force projection capabilities of our Nation's Federal law enforcement
agencies to outposts in Afghanistan, Central America, and West Africa.
These authorities will likely serve as key enablers for DOD to assist
in our government's efforts against transnational criminal
organizations. Further, your office is well-resourced with
approximately $1.5 billion in the President's current budget request.
As the National Strategy to Combat TOC states, ``[t]here is no
single structure under which transnational organized criminals operate;
they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, and may
evolve to other structures. The crimes they commit also vary.'' One
highly common crime, however, is the trafficking of illegal narcotics
and the associated money and weapons that enhance the capabilities of
these criminal enterprises. Despite some targeted success in the aerial
and maritime domain, illegal narcotics continue to flow into the United
States and the swathes of instability in countries around the world.
The Commanders of U.S. Northern and Southern Command recently told
the full committee that TOC poses a threat to national and
international security, and that militaries are more often being called
upon for internal security responsibilities. Law enforcement agencies
that are under-resourced, poorly trained and equipped, and prone to
corruption, complicate DOD's efforts to engage with its counterparts in
many countries and further--risk exposing militaries to the same
corrupting influences that have undermined their law enforcement
counterparts and the potential for human rights abuses as a result of
the unfamiliar operating environment. DASD Wechsler, the subcommittee
looks forward to learning of your efforts to support the combatant
commanders in their security cooperation activities, particularly as it
relates to your engagement and capacity building activities with
foreign law enforcement agencies.
With these circumstances in mind, there are two priority areas
within the strategy I hope our witnesses will discuss: (1) DOD's
efforts to build international capacity, cooperation, and partnerships;
(2) DOD's ability to enhance intelligence transnational threats. These
two areas within the strategy fit the Department's roles and missions
most clearly, and understanding your plans, policies, and programs in
these areas is important to us.
Both Assistant Secretary Sheehan and Deputy Assistant Secretary
Wechsler bring strong backgrounds in the area of law enforcement and
transnational threats. The subcommittee looks forward to our witnesses'
testimony in this area, as well as their analysis of the trajectory of
our efforts.

ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

When the new Defense Strategic Guidance was released, Secretary
Panetta stated that ``whenever possible, we will develop innovative,
low cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security
objectives.'' I believe this statement defines our SOF. The unique
language and cultural skills they have acquired put them at the
forefront of implementing the strategies we are discussing today.
This year, SOF will be engaged in more than 100 countries around
the world and it is clear that the global security environment will
drive a significant demand for their unique capabilities for the
foreseeable future. Many of these personnel will deploy from North
Carolina, home of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Special Operations
Commands.
As effective as counterterrorism operations have been in degrading
the leadership ranks and capability of al Qaeda and its affiliate
organizations to strike our interests, DOD must continue to improve its
ability to work with other agencies and partner nations to address the
factors that allow violent extremism to take hold. As Admiral McRaven,
Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), told the
committee earlier this month, ``the direct approach alone is not the
solution to the challenges our Nation faces today as it ultimately only
buys time and space for the indirect approach and broader governmental
elements to take effect.''
Our SOF rely heavily on the aforementioned authorities to carry out
engagement and capacity building activities with partner nation
security forces. However, some have criticized these authorities for
not being flexible enough to proactively respond to the security
challenges. As a result, it has been argued that our ability to carry
out the ``indirect approach'' outlined by Admiral McRaven lags
significantly behind our ``direct'' capabilities. News reports indicate
that SOCOM is seeking new authorities that would better support
deployed SOF as they work with our partner nations to address the
common threats we face.
The committee looks forward to hearing from our panel what
authorities they believe will be necessary to more effectively carry
out the ``indirect approach'' as described by Admiral McRaven now and
in the future.

Senator Hagan. I will now turn to Senator Portman for any
opening remarks.
Senator Portman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chairman, I welcome our
distinguished witnesses here today, whose testimony today will
help us to come up with a better NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013
because we're going to be relying on your testimony for dealing
with CT and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO).
Over the past several months, we've received testimony from
a lot of folks, including regional combatant commanders, senior
DOD officials, and others with regard to the President's budget
request and its implications for the programs and activities
within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). I think
with this testimony we've already heard has made clear is that
threats facing our Nation remain significant. They're changing,
but both in scale and complexity are still very real. This is
particularly true with regard to the threats that you are going
to be tasked with addressing every day in your jobs and that
you will talk about today. So, we appreciate your being here.
I think it is fair to say al Qaeda remains the top
terrorist threat in the United States, and while its senior
leadership has certainly suffered some losses because of the
sustained CT operations over the years, I am sure you will tell
us today that its regional affiliates, such as those in Yemen,
Somalia, and Northwest Africa are growing in capability, and we
are seeing a resurgence of its franchise in Iraq unfortunately.
But we look forward to hearing from that.
Closer to home, as Chairman Hagan has just pointed out, the
TOC issues continue to be a major problem for us. Those
organized crime entities continue to erode our security and
really our governance, and it is throughout our hemisphere,
including our neighbor to the south, Mexico. So, these criminal
groups now command multibillion dollar global networks, and in
many cases, I understand they are trained and certainly better
equipped than the security forces that are trying to stop them.
So, we look forward to hearing from you about that as well.
In addition to the myriad of security threats facing our
Nation that I have just mentioned, we find ourselves in the
middle of a very difficult budget situation. You are being
asked to find savings under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of
about $487 billion over the next 10 years. That was step one,
but looming on the horizon, of course, is the potential for
huge additional reductions of nearly $490 billion, so roughly
the same amount under sequestration. That is current law. We
have to assume it is going to occur, despite the fact that many
of us believe that it would be devastating to the military. The
Secretary of Defense has said that. He has also said it would
be catastrophic to our military. He has also said it would
hollow out our military. Those are pretty strong words. So, I
look forward to the assessment of our witnesses today and what
impact that second stage sequestration would have on your work
and on the important missions that you are being asked to
execute.
Additionally, these fiscal realities are important to talk
about in the context of which programs you think are the
highest priorities and which processes can be made more
effective, more cost-effective, in particular, to meet our
national security objectives. So, it is what would the impact
be, but also should we have additional reductions as is current
law? What would you do to prioritize?
So, these are all important topics, and, again, we look
forward to having you provide us this information to help us
fill in some of the blanks and be able to talk about what I
think is fair to say is one, if not the most important,
national security concern that we face as a country.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Secretary Sheehan, if you want to give your opening
remarks, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL H. SHEEHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. Sheehan. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Hagan,
Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the invitation to testify this afternoon. As you mentioned, it
is my first opportunity as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
SO/LIC to appear before this committee.
Let me thank you for your support, your meaningful and
consistent support, to SO/LIC and to U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) over the years past.
Recently, as you mentioned, the President has provided
clear direction to DOD, including SO/LIC and SOCOM in the form
of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism and the Strategy
to Combat TOC, both of which frame the DOD role in defending
our citizens and interests from these threats. As ASD SO/LIC, I
am committed to leading and integrating DOD efforts to fully
implement these two complementary and mutually reinforcing
strategies.
Because terrorism, drug trafficking, and other forms of TOC
are increasingly intertwined, SO/LIC is uniquely positioned to
provide policy guidance and program oversight to DOD's CT and
counter TOC activities.
I am pleased to have sitting beside me two of my deputies.
On my right is Garry Reid; on my left is William Wechsler. Both
of them bring unique perspective and considerable experience to
these issues. They look forward to contributing to the
discussion during the question and answer period.
Our perspective within SO/LIC is that by integrating CT,
counternarcotics, and combatting TOC capabilities, resources,
and authorities, the impact of our actions are more strategic,
more effective, and make better use of available resources.
Let me first provide you some of my perspectives on the
National Strategy to Combat TOC. As we look ahead to the next
decade, the landscape is changing to some extent. We have ended
our combat role in Iraq. In Afghanistan, we are transitioning
increasingly the responsibility for security to the Afghanistan
Government and their security forces. What will not change,
however, is our focus on aggressively deterring, disrupting,
dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces
and adherents around the world, while maintaining vigilance
against other terrorist organizations that have threatened--
that threaten or have potential to threaten the United States
and our allies. But our focus will remain on al Qaeda, as you
mentioned, Senator Portman.
Our national and theater Special Operations Forces (SOF)
employ a combination of direct and indirect action to implement
the strategy. While SOF's direct action capabilities are likely
to garner the most attention--these are strikes against
terrorist attacks--just as important, and perhaps more so in
the future, are the SOF's effort to build the capability and
capacity of our partners to shape the global information and
ideas environment, as well as to train and equip the capacity
of other countries. In this regard, section 1208 and other
priorities--other authorities are very important to our
success. Those include CT, counternarcotics authorities of
sections 1004, 1033, 1021, and 1022 of the NDAA. These efforts
often remain largely unnoticed, but have long-term strategic
effects in CT as well.
In implementing the CT strategy, we will continue to focus
on al Qaeda's activity originating from western Pakistan and
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). We have made
great progress on this front, but al Qaeda is a highly adaptive
organization. We must continue to work with Pakistan and
address the threats emanating from this region.
Another important front against al Qaeda is on the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) which poses a direct threat to our interests
and interests of our partners. We have made numerous important
gains over the last year against AQAP, but the group's
capabilities and intent to conduct a terrorist attack in the
United States continue to represent a serious threat. DOD
continues to collaborate extensively with the Yemeni forces on
operational matters, and together we are closely monitoring
AQAP and regularly improving our understanding of its external
plots.
The last area of the CT that I would like to highlight for
you today pertains to the global information environment. As I
alluded to previously, we know that al Qaeda cannot be defeated
by kinetic action alone. In order to counter the residents of
al Qaeda's ideology, our approach must include a balance of
capabilities implemented in close coordination with
interagency, our allies, and local communities.
Recognizing the growing relationship among terrorists,
insurgents, drug traffickers, and other criminals, last year
the President issued his Strategy to Combat TOC. This forward-
looking strategy seeks to address emerging, rapidly-evolving
types of threats to our national security: networks of
adversaries that operate at the nexus of organized crime in the
politically-inspired violence, the convergence of crime,
terrorism, and insurgency, in my view, a burgeoning
geopolitical trend with great implications to our national
security. The Strategy to Combat TOC recognizes that our
traditional focus on countering drug trafficking organizations
must be expanded to a wider perspective that acknowledges that
narcotics trafficking is just one component of the broader
challenge of TOC.
Important initial steps in implementing this strategy have
been recognized in a growing array of security challenges,
global criminal networks pose, increasing the understanding of
the implications of the nexus among criminals, terrorists, and
insurgents developing policies and tools to degrade these
threats.
DOD plays a largely supporting role to U.S. interagency
efforts to combat TOC. In addition to DOD's support to State,
local, and Federal law enforcement agencies, DOD is helping
partner-countries build capacity to address narcotics
trafficking and related TOC within their borders. Critical to
these efforts are DOD's counternarcotics authorities and
budget, which have proven to be effective and flexible tools
for confronting drug trafficking, including where drug
trafficking is linked to other forms of organized crime.
Nowhere is the link between TOC, insurgency, and terrorism
more apparent than in Afghanistan, where the Taliban continues
to receive a large percent of its revenue through the heroin
trade. Because of the convergence of these threats, our law
enforcement partners, such as the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), are employing their expertise and
authorities in support of DOD objectives on the battlefield.
In addition to depriving the enemy of vital narcotics-
related revenue, insurgents found to be involved in drug
trafficking may be prosecuted under Afghan law and
incarcerated, taking them off the battlefield and enhancing
government institutions at the same time.
We know that in order to confront increasing network
threats, we need to be increasingly networked as a government.
Active threat networks will exploit the limitations the U.S.
Government often faces because of separate agency authorities,
budgets, and institutional cultures. The strategy to combat TOC
is a call to action to leverage all the elements of national
power to protect citizens and U.S. national security interests,
and to enable our foreign partners to do the same.
In conclusion, both of these strategies seek to proactively
deter and confront emerging threats for national security
whether they are terrorists or criminals or increasingly
individuals at the nexus of what our too often conceptual
stovepipes. To be effective on both fronts, we must continue to
build cooperation across DOD and the U.S. Government, while at
the same time developing the capacities of like-minded foreign
partners. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC, I
am committed to working with this committee to continue to
build our CT and combatting TOC capabilities so that we are
more effective in the decade ahead.
Thank you again. I look forward to the opportunity for a
frank dialogue and Q&A period.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheehan follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael A. Sheehan

Good afternoon, Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and members of the
committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify before you this
afternoon. As this is my first opportunity as Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) to
appear before the subcommittee, let me express my gratitude for the
consistent and meaningful support you provide to SO/LIC and U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM). I have worked in and around the
Special Operations Forces (SOF) community for the last 32 years, and I
have a deep appreciation of the progress that has been made in the past
decades--in no small part due to the support of Congress and this
committee. I believe a critical turning point came when Congress
created SO/LIC and SOCOM through the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and
the Nunn-Cohen Amendment over a quarter century ago.
These pivotal pieces of legislation are the foundation of the
important work that SOF has done since September 11, from toppling the
Taliban regime to capturing Saddam Hussein to killing Osama bin Laden.
With these recent successes, some have made the argument that SOF has
now arrived into the ``mainstream'' within the Department. While I
agree that progress has been made in institutionalizing Goldwater-
Nichols, this effort remains a work in progress, especially as we look
to the coming decade of sustained global demand for SOF and constrained
defense budgets.
In recent months, the President has provided clear direction to the
Department of Defense (DOD)--including SO/LIC and SOCOM--in the form of
the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (CT) and the Strategy to
Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), both of which frame DOD's
role in defending our citizens and interests from these threats. As
Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC, I am committed to leading
and integrating DOD's efforts to fully implement these two
complimentary and mutually reinforcing strategies.
To this end, the partnership between SO/LIC and SOCOM will be
essential. SO/LIC will continue to support the evolution of SOCOM as we
take on both the challenges of these strategies and the recently
released defense strategy ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for the 21st Century''. Together, we will work to make
efficient use of our resources and authorities to address these cross-
cutting security threats. We will also be looking at developing and
testing new approaches to meeting these evolving threats.
Because terrorism, drug trafficking, and other forms of
transnational organized crime are increasingly intertwined, SO/LIC is
uniquely positioned to provide policy guidance and program oversight to
DOD's CT and counter-TOC activities. I am pleased to have sitting
beside me two of my deputies--Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Garry Reid and William Wechsler--who each bring a unique perspective to
these issues. They look forward to contributing to the discussion
during the question and answer portion of the testimony. Both of their
offices bring extraordinary expertise to the Department's efforts to
implement the CT and Combating TOC strategies. By integrating our CT,
counternarcotics, and combating transnational organized crime
capabilities, resources, and authorities, the impact of our actions are
more strategic, more effective, and make better use of available
resources.
Let me first provide you with my perspective on the National
Strategy for Counterterrorism. As this committee is well aware, we have
made progress in the past decade since the tragedy of September 11 in
confronting al Qaeda, its associated forces, and its adherents. I see
three primary reasons for our success in preventing another terrorist
attack on U.S. soil. First, we have taken down the al Qaeda sanctuary
in Afghanistan. Second, we have maintained constant pressure on the al
Qaeda network around the globe, including in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, crushing the ability of al Qaeda to conduct
strategic attacks. Lastly, we have built broad international
cooperation by developing strong counterterrorism partnerships with
countries around the globe.
Now, as we look to the decade ahead, the landscape is changing to
some extent. We have ended our combat role in Iraq, and in Afghanistan
we are transitioning increasing responsibility to the Afghan Government
and security forces. What will not change is our focus on aggressively
deterring, disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its
associated forces and adherents around the world, while maintaining
vigilance against other terrorist organizations that threaten or have
the potential to threaten the United States and our allies. These
efforts will be guided by the principles set forth in the National
Strategy for Counterterrorism adhering to U.S. core values, building
security partnerships, applying CT tools and capabilities
appropriately, and building a culture of resilience.
Our national and theater SOF employ a combination of direct and
indirect action to implement the strategy. While SOF's direct action
capabilities are likely to garner the most attention, just as
important--perhaps more so--are the SOF efforts to build the capacity
and capabilities of our partners and to shape the global information
and ideas environment. In addition to ``Global Train and Equip''
capacity building efforts often referred to as ``section 1206,'' other
SO/LIC-managed authorities are also critical to our efforts. These
include the counternarcotics authorities of sections 1004, 1033, 1021,
and 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act, which in addition
to traditional counter-drug support, also allow the Department to
enhance the capabilities of the security forces of our foreign partners
where there is a link between drug trafficking and terrorism. These
efforts often remain largely unnoticed, but have long-term, strategic
effects in CT.
In implementing the Counterterrorism Strategy, we will continue to
focus on al Qaeda's activities originating from Western Pakistan and
the FATA. As I noted earlier, we have made progress on this front, but
al Qaeda is a highly adaptive organization, and we must continue to
work with Pakistan to address threats emanating from this region.
Another important front against al Qaeda is in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP). Our challenge in this region is twofold. First, AQAP
poses a direct threat to our interests and the interests of our
partners. We've made a number of important gains over the past last
year against AQAP, but the group's capabilities and intent to conduct a
terrorist attack in the United States continue to represent a serious
threat. DOD continues to collaborate extensively with Yemeni forces on
operational matters, and together we are closely monitoring AQAP and
regularly improving our understanding of its external attack plots.
Efforts to counter AQAP's narrative have also helped delegitimize the
group and discourage its efforts to recruit new operatives. Second, a
large quantity of financial support from individuals and charities flow
from the region to al Qaeda and its associated forces and adherents
around the world. Addressing both of these threats requires partnership
with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait,
and others, to ensure that they have both the capabilities and the will
to effectively confront these challenges.
The last area of the Counterterrorism Strategy that I would like to
highlight for you today pertains to the global information environment.
As I alluded to previously, we know that al Qaeda cannot be defeated
with kinetic action alone. In order to counter the resonance of al
Qaeda's ideology, our approach must include a balance of capabilities,
implemented in close coordination with the interagency, our allies, and
local communities.
Recognizing the growing relationship among terrorists, insurgents,
drug traffickers, and other criminals, last year the President issued
his Strategy to Combat TOC. This forward-looking strategy seeks to
address an emerging, rapidly evolving type of threat to our national
security: networks of adversaries that operate at the nexus of
organized crime and politically-inspired violence. The convergence of
crime, terrorism, and insurgency is, in my view, a burgeoning geo-
political trend with grave implications. As the Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper, recently observed, ``Terrorists and
insurgents will increasingly turn to crime and criminal networks for
funding and logistics, in part because of U.S. and western success in
attacking other sources of their funding. Criminal connections and
activities of both Hizballah and AQIM illustrate this trend.''
The Strategy to Combat TOC recognizes that our traditional focus on
countering ``drug trafficking organizations'' must be expanded to a
wider perspective that acknowledges that narcotics trafficking is just
one component of the broader challenge of TOC. Important initial steps
in implementing this strategy have been recognizing the growing array
of security challenges global criminal networks pose, increasing the
understanding of the implications of the nexus among criminals,
terrorists, and insurgents, and developing effective policy tools to
degrade these threats, to include the ability to track and target the
funds that allow these threats to carry out their activities.
The Department plays a largely supporting role to U.S. interagency
efforts to combat TOC. In addition to DOD support to U.S. State, local,
and Federal law enforcement agencies, DOD is helping partner countries
build capacity to address narcotics trafficking and related TOC within
their borders. Critical to these efforts are the Department's
counternarcotics authorities and budget, which have proven to be
effective and flexible tools for confronting drug trafficking,
including where drug trafficking is linked to other forms of organized
crime.
Nowhere is the link between TOC, insurgency, and terrorism more
apparent than in Afghanistan, where the Taliban continues to receive a
large percentage of its revenue through the heroin trade. Because of
the convergence of these threats, our law enforcement partners such as
the Drug Enforcement Administration are employing their expertise and
authorities in support of DOD objectives on the battlefield. Today we
are seeing unprecedented integration of military and law enforcement
operations. In addition to depriving the enemy of vital narcotics-
related revenue, insurgents found to be involved in drug trafficking
may be prosecuted under Afghan law and incarcerated for over 10 years,
taking them off the battlefield and enhancing Afghan Government
institutions at the same time.
Because the threat networks we face are not limited to a single
illicit activity, we must continue to draw upon all elements of our
national power to confront them. The best example of what can be
achieved through a comprehensive approach of law enforcement, military,
and diplomatic support has been in Colombia, where I served as an
active duty Special Forces officer. Once on the verge of becoming a
narco-state in the 1990s, Colombia today has made substantial progress
in improving its security and continues to make progress against the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other criminal
groups. Colombia is now an exporter of security in the region,
supporting other nations' efforts to confront transnational organized
crime. This success is due in great part to ``Plan Colombia,''
Colombia's comprehensive plan for combating drug trafficking and its
detrimental effects on Colombian society. The principal credit of the
success of Plan Colombia belongs to the Colombian people themselves who
stood up to the criminality of terrorist organizations corrupted by the
illicit drug trade.
Another important factor in Colombia's success was a fundamental
shift in our understanding that the FARC was not simply a political
insurgency, but rather a criminal enterprise. Over time, that
fundamental change in perspective became the bedrock for facilitating a
cohesive, integrated, multi-agency approach to supporting Bogota's
efforts to degrade and defeat the FARC. By conceptualizing the threat
differently, we were able to create new lines of engagement and attack,
which led to strategic success against a group that posed an
existential threat to the Colombian state. Underpinning that success
was the support of Congress for a sustained strategy that could evolve
and integrate authorities from many agencies into one strategic effort.
There may be opportunities to take a similar approach against other
adversaries of significant national security concern that are both
terrorist and criminal in nature. As we identify these opportunities,
we will be working with you and our colleagues across the interagency.
From the Colombia experience, we know that in order to confront
increasingly networked threats, we need to be increasingly networked as
a government. Active threat networks will exploit the limitations the
U.S. Government often faces because of separate agency authorities,
budgets, and institutional cultures. The National Strategy to Combat
TOC is a call to action to leverage all the elements of national power
to protect citizens and U.S. national security interests and to enable
our foreign partners to do the same.
In conclusion, both of these strategies seek to proactively deter
and confront emerging threats to our national security, whether they
are terrorists or criminals or, increasingly, individuals operating at
the nexus of what are too often conceptual stovepipes. To be effective
on both fronts, we must continue to build cooperation across DOD and
the U.S. Government, while at the same time developing the capacities
of like-minded foreign partners. As Assistant Secretary of Defense SO/
LIC, I am committed to working with this committee to continue to build
our CT and combating TOC capabilities so that we are even more
effective in the decade ahead. Thank you again for this opportunity,
and I look forward to a frank dialogue during the question and answer
session.

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Secretary Sheehan. I understand
that, Mr. Reid and Mr. Wechsler, you all have some short
opening statements.
Mr. Reid. Actually I do not. I can.
Senator Hagan. Feel free to take a few minutes for an
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING TERRORISM

Mr. Reid. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and Senator
Portman, for the opportunity to come back and talk to you again
today. It has been just about a year since I came over with the
other colleagues in the gap between Assistant Secretaries. So,
it is good to be back here again. We work closely with your
staff regularly and appreciate the support and interaction.
We feel, as has been highlighted, that as much has been
done in many years of war at great cost, that significant
progress is being made in the CT and special operations area.
As you highlighted, Madam Chair, with the release of a new
strategy and the process going forward, we are currently
looking at how we bridge from past, present, into future, how
that affects our SOFs and our CT authorities, resources, and
everything you highlighted.
So, I look forward to the opportunity to focus in on your
specific questions in these areas and those portions of the
portfolio that I support for the Assistant Secretary.
Thank you.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Wechsler.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS

Mr. Wechsler. Thank you also for having me back, and I want
to compliment you on the topic of this hearing that combines
these issues, as Assistant Secretary Sheehan said, which too
often are viewed separately.
If I might just in a very brief opening statement point out
four different trends that we see that are included in both
strategies. First, terrorist groups are adopting criminal
techniques to fundraise, for logistics, for movements. This we
see accelerating. This is something that Director of National
Intelligence Clapper talked about in his threat briefing to the
committee.
Second, criminal organizations are adopting terrorist
techniques. The criminal organizations in Mexico did not invent
the idea of beheading people and putting the videos up on You
Tube. They saw others do that, but then they adapted it for
their own needs, and that is a different dynamic that we are
seeing.
The third dynamic is terrorist organizations and criminal
organization that heretofore have been separate are working
together in ways that we had not seen previously. Nothing
illustrates this more than the attempted assassination of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Ambassador here in the United States
by the Qods Force trying to use the Mexican Zetas cartel.
Then the fourth trend that I might suggest is a little
different than the first three, which is states, as we used to
think of states, as we still think of states as being sponsors
of terror, there are also states that are sponsors of crime,
that use criminal activity as a tool of the state, as a revenue
producer of the state. That is a dynamic that we are watching
very closely and trying to work against.
So, with that, I am very happy to take your questions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Thanks to all of you for being
here. Right now, what I think we ought to do, Senator Portman,
is take turns and not limit ourselves to a specific number of
minutes. Then obviously if other Senators come in, we can
adjust that.
We also have a vote at 3:30 p.m. that has been announced,
so I think we are clear to continue here until 3:40 p.m.
We obviously are talking about the President's new
strategies that are articulating the threat and then the tools
to combat the threats from terrorism and TCOs. But there is
little in the strategies that lays out the roles and missions
of DOD.
So, Secretary Sheehan, can you discuss the roles and the
missions of DOD in implementing these two strategies and speak
to the situations where you think DOD will be a supported
organization versus where it will be supporting another
organization?
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Actually, as you are
well aware, in all our national security challenges moving
forward, they are becoming increasingly interagency. DOD works
very closely with the Department of State (DOS), the Central
Intelligence Agency, and other organizations in an integrated
manner. But obviously in a CT aspect, DOD has a major lead role
in that.
I like to think about it, and I know that SOCOM does, in
two general areas: direct action and indirect action, or the
strike operations and the advise and assist. We play--and
obviously in the special operations community, what I am
primarily responsible for has a major role in both of those
areas of operation.
The kinetic action has primarily focused in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and increasingly in the Horn of Africa, as well as
once in a while in Yemen, in those three areas. So, the primary
interest for me for al Qaeda has always been Pakistan, has been
for 15 years actually. Even when al Qaeda was in Afghanistan
prior to September 11, they moved through Pakistan. So, that
remains the number one area, the launch point for strategy
attack from al Qaeda.
But increasingly, I have been concerned about Yemen. By the
way, that is not new either as I was the Ambassador for
Counterterrorism when the USS Cole was hit in 2000, and that
came from Yemen as well. So, Yemen has always been a breeding
ground for al Qaeda going back to the 1990s. But increasingly,
it is shifting west into Africa, into Somalia, and across
Africa. So, we need a combination strategy--in DOD, both the
kinetic action to take out leaders when we see them, and then
we need another strategy to advise and assist countries so that
they can do the work. So, those are two of the major
components.
At the center of both of those is the fusion of
intelligence operations and combat operations, and which since
I have come back into government, I have seen this
extraordinary improvement in those capabilities within the
special operations community to get intelligence from all
sources, fuse those together with analysis, and then translate
that into action on the battlefield, which is really the
capacity of our special operation community to do that has been
so greatly developed.
I think that is really the heart of the strategy, Madam
Chair, is those components of direct action of hitting the
terrorists with kinetic strikes, training/advising others to do
work in their country, and then the combination of the
intelligence and the operation. That is really the heart of the
operational aspects of attacking al Qaeda. Now, obviously there
are other parts of it in terms of information operations,
fighting the growth of terrorist organization, and the
recruitment of terrorist organizations. All those are
important. But at the heart of it are those other parts of it.
In terms of organized crime, DOD plays a supporting role
there to our law enforcement partners primarily, but we can
bring tremendous capacity to the table, integrating with those
organizations to bring pressure against organized crime,
narcotics traffickers, both at the tactical level in
Afghanistan, and at the strategic level where these
organizations are operating.
I am going to leave it at that and allow my deputies to
fill in.
Senator Hagan. When you were talking just then, how does
DOD's role in combating the TOC actually work in concert with
the DOS and for roles and missions? Mr. Reid or Mr. Wechsler
feel free to join in.
Mr. Sheehan. Madam Chair, I was the Ambassador to
Counterterrorism at DOS, and for me it was all about leveraging
the national will of our partners and the diplomatic action to
do that. So, what we would do in the defense and the
Intelligence Community is try to find out--to outline the
trends, to find where these funds were flowing from to be as
specific as we can. Then the job of DOS was to help to bring
the political pressure to bear on countries that take
appropriate action. A lot of these funds are flowing through
banks and other areas, and the action taken by host countries,
quite frankly, has not either been effective or willing enough
to put the pressure on those.
So, it is a combination of law enforcement, which helps
identify, bring the law enforcement tools, DOD brings its
different capacities to bear, and the DOS is about the
diplomatic pressure. All together hopefully you will have a
strategy that dries up some of these flows of funding.
Senator Hagan. This will be my last question, and then we
will go to Senator Portman. But let me ask about specifically
Yemen and East Africa. In last year's defense authorization
bill, it included the two authorities permitting DOD to expand
its capacity building activities in East Africa and Yemen. It
permitted DOD to spend up to $150 million to provide equipment,
training, supplies, minor military construction, and we are
talking about the countries Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and any
nation that would contribute to the African Union mission in
Somalia, as well as Yemen's Ministry of Interior (MOI)
counterterrorism unit (CTU).
If you could explain to me whether DOD intends to use these
authorities, and particularly the minor military construction
authority and the authority to support militaries deploying to
Somalia. If you could expand on that issue.
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Madam Chair. We do intend to use those
authorities in those areas. Obviously, in Yemen we had a little
difficulty in delays in that because of the political strife
that was there. But we do want to move forward in both of those
areas with those authorities. Let me turn to Garry Reid who may
give you some of the details on that.
Mr. Reid. We appreciate very much the authority granted
here. I would offer just an example on the construction. As you
may recall, before the political crisis in Yemen, we had
reached a point where they were looking to expand the
capability of their CTU. Again, this is a MOI CTU for which
Congress provided us the authority to work with in this current
year legislation. We were not able to do that last year.
But the CTU expansion is a good example because here is an
organization that is probably the most capable in terms of CT,
but it is really designed to operate in Sana'a. They had put
forth a proposal prior to the political crisis to expand CTU
out into some of these provincial areas, which we thought was a
good idea. Part of getting that done requires us to create a
little space for them to get out there and set up in a way that
we want to be there advising them. Again, this would all be
subject to a process, but they need to have a place to go that
we can work with also.
So, whether it would be something as simple as setting up a
pistol range where you go to get a bulldozer and some plywood.
Under most authorities, those would not be permitted for
training. You may build something a little more elaborate than
that, an operations center made out of plywood, something like
that is where that minor construction becomes very important.
It gives us a place to operate from. It gives us a place to go
with them, and it sets the seeds for them to build further
under their own system, kind of paints the picture for them, so
to speak.
I think that is the best example of that.
Senator Hagan. The actual extension of the fact that this
expires soon.
Mr. Reid. Working on it right now in terms of both of the
Yemen MOI and the East Africa, working with U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command on their side to pull
these proposals together and get them coordinated in both
departments. Again, this is Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State, sort of dual key. Work that up and then go through the
notification process to Congress, and we are optimistic and
confident we are going to make full use of these authorities.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to talk about Iran. Secretary Sheehan, thank you for
joining us. It is good to have you here. These guys did a great
job without you last year, but they were all waiting for you.
Last year, the Treasury Department designated a number of
high-ranking members of al Qaeda who operated a facilitation
network from inside Iran, and this is the press release
announcing the designation. This is from David Cohen, who was
the Under Secretary of Treasury. ``Iran is the leading state
sponsor of terrorism in the world today. By exposing Iran's
secret deal with al Qaeda, allowing it to funnel funds and
operatives throughout its territory, we are illuminating yet
another aspect of Iran's unmatched support for terrorism.''
So, it is frightening that combination of al Qaeda and
Iran. A Shia country to have a Sunni terrorist group might not
seem logical, but it is obviously in existence.
So, my question, with Iran's long history of terrorist
organizations, like Hezbollah and Hamas, to be able to project
their influence around the region, what do you think about this
al Qaeda relationship, especially when you combine it with the
allegations of Iranian ties to planned or actual terrorist
attacks against our allies? Earlier, the apparent planned
attack here in DC was mentioned, but we certainly have seen
this in India, Thailand, and elsewhere.
What is your understanding of this relationship? Do you see
it as expanding in scope? Is it important to al Qaeda's
leadership? Do you see this as part of a growing trend of Iran
using non-traditional alliances with terrorist organizations to
further their anti-Western goals?
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Senator. It is a very important
question, and one that is very interesting.
As you mentioned, it would seem illogical for a Shia state,
like the Iranians, to harbor a Sunni terrorist organization,
organizations that have fought each other in the past. It is
one that perhaps I would not have predicted prior to September
11, but it, as a fact, has happened. The depth of the Iranian
cynicism and use of terrorism as an instrument is expanding,
and this is a classic example.
When they originally took the al Qaeda folks after
September 11, I was watching it closely to see how they would
manage them. It seems to have evolved over time. Increasingly
there seems to be more of an alliance than just the holding of
them. People--and also the movement of al Qaeda operatives
through Iran is also very, very troubling.
They seem to be using them as instruments. I am not sure I
would call it an alliance--but certainly using them by
harboring and then being to release them and move them around
is something very troubling to our interests.
The Iranians are looking at a range of instruments as they
feel the pressure from the international community on their
nuclear program. They are looking at a range of options that
they might be able to use. You have seen some of their
activities over the last few months using terrorism to try and
intimidate the Israelis and others. I think they are probably
looking at other options to include these operatives to find
ways that they can continue to intimidate the international
community so they can have space to achieve their objectives.
It is something that we need to be very, very watchful of
and try to build international coalitions to bring pressures
against Iran so that they limit their options to use terrorism
to advance their interests.
Senator Portman. What should we be doing that we are not
doing with regard to al Qaeda and Iran?
Mr. Sheehan. One of the more challenging things is trying
to get better intelligence on it. It is a difficult operating
environment, and we will continue to work with the Intelligence
Community on that to get a clear picture on what they are
doing, and then try to intercept these people as they move.
That is something we have been very good at over the last years
is trying to track terrorists as they move around the globe and
then intercept them. So, I think intelligence is going to be
the key thing to bring to bear against these individuals.
The second, as I mentioned, I think Iran is susceptible to
international pressure. When we can bring all our European
allies and others together and we can ratchet up pressure on
them, whether it be sanctions or otherwise, I think that can
also be very effective. The extent that we can paint a clear
picture to our friends and allies about that enables us to
bring more pressure against them. That can work. They are
susceptible to that.
I think it is a matter of intelligence and then political
pressure. It is just increasing it and ratcheting it up.
Senator Portman. Actually, this would be troubling to the
Europeans. Is it troubling to the Russians, and is it troubling
to the Chinese, to have al Qaeda being harbored in Iran?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator Portman, that is a good question. The
Russians and Chinese, I have been talking to both of those
countries about al Qaeda since the late 1990s. They certainly
have concerns about al Qaeda, but not at the same level we do.
The Russians obviously had their own issues with Chechnyan
terrorists and other Islamic terrorists, but not as directly
with al Qaeda. So, they are not as focused on it. The same
thing with the Chinese. They have certain concerns about
Islamic extremism within their borders, but again, not the
level of focus that we have on al Qaeda. It is not to say that
they are going to support it all, but they often--you have to
drag them a little bit along further in order to get the
pressure to bear.
Obviously, both of those countries have their own economic
relationship with Iran and with the Chinese with oil and with
the Russians with defense articles. You know that equation as
well as I do. It is one that we just have to continue to work
through and try to bring them on board as well, because
ultimately at the end of the day on an issue like al Qaeda,
they are going to support us, but not just as aggressively as
perhaps our European allies.
Senator Portman. Mr. Reid, the last time you were here, you
talked some about your experience. I have a question for you
with regard to the impact on our special forces, in particular,
after 10 years of sustained combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Some people have talked about the fact that there
has been a degradation in the force, and that some of the core
competencies, particularly in language and cultural expertise,
have been lost by having such a focus on Iraq and Afghanistan.
What specialties, skill sets, do you believe have been
impacted the most? Are you concerned about it? What is being
done to rebuild these skill sets?
Mr. Reid. Thank you for that question, Senator. It is
something that we are paying close attention to, as well as
SOCOM, which has taken some steps in these areas, and we have
worked together on that.
With regards to language and culture, we established within
DOD a steering committee for language and culture expertise. We
used the proficiency standards coming out of Afghanistan for
basic counterinsurgency, language, level of understanding,
level of proficiencies from basic solider up through squad
leader, platoon leader, company commander, as well as the
cultural training piece. We took that and worked through the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to have
the Secretary establish Service-wide, DOD-wide standards.
SOCOM took that piece and has created language programs
within each of the component commands. Marine Corps Special
Forces Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, Naval Special Warfare Command all have their own
language programs. All of this is an effort to get ahead of
this problem that we talked about a year ago. As you probably
are aware, Senator, because of the tempo of activity in the
CENTCOM AOR, we still have around 80 percent of all deployed
SOF in CENTCOM. That has led us to over the years using our 7th
Special Forces Group, which oriented on South America, 3rd
Group oriented on Africa, 10th Group in Europe, and 1st Group
in the Pacific. All of them have been supporting operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
About 2 years ago we tried to reset that as much as
possible. You still are going to have some of that because of
the demand in the theater, but we are into a better rhythm now
of getting those regional forces exposure and interaction
through things like the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
program and others. So, in between deployments, they are
getting some of that exposure back in their region.
We have done some realignment using the National Guard,
19th and 20th groups, to get them to cover some of these things
as well. So, we feel like we are at a point where we are
building it back up.
At the same time, although the demands are still quite
heavy in Afghanistan, we are also realizing the growth of the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of adding the additional
battalions worth of teams to each of the groups. That has
created an additional depth within the groups, again, to help
start alleviating the back-to-back deployments to Afghanistan
phenomenon that was creating this gap in expertise in the other
regions.
With respect to the skills, again, largely through things
like the JSOC program, we get all the operators exposed to
different skill sets that they may not be using in Afghanistan.
But I would also say that the situation in Afghanistan is such
that we are working, for instance, with the Afghanistan local
police. That for us, is really an unconventional warfare
technique set that we are using to work with local forces and
create these local security organizations. It is something you
would see more in a unconventional warfare setting. Obviously
in Afghanistan, it is in a foreign internal defense setting.
But we are using those skills. We are using the CT skills. We
are using the direct action skills. We are using the foreign
internal defense skills.
So, by and large, the majority of those are being hit in
some measure by most of the operators.
Senator Portman. That is good. I have a question for Mr.
Wechsler on Mexico after we have a chance for another round.
But just one quick question. It is really the most important
question I think that I have today having just heard what Mr.
Reid said about the reset and about special operations, in
particular, and the need for broadening some of these skill
sets after this focus. This all requires funding, and it all
requires resources that are being constrained by the first step
of the BCA.
Then, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we now have
the second $490 billion sequestration. If you could just
briefly describe to the committee, and I know that the chair is
interested in this as well, what impact do you anticipate the
$490 billion, the sequestration, to have on your programs, the
ones under your purview we have just been talking about, and
the ones you indicate the more resources are in certain areas,
and what impact does the uncertainty of waiting until sometime
later this year--maybe it is late fall, maybe it is the end of
the year--with regard to the programs and activities that you
oversee?
I am going to come back to Mr. Wechsler later if I have
time on Mexico. I would like to talk to you about this.
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, it is difficult to answer because the
Secretary of Defense has already been very clear about how
devastating it would be. Within DOD, we have not yet decided
how we would respond to that sequestration. But regardless to
say, with that large of amount of money, it would certainly
spill into the special operations community, and I think it
would have a major impact on our ability to conduct the type of
operations around the world that we are doing now.
In both areas that I mentioned before, both in the direct
action, the kinetic strikes against al Qaeda could be
effective, although I think those would be protected pretty
much. But our ability then to build the coalitions and the
types of partnerships that we need around the world, that had
to be an impact for sure.
Senator Portman. As they are developing the fiscal year
2014 budget, are they already coming to you and talking about
what sequestration would mean for you, and are you giving them
some analysis?
Mr. Sheehan. Not yet, Senator. We have not been asked to do
that yet within DOD. But we are aware it is out there. We are
aware it is the law. So, that planning will come if we are not
able to get it resolved.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe, as a member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, we welcome you to this subcommittee hearing, and you
are up.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. I wanted to come by this
subcommittee because I know we have a lot of interest here. Of
course, Mr. Reid is as familiar as anyone with the Lords
Resistance Army (LRA) and what is going on.
Unfortunately, there is a misunderstanding when we first
put the language in, and a lot of people thought it was
something where we were taking on another Libya or that kind of
situation. I think it is very important for all of us on the
committee, as well as you folks, to make sure people
understand. It was specifically structured so that there would
not be combat activity, and it is the type of thing we have
talked about. I have been involved with this for 15 years.
I guess the first question I would ask is, is it reasonable
for people to classify this in that it only started in Northern
Uganda. That is where it was when I first ran into it. Then, of
course, more recently meeting with the new country of South
Sudan, and then all the way down to the Central African
Republic, and even touching on Rwanda and Eastern Congo. It has
spread to the point where it could be considered to be a
terrorist organization by the United States. I would say if you
would agree that it would fall into that category.
Mr. Reid. With the LRA, Senator?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, the LRA.
Mr. Reid. As I am sure you know, Senator, for those that do
not, Joseph Kony himself has been present on terrorist
exclusion list for some time in our Government, and we use that
in part as a basis for some of our resourcing for the counter
LRA mission.
The organization itself certainly operates with the tactic
of terrorism from, I guess, a bit of an academic perspective,
whether what they seek to accomplish with that could be
debated. But we certainly in the context of approaching them as
an adversary and our advice and assistance to the Ugandan
People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and others is exactly the
approach that we have applied to terrorist organizations, and
that is they have to make a comprehensive effort not only to go
after senior leaders, they have to understand the supporting
networks that allow them to operate, and they have to focus on
the local populations to prevent, when they do clearing
operations that group from coming back in there.
So, from all those points of view and my business in the CT
world, they certainly be treated in that fashion as a defeat
and countering strategy.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I have often looked at what we are
trying to do with the LRA as kind of a 1206/1208 train-and-
equip type of thing, that we are assisting them, which I would
say, from your view, how do you see the train-and-equip
program?
Mr. Reid. We are absolutely doing an advise/assist program,
and we are providing training and equipment. DOD is not the
only one providing training. There are international
organizations as well that are providing equipment to the UPDF
and others. But our role clearly in this construct is limited
to advise and assist. Our troops are not authorized or
empowered to make decisions that would put them in conflict
with the LRA. In fact, the sort of rules of the road are
advise/assist. If you have where you are asked to or you have
an opportunity to participate in that activity, that there is
an expectation of contact with a force at all, then you have to
stop, and at that point there would have to be a policy
discussion back in Washington about whether that was an
appropriate step or not.
We are not up against that right now. The advise and assist
operation, since October, has progressed in a manner that was
envisioned. We have some folks up forward, Senator, and we are
increasing the effectiveness of these forces in their mobile
search operations and integrating their command and control,
improving their communications between the different nations
that are involved. Those are all the objectives we set out to
do, and we think we are relatively on track.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and I appreciate that. Really what I
was getting at, though, is just from your perspective, the
three of you, the train-and-equip program, the merits of that
program. Would you have any comments to make on that?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I thank you for the question. I think
they are fundamental for our ability to do our job around the
world. Increasingly as our missions shift away from Iraq and
Afghanistan, these authorities are absolutely essential for us
to conduct this classic special operations foreign internal
defense mission, as Garry was laying out to you. So, we look
forward to working with the committee to extend those
authorities and continue to use them effectively.
Senator Inhofe. The Global Security Contingency Fund, which
is kind of our thing, would you have any comments to make on
that?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator. Again, we are very supportive of
this fund. We are working very closely with DOS now to move
forward our proposals. We see these, again, as fundamental to
our being able to do these jobs in this new environment.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Mr. Reid, it has been probably about
5 or 6 weeks. Is there anything that we need to meet on since
that time? Any updates? Not here, obviously.
Mr. Reid. Not here.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
Mr. Reid. But, again, I would just summarize that from all
the expectations that were built in the front end of this, I
would characterize this as being as on track as we could have
imagined based on the milestones and objectives we laid out.
Senator Inhofe. Good.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. What I propose that we do is
continue going until 3:40 p.m., and then we will reconvene
after the vote. There is a vote, Senator Inhofe, at 3:30 p.m.
Senator Inhofe. At 3:30 p.m., yes.
Senator Hagan. Yes.
Secretary Wechsler, at our meeting last week, you discussed
the success of the training efforts of the Afghan
counternarcotics police. Can you spend a moment updating the
committee on this program with the thought in mind of what role
DEA has played in this program, and how has DOD supported the
DEA's efforts? What are the lessons that we are learning or
have learned from the Afghanistan training program that can be
applied to other efforts around the globe?
Mr. Wechsler. Sure. The efforts that we have done to
integrate military and law enforcement operations in
Afghanistan have really taken us beyond anything that we have
previously experienced in DOD. There are a lot of lessons that
can be taken out of the success.
The most critical one is when we are dealing with an
adversary that has revenue sources from criminal activity, from
drug trafficking, in this case, in order to fund itself to meet
us on the battlefield, the authorities and skill basis that we
need to defeat that adversary extend beyond those that are
contained inside DOD.
We need to rely on our law enforcement partners on the
authorities and the skills that they can bring to the table. In
this case, the DEA's efforts have truly been critical to our
integrated efforts to take down the nexus of narcotics,
insurgency, and terrorism, especially in the south of
Afghanistan.
We have helped in terms of funding, in terms of logistics,
in terms of planning, and in terms of enabling the DEA to do
its work. What they have done, and what has been very
effective, is building Afghan capability, as you mentioned.
They have a variety of specialized vetted units that are very
highly trained, that have been built over time that now number
in the hundreds in order to do investigations, in order to do
interdiction operations, in order to do air lift, in order to
do legal judicial wiretaps, that are really critical.
In fact, in many cases, these vetted units are now so
effective that they are operating independently on their own
without DEA support, much less DOD support. I see the reports
of what they are doing on a weekly basis, and it is definitely
helpful to us in our war effort and our continued efforts that
are going to go forward in the foreseeable future to continue
focusing on the nexus between crime and terrorism in that part
of the world.
Senator Hagan. Do you have any idea how much money actually
comes into Afghanistan having to do with the narcotics trade?
Do we keep a focus on that year in and year out?
Mr. Wechsler. The answer is that there are many estimates
of total amounts of money. I am not exactly sure that any of
those estimates have a very narrow error range around them. But
it is to say that one thing we do know for sure is that 90 plus
percent of the world's heroin, the entire world's heroin, comes
out of Afghanistan. The parts of Afghanistan that it comes out
of are exactly those parts where the Taliban has influence, and
in some cases, serious local control.
That is not an accident. The Taliban and the narcotics
trade are intricately related, and the efforts that we are
making to go after--you cannot go after one without going after
the other. That is why we built these efforts. Our estimate is
that a majority of the funds, especially local funds that are
what the Taliban uses, are derived from different parts of the
drug trade.
Senator Hagan. So, do you think over the years that we are
having success in reducing that 90 percent that is coming out
of Afghanistan?
Mr. Wechsler. What our experience in Colombia has shown is
that that is the most lagging of indicators. It is only after
you have success taking down the networks, after you have
success building security, that then you start to see total
amounts of drug production go down. It is not a leading
indicator; it is a lagging indicator.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. After the unintentional and
regrettable burning of the Korans in Afghanistan recently,
there have been a number of incidents in which our U.S.
servicemembers have been killed by individuals wearing the
Afghan uniforms. As a matter of fact, I believe it was just
yesterday I was heading to the Capitol, and there was a
servicemember who was wounded. When I was chatting with him, he
actually said that he had been shot by an Afghan military
counterpart.
Our SOF have to work closely with our Afghan counterparts
obviously on a variety of operations, often far from the
protection afforded at a larger military installation. The
troubling reports I think even as of this morning indicate that
an alleged member of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) opened fire
on coalition troops yesterday, killing one.
Can you tell me if those reports are accurate? Then do you
have any force protection concerns for our special operation
units as they continue to carry out these very important
operations? Then how would these instances be addressed?
Mr. Sheehan. Madam Chair, these reports are generally
correct, the ones you refer to, and I think there was recent
killing of some of our coalition partners also from Afghan
security forces (ASF). This is an extremely troubling trend
that seems to be growing.
It is an issue for our SOF as well, although normally those
forces operating with smaller units out in outposts, they get
to know them very, very well, and perhaps it would have been
less of a chance. But nevertheless, it is a major concern.
The size of the ASF is so large, in many ways it represents
Afghan society in a way. There is this frustration among some
elements of that society that is reflected within their
military. They have been agitated by different types of clerics
and other extremist leaders, and they are hearing that
language, and it is motivating them to take steps and take up
arms against our soldiers and our coalition soldiers. So, this
is a major concern across the force to include SOFs.
There are numerous programs right now being administered to
try to determine where these types of people may pop up. But
this is very difficult because of the emotions involved, and
because of the susceptibility of some of these members of the
ASF to fall susceptible to the radical narrative that is being
spread around that country.
So, this is a major concern. Even at the strategic level it
has an impact, these types of killings. But hopefully we will
be able to minimize that, work our way through that, and
continue to build partnerships with our ASF that generally is
moving in the right direction, and is really the focus of our
strategy moving forward. This will be a major part of it.
During a vetting process where we feel that there is
somebody that could possibly have an adverse reaction to the
U.S. troops, how is that handled as far as conversations and
communications with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
or the police? Then what action is then taken?
Mr. Sheehan. Obviously, Madam Chair, in the vetting of
people coming into a unit, it is easier to throw them out, and
that is being done increasingly, programs to try to vet new
units. But for people that were in the force, it is much more
difficult to do. So, I am not sure right now whether we have
identified--been able to do that yet. I will turn to Garry. I
am not sure that we have really been able to kick people out
for identifying extremism.
But when there are people identified as extremists, we work
with the Afghans to move them out. But it is difficult.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid.
Mr. Reid. Are you specifically asking about the ALP? I
thought you were. As you may know, that process, the nomination
and vetting process, is driven by the tribal elders, the
village leadership down at the lowest level possible. We think
that is the strength of the program. All of that ends up being
vetted and approved by the district governor as well.
So, the very closeness that on one hand creates maybe the
greatest vulnerability for us, it also gives us the best
awareness of who we are dealing with.
Senator Hagan. How about the ASF?
Mr. Reid. Within the ASF more broadly, again, that process
is done through the the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
training mission in Afghanistan. I am not personally familiar
with how that vetting and validation works.
Senator Hagan. Are you familiar whether we have lost any
SOF in the smaller units further away from the major
installations?
Mr. Reid. Yes, ma'am. With regards to the post-Koran green-
on-blue, knock on wood, we have been fortunate that no Afghan
that we are working directly with has turned his weapon on a
special operator. Again, we are lucky in that sense. But I
think it is a function of the familiarity the Secretary spoke
of.
With respect to the incident last night in Paktika, from
what I have seen on that, it was not that case. It was a case
of a checkpoint. What I know about it, it seems more what I
would call a fog of war issue. It was not a I am turning my
weapon on you because I know you are an American SOF person and
I am mad at you. That was not the case. Some confusion, some
checkpoint, not quite clear. But from what I have seen so far,
I would not put it in that green-on-blue category just yet.
Senator Hagan. It is a tragedy whether it is a SOF or
anybody within our military when this occurs obviously. The
vetting process, I think, needs to be delved into a little bit
more, especially for people who are still currently--or have
been in the Afghan force.
Let me ask one more question. Al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has expanded its role and influence in
the region as a result of large ransom payments, and then an
influx of weapons from the conflict in Libya. What ongoing
efforts does DOD have to counter AQIM? What authorities is DOD
leveraging to conduct these operations?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator Hagan, this is, as I said, after
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in the Horn of Africa, and Yemen,
this is right--coming up as the number three priority and
rising for DOD and, particularly, for our office for the spread
of AQIM in North Africa. It is very, very troubling. Again, not
really new. It goes back into the late 1990s, but now it is
increasing the acceleration of al Qaeda's influence there is
very, very troubling.
This is a very troubled part of the world, and in each
country there are different challenges for us to operate there.
We are working country by country to look for opportunities to
establish the relationships there and start to build our
coalitions to fight AQIM in North Africa.
Again, this is an important question because we will need
different authorities. We will need different types of programs
in order for us to engage with the range of countries from
Libya down through Mali, which is obviously in the middle of a
chaos right now, to Mauritania, all the way--and, quite
frankly, all the way over to Nigeria. So, we are talking about
spanning across the whole continent.
We are looking in my office particularly looking at Africa
very closely, as is General Ham is, to look across these
countries to figure out how we are going to address this in a
coherent way as AQIM grows and strengthens in a very troubling
way.
Senator Hagan. When you say ``different authorities,'' can
you give me an example of what you are describing, or what you
are thinking?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator. Most of the authorities that we
have right now are narrowly construed to CT, and those work. I
think, for some countries, we may need a little bit more
flexibility to go in there. I know Admiral McRaven, the SOCOM
Commander is thinking of some broader authorities and multi-
year funding so we can establish the relationships in some of
these countries, and start to develop the defense relationships
to then build upon their capacity to take on these threats.
As you mentioned, some of these threats are pure
terrorism--extortion groups, criminal groups, different types
of threats. So, if we have a broader range of authorities, we
can respond with more agility to each country with a different
set of programs. So, I think that is the direction we are
thinking.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. It is now 3:40 p.m., and the vote
has not started yet, so, Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thanks, Madam Chair. I cannot come back
after the vote.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Senator Portman. So, I am going to ask my questions now.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Senator Portman. First of all, when you say ``additional
authorities,'' I assume you are not seeking statutory
authorities? Are you talking about understandings with these
countries that would be agreements on a bilateral basis, or are
you looking for legislative authority?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, we are looking for some legislative
authority that we will be bringing up later and discussing with
you, I believe, in the weeks or months ahead that might be able
to give us some broader authorities, legislative authorities,
and multiyear funding for some of the types of activities we
would like to do in terms of building coalitions to take on
these complex threats.
Senator Portman. Okay. We look forward to that, and I hope
you will be able even now to give us some sense of what you are
looking for, because there may not be many vehicles moving this
year unfortunately. So, to the extent you can get us that even
in anticipation of those specifics and before the NDAA gets put
together, that would be helpful.
With regard to Mexico, I mentioned, Mr. Wechsler, I wanted
to ask you some questions about that. Obviously what President
Calderon has done going after the cartels has come at enormous
costs. I think over 50,000 Mexicans have now lost their lives
since 2006, 13,000 last year alone. Of course, this impacts not
only Mexico, but us, including American citizens.
What is your assessment of what is going on right now in
Mexico, the current security situation, and what threat do you
believe these violent criminal organizations pose to the United
States, particularly along the southern border? Are we making
progress?
Mr. Wechsler. Sure. President Calderon deserves a great
deal of credit and respect for his hard first order decision to
take the battle to these criminals. This is a change of
longstanding Mexican history. It is a right decision that he
made. One of the challenges is that when you make that
decision, things tend to look bad before they get worse. In
fact, in some cases they have to look worse because they get
better.
There has been a lot of progress that has been made inside
Mexico, a lot of progress of dismantling certain organizations
and splintering them. But with that progress has come increased
violence in a number of places. This is a continuing challenge
for the Mexicans, and one that they will continue to face in
the years ahead.
This is of critical importance, of course, to the United
States because this is our neighbor. This is our friend. This
is our partner. This is our third largest trading partner, as
you are well aware. It is also important for the United States
because unlike, say, the Colombians back in the 1980s when they
were dominating the drug trade into Florida, the Mexican TCOs
have a much greater presence at the wholesale and retail level
inside the United States.
One of the challenges that I think we face is sometimes we
look so much at the border that we do not pay enough attention
to some of the things that are happening inside the United
States. This is where DOD works, but I cannot help but notice
that just at the end of last year, the DEA did one operation in
Chicago against a sell of the Mexican Zetas, and they captured
$13 million in bulk cash. That is an incredible amount of bulk
cash sitting there. These are the kinds of operations that our
colleagues in law enforcement are doing every day and are a big
part of how we solve this issue.
Senator Portman. I appreciate the answer. I do think when
you have these kinds of seizures, you are talking about the
cashier and a 15-ton seizure of methamphetamines outside
Guadalajara earlier this year, which it certainly sounds like a
lot, and it is. It is equivalent to nearly half of meth
seizures worldwide as recently as 2009.
So, the question is, are we making progress with those kind
of numbers? That was worth $4 billion, one seizure. I just
wonder what it tells us about the progress we are making.
Again, I think President Calderon has been courageous, and I
think he is doing the rights things. How can we assist him in
different ways to be able to make more progress? That would be
my question, not that I am looking for an answer today. But if
you would like to submit one for the record, that would be
appreciated, unless you have something you would like to
mention.
Mr. Wechsler. Yes, sure. I cannot talk about any individual
investigation or operation. I do want to point out that one of
the things that we try to do is make sure that DOD is
supporting law enforcement in the appropriate ways as we can.
Joint Interagency Task Force West in Honolulu has built up
significant expertise over the years in tracking containers and
identifying suspect containers. Over the last year, we have
focused a lot of that work on specifically methamphetamine
related container shipments across the Pacific towards the
Western Hemisphere. Some of the statistics that you are seeing
are evidence of good interagency work that is being done.
Senator Portman. Central America also tragic when you see
what is happening there. The U.S. Southern Command commander
recently said Central America has become the key transshipment
zone. Ninety percent of cocaine destined for the United States,
transits the sub region. I am told that San Pedro Sula, where I
have been, in Honduras, is now known as the most dangerous city
in the world, alarming increase in violence.
So, I would ask you, Mr. Wechsler, but also Secretary
Sheehan, what do you think the current situation is in Central
America? What should we be doing we are not doing to help our
allies in the region increase their capacity to confront this
incredible spike in violence? What are the major gaps, and what
should we be doing? You were a special operator in Colombia.
You have seen a successful play in Colombia. Why are we not
seeing the same success in Mexico and in Central America?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I think it is a classic case where in
Mexico where there has been progress, it has pushed things
south, or the Mexicans have put pressure on the cartels. They
look for other opportunities to move their products, their
precursors, and other activity. Central America has been
traditionally weak states. I served there as special forces
captain in El Salvador in the 1980s, very violent place as
well. I was also in Honduras for many tours as a member of the
7th Special Forces Group.
The Central American Governments have never been very
strong. Their economies are very fragile, so there are
opportunities. The narcotics traffickers have found great
opportunities to operate there, and they moved in there very
quickly, and we have to respond. Basically we need to respond
with all the instruments that we have, both in Mexico and in
Colombia, and in other parts we must try to push back against
the expansion of the narcotics industry through Central
America, because these weakened states are very, very
vulnerable. So, it is something that DOD is turning to, and we
look forward to moving all those fronts in Central America to
help strengthen those states.
Senator Portman [presiding]. The chair is wisely going to
vote, and I am going to be joining her in a second. I guess
just one final question getting back to, again, the opening
statement and the original conversation about resources. This
is a general question, but it goes to the physical constraints
we are going to be feeling here for quite some time regardless
of what happens with sequestration.
Do you suspect that in the 2014 budget, in the 2013 budget,
that your work, particularly SOCOM, will continue to have a
priority? Are you concerned about, again, what these budget
pressures are going to do your capability? Can you just put
that in some context for us?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator Portman. It is good news and bad
news for us in the special operations community.
The good news for the SOF community is that the President
has made it very clear in his strategy that special operations,
as well as cyber and other issues, such as the Pacific, are
going to have priority of resources as we have done a strategic
review and a shift in our national security policy and our
defense strategy. So, I think special operations will, in many
ways, fare better than some other parts of DOD, but there is no
question in my mind that we will also, if there is
sequestration or dramatic cuts, share part of the burden. I
think we will share some major impacts in our programs.
Senator Portman. In terms of the strategy going forward,
though, again, assuming we will continue to be under these
budget pressures, which unfortunately I think looks true when
you look at the President's budget, it is another $11 trillion
to our debt over the next 10 years, which your former Joint
Chiefs Chair said was the biggest national security challenge
we face is our deficit and debt. Are there ways to take our
existing budget and, again, given the fact that we are looking
at a projection of spending less than we had planned to
already, and if sequestration goes into effect we will be
spending even less than we had planned to, is there a way to
use SOF more to be able to do some of the same critical
missions, but at a lower cost?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator, and I think that is part of the
President's strategy, recognizing SOF provides the National
Command Authority (NCA) at a relatively inexpensive way to
project our national interests. So, I think that that is going
to be central to our strategy to try to protect our interests
in a cost-effective way with SOF, and also building coalitions
with our partners to achieve mutual goals. So, I think that is
part of a way to reduce our costs and still protect our
interests.
Senator Portman. With regard to the conversation earlier
about al Qaeda, we did not talk much about Iraq. General
Mattis, Commander of CENTCOM, has stated before this committee
that he sees strong indications that al Qaeda is making a
comeback in Iraq. I would ask you if you agree with General
Mattis' observation that al Qaeda is making a comeback in Iraq.
If so, to what do you attribute this resurgence? Do you believe
that the Iraqi security forces are capable of conducting
effective CT operations?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, there is no question General Mattis
is right. The numbers bear out his observation that al Qaeda
has increased its attacks in Iraq.
I think that it remains to be seen how this evolves. Al
Qaeda has its own problems in Iraq as well, operating there in
areas that--in different areas and different relationships with
the Sunni groups there, although you see some spillover of some
of the Sunni insurgent groups backing al Qaeda, which is also a
troubling trend. So, I think it remains to be seen whether the
Iraqis are going to have the full capacity to deal with it.
Obviously since we left there, there is no question that
the capacity of their SOFs is not the same as when we are
standing side-by-side with them. There is just no doubt about
that. But that is a decision they made. They are going to take
this on by themselves. We will try to help in every way we can
as a country that is trying to assist them gain some stability
there.
But clearly al Qaeda has grown there. It is a troubling
trend. Quite frankly, for me and for our office, we are looking
for the ability of al Qaeda to project from there and export
which will also be troubling to our national interests. So, we
are looking at it not only in terms of it destabilizing Iraq,
but also providing a platform for the projection of a strategic
al Qaeda from that area. So, it's a major concern as well.
Senator Portman. To the extent that al Qaeda uses Iraq as a
platform as they have in other countries, including Yemen, as
you indicated, certainly Afghanistan, which is why we went in
the first place, would it be your view that SOF should be in
Iraq to help deal with that threat?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, that is a very difficult political
question. But obviously for me personally, wherever al Qaeda
exists and where there is sanctuary for al Qaeda and they're
operating, and we can develop a partnership with that host
country in order to take on al Qaeda, that is something I would
like to pursue.
Obviously, we have a political equation with the Iraqis
regarding our defense relationship. Right now, hopefully we
will see it evolve over the years ahead, and we will have
opportunities to work with them where we have a mutual interest
like this.
Senator Portman. Gentleman, again, thank you for your
testimony today. Again, it is being used in a very direct way
to help us put together the right authorization bill, but also
just great information as we try to figure out how to work
through these budget challenges and be sure that our unique
capabilities in the areas that are under your purview have the
resources they need, and that they are used effectively.
This hearing will now be in recess until the chair comes
back, and I am going to sprint to a vote. Thank you.
[Recessed.]
Senator Hagan. If we could reconvene, that would be great.
Thank you.
I had just a few more questions, and I thought as long as
we are still here, we will go ahead and seek out your answers
to these questions.
Secretary Sheehan and Secretary Reid, given the emphasis on
the SOF capabilities in DOD strategic guidance and budget, and
the reduction in the size of the general purpose forces, do you
believe that there is a risk in commanders becoming too reliant
on our excellent SOF? Then, also, how do you believe the focus
of the strategic guidance on the Middle East and Asia Pacific
will impact deployments of our SOFs? So, the first one being
the reliance on SOF.
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Senator. In some ways, because our
SOFs have been so effective, there will be demands for them,
and that is a good thing. But I think that we are going to be
able in the future to manage that expectation. I think Admiral
McRaven is working on that now to make sure that we do not
exhaust the force, and I think we have those plans in place to
manage that.
But certainly there will be lots of demands for the
excellence that these men and women provide to our national
defense, but I think we can manage it.
Senator Hagan. The amount of time it takes to train a
member of the SOF I understand is a rate of 3 to 5 percent per
year without sacrificing quality. So, do you feel comfortable
that we can keep those numbers according to what the demand is
for these troops?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator. I think we are going to project
a growth up to about 70,000 to 71,000 over the next few years
at that rate.
Senator Hagan. Where are we now?
Mr. Sheehan. 66,000, I believe, somewhere around there,
67,000. So, a couple more thousand over the next few years, we
should be able to do that without a great strain. From there I
think we are going to hold it and then try to sustain that
force, and protect the deployment schedule of that force.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid?
Mr. Reid. I would just add to that last point that the
operator growth, which is really the 3 to 5 percent pace within
this current growth plan--the operator growth is in place. The
last layer the Secretary just referred to is in combat support
enablers that were put in place in the last QDR, and then most
recently in the 2013 program review.
With respect to the over-reliance on SOF that you asked
about, the Secretary also sits atop DOD's Irregular Warfare
Policy Group and the Security Force Assistance Group. Both of
those were designed, and the reason they were put in our office
is to apply the experience and expertise that SOF brings into
both those areas, and help the Services with their
capabilities, and oversee it for the Secretary.
Regarding whether SOF becomes overused, in security force
assistance, for example, the policy that is overseen sets out a
framework. So, small missions, sensitive environment where most
people think that is typically a SOF mission, that is a
threshold. Small mission, maybe not overly politically
sensitive, where a general purpose force could apply, that
would go to them. Then a larger context mission that maybe you
would need to have both. Again, that all works through that
process.
Services are involved in this, and particularly the ground
forces in regionally aligning elements in both Army and Marine
Corps special purpose Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force and
advise and assist brigade construct that is being used in
Afghanistan. Again, overseeing how they adapt that going
forward for these future requirements is our hedge against what
you asked about how you just give it to SOF, give it to SOF. We
are promoting the development of those capabilities for the
right mission sets all in one package.
Senator Hagan. Then, how about the focus on the strategic
guidance on the Middle East and the Asia Pacific? How will that
impact other deployments?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I think the President has made it
clear that he does want to shift to the Pacific, and to align
our national defense strategy with our interests there. That, I
think, will require us to look at the resources that are going
to be deployed there, and it will--we are going to have to
shift, as we mentioned that 80 percent of our forces have been
in CENTCOM over the last 10 years. That is going to change in
the future. But I do think we do have the force structure in
SOF to do that and do it properly when we grow to 71,000.
But I do want to mention, though, there will always be a
strain on certain low-density military occupational specialties
and certain types of officers that will get the call, those
with special skills and languages, or intelligence fusion,
logistics people, certain types of skill sets that have to be
managed because they get the call often.
Also what happens, we have to watch our readiness as those
people will be plucked out of units to be tailored to conduct
certain missions in country in order to meet that exact need.
That also disrupts the force.
So, this is a management problem for Admiral McRaven, and
he is very attuned to it and trying to develop the processes to
protect that while we have the flexibility to put together
different packages for countries. But there will be that
challenge of a certain percentage of the force it seems that
will be getting the call often. That has always been the case
in SOF and will continue to be, but it is something that we
will work our way through.
Senator Hagan. What is the typical length of deployment for
our SOF in these situations?
Mr. Sheehan. It varies, but generally 6 months, but
sometimes less, 4 months. Sometimes it goes to a year depending
on what they are doing, but generally around 6 months.
Senator Hagan. Then what is the dwell time?
Mr. Sheehan. Excuse me, ma'am?
Senator Hagan. What is their dwell time?
Mr. Sheehan. Normally, you want about a 20, 30 percent is
what we are looking for. I think that is the number, 20 to 30
percent.
Senator Hagan. So, if they are on for 1 year, you are
saying they will not be deployed for a period of time?
Mr. Sheehan. Right. Say they are on for 6 months. They
should get 18 months off.
Senator Hagan. Let me ask about the rewards program. DOS
offers rewards for the arrest and conviction of certain
individuals that are wanted for terrorism, narcotic
trafficking, certain past war crimes. I understand that
legislation is being developed to expand the DOS rewards
program to include TOC, and to broaden the scope of rewards for
persons wanted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. I understand such an expansion might assist DOD's
efforts against the LRA.
What is DOD's position on the proposed expansion of the
law, and how could it help your efforts?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator Hagan, I am not exactly familiar with
all the details of it, but I will say this, that we--from my
experience, these rewards programs have been very successful in
the past, and we look forward to seeing more of those programs
brought to the table.
Senator Hagan. But this would specifically be just in the
DOS?
Mr. Sheehan. Right. But still, we are looking at the same
target sets.
Senator Hagan. Right.
Mr. Sheehan. So I think it is very, very complementary.
Senator Hagan. Okay. We talked a little bit in some of our
earlier questions, and you referenced Admiral McRaven's request
to perhaps seek more authorities. We have seen a lot of news
reports that have suggested that he is seeking broad, new
global authorities for the SOF.
He actually said in a hearing on March 6, that he will
never deploy forces to a geographic combatant command without
that geographic combatant commander's approval. We never go
into another country without getting clearance from the chief
of mission, and the chief of mission always has a vote on
whether or not U.S. forces arrive in the nation that he or she
is sitting in.
So, what is your understanding of the assessment
authorities being sought by Admiral McRaven? Would such
authorities require a change to the Unified Command Plan (UCP)
or new legislation?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator. These proposals are being worked
in DOD. Right now as we are speaking, our staffs are still
working on these proposals.
I think what Admiral McRaven is doing is really part of the
long evolution of the special operations community since it was
really created by Congress in its legislation in the mid-1980s
of Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen. It was landmark
legislation that created the special operations community,
created our office, the geographic command as well. And those
authorities served us well in providing the NCA these types of
capabilities when they needed them, which might not have
happened had not Congress acted in the 1980s.
I think right now we are at an inflection point of our
strategy in thinking about where the special operations
community is going to be over the next 10 years. The National
Defense Strategy, as articulated by the President and the
Secretary of Defense, calls upon the SOFs in playing a major
role across the globe in achieving our defense objectives.
In order to do that, in order to meet those new demands by
the strategy, Admiral McRaven is trying to come up with
different proposals to give him the ability to react to those
demands that are going to come down. They come across a range
of things that may include a UCP language change. It may
include a different relationship with the subunified theater
special operations commands that are in each of the geographic
commands. It may include different legislative authorities. The
different types of authorities to move forces around are all
being discussed to give Admiral McRaven the ability to provide
options to the NCA to meet our national security objectives in
a more coherent and efficient way. It is something that I
broadly support, and the details are being worked out.
I think it is an opportunity for us to reshape how the
special operation community functions within DOD and within the
interagency community to respond to these emerging threats and
the strategy that we are trying to design to meet those
threats.
So, over the weeks ahead, we will be working through those
proposals. I think at the end we are going to see a new
strength and ability of SOCOM and our office to provide these
options for the NCA both within a geographic command and across
geographic commands when transnational threats require
synchronizing across commands.
So, I think this is really the heart of what we are talking
about and working through DOD, and assuring people, as
mentioned by Admiral McRaven in his remarks, assuring
geographic commands and DOD that their equities will also be
integrated into this in a whole-of-government approach, a
whole-of-DOD approach to resolve these issues.
Senator Hagan. If a geographic combatant commander
requested SOF, can you describe for me what might be the length
of time before he would find out whether he receives those SOF,
how long it could be?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator, and sometimes it can be
instantaneous, the relationships that we have among the
geographic commands in SOCOM, particularly in JSOC and some of
those operations are instantaneous. We can move forces. For
some of the other ones that perhaps require a little bit more
development, it might take weeks or even months to put together
the right team to prepare them for deployment and send them.
So, I would say anywhere between almost instantaneously moving
forces to several months.
Senator Hagan. But I understood that in some instances,
because of the chain of command, this could take up to many,
many, many months.
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator, in some cases. I think those
cases, they are the ones where there is either--I think those
are normally ones where there is more of a political diplomatic
issue at stake, or moving into a country where the issues are
complicated, and whether--how we want to employ force in a
certain situation, or what is the relationship--our defense
relationship with that country. Those are normally the things
that hang it up.
Normally in terms of our forces, if we really need them, we
can shift them pretty quickly. So, the longer ones are normally
a political military dimension.
Senator Hagan. Okay. I wanted to shift a little bit to the
Village Stability Operations (VSO). Witnesses before the
committee have consistently highlighted the importance of the
village stability and the ALP programs to our strategy in
Afghanistan. How do you view the future of these programs given
President Karzai's recent comments that all international
forces should leave the villages and return to the large bases?
He made this statement after the soldier who carried out the
tragic shooting of the Afghan civilians on March 11.
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, Madam Chair, it is interesting. I
listened very carefully to President Karzai's remarks about
this. Quite frankly, he is right in the long-term. In the long-
term, we want the Afghans to be out front. We want to move back
in the barracks. We want to come back home. So, there is no
question about that.
Unfortunately, right now we are not ready for that, and so
we are going to have a dialogue with the Afghan Government
about the pace in which we turn over the security to the local
forces. But right now, I think it is very, very important that
ALP program and the VSO program are, I think, crucial to our
strategy in stabilizing some of the rural areas in Afghanistan.
It is crucial that our forces be out there operating in the
field to try to get the momentum further advanced before we do
turn it over to the Afghans. So, I think it is a matter of
timing, and right now I think that we need more time in order
to get those programs established.
There has been great progress. Again, it varies from place
to place. Some areas, these programs really take off. It
depends on a lot of factors: the local leadership, how
committed they are to it, the levels of corruption, et cetera.
But there has been great progress in many areas, and we plan to
keep growing this program out to 30,000 ALP, and that is going
to take some time. So, I hope the Afghan--we will be able to
work--continue to work with President Karzai and the Afghan
Government to continue these programs as, I think, it is a
cornerstone of our strategy of exiting and actually achieving
what President Karzai wants for us to step back. But we need
some more time.
Senator Hagan. You quoted the number 30,000 for the ALP.
Where are we now?
Mr. Sheehan. We were at 10,000 last time I checked, but I
think we have moved a little bit further than that, somewhere
of 10,000 and moving maybe to 12,000 or something, around
there, 12,000. We have a ways to go, but it is a very, very
important program, Senator.
Senator Hagan. Some human rights groups and others have
accused the ALP units of serious abuses against the populations
that they are obviously being tasked to protect, including
killings, rapes, beatings, and extortions. The program has also
been criticized by some for encouraging the proliferation of
armed groups within Afghanistan. What is your response to these
criticisms of the ALP?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I think some of those have been
exaggerated. I think that--and obviously when there are abuses,
these are some things that we take very, very seriously to
investigate and respond to any abuses of human rights by any
ANSF, whether it be the regular army, the police, or the ALP.
So, I think some of these have been exaggerated for political
purposes. Where there are problems, we need to address them
very rapidly and effectively.
I'm sorry, I forgot the second part of your question.
Senator Hagan. What is your response to the criticisms?
There has been criticism too, or accusations that it has
increased the proliferation of armed groups within Afghanistan.
Mr. Sheehan. Right. I'm sorry, that is right. Again, I
think that is an unfair characterization because the ALP is
within the MOI. Yes, there is a degree of independence at the
local level, which we think is part of why it has been
effective, because as Garry has mentioned, how it links to the
local leadership. It is a local response to a local problem.
You get the commitment at the village level to the security. In
a way, it is a grass roots approach to counterinsurgency, which
historically has been effective.
But there have been those critics that worry about it
becoming its own separate army. That has been a criticism of
these types of units historically and to include in
Afghanistan. It is an issue that we have to be mindful of, and
we have to be mindful to make sure that as we--all of the
organizations within both the Ministry of Defense and the MOI
within Afghanistan are working together and staying together as
unified, and not to split up into different types of political
or other interests, which could unravel things in the future.
So, it is an issue that we have to be wary of, but right
now I think that it is part of the same team, and that those
criticisms are a bit exaggerated. But I am very mindful that
that has to be watched.
Senator Hagan. While we are talking about the VSO program,
can you give me an update on how the women within our military
are being utilized as part of this VSO program? I read a lot
about it a while back, but I have not been updated on it
recently.
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator. Actually, I do not have anything
new either, but just to say that these are critical functions.
They are very interesting and a new area for me to see as
coming back into government to see the role of women involved
out in the field, and they are doing a great job, and extremely
important for our ability to interact across the entire--the
society there with the women in the villages and very
important. I don't know if, Garry, you can articulate it a
little bit deeper.
Mr. Reid. The most obvious value is their ability to
interact with Afghan women and overcome the cultural barriers
that exist to where an Afghan woman, it would be inappropriate
for her to approach a Western male, military person anywhere
outside the village.
So, what we have learned over time, and the Services have
done the same thing. SOF does not own this idea. Matter of
fact, we may have gotten into it after the Marine Corps and
Army had done it as well, is these cultural support teams to
engage with the women in the objective areas. It pays great
dividends. There has been information that they were able to
pass that they wanted to pass to somebody and did not have
anyone to pass it to. But it also softens the hard edges of
engaging with the military at all by having a woman to talk to,
so to speak.
Senator Hagan. But are all the VSO programs, are they
utilizing women?
Mr. Reid. They have access to them, but we do not have them
in every location.
Senator Hagan. Okay. Secretary Wechsler, I know that we
have spent time talking about the counter threat finance. Can
you take a moment to update the committee on the effort with
regards to counter threat finance?
Mr. Wechsler. Sure.
Senator Hagan. Then, do you also have the legislative
authorities to conduct the operations? Then if you could cite
some examples.
Mr. Wechsler. Sure. There are basically two categories. One
is--and both of them are becoming increasingly important to
DOD. One is inside war zones and one is outside war zones.
Inside war zones, our experience in Iraq where we set up the
Iraq threat finance cell, and our experience in Afghanistan
where we set up the Afghan threat finance cell, has proved to--
we have gotten great dividends from that, to bring together the
right kinds of organizations, the right kinds of people from
across the interagency to understand the financial
infrastructure, the financial order of battle of our adversary,
and to use that information to disrupt them both on a tactical
level, integrated into our operations, and then on a more
strategic level, to even influence where we put forces at what
time during the year, to go after our adversaries' financial
revenue streams.
Outside the war zone, we find that it is equally important
for DOD to support other agencies in bringing the unique
tools--analytical tools and also defense intelligence tools to
the table to break down the walls between law enforcement on
one hand and intelligence on the other hand, to make sure that
all the information that the U.S. Government possesses can be
used to enhance an analysis of our adversaries' financial
networks that support them.
There are a great deal of examples that I could use to use
good progress in this regard. Quite many of them, especially
outside of the war zone, as I said, involve the use of other
agencies' authorities. One that I will point out to you right
now was very good work done by the DEA and also the Treasury
Department to go after Lebanese Canadian Bank last year to
build on a DEA case or set of cases, which identified drug
trafficking from Latin America through West Africa into Europe,
the money for which was mixed in with used car sales from the
United States that were brought to West Africa. The money then
was used to buy goods, knock-off goods in China, to give money
back to the people in South America who are producing the
cocaine. A global network of money laundering, all managed and
controlled by someone associated with the Hezbollah, and a lot
of the money that was there went for Hezbollah.
DOD does not have the tool set, and should not have the
tool set, to go after it. We are not going to be bombing
anybody in this part of the world. But the Treasury Department
did, and used their authorities to do what is called a 311
designation against this bank. It was an immediate run on that
bank. It was a short sale to Societe Generale. It ended up
being an indictment in U.S. courts and a separate civil action
for hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. courts.
This is an example of how the entire interagency can get
together to, first and foremost, use the techniques that we
developed under counter threat finance to understand how the
money is actually being moved by these kinds of adversaries,
and, second, use the right authorities that are being applied
from different agencies to go after these in the right place at
the right time. It is that kind of effort that we are building
now and we see as a big part of our future.
DOD's role in these kinds of efforts are driven directly by
the authorities that you have provided for the counternarcotics
account, absolutely essential in doing so, the 1004
authorities, the 1022, 1021. We could not survive without them.
I do have to say, going to what Secretary Sheehan was
saying, that many of these authorities over time were built up
on singular lines of action, on narcotics, or on insurgency, or
on terrorism, and that is not how the world works. That is not
how our adversaries work. As you see in this example, it was
narcotics. It was used car sales. It was knock-off goods. It
was money laundering. It was all of these things together all
to support a terrorism organization. That is the way the world
is. That is the way our adversaries are. So, we work through
the authorities that we have with the level of flexibility that
they have, and the limitations that they have, in order to work
across lines through the interagency.
Senator Hagan. That is an excellent example, and I know
that the funding of terrorism and the TOC is certainly in many,
many different areas. But there is also a specific fundraising
season for terrorism. What are our specific goals to combat--
how are we combatting their fundraising, and really trying to
get to the point where the people who are funding that are no
longer able to do so, or no longer have the willingness to do
so?
Mr. Wechsler. Sure. I like to think of three different
types of funding, and I think it is important. First, is the
old style of state funding. The second is what you are talking
about, are people who are willingly giving funds that they
think--that they know or they think might support a terrorist
organization because they are ideologically or religiously
driven. The third type of funding is when their people do not
even know that they are involved in it, but the terrorist
organization has developed both illicit and sometimes licit
business and criminal organizations to fund themselves so they
do not even need people to be willingly funding them. So, we
need to have operations that go after all three types of
funding.
On the second part that you talked about, the DOS is really
in the lead of trying to combat violent extremism and work with
our friends and partners around the world to ensure that they
have the programs domestically to both publicly discourage, to
bring religious edicts against, and have the law enforcement
intelligence operations to disrupt the fundraisings that do
have an annual cycle in some part of the world.
Senator Hagan. How do you think that is working?
Mr. Wechsler. I think in some places it is working quite
well. I think that, for instance, against al Qaeda proper, we
have had quite significant success on the financial networks at
large over the years. There are other places where, as my
example shows, they have adapted to some of the efforts that we
have done to come up with new, very complicated, and, in many
cases, very sinister techniques to diversify their financial
streams. We have to go after those.
Senator Hagan. Never ending. Over the past decade, given
the increasing threat to security and the numerous challenges
facing law enforcement institutions, many militaries in Latin
America have been called upon to play a larger role in their
domestic security matters. What impact, if any, does this shift
in the responsibilities of partner militaries have on the
policies associated with our security engagement strategy, and
any risk or opportunities this might present?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator. I think most of the time,
militaries are reluctant to get involved in the domestic
issues, whether it is counternarcotics or even insurgency in
some ways. They are somewhat reluctant. They would much prefer
to be defending the homeland, which is what they are often
trained to do. But nevertheless, their national command
authorities ask them to do things that sometimes they do not
want to do. So, they are increasingly and have been
increasingly involved in internal issues and law enforcement
issues.
We in DOD need to look across, when we look at a country,
we look at the different institutions that are working the
problem, and we will need to work with both of them, both the
military and the Ministries of Interior.
One of the concerns for the Ministries of Defense is
obvious, and they see what happens, is that the interior
forces, the police forces, become corrupted when they deal with
narcotics trafficking organizations or criminal organizations.
So, when we work with their Ministries of Defense, we also have
to be very mindful, and it is something that we do not always
do, and it is not something that we always think of in the
first order, about how corruption can impact Ministries of
Defense when they start to deal with these types of
organizations, the amount of money involved.
So, I think when we look for our solution set with the
Ministries of Interior and Defense, this is one of the most
fundamental issues.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid and Mr. Wechsler, do you have
anything to add to that?
Mr. Reid. I would just add that where it would appropriate
in engaging with these countries on these issues, that some of
it can go back to these authorities questions that we keep
bringing up about having the flexibility, under the appropriate
circumstances, to where we can demonstrate agility and take
advantage of opportunity. It may be an opportunity that would
help steer that country back in the direction that in our
interest we needed them to go, or for an opportunity to have
some engagement. So, that would just be my only addition to
that.
Mr. Wechsler. The only thing I would add is that we in the
United States need to avoid the impulse to project our systems
on other countries. Sometimes there are other countries that
might use the military in a different way than we would use the
military, and that is not inherently improper in their system.
The other thing that I would suggest is that sometimes we
make the mistake of not recognizing how challenging a situation
is to a foreign military, therefore, internal defense needs.
That is why they are using the military. In some of these
instances, if the same things were happening in the United
States, we would be using the National Guard; they would be far
beyond what local and State law enforcement could deal with.
That is--those are the situations that foreign countries find
themselves in when they employ the military in these
circumstances, and I think we need to understand the reasons
they do so.
Senator Hagan. Secretary Sheehan, in some of our questions,
you highlighted the need for further intelligence coming in
from Iran. Do you see other countries around the globe where
you also feel that we need further intelligence than we are
getting right now?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I think you can never have enough
intelligence. I have never dealt with a problem or issue where
you had complete visibility of all the problems that you face.
So, I think that in terms of CT, that we follow the threat,
and wherever the threat is, we want deeper levels of
intelligence. So, right now, our priorities are right where the
enemy is on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, in Yemen, and
increasingly in Africa. I think we are going to have an
intelligence challenge there to make sure that we try to stay
ahead of the terrorists and identify these cells as they
develop, these networks as they develop, so that we can crush
them before they have the ability to strike us.
So, I would follow the threat line, Senator, and just keep
working it. We never have enough intelligence.
Senator Hagan. Once again, in his posture statement,
Admiral McRaven highlighted the potential of high definition
video equipment for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Can any of you describe to me
your assessment of this high definition ISR capability?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator. In my view, from what I have
seen in a couple of different operations over the last few
months, that the high definition capability is a game changer
for decisionmakers because the degree of clarity that it
provides to the decisionmaker about certain situations provides
a higher degree of confidence in making a decision regarding
the use of force, and trying to minimize collateral damage. It
is something we always strive to do, not only for humanitarian
purposes--we do not want innocents killed or hurt--but also for
political purposes. It can strain our flexibility when there is
excessive collateral damage, so that the high definition
provides that capability. It is something that we are working
in DOD right now, and I think we are going to get the right
answers there because everyone understands that it truly is a
game changer.
We are going to keep moving forward on to--and, again,
thank you to the technology and the developments of the private
sector, extraordinary in providing a greatly enhanced
capability for our forces.
Senator Hagan. What are you doing as DOD to field these
additional capabilities in this area?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, we are working with the private
sector to get these built and brought online, and getting the
funding online, and bring them into the force. I think we have
a good plan to do so, and I think we are going to get there. It
is just a matter of getting the funding lined up, getting
industry to keep cranking these things out, and deploying them
into the field. It is really extraordinary technology and we
are going to get there.
Senator Hagan. Are you concerned about a lot of this
technology being made not in the United States?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, I think that obviously we would love
to have it home grown, but we will take the best that we can in
order to achieve our objectives, in order to get the bad guys.
We will buy foreign, but obviously we would prefer United
States. But I think most of it is American, I understand, so I
think I am almost sure almost all of it is. I am not aware of
that much of it being done overseas, but I think most of it is
American made.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, any comments on the capability?
Mr. Reid. No, nothing in addition.
Senator Hagan. Okay. Just a few more questions, and I know
we are running out of time. What do you believe are the most
important lessons learned from this collaborative interagency
effort for CT operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere?
Then, how do we best institutionalize these lessons learned for
future CT operations? Sort of a wrap-up.
Mr. Sheehan. From Iraq or Afghanistan?
Senator Hagan. Both.
Mr. Sheehan. From both.
Senator Hagan. Yes.
Mr. Sheehan. I think when we went into Iraq and
Afghanistan, in some ways unfortunately we were learning on the
run, and we were picking up, dusting up, old counterinsurgency
strategies and trying to employ them in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. I think we have learned a lot over the years about
the complexity of counterinsurgency operations, how it needs to
be coordinated, an interagency effort, how the political
supremacy of counterinsurgency is always fundamental, that the
military strategy follows behind that, that those types of
issues are fundamental to our lessons learned.
But I also believe from the SOF that we--I am not so sure
there are as many lessons learned have honed sets of skills
that are extraordinarily well-developed over the past 10 years,
both in the direct and the indirect areas, both in terms of our
kinetic operations against terrorists, which is really an
incredible fusion of intelligence and then precision strike,
that we have developed a tremendous capability there. It
continues to evolve.
On the other side of the coin is the advise and assist
mission, and there, again, a traditional SOF mission, perhaps
one that was focused in certain geographic commands prior to
September 11. Now it is one that is embraced by all of our
special forces groups, including the SEALs as well, to
understand the importance of not only having highly skilled
warriors, but the ability to then work with the host country,
transfer those skills to them so that they provide security for
their country.
So, I think for the special operations community, it is a
matter of retaining those skill sets that have been developed
so tremendously over the last few years. Then applying those
appropriately and differently to each theater as we look around
the world for opportunities to protect our interests with those
types of skill sets.
Senator Hagan. Let me ask the final question having to do
with Pakistan. You have mentioned Pakistan quite a bit today.
In the June 2011 National Strategy for CT, it stated that our
goal of defeating al Qaeda in Pakistan can only be achieved
through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. What is the
current status of DOD's efforts to partner with Pakistan to
defeat the threat from al Qaeda on Pakistan's territory?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator Hagan, it is perhaps the most
complicated relationship we have in the world right now, the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Obviously, you have probably seen
in the press reports of the new parliamentary decisions that
are made that are going to further complicate our ability to
work with the Pakistani Government.
But I would say this, that we have no choice but to work
together, and I think we will. It is very troubling and can be
so frustrating in dealing with the Pakistan Government on so
many levels. But at the end of the day, we are going to find
confluence of interest, and we are going to work together the
best we can and get these issues resolved. Quite frankly, also
at the end of the day, the President is going to do what he has
to do, and unilaterally. He will always protect that
prerogative to protect the security of the American people and
our interests.
Hopefully we will be able to work together and find some
common interests. I think sometimes it is actually a mixed
story. Sometimes it looks worse than it is, and actually we are
making progress, and then sometimes I read other things that
show it is even worse than I thought it was. So, it is so
troubling and complex, but nevertheless, they are there. They
are sitting on top of our adversary, and we are just going to
have to work through this issue indefinitely. We are going to
have ups and downs, and a lot of downs unfortunately in the
months ahead.
I have been working with the Pakistan Government. I
remember sitting with them prior to September 11, after
September 11. They have a different view of what is happening
in Afghanistan. They have a different view of their interests.
They have an addiction to playing around with militia groups to
achieve certain interests, particularly vis-a-vis India, that
gets them in all kinds of trouble. We have had these
conversations with them forever about that. I do not see that
changing. I do not see any set of talking points that is going
to be delivered by some new diplomat that is going to change
their mind. It is the way they view the world. We have to
understand the way they view the world and try to work through
it.
It is not going to be easy, but I think at the end of the
day, we have been successful in the FATA in degrading al Qaeda
over the last 10 years, despite all these problems. I think
that we are going to continue to work through it and hopefully,
again, have another 10 years of success in degrading al Qaeda's
strategic capability in the FATA and elsewhere.
So, I remain somewhat optimistic, even with all the extent
of these problems, that we are going to continue to pound al
Qaeda so that they cannot attack us. If we stay focused on that
and not get discouraged with all the other political drama, we
can keep a level of optimism moving forward. Sometimes I think
that is important because we can beat ourselves to death about
all the different problems we have, but at the end of the day,
we have been successful, and hopefully we will be able to
continue that.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Due to the lateness of the hour,
we will adjourn this hearing. I do appreciate the testimony and
the time that all of you spent preparing for this and obviously
being here today. So, thank you very much. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

1. Senator Udall. Secretary Sheehan, the 2006 National Strategy for
Combatting Terrorism had a section devoted to growing counterterrorism-
related Intellectual and Human Capital as a key to institutionalizing
long-term success, including focusing on continuing education in
appropriate area studies, religious philosophies, and languages. The
2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism makes no such mention of
growing and developing experts in terrorism. Why does the latest
National Strategy for Counterterrorism not mention the need for
growing, or at least maintaining, high-caliber talent in the
counterterrorism field?
Mr. Sheehan. The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism
reflects an evolution in our understanding of the terrorist threat, in
the capabilities of our government, in the capacity of our partners,
and in the tools and technologies at our disposal. Over the past
decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has strengthened its
intellectual and human capital--which has included expanding human
intelligence and linguistic skills--and these investments will
continue. DOD also partners with institutions and countries around the
world to bring about al Qaeda's demise. We have made enormous progress
in building and strengthening an international architecture to confront
the al Qaeda threat, and have also increased our efforts to build the
capacity of partners so they can take the fight to al Qaeda and its
affiliates in their own countries.
As a former Special Forces officer, I know firsthand how critical
training and education in foreign and area studies, religious
philosophies, and languages are in building these partnerships. As
such, I share with the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) an appreciation of the critical role that education and
training play in ensuring an effective global Special Operations Forces
effort. To build this trust with our foreign partners, however, we must
commit to preparing forces for and assigning them to specific regions,
and to managing those servicemembers' careers appropriately. Some
efforts underway to move toward this goal include reorganizing SOCOM
headquarters to create a Force Management Directorate, selecting high-
aptitude foreign language students for extended training, and making it
easier for noncommissioned officers to earn associates and bachelor
degrees. Additionally, SOCOM's Regional Centers Program sends
approximately 80 personnel annually to attend counterterrorism,
combating terrorism, and executive-level seminars at DOD Regional
Centers. Finally, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, which I
oversee, builds partners in the struggle against violent extremism by
providing counterterrorism education and training for mid- to senior-
level international military officers, ministry of defense civilians,
and security officials. Collectively, these kinds of training and
education efforts enable DOD to engage foreign partners more
effectively and build the relationships that we need to combat
terrorism around the world.

2. Senator Udall. Secretary Sheehan, do you feel further
investments in research, education, and training in this field do not
warrant national-level attention?
Mr. Sheehan. Investing in research, education, and training to
combat terrorism is critical to sustaining effective and relentless
pressure on al Qaeda and its affiliates while adhering to our core
principles. As the Secretary of Defense has emphasized, language
skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities are enduring
warfighting competencies and are critical to mission readiness. Within
DOD, it is the mission of the Defense Language and National Security
Education Office to coordinate efforts across the Services and defense
agencies in order to build the language and cultural skills of our
deploying total force. Over the last several years, DOD has made
significant investments in foreign language, regional, and cultural
awareness training, including through incentive pay, language training
detachments, and cultural and area studies research programs. These
investments within DOD and across the U.S. Government continue to
receive my support.

[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

HEALTH AND STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
LABORATORIES AND ENTERPRISE

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, and Portman.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
and Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: John W. Heath, minority
investigative counsel; and Michael J. Sistak, research
assistant.
Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and
Bradley S. Watson.
Committee members' assistants present: Patrick Day,
assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman, assistant to
Senator Gillibrand; and Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator
Portman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Hagan. We will go ahead and call this hearing to
order.
I know that Senator Portman is on his way, but I thought we
would go ahead and get started.
I appreciate all of our witnesses being here, and Secretary
Lemnios, I believe this is your third time in a very short
period of time. So thank you very much for coming back.
This afternoon, as part of our review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013, the Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee meets to receive
testimony on the health and status of Department of Defense
(DOD) laboratories and the science and technology (S&T)
enterprise. This hearing will delve deeper into some of the
important topics that we touched upon last year in our hearing
on the health and status of the national defense industrial
base and related S&T elements. As a key element of DOD's
roughly $12 billion per year S&T portfolio, its laboratories
contribute to a broad range of S&T activities ranging from
conducting Nobel Prize winning basic research to rapidly
developing and fielding capabilities for the warfighter. The
lab enterprise includes 62 organizations.
Welcome, Senator Portman, we just got started.
This lab enterprise includes 62 organizations spread across
22 States, with a total workforce of about 60,000 employees,
more than half of whom are degreed scientists and engineers. In
certain critical national security-related areas, these
organizations and, more importantly, the highly-skilled
scientists, engineers, and technicians in them I believe are
truly our national assets.
The challenge facing DOD is to budget the resources needed
to attract and retain a highly-skilled technical workforce,
conduct relevant and effective research and development (R&D)
to give our military the technology edge it needs while relying
on tools and an infrastructure that are aging. DOD must do all
of this in an era of increasing budgetary pressures on
investments in our future.
In order to gain a better understanding of the health and
status of the DOD laboratory and S&T enterprise, there are
several areas to explore. We would like to better understand
the personnel and infrastructure challenges facing the lab
enterprise, the relevance and effectiveness of its R&D
portfolio, and its ability to transition technologies to the
warfighter and transfer knowledge to industry. We are also
aware that many technologies developed in the DOD labs have
application to Homeland security and the protection of our
cyber infrastructure, as well as dual use for the commercial
sector.
Furthermore, we are interested in how the DOD lab
enterprise interacts with other Federal agencies such as the
Department of Energy's (DOE) national labs, with industry and
academia, including federally funded R&D centers and
university-affiliated research centers.
In order to explore these areas, we have to focus today on
the mechanisms the labs have at their disposal to accomplish
the following key tasks: recruit and retain the best and
brightest scientists, engineers, and technicians; modernize
aging infrastructure; rapidly develop, test, and help field
innovative approaches to address threats in a complex, dynamic
world; and coordinate and collaborate not only across the DOD
lab enterprise, but also with other Federal agencies, industry,
and academia to ensure that ultimately the DOD has the greatest
possible access to sources of innovation.
We also would like to know whether improvements to these
mechanisms I just related are necessary.
We are pleased to have four expert witnesses to help
understand these complex areas.
Mr. Zach Lemnios, as I said earlier, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In this
position he oversees and coordinates DOD's broad S&T portfolio
across the Services and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). In addition, Mr. Lemnios oversees DOD's
laboratory enterprise and serves as an advocate on behalf of
the laboratories to his department's counterparts on personnel
and infrastructure issues. The subcommittee looks forward to
hearing about the DOD's overarching management strategy for the
labs.
Mr. Lemnios, as I said earlier, it is great to see you
again, and thank you for being here and doing what you do.
Dr. Marilyn Freeman is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Research and Technology. In this position, she
sets the goals and objectives of the Army's S&T activities
across the 22 Army laboratories and centers. These laboratories
conduct research on topics ranging from better food for
soldiers to the next generation of ground vehicles. Dr. Freeman
is credited for focusing the Army's S&T activities to be more
soldier-centric through a set of well-defined technology-
enabled capabilities.
Ms. Mary Lacey is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E).
In this capacity, she is the lead for the Navy's science and
engineering capability, capacity, and infrastructure at its 15
laboratories and warfare system centers. The Navy labs conduct
research from the latest autonomous undersea vehicles to
futuristic electromagnetically driven rail guns for ships.
Dr. Steve Walker is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering where he is
responsible for preparing policy, guidance, and advocacy for
the Air Force's S&T program that in part is executed by various
directorates of the Air Force research laboratory (AFRL). The
AFRL performs cutting-edge research from the next generation of
directed energy weapons to the next generation of highly
autonomous drones.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for your service in
the cause of our national security, and we look forward to your
testimony. In order for us to have adequate time to discuss a
broad range of topics, please keep your opening remarks to no
more than 5 minutes, and we will certainly include your full
written statements in the record.
Before we hear from our panel, I want to turn to my
colleague and ranking member, Senator Portman, for any opening
remarks you might have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses for being here. I look forward to
hearing from each of you. We have a distinguished panel with a
lot of background and experience, and we are looking for a
candid conversation about the health and the status of the
laboratory enterprise at DOD. I think it is particularly
important we talk about this today as we are looking at
downsizing our military, particularly the strategic realignment
that the administration is pursuing, and as priorities are
adjusted, we want to be sure that we understand as a
subcommittee exactly what the impact will be on the labs.
The chair has talked a little about the breadth of our labs
and she has talked about the importance of the labs. The
threats we face as a nation, unfortunately, are not diminishing
based on our fiscal problems. So the global environment remains
very challenging, and yet obviously, as we have seen with the
sequester and before that, the changes to the budget proposals
that were being made by the administration, notwithstanding the
additional sequester, we are under a lot of fiscal constraints
at a time when we have plenty of challenges globally.
We think the labs are a critical element to our ability to
prepare for those threats, respond to those threats, and we
certainly cannot afford any disruptions that could cause the
lack of capabilities in these institutions that give our men
and women in uniform a qualitative edge.
During the Cold War, we knew without a doubt that America
was at the top of the heap. We were the most technologically
advanced nation in the world and we had the best research.
Today that picture is a little less clear. The National Defense
University released a report in February of this year on the
topic of S&T on a global scale, and the report stated that--and
I quote them--``the share of U.S. S&T productivity will decline
from about 26 percent in 2005 to about 18 percent by 2050.''
So while we continuously invest precious resources to
develop leap-ahead technologies, it is not as simple as it used
to be. We are not facing, of course, the single threat of the
Soviet empire. We are facing a more complicated, competitive
environment. We cannot out-spend and out-innovate all of these
countries. The global scales are tipped. We are now competing
with countries like China and other emerging economies.
In the President's budget request, I noticed, for fiscal
year 2013, DOD asked for $11.9 billion to dedicate to basic,
applied, and advance research, much of which, of course, is
done inside your labs. This is a slight reduction from fiscal
year 2012, but only a very slight one. It still shows a
commitment and shows our seriousness of purpose I believe.
Because these S&T funding lines have been left largely
untouched, you will have a responsibility, even more so than
your colleagues who have had their budgets slashed, I think, to
ensure that every one of your dollars is spent wisely. I know
you take that seriously.
I look forward to hearing about your plans to ensure that
efforts across the entire Federal Government are coordinated--
the chair just talked about that particularly with the DOE labs
and others within the Federal Government--that we eliminate
unnecessary duplications, that technologies are developed that
we can use by industry as appropriate, and that we use best
practices across the broad range of R&D that is being done.
I would also like to hear a little bit from each of you
regarding this Defense Rapid Innovation Program (RIP). Each of
you have previously talked about this. I think you have, it is
fair to say, talked about its necessity, and yet I notice that
it is not in your budgets. To date, I think $700 million has
been dedicated to the program but it has never been in a budget
request. So why? What do you think about it? Is it working? Is
it a benefit to the warfighter or not?
I have more questions that I will be raising later, and
again, I really appreciate your all being here to provide your
expertise to us as a subcommittee. I look forward to again to
your frank assessment of our Nation's laboratory enterprise and
S&T efforts and how we can improve them.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.
I am pleased that Senator Shaheen and Senator Gillibrand
have joined us.
Secretary Lemnios, if you will start with your opening
comments and, once again, if we can leave them to 5 minutes and
the rest will be on the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. ZACHARY J. LEMNIOS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

Mr. Lemnios. Absolutely.
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman,
and committee members.
I will ask that my testimony be entered into the record. I
have a very short statement and welcome the opportunity to
testify before you on DOD's laboratories.
The President's budget request for S&T funding of $11.9
billion for fiscal year 2013 is structured around a solid
foundation supported by the laboratories of DOD. These
laboratories are comprised of dozens of facilities employing
tens of thousands of public employees, military personnel, and
contractors.
Throughout the years, DOD's laboratories have repeatedly
proven themselves to be a vital component to the overall
success of DOD's S&T enterprise. The labs are uniquely suited
to couple basic research concepts to early-use military
applications and, most importantly, they connect to our
warfighters and understand the challenges they face today and
may face in tomorrow's conflicts.
Our laboratories serve three primary roles for DOD.
First is the development, rapid fielding, and deployment of
systems to support our warfighters, our warfighters urgent
operational needs, such as the many innovative systems that
have been developed to counter improvised explosive devices
(IED).
Second is the development of advanced concepts such as the
high-speed strike weapon that will lead to future capabilities
for our Nation.
Third is the transition of advanced technologies to the
industrial base such as the adaptive versatile engine
technology that will later be used in our acquisition programs.
As we testified just a few weeks ago, key to the success of
this enterprise is the talent base that it supports, and we
have structured our Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math
(STEM) investments and we have leveraged section 219 and other
authorities that you provided us to train, attract, retain the
needed scientists and researchers in these technical fields.
While our laboratories are positioned for success today, I
believe it is important to challenge our existing practices and
consider new business models to position our laboratories for
success in the future in this environment of enormous global
competition.
In coordination with my colleagues here today, DOD has
launched an assessment of our laboratory enterprise to move in
that direction. Our study will examine and compare existing
models of R&D and transition against emerging models that other
organizations are using to rapidly develop and transition
technologies into new products and operational capabilities
across the private sector. A key element of this assessment
will be to examine the balance between the service-specific
responsibilities and the joint effectiveness of this
enterprise. The insights that we gain from this study will
support the development of new models to ensure that DOD's
laboratories remain competitive and relevant today and into the
future. These results will be reflected in the annual strategic
workforce plan directed by Congress.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to present
these brief remarks, and I look forward to questions from the
subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lemnios follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Zachary J. Lemnios

Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Portman, members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today on behalf of the dedicated
men and women of the Department of Defense (DOD) who discover, develop,
engineer, and field the critical technologies that form the foundation
for a secure future. I would like to thank the Members of Congress for
your continued support of the Department's science and technology (S&T)
program and our broader research and engineering (R&E) enterprise.\1\
Your steadfast support has allowed the Department to field
technologically-based military capabilities that provide the edge upon
which our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians rely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ S&T is defined as the sum of basic research (6.1), applied
research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3). Research and
Engineering is S&T plus Advanced Component Development and Prototyping
(6.4). Both S&T and R&E are activities that occur before initiation of
formal acquisition programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am honored to be joined today by Dr. Marilyn Freeman from the
Army, Ms. Mary Lacey from the Navy, and Dr. Steven Walker from the Air
Force. Their leadership has proven instrumental in ensuring our S&T
investments provide compelling technology options and unmatched
operational capabilities for the Department.
We testify today regarding the important role of the Department
Laboratories and in support of the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
request for DOD S&T; a request that has been thoughtfully prepared
within the context of a challenging national fiscal environment. I can
assure this committee that we are all mindful of the budget pressures
facing our Nation. We have made a collective commitment to ensure that
the taxpayers' dollars provided to the Department's S&T enterprise are
invested wisely with a laser-like focus on needed capabilities for our
National security.
As I discuss the status of the Department's Laboratories and paths
to an integrated laboratory enterprise, I'd like to do so in the
context of the Department's new strategic guidance, the fiscal year
2013 President's Budget Request (PBR) and the Department's S&T
priorities.

NEW STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

On January 5, 2012, the President released new strategic guidance
for the Department.\2\ The strategy builds upon developing partnerships
and global alliances and rebalances our global posture and presence to
emphasize Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. It sets a new path for the
Joint Force of the future \3\--a force that will be smaller, leaner,
agile, and flexible, and rely upon advanced technical capabilities for
mission success. The guidance outlines 10 primary missions for a 21st
century defense, which the Joint Force must be prepared to execute. The
Department's S&T budget request was structured in scope and content to
support these missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense, January 2012 http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense--Strategic--
Guidance.pdf
\3\ Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense, January 2012 - cover letter from Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense--Strategic--Guidance.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 2013 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST (PBR)

The fiscal year 2013 Department-wide S&T budget request of $11.9
billion ($62 billion from fiscal year 2013-fiscal year 2017) maintains
a strong S&T posture. The fiscal year 2013 PBR is above the fiscal year
2011 enacted budget of $11.7 billion, and down modestly from the fiscal
year 2012 enacted budget of $12.2 billion. The fiscal year 2013 S&T
budget request:

Maintains Basic Research at $2.1 billion--an
investment that largely supports university based research;
Funds the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency at
$2.8 billion to develop strategic concepts for the Department;
Funds Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction S&T at $1.0
billion; and
Maintains S&T funding in each of the military
departments at approximately $2.0 billion.

In preparing the fiscal year 2013 S&T budget for the PBR request, I
led a comprehensive review of the Department's R&E program elements and
projects. This review, coupled with the Department's Strategic
Guidance, has shaped the scope and content of the S&T budget request.
The fiscal year 2013 PBR S&T investment rebalances and aligns
content to support the Department's strategic guidance. For example,
$700 million was added across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)
to enhance the Joint Force's ability to operate across all domains.
This funding is targeted to initiate an Air Force hypersonic cruise
missile capability demonstration, accelerate the development of
advanced electronic warfare (EW) concepts, accelerate technology
development for the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile program, and launch
technology development efforts in anti-jam precision guided munitions.
Additional adjustments were made to increase funding in the
Department's S&T priority areas of Cyber S&T, EW, Autonomy (Robotics),
and Advanced Manufacturing by realigning funding in lower priority
areas. The Department also increased investments in a next generation,
high-efficiency turbine engine, the Adaptive Versatile Engine
Technology (ADVENT), for an engineering and manufacturing decision in
fiscal year 2014.
The table below summarizes the fiscal year 2013 budget request.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Today's testimony by the Department's S&T leadership provides
additional detail on key strategic initiatives in the fiscal year 2013
budget request. The testimony will also describe initiatives underway
to accelerate the transition of concepts into technologies that will be
part of future acquisition programs.

THE DEPARTMENT'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

In fiscal year 2010, we gathered over 200 scientists, engineers,
operators, and subject matter experts from across the Department and
launched a comprehensive analysis of operational architectures,
critical capabilities, and enabling technologies to support the
Department's current and future missions. We took a broad look at
cross-cutting areas that would have the greatest impact to the
Department, even as the Department's New Strategic Guidance was being
outlined.
That review resulted in the April 2011 announcement by Secretary
Gates that the Department will consider seven S&T areas as key priority
areas. These priority areas are supported in the fiscal year 2013
budget request and provide the technical foundation for important
future capabilities:

Cyber S&T--The focus of cyber S&T is on the
development of technologies that enable system resiliency,
agility, and mission effectiveness across the spectrum of joint
operations. The research also addresses foundations of trust
and development of new frameworks to more thoroughly assess
cyber-security techniques.
Electronic Warfare/Electronic Protection (EW/EP)--
Pervasive advances in commercial and consumer electronics,
challenge conventional U.S. electronic warfare capabilities.
Investments in this area focus on new concepts and technology
to protect systems and extend capabilities across the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Data-to-Decisions--The Department relies upon the
ability to analyze enormous data sets very quickly. Data-to-
Decisions investments focus on investments in automated
analysis techniques, text analytics, and user interface
techniques to reduce the cycle-time and manpower requirements
required for analysis of large data sets.
Engineered Resilient Systems--The technically advanced
systems our Joint Forces will need in the future must be
adaptable to operate in dynamic, and sometimes unpredictable,
environments. Research in Engineered Resilient Systems focuses
on agile and cost-effective design, development, testing,
manufacturing, and fielding of trusted, assured, easily-
modified systems.
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)--The
Department is focused on crosscutting research in countering
weapons of mass destruction, specifically directed at finding
and tracking unsecured fissile material. Research focuses on
the development of novel detectors and processing algorithms
for increased detection capabilities.
Autonomy--The Department's investments in this area
are focused on developing systems that can operate in complex
real-world environments. Such systems will augment or
substitute for human operators, particularly in hazardous
environments, and to conduct missions that are impractical or
impossible for humans.
Human Systems--This goal of Human Systems is to
advance the Department's technology capabilities for
development of system interfaces and for training of personnel
to increase productivity and effectiveness. Training research
focuses on realistic, adaptive, and interactive scenarios, and
persistent, affordable integrated training. Personnel training
research concentrates on human-machine teaming; intelligent,
adaptive human aiding; and intuitive interaction.

The seven DOD S&T priorities represent an integrated effort by the
Department to focus technical staff and budgetary resources on a set of
primary topics important to the Joint Forces. Roadmaps are being
developed for each S&T priority to focus near-term project investment
portfolios and experimentation campaigns.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LABORATORIES

The Department's Laboratories engage in activities ranging from
basic research through defense system acquisition support to direct
operational support of deployed warfighters. These Laboratories are
comprised of dozens of facilities across 22 States, and employs tens of
thousands of scientists and engineers, both civilian and military,
public employees and contractors.\4\ Included are facilities known as
research centers, systems centers, laboratories, engineering centers,
institutes, and development centers. Each of the Military Services
configures and characterizes its laboratories in unique ways to most
effectively accommodate service-specific missions and organizational
structures. The common thread through all of these facilities is
responsibility for conducting first rate research and development
(R&D), both in-house and through external contracts that directly
benefit the warfighter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For the purposes of this testimony, the definition of a
Laboratory is derived from Department of Defense Instruction 3201.4 In-
House Laboratory Independent Research (ILIR) and Independent
Exploratory Development Programs, (8 Oct 1993): Paragraph 3.2
Definition--R&D Laboratory--a facility or group of facilities owned,
leased, or otherwise used by DOD, a substantial purpose of which is the
performance of research, development, or engineering by employees of
DOD. The term ``laboratory'' is used here and throughout to apply as
well to Warfare Centers, Research, Development and Engineering Centers,
and other such entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department Laboratories execute a substantial fraction of the
Department's S&T accounts, particularly in budget activities 6.2 and
6.3. In addition, they conduct substantial amounts of reimbursable R&D
for DOD and Intelligence Community customer organizations. Altogether,
the Department Laboratories execute approximately $30 billion annually.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Most critical to the success of the Laboratories and their ability
to support the Department's mission is the workforce. This workforce is
highly educated; nine percent of the Department's scientists and
engineers possess Ph.Ds and 26 percent hold Master's Degrees.\5\ This
workforce maintains competence in areas of technology specific to
military needs and includes electronics engineers, mechanical
engineers, computer scientists and engineers, aerospace engineers,
electrical engineers as well as chemists, physicists and
mathematicians. These degreed scientists and engineers conduct DOD-
relevant research leading to key technology demonstrations and publish
thousands of reports and peer-reviewed technical papers. In many cases,
this community defines a technical field with seminal work and leads
the industrial base in their respective areas. This enterprise is a
unique environment for advanced technology development and concept
incubation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Department of Defense Laboratory Civilian Science and
Engineering Workforce--2011, ASD(R&E)/RD Laboratory Office, May 2011
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department's Laboratory infrastructure has an estimated total
property replacement value of $38 billion and a total building
footprint in excess of 140 million ft.\2\ The facilities include unique
resources for design, development and testing used by both the
Department and industry.

The Navy's principal laboratory, the Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL), was founded in 1923 on the recommendation of
Thomas Edison and is the primary performer of the Navy's basic
research program. NRL possesses the only organic government
capability to design and build space satellites. Areas of
emphasis include ocean and atmospheric science, autonomous
systems, and materials science.
The Army's primary provider of basic research is the
Army Research Laboratory (ARL) with primary sites at Adelphi
and Aberdeen, MD. ARL areas of expertise include life sciences,
network science, robotics, physical science, weapons technology
and warfighter protection.
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) consists of
ten individual directorates located across the United States
with headquarters located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
OH. The AFRL is the Air Force's primary provider for basic
research through advanced development for Space Vehicles,
Information Systems, Air Vehicles, Propulsion, Directed Energy,
Materials and Manufacturing, Sensors, Human Performance and
Munitions. The Air Force Office of Scientific Research is a
directorate that serves as the basic science program manager
for all Air Force basic science programs.

The Department Laboratories comprise a balance of these corporate
research laboratories, which maintain basic science as an area of
emphasis, and engineering centers, such as the Navy Warfare Centers and
the Army's Research and Engineering Development Centers that maintain
the Department's in-house development and engineering expertise. The
Services align approximately one-third of their basic science budgets
to in-house programs. A recent review of the Department Laboratories'
basic research programs, conducted by the Defense Science Board
(DSB),\6\ concluded that the in-house basic research programs were
technically strong and healthy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Basic
Research (January 2012)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

The role of the Laboratories in supporting the mission of the
Department is critical. The Department's Laboratories rapidly develop
and transition defense technology to the field through knowledge of
warfighter operational needs and knowledge of developments in industry
and academia. They provide unbiased technology expertise to the
Department in support of policy development and systems acquisition.
The ``products'' the Laboratories deliver can be separated into three
categories:

Rapid prototyping, systems development and deployment
to support urgent operational needs. The Department's
Laboratories have provided critical engineering support to
transition early concepts to operational use in theatre. The
following are a few examples of many recent transitions that
have had a significant impact.
The Army Corps of Engineers Engineering Research &
Development Center has fielded multiple capabilities including
Radiant Falcon, Groundhog and Hard Impact, which provide
deterrence, defense and defeat of Improvised Explosive Devices.
The Naval Research Laboratory, in response to a request from
deployed EA-6B squadrons supporting Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), developed and delivered improvements to Jumpstart III
and Stoplight III systems that provide a counter to an emerging
threat in OEF.
The Air Force Research Laboratory has developed and is
performing operational evaluations in Afghanistan of the Sand
Dragon system. This 200 pound runway-independent, long-
endurance Remotely Piloted Vehicle provides an economy of force
capability for route surveillance and Improvised Explosive
device detection.
The Air Force Research Laboratory also developed the Anubis
Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle. This is a lethal weapon delivery
system controlled at the company or platoon level. It provides
an immediate, precise response to enemy fire and is
successfully employed in support of OEF
The ARL's Unmanned Ground Systems were integrated into the
PGSS surveillance systems in support of OEF. In addition,
weapon surveillance systems, developed by ARL, have been
fielded together with Persistent Ground Surveillance System
(PGSS) to determine location of enemy weapon fires. There are
currently 59 PGSS fielded in Afghanistan.
Advanced concepts that support the Department's
current or future acquisition programs. For example, the Air
Force Research Laboratory is continuing to mature critical
components that will make High Speed Strike Weapon technology
capabilities a reality. The program has had key demonstration
successes and is progressing prudently to support future
programs of record. Key technologies to be developed include
air-breathing hypersonic engines; advanced materials and
structures; guidance, navigation and control for GPS degraded
and denied environments; advanced sensors and seekers; and
selectable effects warheads.
In another example, the Office of Naval Research supported,
the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System was developed and
demonstrated jointly by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft
Division, Lakehurst, NJ, and General Atomics. This technology
was in turn transitioned to General Atomics as the lead
contractor for installation of this new aircraft launch system
in the Gerald R. Ford Aircraft carrier (CVN-78).
Transition of advanced technologies to the industrial
base for use on current or future acquisition programs. For
example, the Air Force's ADVENT program is developing multi-
design-point engine technologies that will provide optimized
fuel efficiency of up to 25 percent and performance
capabilities over a wide range of flight regimes. This
investment will help maintain a competitive industrial base in
turbine engine technology, an area critical to our future
military capability.

In response to specific requirements and operating models, each of
the Services has established a unique approach to technology
transition. The headquarters of AFRL is co-located with Air Force
Material Command, the organization responsible for their acquisition
programs. This proximity ensures that personnel are able to work
closely together. Laboratory personnel serve as subject matter experts
to program managers and program executive officers (PEO) and provide
support for technology development, requirements generation, and system
deployment.
The Army has taken a similar approach by colocating PEOs and
acquisition program managers at each of the Research and Development
Centers to tightly couple advanced technology development programs with
the acquisition process. The Navy's Future Naval Capability program
integrates senior leadership, PEOs, industry and their laboratories in
the rigorous identification of technology requirements, program
development and technology transition into programs of record.
Integration of the Defense Laboratory Enterprise is performed by
Defense Laboratory Office within the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for R&E. This office works closely with each of the Services
in the development and deployment of policies governing the enterprise.
It is an entry point for the Department of Energy (DOE) National
Laboratories, Federally Funded Research & Development Centers (FFRDC)
and University Affiliate Research Centers (UARC).
The Department has a broad and growing engagement with industry and
academia to promote stronger transition paths. The basic research
activities of the corporate laboratories facilitate relationships with
academia and the much broader global research community. Relationships
formed through basic science programs ensure our technology base is
well-versed in the latest technology developments and provide a conduit
for new ideas and innovations to flow into our Laboratories and
advanced development programs. This coupling results in a robust path
to mature basic research concepts to deployed weapon systems.
The Department's mechanisms for industry engagement include
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), which allow
industry and universities to leverage the resources of the Laboratories
to develop jointly owned intellectual property. In fiscal year 2009,
the Department engaged in approximately 2,900 CRADAs. In this same
year, the Department's Laboratory staff filed 831 invention
disclosures, 690 patent applications, were issued 404 patents and 57
new inventions licensed. CRADAs, and licensing of intellectual property
open transition path to bring ideas into the Department, and an
opportunity to transition concepts developed in Department Laboratories
to commercial use.
In addition to engagement with industry and academia, the
Department is assessing the capabilities and resources of other Federal
organizations to identify areas for increased collaboration. DOE's 16
National Laboratories represent a $29 billion investment in energy and
weapons S&T and development. The Department is identifying DOE
capabilities, which can be leveraged for future DOD mission support.
This relationship is formalized in the DOD, DOE, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Director of National Intelligence Governance
Charter, which is expected to promote an increase in the level of
partnership and joint activities between our respective organizations.
The DOD/DOE Joint Munitions Program, which has resulted in the
development of next generation weapons concepts, is a framework for
future interagency engagement.

STRENGTHENING THE LABORATORY WORKFORCE

The laboratory talent base represents a unique repository of core
capabilities upon which the Department relies. The market for
recruiting technical talent in the United States is challenging. DOD
competes not only with industry and academia, but also with other
government departments and agencies. Still, the DOD remains competitive
in its ability to hire talented students and technical professionals
into the Defense Laboratory workforce largely because the DOD
environment provides opportunities that are not available anywhere else
in the world, e.g., working side-by-side with world renown
professionals; working in world-class facilities; or being part of a
team that invents solutions to the challenges facing our national
security. For areas where other agencies have a deeper technical base,
we look to leverage that expertise, as illustrated by the Department's
forging of a stronger relationship with the DOE. We have also partnered
with the Intelligence Community and the DHS to extend our talent base
and support Department objectives.
The Department continues to use the three key initiatives,
supported by Congress, to attract and retain a highly-skilled
workforce.

S&T Reinvention Laboratory statutory authorities
(STRL, also known as ``Demonstration Lab'') provide Laboratory
Directors with flexibility and tools for direct hiring of
highly qualified graduates, training of technical personnel and
pay for performance to retain the best and brightest
performers. Under STRL, Laboratory Directors can send
scientists and engineers to graduate schools for advanced
degrees and specialized training courses and thereby retain a
leading edge skill set.
Section 219 authorities: The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 authorized laboratory
directors to use up to 3 percent of available funds for the
purpose of technology development, supporting the transition of
technology developed by the lab, workforce development and
minor construction for enhancement of laboratory capabilities.
This discretionary investment program is expected to reach $150
million this fiscal year, with each of the Services executing a
vigorous investment program in workforce training, developing
high risk high pay-off technologies, transitioning technology
to programs of record and addressing minor construction needs.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition) established the Naval Innovative
Science and Engineering (NISE) program to implement Section
219. The fiscal year 2011 NISE program had a $48.9 million
funding level from Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E) Navy programs (BA1 through BA7) and was executed by 15
Department of Navy Laboratories as a mechanism to revitalize
their Laboratories and rebuild their world class capabilities.

The NRL's continuation of the Jerome and Isabella Karle
Distinguished Scholar Fellowship (the ``Karles Fellowship'') is another
example of a Navy Section 219 effort. This program provides hiring of
highly accomplished scientists and engineers at any degree level within
1 year of receiving their degree and will provide funds to pay their
salaries for 2 years.
The AFRL fiscal year 2011 section 219 program had a total of
$58.077 million for its budget. Of this budget, $36.658 million
supported 36 basic and applied research programs. This research
included examinations of ionospheric impacts on the Global Positioning
System (GPS), cyber vulnerability identification and mitigation, and
expendable thermal energy storage materials for high power directed
energy weapon systems.
The AFRL used the $7 million of the authority to transition 10
technologies into operational use. These programs included improvements
to air drop operations, autonomous vehicle prototyping, and development
of expeditionary airfield technology. Workforce development activities
accounted for 26 programs that cost $5.375 million. Activities include
scholarships and grants for graduate, undergraduate, and high school
students, teachers, and professors in the science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics research realms. Six recapitalization and
revitalization projects were supported by $9.044 million. Facilities
that received funding included an advanced high power microwave
research facility, the Maui Space Surveillance Complex, and Fuze
Industrial Research Facility, and the Combustion Instability
Laboratory.
The ARL directors executed the implementation plan for section 219
with seven Laboratories participating in fiscal year 2011 and have
additional laboratories anticipated to participate in fiscal year 2012.
The Army Laboratories invested $53.5 million funds from a total of $2.4
billion in fiscal year 2011 funding as described by section 219. These
activities included $20.8 million for infrastructure improvements,
$17.5 million for innovative in-house Basic and Applied Research, $13.2
million for Workforce Retention and Development, and $1.7 million for
Transition of Technology Development.
The Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART)
Scholarship for Service Program has shown great potential in attracting
tomorrow's talent to the Department Laboratories. SMART is an
opportunity to increase the number of civilian scientists and engineers
in Department Laboratories by supporting undergraduate and graduate
students who are pursuing degrees in STEM disciplines and then offering
laboratory positions upon degree completion.
Since its inception in 2005, the SMART program has engaged over 270
institutions of higher learning and research organizations and has
transitioned more than 430 young scientists and engineers into the
Department. Overall, the SMART program benefits the Department and
SMART scholars alike. SMART scholars receive a scholarship and a long-
and full-term training, internships, and access to mentors from their
respective fields. Our benefit is that the DOD's S&T mission is
positively impacted by some of the best and brightest scholars,
initially during their schooling and afterwards, when they begin a
career in the Department.

MOVING TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED LABORATORY ENTERPRISE

In the 1950s, the Department led the R&D agenda for the Nation in
areas ranging from aerodynamics and computation to advanced materials
and microelectronics. Each of the Department's Laboratories was formed
to support Service-specific needs and, through multiple realignments,
each has evolved into a footprint of its own. Still today, these
Laboratories have proven successful in providing technology solutions
rapidly to the field, as well as in transitioning technology to
industry.
To ensure that the Department's laboratories remain relevant in the
future environment where technology is increasingly globalized and new
opportunities as well as threats emerge at an accelerated pace, the
Department is launching an assessment of the current Department
laboratory enterprise. The purpose of this assessment is to provide
recommendations from acknowledged business management experts regarding
the best options for operation of this enterprise. The assessment will
consider the current models for in-house RDT&E against emerging models
for innovation in academia, the industrial base, to include the small
business community used to rapidly develop transition emerging
technologies into new products or operational capabilities. The
Department intends to specifically consider the long-term vision for
the Enterprise, its role within the larger defense community, including
FFRDCs and UARCs, the technical quality of the Laboratories and their
workforce and operational models that promote technology transition. A
key element of the assessment is to examine the balance between the
laboratory responsibilities under U.S.C. Title 10 and the overarching
integrated needs of the Department.

CONCLUSION

The Defense laboratory enterprise is critical to our continued
ability to support the mission of the DOD and our national security.
The Department Laboratories are uniquely suited to couple basic
research concepts to early-use military applications and represent
critical technical capability to address operational challenges. The
Department is committed to shaping an Integrated Laboratory Enterprise
to continue to provide this resource and meet the challenges of an
increasingly globalized environment. Key to this integration is a
talent base of scientists and engineers with the credentials,
experience and resources to provide the Department with capabilities
and new models to quickly transition those solutions to industry and
the warfighter. I appreciate your continued support of our S&T efforts
and I look forward to answering your questions.

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Secretary Lemnios.
Dr. Freeman?

STATEMENT OF DR. MARILYN M. FREEMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Dr. Freeman. Thank you, Chairwoman Hagan and Ranking Member
Portman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I really
do appreciate this opportunity to discuss the status and health
of the Army's S&T enterprise and the significant role of S&T in
supporting the warfighter.
I have submitted a written statement and ask that it be put
into the record.
I want to thank the members of the subcommittee for your
important role in supporting our soldiers who are at war and
for your advocacy of the Army's S&T investments that will
sustain technological preeminence to our future soldiers. Your
continued support is vital to our success.
My vision for Army S&T is to invent, innovate, and
demonstrate technology-enabled capabilities that empower,
unburden, and protect our soldiers. I hear often from the
soldiers themselves that technology saved their lives and was
critical to their remarkable accomplishments. For this reason I
believe it is necessary for the Army to maintain a strong Army
laboratory system.
Our current S&T enterprises comprise over 22 labs and
centers spanning 5 commands and located throughout the United
States. These labs and centers are home to 19,000 dedicated
Federal civilians who are the core of the enterprise. By
employing a world-class cadre of scientists and engineers,
technicians, analysts, and administrative support and providing
them with the facilities and infrastructures necessary to
accomplish their mission, we can ensure that the Army has the
ability to address the specific challenges faced by our
soldiers.
Now, it is my job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research and Technology to plan for the long-term health of
Army S&T, and I believe that there are three critical areas to
our long-term success. The first is people. The second is
infrastructure and facilities, and the third is programs.
While I believe that we are generally well-positioned to
weather the current budget climate, I do have major concerns
with the long-term health of our S&T enterprise. I will briefly
highlight some of these concerns.
People are the Army's most valuable resource. Without the
skills and the dedication of the scientists, engineers,
technicians, and support staff comprising our workforce, the
Army R&D enterprise would be in serious trouble. We are
grateful to Congress for making permanent the direct hire
authority for people with advanced degrees. This, along with
the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Project, allows us to
attract great new talent. Science, Mathematics, and Research
for Transformation (SMART) scholarship for service program also
provides opportunities for us to improve the flow of new
highly-skilled technical labor into our DOD facilities and
agencies to enhance the technical skills of the workforce
already in place.
But as mentioned before, in the difficult budgetary times
ahead, we will have to find ways to ensure that we can retain
these new recruits, avoiding the tendency to employ last-in/
first-out mentalities should we need to reduce manpower. We
also need to find ways to bring in more veterans and others who
may not have advanced degrees but have essential experience and
skills needed for our workforce.
While I fully understand the reality of our budget
situation, we must guard against using S&T as a billpayer. I am
concerned that S&T will take a disproportionate share of
personnel cuts should we have to reduce manpower. Such a loss
of talent could have devastating consequences for the Army.
Now, world-class scientists and engineers require better
than adequate infrastructure and facilities to accomplish their
mission. Within our S&T enterprise, we have roughly 2,000
facilities. Of these, 1,143 are within the continental United
States. We do have a lot outside the continental United States.
To give an indication of the extremes, we currently have one
building that was constructed in 1828 to several buildings
currently under construction. Approximately 72 percent of the
facilities are over 25 years old and 48 percent are greater
than 50 years old. It is also important to note that not only
do our facilities support our Army researchers, but many of our
facilities also are highly leveraged by industry.
While we have made some improvements to our infrastructure
and lots of improvements in facilities through the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, congressional adds, and
the minor military construction (MILCON) authorities provided
by Congress, we do not have a good long-term solution to the
problem of aging facilities. We have recently completed an
inventory in the Army of our S&T facilities and are currently
developing a plan to have facility experts inspect nearly 1,000
of our buildings. This will allow us to develop a comprehensive
priority list and hopefully help get construction resources to
where they are most needed. It is my intent--and I have talked
with her about it--to work with the Assistant Secretary of the
Army, Installations, Energy, and Environment, to find ways to
address this and other infrastructure and facilities issues.
With respect to programs, I believe that the 2013 budget
request submitted to Congress provides correct levels of
investment for our enterprise.
So in conclusion, these are exciting and challenging times
for Army's S&T program. We are changing the S&T business model
to be an enduring, sustainable, successful enterprise and
aligning our strategic planning to the budget process to
achieve efficient, top-down S&T leadership investment focus. I
look forward to working with Congress to ensure that we can
maintain a world-class S&T workforce supported by world-class
infrastructure.
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the subcommittee and for your support to our Army's S&T
investments. I am proud to represent the efforts of over 19,000
dedicated Army civilians and employees to providing soldiers
with world-class technology-enabled capabilities. I am pleased
to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Freeman follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. Marilyn Freeman

Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Army's laboratory system, and some of the
concerns I have with sustaining the health of our enterprise.
The Army's Science and Technology (S&T) community has had, and will
continue to have, a significant role in supporting the warfighter. We
have consistently delivered technology-enabled solutions needed for
recent conflicts and we are committed to developing technologies that
will enhance the Army's capabilities, which will be needed to prevent,
shape and win future conflicts in an uncertain, complex world. We are
grateful to the members of this committee for your sustained support of
our soldiers, your support of our laboratories and centers (and the
technically excellent work force resident within them), and your
continued commitment to ensure that funding is always available to
provide our current and future soldiers with the technology that
enables them to defend America's interests and those of our allies
around the world.
The overarching vision for Army S&T is to invent, innovate and
demonstrate technology enabled capabilities that empower, unburden and
protect our soldiers. Based on the past decade of war we know that
technology makes possible dramatic success both in direct combat and in
all other missions that our soldiers must conduct in the various
theaters of operation.
I hear often from the soldiers themselves that technology saved
their lives and was critical to their remarkable accomplishments. This
feedback motivates our scientists and engineers, who use the funding
provided by Congress, to research, mature, and develop advanced
technologies--from armor to combat casualty care, from air vehicles to
ground vehicles, from food to uniforms, from small arms to missiles,
and from communications to training. They apply their accumulated
knowledge and expertise, experimental data, and innovative products to
solve problems, enhance performance, provide new desired capabilities,
and forecast what capabilities are within the realm of the possible for
our Army. Army S&T is committed to providing technologies to keep our
decisive edge against adaptive enemies.
It is necessary for the Army to maintain a strong Army laboratory
system. Our current S&T enterprise comprises 22 labs and centers
spanning 5 commands, and located throughout the United States.\1\ These
labs and centers are home to roughly 19,000 \2\ dedicated Federal
civilians who are the core of the enterprise. By employing a world
class cadre of scientists, engineers, technicians, analysts, and
administrative support and providing them with the facilities and
infrastructure necessary to accomplish their mission, we can ensure
that the Army has the ability to address the specific challenges faced
by soldiers.
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\1\ The Army S&T Enterprise consists of the following laboratories
and Research, Development, and Engineering Centers (RDEC) within five
major commands: Army G-1 (Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences); Engineer Research and Development Center (Coastal
and Hydraulics Lab, Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab,
Construction Engineering Research Lab, Environmental Lab, Geotechnical
and Structures Lab, Information Technology Lab, and Topographic
Engineering Center); Medical Research and Material Command (Aeromedical
Research Laboratory, Institute for Surgical Research, Medical Research
Institute of Chemical Defense, Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases, Research Institute of Environmental Medicine,
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research); Research, Development, and
Engineering Command (Army Research Laboratory, Armaments RDEC, Aviation
and Missile RDEC, Communications and Electronics RDEC, Edgewood
Chemical and Biological Center, Tank and Automotive RDEC, and Natick
Soldier RDEC); and Space and Missile Defense Command (Space and Missile
Defense Technology Center)
\2\ The personnel data represented here and the remainder of the
document are a tabulation of input received from the laboratories
representing fiscal year 2010.
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It is my job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research
and Technology (DASA(R&T)) to plan for the long-term health of Army
S&T. I believe that there are three areas critical to our long term
success: (1) People; (2) Infrastructure and Facilities; and (3)
Programs. While I believe we are generally well-positioned to weather
the current budget climate, I do have major concerns with the long term
health of our S&T enterprise.

PEOPLE

People are the Army's most valuable resource. I am proud to
represent our S&T workforce comprising government civilian scientists,
technicians, engineers, wage grade workers, and support personnel, as
well as soldiers and contract personnel who offer a wide array of
specialties and abilities that allow Army S&T labs and centers to cover
the full spectrum of research, engineering and operational support for
the Nation, especially the soldier.
Developing and maintaining the world-class cadre of scientists,
engineers, and technologists requires a four-phased approach:

(1) using the hiring, evaluation and retention authorities
associated with the laboratory personnel demonstration program to
recruit and retain a highly qualified, success oriented, and dedicated
workforce,
(2) growing existing workforce capabilities through exchange
programs and other authorities that provide for workforce development
to help us maintain a vibrant, agile, well-educated cadre of Scientist
and Engineers,
(3) investing in research initiatives at the college and graduate
school level to provide focus and generate expertise for the next
generation of Army researchers, and
(4) investing in educational outreach initiatives to build a
diverse, Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) capable
talent source for the future workforce.

Today in the Army's S&T workforce there are approximately 12,000
scientists and engineers (S&Es). Approximately 45 percent hold Masters
Degrees or Ph.Ds, 15 percent are women, 17 percent are African
American, and 14 percent Asian. Figure 1 shows the Army's demographics
for years of S&E service:

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

We have been able to stem the bow wave associated with the
potential loss of senior S&Es by hiring initiatives over the last
decade; however, given the current climate, we anticipate having to
reduce or refrain from hiring.
As noted in a 2008 National Defense University Study:

``The growing tendency to view the in-house S&E workforce as
just another set of performers suggests the absence of an
understanding of why DOD (or the government) maintains in-house
competence in science and engineering. In the absence of such
an understanding, the competitive model provides a means to
determine what the in-house workforce will do and at what level
it will be funded. While the competitive model is very
effective at making such determinations, it is not well suited
as a tool for running the government. It hopelessly blurs the
distinction between what is public and what is private, it puts
the government in the awkward position of being in direct
competition with its citizens, and it compromises the
objectivity that the public should expect and demand of its
government.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Timothy Coffey, ``Building the S&E Workforce for 2040:
Challenges Facing the Department of Defense.'' Center for Technology
and National Security Policy, National Defense University, July 2008,
page 18.

I am concerned that in this period of severely constrained budgets
that will carry with it potential for manpower reductions, our S&T
workforce may be expected to carry a disproportionate share of the
reductions. A disproportionate loss of science and engineering talent
could have devastating consequences for the Army. Our laboratory
workforce is funded from many accounts--S&T (6.1-6.3 direct funding),
acquisition (6.4 and 6.5 reimbursable funding), and funding from other
government agencies (customers such as the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the
Defense Health Program). In order to ensure that the science and
engineering workers are able to meet the needs of the soldiers, we must
ensure that any reductions in manpower are assessed against the
workload and funding available.
We are grateful to Congress for making permanent to the
laboratories the Direct Hire Authority for people with advanced
degrees. This, along with the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration
Project, allows us to attract great new talent.
The Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation (SMART)
Scholarship for Service Program also provides opportunities to improve
the flow of new, highly-skilled technical labor into DOD facilities and
agencies to enhance the technical skills of the workforce already in
place. SMART offers scholarships to undergraduate, masters, and
doctoral students who have demonstrated ability and special aptitude
for excelling in STEM disciplines. Students are provided opportunities
to continue their research in civil service roles following graduation.
The Army has been participating in SMART since 2008. In 2011 the Army
brought on 287 SMART awardees (259 in the category of new hires and 28
workforce retention candidates).
Some other personnel issues include losing top talent to industry,
and either regional market shortages of certain types of employees or
salary competition with regional industry.
But, in the difficult times ahead, we will have to find ways to
ensure that we can retain these new recruits, avoiding the tendency to
employ ``last in/first out' mentalities should we need to reduce
manpower
Despite the many challenges, we have an amazing group of young
scientists and engineers to serve as role models for the next
generation. In 2011, Dr. Tad Brunye, from the Natick Soldier Research,
Development and Engineering Center Cognitive Science researcher and Dr.
Reuben Kraft, from the Army Research Laboratory were named by President
Obama as Outstanding Early Career Scientists. The Presidential Early
Career Awards for Scientists and Engineers are the highest honor
bestowed by the U.S. Government on science and engineering
professionals in the early stages of their independent research
careers, and we are lucky to have researchers like Dr. Brunye and Dr.
Kraft to mentor the next generation.
Army S&T contributes to the future success in STEM education with a
cohesive, coordinated, set of K-12 programs under the Army Educational
Outreach Program (AEOP). In the 2010-2011 AEOP received over 15,592
student online applications, engaged nearly 27,000 students as well as
984 teachers, involved 141 universities, and utilized the talent and
time of many of our Army scientists and engineers.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND FACILITIES

World class scientists and engineers require better than adequate
infrastructure and facilities to accomplish their mission. Within our
S&T enterprise we have 2,196 facilities. Of these, 1,143 are within the
continental United States. To give an indication of the extremes, we
currently have one building constructed in 1828 to several buildings
currently under construction. Approximately 72 percent of the
facilities are over 25 years old and 48 percent are greater than 50
years old. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the number of buildings and
the decade in which construction was completed.
It is also important to note that not only do our facilities
support Army researchers, but many of our facilities are highly
leveraged by industry. All industrial or government developed
technologies submitted for Network Integration Rehearsal/Network
Integration Evaluation are required to come into our Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance System Integration Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving
Grounds, (APG) for instance.

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Our infrastructure (the buildings and associated mechanical systems
such as heating, air ventilation, and cooling (HVAC), et cetera) and
facilities (the specialized laboratories and equipment housed within)
are in critical need of modernization. Infrastructure and facility
costs fall essentially into three categories: Sustainment, Restoration
and Modernization (SRM); Operations; and Mission Specific Requirements.
SRM and Operations are planned, programmed and executed by the
Installation Management Command (IMCOM). Costs for SRM and Operations
are assessed at the installation level, but, not broken out by tenant
or, in our case, lab or center. Therefore, the actual costs associated
with operating, maintaining and improving our laboratory infrastructure
and facilities is not identified explicitly nor reflected in the
funding distribution models.. The Common Level of Support (CLS)
provided under IMCOM regulations falls short of providing the services
and upkeep needed in a high-tech laboratory enterprise. At every
laboratory or center we use a significant amount of our RDT&E dollars
to supplement CLS.
We have calculated that our largest command, RDECOM should be
receiving significantly more benefit from SRM than it is, based on the
Office of the Secretary of Defense Facility Budget Model. For example,
at APG the model indicates that we should have received approximately
$24.5 million per year but in fiscal years 2010-2012, we received only
$5.2 million.
As the IMCOM budget is subject to constraints and the cost of
installation management is subject to outdated models apportioning
funds to SRM needs, we anticipate that the laboratories and centers
will have to continue investing a significant amount of RDT&E dollars
to maintain and operate our infrastructure and facilities at the levels
required to conduct our mission.
This problem is often magnified by Defense Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) Commission process. For example when Fort Monmouth was
closed and the majority of the workforce transferred to APG, funding
for CLS at APG remained the same.
In the past 10 years, five construction projects in the S&T
enterprise have been funded through the MILCON process. If we discount
the MRMC Defense-wide MILCON projects, the amount of Army MILCON
invested in the S&T is $61 million.
Building VB1 at the Space and Missile Defense Command Technical
Center was constructed using a mix of programmed MILCON funding and
Congressional Add funding. The Medical Research and Materiel Command
(MRMC) received funding for three major projects through the Defense-
wide MILCON account, and one in Defense-wide Unspecified Minor Military
Construction. All other infrastructure and facilities improvements
across our complex have been achieved through the use Congressional
Adds or mission RDT&E funds through the minor military construction and
``Section 219'' authorities. In the last decade, there was $1,211
million in MILCON, $1,011 million in the BRAC process, and $235.5
million in Congressional Adds.
In addition, infrastructure improvements such as revitalization and
recapitalization projects utilizing Section 219 funds accounted for
$20.88 million in the past fiscal year. Eleven projects were completed
including laboratory renovations and instrumentation upgrades that
directly supported core competency areas within the respective
laboratories. Critical infrastructure needs included the upgrade and
modernization of administrative spaces, upgrade and acquisition of
internal technical infrastructure, ventilation of weapons system spaces
to reduce down time, HEPA filters and sand filtration systems, HVAC
upgrades in energetic laboratory, and unexploded ordnance clearance of
a 1950s vintage range.
Protecting the facilities and equipment we currently have is now
our highest priority. If you visit some of our labs and centers, you
can see examples of specialized, expensive equipment being protected
from leaking roofs and HVAC systems by sheets of plastic. We are
working with air handlers past their useful life, switch gear past
their useful life and made by companies no longer in business, and
aging piping systems for plumbing, roofs and HVAC systems. Many
buildings are simply deteriorating as 48 percent of the inventory is
greater than 50 years old. Some 11 percent are 75 years and older. I am
including with my testimony some pictures of deteriorating conditions,
which I would ask be submitted for the record.
Making improvements to our infrastructure and facilities like this
at the margins is not a long-term solution. In order to develop a
comprehensive plan to modernize both our infrastructure and facilities,
I am currently undertaking an in-depth assessment of what we have now.
My office has recently completed an inventory of all Army laboratory
facilities and in consultation with facilities experts and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers we are developing a Statement of Work for a
team to inspect the roughly 1,000 Army S&T facilities. While I
appreciate the specific authorities provided by Congress in recent
years, the fact of the matter is they will not come close to addressing
a problem of this magnitude.
I intend to work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Energy, and Environment) to find ways to address all
the issues cited in this section.

PROGRAMS

One of my first priorities, when I became DASA(R&T) a year and a
half ago, was to change the perception that Army S&T was irrelevant--
and this remains one of my top goals. I embarked on a path to: (1)
provide a discipline and structure to the way we plan and execute our
S&T programs; (2) develop effective partnerships with key stakeholders,
leaders and Users across traditional organizational stovepipes; and (3)
better synchronize our programs with the priorities of the Secretary of
the Army, the Army Force Generation plan, and the fiscal processes of
the Department of Defense (DOD). This path is leading to a significant
change of the S&T culture and it is still a work in progress.
Over the past year we have developed several management initiatives
to emplace a structure and set of tools, which will enable us to be
successful in delivering capabilities to the warfighter, and to develop
a balanced portfolio based on prioritized needs and desired advanced
capabilities. The first initiative was to restructure the way we think
of and articulate the S&T program. We established a set of S&T
Portfolios. The portfolio construct allows us to focus more on the
desired capabilities for the domains in which the Army operates than on
the color of money in various commodity stovepipes. The main S&T
portfolios are: Soldier; Ground; Air; and Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (C3I). We also have a Basic Research
portfolio. These align closely to the Army's capability portfolios. Our
intent is to be able to show how our S&T programs and products support
the Army's Capability Portfolio Review process. We are also integrating
our efforts with DOD's seven S&T priorities.
The second initiative was to increase active engagement of the Army
Leadership (Headquarters Department of the Army, the Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Acquisition community and the major
commands) in activities that establish real priorities for Army S&T.
The third initiative was to focus on better, more comprehensive
program planning. By doing more concepting, detailed schedule planning,
and realistic program cost estimates before embarking on a path of
research and development, we can better articulate the objectives of
our programs, show the value of them, and track transitions to help us
measure success.
Today I am proud to report to you that there has been a great deal
of forward progress. We have built a much stronger partnership with
Army Leadership, the Acquisition Executives and TRADOC. In the past
year, we established a strategic program planning process with
participation of both our key partners and S&T leaders across all the
laboratories and centers. Collaboratively we developed and validated
the first (ever) set of S&T priorities to focus our near term research
and development efforts. We started by generating a list of seven
problems that soldiers and Small Combat Units are grappling with today
and for which they will continue to need better solutions over the next
several years. Then we collaboratively developed a set of challenges
associated with those problems--24 in all--to be used by the S&T
community to plan programs that will address them or solve them by the
end of fiscal year 2017.
The problems and associated challenges constitute a fundamentally
new approach to planning and managing our S&T investment. In this first
year we concentrated on the top 10 challenges, selected by Senior Army
Leadership. The laboratories and centers teamed up to develop the first
Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration (TECD) programs. Typically
a TECD will mature and bring together several new technologies, couple
them with existing systems/technologies, and demonstrate integrated
technology-based solutions that either measurably enhance performance
and effectiveness of an existing capability or enable a new and
necessary capability. Nine TECD programs were formulated and approved
in this first round. Most of the nine new TECD programs will begin in
fiscal year 2013 and funding for them is reflected in our fiscal year
2013 budget request. The community has already begun collaboratively
planning the set of 15 remaining programs that will be brought forward
to Army leadership for validation within this fiscal year. We will be
addressing any shifts in the budget required to accomplish this second
set of TECDs in the fiscal year 2014 budget cycle.
My goal is to have approximately 50 percent of the Army's Budget
Activity (BA) 3 funding dedicated to TECDs. We will be scrutinizing
these programs constantly; requiring their Technology Program Managers
(TPMs) to focus on cost, schedule, and transition of deliverables; and
we will be generating new problems/challenges as necessary to respond
to the changing needs of our soldiers.
TECDs are focused on near term Army priorities. They are a good
first step. But, in order to maintain a balanced portfolio, we must
also have clearer priorities for the mid and far term investments.
Therefore, this year we are also working to define and develop a set of
programs to meet the mid-term needs of the Acquisition community.
Having these needs identified and then prioritized by leadership will
enable us to better focus the remainder of our BA 3 dollars and a
portion of our BA 2 dollars on near- to mid-term solutions to critical
emerging needs. Simultaneously, we are identifying technologies that
have high potential to ``Bridge Gaps'' or achieve ``Leap Ahead''
capabilities. If we lead the way in developing a set of critical
technologies in our BA 2 and BA 3 programs at the same time when
acquisition programs may be slowing down due to budget constraints, we
believe that we will be better positioned for the future. We are
thinking of calling these programs Science and Technology Enabling
Programs (STEPs). Finally, we are going to establish a set of
priorities for Basic Research. It is my goal to use the collaborative
processes (similar to those used to create the TECDs) to get clear
priorities, problems and challenges against which better programs can
be formulated and executed to achieve the most advanced capabilities
possible, as soon as possible, with the resources you make available to
us.
As we shift to a priority based, programmatically managed, more
collaborative S&T culture within the Army, our scientists and engineers
have not stopped working the existing efforts across the entire
spectrum of the funding lines and the technology areas. Even as they
are taking on the new challenges I have given them, they continue to
deliver on projects that research, mature and demonstrate needed
technology devices, components and subsystems--many of which will feed
future STEPs or TECDs. Many of our major efforts will be described
later in this testimony.

THE FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST

I believe the fiscal year 2013 budget request submitted to Congress
provides the correct levels of investment for our enterprise. Our S&T
program request for BA 1-3 for fiscal year 2013 is $2.2 billion--a 3.2
percent decrease from our fiscal year 2012 request. BA 3 programs
decrease by $86 million, while BA1 and BA2 programs increase by $7
million and $6 million, respectively.
In fiscal year 2013, the Army is placing increased emphasis (and
investment) on ground and aviation vehicle survivability, research in
focal plane arrays, and alternative fuels for ground vehicles. We will
accept some greater risk (reducing funding) in lethality, unmanned/
autonomous ground vehicles, and military engineering. As we adjust to
an era of decreasing or flat budgets, Army S&T must be capable of doing
more with less and correctly managing the risk associated with
shrinking budgets by identifying and focusing on the highest priorities
for the future. I believe that the S&T management strategy, described
previously, allows us to do just that.
In fiscal year 2013, we requested $386.1 million for our soldier
portfolio, $626.9 million for our Ground Portfolio, $141.3 million for
our Air Portfolio and $323.0 million for our C3I Portfolio. We also
requested $444.1 million for Basic Research.
In the request, there is $14.0 million for the BA4 Technology
Maturation Initiatives line, which was established in fiscal year 2012
to better enable the Army to meet the goal of ensuring competition
while maturing S&T efforts to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 or
higher prior to Milestone B in support of the Weapons System
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Funding in this line is expected to
help us cross the ``valley of death'' for some high potential
technologies or subsystems.
To make the decisions concerning which efforts should be funded
with this precious resource, we established an S&T BA4 Executive
Steering Group (ESG) and a rigorous, but streamlined, process for
evaluating, prioritizing and selecting proposed projects. The project
selection criteria include: potential to reduce programmatic costs/
risks, potential for quick transitions, and synchronization with
acquisition plans and programs. Last fall, the ESG selected the first
five projects for funding in fiscal year 2012. These projects will be
continually monitored to ensure that they stay on track to provide the
deliverables to the proper PMs/PEOs within the next couple of years. Of
course, it is too early to make any conclusions regarding the success
of this new approach, but the ultimate test of success will be whether
or not we achieve planned transitions and reduce costs through early
competitive prototyping. I am confident that we have a strong process
in place now, which provides the Army with an improved mechanism for
establishing a closer alignment between S&T and acquisition programs;
however, in the fiscal year 2013 budget request, we did decide to
maintain a modest investment in this line until we have some data on
the effectiveness of the projects against the objectives.
Another new source of funding for S&T is the Rapid Innovation Fund
(RIF), established by Congress in fiscal year 2011. We are using, and
intend to continue using, this additional funding to attract small and
nontraditional businesses, so that we can identify and incorporate what
they produce to help our TECD TPMs solve the 24 challenges. We recently
released a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) asking for white papers in
support of the top 10 Army priority challenges. The response was
enormous--nearly 1,000 white papers were received. My staff, along with
subject matter experts from the Army labs and the acquisition
community, reviewed each of these proposals and selected over 90. We
are asking these selectees to submit full proposals; against which we
will use the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 RIF funding to award
contracts. These contractual efforts will be managed as part of the
appropriate TECD by the TPMs. The plan is to issue another BAA in
fiscal year 2012 seeking technologies that can contribute to solving
the remaining 15 priority challenges. I believe that this new
initiative (the RIF) is providing value to the Army and opening up more
collaborative opportunities for small and nontraditional businesses. In
addition to providing a link to the TECDs for small businesses, the
huge number of white papers received has given us further insight into
innovative technologies of which we may have not been otherwise aware--
and it is our intent to fund more of the highest quality proposals with
core funds. While we are still in the initial phase of this program, I
have confidence it will be ultimately successful in reaching companies
with innovative ideas and getting them on a path for Army's acceptance
of their products into subsystems and systems.
The Army Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is
another way for us to tap the ideas of nontraditional defense
businesses. The SBIR program is designed to provide small, high-tech
businesses the opportunity to propose innovative research and
development solutions in response to critical Army needs. In fiscal
year 2011, the Army SBIR office generated 139 topics based on input
from laboratories, TRADOC and the PEOs. In response to these topics,
small businesses submitted over 3000 proposals, which were evaluated by
the Army SBIR office and which resulted in more than 600 Phase I and
Phase II awards valued at approximately $200 million.
Although the SIBR program is strong, there is a real need to
streamline the topics generation process and reduce the overhead and
labor associated with generating, selecting and contracting SIBR
efforts. I believe we can lean the process, increase the program
success rates and, most importantly, improve the transition of products
that are developed under Army SIBR contracts. Therefore, I have
directed that, beginning this year, SBIR topics/projects align with
TECDs, S&T Challenges and highest priority Program Executive Office
(PEO) needs. By tying more of these efforts directly to S&T priorities
and managing each project as part of a TECD program, the fiscal year
2013 SIBR projects may have greater transition rate and increased
relevance.
Beginning in fiscal year 2012, the High Performance Computing
Modernization Program (HPCMP) and office transitioned from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to my office for management. HPCMP
is, and will remain, focused on supporting the needs of the triservices
and other agencies. HPCMP comprises three elements--it: (1) operates
six DOD Shared Resource Centers; (2) operates and maintains the Defense
Research and Engineering Network; and (3) develops Software
Applications. DOD scientists and engineers use HPCMP resources in
support of many disciplines, including physics, chemistry, materials,
acoustics, and aerodynamics. While there have been some bumps in the
road in the transition process, the Army remains fully committed to
managing and executing this critical capability. In fiscal year 2013 we
have requested $180.6 million in RDT&E and $57.7 million in procurement
to conduct this program, managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Across all of our portfolios, we maintain our focus on power and
energy. As we develop technology enabled capabilities, we must work to
reduce the burden in both weight and logistics that comes from
increased energy consumption by the plethora of electronic equipment we
need in our operations. Since fiscal year 2002, S&T power and energy
research has concentrated on maturation and demonstration of
components, materials, and devices to reduce size, weight, and power,
as well as, extend the useful life of components. We are now shifting
our focus to concentrate on subsystems and systems. Our objectives are
to improve efficiency and reduce consumption while increasing
functionality and developing smart energy-saving designs. Power and
energy issues must be resolved to achieve the objectives of most of the
24 challenges. Our existing programs are integrated with, and
complementary to, the operational energy strategy of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, and the Environment.
In the fiscal year 2013 budget request we have, interspersed among our
portfolios, $160.9 million for power and energy projects.

S&T PORTFOLIO HIGHLIGHTS

Soldier Portfolio
In keeping with the vision of soldier as the Decisive Weapon, the
soldier S&T portfolio researches underpinning human science and matures
and demonstrates technologies for Soldier and Squad Lethality,
Survivability, Mobility, Leader Development, Training, Combat Casualty
Care and Clinical and Rehabilitation Medicine capabilities. The efforts
in this portfolio are designed to maximize the effectiveness of Squad
performance as a collective formation. These efforts result in state of
the art equipment, shelters, clothing, food, training tools, logistic
support, combat trauma therapies, and other medical technologies. Major
initiatives include Protection, Dismounted Soldier Power and an
overarching focus on the human and material science advancements
necessary to Lighten the Soldier's Load. In the coming years, improving
mission performance in a complex and dynamic environment will rely on
improving the integration of cognitive and physical performance with
technology solutions.
In keeping with our holistic approach to Army challenges, this
effort looks to address the entire chain of service from pre-deployment
to return to civilian life including training, health promotion,
rehabilitative medicine and treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD)/Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Efforts seek to reduce
load-related injuries and chronic conditions, address the cognitive and
physical burden through better decision and mission planning tools, and
optimize individual protective equipment to fully consider
survivability in relation to mobility, lethality, and the human
dimension. This effort is truly collaborative, involving researchers
from the Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center,
the Army Research Lab, the MRMC, the Army Research Institute, the
Armaments Research, Development and Engineering Center, the other
Services and DARPA, as well as our academic, industry, and
international partners.
PTSD and TBI continue to be a source of serious concern. The U.S.
Army MRMC has ongoing efforts to address these devastating conditions.
Basic research efforts include: furthering our understanding of cell
death signals and neuroprotection mechanisms, as well as, identifying
critical thresholds for secondary injury comprising TBI. We are also
focused on investigating selective brain cooling and non-embryonic stem
cells derived from human amniotic fluid as non-traditional therapies
for TBI, and identifying ``combination'' therapeutics that
substantially mitigate or reduce TBI-induced brain damage and seizures
for advanced development and clinical trials. We have had some recent
successes in this area, including completion of an FDA effectiveness
study on a candidate neuroprotective drug for treatment of TBI and
completion of a pivotal trial for a bench-top assay for use in
hospitals using candidate biomarkers for the detection of TBI.

Ground Portfolio
The Ground portfolio includes technologies for medium and large
caliber weapons, munitions, missiles, directed energy weapons, vehicle
ballistic and blast protection, vehicle power and mobility, unmanned
ground systems and countermine and counter-Improvised Explosive Devices
(IED) detection and neutralization and deployable small base
protection.
In the past, we have designed vehicles with little consideration
for accommodating soldiers who have to operate in them. Now we are
beginning to explore ways to design vehicles around soldiers.
Increasing protection levels of the platforms means impacting interior
volumes reducing mobility, maneuverability, and freedom of movement for
occupants, and leads to heavier platforms. The Occupant Centric
Survivability (OCS) Program provides the mechanism to develop, design,
demonstrate, and document an occupant centered Army ground vehicle
design philosophy that improves vehicle survivability, as well as force
protection, by mitigating warfighter injury due to underbody IED and
mine blast, vehicle rollover, and vehicle crash events. This design
philosophy considers the warfighter first, integrates occupant
protection technologies, and builds the vehicle to surround and support
the warfighter and the Warfighter's mission. To this end, we are
developing an OCS concept design demonstrator, as well as, platform-
specific demonstrators with unique occupant protection technologies
tailored to the platform design constraints. We are also publishing
standards for occupant centric design guidelines, test procedures, and
safety specifications.
In fiscal year 2013, we are also continuing the effort started last
year in Underbody Blast (UBB) Protection. Some recent successes include
performing vulnerability identification and resolution on most Program
Manager (PM) programs such as JLTV, mine-resistant ambush protected
vehicle, Stryker, HET, and FMTV, and advising PM customers on the
feasibility and performance of potential blast protection technologies
while balancing cost, payload, mobility and mission requirements. We
have developed tools and methods which have led to system level
evaluations through modeling and simulation resulting in improved Live
Fire Test and Evaluation, faster delivery of technologies to theater/
customers and necessary characterizations of threats, systems and
environment. Our efforts continue to look at a full range of
technologies to address this issue, from modeling and simulation and
physiological studies to seats, restraints and energy-absorbing
materials.
We are also continuing our investments and efforts in Deployable
Force Protection (DFP). Our military units operating remotely at small
bases are more vulnerable to enemy attacks because they have less
organic equipment, fewer personnel, shorter kinetic reach, less
hardened areas, significant bandwidth limitations and are difficult to
reinforce, resupply and support with repairs. We are developing force
protection technologies that have a low logistics footprint, are easily
operated with limited manpower and training, and are quick to set up
and take down. This will allow for enhanced protection capabilities,
while leaving soldiers with more time to perform their mission.
In conjunction with the U.S. Special Operations Command Central and
the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, we recently assessed
several systems and recommended an integrated force protection kit to
support Village Stability Operations. The kit is being provided to the
7th Special Forces Group for operational assessment in theater and was
created in a collaborative effort to accelerate delivery. The kit
provides protection and allows operators to focus less on establishing
personal security and more on the mission. We have also developed a
low-logistics armoring system to expediently establish protection for
critical assets, such as the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), mortar
pit, and weapon/sensor systems. Unlike any other, this system also
provides expedient overhead cover that protects against direct-hit
rocket, artillery, and mortar threats. Members of the DFP team worked
with troops and Centers of Excellence on design and employment options.
The 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division will deploy with
a number of modular protective mortar pit and overhead cover systems to
be used in an operational assessment in theater. Use of these systems
will result in savings of countless hours that are typically associated
with establishing mortar pits and protection and will increase the
associated level of protection for soldiers.

Air Portfolio
The Army is the lead service for rotorcraft, owning and operating
over 80 percent of DOD's vertical lift aircraft. As such, the
preponderance of rotorcraft technology research and development takes
place within the Army. The Air portfolio is focused on seven broad
areas of research: platform technology; operations and support;
survivability; rotors and flight controls; engines & drives; weapons
and sensors; and unmanned systems. Our vision for Army aviation S&T is
to provide the best possible aviation technology enabled capabilities
to deliver soldiers, weapons, supplies and equipment where they are
needed, when they are needed.
In order to provide Soldier support over future Areas of Operation
(AO) that may be 16 times larger than current AOs, the Army needs a
faster, more efficient rotorcraft, with significantly improved
survivability against current and future threats. Operating in
conditions of 6,000 feet and 95 degrees (high/hot), this aircraft will
need to transport and supply troops while providing close air support
and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
A major effort currently underway within S&T is technology
development for DOD's next potential ``clean sheet'' design
rotorcraft--the Joint Multi-Role (JMR) aircraft. In fiscal year 2011,
the Army, Navy and NASA agreed to use a common toolset and database and
are collaboratively sharing design responsibility for the JMR-Medium,
an aircraft intended to replace our Blackhawk/Seahawk and Apache fleet.
Three different configurations of JMR aircraft have been designed by
the Government--a conventional helicopter, a large-wing slowed rotor
compound, and a tilt rotor. There are seven design excursions being
investigated that fully explore the size and environmental
characteristics of interest, including shipboard operations. Additional
near-term plans include conducting a small scale wind tunnel test of an
unpowered tilt rotor to validate forces and moments, confirm
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) estimates, and update design
parameters. Additional CFD/Computational Structural Dynamics assessment
and results integration will be done as part of expanding the design
methodology and toolset. We plan to use the BA4 line to allow a second
demonstrator to be developed for JMR.
Additionally, the DOD HPCMP CREATE Air Vehicle Project is
coordinated with this activity and endeavors to increase the fidelity
of the design process with the future goal of being able to conduct a
complete detailed design environment.
While many of our rotorcraft research efforts are focused on the
development of technology for transition to new platforms in 2025 and
beyond, we are also maintaining an investment to keep the current fleet
effective. One recent transition success has been the Advanced
Affordable Turbine Engine (AATE), a 3,000 shaft horsepower engine with
25 percent improved fuel efficiency, and 35 percent reduced lifecycle
costs. In fiscal year 2012, AATE transitioned to PM--Utility for
Engineering and Manufacturing Development under the Improved Turbine
Engine Program, which will re-engine our Blackhawk and Apache fleet.

C3I Portfolio
The key to successful operations in an increasingly complex battle
space is the capability for seamless and timely communications across
all echelons of the system, from headquarters to the soldier. A major
effort in the C3 portfolio is combining enhanced mission command
capabilities for the soldier and small unit with improved mobile
networks.
We are providing solutions to improve command and control,
situational awareness, and dynamic communications, while maintaining
appropriate military security not found in commercial devices. In order
to exploit the full range of capabilities that smart devices offer the
soldier, we need an improved network in an on-the-move (OTM)
environment; handheld devices with tools and functionality to provide
soldiers with the necessary decision and communications capabilities in
an intuitive interface; and appropriate security protocols for the
battlefield.
Our mobile network research efforts are increasing network
efficiency and reliability, increasing OTM connectivity and bandwidth
utilization, and allowing for reliable message delivery in difficult
communications environments. These efforts are leveraging investments
by commercial industry and DARPA.
Our mission command efforts are aimed at providing soldiers and
small units with the kinds of data-driven decision tools once available
only to higher echelons. As our defense strategy moves to a smaller,
more agile force, it is critical that small units and individual
soldiers have access to accurate and relevant situation awareness
information including geospatial and meteorological data, combat ID and
battlespace awareness, as well as full spectrum decision support tools.
Just as critically, we have to design these tools taking into account
human cognitive abilities and limitations.
Finally, the most useful tools for the soldier are worthless if
they are not properly secured. These security issues include approved
encryption for secret and below, identity management, security policy
management, exploitable applications and securing the infrastructure.
Our efforts in this area include authentication of approved
applications and prevention of installation of rogue applications,
providing secret voice and data connections across disparate
technologies including handheld devices, and developing a mutual
authentication mechanism between users, handheld devices, and the
network core.
Beyond the specific security efforts for mobile battlefield
communications, the C3 portfolio also directs our broader cyber
security S&T efforts, which I know the subcommittee has a particular
interest in. Our work in a resilient cyber security framework will
provide a more secure foundation in which participants, including cyber
devices and software, are able to work together in near-real time to
anticipate and prevent cyber attacks, limit the spread of attacks
across participating devices, minimize the consequences of attacks, and
recover systems and networks to trusted states. Within this framework,
security capabilities are built into cyber devices and software in a
way that allows preventive and defensive courses of action to be
coordinated within and among communities of defense in depth
architectures. The power to detect and mitigate threats is distributed
among participants and near-real time coordination is enabled by
combining the innate and interoperable capabilities of individual
devices with trusted information exchanges and shared, configurable
policies.
In the area of software assurance, analyzing software code for
security vulnerabilities and malware is a manually intensive effort
requiring a high degree of skill and experience. Our development
efforts focus on automating the software code analysis for C++ programs
and JAVA source code; developing a compliance checker to ensure that
the software has been developed in accordance with required standards;
reducing false positives; and testing binary objects and images for
logic bombs and unexecuted regions. We also have research efforts in
hardware assurance, including trustworthy computing foundations,
physical tamper and chip level protection schemes.

Basic Research
Underpinning all of our efforts is a strong basic research program.
Beginning this year, we are developing a process similar to the TECDs
to define a set of priorities for Basic Research and identify challenge
statements against which programs can be proposed and approved. The key
emphasis for the Army is to provide the necessary basic research
(through the skills of our workforce and our investments) to achieve
and provide for technically enabled capabilities that meet the specific
needs of the soldier and the Army mission. In Army Basic Research, we
are looking to lead the S&T enterprise. We look for guidance from many
sources--requirements and desired capabilities from TRADOC and our
soldiers; commissioned studies from the National Academies and RAND;
workshops and collaborations with our sister services; and we are in
the midst of rethinking how we approach, describe, and provide strategy
for the overall program.
We know that for most of the 20th century, physics was the
fundamental driver for nearly all leaps in technology. And while
physics will always play a large role in that, over the last 20 years
we have seen big changes in and big advances from biology and bio-
inspired technology. As we move forward we need to watch very closely
and invest selectively to determine what technology is going to come
from that and how are we going to develop that to assist the soldier.
With that in mind, we are beginning to think of and align our basic
research efforts in three areas: Long-Term Exploration; Long-Term
Disruptive Technology investments; and Long-Term Enabling Research.
Long-Term Exploration efforts look to discover or invent new
technologies and capabilities relevant to the Army mission--we explore
with a purpose. Our Long-Term Disruptive Technology investments are
researching technologies which will change the rules of the playing
field for our warfighter. Long-Term Enabling research looks for
innovative ways to move the inventions and discoveries into components
and subcomponents and technologies that our labs and research partners
can exploit. By this we enable future S&T applied research, advanced
tech development, and capabilities. Taken together, this basic research
provides the solid foundation for Army S&T.
These are exciting and challenging times for the Army's S&T
program. We are changing the Army S&T business model to be an enduring,
sustainable, successful enterprise, and aligning our strategic planning
to the budget process to achieve efficient, top-down S&T leadership
investment focus. We are identifying critical Army problems that we can
solve in the near and mid-term, using the best talent and skills
wherever they exist. Finally, we are enhancing the visibility of Army
S&T priorities to provide partnering opportunities to jointly solve
problems and enhance our warfighter capabilities. As you can imagine,
this is a tremendous undertaking, and would not be possible with the
support we have received from Congress. I hope that we can continue to
count on support as we move forward, and I would like to again thank
the members of the subcommittee again for all you do for our soldiers.
I would be happy to take any questions you have.

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Dr. Freeman.
Ms. Lacey?

STATEMENT OF MARY E. LACEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

Ms. Lacey. Madam Chair, Senator Portman, members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear here before you today to
report on the overall health of the Department of the Navy
laboratories and warfare centers.
The Navy relies heavily on the people, facilities, and
capabilities in our labs and centers to sustain the current
Navy, to acquire the next Navy, and to develop the Navy after
next.
I want to thank the subcommittee not only for your
interest, but for your strong support of the many initiatives,
investments, and flexibilities enabling those scientists and
engineers to provide new warfighting capabilities and to
sustain the technology leadership our sailors and marines
enjoy.
The Navy's principal laboratory, the Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL), was created by Congress in 1923. Over half
the work NRL performs is fundamental S&T, nearly all in
partnership or collaboration with academia and researchers in
other government laboratories and activities.
The warfare centers, while being involved in basic science,
play most strongly in technology and engineering often in
partnership with industry and program offices. They too have
long histories, some dating back to the 1800s, and were
generally created to respond to a specific threat or
technological challenge of the day.
The Navy labs and warfare centers maintain a diverse
workforce of over 44,000 employees, over half of whom are
scientists and engineers. Among the scientists and engineers,
1,700 hold doctorates in science, engineering, or mathematics.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition has identified five strategic
priorities for the Navy. Each of these works in harmony with
the other to meet the current acquisition needs and future
technology requirements of our sailors and marines. The five
priorities are: get the requirement right, make every dollar
count, raise the bar on performance, support the industrial
base, and rebuild the acquisition workforce. It is here where
the laboratories and warfare centers play most strongly as they
make up over half of the Navy's technical acquisition
workforce.
I would like to address the various flexibilities and
hiring compensation and personnel movement you have given us
from the China Lake demo back in the 1980s to the expansion of
these authorities and eligible activities over the last few
decades.
Section 852, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund, has
contributed greatly to our expansion of our workforce. Our plan
is to hire an additional 1,600 scientists and engineers under
this authority, nearly half of which will be either permanently
placed or rotated through our labs and warfare centers to
accelerate their professional development.
The direct hiring authority, section 1108, provides for the
appointment of qualified candidates possessing an advanced
degree in science or engineering. Since 2009, we have hired
more than 6,800 scientists and engineers in our laboratories
and warfare centers and over 700 were brought in with this
direct hiring authority. So thank you.
Although the Navy has historically made deliberate and
measured investments to ensure stability within our organic
workforce, section 219 has been a big help. During this period
of refreshing our workforce, it has proven beneficial to the
health of the enterprise. Projections indicate the Navy labs
and warfare centers will invest almost $90 million in fiscal
year 2012, and furthermore, this program has sparked great
enthusiasm on behalf of our scientists and engineers.
The authority for unspecified minor construction, up to $4
million, continues to hold significant potential for the
revitalization of our laboratory and warfare facilities. As the
program gains strength, we anticipate it will become a very
valuable resource. In the likelihood MILCON funds decrease
within our labs and warfare centers, this authority becomes
even more important to revitalizing the technical
infrastructure.
The scientific and technical workforce is the engine that
drives our ability to maintain the technological superiority.
Technical capabilities once lost may take decades to
reestablish. Scientists and engineers require the hands-on
experience. In fact, if you do not do it, you do not know it.
Hands-on experience is essential to provide informed
decisionmaking when setting requirements or overseeing
contractor performance. Consequently, the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition has
directed program executive officers and program managers to
look first at the in-house laboratories and warfare centers for
pre-milestone B technical work.
So in summary, the Navy labs and warfare centers are
critical components of today's Navy, the next Navy, and the
Navy after next. The authorities that you have given us enable
us to strengthen their intellectual and infrastructure capacity
and capabilities. By increasing the hands-on work performed by
scientists and engineers, the Navy has energized the workforce.
Having grown up professionally and technically in this
community, it has been a delight to return in a leadership
position where I can influence their continued success. I
greatly appreciate your continued support to our laboratories
and warfare centers and assure you I will do my best to ensure
they are postured to meet today's and tomorrow's challenges.
I would be happy to take any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lacey follows:]

Prepared Statement by Ms. Mary E. Lacey

INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairwoman, Senator Portman, members of the subcommittee, it
is an honor to appear before you today to report on the overall health
of the Department of Navy (DoN) laboratories and centers. The
Department relies heavily on the people, facilities and capabilities in
our Labs and Centers to sustain the Current Navy, to acquire the Next-
Navy, and to develop the Navy-After-Next. I would like to thank the
Committee not only for your interest but for your strong support of
many of the initiatives, investments, and flexibilities that enable
those scientists and engineers to provide new warfighting capabilities
and to sustain the technology leadership our sailors and marines enjoy.
As was mentioned earlier, the Navy's principal Laboratory, the
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) was created by Congress in 1923. Over
half of the work NRL performs is fundamental science and technology,
nearly all in partnership or in collaboration with academia and
researchers in other government laboratories and activities. The
warfare and systems Centers, while being involved in basic science,
play most strongly in technology and engineering, often in partnership
with industry, and government program offices. They too have long
histories, some dating back to the 1800s, and were generally created to
respond to a specific threat or technological challenge of the day.
Today, DoN has 15 activities that compose the In-house research and
development (R&D) capacity. It is comprised of the NRL and 14 Warfare
and Systems Centers aligned to 3 Systems Commands: Naval Sea Systems
Command, Naval Air Systems Command, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command.
The NRL, under the leadership of the Office of Naval Research
(ONR), operates as the Navy's full-spectrum corporate laboratory,
conducting a broadly based multidisciplinary program of scientific
research and advanced technological development directed toward
maritime applications of new and improved materials, techniques,
equipment, systems and ocean, atmospheric, and space sciences and
related technologies.
The Naval Air Warfare Center Divisions (Air and Weapons) are the
Department of Navy's principal research, development, test, evaluation,
engineering, and fleet support centers for air platforms, autonomous
air vehicles, aircraft engines, free-fall and glide weapons,
survivability systems, mission and planning support systems, electronic
combat systems, and the acquisition and support of fleet training
systems.
The Naval Surface Warfare Center operates Navy's research,
development, test and evaluation, engineering, and fleet support
activities for ship systems, surface ship combat and weapons systems,
littoral warfare systems, force warfare systems and other offensive and
defensive systems associated with surface warfare and related areas of
joint, homeland and national defense systems.
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center operates the Navy's research,
development, test and evaluation, engineering, and fleet support
activities for submarines, autonomous underwater systems, and offensive
and defensive weapons systems associated with undersea warfare and
related areas of homeland security and national defense.
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers are the Navy's
research, development, test, and evaluation, engineering, and fleet
support activities for Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), Information
Operations (IO), Enterprise Information Services (EIS) and Space
capabilities.
The Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers maintain a diverse
workforce of 44,000 employees with 23,000 scientists and engineers.
Among the scientists and engineers, 1,716 hold doctorates in science,
engineering, or mathematics. These are encouraging numbers but there
remain challenges.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has enjoyed a
global leadership role in economic power and technology development/
exploitation. These conditions are now changing as other countries
emerge on the world stage. We recognize that without strong Naval Labs
and Warfare Center leadership in technology, future forces may not
enjoy maritime dominance in all warfare areas as we have in the past.
Over the last few years we have embarked on a number of efforts
specifically aimed at ensuring we maintain that edge for the
warfighter.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)) has identified five strategic priorities for
the Department of Navy. Each of these works in harmony with the others
to meet current acquisition needs and future technology requirements of
our sailors and marines. Within each of these priorities our
Laboratories and Warfare Centers remain pivotal players in
understanding the technological and programmatic ramifications. The
five priorities are:

Get the requirements right;
Make every dollar count;
Raise the Bar on Performance;
Support the Industrial Base; and
Rebuild the Acquisition Workforce.

While each of these priorities is relevant to the labs and centers,
it is in the last that the labs and centers play quite prominently as
they make up over half the department's acquisition workforce. Over the
last few years we have reversed over a decade of downsizing this part
of our workforce: our professional corps had been stretched too thin
and we had outsourced core competencies.

SECTION 852

Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2008 provides a mechanism to achieve the Secretary of
Defense's goal of strategically sizing and rebalancing the Acquisition
Workforce and ensure the Departments workforce has the capacity, in
both personnel and skills, to perform its mission, provide appropriate
oversight of contractor performance, and ensure the Department receives
the best value for the expenditure of public resources. The Naval Labs
and Warfare Centers make up more than half of the Department of the
Navy's Acquisition Workforce. The Department of the Navy plan is to
systematically and strategically hire 1,590 new professionals through
fiscal year 2015 in areas deemed essential to meet long-term needs.
Today, the Navy is executing to the plan. Many of these
professionals are either permanently placed or rotated through our
laboratory enterprise to increase their understanding of our programs
and accelerate their professional development.
Section 852 has been invaluable to the Warfare and Systems Centers
to fill key technical positions. It has enabled Warfare and Systems
Centers to avoid losing highly coveted scientists and engineers.
The demand for scientists and engineers is as strong as it has ever
been; if not stronger. While our colleges and universities see the
numbers of American students pursuing technical degrees holding steady,
or increasing, the number of graduates that are US citizens and
eligible for employment in our workforce is not growing and our need
for them remains great.

DIRECT HIRING AUTHORITY

Section 1108 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009 provides that the
Secretary of Defense may appoint qualified candidates possessing an
advanced degree to scientific and engineering positions within any
Laboratory.
Since fiscal year 2009, the Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers
have hired more than 6,800 scientists and engineers in their effort to
reinvigorate the technical workforce. Of these hires, 729 were brought
on using the Direct Hiring authority. This authority allows us to
compete for the best minds graduating from our colleges and
universities today, and while we've enjoyed relatively good recruiting
results in the last few years largely due to the economy, the situation
is again becoming more competitive.
I would be remiss if I didn't thank you for your strong support of
the various other personnel flexibilities you have given us over the
years, from the ``China Lake'' demo back in the 80's, to expansion of
those authorities and eligible activities over the last few decades.
The flexibilities in hiring, compensation, and personnel movement have
greatly benefitted our workforce and activities. Every organization in
the Naval Laboratory Enterprise has a version of a personnel system
other than the General Schedule that is tailored to their needs. We are
continuously evaluating the effectiveness of these systems and porting
best practices from one system to another.

SECTION 219

The DoN has historically made deliberate and measured investments
to ensure stability within the organic workforce. During this period of
refreshing our workforce, section 219 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009
has proven very beneficial to the health of the Navy Labs, Warfare and
Systems Centers. ASN(RD&A) continues to promote and execute section 219
to:

Maintain the scientific and technical vitality of in-
house laboratories and centers;
Increase the rate of recruitment and retention of
laboratory and center personnel in critical skill areas of
science and engineering;
Foster creativity and stimulate exploration of cutting
edge science and technology;
Serve as a proving ground for new concepts in R&D;
Support high-value, potentially high-risk R&D;
Provide for maturation and transition of technologies
beneficial to the Navy, Marine Corps, and the military forces
of the other Services; and
Enhance the laboratories' ability to address future
military and DoN and Department of Defense (DOD) missions.

Current projections indicate the Naval Laboratories and Warfare
Centers will invest approximately $90 million in section 219 projects.
Furthermore, this program has sparked a great deal of enthusiasm within
the laboratory community. Each of the Labs and Centers has seen an
increase in `new ideas' from their scientists and engineers. A
secondary benefit has been increased communication between the
Laboratories and Warfare Centers and their customers regarding future
technical challenges. For example, the Marine Corps Systems Command
provided Labs and Warfare Centers with a written list of their
priorities for technology focus areas.

10 U.S.C. SECTION 2805

The authority for unspecified minor construction up to $4 million,
under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2805, continues to hold significant potential for
the revitalization of Naval laboratories and warfare centers. We have
not utilized the $4 million under this authority to date. As our
program begins to gain strength, we anticipate it becoming a valuable
resource.
Over the last decade, the Military Construction (MILCON)
investments at NRL and the Warfare Centers have averaged approximately
three percent of the total DoN MILCON budget (based on 2010 Naval
Laboratory/Center Coordinating Group (NLCCG) Report). Approximately
one-third of these were funded through congressional-adds and another
third via BRAC. BRAC MILCONs are complete and congressional-adds will
no longer be considered. In the likelihood that MILCON funds will
decrease within the Laboratories and Warfare Centers, the minor
construction authority granted under section 2805 becomes even more
important to the revitalization of our technical infrastructure. We
recommend considering the elimination of a sunset clause and making
this a permanent authorization.
As was noted in the 2010 Naval Research Advisory Committee report
on the Status and Future of the Naval R&D Establishment, the scientific
and technical workforce is the engine that drives our ability to
maintain technological superiority. Technical capabilities once lost,
may take decades to re-establish. We will maintain a constant state of
``re-invention.'' Our Labs and Warfare Centers are maintaining pace
with the rapid rate of change within science and technology to fully
understand the technical/cost trade-space for next generation systems
and platforms. Scientists and engineers require hands-on experience;
``If you don't do it, you don't know it.'' Hands-on experience is
essential to provide informed decisionmaking when setting requirements
and overseeing contractor performance. The Department needs to always
have the ability to: understand military problems in technical terms,
know who has the potential to solve those problems, and verify a
correct solution technically when it is offered.
Today's most pressing challenge in Acquisition is delivering the
capability needed by our sailors and marines--more affordably. To do so
requires a significant technical understanding of the complex systems
the Department is acquiring. DoN Scientists and Engineers are
instrumental to providing that understanding. ONR, Laboratories,
Systems Commands, Warfare and Systems Centers are the principal sources
of in-house technical knowledge.
During this time of strategic and budget refocus, the Department is
focused to maximize its return on the investment of in-house technical
capability and facilities. Consequently, ASN(RD&A) has directed Program
Executive Officers (PEOs) and their Program Managers to look, first, to
in-house Naval Laboratories, Warfare and Systems Centers for Pre-
Milestone B technical work that would improve the Department's
technical product, and cost knowledge. It is especially important that
DoN Scientists and Engineers perform or participate significantly in
these functions in the early stages of R&D. Examples include:
engineering work in support of Analyses of Alternatives, in-house
prototyping, experimentation, scale-model testing, and reducing program
risk via subsystem development and testing. These tasks serve to
emphasize hands-on work rather than administrative or oversight
functions.
As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation I have oversight responsibility to
the ASN(RD&A) for all RDT&E accounts, systems engineering and overall
stewardship responsibilities for the Naval Laboratories and Warfare
Centers. Since assuming my responsibilities in June of 2011, I have re-
chartered the Navy Laboratory and Centers Coordinating Group (NLCCG).
The NLCCG was first stood up with the establishment of the Warfare
Centers in 1992 and is comprised of the civilian and military
leadership of NRL and Warfare and Systems Centers. They are responsible
to:

Provide stewardship of the mission, technical
capabilities, workforce and facilities of the Naval Laboratory
and Warfare/Systems Centers;
Advocate for the sustainment and enhancement of
technical capabilities and competencies of NLCCG activities;
Develop and implement a Naval Science and Engineering
Strategic Plan;
Increase operational effectiveness and efficiency of
the Naval Laboratory and Warfare/Systems Centers and promote
long-term fiscal health of NLCCG activities; and
Promote communication, cooperation and collaboration
among all organizations.

I have tasked this group to create an overarching strategy, to
define needed core technical capabilities, and to determine how to
optimally integrate all these capabilities to meet the affordability
challenges of today's platform and systems acquisition while planning
integrating and delivering transformational technologies for the Navy-
After-Next.
Our near term focus is to:

Align processes for the work we accept from customers;
Establish common processes for measuring the technical
health of our workforce;
Establish Department of Navy wide definitions for core
capabilities and competencies; and
Ensure consistency and transparency in program costing
practices to ensure we make every dollar count within the Navy
Working Capital Fund model.

All these actions make the Navy Laboratories and Centers better
partners and suppliers of technical expertise and products in the DOD
Lab Enterprise. We will continue efforts to collaborate across the
Services and the Laboratory community to champion the needed workforce,
facilities, and long-term strategic investments.
The military dominance of the United States and U.S Naval Forces in
particular, is closely coupled to technical superiority of our military
equipment and systems. This superiority is evident in such diverse
areas as naval nuclear propulsion, radar, electronic warfare, missile
systems, and has a force multiplier effect throughout our systems and
platforms.
Although the U.S. Government and U.S. companies continue to invest
in R&D, the increasing strength of developing countries and their R&D
investments means that R&D is increasingly a global enterprise. The
Department of Navy technology position will be shaped by the
increasingly global nature of Science and Technology (S&T). Even if the
Department of Navy R&D budgets were to remain a constant fraction of
U.S. GDP, they would be a declining fraction of global Science and
Technology investment. Therefore, those R&D investments must achieve a
greater effectiveness per dollar to maintain U.S. Naval technological
superiority. Important attributes include:

Operationally motivated S&T investments: S&T
investments should be connected to the long term strategies and
operational requirements shaping future naval capabilities. A
core competency of the Naval Labs and Warfare Centers must be
maintaining a clear understanding of how new or emerging
technical impacts might impact naval capabilities. The goal
should be to ensure technical innovation is coupled to equally
innovative concept development.
Self-refreshing: As previously stated, the scientific
and technical workforce is the engine driving our Naval
Laboratories and Warfare Centers. The dynamic nature of science
and technology means the Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers
must be in a constant state of re-invention.
Robust against disruptive innovation: The extremely
dynamic nature of the global technology landscape--new markets
can emerge and flourish in mere years--means the Naval Labs and
Warfare Centers must have sufficient understanding of
technology changes to protect the value of major acquisition
programs.
Agile adoption and differentiation of global
innovation: When promising innovations in the global market are
identified, the task of the Naval Labs and Warfare Centers is
to influence the external community development directions to
satisfy Naval needs and develop key elements that ensure an
advantage to Naval capabilities. We rely heavily on the ONR
international presence in places like London and Singapore to
be our portals to the international technical community. ONR
Global and their foreign-based science officers, provide
outstanding value. But more is necessary. Globalization is a
contact sport. The Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers will
not be effective without our continued commitment to accessing
the global span of S&T. With the rate of growth of technology,
and especially outside of DOD and the United States, the Naval
Labs and Warfare Centers must increase the aperture of the
technical community.

Recent performance trends indicate the Laboratories and Warfare
Centers are executing more S&T work in-house, more than sixty percent
over the last two years. The S&T funding that goes out-of-house is used
to reach out to universities, industry parties, and other Laboratories.
Data over the last decade showed slightly less than 50 percent had been
executed in-house. This slight adjustment is consistent with the
Department of Navy's objective to strengthen in-house technical
capabilities.
The RDT&E investment portfolio is balanced within a variety of
programs and initiatives, using in-house resources and out-of-house to
bring the best ideas and opportunities forward. These include ONR's
Future Naval Capabilities, Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDS),
Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs), Small Business
Innovative Research, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements,
and now the Rapid Innovation Program.
To date, only a handful of contracts have been negotiated under the
Rapid Innovation Program. We are complying with guidance to use the
funds to primarily stimulate and accelerate the transition solutions
from small business providers into the hands of our warfighters. The
Labs stand ready to advise and help Service and small business program
managers and technical staff alike on the most effective insertion
methods and test products if needed. We are optimistic this program
will result in effective capability for the warfighter and introduce
players to the DOD acquisition family, but it is too early to declare
success.
The Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers have the unique position
and capabilities enabling them to: (a) fully understand the technical
complexity of an emerging challenge, (b) quickly reach out all
stakeholders and centers of excellence (other labs/centers, industry,
academia, and other services) with no conflict of interest, (c) develop
ideas against the backdrop of the acquisition process, and (d) deliver
cost effective solutions. The hands-on work these scientists and
engineers perform helps them fully comprehend the technical intricacies
of evolving challenges.
The future technological challenges facing the Department of Navy
are dynamic and constantly in flux. However, there are four areas,
unique to the maritime environment, where the Navy must develop or
maintain the technical competencies for leadership in the future.

Integrated C4ISR. Whether systems are airborne, on the
ocean surface, undersea or in expeditionary air/ground
operations the use of wireless dynamic networks of manned and
unmanned platforms offers significant operational advantage.
Combined with timely intelligence, it can assist the
operational commanders in achieving 'information dominance'. A
major technical challenge exists for these heterogeneous
systems in maritime command and control in that communications
connectivity cannot be guaranteed and as a result, unmanned
nodes must be able to operate with intermittent connectivity.
Our Naval Labs and Centers are participants in defining the
technical issues and in developing the necessary capabilities
to solve the problems, build the systems, and maintain them
into the future.
Massive Data Transport. We are seeing the emergence of
new sensors systems, such as Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft
(P-8) and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) platform
capable of generating petabytes (that's 10 to the 15th power)
of data that will well exceed new military satellite
communications throughput capabilities. This is further
exacerbated by the challenges of the maritime environment where
the available bandwidth can often be degraded. The Naval Labs
and Warfare Centers will play a major role in defining the
issues and finding solutions. The Naval Labs and Warfare
Centers are planning to grow their technical competency to
support and lead this transformation using both commercial and
Navy-specific technologies.
Electronic Warfare. The Navy has a compelling
expertise, dating back to our early radar experiments right on
the Potomac, in Electronic Warfare. The challenge is to ensure
the integration and interoperability of legacy and new systems
across multiple platforms, integrating new capabilities into
planned C4ISR systems and future platforms. The Naval
Laboratory Enterprise already collaborates informally at the
working level in this area, we are planning to review this
approach to ensure it is sufficient to provide the projected
capacity and interaction in this important area.
Counter Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) and High
End Asymmetric Threat (HE/AT). Given the global proliferation
of A2/AD systems and capabilities and growing HE/AT that
attempt to challenge the ability of U.S. maritime forces to
operate freely, the Warfare Centers have and will continue to
grow the technical competencies and provide technical
leadership to in: Cyber warfare, Air- and surface-launched
weapons vs. next generation ships and aircraft, Sea-based
unmanned vehicles with munitions and ISR sensors, Concealment
and Deception, Ballistic Missile Defense, Communications in
non-satellite environment, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Sea Base
systems and technologies, Indications & Warning, Precision
Targeting, and Mine warfare and mine countermeasures.

Within the Naval Warfare Centers and Systems Centers, scientists
and engineers are addressing the total life-cycle of technical issues
for the Current Navy, the Next Navy, and the Navy-After-Next. Our
scientists and engineers who have supported the immediate needs of our
marines and sailors in Iraq and Afghanistan have accumulated invaluable
knowledge of the real-life challenges and anticipated threats we may
face in the future. It is critical that the DoN not miss the
opportunity to re-invest this knowledge back into our future technical
capabilities.

SUMMARY

The Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers are critical components
of Today's Navy, the Next-Navy, and the Navy-After-Next. Authorities
such as Section 852, Direct Hiring Authority, Section 219, and Section
2805 enable the Laboratories to strengthen their intellectual and
infrastructure capacity and capabilities. There is no shortage of
technical challenges. By increasing the hands-on work performed by
scientists and engineers, the Navy has energized and excited the
workforce. Having grown up professionally and technically in the Navy
Laboratory and Center community, it has been a delight to return to the
community in a leadership position where I can influence their
continued success. I greatly appreciate your continued support to our
Naval Laboratories and Warfare Centers, and I assure you I will do my
best to ensure they are postured to meet today's and tomorrow's
challenges.

Senator Hagan. Thank you, Ms. Lacey.
Dr. Walker? Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. STEVEN H. WALKER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENGINEERING

Dr. Walker. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman, Senator Portman,
members of the subcommittee, and staff, I am pleased to have
the opportunity to provide testimony on the S&T program and on
the status and the health of the AFRL, our Service's premiere
research organization.
To protect our Nation amidst a myriad of current and future
security challenges, the Air Force must be an agile, flexible,
ready, and technologically advanced part of the joint team.
Supported by the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request of
approximately $2.2 billion for S&T, our program plays a vital
role by creating the compelling air, space, and cyberspace
capabilities for precise and reliable global vigilance, reach,
and power.
As our single full-spectrum research organization, AFRL
executes the Air Force's investment portfolio in basic
research, applied research, and advanced technology
development. AFRL is unique among the Services, as all the Air
Force efforts to discover, develop, and integrate affordable
aerospace warfighting capabilities are housed in this one
laboratory. Our single unified lab structure has brought Air
Force S&T to a new level of efficiency collaboration and
innovation.
Basic research is the foundation of the Air Force S&T
program and the cornerstone of our future force. Through the
scientists and engineers at the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research (AFOSR), we actively engage the worldwide technical
community, and the Air Force has been able to leverage
significant investments made by other defense and Federal
agencies as well as non-defense and international laboratories
by doing this.
These long-term efforts have led to promising opportunities
such as cold atoms which may enable development of an inertial
navigation system on a chip that is jam-proof and highly
accurate.
Through its Rapid Reaction and Innovation Process, the
laboratory also supports the current fight. Since December
2010, Blue Devil Block 1, persistent intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, has been
instrumental in identifying a number of high-value individuals
and IED emplacements in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility.
AFRL actively collaborates at all levels with other Service
labs and DARPA. This engagement ranges from scientists and
engineers sharing the very latest scientific and technological
breakthroughs at conferences and symposiums to more formal
efforts including disciplined joint planning, which accelerates
technology maturation and ensures that taxpayer resources are
best utilized.
The Air Force's relationship with DARPA has been critical
over the years. Approximately one-third of the DARPA program is
actually executed through AFRL due to our laboratory leadership
and key technical areas, our unique facilities and strong
ability to form world-class teams spanning industry, academia,
and other Government laboratories.
To meet the S&T demands of the current and future
warfighter, we must develop and maintain mission-ready
facilities and infrastructure. AFRL is a world-class lab with
more than 40 sites worldwide which includes AFOSR offices in
Europe, Asia, South America; 539 primary facilities on 10
installations; and 11 million square feet of technical space.
While the recently completed efforts from the BRAC 2005
provided the lab with several new state-of-the-art facilities,
such as the Sensors Range Complex, we recognize that we must
continue to be vigilant and upgrade our S&T infrastructure in a
timely manner so that major research programs are not put at
risk due to aging facilities.
Ensuring the Air Force continues to have world-winning
technology requires the proactive management of our current
STEM workforce and a deliberate effort to grow the lab
scientists and engineers of the future. The Air Force
Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Project adopted in 1997 has
done much to ensure AFRL's ability to attract and retain
personnel. This flexible system has helped to achieve the best
workforce for the mission, adjust the workforce for change, and
improve overall quality. We have also set outreach goals to
aggressively pursue strategic partnerships and activities with
our schools, universities, sister Services, professional
associations, and other Federal agencies in an effort to grow
and develop future STEM talent.
Today's Air Force stands as the most powerful air, space,
and cyberspace force in the world because of technological
advances being transformed into revolutionary new capabilities.
AFRL has and continues to provide innovation and critical
support for the Air Force by balancing near-, mid-, and far-
term research, leveraging efforts across academia, industry,
and the other services; and maintaining an efficient and
effective lab infrastructure; and finally, retaining and
developing a world-class cadre of scientists and engineers.
Madam Chairwoman, Senator Portman, and the subcommittee,
thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and thank
you for your continued support of the Air Force S&T program and
the AFRL.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Walker follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. Steven H. Walker

INTRODUCTION

Ms. Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee and staff, I am pleased
to have the opportunity to provide testimony on the Air Force Science
and Technology (S&T) Program and on the status and health of the Air
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), our Service's premiere research
organization.
To protect our Nation amidst a myriad of current and future
security challenges, the Air Force must be an agile, flexible, ready,
and technologically-advanced part of the Joint team. The Air Force S&T
Program plays a vital role by creating compelling air, space and
cyberspace capabilities for precise and reliable global vigilance,
reach and power.
Directed by Air Force senior leadership, our S&T Program is based
on several enduring tenets. First, we must prepare for an uncertain
future and investigate game-changing technologies to affordably
transition the art-of-the-possible into military capabilities. To
support the Air Force Service Core Functions, we must create technology
options across a wide spectrum ranging from institutionalizing
irregular warfare capabilities to providing new capabilities to operate
effectively in cyberspace and across all domains. We must demonstrate
advanced technologies that address affordability by promoting
efficiencies; enhancing the effectiveness, readiness, and availability
of today's systems; and addressing life cycle costs of future systems.
In keeping with our Service heritage, we must continue to foster an
appreciation for the value of technology as a force-multiplier
throughout the Air Force. We must maintain the requisite expertise to
support the acquisition and operational communities and modernize and
improve the sustainability of unique research facilities and
infrastructure. Finally, we must leverage and remain vigilant over
global S&T developments and emerging capabilities to avoid
technological surprise and exploit art-of-the-possible technologies for
our military advantage.
To accomplish this in a constrained fiscal environment, it is
critical that we make the wisest investment decisions possible with the
precious taxpayer resources afforded us. We've used this opportunity as
a catalyst to holistically examine our S&T portfolio by considering
several fundamental questions guided by our tenets. Where should the
Air Force lead the Department of Defense (DOD) from a technology
development perspective? Where should we be an integrator of
technologies developed by others, and where should we follow the pace
of technology being led by our sister Services, other agencies,
academia, or Industry?
Recognizing that wise investments are rooted in sound strategies,
we embarked more than a year ago on the deliberate and collaborative
development of an S&T Strategy. This strategy, which codified our
enduring tenets and current overarching priorities, led to the creation
of an S&T Plan, published in June 2011. This capstone document
describes how AFRL implements the Air Force S&T Strategy.
In light of the defense strategic guidance released in February, we
ensured our current strategies and plans were appropriately aligned
with new and enduring emphasis areas. Our S&T Program supports the Air
Force capabilities fundamental to the major priorities of the guidance,
such as deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power in anti-
access and area denial (A2/AD) environments, operating in the space and
cyberspace domains, and maintaining a safe, secure and effective
strategic deterrent. Our Air Force S&T Strategy, along with the defense
strategic guidance, provided valuable vectors and helped the Air Force
make some very challenging investment decisions.

AIR FORCE S&T FISCAL YEAR 2013 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST

The Air Force fiscal year 2013 President's budget request for S&T
is approximately $2.2 billion, which includes nearly $200 million in
support of devolved programs consisting of High Energy Laser efforts
and the University Research Initiative. These investments support a
robust and balanced foundation of basic research, applied research, and
advanced technology development that will provide demonstrated
transition options to support future warfighting capabilities. This
year's budget request represents a decrease of $64 million or a 2.8
percent reduction from the fiscal year 2012 President's budget request.
This reflects a more modest reduction than that taken across the total
Air Force budget and indicates the strong support for S&T from our
leadership in this challenging fiscal environment.
Our Nation depends on the Air Force to counter a broad spectrum of
threats that could limit our ability to project global reach, global
power, and global vigilance. In turn, the Air Force relies on its S&T
program to provide the technical edge to affordably meet these threats
across the spectrum of many years. Within the S&T portfolio,
significant adjustments were made to focus investments in the most
promising technologies to develop future warfighting capability. The
most dramatic adjustment is an increase of $55 million in our
propulsion portfolio in support of new DOD emphasis on A2/AD and energy
savings. We were able to maintain stable investments in basic research,
directed energy, munitions, and human effectiveness technology areas.
Based on our strategy, we reduced our investments in airborne active
denial, strategic relay mirrors, and high speed laser communications
development in the directed energy portfolio and laser threat warning
and small remotely piloted aircraft sensing technologies in the sensors
technology portfolio. Finally, we are divesting our investment in
deployed airbase technology development and thermal sciences
technologies. In these and other technology investment areas, we
shifted investment priorities in order to best deliver on our strategic
priorities.

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY BALANCED PORTFOLIO

As our single full-spectrum research organization, AFRL executes
the Air Force's investment portfolio in basic research, applied
research and advanced technology development. AFRL is unique among the
Services as this one laboratory houses all Air Force efforts to
discover, develop and integrate affordable aerospace warfighting
technologies. Two decades ago, the Air Force laboratory system spread
research across 14 different locations nationwide. In 1990, these
locations were merged into four ``superlabs.'' Finally, in 1997, the
current single, unified AFRL structure was completed, bringing Air
Force S&T to a new level of efficiency, collaboration and innovation.
AFRL works collaboratively with key S&T stakeholders to maintain a
balanced portfolio responsive to current warfighter needs while
simultaneously creating the technical foundation for the future force.
The Laboratory is able to provide this critical support to the Air
Force by balancing near-, mid- and far-term research, coordinating with
and leveraging efforts across academia, industry and the other
Services; maintaining an efficient and effective laboratory
infrastructure; and retaining and developing a world-class cadre of
scientists and engineers.
Basic research (science and knowledge) is the foundation of the Air
Force S&T Program and the cornerstone of the future force. Based on
visions of the future established by Air Force leadership, Air Force
scientists and engineers identify, nurture and harvest the best basic
research to transform leading-edge scientific discoveries into new
technologies with substantial military potential. These technologies
transform the art-of-the-possible into near-state-of-the-art and offer
new and better ways for the acquisition community to address far-term
warfighter needs. While it can be more of a challenge to quantify long-
term basic research, with the scientists and engineers at the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research within AFRL actively engaged in worldwide
technical communities, the Air Force has leveraged significant
investments made by other defense and Federal agencies, as well as non-
defense and international laboratories, in its on-going efforts to
advance basic science. These long-term efforts have led to promising
opportunities such as cold atoms, which may enable development of an
inertial navigation system on a chip that is jam-proof and highly
accurate; self-healing structures, which may lead to more durable and
longer-lasting aircraft structures; and bio-energy, which may lead to
renewable bio-hydrogen techniques to propel vehicles. Two projects were
even identified by Time Magazine last year as ``best inventions'' for
2011. First, in conjunction with the University of Texas at Dallas,
researchers developed a multi-walled carbon nanotube sheet that when
rapidly heated effectively ``cloaks'' objects beneath it. And, second,
in conjunction with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
scientists developed a new method to split and store hydrogen and
oxygen using solar energy without any external connections.
Our core technical competencies also allow us to transition applied
research activity directly to the user. One example is in the space
technical area. The Space Weather Models developed by AFRL are used
throughout industry today for spacecraft design and the GEOSPACE Model
of the Space Environment is now commercially sold as part of the
Satellite Tool Kit. Another example is in our Low Observables (LO)
Maintainability area. From this area, the Air Force transitioned
multiple improvements in LO maintainability that allow us to restore
the LO characteristics of the platform and do so more rapidly. For
example, the transitioned Hot Melt Gap Filler project provides the
capability to do on-the-spot repairs in the field while maintaining the
electromagnetic performance of the F-35.
AFRL helps the Air Force maintain a winning edge by continuously
transitioning critical products that strengthen Air Force Core
Functions by managing high-risk with high-return science and knowledge,
maturing affordable technologies that address specific warfighter
needs, and demonstrating high-value S&T capabilities at reduced
acquisition risk. Flagship Capability Concepts (FCCs), Air Force-level
integrated technology demonstration efforts, are matured by AFRL with
the intent to transition to the acquisition community for eventual
deployment to an end user. Key factors in commissioning an FCC include
having a well-defined scope and specific objectives desired by a Major
Command (MAJCOM). These FCCs are sponsored by the using command and are
vetted through the S&T Governance Structure and Air Force Requirements
Oversight Council to ensure they align with Air Force strategic
priorities.
The High Velocity Penetrating Weapon FCC was established to
demonstrate critical technologies to reduce the technical risk for a
new generation of penetrating weapons to defeat difficult, hard
targets. The ultimate goal is to demonstrate 5,000-pound-class weapon
penetration capability in a 2,000-pound-class weapon.
We commissioned a new FCC for Precision Airdrop in response to a
request from the Commander of Air Mobility Command for technologies to
improve airdrop accuracy and effectiveness while minimizing risk to our
aircrews. AFRL, the Aeronautical Systems Center, and Air Mobility
Command members established a working group to explore all aspects of
the airdrop missions--from re-supplying our warfighters in the field to
providing humanitarian aid to people in need across the globe.
The Selective Cyber Operations Technology Integration FCC is
executing smoothly toward providing cyber technologies capable of
affecting multiple nodes for the purposes of achieving a military
objective. The standardized delivery platform being developed is
scheduled to be complete in fiscal year 2013 and will serve as a
baseline for current and future integrated cyber tools.
Developing technologies to equip our forces of tomorrow is the
primary objective of any S&T portfolio. Yet, our dedicated scientists
and engineers are equally motivated to contribute to the current fight
by getting their technologies into the hands of our warfighters today.
AFRL supports the current fight through its Rapid Reaction and
Innovation Process. By capitalizing on AFRL's expertise and tightly
integrating it with operator knowledge, this process harnesses leading-
edge knowledge, commercial off-the-shelf parts and mature technology
efforts to rapidly deliver innovative solutions to the warfighter's
most urgent needs. Its successful rapid-response development efforts
have included a small, lightweight infrared emitter for friendly
aircraft to identify joint terminal attack controllers on the ground, a
wind-measuring dropsonde that unmanned air vehicles can pre-deploy to
enable single-pass airdrop for Air Mobility Command aircraft and a
maritime unmanned aerial system with wide-area search radar for low-
cost, long-range coalition maritime surveillance for U.S. Pacific
Command.
Air Force S&T has played a significant role in developing and
delivering combat capability to our warfighters engaged in the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility through the deployment
of Blue Devil. Blue Devil Block 1 is a persistent intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability demonstrating the
first-ever integration of wide area field-of-view and narrow field-of-
view high definition day and night sensors cued by advanced signals
intelligence sensors. Imagery is transmitted in near-real-time to a
Blue Devil ground station or to individual soldiers on the ground. Blue
Devil Block 1 satisfies a number of CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational
Needs. Warfighter feedback on the situational awareness provided by
Blue Devil Block 1 has been overwhelmingly positive. Since December
2010, Blue Devil ISR has been instrumental in identifying a number of
high value individuals and improvised explosive device emplacements. In
fiscal year 2013, Blue Devil Block 1 will continue to support CENTCOM
with four sorties per day.
In the realm of technology transition and transfer, we are managing
a number of initiatives that are yielding positive results. For
example, the Air Force is engaging with small business to execute the
Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF). The Air Force received 730 white papers in
response to the RIF broad agency announcement, 88 percent of which were
submitted by small businesses.
The Air Force asked submitters to focus on key technology areas in
their white papers. These included support to current contingency
operations, particularly in the areas of precision air delivery, low-
metal or non-metallic detection devices, persistent wide-area airborne
surveillance and exploitation capability, combat search and rescue, and
man-portable fire suppressant. We also asked for ideas in cyber
operations and mission assurance, improved system sustainment, and
power generation and energy for platforms.
In addition to the technical approach and cost, a primary
consideration in our evaluation of white papers was transition
potential. We also considered the degree to which the technical
approach was relevant to our need, whether it enhances or accelerates
the development of an Air Force capability, and if it reduces
development costs of acquisition programs or sustainment costs of
fielded systems. We anticipate making approximately 55 contract awards
this fiscal year meeting the RIF intent to rapidly insert innovative
technology into programs of record to meet critical national security
needs.

FOCUS ON COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION

The AFRL actively collaborates at all levels with other Service
laboratories and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
This collaboration starts at the most basic level. We engage each other
to stay current with the evolving ``state-of-the-art'' and to work to
eliminate duplication of effort. AFRL researchers coordinate at the
scientist and engineer level to share their scientific discoveries and
the very latest scientific and technological breakthroughs through
informal opportunities such as technical conferences and symposiums
which take place throughout the world.
More formally, we are also increasing disciplined joint planning,
which accelerates technology maturation and ensures taxpayer resources
are best utilized. For example, the DOD service laboratories coordinate
their S&T efforts through technology forums, such as the fixed wing
vehicle program effort. Led by AFRL, the forum provides sharing of
capability-focused technology investment roadmaps, as well as
independent research and development industry plans among its members
(including Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Northrop Grumman and NASA). Similar
forums also led by AFRL have addressed engines, hypersonics and the
more electric aircraft initiative.
Tactical technical coordination also occurs at the laboratory level
which typically includes memorandums of agreement or understanding
between specific Service laboratories or larger Communities of Interest
(COIs). For example, in December 2011, AFRL established new initial
collaboration areas with the Army's Research, Development and
Engineering Command to coordinate command, control, communication,
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR),
autonomy/robotics, and power/energy at the laboratory level. Other AFRL
agreements with Army Materiel Command have included sensor-seeker
exploitation technology and common cooperative leveraging of technology
efforts.
In addition to sharing technologies, the Service laboratories also
share unique facilities. For instance, the Navy recently conducted
validation testing on its new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
motor on AFRL test stands at Edwards Air Force Base, CA. The Army also
used AFRL's vertical wind tunnel to test the V-22 Osprey and several
other helicopter configurations.
The Air Force's relationship with DARPA is critical as about one-
third of the DARPA program is executed with AFRL contracts because of
our laboratory leadership in key technology areas, unique facilities
and strong ability to form world-class teams spanning industry,
academia and other government laboratories. This close relationship
between AFRL and DARPA promotes significant data sharing between
organizations and has naturally led to integrated planning of key
efforts.
The Air Force's coordination with DARPA is formalized through
sponsored direct work, partnerships and memorandums of understanding.
There are several examples of AFRL and DARPA collaborations including
the testing of new hypersonic glide vehicles, the Vulcan constant
volume combustion (CVC) power generation turbine engine, the Autonomous
Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance (ARGUS) imaging system--chosen
for the Air Force's Gorgon Stare's electro-optical imager--and the
Cognitive assistant that Learns and Organizes (CALO), a DARPA program
technically managed by AFRL and incorporated into popular applications
for iPhones.

LABORATORY INFRASTRUCTURE

To meet the S&T demands of the current and future warfighter, we
must translate Air Force S&T priorities into mission-ready facilities
and infrastructure. The laboratory infrastructure is a cornerstone for
enabling the required research and development necessary to maintain
our technological superiority. AFRL is a world-class laboratory with
more than 40 sites worldwide which includes AFOSR offices in Europe,
Asia and South America, 539 primary facilities on 10 installations and
11.2 million square feet of technical space.
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) effort successfully
completed in September 2011 and provided several new, state-of-the-art
facilities within AFRL. The Air Force strategy for BRAC 2005 was to
consolidate and right-size operational and support units and, in the
process, reduce excess infrastructure and capacity. The Laboratory's
BRAC realignments successfully realized the Secretary of the Air
Force's priorities for BRAC 2005, including the goals of realigning Air
Force infrastructure with the future defense strategy, maximizing
operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity, and
capitalizing on opportunities for joint activity.
Encompassing nearly 80 percent of Air Force Materiel Command's BRAC
program, the $665 million AFRL program required a movement of 1,380
manpower authorizations, construction of more than 1.2 million square
feet of new laboratory space, and delivery of over 340 truckloads of
equipment to the gaining installations. The BRAC-directed
consolidations created new S&T centers of excellence in human
performance, sensors and space. For example, the 711 Human Performance
Wing's Armstrong Complex was completed at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, and
included the addition of classrooms for the U.S. Air Force School of
Aerospace Medicine, new laboratories, a centrifuge and altitude chamber
and a Warfighter Readiness Center. This move consolidated
geographically separated assets from the Brooks City Base, TX, and Mesa
Research Site, AZ, enabling AFRL to build up technical synergy for
human performance and exploit a center-of-mass of scientific, technical
and acquisition expertise. In addition, the colocation of AFRL's combat
casualty care research with similar activities at Brooke Army Medical
Center on Fort Sam Houston, TX, promotes the rapid application of
research findings to health care delivery, with synergistic
opportunities to bring clinical insight into bench research.
At Wright-Patterson AFB, ISR assets were consolidated from Rome,
NY, and Hanscom AFB, MA, to create the new Sensors Range Complex. This
new outdoor range mission includes research and development of space
and airborne radar sensor concepts, as well as cost-effective detection
and tracking of small, maneuvering airborne and ground-based targets.
It will push the envelope for next-generation radio-frequency sensors.
Through this consolidation, the Air Force will increase the efficiency
in its operations with a multi-functional center of excellence in the
rapidly changing technology area of C4ISR.
While the last round of BRAC provided us an opportunity to
consolidate and improve many laboratory facilities, the Air Force still
has prioritized needs for military construction projects in other areas
of AFRL. We recognize that we must continue to be vigilant and upgrade
our S&T infrastructure in a timely manner so that major research and
programs are not put at risk due to aging facilities. Maintaining high-
quality laboratory facilities is critical to remaining on the cutting
edge of S&T and supporting the innovation necessary for the future.

WORLD-CLASS WORKFORCE

Ensuring the Air Force continues to have war-winning technology
requires the proactive management of our current Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) workforce and a deliberate effort
to grow the laboratory scientists and engineers of the future. Having
the most state-of-the-art laboratory facilities is futile without the
right people to conduct the research inside the walls. We must attract,
access and retain our Nation's best and brightest, and equip them
through education, training and experience. The success of the Air
Force S&T Program depends on an agile, capable workforce that leads
cutting-edge research, explores emerging technology areas, and promotes
innovation across government, industry, and academia.
Published in 2010, the Air Force Technology Horizons report
presented our vision of the key areas of S&T the Air Force must focus
on over the next 2 decades to maintain a winning edge against a variety
of threats. As a follow-on effort, we published the Bright Horizons
STEM workforce strategic roadmap last year. This roadmap addresses the
``people'' dimension of delivering and operating required technology by
having the right STEM qualified people in the right place, at the right
time, and with the right skills.
Retaining our current world-class, highly-skilled workforce is an
important part of the roadmap. The Air Force Laboratory Personnel
Demonstration Project (Lab Demo), adopted in 1997, has done much to
ensure AFRL's ability to attract and retain personnel. This flexible
system has helped to achieve the best workforce for the mission, adjust
the workforce for change and improve overall quality. Initially, the
project covered approximately 2,500 scientists and engineers. By
expanding the coverage to non-bargaining unit employees in Business
Management and Professional, Technician, and Mission Support
occupations, the project now encompasses approximately 3,300 AFRL
employees.
Several key flexibilities within the Lab Demo system have played a
role in our ability to successfully retain personnel. For example,
simplified, delegated position classification, broadbanding and a
Contribution-based Compensation System (CCS) provide Laboratory
leadership greater management capability of their workforce by
transferring decisionmaking authority from a generally inflexible
personnel hierarchy to front line supervisors who have firsthand
knowledge of what is needed to accomplish the mission. Positions can be
classified into one of four broadband levels, instead of one of 15
grades, and the classification process takes only hours at the local
level instead of weeks or months at the personnel center level. The
broadband levels enhance pay progression and allow for a dual-track
system where employees can advance through the levels based on
contribution and technical merit. Finally, the CCS provides AFRL
leadership the ability to manage employee expectations, focus employee
efforts toward mission accomplishment and compensate employees
appropriately based on contribution to the Laboratory. According to a
recent survey conducted at the Laboratory, 94 percent of AFRL
supervisors are positive toward the demonstration project initiatives
and 70 percent of employees are satisfied with their pay and believe
that top contributors are appropriately rewarded.
Recruiting our STEM workforce in today's world presents both
challenges and opportunities. Domestic competition for this valuable
resource is intensifying, while competition from the international S&T
community is simultaneously increasing. The rapid pace of global
innovation has caused Air Force missions to evolve more quickly than
before. For example, the rapid increase in cyber capabilities and
vulnerabilities is driving the Air Force-wide mission evolution which
necessitates changes in personnel requirements, including STEM.
The flexibility inherent in the Lab Demo system has allowed us to
better address some of the recruitment challenges as well. The
legislated authority to direct hire candidates with advanced degrees
has been extremely helpful. This authority has enabled the Laboratory
to hire qualified scientists and engineers who possess a master's
degree or a doctorate in our most needed fields in less than half the
time of traditional hiring methods. Applicants can apply directly to
AFRL and be brought on board in approximately 25 days as compared to
the standard 80 to 160 days outside of the direct hire authority. In
addition, the delegated paysetting authority within the broadbanded Lab
Demo system allows leadership to offer competitive salaries to
perspective candidates based on experience, academic qualifications and
local labor market conditions rather than abide by the typically more
rigid personnel rules. While the direct hire authority for those with
advanced degrees has worked well to attract highly-qualified
candidates, the Laboratory could make excellent use of a similar
expedited authority to hire entry and journeyman-level experienced
candidates who do not yet possess an advanced degree or recent bachelor
degree graduates with skills in new or emerging fields and to more
successfully recruit high quality minority candidates who are
aggressively pursued by private industry.
In addition to retaining and recruiting a workforce for today, the
Air Force has also placed special emphasis on efforts to grow the
laboratory workforce of the future. We recognize that pre-college
(kindergarten through 12th grade) science and mathematics education has
an important relationship to the future supply of U.S. scientific and
technical personnel. We also recognize that global competition for STEM
talent will undoubtedly intensify in the coming years. As such, we've
set an outreach goal to aggressively pursue strategic partnerships and
activities with our schools, universities, sister Services,
professional associations, and other Federal agencies in an effort to
grow and develop future STEM talent. For example, the Air Force
sponsors the Junior Science and Humanities Symposium, a tri-Service
collaboration where students (grades 9-12) compete for scholarships and
recognition by presenting the results of their original research
efforts to a panel of judges and an audience of their peers.
The Air Force has also worked to appropriately target our outreach
efforts in order to cultivate the skills we need to meet future
requirements. For example, informed by the vision from Technology
Horizons, the Air Force has identified over 100 key technology areas
essential for current and future support to the warfighter. Air Force
scholarships given through DOD Science, Mathematics and Research for
Transformation (SMART) program are aligned to support these technology
areas. The Air Force supports 4 MAJCOMs and over 40 individual
facilities within those commands and selects approximately 100 students
a year to meet requirements. SMART scholarship students maximize their
time during 12-week internships during the summer and are doing truly
amazing things for the sponsoring facilities. The SMART scholars
continue to work with their respective facilities once they return to
their colleges and universities.
To coordinate our efforts, we've also established an Air Force-
level STEM office to act as a single focal point and better organize
and synchronize outreach activities. The Air Force conducts over 150
STEM engagements each year, ranging from scientists and engineers
volunteering to judge science fairs to the National Defense Science and
Engineering Graduate Program providing scholarships to STEM students.
These engagements encourage and leverage local, state, and Federal STEM
activities, affecting hundreds of thousands of students and teachers
across the Nation. Our new outreach office allows us to improve
coordination with other Service and agency STEM programs and gives us a
better understanding of the effectiveness and impact of our STEM
investments.

IMPACT OF SECTION 219

The Air Force is critically dependent on technological advances to
respond to emerging threats and to maintain a competitive advantage.
However, since neither science nor threats are static, there is often a
mismatch between defense planning, budget cycles and rapidly evolving
threats and opportunities. The authority provided by section 219 of the
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act gives AFRL a degree of
flexibility to rapidly exploit scientific breakthroughs or respond to
emerging threats. This flexibility increases the rate of innovation and
accelerates the development and fielding of needed military
capabilities to address current and future problems.
In recent years, Section 219 funding has supported S&T in the areas
of autonomous systems in contested environments, human performance
augmentation, resilient cyber command and control networks, space
situational awareness, assured operations in space, nanotechnology,
directed energy protection, robust communications, cyber threats, laser
technologies, and energy. For example, it has allowed AFRL to respond
to rapidly evolving S&T projects such as investigating an insect vision
system for sense-and-avoid applications and all-solid-state lithium
batteries. It has also funded transition of technologies that have been
delivered in theater for operational evaluation, such as the Sand
Dragon and Speckles projects.
Section 219 authority has funded 52 workforce development
activities that cover a very wide range of opportunities related to the
identification, hiring and recruiting of a quality science,
engineering, and technology workforce. For example, AFRL supports
several outreach and development initiatives such as the Wright Scholar
Research Assistant Program, which enables the Laboratory to hire
approximately 40 top-quality high school STEM students to assist with
in-house summer research. We've also used Section 219 funding for our
Air Force STEM Outreach Coordination Office referenced earlier.
This authority is also being used by AFRL to fund upgrades to
internal facilities, such as a hard-target fuse system research
laboratory; an infrared/optical detector characterization and terahertz
electronics laboratory for ISR and space situational awareness; and a
combustion instability laboratory for liquid rocket engines. Overall,
the section 219 authority has generated a positive impact at AFRL for
exploiting S&T for the warfighter.

CONCLUSION

The Air Force depends on its S&T Program to discover, develop, and
demonstrate high-payoff technologies needed to address the ever-
changing strategic and operational environment and to sustain air,
space and cyberspace capabilities now and into the future. Today's Air
Force stands as the most powerful air, space and cyber force in the
world because of past technological advances that have been transformed
into revolutionary new capabilities. AFRL has and continues to
innovatively provide this critical support to the Air Force by
balancing near-, mid- and far-term research, coordinating with and
leveraging efforts across academia, industry and the other Services;
maintaining an efficient and effective laboratory infrastructure; and
retaining and developing a world-class cadre of scientists and
engineers.
Ms. Chairwoman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today and thank you for your continuing support of the Air Force S&T
Program and the AFRL.

Senator Hagan. Thank you all very much for your opening
comments, your remarks, and certainly the depth and breadth of
the research that is taking place in the DOD labs.
What I would like to do is inform the Senators we will do a
7-minute round of questions.
Secretary Lemnios, prior to your confirmation hearing in
2009 in your advance policy questions, you were asked if you
support significantly increased delegation of operating
authority to the lab directors. In your response you said, ``I
believe in aligning responsibility at the lowest possible level
needed to execute. Consequently, I support in principle
delegating increased operating authority to the lab directors.
If confirmed, I will direct the Deputy Under Secretary for
Laboratories and Basic Services to review personnel management,
infrastructure recapitalization, and other lab issues and
provide recommendations to address identified problems. I will
then work towards developing the necessary authorities for lab
directors based upon these recommendations.''
Can you describe briefly what you have done over the last 3
years in developing these authorities and recommendations for
the lab directors?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, we are absolutely doing that. Much of
that work is centered around the implementation of the 219
authorities to make sure that we understand each of the
Services that implemented those authorities differently for
different purposes, still aligned with the legislation.
There are two things that we took on immediately after I
came into the office. The first was standing up our executive
committee which aligns the Services both in the laboratory
sense but also the broader S&T areas. The second, more recently
we have stood up a DOD STEM executive board to help us
understand across the Department where the skill set is
lacking, and that certainly ties to the workforce model that is
being developed by DOD.
So we have really centered on--we have looked at where the
workforce is limiting and where we need to add to that, and
then I work with the laboratory directors to implement those
directly. I think it has to be pushed to the lowest level, but
it has to be coordinated, and that is the key.
Senator Hagan. How about recommendations to address
identified problems?
Mr. Lemnios. I hear problems every day. The issue is not
identifying the problems. The issue is resourcing solutions to
the problems and finding solutions that we can, in fact, adopt
broadly.
I think as you read our testimony, as you read the
testimony of the Services, the challenge that we have across
the Department in our laboratories is supporting the Service-
specific needs of each laboratory but then leveraging the
broader context of how we can leverage this enterprise for
joint use. We are in the middle of that transition now. If you
look at the S&T priorities that we outlined last year we spoke
about in the cyber hearing just a few weeks ago, all of those
are cross-cuts. They are all cross-cutting technologies that
are not owned by one laboratory or another, but we really have
to integrate those efforts. So I guess I would say on my desk
the inbox is full and the outbox is being sourced by what we
can afford to do and what makes sense to do across DOD.
Senator Hagan. Secretary Lemnios, let me give you a
statement. In 2009, the National Academies were asked to review
the basic research laboratory facilities of National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In one of their
findings, they stated--and this is a quote--``based on the
experience and expertise of its members, the committee believes
that the equipment and facilities at NASA's basic research
laboratories are inferior to those at comparable DOE
laboratories, top-tier U.S. universities, and corporate
research laboratories and are about the same as those at basic
research laboratories of DOD.''
Are you disturbed by the inference from this National
Academies' report that the equipment and facilities of DOD's
basic research labs are inferior to those of comparable DOE
labs and then the top-tier universities and corporate research
labs?
Mr. Lemnios. I am concerned about that. I have spoken with
the lab directors about that issue. But the devil is in the
details. So as we look at each of these technology areas,
whether it is electronic warfare or cyber or autonomy--the Navy
just recently opened up a world-class robotics laboratory not
too far from here. I can point to places where DOD, in fact,
has a leadership role, but that leadership role has to include
not only the facilities but the personnel and the projects. Dr.
Freeman mentioned that in her opening comments, and I
absolutely agree that that is the way we have to structure it.
Senator Hagan. Talking about the differences and the MILCON
request, when Services prioritize their MILCON request, in many
cases it seems that laboratory infrastructure sometimes does
not get the top attention. It is obviously competing against
runways, piers, hospitals, gyms, barracks, and roads and other
elements of the base infrastructure. Historically it appears to
some of us that laboratories are at or near the bottom of these
MILCON requests, and consequently, aside from the benefits from
some of the last BRAC moves, the aging DOD laboratory
infrastructure needs attention. I was astounded when Dr.
Freeman stated that one of the buildings was from 1828.
But for Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, what is
your Service doing to address the infrastructure and MILCON
needs of your laboratories? Dr. Freeman, if you want to start.
Dr. Freeman. So, ma'am, what we are doing is as I
mentioned, we are trying to, first of all, do a survey and
trying to look at what the real state of our facilities are. So
the first thing was to identify how many facilities we really
have. The second is to go out and actually look at the
infrastructure and categorize and understand what the condition
is of those different buildings. Then what we are going to do
is we are going to look at those and identify, first of all,
what the major worst things that we have to take care of are
that are keeping us from doing our mission-essential tasks, and
then we are going to go down that next level of what we need to
improve and what do we need to improve.
Up to this point, those kinds of improvements are made at
the individual laboratory level, and they never actually bubble
up to the corporate level, even to my level, of what needs to
be done. So the first thing we are doing is shedding light on
it. After we shed light on it and understand those things, then
we can go work with the commands and help figure out what we
can do to improve our competition for capabilities in the
MILCON field.
That is why it really is important that Assistant Secretary
Hammack and I work together on this, that we can actually
figure out what we can do to get commands to put the
laboratories on a different scale than where we are.
Senator Hagan. I guess I am surprised you do not have that
list already.
Dr. Freeman. Right. We do not.
Senator Hagan. When will you get it? When will the survey
be done?
Dr. Freeman. The survey of just identifying all the
facilities and the infrastructure that we own, because it is in
so many different places, so many different installations.
The second thing is by the end of October, I should be able
to have the result of the rest of that, which is have these
engineers go out and look at these facilities and categorize
what needs to be done for them. So by October is when I am
looking.
Senator Hagan. Ms. Lacey, if you can go ahead and then Dr.
Walker. Thank you.
Ms. Lacey. Ma'am, I am not too proud to say the Army is
ahead of the Navy in this domain. We have not gone out and
tried to analyze the capacity and capability that we have in
our facilities and infrastructure. While every technical
director at every location of every center knows that inside
and out, at the institutional level, we have not looked across
the warfare centers and the NRL. They, however, are looked at
inside their system command to which they are assigned. So the
aviation community looks very closely at the capability and
capacity that they have in their facilities for aviation. The
surface warriors look at that for what they have in the surface
warrior community, submarine, et cetera. But I have not done
the integration across the enterprise to take a look at that.
Senator Hagan. Are you planning to?
Ms. Lacey. I am.
Senator Hagan. When will that be done?
Ms. Lacey. Ma'am, I am sure that is at least a year off
before we will have the results.
Senator Hagan. Dr. Walker?
Dr. Walker. Yes. In my opening statement, I mentioned one
of the benefits of having one lab with multiple tech
directorates in different locations as efficiencies. So one of
the things we have been able to do by the one lab concept is
look across the lab and see what are our needs. So we have a
list of 10 things that we want to do.
As you mentioned, oftentimes those are not judged just on--
the Major Command does not look just at research value. They
look at safety and runways and other things. I would say over
the last 10 years, the MILCON that has been approved by the Air
Force is roughly in the $40 million range. One of the reasons
for that is we had this BRAC in 2005 that provided about $450
million to upgrade AFRL facilities in different locations.
So I feel like right now AFRL is in pretty good shape in
terms of facilities and infrastructure. We can always do more.
The thing on our top 10 list right now is putting a fence
around the Rome information directorate which does not have a
fence around it, and that is where we do cyber work.
Senator Hagan. That is very important.
Dr. Walker. That is on our top 10.
Senator Hagan. You mentioned 539 in your opening comments.
Dr. Walker. 539 facilities at 10 different installations.
Those are buildings at 10 different installations.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Secretary Lemnios, it appears to me that, my time is up and
I will come back. But first, I guess I am surprised that we do
not know the depth and breadth of the laboratories that are
under your purview. Do you want to comment?
Mr. Lemnios. Let me just briefly comment. Asking a very
simple question, not getting a simple answer is a frustration
for everybody. We should have that and we simply do not. The
reason for that is that the operating models are different. A
warfare center looks a little bit different than a basic
research laboratory, looks a little bit different than an
engineering center. So some of this is driven by what is the
function of those facilities and how do we structure that,
which goes precisely to the challenge that Congress gave us in
terms of building a workforce model and a strategic plan for
our workforce so we really understand where the core
competencies are. I can take a building number and I can map it
to a ZIP code and I can map it to a functional element, but at
the end of the day, I have to also make sure that I have the
right workforce in that environment. So some of this is driven
by buildings and a lot of it, I think, is driven by personnel.
It is a daunting challenge.
Senator Hagan. It seems like we need an integrated approach
to what is it that we need, how is it helping the warfighter,
and what our long-term R&D goals are and looking at it at an
integrated level.
Mr. Lemnios. Ma'am, you are exactly right.
Senator Hagan. Senator Portman?
Senator Portman. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I was just remembering being out at AFRL at Wright-
Patterson and seeing some of the Wright brothers wind tunnel
projects there. So it is not 1828 buildings, but some of the
facilities there are also in need of some modernization. But
you have done a terrific job and I appreciate your support of
the lab.
I would like to ask a general question first, if I could,
and it really, I guess, is directed to you, Secretary Lemnios,
which is about sequestration. We are talking about $492 billion
in sequestration that is on the books. It is slated to happen
January 1st next year. That is about $55 billion in fiscal year
2013. What I would like to hear from you is how would that
impact the labs, one? Two, what contingency plans do you have
in place to deal with it?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator Portman, it would be absolutely
devastating. We have no plans right now for that. But I will
tell you, as the Secretary has testified, that that would be a
devastating effect on DOD and certainly on the Nation.
Senator Portman. You say you have no plans to deal with it.
Do you have any contingency plans to try to deal with, as you
call it, devastating impact of the sequestration reductions?
Mr. Lemnios. The effect is so severe that until we get to a
point where we understand what the parameters are, we could be
looking at pluses and minuses of very large numbers, and we
simply have not gone through that exercise yet. We are hoping
that that will be resolved on the Hill, that in fact we will
see a solution that does not get us to that edge of the cliff.
Senator Portman. Do you think that it would endanger our
national security and specifically put our warfighters in
danger not to have the level of funding you think is necessary
at our labs?
Mr. Lemnios. I think the Secretary has testified that the
effect would be serious and the impact, following that thread
back to the laboratories--I have not done that assessment, but
the Secretary's testimony has been that this would be a serious
impact.
Senator Portman. He has used the word ``devastating.'' He
has also said it would hollow out the force. We will work with
you to try to avoid this. But I do think that you ought to make
your initial assessment at least and let it be known to this
subcommittee and others within DOD so that we can be more
effective in making our arguments as to why sequestration would
be so damaging to our labs and our research and to the
warfighters ultimately.
I have to ask about the Defense RIP. You heard me talk
about it a minute ago. $700 million received so far. Never been
in the Department's core budget. Why have you not ever asked
for funding for it? Do you think it is not important? Do you
think it is something that is not on a priority list?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, this came to the table at a time when
we were collapsing the budget through the Budget Control Act.
We had submitted the President's budget request for 2012 at a
time when this came up. At the same time, we were trying to
balance the issues that we had on the table. This was passed in
fiscal year 2011. There was $500 million that was appropriated.
We had four broad agency announcements that were put out. We
are, in fact, evaluating those now. We are going through source
selection, and we are about to award efforts on those.
The good news is the legislation is well-structured with
clarity of effect; that is, once a contract is let, within 2
years we will know whether we have a capability that supports
either our warfighter or supports an acquisition program where
we can measure the effectiveness. As we go through the first
round of RIP funding, we want to see what those effects are.
Did we, in fact, get the impact that was postulated when the
legislation was written? We hope we will, and we will know once
those contracts end.
I think the question as to why it was not in the base
budget, it was simply a time when we were looking at what our
base efforts were going to be, let alone trying to add $500
million into the budget. In fact, we took the leadership from
the Hill on that.
Senator Portman. Does the Defense RIP benefit the labs?
Mr. Lemnios. The RIP certainly uses technologies that come
out of the labs. To date, we have received 3,600 white papers.
Not all will end up in contract awards. Many of those use
technologies that came out of our labs, were submitted through
contract R&D agreements or other efforts. So in many cases, the
ideas are seeded across the defense industrial base.
Senator Portman. You talked about the importance of human
capital--all of you did--the importance of your people and
having a trained workforce and the need for us to continue to
focus on some of these core disciplines. I think you would all
agree that without the scientists and engineers being world-
class, we cannot have a world-class program and that there is
an important relationship between the DOD graduate school
programs and the officers that end up in your labs. Certainly I
have seen that with the Air Force Institute of Technology
(AFIT) and AFRL. As a whole, DOD's laboratory budgets have
fared pretty well as I said earlier.
In some cases, these Service graduate programs have served
to pay the bill, I think, for some other parts of DOD's budget
including the labs. As an example, in the Air Force, Dr.
Walker, AFIT, which is your graduate school--and it is not just
for the Air Force. It is used Service-wide, very important for
developing those scientists and engineers. But AFIT will lose
in your fiscal year 2013 budget 25 percent of its manpower. Is
that right?
Dr. Walker. Sir, I would have to check on that for you. It
is not part of my portfolio. It is not part of the S&T
portfolio.
Senator Portman. I will assert it then and maybe instead
ask you what you think about that. Given these planned
reductions, are you concerned about the impact it is going to
have on your laboratories' futures, the scientist and engineer
talent pool that you rely on?
Dr. Walker. That would be a concern. I think AFIT does a
great job at educating military, Air Force, and other folks
especially at the master's degree level, and it is really a
center of some of our cyber training that we give our folks.
But that is actually a different budget.
Senator Portman. It is a different budget, but it impacts
your lab and it impacts all of your labs, I would assert
although the Navy has its own graduate program, as I understand
it. So I would hope that you all would speak up about that and
work with us to try to ensure that we are not making decisions
that short-term seem to be necessary for budget savings but
longer-term are going to create the very problems you talked
about in all of your testimonies which is having the kind of
human capital to have a cutting-edge research program for our
warfighters. So we appreciate your giving us whatever input you
can on the impact of that proposed reduction of 25 percent in
AFIT on your labs, particularly the AFRL.
The final question that I have really relates to this
infrastructure question. If you can give us more detail as to
what capabilities specifically we are in danger of losing
because of outdated facilities, that is very helpful to us. In
this budget climate, we need to know specifically which of your
facilities, if not updated, will result in a capability being
lost. Are we losing any quality researchers because of it? You
have made general points about the need to attract the best and
the brightest. Is there an aging facility within your ambit
that is causing you to either not be able to attract or retain
the best people?
Then, of course, how much, as the chair talked earlier,
does this relate to our competitive position vis-a-vis other
countries, particularly China, but other countries that are
moving ahead with updated, modern laboratory facilities? Ms.
Lacey, I think you might have some comments on that right now.
We are happy to hear from you now, but also anything specific
you can give us would be very helpful.
Ms. Lacey. Sir, I would prefer to take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of the Navy recognizes the need to continue
investment in the technical infrastructure to maintain technological
advantage for the future. Within the year, the Department will begin a
review of the laboratory facilities to assess their condition,
capability, and capacity with regard to their ability to perform their
mission and retain/attract scientists and engineers. Until the review
no specific examples of capabilities in jeopardy can be cited.

Ms. Lacey. We have a wide variety of technologies that we
work on in our laboratories, and as Mr. Lemnios pointed out,
you have to take a look at the context for each and every one
of them. But we do have some areas where we are concerned.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Senator
Portman. Thank you both for holding this hearing this
afternoon.
Thank you all for your testimony. Please share our
appreciation for the work of the dedicated scientists and
engineers who work at all of our Nation's laboratories. As you
all may know, I represent New Hampshire where the Cold Regions
Lab is located in Hanover, NH. Dr. Freeman, I was there last
year when they celebrated their 50th anniversary. So I can
appreciate the facilities challenges that you are raising. I
think they have had some rehab done there, but clearly that is
an issue that a lot of our facilities have.
Secretary Lemnios, I want to follow up on the issues that
Senator Portman was raising about workforce because all of you,
as he said and as you said so eloquently in your testimonies,
talked about the importance of a workforce educated in the STEM
subjects who can be the scientists and engineers that we need
to do the research in our laboratories. Right now over 57
percent of Federal employees in DOD S&T labs are over the age
of 45. So clearly making sure that we can recruit the next
generation at a time when we are not turning out the number of
scientists and engineers and STEM graduates that we need in
this country is challenging. So I wonder, Secretary Lemnios, if
you could talk a little bit about the strategies that you are
using to recruit those folks.
I would really also like to very much hear from Ms. Lacey--
you talked about the number of engineers and scientists that
you have hired since 2009, Secretary Lemnios would you please
add to that, some of the things that you are doing to recruit
those folks.
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, let me start by providing some
insight on a couple of things. It is not all doom. There is
some great points of light here that we ought to recognize.
This summer we have over 400 students, Students Making
Academically Rewarding Trips (SMART) students from our STEM
program, entering the Department's laboratories. These are
first-rate undergraduates that are providing a year of service
in our laboratories for each year of scholarship that we
provide them. It is a remarkably effective program, and it is a
program that couples us with rising stars in their freshman and
sophomore years, and in many cases we have hired those students
as laboratory employees. That is a great thing.
In fact, in my career path, I will tell you--it is not in
the testimony, but I will tell you that my graduate work was
partially sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR). In
fact, a good friend of mine, Max Yoder, was one of my peers,
one of my mentors, and provided me tremendous insight very
early in my career and helped me along the way.
Senator Shaheen. Can I just ask how you recruit those
students?
Mr. Lemnios. It is an open call. We have a website, a STEM
website, where we announce this. The submissions have just been
completed for the fall 2012 semester. It is very similar to a
college application. It is a terrific program for students. We
offer undergraduate students $25,000 a year plus tuition, plus
$1,000 for books and health insurance and a guaranteed position
in one of DOD's laboratories. So beyond the money, which sounds
great, it is the ability to work side-by-side with a researcher
on a DOD challenge that few people would see. So I look at that
as really an important subject.
The other part of this, of course, is the connections that
the laboratories have built with academia. Our DOD request for
basic research--that is, the most fundamental research in our
portfolio--is about $2 billion a year. Much of that is executed
through our DOD's laboratories and most of that is actually
executed in academia side-by-side with a researcher in our
laboratories.
Just very quickly. Last fall I had an opportunity to visit
many of the Department's laboratories, and I spoke with the lab
bench researchers, people that I like to hang out with. We have
several hundred post doctoral researchers in our laboratories.
By all measure, that is a great indicator. The laboratories
today are receiving patents from the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office at just shy of 600-a-year, almost 2-a-day. This is on
par with best-in-class world companies around the world.
So while I challenge our laboratory infrastructure
internally and get these guys, let us think, how do we drive
faster, how do we make transitions happen more quickly, the
numbers that I am seeing give me a sense--there is a remarkable
sense of horsepower here. I would challenge that we are in
second place. We are not in second place.
Senator Shaheen. That is good to hear.
Ms. Lacey, are you all doing anything that is different?
Ms. Lacey. Ma'am, we are doing much of the same. We are
taking great advantage of the OSD SMART program, the
scholarships. About a third of those are actually doing summer
internships at our Navy laboratories and warfare centers.
But at the end of the day, recruiting is a contact sport,
and we need to have our supervisors develop relationships with
those universities, whether it is in conducting that research
or collaborating on that research or making sure that the
professors are aware of the needs of the laboratory because the
students listen to them more so than they listen to the
recruiters or listen to us. So we found those relationships
particularly important.
To that end, for example, we have established a system
engineering graduate curriculum at Tuskegee. We have formed
consortiums with the University of Michigan and other
universities in naval engineering, which is, of course,
particularly important to us. With the section 219 program, we
have actually sponsored graduate fellowships at our NRL that
are called the Karle Fellows, named after our Nobel Prize
winner, Dr. Jerome Karle, and his wife who was also there.
So there is a wide variety of activities that are going on.
Most of our warfare centers and laboratories also have unique
relationships with the universities that they tend to recruit
from located close by because students, once they graduate,
tend to not move real far.
Senator Shaheen. Let me just point out the University of
New Hampshire has a very good engineering school.
Ms. Lacey. Yes, ma'am. We hire in our Newport laboratory
from the University of New Hampshire.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Now, can you talk about how--I do not know who would like
to address this, but talk about how these labs interact with
private industry and how they aid technology transfer? Also,
specifically, can you talk about whether or not you make use of
the Small Business Infrastructure Research (SBIR) program in
helping you with some of the work that you are doing? Dr.
Freeman?
Dr. Freeman. If I may, let me start with that.
The first thing that we do is that the money that is in the
core budget, in our S&T core budget, pays for people in the
laboratories, as well as facilities, but also a large portion,
particularly of the 6.3 dollars, goes out to industry to
actually build the prototypes, someone to help us get the
hardware and really do the research to make it real. In other
places we have small business, as well as large companies,
involved in that.
We use the SBIR program and we use the RIF as well to try
to focus and then line up even more this connection with these
technology-enabled capability demonstrations that we have been
doing in the Army. We are trying to get the Rapid Innovation
Fund (RIF) proposals tied up with those efforts that are going
on internal to the laboratory, many of which will actually go
out and have proposals in order to build the hardware that is
going to be demonstrated in large industries but also bringing
these smaller companies and these nontraditional folks in
through the RIF and the SBIR process in to be able to compete
and/or participate in those programs and those demonstrations.
So a lot of our efforts are done through industry.
A couple of the things that I wanted to focus on with
transition. We have a number of programs and efforts that do
transition and have transitioned recently. Most of those
transitions are where industry has taken something--we have
either written a specification, we have written a tech data
package, or they have been performers on the S&T program, and
then when those things went into acquisition, those are the
people who actually then either compete for the things that we
specified or indeed then are the performers on those
acquisition contracts.
So a large number of things. We have affordable seeker
programs that are being competed where industry is trying to
build some seekers for S&T so that they can be affordable, and
that can only be done in industry, working on those things.
Similarly we had software code being worked. Then we worked
that and we transitioned that to industry so that they can
compete and/or use that in their communications program. So we
have a number of mechanisms both using the core dollars and
then transitioning either directly or through industry to get
those things out into acquisition programs and eventually out
to the warfighter.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time has expired, but Madam
Chair, I have to go preside. Can I ask one more question before
I leave?
Senator Hagan. Certainly.
Senator Shaheen. This is for Ms. Lacey. I know that both
the Army and the Air Force are working on this, but I know a
little bit more about what the Navy is doing. I know that
Secretary Mabus had set a very ambitious goal for moving to
energy efficiency and renewable and alternative technologies
for your energy use. I wonder if you could speak to the role
that the labs are playing and how you are moving on energy
issues in a way to make us more energy independent.
Ms. Lacey. Ma'am, we have been involved in certain energy
issues for a long, long time, and the fuel requirements for
ship and aircraft has always been a big deal to us. Back in the
1990s and early 2000s, we were working on technologies in our
ship hull design, for example, to reduce drag which has the
side effect of increasing fuel efficiency, the stern flap, if
you have ever heard that.
Senator Shaheen. I have. I was on the USS Kearsarge and I
saw that demonstrated very clearly, hull coatings that reduce
the adhesion of barnacles go a long way to reducing that
friction and things like that.
Ms. Lacey. So we have been in that world for a long, long
time. Now, of course, the game is kicked up a few notches here,
and we are in that part of the business where there is a
military-unique requirement that we need to understand, but at
the end of the day, many of these technologies are going to be
scaled up by our industry partners to make them viable to meet
the Navy needs.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Anything that the Army or Air Force is doing in this area
that you think is worth noting?
Dr. Freeman. Yes, absolutely, ma'am. We have across all of
our portfolios, whether it be the soldier portfolio or the
ground portfolio or the air portfolio or the C3I portfolio--we
maintain a focus on power and energy. In fact, in our 2013
budget request, we have $161 million associated with efforts to
look at improving power and energy, looking at the efficiency
efforts, looking at not only components but power management,
looking at how to get alternative fuels into engines for those
things, alternative battery technologies. So we actually have
been doing this also for quite a long time and are moving very
much into getting it into the Army lexicon as well, along with
Ms. Hammack, the Assistant Secretary for Installations, Energy,
and Environment. We are working those things particularly on
operational energy. Our focus is looking at operational energy.
So S&T is really, really into this in the Army.
Senator Shaheen. I am hoping we can get it into the lexicon
of all of our Federal agencies.
Dr. Walker. In the Air Force, ma'am, we are heavily
invested in turbine engine technologies to reduce fuel
consumption 25 percent over state-of-the-art engines today. So
we have a new program starting up to look at technology options
for future engine programs.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I wanted to go back to the RIP. Secretary Lemnios, you had
an opportunity to speak and then, Dr. Freeman, you mentioned it
a little bit in your answer a few minutes ago.
But, we established this program 2 years ago to help fund
the rapid transition of innovative technologies largely from
the small business community to the warfighter. I also serve on
the Small Business Committee, and last year data was presented
that showed that while the small business community receives
only 4 percent of Federal R&D dollars, the small businesses
actually produce 38 percent of the patents granted.
So, Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, what are your
views on the RIP, and do you find the program useful to meet
time-sensitive DOD needs in a responsive manner?
Dr. Freeman. Let me start and I will try to be as brief as
possible. I believe this new initiative really has been a boon
to the Army, and the value that it has had for us is opening up
more collaborative opportunities with both small business and
nontraditional suppliers to the Government. These processes by
which we have put out these BAAs--and we had an Army BAA that
went out--we got over 1,000 responses, and then we were able to
sort through those. We did put them up against our priorities
in S&T, those technology-enabled capability demonstrations. We
have selected those. They were totally competitive. It was a
very, very tough competition. We had not just the laboratories
involved, but we had the program managers involved who would be
receiving these technologies, et cetera. It was a very, very
rigid process by which we worked through and rated these
things. Then we picked over 10 percent to actually fund with
the fiscal year 2011 available funds. So that is a pretty good
return on investment for everybody doing it.
Having said that, we also then scrubbed that list again and
said, hey, there are some really neat things that did not
exactly fit in with these tech Ds. We may want to pursue these
out of our core budget as well. So part of that was we got
information that we would have gotten no other way about
innovative small business and nontraditional folks, and we got
it in and we have coupled it with our program managers in S&T
really trying to give them opportunities then to use these and
have the companies demonstrate their technologies so everybody
can see them.
Senator Hagan. Ms. Lacey?
Ms. Lacey. I will just add to that. We see some of the same
benefits. We also see that many of these companies have
proposed teaming up with our laboratories and warfare centers
to then actually test, try out, and analyze the products that
they make because they do not come to the table with a full
understanding from the warfighting point of view. So that is a
good thing that I see happening.
The other thing is we too saw that ``aha'' from some of our
program managers where they looked at something and said it did
not quite fit the ground rules but they liked it and they have
started collaborations with the companies.
So we are cautiously optimistic that we are going to see
results. We have only let two contracts so far, but we are in
negotiations with almost 5 dozen as we speak.
Dr. Walker. I will just pile onto the comments already
there. I am cautiously optimistic. I think we are seeing the
value in that our product centers are much more engaged with
looking at small business because of the RIF program and seeing
how what they offer can feed into their programs of record. So
that has been a good thing. We specifically looked at small
businesses that had technologies that were at about a tech
readiness level of 7. So they were ready. With a little bit
more money, they could be transitioned into our programs of
record. So we are not only working with the product centers
with RIF but also having meetings with the larger companies
saying if these smaller companies are successful, how are you
going to team with them and bring this into the programs.
Senator Hagan. That sounds positive to me.
Let me move to the Laboratory Quality Improvement Program
(LQIP). The DOD LQIP, established in 1993, seeks to improve the
efficiency of the labs by streamlining their business practices
and granting the heads of the labs increased authority to
operate their organizations in a business-like fashion.
One of the outcomes of the LQIP was the creation of a panel
to provide recommendations on DOD lab personnel issues.
Secretary Lemnios, currently the panel for personnel falls
under your oversight, and what has this panel recently
accomplished?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, I have looked at the LQIP, the
organization, and what has happened. I asked a very simple
question. When is the last three times you met and what did you
actually produce? There was a long pause.
As I have looked at it, you challenged us, Congress
challenged us, through 10 U.S.C. 1115 to build a functional
capability set of managers around a workforce model that the
Department can use much more broadly. We are looking at how we
take what was being done under LQIP or what should have been
done under LQIP and apply it to a workforce model for the
Department at large; that is, understand where we have
strength, where we have gaps in our workforce broadly to
include our engineering functional areas and our S&T functional
areas. The S&T functional manager is actually a new element of
this enterprise. So working with the Services, we are looking
at how we fit this strategic model and really capture not only
what exists now but what needs to exist in our laboratories
going forward.
Senator Hagan. We have heard that DOD is considering moving
this panel out from under your oversight to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Would it be beneficial
to the labs to do that?
Mr. Lemnios. I am not sure. I am not sure how we are going
to go on that candidly. I think there are arguments that I have
heard--well, there are arguments that I have heard both ways on
this. Again, I want to go back and look at how this work ties
to the broader charge that the U.S. Code has given us to lay
out a workforce, a functional management activity for DOD.
Senator Hagan. Our other witnesses, what are your views on
the effectiveness of the LQIP, and do you feel that it should
stay under the Secretary or potentially shift to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness? Should there
be other panels, for instance, laboratory infrastructure?
Ms. Lacey. Ma'am, if I could. First of all, I believe that
the LQIP has done tremendous work over the years, and ``over
the years'' is the important thing here. They took a lot of the
lessons that we learned with the China Lake demo in the 1980s
and translated that into some of the flexibilities that
Congress granted us around the S&T reinvention laboratories. We
have had a fair amount of authorities, and we have not really
needed much. The panel, as Mr. Lemnios said, slowed down.
Now, that said, I do think that an infrastructure panel,
which was originally envisioned under the legislation, should
be activated, number one.
Number two, you asked about where does it belong. In AT&L
or underneath P&R? I feel strongly it belongs under AT&L, but
there needs to be a partnership with P&R. Over the years, that
has been stronger and weaker.
Dr. Freeman. Let me add on to that. So this is very much
the same thought process. I believe that the intent of having a
group of people from across the Services who understand what
the laboratory systems are, how they operate, and what they
need is really, really an important body to have. Whether we
actually had the right people after everything got restructured
over the years on the panels, that could be part of why they
did not, in the last couple of years, operate as much as they
should have. So I believe we really do need to review,
restructure, and reconstitute some kind of a group like the
LQIP to be able to provide advice and recommendation to both
the senior service leads and to ASDR&E.
I do believe that if you put it in and move it to the
personnel side only, you are actually probably not doing a
great service in that because I believe it is much broader than
just personnel issues. I believe that the effectiveness and the
efficiency of such a group deals with much more than policy and
personnel. Therefore, the Army has not been supportive at all
of moving it over to P&R.
Senator Hagan. Dr. Walker?
Dr. Walker. The Air Force agrees with the Army and the
Navy. [Laughter.]
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I think Senator Shaheen was asking about personnel, and
obviously our personnel I think are our national assets. We
want to be sure that we have the engineers and scientists
coming up through the educational areas throughout our country
to be sure that we can fill these very, very important STEM
jobs that will be so necessary not only now but in the future.
I know the Army has a program called Military Accessions
Vital to the National Interest which grants rapid U.S.
citizenship to non-U.S. citizens that enlist with medical or
cultural and linguistics expertise. What are your views on
expanding this program to gain access to non-U.S. citizens that
graduate with advanced technical degrees from our U.S.
universities and then could become DOD civilians?
Dr. Freeman. Since the Army has the program, I will start
and then let everybody else talk.
I believe that the concept of making offers to people who
have the kind of education we need, who want to be in this
country--I believe that that is a really good and positive
thing if they want to be part of what we do. So I am supportive
of the program that you mentioned that the Army has started.
I have raised issues and questions about that as we have
been talking about expanding that or where we are going to go
with that. I think we really need to study it a good bit more
because I think there are second and third order effects that
we really need to think about.
The real solution here I believe wholeheartedly is to
really get more U.S. citizens into our schools through STEM
education and into getting the degrees and the advanced degrees
in the fields that we need them whether they be the traditional
STEM type things or some of the other talents that we are going
to need in the future which includes some of the softer
sciences. Particularly in the Army, we really need some of the
softer science type capabilities like sociology and so on and
so forth that are not traditionally considered STEM in many
places.
So I am supportive but I am saying and I am telling my
leaders that I think we need to look at it a little bit more
before we extend it without a lot more study. The real solution
is getting folks in our universities in our organizations and
young people engaged in getting the advanced degrees, getting
the degrees in STEM.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Secretary, any comments?
Mr. Lemnios. Ma'am, I would agree. I think the challenge
here is that we are competing globally for talent. We are
competing with the private sector for the same talent. In my
role as DOD's chief technology officer, I am absolutely
concerned and committed to make sure we have a talent base
within our laboratories, but I also need to make sure we have a
talent base within our industrial base because at the end of
the day, the Department is acquiring systems and those systems
are built by a workforce, some of which might be within our
laboratories, much of which is in the defense industrial base.
There is going to be a stream of ideas that we see offshore
that we want to pounce on and elevate and make happen, and we
do that. The pace of this train is moving faster every day and
the complexity of it is growing every single day.
So as I step back and look at the subject of the
Department's laboratories, yes, we really do need to make sure
that we have our A game on with regard to workforce. There is a
huge challenge with regard to the infrastructure and making
sure we have the bricks and the mortar and glass and everything
in the right place and the laboratories in the right place. At
the end of the day, it is about driving innovation and
transitioning those concepts with the warfighter. Some of that
occurs eloquently and every day in the laboratories that you
visited, ones that we are a part of, and much of that occurs
within the defense industrial base. All of that is fed by
talent that we see in all sectors.
So when we talk about workforce, I think broader than just
how many additional billets do we need at this lab or that lab.
I am thinking about how does this enterprise actually operate
and how do we build a defense industrial base model that
replicates the efficiency, the cost, and the genius that we see
in the private sector.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Lacey?
Ms. Lacey. The Navy has looked at the authority that the
Army has and frankly we are still studying it. As Dr. Freeman
pointed out, the second and third order effects of such an
authority we are concerned about, and we would like to have a
better understanding of what they might be and how they might
impact us.
Dr. Walker. We are looking at something called Citizenship
for Service, which would be like a pilot program that we could
run in the labs, similar to the Army's. We have not instituted
that yet.
I agree with Dr. Freeman's comment about getting more U.S.
citizens in the pipeline. One idea we had is the LQIP. This
committee has supported expedited hiring authority for those
folks with master's degrees.
One thing that could help us get more U.S. students in the
pipeline is expedited hiring authority for just undergraduates,
speeding that hiring authority up for very qualified S&Es so
that we can hire them in 25 days not over a period of 120 days
which sometimes is what it takes. So if there is some authority
like that for the laboratories, that might help us get more
U.S. citizen students into the pipeline.
Senator Hagan. We can certainly work on that. I know I have
spoken quite often with Secretary Lemnios on this issue.
I certainly echo everybody's concern that we have to have
more science, technology, engineering, and math students coming
up through middle school, high school, obviously our
universities and graduate schools. It is imperative I think for
the safety and security of our country.
I think Senator Portman is coming back sometime in the next
few minutes but I will keep on asking a couple of questions.
The DOD has, more or less, preserved its top line funding
for S&T, and in part this is due to increases in basic research
at the expense of more applied research and technology
development. While increased basic research obviously is
important, there are concerns over decreases in more applied
research funding than for activities that can help transition
technologies across what has classically been labeled the
``valley of death,'' the gap between the labs and the military
users.
If you could respond to the question. Do you feel that
balance between basic research, applied research, and advanced
technology development is right? Dr. Walker, why do we not
start with you?
Dr. Walker. I do feel like we have been skewed a bit too
much towards basic research in the last few years. One of the
things we are trying to do in AFRL is transition technologies
that our warfighters care about. In order to do that, you have
to have a balanced 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 program and have enough money
in the 6.3 budget to do integrated demonstrations and
experiments of a variety of technologies to show the warfighter
that there is a capability here that they should be interested
in.
So I think our 6.1 budget has grown quite a bit over the
last few years, and it is now the largest piece of the budget
that AFRL has. So I would be in favor of balancing that a bit
more across the 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 spectrum.
Senator Hagan. Ms. Lacey?
Ms. Lacey. I am of a similar mind, that I would like to see
more of an investment in our BA-3 and BA-4 accounts that can
help us transition across the valley of death, as you have
heard it referred to. To that end, Rear Admiral Klunder and I--
the Chief of Naval Research--have joined together to take a
good, hard look at how do we navigate that 6.3-6.4 continuum to
ensure that we are getting those investments through that
portal.
Senator Hagan. When you say ``navigate,'' if you can
explain that to me, being in the Navy.
Ms. Lacey. So inside the Navy, the Chief of Naval Research
has oversight of the 6.1 through the 6.3 accounts, but the
programs, the PEOs, and program managers generally are the 6.4
and above. So to navigate that portal, we have to get the
people together and make sure that our processes involve both
sides of that portal. So that is the divide we are trying to
navigate and ensure that we have things tied together. We have
quite a bit of investment in the 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 world that if
program managers knew about it, they would want it. The reason
they do not know about it sometimes is because they do not have
time to listen. So we have to do a better job to make sure that
we provide them the information they need and the motivation to
take advantage of those S&T developments.
Senator Hagan. Certainly.
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, as we spoke maybe a month ago, I
briefed you and your staff on a comprehensive review that we
did late last year. Again in my role, I have the responsibility
of providing the Under Secretary and the Secretary with some
assurance that DOD's portfolio is well-structured both in the
basic research side but also in applied side. We have to cover
both avenues with sufficient resources and ideas.
I was looking for two things when we did that assessment
last fall. Is the budget in the right location? That is, are we
investing the right dollars? But more importantly, I was really
trying to understand what are the ideas that we are investing
in, what are those concepts, what are the technical ideas, what
is the core of the concepts that we are investing in. Through a
series of dialogues with the Services late last year, in fact,
we made some adjustments. We added funding in hypersonics. We
added funding in advanced imagers. We put some funding in for
some special programs with the Navy. We took ideas out that we
thought were either duplicative or were far past the maturity
that were being done elsewhere in Government.
At the end of the day, we presented a President's budget
just short of $12 billion that is, in fact, shaped by our bets
in the future and our needs for today. We can sit down and go
through it, but that is how we looked at it. In fact, it has to
be a balance. We have to have those space shots and ideas that
are going to be those for the Nation that we see 5 and 10 years
are going to be the coin of the realm that we will need not
within the Department but within our defense industrial base.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Dr. Freeman. I feel pretty strongly about this, and I would
agree with my comrades here with respect to I do think we have
a little imbalance at this point. One of my things when I came
in the job about a year and a half ago, almost 2 years ago now,
one of my goals was to try to figure out what the right balance
is across the entire portfolio. The first thing with basic
research is just like we did in the 6.3 portion where we have
focused our 6.3 portion now on some very specific problems and
challenges, not all of it, but a portion of our 6.3 that are
focused on improving the warfighters' capabilities at the small
unit and the soldier level, I need to do that in the rest of
the portfolio.
I really appreciate the comment that you made at the
beginning, that we really have done a lot of work in trying to
refocus our efforts on capabilities for soldiers. So thank you
for that.
But now that we have done that for our portion of 6.3 that
we have problems and challenges that we are focusing our
programs on, now I am taking that to the rest of the 6.3 and
the 6.2 portion to figure out what are the problems and the
challenges we should focus on in the time frame of 2020 to 2028
which is kind of where that investment would start paying off.
I also have an effort going on to try to figure out for 6.1
what are the sets of problems and challenges that we should be
focusing our research efforts to help soldiers in the 2030 and
beyond time frame, which is where that research starts to pay
off.
So we actually have some workshops started that are going
to happen early in May. The basic research one is happening the
1st and 2nd of May to try to get a community of people together
to try to project into that time period what is it that we need
to do. Once we know what we need to do, then we can go back and
say here is the right amount of money to put into it.
Now, that does not say we are not going to have innovation
and invention and disruptive technologies. What it does say is
that I believe, as I think my colleagues believe, that in the
Services, our main job in the 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 is to focus it
on what our Services really need. Then as Mr. Lemnios said,
then we can focus on what we need to do together to complement
one another.
So I really am in the process of trying to figure out what
is the right amount of 6.1 to solve our problems and where do,
if any, we need to shift to be able to do what we need to do
for the Army in those time periods when those funds would pay
off.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Senator Portman?
Senator Portman. Thank you very much. I am sorry I had to
step out for a moment, but I understand you all covered a lot
but not everything. So I look forward to just asking a couple
more questions. Thank you again for all your help today.
Globalization of S&T. This is a challenging area because,
after all, we are in world of defense policy and we have to be
sure that the classified nature of much of what you do is
maintained. But we also know that while I would agree with
Secretary Lemnios that the United States is still in the lead,
the rest of the world is catching up and there is a lot of
research being done globally that we could benefit from.
I was on the plane the other day late last week going back
to Dayton because I was unable to get a flight into Cincinnati
flying into Dayton, Delta Airlines. I was on with some of the
AFRL scientists. One had come here on a visa and has a green
card now, but there are a lot of folks who you all have
benefitted from who have been trained at least in their
undergraduate training in other countries and then come here
often to get a graduate degree and then stay and help us.
It also is true that each of you, Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey,
Dr. Walker, have global outreach. You have offices in Europe,
Asia, and South America, as I understand it. So the
globalization is already happening both in terms of folks
coming here and you all reaching out. I just wonder how that is
working. Are you able to leverage some of this international
research that we wish was being done here on our shores but is
not to be able to help our warfighters? Is that appropriate to
do more of that? How do you balance this need for having
confidentiality and classified research with the need for us to
take advantage of the most cutting-edge research globally?
Then finally, is it economically or even under statute
feasible for us to open satellite research laboratories in
areas of the world where there is a high degree of scientific
research going on? I think of parts of India, for instance. Is
it possible to have our researchers working side by side with
foreign researchers in some of these areas that have defense
implications?
So if the three of you--and Dr. Lemnios jump in too, but
give me your thoughts on that.
Dr. Freeman. All right. I will start.
We do in the Army. We have what we call international
technology centers or located in several places around the
world. Each one of those is operated through and primarily
through Research, Development and Engineering Command, and we
have a senior, GS-15, or a colonel who is in charge of that
area. Then we send researchers over in certain fields and
certain areas that we have identified in those regions to spend
a year or 2 participating and looking for opportunities both
from industries in those regions but also from universities and
from local military research laboratories. So that is one way
we have done that. Usually what happens then is that they
identify a technology or they identify a product and because of
their knowledge, they call back to a laboratory or a center and
to a colleague in the laboratory or center who is an expert in
that area or field, and then they work together to get those
people to talk to one another and/or to get those products
evaluated and looked at.
Another opportunity that we have, in addition to that, is I
think everybody here--we participate in what we call
roundtables with other countries. Recently I just got back from
Israel, and I have a meeting coming up with five countries--
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the
United Kingdom--where we get together and talk about
technologies and talk about what we are doing not only in the
laboratories but what the opportunities are in those countries
to see technologies and we share those technologies as well and
bring them into our research programs and/or into solutions in
our acquisition side. So we have those fora and we have those
opportunities to do that.
One of the things I just did with these tech Ds, these
challenges, these problems and challenges--I offered to every
one of the countries that we were working with in Germany and
lots of others. I said here are the things we are working on.
Here are our priorities. What do you have? What do you know
about that is in your region or your area that you can come
back and tell us about that we can look at that might help us
to solve these problems?
The last piece that I would recommend is that we have
scientists and engineers who attend international conferences
all the time, and they make these determinations of figuring
out what is out there and they bring it back to their own
laboratory. That is useful because in many cases--actually I do
not have it on hand, but we have many examples of where we have
taken some of these foreign either company products and/or
technologies and we have incorporated them either in our own
research projects or gotten them into some systems.
Now, of course, there is a lot of challenge with that
because you have ITAR regulations that you have to be careful
of. You have classification issues. We have ``Buy American''
issues, and so it is complex. But we do a lot already and
continue to do a lot to understand what is out there in the
global economy and make use of it the best we can.
Senator Portman. I want to hear, if I could, from the other
two Service S&T folks. But let me just also add another
question, I guess, that any recommendations you have ranging
from immigration policy where I assume you have some thoughts
to ways in which we should change any either statutory or
regulatory constraints on what Dr. Freeman just talked about,
which is this more free flow. The four countries you mentioned
happen to be four of our strongest allies in the world and ones
with which we have an unusually strong military relationship
and an information sharing relationship. I do not know as much
about New Zealand, but it certainly is true with Australia and
Canada and the UK. So thoughts on that. Ms. Lacey?
Ms. Lacey. The Navy has many of the same kinds of
activities underway that Dr. Freeman talked to. We do them
through our overhaul and repair, we call it, global
organization, and I would be happy to provide you additional
information, all the details on the activities that we have
underway.
One thing, though, that we have had discussions with the
ONR about is that activity tends to focus very much on the S&T
side of the house and miss the opportunities that perhaps are
there on the industrial side of the house. So I want to see a
greater connection between the S&T view of the world and the
industrial sector view of the world and our warfare centers. So
we have started those discussions.
Senator Portman. Dr. Walker?
Dr. Walker. We have a spectrum of activities at AFRL from
basic research to even classified work going on with
international partners. We have the offices you mentioned,
European Office of Aerospace Research and Development in London
and then Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development in
Tokyo. We have offices now in the South America region as well.
In the late 1990s/early 2000s, I was at AFOSR working a
project with the Russians on the plasma physics and hypersonics
activities. It was 6.1, it was basic research. So we were able
to have that communication and dialogue. They were the best in
the business in terms of plasma physics.
As I mentioned, we have this other spectrum of activity,
even classified work, with partners like Australia and others
that we carry on all the time.
AFRL is building a relationship with Singapore which is in
a vital part of the world. I was just there with Joe Sciabica,
the executive director, looking at even increasing our activity
there at a fundamental science and applied science level.
In terms of regulations, we mentioned, when you were out,
an idea for our pilot project in terms of Citizenship for
Service. The lab is interested in looking at how can we take
foreign nationals that are in our universities that are really
outstanding who want to work for us and bring them into the lab
for a couple years and get them on a fast track to a green card
status and make them one of our employees. So we are interested
in a pilot project on that. I will have to get back to you on
what regulation changes we would need to do that.
Senator Hagan. Mr. Secretary, anything?
Mr. Lemnios. I would just simply add two comments. Actually
right after this meeting, I am headed to San Diego to meet with
my counterpart from Australia. Part of that discussion is our
joint S&T areas that we have structured with the Australians.
The foreign S&T engagements that we have are really quite
broad. They are across the full scope of the 6.1 funding, and
they even, in some cases, move into the acquisition programs. A
very important part of DOD's portfolio.
But one thing that has changed over the past several
years--and you have seen this in the private sector and we are
starting to address it within the Department--research is no
longer sequential. It is no longer that you go from basic
research through the next stage 2, stage 3, stage 4. All of
this stuff is occurring simultaneously. You will see a
researcher at AFRL or at the Army Research Laboratory that is
absolutely at the leading edge on some physical concept that
nobody else has seen that is thinking about the application of
that concept and is coupling with a partner elsewhere in the
laboratory to quickly transition it. So the sequential model
for basic research has changed.
The other thing that has changed, to your point, the teams
that actually come together to do research are--it is seldom
that a single investigator is developing the lead concept. It
really does take a team of people, and in most cases--and the
laboratories are great examples of this--that team has to
include a user. It has to include somebody that understands the
application of that concept in the user space. That is what is
really unique about the laboratories.
Senator Portman. Thank you all. My time has expired, but I
appreciate you being here.
Let me just piggyback on what you were saying about working
with industry then if I could for a second because the chair
has given me a little bit more time.
Joe Sciabica came to an aerospace conference we had week
before last at a GE facility outside of Cincinnati. We brought
in people from all over the State. It was a great example of
where some of the work you are doing can be commercialized in a
way that helps to create jobs, economic growth in our States,
but also helps you to be able to perform your mission because
you are taking, as Ms. Lacey said, information from the
industry as well as them benefitting from some of your basic
research. So I did not want to miss that opportunity, since you
mentioned Joe, to say he is doing a very good job I think
reaching out and working with some of the original equipment
manufacturers and some of the suppliers who are unable to do
the basic research but can provide some of the more
application, I guess, research you would call it that is
helpful to you all.
The final question that I have has to do with your
priorities. Last year Secretary Gates listed seven of them:
cyber, electronic warfare, data decisions, engineered resilient
systems, counter weapons of mass destruction, autonomy, and
human systems. I am not sure what autonomy means. So if you
could explain that to me, that would be helpful.
But with regard to these seven, as Secretary Lemnios has
indicated, things are moving rapidly at the speed of something,
light, sound, maybe quicker. Are these still your priorities?
If not, which ones can you tell the subcommittee are missing
from this list of seven or are some of these now a lower
priority than they would have been even early last year?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, we developed those almost 2 years ago
now, and they actually all apply to the space that the
Department has moved into on the strategic plan that was issued
January of this year. In fact, the President's budget request
for 2013 reflects that. As we went back and looked at the
projects that we had planned last fall and as we were building
our budget for the President's budget request for 2013, we in
fact referenced the strength that we had in each of those
areas. Some of those we had to strengthen and that is what is
really on the Hill right now for deliberation.
As far as autonomy, think robotics. Think robotics without
people. Think about a PackBot that can operate without a joy
stick. Think about a car that could operate because you are in
the driver's seat and maybe a disabled person can think about
driving and the car drives. So we are on that path. In the
commercial sector, you see Google making a big investment in
that area. In fact, the State of Nevada has now authorized
autonomous vehicles to operate on their roads. Interesting
commentary. But we are headed in that direction. You see it
with cars that can self-park in a very, very simple way. But I
think in the not too distant future you will see vehicles and
other systems that interoperate with humans in very natural
ways, almost conversationally. Think Siri on steroids. Think of
a system that understands you and understands what your needs
are a day from now, 2 days from now, say, for travel or
something and then presents that information to you without you
having to ask for it.
Senator Portman. Thank you. Do you think there is any
danger of replacing elected representatives? [Laughter.]
Mr. Lemnios. No. The complexity is too great. It is just
not going to happen.
Senator Portman. It is complex.
Thank you all very much.
Dr. Freeman. Could I just add one thing to the last
comment? So what Mr. Lemnios was talking about were the seven
are the cross-cutting for all of DOD, and as he mentioned
before, those are the priorities that we have agreed that
affect each and every one of us. Every one of us also then has
our own Service priorities of the things that we have to do
with the rest of the budget that we have to meet our own
priorities, and we are in the process in the Army of better
establishing, better advertising, and better articulating to
everybody what those priorities are for Army S&T and getting
leadership to agree to those for that Service-specific part of
the portfolio as well.
Senator Hagan. I have two quick questions and then we will
adjourn.
One of the greatest challenges facing DOD today is the
increased cost of its weapons systems. The DOD S&T enterprise
historically has done a laudable job of increasing the
performance of these weapons systems but with little
consideration for cost. In today's budget constrained
environment, affordability is now a key driver for weapons
systems. As an example, commercial electronics continue to
increase in performance and yet decrease in cost. The same can
hardly be said for any DOD major defense acquisition program.
What are you specifically doing in your S&T enterprise to
address the development of technologies and design
methodologies and manufacturing technologies to improve
affordability? Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Lemnios. Sure. Senator, there are several areas that
directly address that. The first is the work that the
Department has done on risk assessments, technical risk
assessments, to really understand well before milestone A and
actually before milestone B, and in some cases even before
milestone A, what the technical readiness level is of the given
technology in the architecture it is going to be used in.
Senator Hagan. How long has that been in effect?
Mr. Lemnios. This was part of the Weapons Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 that you passed unanimously and
the President signed May 2009. We are implementing that with
great effect. In fact, two elements of that that have been
absolutely central are the technology assessments and the
systems engineering work that is being done well ahead of a
commitment to go and acquire a system. The impact of those your
committee has heard about and certainly others have in terms of
identifying problems very early where we can make an
engineering change well before we are into production.
The other piece of this that I think is going to be
critical--and each of the Services is addressing it--is an
increased focus on modeling and simulation. That is building
greater fidelity tools that allow us to model a very costly
experiment in a new domain--pick hypersonics. Actually pick
your ADVENT system, the high performance engine. Much of that
work was simulated well before we cut the first metal. Now we
are at a point where not only is the first metal matching
simulation, but we are able to then move into what will be an
acquisition phase with much higher confidence that the
technology is in fact ready. So getting that early stage risk
assessment done, strong modeling and software is absolutely
critical.
Senator Hagan. I had one last question. Here it is. Thank
you.
One of the criticisms of DOD is the slow pace of its
acquisition process and the role of the DOD laboratories in
order to rapidly take technologies to the field. I think we
spoke a little bit about--one prime example was the need for
the creation of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization to handle the IED threats. What are you doing to
increase the speed and the agility of the laboratories to help
deploy the systems to the warfighter, and how are you ensuring
that the labs can quickly respond to rapidly emerging threats
or the urgent needs of our combatant commanders? Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Lemnios. Senator, I will give you the counter example
that everybody knows well and that is the mine-resistant ambush
protected vehicle story that went from a request from theater
in September 2009 to the first vehicles being delivered in
theater less than 3 months later. That has now been the vehicle
of choice. It has saved thousands, that has saved hundreds of
lives clearly in theater.
The reason that that worked is because we had core
competency at the Tank Automotive Research, Development, and
Engineering Center laboratory in Warren, MI, and we had
ballistic effects understood at Aberdeen. We had a set of
contractors that understood it. We also had a Secretary of
Defense, as the current Secretary of Defense is, very much
behind it. Secretary Gates was very much behind this. In fact,
we were able to move that very rapidly in the span of months
from a concept to a capability delivered to theater.
In fact, the persistent ground surveillance system is
another example. It came out of our joint capability technology
demonstration program, coupled with the Service laboratories to
make sure we had the technology right. In fact, the sensors
were commercial sensors but the integration was done in our
Service lab, quickly deployed to theater.
The efforts that we have put in place to deliver
capabilities to the fight previously in Iraq, currently in
Afghanistan, have taught us the value of production integration
facilities in DOD's laboratories. That probably would not have
been done by the private sector alone. The private sector
simply did not have the context, the operational context and,
in some cases, in fact with Aberdeen, did not have the
ballistic models to understand what the threat looked like. So
the fact that we were able to couple those two domains so
effectively, in fact, provided immediate support to the
warfighters. That is the path we are on.
Senator Hagan. We certainly had an urgent reason to do so.
Mr. Lemnios. We had a very urgent reason to do so.
Senator Hagan. On behalf of the subcommittee, I thank you
each and every one of you for your testimony today and, in
particular, your service to our country. I think we all will be
looking forward to seeing the results of the survey, once it is
completed, on the labs and the aging infrastructure and moving
forward. So thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

STUDY OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LABS

1. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, the fiscal year 2013 President's
budget requests $4.8 million for lab resource management. We understand
that you are conducting a study of the Department of Defense (DOD)
labs. When will that study be completed?
Mr. Lemnios. The study will be completed by December 2012, not
using fiscal year 2013 funds.

2. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, in addition to this study, what else
are you planning to do with these funds?
Mr. Lemnios. As detailed in the February 2012 Research and
Development (R&D) Descriptive Summary for Program Element 0605798D8Z,
the $4.8 million funding will be used to develop and collect more
effective metrics describing the condition, benefit, and payoff of the
DOD laboratories. The $4.8 million funds includes funds for about four
support contractors, development of an implementation plan for the
ongoing laboratory assessment study, and so forth. While we have been
effective in measuring things such as building age, we have not been as
effective in developing the metrics. The $4.8 million will help us
address where laboratories are and are not effective as they could be.
The results will enable the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
and laboratory management staffs to identify shortfalls and missed
opportunities, and thereby harvest greater benefits from R&D
investments.

DIRECT HIRING AUTHORITY

3. Senator Hagan. Dr. Walker, during the hearing you mentioned the
need to more rapidly hire scientists and engineers (S&E) with only
undergraduate degrees. Would you please amplify on your statement and
explain why direct hiring authority, which is currently used for
scientists and engineers with advanced graduate degrees, would be
needed?
Dr. Walker. The balance of skill levels in the Air Force Research
Lab (AFRL) S&E workforce requires that approximately 10 percent of new
hires consist of entry level candidates. In addition, to maintain a
diverse workforce AFRL has also found that it is most successful in
recruiting high quality minority and female candidates when they are at
the entry level.
Prior to its rescinding in December 2010, the Defense Career Intern
Program (DCIP) hiring authority allowed AFRL to target, successfully
recruit, and quickly on-board well-qualified, highly sought after,
recent and prospective S&E graduates from the country's colleges and
universities.
In response to loss of DCIP authority, DOD laboratories developed
the Distinguished Scholastic Achievement Appointment authority which
requires graduates have a 3.5 grade point average (GPA) overall or in
major field of study. However, other than the restriction on GPA, this
authority is no different from any delegated examining unit (DEU)
announcement, which requires a 5-day announcement on USAJOBs and does
not limit the pool of candidates to those recently graduated with
Bachelor of Science degrees. This means that any candidates with
experience who obtained a 3.5 GPA can apply and will rank higher than
recent graduates due to that experience. This reduces the ability of
hiring officials to select targeted high quality candidates, to include
minority and female candidates, from universities that complement
laboratory skills requirements. Furthermore, due to the time necessary
to process actions (90 days, similar to other DEU actions), managers
have found that desired candidates typically accept positions with
private industry organizations that can hire them much faster.
A hiring authority that mirrors the flexibility of DCIP would allow
AFRL to add a sufficient level of entry level S&E to balance its
workforce and help increase minority and female S&E representation.

AFFORDABILITY OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

4. Senator Hagan. Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, one of
the greatest challenges facing DOD today is the increased costs of its
weapons systems. DOD science and technology (S&T) enterprise
historically has done a laudable job of increasing the performance of
these weapons systems, but with little consideration for cost. In
today's budget-constrained environment, affordability is now a key
driver for weapons systems. In the commercial sector, electronics
continue to increase in performance and decrease in cost. The same can
hardly be said for any DOD major defense acquisition program. What are
you specifically doing in your S&T enterprise to address the
development of technologies, design methodologies, and manufacturing
technologies to improve affordability?
Dr. Freeman. The Army does consider costs in technology
development, and affordability is one of the key metrics considered in
our S&T efforts. To do this, we identify key technology cost drivers,
improve manufacturing technology, and leverage commercial industry
technologies.
To give one example, the Army is developing active electronically-
steered radar arrays to reduce the cost of missile seekers. Cost
reductions of these arrays are achieved by leveraging commercial
technology matured by the telecommunications industry. The beam of a
phased array radar seeker is steered through electronic phase shift,
eliminating the need for large mechanical gimbals. The major technology
hurdles are transmitting adequate power from the miniature devices and
achieving the required thermal management within the packaging. The
Army is collaborating with industry to overcome these challenges. Costs
for the phased array antennas currently used for air and missile
defense missile seekers are projected to be reduced by 50 percent. An
additional benefit of the reduced cost seeker technology is increased
reliability, eliminating the potential impact of obsolescence in
unitary radio frequency transmitter sources. On a smaller scale, image
stabilization algorithms have been developed to enable low cost seekers
to be employed. These algorithms enable the operator or targeting
algorithms to see a steady picture while the munition is flying,
enabling lower cost visual and infrared cameras to be used that are
fixed and non-gimbaled, to reduce the complexity (moving parts).
Ms. Lacey. As budgets tighten, the demand for affordability of new
technologies has shifted the focus of S&T investments to ensure they
are defined and linked to requirements and platforms with an increased
emphasis on total ownership cost. The Navy is addressing affordability
through a three-phased approach:

(1) Issuance of policy and guidance
- Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook for Program
Managers to reduce the overall risk to the Department; and
- Navy S&T Strategic Plan that focuses on affordability by
pressing for transformational scientific breakthroughs in
critical areas, improved methodologies for design, improved
manufacturing processes; technology insertion opportunities to
reduce life-cycle costs through reduced manning and extended
operational viability.

(2) Increasing the Department's technical capabilities
- Directed Department Program Managers to use in-house
technical workforce to understand and optimize pre-Milestone B
technical work to strengthen our understanding of technical/
cost tradespace;
- Increasing the Department's focus on basic through applied
research strengths to better understand and document the long-
term implications of intellectual property and data rights and
publish and patent as appropriate to protect the intellectual
property rights for/of the S&T community.

(3) Continued pursuit of technology breakthroughs
- The Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) world has a high volume
over which to amortize development costs. Where appropriate,
DOD and Navy already use and are increasing COTS products; and
- The Navy has been actively engaged in shipbuilding
affordability.

The Single Ship Tank Coatings Project delivered a
rapid cure single coat system for tank preservation that
provides a 20-year service life. This product is now in use and
is available for purchase from the qualified products list.
The High Performance Topside Coatings project is
developing exterior ship freeboard and topside coatings that
are reducing cost by improving durability while decreasing
solar absorbance.

- The F-35 JSF's Automated Fiber Placement Bismaleimide
Manufacturing Technology project has improved the process and
lay down rate for fiber placement on the wing skins and nacelle
structures by 47 percent and 62 percent respectively for a cost
avoidance of more than $100 million over the life of program.

Dr. Walker. Integral to Air Force S&T are programs focused on
improving affordability in the development of new technologies for
weapon systems spanning their entire life cycle from cradle to grave.
The Air Force Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program, as part
of our S&T portfolio, is a key enabler for affordability in Air Force
systems. ManTech efforts span the entire acquisition lifecycle to
shorten cycle times and improve producibility, availability, cost, and
quality for hardware-intensive weapon systems. High return investments
are formulated in partnership with program offices and associated
industry members in the acquisition, sustainment, and S&T communities.
For example, the Advanced Manufacturing Propulsion Initiative (AMPI)
works with the engine Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and supply
base across seven different technology areas (e.g., ceramic matrix
composites, advanced casting) and is projecting a $2.9 billion
lifecycle cost avoidance for F-35 alone. Manufacturing improvements for
Active Electronically Scanned Array radar systems are delivering over
$380 million in cost avoidance to the F-35 and F-22. A new
manufacturing process for aircraft panel seals has a projected cost
avoidance for the F-35 and F-22 of $881 million. The Engine Rotor Life
Extension project is enabling longer service life for high cost turbine
engine components of legacy systems and is projecting a life cycle cost
avoidance of $1.1 billion. The ManTech space solar cell project has
enabled ultra high efficiency arrays for numerous space systems
resulting in trade space of having reduced mass, volume, and cost per
watt. Finally, a Manufacturing Critical Small Business Innovation
Research project leveraged by ManTech cuts the time to drill the Joint
Strike Fighter inlet ducts from 50 hours per shipset to 12 hours,
saving over $25 million.
The ManTech program is also identifying potential future
investments for agile, affordable low volume, high mix production
involving earlier consideration of manufacturing in the acquisition
cycle, tools, and models to increase performance of the integrated
supply base, application of advanced digital tools and models to
facilitate efficiencies across design/production/operations, and
development of advanced factory floor assembly/machine/infrastructure
technologies.
Additional efforts throughout the AFRL are also focused on
enhancing affordability of Air Force systems and acquisitions. For
example, we have research to understand the root cause of material
failure under the conditions in which they are used since improvements
in affordability are directly related to increasing the mean time
between failures of the part or component of the weapon system and are
rooted in its material system. We are also building design tools that
improve the ability of engineers to successfully design components and
systems thereby reducing development risks and cost. The Upper Stage
Engine Technology (USET) program is one such example: it is a physics-
based modeling and simulation tool for liquid rocket engine
development, replacing expensive and time-consuming empirical test-
driven development and providing great fidelity earlier in the design
process. USET has had 57 industry applications to date and supports the
Air Force's new upper stage rocket acquisition.

MEASURING PERFORMANCE OF LABORATORIES

5. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr.
Walker, there are many ways to measure the performance of a laboratory
enterprise, whether it is numbers of peer-reviewed research papers,
patents, or technologies transitioned to acquisition programs. How do
you measure the performance of DOD laboratories?
Mr. Lemnios. Measuring laboratory performance presents a difficult
challenge. As outlined in this question, numbers of papers and patents
are important metrics because they provide an indication of innovation
in the labs. Other metrics that I consider crucial in measuring
laboratory performance include the scale and impact of transitions to
industry, effectiveness of solutions provided in response to Joint
Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS), and ability to develop
technology prototypes that offer significant new capabilities to the
DOD. Lastly, the ability of the Department's laboratories to compete
for top talent is significantly driven by the quality and impact of
work in our laboratories.
By all measures we are seeing solid levels of performance across
the Department's laboratory enterprise.
Dr. Freeman. Measuring the performance of a laboratory enterprise
is a challenging endeavor, particularly when the enterprise spans the
spectrum from basic research to applied technology development. The
Army looks at all of the measures mentioned above; in addition, the
Army also looks at metrics such as citations, patents awarded,
conference presentations and keynote addresses, and cooperative R&D
agreements.
Ms. Lacey. Navy laboratories conduct broad-based, multidisciplinary
scientific research and advanced technological development directed
toward maritime applications of new and improved materials, techniques,
equipment, systems, and platforms. To be successful, Navy laboratories
must conduct the right research, it must be world-class research, and
it must have high payoff for the Department. This research is measured
using criteria appropriate to assessing the quality of the science/
engineering that are frequently used by academia and other world-class
scientific research laboratories such as:

- Number and quality of papers in scientific journals, patent
applications submitted and patents received, citations to those
papers and patents, licenses granted, royalties received, and
CRADAs negotiated.
- External recognition of the scientific staff by election to
membership in the National Academies, and by selection to be
Fellows of the various scientific societies.
- The fraction of the scientific staff holding a PhD or other
advanced degree, the number and quality of newly hired staff
members, and the experience of the staff.
- Recognition of the staff with prestigious scientific and
engineering awards, and selection to be members of high level
Navy, DOD and National/International panels, boards, and
committees, and as committee chairs of conferences and as
officers of scientific societies.

Measures used to assess the value and impact of research activities
include:

- Transition to/adoption of acquisition and non-acquisition
programs in the Department satisfying requirements of the
Fleet/Force.
- Rapid response to emergent/urgent needs of the Fleet/Force to
meet/correct operational deficiencies.
- Number of times and total funds received from other agencies,
services, laboratories, and companies for the products,
services, and technical expertise of the Laboratory or Center.

Dr. Walker. While some quantitative measures, such as those
mentioned in your question, can be useful when considering the
performance of the AFRL, we have primarily focused on assessing
performance through qualitative means due to the nature of the Air
Force S&T program. The true test of performance of the lab is whether
or not the basic research, applied research, and advanced technology
development is focused on meeting the current and future needs of
warfighters.
To ensure the lab efforts are postured for successful transitions
to warfighting capability, the Air Force deliberately aligns S&T
planning, technology transition planning, and development planning. The
linkages between these planning activities are critical to initiating
acquisition programs with more mature technologies and credible cost
estimates, and we are institutionalizing these linkages in Air Force
policy.
Operational users document their capability development priorities
as part of the larger Air Force strategic planning system. Capability
Collaboration Teams, with participation from the lab, product centers,
and operational users, then derive S&T needs from those capability
development priorities and work together to develop S&T solutions that
will provide technology options with reduced risk for future
acquisition.
Successes such as the High Velocity Penetrating Weapon (HVPW) and
Precision Air Drop (PAD) Flagship Capability Concepts (FCC) have proven
the process and provided us a means to assess the performance of AFRL.
HVPW was initiated as the S&T planning processes were being developed
and has served as a pilot for these processes. The HVPW FCC was
grounded in development planning activities that helped define the key
technology drivers for various hard target defeat concepts. These key
technologies are informing the upcoming analysis of alternatives for
the Hard Target Munition family of systems. The PAD FCC was the first
effort created in direct response to a documented capability
development need. The lab, product center, and operational user put
together a set of technology development efforts to address the entire
problem set. The first of these solutions is scheduled to be
demonstrated in fiscal year 2013.

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD'S STUDY ON DOD'S BASIC RESEARCH

6. Senator Hagan. Mr. Lemnios, Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr.
Walker, in the recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study on DOD's basic
research, it was stated that they found ``an alarming level of
bureaucratic business practices hindering the conduct of basic
research.'' Would you explain your understanding of what these business
practices are and how can they be made more efficient?
Mr. Lemnios. My understanding is that the DSB is referring to
bureaucratic requirements that divert researchers' time from the actual
performance of their research and thereby reduce their productivity.
The DSB gave examples on pages 33-34 of their report. For instance, the
DSB cited a survey of university faculty conducted by the Federal
Demonstration Partnership (FDP), a collaborative effort of universities
and Federal research funding organizations to streamline research
administration. The FDP survey found that (only) 42 percent of the time
available to research faculty for their federally supported research
was being spent on research-related administrative tasks.
It would be nice to say that reducing the bureaucratic burden would
be simple, but this is not the case. The source of bureaucracy comes
from numerous Federal and State statutes, some internal DOD processes,
and other internal university processes. I have asked my Director,
Basic Sciences, and the Defense Basic Research Advisory Group to
develop a plan to address the DSB recommendations, and specific to this
question, reduce the bureaucracy where possible. This will start with a
DBRAG analysis of the FDP data for DOD awards and identifying
individual requirements that are the cause of the burdens on
researchers. This will let us focus on the burdens that matter most.
Reduction of bureaucratic burdens is something we do try to achieve.
For instance, in the past couple of years, we addressed the
bureaucratic burdens for publication of fundamental research by issuing
a memorandum clarifying policy on fundamental research, consistent with
National Security Decision Directive 189. I suspect we will find other
areas that will let us cut bureaucracy.
Dr. Freeman. The DSB report referenced several business practices
they deemed questionable, to include: attending training that may be
inappropriate in a basic research environment or detract from time
spent on research; checking research tools and equipment in and out on
a daily basis; and performing repairs to lab equipment rather than
employing expert technicians. Also referenced in the DSB study, the FDP
conducted a survey among university researchers and found a similar set
of concerns. While we are always open to improve our methods of
conducting the business of doing research and will work with our
laboratory directors to identify burdensome practices, we must also be
mindful of the training and procedures that are required to maintain a
high level of quality within our workforce and be conscious of the
costs associated with supporting our laboratory enterprise.
Ms. Lacey. While raising the administrative burden issue, the DSB
report did not identify specific examples nor did they recommend any
specific processes to eliminate. To a large extent the report supported
how business is done now and makes some recommendations that could, in
fact, create more administrative work for program managers/officers.
The sources of bureaucratic burden include legislation, administration
requirements imposed from outside DOD, requirements imposed from within
DOD, requirements imposed by the Services, and requirements imposed by
the basic research performing organizations themselves.
The Navy recognizes the S&T community may be called upon to answer
datacalls and provide technical reviews. To the extent the Navy has
control; we strive to mitigate these actions using existing data and
information. It is always our goal to maintain efficient operations
with the effective use of all resources.
Dr. Walker. Over the last few years, the Air Force has been
proactively identifying and addressing bureaucratic processes that
reduce the effectiveness of basic and applied research in the
laboratory.
For example, some tool control procedures, originally designed for
flight line activity but also applied to the AFRL, do not make sense in
the research laboratory environment. The administrative burden
associated with tool control procedures such as checking tools in and
out of tool cribs, completing forms for broken tools, and getting tools
etched, takes time away from critical research activities. We estimate
that up to 30 minutes each day per researcher is spent executing tool
control procedures which is time lost from research. The Air Force
recognized this additional burden on research activities and has now
granted waivers to lessen tool control responsibilities for the
laboratory environment.
Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory procedures, also
originally designed for flight line activity but applied to AFRL, also
often do not make sense in a research laboratory environment where
instruments are regularly calibrated by the research scientist
performing the experimentation. The administrative burden and lost
research time associated with instrument calibration at contract
facilities takes time away from critical research activities and often
is unnecessary. The Air Force recognized this additional burden on
research activities and has now granted waivers to instrument
calibration responsibilities in research laboratories.
The Air Force is committed to continuing to identify and reduce
bureaucratic processes which impact our research capabilities.

DECKER-WAGNER REPORT

7. Senator Hagan. Dr. Freeman, it is our understanding that the
Army has an ongoing study in the wake of the Decker-Wagner report
looking at, among many other things, how Army S&T should be managed and
how the laboratories can best be organized for the future needs of the
Army. What is the status of this study?
Dr. Freeman. The Decker-Wagner Army Acquisition Review recommended
the disestablishment of the Research, Development and Engineering
Command (RDECOM) because in the study group's view, RDECOM ``has not
added enough value to be continued.'' The Army did not concur with this
assessment. RDECOM provides a valuable service by integrating R&D
efforts across different Research, Development and Engineering Centers.
Currently, the Army is studying how to optimize materiel development
and sustainment efforts, to include research, across the Army
acquisition and materiel communities. This study is considering how
best to leverage the R&D headquarters to efficiently apply S&T across
the community to solve critical Army problems. This effort, which is
primarily focused on improving processes, is ongoing.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Portman

SEQUESTRATION

8. Senator Portman. Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, during
the hearing, Secretary Lemnios stated that the effects of sequestration
would be devastating to the laboratory enterprise. Do you agree with
that assessment?
Dr. Freeman. I agree that cuts of the magnitude mandated by
sequestration would have severe consequences for the Army's S&T
programs.
Ms. Lacey. The Department of Navy has not begun planning for or
assessing potential impacts of sequestration with the hopes that
Congress will work out a larger deficit-reduction plan. Impacts to Navy
laboratories and warfare centers directly result in impacts to specific
programs; however, specific program impacts are unknown until more
detailed planning has occurred.
Dr. Walker. Yes. A significant cut to DOD and the Air Force S&T
budgets resulting from sequestration could negatively affect laboratory
enterprise.

9. Senator Portman. Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr. Walker, does a
devastating impact mean that you would be forced to shut down needed
facilities?
Dr. Freeman. At this time, we have not done a detailed study on
what consequences sequestration would have for our facilities
specifically.
Ms. Lacey. The Navy has not begun planning for or assessing
potential impacts of sequestration with the hopes that Congress will
work out a larger deficit-reduction plan. Until specific programmatic
impacts are known, the Navy is uncertain if it would be result in the
shutdown of facilities.
Dr. Walker. Until specific parameters of sequestration are defined,
we are unable to provide specific programmatic, personnel, and
infrastructure impacts.

HIGHER EDUCATION

10. Senator Portman. Dr. Walker, there seems to be an important
relationship between DOD graduate school programs and the educated
officers it provides to your labs, both in concurrent research and in
the future. As a whole, the DOD's laboratory budgets faired relatively
well in the fiscal year 2013 President's budget request, while in some
cases these service graduate programs served as near-term billpayers.
How do Air Force Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
(STEM) programs incorporate the Air Force Institute of Technology
(AFIT) into their strategies for building a skilled Air Force S&T
workforce?
Dr. Walker. The Air Force recognizes that advanced STEM degrees for
officers are critical not just to laboratory research efforts, but also
to a myriad of Air Force missions, ranging from cyberspace to
reconnaissance and beyond. We are working closely with the Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Manpower, and Services (AF/A1)
to ensure we can leverage limited resources as best as possible.
We work very closely with AFIT to incorporate student research
activities with the needs of the AFRL and the greater STEM community.
We also hand select each officer to follow their AFIT education with a
job that best utilizes their new degrees. Our goal is to have officers
attend AFIT early in their careers so the STEM advanced degree can be
used on multiple tours of duty. In addition, the Air Force policy is
that any student sent for an advanced degree for the purpose of
teaching at the Air Force Academy or AFIT first serve an intervening
STEM operational tour before going to the classroom environment.
The Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) funds basic
research conducted by AFIT faculty members, postdoctoral research
associates, and doctoral candidates (approximately $1.4 million in
fiscal year 2012). In addition, AFOSR sponsors a seminar series at AFIT
to bring distinguished scientists and engineers to Dayton, OH, to give
presentations on cutting edge research. The relationship between AFOSR
and AFIT helps to educate and train the future STEM workforce for the
Air Force.
AFIT is also used to hone important skills, such as software
engineering, through the Software Professional Development Program.
AFIT's School of Systems and Logistics is the sole provider of more
than 80 professional continuing education courses in acquisition
management, logistics management, contracting, systems management,
software engineering, and financial management delivered to warfighters
around the globe via customer-focused delivery methods including
resident and online courses.
The Civil Engineering School has provided civil engineer
professionals with education from building initial skills to learning
technical and management disciplines to developing the advanced skills
necessary to serve as Civil Engineering squadron commanders. Since
1990, the Environmental Department faculty has provided DOD
environmental professionals the education needed to meet the critical
demands of ensuring environmentally compliant installations.
AFIT's Graduate School of Engineering and Management serves the Air
Force as its graduate institution of choice for engineering, applied
sciences, and selected areas of management. The Graduate School offers
a variety of programs leading to the award of master's and doctoral
degrees, as well as graduate certificate programs. Graduates from AFIT
enable the Air Force to maintain our technological warfighting
advantage by developing, acquiring, sustaining, and operating
sophisticated capabilities.
AFIT also maintains a strong applied research component through its
research centers. The Center for Cyberspace Research, established in
March 2002, conducts defense-focused research at the masters and
doctoral levels. On June 19, 2008, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of
the Air Force designated the Air Force Institute of Technology and the
Center for Cyberspace Research as the Air Force's Cyberspace Technical
Center of Excellence. AFIT is also home to several other research
centers including those focused on Systems Engineering, Advanced
Navigation Technology, Directed Energy, Operational Analysis, and
Technical Intelligence Studies and Research.

11. Senator Portman. Dr. Walker, what do you assess to be the
impact of proposed cuts at AFIT on current and future partnered
research between AFIT and AFRL and what impact do you assess on the
future Air Force S&T workforce and management?
Dr. Walker. The AFIT-AFRL partnered research program is a valuable
part of Air Force S&T research and our workforce pipeline. AFIT
recently completed a top-down prioritization of all of its academic and
research programs which resulted in many efficiencies. In light of this
reprioritization and resulting efficiencies, we believe reductions will
have little impact on meeting the current and future partnered research
between AFIT and AFRL and the future Air Force S&T workforce and
management.

12. Senator Portman. Dr. Walker, are you involved in Air Force
decisions regarding the budgeting for graduate school programs?
Dr. Walker. Indirectly, yes. We work closely with the Air Force
Education Requirements Board (AFERB) within the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, Manpower and Services (AF/A1) to justify
and prioritize our graduate school programs. This process ensures Air
Force S&T equities are considered as AF/A1 defines and articulates
their budget requirements.

13. Senator Portman. Dr. Walker, how do you coordinate with Air
Education and Training Command (AETC) to communicate S&T priorities
that impact AFIT?
Dr. Walker. We communicate our priorities for advanced degrees
through the AFERB process within the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel, Manpower and Services (AF/A1). This process works
hand-in-hand with both AETC and AFIT. The AFERB process allows us to
prioritize from requirements across the Air Force those degrees for
education through AFIT. We continue to work to find the best ways to
capitalize on the S&T advanced degrees we need the most in this budget
and personnel-constrained environment.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

14. Senator Portman. Mr. Lemnios, Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, and Dr.
Walker, for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, DOD is requesting congressional authority to begin a new round of
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). A new round of BRAC would no doubt
affect the laboratory enterprise to some degree. Have the laboratories
been planning for possible base closures and/or laboratory
consolidation?
Mr. Lemnios. BRAC enables the Department to reconfigure its
infrastructure to match the demands of leaner, more flexible forces and
to accommodate our changing strategic emphasis. It is an important tool
for the Department to use to make the tough fiscal choices necessitated
by current budget challenges. If Congress does authorize the requested
BRAC rounds, the Department will undertake the BRAC rounds in
accordance with the statutory directive to consider all installations
equally and make decisions based on a 20-year force structure plan and
statutory selection criteria which give primary consideration to
military value. In this context, the Department will examine all its
missions and functions, including the laboratory enterprise.
Dr. Freeman. The Army laboratories and research, development, and
engineering centers have just concluded consolidation of a large number
of facilities at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, associated with the
last round of BRAC. At this time, the Army is not planning for any
additional consolidation.
Ms. Lacey. The Navy has not begun planning for a BRAC.
Dr. Walker. The Air Force has found efficiency by successfully
consolidating AFRL into a single, unified laboratory structure over the
last 2 decades. We currently do not have any more plans for laboratory
consolidation. If another round of BRAC occurs, rest assured, every
laboratory facility will receive fair and equal consideration using
each of the criteria established by the Secretary of Defense.

15. Senator Portman. Mr. Lemnios, Dr. Freeman, Ms. Lacey, Dr.
Walker, what impact, if any, did previous consolidation efforts have on
laboratory performance?
Mr. Lemnios. My impressions gained from visiting the labs impacted
by the consolidations of BRAC 2005 are favorable. For example, the
Army's consolidation of labs at Aberdeen, MD, and the Air Force
consolidation of labs at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base have resulted
in significant facility and equipment modernization. At these sites I
have seen true state-of-the-art laboratories constructed and equipped,
which has resulted in these Services' ability to attract high quality
graduates in a variety of science and engineering disciplines.
Dr. Freeman. Previous consolidation efforts have had a short-term
negative impact on laboratory performance. Much of the negative impact
stems from the loss of personnel and concomitant loss of experience,
the decrease in morale, and the loss of productivity and time
associated with shuttering existing facilities and building new
facilities. The construction of new facilities associated with recent
BRAC moves may increase laboratory performance over the longer-term,
although it is too early to make that determination.
Ms. Lacey. The overall impact of previous consolidation efforts has
been positive to neutral for Navy laboratories. While the impact to
individuals where activities lost mission responsibilities can be
traumatic, over time, these consolidations have enabled the Department
to improve the effective use of intellectual capital and resources.
Dr. Walker. AFRL is unique among the Services as this one
laboratory houses all Air Force efforts to discover, develop, and
integrate affordable aerospace warfighting technologies. Two decades
ago, the Air Force laboratory system spread research across 14
different individual laboratory organizations nationwide. In 1990,
these locations were merged into four superlabs. Finally, in 1997, the
current single, unified AFRL structure was completed, bringing Air
Force S&T to a new level of efficiency, collaboration, and innovation.
The 2005 BRAC provided further efficiency by consolidating human
performance research and sensor technology research at Wright-Patterson
AFB, OH, space vehicle technology research at Kirtland AFB, NM, and
information technology research at Rome Research Site, NY. The
Laboratory's BRAC realignments successfully realized the Secretary of
the Air Force's priorities for BRAC 2005, including the goals of
realigning Air Force infrastructure with the future defense strategy,
maximizing operational capability by eliminating excess physical
capacity, and capitalizing on opportunities for joint activity.

LABORATORY REVIEW

16. Senator Portman. Secretary Lemnios, in 2009, former Chief
Scientist of Army Materiel Command, Dr. Richard Chait, published a
report on DOD laboratories. In it, he said that since 1962 there have
been at least 100 studies and related reviews of government
laboratories, and that each had emphasized consolidation and increased
efficiency. How will the current assessment of the laboratory
enterprise that you have launched be different from the other studies
that have been reported?
Mr. Lemnios. I expect that some of the results from the current
study may echo findings and recommendations from previous studies.
However, I have directed that the current study focus on DOD labs as an
integrated enterprise oriented towards the Department's strategic
directions articulated in January of this year. As a result, I
anticipate that some findings and recommendations will differ from
previous studies as we align this enterprise with the Department
strategy.

17. Senator Portman. Secretary Lemnios, what goal would you like to
achieve with this new assessment?
Mr. Lemnios. This assessment will provide recommendations for how
DOD should operate its Laboratory Enterprise to support the needs of
the Department. In particular, the assessment is focused on approaches
for the Department's Laboratory Enterprise to deliver prototype
concepts to the warfighter and products to the Department's acquisition
programs, either directly or through the industrial base. This
assessment seeks to answer the question: ``How should the Department
operate a DOD Laboratory Enterprise to support the current and evolving
needs of the Department?''

18. Senator Portman. Secretary Lemnios, are you emphasizing
consolidation and increased efficiency like previous studies?
Mr. Lemnios. No. This assessment will provide recommendations for
how DOD should operate its Laboratory Enterprise to support the needs
of the Department. In particular, the assessment is focused on
approaches for the Department's Laboratory Enterprise to deliver
prototype concepts to the warfighter and products to the Department's
acquisition programs, either directly or through the industrial base.
This assessment seeks to answer the question ``How should the
Department operate a DOD Laboratory Enterprise to support the current
and evolving needs of the Department?''
The assessment will provide recommendations for laboratory
enterprise models that promote technology transition and provide
incentives to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of the Department's
Laboratory Enterprise for the next decade and beyond.

BASIC RESEARCH

19. Senator Portman. Dr. Freeman, a 2012 report on DOD's basic
research by the DSB stated that about 25 percent of DOD's basic
research budget goes to the laboratories. Do you believe this is an
appropriate investment in basic research within the Army's portfolio?
Dr. Freeman. The Army executes approximately 30 percent of our
basic research investment within our laboratories. At this time, this
is an appropriate level; however, we strongly believe in seeking the
strongest performers to conduct basic research in areas relevant to the
Army mission and the soldier--whether that is in our laboratories, or
our academic and industry partners. The Army needs a high-quality,
inquisitive, agile in-house and extramural basic research program with
a long-term time horizon, in part because geopolitical futures and the
needs of the future Army are uncertain. We also seek to leverage our
investment, where appropriate, to maximize the return on our basic
research investment portfolio.

20. Senator Portman. Dr. Freeman, does the basic research being
performed have direct application to the warfighter?
Dr. Freeman. While by the commonly accepted definition basic
research has no specific application, we focus our Army basic research
investments in areas that will provide superior technical capabilities
for our warfighters. For example, we focus our basic research
investment in materials science to provide fundamental knowledge that
will provide our soldier greater protection, at lighter weight--both
for personal protection as well as for vehicles and facilities. We rely
on our program managers within our research facilities to conduct an
aggressive basic science research program on behalf of the Army so that
cutting-edge scientific discoveries and the general store of scientific
knowledge will be optimally used to develop and improve the technical
capabilities for our warfighters.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2013 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

----------

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2012

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

PROLIFERATION PREVENTION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND AT
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R.
Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Hagan and Portman.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan S. Epstein,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker,
professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member; and Elizabeth C. Lopez, research assistant.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Kathleen
A. Kulenkampff.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Cannon,
assistant to Senator Hagan; and Brent Bombach, assistant to
Senator Portman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator Hagan. I would like to go ahead and call this
hearing to order. The purpose of today's hearing is to review
the President's fiscal year 2013 request for proliferation
prevention programs at the Department of Defense (DOD) and
Department of Energy (DOE). The hearing was originally planned
for April 24, but we had to postpone it because of a number of
the Senate votes that were taking place that afternoon.
Today we plan to have a hard stop at this hearing at 3:45
p.m. so that we can adjourn to the Office of Senate Security in
room SVC-217 of the Capitol Visitor Center for a closed session
with today's witnesses.
We're joined today by three expert witnesses to help us
understand these programs that are underway in both
departments. Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon is the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and she is responsible,
among many other subjects, for the policy aspects of these
programs at DOD. This is your third time this year before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and, as you can tell, we miss
you very much. So we're glad to have you back today.
Mr. Kenneth A. Myers III is the Director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) at DOD, which is focused on
reducing the threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The agency is responsible for the Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program. He's also the Director of the U.S. Strategic
Command Center for Combating WMD, located at the agency.
Ms. Anne Harrington is the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) of DOE.
We thank all of you for the service that you are giving to
our country and we thank you for being here today with us.
For fiscal year 2013, DOD and DOE propose to spend on the
order of $3 billion to help stem the flow of WMD. Most of the
programs, such as the CTR program, are well-established in
Russia and the former Soviet states and have made noteworthy
accomplishments in securing bomb-grade nuclear weapons
materials, as well as chemical weapons and biological
materials.
I understand we are now transitioning many of these
programs to countries in the Southeast Asia region and Africa.
As these programs transition geographically to address other
emerging proliferation concerns, we will be looking for a
threat assessment in each case to justify the transition and a
set of measurable goals or metrics to measure programmatic
success. The authorization bill that was just passed by this
committee would require a set of concise program metrics to be
included in the annual report for the program.
Within the DOE's NNSA, I have concerns about the mixed
oxide (MOX) fuel program. The purpose of the 13-year-old
program is to turn 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade
plutonium into reactor fuel for peaceful purposes, a laudable
nonproliferation goal. As originally envisioned, the program
was to be operational in 2014 at a total cost of $3.6 billion.
This cost included three facilities: a facility to prepare
plutonium feedstock for the reactor fuel, a fuel fabrication
building, and a waste handling facility.
In 2008, the total program cost rose to $4.7 billion and in
2010 the operational date shifted back 3 years to 2017. Since
1999, we have spent over $6 billion on this effort. I
understand that last year the plan to build the plutonium
feedstock facility was dropped due to cost growth. Instead,
there is a proposal to use existing facilities at Los Alamos
and the Savannah River Site.
So we now have a situation where we are building a $4
billion fuel fabrication building with no dedicated feedstock
facility to provide it plutonium, and apparently no commercial
reactor vendor has signed a contract to use the plutonium fuel
even at below market rates.
The bill passed by this committee would increase oversight
on this project by requiring an assessment on what facilities
will be used for supplying feedstock and the cost in doing so
over the entire lifespan of the program.
I also understand the program will have a new baseline
established this summer, so there is continuing uncertainty
about cost and schedule. Please make sure you inform Congress
of the results of this baseline adjustment, and I look forward
to hearing from NNSA today on actions that they are taking to
rein in the cost of this project.
I did want everyone to note that, due to some scheduling
conflicts, we need to depart from the closed portion of today's
hearing around 4:30 p.m., so what I'd like to do is wrap up
this open session at 3:45 p.m. if that's sufficient time for
our questions and then move to the Office of Senate Security
for the closed session, which will begin as planned right
around 4 p.m.
To save time, if this is concurrent with Senator Portman, I
would like to ask the witnesses if they could submit their
testimony and oral statements directly for the record so that
Senator Portman and I could go directly into questions.
I do thank you for your testimony, and before we begin
asking questions of our witnesses, I want to turn to my
colleague and ranking member, Senator Portman, for any comments
that he might wish to give.
Senator Portman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I'll be brief.
I want to join you in welcoming these witnesses and thank them
for their work and for the dedicated men and women in their
respective agencies who work every day to protect our Nation.
We find ourselves in a global security environment today
starkly different than ones we've faced in the past and so this
is a great hearing to talk about some of the challenges that we
face. During the Cold War, we knew who the enemy was and we
actually had a pretty good understanding what their
capabilities were. Today, that's not the case. We have rogue
nations, non-state actors who seek to acquire WMD that if
employed successfully would have catastrophic consequences for
our Nation and for those of our allies.
We have made some progress in mitigating such risks--we'll
hear about that today--through ongoing efforts to secure or
destroy some of the world's most dangerous weapons and
technologies, and yet extremist actors remain intent on
obtaining and potentially using these materials to conduct
attacks.
The witnesses today represent the primary entities within
DOD and DOE responsible for preventing the proliferation or use
of WMD. In addition to dealing with a challenging and
increasingly complex security environment the witnesses also
have to contend with the growing budgetary crisis that will
require difficult decisions in the months and years ahead. We
look forward to talking about the budget and about what's
happened over the last few years and what's likely to happen
going forward.
It's imperative we spend every dollar in our counter-WMD
efforts in the most cost-effective way possible and be sure
that we're not wasting any on duplication or underperforming
programs. We'll again have a chance to talk about a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) study and some other questions, I
think, with regard to making sure that we are being as cost-
effective as possible.
Coordination across the interagency and among our
international partners is increasingly essential in this regard
to avoid overlap and fragmentation of our efforts. We have to
be mindful of the potential impact of sequestration, which will
force an additional across-the-board reduction of nearly half a
trillion dollars to the defense budget if it's allowed to
stand. I want to hear more about that today and what is being
planned. As much as we'd like to avoid it, what would have to
happen should we go to sequestration?
So I look forward to an assessment from our witnesses on
sequestration with regard to the programs that specifically you
oversee and your ability to execute the missions you've been
assigned.
Again, Madam Chair, I thank the witnesses for joining us
today and look forward to their testimony and questions.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon

INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today about the recent progress
the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in carrying out the full range
of the Department of Defense's efforts to counter weapons of mass
destruction (CWMD).
The Department has a solid record of achievement in supporting
whole-of-government efforts to prevent the proliferation and use of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials,
protect the United States and its allies and partners from weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) threats, and respond to WMD threats should
prevention fail. DOD accomplishes these objectives by supporting the
global, multilateral WMD nonproliferation regime, robust partner
engagement and capacity-building efforts, as well as further developing
U.S. capabilities to counter WMD. I am pleased to be here, today, with
two colleagues whose efforts are vital to countering the threat of WMD:
Mr. Kenneth A. Myers III, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA); and Ms. Anne M. Harrington, the Deputy Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Together, we are
working to make the world safer from WMD threats.
In my role as the assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
Strategic Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, I oversee Defense efforts to counter WMD, as well as setting
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Space Policy and Cyber Policy. My
team develops strategies and policy guidance to counter WMD, sets
Departmental priorities, and participates in interagency groups and
international relationships, all on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.
DTRA, as ably led by Mr. Myers, implements our CWMD guidance by
managing and executing the CTR Program and other efforts to counter
WMD. Mr. Andrew C. Weber, the assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, provides acquisition
guidance and oversight for DTRA's work. Together, we work with the
Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Services to execute DOD's
CWMD responsibilities.
DOD's efforts are well coordinated with Ms. Harrington and her team
at NNSA, as well as with our colleagues at the Department of State and
other U.S. Government departments and agencies. It is through the close
collaboration, teamwork, and dedication of the men and women at each of
our agencies that we are effective and able to succeed in our mission
to ensure the security of the United States and its citizens.

THE GLOBAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT

There is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of
mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the proliferation of
nuclear weapons to additional states and their pursuit by violent
extremists. We know that both state and non-state actors continue to
seek WMD and related materials and expertise. This fact, combined with
advances in nuclear, chemical, and life sciences, as well as increases
in access to scientific information and expertise, pose new and growing
challenges to preventing potential adversaries from acquiring WMD.
The global security environment continues to change, and has become
more unpredictable as the global order has become more unstable since
the end of the Cold War. Instability anywhere in the world could
present us with new challenges, and underline the need to enhance U.S.
capabilities and international partnerships to counter the WMD threat.
The instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state, such as Syria, is
among the most troubling security concerns in the world today. Such an
occurrence could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons,
and technology, and could quickly become a global crisis posing a
direct physical threat to the United States and all other nations.
Threats like this are at top priorities for the Department of Defense,
Whether they emanate from Syria or elsewhere, I can assure you that DOD
is committed to efforts to prevent the proliferation or use of WMD,
protect the United States and our allies from WMD threats, and respond
to WMD threats should our prevention efforts fail.

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

DOD's efforts to counter WMD are guided by the national-level,
White House-issued strategy guidance, including the National Security
Strategy of the United States and the National Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats. The guidance contained therein informs the
Department's strategy documents, including the Quadrennial Defense
Review, the Nuclear Posture Review Report, Secretary Panetta's January
2012 strategic guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for the 21st Century,'' and the National Military Strategy
of the United States of America.
The National Security Strategy outlines a comprehensive
nonproliferation and security agenda, including reducing the size of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the role of nuclear weapons, promoting
regional stability, and ensuring the effectiveness of our deterrent and
defensive capabilities.
The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats guides our
efforts to prevent and respond to the proliferation and use of
biological weapons by states or non-state actors through increasing
worldwide capability to detect outbreaks of disease, whether
intentional or natural, through the application of targeted and proven
tools for biological risk management.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) establishes ``Preventing
Proliferation and Countering WMD'' and ``Defending the United States
and Supporting Civil Authorities at Home'' among the Department's six
key mission areas.
The Nuclear Posture Review better aligns our nuclear policies and
posture to our most urgent priorities--preventing nuclear terrorism and
proliferation while ensuring the maintenance of a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century
provides us with the latest strategic vision from the Secretary of
Defense on how to prioritize our efforts in a resource-constrained
environment, while still carrying out our essential mission to defend
the Nation. The guidance firmly ensconces countering WMD as one of the
ten primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Finally, the 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States
of America aligns the activities of the Armed Services and Combatant
Commands to the National Security Strategy, the QDR, and other top-
level guidance.
Together, these documents emphasize the need to have the
capabilities to both prevent WMD proliferation to state and non-state
actors, and respond to proliferation or use, should those efforts fail.
We also will continue to build the capacity and capabilities of our
partners to participate jointly in these efforts and reinforce the
effectiveness of the global, multilateral WMD nonproliferation regime.

THE DOD RESPONSE

As I stated previously, DOD works to prevent the proliferation of
WMD and build our and partner nations' capacity and capability to
prevent and respond to WMD threats. These efforts include the necessary
research, doctrine development, training and education to ensure that
these capabilities remain effective components of the response by DOD
and our partners. DOD protects the homeland and our allies and ensures
that our troops, along with those of our coalition partners, can fight
and win in an environment contaminated by WMD hazards.

1. Reinforcing the Global WMD Nonproliferation Regime

The United States has worked with our allies and partners to
support and enhance a global nonproliferation regime to share the costs
and increase the effectiveness of our collective efforts to reduce our
vulnerability to WMD. Each part of the global regime reinforces the
others. For instance, the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention
(BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) help set global norms against biological and
chemical weapons proliferation and nuclear proliferation. Agreements,
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol
(IAEA AP) and the as-yet unratified Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), and a potential Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), raise
and reinforce the barriers to WMD proliferation. Other international
bodies, such as the United Nations Security Council, seek to establish
norms for proliferation prevention and build roadblocks for potential
proliferators. Regional agreements, such as nuclear weapon free zones,
and regional security organizations, such as NATO, and other efforts,
such as the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits, and the
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction provide forums to focus efforts and attention on
reinforcing the norms and behaviors associated with the global WMD
nonproliferation regime.
We see real benefit in strengthening the global regime, both to set
the example of good global citizenship, and to build support for global
action when countries cheat. Unilateral approbation can be a powerful
tool in seeking compliance, but our efforts are stronger when the rest
of the world agrees and acts with us against cheaters and
proliferators. Of course, some countries, such as Syria, Iran, and
North Korea, refuse to play by the rules and continue to challenge
international norms of good behavior. The United States will continue
to uphold the highest standards of nonproliferation and hold cheaters
and proliferators to account.
The norms against biological weapons, stated in the BTWC, are among
the strongest. The parties at the December 2011 BTWC Review Conference
agreed to an ambitious Intersessional process to strengthen
implementation. The BTWC bans the development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, retention, or transfer of biological weapons. The number
of countries that have not signed or ratified the Convention, however,
is too long. In addition, some countries do not fully participate in
the BTWC confidence building measures. DOD's efforts include supporting
expert discussions and providing information on DOD facilities and
activities as part of the confidence building measures. DOD also has
taken steps to increase the transparency of our biological defense
activities. We hosted the Chairman of the BTWC at the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick,
MD, in 2011, and we have invited select BTWC Ambassadors to visit
USAMRIID later this year. The United States encourages other BTWC
parties to do the same and provide transparency to their bio-defense
efforts.
The parties at the NPT Review Conference in 2010 achieved consensus
on an Action Plan that reinforces the Treaty's role as the cornerstone
of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and commits to specific
action to improve its effectiveness during the intersessional process.
The Action Plan calls for strengthening the three pillars of the
Treaty--improving safeguards to ensure nuclear nonproliferation,
working towards nuclear disarmament, and sharing the benefits of the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States has demonstrated
leadership in pursuing nuclear reductions--most notably by bringing
into force the New START treaty with Russia--and DOD actively
participates with our colleagues at State and the NNSA in supporting
proposals and activities to fulfill the commitments contained in the
action Plan. In addition, DOD implements certain U.S. Government
commitments under the IAEA Additional Protocol--an important facet of
U.S. compliance with its nonproliferation obligations--including
providing information on non-sensitive DOD facilities and activities,
and supporting managed access visits.
The administration is committed to seeking ratification of the CTBT
and its entry-into-force. The CTBT bans the testing of nuclear weapons,
thus creating another barrier to non-weapon states that may seek to
acquire nuclear weapons. The CTBT also hinders existing nuclear powers
from developing new, potentially destabilizing types of warheads. The
United States demonstrates our commitment to entry-into-force by
maintaining a nuclear weapons testing moratorium and supporting the
development of onsite inspection procedures and the International
Monitoring System. The ability of both the international community and
the United States to detect nuclear tests has improved greatly since
1999 when the Senate first considered the Treaty. The Department of
Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety,
security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent without nuclear
tests. CTBT remains fully in America's national security interest. The
United States continues to seek a FMCT, and is working in Geneva at the
U.N. Conference on Disarmament towards a negotiation to ban production
of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. DOD provides experts to
form interagency positions on the FMCT, supports discussions, and
participates in discussions among technical experts.
President Obama in 2009 announced a goal of securing all vulnerable
nuclear materials worldwide. The President hosted the first Nuclear
Security Summit in Washington in April 2010 to focus world leaders on
nuclear security and to secure concrete commitments for action. At the
second Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul in March 2012,
participants reported the progress they have made in meeting their 2010
commitments--an analysis by the independent Arms Control Association
indicates that 90 percent of these commitments were completed. In one
such success, President Obama stood with President Medvedev of Russia
and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to announce the imminent
completion of a trilateral project, managed for the United States by
DOD's Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), to secure
hundreds of kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material at the former
Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan. The project represents the most
visible, but far from the only, DOD contribution to the President's 4-
year effort to lock down vulnerable nuclear material globally.
The Department supports various nuclear security conventions aimed
at preventing global nuclear terrorism and proliferation, such as the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (ICSANT), which addresses terrorism involving nuclear weapons
and other radioactive materials; the Amendment to the Convention on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which addresses the
physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes; and
the Two Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, which address the potential use of
maritime vessels or platforms for terrorism or WMD transport. In 2008,
the Senate unanimously provided its advice and consent to ratification
of all four treaties. The Department of Defense encourages the passage
of implementing legislation currently before Congress that will allow
the United States to ratify these agreements to bolster our efforts to
protect the American people against proliferation threats.
In May 2011, the President submitted the protocols to the Treaties
of Pelindaba and Rarotonga to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. DOD supports U.S. accession to the Protocols to both of
these Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs)--in Africa and the South
Pacific, respectively--because both are consistent with the U.S.
Nuclear Posture Review and enhance U.S. security by furthering our
global nonproliferation and arms control objectives. Neither Protocol
requires any changes to U.S. law, policy, or practice, nor would they
require any changes to our defense plans or posture. We hope the Senate
will take up the Protocols for both Treaties for consideration and
provide its advice and consent for ratification. Looking further
forward, we have reached an agreement in principle that resolves our
concerns regarding the Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ Treaty by
completing a revised Protocol. We will continue our efforts to clarify
remaining questions over the Protocol to the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty.
Finally, we engage with regional partners to leverage further our
countering WMD capabilities. One such partner is NATO. The NATO
Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, provides the roadmap for
further developing NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The United
States ensured that the Concept included direction to improve the
capacity of allies to counter proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery.

2. Working with Partners

DOD also responds to global WMD threats by working with allied and
partner nations. This includes robust partner engagement efforts to
leverage existing capabilities and build partner capacity through the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the
International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), and the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI).
In terms of our threat reduction and capacity-building efforts, I
would like to refer specifically to the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program--a
highly-effective effort to work bilaterally with partner governments
around the world to reduce and eliminate existing or past WMD programs
on their territory. The Nunn-Lugar CTR Program is the primary DOD
mechanism that supports the President's goal of improving the security
of all nuclear material world-wide. For 2 decades, the Nunn-Lugar CTR
Program has reduced the threat emanating from the legacy WMD programs
of the Soviet Union. In recent years, the program has adapted to go
beyond the former Soviet states and take on new and emerging WMD
threats in other regions. CTR's many achievements are extraordinary;
however, I will focus my remarks on our most recent achievements and
our future goals and plans.
For fiscal year 2013, the Department of Defense has requested
$519.1 million for the CTR Program; this includes $99.8 million for the
Global Nuclear Security (GNS) Program; $32.4 million for the
Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP), and $276.4 million for the
Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP). Congressional support
for this request will enable the Department to continue its important
contributions to reducing nuclear and biological threats.
During 2011, the CTR program continued to expand globally to build
new partnerships to support our nonproliferation efforts, managing its
largest 1-year budget in its history, and making more new political
commitments than ever. We increased CTR's reach with new partnerships
in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, focused on improving
responsiveness and stewardship of the program. We have adapted CTR to
meet emerging threats with agility--identifying enduring partnerships
with countries focused on providing sustained effort, adjusting our
efforts where attention is not as focused, and enhancing our engagement
across DOD and the interagency.
In Russia, CTR's Global Nuclear Security (GNS) program remains
focused on improving the site and transportation security of nuclear
weapons and related materials. Naturally, this includes close
cooperation with the Department of Energy, building on our joint
experience improving local capacities to sustain and improve security
systems. Since 2010, the GNS program has helped Russia consolidate its
nuclear warhead storage, maintain and improve nuclear weapon storage
security and accountability, transport highly-enriched spent nuclear
fuel from decommissioned submarines for disposal, increase nuclear
security training capacity, and assess new security technologies and
methods.
The Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence is another important
effort that builds a sustainable partnership to support nuclear
nonproliferation. DOD, through the CTR program and in partnership with
DOE, is providing technical expertise and a modest level of resources
to support the Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security in China. We
also are discussing a partnership with India in the nuclear security
component of its Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership and
providing some initial facilitation support to Kazakhstan's nuclear
security center of excellence. These Centers will allow us to exchange
nuclear security best practices, demonstrate security equipment,
contribute to national and regional training programs, and collaborate
on the research and development of nuclear security technologies.
Our strategy requires a layered defense against proliferation
threats. The WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) is CTR's means
to enhance our partners' ability to detect and interdict WMD on-the-
move through the provision of detection, surveillance, and interdiction
capabilities. CTR's increased engagements in Southeast Asia, the
Caucasus, Ukraine, and Moldova are critical to assist in developing the
capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials in
transit.
Although not an element of CTR, the ICP is a DOD activity that
complements the capital-intensive investments of the CTR/PPP program
through its modest, yet effective ``train-and-equip'' efforts. ICP is
unique in that its legislative authority explicitly directs a
partnership with the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
deter WMD proliferation in priority countries and regions. ICP and PPP
are coordinated closely with complementary programs managed by our
interagency partners, to include the State Department's Export Control
and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program.
DOD also participates in the G8 Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as an important
mechanism to coordinate and deconflict international threat reduction
and nonproliferation assistance. This year the United States is serving
as chair and seeking to strengthen Partnership efforts and focus on
creating tangible deliverables to increase global bio-security. The
United States is working to strengthen global efforts to counter
biological threats by working with vitally-important international
organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the
Organization of Animal Health, and the Food and Agriculture
Organization, each of which are dedicated to reducing risks and
detecting outbreaks early. As an example of our cooperation, the United
States has entered into a memorandum of understanding with WHO to
improve global health security.
While the Global Partnership has made it easier to share work on
threat reduction projects with like-minded international partners,
thanks to CTR's legislative authority to receive funds from outside
contributors, we now have greater flexibility also to share costs. Let
me give you one example. Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010, I am currently seeking the determination of
the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State, to enter into memorandums of understanding (MOU) with the United
Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands in pursuit of cooperative threat
reduction goals of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction. The specific CTR projects and scope
of work to be funded will be mutually decided by DOD and outside
contributors on a case-by-case basis once the MOUs are in place. We
anticipate that the priorities for such contributions will include
cooperative biological engagement work in the former Soviet Union,
Iraq, Africa, and Southeast Asia.
The most dynamic area of CTR activity continues to be biodefense
engagement through the CBEP. The CBEP counters the threat posed by
especially dangerous pathogens, related materials and expertise, and
other emerging infectious disease risks in accordance with the National
Security Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. This includes
strengthening global health security, obtaining timely insight on
emerging outbreaks, reducing the potential for exploitation of life
sciences material and technology, and reinforcing norms of safe and
responsible conduct. CBEP focuses its work in four program areas: (1)
Secure and consolidate collections of especially dangerous pathogens;
(2) Enhance partner country's capability to prevent the sale, theft,
diversion, or accidental release of biological weapons-related
materials; (3) Enhance partner country's capability to detect,
diagnose, and report epidemics, bio-terror attacks, and potential
pandemics; and (4) Ensure that the capabilities are sustainable within
each partner country.
Defending against infectious disease outbreaks, whether an attack
or natural, is a global concern that requires a multinational effort
and response. All governments share mutual goals of protecting their
populations from infectious disease and, in doing so, they protect the
global community in the process. This is why DOD, through the Nunn-
Lugar CTR Program, is building partner capacity in critical regions
around the world that elevates the concern over bio-security risks and
bio-surveillance for potential weaponized outbreaks alongside the
broader global commitments to public health. In addition, CTR's legacy
work eliminating the threat posed by the former Soviet bio-weapons
enterprise, and DOD's own work developing the means for our soldiers to
conduct operations in bio-contaminated environments, provides the DOD
enterprise with unique skills and interests in reducing bio threats.
Recently, the CBEP program has shifted from an FSU focus to areas
of emerging bio-threats, such Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and
Africa. With global connectivity bringing people from all parts of the
world to U.S. shores every day, we cannot afford to ignore the threat
that the combination of endemic or unsecure pathogens and terrorists
seeking bio-weapons material or expertise poses. As CBEP has expanded
beyond the former Soviet Union, it has adapted its approach to meet the
unique regional needs and concerns to reduce overall footprint
requirements and find lower-cost, more sustainable solutions for
storage and research on these pathogens. As an example of CBEP's
emphasis on emerging threats, a number of high-impact projects are
underway in Kenya, including improvement of perimeter fences and
security procedures, analysis of pathogen repository needs for over 100
unsecured freezers at one facility, and cooperative biological research
on some of the most challenging endemic diseases in the country. We
will continue to assess the program's approaches and adapt to partner
capacity and collaborative opportunities with other Global Partnership
countries.
DOD has led efforts with our interagency colleagues to make the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) a durable and effective effort
to prevent the proliferation of WMD. Since its founding in 2003, 98
countries have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles,
and many of these partners work with the United States through military
exercises, workshops, and training to improve interdiction and
coordination capabilities. Building on these activities, the United
States has proposed the Critical Capabilities and Practices effort for
PSI. This effort seeks to take advantage of the significant work PSI
partners have done to identify interdiction-related tools and ensure
all PSI-endorsing nations have access to those tools. Examples of these
tools include WMD and ballistic missile-related identification manuals,
legal analyses and model legislation for seizing illicit goods,
interdiction related training, and guidelines for sharing information
related to cargoes. Related efforts over the next year include major
multilateral PSI exercises such as Leading Edge co-hosted by the United
Arab Emirates, which will send a significant deterrent message to
proliferators.
The benefit of these efforts to work collaboratively with partner
and allied nations was demonstrated in the overwhelming U.S. response
to the March 2011 Japanese tsunami and its aftermath through Operation
Tomodachi. While this was not a response to a WMD attack, Operation
Tomodachi highlighted DOD's unique ability to bring vast expertise and
resources to aid allies in the event of a radiological accident or
incident. DOD's extensive military infrastructure in the Pacific, our
close working relationship with Japanese military and civilian
partners, and vast experience in nuclear and radiological consequence
management allowed us to quickly and effectively provide assistance
where it was most needed, including radiation monitoring of the
Fukushima Power Plant, support for humanitarian relief efforts, assist
in search and rescue, and help in containment and decontamination. We
were able to augment domestic Japanese response capabilities in key
areas where we have greater capacity and expertise and assist a close
ally in their critical time of need. This response also served as a
good opportunity to work with our interagency partners and identify
where there was a need for improved coordination.

3. Building U.S. Capabilities

Finally, DOD responds to global WMD threats by looking internally
to improve DOD capabilities and capacities to counter WMD. Over the
last several years, DOD has invested significant time and resources to
develop and enhance capabilities for detection, interdiction,
elimination, and consequence management operations.
We have gained important experience and learned valuable lessons
from our efforts to field specialized consequence management response
forces for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
events. Complementing the evolution of earlier force structures, DOD
and the National Guard are building the CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE),
which will achieve full operational capability by October 2012. The CRE
is a Federal and state military construct designed to decrease response
times, save more lives, and standardize training, evaluations and
exercises. The Homeland Response Force (HRF) is the centerpiece of
National Guard portion of the CRE and provides a regional response
capability to each of the 10 FEMA regions. The 556-person HRFs are
prepared to deploy 12 hours or sooner after notification to support
civil authorities with emergency medical, decontamination, and search
and rescue assets.
As a Department, we take very seriously our responsibility to
protect the force and ensure it is able to operate fully within WMD
environments, as well as defend the homeland from WMD attacks. To
accomplish these objectives, we are building an integrated, layered
defense, which includes working with the Department of Homeland
Security to enhance the protective posture of the homeland;
coordinating with the Intelligence Community to better identify likely
proliferation pathways and illicit procurement networks; and, looking
across the U.S. Government to invest in new capabilities to detect and
characterize chemical, biological, or nuclear WMD threats.
For instance, to counter the nuclear threat, DOD is looking both
internally at how we should organize and invest to ensure an effective
response as well as supporting NSS-led efforts to develop a whole-of-
government response plan. Faced with an unpredictable security
environment, we are working towards a whole-of-government, synchronized
response to detect, interdict, and contain loose nuclear weapons and
related materials. This would include activities such as securing
material at the source, intercepting material on the move, and
increasing defenses to protect against an attack on the homeland. Our
work at DOD has focused on how U.S. military units would coordinate
with other U.S. agencies and with allies and partners in the face of
such a ``loose nuke'' threat scenario. These efforts are critical to
both preventing terrorists from obtaining or acquiring nuclear weapons
or significant nuclear material, and ensuring we are prepared and
postured to effectively respond should the worst case materialize.
We also must enhance our ability to respond quickly to an attack
should these efforts fail. In this regard, the President's budget
request includes new resources to improve capabilities for technical
nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities,
including funding for air sample collection, in order to support the
rapid source attribution of a terrorist attack. For fiscal year 2013,
we have requested $6.5 million to accelerate integration, testing,
evaluation, and certification of new particulate air sample collection
systems, and we are conducting a comprehensive review of the overall
nuclear sample collection requirements to inform future-year efforts.
This study is due to be completed later this month.
DOD plans and operations must reflect the dizzying pace of change,
the limits on U.S. action, the challenges to intelligence in rapidly-
changing situations, and enduring technical hurdles related to WMD
detection. These challenges, among others, have led DOD to establish a
Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) to serve as
a permanent, joint advocate for refining tactics, techniques, and
procedures to enhance our ability to locate, characterize, and secure
WMD threats, to dissuade their use, and to remove or neutralize them if
necessary, especially in non-permissive environments. SJFHQ-E also
ensures that these capabilities are integrated into doctrine, training,
and exercises across DOD. On February 3, 2012, the Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command activated the SJFHQ-E. The headquarters, which will
reach full operational capabilities in fiscal year 2013, will integrate
DOD counter WMD assets, including nuclear disablement teams, CBRN
Response Teams, radiation assessment teams, deployable laboratories,
and tactical intelligence. It will greatly increase DOD's capability to
locate, characterize, secure, and disable or destroy hostile WMD
programs in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. It also
will provide a focal point for working with allies and partners to
build their awareness and capacity for WMD elimination operations
worldwide.
Emerging biological threats are no less dangerous than chemical or
nuclear threats. An important priority of the National Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats is increasing capability to conduct
effective and timely disease surveillance worldwide. CTR, as I
described earlier, is addressing this threat through CBEP, which
collaborates with DOD's overseas medical research laboratories to
leverage their technical expertise and regional relationships. CBEP
provides expert technical training to CTR partners and conducts
cooperative biological research to discover novel pathogens or
characterize pathogens that are not generally found in the United
States. Within the military medical community, these DOD overseas
medical research labs are well-known for their intrepid work protecting
U.S. military members from disease.
DOD also is seeking to address new and novel threats resulting from
the revolution in biotechnology and the chemical industry. While this
revolution can provide tremendous benefits in medical science and
economic growth, it also can undermine our confidence in existing chem-
bio defenses. With growing access to expertise, equipment, advanced
technology, and the precursors needed to produce new chemical or
biological compounds, we continue to devote more resources to research,
doctrine development, training and education to develop improved
countermeasures, personal protection gear, and new decontamination
techniques to mitigate the effects of novel chemical and biological
agents.

CONCLUSION

The threat posed by WMD continues to evolve, and so do our efforts
to combat it. These efforts span a range of unilateral and multilateral
counter-proliferation and non-proliferation responses. The efforts I
have outlined today keep DOD ahead of WMD threats. We continue to
coordinate our efforts within the interagency and with our
international partners to prevent and protect against these most
dangerous threats. But none of the efforts I have described to you
today would be possible without the continuing support of Congress. The
authorities, budget, and personnel that you provide allows DOD to
participate in the most important mission I can imagine--to protect the
American people from a WMD attack. I thank you for your support for our
fiscal year 2013 budget and look forward to continuing to partner
closely with Congress to counter these threats.

STATEMENT OF ANNE HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington follows:]

Prepared Statement by Anne Harrington

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for opportunity to testify before you today on
the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request for the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation Programs. I will also share with you a brief summary
of the successful achievements from the Nuclear Security Summit which
concluded in Seoul, South Korea in March 2012.
One of our most important missions at NNSA has been to support the
administration's commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear
material across the globe in 4 years. Our accomplishments in securing
plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) around the world have made
it significantly more difficult to acquire and traffic the materials
required to make an improvised nuclear device, and I am proud to say
that we are on track to meet our goals to remove or dispose of 4,353
kilograms of HEU and plutonium in foreign countries, and equip
approximately 229 buildings containing weapons-usable material with
state-of-the-art security upgrades.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request, and the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as passed by
the full Senate Armed Services Committee, provides the $2.46 billion
needed to continue these and other critical nonproliferation and
nuclear security efforts. Our continued focus on innovative and
ambitious nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts is vital. The
threat is not gone, and the consequences of nuclear terrorism and state
proliferation would be devastating. Detonation of a nuclear device
anywhere in the world would lead to significant loss of life, and
overwhelming economic, political, and psychological consequences. We
must remain committed to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and
state-based proliferation.
But there is no silver bullet solution, which is why we will
continue to implement a multi-layered strategy to strengthen the
security of nuclear material around the world by removing or
eliminating it when we can; consolidating and securing it, if
elimination is not an option; reducing the civilian use of HEU--
particularly for research and medical isotope production--where low-
enriched uranium options exist or can be developed; and maintaining our
commitment to detecting and deterring nuclear smuggling. Many of you
are familiar with the significant contributions that NNSA's Second Line
of Defense program has made to the worldwide effort to combat nuclear
trafficking. In light of the constrained budget environment that we
find ourselves in, NNSA has initiated a strategic review of the program
to evaluate what combinations of capabilities and programs make the
most effective contribution to national security.
We will continue to research and develop tools and technologies to
detect the proliferation of nuclear materials as well as nuclear
detonations. We will provide technical support and leadership to our
interagency colleagues during the negotiation and implementation of
arms control treaties, as we did with New START. We will expand on our
ongoing efforts to strengthen the capabilities of our foreign partners
to implement international nonproliferation and nuclear security norms,
and support the critically important work of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. We will continue to play a supporting role in the
negotiation of Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (so-called 123
Agreements), which are so crucial for achieving our nuclear
nonproliferation and trade objectives.
The President's fiscal year 2013 budget request also keeps focus on
our commitment to eliminate U.S. excess weapons materials and supports
the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and Waste Solidification
Building at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The $569.5
million committed to the MOX program and related activities this year
will lead to the permanent elimination of enough plutonium for at least
8,500 nuclear weapons, which will be matched by similar commitments by
the Russian Federation. We have eliminated the line item for a Pit
Disassembly and Conversion Facility from the MOX program, opting
instead for a preferred alternative approach to producing feedstock
that is much less costly by utilizing existing facilities at the
Savannah River Site and Los Alamos National Laboratory.
The President's proposed budget for fiscal year 2013 provides the
funding necessary to carry out all of these activities; however, given
the current fiscal constraints on all government agencies, we have
stepped up our efforts to identify areas where our interagency partners
and other nations can help share the costs associated with this
important work. I am pleased to report that since Congress granted NNSA
programs the ability to accept international contributions in fiscal
year 2005, we have received nearly $80 million from Canada, the United
Kingdom, Finland, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, the Czech Republic,
and the Netherlands. In addition, our nuclear and radiological security
and Second Line of Defense activities with Russia have moved to a cost
sharing basis with Russia assuming a growing share of the installation
and sustainability costs of these projects. The full value of cost
sharing with our international partners can be difficult to estimate
precisely, but the financial, technical, and diplomatic resources that
they bring to these efforts have enabled and accelerated important
nuclear security efforts and saved the U.S. Government millions of
dollars over the last several years.
Nowhere is the positive impact of the international collaboration
more demonstrated than in the Nuclear Security Summit process. The
Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul issued a Communique, supported by 53
Heads of State and Government, as well as representatives of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Interpol, all of which
unanimously agreed that nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the
most challenging threats to international security. Countries not only
reported on their very substantial accomplishments since the Washington
Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, they pledged additional actions to
strengthen the IAEA; securing, accounting for, and consolidating
nuclear materials; securing radioactive sources; enhancing the security
of materials in transport; combating illicit trafficking; improving
nuclear forensics capabilities; fostering a nuclear security culture
through education and training; protecting sensitive information and
enhancing cyber security measures; and engaging in international
cooperation to achieve all of these goals. NNSA has been and will
continue to be at the forefront of supporting efforts in all of these
areas.
Every country attending the Summit announced its accomplishments in
a number of critical areas. Each statement in its own right was
significant, but taken together they constitute a tremendous leap
forward in the global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. These
achievements would not have been accomplished in such a short amount of
time without the high-level attention that President Obama and his
counterparts have focused on this issue. Some of the most impressive
accomplishments announced at the Summit included: the United States,
Mexico, and Canada working together to remove all HEU from Mexico; the
United States, Russia, and Ukraine announcing the removal of the final
HEU from Ukraine; and the removal of all plutonium from Sweden to the
United States. As a result of these shipments, 22 countries have now
been cleaned out of all HEU and Plutonium. It took 13 years to remove
all special nuclear material from 13 countries prior to the President's
April 2009 Prague speech announcing the 4-Year Effort. With the
momentum of the Nuclear Security Summit process, 9 additional countries
have been cleaned out of HEU and Plutonium, bringing the total to 22
countries.
A key to our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is
minimizing the civilian use of HEU. Our agreement with Belgium, France,
and the Netherlands to eliminate the use of HEU in medical isotopes
production while concurrently assuring the reliable supply of these
isotopes to patients in need, makes a meaningful contribution to this
effort. The President also announced a previously secret program with
Russia and Kazakhstan to remediate vulnerable nuclear material from the
former Semipalatinsk Test Site. In addition, there were several key
illicit trafficking deliverables, including the creation of counter
nuclear smuggling teams in countries such as Jordan and a counter
nuclear smuggling center of excellence in Lithuania. Finally, nearly 20
countries also ratified key nuclear security and nuclear terrorism
treaties: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism. There is much more to add, but this hopefully
gives you a flavor of the positive and constructive framework that the
Nuclear Security Summit process provides.
In conclusion, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on the NNSA's contributions to nuclear security. Working in
concert with other U.S. Government programs and partners around the
world, we are making concrete contributions to reducing the risk of
nuclear terrorism and building a more secure future. Thank you for the
tremendous support that our programs have enjoyed over the years from
this committee and Congress. I welcome any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND DIRECTOR, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers follows:]

Prepared Statement by Kenneth A. Myers III

INTRODUCTION

Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Portman, and members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the programs
and activities performed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
and the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction (SCC-WMD). I serve as the Director of both DTRA and the
SCC-WMD.
The threat posed by Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) weapons is one of the greatest security challenges facing our
Nation and has the potential to undermine peace and stability around
the globe. The May 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States
of America cites reversing the spread of nuclear and biological weapons
and the securing of nuclear materials as one of the Nation's six
essential tasks to provide enduring security for the American people.
The December 2002 National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction (NSPD-17), and the 13 February 2006 National Military
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction further recognize the
importance of cooperation with allies and other partners to prevent,
deter, defend against, and respond to WMD threats. Most recently, the
January 2012 Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance, entitled
``Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century,''
included countering WMD (CWMD) as one of the ten primary missions of
the U.S. Armed Forces. Furthermore, the ``Defense Budget Priorities and
Choices'' document issued that same month stated that ``We [OSD]
protected investment in this area (CWMD) and expanded its scope in the
area of biological weapons.''
The mission of DTRA and the SCC-WMD is to safeguard the United
States and its allies from global WMD threats by integrating,
synchronizing and providing expertise, technologies, and capabilities
for reducing and eliminating WMD threats at their sources
(Nonproliferation); deterring, interdicting, or defeating them
(Counterproliferation); and and mitigating the consequences of their
use (Consequence Management). Together we provide synergy and momentum
for more effective and efficient implementation of national and
department CWMD strategy and policy. We provide Counter WMD (CWMD)
expertise and capabilities to a growing range of partners across DOD,
the U.S. Government, and the international community. DTRA also
combines science and technology with operational needs and
requirements, providing capabilities tailored to the DOD operating
environment. Additionally, DTRA provides support for the continued
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, the
importance of which was reaffirmed in the Defense Budget Priorities and
Choices document.
However, we could not do our job without the strong support of
Congress and I thank you and your colleagues for fully approving the
DTRA fiscal year 2012 budget request. I can assure you that we will be
responsible stewards of the resources you have provided and the trust
you have placed in us.

DOD AND THE NATION'S EXPERT ON WMD THREAT REDUCTION

DTRA and the SCC-WMD provide the core of the DOD and national
expertise on the full scope of the CWMD mission. While many DOD and
other U.S. Government organizations contribute to WMD threat reduction
against a background of a broader mission scope, we focus full time on
just CWMD. We are a policy and strategy implementation and execution
team. We do not perform all functions in the CWMD mission, nor do we
control all the resources or provide all of the capabilities.
However, DTRA is the primary repository for the Nation's knowledge
on the effects of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE), and in seamless partnership with the SCC-
WMD and in collaboration with others across the U.S. Government,
performs unique CWMD responsibilities.
Our activities and program span the full spectrum of the national
CWMD strategy--from Nonproliferation through Counterproliferation to
Consequence Management--and all eight of the military CWMD mission
areas: Security Cooperation and Partner Activities, Threat Reduction
Cooperation, Interdiction, Elimination, Offensive Operations, Active
Defense, Passive Defense, and Consequence Management.
Our responsibilities also require that we perform CWMD research and
development for, and provide CWMD operational support to, the combatant
commands (COCOMs). DTRA Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) programs combine Science and Technology (S&T) with operational,
needs, requirements, and operating concepts, delivering capabilities
that better enable the warfighters to counter WMD threats. In so doing,
we also help shape concepts of operation, and the tactics, techniques,
and procedures that forces in the field employ.
This requires us to have a firm understanding of the environments
in which DOD would perform its CWMD responsibilities. Many on our staff
have military backgrounds and we also depend heavily on the 37 percent
of our workforce provided by the Armed Forces. Our uniformed personnel
keep us current on operational needs and procedures, and their
assignments to DTRA and the SCC-WMD also provide a critical way for the
Services to maintain their own CWMD expertise.
Because our S&T and operational support responsibilities are
intertwined, DTRA has a unique workforce with a wide range of
professional disciplines that collaborate on CWMD challenges. DTRA
microbiologists, computer scientists, health physicists, structural
dynamics experts, and Special Operations Forces personnel work together
on a daily basis to solve WMD-related challenges. Our nuclear experts
are supporting efforts from global nuclear weapons lockdown, protection
of our nuclear deterrent, and the hardening of U.S. Nuclear Command,
Control, and Communications against nuclear weapons effects, to nuclear
weapons employment plans. Our biologists are consolidating and
improving the security of dangerous pathogen collections across the
planet, working cooperatively with international partners to counter
emerging infectious diseases, and developing new means for protecting
our military personnel against biological terrorism and naturally
occurring diseases. Our chemical weapons experts are assisting with the
elimination of chemical weapons in the United States and Russia;
developing means for improved force protection; and are working on
policies, actions, and procedures that will ensure decontaminated air
transport airframes are in fact safe for continued use. DTRA structural
dynamics experts are working on solutions to hold underground WMD
facilities at risk while also developing new means for mitigating blast
effects resulting from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.
Our workforce performs CWMD planning and exercise support, and
provides CWMD expertise to the combatant commands and other U.S.
Government customers. However, our CWMD S&T development is conducted
differently. We do not have our own laboratory. Instead, we select from
the full range of national expertise, wherever that may be. Our
performers include the DOD and Department of Energy/National Nuclear
Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) labs, contractors, federally Funded
Research and Development Centers, University-Associated Research
Centers, and academia. Our technical and operational experts provide
direction and oversight for these performers and we select S&T
performers on the basis of ``best of breed.''
The contributions of the DTRA/SCC team are made daily at national,
theater, and battlefield levels. For example, during the negotiations
on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), DTRA
interpreters and onsite verification experts comprised 15 of the 56-
members of the U.S. negotiating team in Geneva. In addition, DTRA has
conducted vulnerability assessments of the White House, the Capitol,
and national-level command and control infrastructure. The Combatant
Commanders rely upon us for CWMD planning and exercise support,
training, and augmentation of their internal subject matter expertise
to assist their CWMD efforts from theater security cooperation through
warfighting and WMD elimination. We provide ``boots on the ground'' in
hostile and uncertain environments to conduct vulnerability
assessments, assist current military operations, and provide CWMD
training. We are simultaneously and continuously addressing strategic,
operational, and tactical level CWMD challenges. Our customer base
continues to grow, as do the expectations of those we serve and
support.

RELATIONSHIPS

DTRA's roots reach to the early days of the Cold War when its
predecessor organizations provided planning, technical, and operational
nuclear weapons expertise to the Military Services, U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), and that command's predecessors. Over the decades,
our understanding of weapons effects has expanded from nuclear/
radiological to the full range of WMD effects, adding chemical,
biological, and high-yield explosives to our portfolio of WMD effects
expertise.
The agency performs its mission in response to direction provided
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As the Director of
DTRA, I report through Mr. Andrew Weber, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Because DTRA performs S&T, we also work in close partnership with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Since the
DTRA/SCC-WMD team implements DOD and national security policy, and
often with international partners, we are partnered with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Office of the
Under Secretary for Policy at OSD, and also work in collaboration with
the Department of State.
DTRA is also the DOD Combat Support Agency charged with providing
CWMD expertise and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military
Services, and the combatant commanders. While we serve all combatant
commanders, we work most closely with the six Geographic Combatant
Commanders (GCCs), STRATCOM, and the U.S. Special Operations Command.
Given the catastrophic nature of the WMD threat, timely and
accurate intelligence is fundamental to preventing and attributing WMD
attacks. A close relationship between WMD experts and the Intelligence
Community is essential.
Because the CWMD mission requires whole-of-government solutions,
DTRA works closely with NNSA, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in particular
leveraging our collective S&T investments and ensuring collaboration
between our programs and activities. While DTRA, NNSA, DHS, and HHS
share an interest in WMD-related science, the DOD application of that
science is quite different from that of DHS as DOD forces must deploy
and operate in unstable or hostile military environments at great
distances from supporting infrastructure and logistical support. The
military forces that we support face space, volume, and weight
limitations, and must be easily deployable, supportable, reliable,
rugged and survivable, yet simple to use.

DTRA AND STRATCOM PARTNERSHIP

Since the early days of the Cold War, DTRA's predecessor
organizations have had an extremely close and strong partnership with
STRATCOM's predecessors on the nuclear mission. Seven years ago, that
partnership was expanded to include the CWMD mission. In late 2005, the
Secretary of Defense assigned the Commander, STRATCOM (CDRSTRATCOM)
responsibility for integrating and synchronizing DOD CWMD efforts in
support of U.S. Government objectives. The CDRSTRATCOM, turned to DTRA
for its CWMD expertise and established the SCC-WMD alongside the agency
at Fort Belvoir, VA, to leverage the agency's expertise and provide a
seamless bond between the two organizations. On 31 January 2006, the
Secretary of Defense assigned the DTRA Director to serve in the
additional capacity as the Director, SCC-WMD, under the authority,
direction, and control of the CDRSTRATCOM.
The SCC-WMD supports STRATCOM's assigned CWMD Unified Command Plan
(UCP) responsibilities:

Synchronizing planning for DOD CWMD efforts;
Advocating for CWMD capabilities;
Providing military representation to U.S. national
agencies, U.S. commercial entities, and international agencies
related to CWMD, as directed;
Integrating Theater Security Cooperation activities,
deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns to combat
WMD, as directed by CDRSTRATCOM;
Developing and maintaining a global CWMD concept of
operations;
Coordinating global CWMD operations support;
Planning against designated CWMD threats; and
Executing CWMD operations, as directed.

The CDRSTRATCOM has delegated Coordinating Authority to the SCC-WMD
Director for synchronized planning of DOD-wide CWMD efforts in support
of STRATCOM UCP missions. The major functions performed by the SCC-WMD
are planning synchronization across geographic boundaries;
identification and assessment of CWMD capability requirements; and
promoting a unified approach across the U.S. Government.
On 3 February 2012, at the STRATCOM-sponsored biannual CWMD Global
Synchronization Conference, a new CWMD mission component, the Standing
Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) was activated to
provide a needed enabling capability to eliminate WMD in hostile and
uncertain environments. Appreciation for the need for such an
organization was an outgrowth of our experiences in Iraq beginning in
2003, and the requirement was established in the 2006 and 2010 DOD
Quadrennial Defense Reviews. This new headquarters will be a full-time,
fully trained, scalable, deployable, joint command and control element
able to quickly integrate into an operational headquarters such as a
GCC or Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. As the core of a JTF-E HQ,
the SJFHQ-E, appropriately augmented, will enable command and control
of the fielded WMD elimination forces attached to the JTF. Initial
operational capability is planned for January 2013 with full
operational capability to be achieved by the end of that year. The
SJFHQ-E will be co-located with DTRA and the SCC-WMD at Fort Belvoir,
VA. The SCC-WMD Deputy Director, Air Force Major General Eric Crabtree,
will be dual hatted as the Commander of the SJFHQ-E. Major General
Crabtree will report to General Kehler in his role as SFJHQ-E
Commander, and he will continue report to me in his role as the SCC-WMD
Deputy Director.
Together, DTRA, the SCC-WMD, and the SJFHQ-E will provide a more
capable DOD CWMD team that is better integrated within overall U.S.
Government CWMD community. They will leverage and maximize skills,
expertise, capabilities, and resources across all, and think and act as
an integrated CWMD team.

NONPROLIFERATION

DTRA and SCC-WMD perform several major nonproliferation programs
and activities.
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program's overarching
mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from
WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise. The program
focuses on eliminating, securing, or consolidating WMD, related
materials, and associated delivery systems and infrastructure, at their
source in partner countries. It also builds partnership capacity to
prevent the proliferation of WMD materials across borders.
Since its enactment into law in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1993, the Nunn-Lugar program has proven highly
effective. It enabled the elimination of nuclear weapons from Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, ensuring that Russia would be the only
nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union. As of 29 February
2012, the assistance provided through this program has deactivated
7,619 nuclear warheads; destroyed 793 Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBM), 191 ICBM mobile launchers, 906 air-launched cruise
missiles, and 33 nuclear-powered submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) submarines (SSBNs); eliminated 498 ICBM silos, 155 bombers, 492
SLBM launchers, and 680 SLBMs; sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels and
holes; destroyed 2,803.5 metric tons of declared Chemical Weapon
agents; safely and securely transported 562 nuclear weapons train
shipments; upgraded 24 nuclear weapons storage sites; and built and
equipped 38 Biological Threat Reduction Zonal Diagnostic Laboratories.
Although Nunn-Lugar activities in Russia continue, the program is
evolving in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 to address emerging security challenges and urgent
threats in regions of the world beyond the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
Today, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program supports a layered defense approach
to countering WMD threats, builds strategic relationships with key
international partners that enhance threat reduction on a global scale;
and support the resilience of the global nonproliferation framework by
building partnership capacities to enforce the tenants of that
framework. The program is expanding its activities beyond the FSU, and
promoting cooperative biological engagement, security, and early
warning in East Africa and South Asia, and is currently authorized to
operate in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan,
Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
Projects in Russia include ICBM (SS-25, SS-18, and SS-19) and SS-N-
18 SLBM elimination; SS-18 and SS-19 silo and launch control center
elimination; and dismantlement of nuclear reactor core and missile
launcher sections of Delta III-class and Typhoon-class SSBNs.
Additionally, this project assists Ukraine with the storage and
elimination of rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs.
Chemical Weapons Destruction
Russia, as a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
is obligated to eliminate its stockpile of over 40,000 metric tons of
chemical weapons (CW). The United States, Russia, and other
international partners funded construction of the Shchuch'ye Chemical
Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF). Russia began CW destruction
operations at this facility in March 2009. DOD continues to provide
technical support to this effort through the Nunn-Lugar Program. As of
31 December 2011, 2,601.8 metric tons of CW agents have been destroyed.
Russia also is constructing with its funds a similar CWDF at Kizner,
with a completion date in late 2012. The DOD has agreed to provide the
Kizner CWDF with technical support similar to that provided at
Shchuch'ye.
Global Nuclear Security
This project provides assistance for the improved security of
Russian nuclear weapons and at-risk material rail shipments and
storage. It also helps establish Centers of Excellence with partner
countries to enhance training capability, consistent with international
best practices, for nuclear security, material control, and inventory
management. This effort is closely coordinated with other related U.S.
Government activities and international governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Through an unprecedented partnership with
Russia and Kazakhstan hundreds of kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear
material was secured at the former Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site in
Kazakhstan.
Cooperative Biological Engagement
This project implements the National Security Staff directed policy
priorities for countering biological threats. Cooperative Biological
Engagement (CBE) is the largest effort within the Nunn-Lugar CTR
program and involves a growing number of international partner states
across Europe, Asia, and Africa. It responds to the threat of state and
non-state actors acquiring biological materials and expertise that
could be used to develop or deploy a biological weapon. The program
destroys or secures Especially Dangerous Pathogens (EDPs) at their
source, builds partner capacity to sustain a safe, secure, disease
surveillance system to detect, diagnose, and report EDP breakouts, and
to work collaboratively with partner country scientists in engagements
that support the ethical application of biotechnology to a better
understanding of endemic EDPs and their control and prevention. The CBE
leverages the expertise, capabilities, and international access of
other U.S. Government departments and agencies, international partners,
and the private sector, and provides tailored approaches that
recognize, build upon, and enhance regional and partner countries'
indigenous capacities. For relatively small investments, this program
delivers a high return by improving biological safety and security;
improving disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, reporting, and
response capabilities; and increasing cooperative biological research
and engagement.
Proliferation Prevention
This project enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states and
other partner countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit
trafficking of WMD and related materials across international borders.
It is coordinated with the DOD International Counterproliferation
Program and other U.S. Government border security programs, and
furthers interagency collaborations that contribute to a holistic
approach to export control, border security, and law enforcement-
related capacity building efforts.
Threat Reduction Engagement
This project funds relationship building engagements intended to
advance the Nunn-Lugar CTR mission. Specific activities include non-
proliferation and counterproliferation symposia or workshops; bilateral
or regional CTR-related symposia; high-level exchanges or planning
activities; and tabletop exercises. Although historically focused on
engagement with foreign military organizations, engagement is
increasing with foreign civilian organizations and entities, primarily
for supporting CBE and improving border security.

Arms Control
DTRA performs several critical arms control mission
responsibilities related to on-site inspections and monitoring. Onsite
inspection is not the sole mechanism for verification, but one part of
a system of complementary reinforcing measures that include National
Technical Means (NTM) of verification; periodically exchanged data on
weapon systems and facilities; regular notifications updating this
data; on-site inspections; and a compliance and implementation body.
Onsite inspection was a key component of the verification
frameworks of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and now, remains a key
component of the New START Treaty. Such inspections provide eyes-on
evaluation of the facilities and systems to confirm that what has been
reported in data exchanges are actually what exists at individual
sites; access and perspective not achievable through data exchange and
NTM alone; and a deterrent to misreporting data or cheating by
including a short-notice inspection regime that each side knows
provides the other to spot-check declarations and discover
discrepancies between what has been reported and facts on the ground.
Although DTRA inspectors provide the eyes on site, DTRA does not make
verification or compliance judgments. Our inspectors observe, document,
and report the factual findings of inspection activities to the U.S.
Government interagency policy community, who uses that information to
determine treaty compliance.
Additionally, DTRA is responsible for coordinating and conducting
the escort of foreign inspection teams for inspections or continuous
monitoring activities in the United States and at U.S. facilities
overseas.
Because DTRA has extensive experience with onsite inspections and
monitoring under the INF Treaty and the START treaty, U.S. policymakers
and treaty negotiators concerned with the development, implementation,
or evaluation of compliance with arms control treaty provisions
consistently call on the agency's technical and operational experience.
The DTRA team supporting the U.S. delegation at the New START
negotiations in Geneva provided years of arms control implementation
expertise and negotiating experience, linguistic ability, and
administrative support to the delegation as a whole and to the chief
negotiator, Ms. Rose Gottemoeller, the acting Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, and the assistant
Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance. DTRA
personnel fulfilled key roles in the negotiating working groups on
Inspection Activities, Conversion and Elimination, and Treaty Articles
and Definitions, and played a critical part in the development of those
portions of the new treaty. DTRA military linguists augmented the
language support staff at the U.S. Mission, providing much-needed help
in translating the large number of negotiating documents, and were
frequently called on to interpret for high profile or technically
oriented meetings due to their exceptional language abilities and
precise knowledge of arms control terms. In addition, DTRA personnel
continue to support the Bilateral Consultative Commission in Geneva as
discussions are undertaken to fine tune the implementation process.
The agency spent a full year prior to New START entry into force
preparing itself, as well as U.S. facilities subject to inspection, for
treaty implementation. This effort involved comprehensive internal
training sessions which utilized experienced personnel from both the
INF and START Treaties to adapt over 20 years of onsite inspection
experience into the DTRA implementation plan for New START. DTRA
conducted mock inspections or staff assistance visits at each major
U.S. facility subject to inspection to ensure a smooth implementation
process once New START entered into force.
During the New START Treaty's first year in force, DTRA conducted
the full annual quota of 18 inspection missions in the Russian
Federation and provided escort functions for 18 Russian inspections
conducted in the United States. DTRA inspectors also participated in
one exhibition of a Russian ICBM and two exhibitions of U.S. heavy
bombers.
In all, DTRA performed 276 arms control treaty and agreement
related missions in fiscal year 2011; is planning to conduct 320 such
missions in fiscal year 2012; and anticipates performing 340 in fiscal
year 2013.
The agency also acquires and fields technology capabilities
required to implement, comply with, and allow full exercise of U.S.
rights and prerogatives under existing arms control treaties and
agreements, and in support of the administration's arms control goals.
Despite the technology available, to date the equipment used for onsite
inspections remains low-tech. Current equipment includes tape measures,
#2 pencils, small notepads, and reference photos to determine the type
of item being inspected. Limited use of radiation detection equipment
during the New START treaty inspections is allowed only to prove that
an object is non-nuclear. The counting of deployed warheads is limited
to counting covered objects declared to be warheads and placed on a
deployed missile or bomber. There are no photographic confirmation,
measurement, or radiation detection equipment provisions for the
nuclear weapons. Future onsite inspection equipment must be
manportable, robust, and easy to use. Such equipment must be well
understood by all parties, but will likely need to be as minimally
invasive as possible. This could require joint development or
certification and/or use by a neutral international body. Reliable and
trusted procedures still will be needed to allow parties to
authenticate and functionally check the equipment prior to use.

International Counterproliferation Program
The DOD is the lead agency for, and partnered with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and DHS, on the International
Counterproliferation (ICP) Program, a program that is the primary tool
for the COCOMs to apply in their theater security cooperation strategy
to combat trafficking of WMD and related materials. The program
provides specialized training designed for foreign officials involved
with border security, customs, and law enforcement. Some training
courses include critical equipment packages to enhance the capacity of
partner countries to deter, detect, investigate, and respond to the
attempted proliferation of WMD. Training is sustained with periodic
local and regional WMD Integrated Exercises which enable students to
use program skills and equipment within a realistic training
environment. ICP program partners span the Baltic States, the Caucuses,
Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia. In September 2011, the
Secretary of Defense approved ICP program engagement with new partners
in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa (excluding Egypt).
Additionally, the ICP is incorporating cost-saving efficiency measures
such as shifting from bilateral to regional engagement, combining
events into single missions, and reducing the cost of equipment
provided by the program.

Proliferation Security Initiative
DTRA and the SCC-WMD support GCC and U.S. Government participation
in international cooperative activities under the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), an international effort by 98 countries to
stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials
to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. These
activities have been centered upon cooperative maritime interdiction of
illicit WMD trafficking. The SCC-WMD operates the PSI Support Cell with
DTRA assistance to increase COCOM staff and partner nations'
understanding of and support for the PSI by providing subject matter
expertise during exercise and activity planning and execution.

Small Arms and Light Weapons
DTRA supports nonproliferation efforts to assess, reduce, and
secure stockpiles of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) worldwide by
supporting the DOS Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. This
program helps foreign governments ensure that Manportable Air Defense
Systems, small arms and light weapons, conventional ammunition, and
other ordnance are properly secured, and managed, and that excess
stockpiles are destroyed. DTRA SALW teams perform assessments, provide
technical advice, and share U.S. best practices through training and
seminars.

Regional Security Engagement Program
Through the Regional Security Engagement (RSE) Program, DTRA
creates regional networks with shared understanding and approaches to
countering WMD threats that implement common counterproliferation goals
by leveraging existing resources. This program supports the development
of a shared regional threat picture; the development and use of common
methods for risk analysis and targeting; the development of a common
indicator and warning methodology; the identification of regional gaps/
overlaps of CWMD capabilities; and the reinforcement of existing
information-sharing mechanisms. Additionally, the program integrates
partner states into the global counterproliferation community while
supporting COCOM CWMD theater campaign plans. Pilot events were held in
December 2010 and April 2011. Four events are planned for 2012 and
eventually six suited to COCOM needs on an annual basis

Planning and Plans Coordination
The DTRA/SCC-WMD contribution to nonproliferation includes a wide
range of plans and planning development support, coordination, and
synchronization across DOD and with other U.S. Government
organizations. For example, planning synchronization across geographic
boundaries is achieved through STRATCOM's biannual Global
Synchronization Conferences and regional CWMD campaign plans, among
other means.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Nonproliferation is only part of the larger DTRA/SCC-WMD effort and
we also perform counterproliferation and consequence management
activities. Our counterproliferation programs deter and defeat WMD use
and we are providing capabilities for some of the most challenging CWMD
mission needs including:

Capabilities to detect, track, and interdict WMD in
hostile and uncertain environments at great distances from our
homeland;
Sensors, novel energetic materials and weapon design
technologies, and operational concepts to hold at risk WMD and
WMD-related facilities, including those deeply underground; and
the
Protection of people, systems, and infrastructure from
WMD effects.

Over the past year, we have made significant achievements in the
areas of counterproliferation and consequence management:

Assisted activation of the STRATCOM SJFHQ-E to support
the elimination of WMD in hostile and uncertain environments.
Responded to 1,695 requests in fiscal year 2011 for
Reach Back support from a wide-range of DOD and other U.S.
Government customers with the top five customers being U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Africa Command, STRATCOM, the
National Guard, and the Navy.
Conducted 17 surety inspections of nuclear capable
units in fiscal year 2011; a similar number are planned for the
current fiscal year; and 18 are planned for fiscal year 2013.
Provided continuous high-level nuclear policy support
analysis for a wide range of senior-level DOD and other U.S.
Government organizations and oversight committees in sustaining
and modernizing the nuclear deterrent force and countering the
nuclear threat.
Conducted 30 nuclear weapons accident and incident
exercises and seminars in fiscal year 2011; planning to conduct
a similar number in fiscal year 2012; and anticipate performing
29 in fiscal year 2013.
Conducted 39 consequence management exercises and
seminars in fiscal year 2011; planning to conduct 40 in fiscal
year 2012; and anticipate performing 40 in fiscal year 2013.
Initiated the Consequence Management Assessment
Program (CMAP) in fiscal year 2012 to assist the COCOMs in
building consequence management capacity in select partner
states by increasing the tactical training and operational
capabilities of partner nations to effectively respond to WMD
incidents, supporting COCOM requirements to aid partner nations
to effectively respond to WMD, and building partnership
capacity to prevent WMD proliferation. Under this program, DTRA
and U.S. Central Command are conducting planning and training
events in Bahrain, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates
throughout this fiscal year. Additionally, DTRA is working with
PACOM to expand CMAP activities into its area of responsibility
beginning in fiscal year 2013. Nine CMAP events will take place
in fiscal year 2012 and 24 are anticipated in fiscal year 2013.
Conducted 88 vulnerability, survivability, and Red
Team assessments and training events in fiscal year 2011. This
number will grow to 101 in fiscal year 2012 and 106 in fiscal
year 2013.
Supported Operations Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector
and Tomadachi concurrently in fiscal year 2011 and will
maintain a focus on potential WMD events in the Middle East and
Asia.
Continued to support Air Force testing of the Massive
Ordnance Penetrator in support of fielding in fiscal year 2012.
Demonstrated optimized dual and multiple delivery of
hardened target defeat capabilities.
Continued to support Bio-Response Testing and
Evaluation with DOD, Environmental Protection Agency, DHS, CDC,
and FBI partners.

NUCLEAR SUPPORT MISSION

DTRA also performs essential support functions for sustaining and
safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. These include
providing targeting support to STRATCOM; management of the nuclear
stockpile accounting and tracking system; independent Nuclear Safety
and Security Inspections for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff; development of technologies and operational
concepts for protecting our nuclear weapons and conducting tests of
nuclear security policies; nuclear weapons familiarization training;
and maintenance and logistical assistance.

FISCAL YEAR 2013 DTRA BUDGET REQUEST OVERVIEW

The DTRA budget request for fiscal year 2013 is $1.474 billion as
follows: $443.382 million in Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Defense-
wide funding; $13.146 million in Procurement, Defense-wide funding;
$498.194 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E), Defense-wide funding; and $519.111 million for the Nunn-Lugar
CTR program. I also urge your support for the $511.6 million requested
for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology
(CBDP S&T) Program, which DTRA executes. Details and highlights for
these requests follow.

Operations and Maintenance Funding
Nearly 60 percent of DTRA O&M funding directly supports warfighters
and national missions as it pays for planning, training, exercises,
conferences, and other means for collaboration across DOD and the U.S.
Government, and with international partners. Consistent with OSD
direction, we have taken steps to reduce O&M funding for Temporary Duty
(TDY); however, the nature of the CWMD mission necessitates a
relatively high level of TDY funding for efficient and effective
support to the Combatant Commanders including augmentation of their
limited on-site expertise, the conduct of arms control treaty
inspection and escort missions, the building of partnership capability
with our allies and friends around the globe, the operation of the
Defense Nuclear Weapons School that provides CWMD and nuclear mission
training, and the performance of safety and security inspections and
assessments of our nuclear deterrent. O&M funding is the fuel that
enables us to reach out to our components and personnel, the
warfighters, and international partners across the globe. Reductions to
our O&M request would necessitate cutbacks in essential support that we
uniquely provide.
The requested O&M funding would be applied as follows:

Nonproliferation Activities ($71.718 million) for arms
control activities including the conduct of U.S. Government
inspections of foreign facilities, territories, or events;
coordination and conduct of the escort of inspection teams for
inspections or continuous monitoring activities in the United
States and at U.S. facilities overseas; and the acquisition and
fielding of technology capabilities required to implement,
comply with, and allow full exercise of U.S. rights and
prerogatives under existing and projected arms control treaties
and agreements. Treaties, agreements, and other
nonproliferation programs to be supported by this funding
include: New START, CFE, CWC, OS, ICP, CFE Adapted, Plutonium
PPRA, SALW, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Additional Protocol, DTIRP, and the RSE Program.
WMD Combat Support and Operations ($174.332 million)
for a wide range of combat and warfighter support to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the COCOMS, and military forces as they engage
the WMD threat and challenges posed to the United States, its
forces and allies. DTRA supports the essential WMD response
capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to
sustain all elements of operating forces within their area of
responsibility at all levels of war. DTRA supports OSD
oversight of DOD nuclear matters by performing stockpile
tracking; conducting nuclear surety inspections; and providing
advice and support for maintenance, safety, Joint Nuclear
Weapon Publications, logistics, policy, planning, training, and
exercises. The agency provides the Combatant Commanders with
deployable Technical Support Groups that support and assist
COCOM designated search forces. This budget also funds DTRA's
24 hour/7 day Technical Reach Back and Operations Center
capability. Technical Reach Back is provided by a core group of
specialized CBRNE trained subject matter experts that provide
decision-response and support capability for deliberate,
crisis, and immediate planning and operations to first
responders, National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, COCOMs,
OSD, the Joint Staff, the Intelligence Community, command
elements, and Federal, state, and local government
organizations. Most of these requests require modeling a
variety of operational and exercise scenarios related to WMD.
Additionally, DTRA serves as the Program Manager for the
Foreign Consequence Management (FCM) Exercise program that
creates a series of exercises that prepare Geographic Combatant
Commanders (GCCs) to respond to foreign WMD attacks or the
accidental release of radiological or toxic materials. This
request also funds the supporting CMAP. The Balanced
Survivability Assessment Program conducts mission vulnerability
and continuity assessments of critical and vital U.S. and
allied national/theater mission systems, networks,
architectures, infrastructure, and assets; our Red Team
provides a unique assessment capability simulating an
independent, multidisciplinary adversary and performs all
assessments from an adversarial perspective emulating threats
ranging from well-funded terrorist organizations to foreign
intelligence services; and the Joint Staff Integrated
Vulnerability Assessments advise the Services, COCOMs, and DOD
agencies on facility vulnerability to terrorist operations and
the means of reducing mass casualties and damage to mission-
essential materials. The Defense Threat Reduction University
(DTRU), located on Kirtland Air Force Base, NM, is composed of
the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS), the Defense Threat
Reduction Information Analysis Center (DTRIAC), and the
Publications and Strategic Studies Branch. DNWS is the only DOD
school for courses that familiarize the U.S. nuclear community
with the national nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear
weapons program and also provides training on nuclear and
radiological incident command and control, incident response,
and WMD effects modeling for DOD, Federal, State, and local
agencies. The DTRIAC is the key DOD source of information and
analysis on nuclear weapons effects. Its information collection
has over three million records; over two million still photos;
and over ten million feet of video. If not preserved, these
important items will be lost forever due to treaty-based
restrictions on nuclear testing. The Publications and Strategic
Studies Branch is DTRA's focal point for review and updates to
Joint Doctrine, publication of Lessons Learned, and
implementation of the Joint Training Systems through the annual
publication of the Joint Training Plan.
U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD
($12.389 million) for DTRA direct support to the SCC-WMD
including development of tools; providing strategic and
contingency planning, policy, and analytical support;
developing interagency relationships; and working closely with
STRATCOM partners to establish the means for assessing and
exercising capabilities to combat WMD. DTRA's efforts focus on
enhancing global WMD situational awareness and providing for
the development and maintenance of a worldwide common operating
picture. The agency also provides access and connectivity to
CWMD expertise critical for strategic and contingency planning,
facilitates the integration of DTRA-unique capabilities, and
provides situational awareness for integrating and
synchronizing efforts across DOD to support national CWMD
objectives. What appears to be a considerable reduction in this
year's request from the $25.253 million authorized and
appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 2012 actually is a
realignment of $9.970 million for Technical Reach Back and
Operations Center mission execution to the Combat Support and
Operations sub-activity group, and the realignment of $3.363
million for Agency Strategic Planning activities to the Core
Mission Sustainment sub-activity group. These realignments do
not change the level of support DTRA historically has provided
to the SCC-WMD.
Core Mission Sustainment ($184.943 million) for a wide
range of enabling capabilities which provide the necessary
resources to support all DTRA mission essential functions. The
requested amount provides for the management of a total mission
portfolio that exceeds $3 billion. Activities specifically
funded by this account include information management; resource
management; security and asset protection; acquisition and
logistics management; strategic planning; strategic workforce
planning; hiring and retention incentives; leadership and
professional development; and providing the safety, security,
and efficiency necessary for mission success. In recent years,
DTRA has increased investment in its Information Technology
systems to provide secure and dependable connectivity for
global mission execution.

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
The request of $519.111 million for this important program would be
used as follows:

Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ($68.271 million)
for elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms in Russia and the
storage and elimination in Ukraine of rocket motors from
dismantled SS-24 ICBMs. Specifically in Russia, the funding
would eliminate 4 SS-18, 11 SS-19, and 24 SS-25 ICBMs;
eliminate 15 SS-18 silo launchers and launch control centers;
dismantle and eliminate 11 SS-19 silo launchers and launch
control centers; eliminate 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers;
eliminate 4 SS-N-18 SLBMs; dismantle nuclear reactor cores and
launcher sections of one DELTA III-class SSBN and eliminate 16
SLBM launchers; and continue dismantlement of nuclear reactor
cores and launcher sections of one Typhoon-class SSBN and
eliminate 20 SLBM launchers.
Chemical Weapons Destruction ($14.630 million) for
technical support to the Russian chemical weapons destruction
operations at the Shchuch'ye CWDF and, as recently decided by
OSD, the Kizner CWDF.
Global Nuclear Security ($99.789 million) for
improving Russian capacity to sustain 18 nuclear weapons
storage sites, and the sustainment of 5 rail transfer points
and 2 regional security training centers; transportation of
approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads
(1,000 to 1,500) from deployed locations to enhanced security
storage sites or dismantlement and from storage to
dismantlement facilities; continued support for Nuclear
Security Centers of Excellence; and assistance with future
shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel that meet the IAEA criteria.
Cooperative Biological Engagement ($276.399 million)
to initiate biological engagement in Burundi, Rwanda, and other
African regional partners and begin a regional engagement in SE
Asia; continue cooperative research efforts in Cooperative
Biological Engagement (CBE)-engaged countries; continue to
implement the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System
in CBE-engaged countries; continue construction and equipment
installation of Secured Pathogen Repositories in Kazakhstan and
in other partner states; continue Cooperative Biological
Research projects in Afghanistan, Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Ukraine, and other CBE-engaged
countries as valuable projects are approved; continue to
provide training in laboratory diagnostics techniques,
epidemiology, clinical sample collection, outbreak
surveillance, laboratory and health system management, and
biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics in CBE-engaged countries;
continue the sustainment of 42 diagnostic labs in Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; continue
construction for a National Public Health Laboratory in
Afghanistan; continue construction of a Veterinary Central
Diagnostic Facility in Ukraine; complete construction and
equipment installation for Secured Pathogen Repositories in
Azerbaijan and Ukraine (Azerbaijan is funding the cost of its
construction); complete the Biological Medical Research Center
in Pakistan; complete 11 diagnostic labs in Kenya, Uganda,
Ukraine, and other countries to fill gaps in analytical bio
surveillance capacity; complete biorisk assessments in select
areas of Asia and Africa; and continue to provide for bio-
related conference support.
Proliferation Prevention ($32.402 million) to enhance
the capability of non-Russian FSU states and other partner
countries to deter, detect, report, and interdict illicit WMD
trafficking across international borders. In Armenia, these
funds would continue to increase WMD command and control,
communications, surveillance, detection, and interdiction
capabilities along the Georgia border; continue project
assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and
state ports of entry and inland clearing stations. In Moldova,
these funds would continue to increase WMD command and control,
communications, surveillance, detection, and interdiction
capabilities along the Ukraine border; continue project
assessments and support efforts to upgrade international and
state ports of entry and inland clearing stations. In Southeast
Asia, these funds would continue to increase WMD command and
control, communications, surveillance, detection, and
interdiction capabilities, and sustainment in initial
countries, and begin implementation in additional countries
along the Strait of Malacca and in other regional waters and on
land borders.
Threat Reduction Engagement ($2.375 million) to
conduct engagements with the FSU states and in new geographic
areas to support program expansions.
Other Assessments/Administrative Support ($25.245
million) to ensure that DOD-provided equipment, services, and
related training are fully accounted for and used effectively
and efficiently for their intended purposes; provide for Nunn-
Lugar CTR program travel, translator/interpreter support, and
other agency support to include support to program personnel
assigned to U.S. Embassy offices in partner states.

Reductions to the fiscal year 2013 request would result in missed
opportunities to build international partnerships and partner
capabilities, protect extremely dangerous pathogen collections from
potential terrorist threats, and eliminate WMD and WMD-related
materials that could fall into the hands of terrorists or states
potentially hostile to the United States.

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
On 26 January 2012, in his press briefing on the DOD fiscal year
2013 budget request, Secretary Panetta stated: ``And lastly, with
regards to key investments in technology and new capabilities, we have
to retain a decisive technological edge. We have to retain the kind of
leverage the lessons of recent conflicts have given us. And we need to
stay ahead of the most lethal and disruptive threats that we're going
to face in the future.'' Consistent with this decision, DTRA RDT&E
programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges including stand-
off detection, tracking, and interdiction of WMD; modeling and
simulation to support weapons effects and hazard predictions;
classified support to Special Operations Forces; defeat of WMD agents
and underground facilities; and protection of people, systems, and
infrastructure against WMD effects.
DTRA RDT&E is unique in being focused solely on CBRNE; tied closely
with the agency's Combat Support responsibilities; has a top-notch in-
house field test capability; relies upon competitive bids, the national
labs, industry, and academia rather than an in-house laboratory
infrastructure, allowing for a ``best of breed'' approach to performer
selection; and is nimble and responsive to urgent needs.
The agency has a comprehensive, balanced CBRNE S&T portfolio that
supports DOD goals and is well connected with DOD customers, as well as
interagency and international partners. Our RDT&E approach balances the
need for near-term pay-off with the need for long-term knowledge and
expertise. The requested RDT&E funding includes $45.071 million in
Basic Research to provide for the discovery and development of
fundamental knowledge and understanding by researchers primarily in
academia and world-class research institutes in government and
industry. This program leverages DOD's $2 billion annual investment in
basic research by ensuring a motivation within the scientific community
to conduct research benefiting WMD-related defense missions and by
improving DTRA knowledge of other research efforts of potential
benefit.
The DTRA fiscal year 2013 request also includes $172.352 million
for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research, $275.022 million for
Proliferation Prevention and Defeat Advanced Research, and $5.749 for
WMD Defeat Capabilities System Development and Demonstration.
Multiple projects span these program elements:

The Fundamental Research Project is the ``transition
enabler'' that bridges the gap between basic research and
technology development. Examples of work being done under this
project include developing nuclear materials detection
capabilities with the potential for pre-detonation nuclear
weapon detection systems, and a new carbon-based transistor
with the potential for becoming the basis for next generation
radiation-hardened electronics and for space sensors.
The Detection Technology Project includes nuclear and
radiological detection; post-nuclear detonation forensics; and
treaty verification related S&T development. Protective and
targeting planning tools, and WMD Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance S&T development is conducted under the WMD
Battle Management Project.
The Advanced Energetics and Counter WMD Weapons
Project develops novel energetic materials and weapon design
technology for rapid, directed, and enhanced (non-nuclear)
energy release providing new capability to defeat difficult WMD
and hardened and deeply buried targets. It also covers the
systematic identification and maturation of advanced
technologies for combating WMD with specialized hardened target
defeat expertise; developing innovative kinetic and non-kinetic
weapon capabilities for the physical or functional defeat of
WMD structures; and minimization of collateral effects from
incidental release of WMD agents.
The Systems Engineering and Innovation Project
develops improved high performance computing methods and tools
for 24/7, near-real time CBRNE decision support; develops and
integrates individual-based social networks and realistic
behavioral models with infrastructure such as power and
transportation grids; and demonstrates capabilities to model
selected secondary and tertiary effects and course of action
impacts for CWMD scenarios.
The Nuclear and Radiological Effects Project provides
nuclear weapons effects subject matter expertise, model/code
development, and analysis. Under this project, DTRA is
reversing the decline in nuclear weapons effects and system
hardening that occurred in the decades following the end of the
Cold War, but with focus on 21st century threats. For example,
we are supporting the standup of a Nuclear Weapons Effects
Network across DOD, NNSA, and the United Kingdom, and are
delivering three-dimensional models of nuclear fallout to the
U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, STRATCOM, and DHS for
better predictions of fallout from ground or low altitude
detonations and improved prediction of nuclear weapon urban
environment effects. This project also is integrating
conventional, unconventional, and nuclear software planning
tools within a net-centric framework that provides simplified
near real-time access for customer use of DTRA expert support
and CBRNE tools in classified and unclassified environments,
and meets user requirements at the state/local, national, and
international levels.
The Target Assessment Project supports targeting and
Intelligence Community technology analytical needs. Efforts
underway include providing geotechnical, structural and
functional analysis in a time-dependent, 3-dimensional model to
defeat WMD targets in underground facilities; creating a
software tool that integrates buildings, bunkers and tunnels
into a common operating picture for functional vulnerability
and defeat analysis of WMD targets; and developing modeling and
simulation capability for a network of WMD target systems
analysis. In collaboration with the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) and DOE National Labs, it also provides technology for
the DTRA/DIA Counter WMD Analysis Cell, integrating engineering
insights and operational expertise for exploitation of
vulnerabilities to counter WMD targets and developing
capability to perform strategic level technical analysis of
adversary WMD programs.
The Nuclear Survivability Project develops radiation-
hardened microelectronics and nanotechnology to keep pace with
commercial technology advances; applies trusted U.S. commercial
design and foundry capabilities to achieve capability for =45
nanometer radiation hardened microelectronics; develops and
demonstrates technology to support hardening of
microelectronics and photonics to meet DOD's missile and space
requirements; provides for High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) protection, operational vulnerability assessments,
technical assistance to Service Acquisition Special Projects
Officers, defense agencies, and COCOMs; and provides expert
advice on System EMP Certification for STRATCOM and DOD CBRN
Survivability Implementation. In addition, this project
supports nuclear surety programs through field-able nuclear and
non-nuclear physical security equipment for the Services and
interagency partners; provides for Force-on-Force tests and
evaluation of DOD, Service, and COCOM nuclear weapons security
policies and capabilities; evaluates nuclear security policy
for waterfront restricted areas; and conducts engineering
studies and out-of-cycle tests focused on specific portions of
the nuclear environments.
The Test Infrastructure Project provides a unique
national test bed for simulated WMD facility characterization,
weapon/target interaction, and WMD facility defeat testing;
provides test articles, construction, tunnel operation, data
acquisition systems, test optics, and data analysis for the Air
Force's Massive Ordnance Penetrator; and provides the test
environment for the Treaty Verification Technologies Program
and Source Physics Experiments to support Comprehensive Test
Ban initiatives.

Reductions to the DTRA RDT&E request would delay or terminate
solutions to priorities received from the Combatant Commanders and miss
opportunities to take advantage of emerging technologies and
operational concepts to counter WMD threats.

Chemical and Biological Defense Program S&T
The Department's CBDP S&T programs support DOD-wide efforts to
research, develop, and acquire capabilities for a layered, integrated
defense against CBRN agents; better understand potential threats;
secure and reduce dangerous materials whenever possible; and prevent
potential attacks. Although funding for the CBDP is not part of the
DTRA budget request, the agency executes the S&T portion of this
program, for which the Department has requested approximately $511.6
million in fiscal year 2013. The agency also manages funding execution
in support of CBDP advanced development and procurement.
DTRA is addressing key chemical and biological defense mission
areas in multiple ways including: emphasizing innovation and discovery
in Basic Research and the Physical Sciences; bio surveillance;
biological diagnostics; and medical countermeasures such as
advancements in regulatory S&T of agile, flexible manufacturing and
rapid enhanced product development and new avenues of treatment against
CB threats. DTRA and the CBDP leverage each other's expertise, unique
capabilities, resources, and investments--as well as those of the other
DOD, U.S. Government, and international partners--in a wide range of
areas including Basic Research, modeling and simulation, Technical
Reach Back support, Consequence Management Assessment Team Support,
Cooperative Threat Reduction and Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation Support.

Procurement Funding
The DTRA Procurement, Defense-wide request provides for essential
vehicle replacement and procures new investment items, including
mission-critical information technology, required for the agency's
global mission execution. The fiscal year 2012 request is for $13.146
million.

IMPACT OF DEFENSE-WIDE EFFICIENCIES

DTRA has achieved efficiencies in its mission execution, yielding
$52.73 million from all of our appropriation accounts as part of DOD-
wide adjustments. This includes savings of $19.78 million in O&M, $1.88
million in the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, $32.59 million in RDT&E, and
$2.24 million in Procurement. We terminated the Innovative Technologies
program, the Systems Engineering program, and the University Strategic
Partnership Program. Additionally, reductions were made to our travel
budget; contract costs related to security support; core operational
support; contracts related to the CWC; contract costs related to S&T;
ICP; DTRIAC; Basic Research; Advanced Energetics; wargaming;
environmental restoration; WMD National Test Bed; Test and Technology
Support; strategic research and dialogues; countering WMD terrorism;
and nuclear surety. We continue to seek innovative ways to reduce
operating costs and find more efficient and effective ways of executing
our mission.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and other members, WMD pose a global threat that is
growing in scope and evolving in its potential applications. DTRA and
the SCC-WMD provide much of the expertise and the daily focus that is
applied to countering this threat by the Department and, indeed, by the
U.S. Government. We also build and harness CWMD partnership capability
with our friends and allies around the globe.
The challenge facing us is great. The DTRA fiscal year 2013 budget
request is critical and central to DOD, U.S. Government, and
international efforts to counter WMD. The relatively small national
investment in the DTRA/SCC-WMD/SJFHQ-E team provides a tremendous
return to national and global security. I urge your support for the
DTRA fiscal year 2013 budget request and would be pleased to discuss it
in greater detail with the subcommittee at your convenience.
I hope that DTRA and the SCC-WMD will continue to earn your
support. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Senator Hagan. We will go ahead and proceed with the
questions. Secretary Creedon, I'd like to ask you about the
transitioning of the CTR programs in Russia. The CTR program is
transitioning from Russia and the former Soviet states to
Southeast Asia and the African continent. The emphasis has been
shifting from the nuclear programs in Russia and the former
Soviet states to engagement in these new regions on handling
and storing the dangerous biological pathogens.
What's the long-term vision for the CTR program in Russia
and the former Soviet states? Then I have a series of questions
regarding the nuclear security investments in Russia and the
former Soviet states and how they will be maintained over the
long-term as we make this transition.
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator. We are gradually shifting
to more of a biological threat reduction program and that then
allows us to place less emphasis on the nuclear programs. With
all the work that's gone on in Russia over the better part of
the last 20 years, a tremendous amount has been accomplished. I
think you are all familiar with the scorecard, which does
indicate the literally thousands of items that have been
destroyed as part of the CTR program.
Senator Hagan. I was very impressed when I looked over the
report.
Ms. Creedon. I should give a plug actually to Senator
Lugar. That whole scorecard was actually one of his ideas to
demonstrate the success of the program.
But in any event, we do continue to do a wide variety of
work with Russia, and in time that will phase down a bit. We
also value that relationship with Russia and in that context
are seeking an extension of the umbrella agreement that allows
for the work in Russia. It expires next year and we are seeking
an extension of that so that we can continue to do some work,
although at a lower level in Russia, particularly in some of
the areas of sustainment, chemical weapons, and some small
amount of additional destruction work.
We also continue to work in the states of the former Soviet
Union, although primarily in Kazakhstan we have some very large
biological security programs ongoing, and we have some similar
programs in Ukraine. Those are probably the largest programs.
Then we are beginning to shift the focus in the biological
program to Africa and the Middle East. So in time we will
transition over to those areas of the world as well.
Senator Hagan. How will the nuclear and security
investments in Russia and the Soviet states be maintained
during this period of transition?
Ms. Creedon. One of the key aspects of all this is, in
fact, the umbrella agreement, and that's why we're working to
continue the umbrella agreement, which expires in June of next
year.
Senator Hagan. What is involved in order to extend it?
Ms. Creedon. Both sides, both the United States and Russia,
have to agree to continue it, basically to just extend it for
some period of time, because it's that umbrella agreement that
allows us to do the work in Russia. So if the umbrella
agreement isn't extended, although we think that it will be--so
far our very preliminary discussions are positive. But if we
don't have that agreement, then pretty much the work stops.
Senator Hagan. How much of a percentage is Russia paying on
that agreement?
Ms. Creedon. I can't give you those--maybe Ken can give you
some more specific numbers. Over time, obviously, the United
States has paid for everything. But it has changed over time.
Probably one of the biggest examples of where Russia has kicked
in a substantial amount is in the various security upgrades
that frankly both departments participated in as a result of
the Bratislava agreement some years ago. My recollection was
that was a very hefty percentage of Russian participation in
that overall program. DOE and DOD did the exterior and Russia
did all the interior work.
The other big program that is definitely transitioning to
Russia is there's been a train-the-trainers program, and that
program built a training facility not too far outside of
Moscow, and Russia is now running that facility. It was
recently upgraded. They are bringing their people there.
They're training their people. Then their people go out, and
that's important for sustainment of the security work that
we've done over time.
Senator Hagan. Do you have concerns about Russia and the
other Soviet states actually maintaining the equipment over the
long-term?
Ms. Creedon. That is, in fact, one of the things that we
are continuing to discuss. All the parts and pieces of DOD were
over there just last week, and that's one of the topics of
discussion on the table, is the long-term sustainment of the
programs, and I think that's the same for DOE.
Senator Hagan. I forgot to say, we should probably take
maybe 15 minutes, unless more members show up and then we'll
cut that back a little bit.
Ms. Harrington, for fiscal year 2013 the administration is
proposing to reduce the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program
from $262 million to $92 million. This program has received
wide support for installing nuclear detection systems at ports
and borders around the world to detect illicit transfers of
nuclear material. The fiscal year 2013 budget states that much
of the work of installing these detectors has now been
completed, resulting in the $115 million reduction.
Is it accurate to say that in fiscal year 2013 and onwards
you will not be installing future detection systems and
concentrating on maintaining what we have?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you, Senator, for your question. On
the SLD program, we recognize that that program has had a large
degree of success. As Secretary Creedon just mentioned, one of
our biggest successes has been in Russia, where we co-funded,
equal shares U.S. and Russia, the installation of 383 land,
sea, and air border crossings.
The maintenance and sustainment of those systems will in
the next year or so transition 100 percent to Russia. From
everything that we see, they are vigorously maintaining their
system and in some senses it will be on a par or even better
than what we have in the United States.
Senator Hagan. That transition is to be completed, what
date did you say?
Ms. Harrington. In about the next year.
Senator Hagan. Okay.
Ms. Harrington. So this is an area where we've seen them
really step up. The installations use Russian equipment that we
have brought to the United States and certified as meeting
international standards, and we have seen evidence that the
equipment is indeed working.
We also provide the training for that, and as we look into
the future again, as with DOD, we really will be focusing on
keeping up the discussion with them, continuing to exchange
best practices, making sure that the systems are up and
working.
There are other installations in the area surrounding
Russia that we also are either completing this year or will
complete next year. We will have about 40 new installations
next year.
What we are doing in our strategic pause or program review
is evaluating what we should be doing beyond the former Soviet
Union. There we've had some extremely interesting recent
discussions at the Seoul nuclear security summit. Many
countries in areas, new areas to us, for example Southeast
Asia, the Middle East, becoming increasingly concerned about
having this capability because many nations, despite the
Fukushima events, still do plan to expand nuclear energy. So
that means larger commerce in nuclear materials, more need to
be able to track and ensure the proper management and control
of those materials.
So there is a global interest. But what we are doing right
now is working closely with our interagency colleagues, with
the Department of Homeland Security, which has a lot of
experience in this area, along with law enforcement, which
plays a critical role, to really see what the best balance of
technical capabilities and programming will be for some of
these new sites.
So we have not finished that process yet. We will be happy
to come brief you when we do.
Senator Hagan. My next question is, could you be specific
on these new sites or new areas? You said Southeast Asia. Any
more specifics on that?
Ms. Harrington. Since we're still in the process of review
and we are, of course, evaluating some of the threat assessment
with the Intelligence Community--we should within the next
month or two be able to come back and give you a more
substantial briefing.
Senator Hagan. Okay. The 5-year budget profile for this
program is reduced further in fiscal year 2014 to $47 million,
and then it increases to $64 million in fiscal year 2017. If
additional detectors have to be installed, will this 5-year
budget profile support these additional detectors?
Ms. Harrington. As we move forward into the more specific
2014 build and the years beyond, we will take into account the
results of the program evaluation. We will also seek to engage
our international partners. We have the ability to accept
foreign funds, for which we thank this committee a great deal
for supporting that capability. We now have, following the
nuclear security summit and under the U.S. leadership of the G8
global partnership, a renewed commitment by countries to
address border security issues, in particular.
So we are hoping that we can really leverage U.S.
taxpayers' investments with dollars from other countries. We
also will look across our whole suite of programs if we need to
rebalance internally to provide more funding for this program.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Director Myers, in your testimony you list two jobs that
you hold: first, as the Director of DTRA; and then second, as
Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating
WMD, which integrates for DOD capabilities to defeat WMD.
I understand this year that the U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) has created a new component called the Standing
Joint Forces Headquarters for Elimination, which is supposed to
provide a capability to eliminate WMD in hostile or uncertain
environments.
It seems to me that you are wearing three hats now instead
of two. Can you explain in layman's terms these roles and how
they differ?
Mr. Myers. Certainly. Thank you. As the DTRA Director, we
are a combat support agency and a defense agency. To break
those down in layman's terms, as a combat support agency we
need to be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to support
the combatant commanders, support the Military Services, to be
able to respond to any WMD threat or challenge that they might
face, whether it be in combat or whether it be as part of a
domestic issue, whether it be a civil support team through the
National Guard or what have you.
As a defense agency, one of our prime responsibilities is
to perform and to manage a research and development (R&D)
portfolio, to develop the tools and capabilities that the
warfighter will need to address and to operate in a WMD
environment, whether that be nuclear detection, whether that be
chemical, biological protection gear, actually uniforms or
detectors, as well as the capability to interdict and defeat
WMD.
Most recently, we have transitioned the massive ordnance
penetrator (MOP) to the Air Force, which is a deep earth
penetrator conventional weapons system.
So in layman's terms, that's the DTRA side of the house. On
the STRATCOM Center (SCC) for Combating WMD, I report to
General Robert Kehler, Commander, STRATCOM. STRATCOM has
responsibilities under the unified command plan for
synchronizing the U.S. response to WMD and in advocating on
behalf of counter-WMD funding and the support needed across
DOD.
So in a lot of ways the SCC responsibilities and the DTRA
responsibilities dovetail nicely together.
The Standing Joint Force Headquarters, as you pointed out,
was stood up on February 3 by General Kehler at an event near
Fort Belvoir. I am not the commander of the headquarters. The
commander of the headquarters is Major General Eric Crabtree,
USAF. He is also the Deputy Director of the SCC, so there is
that connection between the two STRATCOM components, SCC as
well as the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.
We spent quite a bit of time thus far this afternoon
talking about our nonproliferation efforts, the Nunn-Lugar
program, the SLD. All of those programs are based upon a
cooperative relationship with a country, based upon a
nonviolent environment, where those programs can be carried
out.
The Standing Joint Force Headquarters is designed to be
able to provide the same type of capability in a nonpermissive
environment or one in which we are not permitted a cooperative
opportunity to reduce WMD. So in a lot of ways DTRA, the SCC,
and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters all have different
roles in the counter-WMD mission area.
General Kehler has determined he wants the Standing Joint
Force Headquarters to be co-located with DTRA and the SCC at
Fort Belvoir so we can get the most from leveraging the three
organizations, get the most in terms of effectiveness and
efficiency across the board, to ensure that we don't have to
have three separate organizations with all the different types
of support mechanisms, to permit the headquarters to lean on or
rely on maybe specific expertise that DTRA or the SCC might
have and that they don't need to maintain that independently on
their own.
So while there are three separate mission areas, having us
all colocated, working together on the same mission with the
same goal in mind, we seek to get the best bang for the buck
for the taxpayers, as well as for the committee.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. Thank you, Director Myers.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I appreciate those responses. I want to back up a little
bit and talk about some questions that relate to our oversight
responsibilities, specifically measures of performance,
metrics, and looking at our budget this year as requested and
going forward. The fiscal year 2013 budget request, Ms.
Harrington, on the DOE side for NNSA and specifically for your
defense nuclear nonproliferation program is $2.46 billion,
which is an increase of about $160 million from fiscal year
2012. I actually look at it here on the chart from fiscal year
2009, until this request in fiscal year 2013, there was
actually a 60 percent increase in your funding of just over
$900 million, almost $1 billion.
With that kind of substantial growth, of course, it's the
responsibility of this committee to ensure that the appropriate
metrics are in place to evaluate the effectiveness of our
efforts. You've talked about some of those efforts in response
to the chair's questions.
GAO released a study in December 2011, concluding that some
of the defense nuclear nonproliferation programs failed to
satisfy key program performance measures that GAO has long
considered essential to measuring and validating program
effectiveness. This is really nothing new. In December 2010
they had a report that found that the President's 4-year global
nuclear material security initiative ``lacks the specific
details'' on implementation, overall cost estimates, timeframe,
and scope of planned work remain unclear.
So I would ask you, Ms. Harrington, if you could respond to
that. Do you believe that GAO's assessment is accurate, and
again in the context of a substantial increase in the budget?
If not, why not? If you believe you are taking steps to address
what GAO has outlined, we'd like to hear about those as well.
Ms. Harrington. Thank you, Senator. My view has always
been, no matter what agency I've worked for, that it's always
valuable to have somebody from the outside take a look at your
work, how you manage it, and whether you can improve it. GAO is
one of the key elements in that process for us in the
government. We, of course, have our own inspector general, who
is not inactive, I can assure you, in terms of internal
oversight.
On the specific Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
study, the GTRI program has existed for a number of years, but
was given a very specific boost or impetus in April 2009 when
the President made a speech in Prague and announced that the
United States was going to undertake a very focused leadership
role for 4 years to try to lock down dangerous materials
worldwide.
We launched into that effort working very specifically with
Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency because among
the three of us we are the key players in terms of that
mission. Now, there are many other key players--all of the
countries that are the targets of the program where the
material resides. So the criticism in December 2010 that there
was not a very detailed time line plan for every single action
that would need to take place really doesn't take into account
the diplomacy, and sometimes we have to work with our
colleagues at the Department of State (DOS) to even get our
foot in the door in a country, negotiation of agreements, the
management of transportation contracts, the technical work--
sometimes we would not have full information before going in a
country, what condition the materials were in, the length of
time it takes material to be extracted from a research reactor,
for example, cooled, and then safely removed.
All of those technical issues have variables that go along
with them. The diplomatic issues have variables that go along
with them. So it makes very specific day-by-day planning a real
challenge. Governments fall, new governments are elected.
Policies change. Contracts have to be renegotiated. All of
those things are just a fact of life of working in the
international environment.
It makes life complicated and it requires a certain amount
of flexibility on our side and I would say on the side of those
who provide oversight.
So I would take some issue with the conclusions of GAO, but
not any difference at all in terms of agreeing with them that
there has to be an orderly and responsible management of these
efforts. We are, after all, using taxpayers' dollars. But there
is that flexible requirement within the overall context.
Thank you.
Senator Portman. I guess what we would like to know from
you today, and maybe you can follow up in writing, is what then
are the metrics that you think are appropriate? Obviously, you
believe that the GAO program performance measures are not
appropriate to validate your effectiveness, and yet you
indicate that you do believe that, given the tax dollars going
into these programs and the substantial increase in funding
over a 3-year period, about a 60 percent increase overall, that
there ought to be metrics that you're held accountable to.
So do you feel you have those metrics in place and that you
think that this is something that is more appropriate to your
task, as you've talked about needing more flexibility than what
GAO has outlined in terms of their metrics?
Ms. Harrington. I think the bottom line metric,
particularly for GTRI, is are we removing the material? I think
that goes without saying. We can document that some 4,600
kilograms of material, both plutonium and highly-enriched
uranium, have been physically removed from the countries that
we had on our original target list.
We have a schedule. In fact, some of the details of the
next removals are being discussed in an international meeting
today.
So the planning process is a very precise and well thought
through process. It's just the timing of that process does need
to be flexible enough to reflect the realities of international
diplomacy. I think if you look at where we said we would be and
where we are right now in terms of the targets and the number
of kilograms of material removed and the number of buildings
secured, that we are quite on track at this point.
Senator Portman. So you have metrics, and the number of
kilograms is meeting and maybe exceeding your expectations,
because you have metrics in place and you're measuring it? I'm
trying to help you here.
Ms. Harrington. Yes, yes. Yes, indeed, indeed. We always
have had.
Senator Portman. Okay. I guess again what we would like is
if you could follow up with this hearing, with your more
specific response. I'm talking about now the GAO 2011 report as
well. To the extent you believe you have established metrics
that are appropriate for this program as it's grown, we'd like
to get a response more formally from you to the GAO report.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) removal program is
measured and evaluated based on the number of kilograms of highly-
enriched uranium or plutonium that the program removes or eliminates
each year. This metric is appropriate for the program as it measures
the amount of material that is removed from civilian sites and
permanently eliminated so it cannot be used by terrorists to make
nuclear weapons. GTRI's metric for removals under the 4-year plan is
4,353 kilograms removed or downblended by the end of December 2013. To
date, we have removed and/or downblended 3,333 kilograms. Shipments
remaining include:

Uzbekistan.................... INP............... Spent HEU......... 2012.............. Russian
Poland........................ Maria............. Spent HEU......... 2012.............. Russian
Poland........................ Maria............. Fresh HEU......... 2012.............. Russian
Uzbekistan.................... INP............... Spent HEU......... 2012.............. Russian
Czech Republic................ Rez............... Spent HEU......... 2013.............. Russian
Vietnam....................... Dalat............. Spent HEU......... 2013.............. Russian
Belarus....................... Pamir............. Fresh HEU......... 2013.............. Russian
Uzbekistan.................... Photon............ Spent HEU......... 2013.............. Russian
Hungary....................... BRR............... Spent HEU......... 2013.............. Russian
South Africa.................. SAFAR I........... Spent HEU......... 2013.............. South African
South Africa.................. SAFAR I........... Fresh HEU......... 2013.............. South African

[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Portman. Ms. Creedon, on your side, section 1304 of
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year
2010 required the National Academies to assess the
effectiveness of tools used to evaluate the CTR programs in
response to the National Academy of Sciences' findings, which
included a recommendation for CTR programs to better refine its
stated objectives. I understand you're undergoing a top-to-
bottom review of the CTR program.
What's the status of that review and what lessons learned
through this exercise do you believe can be shared or even
replicated at NNSA to ensure greater accountability and
effectiveness?
Ms. Creedon. The section that you refer to, section 1304,
required a sequential series of events, and the first event was
the submittal by DOD of a report that laid out how these
metrics were going to be developed in the future.
We came to this with a background of probably what, for
lack of a better description, were easy metrics, because we
knew how many intercontinental ballistic missiles we'd
destroyed, how many launchers we'd destroyed, how many
submarines we'd cut up. That was a fairly easy way to approach
this. As we were going to transition into more of the
biological side, that's when a lot of the discussion of metrics
came up.
So in that report that we submitted initially, and I
believe it was September 2010, in response to the requirement
in the NDAA, we laid out how we have developed metrics for all
of the more traditional programs, the nuclear element
destruction, the chemical weapons destruction--again, counting
things; you know how many tons of something you've destroyed--
and looking at the biological weapons really is where the
challenge is.
So in that report we laid out a series of things that we're
going to look at as metrics in the expansion of the biological
threat reduction program. That report was recently reviewed by
the National Academy. We're now in the next step of finalizing
the metrics, and that report is in its final stages. In fact, I
think there were some staff briefings to some of the committee
staff here a couple of weeks ago.
When you look on the biological side, each country will
have an agreement, based on what the requirements are of the
country and what the needs are of the country. When we look at
some of the countries that are more advanced in this work, such
as Kazakhstan, you look at things like how many collections of
dangerous pathogens do they have, how are they secured, should
they be consolidated, should you combine the sort of veterinary
pathogens and human health pathogens, or does it make more
sense to keep them apart?
The focus of CTR historically has been on trying to
consolidate to the greatest extent possible consistent with the
requirements of the country, to reduce the number of these
sites. So we've done a lot of work on consolidation.
We look at the security of these sites, and again we've
done a lot of work, particularly in Kazakhstan and in some
other places, Ukraine, on making sure that these sites are
secure. You look at the safety, what's the biological safety
level of these facilities? Do these facilities meet
international health regulations and standards?
We also look at the overall disease surveillance
capabilities of the country, because that's why we, DOD, are in
this to begin with, because it's a national security
requirement to make sure that our troops in the area, our
families in the area, were protected. We wanted to make sure
particularly in these countries that had naturally occurring
incidents of diseases that could be weaponized, that we knew
whether or not an outbreak was manmade or whether it was
natural. So we wanted to make sure that these countries also
had surveillance capabilities and that they had forensics
capabilities.
So as we expand the biological program, these are the
things that we're going to look at with respect to each
country, each agreement, as we go forward on the biological
program.
Senator Portman. What's the timing of that report?
Ms. Creedon. It's almost done. I think it's probably within
the next couple of weeks, I think the final version.
Senator Portman. Would you be planning to brief the
subcommittee?
Ms. Creedon. We have had some preliminary briefs to the
staff a couple of weeks ago, and when it's done, we'll be happy
to come back and brief the subcommittee.
Senator Portman. Yes, we would appreciate getting that in
that briefing and looking carefully again at making sure we're
avoiding duplication and doing this in the most cost-effective
way possible. It sounds like you've laid out a lot of metrics
that you feel comfortable with.
The next question I have relates to what I talked about in
the opening, which is sequestration, how are we going to deal
with this. In addition to the $487 billion in proposed cuts to
the defense budget already in place, which I know you've had to
deal with, although again your budgets for the most part have
been increased, we now have this additional $500 billion across
the board.
I believe we should act as a Congress to avoid that. I know
the chair shares my concern about that. So we're not here to
tell you that we think it's the right thing to do. But I think
it is appropriate for us to plan for the possibility that
Congress does not figure out a way to find offsets or otherwise
deal with sequestration.
Can you provide us today--and I guess I would direct this
really to all three of you; maybe Mr. Myers because he's been
off the hook so far--how would these additional cuts affect
your respective agencies? I look at a lot of your programs,
some of them involve international commitments. In other words,
they're obligations to other countries. I just wonder if you
can talk a little about that.
What would these cuts mean? Would we be violating
international obligations? How would you deal with it should
sequestration not be avoided and should as of January 1, 2013,
we have these across-the-board cuts in place? Mr. Myers?
Mr. Myers. Thank you, Senator. To start off with, the
impact of sequestration would be devastating. The U.S. strategy
for dealing with WMD in my opinion is based upon developing and
constructing lines of defense--at the source when possible in a
cooperative way, at the borders in terms of interdiction--open
spaces, if you will, in terms of detecting whether something is
moving by sea or over land or in the air; and when necessary,
have the ability to identify, detect, and eliminate weapons and
materials of mass destruction, if necessary; and obviously, if
one is unsuccessful, consequence management in the event of a
WMD incident.
I believe sequestration would cause a major erosion in
these lines of defense. It's very difficult for me to tell you
exactly what the budgetary impact would be on each and every
single one of them, but I think across-the-board our efforts
would erode. I think we would have a lot of problems in terms
of manning and being able to implement arms control treaty
obligations and the R&D portfolio that we have today.
We have no planning going on for sequestration, but we are
hopeful that it can be avoided, because I believe that the
impact will be severely detrimental, if not devastating.
Senator Portman. What concerns me about your answer is it
sounds like you have not been directed to come up with a plan
and, although I agree with you it'll be devastating, just
looking at it on a general level, because it's across-the-
board, I think it would be really helpful to understand better
what the consequences would actually be and whether, as you
indicate, it might result in the United States not meeting some
of our international obligations, because a lot of those lines
of defense you talk about are involving partnerships, including
the source, the border, even the transit.
Ms. Harrington, Secretary Creedon, would you like to
respond to the question about sequestration?
Ms. Creedon. Sir, only to just add from the policy office
perspective. We obviously were very much in support of the
Secretary's development of the strategic guidance for DOD that
was put out in January and, as the Secretary has indicated,
that strategic guidance would not be executable under
sequestration. But the Secretary has not directed us to plan
for sequestration at the moment.
Senator Portman. How about DOE?
Ms. Harrington. That's similarly the case in DOE. We have
not been instructed by the Secretary.
Senator Portman. Thank you all.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Director Myers, as part of the counterproliferation program
legacy DTRA had the principal role in developing the fuse
systems for the MOP that you mentioned in your answer a minute
ago, a bomb that's designed to attack hardened and buried
targets. What's the status of the follow-on efforts in these
weapons and, in particular, being able to defeat or neutralize
biological or chemical weapons facilities?
Mr. Myers. The MOP has been successfully transferred to the
U.S. Air Force. They're carrying out testing of their own at
this time. DTRA is in full support of them in this, but I'm not
aware of the exact way that the Air Force would characterize
the status of the MOP at this time.
I know we believe that when we transferred it over to the
Air Force it was in good condition, and I think that they're
continuing ways to improve it and improve performance.
Senator Hagan. When did that transfer take place again?
Mr. Myers. It was 9 to 12 months ago.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Deputy Administrator Harrington, the MOX fuel program has
been under way since 1999 and, according to GAO, we've spent
over $6 billion to date on the program, $5 billion in
construction and another $1 billion in research. I understand
its importance from a nonproliferation perspective, but I
question in hindsight if there was a more cost-effective means
for the taxpayers to dispose of the excess weapons-grade
plutonium.
I want to have a series of questions about this. What's the
status of obtaining a reactor operator who will use the MOX
fuel and has the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted a
license for this new form of fuel?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you for your question. The MOX
program--and I think you appropriately characterized it--a lot
of times people get distracted by one facility or the other. It
is a capability to dispose of U.S. excess weapons plutonium,
and there are several components to that capability. In terms
of the operator, of course we need to have a customer. We have
been working closely with the nuclear industry for a number of
years on this, and currently specifically we are working with
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). We have very regular
interactions with them and they are studying the technical and
regulatory requirements associated with irradiating MOX fuel in
five of their reactors.
The current schedule with TVA is to execute the fuel supply
agreement for MOX fuel in 2013, after the NNSA completes a
supplemental environmental impact statement, in which TVA is a
cooperating agency, so we're working extremely closely together
on this.
In addition, we have ongoing conversations with a variety
of fuel fabricators regarding the option of having them market
MOX fuel to their utility customers. In some cases, the fuel
fabricators are coming to us with interest, not us reaching out
to them. So it has been interesting to see that as the project
progresses, the interest in the commercial sector also has been
increasing.
We also are developing other strategies to engage
commercial customers. I think we are confident that when the
fuel fabrication plant comes on line there will be customers
ready to use the fuel.
In terms of the NRC, we also are working very closely with
them on the licensing aspects of the MOX. The whole process
takes about 30 months and a variety of technical papers need to
be submitted by Areva in order for that review to take place.
Areva plans to submit these licensing topical reports in the
2013 to 2014 timeframe to allow enough time for NRC review and
then that should mesh with the target production date.
So right now we see these two tracks going on in parallel,
but timing to meet the targeted production dates.
Senator Hagan. I understand that last year NNSA cancelled
the facility that will supply the plutonium feedstock to the
fuel assembly building, and I commented on this in my opening
remarks. But in our fiscal year 2013 authorization bill this
committee asked NNSA to supply a long-term plan for the life of
the program on facilities and costs you will incur to obtain
the plutonium feedstock.
Do you see any issue with meeting our December 31, 2012,
deadline?
Ms. Harrington. Senator, I do not. I am very confident that
we can provide a plan that is credible and that will indeed
provide the stable and necessary feedstock for the facility. I
have been very intimately involved in this particular element
of the project. I have been out and gone through the facility
at Los Alamos. We've had detailed discussions with our
colleagues in Defense Programs, because we, in fact, would be
sharing capabilities within a facility at Los Alamos. Not only
does that not cause a problem, it helps both of us preserve a
plutonium capability for the United States that we need for
both programs, that without our interaction on the MOX project
would be very difficult to preserve.
In addition, we are building up a feedstock in South
Carolina of MOX, of the actual oxide, plutonium oxide, that is
ready to go into the plant now. We have more than four tons and
by the time the plant actually goes into cold startup or warm
startup, we'll probably have about 10 of the 34 tons already
there on site ready to use.
Senator Hagan. When will that be?
Ms. Harrington. Right now we're looking at 2016. But if we
are at that point, and I think we can be, even before 2016, I
see no reason why we can't be fully confident that the
feedstock issue is behind us.
Senator Hagan. Did you say you'll be getting it from South
Carolina?
Ms. Harrington. We already have the 4 tons there, and we
are working with our colleagues in the Environmental Management
side of DOE on how to clean up some of the additional material
there, which has the double benefit of reducing the amount that
we need to put into waste, long-term waste, and upping the
amount that we have available for the MOX plant. So it's a win-
win situation for us.
Senator Hagan. I understand that the main fuel fabrication
building, which is under construction, will have its cost and
schedule baseline revised this summer. Is that correct? If it
is revised, will you be obtaining an independent cost estimate
(ICE)?
Ms. Harrington. We are in the process right now of
evaluating the cost and schedule impacts associated with a
number of the cost pressures and challenges that I think we've
spoken to this subcommittee about before. We are, as part of
this evaluation of a possible baseline change, we will
definitely obtain an ICE.
Senator Hagan. Do you have any idea now as to the impact of
that change of the baseline?
Ms. Harrington. There are several elements that are being
considered in a comprehensive review, which also includes the
possibility of putting a furnace inside the MOX plant that will
turn the plutonium metal into oxide as part of the feedstock
program. So there are a lot of moving parts in this analysis
right now.
Senator Hagan. Is that being done anywhere else in the
world?
Ms. Harrington. Yes. It, in fact, was a solution that was
proposed to us by Areva, which controls the technology for the
plant. It's something that we've reviewed with them in great
technical detail, and the analysis is that, yes, this is
something that's compatible with the approach at the reference
plant.
Senator Hagan. Is it being done currently?
Ms. Harrington. In this precise configuration, no.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Director Myers, DTRA and NNSA both have active programs to
develop radiation detection systems. How do you and NNSA
coordinate these programs and budgets, and are there any
differences in how the detectors are used?
Mr. Myers. Thank you, Senator. DTRA and NNSA coordinate
very closely on not only nuclear detection, but all programs
and projects that we have in the nonproliferation and
counterproliferation arena, as well as the arms control arena.
The three of us and other colleagues meet at least on a
quarterly basis, if not more often, just to compare and
contrast what the goals are, where we're headed, the pathway
we're taking, the needs and requirements each of us have within
our own portfolios, and what we're trying to accomplish.
Specifically in the area of nuclear detection, the
scientific expertise that Ms. Harrington has at NNSA and the
scientific expertise in nuclear detection at DTRA get together
even more often than we do within the bridge meetings. They
have a slightly odd sense of humor. They consider themselves
the ``trolls'' because they're under the bridge. They are
constantly working together.
I would point out, Ms. Creedon said earlier today about
NNSA, DOD policy, DTRA, and other elements working together
last week in Moscow. We had an executive review of the Nunn-
Lugar program in Moscow. It is to the point in the relationship
between the organizations, it would almost be unthinkable for
DTRA and OSD policy to go to that executive review without our
colleagues from NNSA joining us to ensure that we don't have
any overlaps, that we don't have any gaps, that there is no
duplication in our efforts, not only on domestic programs like
you laid out in nuclear detection, but also our international
efforts, to ensure that we are a united front and that we have
one policy that is covering the entire waterfront with regard
in this case to the Russians.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ms. Harrington, a major element of your portfolio is
converting reactors here and abroad from highly-enriched
uranium to the low-enriched uranium, and as a part of that
effort to develop a domestic supply of medical isotopes using
low-enriched uranium, called molybdenum-99.
Can you please explain the vendors you're working with in
the United States to develop a domestic supply of these medical
isotopes, and when do you expect it to be commercially
available here in the United States?
Ms. Harrington. Thank you for raising a very important part
of our mission, Senator. The reason that we are so interested
in this area is that traditionally moly-99 has been produced in
many places around the world using highly-enriched uranium and,
we are firmly committed to reducing and to the extent
eliminating the use of highly-enriched uranium in civilian use.
So when we reached out to the U.S. commercial community and
asked for expressions of interest by U.S. companies in working
with us to develop a domestic capability, we were very pleased
when Babcock and Wilcox, GE-Hitachi, Northstar Medical
Radioisotopes, and Morgridge Institute for Research responded
positively and submitted proposals which we have been working
on collaboratively with them since then.
The whole idea is to accelerate the production of a viable
technology for moly-99 use in the United States in 2016. That
is our target date.
Senator Hagan. I understand that Russia still supplies this
isotope using the highly-enriched uranium. What are you doing
to help them make this medical isotope from the low-enriched
uranium? Is our medical isotope industry supportive of your
efforts? I appreciate the comments on the companies.
Ms. Harrington. In terms of Russia, we have reached a
point, I think, of breakthrough with them in terms of their
commitment to begin converting their research reactors to low-
enriched uranium. We engaged in a series of studies on six of
their reactors. Four of those studies are now complete. Two
will be in the coming months.
The initial conclusions are that one reactor can be
converted immediately. A second probably can be converted over
the next 18 to 24 months. The Russians have informed us that
they intend to proceed, are looking to us to work with them
technically to accomplish this. That will lead ultimately to
their commitment, which they have made, to convert their
isotope production also to low-enriched uranium.
So after a number of years of trying to move forward on
this, we are extremely excited that finally we are seeing some
concrete progress.
Senator Hagan. Did we use to make this medical isotope in
the United States?
Ms. Harrington. I don't believe we did, but we may have in
the past. I would have to get back to you on that specifically.
[The information referred to follows:]

Yes, Mo-99 was produced in the United States prior to 1989. Chapter
3 of the 2009 National Academy of Sciences study ``Medical Isotope
Production without Highly-Enriched Uranium'' discusses the history of
Mo-99 production in the United States. Following is the excerpt from
Chapter 3, and the entire report can be found at the following URL:
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record--id=12569&page=R1

``PAST PRODUCTION OF Mo-99 IN THE UNITED STATES--Although
there is currently no commercial production of Mo-99 in the
United States, this was not always the case. Prior to 1989,
Cintichem, Inc. produced Mo-99 for the U.S. market using a 5
MWt (megawatt thermal) research reactor located in Tuxedo, NY.
This reactor was shut down when tritium contamination of
surface waters adjacent to the reactor site was confirmed. A
decision to decommission the reactor was subsequently made
after a risk-benefit study carried out by Cintichem's parent
company, Hoffman-LaRoche, determined that its continued
operation was not justified. Cintichem offered to arrange a
long-term supply agreement with the other North American
supplier, the Canadian company Nordion (later MDS Nordion), to
supply Mo-99 to U.S. technetium generator manufacturers
(Amersham [now GE Healthcare], Mallinckrodt, and DuPont).''

Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Assistant Secretary Creedon, the interagency coordination
of the CTR programs, especially the biological engagement
programs, has been an area that Congress and GAO continue to
monitor. Explain, please, how you vet these programs across the
interagency community, especially with the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) and the Department of Agriculture?
Ms. Creedon. There's an interagency process that is led by
the White House staff where a lot of these topics come for
discussion, and in the normal process of working out, as I
mentioned earlier, with respect to the various countries where
we engage with the agreements, we bring in these other
countries. So for instance, one of the long-term goals of these
programs is to make sure that the various facilities that we
establish are sustainable and that they become part of the
World Health Organization, they comply with those standards.
CDC will become a key part of that.
I mentioned some of the work that we've done in some of the
countries of the former Soviet Union. One of those is also
Georgia, which I hadn't mentioned earlier. Georgia also has a
laboratory that's a very nice laboratory--it meets all current
standards--that the CTR program has built, and we're now
transitioning to operation by the Georgians. Their equivalent
of the CDC is going to work with them, as is our CDC is also
going to have a presence there.
So this lab is actually turning into, and will turn into
over time, a regional center with both Georgian health effects
people and the international and the CDC. So in all of these
efforts, we're trying to bring our CDC in, because that's
really the key, is the involvement of the CDC to the long-term
sustainment and the ability of these countries to sustain these
labs in the long-term so that CTR isn't the source of the
sustainment funding forever.
Senator Hagan. How about the Department of Agriculture?
Ms. Creedon. The same is true on the veterinary side. So
that's the human health side, so on the veterinary side we work
pretty closely with our U.S. Department of Agriculture to make
sure that we're coordinated with them on the security and
cooperation and to the extent that we can we work with their
labs as well. Their laboratory structure is obviously different
from the CDC, but we coordinate with both of them.
Mr. Myers. Senator, if I might add a quick comment,
Secretary Creedon very accurately described the interagency
process here in Washington. The element that I would like to
add to that is that the DTRA work, the Nunn-Lugar program
efforts and the DTRA personnel that are working in these
countries are part of an embassy team, and they are working
side-by-side with colleagues from the CDC or the Department of
Agriculture or Department of Health and Human Services. They're
bringing together consolidated strategies.
Obviously, DOD, we have a skill set that we bring to the
table in terms of the security and the safety and a lot of the
disease surveillance. But our colleagues from these other
departments and agencies in many cases have been on the
continent or in this area longer than we have. We're trying to
learn those lessons that they've learned over 30 or 40 years
from them, so we don't have to learn them ourselves. Being a
part of that team, doing it together in full coordination,
allows us to skip ahead an awful lot down the path in terms of
understanding and in terms of building those kind of relations
and ensuring that when we approach a foreign government entity,
whether it be a department of health or a Department of
Agriculture, we do it on a consolidated front across, so it's
one U.S. Government position.
This is developing extremely well. Just in the last 12 to
18 months, one sees real huge strides, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa. I think it's something we'll continue to see
improve.
Senator Hagan. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I have a couple questions that maybe we can go into further
during closed session. But one is about Syria. I was over in
the region last week and heard a lot about it publicly and a
lot of discussions about their chemical and biological weapons
stockpile. I'm looking here at a Reuters story which was from
last month, but talks very openly about the concern. This
Reuters story says what we have heard, which is that many
countries, including the United States, believe that this may
be the world's largest remaining stockpile of undeclared
chemical weapons, and obviously with the unrest and instability
in that country and that part of the world, it's a major
concern.
The first question is, what is your assessment of the size
and the composition of the chemical and biological weapons
stockpile in Syria? Second, of course, should the Assad regime
fall, are you confident that a plan is in place to help secure
these deadly materials? I'll leave it open to all three.
Ms. Creedon. Syria does have a substantial stockpile of
chemical weapons at the moment, at a variety of locations
across the country. We believe these weapons are secure at the
moment, and it would be an understatement to say we worry about
them a lot and we think about them a lot. Like DOD does in all
circumstances, we think about options that might be developed
to deal with them.
Senator Portman. Mr. Myers, anything to add?
Mr. Myers. Senator, I'd prefer to address the issue in the
closed session if that's all right with you.
Senator Portman. That's fine with me. I just wanted to give
you a chance in the public session to respond to the question,
and I think you have.
Since you were talking about low-enriched uranium and
medical isotopes, I'd like to talk about the more general issue
of national security requirements for enriched uranium. I have
a document here from NNSA regarding that. In fiscal year 2013
your budget request includes $150 million for domestic uranium
enrichment R&D. Due to certain treaty obligations, we need U.S.
origin and unobligated uranium to support certain national
security missions, such as producing tritium for our nuclear
weapons stockpile. It's my understanding that this R&D effort
is the only planned technology capability that can fulfill
those requirements.
In addition, this effort will allow NNSA to better
understand uranium enrichment technologies to support
nonproliferation by discouraging the unnecessary spread of
enrichment technology, by having a source, an alternate source
that the United States can provide at a reasonable cost and a
reliable way.
I think it also increases confidence in the international
commercial enrichment market and improves the ability to detect
proliferant programs. Then finally, it produces the necessary
tritium.
Ms. Harrington, maybe you're the right person to answer
this question; can you explain what the administration means
when it says U.S. origin, unobligated uranium and why the
United States has this requirement?
Ms. Harrington. I wish I had my team of lawyers here, but I
think I can answer your question. We engage other countries in
nuclear commerce and nuclear cooperation under the general
article of the nonproliferation Treaty on Peaceful Uses. Under
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it is very specific that
when you do engage in that kind of cooperation, it is
exclusively for peaceful uses. So under the Atomic Energy Act
we have the ability, under the negotiating leadership of DOS,
to negotiate and conclude what we call 123 agreements.
Those agreements allow us to engage in nuclear commerce and
for countries to come to the United States and establish
facilities for uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, et cetera.
So it's all part of both our commitment under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty as well as our commitments under
bilateral peaceful uses agreements.
When we look at our needs for national security, production
of tritium for our weapons or the production of the highly-
enriched uranium that's needed for our naval nuclear propulsion
systems, that material cannot come from facilities that were
established in the United States either using foreign
technology, which is covered under the peaceful uses
requirement, or a foreign-owned facility.
So that means that we have to have what we call an
unencumbered U.S. origin source of material. That is absolutely
critical from our perspective to sustain the long-term
viability of our nuclear stockpile, as well as our nuclear
Navy.
That is why this particular issue is so important and why
we have this particular piece of funding in our budget for next
year.
Senator Portman. By the way, Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman
has been terrific in my view at pointing out this requirement,
and also emphasizing the need to have a source as the
administration gets even more aggressive in nonproliferation
efforts. I heard recently the President say that in his second
term, should he be reelected, he intends this to be one of his
top priorities, and we'll need to have the ability to tell
countries that would like to pursue this technology that they
don't need to have an enrichment capability because we can
provide it, but we need to have a secure means of doing so.
Would you agree with that?
Ms. Harrington. I do agree with that. We invest a lot of
our diplomatic capital trying to persuade countries that they
do not need to establish enrichment or reprocessing
capabilities, in part because it doesn't make economic sense
unless you have a very large suite of reactors. It's also part
of the global concept that is beginning to gain real traction
on comprehensive fuel services, that if a country offers to
build a reactor it can offer at the same time to provide the
fuel and take it back, so the customer doesn't have to deal
with some of the messier parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.
It makes it more difficult for us to persuade countries to
go down that path if we can't offer some of those services
ourselves. At this point we really don't.
If we are successful in this R&D project, we could serve
nonproliferation and national security in two senses: one, to
be able to meet our own domestic needs for defense; but also to
then, if we have a competitive commercial technology, to be
able to, as you very correctly pointed out, be able to compete
on the global stage and reduce the need for countries to
develop the capabilities themselves.
Senator Portman. That's well put. As you said, we don't
have that capability now because both for the requirement you
talked about, which is the U.S. origin unobligated uranium, and
also to be able to encourage more countries not to go down the
road of enrichment, we need to have a U.S. source that's
reliable and one that has technology that can be competitive.
The Paducah gaseous diffusion plant is the only current
operable enrichment plant that meets the domestic requirements
currently, isn't that accurate?
Ms. Harrington. That is true.
Senator Portman. They've just been given another year to
operate. But with that very dated technology, the gaseous
diffusion technology, as opposed to the centrifuge technology,
which is very energy inefficient, among other things, that
certainly is not our long-term solution. So I agree with you
that the R&D effort is important.
I guess what I would ask you is, can you tell me if there
are any other planned new enrichment capabilities deployable in
the near future that can meet the requirements that you spoke
about previously, other than the R&D?
Ms. Harrington. Not that I'm aware of, no.
Senator Portman. I would appreciate it if you could outline
DOE's strategy for meeting the national security mission
obligations following the end of the R&D effort, which will be
in fiscal year 2013, and elaborate more on why you believe this
effort is so important going forward? In other words, after the
R&D what comes next?
Ms. Harrington. At the end of the R&D program what we hope
we will have in hand is a sufficient proof of principle and
pilot operation that would allow the commercialization of the
technology. That is not necessarily something that is DOE's
responsibility. That would be something that we would look to
the private sector to be very involved in.
But we do think it's worth another year of investment in a
technology that we believe is promising and could have
commercial potential to see if we can prove that principle.
Senator Portman. I appreciate your testimony today and I
would just make the obvious point that over 3\1/2\ years into
the loan guarantee program, it seems to me we need to move
forward on a longer-term solution, as you have indicated how
important that is to our national security, as well as our
nonproliferation efforts. I would hope that you and your
colleagues would continue to promote this effort, including
encouraging my former Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
understand the significant issues you've raised today, because
those are difficult to take into account under their current
methodology when they come up with a credit subsidy, and I
think that's been one of the issues with regard to the loan
guarantee not going forward to provide the necessary, as you
said, source of U.S. origin unobligated uranium.
So I would thank you, Ms. Harrington, for your efforts
already and hope that you would continue to work with us on
that effort.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harrington. Thank you, and we would be happy to work
with you and draw on your OMB experience any time.
Senator Portman. I hope you'll have better luck than I've
had. [Laughter.]
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Senator Portman.
To our witnesses today, thank you so much for your
testimony. I would like to adjourn this meeting and then let us
reconvene almost immediately, at least by 4 p.m., for the
closed session.
Thank you all again. This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

METRICS FOR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

1. Senator Hagan. Secretary Creedon, Congress has worked with your
office over the past 3 years on developing program metrics to ensure
the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has clear goals and end-
states to ensure each program in a particular country has a transition
path out once the program has met those goals. Do you support the
objectives of developing such program metrics?
Ms. Creedon. Yes. I agree with the need to establish durable
metrics that can account for dynamic changes in the operating
environment and new technologies (particularly for the capacity-
building program elements), and to support the sustainment and
transition of the program to the partner country.

2. Senator Hagan. Secretary Creedon, in this year's authorization
bill, this committee directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to
include metrics in the CTR annual report and to identify the transition
path for a program once it is completed. Do you support these
objectives?
Ms. Creedon. Yes. Metrics are an important element to enable any
program to track and report progress, including charting a path to
sustain and/or transfer a program once completed.

STRATEGIC REVIEW OF SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

3. Senator Hagan. Deputy Administrator Harrington, your testimony
states that for fiscal year 2013 the ``National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has initiated a strategic review of the second
line of defense (SLD) program to evaluate what combinations and
programs make the most effective contributions to national security.''
Can you please describe this review and who is participating in it?
Ms. Harrington. The review is well underway and is being supported
by subject matter experts in the Federal Government, at the national
laboratories and in private industry. The SLD Program is utilizing all-
source information to reassess trafficking incidents and adversaries,
the models it uses to prioritize countries and ports, green and blue-
border trafficking vulnerabilities, the detection and deterrence role
of the equipment provided, and how SLD equipment and training fit into
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The NNSA has engaged other
U.S. Government agencies for their opinions on the program and any
improvements they would suggest. In addition, the role of fixed and
mobile systems is being discussed at interagency meetings chaired by
the National Security Staff (NSS), and ideas provided by the NSS and
attending agencies are also being integrated into the recommendations.
The review should be completed in time to impact the fiscal year 2014
budget--probably in August or September 2012.

4. Senator Hagan. Deputy Administrator Harrington, when completed,
can you share the review with this committee so we can understand its
implications on future budget submissions?
Ms. Harrington. NNSA is willing to brief the subcommittee at the
time that the strategic review is completed, or before, if you wish.

BIO-SURVEILLANCE NETWORK

5. Senator Hagan. Secretary Creedon, there has been concern about
the ability of the CTR's bio-surveillance network, which is carried out
as part of the cooperative biological engagement program, to monitor
the development of dangerous pathogens by countries that do not fully
participate with the network or by non-state actors and groups who
might be able to circumvent such a network. Can you please explain what
this bio-surveillance network is and how it works with other U.S. and
international agencies?
Ms. Creedon. DOD participates in bio-surveillance as part of a
larger U.S. Government biodefense effort. DOD's strategic approach,
however, does not promote undertaking Cooperative Biological Engagement
Program (CBEP) work on a global scale, and DOD does not intend to build
a global biological surveillance network through the CBEP. DOD has
taken a deliberate, sequenced, and measured approach to expanding our
biological engagement while maintaining sustainability, focusing on
building cooperative partners' national capacities for accurate and
timely bio-surveillance, and encouraging broader regional cooperation
and transparency. We continue to ensure that our investments are
complementary on regional and global levels to increase information
sharing where possible. However, DOD invests in high-priority areas,
and we measure the success of these investments against their threat
reduction performance at the local and regional levels. All of these
individual efforts are developed with a view towards supporting broader
international efforts to improve information sharing among all relevant
countries and regions.
DOD and the CTR program, through the CBEP, partner with health and
security experts and other elements of the U.S. Government and
international community to ensure that health security risks are
mitigated. The program works in a variety of ways to reduce the risk of
biological weapons development and use, and it also works with partner
countries to strengthen capabilities to detect, diagnose, investigate,
and report infectious disease outbreaks anywhere in the world. In
addition, the CTR program supports broader U.S. Government efforts to
encourage rapid response to contain and eliminate the cause of such
outbreaks.

6. Senator Hagan. Secretary Creedon, do you think this network has
vulnerabilities associated with these concerns, and if so, what are you
doing to correct them?
Ms. Creedon. DOD does not intend to build a global biological
surveillance network through the CBEP. DOD participates in bio-
surveillance as part of a larger U.S. Government biodefense effort with
a focus on sustainability, building cooperative partners' national
capacities, and encouraging broader regional cooperation and
transparency. This CBEP effort must take into account select agents and
other specific biological-related threats while other agencies are
focused on protecting the public from infectious disease outbreaks.
Although the security mission and the public health mission are not
identical, the U.S. Government's national security entities--including
the Departments of State and Defense--work in concert with the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Commerce,
Energy, and Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, and a wide range of
international and nongovernmental partners to address problems that are
of shared concern. DOD has regular dialogue with its interagency
partners and international organizations to ensure that we are building
safe, secure capacity that is capable of mitigating and warning of
critical biological events that could affect U.S. national security,
and that we are doing so in ways that are harmonized and coordinated
with broader bilateral and multilateral relationships with CTR program
partners.

7. Senator Hagan. Secretary Creedon, will the CTR program maintain
this network over the long-term or will other health monitoring
agencies sustain it?
Ms. Creedon. DOD does not intend to build a global biological
surveillance network through the CBEP. DOD participates in bio-
surveillance as part of a larger U.S. Government biodefense effort with
a focus on sustainability, building cooperative partners' national
capacities, and encouraging broader regional cooperation and
transparency. Through this effort, the CBEP contributes substantial
time and energy into establishing a unified voice within the U.S.
Government that focuses on improving bio-surveillance. DOD has found
ample opportunity for a shared commitment to strengthen cooperation to
ensure that we effectively manage global and regional health risks
through collaboration.

TECHNICAL SKILLS AND SOPHISTICATION IN NEW REGIONS

8. Senator Hagan. Director Myers, the CTR program in Russia and the
former Soviet states concentrated on protecting nuclear assets and
biological research laboratories all relying on a high degree of
technological sophistication. As the CTR program transitions to
Southeast Asia and Africa, are you able to use the same skill mix of
people, training, and equipment, or do you have to retool for these new
regions, and will you need the same level of technical sophistication?
Mr. Myers. In order to effectively team with new partners in
Southeast Asia and Africa, we need to first understand the unique needs
and capabilities of each partner state. A key lesson we have learned is
the need for varying levels of equipment and training within each
partner at the various laboratories at the national and local levels.
In some cases, the same equipment used in our programs in the former
Soviet Union generally works at the national level labs with our new
partners. Our goal at this level is to enable these partners to sustain
this sophisticated equipment over the long-term. We expect that we may
encounter situations where less complex and costly technology should be
used to increase capability in bio-surveillance. Moving beyond national
labs into regional or rural labs presents new, but manageable changes.
Since we do not expect these facilities to have access to the same
utility infrastructure and educational opportunities as the urban
locations, we have to change or, as you put it, retool our approach.
With our interagency partners we have identified more sustainable
approaches to develop the human and technical capacity to safely detect
and report dangerous diseases. In some cases, even simpler technology
cannot be sustained. So, we work with the host nation to develop
alternative ways to detect and report outbreaks. We are finding ways to
provide the right level of technology that works best for each
individual partner state. In addition to taking a closer look at
technology, we examined the expertise of our people as we transition to
new locations. We have added more biological and regional expertise to
our Nunn-Lugar work force to address these evolving threats in new
regions around the world.

CTR AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

9. Senator Hagan. Secretary Creedon, the current CTR agreement for
activities with Russia is set to expire in June 2013. Are there any
issues or concerns at the present time that Congress should be aware of
related to its renewal?
Ms. Creedon. In Russia, the CTR program has a very successful
legacy of developing the institutions, industries, and culture needed
to secure and eliminate WMD and related technologies. Now that Russia
has become a relatively wealthy nation, the CTR program is shifting its
focus to cooperative activities designed to increase Russia's capacity
to continue developing, sustaining, and upgrading those improvements
with organic resources.
Under this concept, the cost and scale of the CTR program's
proposed activities in Russia will be much lower than in years past.
But DOD believes that our continued engagement with Russia will be very
valuable in securing and eliminating WMD and related technology, and
that to continue this will require extending or renewing the CTR
agreement with Russia. To this end, the United States is proposing to
the Government of Russia that the U.S.-Russia CTR agreement be
extended, which would also cover existing program work.

PROGRAM TRANSITION

10. Senator Hagan. Deputy Administrator Harrington, for fiscal year
2013, the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) has
been phased out and replaced by the Global Security through Science
Partnership (GSSP) program. Can you please explain why the prior
program was phased out and how this new program differs and why it is
important?
Ms. Harrington. In 2010, NNSA completed an all-source assessment of
the expertise proliferation threat, including an extensive intelligence
component. The assessment concluded that there is a significant WMD
expertise proliferation threat that is no longer limited to expertise
acquired by direct involvement in weapons programs, and that the threat
is exacerbated by the increasing global availability of weapons-usable
information and knowledge. The report concluded that a global scientist
engagement program could help mitigate the evolving threat of WMD
expertise proliferation and that the GIPP program should be reoriented
to address this threat. Taking into account the recommendations of the
reassessment, NNSA is planning to restructure its approach to scientist
engagement in 2013 through a renamed activity, the GSSP program.
Working through GSSP, NNSA will address the expanding threat of WMD
expertise proliferation by: (1) refocusing and retargeting efforts
geographically; (2) emphasizing engagements that build sustainable
partnerships rather than providing assistance; and (3) using a whole-
of-government approach that leverages complementary NNSA and U.S.
Government resources.
The GSSP program will focus on creating opportunities for
international partners to share information on scientific best
practices, including the protection of WMD applicable knowledge and
information. Targeted training and capacity-building efforts will be
designed to strengthen scientists' abilities to recognize and stop WMD
expertise proliferation. The promotion of targeted research and
development initiatives also will be emphasized to mitigate the WMD
expertise proliferation threat by fostering transparency and advancing
nonproliferation objectives through scientist-to-scientist cooperation.
NNSA's innovative approach to advancing nonproliferation goals through
global scientist engagement is timely and tailored to an age where
access to WMD-related technical know-how can spread effortlessly
through the internet. The program is finalizing a country
prioritization tool, and will present selected countries for
engagement, along with discrete metrics designed to measure engagement
progress, in July.

GREATEST THREAT CONCERN

11. Senator Hagan. Director Myers, what is your greatest concern in
terms of threats as the CTR program moves from Russia and the former
Soviet states to South East Asia and Africa?
Mr. Myers. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program has been a tremendous success
in the former Soviet Union. By reducing from four to only one nuclear-
successor state, dismantling large portions of the former Soviet
nuclear, biological, and chemical complex, and enabling Russia to
better protect its remaining nuclear weapons against insider and
terrorist threats, we have significantly reduced opportunities for
potential proliferators. On the other hand, terrorists and potential
state proliferators may take advantage of modern information age to
weaponize dangerous, naturally occurring pathogens found in Africa and
Southern Asia. This threat concerns me greatly. The expansion of the
Nunn-Lugar program from the former Soviet Union to these parts of the
world is intended to address this evolving threat. We are working with
partner states in helping them to protect and account for the dangerous
pathogens maintained at national and regional levels as part of their
public health system. DOD works closely with our interagency partners
in Southeast Asia and Africa, where terrorist groups are known to be
active, in order to help the host nation with the security and safety
of their biological laboratories. At relatively small cost, we are
making these laboratories less attractive potential targets for
terrorists who we know want to acquire such pathogens.
We are also better integrating these new partners into regional and
global health surveillance systems. We are also helping countries to
prevent proliferation and the capability to interdict smugglers by
training and equipping key partner agencies such as their coast guard,
border guards, and customs. Preventing terrorists from acquiring
biological weapons and helping the international community improve its
bio-surveillance capabilities are critical investments for our national
security.

UNENCUMBERED ENRICHED URANIUM

12. Senator Hagan. Deputy Administrator Harrington, if fully
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, would General Electric's
separation of isotopes by laser excitation process be considered a
viable source of unencumbered uranium for defense purposes?
Ms. Harrington. No. Enriched uranium produced by General Electric's
separation of isotopes by laser excitation process is not available for
defense purposes. The terms of the Agreement for Cooperation between
the United States of America and Australia Concerning Technology for
the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation provide that
any material produced by this isotopic separation process shall not be
used for any military purpose.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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